C RIMI N A L L A W

R EVIE W E R
VOLUME II
JUDGE MARLO BERMEJO CAMPANILLA
Presiding Judge
Metropolitan T r ia l C o u rt, B r a nch 83
North Caloocan City
AUTHOR:
The Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2007 Edition; Special Penal Laws, Volumes
One to Four; A Handbook on Penalties, 2015 Edition; Dangerous Drugs Law
with Annotation, 2017 Edition; Penal System under the Revised Penal Code
as amended by RA No. 10951, 2018 Edition; BP Blg. 22 and Estafa through
Issuance of Bouncing Check, 2018 Edition; Special Penal Laws, 2019 Edition
and Politics, Governance and Philippine Constitution.
REVIEWER, LECTURER, and PROFESSOR (past and present):
Villasis Law Center; Legal Edge Review Center, University of Cebu Law Center,
Academicus Law Center, Magnificus Jurist Review, CPRS Bar Review Center;
Power House Review Center; IBP, National Office; Chan Robles Professional
Review Inc.; Internet Bar Reviewer on Criminal Law; Suprema Legis Reviews;
Isecure-Philjust Law & B a r R e view Center; Lex Review Center; Sed Lex
Provider, Inc., and Center for Global Best Practices, UP Law Center.
University of Santo Tomas; University of Asia and the Pacific; University of
Cebu — School of Law; De la Salle University; Arellano University; University
of Negros — Recoletos; Manuel L. Q uezon University; Lyceum University;
S an Sebastian College-Recoletos; University o f t h e E a st ; U n i v ersity o f
Manila; Philippine Christian University; New Era University; Bulacan State
University; University of San Carlos; Saint Louis University; University of
the Cordilleras; Xavier University — pteneo de Cagayan; UST, Legazpi City;
University of Northern Phili + iytes';"IIrfiversity of Nueva Caceres; Ateneo De
Naga City University; Jose Rizal Memorial State University; University of
San Jose-Recoletos, Cebu City; University of Iloilo, Iloilo City; University of
Bohol; University of Mindanao; Mindanao State University; Western Mindanao
State University; Northeastern College, Santiago City, Isabela; Tarlac State
University; Notre Dame University; DVOREF; Cagayan State University; Bicol
College, Daraga, Albay; St. Mary's University, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya;
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila; University of Visayas; University of the
Philippines.

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 Philippine Copyright 2019, 2020

by

e~g
MARLO B E R M K J O A M PA N LA

TO
MY FAMILY
N o por t io n o f t h i s b o o k m a y b e c o p i e d o r
reproduced in books, pamphlets, outlines or n otes, (Sarah Nelivie, Tristan Mhar, and Sean Marco)
whether printed, mimeographed, typewritt en, copied
in different electronic devices or in any other form, for
distribution or sale, without the written permission of THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
the author e x cept brief passages in books, articles,
reviews, legal papers, and j u d i cial or o t her official
proceedings with proper citation.

Any copy of this book without the corresponding

number and the signature of the author on this page
either proceeds from an i l l egiti m at e source or is in
possession of one who has no authority to dispose of
the same.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

EIY THE AUTHOR

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 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Judge Marlo Campanilla is an accomplished author, lecturer,

and reviewer in crim i nal law and special penal laws. He is now one
o f the most sought-after regular and pr e-week Bar r eviewer at t h e
University of the Philippines Law Center in D i l i m an , Quezon City,
University of Santo T omas, and Ar el l ano U n i v ersity. H e i s also a
r egular r e v i ewer a t t h e V i l l a si s L a w C e n t er , M a g n i ficus, J u r i st
Review, Legal Edge Review Center, and Academicus Review Center.
His authorship of tw elve books in cr i m i nal l aw , special penal
laws, and the Constitu t ion stands as a testament to his dedication
in th e s t ud y o f t h e l a w a n d h i s d e v otion t o g i v e ba r r e v i ewees,
practitioners, and students of law an insightful reading companion.
His simple and enlightened discourse on complicated criminal
l aw pr ovisions, pr i n ciples, and c a ses earned hi m p r a i ses for i t s
clarity, i n c i sive d i s section, a nd m a st erfu l d i s p la y o f l o g i c a n d
common sense.
T he A u t h o r t a c k l e s t h e l a w s , r ulings, an d p r i n c i p les i n
a ccordance wit h t h e 2 0 2 0 S u p r em e C o ur t s y l l a bu s fo r t h e B a r
E xaminations on C r i m i n a l L a w . F o r t h i s , h e i n c orporates in i t s
d iscussion the evolution of th e leading legal pr i n ciples in cri m i n al
and special penal laws, ascited in actual cases from 1901 to 2019,
the new Terr orism La w (R A N o . 1 1479) t en s p e c ial p e n al l a w s
recently included in the coverage of the Bar Exam such as the
Data Pr i v acy La w an d Safe Space Act a n d a ll Bar Examina tion
Questions dating from 1946 to 2019.
I n t h i s l a t es t e d i t i on , J u d g e C a m p a n i ll a " r a i ses t h e b a r "
of knowledge i n c r i m i n a l l a w s b y h i s s ignature al l i m p o r t a n t
discussions, interpretations and comparative analyses. The book is
a surefire guide to understanding one of the most difficult subjects
in the Bar Examin ations.

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 CONTENTS

C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R

BOOK TWO

I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECUR ITY

AND LAW OF NATIONS

TREASON
1
Filipino Citizen and Resident Alien
Levying War, and Giving Aid and Comfort ..
Aggravating Circumstances 22
3
Two-witness Rule .
PROP O SAL OR CON SPIRACY TO COM M IT TREA SON ...
Appointment
Membership 5
4
Doctrine of Absorption
1 Pr op o s al
2. Co n s p iracy
3. Tr e a s on
Offenders
Peacetime and Wartime Crime. 6

MISPRISION OF TREASO N
Misprision of other crime. 8
7
Filipino citizen as offender in misprision of treason...
Concealment or non-disclosure of conspiracy to
comm1t treason.
Concealment or non-disclosure of treason 8
Concealment or non-disclosure of intent to commit
treason..
ESPIONAGE ..
INCITING TO WAR OR GIVING MOTIVES FOR REPRISAL...... 10
VIOLATION OF NEUT R A L ITY 10
CORR E S P O N D E N C E W ITH HO STILE COUN T R Y.... 10

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 F LIGHT TO ENEM Y'S COUN T R Y .
Terrorist act 27
PIRACY Terroristorganization. 29
Terrorist 29
ANTI-PIRACY LAW P.D. NO. 532
Piracy under the Revised Penal Code and Piracy under DEALING WITH PRO P E R T Y OF DESIGNA TED PER SON ... 29
P.D. No. 582 12 CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT TERRORISM, FINANCING
1. Cr i m i n a l Act
O F TERRO R ISM, OR DEALING WITH PRO P E R T Y
2. Mo d e of Commission
O F DESIGNATED PER S O N . 31
8. Off e n der
4. V e s s el ATTEM P T TO COM M IT FINANCING OF TERR O R ISM
5. Pl a c e of Commission O R DEALING WITH PRO P E R TY OF DESIGNAT E D
6. Qualifying Circumstance PERSON 31
MUTINY A CC O M P L ICE AND ACCE S S O R Y
17
ANTIHI JACKING LAW R.A. NO. 6235. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT OF 2001 (RA NO. 9160) ..... 33
17
Philippine Aircraft.
17 C RIME OF MO NEY LAU N D E R I N G . 34
Foreign Aircraft
18 Monetary instrument 34
Qualified Hijacking 18 Unlawful activity 34
THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 2020 R.A. NO. 11479 .........
19 A TTEM P T E D M O N E Y LA U N D E R I N G . 38
Intent to intimidate the general public.
20
Intimidate the government or international government..... 20 CONSPIRACY TO COM M IT M O N E Y LAU N D E R I N G..... 39
Destroying fundamental political, economic,
or socialstructures . AIDING, ABETTING, OR ASSISTING IN, OR COUNSELING
21 OR FACILITATION OF, THE COMM I SSION OF
Creating a public emergency or seriously undermine
publicsafety MO N E Y LAU N D E R ING .
22
Terrorism is committed regardless of stage of execution...... FAILURE TO REPORT.
22 89
Exclusionary proviso Covered persons.
22 89
P LANNING, TRAINING, PREPARING, AND FACILITATIN G Covered transaction 41
THE COM M I SSION OF TERR O R ISM . Suspicious transaction . 42
22
CONSPIRACY, PROPOSAL, AND INCITING I I. CRIMES AGAINST THE FUND A M E N T A L LAW S
TO COMMIT TERRORISM. 23 OF THE STATE
PROVIDING MA T E R IAL SUPP OR T TO TERR O R ISTS ...
23
R ECRU ITM E N T TO AND M E M B E R S H I P ARBITRARY DETENTION 44
IN A TERRORIST ORGAN I ZATION . D ETEN T ION WITH OU T LEGAL GR O U N D S 44
24
FOREIGN TERRORIST In Pursuit of Duty to Arrest 44
25 Legal Grounds for Detention 45
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10168. 1. L aw f u l Warrantless Arrest
26
2. Pr o b a ble Cause
THE TERR O R ISM FINANC ING PREV E N T ION AND
SUPPRESSION ACT OF 2012 (RA NO. 10168) ........ DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PER S O N S..... 46
26
Legally Arrested . 46
F INANCING OF TERR O R I SM .
26 Period to Make Judicial Delivery. 47
Criminal Act
26 Delivery to Judicial Authorities ....................... 47
Means........................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
26 Waiver of Right 48
Intent or Knowledge.
27 Distinct Crimes. 48
Use of property or service
27 Period of Detention (R.A. No. 11479 49

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 DELAYING RELEASE . 50 The law on inciting to sedition is constitutional.................
Proposal tocommit rebellion or terrorism, and
EXPULSION. 50 inc'ting to commit rebellion, sedition or terrorism ... 72
VIOLATION OF DOMICILE .. 50 Cyber inciting to rebellion or sedition. 72
Public Officer 51 Incited audience . 73
Unlawful Entry 51 Intent to commit rebellion, terrorism, or sedition .............. 73
1. Implied Prohibition
2. Owner of the Dwelling UNLAWFUL UTTERANCE 74
Unlawful Search. 52 UNLA W F U L USE OF MEANS OF PUBLICATION .... 74
Refusal to Leave. 52
LAWS ON LOOSE FIREARM R.A. NO. 10591 ......... 76
OBTAINING AND SERVING SEARCH W A R R A N T .... 58 Locse Firearm 76
Possession of Loose Firearm. 76
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER Possession of Loose Firearm and Other Crime..... 78
Aggravating Circumstance 79
REBELLION. 54 Doctrine of Absorption 80
Insurrection . 54 LAWS ON EXPLOSIVES.. 80
Removing the territory of the Philippines ................. 54
Deprivation ofexecutive power 55 P.D. NO 1866 ASAMENDED BY R.A. iNO. 9516 ................. . . . . . 80
Rebellion and Treason 55 Crime Involving Explosive. 81
Doctrine of Absorption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56 Presumed. Knowledge. 81
Declaration of Martial Law.. 57 Animus Possidendi 81
Terrorism and Rebellion or Coup d' etat 58 Qualifying Circumstance of Commission of Other Crime..... 81
1. Ob j e ctives in Rebellion and Terrorism Terrorism and Possession of Loose Firearm or explosive ..... 83
2. N on - M u t ually exclusive crimes
DISLOYALTY OF PUBLIC OFFICER
COUP D' ETAT 59
Swift Attack by Military Men . ILLEGAL ASSEM B L IES 88
.
59
Leader Illegal Assembly Organized —.o Incite . 83
60
Rebellion and Coup d' etat. 1. A u d i e nce Is Incited. 84
60
Doctrine of Absorption . 2. L i a b i l ity of Audience .. 84
61
Illegal Assembly Organized —.o Commit a Felony ... 85
PROPO SAL OR CON SPIRACY TO COM M IT REBE L LION
OR COUP D' ETAT ILLEGAL ASSOCIATION. 85
61
Illegal Association and Illegal Assembly . 85
SEDITION. 61 Membership in CPP . 86
Rebellion and Sedition. 62 Membership in an association. 86
Doctrine of Absorption . 64
INTERRUPTION, PROHIBITI ON, OR DISSOLUTION
CONSPIRACY TO COM M IT SEDITION . 64 OF PEACEFUL M E E T ING 88
INCITING TO REBELLION 66 INTERR U P T ION OF RELIGIOUS WO R S H IP .. . . .
89
Inciting to commit terrorism.. 66 Public Officer 89
Religious Ceremony or Manifestation. 89
INCITING TO SEDITION 66
Freedom of Expression. 67 OFFEND ING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS 90
Inciting to Rise Publicly. 68 Offender 90
Dangerous Tendency Test. 69 Place of Commission. 90
1. S e d i t ious Speech Notoriously Offensive to Rel gious Feelings ... 90
2. Se d i t i ous Words
8. Scu r r i l ous Libel Against the Government ALARM AND SCANDAL .. 92
4. Con c e alment of Evil Practice

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 DISTURB A N C E OF PUBLIC ORDER .... 92 Evasion of Service of Sentence, Infidelity in the Custody
DIRECT ASSAULT of Prisoner and Delivery of Prison r from Jail ........... 118
93
I. Fi r s t m o de 1. Off e n d er
93
II. S e c ond mode. 2. Pr i s o n ers
94
Offender in direct assault 3. Do l o or Culpa
94
Victim of direct assault. 4. Sen t e n ce
94
1. Pe r s on in Authority ESCAPE OF PRISONER UN D E R CU S T O D Y OF
2. A ge n t of a Person in Authority PRIVATE PERSON 120
Performance of duty. 98
1. Whi l e Engaged in the Performance of Duty EVASION ON OCCASION OF CALAM ITY 120
2. On O c casion of Performance of Duty V IOLATION OF COND ITIONAL PAR D O N . 121
Criminal act 100
1. Re s i stance IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
2. I nti m i d ation
3. At ta c k ing or employment of force FORG E R Y OF GREAT SEAL, SIGNATURE, OR STAMP..... 122
4. L ay i n g of hands upon a person in authority
Complex Crime FORG ERY AND M U T ILATION OF COINS . 122
104
INDIRECT ASSAULT F ORG E R Y INVOLVING BANE NO T E S, TREASUR Y
105
Aiding a Person in Authority N OTES, OR OTHER INSTRU M E N T S . 122
105
Aiding a person in authority and his Agent 107 F ALSIFICATION OF DOC U M E N T 124
SIMPLE RESISTANCE . Document 124
107
Resisting Arrest......... 1. Pub l i c Document
108
Lawful Resisting. 2. Offi c i al Document
108
3. Co m m ercial Document
DISOBEDIENCE . 109 4. Pr iv a t e Document
Community quarantineorder 110 Acts of Falsification. 126
D ISOBEDIENCE TO SUM M O N S . 1. Co u n t erfeiting (Imitating) or Feigning
2. Cau s i n g the Appearance of One's Participation
PREVE N T ING LEGISLATIVE MEETING 3. A tt r i b u t ion of a Different Statement
DISTURB A N C E OF LEGISLATIVE PROC E E D ING . 4. M aki n g U n t r u t hful Statement
. . . .

Third Element of Falsification.. 133

VIOLATION OF PARLIAM E N T A R Y IM M U N I T Y..... a. Tak i n g Advantage of Position 134
b. Ci v i l St atus.....................
. . . . . . . . . .
134
E VASION OF SERVICE OF SENTEN C E . 112 c. Dam a ge or Prejudice to Third Person..
Sentence by Final Judgment ................
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
134
.
112
Deprivation of Liberty. 113 USE O F FALSIFIED DOCUM E N T 136
Qualifying Circumstance . 114 INSTRU M E N T S FOR FALSIFICATION 137
Continuing Crime. . . . . ..... 115
FALSE TESTIMONY AND PER JURY 138
DELIVERY OF PRISONERS FROM JAIL 115 Perjury and Falsification of Document 138
Substitution 115 Contradictory Sworn Statements ........... 140
Furnishing Weapon. 116 Oath Is Required by Law 140
Outside the Penal Establishment............... 116 Material matter 141
INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONE R S.... 116 Privileged communication. 142
Off-duty. 116 Good Faith 144
Evasion Through Negligence 117 Subornation of Perjury. 144
Consenting to Evasion 117 Venue 145

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 OFFERING FALSE TESTIMON Y IN EVIDENCE.... 146 G IVING AWAY DA N G E R O U S D R U G S . 165
F ALSIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE DOC U M E N T S ,
TRADE OF DAN G E R O U S D R U G S .. 165
MESSA G ES, AND CERTIFICATES...... . . . . . . . . . . 147
ADMINISTERING DANGEROUS DRUGS. 166
USING FICTITI OUS NAME AND CONCEALING
TRUE NAME. 148 B ROK E R A G E OF DAN G E R O U S D R U G S . 166
ILLEGAL USE OF UNIFORM S OR INSIGNIA.... 149 M A N U F A C T U R E OF DAN G E R O U S D R U G S . 166
USUR P A T ION OF AUTH O R ITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTION......149 CULTIVATION OR CULT UR E OF DAN G E R O U S D R U G S..... 167
Offender is any person. 150
Performing the Function of Public Officer. 150 DEN, DIVE, OR RESORT 167
Person in Authority. ] c] P OSSESSION OF DANG E R O U S D R U G S 168
Pretense of Official Position 151 Parties, Social Gathering, and Meeting 168
Doctrine of Absorption . 1c2 Possession of Shabu and Marijuana.. 169
U SURP A TION OF LEGISLATIVE POW E R S Possession and Use of Dangerous Drugs ........................ 169
153
Possession and Sa?e of Dangerous Drugs 170
USURP ATION OF EXECUTIVE FUN C T IONS . 153 Possession of Dangerous Drugs and Drug Paraphernalia......... 170
Variance Rule in drugs case 170
USURPATION OF JUDICIAL FUNCTION S 154 1. Po s session and Sale of Dangerous Drugs
Usurpation of Powers or Function. 154
2. Po s s ession and Importation of Dangerous Drugs
MACHINATION IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS 155 3. Po s session and Delivery of Dangerous Drugs
4. Po s s ession of Dangerous Drugs
M O N O P O L IES AND COM B I N A T ION . 1c5
and Drug Paraphernalia
Combination in Restraint of Trade 1" 6
Monopolization in Restraint of Trade 1 c PT U SE OF DANG E R O U S D R U G S . 172
Combination of Manufacturer, Producer, or Apprehended for Drug-related Crime . 172
Processor or Importer and Others ] cp T Presumption of Use of Dangerous Drug.. 173
Liability of Officer ................................... 1c8 Confirmatory Test 174
Penalty of Rehabilitation. 174
FALSELY MARKED MERCHANDISE
MADE OF PRECIOUS MET ALS . 1ci8 A TTEM P T OR CON S P IRACY TO COM M IT DRU G
TRAFFICKING. 174
V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OT HE R P R O H I B ITED
PERSONS LIABLE UNDER R.A. NO. 9165. 175
DRUGS (R.A. NO. 9165)
CHAIN OF CUSTODY 175
I MPOR T A T ION OF DAN G E R O U S D R U G S 160
I NVENTORY AND PH O T O G R A P H .. 176
TRANS P O R T A T ION OF DAN G E R O U S D R U G S.... 161 1. I m i n e d i a t enes
SELLING DAN G E R O U S D R U G S .....
........... 162 2. Pl a c e of inventory and photographing
Consummated Sale 162 3. Thr e e witnesses
Attempted Sale. 162 Additional requirements 177
Seller and Buyer of Dangerous Drugs. Non-compliance with the Requirements 178
163
Buy-bust Operation 163 Preservation of the Integrity of the Confiscated Drugs ... 178
Selling Drugs to a Stranger 164 Justifiable Grounds tor Not Complying with the
Selling Drugs at a Public Place 164 Three-Witness Rule . 178
Procedural Requirements 180
D ELIVERY OF DANG E R O U S D R U G S . 164
MARKING .. 180
DISPATCH ING DA N G E R O U S D R U G S IN TRANSIT .. 165
CONFISCATION RECEIPT 180

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 P DEA COO R D I N A T IO N . 181 OBSCENE PU BLICATION AND INDE C EN T SHOW
UNDER R.A. NO. 7610. 200
INFORMANT. 181
Confidential Informant 181 PORN O G R A P H Y U N D E R R.A. NO. 9208 AND
Non-confidential Informant 182 R.A. NO. 9775. 201
PLEA BARGA INING . 182 CHILD PORNOGRAPHY UNDER RA NO. 9775..... 202
Possessicn ofpornographic materials 203
IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION . 183
CYBER CHILD PORNOGRAPHY UNDER R.A. NO. 10175..... 204
V I. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MOR A L S TRAFFICKING IN PERSON INVOLVING
ANTI-GAMBLING LAW P.D. NO. 1602 PORNOGRAPHY 204
AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 9287. 1. T r a f fi c k in g in person and child pornography.... 204
185 2. A ct t h a t promotes trafficking in persons
PUNISHABLE ACTS . 185 and child pornography.. 205
Direct Participation 185
Game of Chance or Skill. CYBERSEX UNDER R.A. NO. 10175. 206
186
Wager Cyber prostitutionor pornography 206
186 Traffickingin person
Lottery. 207
186
Illegal Number Game Child Po"nography 207
187
GRAVE SCANDAL. P ORN O G R A P H Y IN GENE R A L 207
187
1. Tr a f fi cking in person
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS R.A. NO. 9208 2. Ch i l d pornography
as amended by R.A. NO. 10364. 188 3. R. A . No. 7610
Trafficking in Person in General. 188 4. Cyb e r s ex
1. Ac t s of Trafficking. 188 5. Re v i sed Penal Code
2. Mea n s to Commit Trafficking. 188
3. Exp l o i t ive Purpose . PROSTITUTION . 209
190
Consent of the victim is immaterial. 190 CHILD PROSTITUTION UNDER R.A. NO. 7610..... 209
Within or across national borders . 191
Specific Crimes of Trafficking in Person TRAFFICKING IN PERSON INVOLVING PROSTITUTION ....... 210
191
Prostitute 210
QUALIFIED TRAFFICKING IN PERSON 193 1. Ge n d e r
1. Mi n o r i t y 194 2. H ab i t u ality
2. Mi n o r i t y and Adoption 194 3. V ic t i m and Offender in prostitution
CHILD TAFFICKING UNDER R.A. NO. 7610 . Pimp.
.
194
1. Co r r u p tion of Minor
ATTEM P T E D TR A F FICKING IN P ERSONS UND E R 2. Chi l d Prostitution
RW. NO. 9208. 195 3. Tr a f fi c k ing in person involving prostitution
A TTEM P T E D CH ILD TRAFFICKING UN D E R House of prostitution.. 214
R.A. NO. 7610. 1. Whi t e Slave Trade
195 2. Chi l d P r ostitution
A CTS THAT PRO M O T E TR A F F ICKING IN PERSON S 3. Qualified Slavery
UNDER R.A. NO. 9208 . 196 4. Tr a f fi cking in Persor
Customer of prostitute .. 215
I MMO R A L D O C T R I N E . 197 1. Chi l d Prostitution
OBSCENE PUBLICATION . 198 2. Us e of Trafficked Person
OBSCENE EXHIBITION AND INDEC ENT SH O W S.... 198 A TTEM P T E D CH ILD PRO STITUTION UN D E R
Obscenity 199 R.A. NO. 7610 216

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 CHILD ABUSE IN A SECLUDED PLACE UNDER 2 Su s p e nded license
R.A. NO. 7610. . . . . . . . .

217 Exceeding 8% interest per annum. 235

Stages ofchild prostitution. 218 Exclusivity of financing institutions, clinics, or
VAGRANCY seminar center 235
218
Refusal to renegotiate or condone after termination
MIGRANT W O R K E R S AND OV E R S EAS FILIPINOS of contract. 236
ACT OF 1995 Republic Act No. 8042 as amended Salary deductionof insurance expenses 236
by RA No. 10022 219
RECRU ITM E N T INVOLV ING ECO N O M I C SABO T A G E .... 287
RECRU ITM E N T W ITH O U T LICENSE OR AUT H O R I TY...... 219
Non-license or non-holder of authority . SYNDICATE 238
219
1. Re c r u i t ment before the issuance of license L ARGE-SCALE ILLEGAL REC R U IT M E N T 238
2. Re v o k ed, cancelled license, terminated,
or expired license MU LTIPLE ILLEGAL RECZ U I T M E N T S . 239
8. U na u t h o r ized representative Two vi tims recruited. 240
4. Per s o nal recruitment Three victims recruited. 240
Recruitment activity ~22 Six victims recruited . 241
1. Te c h n ical meaning Amencing informations 242
2. Re f e r r al 242
A CCO M P L ICE AND ACCE S S O R Y
3. Cap a city to deploy
4. P romise oroffer R ECRU ITM E N T FOR LOCAL EM P L O Y M E N T . 243
5. P reparatory interview R.A. No. 8042 and Labcr Code. 248
6. Tr a v e l documents 1. Sc o p e
7. Pl a c e ment fees Crimes
For profit or not Criminal act
4. Qualifying circumstance
I LLEGAL RE C R U I T M E N T INVO L V IN G Principal, a:.:omplice, and accessory
PROHIBITED ACTS >28
Charging agreater amount 228 ILLEGAL REC R U IT M E N T BY JURIDICAL PERSON ... 245
Acknowledging agreater amount.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
228 Active and conscious participation 245
False information 228 Responsible officers. 246
False information to obtain license to recruit....... . . . . . . . . . .
229 Responsibleemployees 247
Inducement to quit ......... 229
Influencing onenot to employ a worker ILLEGAL REC R U IT M E N T IS MALUM P R O H IBITUM.... 247
929
Recruiting to work in harmful job. 230 ILLEGAL REC R U IT M E N T AND OT H E R CR IMES ..... ............. 248
Failure to submit reports. 230 1. I l l e gal recruitment and estafa
Substitution or alteration of employment contract ........ 280 2. I l l e g al recruitment and trafficking in person
Becoming an officer or agent in both recruitment 3. Il l e g al recruitment, trafficking in person, and estafa
agency and travel agency... . . .
231
Withholding travel documents prior to departure ......... 231 VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
Non-deployment of worker. 231
Non-reimbursement of expenses 282 P UBLIC OFFI CER . 250
1. Non - d eployment
2. Re i m b u rsement PUBLIC OFFICER UNDE R SPECIAL LAWS 251
Private Individual . 252
3. Wi t h o r w i t hout license to recruit
No Double Jeopardy. 252
Allowing foreign management of recruitment agency ... 233
CRIME OF PROH IBITED ACTS.. C AUSING UNDU E IN JURY OR GIVING UNW A R R A N T E D
283 BENEFITS, ADVANTAGE, OR PREFERENCE ................ 253
Recruitment activity by a suspended agency. 283 Public Officer . 258
1. Re v o k ed or expired license

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 Intentional or Culpable Offense 254
1. A r i a s Pr inciple Gift offered by Private Individual 276
2. Re l y i n g on official legal opinion or resolution Gift solicited by Public Officer 277
3. Er ro n e ous Interpretation of the Law Demand with Threat. 277
Two Modes of Commission Entrapment Operation 278
260
First Mode . 260 PERSUASION, INDUCE M E N T OR INFLU E N C E TO
Second Mode. 261 C OM M IT OFFENSE OR VIOLATE RULE S
1. Da m a g e UNDER R.A. NO. 3019 278
2. P arty Injured orBenefited Deliberate Intent 279
REND E R ING UN J UST JUDGM E N T OR By Means of Consideration. 279
I NTERLO C U T O R Y O R D E R . Direct Bribery, Corruption of Public Officer,
263
Unjust Judgment. and Section 3(a) . 279
263 Inducing or causing public officer to commit crime
Error of Judgment. 264
Without a Hearing. of corruption. 280
264
Unjust Resolution. . . .

264 REQUESTING OR RECEIVING GIFT IN

MALICIOUS DELAY . C ONN E C T ION WITH LICENSE OR PERM IT
265 UNDER R.A. NO. 3019 281
DERELICTION OF DUTY 265
REQU E ST ING OR RECEIVING GIFT IN CONNE C T ION
TOLERANCE . 265 WITH GOV E R N M E N T C O N T R A C T OR TRA N S A C T ION
REVELATION OF SECRETS AND BETR A YAL OF TRUST......
... 266 UNDER R.A. NO. 3019 282
Request or Receive . 282
DIRECT BRIBERY 266 Contract or Transaction. 282
1. Pu b l i c Officer 1. I nv e s t i gation
2. Agr e ement 2. B IR E x amination
3. Of f i c ial Duties 3. Co n s t r uction Contract
4. Gi ft Right to Intervene under the Law 284
Commission of crime 268 Direct Bribery and Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 ...................... 284
Performance of Unjust Act. 268 Section 3 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 285
Unjust Act ................... . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
269
Non-Performance ofan Official Duty. ACCEP T A N C E OR SOLICITATION OF GIFT
270 UNDER R.A. NO. 6713. 285
Crime Involving Moral Turpitude. 271 Gift 286
QUALIFIED DI RECT BRIBERY. 271 Solicitationor acceptance of gift 286
Offender 271 Bribery, R.A. No. 6713, and R.A. No. 3019 286
Crime punishable by reclusion perpetua 1. Cr i m i nal act
or death penalty 272 2. Co n n ection of the gift
Consummation of direct bribery 3. Pr o s e cution
and qualified direct bribery. 272 4. De f e nses
Gift orpresent 273 Lawful acceptance of unsolicited gift under R.A. No. 3019 .......... 287
INDIRECT BRIBERY Lawful acceptance of unsolicited gift under R.A. No. 6713........... 288
273 Family celebration of national festivity under R.A. No. 3019 ...... 289
Intent to Receive...... 273 Family celebration of national festivity under R.A. No. 6713 ...... 290
By Reason of His Office .. 274 Gift given by a relative. 291
. . . .

Direct Bribery and Indirect Bribery 274

1. A gr e e ment APPR O V ING OR GRA N T ING LICENSE, PERMIT,
2. Unj u s t ness or justness of the act PRIVILEGE, OR BENEFIT TO UNQU A L IFIED
CORR U P T ION OF PUBLIC OFFICER PERSON 291
275 Section 3 (c) and (j) 292

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 Intervention in his official capacity. 807
TAKING ADVA N T A G E OF RELATION SHIP WITH
Possession of prohibited interest and
PUBLIC OFFICER UNDER R.A. NO. 3019 292 307
Section 8 (h) of R.A. No. 8019.
NEGLECT OR REFU SAL TO ACT WITHIN A Prohibited interest under the Constitution or law .... 307
REASONABLE PERIOD UNDER R.A. NO. 3019..... 293 Prohibition under the CSC rules 308
FAILURE TO REPLY UNDER R.A. NO. 6718 ... 293 U NLA W F U L INTER EST IN A TRANSACTION APPR O V E D
B Y THE BOARD, PANEL, OR GROUP UN D E R
ACCEPTING EM P L O Y M E N T IN A PRIVATE R.A. NO. 8019. 809
ENTERPRISE UNDER R.A. NO. 8019. 293
U NLA W F U L INTER EST IN A TRANSACTION UN D E R
OWN ING, CONTR O L L ING, MANAG ING, OR BEING 309
R.A. NO. 6718.
EM P L O Y E D IN A PRIVATE ENTE R P R ISE
R.A. NO. 6718). 294 UNLA W F U L INTER V E N T ION OF RELATIVES OF
Section 7 (b) (1) of R.A. No. 6713 and HIGHRANKING OFFICIALS UNDER R.A. NO. 8019:.... 310
Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 3019 294 U NLA W F U L INTER EST OF MEM B E R S OF CON G R E S S
ILLEGAL RECOMMENDATION UNDER R.A. NO. 6718..... 295 IN A BUSINESS ENTER P R ISE BENEFITED
BY LAW UNDER R.A. NO. 8019. 311
U NLAW F U L PR A C T ICE OF PROFE SSION UND E R
R.A. NO. 6718. MALVERSATION. 311
295
Privatepractice of law. Public Property or Funds. 312
296
Constitutional Prohibition on Private Practice of Law ................. 297 1. Cu s t odia Legis
1. Exe c u tive officials and constitutional commissioners 2. Ca s h Advance
2. L eg i s l ative officers 3. Con f i scated Dangerous Drugs
Constitutional Prohibition on Private Practice of Law .........,....... 298 Accountable Officer
1. Ju d i c ial officers, solicitors and prosecutors 1. Co n t r o l
2. L ocal executiveand legislative officers 2. Cus t o d y
Conflict with official function. 3. W i th o u t A u thority to Receive and Disburse
299
4. No n - Accountable Public Officer
E NTERING INTO A DISADVAN T A G E O U S G O V E R N M E N T 5. Pr i v a t e Individual
CONTRACT UNDER R.A. NO. 8019. 299 Modes of Committing Malversation
Overprice Project 300 1 Mal v e r sation through Misappropriation
1. No D o u ble Jeopardy 2. M al v e r sation through Taking
2. Beh e s t Loan Presumption of Malversation . 822
FRAUDS AGAINST THE PUBLIC TREASURY....... Payment in Good Faith 328
. . . . . . . .
302
Contract or scheme to defraud to the government........ Restitution . 823
802
Fraud against the public treasury and 1. De f e n se
Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. 2. M it i g a t ing Circumstance
302
Fraud against the public treasury and malversation ... 802 8. No t a D efense or a Mitigating Circumstance
Failure to issue receipt. 303 F AILURE TO RENDE R AC C O U N T I N G 326
Collecting different from of payment 303 1. M al v e r sation and Failure to Render Accounting..... 327
Demanding excessive amount .......... 304
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. M it i g a t ing Circumstance .. 327

Doctrine ofabsorption 304
TECHN ICAL MA L V E R S A T ION 327
P ROHIBITED TRAN S A C T IO N S . 305 1. A pp r o p riation Law or Ordinance
POSSESSION OF PROH IBITED INTEREST 306 2. M al u m Prohibitum
8. V ar i a nce Rule in malversation
U NLA W F U L INTER EST IN A BUSINESS, CONTRA C T 4. M al v e rsation and Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
OR TRANSACTION UNDER R.A. NO. 3019......... . . . . . . .
306
Indirectinterest. F AILURE TO MAKE DELIVER Y . 330
306

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 EXTENDED APPLICATION 330 PROL O N G ING PER F O R M A N C E OF DUTIES AND POW E R ......848
INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF DOC U M E N T ..... 831 ABAN D O N M E N T OF OFFICE OR POSITION....
REVELATION OF SECRETS. 832 RESIGNATION IS NOT A DEFENSE 850
DIVULGING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
DISOBEYING REQ U E ST FOR DISQUALIFICATION .... 850
UNDER R.A. NO. 3019 ......... . . . . . . .
882
DISCLOSURE OR MISUSE OF CONFIDEN T IAL ORD ERS OR REQ U E S TS BY EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
TO JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 850
INFORMATION UNDER R.A. NO. 6718. 338
Revelation ofsecrets, espionage, and violation U NLA W F U L AP P O IN T M E N T 851
of R.A. No. 6713, R.A. No. 3019 .
PLUNDER UNDER R.A. NO. 7080. 851
O PEN DISOBEDIEN C E . 338 Main plunderer 352
Without jurisdiction . 334 Secondary offenders 852
Disobedienceand open disobedience 335 Predicate crimes ........ 358
DISOBEDIENCE TO ORDER OF SUPER IOR OFFICERS ... 1. M al v e r sation
835 2. M i s a p p r opriation
Crime ofdisobedience.. 385 8. Mi s u s e of fund
R EFUSALOF A S SISTANCE . 835 4. Ra i d on public treasury
Refusal to
give assistance and open disobedience ... 336 5. Re c e iving commission
Refusal to
discharge elective office ... 886 6. Un l a w ful disposition of government asset
7. M o nopoly and acquisitionof shares of stock
TORTURE UNDER R.A. NO. 9745 .......... 886
. . . . .

8. M ul t i p l icity of offenses
1. Phy s i cal Torture Combination or Series of Predicate Crimes 355
2. Men t a l T orture 356
Ill-gotten Wealth
Other Forms of Torture. 388 858
Pattern
Criminal act . 388 858
Identification of the main plunderer
Criminal intention 338 Single plunderer. 859
Victim of torture 338 859
Conspiracy in Plunder.
Offenders......................................... 340 860
Single Conspiracy
Independent Crime. 341 861
Wheel Conspiracy
Application of the Provisions 362
The Hub Must Be a Public Officer.
of the Revised Penal Code. 341 862
Chain Conspiracy
MAL T R E A T M E N T OF PRISONER ..... 342 363
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION UNDER R.A. NO. 3019 ...
Maltreatment of an Arrestee. 342 Incumbent public offender 864
Personal Maltreatment. 343 Valid Information 864
ABUSE OF CHASTITY 343 Hearing 864
Arrestee 343 Mandatory suspension 865
Consummated Stage 843 Period of suspension. 865
Abuse of Chastity, Maltreatment Suspension from the current office. 866
of Prisoner, and Torture. 844 Constitutionality of the rule on suspension.................. 866
ANTICIPATION OF DUTIES OF A PUBLIC OFFICER ... 845 VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
FAILURE TO SUBMIT SALN UNDER R .A. No. 6718 ....... 345
UNINTEN T IONAL ABO R T IO N 368
DISCLOSURE OF RELATI ONSHIP UN DER R.A. NO. 6713...... ... 3 4 6 Knowledge of pregnancy 868
C ONFLICT OF INTEREST AND DIVESTM E N T Intentional or Culpable violence . 368
UNDER R.A. NO. 6713. Abortion and unintentional abortion 869
............................................... 347
369
. .

Proximate Cause Rule

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 1. V i o l e nce PHYSICAL IN JURIES 892
2. Th r e a t Serious Physical Injuries .......................................,..., 392
8. T aki n g Poison Administering injurious substances or beverages.... . 392
ABORTION. Less Serious Physical Injuries. 893
371
Killing a fetus inside the womb. Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment 398
371
Killing a nonviable fetus outside the womb. Qualifying Circumstances.. 393
372 393
Killing a viable fetus (infant) outside the womb ......... Bullying
372
Killing a 3-day-old child outside the womb. 373 DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY ..... 394
Viability of a Fetus. 373 394
Criminal act
1. Exp e r t testimony Free-for-all Rumble 894
2. I ntr a u t e rine life of more than 6 months No conspiracy. 395
Attempted or Frustrated Abortion. 874 Confusion 896
INFANTICIDE . 375 P HYSICAL IN JURIES INFLICTED IN A TUMUL T O U S
Victim of infanticide. 875 AFFRAY 396
Requisites of infanticide. 375 Participants..... 396
Intent toabort 376 897
Criminal acts .
Parricide with abortion, parricide with infanticide 897
No conspiracy.
and double parricides 377
Separatecrimes ofparricide and intentional abortion ... GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE . 398
378
Concealment of Dishonor. 378
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DISCHARG E OF FIREARM 398

Purpose of the three-day rule 379 Lack of Intent to Kill 898
P ARRICIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

380 Non-commission of a Graver Crime 399

Legitimate Relationship. Intent to Threaten or Inflict Injuries 899
380
Blood Relationship 881 401
DUEL.
Personal Relationship . 882
Knowledge of Relationship . 383 HAZING (R.A. NO 8049). 401
Elements of Hazmg 401
MURDER 883 Initiation Rite or Practice 402
Intention of the Offender 383 Organization. 402
Intent to Kill 384 Requisite for Admission or Continuing Membership ... 402
1. I nt e n t to kill as an element
Death, Rape, Sodomy, or Mutilation. 403
2. L a c k of intent to kill as a mitigating circumstance
Malum Prohibitum 408
3. I nt e n t to kill as a requisite of
Persons Liable for Hazing 404
qualifying circumstance
1. Pr e s e nce
Multiple Qualifying Circumstances 886 2. A ct u a l Participation
1. Doc t r i n e of Absorption
3. Pl a n n i n g
2. Ru l e on Qualifying Circumstance and
4. A dv i s er
Aggravating Circumstances
5. In du c e ment
3. Ru l e on Infanticide, Parricide
6. In c u m bent Officers
Murder and Homicide
7. Own e r or Lessee
HOMICIDE 8. Par e n t s
390
MUTILATION 9. Sc h ool Authorities
391 10. O b s t r u ction of Justice
Vasectomy . 891 11. F o r cible Recruitment
Under 12-year old Victim.. 391 12. C o r p orate or Company Officers
Intent to Mutilate.
391 Common Defense 408
Physical Violence Against Woman. 391 Homicide and Hazing 409

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 Regulated Hazing 410 KIDNAPPING AND RAPE . 482
1. F orcible abduction
V IOLENCE AGAINST WO M E N AN D CH ILD R E N
2. K i d n a pping and attempted rape
(R.A. NO. 9262) 410 3. R ape or complex crime ofrape
Relationship .. 410 through forcible abduction
Child of the woman. 411 432
4. Sp e c ial complex crime of kidnapping with rape.........
Conspiracy . 411
Offender in Violence Against a Woman 411 KIDNAPPING AND HOMI CI DE/MURDER .. 433
Violence 412 1. C o m plex crime ofattempted or frustrated murder
Physical Violence.. 412 through kidnapping
Sexual violence 412 2. K i d n a p ping and attempted or frustrated murder
Economic Violence. . . . . . .

413 8. K idnapping and homicideor murder

Psychological Violence.. 414 K IDNAPPING, RAPE AND HO M ICIDE/MU R D E R .......
........
1. Co n t r o lling the Woman or Her Child
2. Su b s t antial Emotional or Psychological Distress ME R C A D O PR INCIPLE .. 434
3. Emo t i o nal or Mental Anguish 1. App r e ciable Period of Detention
Physical and psychological violence 416 2. I nc i d ental deprivation of liberty
Economic and psychological violence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
416 3. De m a nd for Ransom After Committing Murder
Concubinage and bigamy 416
K IDNAPPING FOR RAN S O M . 486
CHILD ABUSE (R.A. NO. 7610). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
417 Persons Liable for Kidnapping for Ransom..... 437
Offender of child abuse 418
Four crimes under Section 10 (a) . SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETE N T ION 488
418
1. Chi l d a buse committed by parents I LLEGAL DETE N T ION IN GENER A L 488
2. In de p endent acts Duration of detention 489
3. Cat c h -all provision Public Officer 439
4. Hab i t u a l ity is not an element Voluntary Release 439
Child abuse 419 Place of Detention 440
1. Co r p o ral punishment Illegal Detention and Coercion. 441
2. De g r a ding the dignity of the child
3. Ph y s i cal injury UNLAWFUL ARREST 441
4. Neg l e ct KIDNAPPING OF MINORS 448
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 1. Ki d n a pping and Serious Illegal Detention
(R.A. NO. 9344) 2. Sl i g h t Illegal Detention
423
3. Fai l u r e to Return a Minor
IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSO NA L LIBERTY INDUCING A MINOR TO ABAN D O N HIS HOME .... 446
AND SECURITY
TRAFFICKING IN PERSON FOR LABOR EXPLOITATION ...... 447
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETE N T ION ... 425 SLAVERY 447
Two Indispensable Elements of Illegal Detention............ 425 Traffickingin Person involving Forced
1. D e privation ofLiberty Labor and Slavery.. 448
2. Int e n t t o Deprive Liberty Involuntary Servitude .. .
448
Public Officer Acting in His Private Capacity .................. 428 EXPLOITATION OF CHILD LABOR 448
SPECIAL COM P LEX CRIM E 429 1. Ch i l d Exploitation
1. Or i g i n al Design 2. Chi l d T r afficking
2. Vi c t i m of Homicide
8. M ul t i p l e Kidnappings SERVICES REND E R E D U N D E R C O M P U L S I O N..... 449
1. Hou s ehold Servant or Farm Laborer
4. Mu r d e r as a Component
2. Tr a f f i cking in Person
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 CHILD ABUSE INVOLVING ABA N D O N M E N T UNAU T H O R I ZED PRO C E S SING OF SENSITIVE
UNDER R.A. NO. 7610 450 P ERSO NAL INFOR M A T I O N 465
A BAN D O N M E N T OF PER S O N S IN DANG E R . Sensitive personal information 465
. . . .
450
Lawful processing of sensitive personal information
ABAN D O N M E N T OF ONE'S OWN VICTIM . 451 and privileged information 466
Child abuse 451 Accessing personal information or sensitive personal
Accidental Infliction of Injury 451 information due to negligence. 467
Intentional Infliction of Injury. 451 Improper disposalof personal information or sensitive
Reckless Infliction of Injury 451 personal information 467
ABAN D O N M E N T OF A PERSON IN DANGER ..... Processing ofpersonal or sensitive personal
453 information for unauthorized purposes................... 468
ABAN D O N ING A MINOR 454 Unauthorized access or intentional breach. 468
ABAN D O N M E N T OF MINOR BY CUSTOD IAN .... Concealment of security breaches involving sensitive
454 personal information . 468
CONC E A L M E N T OR ABA N D O N M E N T OF A Malicious disclosure. 468
LEGITIMATE CHILD 454 Unauthorized disclosure 469
PARENTAL INDIFFERENCE 455 COM B IN ATION OR SERIES OF ACTS OR LARGE SCALE......
... 46 9
EXPLOITATION OF MINOR . 455 GRAVE THREAT 469
T RESPASS TO DWE L L IN G . LIGHT THREAT 470
457
1. Abs o l u t ory Cause Grave threat and terrorism 471
2. Vi o l a t ion of Domicile and Trespass to Dwelling Grave Threat and Light Threat .... 471
3. Pr o h i b i tion Robbery, Grave Threat, and Other Light Threat ..... 472
Blackmail 474
TRESPASSING.
Threat to Publish a Libel and Light Threat ............. 474
VIOLATION OF DATA PRIVACY (R.A. NO. 10173) ........................ 459
OTHER LIGHT THREATS 475
INFORM A T ION NOT COV E R E D BY DATA PRIVACY ACT......... 459
Threat with a Weapon. 475
Information on public officers. ....................... 459
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. Imp l i ed Threat
Information on service contract with government .................. ...... 460
2. Se r i ous Threat
Information on license, permit or discretionary benefit....... ......... 460
3. Wi t h o u t Demand of Money or
Journalistic, artistic, literary or research information ................. 460
Imposition of Condition
Information obtained by central monetary authority,
Oral Threat in the Heat of Anger 476
law enforcement and regulatory agencies . . 461 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. H ar m C o nstituting a Crime
Information to prevent money laundering.. ..., ........................ 461 2. H e a t of Anger
Information collected from residents of
3. Pe r s i stence in the Idea Involved in the Threat
foreign jurisdictions. ........................................ 461
. . . . .

4. No D e mand for Money or Imposition of Condition

CRIMES UNDER THE DATA PRIVACY ACT.................... 461 Oral Threat with Harm Not Constituting a Crime ....................... 478
Grave Threat, Light Threat, and Other Light Threat .................. 479
U NAU T H O R I ZED PR O C E S S ING OF PERSO N A L
1. M an n e r of Commission
INFORMATION 462 2. Imp o s i tion of Condition
Personal information .. 462 3. Cr i m i n al or Non-criminal Wrong
Processing of personal information. 462
. . . .

Written Threat 479

Without consent of the data subject ......................... . . . . .
463 Threat with a Weapon.. 479
Authorized processing of personal information ............... 463 Oral Threat to Inflict a Wrong Constituting a Crime ................... 480
Criteria for lawful processing of personal information ...
464 Threat to Inflict a Wrong Not Constituting a Crime..................... 480
Threat with Demand for Money. 480

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 G RAVE COE R C IO N . 480
Robbery,G rave Coercion,and Grave Threat..... Spam 497
481 Other Cyber Crime Offense 497
1. Cr i m i nal Act
Prescription for Cyber Crime 498
2. I nti m i d ation
L IGHT COER C IO N . 484 X . CRIMES AGAINST PROP E R T Y
OTHER LIGHT COE R C ION OR UNJUST VEXATION ..... 484 THEFT 501
Coercion Without Violence or Intimidation. 484 Personal Property 501
Vexation Without Coercion 485 1. A ll e g a t ion Requirement
Just Vexation 486 2. V a lue of theproperty
Without Court Order. 486 Taking of Personal Property 502
Cyber Bullying.. 487 1. Con s t r u ct ive Possession
COM P U L S O R Y PU R C H A S E OF ME R C H A N D ISE .... 2. A sp o r t a t ion, Not an Element of Theft
487
8. A bi l i t y to Freely Dispose, Not an Element of Theft
PAYM E N T OF WA G ES BY MEANS OF TOKENS ... 487 Property Belongs to Another 504
FORM A T ION, MAINTEN A N C E, AND PROH IBITION Intent to Gain. 504
OF COMB INATION OF CAPITAL OR LABOR 1. Intent toAppropriate
T HRO U G H VIOLE N C E OR THR E A T S . 2. I nt e n t to Deprive
487 Taking Without Consent . 505
DISCOVERING SECR ETS THR O U G H SEIZURE Finder of Lost Property 505
OF CORRESPONDENCE. 488 1. L o s t Property
2. Sto l e n Property
REVEALING SECR ETS WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDE N CE ... 488 8. Fi n d e r in Law
REVEALING INDUS TR IAL SECRETS . 488 Theft and Malicious Mischief 507
Theft and Trespassing 507
ANTI-WIRETAPPING ACT (R.A. NO. 4200) 488 Theft of Commercial Document. 508
Private Communication . 488 1. Co m m ercial Document
Tapping Wire orUsing Device. 489 2. Non - r ealization of Gain
1. De l i b erate Installation of Device 8. Re a l i zation of Gain
2. V id e o Recording
Theft and Deceit 510
8. I nt e r ception of Wireless Communication Falsification and Deceit 511
4. Par t y t o the Conversation Theft, Falsification, and Deceit 512
Court Order 491
Other Persons Liable.. 492 QUALIFIED THEFT 512
1. Gr a v e Abuse of Confidence
CYBER CRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012
2. Dom e s tic servant
(R.A. NO. 10176) . 492 3. On O c casion of Calamity
OffensesAgainst the Confidentiality, Integrity,
4. Coc o n u t
and Availability of Computer Data and System ... 493
1. Il l e gal Access Theft of Intangible Property. 514
2. I l le g al Interception ILLEGAL USE OF ELECTRICITY (R.A. NO. 7882) ... 515
3. Dat a I n t e rference Prima facieevidence 518
4. Sys t e m I n t erference Effectsof prima facie evidence 519
5. M is u se of Devices Requisitesof prima facie evidence 519
6. Cyb e r s quatting Person benefitted from illegal use of electricity..... 519
Computer-related Offense.. 496 Required witness to the discovery. 520
1. C o m puter-relatedForgery
2. C o m puter-relatedFraud THEFT OF ELECTRIC POWE R TR A N S M I SSION LINE
3. Com p u t er-related Identity Theft AND MATERIALS . 520
Qualifying circumstance 521

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 ROBBERY IN GENERAL 52o Document 545
R OBB ERY BY USING FORCE UPON THIN G S . Robbery, Theft, and Execution of Document .... 546
52o
Things 52" ROBB ERY BY BAND OR IN AN UNINHA B ITED PLACE..... 546
1. I nh a b i ted House Application. 546
2. Pu b l i c Building Use of Unlicensed Firearm. 547
3. U ni n h a bited House Separate Prosecutions. 547
4. H ab i t a ble Structure
5. Spe c ial Laws BRIGANDAGE . 548
Force . Armed 548
524
1. U nl a w ful Entry Forn.ation of Band. 548
2. B r e a k ing the Window H IGHWA Y R O B B E R Y /BRIGAN D A G E 549
3. Fal s e Keys Highway 549
4. Si m u l a t ion of Authority Formation of Band and Commission of Robber ..... 550
Special Aggravating Circumstance 527 Brigands or Highway Robbers 550
Robbery in the Dependency of an Inhabited House . . .
528 1. In d i s criminate Victim
Taking in Robbery by Using Force upon Things ........ 529 2. Re g u l ar ity
POSSESSION. OF PICKLOCK OR SIMILAR TOOLS.... 3. Nu m b e r of offenders
530
Robbery by Band, Brigandage, and Highway
ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE OR INTI M I D A TI ON .............. . . . . . . .
530 Robbery/Brigandage 552
Violence or Intimidation 531 1. Pl a c e of Commission
Taking of Personal Property 532 2. Nu m b e r of Offenders
Personal Property Belonging to Another 588 8. Cha r a cter of the Offenders
Intent to Gain. 538 4. Consummation
Stages of Robbery 534 5. Pr e s u m p tion
1. Co n s ummated Robbery
2. A tt e m p ted Robbery A IDING AND ABETTING HIGHW A Y
8. A tt e m p t ed Robbery with Homicide ROBBERS/BRIGANDS .. 553
Special Complex Crime Involving Robbery. 535 CARNAPPING (R.A. NO. 10888) . 554
Robbery, Kidnapping, and Arbitrary Detention.............. . . . . . . . . . . . 537 Concept of Carnapping. 555
Robbery and Kidnapping for Ransom. 537 1. Ta k i n g
1. Ro b b ery Absorbed Illegal Detention 2. Mot o r Vehicle
2. Co m p lex Crime of Robbery Through Kidnapping 3. L i c e nse to Use Public Highways, Not Required
8. Separate Crimes ofRobbery and Kidnapping 4. B el o n ging to Another Person
Robbery, and DirectBribery and Corruption of 5. I nt e n t t o Gain
Public Officer. 539 Return of the Motor Vehicle . 558
1. Vo l u n t ariness in parting the money Quahfied Carnapping. 559
2. I nvo l u n t a r iness in parting the money 1. Or i g i nal Design
Robbery and Section 8(b) of R.A. No. 8019 . 541 2. Ow n e r , Driver, or Occupant of the Motor Vehicle
Robbery and Kidnappingfor ransom Against 8. M ur d e r or Homicide
a Criminal Suspect . 541 4. Non b a i lable Crime
1. L awf u l d etention Author's Opinion 561
2. Unl a w f ul detention Special Rules for Carnapping 562
Extortion and Other Crime. 543 1. Vi c t i m of Homicide or Rape
Robbery and Estafa 548 2. A me r i can Penalty
E XECUTION OF DEEDS BY MEANS OF VIOLEN C E 3. Do c t r ine of Absorption
OR INTIMIDATION . 545 CATTLE-RUSTLING (P.D. NO. 588) . 565
Intent to Defraud. 545 Large Cattle.. 565

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 Without Consent of the Owner 666 Ob igation to Return 592
Concept of Cattle-Rustling. o66 Employer-Employee Relationship . 593
Qualified Cattle-Rustling. 567 Ag ncy. 598
Partnership. 595
OCCU P A T ION OF REAL PRO P E R TY OR USU R P A T ION
Qu asicontract. 596
OF REAL RIGHTS.. 567 Sa e 596
Real Property 567 Leasehold Tenancy. 597
Belonging to Another 567 Loan.. 598
Violence or Intimidation . 568 Deposit 598
1. Th r e a t or Violence to Occupy
Deposit of Money. 599
2. Th r e a t or Violence to Prevent Re-occupation
3. Thr e a t or Violence to Occupy and to Prevent M O N EY M A R K E T PLA C E M E N T 600
Violence as a Basis of Imposing Additional Penalty .. . . . . . . . . . . . 569 Loan Between Lender and Borrower 600
Robbery and Occupation of Real Property. 570 Agency Between Lender and Middleman . 600
Occupation of real property with rape or homicide ............... 570 Dis "retion to Choose the Borrower. 601
Dis "retionto select itself as borrower . 602
A LTERING BOU N D A R IES OR LAND M A R K S .....
.................. 572 Estafa Through Misappropriation and Carnapping............ 603
E STAFA OR SWINDLING IN GENER A L 572 1. Se r v i ce Contract
Mode of Commission 572 2. L ea s e Agreement
Damage 572 8. Bou n d ary Arrangement
Estafa Through Misappropriation and Cattle-Rustling...... 604
ESTAFA BY. ALTERATION. 574 Estafa Through False Pretense and Theft. 605
ESTAFA BY USING FICTITIOUS NAME . Estafa Through Misappropriation and Malversation ......... 606
575
ESTAFA THROUGH FALSE PRETENSE. F ALSIFICATION OF DOC U M E N T, MALV E R S A T ION ,
575
False Pretense ESTAFA AND THEFT. 607
575
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cause and Effect Relationship . 576 C OM P L EX CRIM E . 607

ESTAFA BY PRETE N D ING TO HAVE BRIBED Malversation. 607
A PUBLIC OFFICER . Es=afa through false pretense. 607
577
Theft .. .. .......................... 608
ESTAFA THR O U G H M I SA P P R O P R I ATION 678
Obligation to Deliver or Return SEPARATE CRIMES 608
578
Conversion, Misappropriation, or Denial. Malversation. 608
579
1. A p p o i nting a Subagent Es'.afa. 610
2. Ret a i n ing the Property of the Principal Theft ....................... 610
8. N o Estafa Through Negligence C OM M O N E L E M E N T D O C T R I N E . 610
Demand Not Necessary. Single crime rule 610
V IOLATION OF TRUST RECEIPT LAW . Damage as a Common Element. 611
Fi=st crime rule.. 612
SYNDICATED ESTAFA (P.D. NO. 1689) 684 Falsificatio of document used as a substitute for money..... 612
Syndicate 684 Falsification as a Means to Conceal a Crime......................... 613
Funds Solicited from the General Public 686 Falsification of payroll.. 613
Ponzi or Pyramid Scheme 688
Suspension ofPayment. ESTAFA THR O U G H ISSUA N C E OF BOU N C ING CH E C K..... 614
589 1. De c e i t
Estafa Involving More Than P100,000.00.. 589
2. Un au t h o r ized Signature
ESTAFA THR O U G H M I SA P P R O P R IATION AND THE FT.....
590 ANTIBOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. BLG. 22)....
1. Ph y s i cal Possession 615
2. L eg a l Possession 1. Mal u m Prohibitum and Malum in Se.......... 615
3. Own e r ship 2. Ut il i t a r ian Principle.. 616

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 ISSUANCE OF UNFUNDED CHECK 617
Check 618 ESTAFA THR O U G H F R A U D U L E N T G A M B L ING .... 644
1. Fo r e i gn Check
ESTAFA BY REM O V I NG, CONCE A L ING OR
2. Ne g o t iable Order of Withdrawal check
3. M em o r andum Check D ESTR O Y ING DO C U M E N T 644
619
Issuance 619 OTHER FO RM S OF SWINDL ING 644
Valuable Consideration. 620 Pretending to be an Owner. 644
Knowledge ofInsufficiency of Funds. 621 Free from Encumbrance. 645
1. Th e D a t e of Issuance and Presentment 1. A ct o f ownership
2. Dat e of Postdating or Maturity 2. Re a l P r operty
3. K no w l edge of the Payee 3. Exp r e ss Representation
Dishonor 624 4. Fal s e Representation of Ownership and
1. Clo s e d Account None ncumb
rance
2. DAU D Swindling by Taking 647
3. DA I F and Stop Payment Accepting Compensation for Unperformed Services ..... 648
Presumption in B.P. Blg. 22 and Estafa . 626 Swindling by Surety. 648
1. Pr e s u mption of Deceit Execution of Fictitious Contract. 648
2. Pr e s u mption of Knowledge of
Insufficiency of Funds FRAUDULENT INSOLVENCY 648
Presentment of the Check. 627 SWINDLING A MINOR
. . . . . . .

648
1. Pre s entment within 90 Days
2. Pr e s entment Within Six Months OTHER DECEIT 649
Notice of Dishonor 628 Catch-all Provision. 649
1. Wr i t t e n Notice Estafa Through False Pretense and Other Deceit ... 650
2. Gr a c e Period from Receipt Estafa Through Issuance of Bouncing Check and
3. Eff e ct of Lack of Notice Other Deceit. 651
4. Re c e ipt of Notice of Dishonor Fortune Telling. 651
5. Di s p e nsation of Notice of Dishonor
CRIMES INVOLVING CHA T TEL M O R T G A G E .... 652
Payment. 632 Removal ofMortgaged Property. 652
1. Pa y m ent in B.P. Blg. 22
Sale orPledge ofMortgaged Property. 652
2. Pa y m ent in Estafa
1. W i th o u t Consent of the Mortgagee
3. Su s p e nsion of Payment
2. Identity ofthe Property
4. N o v a t i on
3. R egistrationof Chattel Mortgage
FAILURE TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS ... 635 4. V alidity ofChattel Mortgage
Persons Liable for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 636 5. D ouble Saleor Mortgage
1. Co r p orate Check ARSON
2. Co n s piracy 654
Not Included in Article 320 656
Penalty for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 638 1. B ur n i n g House
Estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 640 2. B ur n i n g Personal Property
E STAFA BY NOT PAYING FOOD, REFRES H M E N T 3. B ur n i n g His Own Property
O R ACCO M M O D A T I O N . 640 Arson with Resulting Death 657
Criminal Object in Burning the Property. 657
ESTAFA BY TAKING ADVA N T A G E OF SIGNAT UR E ..... 641 Terrorism, and destruction, and arson . 658
ESTAFA BY INDUCING ANO T H E R TO SIGN ..... ........ 642 MALICIOUS MISCHIEF 659
1. I n d u c ing to Sign Deed of Sale
2. A ttr i b u t ing a Statement of Sale THE PHILI P PI NES FISHERIES CODE OF 1998
3. A ttr i b u t ing a Statement of Authority to Sell (Republic Act No. 8550 as amended by R.A. No. 10654)....... 660
Fishing Through Explosives, Noxious or Poisonous
Substance or Electricity 660
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 Poaching 661 4. Pl a c e and Time
Violation of R.A. No. 8550.. 661 5. I mpr e g n ation
6. Swe e t h eart Theory
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY SEXUAL ASSAULT 682
Rape and Sexual Assault . 683
ADULTERY . 664
Sexual Intercourse Marital Rape .. 684
664
Gender Element of Adultery. 664 QUALIFIED RAPE.. 684
Independent Responsibility of Secondary Offender ..... 66o Minority 685
Subsequent Declaration of Nullity 66o Relatior ship and Minority 686
CONCUBINAGE Guardianship and Minority . . . . ..... 687
666 Common:aw Relationship or Step-relationship
Keeping a Mistress 666
Cohabitation . and Minority 688
666 Mental Disability.
Scandalous .......... 667 688
Concubinage and Adultery 667 R APE WITH HOMI CI D E 688
Concubinage and Bigamy 669
Violence against woman and bigamy. A CTS OF LASCIVIOUSN E S S 689
669
Effects of R.A. No. 8353 on Article 336 of the Revised
RAPE THR O U G H SE X UA L INTER C O U R S E OR Penal Code. 689
SEXUAL ASSAULT . 670 Acts of Lasciviousness, Sexual Assualt, and Rape .......... 691
RAPE . Acts ofLasciviousness and Sexual Assault. 692
670 1. Do c t r ine of Absorption in Rape
Carnal Knowledge. 670 2. V ar i a nce Rule in Rape
. . . . . . . . .

Lack of Consent. 670

1. Co n s ent Before Penetration TOUC H ING THE BODY OF THE VICTIM . 693
2. Wit h d r a wal of Consent Consummated Rape . 693
3. Co n d i t i onal Consent 1. Pe n e t r a t ing the vaginal orifice is not an element
4. St e althing 2. Ci r c u m stantial evidence
5. Co n s ent after the Consummation of the Crime 3. E rect peniscapable of penetraticr
Intimidation. 672 4. I ns e r t i ng instrument or object into the lab.a
1. Te n a cious Resistance Attempted Rape .. 696
2. Con s t r u ctive Force or Intimidation Acts of Lasciviousness. 697
3. L o n e testimony Unjust Vexation 697
4. Mar i a Clara rule 1. Wi t h o ut Lewd Design
Child Under 12 Years of Age 675 2. Wi t h o u t Force or Threat
Mental Retardation. 676 Slander b r Deed . 699
1. Exe m p t ing Circumstance of Direct Assault....................... 701
Imbecility or Minority Sexual Abuse. 701
2. Se x u al Abuse Against a Mental Retarded 1. Gr a t i fi cation of Sexual Desire
3. Rap i n g a Mentally Retarded 2. I nt e n t t o Abuse, Humiliate, Harass, or Decade
Demented Person . 677
Deprived of reason.. SEXUAL HARASSMENT (R.A. NO. 7877) 702
678 Authority or Ascendency
Unconsciousness .. 679 702
Fraudulent Machination. Work or Training, or Education Environment ... 703
679
Grave Abuse of Authority. Demand., Request, or Require Sexual Favor. 703
683
Untenable Defense in Rape 1. Implied Demand
683
1. L a c k of Medical Examination 2. Friendly Kiss
2. L a c k of Sperm Additional Element of Sexual Harassment 706
3. I mm o r al Character Perform r g Sexual Acts 707

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 GENDER-BASED SEXUAL HARASSMENT CONSENTED ABDUCTION 727
SAFE SPACES ACT (RA NO. 11313). 707 Virginity 728
Minority 728
GENDER-BASED STREETS AND PUBLIC SPACES
Lewd Design . 729
SEXUAL HARASSMENT. 708 Solicitation ..............
Public spaces. 730
708 Consented Abduction with Rape 731
Specific criminal acts.. 708
Harassment must begenderbased PROSE C U T ION OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY..... 731
and sexual in nature 710 P ROSE C U T ION OF ADUL T ERY OR CO N C U B I N AG E ..... .... . .
781
GEND E R- BASED ONLINE SEXUAL HAR A S S M E N T ..... 710 Complaint . 781
Exemption 711 1. Eff e ct of noncompliance with the rule on filing
Inadmissible evidence . 712 of complaint
Online harassment must begenderbased and sexual 2. E ffect ofdivorce
in nature. 712 Charging both guilty party . 732
Express orimplied pardon in adulte "y
Q UALIFYING CIRCUM S T A N C E . 712 and concubinage. 733
GENDER-BASED SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN Express or implied Consent in Adultery
THE WO R K P L A C E OR ED U C A T IO NAL AND or Concubinage . 734
TRAINING INSTITUTI ONS . 713 Suggested answer 735
ANTI-PHOTO AND VIDEO VOYEURISM ACT OF 2009 PROSE C U T ION OF SEDU C T ION, ABDUCT ION, OR
(R.A. NO. 9995) . 718 A CTS OF LASCIVIOUSNE S S 735
Reasonable expectationofprivacy. 714 Complaint 735
Other crime. 714 Right to file complaint. 736
1. V i c t i m i s an adult
QUALIFIED SEDU C T ION .. 715 2. V i c t i m is a minor
1. Off e n der 3. Par e n t s of the minor victim
2. O ffended Party 4. Gr a n d p arents and guardian
3. Se x u a l I n t ercourse 5. St a t e
S IMPLE SEDU C T IO N . 717 Express pardon in seduction, abcuction, or
1. Off e n ded Party acts of lasciviousness. 738
2. Se x u al Intercourse Express pardon. 789
3. Dec e i t Consent in seduction, abduction,
or actsof lasciviousness.. 740
C ONSE N T ED ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNE S S . 720 Rape is a public crime 740
Seduction, Rape and Sexual Abuse 720 Mode of barring Criminal Prosecuticn for Crimes
1. M in o r i t y Against Chastity 740
2. V ir g i n i t y Private Pardon and Executive Psrdcn 741
3. Te a c her
4. Fat h e r M ODES OF CRIMINAL EXTINCTION IN CRIM E S
5. Pr om i s e to Marry AGAINST CHASTITY 742
Marriage in Seduction, Abduction,
F ORCIBLE ABD U C T I O N . 724 or Acts of Lasciviousness. 742
Abduction 724 Marriage in Rape..... ...... 742
Lewd Design 725 Valid Marriage. 743
Against the Will or Under 12 Years of Age. 726 Marriage m Bad Faith 743
Forcible Abduction absorbs attempted rape .......
. . . . . . . 726 Modes of Barring Criminal Prosecution and Modes
Forcible Abduction cannot absorb Rape 727 of Criminal Extinction. ..................................... 744
Rape absorbs ForcibleAbduction 727 Death ofthe offended party 745
Complex crime of rape through forcible abduction..... 727 Pari delicto. 745
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 CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY .... 745 SUBSTITUTION OF CHILD . 761
L IABILITY BY ASCEND A N T S AND OT H E R S 746 USUR P A T ION OF CIVIL STATUS. 761
C HILD PROSTITUTION AND SEXUAL ABU S E BIGAMY 762
UNDER R.A. NO. 7610. 746 Events Subsequent to the
1. Ch i l d
Consummation of Bigamy. 762
2. L as c i vious Conduct Declaration of Nullity of the First
8. In te r v ention of third person or Previous Marriage. 763
4. Coe r c ion or Infiuence
1. Ps y chological Incapacity
5. Coe r c ion or Infiuence employed by the offender
2. Bi g a m ous Marriage
6. Co n s ent of the victim 3. L a c k of License or Affidavit of Cohabitation
7. A l l e g ations
4. I nc e s tuous Marriage
The Penalty for Child Prostitution and Sexual Abuse.... 749 5. Ar t i c l e 40 is Procedural
SEXUAL ABUSE AND RAPE OR ACTS OF 6. De c l a r ation of Nullity Before Criminal Institution
LASCIVIOUNESS. 750 Exceptions 767
Non-application of Article 48 of the Declaration of Nullity of Second or
Revised Penal Code. 750 Subsequent Marriage 766
Prosecution for single crime. 751 1. Ps y chological incapacity
Prosecution for the graver crime. 751 2. L a c k of Marriage License
1. Se x u al abuse, and sexual assault or acts Exception 767
of lasciviousness Subsequent Annulment ofSecond Marriage ................................. 767
2. Se x u al abuse and rape Presumption of Death . 768
Divorce Obtained by a Foreign Spouse . 768
SPECIAL RULES IF THE VICTIM OF SEXUAL ABUSE Adultery, Concubinage, and Bigamy.. 770
AND RAPE OR ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSN ESS IS UNDER 1. Co n c ept
12 YEARS OF AGE 753 2. Numb e r of crimes
Raping a child exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse, 8. Cr i m i n al Prosecution
who is under 12 years of age. 758 4. Offended Party
1. Ra p e 5. Se c ondary Offender
2. Qualified sexual assault
Committing lascivious conduct against a child exploited I LLEGAL MA R R IA G E 771
in prostitution or sexual abuse, who is under
PERFO R M A N C E OF ILLEGAL MA R R IAGE CER E M O N Y .... 773
12 years of age . . . . ........... 754
. . . . . . .

1. Ac t s of lasciviousness. 754 D ECRIMINALIZATION OF PREM A T U R E M A R R I AGE .....

... 774
2. Sim p l e sexual assault 755
The Chingh principle is not applicable to qualified sexual assault....756 XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
Designation of crime 756
DEFAMATION .
S EXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WO M E N
UNDER R.A. NO. 9262 759 E LEM E N T S OF DEFA M A T I O N . 775
Defamatory Imputation . 775
XII. CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS Malice 776
1. Mal i ce in Law
SIMULATION OF BIRTH 760 2. M al i c e in Fact
Attempted Child Trafficking or Attempted Trafficking Publicity. 777
in Person.. 760 Identifiable Offended Party 779
Child Trafficking . 761
Qualified Trafficking in Person LIBEL OR WRITTEN DEFA M A T ION .. 781
761
Means to commit defamation. 781
Persons Responsible for Libel. 781
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 CYBER LIBEL . P ROHIBITED PUBLICATION . 816

MU LTIPLE PUBLICATIONS RULE .. 783 INCRIMINATING AN INN OCENT PERSON ..................,.... 816
Libel, Not a Continuing Crime 784 Not Constituting Perjury. 817
Planting Incriminatory Evidence . 817
S LANDER OR ORAL DEF A M A T I O N 784 Complex Crime. 817
Grave orSimple Slander. 785 Malicious Prosecution and Incriminatory Machination.... 818
Putang Ina Principle 786
Publicity 787 INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR . 819
Single Defamatory Statement Against Several Persons........... 788 Gossiping.. 819
Two Distinct Defamatory Statements Scheme or Plot 820
Against Two Persons 788 Expression of Opinion 821
Several defamatory statements
Against a single person . 789 XIV. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Privileged Communication. 789
1. A b s o l ute Privileged Communication R eckless Imprudence Resulting in Arson . . . 822
2. Qualified Privileged Communication Simple Negligence Resulting in Alarm and Scandal.... 823
Privileged Private Communication . Discharging Firearm. 823
791
1. Co m m u n icating Complaint to the Right Person Murder 825
2. In d i s criminately Communicating Complaint No Reckless Imprudence Resulting
Privileged Communication of a Fair and True Report............. in Frustrated Homicide. 825
795
1. Re p o r t Doctor. 825
2. No R e m arks Pharmacist. 827
Private Communication and Fair and True Report ................. Overtaking. 828
795
Fair Commentaries . Contributory Negligence. 828
796
1. El e m e nts of Fair Commentaries Last Clear Chance Rule 828
2. Pub l i c Figure Emergency Rule 829
Mamasapano case.. 829
3. Pu b l i c Aspirant
Fair and True Report and Fair Commentary........................... 803
Good Motive and Truthfulness 803
1. Go o d Motive
2. Go o d Motive and Truthfulness
3. Tr u t h f u l ness
Defamation Against Public Officer
and Private Individual 806
Defensive Libel 808
Venue for Written Defamation 809
P RIVATE LIBEL . 812
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 08-2008..... 812
SLANDER BY DEED 813
Slanderous Actions .. 814
Publicity 814
Serious orSimple Slander by Deed. 814
Maltreatment, Slander by Deed, and Direct Assault.... 814
Less Serious Injuries and Slander by Deed 815
Unjust Vexation and Slander by Deed 815
THREA T E N ING TO PUBLISH LIBEL 816

xlviii xlix

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 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
BOOK TWO
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW OF NATIONS

TREASON
Treason is committed by any Filipino citizen or an alien residing
in th e P h i l i p p i n es, wh o s h al l l e v y w a r a g a i ns t t h e P h i l i p p i n es
o r adhere to he r e n e mies giving t h e m a i d o r c o m fort w i t h i n t h e
Philippines or elsewhere. (Article 114; 1946 Bar Exam)
Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be
committed in peace time. While there is peace, there are no traitors.
(Laurel v. Misa, G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947)

F ilipino Ci t i zen an d R e sident A l i e n

Treason is a breach of allegiance and can only be committed by
a person who owes allegiance either perpetual or temporary. (52A m
Jur 796) Allegiance means obligation of fidelity and obedience which
individuals owe to the government under which they live, or to their
sovereign in return for the protection which they receive. (Laurel v.
Misa, supra)
A citizen owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity
and obedience to hi s government o r s overeign. Th e absolute and
permanent allegiance of the citizens to their legitim ate government
or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy [Japanese]
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign
de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier [Japan]. (Laurel v.
Misa, ibid.)
A foreigner owes temporary allegiance to the government of the
place wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives. Such

J9JC9B0M
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
temporary allegiance continues during th e period of his residence.
If an alien, while residing in a f or eign country, does an act, which
w ould amount to t r eason if commit ted by a citizen of that countr y ,
he will b e h el d l i a ble for t r e ason. (52 Am J u r 79 7 ) F u r t h e r m o re,
Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code punishes a resident alien for
committing treason. (2012 Bar Exam)
L evying War , an d G i v in g Ai d an d C o m f o r t
L evying of war r e quires an actual assemblage of men for t h e
purpose of executing a treasonable design by force. (52 Am Jur
799) Actual assemblage or g a th ering of m e n t o l ev y w a r a g a i n st
the government or t o fi gh t t h e g overnment f orce in a d h erence to
its enemy consummates the crime of treason. However, actual arm
e ncounter, or gun battle between the government forces and t ait or s
is not required.
The phr a se "giving ai d a n d c o m f o rt" m e a ns a n a c t w h i c h
strengthens or tends to strengthen the enemy, and weakens or tends
to weaken the power of the tr a i t or's country, in th e conduct of war
between them. (C ramer v. U . S., 65 Sup. Ct. 918) Commandeering
foodstuffsfrom civilian populace for the Japanese soldiers is treason.
Food supplies are indispensable in the conduct of war. Insufficiency
of food supplies tends to weaken th e m i l i t ar y p ower of th e enemy
[Japan]. (see: People v. Ma n g ahas, G.R. Nos. L-5867 and L - 5 8 68,
June 9, 1958) However, commandeering women to satisfy the l us t
o f the Japanese officers is not tr eason. Enemy soldiers can fight i n
a war with or w i t h out sex. Providing sex services to enemy soldiers
did not tend to improve war efforts ofthe Japanese imper'al army
or to weaken the power of th e U n i t ed St ates. (see: People v. Perez,
G.R No. L-856, April 18, 1949) In this case, the crime committed is
trafficking in persons.
Aggravat ing C i r c u m s t a n c es
T reachery and abuse of superior strength are by their n a t u r e ,
inherent in the offense of treason and may not be taken to aggravate
the penalty. (People v. Adl a w a n, G. R. No. L-456, March 29, 1949
Evident premeditation is inherent in treason because adherence and
) of adherence to t h e e n e my . T h u s , t h e t e s t i m ony o f on e w i t n e ss
the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is a long, continuec process
requiring for the successful consummation of the traitor's purpose a
fixed, reflective and persistent determination and planning. (People
v. Racaza, G.R. No. L-865, January 21, 1949) However, the penalty
f or treason may b e a ggravated by th e c i r cumstance of cruelty b y
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW OF NATIONS
deliberately augmenting the wr ong by being unnecessarily cruel to
captured guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to barbarous forms of
torture and fi n a ll y p u t t i n g t h e m t o d e ath, or t h a t o f i g n ominy by
arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect and then stripping his
wife of her clothes and then abusing her together with other Filipin o
girls. (People v. Adlawan, supra; 2012 Bar Exam)
Two-wit n ess Rule
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony
of two witnesses atleast to the same over act or on confession of the
accused in open court. (Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code)
To meet the t est u n der th e t w o -w i t ness rule, it i s n ecessary
that, at least, two wit nesses should testify as to the perpetration of
the same treasonous overtact. (People v. Agpangan, G.R. No. L-778,
October 10, 1 947) Th r ee w i t n e sses testified t h a t a c c used burne d
different houses on the same day. However, the w i t n esses did not
see the accused burned the same house. Accused was acquitted for
lack of compliance with t h e t w o -wi t n ess rule. (People v. Gonzales,
G.R. No. L-710, March 5, 1948) However, the accused can be held
liable for arson.
I t i s n o t h o w e ver r e q u i re d t h a t t h e t e s t i m on y o f t h e t w o
witnesses must be identical. Although there may not be corroboration
between the two prosecution wit n esses on the points they testified,
yet when the wit nesses are uniform in t h eir t estimony on the overt
act of treason charged, the two-witness rule is complied with. (People
v. Concepcion, G.R. No. L-1558, October 25, 1949) A witness testified
that he heard a gunshot, and saw smoke emitt in g from th e gun of
the accused whil e t h e v i c ti m f e ll . A n o t her w i t n e ss, who i s d e af,
testified that t h e accused raised and pointed th e gun, an d smoke
puffed from it. The testimony of both would certainly be to the same
overt act. (See: Hauft v. U.S., 67 S. Ct. 874; The Revised Penal Code
by CA Justice Luis Reyes)
Testimony of two witnesses is needed to prove overt act of
giving aid and comfort to the enemy but not to establish the element
is enough to pr ove that t h e accused is a m e mber of Ma k a pi l i, a n
organization of traitors, to show that he is adhering to the Japanese
Imperial Ar my. (People v. Rosas, G.R. No. L-2958, March 16, 1951)
T wo-witness r u l e i s n o t a p p l i c abl e i f t h e r e i s a j u d i c i a l
confession. On the other hand, extraj udieial confession is not enough
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
to convict the accused for treason. (Alarcon, G.R. No. L-407, July 28,
1947) At l east tw o w i t n esses must st il l t e stify on t h e over, act of
treason as a pre-condition for his conviction.
Two-witness rule is not applicable in proving crime other than
treason such as conspiracy or proposal to commit treason, misprision
of treason or conspiracy to commit rebellion. (2018 Bar Exam)
In Pe ople v. C l o r e s, G . R. N o . 8 2 3 6 2, A p r i l 2 6 , 1 9 9 0 , t h e
testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to
support a criminal conviction for murder. The fact that his testimony
i s uncorroborated will no t d e t r act f rom it s cr edibili ty . Th ere is no
law which requires that the testimony of a single witness h" s to be
corroborated, except where expressly mandated as in tre ason where
t he testimony of a t l e ast t w o w i t n e sses to th e s ame overt ac t i s
needed.
P ROP O S A L OR CO N S P IRACY TO CO M M IT TREASO N
Proposal o r c o n spiracy t o c o m mi t t r e ason i s c o m m i t t ed b y
Filipino citizen or resident alien, who has decided to commit treason
and proposes its execution to some other person or persons. (Article
115)
C onspiracy to commi t t r e a son is commi t ted by t w o o r m o r e
Filipino citizens and/or resident aliens, who come to an agreement
c oncerning th e c o m m i ssion o f t r e a son an d d e cide t o c o m mi t i t .
(Article 115)
A ppointm e n t
Mere possession of an appointment as officer of the enemy of the
State is not an evidence of a crime. (U.S. v. Manalo, G.R. No. L-2723,
August 9, 1906) Mere acceptance of the commission as officer of the
enemy of the State is not an evidence of treason. But the acceptor can
be held liable for a lesser crime. (U.S. v. Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 1484,
February 28, 1 904) At tending a m e e ting w h e re conspiracy to levy
war against the government was hatched, acceptance of appointment
as officer of the armed forces to be raised for the fur t h erance of the
designs of the conspirators and assumption of obligation as officer
constitute the crime of conspiracy to commit treason by levying war.
(U.S. v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-2189, November 8, 1 906)
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND I AW OF NATIONS
M emb er s h i p
Treason by levying war requires actual assemblage of men for
purpose ofexecuting a treasonable design by force. Ifthere is actual
assemblage of men for treasonable purpose, there istreason even
though there is no actual clash of arms. (Crimin al L aw C onspectus
by Justice Florenz Regalado)
In t r e ason by g i v i n g a i d a n d co m f o rt, m e m b e rship i n a n
organization established toadhere to the enemy by giving it aid and
comfort is treason. Being a member of organization of trait ors (e.g.,
Makapili o rg anization) is in i t s elf constituti ve of an overt act. It i s
not necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the punishment,
that th e m e mber a c t u ally w en t t o b a t t l e o r c o m m i t ted n efarious
acts against his country or countrymen. The cri me of t r e ason was
committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side
with him when the opportune time came even though an opportunity
never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the
enemy aid an d comfort. Th e enemy derived psychological comfort
in the knowledge that he had on his side citizens of the State with
which it was at war. It fur ni shed the enemy aid in that his cause was
advanced, his forces augmer ted, and his courage was enhanced by
the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused and
his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The practical
effect of it was no different from that of enlisting in the invader's army.
(People v. Adriano, G.R. ¹. L- 4 7 7 , June 30,1947)
In sum, joining the Makapili organization during World War I I
is treason by giving aid a nd c omfort. If u pon receiving information
that the American forces are coming, the members of Makapili sid e
by side with the Japanese soldiers assembled and established a line
of defense in an i s l and, they ar e l i able for t r e ason by levying war
against the government. Ac tual a r m e d b a t t l e w i t h t h e A m e r i c an
forces is not required to consummate the crime of treason by levying
war.
D octrine of Absorpt i o n
1. P r op o s a l —I f a p e r s on to w h o m t h e p r o p osal is m a d e
does not agree tocommit treason, the proponent shall be held liable
for the "crime of proposal to commit treason."
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
2. C o n s piracy —
If a person to whom the proposal is made
agrees and decides to commit treason, said person and the proponent
shall be held liable for the "crime of conspiracy to commit treason;"
t he pr oponent c a n not b e s e p ar ately h el d I ' a bl e f o r p r o p osal t o
commit treason sinceconspiracy to commit treason absorbs proposal
to commit tr eason.
3. T r e a s o n —If the p e rson to whom t he p r o posal is made
actually commits the crime of treason, said person and the proponent
as conspirators are liable for the "crime of treason"; the proponent is
also considered as principal by i n d ucement; the conspirators could
not be heldliable for treason and conspiracy to commit treason since
former absorbs the latt er. Conspiracy in t hi s case is just a mode of
incurring collective criminal li ability for tr eason.
Offenders
To be heldliable for conspiracy to commit treason, the offenders
must be in th e position to commit t r e ason. Since treason can onl
be committed by F i l i p in o cit i zen and r esiden: al i en, th e offenders
in conspiracy to commit t r e ason must l i k e w ise be Fi l i p ino citizen
and resident a l i en . I f a F i l i p i n o c i t i zen an d a J a p a n ese touri st
during World War II conspired to help the Japanese Imperial Arm
my
t o defeat the Am erican forces, they are not li able for conspiracy to
commit treason.
Peacetime and Wartime Crime
According t o C A J u s t ice L u i s R eyes, conspiracy or p r o posal
to commit tr eason is committed in t i me of war. However, according
to Justice Florenz Regalado, the crime of proposal or conspiracy to
commit treason or misprision o f treason can be committed in peacetime
although they are more often wartime offenses. If offenders conspired
to levy wa r a g a i nst t h e P h i l i p p in e G overnment, in a d h erence to
its war enemy, th e p l o t t ers ar e l i a ble for th e c r im e of conspiracy
to commit t r e a son even t h o ug h t h e co n s piracy w a s h a t c h ed i n
peacetime.
Group of armed men seized a southern island of the Philippines
and declared war against the government. X, a Filipino, and, Y, a
citizen of Rwanda, agreed to help the armed men by raising funds in
support of their armed struggle.X and Y are not liableforconspirac
spiracy
to commit tr eason for the following reasons:
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW OF NATIONS
1. T h e a r m e d m e n , w h o s e i zed a s o u t h er n i s l an d o f t h e
Philippines, are liable for rebellion by rising publicly and taking
u p arms to r e m ove a southern i s l and of th e P h i l i p p i nes from t h e
allegiance to Republic of the Philippines and its laws. (see: Lagman
v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 28 1658, Ju ly 4, 2 0 17) Thus, agreeing and
deciding tohelp the rebels by raising funds constitutes conspiracy to
commit rebellion, and not conspiracy to commit tr eason.
2. T r e a s on and conspiracy to commit treason are war crimes.
They cannot be committed in t i mes of peace. The war contemplated
i n tr eason an d c onspiracy t o c o m mi t t r e a son p er t ains t o a r m e d
disputes between the Philippines and a foreign state, and not a mere
civil war. Since the Philippines is not at war w i th a foreign state, X
and Y cannot be held liable for conspiracy to commit tr eason.
3. Y , f o r not being a Filipino citizen or a resident alien, cannot
c ommit t r e ason; hence, Y c a nnot c onspire w it h X i n c o m m i t t i n g
treason. (2018 Bar Exam)
MISPRISION OF TREASON
Misprision o f t r e ason i s c o m m i t t e d b y a p e r s o n w h o o w e s
a llegiance to th e P h i l i p p i nes, wi t h out b e in g a f o r eigner, who h a s
knowledge of any conspiracy against them, and shall conceal or
shall not disclose and make known the same, as soon as possible
to the governor, mayor or fiscal of the place in which he resides.
(Article 116)
M isprision of other c r i m e
Misprision of rebellion, coup d' etat or sedition is not punishable.
Failure of a priest to disclose information given by a confessant
pertaining t o c o n spiracy t o c o m mi t r e b e l lion i s n o t p u n i s h able.
Misprision of r ebellion i s no t a c r i m e p u n i shable under th e book
of statutes. Nu l l um c r i m en n u l la p o e na sine lege. Moreover, non-
disclosure of such in f or m ation by th e p r i est i s du e to i n superable
cause, which is an ex empting circumstance, because confession is
confidential, and he has an obligation to the Church not to reveal the
same. (1994 Bar Exam)
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Filipino cit i zen as offender in m i s p r i sion of tr e a son
Th e offenders in treason and conspiracy or proposal to commit
treason are Fi l i p ino citizen and a r e sident ali en. (2018 Bar Exam)
On the other hand, the offender in misprision of treason is a Filipino
citizen. The phrase 'person who owes allegiance to the Philippines,
without being a foreigner" in Art i c le 116 of the Revised Penal Code
p ertains t o a F i l i p i n o c i t i z en. H e nce, an a l i en , r e sident o r n o n -
resident, cannot commit mi sprision of treason.
A , a Fil i p in o ci t i zen, and B, a r e s i d e nt a l i e n, w e re p r e sent
w hen X, a F i l i p in o c i t i zen, an d Z , a r e s i dent a l i en, conspired t o
commit treason. However, A and B did not disclose the information
regarding such conspiracy toproper authorities.Xand Z are liable for
conspiracy to commit treason. A is liable for misprision of treason. B,
for not being a Filipino citizen, is not liable for misprision of treason.
C oncealmen t o r no n - d i s closur e o f c o n s p i r ac y t o c o m m i t
treason
In misprision of tr eason, a Fili p ino citizen obtains knowled
we ge
of j cco n s piracy to commit t r e ason"by a F i l i p i no c it i z en or r e s ident
alien but he failsto report the matters to proper authorities. (1965
Bar Exam) During the Japanese occupation, one could not commit
m isprision o f t r e a son s i n c e t h e r e a r e n o a utl orities t o
whom
information o n c o nspiracy t o c o m mi t t r e a son could b e r e p orted.
The puppet government headed by President Lau"el was under the
Japanese.
Misprision of treason cannot be committed without conspiracy
to commit t r eason. Thus, failur e to disclose information regarding
t he location of t h e f o od, supplies, and a rm s o f t h e e n emy i s n o t
misprision of treason. (1968 Bar Exam)
Concealment or n o n - d isclosure of tr eason
Under Act No. 292, misprision of treason is committed b
i e y on e ,
w o a s kn ow l e d ge of t r e ason against t h em ( g c vernment)," a nd
s hall conceal or s h al l n o t d i s close and m ak e k n ow n t h e s am e t o
proper authorit i es. The Revised Penal Code has
e pealed A t N .
292
9 2, bbut reenacted the provision on misprision of treason in Ar t i cl e
1 16 thereof. H o w ever, t h e t e r m "knowledge of t r e ason a g a i n st
them" under Act N o . 2 92 w as r e placed by the t e rm "k n o w ledge of
any conspiracy against them." According to Lu is Reyes, the phrase
" aving knowledge of any conspiracy against them" has reference to
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW OF NATIONS
conspiracy to commit tr eason defined in Ar t i cle 115. In sum, failure
to disclose treason to p r oper a u t h o r i t ies i s m i s p r i sion of t r e ason
under Act Nc. 292, but not u n der A r t i cle 116 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Concealment or n o n - d isclosure of int ent to com mi t t r e a son
W hile th e P h i l i p p i nes i s i n a s t a t e o f w a r a g a i ns t C h i n a ,
"A," a F l i p i n o c i t i z en, obt ained k n o w l edge of a c o r r espondence
between "B," a C h i n ese General, and " C," an I t a l i a n c i t i zen, who
is a resident of the Phil i ppines, where the latter agreed to provide
vital information on th e m i l i t ar y d efense of the Phil i p pines to th e
Chinese government. However, " A" did not i m m e diately report th e
matter tc the proper authorit i es.
"C" for being a r e sident alien can commit t r e ason. Providing
military .'nformation to the war er emy of the Philippines is treason
by giving aid and comfort.. However, "C" did not commit an overt act
of treason. His intention to commit tr eason is not yet punishable.
"B" cannot commit tr eason since he is a Chinese citizen, who is
not residing in the Philippines. "B" for being a Chinese General owes
allegiance to China an d no t t o t h e P h i l i p p i nes. S i n ce "B" cannot
commit t r e ason, he cannot conspire w it h " C " t o c o m mi t t r e ason.
Hence, B and C are not liable for conspiracy to commit tr eason.
Since there is no conspiracy to commit t r e ason, A cannot be
held liable for misprision of treason. Moreover, A's failure to report
t o the a u t h or i t ies th e i n t e n t ion o f " C " t o c o m mi t t r e a son i s n o t
misprision of treason. (2010 Bar Exam)
ESPIONAGE
Espi onage i s com m i t t e d b y an y p er so n wh o , w i th o u t
a uthorit; t h e r efor, shall enter a w a r sh ip, fort or n a val or m i l i t a r y
establisl ment o r r e s e r v ation t o o b t a i n a n y i n f o r m a t i on, p l a n s,
p hotographs or other d at a of a confidential n a t ur e r e l ative to t h e
defc.nse ot the Philippines; or by a public officer, who shall disclose
to a representative ofa foreign nation the contents of articles, data
or information of a confidential nat ure relative to the defense of the
Phi ippines, which is in his possession by reason of his office. (Article
117; 2012 Bar Exam)
The differences between treason and espionage are as follows:
(1) treason is a war crime while espionage can be committed whether
 10 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
i n tim e of w a r o r p e a ce; (2) t r eason can only b e commi t ted by a
Filipino citizen or resident alien wh ile espionage can be committed
by a person regardless ofhis nationality or residency.
The foreign status of a political detainee does not exclude him
ipso facto from the scope of the law on espionage because this crime
is not conditioned by the citizenship of th e offender. (Go Tian Se h
Santos v. Misa, G.R. No. L-319, March 28, 1946; 1966 Bar Exam)
The c oncept o f e s p i o n age m ay b e e m b r a ced w i t h i n t h e
l egal contemplation o f t r e a s on. D i s closing c onfidential m i l i t a r y
information by a public officer to a representative of a foreign nation
is espionage. But d i sclosing such i n f or m ation i n a d h erence to an
enemy in times of war constitutes treason and not espionage.
(1966
Bar Exam)
Revelation of classified information involving national defense
is constitutive of the crime of espionage under Commonwealth Act
N o. 616. Revelation of c l assified i n f or m ation o n t e r r o r ism u n d e r
R .A. No. 11479 is punishable under Section 41 th ereof. The crim e
of unauthorized revelation of classified materials un der Section 41
of R.A. No. 11479 is committed any person, law enforcement agent
or military personnel, judicial officer or civil servant who. not being
authorized by the Court of Appeals to do so, reveals in any manner
or form any classified information under this Act.
INCITING TO WAR OR GIVING MOTIVES FOR REPRISAL
Inciting t o w a r o r g i v i n g m o t i ves for r eprisals i s c o mmi t t e d
b y any public officer or e m p l oyee or an y p r i v at e i n d i v i dual w h o
'P
by unlawful
l f or u n a u t h orized acts, provokes or gives occasion for a
war involving or liable to involve the Philippines or exposes Filipino
citizens to reprisals on their persons or property. (Article 118)
VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY
Violation of n e u t r a lity i s c o m m i t t ed by a n y o ne w h o, on t h e
occasion of a war in w h ich the Government is not involved, violates
any regulation i s sued by c ompetent a u t h or it y f o r t h e p u r p ose of
enforcing neutrali ty. (Art ic le 119)
C OR R E S P O N D E N C E W ITH HOSTILE COUNT R Y
Correspondence w ith h o s ti l e country i s c o m m i t t e d b y an y
p erson who, i n t i m e o f w a r , s h al l h a v e c orrespondence wit h a n
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW OF NATICNS
enemy country or territory occupied by enemy troops: (1) ifthe
correspondence has been prohibited by the Government; (2) if such
correspondence be carried on in ciphers cr conventional signs; (3) if
notice or information be given thereby which might be useful to the
e nemy; or (4) if t h e offender i n t ended to ai d th e enemy by gi v i n g
such notice or information. (Article 120,
F LIGHT TO ENEMY'S COUN T R Y
Flight t o enemy's country i s c o m m i t t ed by a n y p e r s on w h o ,
o wing allegiance to th e Government, at t e rr pt s t o flee or go t o a n
enemy country w h e n p r o h i b i ted b y c o mpetent a u t h o r i ty. ( A r t i c l e
121)
PIRACY
Piracy is committed by a ny p e rson wl o, not being a member
of complement of a vessel nor a passenger thereof, shall att ack or
seize itor, shall seize the whole or pa:t of the cargo thereof, its
equipment or personal belongings of its complement or passengers
on the high s eas, or i n P h i l i p p in e w a t ers. (Ar t i c le 122) Qualified
piracy is commit ted wh enever th e p i r a tes have seized a vessel by
boarding or firing upon the same; the pirates have abandoned their
victims without means of saving themselves or; it is accompanied by
murder, homicide, rape or physical injurie s. (Article 123)
ANTI-PIRACY LAW
P.D. NO. 532
P iracy under Section 2 of P .D . Nc . 532 i s commi t ted by a n y
person including a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel, who attacks upon or seizes a vessel, or takes away the whole or
part of the v ssel or its cargo, equipment. or the personal belongings
of its complement or p a ssengers by m e ans of v i olence against or
intimidatior o f p e r son, or force upon t h i ngs in P h i l i p p ine waters.
The offenders shall be considered as pirates. Qualified piracy under
Section 3 of P.D. No. 532 is commit ted when th e seizure of vessel
i s accomplished by fi r i n g u pon or b o ar ding a v essel; or when t h e
pirates abandoned the victims without. means of saving themselves;
or if rape, rrurder or homicide, physical injur ies or other crimes are
committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy. (Section 3)
Seizing the cargo and equipment of the vessel and the personal
belongings of the passenger by means of violence and inti m i d a tion
 12 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
in a river of a m u n i cipality constit utes piracy under P.D. No. 582.
(People v. Dela Pena, G.B. No. 219581, January 81, 2018)
Any person, who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects
pirates, or who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy,
shall beconsidered as an accomplice of the principal offenders, and
t hus, the p enalty p r escribed by P .D . N o . 58 2 fo r p i r acy sh all b e
graduated one degree lower.
Aiding or protecting pir ates includes giving them information
a bout t h e m o v e m en t o f p o l i c e o r ot he r p e a c e officers of the
government, or acquiring or r eceiving property t aken by pi r a tes or
in any manner derives any benefit therefrom.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts
o f an accomplice in p i r acy h a s p e r f ormed k n o w i n gly, u n l ess t h e
contrary is proven. (Section 4 of P.D. No. 882)
Piracy under the Revised Penal Code and Piracy under P.D.
No. 582
Similarities and differences between piracy under the Pievised
Penal Code, and piracy under P.D. No. 582 are as follows:
1. Cr i m i n a l A c t — The criminal act in both piracy under the
Revised Penal Code and piracy under P.D. No.582 is attacking upon
or seizing a vessel, or t a k in g a way or s eizing th e vessel, o" other
properties with in t ent to gain.
2. M o d e of Com m i ssion — In piracy under P.D. No. 532,
the seizure or t a k in g m u s t b e commi t ted by m e ans of vi olence or
intimidation against person, or force upon things (such as destroyin
eying
t he door of a vessel s room). On the other hand, the Revised Penal
Code has no t m e n t i o ned " b y m e a ns of v i o l e nce or i n t i m i dation
against person orforce upon things" as an element of or as a mode of
committing piracy.
In 2006 Bar Ex am, the offenders, who are from a vesse', took
properties from another vessel while the crew were sleeping. There
is no violence or in t i m i d a t ion against person or force upon th i n gs.
Thhe panel organized by UP Law Center suggested that the crime is
piracy under the Revised Penal Code.
Piracy under P .D. No. 582 is simi lar t o r o bbery w h il e p i r acy
under the Revised Penal Code is similar to theft or robbery.
8. O f f e n d e r — U n der t h e R evised Penal Code, a pi: at e i s
any person, who is not a member of complement of a vessel nor a
passenger thereof. In sum, a pirate must be an outsider. Under' P.D.
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY 13
AND LAW OF NATIONS
No. 582, a pirate is any person including a passenger or member of
the complement of the vessel. Thus, a pir ate can be an outsider or
insider.
4. V es sel —
Vessel for purposes of piracy under P.D. No. 532
refers to any vessel or watercraft used for t r a n sport of pa ssengers
and cargo from one place to another thr ough Philippine waters. But
it shall i n clude vessels or boats used in fi s h i ng. (1 977 Bar E x a m )
T hus, a s hi p o r v e ssel constitu t in g t h e d w e l l in g o f on e o r m o r e
persons is not a vessel within the meaning of P.D. No. 582.
The Revised Penal Code provides no definition of a vessel for
purposes of piracy. Hence, vesselfor purposes of piracy under the
Code is generic, and it is not confined to passenger, cargo or f ishing
vessel. However, under A r t i cle 301 of the Revised Penal Code, for
purposes of robbery by u s in g f o rce upon t h i n gs, a s hi p o r v e ssel
constituting the dwelling of one or more persons is considered as an
inhabited house.
If the ac "used used force upon thing (e.g., breaking the window)
to enter i n t o a r e s i d ential v e ssel, an d t h e r eafter, t ook p e r sonal
properties therein, the crime committed is piracy under the Code if
the accused is an outsider, or robbery by u sing force upon thing if
he is an insider. Accused is not liable for piracy under P.D. No. 532
since the crime i s not comm i t ted i n a p a ssenger, cargo or fishing
vessel.
5. Pl a c e o f C o m m i s s ion —In pira cy under P.D. No. 532,
the vessel where the crime is committed must be in Philippine
waters. P.D. No. 582 in defining "Phil i ppine waters" merely copied
the definition of t e r r i t or y u n der t h e 1 973 Constit u t i on. Since th e
1987 Constitution introduces changes in the definition of territory,
Philippine w a t er s u n de r P .D . N o . 5 8 2 m u s t n o w b e u n d e r stood
within th e context of t h e p r esent Constit u t i on. Ph i l i p pine w at er s
include national w a ter such as Pasig r i ver ( 1 977 Bar E x a m ), a n d
archipelagic waters such as those around, between, and connecting
the islands of the Philippine archipelago and the 12-mile territ orial
water such asManila Bay. (1970 Bar Exam) Beyond this point are
high seas forpurposes of piracy.
Before, in p i r acy u n der t h e R e v ised Penal Code, th e v essel
where the crime is commit ted must be on high seas. But R.A. No.
7659 amended Article122 of RPC by punishing piracy not only on
high seas but also in Philippine waters. Since Philippine waters has
a technical meaning under P.D. No. 532, it is presumed that R.A.
No. 7659 has adopted its concept in the definition of piracy.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
a. P h i li p p i n e Wa t e r s — I f p i r a c y i s c o m m i t t e d i n
Philippine w at ers such as th e P a sig River (1977 Bar E x a m ;
People v. Dela Pena, G.B. No. 21 9581, January 81, 2018), or
Manila Bay (1970 Bar Exam), the pirates can be prosecuted for
piracy under P.D. No. 582 whether the offenders are outsiders
or insiders provided that t h er e is vi olence or in t i m i d a t ion or
force upon things, or for piracy under the Revised Penal Code
provided that the offenders are outsiders.
If the acts constitute piracy under the Revised Penal Code
and piracy under P.D. No. 582, the accused can be prosecuted
for either of them. In People v. Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, August
3 0, 2001, t h e a c cused a r g ued t h a t R . A . N o . 7 6 5 9 , which
a mended Ar t i cl e 12 2 o f R e v i sed P enal C od e b y p u n i s h i n g
piracy in Ph i l i p p ines waters, impliedly repealed P.D. No. 532
on piracy in P h i l i p p ine w a t ers. The Supreme Court r e jected
s uch ar g u m ent . I t w a s h e l d t h a t R . A . N o . 7 6 5 9 n e i t h e r
superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under P.D.
No. 532. There is no contradiction between t' he provisions on
piracy under the Revised Penal Code and P.D. No. 582.A:I the
presidentialdecree did was to widen the coverage of thec alaw
w by
punishing piracy committed by a passenger and complement
o f the ship. For this reason, piracy under the Article lo2 f
Revised Penal Code and piracy under P.D. No. 582 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.
While piracy under P.D, No. 532 must be committed
by the principals in Philippines waters, the participation of
accomplice can be made on high seas or in f oreign waters. In
People v. Tulin, supra, the pirates boarded and seized a vessel
by means of violence and intimidation while in the Philippine
waters. They then directed the vessel to proceed to Singapore
w here th e c a r goes w er e u n l o aded, t r a n sferred an d s ol d t o
accused Hiong. Although P.D. No. 532 requires that the attack
and seizure of the vessel and its cargo must be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pi r ates of the vessel
and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy. Hence, the
participation of Hiong as an accomplice in receiving prope. ties
t aken by t h e p i r a t e s n eed no t b e c o m m i t te d i n P h i l i p p i n e
waters. As to the issue of jurisdiction, piracy is a crime against
the
h e law of nati ons and as such, it i s an exception to th e r u l e
on t e r r i t o r i a l it y i n criminal l a w . T h e e xtraterrit ori al i t y
principle applies even if Hi ong was charged with pi r acy under
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY 15
AND LAW OF NATIONS
a special law. Regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy
committed by a principal or accomplice is a universal crime or
crime against the whole world.
b. H i gh S e a s — If piracy is committed on high seas such
800 miles away from Apar ri , Cagayan, the pirates can only be
prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code. (2006and 2016 Bar
Exams) The 12-m-'le territorial water of a foreign country such
as Sabah (1986 Bar E x a m), or Ta i w an ( 2008 Bar E x a m) m a y
be considered as h ig h s eas because in Pe ople v. L o l - Lo a n d
Saratv, G.R. No. L - 1 7 958, February 2 7 , 1 9 2 2, t he S u p r e me
C ourt convicted the accused of piracy even th ough th e cri m e
is committed wit hi n th e t er r i t o r ial w a ter of islands under the
Dutch government. It was held that since piracy is a universal
c rime, it does not matter that the crime was committed with i n
t he ju r i s dictional t h r e e-mile l i m i t ( n o w 1 2 - m il e l i m i t ) o f a
foreign state.
P iracy on h i g h s eas u n der t h e R e v i sed Penal C ode i s
subject to t h e ex t r a territorial ity r u l e u n d er A r t i c le 2 o f t h e
Code and un i v e rsality p r i n c i p le u n d e r i n t e r n a t i o nal l a w .
Hence, the court has jurisdiction over this crime. But homicide
or murder committed not by a pi r ate but by a passenger, who
took advantage of the calamity brought about by piracy, is
subject to the flag state rule. Thus, the court of the State where
the vessel is registered has jurisdiction over this crime. (2008
Bar Exam)
The differericesbetween piracy on high seas and robbery
on high seas are as follows: (1) piracy on high seas is committed
by outsiders while robbery on th e h ig h seas is committed by
i nsiders; an d ( 2 ) p i r a c y i s s u b j ect t o e x t r a t e r r i t o r i alit y o r
universality principle under international law while robbery is
subject to the flag state principle. (1968 Bar Exam)
6. Qualifyin g C i r c u m s t a nce — Mu r d e r, h o m icide, rape,
and physical inj u r ies that accompanied piracy shall be considered
as components of qualified pir acy under A r t i cle 128 of the Revised
Penal Code. I n P . D . N o . 5 3 2 , m u r d er , h o m i cide, r a pe, physical
injuries, or any other crime committed as a result or on the occasion
of piracy qualifies the crime.
If while piracy was taking place, the pirates stabbed a member
of the crew while sleeping, the crime committed is qualified piracy.
(2006 Bar Exam) If several victims, who resisted, were killed in the
 16 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECUFITY 17
VOLUME II AND LAW OF NATIONS

course of piracy (1970 Bar Exam) or m u l t i p le m u r d e rs qualified by MUTINY

the circumstances ofby means of explosion accompanied piracy (2016
Bar Exam), th e cr im e commit ted i s q u a lified p i r acy. The nu m b e r
of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not m at eri al. The law
considers qualifiedpiracy as a special complex crime regardless of
the number of victims. (People v. Siyoh, G.R. ¹. L - 5 7 2 92, February
18, 1986; 2016 Bar Exam)
In the course ofpiracy, A, a passenger, taking advantage of the
confusion to settle an old grudge with B, ki l led him. The pirates are
liable for simple piracy wh ile A i s l i a ble for homicide. The pir ates
are not liable for qualified piracy since there is no direct connection
or intimate relationship between piracy and homicide. A killed B for
personal reason, which is unrelated and foreign to piracy. (1 986 Bar
Exam) However, if A w a s r e s isting t he p i r a t e s, and in t h e c ourse
thereof, he accidentally shot and k i l led B, the pir ates are liable for
qualified piracy while A is exempt from crim i nal li ability due to the
circumstance of accident. In t h i s case, there is a di r ect connection
between piracy and homicide.
S eizure of a v e ssel by b o a r ding or fi r i n g u p o n t h e s am e or
abandonment o f v i c t i m s w i t h ou t m e an s o f s a v in g t h e m selves is
a qualifying circumstance in piracy under P.D. No. 532 and the
Revised Penal Code. In a speedboat, accused fired a bazooka at the
bow of another vessel, boarded it a n d d i v ested th e p assengers of
their money and j ewelry, th e cr im e commit ted is qu alified pi r acy.
(2008 Bar Exam)
Piracy under PD
Piracy under RPC
No. 532
Attacking vessel
Seizing any properties
Violence or intimidation
Force upon things
Intent to gain
Mutiny is committed by a member of complement of a vessel or
a passenger tl ereof, who unlawfully resists a superior officer or raise
commotion or disturbance on board a vessel against the authority of
its commander on the high seas or in Philippine waters. (Article 122)
The differences between piracy and mut i ny a re as follows: (1)
i n piracy, the criminal act is tak in g or seizing property wit h i n t e nt
to gain; in m u t i ny , th e cr i m i nal act i s r e sisting th e au t h ori t ies in
t he vessel; (2) the concept of p i r acy i s si m i la r t o r o bbery or t h e f t
where intent to gain is an element; the concept of mutiny is similar
to coercion where intent to gain is not an element; and (3) in piracy
under the Revised Penal Code, the pirate must not be a passenger
or member of the complement of the vessel; however, in piracy under
P.D. No. 582, the pirate is any person; in muti ny, the mutineer must
be a passenger or a member of the complement of the vessel. (196'8
Bar Exam)
ANTI-HIJACKING LAW
R.A. NO. 6235
There are tw o k i n d s of h i j a cki ng, to u! it: hija cking i n v olving
Philippine aircraft and hijacking involving foreign aircraft.
P hilipp ine A i r c r a f t
Hjiacking is c o m m i t t ed by a p e r s o n, w ho c ompels a c ha nge
in the course or destination of an air craft of Phi l i p pine registry, or
seizes or usurps the control th ereof, while it i s i n fl i g ht . (2018 Bar
Exam) An aircraft is in flight from the moment all its external doors
are closed fol:owing embarkation un ti l an y of such doors is opened
for disembarkation. (Section 1 of R.A. ¹. 6' 2 8 5)
The concept of hijacking is similar to that of coercion or mutiny
and not of robbery, theft or pi r acy. Intent to gain is not an element
of hijacking.

Offender Outsider Outsider, Hijacker ordered the pilot to fly the airplane to Peking instead
passenger, crew of Davao, which was the plane's destination. Since the pilot refused,
PbillppineWaters t he accused shot hi m t o d e a th . Th e cr im e committed is h i j ackin g
Place of commission Philippine Waters since the h i j a cker compelled th e p i l o t t o c h a nge th e d estination
High seas
of the plane. Success in compelling a ch ange ot' destination is n ot
Same plus n ecessary to consummate the crime. Since the pilot is ki l led in t h e
Qualifying circumstance 3 circumstances commission of course of hijacking, the crime committed is qualified hijacking. (1975
other crime
Bar Exam)

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 18 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
"A" boarded an airplane at the Manila Domesti" Airport bound
for Davao City. While the airpl ane was still on t h t a r m a c , its door
is still open and waiting for the last passenger to board, "A" ordered
t he pilot at g u n p oint t o t ak e th e a i r p l ane to Singapore. When th e
pilot refused, " A" shot hi m t o d e a th . H i j a ck ing i s n o t c o m m i t t e d
since the aircraft is not yet in fl i g ht . Neither is attempted hijacking
committed. Arti cle 6 of the Revised Penal Code on attempted crime
will no t a p p ly . S i nce R .A . N o . 6 23 5 di d n o t a d op t t h e t e c h nical
nomenclature of the penalty of the Code, the intentior of the law is
not to adopt the penal provision under the Code including Ar t i cle 6
on attempted crime in relation to Article 51 on graduation of penalty.
Hence, the crime committed is murder. (1978 Bar 5'xam
)
O ffender comm i t te d h i j a c k in g o f P A L a i r p l a n e w i t h i n t h e
t erritory of Sa n F r a n cisco. The Ph i l i p pines for b eing a fl a g s t a t e
has territorial jur i sdiction over the crime of hijacking because of the
Hag state rule under Ar t i cle 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
h ijacking is a u n i v ersal cr i me; hence, all courts, including t ha t o f
the Philippines have jurisdiction applying the universality principle
under international law. (1971 Bar Exam)
Foreign Aircraft
Hijacking is li k e w i se committed by a person, who compels an
aircraft of foreign registry to l and in P h i l i p p ine terr i t ory, or seizes
o r usurps the control t h ereof wh il e i t i s w i t h i n t h e s aid t e r r i t o r y .
(Section 1 of R.A. No. 6285)
In hijacking involving Phili ppine aircraft, flight is an element.
I n hijacking of foreign air craft, fl i ght i s not an el ement. H i j ackin g
i nvolving P h i l i p p in e a i r c r af t i s s u b j ect t o t h e e x t r a t e r r i t o r i al i t y
p rinciple. In h i j a cking of foreign air craft fl i g ht , t e r r i t o r i al it y i s a n
element.
O ffender c o m m i t t e d h i j a c k i n g o f Ca t h a y P a c i f i c airplane
within the terr i t ory of San Francisco. Crime under R.A. No. 6285 is
not committed since the hijacking did not t ak e place while foreign
aircraft is wit hin the terr i t ory of the Philippines.
Qualified Hijacking
Q ualified hij acking i s c o m m i t t ed: (1) w h enev=r he ha s f ired
upon the p i l ot , m e mber of t h e c rew o r p a ssenge of the aircraft;
(2) whenever he h as e xploded or a t t e m p ted to e xp lode any b omb
o r explosive to destroy th e a i r c r a ft ; or ( 8) whenever th e cr im e i s
accompanied by m u r d er , h o m i cide, serious phys cal i n j u r i e s, or
rape.
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY 19
AND LAW OF NATIONS
"A" ordered the pilot to take the PAL airpl ane to Sabah instead
o f Cebu. The p i lot obeyed for a w h i l e , an d t h e n w r e stled w it h A
f or the possession of th e g u n . I n t h e s t r u g gle, A s hot an d k i l l e d
t he pilot. Th e cr im e commi t ted i s q u a l i fied hi j acking. Thi s i s n ot
a complex crime under A r t i cle 48 of the Revised Penal Code but a
special complex crime of hijacking with homicide since the law (R.A.
No. 6286) prescribes a sing le penalty f or c o m m i t t i ng t w o c r i m e s.
Moreover, an offense punishable under special law such as hijacking
cannot be made a component of a complex crime under A r t i cle 48
of the Code. (People v. Araneta, G.R. No. 24622, January 28, 1926;
1971 Bar Exam)
THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 2020
R.A. NO. 11479
B efore terrorism i s p u n i s h able u n der R .A . N o . 9 872 or t h e
H uman S ecurit y L a w . H o w e v er , S ection 5 6 o f R . A . N o . 1 1 4 7 9
expressly repeals R.A. No. 9872. Terrorism is now punishable under
R.A. No. 11479.
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 11479, terrorism is committed by
any person who, within or outside the Philippines, regardless of the
stage ofexecution:
(a) Engages in acts intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to any person, or endangers a person's life;
(b) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive damage or
destruction to a government or public facility, public place or private
property;
(c) Engages in acts i n t ended to cause extensive int erference
with, damage or destruction to critical infrastructur e;
(d) Develops, manufactures, possesses, acquires, tr ansports,
supplies o r u s e s w e a p ons, e x plosives o r o f b i o l o gical, n u clear,
radiological or chemical weapons; and
(e) Release of dangerous substances, or causing fire, Hoods or
explosions
w hen the p u r p ose of such act, by i t s n a t u r e an d context, i s
to inti m i d ate th e g eneral p u b li c or a s e gment t h e reof, create an
atmosphere orspread a message of fear,to provoke or influence by
intimidation th e government or an y i n t e r n a tional organization, or
seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic,
 20 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
or social structures of the country, or create a public emergency or
seriously undermine public safety.
Terrorism is composed of criminal act and cr i m i nal i n t e n t i on
(or purpose). For example, engaging in acts intended to cause death
person is the cri m i nal act w h il e i n t i m i d a t in g th e general public is
the criminal int ention.
I ntent to i n t i m i d at e th e ge n e ra l p u b l i c
P edro out of j e a l ousy t h r e w h a n d g r e n ade at h e r w i f e a n d
paramour. This i s not t e r r o r ism bu t a c o m plex crime of p a r r i cide
and murder. The reason behind the kil l i ngs is personal. There is no
intention to int i m i d ate the general public, create an atmosphere or
spread a m'essage of fear, or provoke or influence by intimid a tion the
government.
Pedro detonated a time bomb in LRT, and caused death and
serious bodilyinjury to several persons, endangers the lifeof others,
a nd causes extensive damage a critical infrastructure. By its natur e
and context, the bombing inti m i d ated the general public and created
an atmosphere or spread a message offear. This is terrorism. Direct
evidence that t h e p u r p ose of P e dro i s t o i n t i m i d at e t h e g e n eral
public is not required. The phrase "by its nature and context" means
t hat th e court ca n d e t er m in e t ha t t h e p u r p ose of th e offender i n
detonating a bomb is to inti m i d ate the general public by taking int o
consideration nature and context of criminal act.
In terrorism u n der R .A. No. 9872, a pr edicate crime such as
murder must c r eate a condition of w i d espread and ex t r aordinary
fear and panic among the populace. However, under R.A. No.11479,
widespread fear tothe populace is not an element of terrorism since
this crime can be committed although the intention of the terrorists
is merely to inti m i d ate "segment" of the general public.
I ntim i d at e th e gover n m en t o r i n t e r n a t i o na l gover n m e n t
The word "government" in RA N o . 11479 which the terrorist s
intend t o p r o v ok e o r i n fl u e nce b y i n t i m i d a t ion i n c l u des f oreign
government. The law uses the word "government" with out mak ing a
distinction between Philippine Government and foreign government.
I t is a well-known m a xim i n s t a t u t ory construction that w h ere th e
law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish.
The word "international organization" in R.A. No. 11479 which
th e terrorists int end to provoke or influence by int i m i d a t ion refers
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY 21
AND LAW OF NATIONS
t o an o r g anization e stablished b y a t r e a t y o r o t h e r i n s t r u m e n t
governed by international law and possessing its own international
legal personality. U n i t e d N a t io n an d W o r l d H e a lt h O r g a n ization
are international organizations.
P edro, a member of A l - Qaeda, detonated a t im e bomb in U S
E mbassy, M a n i la , a n d c a u sed d e at h a n d s e r i ou s b o dil y i n j u r y
t o several p e r s ons, e n d angers t h e l i f e o f o t h e r s , a n d c a u s es
extensive damage to an US government facility. Al -Qaeda claimed
responsibility and demanded that the US government should not to
interfere with th e affairs of the Mu sl im. This is terrorism since the
purpose of Pedro is to influence the US government by inti m i d ation.
T o constitute t e r r o r ism u n der R .A . N o . 9 8 72, m u r der m u s t
create a condition of fear an d p a ni c am ong th e populace in order
t o coerce the government t o g i v e i n t o a n u n l a w fu l d e m a nd. I n
t errorism u n der t h e ol d l a w , c r e atin g f ear t o t h e g e n eral p u b l i c
b y committin g m u r d er, and i n t ent t o coerce the government m u st
c oncur. H o w ever, u n d e r R . A . N o . 1 1 4 79 , t h e i n t e n t io n o f t h e
terrorist is eit her to i n t i m i d a te t he g eneral pub l ic, or to i n f l u e nce
the government t h r ough in t i m i d a t i on. The concurrence of intent to
intimidate the public and intent to infl uence the government is not
required in terrorism under the new law.
Pedro detonated a time bomb in LRT, and caused death and
serious bodily injury to several persons, endangers the life of others,
and. causes extensive damage a crit i cal i n f r a structure. This is not
t errorism u n der R .A . No . 9 872 because there is n o sh owing t h a t
P edro detonated th e b omb i n o r d e r t o c o erce th e government t o
give in t o a n u n l a w fu l d e m and such secession of M i n d anao fr om
the Philippines. However, this is terrorism under R.A. No. 11479
since by its nature and context, the bombing inti m i d ated the general
public and created an atmosphere or spread a message offear.
D estroyin g f un d a m e n t a l p ol i t i c a l , ec o n o m i c , or soc i a l
s tructur e s
Committing a criminal act described in Section 4 of R.A. No.
11479 such as actsintended to cause death to person for purpose of
seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic,
or social structures of the country is terrorism .
M embers of the CPP-NPA w age a civil wa r t o overthrow t h e
g overnment, an d r e p l ace i t w i t h c o m m u n is t g o v ernment. S i n ce
t here is public and a r med u p r i sing t o r e m ove the ter r i t ory of t h e
 22 CRIMINAL IMW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Philippines from t h e a l l e giance of th e F i l i p in o p eople t o p r esent
government and itslaws, they are liable for rebellion. Ifmembers of
the CPP-NPA detonated time bomb in LRT for purpose of destroying
the political and economic structure of the country from democratic
and capitalist government to communist government, they are liable
for terrorism.
Creating a p u b li c em e r g e ncy or s e r i o usly un d e r m i n e p u b l i c
safety
Release of dangerous substances such a biological weapon that
creates a public emergency or seriously undermine public safety is
terrorism.
Terrorism is comm i t te d r e g a r d l ess of stage of execution
Pedro, a member of Al-Qaeda, set a time bomb in US Embassy,
M anila, t o e x p l od e a f t e r t w o h o u r s . H o w e v er , t h e authorities
d iscovered th e b om b a n d d e f u sed it . E v e n t h o ug h t h e s t a g e o f
executing the cr i m i nal design to bomb th e U S E m b assy is m erely
attempted, the crime committed is terrorism.
E xclusionary p r o v i so
Terrorism under R.A. No. 11479 shall not include advocacy,
protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and
o ther similar ex ercises of civil an d p o l i t i cal r i g h ts, w h ich ar e n ot
intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to
endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety.
Mass action which caused incidental destruction of properties
and killing of police officers will not make all participators thereof
liable for terrorism. However, if the organizers deliberately organized
mass action to cause death or serious bodilyinjury to any person,
extensive damage or destruction to agovernment or public facility,
public place, or private property or critical infrastructure to infiuence
by intimi dation the government, the crime committed is terrorism.
PLANNING, TRAINING, PREPARING, AND F A C ILITATING THE
COMMISSION OF TERRORISM
A ny p e r son, w h o p a r t i c i p ates i n t he pl a n n i n g , t r a i n i n g ,
p reparation a n d f a c i l i t a t io n i n t h e co m m i s sion o f t e r r o r i s m ,
possessing objects connected with the preparation for the commission
o f terrorism, or collecting or mak ing documents connected with t h e
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW OF NATIONS
preparation of terrorism, is liable for the crime of planning, training,
p reparing, an d f a c i l i t a t in g t h e c o m m i s sion o f t e r r o r is m u n d e r
Section 6 of R.A. No. 11479.
Immediately afterthe "September-11" attack, foreigners were
arrested in B a y view H o tel for t a k i n g v i deo of U S E m b assy. They
found chemicals therein t ha t could be used in a b omb e.g. residue
of bomb-making materials. One of the suspects is in the passenger
manifest of one of the h i j acked planes used in th e suicide attacks
in New Y or k a n d W a s h i n gton D C . H o w ever, t hey w er e r e l eased
for lack of evidence that t hey ar e i n v olved in t e r r ori sm. H owever,
if the incident happened today, they can be charged with cr im e of
planning, t r a i n i ng, p r eparing, an d f a cil i t a t in g t h e c om mission of
terrorism under Section 6 of R.A. No. 11479.
CONSPIRACY, PROPO S A L, AND INCITING TO COMM IT
TERRORISM
C onspiracy, proposal, an d i n c i t in g t o c o m mi t t e r r o r ism a r e
punishable under Sections 7, 8, and 9 of R.A. No. 11479. The concept
of conspiracy, proposal, and inciting to commit terrorism is the same
as conspiracy, proposal, and inciting to rebellion.
PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS
Providing material support t o t e r r o r i sts is committed by an y
person who provides material support to any terrorist in divi dual or
terroristorganization, association or group of persons committing
any of the acts constitut ing terrorism, knowing that such individual
or organization, association, orgroup of persons is committing or
planning to commit acts constituting terrorism shall be l i able
a s principal t o an y a n d al l t e r r o r ist a c t i v i t ies committed by s a i d
individuals or organizations. (Section 12 of R.A. No. 11479) However,
humanitarian activities undertaken by the International Committee
of the Red Cross, the Philippine Red Cross (PRC), and other state-
recognized impartial humanitarian partners or organizations in
conformity with the International Humanitarian Law, do not fall
within the scope of Section 12 of this Act. (Section 18 of R.A. No.
11479)
Material Support shall r efer t o an y p r operty, tangible or
intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments
o r fi n a n c ia l s e c u r i t i es , fi n a n c ia l s e r v i c es, l o d g i ng , t r a i n i n g ,
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
 24 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
identification, c o m m u n i cation s e q u i p m ent , f a c i l i t i e s, weapons,
l ethal substances, explosives, personnel (one or m or e i n d i v i du al s
who may be or i n c l ude oneself), and t r a n sportation. (' Section 8 of
B.A. No. 11479)
R ECRUITMEN T TO A ND M EM B E R S H I P I N A T ER R O R I S T
ORGANIZATION
T he cr im e o f r e c r u i t m en t t o te r r o r i s t o r g a n i zation u n d e r
Section 10 of R.A. No. 11479 is committed by any perscn, who shall
recruit another to participate in, join, commit or support:
1. A n y t e r r o r ism or a terrorist in divi dual ;
2. A n y o r g a n i zation organized for the purpose of engaging in
terrorism
3. A n y t e r r o r organization designated by the United Nations
Security Council (e.g. ISIS, Abu Sayyaf group, and Al Qaida); and
4. A n y t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i zation p r oscribed b y t h e C o u r t o f
Appeals.
Membership in terr orist organization under Section 10 of R.A.
N o. 11479 is commi t ted by an y p e rson wh o shall v o l u n t a r il y a n d
knowingly j oi n an y o r g a n i zation, association or g r ou p of p e r sons
knowing t ha t s u c h o r g a nization, association or g r ou p o f p e r sons
is proscribed by the Court ofAppeals, or designated by the United
Nations Security Council as a t e r r orist or ganization, or organized
for the purpose of engaging in terrorism
A proscribed terrorist organization is one, which commits any
of the acts penalized under this Act (e.g. providing material support
to terrorists)or organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism,
a nd which i s d e clared b y t h e C o ur t o f A p p e als a s t e r r o r ist a n d
outlawed organization t h r o ugh a p e r m anent or der of p r oscription
in accordance wit h S e ction 2 6 o f R . A . N o . 1 1 4 79. Such j u d i ci al
declaration s h al l b e m a d e u p o n a p p l i cation o f t h e D O J , n o t i c e,
and hearing. I t s h a l l b e th e bu r den of the applicant to pr ove that
t he respondent i s a t e r r o r is t a n d a n o u t l a wed or ganization. T h e
permanent order ofproscription shall be posted in a newspaper of
general circulation.
If the organization i s p r o vi ding m a t erial su pport. to terrorist
individual or organization, the former may be judicially declared as
an unlawful terr orist organization by the Court of Appeals.
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I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW OF NATIONS
The same p enalty f o r r e c r u i t m en t t o t e r r o r is t o r g a nization
s hall be i m p osed on an y p e r son wh o o r g anizes or f a cilit ates t h e
travel of individuals to a state other than th eir state of residence or
nationality for the purpose of recruitment wh ich may be committed
through any of the following means:
(a) R e c r u i t i n g an other person to serve in any capacity
in or with an armed force in a foreign state, whether the armed
force forms part ofthe armed forces of the government of that
foreign state orotherwise;
(b) P u b l i s h in g an advertisement or propaganda for the
purpose of recruiting persons to serve in any capacity in or
with such an armed force;
( c) P u b l i s h in g a n a dv e r t i s e men t or p r op a g a n d a
containing any i n f o r m a t ion r el at in g t o th e p l ace at w h ich or
the manner in w h ich persons may make applications to serve
o r obtain i n f o r m a t ion r e l a t in g t o s e r v ice i n a n y c a pacity i n
or with such ar m ed f orce or relati ng to t he m a n n er in w h i c h
persons may travel toa foreign state for the purpose of serving
in any capacity in or with such armed force; or
( d) P e r f o r m in g a n y o t h e r a c t w i t h t h e i n t e n t io n o f
facilitating or promoting the recruitm ent of persons to serve in
any capacity in or wit h such armed force.
FOREIGN TERRORIST
The crime of foreign terrorist is commit t ed: (1) by any person
who travels or attempts to travel to a state other than his/her state of
residence or nationality, for the purpose of perpetrating, planning, or
preparing for, or participating in terrorism, or providing or receiving
terrorist tr ai n i ng; (2) by any person, who organizes or facilitates the
travel of individuals who travel to a state other than th eir states of
residence or nationality k n owing that such travel is for the purpose
of perpetrating, planning, training, or preparing for, or participating
in terrorism or providing or receiving terrorist tr ai n i ng; or (3) by any
person residing abroad who comes to the Philippines to participate
in perpetrating, planning, traini ng, or preparing for, or participating
in terrorism or provide support for orfacilitate or receive terrorist
training here or abroad.
 26 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10168
THE TERR O R ISM FINANCING PREV E NTION AND SUP P R E S S ION
ACT OF 2012 (RA NO. 10168)
R .A. No . 1 0 16 8 ( Th e T e r r o r is m F i n a n cin g P r e vention a n d
Suppression Act) punishes (1) financing of terrorism, (2) attempt to
commit the crime of financing of terrorism, (3) conspiracy to commit
the crime of financing of terrorism, and (4) dealing with pr operty or
funds of designated persons.
FINANCING OF TERRO R ISM
T he crim e o f fi n a n c in g o f t e r r o r is m i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y
p erson who, d i r e ctly o r i n d i r e ctly , w i l l f u ll y a n d w i t h o ut. l a w f u l
excuse, possesses, provides, collects or uses property or funds or
makes available property, funds or financial service or other related
services, by any means, with the unlawful and will ful in t ention that
they should be used or with the knowledge that they are to be used,
in full or in part : (a) to carry out or facilit ate the commission of any
terroristact; (b) by a terrorist organization, association or group; or
(c) by an individual terrori st. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 10168)
Any person who organizes or directs others to commit financing
of terrorism shall lik ewise be guilty of this offense. (Section 4 of R.A.
No. 10168)
H owever, f i n a ncing t e r r o r is m m a y c o n s t i t ut e t h e c r i m e o f
providing material support to terrorists under Section.12 of R.A.
No. 11479.
Criminal Act
T he c r i m i n a l a c t co n s t i t u t i n g fi n a n c in g o f t er r o r i s m i s
possessing, providing, collecting or using property or funds or
making available property, funds or financial service or other related
services connected with terr or i sm .
However, lawful excuse in committ in g the aforementioned act
is a defense since "without lawful excuse" is an element of financing
of terrorism.
Means
Financing of terrorism can be committed by any means.
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I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY 27
AND LAW OF NATIONS
I ntent or K n o w l e d g e
The act constitut ing financing of terrorism must be committed
with in t ention t h at p ro perty or services should be used or with t h e
knowledge that they are to be used:
1. To carry out orfacilitate the commission of any terrorist
act; or
2. B y a terroristorganization, association or group; or
3. B y a n i n d i v i d ual terr ori st .
Knowledge or i n t ent a s a n e l ement of f i n ancing of t e r r orism
may be established by direct evidence or inferred from the attendant
circumstances.
U se of property or ser v i c e
T he use of t h i s p r operty o r f u n d , o r s e r v ice to carr y ou t o r
facilitatethe commission of terrorism, or by terrorist organization
o r a terr orism m ade be i n f u l l o r i n p a r t . H o w ever, for a n act t o
constitute a crime of financing of terrorism, it shall not be necessary
that the funds were actually used to carry out a terrorist act.
Property or funds refer to financial assets, property of every
kind, w h e t he r t a n g i bl e o r i n t a n g i b le , m o v a bl e o r i m m o v a ble,
however acquired, and legal documents or instrum ents in any form,
including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such
funds or other assets, including, but no t l i m i t e d to , bank c r edits,
travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities,
bonds, drafts, or l e t t er s of c r edit , an d an y i n t e r est, di v i dends or
other income on or value accruing from or generated by such funds
or other assets.(Section 8 ofR .A. No. 10168)
Terrorist act
Terrorist acts, the carrying out or the facilitation of the
commission of which the property or service is being used, refer to
the following:
(1) T e r r o r i sm or any act in violation of Section 3 or Section 4
of the Human Security Act of 2007;
(2) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part
 28 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
in the hostilit ies in a situ ation of armed conflict, when the purpose
of such act,by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or
to compel a government or an int er n ational organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act;
( 3) A n y a c t w h i c h c o n st i t u tes a n o f f ense u n der t h i s A c t ,
that is withi n th e scope of any of the following treaties of which the
Republic of the Philippines is a State party:
(a) C o n v e n t ion for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft, done at The Hague on 16 December 1970;
( b) C o n v e n t ion fo r t h e S u p p r ession of U n l a w fu l A c t s
a gainst the Safety of Ci vi l A v i a t i on, done at M o n t r eal on 2 3
September 1971;
( c) C o n v e n t ion o n t h e P r e v ention an d P u n i s h ment of
Crimes against I n t e r n a t i onally P r otected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents, adopted by th e Ge n eral A s s embly of t h e
United Nations on 14 December 1973;
( d) I n t e r n a t i ona l C o n v ention a g a i ns t t h e T a k i n g o f
H ostages, adopted b y t h e G e n eral A s sembly o f t h e U n i t e d
Nations on 17 December 1979;
(e) C o n v e n t ion o n t h e P h y sical P r otection of N u c l ear
Material, adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980;
( f) Pr o t o col fo r t h e S u p p r ession of U n l a w fu l A c t s o f
V iolence a t A i r p o r t s S e r v i n g I n t e r n a t i onal C i v i l A v i a t i o n ,
s upplementary t o t h e C o n v e n t io n f o r t h e S u p p r e ssion o f
Unlawful A ct s a g ainst t h e S a fety of C i vi l A v i a t i on, done at
Montreal on 24 February 1988;
(g) C onvention fo r t h e S u p p r ession of U n l a w fu l A c t s
against the Safety of Mari t im e Navigation, done at Rome on 10
March 1988;
(h) P r o t o col for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf,
done at Rome on 10 March 1988; or
( i) I nt e r n a t i o na l C o n v ention f o r t h e S u p p r ession o f
T errorist Bombings, adopted by th e General Assembly of t h e
United Nat i ons on 15 D ecember 1997. ( Section 3 of A. A. N o .
10168)
The person, who committed the terrorist act,, can be held liable
for terrorism, murder, hijacking, piracy or any other crime.
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I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY 29
AND LAW OF NATIONS
Terrorist organization
Terrorist organization,association ora group of persons refers to
any entity owned or controlled by any terrorist or group of terrorists
that.: (1) commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts by any means,
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wil l f u l ly; (2) participates as an
accomplice interrorist acts; (3) organizes or directs others to commit
terroristacts; or (4) contributes to the commission of terrorist acts
by a group of persons acting with common purpose of furthering the
t errorist act where the contribution is made intentionally and wi t h
the aim of furt h er ing the terrorist act or wit h th e k n owledge of the
intention of the group to commit a t e r r o r ist act. (Section 8 of R. A.
No. 10168)
Terrorist
Terrorist r e f e rs t o a n y n a t u r a l p e r s on w h o : ( 1 ) c o m m i t s ,
or attempts, or conspires to commit t e r r o r ist a cts by an y m e a ns,
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wi l l f u l ly ; (2) participates, as a
principal or as an accomplice, in terrorist acts; (3) organizes or directs
others to commit terrorist acts; or (4) contributes to the commission
of terroristacts by a group of persons acting with a common purpose
w here the contribution i s m ade i n t enti onally an d w i t h t h e ai m o f
furthering the t err orist act or w i t h t h e k n o w l edge of the int ention
of the group to commit a terrorist act. (Section 8 of R.A. No. 10168)
DEALING WITH PROPERTY OF DESIGNATED PERSON
Dealing wi t h p r o p e rty o r f u n d s of designated p e r s ons i s
committed by any person who, not being an accomplice or accessory,
i n relation to any property or fund :
1. D ea l s d i r ectly or indirectly, in any way and by any means,
with any property or fund that he knows or has reasonable ground to
believe is owned or controlled by a designated person, organization,
association or group of persons, including funds derived or generated
from property orfunds owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by
a designated person, organization, association orgroup of persons;
or
2. M a k e s available any property or funds, or financial
services or other related services to a designated and/or identified
person, organization, association, orgroup of persons. (Section 8 of
B.A No. 10168)
 30 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Designated persons refers to:
1. A n y p e r s o n o r e n t i t y d e signated an d/or i d e n t i fied
a s a t e r r o r i st , o n e w h o fi n a n ces t e r r o r i sm , o r a t e r r o r i s t
o rganization or g r ou p u n de r t h e a p p l i cable U n i te d N a t i o n s
S ecurity C o u n ci l R e s olution o r b y a n o t h e r j u r i s d i ction o r
supranational juri sdiction;
2. A n y o r g a n i z ation, association, or gr oup of p ersons
proscribed pursuant to Section 17 of the H u ma n Security Act
of 2007 or any organization, association, orgroup of persons
o rganized for the pu r pose of engaging in t e r r ori sm, or w h i ch ,
although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts
to terrorize orto sow and create a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order
t o coerce the government t o g iv e i n t o a n u n l a w fu l d e m an d .
R egional T r i a l C o u r t m u s t d e c l ar e t h e o r g a n i zation a s a
terroristorganization.
3. A n y person, organization, association, or group of
persons whose funds or property, based on probable cause are
s ubject to seizure and sequestration u n der Section 39 of t h e
Human Security Act of 2007. (Section 3 of R.A. No. 10168)
Dealing, wi t h re g a rd t o p r o pe rty or f u n d s re f e rs to r e c eipt,
acquisition, t r a n s acting, r e p r esenting, concealing, disposing or
converting, transferring or moving, use as security ofor providing
financial services. (Section 3 of R.A. No. 10168)
"Making available property or funds, financial services or other
related services to designated persons, organizations, associations
or groups of p e r sons" s h a ll m e a n m a k i n g o r c a p a c ita ti ng s u c h
designated persons,organizations, associations or groups of persons
to obtain b enefit o r b e nefits f r o m p r o perty o r f u n ds , or f i n a n cial
services or other related services. (Implementing rules of B,A. No.
10168)
"Financial benefit" includes, but is not limited to, the discharge
of a financial obligation of such designated persons, organizations,
associations or groups of persons. ( Implementing ru l es of RA . N o .
10168)
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I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW OF NATIONS
CONSPIRAC Y TO C O M M I T T ER R O R I S M , F INA N C ING OF
TERRORISM OR DEALING WITH PROPERTY OF DESIGNATED
PERSON
Conspiracy to commit a c r i m e i s p u n i shable only i n c ases in
which the law specially provides a penalty th erefor. (Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code) Hence, conspiracy to commit terrorism, financing
of terrorism, ordealing with property or funds of designated persons
is punishable because Section 7 of R .A. No. 11479 or Section 5 of
R.A. No. 10168 specifically provides penalty for this crime.
There is conspiracy to commit terrori sm, financing of terrorism
or dealing with property or funds of designated persons when two (2)
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of such offense and decided to commit it . The concept of conspiracy
under R.A. No. 11479 and R.A. No. 10168 is the same as that under
the Revised Penal Code.
T he penalty fo r t e r r o r i sm, fi n a n cing of t e r r o r ism o r d e al i n g
with pr operty or f u n d s of designated persons is th e same as th at
prescribed for conspiracy to commit thi s crim e.
ATTEMPT TO CO M M IT FINANCING OF TERR O R ISM OR DEALING
W ITH PROPE RTY OF DESIGNATED PERS O N
Any attempt to commit fi n a n cing of terrorism or dealing with
property or f u n d s of designated persons is a c r im e u n der Section
5 of R.A. No. 10168. Since the word " a t t empt" wa s not defined by
law, the concept of attempted felony under Ar t i cle 6 of the Revised
Penal Code can be used in interpreting this word. Hence, there is an
attempt when the offender commences the commission of financing
of terrorism or dealing with property orfunds of designated persons
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which sl;ould produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The penalty for a t t e mpt t o commi t an y c r im e of fi n ancing of
terrorism or dealing w it h p r o perty cr f u n d s of designated persons
is two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated crime.
Terrorism under R.A. No. 11479 can be committed regardless of
stage ofexecution. Hence, there is no crime of attempted terrorism.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECUFITY 33
VOLUME II AND LAW OF NATIONS

ACCOMPLICE AND ACCESSORY provides that the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall apply
Principal, accomplice and accessory can be held iable for suppletorily t o t h i s A ct . M o r eover, offender can be h eld l i a ble for
financing terrorism, or conspiracy to commit financing of terrorism. obstruction of justice.
Principal and accessory can be held liable for terrorism. Section 14 of
R.A. No. 11479 and Sections 6and 7 ofR.A. No. 10168 have adopted Summary
the concept of accomplice and accessory under th e R evised Penal Conspiracy as a crime
Code. There i s no provision penalizing an accomplice for the crime
of terrorism since the act of an accomplice will be considered as the 1. T er r o r i s m
crime of providing material support to terrorists under Section 12 of 2. Fi n a n c i n g of terrorism
R.A. No. 11479.
3. D e aling with property ofdesigna-.ed person
Accomplice i s a n y p e r s on w h o , n o t b e i n g a p r i n c i p al o r a
conspirator cooperates inthe execution of terrorism, conspiracy to Attempted crime
commit t er r or i sm, fi n ancing of t e r r or ism or c onspiracy to commit 1 Fi n an c i n g of terrorism
financing of terrorism by previous or simult aneous acts.
2. D e aling with property ofdesignated person
Accessory i s an y p er s o n who, h a v in g k n o w l e dge o f t h e
commission of terrorism, conspiracy to commit terr ori sm, financing Note: Terrorism is committed regardless of stage of execution
of terrorism, conspiracy to commit financing of terrorism but without Accomplice or accessory
having participated therein as a principal, takes part subsequent to
its commission, by profiting from it or by assisting the principal or 1. Fi n a n c in g of terrorism
principals toprofit by the effects of the crime, or by conc aling or 2. Con s p i r acy to commit fi n ancing of terrorism
destroying the effects of the crime in order to prevent its discovery,
or by harboring, concealing orassisting in the escape of a principal 3. D ea l i n g w it h p r operty of designated person
of the crime shall be guilty as an accessory to the crime of financing 4. Con s p i r ac y t o c o m m i t d e a l i n g w i t h p r o p e rt y o f
of terrorism. designated person
R .A. N o . 9 3 7 2 p r o v i de s t h e exempting c i r c u m st ance of Accessory
relationship in f a vor of an a ccessory in t e r r o r ism or conspiracy to
commit t e r r o r i sm . H o w ever, R .A . No . 1 1 479 pr ovides no p erson, 1. T er r o r i s m
r egardless of relationship or affin i ty, shall be exempt from li abil i t y
as an accessory forterrorism. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9160
Under the Revised Penal Code and R.A. No. 10168,the penalty ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT OF 2001 (RA NO. 9160)
for accomplice and accessory is subject tothe rule on graduation
w hile R.A. No . 1 1 479 p r escribes a specific penalty fo r t e r r o r i sm Money laundering has been generally defined by the
committed by an accessory. I nternational C r i m i n a l P o l ice Or ganization ( I n t e rpol) as an y a c t
or attempted act to conceal or di sguise the identity of t he ill egally
R.A. No . 1 0 168 d oes no t p u n i s h a c complice an d a c cessory obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from
i n d e a lin g w i t h p r o p e rt y o r fu n d s of designated p e r s on and legitimate sources. (Republic of the Philippines v. Eugenio, G.R. No.
conspiracy to commit dealing wit h p r operty or f u nds of designated 174629, February 14, 2008)
person. However, since R.A. No. 10168 has adopted the t echnical
nomenclature of penalties of the Revised Penal Code, the provisions If the clothes are dirty, one must wash or launder them. If th e
on accomplice and accessory and the rules on gra.duation are deemed moneys are dirt y fo r h a v in g been obtained from u n l a w ful source,
adopted. (Simon doctrine) Furthermore, Section 21 of R.A. No. 10168 offender may wash or l a u n der them by t r a n sacting with t hem e.g.,

J9JC9B0M
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
d epositing them i n a b a n k , t h e r eby m a k in g t h e m a p pear t o h a v e
originated from legitimate sources.
S ection 7 c r e ates th e A M L C a n d d e fi nes it s p o w ers, w h i ch
generally re l a te to t h e e n f o rcement of t h e A M L A p r o v i s ions and
the initiation of legal actions authorized in the A ML A s uch as civil
forfeiture proceedings and complaints for the prosecution of money
l aundering o f f enses. I n a d d i t i o n t o p r o v i d in g f o r t h e d e fi n i t i o n
a nd penalties for th e cr im e of m o ney l a u n dering, the A M L A a l s o
authorizes certain provisional remedies that would aid the AMLC in
the enforcement of the AMLA. These are the "freeze ord r" authorized
under Section 10, and th e " b ank i n q u ir y o r d er" a u t h orized under
Section 11. (Republic of the Philippines u. Eugenio, supra)
CRIME OF MONEY LAU N D E R ING
M oney laundering iscommitted by any person;vho, knowing
that any monetary i n st r u m ent or p r operty r epresents, involves, or
r elates to the proceeds of any unlawful activit y :
(a) t r a n s a cts said monetary instr u m ent or property;
(b) c o n v e r ts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses
or uses said monetary instr u m ent or property;
(c) conceals or disguises the true nature, source location
dlisposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said
monetary instr u m ent or property. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 9160
) person (Note: violence against women is not included);
M onetary i n st r u m e n t
Monetary i n str ument r e fe rs t o : (1) coins or currency of legal
tender of the Philippines, or of any other country; (2) drafts, checks
and notes; (3) securities or negotiable instruments, bonds, commercial
papers, deposit c e r t i f i cates, t r u s t c e r t i f i cates, custodial r e ceipts
or deposit s u b s t i t ut e i n s t r u m e n ts , t r a d i n g o r d e rs , t r a n s action
tickets and confirmati ons of sale or investments and money market
instruments; and (4) other sim i lar i n s t r u m ents where ti tl e th ereto
passes to another by endorsement, assignment or deli~cry. (Section
8 of R.A. No. 9160)
U nlawful a ct i v i t y
U nlawful a c t i v i t y , w hich i s t h e p r e d i cate c r im e o f m o n e y
laundering, refers to any act or o m i ssion or series or combination
thereof involving or having direct relation to the following:
J9JC9B0M
35
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW OF NATIONS
1. K i d n a p p i n g f o r r a n s om , m u r d e r a n d d e s t r u ctive
arson (Note: homicide and simple arson under P.D. No. 1613
are not included);
2. For g e r ies and counterfeiting involving coins, money,
bank notes and other i n s t r u m e nt , estafa and ot her f o rms of
swindling; I l l egal r e crui t m ent , p i r a cy, robbery an d q u a lifi ed
theft, carnapping, hijacking, and fencing (Note: simple theft is
not included);
3. B ribery, corruption of public officers,frauds and
illegal exactions and transactions, malversation, and technical
malversation, vi olation o f A n t i - G r af t a n d C o r r up t P r a c tices
Act, and plunder;
4. D r u g t r a f fi c k in g or p u s h i ng, i l l egal gambling, an d
smuggling, and p ossession, acquisition or s al e of i i n l i censed
firearms or explosives;
5. T er r o r i sm , f i n a n cin g o f t e r r o r i sm , d e a l in g w i t h
property or funds of designated person, and conspiracy to
commit terrorism, financing of terrorism, dealing with property
or funds o: designated person;
6. Ch i l d a b u se, sexual abuse or crimes under R.A. No.
7610, photo-or-video voyeurism, child pornography, simpleor
qualified tr a f ficking i n p e r sons, and pr omoting t r afficking i n
7 . V i o l a t i o n o f t he El e c t r o ni c C o m m e rce A c t , t h e
Intellectual P r o pert y C od e o f t h e P h i l i p p i nes o r S e curiti es
Regulation Code;
8. V i o l a t i o n o f t he Re v i se d F o r e str y C o d e o f t h e
P hilippines; Philippine Fisheries Code; the Philippine Min i n g
Act; t h e W i l d l i f e R e s ources C o nservation a n d P r o t e ction
Act; th e N a t i o na l C a ves an d C a v e R esources M a nagement
Protection. Act; and
9. F elonies or offenses of a similar nature that are
punishable u n der t h e p e na l l a w s o f ot h e r c o untr'es. (Note:
Under the implementing rules of R.A. No. 9160, in determining
w hether o r n o t a f e l o n y o r o f f e nse p u n i shable u n der t h e
p enal laws of o t her c ount r ies i s "o f a s i m i l a r n a t u re" so a s
t o constitut e a n u n l a w f u l a c t i v it y u n d e r t h e M IL A , i t i s
sufficient that both th e Ph i l i p pi nes and the othei j u r i s diction
criminalize th e c o n duct o r a c t i v it y u n d e r l y in g t h e o f f ense,
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
r egardless of whether both countries place the offense withi n
the same category, or denominate the offense under the same
nomenclature). (Section 8 of R.A. No. 916'0)
2007 Bar E x a m Q u e stion: N am e a t l e ast fi v e ( 5 ) p r e dicate
crimes to money laundering.
1. R e pe a l of the laws,which contain unla w f ul a ctivi t i e s
— Violation of R.A. No. 8792 (Electronic Commerce Act), carnapping
under R.A. No. 6539,possession of loose firearm un der Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 and terrorism under R.A. No. 9372 (Human Security
Act) are expressly mentioned in Section 3 of R .A. No. 9160 as an
unlawful activity or predicate crime of money laundering. However,
R.A. No. 10175, R.A. No. 10883, R.A. No. 10591 and RA No. 11479
have repealed Section 33(a) of R.A. No. 8792, R.A. No. 6539, Section
1 of P.D. No. 1866, and R.A. No. 11479 respectively, and these new
I aws punish cybercrime, carnapping, possession of l oose firearm ,
a nd terr orism r e spectively. D espite of t h ese r epeals, th e c r i m e s
u nder Section 33 (a) of R.A. No. 8792, R.A. No. 6539 S ection 1 f
.D. No. 1866 remain as unlawful activi t i es, which are elements of
money laundering.
Under the implementing ru les of R.A. No. 9160, any unlawful
a ctivity w h i c h l a w h a s b e e n amended, by way of renaming,
renumbering or r e p h r a sing th e r e l evant p r o visions th ereof, shall
continue t o b e a n u n l a w fu l a c t i v it y u n d e r t h e A M L A . P r o v i ded,
t hat t h e m a t e r ia l e l e m ent s o f t h e u n l a w f u l a c t i v it y u n d e r t h e
a mendatory law r e m a in s th e s ame wit h t h e a m ended law; or t h e
unlawful activity, as defined under the amendatory law includes or
is necessarily included in the un l awful activity u n der the amended
law. Any law r epealing, superseding or replacing the law covering
a ny un l a w fu l a c t i v it y d e fi ne d h e r ein, s h al l b e c o n str ued a s t h e
c ontinuation of the r epealed, superseded or replaced law, which i s
the basis of the unlawful activity cited under the AM L A . Pr ovided,
that the new law provides the same elements as the unlawful activity
under the repealed,superseded or replaced law.
M
M oney la u n d e r i n g a nd u nl a w f u l a ctivit y ar e
independent cr i m e s — T he un l a wf ul a c t i v i ty c an be c ommi t t e d
by the money launder hi m self or a th ir d p erson. Thus, a drug lord,
w ho deposited the proceeds of importation of cocaine in th e ba n k ,
is liable for importation of dangerous drugs and money laundering.
Under Section 6 ofR.A. No. 9160 as amended, any person may be
charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering
and the unlawful activity.
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW OF NATIONS
I n add'tion to cri m i nal actions for money laundering and th e
unlawful ac tivit y, a p e ti t i on f or f o rfeiture can be filed against th e
money launderer. It i s a b a sic r ul e t h a t a c r i m i n a l conviction for
a n unlawful a c t i v it y i s n o t a p r e r e quisite for t h e i n s t i t u t ion of a
civil fo rfeiture p r o ceeding. Stated otherwise, a fin d i ng of g ui lt f o r
an unlawful activity i s not a n essential element of civil f orfeitur e.
(Republic of the Philippines v. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services
Inc., G.R. Na. 170281, January 18, 2008)
A cr i m i n a l c o n v i ction f o r a n u n l a w f u l a c t i v i t y i s n o t a
p rerequisite fo r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n f o r m o n e y
laundering. Statedotherwise, a fi n ding of guil for an unlawful activity
is not an essential element of criminal action for money laundering.
Under Section 6 of R .A. No . 9160 as amended, the prosecution of
money laundering shall p r oceed independently of an y p r oceeding
relating to t h u n l a w f u l a c t i v i ty . U n der th e i m p l emen:ing ru les of
R.A. No. 9160, the elements of money laundering are separate and
distinct from the elements of the unlawful activity. The elements of
the unlawful activity, including the identity of the perpetrators and
the details of the commission of the un l a wful activi ty, need not be
established by proofbeyond reasonable doubt in the case for money
laundering.
2006 Bar Exam Question: Rudy is jobless but is r p u t ed to be
a jueteng operator. He has never been charged or convicted of any
crime. He m a i n t a in s several bank a ccounts and ha s p u r chased 5
houses and lots for his children from the Luansing Realty Inc. Since
he does not have any visible job, the company reported his purchases
t o the Anti -M oney Laundering Council (AM L C). Thereafter, AM L C
c harged hi m w i t h v i o l a t ion o f t h e A n t i - M o ney L a u n d ering L a w .
Upon request of th e A M L C , t h e b an k d i sclosed to it R u d y's bank
deposits amounting to P100 Mil l i on. Subsequently, he was charged
in court for violation of the Anti -M oney Laundering Law. Can Rudy
m ove to dismiss th e case on th e g r o und t h a t h e h a s n o c r i m i n al
record?
T he case cannot be out r i g h tl y d i s m i ssed on th e gr ound t h a t
Rudy has no criminal record. A crim i nal conviction for an unlawful
activity is not a pr erequisite for the instit u t ion of a criminal action
for money laundering. However, the prosecution must show that the
moneys deposited under several bank accounts, and those used in
buying five houses are derived from the proceeds of illegal gambling,
and that accused has knowledge of the involvement of the moneys in
illegal gambling. His reputation as a jueteng operator is not enough
 38 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
to meet the standard of evidence in a criminal case, and that is proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Kno w l e dge of i n v o l v e m ent of t h e pr op e r t y in
unlawful ac t i v i ty — T o be held l i a b le for m o ney la u n dering, the
o ender m us t k n o w t h a t m o n e t ary i n s t r u m ent o r p r o p erty, w i t h
which he was dealing or transacting, represents, invclves, or relates
t o the p r oceeds of an y u n l a w fu l a c t i v i ty . M e r e s u s picion i s n o t
enough. However, if the money launderer is the one, who committed
the unlawful activity, "knowledge of involvement of the property in
unlawful activi ty" a s a n e l ement of m o ney l a u ndering i s p r esent.
U nder th e i m p l ementing r u l e s of R .A . No . 9 1 6 0 , t h e e l ement of
knowledge may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence.
The deliberate non-performance of the prever t iv e m easures under
the AM LA , t h i s I R R , A M L C i s s u ances, and SA's guidelines by a
covered person's responsible directors, officers and employees shall
b e considered in d etermi n in g k n o w ledge of the commission of M L
offenses.
2005 Bar Exam Question: Don Gabito, a philanthropist, offered
t o fund several projects of the Mayor. H e opened an account in t h e
Mayor's name and regularlydeposited various amounts ranging from
P500,000.00 to Pl M i l l i on . F r o m t hi s account, the Mayor wit h d r ew
and used the money for constructing feeder roads,.ba"angay clinics,
repairing s chools an d f o r a l l o t h e r m u n i c i pal p r o j ects.
It was
s ubsequently d i scovered tha t D o n G a b it o wa s a c t u ally a j u e t e n g
o perator an d t h e a m o u nt s h e d e posited w er e p r oceeds from h i s
jueteng operations. What crimes were committed?
Don Gabito is liable for illegal gambling and money launderin
u n erm g
for disposing money involved in the illegal activit y or illegal gambling,
Mayor is also liable for money laundering for acquiring, possessing
and disposing gambling money, provided tha-. he has knowledge
that the money is involved in il legal gambling. The mayor and Don
Gabito are liable for indirect bribery and corruption of public officer,
respectively, since the money was given by the former to the latte r
by reason of his office.
ATTEMP TED M O N E Y LA U N D E R ING
Attempt to commit money laundering is also punishable. Thus,
a drug lord, who was arrested during an entrapment operation while
attempting to deposit drug money in a bank, is liable for attempted
money laundering. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 916'0)
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY 39
AND LAW OF NATIONS
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT IIONEY LAUNDERING
Conspiracy to commit a c r i m e i s p u n i shable only i n c ases in
whicn the law specially provides a penalty th erefor. (Article 8 of the
Revised Per.al Code) Hence., conspiracy to commit money laundering
is punishable because Section 4 of R.A. No. 9160 provides a penalty
for it.
AIDING, ABETTING, O R A S S ISTING IN , O R C O U N S ELING, O R
FACILITATION OF, THE COMMISSION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
Aiding, abetting, assiscing in, or counseling the commission of
the money laundering; or performing or failing to perform any act
as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering
also constitutes the crime of money laundering. (Section 4 of R.A.
No. 916'0) 'Knowledge of involvement of the property in unlawful
activity" is also an element of this crime.
A , a c i t y m a y o r , e a r n e d m o n ey s t h r o u g h o v e r p r i cin g o f
government pr ojects in vi o ation of an t i -corrupt p r a ctices law an d
plunder l aw . A u s e d t h ese moneys to bu y a f a r m i n a p r o v i n ce.
However, to conceal his il -gotten wealth, A used B, his dummy, in
a cquiring the said farm. C, lawyer of A, caused thc tr ansfer of tit l e
involving the farm to B, but C required B to execute undated deed of
sale involving the farm in favor of A.
A is li able for m oney l a u n dering by t r a n sacting or d i sposing
m on tar y i n s t r u m e nt s i n v o l ves i n t h e c r i m e o f c o r r u p t io n a n d
p lunder ar d c o n v ert in g th e m o n etary i n s t r u m en t i n t o a f a r m . B
is also liable for money laundering by concealing or disguising the
true ownership of t h e f a r m . C i s l i a bl e fo r m o ney l a u n dering by
counseling the commission of money laundering.
FAILURE TO REPORT
Money laundering i s a l s o commit ted b y a n y c overed person
who, knowing that a covered or suspicious transa"tion is required
under this Act to be reported to the Anti-M oney Laundering Council
(AM C), fails to do so. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 9160)
Covered pe rs ons
Covered persons, natural or jur i d i cal, refer to:
1. Ba nk s , no n - b anks, q u a s i-banks, t r u s t e n t i t i e s, f o reign
e xcl ange dealers, p a w n shops, m oney c h a ngers, r e m i t t ance a n d
 40 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
transfer companies and other similar enti t ies and all other persons
and their subsidiaries and affili
ates supervised or regulated by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilip i nas;
2. In su r a n c e companies,p re-need companies and a ll o t h e r
persons supervised or regulated by the Insurance Commission;
3. Sec u r i t i es dealers,brokers, salesmen, investment houses
and other similar persons managing securities or rendering services
as investment agent, advisor, or consultant ;
Mutual funds, close-end investment companies, common trust
funds, and other similar persons;
Other entities administering or otherwise dealing in currency,
commodities o r fin a n c i a l d e r i v a t i ve s b a se d t h e r e on, valuable
o bjects, cash substitutes and ot her si m i la r m o n etary i n s t r u m e n t s
or property supervised or regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission;
4. Ca si n o s, in c l u d i ng i n t e r n e t a n d sh i p - b a sed c a s i nos,
with respect to their casino cash transaction related to the gaming
operations;
5. J ew e l r y d ealersin p recious metals (e.g., gold, silver, and
platinum) or s t ones (e.g., diamond, ru by, emerald, and sapphire),
who, as a business, trade in precious metals or stones, for transactions
in excess of P1,000,000.00;
6. Comp a n y service providers which, as a business, provide
any of the following services to third parties: (a) acting as a formation
agent of j u r i d i cal persons; (b) acting as (or a r r a n ging for a n other
person to act as)a director or corporate secretary of a company, a
partner of a p a r t n ership, or a s i m i lar p osition in r e l a t ion to other
juridical persons; (c) providing a registered office, business address
or accommodation, correspondence or administrative address fora
company, a partn ership or any other legal person or ar r a ngement;
a nd (d) act in g a s (o r a r r a n g in g fo r a n o t her p e r son t o a c t a s ) a
nominee shareholder for another person; and
7. Per s o n s w h o p r o v i d e any o f t h e fo l l o w in g s e r v i ces:
( a) m a n agin g o f c l i e n t m o n e y , securities or other assets; (b)
management of bank, savings or securities accounts; (c) organization
of contribu t i ons fo r t h e c r e a t i o n, o peration o r m a n a g ement o f
companies; and (d) creation, operation or m a n agement of ju r i d i cal
persons or arrangements, and buying and selling business entities.
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY 41
AND LAW OF NATIONS
Notwithstanding t h e f o r e going, t h e t e r m ' c o v ered p e rsons'
shall exclude lawyers and accountants acting as independent legal
professionals in r el ation to i n f orm ation concerning th eir clients or
where disclosure of information would compromise client confidences
or the attorney-client relationship: Provided, That these lawyers and
accountants are authorized to practice in the Phil i ppines and shall
continue to be subject tothe provisions of their respective codes of
conduct and/or professional responsibility or any of its amendments.
(Section 8 of R.A. No. 9160)
Before, casinos were not considered as covered persons under
R.A. No. 9160. However, in 2 0 1 6 h a ckers br oke i nt o B a n gladesh
b ank's account w it h t h e F e d eral R eserve Bank o f N e w Y or k a n d
successfully stole US$81,000,000.00, which found their way to four
fake bank accounts in a Makati branch of RCBC. These monies were
then transferred to Philrem Services Corporation and then delivered
in cash tranches to casinos. (Sponsorship speech of Senator Escudero
on the bill seeking to amend R.A. No. 9160) This is one of the reasons
why R.A. No. 10927 has amended R.A. No. 9160 to include casinos
in thelists of covered persons.
Under t h e i m p l e m entin g r u l e s o f R . A . N o . 9 1 6 0 , c a sinos
shall be p r o h i b i ted f r o m e n g aging i n t h e f o l l o w in g t r a n sactions
or activities: (1) Any t r a n saction i n v olving th e conversion of cash
from one form to another with out being used in gaming, and results
therefrom, made through: the receipt of cash for t r a n smi t tal of all
or part thereof through wire or telegraphic transfer for or on behalf
o f a customer; payments i n c ash o f f u n d s r e ceived t h r ough w i r e
or telegraphic transfer;the cashing of checks or other negotiable
instruments; (2) Receiving cash, the purpose or ownership of which
cannot be ascertained within a period of at least seven days from the
date of receipt; and (3) Using of casino chips in the premises other
than the issuing casino, including betting and exchanging into cash
or other forms ofcasino chips.
Covered tr a n s action
C overed t r a n s action i s a t r a n s a c t io n i n ca s h o r oth e r
equivalent monetary instr u m ent i n volving a total amount in excess
of P500,000.00 within one banking day; for casinos, a single casino
transaction i n v o l v in g a n a m o u n t i n e x c ess o f P 5 , 000,000.00 or
its equivalent i n a n y o t her c u r r ency. (Section 8 of R . A. ¹ . 916 0 )
T hus, a b an k m u s t r e p or t t o t h e A M L C a d e p osit a m ount in g t o
P535,000.00. A casino must report to AML C a gambling transaction
 42 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
with a high roller involving the amount of P678,000.00. Failure to do
so constitutes the crime of money laundering.
S uspic i ou s t r a n s a c t i o n
Suspicious t r a n s a ctions are t r a n s a ctions w ith c o v e r ed
instituti ons, regardless of the amounts involved, w here any of t h e
following circumstances exist:
1. T h e r e i s no underlying legal or tr ade obligation, purpose
or economic justification;
2. Th e c l i e n t i s n o t p r o p erly i d e n t i fied; (N ote: U n der t h e
implementing rules of R.A. No. 9160, anonymous accounts, accounts
under fictitious names and numbered accounts are prohibited.)
3. T h e a m o u n t i n v o l ve d i s n o t c o m m e n surat e w i t h t h e
business or financial capacity of the client;
4. T ak i n g i n t o account all k n ow n cir cumstances, it may be
perceived that the client's transaction is structured in order to avoid
being the subject of reporting requirements under the Act;
5. A ny c i r c u m s t ance r el at in g t o t h e t r a n s action w h ic h i s
observed to deviate from the profile of the client and/or the client's
p ast transactions with the covered institu t i on ;
6. Th e t r a n s action i s i n a n y w a y r e l a t e d t o a n u n l a w f u l
activity or offense under this Act that is about to be, is being or has
been committed; or
7. A n y t r a n s action that is similar or analogous to any of the
foregoing. (Section 8 of R.A. No. 916'0)
Thh e tr a n saction i s n o t c o v ered i f t h e a m o u n t i n v o l ve d i s
exactly P500,000.00. However, even though the amount of money or
property is P500,000.00 or less, if the tr ansact-.:on is suspicious the
c overed person such as a bank has the obligation to report it t o t h e
AMLC. Failure to do so constitutes the crime of money laundering.
A d e p o si te d m o n e y i n t h e amount o f P 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 00.00,
P480,000.00, P4 5 0 , 0 0 0.00, P490,000.00,
and P5 0 0 , 0 00.00
successively on January 1, 2,8, 4, and 5, 2020 under five different
accounts r e spectively w i t h B P I . T h e d e p o sits
are no t c o v ered
transactions because the amount involved in each of the transaction
made within one banking day does not P500,000.00. However, the
deposits are considered as suspicious transactions since it seems that
t hey are structured in order to avoid being the subject of reportin g
J9JC9B0M
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW OF NATIONS
requirements under R .A. No. 9160. Hence, BPI m us t r e port t h ese
s uspicious tr ansactions to A M L C . F a i l ur e t o d o so w il l m a k e t h e
responsible bank personnel liable for money laundering.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Dumayas, GR. No. 190857, April
1 7, 2017, the Phi l i p pine N a t i onal B an k ( P NB ) i n 2 0 0 4 submi t t ed
t o AML C a s e r ies of suspicious tr a n saction r eports i n v olving t h e
accounts of Li v ecor, Molugan, and A GS. According to th e r eports,
Livecor transferred to Molugan a total amount of P172.6 million in a
span of 15 months. On one occasion, Livecor transferred P40 million
t o AGS, which received another P88 m i l l ion f rom M o l u gan on t h e
s ame day. Cu r i ously, AG S r e t u r ne d t h e P 8 8 m i l l i o n t o M o l u g an
also on the same day. The tr ansactions were reported "suspicious"
because they had no underlying legalor trade obligation, purpose or
economic justification; nor were they commensurate to the business
or financial capacity of M o l u gan and A GS, wh ich w ere both lowly
capitalized at P50,000.00 each.
T he Senate f u r n i shed t h e A M L C a c o p y o f i t s C o m m i t t e e
Report, which narr ated that Un dersecretary of Agriculture Bolante,
who was appointed also by President Arroyo as chairman of Livecor,
requested the Department of Budget and Management to release to
t he Department of A g r i cult ur e th e am ount of P728 mi l l ion for t h e
purchase of farm i n p u ts. This amount was used to purchase liquid
f ertilizers, which w ere t hen d i s t r i b u ted to l ocal government u n i t s
and congressional districts. The use of the funds was characterized
by massive irregularit i es, overpricing, violations of the procurement
law and wanton wastage of scarce government resources.
AMLC fi n d p r o b able cause tha t t h e s u s picious t r a n sactions
of Livecor, Molugan, and AG S as r eported by PN B a r e r e l ated t o
the fertilizer fund scam, which i n v o lves violation of R.A. No. 3019
and plunder. AML C fi l e d a p e t i t ion to examine the bank accounts
of these entities. However, the RTC j u dge finds no probable cause
to issue bank in qu ir y or der since that only evidences presented by
AMLC ar e Senate Commit tee Report No. 54 and th e t estimony of
w itness Thelma E s p i na. Th e S u p r eme Cour t s u s t ained th e R T C
findings.

I I.
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAM E N T A L
LAWS OF THE STATE
ARBITRARY DETENTION
T here ar e t h r e e w a y s o f c o m m i t t i n g a r b i t r a r y d e t e n t i on :
by detaining a p erson wi t h out an y l e gal cause or ground t h erefor
purposely to r estr ain hi s l i b e rty (A r t i c le 124 of the Be vised Penal
C ode); by delaying d e livery t o t h e p r o per j u d i cial a u t h o r it y o f a
person lawfully arrested without a warr ant (Art ic le 125 of the Code
);
and by delaying release ofa prisoner. (Article126 of th.eC ode; 1964
and 2006 Bar Exams)
DETENTION WITHOUT LEGAL GROUNDS
A rbitrar y d e t e n t io n i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p u b l i c o f fi cer o r
employee who detains a person without legal grounds. (Article 124;
1975 Bar Exam)
I n Pur suit of D ut y t o A r r e s t
In arbitr ary detention, the public officer must arrest a criminal
suspect in p u r s ui t o f h i s a u t h o r it y t o m a k e a r r e st . I n Pe o ple v .
Santiano, G .R. No. 123979, December 8, 1998, it was held that t h e
f act that t hey ar e police officers would not exempt t hem f ro m t h e
criminal liability for k i dnapping instead of arbitrary detention.
T aking
k' the prisoner to a secluded place for purposes of detaining
and mal t r eatin g h i m c o n s t i t u te s k i d n a ppin g an d s e r i ous i l l e gal
d etention qualified by the circumstance of serious physical injur i es.
A rbitrar y d e t ention i s n o t c o m m i t t e d s i nce th e a c cused di d n o t
c ommit the act in f u r t h e r ance of official function or i n t h e p u r su i t
of authority vested in them. In sum, they committed the act in their
purely private capacity.
The element of "in p u r s u it of hi s du ty to a r r e st" i n a r b i t r aary
r committed, is actually commit t i ng, or is attempting to commit
detention ispresent if the purpose of the arrest is:
1. To de l i v e r t h e s uspect t o j u d i c ia l a u t h o r it y ( U . S .
v.
Gellada, G.B. 1Vo.L-5151, January 81, 1910
);
J9JC9B0M
II.CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMEN TAL 45
LAWS OF THE STATE
2. T o co n d u c t c r i m i n a l i n v e stigation ( U .S . v. Ag r a v a n te,
G.B. No. 8947, January 28, 1908); or
8. To d e t e r m i n e i f t h e v i c ti m c o m m i t te d a c r i m e . (U.S. v.
Haivchaw, G.B. ¹ . L - 6 9 09, February 20,1912)
On the other h a nd, th e el ement of "i n p u r s u it of hi s d u ty t o
arrest" in arbitra ry detention is not present:
1. I f t h e p o l ice authorities brought the suspect to a secluded
place i nstead to the police station for purp oses of maltreating him .
(People v. Santiano, supra). Note: The crime committed is kidnapping
and serious illegal detention.
2 I f the policeauthorities arrested a criminal suspect (Pablo
v. People, G.B. No. 152481, April 15, 2005) or innocent person (U.S. v.
Sanchez, L-9102, November 5, 1913) to rob him. This is called in the
layman's term as "hulidap." Note: The crime committed is robbery.
8. I f t h e p o lice authorities arrested a suspected drug pusher
to demand r a n s om. (P e ople v. G o n z a lez, J r ., G . B. ¹ . 1 922 8 8 ,
February 17, 2016) The media describes an arrest of adrug suspect
for ransom as "tokhang for ransom." Note: The crime committed is
kidnapping forransom.
4. I f t h e p o l i ce au th or i t ies ar r ested an i n n ocent person to
give him o p p ort u n it y t o p l a n t i n c r i m i n a t or y e v i dence. (People v.
Alagao, G.B. ¹. L- 2 0 7 21, April80, 1966) Note: The crime committed
is complex crime of i n cr i m i n a t in g i n n ocent person th r ough i l l egal
detention.
L egal Grou nds for D e t e n t i o n
T he commission of a c r i m e, or v i o lent i n s anit y o r a n y o t h er
a ilment requir in g th e compulsory confinement of th e p a t i ent i n a
hospital,shall be considered legal grounds for the detention of any
person.(Article124; 1975 and 2006Bar Exams )
1. L a w f u l W a r r a n t l e s s A r r e s t — A p e a c e o ff icer o r a
private person may, without a war r a nt, arrest a person:
a. W h e n , i n hi s presence, the person to be arrested has
an offense;
b. Wh e n a n o f f e nse has just been committed, and h e
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or cir cumstances that t h e p e rson to be ar r ested has
committed it; and
 46 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER I I.CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAM E N T A L 47
VOLUME II LAWS OF THE STATE

c. W h e n t h e p e r son to be a r r ested is a p r i s oner w h o

party must be detained with legal ground but the public officer fails
h as escaped from a penal establishment or p l ace where he is
to deliver hi m t o j u d i c ial a u t h o r i t ies w i t hi n t h e r e q u i red p eriod.
s erving fi na l j u d g m ent o r i s t e m p or ar il y c onfined w h i l e h i s
If the police officer detained him wi t h o ut l e gal g r o und, t he c ri m e
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from committed is arbitr ary detention under Ar t i cle 124.
one confinement to another. (Section 5, Rule 118 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure; 2006Bar E xam) Amy was apprehended and arrested by Patrolman Bart for
illegal parking. She was detained at the police precinct, underwent
2. P r ob a b l e C a u se —At about mid night, a patrolman saw
investigation, and released only after 48 hours. Under R.A. No. 4186,
three persons acting suspiciously in f r ont of an u n i n h abited house
or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure
and entering the same, he arrested them with out wa r r ant and took
for dealing with a t r af fic violation is not th e ar r est of the offender,
them to the municipal buil ding where they were detained in jail for
but the confiscation of th e d r i v er's license of the l a t t er. M oreover,
a bout five hours before they w ere r eleased. The patr olman i s n o t
under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if
liable for arbitrary detention. Good people do not ordinarily lurk the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine
around streets and u n i n h abited pre mises a t m i d n i g h t. P re vert i o n
only. Itmay be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless
of crime is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals. Surel ure y arrest be made for traffic violation involving illegal parking since the
the officer must not be forced to await the commission of robbery or
penalty for this crime is fine only. (I uz v. People, G.R. No. 197788,
other felony. Reasonable ground of suspicion is a defense of public
February 29, 2012) Since the arrest is ill e gal, the crime committed
o fficer in a r b i t r ar y d e t ention. U n der s uch conditions, even if' th e
is not delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
suspected person is later found to be in nocent, the 'peace officer is
authorities under Ar t i cle 125, but arbit r ary detention under Arti cle
not liable. (U.S. v. Santos, G.R. No. 12779, September 10, 1917; 1948
124. (1990 Bar Exam)
and 1980 Bar Exams)
CCg PP
A., a police officer, implemented a warrant of arrest for robber P eriod to M ak e J u d i c ia l D e l i v e r y
against " B . " "B" posted bail. T h r ee days la ter ' A." sees "B" a t t h e
cockpit and immediately arrests him. "B" was telling 'A" that he was F or th e p u r p ose of d etermi n in g t h e c r i m i n a l l i a b i l it y o f a n
o ut on bail, but 'A " w o uld not believe him . 'A" did not m ake effort officer detaining a person for more than th e 12-18-86-hours period
to verify if "B" had really been released on bail. 'A" is not liable for prescribed by Ar t i cle 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the means of
arbitrary detention since he acted without malice. But for failure to communication as well as the hour of arrest and other circumstances,
verify the order ofrelease before proceeding to make the re-arrest s uch as the t im e of surr ender and th e m a t erial possibility for t h e
h e is
' liable
I' for simple im p r u d ence resulting in ar b i t r ar y d etention. fiscal t o m a k e t h e i n v e stigation an d fi l e i n t i m e t h e n e c essary
(People v. Misa, C.A., 86 O.G. 8496; 1960 Bar Exam) information, must b e t a ken i n t o consideration. (Soria v. Desierto,
G.R. Nos. 158524-25, January 81, 2005)

D ELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSO N S An election day or a special holiday, should not be included in
the computation ofthe period prescribed by Article 125 for the filing
D clay
I in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial of complaint or information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests,
a uthorities i s c o m m i t te d b y a n y p u b l i c o f ficer, wh o s h al l f a i l t o
it being a "no-office day." Thus, the complaint for arbitr ary detention
deliver a person detained for some legal ground to the proper judicial
will not p r osper because the ru n n in g of th e 12-18-86-hours period
authorities within th e period of 12 hours for light penalty, 18 hours
prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the
for correctional penalty or 86 hours foraffiictive penalty or capital
time of his arrest was int err u p ted by one day, which is an election
punishment. (Article 125; 1969 and 1971 Bar Exams)
day. (Soria v. Desierto, supra; 1972 Bar Exam)
Legally Ar r e st ed
D elivery to J u d i c ial A u t h o r i t i e s
To be held liable for delay in th e delivery of detained persons
T he arresting officer's duty u n der A r t i cl e 125 wa s ei ther t o
to the pr oper j u d i cial a u t h o r i t ies u n der A r t i cl e 125, th e offended
deliver him to the proper judicial authorit ies within 12-18-86-hours

J9JC9B0M
 48 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
period or r elease him a f ter t h e e x pir a t ion of th e p e r iod. (Soria v .
Desierto, supra)
The words j'u d i c ial a u t h orit ies" within t he meaning of Arti c le
125 mean the courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary
detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed
a public offense (or to re l ease such person), that i s, "t he Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as m ay be established b l
y aw ."Th .
fi seal is not a j u di cial au t h or it y w i t h i n t h e p u r v iew of A r t i cle 125.
The fiscal, unlike a judicial authori ty, has no power to order either
the commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with penal
offenses. (Lino v. Fugoso, G.R. No. L-1159, January 80, 1947; Sayo
v. Chief of Police of Manila, G.R. No. L-2128, May 12, 1948; Agbay v.
Nativi dad, G.R. No. 1845'08, July 2, 1999; 1978 Bar Exam)
The delivery to th e j u d i cial au t h ority of an a r r e stee does not
consist in a p h y sical de livery be cause the. arresting officer cannot
transfer to th e j u dge and th e l a t ter d oes not assume the physical
custody o f t h e p e r so n a r r e s ted. D e l i v er y i s t he
m aking o f a n
a ccusation or charge or fi l in g of a n i n f o r m a tion against hi m w i t h
the corresponding court, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to
issue an order ofrelease or of commitment of the prisoner.
(Sayo v.
Chief of Police of Manila, supra; 1978 Bar Exam)
Waiver o f Ri g h t
Under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, a person arrested
w ith l e gal g r o un d h a s t h e r i g h t n o t t o b e d e t a i ned b eyond t h e
1 2-18-86-hours period stated t h erein. H owever, such r i gh t can b e
w aived. Under R .A . N o . 7 488 ( Custodial I n v estigation L a w ), a n y
waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of
Article 125 of the Code shall be in writ ing and signed by such person
i n the presence of his counsel; otherwise, the waiver shall be n u l l
and void and of no effect. If th e wa i v er is v al id, the a pprehending
officer cannot be held liable for arbitr ary detention even though the
p erson, who wa s l egally a r r e sted, had been detained beyond t h e
period stated in A r t i cle 125. If the wa i ver is inv alid, apprehending
o ce r may be held liable for arbitra ry detention unless he honestly
believed that the waiver is valid.
D istinct Cr i m e s
The commission of the crime of delay in the delivery of detained
person to proper judicial authority w il l not affect the proceeding for
possession of dangerous drugs for which he was detained since the
J9JC9B0M
I I.CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAM E N T A L 49
LAWS OF THE STATE
two crimes are distinctand separate. The accused for possession of
dangerous drugs cannot r ely o n s h o r tcomings of police officers to
get. a judgment of acquittal for t h ese do not di m i n ish th e fact th at
illegal drugs were found in their possession. (People v. Liu, G.R. No.
189272, January 21, 2015)
Period of Det e n t ion U n d e r R .A . No. 11479
e
A s a r u l e , t h e p e r i o d w i t h i n w h i c h a p e r so n d e t a i ned f o r
terrorism o r c o n spiracy t o c o m mi t t e r r o r is m m u s t b e d e l i v ered
to judicial au t h or i t ies is 36 h o ur s i n a ccordance with A r t i cl e 125
of the Revised Penal Code since the penalty of l i f e i m p r i sonment
prescribed for it is equivalent to an afflictive penalty.
I f the apprehending police or law enforcement officers fail t o
deliver the suspected terrorist w i t hi n t h e p eriod of 36 hours, they
are liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons under Artic le
125 of RPC.
H owever, the Anti-Terrorism Council may authorize in writ i n g
any law enforcement agent or m i l i t a r y p e r sonnel to t ak e custody
of a person suspected of terrorism or an y c r im e pu n i shable under
Section 5 to 12 such as threat to commit terrorism, providing
material support or t e r r o r i sts, and p l a n n i ng, t r a i n i ng, pr eparing,
a r d facilit a t in g t h e c o m m i s sion o f t e r r o r i s m , and conspiracy,
p roposal and i n c i t in g t o c o m mi t t e r r o r is m c onspiracy t o c o m m i t
terrorism. Wit h t h i s w r i t t e n a u t h or i ty , th e law enforcement agent
o r milit ary p ersonnel may ar r est th e suspected terrorist, take in t o
custody and detain him for a period of more than 36 hours without
incurring any crim i nal li abil ity for delay in the delivery of detained
persons notwith standing A r t i cle 125 of the Revised Penal Code to
the contrary. H o w ever, th e a p p r ehending agents m ust j u d i cially
deliver (file information in court) the terrorist suspects or suspected
violator ofR.A No. 11479 within a period of fourteen (14) calendar
days counted from the moment he has been apprehended or arrested,
detained, and taken intocustody. The 14-day period can be extended
to a maximum period of ten (10) days by the Anti- Terrorism Council.
The detainee for t er r orism or v i o l ation of R .A . No. 11479 has th e
right not to be detained beyond the period of 14 days or extended
period of 10 days. The apprehending agents must either ju dicially
c harge him i n c o ur t w i t h i n t h e p e r i od, or r e l ease hi m a f te r t h e
expiration ofthe period. Detaining the suspect beyond the 14-day
period, or 10-day extended period without formal criminal charge in
court constitutes the crime of violation of the ri ght of th e detainee
under Section 81 of R.A. No. 11479.
 50 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
In addition to right not to be detained beyond the 14-day'
p eriod or 10-day extended period, the detainee has the r i gh t t h a t .
the details of his detention be communicated by the apprehending ',
agents in wr i t in g to a judge, Anti-Terrorism Council, Human Right
Commission, rights under the M i r a nda pr i n ciple, rights to counsel,
right to have access to his counsel, relatives and physician. Failure
to recognize any of these rights constitutes the crime of violation of
the right of the detainee under Section 31 of R.A. No. 11479.
DELAYING RELEASE
D elaying release is committed by any public officer who delays
th
t e performance of any judicialor executive order for the release of
a prisoner or detention prisoner, or unduly delays the service of the
notice ofsuch order to said prisoner or the proceedings upon any
petitionfor the liberation of such person. (Article 126)
EXPULSION
Expulsion is commit ted by an y p u b li c officer who expels any
person from the Philippines or compels him to change his residence
without being authorized by law. (Article 127)
A mayor, without being authorized by law, compelled prostitutes
residing in M a n il a to go to, and live in, another place against their
wiill.
w . H e i' s Il i' a ble for expulsion. The prostitutes are not properties b t
ies u
huuman beings protected by the constituti onal guaranties such as the
provision on liberty of abode. The mayor could not even for the most
praiseworthy of motives render the liberty of the citizen so insecure.
No official, no mat ter how h i gh , is above the law. (U il l a v icencio v.
I ukban, G.R. No. 14689, March 25, 1919; 2012 Bar Exam)
VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
V iolation of domicile is commit ted by an y p u b li c officer wh o,
w ithout being authorized by ju dicial order, (1) enters any dwellin g
against the w il l of th e owner t h ereof; (2) searches papers or other
effects found therein wi t h out the previous consent of such owner; or
(3) surreptitiously enters it, and refuses to leave after being required
to do so. (Art ic le 128) The re a re t w o q u a l i f y i ng c ir c umstances in
Article 128, to wit: (1) nightti me and (2) failure to return any papers
or effects not constitut ing evidence of a crime.
J9JC9B0M
II.CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMEN TAL 51
LAWS OF THE STATE
public O f f i c e r
Violation of domicile is a cr im e against th e f u n d amental l aw
of the la r d . Th e act of th e o f fender m ust b e m ade in v i o l ation of
the victim's constituti onal " i ght t o be secured in hi s house, papers
anc effects against unreasonable search. Thus, to be held liable for
violation of domicile, a public officer must be acting in hi s official
capacity. (U .S. v. Ma c a spac, G.R. N o. 88 7 8, No vember 16, 1 907)
A police officer entered a d w el l in g a gainst th e w i l l o f t h e o w n er ,
the "eof:o collect debt payment. He is liable for trespass to dwelling,
and not arbitr ary detention since the entry was made in his private
capacity.
A priv ate i n d i v i d u al, wh o c onspires w it h a p u b l i c o f ficer i n
committing violation of domicile, is also liable for this crime. Because
of conspi acy, the act of the public officer in commit t ing violation of
domicile is iinputable to the private individual although they are not
similarly situ ated in r elation to the object of the crime. (see: U.S. v.
Ponte, G.R. No. L-5952, October 24, 1911; 1989 Bar Exam)
V iolation of domicile is "om m i t ted by th e p u b lic officer if h i s
p urpose is to violate the dom cile of complainant. If t ha t i s not t h e
purpose cf his entrance, another crime is committed, as for example,
r obbery or r a pe, w h at ever th e c r i m i na l i n t en t m a y b e (Quintano
Ripolles, Codigo Penal, Ual. II) wi t h a g g r a vating c irc umstance of
disiegard. of dwelling.
A police officer ent ered a r e s idential h o use against th e w i l l
o f che own er, an d t h e n , r a p e d a n o c c upant t h e r eof. Th e c r i m e
committed is rape with the aggravating circumstance of disregard
of dwelling. Violation of domicile is not commi t ted since the entry
was made to rape the victim in hi s pr i v ate capacity. The entry was
not made in connection with his duty as a police officer.
U nlawful E n t r y
To constitute violation of domicile, the entry by the public officer
must be made against the wil l of th e owner of the dwelling, which
presupposes opposition or p r o h i bi t ion by t h e s aid owner, whether
express or impli ed. If th e pu blic officer's entry i nt o th e dwelling is
on y made without previous consent of the owner, he is not liable for
viclation of domicile. (People v. Sane, CA 40 OG Supp 5, 118)
1. I m pl i e d P r o h i b i t i o n —There is an im p l ied prohibition
to n t e r w h ere the entry v, as made by cutting a string fastening the
door (U S . L i n d i o , G.R. ¹. 4 83 5 , F e bruary 19, 1908) or where the
 52 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
public officer used violence, force, or intimidation to enter a dwelling.
(U.S. v. Clauck, G.B. No. 2977, October 9, 1906) A police officer, who
surreptitiously enters a dwelling t h r ough an u n l ocked door, is not
liable for violation of domicile.
2. O w n e r o f t h e B w e l l i n g —According to Justice Florenz
R egalado, although A r t i cl e 12 8 of t h e C ode speaks of th e o w n er
o f the premises, it would be sufficient if th e i n h abit ant i s a l a w f u l
occupant using the premises as his dwelling, although he is not the
proprietary owner thereof.
I nvitation t o e n t e r i s a d e f e nse i n v i o l a t ion o f d o m i cile b y
u nlawful entry . Such in v i t a t ion is considered as waiver of ri ght of
privacy in one's domicile. In g eneral, all m e m bers of a h o usehold
m ust be p r e sumed t o h a v e a u t h o r it y t o e x t en d a n i n v i t a t io n t o
enter. Even a 12-year old occupant can extend such invitation.
(U.S.
v. Dulfo, G.B. No. 4183, August 10, 1908) However, even though a
member of household inv i ted a p u b lic officer to e nte r, violation of
domicile is committed if the owner thereof expressly prohibited such
entry. (U.S. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 486'6; February 28, 1908)
U nlawful Se a r c h
I n violation of domicile by u n l a w ful en t ry , th e entr y i s m a d e
"against the will of the owner" of the dwelling. In violation ' n oof domic I
omici e
b y unlawful search, the search i.s made "without his previous consent."
T he phrase "against the w i ll " p r esupposes "prohibition" wh ile th at
of "without previous consent" connotes "lack of permission."
If a public officer entered the house and made search thereon
either surreptiti ously or without objection from the owner, the entry
is not a violation of domicile because it was not made against the will
of tthe owner; however, the search is a violation of domicile because it
o S earching d o m i cil e w i t h ou t w i t n e sses i s c o m m i t t e d b y a
was made without previous consent of the owner. (1989 Bar Exam)
S ilence or f a i l ur e t o o bject i s n o t t a n t a m ount t o c o nsent t o
search the house or w a i ver of r i gh t a g a i nst u n r easonable search.
The fact that th e owner failed to object to the entry i nt o hi s house
(People v. Barros, G.R No. 90640, March 29, 1994) or he allowed the
public officers to enter (People v. Compacion, G.B. No. 124442, July
20, 2001) does not amount to a permission to make a search therein.
R efusal to Lea v e
I f a p u b l i c o f fi ce r e n t e re d t h e h o u s e surreptitiously and,
thereafter,refused to leave the premises after being required to do
J9JC9B0M
I I.CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAM E N T A L
LAWS OF THE STATE
so, the entry is not a violation of domicile because the entry was not
made against the will of the owner; however, the "refusal to leave" is
a violation of domicile. (1989 Bar Exam)
A public officer entered the house wit h consent of th e owner
and, thereafter,refused to leave the premises after being required
to do so. Refusal to leave does constitute th e cr im e of vi olation of
domicile since he did not su r r eptitiously e nter t he d w e lling of t h e
complainant. The crime committed is unjust vexation.
O BTAINING AND SERVING SEARCH W A R R A N T
Violation of d omicile is a lso commit ted by an y p u b li c officer
by maliciously obt ain in g s e arch w a r r a nt s o r p r o c u r in g a s e ar ch
warrant wit h out just cause. (Article 129)
The true test of lack of just cause is whether the affidavit filed
i n support of t h e a p p l ication for search w a r r an t h a s been dr aw n
in such a manner that perj ur y could be charged thereon. (People v.
Alvarez, G.B. No. 45858, January 29, 1987; People v. Sy Juco, G.B.
No. 41957, August 28, 1987; 1975 Bar Exam) Under Art i c le 129, the
p enalty for m a l i ciously obtaining search war r an t i s i n a d d i t ion t o
t he liabilit y a t t a ching t o t h e o f f ender for t h e c o m m ission of a n y
other offense such as perjury.
A buse in t h e s e r vice of search w a r r a nt s l e gally o b t ained i s
committed by any p u b lic officer who shall exceed his authority or
u se unnecessary severity i n e x ecuting a search wa r r a nt , w h ich i s
legally procured. (Artic le 129) This is a no ther f o rm of v i o la tion of
domicile.
public officer who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search a
domicile.papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence
of the latter, any member of his family, or two witn esses residing in
the same locality. (Art ic le 180) This is another form of vio lation of
domicile.
A public officer may commit v i ol ation of domicile although he
is provided with asearch warrant in cases of abuse in the service of
search warrants or searching domicile without wi t n esses. (1957 Bar
Exam)

III • CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
REBELLION
Rebellion or insurrection is committed by mult i t u de of persons
w ho rise publicly an d t a k e a r m s a g ainst th e G overnment for t h e
purpose of: (1) removing the territory of the Philippines or part
thereof, or its armed forces from the allegiance to said Government
or its laws; or (2) depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature
of any of their powers or prerogatives or part thereof. (A rticle 184 of
the Bevised Penal Code)
Insurrection
Before, there is a distinction between rebellidn and insurrection.
P ublic up r i sin g an d t a k i n g u p a r m s a g a i nst t h e g o v ernment t o
e ffect some change of m i n o r i m p o r t ance such a s t h e m a n n e r o f
g overnance, or to prevent the exercise of government authcr ity w i t h
respect to particular matters or subjects or toremove the locality
under the control of the offenders from the allegiance to the laws of
the government is called "insurrection." If the rebels sought to have
a major change in the government, the crime is rebellion. A publi c
and armed u p r i s ing t o o v er t h row t h e g overnment i s r e b ellion. A
public and armed uprising to make a city (e.g., Marawi City) a State
independent and separate from th e R epublic of th e P h i l i p p ines is
insurrection.
However, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code has ekminated
t he d i s t i n ction b e t w een r e b ellion o r i n s u r r e ction. W h e t he r t h e
u prisers sought a m i nor or m a jor change in th e government t h
ey
sh I be prosecuted for the crime of rebellion or insurrection under
s all
Article 134. (see: People v. A l m a zan, 37 O .G . 1932; Th e R evised
Penal Code by CA Justice Luis Beyes; 2012 Bar Exam)
R emoving the t e r r i t or y of th e P h i l i p p i n e s
T he purpose of CPP-NPA i s t o o v erthrow t h e capitalist
g overnment and replace it w it h a commu nist government. In su m ,
54
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 55
t he intention o f t h e C P P - NPA i s t o r e m ov e t h e t e r r i t or y o f t h e
Philippin s f r o m t h e a l l egiance to the government of th e Republic
of the Philippines and it s l a ws. I f C P P -NPA w i l l b e s uccessful in
o verthrowing th e government, th e al legiance of ~he people will b e
shifted fr = m the capitalist government to the communist government.
D uring th e M a r aw i s i ege, the p u r p ose of M a ut e g r oup i s t o
make Marawi Cit y a t e r r i t ory of I S IL . I n s um , th eir i n t ention is to
remove part of the terr i t ory of the Philippines or Marawi City fr om
the allegiance
to the government of the Republic of the Philippines
and its laws, Hypothetically, if the Maute grcup successfully made
M arawi C it y a t e r r i t or y o f I S I L , t h e a l l e giance of th e p eople i n
Marawi would be shifted from the Republic of the Philippines to
ISIL.
Deprivation of executive power
M ultit ude of p eople w it h a r m s a t t a cked M a l acanang, ki l l ed
PSG members and burned the government buil di ngs therein. Their
purpose is to replace the incumbent President by the Vice-President.
The intention of t h e u p r i s ers i s t o d e p r iv e execut've powers and
prerogati:es ofthe President.
Rebellion and T r e a son
The differences between treason, which is an American concept,
and rebellion, which is a Spanish concept, are as follows:
1. I n t r e a s on, the offender levies war agair st the government
in adherence to an enemy; while in rebellion, the offenders engage in
civil war against the forces of government wi t h out adherence to the
enemy;
Note: The civil war in rebellion is not within the context of war
under in-.ernational law, the condition of which is an in dispensable
element =f treason.
2. T r e a s on i n cludes giving aid and comfort, in adherence to
the enen y; while giving aid and comfort in adherence to rebels is not
rebellion unless there is a conspiracy;
3. In t r e a s on , i n t e n t ion o f t h e of f e nders i s t o b e t r ay t h e
g overnm .nt b y a d h e r ence t o t h e e n e my ; w h i l e i n r e b e l lion t h e
intentior of the rebels is to remove the allegiance to the government
and its laws from the terr i t ory of the Phili ppines or part t h ereof or
armed fo"ces, or to deprive executive or legislative power;
 56 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
4. Tr e a s o n can only b e commi t ted by a F i l i p in o ci t i zen or
resident alien while rebellion can be committed by any person;
5. Tr e a s on is a war cr ime wh ile rebellion can be committ ed
in times of war or peace; and
6. Tr e a s o n i s s u b j ect t o t h e e x t r a t e r r i t or i al it y r u l e w h i l e
rebellion is governed by the territ oriality pr i n ciple. (1946 Bar Exam)
D octrine of Absorpt i o n
Rebels cannot overthrow th e government w i t h out u s ing loose
f irearms, k i l l i n g s o l d i ers, b u r n i n g m i l i t a r y c a m p s , d e m a n d i n g
r evolutionary t axes from th e people, etc. They are inh erent i n t h e
commission of rebellion.
Crimes commi t te d i n f u r t h e r a nce o f r e b el lion a r e d e e m ed
absorbed in one single crime of r ebellion. Di r ect assault, m u r d er,
homicide, arson, robbery, and k i d n apping, just to n ame a few, are
absorbed in t h e c r i m e of r e bellion i f c o m m i t ted i n f u r t h e r ance of
rebellion. Itcannot be made a basis of a separate charge. Murder
committed i n f u r t h e r a nce of th e c r im e of r e b ellion i s s t r i p ped of
its common complexion and i s absorbed in th e c r im e of r ebellion,
(People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26, July 18, 1956; People v.
Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, October 28, 1956; Lagman v. Medialdea,
G.R. No. 281658, July 4, 2017)
Not only common crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but also
"offenses under special laws (such as obstruction of justice or illegal
possession of loose firearm), which are perpetrated in furt h erance of
the political offense." All crimes, whether punishable under a special
law or general l aw, w h ich are me re components or ing redients, or
committed in f u r t h e r ance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves. (Lagman v. Medialdea, supra)
It is of judicial notice that the sparrow un it is t he l i q u i d ation
s quad of the New People's Army wit h th e objective of overthrowin g
the duly constituted government. Thus, the kill ing of a police officer
(People v. Dasig, G.R. No. 100281, April 28, 1998) or governor (People
v. Avila, G.R. No. 84612, March 11, 1992) by this squad in furtherance
of the ends of the NPA is rebellion, which absorbs murder with direct
assault. (1998 Bar Exam)
T he old v e r sion o f A r t i c l e 1 3 5 o f t h e R e v i sed P enal C o d e
provides the m odes of commi t t in g r e bellion such as " e ngaging in
war against the forces of the government, committing serious violence
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 57
and destroying property." These modes in Art i c le 135 were used by
t he Supreme Court i n j u s t i f y in g th e doctrine of absorption in t h e
Hernandez case. Ho wever, R . A. N o . 6 9 6 8 e l i m i n a t ed t h e m o d e s
of committ in g r e b ellion i n A r t i c l e 1 3 5 o f t h e C o de . B ecause of
this amendment, t h ere are vi ews t ha t t h e He r n a n dez principle is
not anymore controlling. Bu t a c c ording to J u s t i ce R egalado, the
amendment of Article 135 does not affectthe accepted concept of
rebellionand these "overt acts of violence" are deemed "subsumed" in
the provision (Article 1-"4) on public and armed uprising, which is an
element of reb l l i on. Hence, the doctrine of absorption is still good.
It is submitted that the opinion of Regalado is the better view.
The incidents in Pe ople v. Lo vedioro, G.R. No. 112235, November
29, 1995 and People v. Solongan, G.R. No. 137182, April 2 4, 2003
h appened after R.A. No. 6968, and yet, the Supreme Court i s st i l l
applying t h e d o c t r in e o f a b s or pti on . I n La g m a n v. Med i a l d e a,
G.R. No. 231658, July 4 , 2 0 17, the Supreme Court, En B a nc, has
recognized the absorption doctrine in rebellion.
D eclarat ion of M a r t i a l L a w
Under S c t i o n 1 8 , A r t i c le V I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n, m a r t i a l
law can be declared on the basis of the existence of rebellion. Since
t he Constitut ion di d n o t d e f in e t h e t e r m " r e b ellion," i t m u s t b e
understood to have the same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in
the Revised P na l C o de. (Lagman v. Me dia l dea, G.R. No. 281658,
July 4, 2017)
In La g m an v. Me d i a l d e a, su p r a, t h e p e t i t i o ner q u e s tioned
D uterte's declaration o f M a r t i a l L a w i n M i n d a n a o d e spit e t h e
rebellion is merely corifined in Marawi City. The Supreme Court
denied the petition.
It has been said that the gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an
a rmed public uprising against the government; and that by n at u r e
rebellion is a crime of masses or multi t u des, involving crowd action,
that cannot be confined a priori, wit h in p re determined bounds.
To illustrate: A contingent armed with h i g h - powered firearms
p ublicly a ssembled i n P a d r e F a u r a , E r m i t a , M a n i l a w h e r e t h e
Court's compound is situated. They overpowered the guards, entered
the Court's premises, and hoisted the ISIS fiag. Their motive was
political, i.e., they want to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
government a p ar t o f t h e t e r r i t or y of th e P h i l i p p i nes, particularly
the Court's compound and establish it a s an I SI S t e r r i t ory. Based
on the foregoing ill u s tra t i o n, and vis-a-vis t he natu re of the crime
 58 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
of rebellion, it could not be validly said that the rebellion is confined
o nly wi t hi n t h e C o u r t's compound. The possibility t h a t t h er e a r e
other rebels positioned in the nearby buil di ngs or compound of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) or the Manila Science High
School (MSHS) could not be discounted. There is no way of knowing
that all p a r t i c i pants in t h e r e b e llion w e nt a n d s t a y ed i n s ide t h e
Court's compound.
Neither could it b e v a l i dly ar g ued th at t he a r m ed contingent
positioned in PG H o r M S H S i s n o t e n gaged in r e b ellion because
there is n o p u b l i cit y i n t h e i r a c t s as , i n f a ct , t h e y w er e m e r ely
lurking inside the compound of PGH and M S HS. However, it mu st
be pointed out t ha t fo r t h e c r im e of r ebellion to be consummated,
it is not required that al l ar m e d part ic ipants should congregate in
one place, in this c ase, the Court's compound, and publicly r i se in
arms against th e government for th e a t t a i n m ent of t h eir cu l pable
purpose. It suffices that a po r t i on of t he c oritingent g athered and
formed a mass or acrowd and engaged in an armed public uprising
against the government.
Similarly, it c annot be validly concluded that th e gr ounds on
which the armed public upri sing actually took place should be the
measure of the extent, scope or range, of the actual rebellion. This is
logical since the other rebels positioned in PGH, MSHS, or elsewhere,
whose participation did not involve the publicity aspect of rebellion,
may also beconsidered as engaging in the crime of rebellion.
Terrorism an d R e b e l l ion or C ou p d' etat
If the p a r t i cipants of r ebellion or coup d' etat e ngage in a c ts
intended to cause death or serious bodily i n j ur y t o an y p erson, or
endangers a person'slife or extensive damage or destruction to a
government or p u b li c f acility , p u b lic pl ace or p r i v ate pr operty, or
critical in f r a structure for t h e p u r p ose of in t i m i d a t in g th e g eneral
public, provoking or i n fl u e ncing by i n t i m i d a t ion t h e g overnment,
or seriously destabilizing or d estroying th e f u n d amental poli t i cal,
e conomic, or social s t r u ct u res of t h e c oun t ry , t h e y ar e l i a bl e f or
rebellion and terrorism under R.A. No. 11479.
l. O bj e c t i v e s in R eb el l i o n and T e r r o r i sm — T h e
objective of a "terrorist" is to int i m i d ate the general public, provoke
or influence by inti m i d a t ion the government, create an atmosphere
or spread a message offear, or seriously destabilize or destroy the
fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country .
This condition of f ear i s t r a d i t i o nally a chieved t h r ough bombing,
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 59
kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading among others. In contrast,
the purpose of r ebellion i s p o l i t i c al, i. e ., (a) to re m o ve f r om t h e
allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory
of the Philippines or any p ar t t h e r eof; (ii) anybody of land, naval,
or armed fcrces; or(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress,
wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives. (Lagman
v. Medialdea, supra)
In determining what crime was committed, the ccurt must look
into the ma=n objective of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for
the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine
Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If,
on the other hand, the primary objective is to inti m i d ate the general
public, provoke or influence by intim i d a tion the government, create
an atmosph re or spread a message offear, or seriously destabilize
or destroy trie fundamental political, economic, or social structures
of the count y, the crime is terrorism under RA No. 11479. (Lagman
v. Medialdea, supra; 2019 Bar Exam)
2. N on- m u t u a l l y e x c l u sive c r i m e s —Rebels can be held
liable of reb ll ion and terrorism. In La g m an v. Media.'dea, G.R. No.
231658, Ju r 4, 2017, the Supreme Court stated that there is nothing
in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and RA No. 9372 (now RA
No. 11479) which states that r ebellion and terr orism are mu t u ally
exclusive o ea c h o t h er or t h a t t h e y c a n not c o-exist together. RA
No. 9372 (row RA No. 11479) does not expressly or impliedly repeal
Article 134 of the Code. Terrorism cannot absorbs rebellion as they
have different elements.
COUP D' ETAT
Coup c.'etat is committed by a mil i t a ry, police or public officer,
with or without support or participation of civilians, who swiftly and
singly or simult aneously attacks by means of violence, intimidation,
t hreat, strategy or stealth, th e d ul y constit u ted au t h ori t ies of th e
Philippines. or f a c i l i t ie s n e eded fo r t h e e x e r cise an d c o n t i n u ed
possession o f p o w e r s u c h a s mi l i t a r y c a m p or i n s t a l l a t i on,
c ommunications n e t w o r ks , o r p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s a nywhere i n t h e
Philippines for th e p u r pose of seizing or d i m i n i sh ing state power.
(Article 184-A of the Revised Penal Code; 2002 and 2012 Bar Exams)
Swift A t t a c k by M i l i t a r y M e n
Military troops headed by Col. Amparo, withdrew firearms
a nd bull ets an d a t t a c ked t h e o f fi ces of t h e C h i e f o f S t a ff , a n d
 60 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
other offices, held hostage the Chief of Staff, k i l led t h ree scldiers,
inverted the Ph i l i p pine fl ag, barr i caded all er tr ances and exits of
the camp, and announced complete control of the camp. Because of
t he superiority of the pro-Government forces, Col. Amparo and hi s
troops surrendered. The crime committed is coup d' etat. (1991 Bar
Exam)
During a military uprising aimed at ousting the duly constituted
authorities and taking over the government, General Tejero and his
men forcibly took over the entire Rich Hotel which they used as their
base. They used the rooms and other facilit ies of the hotel, ate all
the available food they found, and detained some hotel guests. The
crime of coup d' etat is commit t e d. Rich H o t el is a f a c i l i ty r . c eded
f or the exercise and conti nued possession of power. T hey s w i f t l y
attacked toseize state power. (2018 Bar Exam)
Leader
The penalty for coup d' etat committed by a leader is graver. If
the leader is unk n own, any person who in fact directed the others,
spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their
n ame, or performed sim i lar a c ts, on behalf of th e g r oup, shall b e
deemed the leader of said coup d' etat. (Article 185 of RPC; 2002 Bar
Exam)
Rebellion and C oup d'etat
The differences between rebellion and coup d' etat are as follows:
1. T h e c r i m i n al act in rebellion is public uprising and taking
up arms; w h il e t h a t i n co u p d ' etat is a s w i ft a t t a ck by m e a ns o f
v iolence, intim i d ation, th r eat, str ategy or stealth against th e du l y
c onstituted a u t h o r i t ies o r f a c i l i t ie s n e eded for t h e e x e r cise an d
continued possession of power;
2. T h e o f f enders in rebellion can be any persons; on the other
hand, the offenders in coup d' etat are mili t a ry o fficer, police officer
a nd public officers; however, thi s cr im e can be committed w it h o r
without the participation of civilians; and
3. Th e p u r p o s e of r e b ellion i s r e m o val o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e
t erritory or part t h ereof or armed forces from the allegiance to t h e
government and it s l aw s or d epr iv ation of executive or legislative
powers or privileges; while that of coup d' etat is seizure or diminutio n
of State power. (1991and 2004 Bar Exams)
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 61
T he difference between th e p u r p ose of r ebellion an d t h a t of
coup d' etat is more on the phraseology than on its substance.
Overthrowing t h e g o v e r n m ent i s a n o b j e c t iv e o f r e b e l lion
or coup d' etat since the pur p ose of the o ffenders is to r e m ove the
territory of the Phil i p pines from the allegiance of the people to the
government and its laws, or to seize state power.
Secession is an objective of r ebellion or coup d' etat since the
p urpose of the offenders is t o r e m ove part o f t h e t e r r i t or y of t h e
Philippines (e.g., Mindanao) from the allegiance of the people to the
government and its laws, or to diminish state power.
Deprivation of executive or legislative power or prerogative is
within the concept of diminu t ion of State power.
D octrine of Absorpt i o n
Doctrine of absorption in th e He r n a n dez case is applicable to
coup d' etat for being a political crime because the purpose of the coup
plotter is to seize or diminish state power. (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.B.
No. 164007, August 8, 2006, concurring opinion by Justice Callej o)
PROPOSAL OR CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT REBELLION OR COUP
D' ETAT
Proposal to commit r e b ellion or coup d' etat is c ommitted b y
any person who has decided to commit r ebellion or coup d' etat and
proposes its execution to some other person or persons. (Article 136)
Conspiracy t o c o m mi t r e b ellion o r c oup d' etat i s c ommitt e d
by two o r m o r e p e r sons wh o c ome t o a n a g r e ement concerning
the commission of rebellion or coup d' etat a nd decide to commit i t .
(Article 186)
SEDITION
Sedition i s c o m m i t t e d b y pe r s o ns w h o r i s e p u b l i c ly a n d
tumultuously, and by means of force, intimidation, or by other means
outside of legal methods, in order: (1) to prevent the promulgation or
e xecution of any law, execution of any admini str at ive order, or th e
holding of any popular election, or the free exercise of functions of
any public officer or the government; (2) to inflict any act of hate or
revenge against private persons or any social class for any political
or social end or upon the person or property of any publicofficer;
 62 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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or (3) todespoil any person, or government of its property for any
political or social end. (Article 189)
In People v. Ca b r era, G . R. N o . 1 7 7 4 8, M a r c h 4 , 1 9 2 2, t h e
encounter between policemen in M a n il a and Constabulary soldiers
resulted i n t h e d e at h o f a c o n s t abulary p r i v a te. T h i s e n counter
engendered a deep feeling ofresentment on the part of the soldiers.
They escaped through th e w i n dow of t h ei r q u a r t ers and a t t a cked
the police force. They fired in the direction of a crossroads, killing a
policeman and a civili an. They also fired at a street car, kill ing one
and wounding other p assengers. They at t acked the L u n et a police
station and the office of the secret service. Seventy-seven members
of the Philippine Constabulary were held guilty of sedition. The
o bject of the public and t u m u l t u ous upr i sing is to in fl ict a n act of
hate or revenge upon the person of police officers.
In U.S. v. Lapus, G.R. No. 1222, January 21, 1905, the accused
were members o f a n i l l e ga l a s sociation, c a lled "S a n ta I g l e sia,"
w hich was organized for th e p u r p ose of performing acts of ha t r ed
and vengeance against t h e a u t h o r i t ies an d t h e w e a l th y p e ople.
They had publicly and t u m u l t u ously at t acked a t own an d r o amed
i ts st r eets, fi r i n g s h o t s , y e l l i n g , and t h r e atening t h e r e s i d ents
with death, and t h ereby fr i g h t ening th em. They performed acts of
violence on the persons of the president and other residents of the
town with political-social purposes. The reason for the uprising was
that the rich people were loaning money at usurious terms to their
f arm laborers, and w hen t h e l a t t e r w er e u n a ble t o pa y t h e l o a n ,
t hey compelled their c h i l d ren t o w or k f o r t h e m a s servants (T h i s
i s exploitation of c h il d l a b or). A ccording t o t h em , i f t h e w e a l t h y
l andowners continued op pressing th e p o or , t h e y w o ul d n o t s t o p
d isturbing th e t o wn , because the la w m u s t b e e qually a p p l ied t o
rich and poor. The crime committed is sedition because the object of
public and tumu l t u ous uprising is to inflict an act of hate or revenge
upon private persons (wealthy landowners).
R ebellion and Sed i t i o n
The differences between rebellion and sedition are as follows:
1. I n r e b e l l i on, there must be public uprising and taking up
arms against the government; in sedition, there must be public and
t umultuous up r i sing by m e ans of f orce, in t i m i d ati on, or b y o t h e r
means outside of legal methods;
2. I n r e b e l l i on, the purpose of the rebels is political while in
sedition the purpose of the seditionists is either political or social.
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III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 63
3. R e b e l l io n a b s o rb s c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d i n fu r t h e r a n ce
thereof; the doctrine of absorption is not applicable to sedition. (1950
Bar Exam)
Senator A n t o ni o T r i l l a ne s a n d o t h e r d e t e n t io n p r i s oners
walked-out f ro m t h e c o u r t r oom d u r i n g t h e t r i a l o f t h e O a k w ood
rebellioncase on November 29, 2007. Escorted by armed supporters
and civilians including former Vice-President Teofisto Guingona,
Jr,, they proceeded to Manila Peninsula Hotel and forcibly occupied
it. They set up a command center at the second floor of the hotel and
made a public statement, to wit: "We take the fateful step of removing
Mrs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the Presidency and undertake
the formation of a netv government." Former Vice-President Guingona
uttered publicly "This is like Edsa,"
T he participants of th e M a n i l a P e n in sula i n cident i n clu di n g
Senator Tri l l anes, was charged for rebellion. Hov ever, there is an
i ssue on whether or not wal k i n g-out from the court room to Manil a
Peninsula and the appeal to the public to repeat the Edsa Revolution
constitute rebellion.
In the Hernandez case, the Supreme Court ruled that the word
rebellion is not m e r ely a c h a l l enge to th e constituted au t h ori t i es,
but it involves civil w ar. Civil war p r esupposes engaging in combat
against the forces of the Government, destroying property or committing
serious violence. In sum, if t he p u b l ic aris ing is equivalent to civil
war, the same shall be considered as public and armed uprising, and
thus, the crime is rebellion. If the public upri sing is not equivalent
to civil war, the same shall be considered as public and tumultuous
uprising, and thus, the crime is sedition.
By r e a son t h e r e of, i t i s sub m i t t e d f o r b a r ex a m i n a t i on
purposes, the p a r t i cipants of t h e M a n i l a P e n i n sula Si ege should
b e prosecuted for s e dition s i nce t h er e i s p u b l i c an d t u m u l t u o u s
uprising to prevent a pu blic officer (e.g., the President) from freely
exercising its function by other means outside of legal methods. But
hypothetically, if the group of Trill anes attacked Malacanang, killed
soldiers, police officers and PSG personnel, and burned buildings to
compel President Arroyo to resign, the crime committed is rebellion.
The purpose of the armed uprisers isto deprive President Arroyo
her executive powers and prerogatives.
There is public and t u m u l t u ous u p r i sing i n E dsa Revolution
III. The purpose of the tu m u l t u ous uprisers is to compel President
Aquino to resign or to prevent her from freely exercising her functions
 64 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 65
VOLUME II
t
a s a pu b li c officer. I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e c r i m e c o m m i t te d i s
for that purpose. The former soldiers agreed. They are liable for
sedition. But h y p othetically, if th e par t i cipants of Edsa Revolution
conspiracy tocommit sedition. Jose, Pedro, and the former soldiers
I II a t t a cked M a l acanang, k i l led soldiers, police officers and P S G
agreed and decided to rise publicly and tum u l t u ously and by means
p ersonnel, an d b u r n e d b u i l d i ng s t o c o m pel P r e sident A r r oy o t o "
of force or inti m i d ation to prevent the promulgation or execution of
r esign, the crime committed is rebellion. The purpose of the armed ~
any law. (1987 Bar Exam)
uprisers is t o deprive President A r r oyo her executive powers and
prerogatives. The proposals to commit the following felonies are punishable:
E ven if t h ere is a p u b li c an d a r med u p r i sin g i f t h e p u r p o s 1. Tr e a s o n ;
o h
of th e u p r i sers is not a n o b ject of r ebellion, th e cr im e commi t t e d
2. Re b e l l i o n ;
is sedition. In Pe o ple v. Um a l i , G . R . N o . L - 5 8 0 3, N o vember 2 9, j
1 954, to elimin ate his political r i v al , th e i n cumbent m ay or, in t h e 3. Co u p d' etat; and
c oming election, accused wit h o t h er s r a i d ed, b u r n ed, l ooted an d
4. T er r o r i s m — Section 8 of R.A. No. 11479
r obbed stores and houses including t ha t o f t h e m a y or, an d k i l l e d
and wounded several persons. Rebellion is not commi t ted because Proposal to commit espionage (2011 Bar Exam) or sedition (2011
t he acts of the r a iders in r i s ing pu blicly and t a k in g up a r m s w er e and 2018 Bar Exams) is not punishable. However, one who proposes
not exactly against the Government. The purpose of the public and sedition to a n other ma y b e h el d l i a bl e for i n c i t in g t o s edition by
tumultuous upri sing is to infl ict an act of hate or revenge upon the uttering seditious word. (Article 142)
person or property of a public official. Thus, the crime committed is
The conspiracies to commit the following felonies and offenses
sedition under Ar t i cle 139.
under special laws are punishable:
D octrine of Absorp t i o n Treason;

Doctrine of absorption in the Hernandez case is not applicable 2. R e b e llion;

to sedition (P eople v. Ha d ji, G . R. N o. L - 1 2686, October 24, 1968)
3. Co u p d' etat;
s ince this crime can be committed wit h out k i l l in g soldiers, burnin g
of properties and extortions. Hence, if sedition is accompa ' d 't h 4. Sed i t i o n .
n ie w i
killin
i ing ofpersons and burning of properties, the uprisers are liable
5. Si m p l e a r son — Section 7 of P.D. No. 1613
for sedition, murder, and arson. In People v. Cabrera, supra, accused
w as convicted of sedition and separate crimes of mu l t i pl e m u r d er , 6. D an g e r ous drugs trafficking — Section 26 of R.A. No. 9165
arson, frustrated mu r der and physical inju r i es. In People v. Umali,
7. T er r o r i s m — Section 7 of R.A. No. 11479
supra, accused was convicted of sedition and murder.
8. Fi n a n c i n g of terr orism or dealing with p r operty or fun ds
of designated persons — Section 5 of RA No. 10168
CON SPIRACY TO CO M M IT SEDITION
9. Ch i l d p o r n ography — Section 4 of R.A. No. 9775
Conspiracy to commit sedition i s c o mm i t t ed by t w o o r m o r e
persons who come to an a greement concerning th e commission of 10. M o n ey laundering — Section 4 of R.A. No. 9160
sedition and decide to commit it. (Art ic le 141)
Conspiracy t o c o m m i t d i r e c t a s s aul t ( 2 011 Ba r E x a m ) o r
Jose and Pedro proposed to the former soldiers that they robbery (1 987 Bar E x a m ) is n o t p u n i s h a ble. Proposal to c ommit
recruit theircomrades and organize a group of 100 for the purpose arson, drug trafficking,child pornography or money laundering is
of challenging the government by force of arms in order to prevent not punishable. Conspiracy to commi t t r a f f i cking i n p e r son (2011
the implementation of the Land Reform Law i n C otabato Province. Bar Exam); or highway robbery (2011 Bar Exam); or to assassinate
Jose and Pedro promised to finance the group and to buy firearms the President (1950 Bar Exam) is not punishable. Conspiracy against
the life of t h e P r e sident w a s p u n i shable un der P .D . No . 1 1 10-A.

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III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
VOLUME II

However, E.O. No. 183 dated June 5, 1987 b.as repealed P.D. No. I
1110-A.
INCITING TO REBELLION
To concept of i n c i t in g t o r e b ellion u n der A r t i cl e 13 8 of t h e '',
Revised Penal Code is the similar t o i n cit ing tc sedition under the '
original version ofArticle 142 of the Code.
Under Ar t i cle 138, incitin g t o r e bellion i s commi t ted by an y ',
person who sh al l i n c it e o t h er s t o c o m mit re b e llion by s p e eches
p roclamations, w r i t i n g s , e mblems, b a nn ers. T h e o f f e nder m u s t ,
not be a participant in r ebellion; otherwise tl e crime committed is '
rebellion. He must incite others:
1. To r i s e publicly;
2. To t a k e u p ar ms; and
3. T o at t a i n t h e p u r p ose of r ebellion (e.g. to r e m ove
t he ter r i t or y o f t h e P h i l i p p i nes f ro m t h e a l l e gi ance t o t h e '
government and its laws)
I nciting to commi t t e r r o r i s m
Inciting to commit terr orism is perpetrated by any person, who
shall incite others to commit t e r r orism by speeches, proclamations
writings, emblems, banners. The offender must not be a participant
in terrorism; otherwise the crime committed is terr orism. He mu st
inciteothers:
1. T o c o m m i t c r i m i n a l act of terr orism e.g. engaging in act
i ntended to cause death to person or extensive damage to prope t .
oper y;
and
2. To a t t a i n t h e p u r p ose of terrorism (e.g. to inti m i d ate the
general public or influence by inti m i d ation the government).
INCITING TO SEDITION
Under the original version of Article 142, inciting to sedition is
committed by any person who shall incite othe "s to commit sedition
by speeches, proclamations, w ritings, e m b l ems, b a n n e rs . T h e
offender must not be a par t i cipant in sedition; otherwise the crime
committed is sedition. He must incite others:
1. To r i s e publicly;
2. T o r i s e t u m u l t u ously; and
3. T o a t t a i n th e pur pose of sedition (e.g. to prevent the
government or public officer to freely exercise its/his function)
Under the original version of Art i cle 142 of the Revised Penal
Code, there is onl y on e f or m o f i n c i t in g t o s edition. T hi s concept
is Spanish. Ho w e ver, C ommonwealth A c t N o . 2 0 2 h a d a m e n d ed
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the prohibited
acts under Act No. 292, which is an American origin. The additional
f orms of inciting to sedition involves seditious utterances or writi n g
or scurrilous libels against th e government or i t s a u t h or i t ies and
concealment of seditious practices.
To constitut e i n c i t in g t o s e d i t io n t h e s e d i t i ous u t t e r a nce or
w riting or scurr i l ous libels against th e Government, or any of t h e
duly constituted authorities thereof must:
a. T e n d t o d i s t u r b o r o b s t r uc t a n y l a w f u l o f fi cer i n
executing the functions of his office; or
b. T e nd to instigateothers to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes; or
c. Su g g e st or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; or
d. T e n d o r l ead to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities;or
e. T en d o r l ead to disturb the peace of the community ,
the safety and order ofthe Government. (1967 and 2006 Bar
Exams)
Freedom of Ex p r e ssion
Speeches calling resignation of h igh government officials are
just an exercise of freedom of expression. Even though the utterance
of statements is irritating or obnoxious to the ears of the police
officers, the same is st il l p r o t ected by th e Constitu t i on. (2011 Bar
Exam)
Speeches extolling commu n ism i s a n e x e r cise of f r eedom of
expression. Communism is a m er e polit ical t h eory, which upholds
the belief in t h e s u p r emacy of th e p r o l etari at ; a communist does
n ot yet advocate the seizing of th e r e in s of Government by it . A s
a political t h eorist, th e commu nist i s n o t y e t a c t u ally considered
as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. (People v.
Hernandez, G.R. No. L - 6 025, May 8 0 , 1 964) However, when t h e y

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 68 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
extol communism and urge the people to hold a national strike and
paralyze commerce and trade,they can be held liable for ir.citing to
sedition. (2011 Bar Exam) I f t he communists rise publicly and take
up arms to overthrow the government, they are liable for rebellion.
Statement "bukas t uloy a n g we l g a natin h a n g g ang s a
magkagulo na" made in presence of his followers justifies the arrest
of the person, who u t t e red it , on t h e b a sis of th e h onest belief of
the arresting officer that he is commit t in g in cit ing to sedition. The
validity of t h e a r r est w a s s u st ained because in t h e b a l a n cing of
authority and freedom of expression,the scale was tilted in favor of
authority but "o nly for purposes of the arrest." (Espiritu v. Lim, G.A.
No. 85727, October 3, 1991) But for purposes of conviction for inciting
to sedition, whether such statements constitute inciting to sedition
or an exercise offreedom of expression is not clear. Applying the
pro reo doctrine, the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the
accused. Hence, accused is not l i able for in cit ing to sedi=ion. (2011
Bar Exam)
Inciting to R ise Pu b l i c ly
W hat is the proper charge against a person who, without takin g
arms or being in open hostility against the Government, shall incite
others to deprive Congress of itslegislative powers, by means of
speeches or writi n gs? (2012 Bar Exam)
T o be held l i a ble for i n c i t in g t o r e bellion, th e offender m u st
incite o t h er s n o t o n l y t o a c c omplish a n y p u r p o ses of r e b ellion
(deprivation of legislative power) but lik ewise to perform the acts of
rebellion. In sum, the offender must also incite them to rise publicly
and to take up arms to deprive legislative power. Thus, this is not
inciting to rebellion because he did not incite them to r ise publicly
and to take up arms.
To commit i n c i t in g t o s edition of th e fi r s t f o rm , th e offender
m ust in cit e ot h ers t o r i s e p u b l i cly an d t u m u l t u o usly i n o r d e r t o
attain any of the ends of sedition. (People v. Arrogante, 39 O.G. 1974)
In sum, the offender must incite others not only to prevent Congress
from freely exercising its function but l i k e w ise to rise publicly and
tumultuously. Thus, this is not incit ing to sedition of the first r s foo r m
b e cause he did not incite them to rise publicly and tum uu,l t ullous ousl y..
However, this is i n ci t in g t o sedition of th e second form sin ce
t he offender ut t e red seditious speeches or w r i t i ng s w h ich t en d t o
disturb or o b s t r uct a n y l a w f u l o f f icer i n e x ecutin g t h e f u n c t i ons
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III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 69
of his office,tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for
unlawful pur poses; or lead or tend to stir up th e people against the
'awful authorities;or lead or tend to disturb the safety and order of
".he Government.
Dangerous Tend ency T e st
P rohibiting, i n t e r r u p t in g o r d i s s olvin g a p e a ceful m e e t i n g
without legal ground is a crime under Article 131 of the Revised Penal
Code. To determine if the prohibiti on, interr u p t ion or dissolution of
the peaceful meeting is with legal ground, the controlling test is the
"clear and present danger rule."
On the ot her h a n d , t o d e t er m in e i f a s p eech or p u b l i cation
constitutes the crime of in cit in g t o sedition, the controlling test i s
the "dangerous or seditious tendency ru l e." T o c o mmit t h e c r i m e
of inciting to sedition, the speech or scurr i l ous libels must h ave a
seditious tendency. The phrases "tend to disturb or obstruct," "tend
to instigate others," and "lead or tend to stir up the people" in Article
142 is a c o n f i r m a t io n o f t h e "d a n g e rous t e ndency pr i n c iple" a s
the controlling r u l e i n d e t er m i n in g i f t h e s p eeches, utterances or
writings are seditious.
According to Dean An t onio Gregorio, the dangerous tendency
rule and not the clear and present danger rule is generally adopted
i n the Phi l i p p ines regarding sedition cases. It i s e n ough t hat t h e
words used may tend to create the danger of public uprising. It is not
necessary thatthere be a clear and present danger of the substantive
evil which the law aims to prevent.
1. Se di t i o u s Speech —In People v. Nabong, G.R. No. 36426,
November 3, 1932, at a necrologicalservice on the occasion of the
death of acommunist leader, accused delivered a speech as follows:
"They committed a r e a l a b use i n s eizing t h e flag. The
members of the Constabulary are bad because they shoot even
innocent women, as it h a ppened in T a yug. In v iew of th i s, we
ought to be united to suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present
government and establish our own government, the government
of the poor. Use your whip so that there may be marks on their
sides."
The accused in t h e Na b o ng c ase is n ot l i a b le f or i n c it i ng t o
r ebellion si nce h e m e r el y i n c i te d t h e a u d i ence to ov erthrow t h e
g overnment, w h ich i s a n o bject of r ebellion; but h e di d no t i n c i t e
them to rise publicly and to take up arms against the government.
 70 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Neither is he liable for inciting to sedition of the first form since he
did not incite them to rise publicly and tumul t u ously. Howeve", he is
liable for inciting to sedition of the second form since his speech: (1)
instigated the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful purpo
u purpose;
(2) su
suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies; (3) tended to stir up
the people against the lawful au t h or i t i es; and (4) tended to disturb
the peace of the community and the order of the Government.
A teacher in General Santos during the corona virus crisis
posted in Facebook "Maraming mamamatay sa gutom if hindi tayo
magtutulongan na magreport sa Pangulo na inutil ang ating ~'Zayor.
Panawagan sa walang makain, sugurin nyo na nang sabay.sabay
ang Lagao Gym. Nakatambak doon angpagkaing para sa inyo."Sh e
was arrested for inciting to sedition with the qualifying circumstar ce
of using information or communication technology under R.A. No.
10175.
There is no crime of inciting to coup d'etat or treason. However
a person who incites others to commit coup d' etat or treason may be
held liable for inciting to sedition of the second form.
2. S e d i t i o u s W o r d s — I n P eop l e v. Perez G .R . N .
1049, December 22, 1923, accused, a municipal secretary, and
t he m u n i cipal p r e sident e n g aged i n a d i s c u ssion r e gardin g t h e
administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez
shouting a number of times:
<A
T!
he Filip i nos, l i k e m y self, must u se b olos for c u t t i n g
o ff Wood's head for h a ving r ecommended a ba d t h ing fo r t h e
Filipinos for he has killed our independence."
This is i n c i t in g t o s e d i t ion o f t h e s econd f or m b e caus
the
words uttered: (1) instigated the poor to cabal and meet together for
unlawful purpose; (2) suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies;
(3) tended to stir up th e people against the lawful a u t h or i t i es; and
(4) tended to disturb th e peace of the community an d th e order of
the Government.
3. Sc u r r i l o u s L i b e l A g a i n s t t h e G o v er n m e n t — I n
Espuelas v. People, G .R. No. L- 2990, December 17 1 9 5 1
, accuse d
ha ad hiiss p i c t u r e t a k en , m a k i n g i t a p p ea r a s i f h e w e r e h a n g'ng
i
lifi eless atthe end of a piece of rope suspended from a tree. He sent
copies ofhis photograph to several newspapers for their publicaticn
w ith a suicide note, which contained statements that he cominitt cd
s uicide because he w a s n o t p l e a sed w i t h t h e a cl mi ni str at ion o f
P resident Roxas, that our government is infested with many H i t l er s
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III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 71
Mussohnis an d t h a t h e i s a shamed of our g'overnmen
R oxas and cannot hold high hi s br ows to the world w it h t h i s d i r t y
government, H e i n s t r u c ted hi s c h i l d re n t o b u r n t h e p i c t u re s of
Roxas if and when they come across them. This is inciting to sedition
of the second form since this scurril ous libel suggested and incited
rebellious conspiracies and tended to stir up th e people against the
lawful authorit i es.
T o be considered as i n c i t in g t o s e diti on, th e l i b els m ust b e
scurrilous and seditious. Scurri l o us me ans low, v u l g a r, m e a n, or
foul. If it is not scurrilous and has no seditious tendency, but the
publication involved false news, which may cause damage to the
interest or credit of the stats, or contained encouragement to disobey
&e law or constituted authority, the crime committed is unlawful
publication under Article 154 of the Revised Penal Code.
4. C o n cealnmnt of Evil P r actice — The phrase "such
evil practices" in Article 142 refers to the inciting to commit acts
of sedition, utterances of seditious speech and writing, publishing
o r circulat in g s c u r r i l ou s l i b el s a g a i ns t t h e g o v e r n m ent . T h u s ,
concealment of the crime of sedition or cr ime of inciting to commit
rebellion is not punishable under Ar t i cle 142.
I f a person incited another t o commi t s edition t h e i n c i ter i s
liable for i n c i t in g t o s e diti on. Th e p ersons being in cited can al so
be held li able for i n c i t in g t o s edition i f d u r i n g i n v estigation th ey
conceal this crime to authorit i es.
T he law o n i n c i t i n g t o s e d i t i o n i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
In Ponsica v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. L-72301, July 31, 1987, the
p etitioner q u estioned th e c onstit u t i onalit y o f A r t i cl e 14 2 o n t h e
ground that i t w a s "borrowed" from th e U .S. Sedition Act of 1198,
w hich i n t u r n h a s b e e n s t r u c k d o w n a s i n c o n sistent w i t h t h e
American Constituti on. The Supreme Court sustained the argument
of the Solicitor General, to w it : " Our l a w o n i n c i t in g t o sedition is
not akin to the US Sedition Act of 1798, which was imposed on
the American colonies by t h ei r B r i t i s h r u l er . W i t h t h e s u ccess of
the American Revolution, th e 1 798 Sedition Act n a t u r a lly ceased
to have effect as it w o ul d b e u t t e rl y i n c ongruous to pu nish t h ose
who sought the overthrow of the British government in America.
To annul our law on sedition is to give license to those who seek the
application of lawless methods in the advancement of their political
views. Our constitution surely does not contemplate this,"
 72 CRIMINAL LAW RLVIEWER
VOLUME II
P roposal t o c o m m i t r e b e l l i o n o r t e r r o r i s m , a n d i n c i t i n g t o
c ommit r e b e l l i on , sedi t i on , or t e r r o r i s m
I n both proposal to commit r e bellion or ter r o r i sm, and in ci t i n g
t o rebellion o r t e r r o r i sm , t h e o f f e n der i n d u ces ot h r s t o c o m m i t
r ebellion or terr or i sm. However, in incit in g to rebellion or terr or i s m ,
th
t e in d u cement is made publicly; while in pr oposal, the inducement
is done secretly. According to Albert, there is no proposal where there
is publicity i n t h e i n c i t a t io n o r p r o v ocation. I n s u m , t h e o f f ender
in proposal to commit r e b ellion does not in d uce others by m eans of
speeches, proclamations, wri t i n gs, emblems, banners.
T here is n o c r i me of p r oposal to commit s edition. I f t h e
inducement to commit sedition is made publicly, t he crime committ e d
i s incit in g t o s e d i t io n o f t h e fi r s t f o r m ( S p a n is h c o ncept). I f t h e
inducement to commit sedition is done secretly, t he crime commit t e d
is inciting to sedition of the second form involving seditious utterance
(American concept). The crime of inciting to sedition of the second
form introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 202 is comprehensive
e nough to cover secret i n d u cement t o com mi t s e di t i on. Pu b l i city i s
not an element of incit in g to sedition of the second form. In th e case
of Perez, the accused in a me eting w as discussing with t w o p e rsons
r egarding th e a d m i n i s t r a t ion of G overnor G eneral W oods when h e
uttered the seditious words of cutting the head of Wood with the use
of bolo. He was not delivering a sediti ous speech in a pl aza. He was
convicted of incit ing to sediti on .
C yber in c i t i n g t o r e b e l l io n o r s e d i t i o n
I f incit in g t o r e b ellion or i n c i t i n g t o s e di t ion i s com m i t t e d b y
using infor m a t ion or c o m m u n i c a t ion t e chnology such as F a cebook
or twitt er, the penalty for t hi s cr im e shall be increase by one degree
b ecause of Section 6 o f R .A . N o . 1 0 175 or C y ber C r : m e L a w ( e . g.
the penalty of pr i s i on m a y or i n i t s m i n i m u m p e r i o d f or i n c i t i ng t o
r ebellion shall be gr a du ated to pr i s ion m a yor i n i t s rr edium p er i od
if informat ion technology is used in commi t t i n g t hi s crim e). If this is
the case, the crime may be designated as cyber incit in g to r ebellion
or cyber inciting to sedition .
H owever, th ere is n o cyber i n c i t in g t o co m mi t t e r r o r i sm . T h e
p enalty for incit ing to commit t e r r o r ism is 12 years of imprisonment .
H ence, t h e q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a n ce of u s i n g i n fo r m a t i o n
or
communication technology under R.A. No. 10175 c a n no t be
c onsidered to up gr ade th e penalty for i n c i t i n g t o commi t t e r r o r i s m
o ne degree hi gher s i n c e a n A m e r i ca n p e n a lt y o f 1 2 y e a r s i s n o t
s ubject to graduati on .
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
I ncited a u d i e n c e
It is not requ i red in i n c i t in g to r ebellion or i n c i t in g to sedition
t hat th e t h i r d p e r s ons or a u d i e nce be a c t u a ll y i n c i t e d t o c o m m i t
r ebellion, sedition, or any evil acts against the government or publ i c
authoriti es.
Article 146 of the Revised Penal Code punishes illegal assembly
w here th e a u d i e nce ar e a c t u a ll y i n c i t e d t o c o m m i t r e b e l l io n o r
s edition. I f t h e a u d i e nc e i n a n a s s e m bl y a r e i n c i t e d t o c o m m i t
r ebellion or sediti on, th e au di ence, leader, and organizer are l i a b l e
for illegal assembly.
I f th e o f f ender i n a p u b l i c p l a z a t r i e d t o i n c i t e a u d i e nce t o
commit rebellion or sediti on, he is l i a ble for i n c i t in g t o r ebellion or
i nciting t o s e di t i on . H o w ev er, i f t h e a u d i e nce are actu all y i n c i t e d
to commit r e b ellion or s e di t i on, th e i n c i ter sh al l b e p r osecuted for
the graver crime of illegal assembly as leader; the organizer and
the incited audience are also liable. In sum, the int ent ion of the law
is to make successful in ci t em ent as an e l em ent of i l l e gal assembly
but not as an element of in ci t in g to r ebellion or in ci t in g to sedition .
To rule otherwise is to oblit er ate the di st in ct ion between inciting to
sedition or i n c i t in g t o r e b ellion an d i l l e gal assembly commi t ted by
a leader.
Moreover, th ere i s n o t h in g i n t h e R e v i sed Penal Code whi ch
r equired t h a t t h e p e r s on s b e in g i n c i t e d a r e s u c cessfully i n c i t e d
to commit r e b ellion or s e d i t ion o r a n y o t h e r e vi l a c ts . I n t h e c a se
of Perez, t here is n o s h o w i ng t h a t t h e t w o p e r s o ns, who h e a rd t o
seditious u t t e r a nce i n v o l v in g t h e k i l l i n g o f W o o d b y t h e a c cused
Perez, were successfully in cited to kil l or assassinate Wood.
I n i n c i t in g t o c o m m i t t e r r o r i s m w h e r e t h e a u d i e nce w h e r e
a ctually i n c i te d t o c o m mi t t e r r o r i sm , t h e i n c i t e r i s s t i l l l i a b l e f or
i nciting t o c o m m i t t e r r o r i s m w h i l e t h e i n c i t e d a u d i e nce ar e n o t
liable for ill egal assembly.
I ntent t o c o m m i t r e b e l l i on , t e r r o r i s m o r s e d i t i o n
In p r o p osal t o c o m m i t r e b e l l io n o r t e r r o r i sm , t h e o f f e nder
m ust be decided to commit r e bellion or t e r r o r i sm . In s um , i n t ent t o
commit rebellion or terr o r ism on the part of the offender is essential
i n proposal to commit r ebellion or t er r o r i s m .
However, in incit in g to rebellion, terrorism or sedition, it is not
required that the offender is decided to commit rebellion, terrorism,
sedition, or any other evil acts such as assassinating the President.
 74 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
I n sum , i n t en t t o c o m m i t r e b e l l i on , t e r r o r i sm , o r s e d i t ion o r a n y
other evil act is not an el ement of in ci t in g to r ebellion, terr or ism or
sedition. In th e case of Perez, there is no showing t ha t t h e accused
is decided to k il l t h e Go vernor Ge ne ral ( now P r e s ident) by u s i ng a
bolo, and yet, he was convicted.
I n inciting to rebellion, terr o r i sm , or in ci t in g to sedition, wh at
i s imp or t an t i s n o t t h e i n t e n t t o c o m m i t r e b e l l i on , t e r r o r is m o r
s edition or an y o t he r e vi l a ct s bu t t h e i n c i t i n g effects of m a k in g a
speech, writin g or u t t e r a nce on other pe rsons.
H owever, l ac k o f i n t e n t t o i n c i t e o t h e r p e r s on s t o c o m m i t
r ebellion, t e r r o r is m s e d i t i on s o r e v i l a c t m a y b e c o n s i dered a s a
d efense (e.g. statement to assassinate the President is merely ma d e
as a joke). Inciting to rebellion, terr or ism or sedition is ma l um in se.
D olo or evil in t ent i s an element of thi s cr i m e .
UNLAWFUL UTTERANCE
Unlawful utterance is committed by any person who encourages
disobedience tothe law or to the constituted authorities, or praises,
justifies, or extols any act p u n i s hed by law by w o r ds, ut t e r a nces or
speeches. (Article 154)
O ne, wh o i n c i t e s o t h er s t o k i l l d r u g p u s h e r s
ma b h l d
liab
i a le for unl a w fu l u t t e r a n ce. Incit ing to commit a crime is unl aw f u l
u tterance provided t ha t t h e ac t i s n o t c o n st i t u t i v e of t h e c r i m e o f
inciting to rebellion or in ci t in g to sediti on .
UNLA W F U L USE OF ME A N S OF PU BLICATION
Unlawful u s e o f m e a n s of p u b l i c a t i on i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y
p erson: (1) wh o p u b l i s hes or c a u ses to b e p u b l i s hed as n ew s a n y
false news which may endanger the public order, orcause damage
to the interest or credit of the State; or who encourages disobedience
to the law or to the constit u ted aut h or i t ies or pr aise, justify, or extol
a ny act pu n i shed by la w b y m e an s of p r i n t i n g , l i t h o gr aphy, or an y
ot er m e ans of publication; (2) who ma l i ciously publi shes or causes
to be published any official r e solut ion or d o cument w i t h ou t p r o p er
a uthority, or b efore they h ave been pu b l i shed officially; or (3) w h o
prints, publishes, or distri b u tes or causes to be printed, published or
d istributed books, pam p h l ets, periodicals, or l eafiets w h ic h d o n o t
b ear the real p r' i n t e r'' sname, or which are classifiedas anonymous.
(Article 154)
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III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 75
According t o D e p a r t m en t o f I n t e r i o r a n d L o ca l G o v er n m ent
( DILG) d u r i n g t h e c o r on a v i r u s c r i s i s , t h os e w h o a r e s p r e a di n g
false news should be p u n i s hed u n der P .D . N o . 90 , w h ic h d eclared
u nlawful r u m o r - m ongerin g an d s p r eading f a lse i n f or m a t i on. W i t h
due respect to t h e D I L G , E . O . N o . 6 5 , w h i c h i s i s s ued P r e sident
Corazon Aq u in o p u r s u an t t o t h e F r e e dom C o n st i t u t i on , r e p ealed
P.D. No. 90 on November 21, 1986.
Spreading false news in connection with th e corona virus crisis
such as a nationwide lockdown constit u tes the crime of unlawfu l use
of means of publication und er Art i " l e 1 54 of the Revised Penal Code.
This provision puni shes any person, who shall publish or cause to be
published false news which may endanger the public order, or cause
damage to the interest orcredit of the State. However, if the false
n ews is pu b l i shed w i t h t h e u s e o f c o m m u n i c at ion o r i n f o r m a t i o n
t echnology (e.g., Facebook or t w i t t e r '), the penalty for u n l a w f u l u s e
of means ofpublication applying Section 6 of R.A. No. 10175 shall be
upgraded one degree higher.
I s t h e p e r s on , w h o c l i c k e d t h e b u t t o n "like" o r m ad e a
"comment" on, or shares false news posted in Facebook, are liable as
an accomplice for cyber un l a w fu l use of means of publication?
In D i s in i v . Se c retary of J u s t i c e, G.R. N o. 20 3 3 35, Fe bruary
18, 2014, the Su p r em e Cour t d e cl ared as u n c onstit u t i o nal Section
5 of R.A. No. 10175 on ai d in g or ab et t in g cybercrime in r e l a t ion t o
cyber libel, child pornography. It wa s held that th e t e rm s "aiding or
abetting" constit ut e br oad sweep that generates a chill in g effect on
those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments,
and other messages. Hence, this pr ovi sion tha t p u n i s hes "aiding or
a betting" l i bel on th e cyberspace or cyber por n ography i s a n u l l i t y
s ince it e n c r oaches u po n f r e e dom o f s p e ech o n g r o u n d s o f o v e r
b readth or vagueness of the statu t e .
Applying th e D i s in i p r i n c i p le, a blogger who ori g i n a lly posted
a libelous m e ssage o r c h i l d p o r n o g r ap hi c m a t e r i a l i s l i a b l e f o r
cybercrime. But n e t i z ens, who mer ely r eacted to the defamatory or
child pornographic message on Facebook by click ing th e bu t ton for
"Like," "Comment," or "Share" or on a Twi t ter account by retweeting
i t, are not liable for ai ding or abett in g cybercrim e .
It is the submission of this wri ter that D i s ini case can be applied
to limit th e a p p l i cation of' A r t i cl e 154 of the Revised Penal Code on
unlawful us e of m e ans of p u b l i c ation t o t h e b l o ggers, who created
a nd spread the false news on corona vi r us . E x t en ding th e cr i m i n a l
e ffect of t hi s p r o v i sion t o p er sons, who m e r ely sh ared or l i k e d t h e
 76 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
false news in t h ei r i n t e r ne t a ccounts ma y v i o l at e t h ei r f r e edom of
expression.
However, if there is conspiracy to spread by false news between
t he blogger and t h e on e wh o s h a red it , b ot h o f t h e m a r e l i a bl e as
principals.
L AWS ON LO O S E FIREAR M
R.A. NO. 10591
Sections 1 and 2 ofP.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294
punished crimes involving u n l i censed firearm . H ow ever, Section 45
of R.A. No. 10591 has expressly repealed Sections 1 and 2 of P.D. No.
1 866. R.A. No. 10591 is now th e governin g law on cr i mes involvi n g
loose firearm.
C harging t h e a c cused fo r p o ssession of l o ose fi r e ar m u n d e r
P.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 10591 is wrong since R.A. Nc.
10591 is not an amendatory law. The proper charge should be illegal
possession of loose firearm u n der R .A. No. 10591.
L oose Fir e a r m
The concept of loose firearm u n d e r R .A . No . 10 591 is br oader
than that of unlicensed firearm under the repealed P.D. No. 1866.
Under S e ction 3 o f R . A . N o . 1 0 5 9 1 , l o ose fi r e arm r e f e rs t o a n
u nregistered fi r e a r m , a n o b l i t e r a t e d o r a l t e r e d fi r e a r m , f i r e a r m
w hich h a s b e e n l o s t o r s t o l en , i l l e g a ll y m a n u f a c t u re d f i
rearms,
r egistered fi r e a rm s i n t h e p o s session of a n i n d i v i d u a l o t h e r t h a n
t he licensee and those with r e v oked licenses in accordance with t h e
rules and regulati ons.
A n im i t a t io n fi r e ar m u sed i n t h e c om m i s sion of a cr im e sh a l l
be considered a real firearm. (Section 85 of R.A. No. 10591) If the
o ffender uses im i t a t ion fi r e ar m i n c o m m i t t i n g r o b bery, he shall b e
prosecuted fo r r o b b er y w i t h s p e c ia l a g g r a v a t in g c i r c u m s t ance of
u sing loose firearm .
Possession of Loose Firearm
The unlawful acquisit ion and possession of loose firearms an d
ammunition is a crime. (Section 29 of R.A. No. 10591
) o r amm u n i t i on , o r a m a j o r p a r t o f a fir e a r m o r a m m u n i t i on , o r
A was sleeping on the fioor. Immediat ely beside him was a clutch
b ag containing a loose firearm. He was ar r ested. A mai n t a i ned th at
t he bag contai n in g t h e u n l i c ensed fi r e ar m b e l onged t o h i s f r i e n d ,
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 77
and that he was not in actual possession thereof at the t im e he was
arrested. (2000 Bar Exam) His argument is untenable. The rule
is that ow n er ship i s no t a n e s sential e l em ent of i l l e gal p ossession
o f firearm s a n d a m m u n i t i o n . W h a t t h e l a w r e q u i r e s i s m e r e l y
possession, physical, or constructive. (People v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos.
102009-19, July 6, 1 994) The s ame evi ls, wh i ch t h e l a v p e n a l i z e s,
e xist whether t h e u n l i c ensed holder of a p r o h i b i te d w e apon i s i t s
owner or a borrower. (People v. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5798, 4ugust 27,
1953) Morecver, A has constructive possession over the loose firearm
s ince the same is under h:s contr ol. Possession wit hi n t h e m e a n i n g
of R.A. No. 10591 includes not onl y a c t ual p h y sical possession but
also constructive possession or th e s u bjection of th e t h i n g t o o ne' s
control and man agement. (People v. De Gracia, supra)
A security agency delivered to X, it s security gu ard, a firear m .
X was arrested forpossession of loose firearm. It turned out that the
agency has no license for said firearm. (1972 Bar Exam) Although
possessicn of loose firearm is malum prohibitum, knowledge that
the firearm is unlicensed is indispensable to make the possessor
criminally i a ble under R.A. No. 10591. The obligation to obtain
l icense for fi r e ar m t o b e u s e d b y s e c u r it y g u a r d s b e l ongs t o t h e
officers of the security agency. If the agency failed obtain license for
t he said fi r earm , an d t h e r e i s n o s h o w in g t h a t t h e s ecurit y g u a r d
i s aware of such u n l i c ensed condition of t h e fi r e a r m , t h e s ecurit y
guard is not liable for ill egal possession of loose firearm. In People v.
Chowdury, G.R. No.129577-80, February 15, 2000, lack of knowledge
of the failure to register th e accused as an employee of the licensed
recruitment agency wit h —.he POEA was considered as a defense in
illegal recrui t m e nt , w h ich is also classified as malum in se.
Although p o ssessior o f l o o s e fi r e ar m i s m al u m p r o h i b i t u m ,
knowledge that t h e fir e a r m is s u ed by t h e a g e ncy is u n l i c e nsed is
indispensable t o make the security g ua rd cri m i n a l ly l i a b l e .
Even t h o ug h t h e f i r e a r m i s n o t l o o se , c a r r y i n g re g i s te red
firearm outs ide his residence without any legal autho ri ty t h e re for is
also punishable under the law. (Section 81)
The law also punishes a person who shall unlawfully engage
i n the m a r u f a c t u r e , i m p o r t a t i on , s al e o r d i s p osition of a fi r e a r m
m achinery, tool or i n s t r u m en t u se d or i n t e n ded t o be used by t h e
s ame perscn i n t h e m a n u f a c t ur e o f a fi r e a r m , a m m u n i t i on , o r a
major part t h e r eof. (Section 82)
 78 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUiilE II
T he possession o f a n y m a c h i n e ry , t o o l o r i n s t r u m e n t u s e d
d irectly i n t h e m a n u f a c t ur e o f f i r e a r m s , a m m u n i t i on , o r m a j o r
p arts thereof by any person whose business, employment or activi t y
d oes not law f u ll y d eal w i t h t h e p o ssession of such ar t i c le, shall be
prima fa cie evidence that s uch art i c le is in t e n d ed to be used in t he '
unlawful or i l l e gal m a n u f a ct ur e of fi r e a r m s, a m m u n i t i o n, or p a r t s
thereof.(Section 82)
The law also im p oses penalty t o l a b orer, wor k er , or em pl oyee
o f a l i c ensed fi r e a r m s d e a ler w h o s h a l l u n l a w f u l l y t a k e , s el l o r
otherwise dispose of parts of firearms or ammunition which the
company manufactures arid sells, and other materials used by Chs
company in Che manufacture or sa1e of firearms or ammunition. The
buyer or possessor of such sto1en part or materia1, who is aware Chat
such parC or materia1 was stolen, sha11 suffer Che same pena1Cy as
Che laborer, worker or employee.
Engaging or participating in arms smuggling is also prohibited.
(Section 38) Arms smuggling refers to the import, export, acquisition,
s ale, delivery, m o v em ent o r t r a n s fer o f fi r e a r m s , t h ei r p a r t s a n d
c omponents an d a m m u n i t i on , f r o m o r a c r oss th e t e r r i t or y o f o n e
country t o t h a t o f a n o t her c ou n tr y w h i c h h a s no t b een a u t h o r i z ed
in accordance with domestic law in ei t her or both count r y /count r i es.
(Section 8)
T ampering , o b l i t e r a t i n g o r a lterin g w i t h o u t au t h o r i t y a
l icensed fi r e a r m , or i t s i d e n t i f y i n g c h a r a c t er i sti cs e ssential i n
forensic examinat ion of a firearm is a crime. (Section 34) A tampered
firearm is considered as a loose firearm; hence, possessing thereof is
a crime.
P ossession of L o ose F i r e a r m and Other Cr im e
I f a felony or offense under a special law i s com m i t t e d by t h e
person wit h out u s in g th e l oose firearm, possession of loose firearm
shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense. (Section 29 of
R.A. ¹. 10 5 91)
Under the old rule, the accused cannot be convicted of illegal
p ossession of fi r e a r m s a n d i l l e ga l p o ssession of d a n g erous d r u g s
because the penalty fo r t h e fo r m e r un d e r P . D. N o . 1 8 66 is s ubject
to the condition t ha t n o ot her cr im e has been commi t t ed. (People v.
Almeida, G .R. N os. 146107-09, December 11, 2008) Al m e ida i s n o t
anymore controlli ng. Under Section 29 of R.A. No. 10591, the accused
can be prosecuted for possession of loose firearm and possession of
J9JC9B0M
III, CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 79
dangerous drugs since th e l a t t e r ca n b e c o m m i t t e d w i t h o u-. using
loose firearm.
In Escalante v. People, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2 013, the
Supreme Court af fi r m e d th e conviction of th e accused for vi olati on
of election gu n b a n d e s p it e t h e f a c t t h e h e w a s a l s o ccnvi cted of
p ossession of ur licensed firearm un der P.D. No. 1866. It is submit t e d
that Escalante is not anym o re controlli n g. Un d er Section 2'9 of R.A.
No. 10591, the accused cannot be prosecuted for possession of loose
f irearm an d v i o l a t ion of el ection gu n ba n s i nce th e l a t t e r m u s t b e
committed with the use of loose firearm.
App1ying Section 29 of RA No. 10591 in reverse, if a crime
(s,g., homiride or robbery) is oommiCCed by a person with Che use of
1oose firearm, L1ega1 possession of 1oose firearm is noC a distinct arid
separaCe offense, In suoh a ease, Che offender shaQ be prosecuted
only for Chat, crime while using 1oose firearm sha11 be considered
as a special aggravating circumstance, or a qualifying circumstance
requiring the imposition of the graver penalty prescribed by R.A.
No. 10591, extraordinary aggravating circumstance requiring the
imposition of addit i onal p enal ty , or as a m er e element cf r ebellion,
or coup d' etat. (see discussion in Cri m i n a l L a w R e v iewer, Volume I)
Aggrav a t i n g C i r c u m s t a n c e —If a loose firearm w as used in
committin g r obbery or homi cide, the accused cannot be con ricted of
a complex crime ofrobbery with possession of loose firearm (1954 Bar
Exam) o r complex crime of homicide with possession of loos f ir e a r i n .
(1975 and 197-" Bar Exa ms) Settled is the ru le t h at t he components
of compound crime or complex crime pr oper m ust be felonies. Since
possession of loose firear m i s a n o f f e nse pu n i shable urdar special
law, it cannot be m ade a component of a complex cr i me. (People v.
A raneta, G.R. ¹ . 24 62 2 , Ja n u a r y 28 , 1 9 2 6) N e i t h er t h e a c c used
c an be convi cted o f s e p a r at e c r i m e s o f r o b b er y o r h o m i c id e a n d
possession of loose firearm . (2004 and 19 75 Bar E x a m s) Possession
o f loose firearm s h al l n o t b e c onsidered as an o f f ense distinct an d
separate from r o b b ery o r h o m i c id e si nce the fir e a rm w a s u s ed i n
committ in g robbery or homi cide. In t hi s sit u a t i on, the accused shall
be held liable for robbery or h omicide with special aggravating
circumstance of using loose firearm. (Section 29 of R.A. ¹. 105 9 1 )
I f the accused is charged wit h p o ssession of loose firearm an d
other crime such as homicide, or alarm and scandal, or rebellion,
where s uch fir e a r m w a s u se d i n t h e c ommission t h e r e of, t h e
information fcr possession of loose firearm shall be quashed because
the possession of firearm must be t r ied together with I omicide,
 80 CRIMINAL IWW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
o r alarm an d s c andal, or r e b ellion an d t h e u s e of f i r e ar m s h al l b e
considered merely as a special aggravating circumstance in homicide,
or qualify in g ci r c u m st ance in a l ar m a n d s c and al; or b e t r e a ted as
absorbed in rebellion.(Celino v.CA, G.R. ¹. 170662, June 29 2007)
D octr in e of A b s o r p t i o n
Under Section 29 of R.A. No. 10591, possession of loose firearm
committed i n c o n n e ct ion w i t h r e b e l l io n o r c o u p d'e tat s h a ll b e
absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or coup d'etat.
Under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294,
p ossession of u n l i c e n sed fi r e a r m c o m m i t t e d i n c o n n e ct ion w i t h
s edition shall b e a b sorbed as an e l e m ent o f t h e c r i m e o f s e di t i on .
H owever, Section 45 of R .A . N o . 1 0 591 r epealed Section 1 of P . D .
No. 1866. The doctrine of absorption, which is now found in Section
28 of R.A. No. 10591, is confined to rebellion or coup d'etat. This
rule does not anymore apply to sedition. In sum, sedition shall not
absorb possession of loose firearm. Offender shall be charged with
sedition while using loose firearm shall be considered as a special
aggravating circumstance. The change introduc d b
R.A. N .
0 591 is r e a sonable. O f f enders c a n no t c o m m i t r e b e l l io n o r c o u p
detat to overt h row th e governm ent w i t h ou t u s in g fi r e a r ms. H ence,
p ossession of l o ose fi r e ar m f o r b e i n g a n i n d i s p ensable m e an s t o
commit r e b elli on, or coup d' etat is a bsorbed. (People v. Ro dri g u e z,
G.R. ¹. L-13981, April26, 1960) On the other hand, offenders
c an commi t s e d i t i o n w i t h o u t u s i n g fi r e a r m . T h e u s e o f fi r e a r m
i s not r e q u i re d i n r i s i n g p u b l i cl y a n d t u m u l t u o u s ly , w h i c h i s t h e
e ssence of sedition. Hence, possession of loose firearm for not bein g
a n indispensable m e an s t o c o m m i t s e d i t io n i s n o t s u b j ect t o t h e
absorption pr i n ci pl e.
LAWS ON EXPLOSIVES
P.D. NO. 1866 AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 9516
Illegal possession ofexplosives is governed by Sections 3 and 4
of P.D. No. 1866. R..A. No. 8294 had amended these provisions. But,
R .A. No. 9 5 1 6 s u b s equ e ntly, m o di fies t h ese r u l e s o n e x p l o sives.
Section 45 of R.A. No. 10591, which has expressly repealed Sections
1 and 2 oof P.D.
. . No.
o . 1 866 on un l i censed firearm, does not include the
repeal of Sections 3 and 4 of P.D. No. 1866 on explosives. Hence,
P .D. No. 1866 as amended by R .A . No . 9516 is st il l t h e cont r o l l i n g
law on explosives.
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 81
Crime I n v o l v i n g E x p l o s i v e
Sec-.ions 3and 3-A of P.D. No. 1866 punish any person who shall
w illfully a n d u n l a w f u l l y m a n u f a ct u re , assemble, deal in , a c qu i r e „
dispose, import or possess any explosive or incendiary device, with
knowledge of its existence and its explosive or incendiary character,
or any part , i n g r e dient, m a chin ery, t ool or i n s t r u m en t t h e r eof any
e xplosive or in cendiary d evice used or i n t e n ded to be used by t h a t
p erson fo r i t s m a n u f a c t u r e , c onstruction, a s sembly , d e l i v er y o r
detonation.
T o oe considered as an explosive or incendiary device, it mu st
be capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or
c ausing inj ur y o r d e ath t o an y p e r son, inclu d ing bu t no t l i m i t e d t o
h and grenade, rifi e g r e n ade, pil l box bomb, m ol otov cocktail b o m b ,
fire b o mb , o r e t h e r s i m i l a r e x p l o s ives a n d i n c e n d i ar y d e v i c es.
(Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866)
P resumed K n o w l e d g e
Mere possession of any explosive or incendiary device shall be
prima facie evidence that the person had knowle dge of the existence
and the explosive or incendiary character of the device. (Section 3 of
P.D. No. 1866)
A nimus P ossiden d i
The court may d et er m in e th e absence of animus possidendi i n
a ccordance wit h t h e f a ct s an d c i r c u m st ances of each case and t h e
application of other per t i n ent l a ws, among other t h i n gs, Ar t i cles 11
and 12 of th e R evised Penal Code on ju s t i f y in g ci r cu m st ances and
exempting circum st ances. (Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866)
A t e m p o r a ry , i n c i d e n t al , c a s u al , h a r m l e ss , o r t r an s i e n t
possession or control of any explosive or incendiary device, without
the knowledge of its existence or its explosive or incendiary character
or for the sole purpose of surrendering it to the proper auth or i t ies is
not punishable. (Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866) A temporary, incidental,
casual, h a r m l e ss, o r tr a n s i en t p o s s ession o f e x p l o siv e n e g at es
animus possidendi.
Q ualify in g C i r c u m s t a n c e of C o m m i s s ion of O t h e r C r i m e
The penalty for possession of explosive is higher in the followin g
cases:
 82 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
1. W h e n t h e c r i m e i n v ol v in g explosive is a necessary means
or committ in g an offense under special law such as violation of gun
ban or felony such as mur d er, robbery, or public distu r b an ce
2. W ll e n t h e c r i m e i n v o l v i n g e x p l o siv e i s c o m m i t t e d i n
furtherance of other crime such as rebellion
3. W h e n t h e c r i m e i n v o l v in g ex p losive is comm i t t e d a s a n
incident to, or in connection wit h o t her cr i me; or
4 W h en t h e c ri m e i n v o l v i n g e x p l o sive i s c o m m i t t e d b y
reason or on occasion ofother crime.
C ommission o f o t h e r c r i m e i s a q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a nce i n
p ossession of explosive since the penalty for th e la t ter is hi gh er .
E ven if t h e a c cused, wh o i s i n p o s session of a g r e n ad e d i d
n ot use such explosive in com m i t t i n g p h y s ical i n j u r i e s against t h e
victim, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s s t i l l i l l e gal p ossession of explosive
with the quali f y in g circum st ance of commission of other crime since
possession of explosive is commi t ted as an incident to or on occasion
o f the crime of physical inj u r i e s .
T here a r e t w o e ffects i f t h e q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a n ce
commission of other crime a ttended t h e of
commission of i l l e gal
possession of explosive, to w i t: ( 1) the penalty of f ne in a d d i t i on t o
reclusion perpetua is i m p o sable under Section 3-B of P.D. No. 1866
as amended by R.A. No. 9516; and (2) the rule on jeopardy shall
apply under Section 3-C thereof.
Under Section 3 -C, conviction o r a c q u i t t a l o f t h e a c cused or
t he dismissal of the case for possession of explosive wit h q u a l i f y i n g
circumstance of commission of other cr ime shall be a bar to another
prosecution of the same accused for such other crime, and vice versa.
If the offender k i l l e d a p e r son by m e ans of explosives, he can
e prosecuted either for m u r d er q u a li fied by th e circum st ance of by
means of explosive and aggravated by the circumst ance of treachery
( cople v. Comadre, G.R. No. 168569, tune 8, 2004; 1991; 2008
Bar Ex a m s); o r f or i l l e g al p o s session of explosive qua lif ied by t h e
c ircumstance of commission of other cri me. He cannot be held liabl e
or ot h m u r d er and possession of explosive since Section 3-C of P.D.
o. 1866 adopts the rule on double jeopardy.
A r e be l w ho
h o i s c a u g h t i n p o s s ession
of gr enade, can be
prosecuted either: (1) for rebellion, which absorbed illegal possession
o e x p l o sive (P e ople v. Rodri g u ez, G .R . N o . L- 1 8 9 81 A p r i l 2 $
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER s3
1 960); or (2) for i l l e gal p ossession of explosive w it h t h e q u a l i f y i n g
circumstance of commission of other cri me. He cannot be held liable
for both crimes.
T errorism an d P o s session of L o ose F i r e a r m o r e x p l o s i v e
W hen t h e p u r p o s e o f p o s session o f u n l i c e n sed fi r e ar m o r
e xplosive or ex p losive, by i t s n a t u r e a n d c o n t ext , i s t o i n t i m i d a t e
the general p u b li c or a s e g m ent t h e r eof, create an a t m o sphere or
s pread a m essage of fear, t o p r o v oke or i n fl u e nce by i n t i m i d a t i o n
the governm en t o r a n y i n t e r n a t i o na l o r g a n i z a t i on , o r s e r i o u sly
destabilize or destroy the fu n d a m ental pol i t i c al, economic, or social
structures of the count ry , or create a public emergency or seriously
u ndermine p u b li c s afety, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s t e r r o r is m u n d e r
R.A. No. 11479.
DISLOYALTY OF PUBLIC OFFICER
Disloyalty o f p u b l i c o f fi cer i s c o m m i t t e d b y pu b l i c o f f ic e rs
who failed to r esist a r e b ellion by al l t h e m e an s in t h ei r p o w er , or
continued to di s charge the d u t i es of t h e ir o ff ic es under t he c ontro l
of the rebels, or accepted appoint m ent t o office under th em. ( Art i c le
187) Disloyalty of pu b lic officer in t r e ason, coup d' etat, and sedition
is not punishable.
The public officer wh o p e r f o rm s an y o f t h e a ct s of d i s l oyalty
s hould not b e i n c o n spir acy w it h t h e r e b e ls; oth er w i se, he w il l b e
guilty of rebellion, not merely di sloyalty, because in conspiracy, the
act of one is th e act of a ll . (T h e Revised Penal C ode by CA t ' u s t ic e
Luis Reyes; 2012 Bar Exam )
ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES
Illegal assemblies is committ ed by the organizers or leaders of,
and persons present at, a meeting attended by armed persons for the
purpose of committ in g a felony; or in wh ich the audience is incited to
the commission of tr eason, rebellion, sedition or di r ect assault. Th e
word "meeting" shall be understood to include a gathering or group,
whether in a fi xed place or moving. (Art ic le 146)
I llegal Assembly O r g a n i z e d t o I n c i t e
If th e m e e t in g i s o r g a n i zed fo r t h e p u r p o s e of in c i t i n g t h e
audience to commit t r eason, rebellion, sedition or direct assault,
 84 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
the crime comm i t te d i s i l l e gal assembly. Th e au d i ence and person l
inciting t h e m t o c o m m i t a n y o f t h i s c r i m e a r e l i a b l e f o r i l l e gal j
assembly. Ot he r v i e w — The i n c i te r m a y b e h e l d l i a bl e fo r i l l e gal i
assembly as leader or for i n c i t in g t o r ebellion. (Revised Penal Code l
by Dean Vicente Francisco)
I f t h e m e e t i n g i s organized f o r a n y oth e r p u r p o s e ( e . g.
religious meeting), or i f t h e r e i s n o m e e t in g bu t m e r el y g a t h e r ing l
o f persons (such as persons stroll ing in a p l a z a ) , the person inciti n g
the audience to commit a c r i m e i s l i a ble for i n c i t in g t o r ebellion or
inciting t o sedit ion ( see: Compendium on C r i m i n a l L a i v b y J u s t i c e
Florenz Regalado) or f o r u n l a w f u l u t t e r a n ce d e pending u p on t h e '
circumstance of the case. The audience is not li a ble for the cr ime of
illegal assembly. Bu t i f t h e s p eaker comm i t te d i n c i t in g t o sedition,
and audience conceals this evil p r a c t i ce, the la t ter i s also liable for
inciting to sedition .
l. A u d i e n c e I s I n c i t e d — At a m e e t i n g, J u a n, w h o se son
was shot by th e m a r i n es, told th e a u d i ence that i t w a s h o peless to
seek redress from th e au t h o r i t ies and t hat th e only r ecourse was to
topple itby force. Four armed men were edging and cheering Juan
w hile he was speaking. Juan and the two men on the pl atf orm w e r e
arrested. Juan as leader and the four men as audience are liable for
illegal assembly. (1985 Bar Exa m )
However, if the four -a r m ed. men stated above tur ned out to be
i ntelligence operatives of the PNP, the crime is not ill egal assembl .
a ssem y .
Article 146 uses the p h r ase "t he aud i e nce is inc it ed." Th u s, actual
i ncitement of the audience is an essential element of illegal asse b l .
n this case, the four-ar med men are not i n c i ted audi ence; they are
operatives. They are just p r e t en ding t ha t t h e y ar e au di ence incited
to commit r ebellion. However, Juan is li able for in ci t in g to sediti on.
(1985 Bar Exam)
2. Li a bi l i t y o f A u d i e n c e —A, B, and C organized a meeting
in which the au dience was incited to the commission of the crime of
s edition. Some of the persons present at th e m eeting w ere carr y i n g
unlicensed fi r e a r m s . A , 8 , a n d C a r e l i a b l e f o r i l l e ga l a s sembly
a s or ganizers t h e r e of . A r m e d a n d u n a r m e d p e r s o n s, w ho a r e
merely present at t h e m e et i ng, are also crim i n a ll y l i a bl e for i l l e gal
assembly.(2012 Bar Exam) A person armed with unlicensed firearm
i s considered a l e ader or o r g a n i zer of th e m e et in g even t h o ugh h e
w as merely present th er eat .
However, since illegal assembly is a felony, one cannot be held
liable for t h i s c r i m e o n t h e b a s is of b e i ng p r e s ent at t h e m e e t i n g
J9JC9B0M
85
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
w ithout c r i m i n a l i n t e n t o r d o l o . T h u s , i f a p e r s o n h a p p en s t o
b e present at a n i l l e gal a ssembly ou t o f c u r i o sity , h e i s n o t l i a b l e
(Reyes). I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t o m a k e p e r s o ns w h o a t t e n d ed t h e
i llegal assembly cr i m i n a ll y l i a b le, t hey m u s t b e i n c i ted t o com m i t
treason, rebellion, sedition or direct assault. Passive presence in the
'
meeting will not m ak e them l i a ble for il l egal assembly.
I llegal Assembly O r g a n i z e d t o C o m m i t a F e l o n y
If the m e etin g or ganized for p u r p oses of commi t t i n g a f e l ony
( not offense pu n i sh able u n de r s p ecial l a w ) i s a t t e n ded b y a r m e d
m en, the cr im e c o m m i t t e d i s i l l e gal a s sembly. H o w ever, i t i s n o t
necessary that all of them are armed. Nor it is needed that the felony,
which is the agenda of the meeting, is treason, rebellion, sedition or
direct assault. N e i t her i t i s r e q u i red t h a t a u d i ence is being in cit ed
to commit a c rim e .
Since it is sometimes difficult to establish the purpose of the
meeting, the law provides a rule on presumption. If any person
present at t h e m eeting carries an u n l icensed firearm, it s h a l l
be presumed that the purpose of said meeting, insofar as he is
concerned, is to commit a felony. Thus, he shall be held liable for
illegal assembly as a leader or organizer. (Art i c le 146) Possession of
loose firearm shall be considered as a modifying circum st ance.
Six armed men in a house conspired to kill Pedro. They are not
liable for the crime of conspiracy to commit m u r d er since there is no
law prescribing a penalty for it . H o w ev er, they are li able for i l l egal
assembly.
ILLEGAL ASSO C IATION
Illegal as s ociation i s c o m m i t t e d b y t h e f o u n d e r s, d i r e c tors,
presidents and members of association totallyor partially organized
for the purpose of commit t in g a felony or for some purpose contrary
to public morals. (Article 147)
Illegal Association and I l l e gal Assembly
The differences between illegal association and illegal assembly
are as follows:
1. I n i l l e g a l assembly, it is necessary that t h ere is anactual
meeting o r assembly of armed persons for the purpose of committi n g
a felony, or of indivi du als who, although not arm ed, are incited to the
commission of treason, rebellion, sedition or direct assault; in il l egal
a ssociation, it is not necessary that t h ere be an actual meetin g .
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
2. I n i l l e g a l a s sembly, i t i s t h e me e ting and at t e ndance at
s uch meeting t ha t ar e p u n i s h ed; in i l l e gal associaticn, it i s t h e act '
of forming o r o r g a n i z i ng an d jo i n i n g i n t h e a s s o ciation t h a t a r e ' .
punished.
8. I n i l l e g a l a s s e m b ly , t h e p e r s on s l i a b l e are: (1) the '
organizers orleaders of the meeting and (2) the persons present at
the meeting; in illegal association, the persons liable are: (1) the!
founders, di r ectors an d p r e s i dents, an d (2 ) t h e m e m b er s t h e r eof.
(Revised Penal Code by Luis Reyes)
4. T h ep u r pose of i11egal assembly is to commit a felony or
to incite the audience to ooxnmit treason, rebe11ion, sedition or direct.
assau1t; the purpose of i11ega1 association is to oomtnit a fe1ony or
aot, which is contrary to public mora1,e.g., offense punishab1e under
special law. (1951 and 1967 J3ar Exame)
Membership in CPP
Rebellion is d i stinct f rom p a r ticipation or m e mbership in
a n o r g a n i zatio n c o m m i t t e d t o o verthrow t h e d u l y co n s t i t u t e d
government. (Bu scayno v. Mi l i t a ry C o mm issions, G.Pi. No. L-58284,
November 1 9, 1981) The p r e s ence of C r i s p in B e l t r a n a s c h a i r m a n
o f Ki l u s an g M a y o U n o d u r i n g t h e 1 9 9 2 C P P P l e n u m d o e s n o t
a utomatically m a k e o n e a l e a d e r o f a r e b e l l i on . M e m b e r shi p i n
the Commu n ist P a rt y pe r se does not constit ut e r ebellion. (Crispin
Beltran v. People, G.R. No. 175018, tu ne 1, 2007)
B efore, membership i n C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s
(CPP) is subversion un der R .A . No . 1700. (People v. Liw a n a g, G.R.
No. L-27688, October 19, 1976) However, R.A. No. 7686 repealed R.A.
N o. 1700. But Section 2 of R .A. No. 7686 expressly provides that i t
does not in any manner repeal, amend or modify the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, members of group organized to overthrow
the government b y f o rce such as CPP (P eople v. Ev angelista, G.R.
No. 86278, October 26, 1982; U.S. v. Sadian, G.R. ¹. 15 1 8,February
12, 1904) may be h el d l i a bl e for i l l e gal association (1951 and 19 5 8
Bar Exams) o r conspiracy to commit r e bellion.
M em b e r s h i p in an association
M embership i n an association (e.g., Co ngress o f L a b o r
Organization), w h ich ad v o cates communism, i s n ot a c r i m e . If t h e
m embers of a comm u n ist o r g a n i zat ion ar e not yet i n d octr i n a ted in
the need of an actual war against capitalist government, membership
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 87
t herein is not a source of crim i n a l i t y . Th e advocacy of Commu n i sm
i s not t o b e c o n s i dered a s a c r i m i n a l a c t u n l e s s t r a n s f or med o r
converted into an advocacy of action.(People v. He r n a n d ez, G.R.
No. L-6025, M ay 80, 1964) Under t he C onstit u t i o n, t he r i g ht of t h e
people toform associations for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.
Membership in a n a ssociation (e.g.,Partido Eomunista ng
Pilipinas), which advocates communism, and the overthrowing of
the government, constitutes the crime of illegal association. Article
147 punishes a member of association organized for the purpose of
committing a felony such as rebellion. (People v. A lipio, CA-G.R. ¹,
11260-R, ¹v e m ber 29, 1956; People v. Evangelista, G.R. ¹. 86 2 78,
October 26, 1932; U.S. v. Sadian, G.R. No, 1518, February 12, 1904)
M embership i n a n a s sociation, w h ic h a d v ocates commun i sm ,
and performance of acts in preparation for rebellion, which shows that
t he members agreed and decided to commi t a r e b el li on, constit u t e
t he crim e o f c o n s p i r acy t o c o m m i t r e b e l l io n u n d e r A r t i c l e 1 8 6 .
Buying weapons, appoint in g m i l i t a r y of fi cers, recrui t in g m e m b er s,
a nd soliciting f u nd s f ro m t h e p o p u l ace are pr epar at ory a cts to t h e
c ommission of r e b e l l i on . T h ese a ct s m a y e s t a b l ish c o n spir acy t o
commit r e b ellion a m on g t h e m e m b er s of t h e a s sociation. (U . S. v .
Vergara, G.R. No. 15 48, Ma r c h 19, 1 904; U. S. v. C a b ola, G .R. N o .
46'63, October 9, 1909; U.S. v. Baut is ta, G.R. No. 2189, November 8,
1906)
Membership in an association (e.g., CPP-NPA), which advocates
communism , a n d i s al r ea d y en g a g ed i n r eb e l l i o n, c o n s t i t u t e s
conspiracy to commit r ebellion. Joining an il l egal association, which
i s already fi g h t i n g t h e g o v e r n m en t f o r c es, e st abli shed n o t o n l y
a greement to commit r ebellion but also decision to commit it . (People
v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-6025, May 80, 196'4)
M embership i n a n a s sociation, w h ich a d v ocates commun i sm ,
and performance ofovert acts in furtherance of rebellion eg., attacking
a military camp would make a conspirator liable for rebellion. In thi s
s ituation, conspiracy is just a m ode of in cu r r i n g collective crim i n al
liability for r ebellion. (People v. Hernandez, ibid.)
M embership in the Commu n ist Party per se does not constitut e
rebellion. (Crispin Beltran v. People, supra) However, if a member of
the Communist P a rt y t a k es to the fi eld and joins in th e rebellion or
uprising, he commits r ebellion. (People v. Hernandez, supra; U.S. v.
Baldello, G.R. No. 1830, March 28, 1904) If a member of the NPA
 88 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 89
VOLUME II

sparrow u ni t k i l l e d a p o l ice officer i n f u r t h e r a nce of r ebe]]ion, th e e n s u in g c o n f u sion, th e c r ow d w a t c h in g t h e P r o ceeding d i sPersed

crime com m i t t e d i s r e b e l l i on . ( People v. Da s i g, G. R. N o . Z 0 0 281 a n d t h e m e e ti ng w as eventua lly d i s solved. The chief of Police is not
April 28, 1998) liable for int er r u p t ion of peaceful meeting but for u n j ust vexation.

A ccording to CA J u s t ice Lui s Reyes, actual clash of arms wi t h V'hat is protected under the Constit u t ion is a peaceful meeting.
the forces of the government is not necessary to convict the accused,: I f the meeting is not peaceful, public officers can prohibit, i n t e r r u p t
who is in conspiracy w it h o t h er s actu a ll y t a k i n g a r m s a g a i nst t he., o r dissolve i t w i t h o u t i n c u r r i n g c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y f o r v i o l a t io n o f
government. Those merely acting as couriers or spies for the rebels Article 131. The violent character of the meeting is a legal ground to
are also guilty of rebellion . prohibit or dissolve it.
B efore m e m b er shi p i n a t er r o r i s t o r g a n i z a t io n c o n s t i t u t es
i llegal a ssociation. N o w t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s m e m b e r s hi p i n INTERRUPTION OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
terrorist organization un der R.A. No. 11479.
Interruption of r e l i g i ous i vorship i s c o m m i t t e d by a n y p u b l i c
officer who p r events or d i s t u r b s t h e c er emonies or m a n i f estations
INTERRUPTION, PROHIBITION, OR DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL of any religion. (Art ic le 1 82) Use of threat or vio lence is a qualifyin g
MEETING c ircumstance in in t e r r u p t ion of reli gious worship .
Prohibition, i n t e r r u p t i on, o r d i s s olu tion of p e aceful m eetings
Public Officer
i s commit ted b y a n y p u b l i c of fi cer w h o , w i t h ou t l e ga l g " o u nd : ( I )
prohibits orinterrupts the holding of a peaceful meeting, or dissolves I nterru p t io n o f r e l i g i ou s w o r s h i p i s a cr i me ag a i n s t t he
the same; (2) hinders any person from joining any law ful association f undamental la w of th e l a n d . H e n ce, only a p u b li c officer acting i n
or from attending any of its meetings; or (3) prohibits or hin d ers any h is official capacity can commit t h i s cr i m e .
person from a d d r essing, eit her a l one or t o g ether w i t h o t h e rs , any
If th e o f f ender, wh o p r e v e nt s o r d i s t u r b s t h e c e r emonies or
petition tothe authorities for the correction of abuses or redress of
m anifestations of an y r e l i g i on , i s a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u al , t h e c r i m e
grievances. (Article 181)
committed i s un j u s t v e x a t i on ( A r t i c le 2 8 7) o r o f f e nding r e l i g i o u s
T he felony o f i n t e r r u p t i o n o f p e a ceful m e e t i ng s i s a c r i m e feeling (Article 188).
against the fund am ental law of the land. Hence, only a public officer
T he accused constructed a f ence at th e l at e h ou r of t h e n i g h t
acting in hi s official capacity can commit t h i s c r i m e . (see. Crimin a l
in such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who had gathered
Law Reviewer by CA Ju s t i ce Lu is B. R e yes) If a p r i v a te i n d i v i d u a l
to celebrate the pa b asa. H e is l i a b le for u n j u s t v e x a ti o n. (People v.
is the one who int e r r u p t s, or di st u rbs a peaceful meeting. the crime
Reyes, G.R. No. 40577, August 28, 1984)
committed is distu r b a nce of public order un der A r t i cl e 153.
In People v. Ba e s, G. R. N o. 4 6 0 0 0, M a y 2 5 , 1 9 3 9, p a ssing a
A city m a y or , wh o d e n ied an a p p l i cation for a p e r r r i t t o h o l d
f uneral in accordance wit h t h e r i t e s of r e l i gi ous sect kn own as t h e
a political m e e t i ng , o n a c e r t a i n d a y , i s l i a b l e f o r p r o h i b i t i o n of
"Church of Christ" through the churchyard fronting the Roman
peaceful meetings. (1971 Bar Exam )
Catholic Church wi th the use of force and threats of physical violence
T he offender m u s t b e a s t r a n g er , n o t a p a r t i c i p a nt , i n t h e constitutes the crime of offending reli gious feelings.
peaceful meeting. (Reyes) If a participant, who is a public officer,
interru pts or dissolves the meeting, he is liable for coercion or unjust R eligious Cer e m on y o r M a n i f e s t a t i o n
vexation. (A r t i cles 286 and 28 7 ) In Pe o ple v. Ca l e ra a nd C a n t e la,
T he meeting i n a p r i v a t e h o use w h er e v erses from th e B i b l e
C.A., 45 O.G. 2576, dur in g m e et in g of m u n i c i pal offi cials called by
were read i s t r e a t e d a s a r e l i g i ou s c e r emony . ( U .S . v. Ba l c o r t a ,
the mayor, the chief of police kept on t a l k i n g a l t h o ugh he had been
G.R. ¹ . 872 2 , Se ptember 10, 1 918) The r e a d i ng of a s a c red book
asked by the mayor to sitdown. Heated exchange of words among
is religious service or ceremony. (U.S. v. Mo r a l es, G.R. No. 1 2644,
t he mayor, a councilor an d t h e c h ief of police ensued. Then, in t h e
December 22, 1917)

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 90 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 91
VOLUME II

OFFEN D ING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
Offending th e re l ig i o us feelings is c o mm i t t e d by a n y c n e w h o ,
p erforms acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the fait h fu l i n'
a place devoted to religious worship or du r in g th e celebration of any,
religious ceremony. (Art ic le 183)
Offender
The cr im e a g a i ns t r e l i g i ou s w o r s hi p b y o f f e n d in g r e l i g i ous
feelings is a c r i m e a g a i nst t h e f u n d a m e n ta l l a w o f t h e l a n d . A s a
general ru le, only a p u b li c officer acting in h i s offi cial capacity can
commit a cr im e against th e f u n d a m en tal la w of th e l a nd. H ow ever,
Article 133 is an exception to the ru le. Because of the term "a n yone",
in Article 133, private indi v i d u als can commit th e crime of offending
the religious feelings.
Place of Co m m i s sion
To be held liable for the crime of offending the religious feelings,
the offensive acts m u s t b e c o m m i t t ed ei t h er in a p l a c e d evoted to
religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony,
If the crime is commi t t e d i n a p l ace devoted to religious worship, it
i s not necessary t ha t r e l i g i ous ceremony is being celebrated at t h e
time of commission th ereof.
N otori o u sly O f f e n s ive to R e l i g i ou s F e e l i n g s
is a participant of the peaceful meeting. Apply ing the case of Calera
and Cantela case by analogy, interru p t i on of religious worship is not
ccmmitted si nce Policeman S t one i s a p a r t i c i p an t t o t h e r e l i g i ous
worship. Moreover, one of th e elements of i n t e r r u p t io n of re l i g io us
worship is t h a t t h e o f f ender m u s t b e a p u b l i c officer. H ow ever, in
tl.is case, Policeman Stone did not m ake the th r e atening statement ,
w hich disr u p ted th e m a s s celebrati on, i n h i s c a p acity a s a p u b l i c
officer.
However, Policeman Stone is li able for offending th e r eli gious
f eelings. To be h el d l i a bl e for o f f en din g th e r e l i g i ous feelings, th e
notoriously offensive act must be directed against religious practice,
dogma or ri t u al . ( U .S. v. Ba es, G.R. No. L- 4 6 000, May 2 5, 1989) In
People v. Migallos, CA-G.R. No. 13619, August 5, 1955, the accused,
w ho th re w a p i e c e o f c o c onu t t r u n k a t t h e m i n i s t er , w h o w a s
s preading th e t e n ets of hi s sect, and ch a l l enged hi m t o a fi s t f i g h t ,
was convicted of offending the religious feelings. In this case, the act
o f Policeman Stone is directed against th e pr a ctice of the Ch r i s t i a n
Church o f expressing their opposition to the extra ju d i c ial ki l l i n g s .
Moreover, settled is the rule that w h e t her or not an act offends
t l:e feelings of th e C a t h o l ics should b e v i e wed or j u d ged f ro m t h e
latter's point of v i ew , an d no t f r o m t h a t o f t h e o f f ender. (People v.
Baes, supra) In t h i s c a s e, congregation l e ft t h e c h u r c h i n d i s g u s t
over the actuati ons of Policeman Stone. Hence, his acts notoriously
offended the religious feelings of the parishioners.

In People v. Mi g a l l o s, C A - G . R. N o . 1 3 6 1 9, A u g u st . ', 1 9 5 5 , According to M a r i a n o A l b e rt , a n ac t i s s ai d t o b e n o t or i ously

accused, who st oned a m i n i s t e r o f t h e Ig l e s ia ni K r i s t o w h i l e t h s offensive to the religious feelings of the faith ful w hen a person plays
latter was preaching or spreading his beliefon a public road before w ith or damages or destroys any object of veneration by the fait h f u l .
a crowd of a r o u n d 5 0 0 p e r s ons, wa s h el d l i a b l e fo r t h e c r i m e o f Remarks t h a t t h o se, wh o b e l i e ved th a t Ch r i s t i s G od , are
offending the religious feelings. Anti-Christ, t h a t al l m e m b e rs of th e Ro m a n Ca t h o l ic C h u r ch a r e
Peeved by the denunciations of extrajudicial killing by Fr. Chris marked by the demon, and th a t t he Pope is the commander-in-chief
in his homily, Policeman Stone, a parishioner, approached the priest of Satan are n o t o ri o usly o ffensive to t he f e e lings of t he C a t h o l ics.
during the homi ly, openly displayed his firearm t u c ked in hi s waist, (Mandoriao, CA — G.R. No. 12114, February 25, 1955) The statement
and menacingly ut t e red at the pr i e st: "Father, may kala l a gyan kayo "Come on now, they are already star ti ng, let us ha ve aj am s ession"
kung hindi kayo tumig i l . " T h e celebration of the mass was disrupted, i s not notori ously offensive. H ence, the cr im e com m i t t e d i s u n j u s t
and the Congregation left th e Ch u rch in d i sgust over the actuati ons vexation. (People v. Tamarr a, C A- G.R. No. 02658-R, July 1, 1963)
of a co-parishioner. (2017 Bar Exam) A famous tour gu i de, Carlos Celdran, in pr otesting against th e
T he police officer i s n o t l i a b l e f o r i n t e r r u p t i o n o f r e l i g i o us Church's opposition to the reproductive health bil l d r essed like Jose
worship. I n Pe o p le v. Ca l e ra a n d Ca n t e l a, C . A . , 4 5 O . G . 2 5 7 6 , Rizal, stood in front of the main al tar of M a n il a Cath edral dur in g an
interru p t ion of peaceful meeting is not commi t ted wh ere the accusers e cumenical service, and brought out a pl acard emblazoned with t h e
word "DAMASO." Commotion ensued when Celdran started shouting

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 92 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
while in side th e ch u rch say ing "B i s h o ps, stop in v olving yourself in I
politics," disrupt in g and showing di srespect to a solemn celebration. I
C eldran wa s convicted of offending th e r e l i g i ous feelings. Hi s acts !
were meant to m ock, in su lt , an d r i d i c ule th ose clergy whose beliefs
and prin ci ples w ere d i a m e t r i c all y o p posed to hi s o wn . (C eldran v .
People, G.R. No. 220127, March 21, 2018)
ALARM AND SCANDAL
Alarm and scandal is an act constitu t i n g d is tu r b a n ce of public
order commit ted by: (1) any person who discharges firearm, rocket, ',
f irecracker, or other explosives in a t ow n or p u b li c pl ace calculated ,
to cause alarm or d a n ger; (2) any person who in st i gates or takes an ,'
active par t i n a n y c h a r i v ar i o r o t h e r d i s o r derly m e e t in g o f f ensive
t o another or p r e j u d i cial t o p u b l i c t r a n q u i l i t y ; (3) an y p e r son w h o :
d isturbs th e p u b li c peace whil e w a n d er in g about a t n i g h t o r w h i l e
engaged in any other nocturnal amusements; or(4) any person who, ',
while int oxicated or other w i se, cause any distu r b a nce or scandal in '
public places. (Article 155)
As a r u l e , t h e c r i m e o f a l a r m b y d i s c h a r g in g fi r e c r ackers or . fact. (Albert) If t h e di s t u r b a n ce is sl i g h t, t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s
explosives must be comm i t t e d i n a p u b li c pl ace. Thus, discharge of
f irearm i n u n i n h a b i t e d f o r est i s n o t a c r i m e . H o w ev er, t h i s c r i m e
can also be commit ted in a p r i v at e pl ace provided that i t i s l o cated '
in town and it p r o duces alarm or d a n ger .
The phr ase "c alculated to ca u se al a rm o r d a n g e r" i n A r t i c l e
1 55 is a w r o n g t r a n s l a t ion o f t h e S p a n ish t e xt , w h i c h r e ad s " q u e
produzco alarma o peligro"(which produces alarm or danger). Thus,
even though the discharge of firearm is calculated to cause alarm or
danger, the crim e u n der A r t i cl e 155 is not comm i t t ed if i t d oes not
produce alarm or danger .
A larm an d scandal is an i n t e n t i o nal felony. Hence, it m ust b e
committed with cr i m i na l evil intent. Discharging firecrackers on New
Y ear's Eve, which pr oduces danger to the publ ic, is not constit u t i v e
o f the crime of al ar m an d scanclal because there is lack of cr i m i n a l
i ntent to produce danger or al a r m .
D ISTURB A N C E OF PU B LIC ORD E R
Disturbance or interr up t ion of public order is ccmmit t ed by any
person who causes any serious distu r b ance in a pu b lic place, office,
or establishm ent , o r i n t e r r u p t s o r d i s t u r b s p u b l i c p e r f o r m a n ces,
f unctions o r g a t h e r i n gs , o r p e a ceful m e e t i ng s p r o v i ded t h a t t h e
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III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 93
acts do not constit ut e th e cr im e of in t e r r u p t ion of r el i gious worship
or inter r u p t i on . p r o h i b i t io n o r di s s o l u t i on of p e a c eful m e e t i n g s .
T umultuou s d i s t u r b a nc e i s co m m i t t e d i f t h e di st u r b a n c e or
interruption of public order is of a tumultuous character or caused
, by at least four p er sons who ar e a r m e d or p r o v i ded w it h m e an s of
violence. (Article 158; 1967 and 2012 Bar Exa m s )
I f t h e p u " p ose o f t h e u p r i s e r s i n ca u s i n g a t u m u l t u o u s
disturbance in a public place is to attain a politi cal or social objective
mentioned in A r t i c l e 18 9 an d t h e y e m p l o y f o r ce, i n t i m i d a t i on , or
o ther means out side of l e gal m e t h ods t o a t t a i n s u c h p u r p ose, th e
crime comm tted is sedition. If the pur p ose is not one of those stated
in Article 189 such as to celebrate a win in basketball championship,
the crime comm-tted is tu m u l t u ou s dist u r b ance under Ar t i cle 158.
Article 158 u ses th e p h r a se "s erious d i s t u r b ance." The C o de
d oes not say w h e n a d i s t u r b a nce i s s e r i ous bu t i t w i l l b e r e a d i l y
seen that for th e deter m i n a t ion of t hi s condit ion it s h ould be tak en
into account the mot ive wh ich ori gi n a ted the same, the person who
c aused it, it s d u r a t i on , r e sult s an d al l o t h e r d e t a il s a t t e n d in g t h e
alarms and scandal un d er Ar t i c le 155.
F iring a g u n a t a t o w n p l a z a c a u s in g s l i gh t d i s t u r b a nce i s
alarm and scandal. Causing a grenade to explode at a town plaza
causing serious distur b ance is distur b ance of public order.
If at least four ar med persons caused disturb ance to a peaceful
m eeting, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s t u m u l t u o u s d i s t u r b a nce u n d e r
Article 158
DIRECT ASSAULT
D-;rect assault i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s o n w h o , w i t h o u t a
public upris ng, employs force or in t i m i d a t ion for th e at t a i n m ent of
a purpose of rebellion and sedition..
I. First mode
The fir: t m o d e of d i r ect assault i s t a n t a m o un t t o r e b ellion or
sedition, w i t h ou-. the el ement o f p u b l i c u p r i s i ng. (P eople v. Recto,
G.R. No. 129069, October 17, 2001) If four persons prevented by force
the holding of a popular election in some precincts, they may be held
liable for di r ect assault of th e f i r s.' form an d no t s edition since th e
elemen =. of public uprising is absent. (Clarin v. Justice of Peace, G.R.
¹. 1 - 7 6 61, Apr'i 80 , 1955; 2012 B ar Exa m )
 94 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
I f a p e r s o n a s s a s sinate d t h e P r e s i d en t f o r p u r p o s e s of
deprivation of executive powers and pr erogatives, complex crime of
direct assault w i t h m u r d e r i s c o m m i t t ed . A l t h o ugh d e p r i v a t ion of 151 of this Code" in Arti c le 152, teachers, professors, and supervisors
executive powers and prerogatives is one of the crimi nal objectives of
rebellion, the assassin is not liable for rebellion because the element ~ and resistance. For ot her p u r p o ses such as u s u r p a t ion of f u n c t i on
of public and armed up r i s ing is not pr esent.
I t is not necessary that t h e v i c ti m of d i r ect assault of th e fi r st
f orm is a person in au t h o r it y or an agent of a person in au t h o r i t y .
II. S e c ond mode
Direct assault is also committed by any person who shall attack, ',
employ force or seriously intimidate or resist a person in authority l
or his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or ',
on occasion of such performance. (Article 148; 1951 Bar Exam)
Direct assault is qualified when it is comm i t ted w it h a w eapon:
o r when th e o f f ender i s a p u b l i c of ficer or w h e n t h e o f f ender l a y s
hands upon a person in au t h o r i t y . (Ar t i c le 148) '
O ffender i n d i r e c t a s sau l t
The offender in d i r ect assault is any person. Thus, an agent of
a person in au t h o r it y (soldier) can commit d i r ect assault against an '
agent of a p e r son i n a u t h o r i t y ( p o l i ceman). (U.S. v. Cox, G. R. No .
1406, January 6; 1904)
V ictim of d i r e c t a s sau l t
The victim of direct assault of the second forin must be a person
i n authority or an agent of a person in au t h o r i t y .
1. Per s o n in Auth or ity — Those who are directly vested with
j urisdiction ar e p e r sons in a u t h o r i t y . On e v e sted w it h j u r i s d i cti on :
can be individu als (e.g., chief of police or mayor), a member of a court '
( e.g., judge), or a m e m b e r o f a b o a r d , com m i ssion or g o v er n m ent.
owned or controlled corporation (e.g., Social Security Com m i ssioner;
Article 152).
A di v i sion s u p e r i n t e n dent o f s c h ools i s d i r e c tl y v e s ted w i t h
jurisdiction si nce he ha s th e a u t h o r it y o f g en eral su p er vi sion over
schools in his di v i si on, wit h t h e r i gh t t o a p p oint t e achers and to fix
their salar i es. Thus, he is a person in a u t h o r i t y . (People v. Benito,
G.R. No. 49396, September 11, 1942; 1976 Bar Exam)
I n applying the provisions of Ar ticles 148 and 151 of t h i s
Code, teachers, professors, and supervisors ofschools, colleges and
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III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 95
universities, and lawyers are also persor s in auth or i ty . (Ar t i c le 152)
Because of the phrase "in applying the provisions of Artic les 148 and
of schools are only persons in autho ri-.y fo" purposes of direct assault
o f a person n au t h o r i t y , a g g r a v a t in g c i r c u m s t a nce o f c o n t e m pt
of authorit y a n d r u n n i n g o f p r e s cri p t i on , t h e y a r e n o t p e r s ons in
authority. (Feople v. Tac-an, G.R. Nos. 76338-29, February 26, 1990)
Before. Article 152 of the Revised Per al Code provides definition
of persons in. authority inv olving baranga. officials. Now, Section 388
of the Local ~government Code provides that th e Pu n o ng Ba r a n gay,
members ofSangguniang Barangay, and Lupong Tagapamayapa in
theirj urisdi ctions a re deemed persors in a u t h o r i t y .
a. E x e c u t i v e O f fi c e r s — Th e P r e s i d e nt, g o v e rno rs,
mayors and punong barangay a re persons in autho ri t y .
Punong barangay (barangay chair m a n) of T a n d a ng Sora
assisted policemen in arr esting a person who is causing trouble
in B a r a n gay K a t i p u n an . T h e s u s p ect a s saulted t h e p u n o n g
barangay. I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h i s i s n o t d i r e c t a s s a ul t. A
punong bara ngay is a p e r s on in a u t h o r i t y i n h i s j u r i s d i c tio n,
a nd not ir a pl ace beyond his juri sdi —.ion. Barangay Kati p u n a n
where the assault was commi t ted is not w i t h i n hi s j u r i s diction
since he is a pu n o ng barangay of Tar dang Sora. Mo reover, at
the time of the assault he is not perform in g his duty as punong
barang"y of Tandang Sora. He has no duty to maintain peace
and order in Barangay Katipunan, Hence, thecrime committed
i s only physical inj u r i e s.
b. L e gi s l a t i v e o f fi c e r — C ongressmen, S e n a t o r s ,
municipal councilors (People v. Ro d a, . G.R. No. L - 3 5156,
November 20, 1981) are persons in authority. Under Article
152 of the Revised Penal Code, barri o councilman i s an ag e nt
of a p e r son i n a u t h o r i ty. T h i s i s n o t a n y m o r e c o n t r o l l i n g .
Under Section 88 8 of t h e L o cal G o v er n m en t C o de, m embers
of sanggunia ng b a r a n g ay in - :.heir j u r i s d i c tio ns a re d e e m e d
persons in authori ty.
c. Judicial officers and Lupon Tagapamayapa-
Justices and ju d g es are p e r s ons ir a u t h o r i t y . U n d e r S e ction
388 of t h e L o c a l G o v e r n m en t C e d e , m e m b er s o f L up o n g
Tagapamayapa i n t h ei r j u r i s d i c t i or s ar e d e e m ed p e rsons in
author::ty.
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VOLUME II
2. A ge n t o f a P e r s o n i n A u t h o r i t y — Un d er A r t i c le 1 52I
o f th e R e v i sed P e na l C o d e , p e r s ons w h o a r e c h a r g e d w i t h t h s
f Code provides barangay m e m b ers wh o come t o th e ai d o f p e r sons
m aintenance of public order an d t h e p r o t ection and securit y of l i f e
and property by d i r ect pr ovision of law, election, or appoint m ent by
I in authority sh all be deemed agents of a person in a u t h o r i ty . (2000
c ompetent aut h o r it y sh all be deemed agents of person in au t h o r i t y .
.
To be considered a s a n ag e nt of a p e r s on i n a u t h o r i t y , t h eI I
function of the public officer must be connected in any way w it h the '',
preservation o f law, peace and o rd er; ot h e rw i s e, its e xercise would I
n ot create t h e p r i n c i pl e o f a u t h o r i t y , d e f i ance of w h i c h i s w h a t !
Article 148 severely pu n i s h es. (People v. Site, CA, G. R. N o. 17 639, i
September 22, 1958)
Chief of police is a p e r son i n a u t h o r i t y fo r he i s v e s t ed w i th ~
ju r i s d i c tion or au th ority to ma i n t a in p eace and order in a part i c u lar I
place such as a m u n i c i p a l i ty . (P e ople v. Ro d i l, G . R. N o . L - 3 5 156, „
November 20, 19 8 1) P o licemen u n d e r t h e c h i e f o f p o l i c e a re h i s j
a gents. T h a t i s w h y p o l i c emen ar e c a l led a g ents o f a p e r son i n
authority. Th eir f u n c t i ons are to preserve the law, peace and order.!,
(People v. Abalos, G.R. No. 88189, July 9, 1996)
A judge is a person in authority for he is vested with jurisdiction!
over crimi nal and civil cases in a parti cular pl ace. The Sheriff under '
him is his agent. His fu n ct ion is to preserve the law and order. (see::
People v. Hernandez, G.R. ¹. 39 8 4 0 ,December 23, 1933) However, a
casual employee appointed fora period of three months as bodyguard ',
o f a judge is not an agent of a person in au t h o r it y si nce his functi on :
i s not connected i n a n y w a y w i t h t h e p r e s erv at ion o f l a v , p e a c e
and order. (1966 Bar Exam) But, ifthe bodyguard comes to the aid,
o f the ju dge, who i s a v i c ti m o f d i r ect a ssault, th e f o r me r s h al l b e
c onsidered as an agent of a person in au t h o r i t y .
Section 388 of L ocal Government Code has expanded the
concept of agents of a person in a u t h o r it y w i t h r e spect to barangay
officials. U n d e r t h i s p r o v i s i on, ba r a n g ay of f i c ia ls a n d m e m b e rs '.
who are charged w it h t h e m a i n t e n a nce of pu b li c or d er, pr o t ection '
and securit y o f l i f e a n d p r o p e r ty , o r o f a d e s i r a bl e an d b a l a n ced
environment by law or ord i n ance shall be deemed agents of a person
i n authori t y .
A punong b a r a n gay is a p e r s on in a u t h o r i t y w h i l e ba r a n g ay .
tanods are h i s a g e n t s. Ba r a n g ay t a n o ds a r e t a s k e d t o m a i n t a i n '
public order, protection and security of life and property. (See: People:,
v. Recto, G.R. No. 129069, October 17, 2001
) The p r i n c i pl e o n des c e nding t o the l ev e l o f p r i va t e
Under Art i cle 152 of the Revised Penal Code, persons who come '
to the aid of persons in auth or it y sh all be deemed agents of a pe son
J9JC9B0M
97
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
in authori ty . On t h e o t her h a n d , Section 388 of L ocal Government
Bar Exam)
a. K n ow le d g e o f t h e p os i t i o n o f t h e v i c ti m -
In d i r e ct a s sault, it i s e s s ential t h a t t h e a c c used must h a v e
k nowledge teat th e person att acked was a person in au t h or i t y
or his agent in the exercise of his duties. Such knowledge must
be alleged in the inform a t ion (Guelos v. People, G.R. No. 177000,
June 19, 2 0 1 7) a nd p r o v e n b y e v i d e n ce b e yo nd r e a s onable
doubt. In Pe ople v. Vi l l a s enor, G. R. No. L - 2 8 574, October 24,
1 970, evider ce show that th e vi cti m w a s not in u n i f or m at t h e
time of the assault and t h ere is no evidence that accused knew
that th e v i c ti m w a s t h e n p e r f o r m i n g h i s of fi cial f u n c t i ons as
police sergeant. Direct assault was not established.
H owever, it i s not n ecessary that t h e a ccused knew t h a t
a teacher is a p e r son i n a u t h o r i t y . W h a t i s i m p o r t a n t . is that
the accused knew that th e victim is a teacher. The position of a
teacher as a person in au t h o r it y i s a m a t t e r of l aw , and not of
fact. Ignorance of the law, which confers to a teacher the status
of a person i n a u t h o r i t y , i s n o t a n e x c u se. (People v. Ba l b a r ,
G.R. No. L-20216; November 29, 1967)
I nformation for d i r ect assault i s no t d e fective if t h er e i s
a llegation of ci r c u m st ance showing t h a t a c cused should h a v e
k nown t h e v i c t i m i s a t e a c her o r p o l i c eman s uc h a v e r m e n t
that th e v i c ti m w a s t e aching i n s ide th e cl ass room (People v.
Balbar, G.R. No . L - 2 0216, November 2 9, 1 96'7), or the v i c t i m
was wearing police uniform , at th e t i m e of th e assault (People
v. Hernandez, G.R, No. 17283, March 7, 1922)
b. D esc e n d i n g t o t h e l e v e l of p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l -
In People v . Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 2 6, 1955, durin g
a legislativ e s e ssion, c o m p l a i n an t ( a mu n i c i p a l c o u n c il or),
who w a n te d t o t a k e t h e fi o o r , i n t e r r u p t e d a c cused (another
c ouncilor) in h i s s p eech. Provoked, the accused assaulted th e
c omplainant . T h e c o m p l a i n a nt , w h o i n i t i a t e d t h e t r o u b l e ,
descended to the level of a private indivi d u al. He is not anymore
p erforming hi s d u t i e s as councilor at t h e t i m e of th e q u a r r e l .
H ence, the crime commi t ted is physical inj u r i e s.
individ ual i s only applicable if the person in autho ri ty in i t i a t e d
the fight or t r o u ble wit h th e accused.
 98 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R
VOLUME II
Slapping an d p u s h in g a p u b l i c -school teacher, a p e r son',,
i n au t h o r i t y , a g a i ns t a w a l l d i v i d e r , w h i l e e n g a ged i n t h e I
performance of d u t y i s d i r e c t a s s au lt. Ac c u sed in i t i a t ed h e r
tirades against the teacher. The fact that t he teacher retalia teel
by similar verbal invectives against the accused, does not mean'
that she as a person in auth or it y al r eady descended to the level
of a priv ate person. (Gelig v. PeopLe, G.R. No. 178150, July 28,'
2010)
In Justo v. CA, G.R. No. L-8611, June 28, 1956, a district
school supervisorfailed to accommodate accused to the position
o f teacher. Accused challenged the supervisor to a fight . W h i l e
t he supervisor wa s on h i s w a y ou t t h e b u i l d i n g fo r t h e fi g h t ,
a ccused assaulted h i m . B y a c cepting chall enge to a fi g h t , t h e
school supervisor is not anymore perform ing his duty. However,
direct assault i s co m m i t t e d si nce he was assaulted by r e ason
of past perform ance of duty. As to th e element t ha t t h e v i c tim '.
must be a person in a u t h o r i t y , i t w a s r u l e d t ha t th e character
of person in a u t h o rity ca nnot be laid off a t w i l l . S u c h p o siti on
attaches to a public official u n ti l he ceases to be in office.
Performance of duty
In direct assault, th e offender assaulted the vi ctim w h i l e he is
performing his duty or on occasion thereof.
1. W h il e E n g a g e d i n t h e P e r f o r m a n c e o f D u t y — When
a ba r a n gay c h a i r m a n w a s p r e s i d i ng o v e r a m ee t i n g r e g a r d i n g
c leanliness of the commu n i ty , he was i m m e d i at ely assaulted by hi s
creditor whom h e has not p ai d for a l on g t i m e despite his r epeated
promises to pay. Although the motive behind the assault is personal,
t he crime comm i t t e d i s d i r ect assault s i nce he was engaged in t h e
performance of his duty at th e t i m e of the assault. (1977 Bar Exam)
In Sa r cepuedes v. People, G.R. No. L - 3 8 5 7, October 22, 1 95I,
a ccused r e s ente d c o m p l a i n a n t , a t e a cher-nur se, f o r c losing a
p athway i n h i s l a n d . H e a s s au l ted he r w h i l e sh e w a s p e r f o r m i n g
her duty i n t h e school clinic. The crime commi t t e d is di r ect assault
although the mot ive behind th e assault is personal.
2. O n O c c a s i o n o f P e r f o r m a n c e o f D u t y — T he p h r a s e
CC
on occasion of such performance" used in Article 148 means "b
reason o f the past performance of official du ties" because the purpose
o f the law i s t o a l l o w t h e m t o d i s c h arge t h ei r d u t i e s w i t h ou t f e a r
of being assaulted by r eason th ereof. (People v. Renegado, G.R. No.
L-27081, May 81, 1974)
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 99
If the person in au t h o r it y or hi s agent is engaged in the actual
p erformar ce of d u t i e s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a s s a u lt , t h e m o t i v e f o r
the assault is im m a t e r i a l. D i r e ct a s sault i s c o m m i t t e d e ven if t h e
motive was totally foreign to vi ct i m's official fu n cti on. (Sarcepuedes
v. People, G.R. ¹. L- 8 8 5 7 , October 22,1951)
If the p er son i n a u t h o r it y o r h i s a g en t i s no t e n gaged i n t h e
a ctual perform ance of dut ies at th e t i m e of th e assault, th e m ot i v e
for the assault i s ma t e r i a L. I f t h e a s s ault i s b y r e a s on of t he p a s t
p erformance of of fi cial d u t i es, th e c r i m e w o u l d b e d i r ect a s sault ;
otherwise, it w o ul d o nl y b e p h y sical i n j u r i es (People v. Pu no, G.R.
No. 97471, February 17, 1998) orthreat, or any other crime depending
upon the circumst ance of the case.
a. A ss a u l t a f t e r r e t i r e m e n t — A c c u sed s t r u ck t h e
Judge, who previously cited him in contempt, on the street. The
crime is direct assault since he was assaulted by reason of past
p erformance of his du t y . (1998 Bar Exam; U. S. v. Garcia, G.R.
No. e"820, October 16, 191 I) But atta cki ng a retir ed judge on his
71st birthday by reason ofpast performance of his judicial duty
is not direct assault since at the t im e of the assault he is not a
person in auth o r it y a n y m o re. Note: The mandatory re ti r e ment
a ge of a j u dge u n der t h e C o n st i t u t i o n i s 7 0 y e a r s . (2009 Bar
Exam)
B ut i f t h e r e t i r e d j u d g e wa s a ssaulted b y r e a son of h i s
past performance of duty as a practicing lawyer, who previously
c aused the conviction of hi s assailant, th e cr im e comm i t ted i s
d irect assault. Th e s t a tu s of a l a w y e r a s p e r son i n a u t h o r i t y
r emains even i f t h e a s s a ul t c o m m i t t e d i s o u t s i d e t h e c o u r t
room as long as it is perpetr a ted by reason of the perform ance
of his p r o f essional d u t i es. ( R e cords of t h e B a t a s a n, V o l u m e
Four, 1984-1985 of B.P. Blg. 878, which amended Art i c le 152 of
the Revised Penal Code; 2009 Bar Ex a m )
b. E l em e n t o f P e r f o r m a n c e o f d u t y i s no t p r e s e n t
— Offender attacked a policeman, who was on his way to buy
a lotto t i c k et . T h e p o l i ceman w a s n o t p e r f o r m i n g h i s d u t i e s
w hen he w a s a s sault ed. Th e a s sault i s n o t b y r e a son of h i s
past pertorm ance of dut i es. The crime commi t ted is not di r ect
assault but p h y sical inj u r i es. (1995 Bar Exam )
y
O ffender a t t a c ke d t h e m a y o r , w h o w a s d e l i v e r in g a
c ampaign speech for h i s r e - election b id . T h e m a yor w a s n o t
performin g h i s d u t i e s w h e n h e w a s a s s a u l t ed. Th e a s s aul t
is not by reason of his past performance of his duties.Direct
 100 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
a ssault i s no t c o m m i t t e d . (1971 Bar E x a m) In t h i s s i t u a t i o n,
I
t he offender i s l i a b l e f o r l e s s s er i ous p h y s ical i n j u r i e s w i t h ~
x
seriously
qualifying circumstance that the victim is a person in authority,
"intimidate."
or that the crime is commit ted with m a n i f est int en t ion to insult
the vict im ; (P eople v. L a s a l a, G . R. ¹ . L - 12 1 4 1, Jan u a ry 3 0 ,
1 962) or slight ph y sical inj u r i es, serious physical inj u r i es wit h
the aggravating ci r c u m s t ance of di sregard of r a n k . (P eople v. i
l as serious, which is an element of direct assault, the same must
Ablao, G.R. No. 69 184, Ma r ch 26 , 19 90; People v. Ta l ay, G.R. ~
No. L-24852, November 28, 1980)
C rimi na l a c t
I n d i r ec t a s s a u lt , t h e offender attacks, employs f o r c e, or I.
s eriously int i m i d a tes or resists the victi m .
1. R e si s t a n c e — Ar t i c l e 1 4 7 u s e s t h e p h r a s e "s h a ll x x x '
seriously x x x r e s i s t ." T h e adverb "s e r i o usly" modifies t h e v e r b '
u rr m
resist. To c o n s i d er r e s is tance as serious as an e l e m e nt o f d i r e ct I
a ssault, the same must be made wit h i n t en t t o defy the law an d i t s
representative at allhazard. The representative of the law is the
person in aut h o r it y or hi s agent. If th e resistance is not. serious, the
crime commit ted is sim ple resistance.
A police officer w a s a r r e s t in g t h e a c cused for c o m m i t t i n g a
crime. The accused suddenly punched him or pushed him. (1979 Bar '
Exam). Di r e ct a s s ault i s n o t c o m m i t t e d b e cause the r e s is tance is
n ot serious. Accused did not d i splay i n t e n t ion t o defy th e ar r e sti n g
officer at all h azard. The crime commi t ted is only sim ple resistance.:
(U.S. v. Tabiana, G.R. No. 11847, February 1, 1918; U.S. v. Agustin, '
G.R. No. 13083, December 11, 1917)
The concept of "s e rio us r e sistance" and t h a t o f " a t t a c k i ng o r
employing f o r ce" an d "s e r i o us i n t i m i d a t i o n" i n A r t i c l e 1 4 8 a r e
overlapping. The offender in resisting the victim may at t a ck, employ .
f orce upon, or seriously in t i m i d at e h i m .
S erious resistance i n d i r e c t a s s a ult ma y i n v o l v e a t t a c k i n g
employing force o r s e r i ou s i n t i m i d a t i on . H o w e v e r ,
r i ntim i d a t ion u p o n a p e r s or. i n a u t h o r i t y o r h i s a g en t i s n o t
attacking t
employing f orce or s e r i ous i n t i m i d a t io n i n d i r ec t a s sault ma y n o t
involve resistance. In U.S. v. Cox, G.R. No. 1406; January 6, 1904
a ccused was convicted of d i r ec t a s sault f o r s e r i o u sly a t t a c k in g ar
policeman. Resistance is not involved in this case since the policeman
w as not a r r e s t in g t h e a c cused or d o in g s om eth in g w h i c h i s b e i n g
resisted by him . Accused simply assaulted the policeman w i t h ou t a
reason.
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 101
2.
In t i xn i d a t i o n — Ar t i c le 1 47 u s es t he p h r a s e "s h a ll x x
in t i m i d a t e ." T he a d v e rb "s e r io usly" m o d if ies t h e v e r b
a. S e r i o u s i n t i m i d a t i o n — T o c onsider i n t i m i d a t i o n
be made wit h i n t en t t o d efy th e la w an d i t s r e p r esentative at
all hazard.
T he accused malt r e ated somebody. Policeman ar r i ved t o
a rrest him . A ccused resisted the a r r e st, and said to a r r e st i n g
officer "D o n 't come near, because I w i l l t a k e y o ur l i f e ." W h e n
the policeofficer approached the accused, the latter attempted
t o inflict i n j u r y u p o n f o r mer b y s t r i k i n g h i m w i t h a k n i f e . A s
a consequence of th e s e r i ou s i n t i m i d a t i on , t h e p o l ice officer
failed to arrest him . A l t h o ugh th e policeman was not wounded
or touched by th e accused, he was convicted of di r ect assault
(U.S. v. Sa m o n t e, G . R. N o . 56 4 9, Se pt ember 6, 1 9 1 0) s in c e
c ircumstance' establishes hi s i n t e n t i o n t o d e f y t h e a r r e s t i n g
o fficer at all h a zar d .
A detention p r i s oner escaped fro m p r i son b y d i s a r m i n g
the guards wit h t h e use of pistol. A is l i a ble for di r ect assault.
S erious i n t i m i d a t io n w i t h i n t e n t i o n t o d e f y t h e l a w a n d i t s
representative at all h a z ar d constit u tes thi s cr i me. Evasion of
service of sentence is not commi t ted since this crime cannot be
committed by a detention pr i soner. (2016 Bar Exam)
A convicted p r i s o ner e scaped from p r i s on by d i s a r m i n g
t he gu ar d w i t h t h e u s e o f p i s t ol . A i s l i a b l e f o r e v a s ion o f
service of sentence with t h e q u a l i f y in g ci r c u m st ance of use of
intim i d a t i on . D i r ect a s sault i s a b s orbed i n q u a l i fie d e v asion
of service o f s e n t e nc e b e c ause f o r m e r i s i n h e r e n t i n t h e
c ommission of the latt e r .
b. N on - s e r i o u s i n ti x n i d ation - Non-serious
direct assault .
In Pe o ple v. La p i tan, G . R . N o . 3 8 2 2 6r November 1 7 ,
1933, a policeman was i n s t r u c ted to w a tch th e u n h u s ked ri ce
levied by the Sheriff. Third party claimants wanted to get the
r ice. T h e p o l i ceman m a i n t a i ned t h a t t h e y h a d n o r i gh t t o d o
so without a c o ur t o r d er . Q n e a c cused st r uck t h e p o l i ceman
with h i s fi s t , a n d a n o t h er th r e a t ened hi m w i t h a g un . T h e
t hree accused pu shed th e p o l i ceman a w a y a n d r e m o ved t h e
 102 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 103

rice. Accused were convicted of simple resistance in accordance

with the Ta b ia na pr i n c i p l e. The resistance or the int i m i d a t i on ~; i s an exception. I f t h e v i c t i m o f a s s aul t i s a p e r son i n a u t h o r i t y ,
laying of hands (physical assault) upon him , wh e t her serious or not,
in thi s case is not s e r i ous. N ote: If t h e a c cused fired hi s gun j
without hi t t i n g the police officer, the resistance or inti m i d a t ion ~ constitutes qualified direct assault .
may be treated as serious. In U. S. v. Gu m b a n, G . R. N o . 18 6 5 8, No v e mber 9 , 1 9 18, th e
A policeman, wh o w a s o n p a t r o l d u t y , e n count ered t h e i a 1
nimal of t h e b r o t h e r o f t h e a c cused destroyed th e p l a n t s o w n e d
accused. Th e a c cused s t a te d t o t h e p o l i c eman "P u t a n g in a j b y another p e r s on. T h e p l a n t o w n e r b r o u gh t t h e a n i m a l t o t h e
mo, patayin k i t a . " T h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s t h r e at s i n ce t h police station. Accused complained to m u n i c i pal p r esident (m ayor).
i ntimi d a t ion is not serious. Note: Offender is not li a ble for t h e ! A ccording to th e m u n i c i pal p r e sident t h a t t h e p l an t o w ner di d t h e
crime of simple resistance since he is not r e sisting something ' right th i ng . Accused insul ted th e m u n i c i pal p r e sident an d sl apped
s uch as resisting an at t e mpt t o ar r est h i m . h im. Th e a c cused wa s c o n v i cted o f q u a l i f ie d d i r ec t a s saul t e v e n
t hough th e l a y in g of h a n d s i s n o t s e r i ous. I t w a s h e l d t h a t i f t h e
S tanding w i t h c l e n ched fi st s b efore a h ea d t eaacher c er aan d ' v ictim of d i r ect a s sault i s a p e r son i n a u t h o r i t y , l a y i n g o f h a n d s
sshoutin g d e f a m a t or y w o r d s a t h e r d u r i n g a m e e t i n g o f t h e ~ (physical assault) i s a q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t ance. The la w d oes n ot
parents-teachers' association is not direct assault but only oral ', distinguish b e t w een serious an d s i m pl e "l a y i ng of h a n d s " u p o n a
defamation. (People v. Remilla, CA 52 O.G. 4815) p erson in a u t h o r it y a s a q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m st ance. Hence, a sim p l e
3. A t t a c k i n g o r employm en t o f f or c e — Ar t i c l e 1 4 7 ' ; laying of h a n d s u p o n a p e r so n i n a u t h o r i t y c o n s t i t u t e s q u a l i f i ed
uses the ph r ase "shall at t a c k, employ force, or seriously in t i m i d a te ~i d irect assault. Th e S u p r em e C our t r e j e cted th e a p p l i cation of t h e
or resist." Wh i l e t h e a d v e rb "s e riously" m e r e ly m o d if ies t he v e r b s ! Tabiana p r i n c i p le s i n ce t he v i c t i m i n t h a t c a s e i s a n a g e nt o f a
"intimi d a te" and "r esist," the act of at t a ck in g or em pl oying force as p erson in auth or i t y .
i
an element of d i r ect assault m u s t b e serious since the case U.S. v, ' Accused struck the Judge, who previously cited him in contempt ,
Tabiana, G.R. No. 11 847, February 1, 1 918 requires "in t e nt to de fy i on the street. The crime is qualified direct assault alth ough the judge
the law and it s re presentative at all ha z a r d" a s an element of dir e c t' , merely suffered slight contusion. (1993 Bar Exam )
assault.
a. Si m p l e l a y i n g of h a n d s up o n a n a ge nt of
T hree A m e r i c a n s oldiers, o n e of t h e m i s t h e accused,: a person in authority -Laying of hands upon a person in
approached a policeman, who was on patrol duty.The accused asked:, a uthority i s a q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t ance i n d i r ect a s sault . B u t
t he policeman if he wa n ted to fight, seized him by th e t h r o at, th r e w : laying of h a nd s u pon an ag e nt of person in a u t h o r i ty i s n ot a
him to the ground, seized the club from h im , and str uck hi m several . qualifying circum st ance in dir ect assault .
blows with th e cl ub. The crime comm i t t e d is di r ect assault because .
the attack and employment of men upon the policeman while he was In sum, if the victim of simple laying of hands is a person in
performing his duty is serious. (PJ.S. v. Cox, G.R. No. 1406 J authority, th e c r i m e com m i t t e d i s q u a li fied d i r ect assault b ecause
6 1904) of the Gumban p r i n c ip le. On the other h a n d, if t he vic tim of simp l e
l aying of h a n d s i s a n a g e n t o f a p e r s o n i n a u t h o r i t y , t h e c r i m e
H ypothetically , i f t h e accused i n t he c ase of C o x m e r e l y committed is simple resistance because of the Tabiana pr i n c ip le .
p unched t h e p o l i c em an , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s s l i g h t p h y s i cal .
Punching a ba r a n g ay c h a i r m a n w h o w a s j u s t d o i ng h is d u t y
i njuries because the assault is not seri ous. Simple resistance is not .
t o maint ai n p e ace and or der i s q u a li fied d i r ect a ssault . Bu t i f t h e
committed since he is not r e sisting somethin g such as resisting an
victim i s j u s t a ba r a n g ay t a n o d, p u n c h i ng h i m m e r e ly c o n s tit u t e
attempt to arrest him.
simple resistance. (2001 Bar Exam)
4. L a y i n g o f h a n d s u p o n a p e r s o n i n a u t h o r i t y —A s 2. Simple i n t i m i d ation o f a p e r so n i n a u t h o r i t y -
general rule, attacking, employing force, intimi d a t i ng or re sisting as Gumban p r i n c ip le is a n e x c e ption r a t h e r t h a n g e n e r al r u l e . T h e
element of di r ect assault m u s t be serious in n a t u r e showing i n t e nt ' .,
Gumban case will only apply if offender laid his hands on a person
to defy the l aw in it s re p r e sentative at al l ha z a r d. H o w e ver t h e r e
i n aut h o r i t y . I f t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i s i n t i m i d a t i on , a n d n o t l a y i n g
of hands, Gu m b an p r i n c i p le w i l l n o t a p p l y . I n d i r e c t a s s ault, t h e

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 104 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
intimi d a t ion u p o n a p e r son i n a u t h o r i t y m u s t b e se r i o us be cau"
cause j
Article 147 uses the phrase "sha/l xxx seriously intim i d a t e ."
Accused, who in th e h eat of th e m o m ent, t l : r e at ened to slap a i
teacher dur in g hi s class and t h re w a s m al l fl ower p ot. at him bu t it l~
was deflected by a t h i r d p e r s on, is l i a ble for t h r e at , an d no t d i r ect ',
assault. In t i m i d a t ion as an element d i r ect assault m u st be serious. ',.
(2001 Bar Exam)
Com p lex Crime
A compound crime is commi t ted if a sin gle "ct p r o duced dire=t;
assault an d s e r i ou s p h y s i cal i n j u r i es. ( T a c as v. P e ople, G.R. ¹ . ;
L-87406, August 81, 1976; 1977 Bar E x a m ), or h o m i c ide or m u r d er j
(People v. Estonilo, Jr., G.R. No. 201565, October 18, 2014) regardless
of its stage. (People v. Beltran, G.R. Nos. L-87168-69, September 13,
1985)
T reacherously k i l l i n g t h e m a y o r w h i l e i n t iae performance of I latter is a necessary consequence of the employment of force, which
h is duty constit u tes a complex crime of dir ect assault w it h m u r d e r .
(People v. Siega, G.R. No. 218278, tu ne 27, 2018)
Killin g a p o l i c e o f fi ce r b y m e a n s o f d y n a m i t e w h i l e h e i s ',,
p erformin g h i s d u t y o f a r r e s t i n g p e r s on s f o r d y n a m i t e fi s h i n g , ~gplRECT ASSAULT
constitutes complex crime of direct assault w it h m u r d er qu al i fied b
the circumstance of by means of explosion. (1991 Bar Exam)
Killing a teacher wh il e she is perform ing his duty or by r eason
of his past perform ance of duty i s a complex crime of dir ect assault '.
with h o m i cide or m u r d er . (S a r cepuedes v. People, G.R. No. L- 8 8 57,
October 22, 1 951; People v. Re negado, G.R. N o . L- 2 7 081, M ay 3 1 ,
1974) The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank for being
inherent in d i r ect assault shall not be appreciated. (2017 Bar Exam)
If the victim of di r ect assault suffered abortion, the offender is
liable for complex crime of direct assault with u n i n t e n t i o nal abortion
s ince sin gl e ac t o f a s s a u l t i n g a p e r s o n i n a u t h o r i t y c o n s t i t u t e s
two crimes. However, in Ge l ig v. People, G .R. No. 1 78150 July 2 8 ,
2 010 t hhe prosecution f a i led t o p r ov e t h a t t h e p r o x i m at e c a use cf
the abortion i s t h e c o m m i s sion of d i r ect a ssault. since th e d octor,
w ho examined h er , wa s no t p r e sented as w i t n ess to t estify on t h
causal connection between the t wo. Th us, accused. is only convicted
of direct assault.
Killin g a bar a n g ay chairman for preventing a violent
confrontation b e t w een th e a c cused an d a n o t her p e r son (1995 B a r
J9JC9B0M
I' III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 105
Exam) or for admonishing the accused for disturb i ng peace during a
fiesta (2000 Bar E x a m ), or a police officer on duty ( 1958 Bar E x a m )
constitutes complex crime of direct assault wit h h o m i cide or mur d er .
I nflictin g s e r i ou s p h y s i ca l i n j u r i e s a g a i n s t t h e c h a i r m a n
while he is presiding over a ba r a n gay me eting (1977 Bar Ex a m ); or
throwing a sh t ra y a g a i ns t a j u d g e c a u sing b l i n d n ess i m m e d i at ely
after pr om u l g at ion o f a j u d g m en t o f c o n v i ct i on (1987 B ar E x a m )
c onstitutes complex cr im e o f q u a l i f ied d i r ect a s sault w i t h s e r i o u s
physical inju r i e s.
H owever, there is no complex crim e w h ere th e act constit u t e s
d irect assault an d s l i gh t p h y s i cal i n j u r i es. A l i g h t f e l on y s uch a s
slight physical inj u r i es cannot be made a component of a compound
crime because Arti cle 48 of the Revised Penal Code speaks of single
act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies. In this
,"
s ituation, di r ect a ssault a b sorbs sli gh t p h y s i cal i n j u r i e s si nce t h e
is just an element of the f o r m e r . (People v. Acierto, G.R. No. 36595,
November 28, 1982)
,
Indirect assault is commit t ed by a ny p e rson who ma k es use of
f orce or inti m i d a t ion upon a person coming to the aid of auth or i t i e s
o r their a g e nt s o n o c casion o f t h e c o m m i s sion o f d i r ec t a s sault .
(Article 149)
A iding a P e r son in A u t h o r i t y
.
U nder t h e o l d r u l e , a c c u sed, w h o a s s a u l te d a p e r s o n i n
authority, an d a t h i r d p e r son wh o co mes to h is a i d, w as l i a b le for
direct assault and i n d i r ect assault .
R.A. No. 1978 has am ended A r t i cl e 152 of th e R evised Penal
Code by providing tha t an y p erson, who comes to the aid of persons
' i n author i ty , s h al l b e d e e med a n a g en t o f a p e r son i n a u t h o r i t y .
Thus, accused, who assaulted a person in authority,and a third
person who comes to his aid, is liable for two counts of direct assault.
.
Since the third person shall beconsidered as an agent of a person in
authority, assaultin g hi m i s also direct assault .
I f thir d p er son, who comes to the aid of a person in a u t h o r i t y ,
s uffered l ess s e r i ou s p h y s i cal i n j u r i es , t h e a c c used i s l i a b l e f o r
c omplex crime of d i r ect assault w i t h l e s s serious physical in j u r i e s.
(1998 Bar Exam)
 106 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 107
VOLUME II

Offender a ssaulted a t e a c her w h i l e s h e w a s c o n ductin g h er',: aiding him must belong to the same barangay. Since the third person
class. A stu dent comes to th e ai d of th e t e acher. Th e offender also! is a member of a Barangay Tandang Sora, he cannot be considered
assaulted the student. By providing aid, the student shall be deemed ~i as an agent of Pu n o ng B a r a n g ay o f K a t i p u n a n. H e n c e, the cri m e s
an agent of th e t e acher. T h us, th e cr i mes commi t te d ar e q u a li fi ed I
c ommitted are qu a li fied d i r ect assault u pon a p e r son in a u t h o r i t y ,
direct assault u po n a p e r son i n a u t h o r it y a n d d i r ect a ssault u pon l arid indirect assault. U n der A r t i cl e 149 of th e Revised Penal Code,
an agent of a person in au t h o r i t y . (2002, 2018 and 2019 Bar Exa ms) l indirect assault is commi t ted by any person who m akes use of force
O ffender assaulted a m a yor w h i l e h e i s p e r f or m in g hi s d u t y ,; or intim i d a t ion u po n a p e r son comin g t o t h e ai d o f a u t h o r i t i e s or
A lawyer comes to the aid of the mayor. Offender also assaulted the I their agents on occasion ofthe commission of direct assault. The
lawyer. The lawyer sh all not be considered as a person in au t h o rity: word "author i t ies" pert a in s t o p e r son i n a u t h o r it y s uch as pu n o n g
b ecause it i s n o t p a r t o f h i s p r o f essional d u t i e s t o h el p v i c ti m o f l barangay.
aggression. H ow ever, th e l a w ye r s h al l b e d e emed an ag e nt of t h s
mayor. Thus, the crimes committ ed are qualified direct assault upon,' A iding a p e r son in a u t h o r i t y a n d h i s A g e n t
a person in a u t h o r it y an d d i r ect assault u pon an a gent of a p erson ' A chief ofpolice is arresting a criminal suspect, Pedro. Pedro
in a u t h o r i t y . ( S ee Cr i m i n a l L a w Co n s p e ctus by J u s t i c e F l o r e nz', s eriously resisted and a ssaulted h i m . J u a n c am e t o th e ai d of t h e
Begalado) chief of police. Pedro also assaulted Ju an . Juan sh all be considered
A ccused af te r p r o m u l g a t io n o f h i s c o n v i c t ion a s s au l te d t h e as an agent of the chief of police. The crimes commit ted are qualified
judge. Th e l a w y e r o f t h e a c c u sed comes t o t h e a i d o f t h e j u d g e.', direct assault upon a person in auth or i ty , and direct assault upon an
Accused also assaulted hi s l a w y er . Th e l a w yer sh all b e considered a gent of a person in au t h o r i t y .
as a person in au t h o r i ty because it is part of h is p ro fessional dut i es. A policeman i s a r r e s t i n g a c r i m i n a l s u s p ect, P e d ro. P e d r o
a s an officer of the court to prevent his client from fu r t her assaulti n g s eriously resisted and a ssaulted h i m . J u a n c am e t o t h e ai d of t h e
the judge. Thus, th e c r i m e s comm i t t e d ar e tw o counts of q u a l i f i ed policeman. Pedro also assaulted J u an . Si nce the policeman is only
direct assault upon a person in au t h o r i ty . (1987 Bar Exam) a n agent of a p e r son i n a u t h o r i t y , a i d in g hi m w i l l n o t m a k e J u a n
Section 388 of Local Governm ent Code provides that ba r an gay an agent of a person in a u t h o r i t y . Th e cr i mes commi t ted are direct
members who come to the aid of persons in author ity shall be deemed assault u po n a n a g en t o f p e r son i n a u t h o r i t y a n d i n d i r ect d i r e ct
a gents of a person in a u t h o r i t y . T h u s , th e p erson in a u t h o r it y a n d assault.
the thir d p e r son ai d in g hi m m u s t b e l ong t o th e s ame ba r a n gay t o A policeman i s a r r e s t in g a c r i m i n a l s u s p ect, P e d ro. P e d r o
consider the latter asthe agent of the former. resisted by p u n ch in g h i m . J u a n c am e t o t h e ai d o f t h e p o l iceman.
Offender assaulted a pu n o ng b a rangay w hile h e w as P edro also punched J u an . S i nce th e r e si st ance is not s e r i ous, th e
conducting a ba r a n gay me e tin g. A t h i r d p e r s on comes to the a id of crime commi t t e d a g a i nst t h e p o l i c eman i s s i m p l e r e si stance. The
a punong bar a n gay. The o ffe nder a l so assaulted t he t h i r d p e r s on. crime committed against Juan is physical inj u r i es. Juan is not liable
B y providing aid, th e t h i r d p e r son shall be deemed an agent of t h e for indirect assault since this crime presupposes the person aided is
punong barangay. The crimes committ ed are qualified direct assault a victim of d i r ect assault . U n d e r A r t i c l e 149 of th e R evised Penal
upon a pe rson in a u t h o r i t y , a nd d i r e ct a ssault u p on an a g e nt of a Code, indirect assault is commi t ted by assaulting a person coming to
p erson in aut h o r i t y . (1977 Bar Exam) the aid agent of person in au t h o r ity on occasion of the commission of
direct assault, and not simp le resistance. (1989 Bar Exam)
Offender assaulted a pu n o ng barangay of Ka t i p u n an w h i l e he '
was conducting a ba r a n g ay me e ti n g. A t h i r d p e r s o n, a r e s ident o f
Barangay Tandang Sora, comes to the aid of apunong barangay. SIMPLE RESISTANCE
The offender also assaulted th e t h i r d p e r s on. Section 388 of L ocal Resistance is commit ted by any person who resists a person in
Government Code provides barangay members who come to the aid of:: authority, or his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
persons in aut ho ri ty shall be deemed agents of a person in au t h o ri t y. d uties provided t h a t t h e a c t i s n o t c o n s t i t u t i v e o f d i r ect a ssault .
To apply this provision, the person in auth or it y and the th ir d person (Article 151)

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 108 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
R esisting A r r e s t
In d i r ec t a s s a u lt , t h e r e s i s t a nce m u s t b e s e r i ou s s h o w i ng', the sheriff t ha t h e ha d ot her p r opert ies which could be at t ached to
intent to defy th e la w an d i t s r e p r esentative at al l h a z a rd. ( U.S. u.!
Samonte, G.R. No. 5649, September 6, 1910) If the r e sistance is not!
serious, the crime commi t ted is sim ple resistance. (U.S. v Ta b i a n a, '
G.R. No. 11847, February I, 19 18)
I n d i r ect a s s au lt , t h e a s s a ul t i s m a d e w h i l e t h e x a c ti m i s l
performin g h i s d u t y o r b y r e a so n o f p a s t p e r f o r m a nce of d u t i es.l
I n si m pl e r e s i st ance, th e r e s i st ance i s m a d e w h i l e t h e v i c t i m i a !
p erforming his du t y .
L awful R e s i st i n g
D urin g a r a l l y c o n d u c te d w i t h o u t p e r m i t , accused sa w a l
policeman str i k i n g a f e l l ow-student w i t h a t r u n c h eon. The accused j
h it th e f or ear m o f t h e p o l i ceman w i t h a n e m p t y b o t t l e i n o r de r to!
prevent t h e l a t t e r f r o m f u r t h e r h u r t i n g t h e s t u d e nt . T h e p o l i ce'.
officer exceeds his a u t h o r it y i n s t r i k i n g t h e s t u d e nt . Th e a c cused.;'
i s not li a ble for si m pl e r e sistance since he is m er ely defending t h e t
student. Hence, his act is justified due to the circumstance of defense.
of stranger. (1984 Bar Exam )
Amy w a s a p p r e h en ded b y a p a t r o l m a n f o r i l l e ga l p a r k i n g . ',
A my r esisted th e a r r est an d g r a p p led w i t h t h e p a t r o l m an . Sh e i s
n ot cri m i n a ll y l i a b l e f o r r e s i s t ance. U n de r R .A . N o . 4 1 36, or t h e
L and T r a n sport a t ion an d T r a f fi c C o de, th e g e n eral p r o cedure f or .
dealing wit h a t r a f fi c v i ol at ion is not th e a r r est of th e offender, but
the confiscation of the dr iv er's license of the latt er. M oreover, under
t he Rules of C o u rt , a w a r r a n t o f a r r e s t n eed no t b e i s s ued i f t h e
i nformation or c h a r g e wa s fi l e d fo r a n o f f ense penalized b r a fi n e
only. It ma y be stated as a corollary t ha t n e i t her can a w a r r a n t l e ss
a rrest be m ad e for t r a f fi c v i o l a t ion i n v o l v in g i l l e gal p a r k i n g s i n ce ,
the penalt y f o r t h i s c r i m e i s fi n e o n l y . (L u z v. P e o ple, G . R. N o .
197788, February 29 , 2 0 12) Since t he a r r e st i s i l l e g a l, re s isting it '
i s not constit u t iv e of th e cr im e of resistance. In ar r e st ing A my , t h e
patrolman is not perfor m in g hi s du ty . (1990 Bar Exa m )
H owever, i f t h e t r a f fi c e n f o r cer r e q u i r e d t h e m o t o r i st , w h o
violated tr affic ru l es, to surr ender his license, but the la t ter re f u sed
to do so, a warrantless arrest forthe crime of disobedience can be
made.
Accused had prevented the sheriff, who was enforcing a writ of
execution, from car r y in g a way hi s p i ano and ch airs from hi s h ou se
b y holding t h e s h e r if f b y t h e a r m , a n d w r e s t in g a w a y t h e c h a i r s
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 109
which the said sheriff was tr y in g to load on a pick-up t r u ck . He told
satisfy the j u d g m ent a g a i nst h i m , an d p o i n t e d t o s uch p r opert i es.
He is rot liable for resistance. The writ of execution does not give the
sherif absolute discretion in choosing the property to be attached.
Such writ does not prohibit th e debtor in p o i n t in g out t o th e sheriff
w hich of such p r operty s h o ul d b e a t t a ched an d s old t o s a t i sfy t h e
judgm nt w i t h t h e pr oceeds thereof. The accused is just exercising a
right in pr event ing th e sheriff f rom a t t a c h ing hi s pi ano and chair s.
(1974 Bar Exam; People v. Hernandez, G.R. ¹. 89 8 4 0 ,December 28,
I988)
PISPBEPIENCE
Disobedience i s c o m m i t t e d b y an y p er s o n w h o d i s o b e ys a
persor in au t h o r i ty , or his agent, wh il e engaged in the perform ance
of official d u t i e s p r o v i ded t h a t t h e a c t d o e s no t c o n st i t ut e d i r e ct
assault. (Artic le 151) This crime is commit t ed w h e t h er d is obedience
is ofa serious character or not.
The victim in d i r ect assault, sim ple resistance, or disobedience
is a person in au t h o r it y or hi s agent .
S imple resistance or disobedience can only be commit ted if t h e
person in a u t h o r it y o r h i s a g ent i s e n g aged in t h e p e r f or m a nce of
d uty. In t h i s c r i m e , th e p e r son i n a u t h o r it y o r h i s a g en t m u s t b e
performing his duty of commit t in g an act which the accused resisted,
o r makin g a n o r d er , w h i c h t h e a c cused disobeyed. U n l i k e d i r e ct
assau t, simple resistance and disobedience cannot be committed by
r eason of past perform ance of duty .
D isobedience presupposes that th e p e r son in a u t h o r it y o r h i s
a gent is lawf u ll y o r d er in g th e accused to do or not to do somethin g
(e.g.. order not to block the street) but the lat ter disobeys such order.
Resistance presupposes that th e person in au t h o r it y or hi s agent i s
d oing something in t h e p e r f or m a nce of his d ut y (e.g., arresting t h e
accused) but the accused resisted it .
In the crime of simple resistance, the resistance is not serious.
In the crime of disobedience, the disobedience may be serious or not
serious in n a t u r e . H o w ever, if th e d i sobedience involves attacking,
e mployment of force or serious in t i m i d a t ion w it h i n t en t t o d efy th e
l aw and its r epresentative at al l h a z ard u pon a person in au t h or i t y
or his agent, or laying of hands upon a person in authority, the crime
committed is direct assault .
 110 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
VOLUME II

Com m u n ity quarantine order D ISOBEDIENCE TO SUMMO N S

Section 6 , A r t i c l e I I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i des "1Veither' Disobedience to summons i s c o m m i t t e d b y: ( 1) a p e r s on w h o
shall the right to tra vel be impair ed except in the interest o refuses to obey summ ons to at t end as a w i t n ess before Congress or
f national
security, public safety, or public he alth, as may be provided by law."
The phrase "as may be provided by law" in th is provision means that ~
)
Constituti onal Com m i ssions or its commi t t ees with out legal excuse;
o r (2) a w i t n ess r e f u ses to b e s w or n o r p l a ced u n de r a f f i r m a t i o n
the impair m ent of ri ght t o t r a vel is only all owed thr ough legislation~> or to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers,
i nvolving na t i onal securi ty , pu b li c safety o r p u b l i c h eal th . I n s d ocuments, or records in hi s possession, when r equ i red by t he m t o
n sum,~'
tthe C on st i t u t i o n g r a nt s t h e p o wer t o i m p ai r t h e r i g h t t o t r a v el t o t
d o so in the exercise of their fu n ct i ons; or (8) a person who restrain s
Congress, and not to the President . another fro m a t t e n d in g a s a w i t n e ss, or i n d u c e di sobedience to a
D espite th e a b sence of legislati on, i n 1 9 8 8 or a f t e r t h e E d s a ~ summons or refusal to be sworn. (Art i c le 150)
Revolution President Cory A q u ino barred President M a r cos and his j
immediate family from r e t u r n i n g to the Phil i p p i nes from the Un i ted ~ PREVENTING LEGISLATIVE MEETING
S tates of A m e r ica i n t h e i n t e r est of n a t i o na l securi ty . Th e r e t u r i i
i
of the Marcoses was considered as a th r eat to th e governm ent. The j A cts t e n d in g t o p r e v en t t h e m e e t i n g o f t h e l e g i s l a t iv e o r
c onstituti onal b o d ies ar e c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r so n w h o b y f o r c e
Supreme Court in t he case of Marcos v. Manglapuz, G.R. No. 88211,
October 27, 1989, considered the decision ofAquino as valid. olr fr au d p r e v e nt s t h e m e e t i n g o f Co n g r es s o r Co n s t i t u t i o n a l
Commissions or its commi t t ee, or a Sanggunia n. (Art i c le 148)
According to th e S u p r em e Court , th e p ow ers of th e P r esident
Congress i n c l u de s S e n at e a n d H o u s e o f Re p r e s entat i ves.
are not l i m i t e d t o w h a t a r e e x p r e ssly s t a ted i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i on. ~
Her unstated powers are im p l ied from th e gr ant of executive power ,' C onstitut i ona l C o m m i s s ion i n c l u d e s C o m m i s sion o n E l e c t i o n s,
Commission on A u d i t , an d C i vi l S e r v ice Comm i ssion. S anggunia n
and from her d u t y t o p r o t e ct t he w e lfa re of the people. In s um t h '
n sum, e j includes Sanggunia ng P a n l a l a w i g a n, S a n ggun ia ng P a n l u n gsod or
Pre '
resident has th e p ow er, t h o ugh not s t a ted in t h e C on st i t u t i on , to [
Sangguniang Pambayan.
deny persons from e x er cising hi s r i g h t t o t r a v e l i n t h e i n t e r est of ',
national security and to protect welfare ofthe people.
DISTURBANCE OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDING
P resident D u t e r t e i s s u e d c o m m u n i t y q u a r a n t i n e o rder t o l
prevent the spread of corona virus i n fections. It i s s u b m itted ~ Disturbance of proceeding is committed by any person who
h owever t ha t t h e c o m m u n i t y q u a r a n t i n e o r der of t h e P r e si d t ' d isturbs th e m e et in g of C on gress or it s c o m m i t t ee, Constit u t i o n al
valid.
va i . A p p l y i n g t h e Ma r c os v. Mangla puz by ana logy, the President j Comrrissions or i t s c o m m i t t ee, or a Sa n g g u n i a ng b o dy o r i n t h e
has pow er , t h o u g h n o t s t a t e d i n t he Co n s t i t u t i on , t o d i s a l l ow ~ p resence of such body b ehaves in s uch m a n ne r a s t o i n t e r r u p t i t s
persons to tr avel in d e fi ance wit h t h e comm u n it y q u a r a n t i n e ord er ,j proceedings or toimpair the respect due to it.(Article 144)
in the int erest of public health. M or eover, the said order was issued "
pursuant to R.A. No. 11882.
VIOLATION OF PARLIAM E N T A R Y IMM U N ITY
L ocal governm ent s i n c l u d in g Q u e zon C i t y m a d e r e g u l a t i o ns ,' Violation of pa r l i a m entary i m m u n i ty is c omm i t t e d: (1) by any
to im p l em en t t h e c o m m u n i t y q u a r a n t i n e o r d e r o f t h e P r e s i d ent
person who u ses f orce, i n t i m i d a t i on , t h r e a ts, or f r a u d t o p r e v ent
such as requir in g t h ei r consti t u e nt s to obtain qu a r a n t in e pass, and ,'
a ny Senator, Con gressman, or C o n s t i t u t i o na l C o m m i s sioner f r o m
imposing curfew an d social d i s t a n cing. Th e or der of t h e P r e sident ''.
attending its meetings or from expressing his opinions or casting his
and that of Q u ezon Cit y ar e l a w fu l s i nce they ar e m ad e to r esolve
vote; or (2) by any public officer who ar r ests a Senator or a M ember
the crisis by prevent in g th e h u m a n t r a n s m i ssions of the vi r us. Any
o f the H o use of R epresentatives i n a l l o f f e nses puni shable by n o t
p erson, who wil l d i s obey these lawful or d ers, can be charged of t h e :
more than six years im p r i s onment w h i l e th e Congress is in session.
crime of disobedience.
(Article 145 of Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 11, Article VI
of the Constitution; 1959 B ar Ex a m )

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 112 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
T his i m m u n i t y i s n ot a p p l i c a bl e t o a m e m b e r of the .
Constitut i onal Conventi on. (1972 Bar Exam)
A police officer im p l em ented a search war r an t on th e h ouse of
a Congressman w h il e C on gress is in s ession. Un der A r t i cl e 145 of :
the Revised Penal Code, parliam ent ary i m m u n i t y ext ends to search.
However, under Section 11, Ar t i cle VI of t h e C onsti t u t i on , t h ere is
no parliam ent ar y i m m u n i t y o n s e ar ch. It i s a s e t t led r ul e t h a t t h e '
Revised Penal C ode ca nnot e n l a rg e t h e p a r l i a m e n t ar y i m m u n i t y ' r eason of final j u d g m e nt ; h e i s o nl y t m p o r a r i l y d e t a i ned pendin g
under the Constit u t i on. (Ma r t i n ez v. Morfe, G.B. 1Vo.L-84022, March .
24, 1972) Hence, portion of A r t i cl e 145 of the Code on im m u n i t y on . he could not commi t e v a sion of servic of sentence. Since he is not
s earch is i n o p er a t iv e o r u n c o n st i t u t i o n al . S i nc e t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n yet serving sentence, there is n o t h in g t o e v ade. In s u m , service of
d oes not pr ovide p a r l i a m e n t ar y i m m u n i t y f r o m s e ar ch, th e p u b l i c
officer i s n o t l i a b l e f o r v i o l a t i o n o f p a r l i a m e n t ar y i m m u n i t y f o r I'
searching the house of the Congressman.
A p o l ic e of fi cer i m p l e m e n t ed . a w a r r a n t o f ar r e s t a g a i n s t
a Senator f o r f r u s t r a t e d h o m i c id e p u n i s h a bl e by p r i s i o n m a y o r
(6 years an d 1 d a y t o 1 2 y e a rs) w h i l e t h e C o n g r ess is i n s e ssion. I
Under A r t i cl e 145 of th e C o de, a legislator i s i m m u n e f r o m a r r est I
for offense punishable by no t m or e t h a n 12 ye ars of im pr i s o nment.
(2012 Bar E x a m ) H o w e v e r, u n d e r S e c t i on 1 1 , A r t i c l e V I o f t h e '
1987 Constit u t io n t h e i m m u n i t y f r o m a r r e s t i s l i m i t e d t o o f f ense '
punishable by not mo re th an 6 years of impri s onment. I t is a settle d ,
r ule that th e Revised Penal Code cannot enlarge the parl i a m en t ar y '
immunity u n der th e Constit u t i on . (Ma r t i n ez v. Morfe, supra
) Hence,
portion of Ar t i cle 145 of the Code on im m u n i t y on a r r est for offense "
p unishable by a p en alt y of m or e t h a n si x y e ars of i m p r i s onm ent i s . ,
i noperative or u n c onsti t u t i o n al . Th e p u b li c officer i s no t l i a bl e f o r : ;
violation of parliamentary immunity under Article 145 since the ',
penalty for f r u s t r a ted h o m i ci de, for w h ich th e w a r r an t i s i s sued, is '
m ore than six years of imp r i s onm ent .
EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
Evasion of service of sentence is committed by any convict, who
shall evade the service of his sentence by reason of fi I' d
w i e s u f e r i n g d e p r i v a t i o n o f l i b e rt y b y es c a p in g i n
c ase of '
imprisonment, by ent er in g a pr o h i b i ted place in case of destierro or
y return in g to the Ph i l i p p i nes in case of deportati on. (Art i c le 157)
S entence by F i n a l J u d g m e n t
E vasion of s e r v ice o f s e n t ence can o n l y b e c o m m i t t e d b y a
convict, who is serving sentence by Pnalju d g m e n t. Fr om t he t i t l e o f
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
this crime, and that is , evasion of service of sentence, the elements
t hereof can be i d e n ti fi ed , an d t h e s e a re : (1) th e a c cused must b e
sentenced by final j u d g m ent t o suffer penalty i n v ol v in g depriv at i on
o f liberty ; (2 ) t h e a c cused i s s e r v i n g s u c h s e n t ence; an d ( 3 ) t h e
a ccused evade the service of such sentence by final j u d gm ent .
A deter t i o n p r i s o ner i s n o t c o n f i ne d i n t h e p e n i t e n t i ar y b y
the investigation o r t r i a l a g a i n s t h i m c r p e n d i n g a p p e al ; h e nce,
sentence as an element of this crime is net pr esent.
I
A detention pr i soner, who escaped, 's not puni shed because to
escape is an instinct of hu man n a t u r e. (Pacheco; 2012 Bar Exam) I n
sum, evil intent of the part of the det r t i on pr i soner is want ing since
h e merely acted based on his inst i n ct .
Even tl.ough the pr i soner escaped after his conviction, evasion
of service of sentence is not comm it-.ed if the j u d g m ent wa s not yet
'. f inal at t h a t, tim e b ecause th e r e gl ement ar y p e r iod t o a p p eal h a d
not yet lapsed or th e sentence of his conviction wa s u n der a p peal.
,'
I'Curiano v. CF I, G . R. 1Vo.L-8104, Apr il 15 , 19 55; 1972 B ar E x a m )
I f the case is on a p p eal, th e d e t en t ic n p r i s oner i s n o t y e t s e r v i n g
sentence; hence, there is nothing to evade. In sum, service of sentence
by final jud gment as an element of this crime is not present.
'
A d et en t io n p r i s o ner c a n n o t c o m m i t e v a s io n o f s e r v i c e o f
s entence. H ow ever, i f t h e d e t e n t i o n p r i s o ner e m p l o yed f o rc e o r
i ntimidatio n a g a i ns t t h e g u a r d , w h o w a s t r y i n g t o p r e v en t h i s
e scape, he is l i a bl e fo r d i r ect a s sault u n d e r A r t i c l e 14 8 or s i m p l e
r esistance u n d e r A r t i c l e 1 5 1 . T h u s , a de t e n t i o n p r i s o n er , w h o
escaped by cisarming the guards with tle use of pistol, is liable for
direct assault. Serious in t i m i d a t ion i s a m ode of commi t t i n g d i r ect
a ssault. U s i n g a p i s t o l t o d i s a r m t h e g u a r d s m a n i f e sts c r i m i n a l
i ntention to defy the law an d it s r e p r esentative at all h a z ar d . (2015
Bar Exam) On the other hand, a conv:cted prisoner, who escaped by
d isarming th e g u a r d s w i t h t h e u s e c f p i s t ol, i s l i a bl e for q u a li fi ed
evasion ofservice of sentence.
D eprivat ion of L i b e r t y
The English t ext of A r t i cl e 157 uses the term "i m p r i s o nment."
H owever, th e S p a n ish t ex t t h e r e of, w h ic h i s c o n t r o l l i ng , u ses th e
phrase "priv aeion de li b e rt a d ," w h i c h, as t r a n s l a t ed i n t o E n g l i s h ,
 114 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
means "depriv at ion of l i b e r t y." Sentence consisting of d e p r i v a t i o n(
of liberty i n c l u des i m p r i s onm ent a n d de s t ierro. Destierro in v o l ves
deprivation of l i b e rt y considering t h a t t h e convict w il l b e d epr i ved I
of the liberty to enter for a period of time the prohibited glace!:
d esignated by t h e c o u r t . E s c apin g t h e r e s t r i c t i ons of t h e p e n a ly~.
pena t
of destierro by e nt e ri ng t he p r o h i b i t ed p l a ce constitut es evasion of
service of sentence. (People v. Abil ong, G.R. No. L- 1960, November
26, 1948; Ta n ega v. Ma s a k a y a n, G . R. N o . L - 2 7 1 91, February 2 8 ,
1967; 1952, 1957, and 1998 Bar Ex a m s)
Under Section 31 of R.A. No. 9165, in addit ion to the penalti es
prescribed for cr im e i n v o l v in g d a n gerous dr u gs, any al ien offender ![
a fter ser v ice o f s e n t e nce sh al l b e d e p o r te d i m m e d i a t el y w i t h o u t
further proceedings.
In U.S. v. Loo Hoe, G.R. No. 12473, Septembe" 18, 1917, the trial
c ourt found accused guilt y of t h e c r i m e of v i o lat on of O p iu m I a w
and imposed the penalty of deportat i on. The sentence was executed.
After four m o n t hs, he retu r ned to the Phi l i p p i nes in vi olation cf the ~
terms of his sentence. The Supr eme Court s aid t h a t a c cused is not I
l iable for j ai l b r e a k in g u n der A r t i c l e 127 of th e ol d Sp a nish P en al !
Code because he was not sentenced to "impr i s onrr ent."
It i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e Lo o H o e p r i n c i p l i s not a n y m o r e ,
controlling. The int er p r et a t ion of the Supreme Court in th e Loc Hoe ':
case that t h e a c cused m us t b e s e n t enced t o s u f fer i m p r i s o n m ent '
to be h el d l i a b l e f o r ja i l br e a k i n g u n d e r A r t i c l e 1 2 7 o f t h e O l d : ;
Spanish Penal Code should not be used in i n t e r p r e t :ng A r t i cl e 157 !
of the Revised Penal C o de. I n t h e Ab i l o ng c a s e, to be h e ld l i a b l e ' ,
for evasion of s e r v ice of s e n t ence u n der A r t i c l e 1 5 7 o f t h e C o de, ':
i t is n o t n e cessary t h a t t h e a c c u sed m us t b e s c n t c n ced t o s u f f e r ,
imprisonment. T hi s cr im e is comm i t ted even th ough th e accus d i s ',.
merely sentenced to suffer penalty i n v olving "pr i v ac ion de liber:ad."
Deportation as a p e n a lt y c onsists of depriv a t ion of l i b e rt y b ecause
t he deportee is deprived of hi s l i b e rt y f r o m s t a y in g i n o r r e t u r n i n g '
to the Philip p i n es. Hence, it is submi t ted that an ali en, who violated
his penalty ofdeportation, is liable for evasion of service of sentence.
(1975 Bar Exam)
Q ualify in g C i r c u m s t a n c e
Evasion is qualified if th e convicted prisoner escapes by me
means ,
of scaling (escalamiento), by bre aki ng d oors, win d o ws, gates, walls,
o prisoners from j a il . T hi s i s not a com plex crim e pr oper. Delivery of
roofs, or floors, or b y u s i n g p i c k l o cks, false k eys. disguise, deceit,
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 115
violence or int i m i d a t i on, or t h r o ugh conniv ance with ot her convicts
I or employees of the penal in st i t u t i on . (Ar t i c le 157)
C ontinu in g C r i m e
E vasion o f s e r v i c e o f se n t e n c e i n v o l v i n g t h e p e n a l t y o f
I: imprisonment is a c o n t i n u i n g c r i m e . T h u s , i f t h e c o n v i ct e s caped
.
f rom Nati onal B i l i b i d P r i so n i n M u n t i n l u p a , an d w a s a r r e sted i n
Manila, h e c a n b e p r o s ecuted fo r e v a sion o f s e r v ic e o f s e n t ence
!, either i n M u n t i n l u p a o r M a n i l a . (P a r u l a n v . D i r e c tor of P r i s o n s,
I G.R. No. L-28519, February 17, 1968) However, in evasion of service
of sentence involvin g t h e p e n a lt y of de s t ierro, t he v i o l a t i on of h i s
s entence by th e accused ceased once he gets out of t h e p r o h i b i t e d
a rea. Thus, if t h e c o n vi ct, wh o e n t e red D a g u pan C i t y , w h i c h i s a
prohibited place by reason of the penalty of destierro, and thereafter,
h e went to M a n i l a an d w a s a r r e sted in t h a t p l a ce, he can only b e
p rosecuted in D a g u pan C i t y . W h e n h e w a s a r r e sted in M a n i l a , h e
is not any m ore v i ol at in g t h e p e n a lt y of de s t ierro s i n ce that i s n o t
a prohibited ar ea. In s u m , ev asion of service of sentence involvin g
destierro is not a continu i ng cri m e. (1998 Bar Exa m )
DELIVERY OF PRISONERS FROM JAIL
Delivery of prisoners fromj a i l is c omm i t t e d by any person who
removes from any jail or penal establishment any pe rson (detention
prisoner or convicted prisoner) confined therein or helped the escape
of such person. The crime is qualified if it i s comm i t t ed by means of
violence, inti m i d a t i on, or br ib ery; it i s si m ple if comm i t t ed by other
means such as deceit or fu r n i s h in g weapon. (Artic le 156)
S ubstitut i o n
'
A person, who substit u ted for a pr i soner by t a k in g his place in
jail, is liable for delivering prisoners from jail because the removal of
the prisoner from jail is by other means, that is, deceit. (The Revised
Penal Code by Lvis Reyes; 1972 Bar Exam)
A person, who took the place of another who had been convicted
by finaljudgment, would not necessarily use his own name. Hence,
h e is also guilty of the crime of using a ficti t i ous name under Ar t i cl e
178 since he used a fictiti ous name to conceal the crime of delivering
prisoners from j ail i s a l r eady consumm a ted when th e accused used
fictitious name to conceal this cr i me; hence, using a ficti t i ous nam e
 116 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 117
VOLUME II
f.
I,
i s not a n ecessary m e ans t o com mi t
(2012 Bar Exam)
d e l i v ery of p r i s oner f ro m j a i l ,
( the jail about 5 h o ur s t h e r eafter, may be held li a ble of the crim e of
delivering pr i soner from j ai l an d no t for in fi d e l it y i n t h e cu stody of
prisoner. (1972 Bar E x a m) O n ly c u s todian can commit i n f id e l i ty i n
F urn i s h in g W e a p o n
the custody of pr i soner. Since the gu ard i s off-duty, th e pr i soner i s
One, wh o f u r n i s he d a d e t e n t io n p r i s oner w i t h t h e m a t e r ial j technically not u n der his custody.
means or t o o l s w h i c h g r e a t l y f a c i l i t at e h i s e s c ape, i s l i a b l e f or <.
delivery of prisoner from ja il. (Albert) Hence, providing pistol, which '':, E vasion T h r o u g h N e g l i g e n c e
helped the prisoner to escape, is delivery of pri soner fronr jail. (2015 l A detention p r i s oner fo r h o m i c ide escaped w h il e w o r k i n g a t
Bar Exam) t he guest house of a p r o v i n cial g overnor. Th e d e t a i nee wor ked a t
the guest house pursuant to a note of the Governor to the Assistant
O utside th e P e n a l K s t a b l i s h ni e n t
Provincial W a r den ask ing for five m en to w o rk i n t h e g u e st house.
Delivery of p r i s on ers f ro m j a i l c a n t a k e p l ace out side of t h e ," The notice did not men t ion th e n a mes of the pri soners. The warden
penal establishments by t a k ing th e guards by surprise. (Article ~' merely picked th e m e n t o c o m pose the w or k p a r t y . T h e G o v ernor
1M) A, a detention pri s oner, was taken to a hospital for e me rgency ~ and the Assistant P r o v i n cial W a r de n ar e no t l i a bl e for c.elivery of
medical treat m e nt . Hi s f o ll owers, all of w hom w er e ar m ed, went to ' prisoner from j a i l s i n c e t he y ar e ja i l e rs of t h e d e t e nt i on p r i s o ner.
!:
the hospital t o t a k e h i m a w a y o r h e l p h i m e s c ape. Th e d et enti on This crime is comm i t t ed by an ou t s ider w h o r e m o ves from ja il a n y
prisoner i s n o t l i a b l e fo r e v a sion of s e r v ice of, sentence since this ' person therein confined or helps him escape. They are not li a ble for
iS )
crime can only be comm i t ted by a convicted prisoner. How ever, his ~ connivance in the evasion of the prisoner. For sure no connivance in
i
followers are liable for delivery of prisoners from jail. This crime can t he escape of the detention p r i s oner can be deduced from th e n o t e
t ake place outside of the penal establishments by ta k in g th e guar d of the governor, which does not ment ion th e n a mes of the prisoners
u ar s [
by surprise. (2002 Bar Ex a m ) to be brought t o t h e g u est h o u se. They ar e n o t l i a bl e fo r e v a sion
t hrough negligence since thi s cr im e can o nl y b e com m i t t e d by t h e
officer who is charged with the custody and guarding of the prisoner.
I NFIDELITY IN THE CUSTOD Y OF PRISON E R S
(Alberto v. De la C r u z , G . R. N o. L - 8 1 839, tu n e 80 , 1 980; 1981 Bar
Infidelity in the custody of prisoners is committ ed by any public t Exam)
officer who consents to th e escape of a p r i s oner sentenced by fi nal ,': A gu ar d i s l i a b l e f o r i n f i d e l it y i n t he c u s t o d y o f p r i s o n er
judgment or a detention pr i soner in hi s custody or charge, or allows ': o r evasion t h r o ug h n e g l i gence for r e l a x in g t h e i n s p e ct'on o f t h e
s uch escape through his negligence. If evasion is commit ted wit h h i s
consent, this crime can also be called as conniving with or consenting .'
l
b elongings of a detention p r i s oner d u r i n g j ai l v i si t a l l o w in g hi m t o
smuggle a pistol, which he subsequently used to escape. (2015 Bar
to evasion. (Artic le 228) If it h as taken place through his r iegligence, ~j Exam)
it can also be called as evasion thr ough negligence. (Article 224)

I nfidelity in the custody of prisoner, which is a crime commit t e d , C onsenting to E v a s i o n

by a public officer, will be discussed in relation to evasion of service In U .S . v. Ba n d i n o , G. R. N o . L - 9 9 6 4, F e b r u a ry 1 1 , 1 9 1 5, a
of sentence and d e l i v er y o f p r i s o n ers f ro m j a i l , w h i c h a r e c r i m es ': guard permitted a convicted prisoner to go and buy some cigarettes
against public disorder. n ear the place where he was h eld i n c u s t ody. The pr i soner, tak i n g
advantage of the confusion in the crowd th ere, fled from the custody
of the accused. The guard i s l i a bl e for ev asion t h r o ugh connivance
a nd not onl y e v a sion t h r o ugh n e g l i gence. Permi t t i n g t h p r i s o n er
In People v. Del Barr i o, CA 60 O.G. 3908, a policeman assigned
to city jail as a gu a rd , w ho, wh il e he was off-duty, brought r e cently to leave the jail and to obtain a r el ax at ion of his im p r i sonment and,
released prisoner inside the jail to substit ute for a detention prisoner although the convict may not have fled, is consenting to evasion, and
whom he later on br ou ght out of j a il , r et u r n i n g said pr i s oner in s id e not merely evasion through negligence since the penalty is made
ineffectual.

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 118 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 119
VOLUME II

Relaxation of impr i sonment is considered consenting to evasion
or infidelit y i n t h e c u s t ody of p r i s oner si nce it m a k e s th e p e n alty
ineffectual.(U.S. v. Bandino, supra) Thus, a guard, whc allowed
prisoner to sleep at his house every night because the muni cipal jail
was so congested and there was no bed space available and tcreturn '
to jail early each mor n i ng, un ti l t h e 10-day sentence I ad been fully
served, is l i a ble t o c onsentin g t o e v a sion. (People v. Re viila, C. A.,
87 O.G. 1896; 1996 Bar E x a m ) A c h i e f o f p o l i c e, who p e rr r i t t e d a
detention p r i s oner, hi s co m pa d r e, t o l e a ve t he m u n i c i p al j a i l a n d
to entertain v i s i t or s i n h i s h o use from 1 0 :00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. and
to return t o th e m u n i c i pal j ai l a t 8 :30 p .m., is li a ble for consenting
to evasion un der A r t i c l e 223 of th e R evised Penal C d . ( ' 5 9 7 B
in delivery ofprisoner from jail, the offender is a person other than
the custodian of the convicted or detention pr i soner.
2. Pr ison e r s — P r i or t o c o n f i n e me nt, t h e a r r e s t ee is n o t
yet a prisoner. To be considered as detention p r i s oner, th e p erson
arrested must be booked in th e office of the police and placed in jail
e ven for a moment . (People v. Barin g, C.A., 87 O.G. 1866) Escape of
an arrestee from cu stody of police officers prior t o hi s confinement
in prison could not b e a s o u rce of th e c r i m e of d e l i v er in g p r i s oner
from jail, evasion of service of sentence or in f i d elit y i n t h e c u stody
of prisoner. However, the person who helped the ar r estee to escape
can be held liable as an accessory, dereliction of duty or obstructi on
of justice.

In addition to consenting to evasion, the custodiar is also liable j In evasion of service of sentence, the accused must be a convicted
or violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Transferr in g p r i s oner I prisoner and not merely a detention pr i soner. In delivery of prisoner
r om jail to his residence is giving un due preference a d v an - a from jail, the person, who escaped through the help of the accused, is
d ~
b enefit to a p r i v a t e p a rt y t h r o u g h m a n i f est p a r t i a l it y a n d e v i d ent e ither a detention pri soner or convicted prisoner. In in fi d el it y in t h e
bad faith i n v i o l a t io n o f t h i s p r o v i si on. (Am b il v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, ' c ustody of pr i soner, th e person wh o escaped in conniv ance wit h o r
G.R. 1Vo. 175457, July 6, 2011) consent of or t h r o ugh negligence of the accused-custodian, is either
a detention prisoner or convicted prisoner.
Xis serving a 6-year prison term. In his fourth year in p=ison, he
discovered that the judge commit ted a mistake in giving him a 6-year ' The brother of a detentior prisoner and convicted prisoner
sentence when the law he violated called for 3 years of imprisonment i bribed the clerk ofcourt to falsify release order and their custodians
only. Y, the jail guard and a law st u d ent checked X's contention and I to release his brothers. The convi"ted prisoner but not th e detention
f ound it correct. X did not w an t t o go to court an y m ore as he did not ; prisoner isliable for evasion of service of sentence. The brother and
have any money to hire a lawyer to file habeas corpus and he had I the clerk of cour t a r e l i a bl e for t w o c o u nt s of d e l i v ery of p r i s oner
l ost fait h i n t h e c o m p etence of j u d ges. X t h e n i n f o r me d Y t h a t h e ; f rom jail w i t h r e s p ect t o t h e escape of th e d e t en t ion p r i s oner a n d
would just escape and the la t ter di d not object. As soon as Y tu r ned ', c onvicted prisoner. Custodians are liable for two counts of infi deli t y
his back X spri n ted out of his cell. Xi s l i a ble for evasion of service of ,' in the custody of prisoners with respect to the escape of the detention
s entence while Yi s li a ble for consenting to evasion. The fact that th e prisoner and convicted prisoner. The brother is liable for two counts
judge committed a mi st ake in i m p osing the penalty is not an excuse '.f of corruption of public officer. The clerk of court an d custodians are
o r escaping. X should h ave avail of pr ocedural r e m edies under t h e l iable for d i r ect b r i b er y a n d v i o l a t ion o f S e ction 3 (e ) of R .A . N o .
law. By assessing on hisown the proper penalty and escaping on the; 3019. The clerk of court and brother are liable for falsification of
assumption that he already served the correct penalty, he placed the ': d ocument as p r i n c i pal b y d i r ect p a r t i c i p a t ion an d a s p r i n c i pal b y
aw into his own hands, which is not allowed since it will destroy the I inducement, respectively.(2009 and 2014 Bar Exams)
foundation of the ju di cial system. (1979 Bar Exam)
3. B ol o o r C u l p a —Evasion in t he s ervice of sentence and
t h e C u s t od y of ', delivery of p r i s oner f r o m j a i l c a n o n l y b e c o m m i t t e d b y m e an s of
Evasion of S e r v ice of S e n t ence, In fi d e l it y i n
P risoner and Deliv ery of Pr i soner from J a i l dolo. Infidelity in the custody of prisoner can be committed by means
of dolo or cu l pa. If c o m m i t t e d by m e a ns of do l o, th is c ri me can be
1. O f f e n d e r —In evasion of service of sentence, the cffender i~
called consenting to evasion; if commi t t ed by m e ans of culpa, it can
is t e convicted prisoner; in in fi d e l it y of the custody of prisoner, the I
be called evasion thr ough negligence.
o ffender is the custodian of the convicted or detention pr i soner a n d ;

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 120 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
On the date of hear i ng, th e cu stodian r e m oved th e h a n dcuffs
o f a detention p r i s oner an d a l l o wed hi m t o si t o n on e of th e ch air s
i nside th e c o u r t r o om . A s t h e c u s t o d ian w a s t a l k i n g t o a l a w y e r
i nside th e c o u r t r o om, t h e d e t e n t io n p r i s on er, w i t h t h e h e l p o f a
cigarette vendor, escaped. The d et ention p r i s oner i s no t l i a bl e f or
e vasion of service of sentence since this crime can only be commit t ed
b y a convicted prisoner. The custodian is l i a ble for i n f i d elit y i n t h e
c ustody of p r i s oner o r e v a sion t h r o ug h n e g l i gence. The v e n dor i s
liable for delivery of pri soner from j a il . (1989 Bar Exam )
4. S en t e n c e —In evasion of service of sentence, the penalty
involves deprivation of l i b e rt y w h i l e i n i n fi d e l it y i n t h e c u s t ody of
prisoner an d de l i v e ry o f p r i s o n er f r o m j a i l , t h e p e n a l ty i n v o l v e s
imprisonment .
E SCAPE OF PRISONER U N D E R C U S T O D Y OF PRIVATE PERS O N
I f t h e e v a s io n i s c o m m i t t e d w i t h c o n s en t o r t h r o u g h t h e
negligence of a pr i v a te person to w h om t h e c o nveyance or custody
o f a pri soner or p e r son u n der a r r est h a s b een confided, th e c r i m e
committed is escape of prisoner under the custody of a private person.
(Article 225)
EVASION ON OC C A S ION OF CA L A M ITY
Evasion of s ervice of sentence on th e oc casion of c a l a m i ty i s
c ommitted b y a c o n v i c t w h o , a f t e r l e a v i n g t h e p e n a l i n s t i t u t i o n
where he shall h av e been confined on occasion of calami ty , evades
t he service of h i s s e n t e nce b y f a i l i n g t o g i v e h i m s el f u p t o t h e
authorit ies wit hi n 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation
b y the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of calami t y .
C alamity i n c l u de s d i s o r der r e s u l t i n g f r o m a c o n fi a g r a t i o n ,
e arthquake, explosion, or simi lar cat astrophe, and mu t in y i n w h i c h I
the prisoner has not participated. (Article 158) If the prisoner
participated in the mu t i ny , the crime commi t ted is evasion of service
of sentence under Ar t i cl e 157.
In case of c a l a m i t y , t h e p r i s o ner i s e n t i t l e d t o s p e cial t i m e ~
allowance for loyalty un d er A r t i c le 98 of the Revised Penal Code as
a mended by R.A. No. 10592 if he did not leave the penal inst i t u t i o n ,
or if he surrendered to auth or i t ies wi t hi n 48 hours after the passing
away thereof as announced by the President. If he did not surrender
within the period, he is liable for evasion of service o f sentence under
Article 159.
J9JC9B0M
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 121
Both the detention pri soner and convicted prisoner are entitl ed
to special time allowance for loyalty. However, only convicted prisoner
can be held l i a ble for ev asion of service of sentence on the occasion
of calamity. Since a detention p r i s o ner is n ot y et s e rv i ng s entence,
there is nothing to evade.
V IOLATION OF CON D ITIONAL PAR D O N
Violation of c o n d i t i o n al p a r d o n is c o m m i t t e d b y a p a r d o n e e
who violates the conditions of pardon granted by the Chief Executive
(Article 159) such as commit t i n g t he c ri m e. Vio la ti on of conditio nal
pardon is a form of evasion of service of sentence.
A prisoner who had been sentenced to 10 years im p r i s onment
was granted a conditional pardon, which he accepted, when he had
s ix more m on th s t o s e r ve, th e condi t ion b e in g t h a t h e s h o ul d n o t
again commi t a n y l a w v i o l a t i on . T h r e e y e ar s a f te r t h e p a r d o n ed
prisoner's release he commit ted a vi olat ion of the I n t e r nal Revenue
C ode and upon t r i al , wa s found gu i lt y an d sentenced to pay a fi n e .
A is not li able for vi ol at ion of th e conditi onal p a r d on. Settled is th e
rule that t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e c on di t i ons subsequent, an n exed to a
pardon, would b e l i m i t e d t o t h e p e r i o d o f t h e p r i s oner's sentence
unless an i n t e n t io n t o e x t en d i t b e y on d t h a t t i m e w a s m a n i f e st
f rom the n a t u r e o f t h e c o n d i t io n o r t h e l a n g u age in w h i c h i t w a s
i mposed. In t h i s c a se, th e p a r do n d oes not s t at e t h e t i m e w i t h i n
which th e c o n d i t i on s t h e r eof w e r e t o b e p e r f o r m e d o r o b s erved.
The condition c a n not o p er at e b eyond th e t e r m o f h i s s e n t ence. A
committed the offense beyond the t er m of hi s sentence because the
u nserved portion of his sentence at the tim e of pardon is six month s
w hile he comm i t t e d t h e c r i m e a f t e r t h r e e y e ars. H e n ce, he i s n o t
l iable for vi ol at ion of p a r don s i nce th e condi t ion wa s no t a n y m o r e
operative when h e comm i t t e d a c r im e u n der th e I n t e r na l R evenue
Code. (Infante v. Provincial W ar d e n, G.R. ¹. L - 41 6 4, December12,
1952; 1957 and 1958 Bar Ex a ms )
T he penalty fo r v i o l a t ion of condi t i onal p a r don u n der A r t i c l e
1 59 of the Revised Penal Code will depend upon the penalty remi t t e d
l
by the gran t in g of p a r d on . I f t h e u n e x p i red p or t ion of th e p en alty
is higher th an s ix (6) years, the convict shall s uf f er s uch une xpire d
portion. If the unexpired portion of the penalty is not higher than six
(6) years, the convict shall then suffer penalty of pris ion correccional
in its mi n i m u m p e r i od. Th us, th e court ca n not r e qu ir e th e accused
[ to serve the u n e x p i red p or t ion of t h e o r i g i na l s e nt ence unless the
same is more than 6 years.(2012 Bar Exam)

IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
F ORG E R Y OF GR EAT SEAL, SIGNATURE OR STA M P
Forgery of great seal, signat u re or stamp i s c omm i t t e d by a n y
p erson who forges the Great Seal of the Government or the signatur e
or stamp of th e C h ief E x ecut ive (Ar t i c le 161), or makes use of such
forged seal, signature or st amp. (Art i c le 162)
FORG E RY AND M U T ILATION OF COINS
Forgery or counterfeiting of coins is c omm i t t e d by a ny p e r s on
w ho makes or i m p o rt s f a lse coins; who u t t er s such false coins wit h
o r wi t h ou t c o n n i v a nce w i t h c o u n t e r f eit er s o r i m p o r t e r s ; o r w h o
p ossesses such false coin wit h i n t en t t o u t t e r t h e same but w i t h o u t
connivance with count erfeit ers or im p or t ers. (Art ic les 168 and 165)
Mutila t ion of coins i s commit t ed by a ny p e rson who m u t i l a t e s
c oins of t h e l e g a l c u r r e n c y o f t h e P h i l i p p i n es; o r i m p o r t s s u c h
mutilated coins; or u t t e r s s uc h c o in s w i t h o r w i t h o u t c o n n i v a n ce
w ith m u t i l a t or s or i m p o r t e rs; or possesses such coin w it h i n t en t t o
utter but w i t h ou t conniv ance with m u t i l a t ors or im p or t ers. (Artic les
164 and 166)
In forgery, th e f or ged coins in cl ude t h ose of legal cu r r ency of
t he Phi l i p p i n es, or f o r e ig n c o u n t r y . I n m u t i l a t i on , t h e m u t i l a t e d
coins are confined to that of legal curr ency of the Phi l i p p i n es.
FORGERY INVOLVING BANK N O T ES, TREASURY NOTES O R
OTHER INSTRUMENTS
F orgery o r c o u n t erfeitin g i n v o l v in g t r e a s ury, b a n k n o t e , or
other instrument is committed by any person: (1) who forges such
i nstrum en t b y g i v i n g i t t he a p p e a r a nce o f a t r u e a n d g e n u i n e
d ocument, or e r a ses, substi t u t es, count erfeit s o r a l t e r s i t b y a n y
means the fig u r e s, le t t e rs, wo rds or s i g ns contained t h e r e in ( 1999
Bar Exam); ( 2) who im p o r ts s uch forged instr u m e n t; (3) who ut t e r s
it with or w i t h ou t c on n i v ance wit h f o r g ere or i m p o r t ere; or (4) wh o
122
J9JC9B0M
IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 123
possesses it w i t h i n t e n t t o u s e o r u t t e r i t b u t w i t h o u t c o n n i v an ce
w ith forgers or im p or t er s . (Articles 166 to 169)
T he forged i n s t r u m en t m a y b e p a y a bl e t o b e a rer o r n o t , o r
p ayable t o o r d e r . I t i n c l u d e s P h i l i p p i n e -peso m o n ey , t r e a s u r y
n otes, or document i n v olv ing the Ph i l i p p i n es' obligation or securit y ,
document issued by a foreign governm ent (such as US dollar n otes)
or circulating n ote or b il l i s sued by a f or eign bank d u l y a u t h o r i zed
t herefor ( s uch a s H o n g K o n g d o l l a r n o t e s i s s ue d b y S t a n d a r d
C hartered Bank) .
In People v. Galano, C.A. 54 O.G. 5899, the accused wrote the
word i n i n k a t t h e b ack of a genu in e pr e-war t r e a sury certi ficate,
w hich ha s b e e n w i t h d r a w n f r o m c i r c u l a t io n ( I n 1 9 4 4 , t r e a s u r y
certificates, feat u r in g t h e w o r d "v i c t o r y" pr i n t e d o n t h e r e v e r s e ,
w ere issued to replace all th e ear l ier n o t es). The accused used thi s
certificate to buy balut eggs. He is liable for forgery since a word has
been added i n t h e d e m o netized tr e a sury c ert if ic ate in a n e f f o rt t o
give it the appearance of the true and genuine certificate that it used
to have before it was wi t h d r aw n f r om c i r c u l a t io n. (1966 Bar Exam)
P ossession o f f a l s e t r e a s ur y o r b a n k n o t e s a l o n e , w i t h o u t
a nything m o re , i s n o t a c r i m i n a l o f f e n se. For i t t o c o n s t i t u t e a n
o ffense under Ar t i cl e 168 the possession must be wit h i n t en t t o u s e
s aid false treasury or b an k n o t e s . (1999 Bar E x a m) I t f o l l o ws t h a t
an information averr in g possession of false treasury and bank notes
but without al l egation of "intent to use the same" charges no offense.
The allegation of "in t ent to p ossess" in the inf o rm a t i on w i ll n ot c ur e
t he defect because int ent t o p o ssess is not e q u i v a l ent t o i n t en t t o
use. (People v. Di goro, G.R. No. L-22082, March 4, 1966)
A person who ha d a c ou n t e r f eited P50-bill u n der t h e g l ass of
his table among other objects as decorations is not l i a ble for i l l egal
p ossession of false bank n o te, th ere being no i n t en t t o use it t o t h e
damage of another. (Revised Penal Code by Luis Reyes)
T he accused was caught i n p o ssession of 100 counterfeit P 2 0
bills. He could not explain how and wh y h e possessed the said bills.
N either coul d h e e x p l ai n w h a t h e i n t e n d e d t o d o w i t h t h e f a k e
bills. He is li able for possession of forged bills w it h i n t en t t o use it .
Possession of such considerable nu m ber of f a lse notes such as 100
pieces of false bills i n d i cates, first, the in t e ntion of t he possessor to
utter said notes and, second, the knowledge, which the possessor had
of the falsity of th e said n otes. (People v. Sane, C.A. 40 O.G., Supp.
5, 188; 1999 Bar Exam )
 124 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
F ALSIFICATION OF DOC U M E N T
Falsification of d o c ument u n d er A r t i c l e s 1 71 a nd 1 7 2 o f t h e :
Revised Penal Code is commit ted by :
(1) A p u b h c o f ficer, or not ary w h o , t a k in g a d v a n t age of ,
his official position, falsifies a document;
(2) A n e c c l esiastical m i n i s ter wh o f a l sifies document of '
such character t ha t i t s f a l sification may a f fect the civil st a t ue ::
of persons;
(3) A p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l w h o f a l s i fies pu b li c or of fi cial '
document, or commercial document such as letter of exchange; ',
or
( 4) A n y p e r s o n w h o f a l si fies p r i v at e d o cument t o t h e
damage (prejudice) of a thir d p a r ty , or w it h th e i n t ent to cause ~
such damage (prejudice).
D ocumen t
D ocument i s a n y wr i t t e n s tatement b y w h i c h r i g h t i s '
I
established or a n o b l i g a t io n e x t i n g u i shed (M o r e no, C .A., 88 O. G. '.,
119) such as contract or official receipt; or deed, instr u m ent or other i
duly aut h or i zed paper by w h i c h s ometh in g i s p r oved, evidenced or,,
set forth ( U . S . v. Or e r a, G . R. ¹ . L - 8 81 0 , O c t ober 18, 1 907) such ';
as demand letter, letter requesting for financial assistance and,
marriage contract.
1. P u bl i c D o c u m e n t — Public document is one auth o r i z ed
by law or r e g u l a t ion o r i n w h i c h a p u b l i c of ficer, n o t ar y p u b l i c or ';
any person author i zed to admi n i ster oaths int er v enes for purpose of ':
authenticatin g th e s a me, and not a s p a rt y t h e r e to. ( Crim i n a l L a w :
Conspectus by t u s t ice Florenz Regalado )
Certificate of n o n - r el at i onship r e q u i re d b y t h e r u l e s o f C i v i l i
Service Comm i ssion t o a p p o in t a p u b l i c of fi cer (Layno v. Pe ople,,'
G.R. No. 98942, September 7, 1992); affidavit (L o n z an ida v. People, '.
G.R. Nos.160248-52, tuly 20, 2009) and notarized special power of i
attorney (I n t e state Estate of G o n zales v. People, G.R. N o. 18 1409,
February 11, 2010) are public documents.
2. Of fi c i a l D o c u m e n t —An official document is also a public .''
document. It f a lls wi t h i n a l a r ger class called public document . (The '
Revised Penal Code, Book II by CA t u s t i ce Luis B. Reyes)
J9JC9B0M
IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 125
Official documents are:
a. D oc u m e n t s i ssued by a public official in th e exercise
o f functi ons o f h i s o f f ic e such a s c o m m u n i t y t a x c e r t i fi c a t e
(People v. Ba r b a s, G . R. N o . L - 4 1 2 65, J u l y 27 , 1 9 84); m o ney
order (People v. Vill a n u eva, G.R. No. 89047, October 81, 1988);
treasury w a r r an t (P e ople v. Sil v an n a, G . R. No. L- 4 8 120, July
27, 1985);
b. D oc u m e n t s i n t h e e x ecution of w h i c h p u b li c officer
t akes part b y v i r t u e o f h i s o f fice such as governm ent p a y r o l l
(Ilumin v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85667, February 28, 1995);
voucher signed by provincial t r e asurer (People v. Sendaydiego,
G.R. Nos. L-88252-54, Janu a ry 20 , 1978); tax collection report
(Zafra v. People, G.R. No. 176817,July 28, 2014); or
c. D ocu m e n t s w h i ch become part of th e public records
such as pet i t io n for ha b e as corpus (Bermejo v. Ba r r i o s, G.R.
No. L-23615, February 27,1970); and Bar examination paper,
1
I which are par t of j u d i cial r ecords. (People v. Romualdez, G.R.
No. 31012, September 10, 1982; Cr i m i n a l La w Co n s pectus by
tustice Florenz Regalado )
3. Com m e r c i a l D o c u m e n t — Commercial documents are:
a. Do c u m e n t s u s e d b y m er c h a n t s o r b u s i n e s smen
t o promote or f a c i l i t at e t r a d e o r c r e di t t r a n s a ctions such a s
certificate of t i m e d eposit (A m b i to v. People, G.R. No. 127827,
February 18 , 2 0 0 9 ), loan d o c um e nts (P eople v. G o, G . R. N o .
191015, August 6, 2014) and sales invoice (People v. Monteverde,
G.R. No. 189610, August 12, 2002); or
b. D o c u m e nts defined and regulated by commercial
law (Batu l a n on v. People,G.R. No. 139857, September 15, 2006)
such as promissory note (Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448,
tune 26, 2018) and check. (People v. Salonga, G.R N o . 181181,
June 21, 2001)
4. Pr iv at e D oc u m e n t — Pr i v a t e d o c u m ent i s a d e e d o r
,'
a n instr u m en t e x ecuted by a p r i v a t e p e r son, by w h i c h s o m ethi n g
is proved or evidenced (U .S. v. Orera, G.R. No. L- 8 810, October 18,
1907), provided tha t t h e s am e is not c l assified as public, official or
c ommercial d o cum ent . T i c ke t f o r t h e a t r i ca l p e r f o r m a nce ( U .S. v .
Orera, supra), le t t er r e q u e sting f or f i n a n c i al a s s istance (Zoleta v .
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.185224, July 29, 2015) and demand letter
are private documents.
 126 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
A n official r eceipt i s a p u b li c document, for th e r e ason that i t
was invested wit h t h e c h a r a cter of a n o f f i cial document b y r e a son
o f the f ac t t h a t i t w a s p r i n t e d i n a c c o r d ance w i t h t h e s t a n d a r d
forms required by the Governm ent . (U.S. v. Guico, G.R. No. L-4696,
December 9, 1908) On the other hand, an unofficial or priv a te receipt
is a private document. (U.S. v. ¹eto, G.R. No. 2607, February 2,
1906)
A n ot a r ia l w i l l i s a p u b l i c d o c u m en t ( U . S . v . De l o s Re yes,
G.R. No. 1276, July 2 6, 1905); whi le a h o lographic wi ll i s a p r i v a t e
document.
A p r o m i ssory n o t e i s a com m e r c ia l d o c u m ent (T a n e n ggee
v. People, G.R. N o . 17 9 448, Ju n e 26 , 2 0 1 8) b ut a n o n - n e gotiable
promissory note isa private document.
Vouchers showing r eceipt of m o ney loaned from th e company
for not being a commercial document or public documents are private
documents. (Batul a n on v. People, supra)
C lassification of documents u n der Section 19, Rule 132 of th e
R ules of E v i d ence should no t b e confused w it h t h a t u n d e r A r t i c l e
172 of the Revised Penal Code.
C lassification o f d o c u m e nt s u n d e r t h e Ru l e s o f E v i d e n ce
i s connected w i t h t h e r u l e s o n s e l f - a u t h en t i cation o f d o c u m e n t .
C lassification o f d o c u m e nt s u n d e r t h e R e v i s e d P e n a l C o d e i s
connected with th e cr im e of falsification of document .
W ritten official acts or records, notarized document and publi c
records a re public documents un d er t he R u l es of Evi d e nce and the
R evised Penal C o de. H o w ev er , l a s t w i l l a n d t e s t a m e nt , w h e t h e r
holographic or notarial, is a public document under the Ru'les of
Evidence; under the Revised Penal Code, holographic will is a private
document wh il e not ar ial w il l i s a pu b lic document. U n der the Rul es
of Evidence, a check is a priv ate document; under the Revised Penal
C ode, a check is a commercial document .
Acts of F a l s ificati o n
The followin g a r e a c t s o f f a l s i f i cati on : (1) co u n t e r f e iti ng o r
i mitat in g an y h a n d w r i t i n g , s i g n a t ur e o r r u b r i c ; (2 ) c a u sin g i t t o
appear t h a t p e r s on s h a v e p a r t i c i p a ted i n a n y a c t o r p r o c eeding
when they di d no t i n f a c t so p a r t i c i p a te; (3) at t r i b u t i n g t o p e r sons
who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other th an
those in fact made by them; (4) making untruthful statements in a
J9JC9B0M
IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 127
narration of facts; (5) altering t ru e dat es; (6) making any al t er a t i on
or intercalation in a genu ine document w h ich ch anges its meanin g;
( 7) issuing in a n a u t h e n t i c ated for m a d o c u m ent p u r p o r t i n g t o b e
a copy of a n o r i g i n a l d o c u m en t w h e n n o s u c h o r i g i na l e x i s ts, or
i ncluding in such a copy a st at ement cont r ar y to , or di f f erent f r o m ,
t hat of the genuine ori gi n al ; (8) or i n t e r calat in g any i n s t r u m en t or
note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official
book. (Article 171)
1. C ou n t e r f e i t i n g ( I m i t a t i n g ) o r F e i g n i n g —X deposited
a check for P20,000 endorsed by Z. Z l a t e r com pl a i ned to hi s bank
w hen the am ount of P 2 0 ,000 was debited from hi s account, as h i s
signature on the check was forged. Xsubsequently deposited another
check signed by Z, which amount he later w i t h d r ew . Upon receiving
th amount covered by the check, X was arrested by NBI agents. X
c laims that the entr a p m ent is ill egal for th ere is no showing that th e
second check was forged, and therefore, his wit h d r a wal based on the
se"ond check was a legal act. (2014 Bar Exa m) Since the first check
i s forged, such c i r c u m s t ance j u s ti fies t h e e n t r a p m en t o f X s i n c e
there isalready probable cause that the second check is also forged.
M oreover, even assuming t ha t t h e e n t r a p m ent i s i l l e gal, it w il l n o t
v alidate th e w i t h d r a w a l b a sed on t h e s econd check, w h ich i s a l s o
fo=ged. The crimin a l it y in f or ging the second check is not affected by
t he alleged illegality in th e en t r a p m ent operati on .
The English text of para graph 1 of Ar t i cl e 171 uses the phrase
"counter feiting o r i m i t a t i n g." H o w e ve r, i ts S p a n i sh t e x t , w h i c h i s
controlling, uses the phrase "contrahaciendo o fingiendo."
In f e i g n i n g (f i n g i e n do), t h e r e i s n o or i gi n a l si gn a t u r e ,
handwrit in g or r u b ri c but a si m u l a t ion of signat u re, handw r i t i n g or
r ubric that d oes not exi st. A com pl a i n a nt , wh o d oes not k now h o w
to write, ha s n o s i g n a t u re . T h u s , t h er e i s n o w a y f o r a n o f f e n der
to imitat e th e s i g n a t ur e of t h e c o m p l a i n an t s i m p l y b e cause th er e
i s no signat ur e t o i m i t a t e . H o w e v er , i f t h e o f f e n der c a u sed i t t o
a ppear tha t c o m p l a i n an t s i g ned a d o cum ent , w h e n i n f a c t h e d i d
not do so, such act is considered as "feigning of signatu re." (see: The
Revised Penal Code by CA J u s t ice L ui s R eyes) Resemblance of the
false signature and genuine signature is not required because in the
first place there is no genuine signat ur e i n v olved in f a l sification by
f eigning a signat u r e .
In c o u n t e r f ei t in g (co n t r a h a c iendo), t h e r e i s a n or i gi n a l
signature, handwriting or r u bric, which is i m i t ated. In order to
c cnstitute an i m i t a t ion of another's signature on a document wi t h i n
 128 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 129

the meaning of p a r a gr aph 1 of A r t i cl e 171, it i s not n ecessary that.

3. A t t r ib u t i o n o f a D i f f e r e n t S t a t e m e n t — I n U . S . v .
the im i t a t io n b e p e r f ect. W h a t i s i m p o r t a n t i s t h a t t h e i m i t a t i on
can deceive a person well a c q u a i n t ed wi t h t h e si g n a t u re sought tp . Capule,G.R. No. 7447, January 2, 1913, owners of a tract of land
agreed to confer upon the accused a power of attorney to represent
be imitated. In c o un t e rf e it i ng of s ig na t u r e, t h e re m u st be i n t e nt t<:,
imitate or an attempt to imitate, which can be established by showin~, t hem in a c a se. B ecause t hey c o ul d n e i t h e r r e a d n o r w r i t e , t h e y
that th e g en u in e si gn at ur e an d t h e f a ls e si gnat ur e b ear su ffic ienl let the accused drew u p t h e d o cument. Accused, however, th r o u gh
resemblance t o e ach o t h er a s t o b e l i k e l y t o d e c e ive an o r dinary d eceit, was a bl e t o g e t t w o p e r s on s t o s i g n i n t h e n a m e o f s a i d
inar
person receiving or d e al in g w i t h t h e i n s t r u m e nt . ( U .S. v. Ra m pas, owners. after mak ing them un d erst and that the document contained
G.R. No. 9146, November 26; 1918) a power of a t t o r n ey, w he n i n f a c t i t w a s a d e e d of s ale of a p i e ce
of land. The legit i m at e ow n ers of th e p r operty ha d n e ver i n t e n ded
2. )
Ca u s i n g t he A p pe a r a n c e o f O n e ' s P a r t i c i p a t i o n n or consented to its ali enati on. Fu r t h e r m o re, they denied that t h e y
— Even though " i n t ent to im i t a t e" is n ot e s t a blis hed because there
is "no semblance of s i m i l a r i t y" b e t w e en f a l s e s ignatur e o n t h e .
I
h ad ever been in t h e h o u se of th e n o t ar y t o e x ecute or r a t i f y a n y
d ocument. Accused is gui lt y of t h e c r im e of f a l sification of not a r i a l
document and th e genu in e sign at u re, the person, who caused such '
document by a t t r i b u t i n g t o t h e c o m p l a i n a nt s a st a t e ment of s ale,
false signature thereon, may still be held liable for falsification of the
which is di f f erent f r o m t h e st a tement of au t h o r i ty to r e present in a
document by causing it t o a p p ear t h a t t h e p e r son wh ose signature.
case made by them .
is forged had part i cip ated in the execution of the document when he '
did not in fact do so. (U.S. v. Cinco, G.R. No. 12127, October 18, 1917) In Pe o ple v. Ro m u a l d e z a n d M a bu n a y , G . R . N o . 3 10 1 2 ,
Postmaster wh o f o r ged th e s i g n a t ur e o f t h e p a y ees on t h e p o stal September 10, 1932, accused made the alterations in the grades given
money order t o m a k e i t a p p ear t h a t t h e y s i g ned th e d ocuments is by the "correctors" in the bar examin a t ion papers in question in such
liable for falsification alth ough the signatures of the payees were not
imitated. (People v. Villa n u eva, G.R. No. 89047, October 8 1, 1983) [ I
a way as to make it appear that said "correctors" had participated
therein, because she blotted out t h e g r a des of th e "correctors" and
w rote new a n d i n c r e a sed g r a des o p posite t h ei r i n i t i a l s , w i t h o u t
A Deed of Sale, hav in g been executed before a n ot ar y p u b lic,
is a public document. It c a r r i e s w it h i t t h e l e gal pr esump t ion of it> indicating by h e r o w n i n i t i a l s t h a t s h e h a d m a d e t h e a l t e r a t i on s.
authenticity un ti l th e contr ary is fully established. (U.S. v. Enri quez, ' S he, in t h a t w a y , a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e " c o r r ectors" st a t em ents o t h er
G.R. ¹. 4 08 , Ap r i l 24 , 19 0 2 ) H o w e v e r, w h e n a p er s o n w h o s e' t han those in fact made by th e m .
signature was affixed to a document denies his signature therein a
erein, a I 4. M a k i n g U n t r u t h f u l S t a t e m e n t —Falsely impersonating
prima facie case for falsification is established which the defendant
) the owner of a piece of land as vendor in a fo rg ed deed of sale would
must overcome. (Sales v. Adapon, G.R. No. 171420, October 5, 2016)
I. c onstitute a n a c t o f f a l si fi cation b y c a u s in g i t t o a p p ea r t h a t t h e
owner of th e l an d p a r t i c i p a ted in t h e ex ecution of th e d eed of sale
In C o n stan t in o v . Pe o pl e, G . R. N o . 2 2 5 6 9 6, A p r i l 8 , 2 0 1 9 ,
accused, a not ar y p u b l ic, wa s ch a r ged of f a l sification of d o cum when he did not in f act execute it. ( T he Revised Penal Code by Luis
ocumen t
y making it a p p ear t h a t D r . A s u n cion pa r t i c i p ated in execution of Reyes) Falsely representing hi m s elf as the owner of ho use and lot in
the acknowledgement of th e w i l l a n d t e s t a m ent b y s i g n in g i t a s a a deed of sale w oul d c onsti t ut e o t her f or m o f d e ceit u n der A r t i c l e
witness, where in fact he did not sign it. However, it was established'I 316. Falsely representing hi m s elf as the Fil i p i n o c it izen in a d eed of
that Dr . A s u n c ion a t t h e u r g i n g o f F e r r er , h i s s o n -in -l aw , si gned sale involving l an d t o c i r c u m v ent t h e consti t u t i o nal p r o h i b i t ion on
the acknowledgement a f ter t h e n o t a r i z a t i on. Th er efore, it w a s n ot acquisition of land by an alien would constit ut e an act of falsification
accused who m ade it a p p ear t h a t D r . A s u n cion p a r t i c i p ated in the j by making unt r u t h f u l st a t em ent in th e nar r a t ion of facts in the deed
execution of the Joint Ackn ow l edgment, but Ferrer and Dr. Asuncion ' of sale, and that is, declaring hi m s elf to be a Fil i p ino citizen.
himself. Accused is not liable for falsification of document. However,;
a. O bl i g a t i o n t o D i s c l ose th e T r u t h — The accused
accused should be administ r a t i v ely sanctioned for failure to cross out I
is for m in g P a ci fi c A i r w a y s C o r p o r a t io n f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f'
Dr. Asuncion's name when he notar i zed the Joint A c k n ow l edgment, I
e ngaging in bu si ness as a common carr i er . In connection wit h
which has all owed Dr . A s u n cion t o st il l s ig n t h e d ocument d espite ~
t he form a t ion of t h i s c o r p or at i on, h e s u b m i t t e d t o S ecuri t i es
not having par t i c i p ated in it s due execution.
and Exchange Commission, the articles of incorporation in

J9JC9B0M
 130 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
which he made it appear that he, a Fil i p in o citizen, owns more '
than 60% of the capital stock th ereof, when in fact he is a mers
trustee of for eigners. Accused is not l i a bl e for f a l s i fication of
d ocument. A l t h o ug h t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s 60 % F i l i p i n o
capitalization of a corporation in obtain ing fr anchise to operate '
a s a p u b l i c u t i l i t y , C o r p o r a t io n L a w d o e s n o t r e q u i r e 6 0 %
F ilipino c a p i t a l i z at ion i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a c o r p o r a t i on . I n
sum, the accused has no obligation to disclose that percentage .
o f foreign c a p i t a l i z a t io n i n f o r m i n g t h e c o r p o r a t i on . I n t h e
absence of such obligation, mak in g an u n t r u t h f u l s t a t em ent of '.
facts regarding the Fi l i p in o capitali zation is not falsification of
public document. (People v. Quasha, G.R. No. L-6055, June 12,
1958; 1971 Bar Exam)
A fter for m i n g P acific A i r wa y s Corporation , t he
accused, an i n c o r p or at or , fi l e d a n a p p l i c a t io n f o r f r a n c h i se,
for the corporation to operate as a common carrier with the
D epartmen t o f T r a n s p o r t a t io n a n d C o m m u n i c a t i on . I n t h e
s aid application, accused makes it a p p ear t h a t h e a Filipi n
i ncorporator, own s m or e t h a n 6 0 % of th e ca pi ta l s t ock of t h
o e
Pacific Air w ay s Corporati on, when in f act he is a mere tr u st ee
of foreigners. Accused is liable for falsification of document (
n or I
perjury i n c a s e of a s w or n a p p l i c a t i on). I n s u c h a p p l i c ation,,'
disclosure of the true owners of the stocks of the corporation'
is essential in or der not to circumv ent th e Constit u t i on; hence, I
he is legally ob l i ged t o r e v eal th e t r u t h ; a n d f a i l u r e t o d o so I
c onstitutes falsification of document (or perj u r y ) .
Obligation to disclose the truth as a n e l e m en t o f
f alsification o f d o c u m en t i n v o l v i n g m a k i n g a n
untrut h ful i
statement of facts can be express or impli ed. In La yno v. v. Peopl
.R. No. 93842, September 7, 1992, accused, a mayor, issued a I
cope, I
certification st a t in g th e p e r son being appointed is not r e l a ted I
to him w h er e i n f a c t t h a t p e r son is hi s son. Th e cert i f icate is I
required by th e r u l e i s sued by th e C i vi l S e r v ice Comm i ssion. I
Accused argued that he is not liable for falsification becau
s e he ,
as no obligation to disclose the trut h u n der th e law. Al t h o ugh I
the law a g a i nst n e p otism d oes not explic itly pr o v i de t h at t h e "
a ppointing a u t h o r it y s h al l d i s close his t r u e r e l a t i on ship w i t h
the appointee i n t h e f o r m o f a c e r t i fi c a t i on, n o n etheless, his I
l egal obli gat ion t o d i s c l ose such r e l a t i o n shi p i s i n h e r e t '
r en i n ~
thee I law a n d t h e n a t u r e a n d p u r p o s e o f s u c h c e r t i fi c t '
a ion. <
Hee nce, accused i s l i a b l e f o r f a l s i fi c a t i on o f documen t b y l
making a n u n t r u t h f u l s t a t e m e nt . M o r e over, th e w i t h d r a w al I
J9JC9B0M
IV. CRIMES A AINST PUBLIC INTEREST 131
of the appointm e nt is n ot a d e f e nse. The crime of fals ification
having al r eady been comm i t t ed , n o a cts show in g subsequent
repentance and abandonment of purpose, even if true, can
relieve the accused of his penal li abi l i ty . (1998 Bar Exam )
The prosecution need not i d e n t if y a s p ecific pr ovision of
law und.er which the accused has the obligation to disclose the
truth. As long as the offender has such obligation from the very
nature and pu r p ose of the document . (Solis v. Sandiganbayan,
G.B. Ncs. 198248-49, September 17, 2018)
"Obligatio n t o di s c l ose t h e t r u t h " i s n ot ex p r e s s l y
.
m entioned a s a n el e m e n t o f f a l s i fi c a t io n o f d o c u m en t i n
A rticles 17 1 an d 1 7 2 o f t h Rev i s e d P e na l C o de. B u t , "lack
of obligation to d i s close the tr v t h" i s a d e f e nse in p r o secution.
for fal sification be c a use of t h e l a n d m a r k c a s e o f " Q u a s h a . "
However, jur i s p r u d en"e is now t r e a t in g "o bligation to disclose
the tr u t h" a s a n e l e m e nt c f f a l s i f ic at i o n. I n s u m , o b l i g a t i o n
to disclose the t r u t h ' s a n l e me n t o f f a l s if ic ation b ecause of
jurispru dence, and not because of the law .
I While u n de r t h e R e v i sed R u le s of C r i m i n a l P r o cedure,
t he i n f o r m a t io n m u s t a l l e g e t h e a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g a c r i m e ,
"obligation. to di s c lose t he t r u t h." need n ot b e a l l e g ed in t h e
,
information provided that such obligation is inherently requir ed
by the document because of the nat ur e t h ereof. In People v. Po
Giok To, G. R. N o. L - 7 2 3 6, Ap r il 3 0 , 1 9 5 5, t he a c cused mad e
I untrut h fu l s t a t em ents as tc his n a me, citizenship and place of
birth i n r e s i dence certificat ( N o w c o m m u n i t y t a x cer t i fi cate).
T he Inform at ion for fslsification of document involv ing mak i n g
an untr u t h f u l s t a te m n t f a i l e d t o a l l ege obligation to di sclose
the truth in th e document. But. the inform a t ion for falsification
is not quashed. Under the law, residence certificate for persons
s hall c ont ai n t h e f u l l n a m e , d a t e o f b i r t h , a n d c i t i z e n ship .
T hese facts are required to appear th erein to establish identi t y
of the taxpayer. Th us, since the dut y t o d i sclose these facts is
i nherent in th e t r a n saction, there was no need for the crim i n a l
charge to a l l ege t h a t t h e a c c u sed ha d s uc h d u t y . ( 1992 B a r
Exam)
P "osecution need not identify a specific law under which
the accused has th e ob l i gation t o d i s close the t r u t h . (S o lis v .
Sandiganbayan, supra) To convict the accused for falsification
o f document i n v ol v in g m a k i n g an u n t r u t h f u l s t a t em ent, wh at
I
is import an t i s t h a t h e h a s a le g al o b l i g at ion to d i s c lose the
 132 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
truth. In Ma n a n s a la v. People, G.R. No. 215424, December 9,
2015, the accused made an un t r u t h f u l s t a t em ent in p e tt y cash I
replenishment report of a priv ate corporati on. The accused wasI
convicted of falsification of pr i v ate document because he has a~
legal obligation to disclose the tru th in a r e p ort. No te: Tnere is I
no law specifically requ i r in g di sclosure of tr ut h i n a p e tt y case ';
replenishment r eport by a p r i v at e corporati on .
In So l i s v . S a n d i g a n b a ya n, G .R. N o s . 193248-49,
September 17, 2018, NAM R I A is the government agency
r esponsible f o r conductin g g e o p h y sical s u r v e y s . B e c a u se
of th e a g e n c y 's s pecial c o m p e t ence, p e t i t i o n er , N A M R I A :
A dmini st r a t o r , w as r e q u ested b y t h e S o l i c i to r G e n e ra l t o ,
conduct a r e - s u r vey o f F o r t M a g s a y say. T o a l l o w p e t i t i o n er
to claim t h a t h e h a d n o l e gal ob l i gation t o d i s close the t r u t h '
i n his l e t ter (on th e r e -survey). will. be contrary t o N A M R I A ' s
functions. It w il l er ode the public's con6dence in NA M R I A an d '
all its issuances and research f indi n g s .
b wT
Narration of Facts — The document must contain I
"narration of f a cts" and no t "c o nclusion of l a w " t o c o m m it a n
act of falsification under paragraph 4 of Art i cle 171. Conc usion
of law is defined as a proposition not ar r i ved at by any p r ocess I
of natural r e asoning from a fact or combin at ion of facts stated '
but by the appl i c a t ion of the ar t i f'facial rules of law to t he f a cts ~
pleaded. (B l a c k's L aw D i c t i o n a r y) S t a t e m e nt o f a c a n d i d a t e
in a certi fi cate of can d i d acy t ha t sh e w a s b orn on M a r c n 2 9 ,
1931 instead of M a rc h 29 , 1933, her t r u e b i r t h d ay , to m ak e it I
appear that she was above 23 years old on the date ofelection I
to comply w i t h t h e a g e q u a l i f i cation of a n e l e ctive official, is I
making an u n t r u t h f u l s t a t e m ent i n a n a r r a t i o n o f f a ct . T h i s I
is falsification. H o w ever, st at em ent t h a t sh e w a s " eli gible" to
t he office of m u n i c i pal c ouncilor b a sed on th e b e l ief t h a t t h e :
2 3-year-old requir ement could be adequately met if she reached :
23 years upon assuming th e position of councilor al t h ough she
w as 22 years of age on the date of the election is conclusion of :
law. This is not falsification. (People v. Yanza, G.R. No. L-12089,
Apri/ 29, 196'0)
c. F a l s i fi c a t i o n b y O m i s s i o n — I n Pe o ple v. D i z o n ,
.R. No. L - 2 2560, Ja n u ar y 2 9 , 1 9 25, accused, bookkeeper of ',
t he Arm y P o s t E x c h a n ge, wa s i n c h a r g e of r e c ordin g o f t h e
sales ofseveral stores, in cash or on credit in the record books,
a nd keeping t h e c h i t s ( e v i d ence of cr edit) an d t h e r e c or din g '
J9JC9B0M
IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 133
I
thereof i n t h e p e r s onal a c counts o f t h e c u s : o m ers. A c cused
bought several goods in the Post Exchange on credit and signed
I c hits for th e goods. To avoid pay in g th e a m o un t s t a ted in t h e
chits, accused destroyed s om e o f t h e c h i t s a n d d e l i b er at ely
did not record them i n h i s p e r sonal account. The accused was
found gu i lt y o f f a l si fi cation b y o m i s sion. (1975 Bar E x a m) I n
sum, failure to enter hi s debt i n t h e r ecord book is considered
as making un t r u t h f u l s t a t em ent in a n a r r a t ion of fact.
I 5. G e n u i n e o r Si m u l a t e d Do cu m e n t — I n p ar . 6 of
A rticle 171, alter ation or i n t e r c alat ion m u s t b e m ade in a g e n u i n e
document such as tr a n scripts of stenographic notes in a deposition.
(1986 Bar Exam) In t h e s econd part of p a r. 7, Ar t i c le 171, the false
statements are in clu ded in an a u t h e n t i c ated genuine document. In
par. 8 of Arti cle 171, the false document is int ercalated in a genuine
registry or official book. In other acts of falsification, the documents
falsi6ed rr ay be genuine or simulated. Example: Offender may cause
i t to appear t h a t a p e r son p a r t i c i p ated i n a n a c t w h e n i n f a c t h e
did not dc so (par. 2) in ge nuine document ( U . S. v. Br a go, G.A. No .
46'82, December 9, 1908) or simula ted document. In. falsification, the
document need not be an authentic of6cial paper since its simulati on
i
is also cort e m p l a ted in f a l si fication. (Ni z u r t a do v. Sa nd i g anbayan„
G.B. No. '07838, December 7, 1994; 1949 Bar Exam)
In Tadena v. People, G.R. No. 228610, March 20, 2019, the local
chief executive may veto the ordin ance and submit hi s objections to
I
',.
the sanggunian. However, the accused, a mayor, neither approved
nor vetoed the ordin ance. He int er v ened in th e pr ocess by changing
the wordings cf the whereas clause of the muni cipal ordin ance. This
is falsi6cation of document by mak ing any alt er at ion or int ercalation
i n a genu:ne document w h ich changes its meanin g.
T hir d E l e m e n t o f F a l s i fi c a t i o n
There are tw o essential el ements of fal sification of document,
to w it: (1 a c t - o f f a l s if ic ati o n; a nd ( 2) t h e a c ts of f a l s ification a r e
'
made on a document.
In falsification of document by a public officer or notary public,
there is a thir d el ement, and that is, tak in g advanta g o f h i s official
',
position.
In falsification of do cument by an ecclesiastical min is ter, there
is also a third element, and that is, the document falsified is of such
character that it s f al sification may affect the civil st a .us of persons.
 134 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
In f al sification of p r i v a t e d o c u ment by a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l
) o f the p u b li c f a it h a n d t h e d e s t r u c t ion o f t r u t h a s s o l em n l y
there is a th ir d el ement, and t ha t is, damage or preju dice caused to '
a third par ty , or w it h t h e i n t en t t o cause such damage or prejudice.
In falsification of pu b l i c, official or c ommercial d o cument by a
private indi vi d u al, t h e re is no thi rd e le ment.
a. T a k in g A dv a n t a g e o f P o s i t i o n — T h offender
is considered to h ave t a ken a d v a n t age of hi s official position,
w hich is a n e l e m en t o f f a l si fi cation o f d o cum ent b y a p u b l i c ; :
officer when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwi se
to intervene in the preparat ion of a document; or (2
) he has the
official custody of t h e d o cum ent w h i c h h e f a l sifi es. (People v.
Sandi ganbayan, G.R. No. 197953, August 5, 2015)
The element t h a t " t h e n o t a ry p u b l ic t a k es adv a n tag f !,
a eo
hiis official p o si t i on" is p r e s u m ed w h e n t h e f a l s i ty a l l e g edly
I three tr easury w a r r a n t s , so t ha t t h e g ov ern m ent s u f f ered no
c ommitted b y h i m p e r t a i n s t o t h e n o t a r i z a t i on , s i n c e o n l y
n otaries p u b l i c h a v e t h e d u t y a nd a ut h o r i t y t c
n otarize ,
documents. (Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 225696', April 0 8 ,
pri
2019)
b. Ci v i l St a t u s — B e f o r e , t h e pa r o c h i al r eg i s t r i e
of baptisms were considered as officialbooks and registers,
o
and the cer ti fi cates t a ke n f r o m t h o s e books w er e considered
as public documents. (U.S. v. Orosa, G.R. ¹. 291 6 ,De cember
29, 1906) Th us, f a l sification of p a r o chial do c ument, w h i c h i s
considered pu b l ic d o c ument, w as c onstitu t i ve of t h e c r i m e o f
falsification commi t ted by ecclesiastical mi n i s ter because such
falsification affects the civil status of a person. (see: The Revised
Penal Code by V i c ente F r a n cisco) N o w, p a r o chial d o c uments
are considered pr i v at e w r i t i n g s (U . S. v. Ev angelista, G.R. No.
L-9841, January 9, 1 915), the fals ification of w h i ch w i l l a f f e ct
the religious status of a person but not hi s civil st a t us. Hence,
f alsification o f b a p t i s ma l c e r t i f i c at e b y m a k i n g i t a p p e a r a
godparent of the child being baptized signed it is not punishable
under the Revised Penal Code. In falsification of document (e.g.
m arriage cer ti fi c ate) b y a n e c c l esiastical m i n i s t er , a f f ectin g
the civil st a tu s of a person is an i m p o r t an t el ement. (2012 Bar
Exam)
c. D a m a ge o r P r e j u d i c e to T h ir d P er so n
Falsification o f a p u b l i c d o c u m en t i s consummat d
e execution o f t h e f a l s e d o c u m e nt . W h a t i s p u n i s h e d i n
falsification of public document is principally the undermining
J9JC9B0M
IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 135
p roclaimed therein. The fact that accused did not benefit fr om ,
or that the public was not preju diced by the falsified resolution
is not a d e f ense. (Goma v. CA, G . R. N o . 16 8 487, Jan.uary 8 ,
2009; Regidor, J r. v . P e o ple, G.R. N o s. 16 6 086-92, Fe bruary
18, 2009) Thi s r u l e i s a p p l i c able t o f a l sification of o f fi cial oi
commercial document .
',
A ndrea s i g n e d h er d ec e a s e d h usband's n a m e i n
e ndorsing hi s t h r e e t r e a sur y w a r r a n t s w h i c h w e r e d l i v e r e d
t o her d i r e ctly b y t h e d i s t r i c t s u p e r v i sor wh o k n e w t h a t h e r
I husband had already died, and she used the proceeds to pay
for the expenses of the il l n ess and bu r ia l of her h u sb and. She
k new t h a t h e r h u s b an d h a d a c c u m u l a ted v a cation an d s i c k
l eaves the m o ney v a lu e o f w h i c h e x ceeded tha t v a l u e of t h e
damage. Falsification of public document is commit ted because
damage to a thir d p erson is not an element of this crime. (1988
I Bar Exam)
I However, in f al sification of pr i v at e document, damage to
a third party or the in t ent to cause such damage is an element,.
In estafa, da m age as an e l e m ent t h e r eof m u s t b e c apable of
p ecuniary est i m a t i on . I n f a l s i f ication of p r i v at e d ocument, i t
is not required th at. the damage as an element th ereof must be
c apable of pecuni ar y e s t i m a t i on . Th e S p a n ish t ex t o f A r t i c l e
172 uses the w ord "p e rj uicio," w h i ch i s p r e j u d i ce in E n g l i s h .
The concept of the word "pr eju dice" includes damage, whether
capable or in capable of pecuniary est i m a t i on . T h us, pr ejudice
i ncludes damage to one's honor. If a p e r son counterfeited th e
handwri t i n g an d si gn at ur e of another i n a l e t ter a d d r essed to
the governor att r i b u t i n g to others the commission of scandalous
acts, falsification is comm i t t ed. (Decision of Supreme Court of
Spain, February 10, 1845) In e s t a f a, inte nt to cause damage is
n ot enough to consumm ate it .
Z filed a lease application with D EN R involv ing inalienable
l and. I n h e r a p p l i c a t i on , sh e s t a te d t h a t s h e w a s a F i l i p i n o
citizen, although she was still a n a t u r a l i zed Russian citizen at
that ti me. H owever, Z has no int en t ion to cause damage to the
government since she filed after six mon th s after a petition for
dual citizenship. Z is li able for falsification of public c.ocument
I b ecause int en t t o c a u s e d a m age t o a t h i r d p e r son i s n o t a n
element of this crime. (2018 Bar Exam)
 136 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER IV. CRIMES ACAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 137
VOLUME II

In a n o n - n ot a r i zed con t r act o f s a l e , X r e p r e sented th e ~ personally wi t n essed the accused falsifying a d.ocument. For obvious
p roperty as ali enable and di sposable, and t ha t h e ha d a v a li d . reason, a forger w o ul d no t f a l s ify a d o cument i n t h e p r e sence of a
title to the pr operty. H o w ever, it t u r n e d out t h a t t h e p r operty person who i s a p o t e n t ia l w i t n ess against h i m . T h u s , p r osecution
was a public non-alienable and non-disposable land. However, u sually r e l ies o n t h e r u l e o n p r e s u m p t i on . I n s t ea d o f p r o d u ci n g
:

X had a valid Transfer Certif i cate of T i t l e i n h i s n a m e , a n d d irect evi dence, th e p r o s ecution w i l l j u s t p r o v e f a c t s o n w h i c h

he had a r i g h t t o r e l y o n h i s t i t l e . T h u s , h e i s n o t l i a b l e f or p resumption of a u t h o r shi p o f f a l si fi cation ca n b e b a sed. One w h o
falsification of document because intent to cause damage to the w ill be benefited by the falsification m ade on public document in h i s
buyer, which is an el ement of t hi s cr i me, is not p r esent. (2018 ~ possession is presumed to be th e a u t ho r o f f a l s i f i c a t i o . ( 1999 and
Bar Exam) 2014 Bar Exams)
In People v. Ca r a gao, G. R. N o. L - 2 8 2 58, December 27, 1 969,
U SE OF FALSIFIED DOC U M E N T a ccused co-owned a pr o p e r t y c o v e r e d b y Ce r t i f i c a t e o f T i t l e .
Purporting t o act on b eh alf of hi s co-owner pu r s u ant t o a p ower of
Use of falsified documents is committ ed by any person who, not !j
being th e a u t h o r o f f a l si fi ca t i on , k n o w i n gl y i n t r o d u ces a f a si fied ~: attorney in hi s f a v or , accused secured a l oan an d e xe=uted a deed
of mortgage on sai d p r o p er ty . Th e s i g n a t u r e s of hi s co-owners on
d ocument cont em p l a ted i n A r t i c l e 1 7 1 o r 1 7 2 i n e v i d e nce i n a n y ',
the special power o f a t t o r ne y ar e f o r g ed. H a v in g u sed th e f o r g ed
judicial proceeding, or uses it to t h e -damage of another or w i t h t h e ,'
document, accused is presumed to be its forger.
intent to cause such damage. (Artic le 172)
X deposited to his bank account a check in the amount of P 10,000
T he elements of u s e of f a l s i fied document ar e a s f o l l ows: ( 1) ,'
t hat th e o f f ender k n e w t h a t a d o c u m en t w a s f a l s i fied by a n o t her ! with the falsified endorsement of Y. A week l at er, the accused went
to Bank A to wi t h d r a w P 1 0 ,000. While wit h d r a w i n g t he amount, he
person; (2) that th e f a lse document is embr aced in A r t i cl e 171 or in ,'
was arrested. The crime commi t ted is estafa thr ough falsification of
any subdivisions Nos. 1 or 2 of Article 172; and (3) that he intr oduced ,.' vidence was
said document i n e v i d e nce i n a n y j u d i c ia l p r o ceeding or h e u s e d ;', c ommercial document. Hi s a r g u m en t t h a t n o f u r t h e r
s uch document (not in j u d i c ial p r oceedings) that caused damage to , ' presented to establish t ha t h e w a s th e f or ger of th e si gn at ur e of Y
another or a t l e ast i t w a s u sed w i t h i n t e n t t o c a use such da m age. is untenable. Using the falsified check for his own ben fi t g i v es ri se
to the presumpt ion t h a t h e i s th e a u t ho r of f a l sificati on. (1997 Bar
~

(Civil Service Commission v. S t a. An a, A .M ¹ . OCA - 0 1 - 5,Au gu st I

1, 2002; Borlongan v. Pena, G.B. No. 148591, May 5, 2010) Exam)

The first element of use of falsified document i.s that the offender ';
knew that a document was "falsi jied by another person." I n surr, it is
important t hat the accused is not the one who falsified the document.
I f th e accused is the au t hor of f a l sification, th e cr im e comm i t t e d i s
falsification of document and not use of falsified document .
In U; S. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 2829, September 19, 1906, accused
presented th e check w i t h t h e f o r ged signat ur e of hi s e m p l oyer f or
payment. The t r i a l c o ur t c o n v i cted th e accused of the cr
o f a l s i f ied m e r cant il e document. Th e Su p r em e Cour t r e v er sed th e
of
judgment an d convi cted th e accused of the cr im e of f a l sification of
a commercial document because unexplained fact that he used a
forged check is a str ong evidence tending to p ro ve that t he a ccused
either forged the check hi m self or caused it to be forged.
O rdinari ly , t h e p r o s e c u t i on c ould n o t p r o v e f a l s i fi c a t i on
t hrough di r ect evidence. It w o ul d be h ar d t o p r o duce a person wh o
In a c i vi l c a se for r e c overy o f a s u m o f m o n e y fi l e d a g a i n st,
him by A, B in t e r p o sed the defense of payment. In s u p port t h e r e of,
h e identified a n d o f f e red i n e v i d e nce a f a l si fied r e ceipt w i t h t h e
counterfeited signat ur e of A. Us i n g t he f a l s ified r e ceipt to s up port
his defense of payment gi ves rise to th e p r esum p t ion t h at B i s t h e
author cf f a l sifi cati on. H e r c e , th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s f a l s i fication
of public document an d not use of a falsified document in a j u d i ci al
proceeding. (1991 Bar Exam)
c im e of
rime o uu s e
INSTRUMENTS FOR FALSIFICATION
Manufacturing of in st r u m ents or imp l ements for , a l si fication is
committed by any person who makes or introduces into —.he Philippine
stamps, dies, marks, or ot her i n s t r u m e nt s or i m p l e m ents in t ended
t o be used i n t h e c o m m i s sion of t h e o f f e nses of count erfeit in g o r
falsification .

J9JC9B0M
 138 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 139
VOLUME II

P ossession of i n s t r u m e n ts o r i m p l e m e nts fo r f a l s i f i c at ion i s

c ommitted b y a n y p e r s o n who p o ssesses s uch i n s t r u m e n t s or '-' document as long as th e offender ha s an ob l i g a t ion t o d i sclose the
truth.
implements wit h t h e i n t e n t ion of using th em. (Art i c le 176)
t Makin g u n t r u t h f u l s t a t e m en t s u c h a s f ai l u r e t o di s c l o se
previous criminal conviction in a sworn applic ation for the patrolma n
FALSE TESTIMONY AND PERJURY
examination constit u tes perju ry . (People v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-15182,
False testimony is c o m m i t t e d b y a w i t n e s s w h o g i v e s f a l s e'' 1Ifay 25, 1960; 1972 Bar E x a m) Ma k i n g u n t r u t h f u l s t a t e m e nt s uc h
testimony u n d e r o a t h o r s o l e m n a f fi r m a t i o n i n a cr i m i n a l c a se ' as failure t o d i s c lose pendin g c r i m i n a l c a s e i n a n un s w o rn P D S
against (A r t i c le 180) or in f a v o r o f t h e a c c used (Ar t i c le 181 constitutes f a l si fication o f d o c u m e nt. (S e villa v. P e o ple, G.R. N o .
); or in,
a civil case (Ar t i c le 182), or in o t h e r c a s e s uch as a d m i n i s t r a t i ve I:, 194890, August 18, 2014; Civil Service Commission v. Vergel De Dios,
case (Article 1 88); or by a p e r s on w ho c omm i ts p e r j u ry i n a s w o r n G.R. No. 208536, February 4, 2015)
statement. (Art i c le 188) I If there are several mi st akes in the PDS inclu d ing those which
U nder t h e R e v i se d P e n a l C o d e , f a l s e t e s t i m on y i n c l u d es a re not i m p o r t a nt , a c cused cannot b e c o n v i cted of f a l si fi cation of
perjury. (U n i on B a nk of th e Ph i l i ppi n es v. People, G.R. No. 192565, d ocument since it ap pears that f a i l u r e t o d i sclose pending cri m i n a l
February 28, 2012) In sum, perjury is just a specie of false testimony. I case is not d e l i b er ate. H e n ce, accused i s o n l y l i a b l e f o r r e c k l ess
Perjury i s commit t ed by an affiant w ho kno wi n g ly ma k es untr u t h f u l
I. imprudence resulting in f al sification. (Sevilla v. People, ibid.)
statements upon any m a t e r ia l m a t t e r i n a n a f f i d avit or a s ol emnly I
a ffirme d s t a t e m en t b e f o r e a c o m p eten t p e r s o n I A General Inf or m a t ion Sheet (GIS) of a corporation is requir ed
t o be filed w i t h i n 3 0 d a y s f o l l o w in g t h e d a t e o f t h e a n n u a l o r a
authorized t o '
administer an oath in cases in wh ich th e law so requires. special meeting, and must be certified and sworn to by the corporate
(1948 Bar
Exam) I s ecretary, or by th e p r e sident, or an y d ul y a u t h o r i zed officer of th e
M alicious p r o s ecutio n i s e mbodied i n c orporation. H e n c e, m aking a n u n t r u t h f u l s t a t e m en t t h e r ei n i s
A rt i cl e 3 2 6 f th
Spanish Penal Code of 1887. H ow ever, t hi s cr im e does not appear
in the Revised Penal Code, which contains no offen
I not falsification of document bu t p e r j u r y . (S h iou v. C h i m, G . R. No .
17416'8, March 30, 2009)
=e denominated
"acusacion o denuncia falsa or i ts e quiva le nt. " A contr act o f s a l e i n v o l v in g l a n d i s n o t a s w o r n d o c u m e nt.
(Ventura v. Bernabe,
G.R. No. L - 2 6 760, Ap ri l 80 , 1 9 7 1) Ho w e ver, o ne vr ho ma l i c i o usly . A cknowledgment i n a c o n t r a c t o f s a l e i s n o t t a n t a m o un t t o a n
prosecuted another can be held liable for false testimon o r e r ' u r . o ath. H e n ce, u n t r u t h f u l l y s t a t i n g t h a t t h e b u y e r i s a Fi l i p i n o
(1959 Bar Exam) c itizen although she is a foreigner to cir cu m v ent th e constit u t i o n al
p rohibition o n f o r e i g n o w n e r s hi p o v e r l a n d i s n o t p e r j u r y b u t
P erjur y a n d F a l s i fi c a t io n of D o c u m e n t f alsification of document fo r m a k i n g a n u n t r u t h f u l s t a t e m ent i n a
Making u n t r u t h f u l s t a t e m ent i s t h e ac t us r e us (crim i n al a c t) i~ narration of facts. (People v. Kho, CA-G.R. No. 08618-CR, Apr il 2 1 ,
in perjury and falsificati on. The difference between the two however 1964)
lies on the nat ur e of document. If th e u n t r u t h f u l s t a t em ent is m ade ' Making i t a p p ear t h a t a p e r son p ai'ticipated in t h e execution
in a sw o rn d o c u ment wh e re t he l a w r e q u i r e s o ath ( e.g., complaint of document wh ere in fact he did not, and counterfeit in g or feignin g
I
affidavit fi led i n a p r e l i m i n ar y i n v e st i gation or v e ri fied pet i t ion for ', o f signatur e a r e a c t s o f f a l s i fi ca t i on . B u t t h e y a r e n o t c r i m i n a l
habeas corpus), t he c r i me c o m m i t t e d i s p e r j u r y . I f : h e u n t r u t h f u l I acts in perj u ry . T h u s , w h e t her th e d ocument is s w o rn or u n s w o rn ,
statement i s m a d e i n a n un s w o rn d o c u m e nt
( .g., commu n it y t a x , ' counterfeitin g o r f e i g n in g t h e s i g n a t ur e t h e r ei n o r m a k i n g i t t o
m en ( e.g.,
certificate, PDS, or contract of sale) where the offend appear that a person par t i c i p ated in th e execution th ereof where in
= r has the legal ,
obligation to disclose the tr u t h , th e cr im e comm i t t ee. is falsification l fact he did not constit ut e fal sification of document .
of document. But even if the unt r u t h f u l st at ement i.s niade in a sworn 'I
A mayor, who made it appear that affiants swore and signed
document but t he law do es not require oath
(e.g., verified complain t ';. affidavit before him when in fact they did not, is liable of falsification
or collection o f m o n e y), p e r j ur y i s n o t c o m m i t t e d . I t i s h o w e ver '.'
of document and not perjury.(Lonzanida v.People, G.R. Nos. 16'0248-
s ubmitted t h a t t h e a c c u sed can b e p r o secuted for f a l s i fication o f '
52, July 20, 2009)

J9JC9B0M
 140 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
In th e C i v i l S e r v ic e E x a m i n a t i on , X fi l e d t h e c o r r e sponding '
s worn application feigning to be Y, who was his f r i e nd. Af ter b eing ,
accepted, the former t ook th e exam i n a t ion in t h e l a t t e r's name and '
behalf. He ansvrered the questionnaires in wr i t i n g . His compositions '
were his personal and p r i v at e p ap ers u n ti l h e s u b m i t t e d th e same .'
t o the Civi l S e r v ice Ex a m i ner fo r r e v i si on, r a t in g an d fi l i n g i n t h e
archives of th e b u r e au . T h er e ar e t w o d o cuments i n v o lved i n t h i s "
case, to wit: sworn application and exami n a t i on booklet. Ma k i ng an '
u ntrut h fu l s t a t e m ent i n t h e s w or n a p p l icai c ation
i o is p e r j u r y . 7viaking
'
. 7vi k'
i t t o a p p ea r t h a t Y p ar t i c i p a te d i n a n s w e r i n g t h e q u e s t i on
ions in
e examinat ion booklet w h e n i n f a c t h e d i d n o t i s f a l s i fication of :
d ocument. Since perjury is a necessary means to commit falsificati on ,
of document, this is a complex crime proper. (1958 Bar Exam)
C ontra d i c t or y S w o r n S t a t e m e n t s
A person cannot be held liable for perjury i n v olv ing a complai nt ,
affidavit for t h ef t b a sed on th e execution of affi d a vi t of d e sistance. j
(1984 Bar E x a m) O n e c annot be c onvicted of perju ry s o le ly on t h e
b asis of two contra di ctory st at ement s .
(U.S. v. Capistrano, G.R. No.
15001,March 16; 1920; 1948 Bar Exam) The inconsistency between [
the tw o af fi d a v it s m e r el y m e an s t h a t o n e o f t h e m i s f a l se, w h il e ~,
t he other is n ot. Bu t i t c a n no t establish w h ich of th e tw o affi da v i t s
is actuall y f a l s e. (M a s a n g k ay v. P e o ple, G . R. N o . 1 6 4 4 4 8, J u n e
18, 2010) If t h e a f fi d a vi t o f d e s i st ance i s t h e o n e , w h i c h i s f a l s e,
t he accused cannot b e c onvi cted of p e r j ur y i n v o l v in g t h e t r u t h f u l ' ) m ain fact subject of th e i n q u i r y , or an y c i r c u m s t ance which t e n d s
complaint a f fi d a v i t . H e n ce, t h e p r o secution m u s t pr o v e t h a t t h e
complaint af fi d a v it , w h i ch i s th e su bject of perj ur y case, is false by
presenting evidence other than contr a di ctory affidavit of desistance.
(Villanueva v. T h e Hon . S e c r e tary o f J u s t i c e, G . R. N o . 16 2 1 87,
November 1 8 2 00005) 5) The
Th pr osecution can p r esent p i c t u res t ha t t h e
complainant was in Japan w hen the alleged theft was commi t ted by
h im. The affidavit of desistance and the pictures may establish th at
t he complaint affi d a vit i s perj u r i o u s .
O ath Is R e q u i r e d b y L a w
I n p e r j u r y , t h e s w o r n s t a t e m en t m u s t b e r e q u i r e d b y l a w
t o be under o at h s uch a s a v e r i fi e d p e t i t ion fo r i s s u ance of a n e w
owner's duplicate copy of title. (Ilu sorio v. Bildn er G . R. N . 17 3 9 3 5-
ecember 2 8, 2008) A p e t i t i o n f or n a t u r a l i z a t i on is r e q u i r ed t o
e veri e d . H e n ce, m a k i n g a n u n t r u t h f u l s t a t e m en t i n a v e r i fi e d
petition for naturalization is perjury. (Choa v. People, G.R. No.
i
J9JC9B0M
IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 141
Under Section 4 , R u l e 7 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t , ex cept w h e n
otherwise specifically required by la w or r u l e, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affida vit. N o such law or rul e
specifically r equ i res t ha t c o m p l a in t fo r d a m a ges should h ave been
verified. (Vallacar Tr a n s it, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. ¹. 175 5 12,May 80,
2011) Since a complaint for d a m age (Saavedra, Jr. v. Department of
Justice, G.R. No. 98173, September 15, 1993) or answer to complaint
for collection of money (F l o r d elis v. Hi m a l a l o a n, G.R. No. I - 4 8 0 8 8,
July 81, 1978) is not r e q u i r ed to b e v e r if ie d, an e s sential e le ment
of the crim e o f p e r j u r y i s a b s e nt, i. e ., th a t t h e sw o rn st a t e m e nt
containing t h e f a l s it y i s r e q u i r e d b y l a w . C o n s equently , a ccused
c annot be p r o secuted on t h e b a si s o f a n a l l e ged f a l sehood m a d e
in a verifiedcomplaint for damage or verified answer because its
verification is not m a n d a ted by l aw . (1978 and 19 91 Bar E x a m s) I t
is submitted h ow ever t h a t h e ca n b e h el d l i a bl e for f a l sification of
document.
Saavedra case and Fl o r d e lis case are n ot i n c o n f o rm i ty w i t h
the old doctrine in Pe ople v. An g a n gco, G.R. No. L- 4 7693, October
-:
12, 1943 declaring that t h ere is perjury i n m a k i n g a false allegation
in verified answer since law auth o r i z es or permi ts verificatio n.
M aterial m a t t e r
The term "m a t e r i al r n a t t e r" a s a n e l e m e nt o f p e r j u r y i s t h e
t o prove t h a t f a c t , o r a n y f a c t o r c i r c u m s t a nce w h i c h t e n d s t o
corroborate or strengthen the testimony r el ated to the subject of the
i nquiry, or w h i c h l e g i t i m a t el y a f f ects th e cr edence of any w i t n e s s
who testified. (Vil l a n u e va v. The Hon. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
162187, November 18, 2005)
F act, w h ic h i s s u b j ect o f i n q u i r y , i s a m a t e r i a l m a t t e r . I n
complaint af fi d a vi t f o r m u r d e r , f a ct s constit u t i n g t h e e l e m ents of
t his crime ar e m a t e r ia l m a t t e r s . I n c o u n te r af fi d a vi t i n a m u r d e r
c ase, facts constit u t i n g t h e d e f ense of th e r e spondent such as t h e
elements of self-defense are material matters. F act, w h ic h h a s
s omething t o d o w i t h t h e c r e d i b i l it y o f t h e w i t n e s s s uch a s t h e
witness was pr eviously convicted of f a l sification of d ocument, is a
m aterial ma t t e r .
In a complaint foradultery, allegation of the marriage status of
the respondent is a m a t e r ia l m a t er . I n a c o m p l a in t for f a l sification
of document, allegation of th e m a r r i age status of th e respondent is
not a material matter.
 142 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
A m a t t e r a l l e ge d i n a complain t a f fi d a v i t f o r
m urder i s
m aterial if it has a mat er ial effect or tendency to influ ence the off i c
of the city p r o secutor i n r e s olving th e case for mu r d e r. T he e ffects
o f the st at em ent ar e w e i g hed i n t e r m s o f p o t en t i a l it y r a t h e r t h a s
probability. The prosecution need not prove that the false allegation
in the complain t af fi d a vi t a c t u a ll y i n fl u e n ced th e office of th e city
prosecutor. (See: Villa n u e va v. Th e H o n. S ecretary of J u s t i ce, G.Il,
No. 162187, November 18, 2005)
In Choa v.People, G.R. No. 142011, March 14, 2008, the accuse<I
made false st a t em ent s i n h i s v e r i fi e d p e t i t i o n f o r n a t u r a l i z a tion
o n her r e s i d ence an d m o r a l q u a l i f i cation ( N o t e : H e a l l e ged t h at
h is moral c h a r a cter i s g oo d w h er e i n f a c t h e , a m a r r i e d m a n , i s
m aintain in g an i l l i ci t a f f ai r w i t h a w o m a n) . Th e al l egations in t h e
petition regarding "residence" and "moral character" are material
m atters b ecause t h e y a r e a m o n g t h e v e r y f a c t s i n i s s u e o r t h e
main facts w h ic h ar e t h e s u b j ect of i n q u ir y a n d a r e t h e b a ses for
t he deter m i n a t io n o f p e t i t i o n er's q u a li fi ca t i on .
a nd fi t n es s a s a
naturalized Fil i p ino citizen.
Pri v i l e g e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n
It is a basic rul e t h a t a d e f a m a t or y a l l e gation i n a p l d'
in a p ea ing,
w i c i i s r e l e v an t t o t h e i s sue of th e case, is an absolute pr i v i l eged I'
which
communication; h e nce i t i s a d e f e nse in li b e l. ( P eople v. Aq u i n o ,
L-28908, October 29, 1 9 6 6) In Fl o r d e l is v. Hi m a l a l o a n, G . R. N o .
1-48088, July 31 , 1 9 78, th e Su p r em e Cour t a p p l ied th e p r i v i l eged j
communication pr i n ci ple under the Aq u i no c as t
ase o p ejrury.
In Choa v. People, G.R. No. 142011, March 14, 2003, the accused I
made false statements in hi s v e ri fied pet i t ion for n a t u r a l i z a t ion on
her residence and m o r a l q u a l i f i cati on. I n a p e r j u r y c a se, accused
invoked th e p r i v i l e ged comm u n i c ation p r i n c ip l a s a d e f e n se. The "
Supreme Court said the term "a b solute privilege" has an established l.
technical meaning in connection wit h acti ons for " l i b
el and slander." I
Accused in this perjury case cannot seek refuge under the absolutely '
privileged communication rule because this defer se is only applicable "
to libel or slander cases. ( 2005 Bar Exa m )
In Asturias v. Serrano, A.C. No. 6538, November 25, 2005, the ~
Supreme Court r e v er ted back to the Fl o r d e lis case and a
a n a p p lied
i e thee
' g e dd c o m m u n i c a t ion prin ciple as a defense in pe
p r ivile
p erjury . . H o w e v e r ,
Ilusorio
usorio vv. . Bildner, G.R. Nos. 173935-38, December 23, 2008, the
Supreme Court r e t u r n ed to the Choa p ri n c iple. The Supreme Court ;
said that th e p r i v i l e ged commu n i cation pr i n c i ple un der th e A q u i n o
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IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 143
case applies to libel. However, absolutely pr i v i l eged communication
r ule is not a defense in perju r y .
It is subm i t t e d t h a t t h e Ch o a ca se and Il l u s o rio case, are the
c orrect pr i n c i p l es. T h i s w r i t e r w i l l e x p l a i n h i s p o s i t io n t h r o u g h
i llustrati on .
P edro filed a v e ri fied p e t i t io n fo r c u s t ody over hi s m i n o r s o n
against his w ife M a r i a . One of th e gr ou nds to ju st ify hi s p r a yer for
custody is t h a t M a r i a i s a d r u g a d d i ct , an d t h u s , p l a cing hi s s on
under her custody is detrime ntal to him. In support of this allegation,
he attached a picture depicting M a ri a i n j ecting cocaine in her body.
H owever, the t r u t h i s t h a t M a r i a w a s i n j e ct in g gl u t a t h i one in h e r
body, and that itwas Pedro, who bought that substance. Although
the allegation that " M a r i a is a dr ug" is defamatory, Pedro cannot be
held liable for libel since he has the absolute privil ege to communicate
to the court al l m a t t e r s , w h ic h ar e r e l evant t o t h e c ase. As st at ed
in Choa case, t he pur po se of t he pr i v i l e ged communication r u l e i s
to ensure that w i t n esses may speak th eir m i n d s f r eely and exercise
t heir respective functions w i t h ou t i n c u r r i n g t h e r i s k o f a c r i m i n a l
prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. However, Pedro
c an be held li able for perj u ry . Th e r u l e s r equ ir e t ha t a p e t i t ion f or
I custody of child m ust be veri fied to ensure that th e p et i t i oner shall
always allege tru t h fu l m a t t e rs. If th e peti t i oner shall not be subject
to criminal action for perjury for asserting falsehood in the petition,
then th e r e q u i r e m en t o f v e r i fi c a t ion w i l l b e r e n d e red u s eless. In
sum, while the peti t i oner has an absolute pr i v i l ege to communicate
t o the court al l r e l ev ant m a t t e rs, even if th e s ame are defamatory ,
he has no pri v i l ege to allege unt r u t h f u l m a t t e r s t h e r e in. As st at ed
in the case of Choa, certainly, petitioner (who is charged with perjury)
cannot seek refuge under the absolutely privileged communication rule
since the false statements he made in hi s pe tit ion for n a t u r a l i z a t io n
has instead made a mockery of the admi n i s t r a tion ofj ustice.
Pedro filed a verified complaint for collection of money against
M aria. Pedro a l l eged i n t h e c o m p l a in t t h a t M a r i a , a d r u g a d d i ct ,
borrowed money from h i m ; bu t sh e fa i led to pay h im . I n s u p p ort of
this allegation, he attached contract of loan, and a picture depicting
M aria injecting cocaine in her body. However, the truth is that M a r i a
was injecting gl u t a t h i one in h e r b o dy , an d t h a t i t w a s P e d ro, wh o
s old that su b st ance to h er . Pedro cannot be h eld l i a ble for perj u r y
s ince the u n t r u t h f u l a l l e g ation t h a t M a r i a i s a d r u g a d d ict i s n o t
material t o hi s cause of action. W h e t her M a r i a i s a d r u g a d dict or
not, she has the obligation to pay Pedro. Moreover, the law does not
I
 144 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
require a complaint for collection of money to be verifi ed. However,
Pedro is liable for libel since his allegation is defamatory. He cannot '
invoke the pr i n ci ple of absolute pri v i l eged communi cation since the
defamatory statement that Maria is a drug addict is not material
t o the case. Pedro ha s n o p r i v i l eg e t o c o m m u n i c ate t o t h e c o u r t ,
i mmaterial m a t t e r s .
G ood Fa i t h
P erjury c a n not b e d e l i b er at e w h er e t h e o at h i s a c cording
r in g to
b elief or conviction as to its tr u t h . A f alse statement of a belief is not
perjury. Bo na fide belief in t he t r u t h o f a s ta t e me nt is an a dequate
defense. A false statement wh ich is obviously the result of an honest
mistake is not perju ry . (V i l l a n u e va v. The Hon. Secretary of t'ustice,
G.R. ¹. 16 2 1 87,November 18, 2005)
X purchased the share of the stockholders of Z Corporation in
two installm e n ts, ma k in g hi m t h e m a j o r it y st ockholder th ereof and
e ventually, it s p r e sident. B ecause the stockholders wh o sold t h e i r
stocks failed to comply with t h eir w a r r a n t i es, X wit h h eld payment of
the second instal l m ent du e on th e sh ares and deposited the money
in escrow instead. The stockholders rescinded the sale and removed
X f ro m t h e p r e s i d ency o f t h e Z Co r p o r a t i on . X f i l e d a v e r i fi e d
complaint for d a m a ges against said stockholders in hi s capacity as
president and pr i n cipal stockholder of Z Corporati on. Complaint for
perjury wa s f i l ed against X. A c cording to complain a n t, X c e ased to
b e president of Z c o r p or a t ion w h e n t h e s al e of s h a res of s t ock t o
h im wa s a u t o m a t i cally r e s cinded. X i s n o t l i a b l e fo r p e r
. Th
assertion that he is the president of the corporation was done in good
f aith, in the belief that the non-payment of the last instal l m ent pr i ce
w as justified by t h e s ell ers' non-compliance wit h t h ei r w a r r a n t i e s.
Besides, the balance was deposited in escrow. Even if SE C decides
adversely against X, there is no perjury because the falsehood was
not willfu lly and deliberately made. Moreover, complaint for damage
is not required to be verified. Hence, untr u t h fu l st a t em ent th er ein is
not perjury.(Saavedra, Jr. v.Department of Justice, G.B. ¹. 98178,
September 15, 1998; 1996 Bar Ex a m )
I
Subornation of perjury
U nder A c t N o . 1 6 9 7 , a ny p e r son w h o c a u s e s or pr ocur es
a nother person to commit perj ur y is gui lt y of subornation of perjur y .
The Revised Penal Code, which has repealed Act No. 1697 does not
e xpressly p e n a l ize s u b or n a t io n o f p e r j u r y . H o w e v er , a s u b o r n e r ,
J9JC9B0M
IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 145
w ho causes or procures another person to commit p e r j u r y , is gui l t y
as principal b y i n d u c em ent . I n Pe o ple v. Pu d o l, G. R. N o . 4 5 6 1 8,
October 18, 1938, the fact that subornat ion of perjury is not expressly
penalized in th e Revised Penal Code does not mean t ha t t h e d i r ect
induction of a person by another to commit p er j ur y has ceased to be
a crirr e, because said crime is fu ll y w i t h i n t h e scope of that defined
in Article 1 7 of t h e s ai d C od e on p r i n c i pal b y i n d u c ement . (1950,
1955, 1998, and 2012 Bar Exa m s )
A, a government em pl oyee, was admini s t r a t i v ely charged with
immorality for h a v in g a n a f f ai r w i t h B, a c o -employee in t he s ame
office who believed him to be single. To exculpate himself, A testified
that he wa s s i n gl e an d w a s w i l l i n g t o m a r r y B. H e i n d u c ed C t o
testify and C did testify t ha t A w a s sin gle. The tr u t h , h owever, was
that A had earlier ma r r ied D, now a neighbor of C. A and C are liable
for false testimony in an ad m i n i s t r a t iv e case under Ar t i cle 83 of the
R evised Penal Code, as p r i n c i pal b y i n d u c ement an d p r i n c i pal b y
d irect parti cip ati on, r espectively. Hi s m a r i t a l s t a t u s i s r e l evant t o
the case of immoral ity because if A is single having an affair w it h B
is not imm or al. A for convin cing C to t estify f a l sely is not l i a ble for
s ubornation of perj ur y s i nce thi s a cr im e p u n i s h able un der th e ol d
Penal Code, which i s no t a n y m or e f oun d u n der t h e R e v i sed Penal
Code. (1997 Bar Exam)
Venue
B efore, the venue for p erj ur y i s t h e p l ace wh ere th e p erj u r e d
affidavit was pr esented. (U.S. v. Canet, G.B. No. L-9869, March 25,
1915; Ilusorio v. Bi l d n e r, G.R. ¹ s . 178 9 3 5 -88, December 28, 2008)
H owever, th e p r e sent r u l e i s t h a t v e n u e f o r p e r j u r y i s t h e p l a c e
w here the affidavit wa s sworn by th e affi ant before a notary pu b l i c.
In Un i on B a n k o f th e Ph i l i p p i n es v. People, G.R. No. 192565,
February 28, 2012, the Supreme Court, En Banc, explained that at
the time the Canet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury
w as found i n A c t N o . 1 6 97 . Th e v e nu e of a c t ion w a s h el d b y t h e
Cour-. in the Canet case to be at the place where the false document
was presented since the presentation was the act that consumm at ed
the c=ime. On the other hand, Ar t i cle 183 of the Revised Penal Code
pena izes one who " m a k es an a f f i d a v i t, u p on a ny m a t e r i al m a t t e r
before a competent person authorized to ad mi n i s ter an oath in ca ses
in which the l aw so re quires." The constitu t i ve a ct of t he o ffense is
the makin g of a n af fi d a v it ; t h u s , th e c r i m i n a l ac t i s consum m at ed
w her th e s t a t e m en t c o n t a i n in g a f a l s it y i s s u b scribed an d s w o r n
 146 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
b efore a duly a u t h o r i zed person. H ence, venue of t hi s cr im e i s t h e
place where the perju red affidavit wa s notar i zed.
Perjury is consumm ated when the false statement is made. The .
p erjury w a s com m i t t e d w h e n r e spondent su bscribed and sw orn t o
the General In f or m a t ion Sheet in th e City of M a n i la . Th us, the City .
of Manila is th e p r oper v enue for th e offense alth ough th e General
I nformatio n S h ee t w a s fi l e d w i t h t he S e c u r i t i e s a n d E x c h a n g e ;
Commission in Pasay Ci ty. (Shiou v. Chim, G.R. No. 174168, March '
30, 2009)
OFFERING FALSE TESTIMONY IN EVIDENCE
Offering false testimony in evidence i s committed by any person, .
who know i n gl y o f f er s (or p r e sents) i n e v i d ence a f a lse w i t n ess or
testimony in any j u d i cial or official proceeding. (Artic le 184)
A lawyer offered a w i t n ess in a c r i m i n a l c ase despite the fact '
t hat he i s a w ar e t h a t h i s t e s t i m on y i s f a l se. The w i t n ess is l i a b l e
for false testimony u n der A r t i cl e 180 w h i l e th e l a w yer i s l i a bl e for ''.
offering false testim ony i n e v i d ence under A r t i cl e 184. The penalt
p ena y :
for false testimony is the same as that foroffering false testimon
s imony ':
in evidence.
Offer of evidence has a t echnical m ean in g u n der th e R u les of ':
Court. Under Section 32 of Rule 182 of the Rules of Court, as r egards '
t he testimony of a w i t n e ss, the offer m ust b e m ade at th e t i m e t h e
witness is called to t e st i fy ; document ary an d o bject evidence shall
b e offered after th e p r e sentat ion of a p a r t y ' s t est i m o n ial ev i d ence.
However, the words "offer in evidence" i n the E ng l i sh te xt of Ar t i c l e
1 84 of the Revised Penal Code'should not be considered as within t h e
c ontext of t e rm s " offer of ev i d ence" under th e R u les of Cour t s i n ce
the Spanish t ext of t h i s p r o v i sion has used the w o rds "presentare,"
which means present.
A l a w y e r s u b m i t t e d a c ounter a f fi d a vi t i n a pr e l i m i n a
ary
r '
proceeding despite knowl edge the same is perjur ed. The lawyer nas
not yet formally offered the perjur ed affidavit in c ourt s in ce the case
i s still at t h e p r e l i m i n ar y i n v e s t i gation l evel. H ow ever, he is l i a bl e
for offering false testimony in evidence since he presented (presentare)
in evidence a false witn ess in an official proceeding.
Perjury u n der A r t i cl e 184 of th e Revised Penal Code is un der
Section 2 of C h a p ter 2 , T i t l e F o ur , B ook Tw o of t h e C ode on fa l s e
testimony. In s u m , t h e t e r m "fa l s e t e s t im ony" i n c l u d es p e r j u r y .
J9JC9B0M
IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 147
(Union Bank of the Philippi n es v. People, G.A. No. 192565, February
28, 2012) Hence, the words "false testimony" in t he cri me of offering
f alse testim on y i n e v i d e nce i n c l u des p e r j u r y . T h u s , i f a l a w y e r
p res nted a p e r j u r e d af fi d a vi t i n a p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i gati on, t h e
a ffiant is l i a bl e fo r p e r j u r y u n d e r A r t i c l e 18 8 w h i l e t h e l a w ye r i s
liable for offering false testimony in evidence under Ar t i cle 184. The
penalty for perjury isthe same as that for offering false testimony
in evidence. On the other hand, ifthe lawyer presented a falsifi
ed
public document in a pr el i m i n ar y i n v estigati on, the author of falsity
i s liable for f a l sification of d o cum ent u n d e r A r t i c l e 17 2 w h i l e t h e
lawyer is liable for use of falsified document u n der Ar t i cl e 172.
M wa s f o r ced b y a p o l i c e ma n t o s i g n a d o c u m en t e n t i t l e d
"Sin umpaang Salaysay" in which M implicated Xas the brain behind
the robbery o f a b a n k w h e r e P 5 0 0 ,000 w er e l o st . T h e d o c u ment
was prepared by t h e p o l i c eman u p o n t h e a d v ic e of B, t h e b a n k ' s
l awyer, who was p r esent w h e n t h e p o l i cemen asked M t o s i g n t h e
d ocument. As M r e f u sed to sign it , t h e p o l i cemen h eld hi m b y t h e
neck. and forced him to sign, which he did. During the hearing of
the robbery before the Fiscal's Office, B submit t ed the "Sinum pa an g
Salaysay" a s evidence, on the basis of whi ch X w a s i n c l u d ed in t h e
i nformation fi led by th e F i s cal i n c ou rt . W h e n M t e s ti fied i n c ou r t ,
h e repudiated th e d o cum ent . M c o m m i t t e d p e r j ur y i n m a k i n g a n
u ntruthfu l s t a t e m ent i n h i s af fi d a v it . H o w ev er, he i s exempt f r o m
criminal l i a b i l it y b e cause of th e c i r c u m st ance of i r r e sistible force.
P olice officer is l i a bl e for p e r j ur y a s p r i n c i pal b y i n d u c ement. T h e
lawyer is l i a bl e for offer in g f a lse testim ony i n e v i d ence. (1987 Bar
Exam)
FALSIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS, MESSAGES AND
CERTIFICATES
Falsification of legislative documents is committed by any person
who alters an y b i l l , r e s olu t i on , or o r d i n a nce enacted or a p p r oved
or pending a p p r oval b y C o n g r ess or, Sa n g gu n i a ng P a n l a l a t v igan,
Paniungsod or Pambayan without proper authority therefor. (Article
170)
Falsification of messages is committed by an officer or employee
of a pri v at e c orpor ation o r g o v e r n m en t e n g a ged i n t h e s e r v ice of
sending or receiving message, who utt ers a ficti t i ous message of any
system, or falsifies the same. Use of falsified messages is committe d
by any person who uses such falsified dispatch to the pr ejudice of a
third party or w i t h t h e i n t en t t o cause such prejudice. The message
 148 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II IV. CRIMES ACAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 149

includes wireless, cable, telegraph, and telephone messages.

( Article ;Publicly m e a n s m a n i f e s tly a n d o s t e n s ibly. I f t h e fi c t i t i o u s
173)
name is used in a p u b li c or official p r oceeding, or in t h e case of an
Falsification of certificate is commi t t e d b y: ( 1) a p h y s i c ian or alien who used a fict i t i ous na me, i.e., Toribio Jalig ali, ins tead of To
surgeon, or private person who issues a false certificate in connection '. Lee Piu, in application for passport, there is a public use of fictiti ou s
with th e p r a ct ice of his pr ofession; or ( 2) a pub l ic officer or p r i v a t e , ' name. (U.S. v. To Lee Piu, G.R. No. 11522, September 26, 1916)
person who issues a false certificate of merit or service, good conduct
or similar c i r c u m s t ances. (Article 174; 2 012 Bar E x a m) U s ing f a l s e:
certificate i s c omm i t t e d b y a n y p e r s o n, w ho k n o w i n g ly u s e s s uc h: ILLEGAl US E OF U NIFORMS OR INSIGNIA
false certificates. (Artic le 175) Illegal use of uniforms or ins ign ia is c ommi t t e d by a ny p e rson
who publicly a n d i m p r o p e rly m a k e s u s e of i n s i g n i a, u n i f o r ms o r
USING FICTITIOUS NAME AND CONCEALING TRUE NAME dress pertaining to an office not held by such person or to a class of
persons of which he is not a memb er . (Article 179)
Using fictiti ous name i s commit t ed by any person who publicly,
u ses a fictiti ous name for the pu r p ose of concealing a crime, evading ,: I llegal use of unif orms is an i n t e n t i o nal felony; hence, it mu st
the execution of a jud gm ent or causing damage. b e committed w it h d o l o or e vi l i n t e nt . M o r e over, im p r operly u s i n g
official uniform is an element. of this crime. Pedro, Tristan and Mar co
Concealing true name is committ ed by any person who conceals ' are wearing p olice un i f o rm s w h i l e s i n g ing "K a t a w a n" b y H a g i b i s ,
his true name and other personal circum st ances, (Article 178) and dancing dur in g a t own fi e sta. They are not li a ble for il l egal use
I f t h e u s e o f fic t i t i o u s n ame o r c o n c ealin g t r u e n ame i s ' of uniform since the elements of dolo and "im proper use" thereof are
committed to obstru ct, im p ede, frustr ate cri m i na l i n v estigation and not present.
p rosecution, offender ca n b e p r o secuted for o b s t r u c t ion o f j u s t i c e Pedro is wear in g a p o l ice un i f or m i n s id e hi s h ouse. He is n ot
under P.D. No. 1829. liable for i l l e gal u s e o f u n i f or m s i n c e th e e l e m ent of "p u b l ic u s e "
Under Section 1(d) of P.D. No. 1829, publicly using a f i ctitious ,. thereof is net present.
name for t h e p u r p ose of c oncealing a c r i m e , e v a d in g p r o secution '
o r the execution of a j u d g m e nt , o r c o n cealing hi s t r u e n a m e a n d uSURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTION
other personal ci r c u m s t ances for th e s am e p u r p ose or p u r p oses is
obstruction of justice. Usurpation of a u t h o r i t y i s co m m i t t e d b y a n y per s o n w h o
knowingly and falsely represents hi m self to be a public officer, or a
Under Ar t i cl e 178 of the Revised Penal Code, publicly u sing a foreign public officer. (Art i c le 177)
f ictitious n am e for t h e p u r p ose of concealing a c r i m e , evading t h e
execution of a j u d g m ent or c a u s i ng d a m a ge or concealing h is t r u e If the offender intr o duced himself as BIR agent by showing false
name and other personal circum st ances constitu tes the crime of use B IR identification card an d ot her BI R p a p ers, the crime commi t t e d
o f fictitious name or concealing t ru e nam e . is complex crime of usu r p a t ion of au t h o r it y t h r o ugh f a l sification of
documents. The crime of falsification was commi t ted as a necessary
T he p en alt y f o r o b s t r u c t io n o f j u s t i c e i s h i g h e r t h a n t h a t means to commit u s u r p a t ion of au t h or i t y . (People v. Cortes, (CAJ 73
prescribed for using a fict i t i ous nam e. O.G. 10056) However, if the accused after representing himself as a
The term j"u d g m e n t" in S e ction 1(d) of P.D. No. 1829 must be BIR agent st ar ted to collect taxes, the crim e comm i t t ed is complex
rendered in a cri m i n al p r o ceeding b ecause of the general element o f: c rime of e s t af a t h o u g h f a l s i fi c a t i ori o f d o c u m e nt . U s u r p a t io n o f
obstruction of justice. However, the term "jud g m e nt" i n Arti I 1 7 8 f function constit u tes f alse p" etense, which i s a n e l e m ent of e stafa.
th e Revised Penal Code may involve c rimin a l, civil or admin i s t r a t i v e Hence, estafa absorbs usurpation of functi on .
proceeding. Usurpation of o f f i c ia l f u n c t i ons is c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s o n
w ho performs an ac t p e r t a i n i n g t o a p e r son i n a u t h o r i t y , a p u b l i c

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 150 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 151
VOLUME II

officer, or a for eign pu b li c officer u n der p r e t ense of official position ' of function of a person in auth or it y u n der Ar t i cle 177. However, if he
and without being law f u ll y en t i t l ed to do so. (Article 177) obtained acceptance fee and appearance fee torepresent a person in
a case,the crime committed is estafa.
O ffender i s an y p e r s o n
In U.S. v. He rn a n dez, G.R. No. 9405, Deceinber 24, 1914, the
As worded, any pe rson who c omm i ts u s u r p a t i on of a u t h o r i ty ',, a ccused, wl:o p r e t e nded t o b e a m i n i s t e r o f a r e l i g i ou s sect a n d
or function, i s l i a bl e fo r u s u r p a t io n o f a u t h o r i t y o r f u n c t i on . The ' solemnized a marri a ge, was convicted of usurpation of function since
application of Ar t i cle 177 cannot be restricted to priv ate in di v i duals ' he p
erformed an a ct p r o perly pe rt a in i ng t o a p e r s on in a u t h o r i t y .
only. (D e g amo v. Of f i c e o f th e Om b u d s m a n, G . R . N o . 21 2 4 16,;. The case ofHernandez was decided prior to the effectivity of the
December 05, 2018) Revised Penal Code. Before, a r el i gious official such as a b i shop is
a person in a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n t h e p u r v i e w o f t h e O l d P e na l C o d e.
P erfor m i n g th e F u n c t i o n o f P u b l i c O f f i c er (U.S. v. Smith, G.R. No. 14057, January 2 2, 1 919) However, Art i c le
In People v. Reyes, C.A., 70 O.G. 7801, the accused, who blew ' 152 of the Revised Penal C ode does not i n c l ude r e l i gious m i n i st er
his whistle, stopped buses, and or d ered dr i v ers t o step down f rom ' a s a person in aut h or i ty . H e nce, it is subm i t t ed t hat perfor m in g t h e
their passenger vehicles and produce their dr i v er's licenses, is 1 able function of religious mini ster or priest in solemnizing mar r i age is not
for usurpation of official fun ct i ons. usurpation of offi cial f u n c t i on . H o w ever, a p e r son, wh o p r e t ended
to be a Ma ror or a J u d g e , an d s o l em n i zed m a r r i a ge, is l i a bl e f or
One, who f alsely r e p r esented h i m s elf as a C I S a g ent d e spite : u surpation of official functi on .
having been duly noti fied of his dismissal, is liable for usurp a t ion of '
authority. H ow ever, if t h er e is no proof that he was duly n o ti fied of ' P retense of Official P o s i t i o n
his dismissal from th e service, he is not cri m i n a ll y l i a ble (Gigantoni
v. People, G.R. No. L-74727, June 16, 1988) "Pretense of o f f i c ia l p o s i t i on" i s a n el ement i n u s u r p a t i o n
o f official f u n c t i o ns . T h u s , i f a com m u n i t y i n r e m o t e a r e a i n
In People v. Hi l v a n o, G. R. N o . L - 8 5 8 8, J u ly 8 1 , 1 9 5 6, w h en '. Central L u zon e stabli shed t h ei r ow n g o v er n m en t c a l led "i n v i s ib le
the M a yor o f S a m a r d e p a r t e d fo r M a n i l a o n o f fi c ia l b u s i n ess, he government," a member of such community, who is engaged in
designated t h e a c c u sed, a councilor, to discharge the duties of' a dministering j u s t ice or d e ciding cases under t h i s g ov er n m ent , i s
his office. The V i c e M a y o r s e r ved w r i t t e n n o t i ces to accused that n ot liable for u s u r p a t ion of f u n c t ion of a p e r son i n a u t h o r it y s i n c e
he as Vice M a yo r w a s a s s u m in g t h e d u t i e s of t h e a b s ent m a y or, ,
p retense of official p o siti on, w h ic h i s a n e l e m en t o f t h i s c r i m e , i s
However, accused declined to vacate the post. Despite the opinion of n ot present. In s u m , i n p e r f o r m i n g t h e f u n c t ion of a j u d ge, he di d
the Executive Secretary an d th e F i scal t ha t t h e V i ce M a y or should n ot make "epresentation t h a t h e i s a j u d g e of th e R e public of t h e
discharge the fu n cti ons of th e M a yor d u r i n g th e l a t t e r's temporary Philippines. (1969 Bar Exa m) Ho we ver, if th is irivisible government
a bsences, accused for a b ou t a m o n t h a p p o i n te d s om e p o l i cemen ; i s engaged n s u b v e r sive activ i t i es, the person, who performed t h e
t
solemnized m a r r i a ges an d c o l l ected th e c o r r e sponding s a l ar y f or . f unction of a j u d ge, is l i a bl e u n de r R .A . N o . 1C. U n l ik e i n A r t i c l e
mayor. Accused is l i a bl e fo r u s u r p a t ion of f u n c t ion of a p e r son in 177 of the Revised Penal Code, pretense of official position is not an
a uthorit y . element in usu r p a t ion of public position un der R .A. No. 1 0. But t h e
crime under R.A. No. 10 can only be comm i t ted by a m e m ber of an
P erson in A u t h o r i t y organization engaged in subversive activities. (People v. Lidres, G.R.
U nder A r t i c l e 1 5 2 , l a w y e r s and t e a cher s a r e p e r s on s i n f No. L-12495, July 26, 1960)
authority for purposes of applying the provisions on direct assault and; Good faith is a defense in criminal p rosecutionsforusurpation
resistance. However, they are not persons in aut h o r i ty f or p u r p o ses ' of official fun cti ons. (Degamo v. Office of the Orr>u d s ma n, G.R. No.
of applying the provision of Ar t i cle 177. (People v. Tac-an, G.R. Nos,f 212416, December 05, 20 18) In R u z ol v. S ar diganbayan, G.R. Nos.
76888-29,February 26, 1990) Thus, the court appearance of aperson i ~
186789-960, April 17, 2018, accused, a Mayor, issued permits to
who is not adm i t t ed to pr actice law is not pu n i s h able as usurpati on
I transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that

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 152 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 153

a ccused usurped th e of fi cial f u n c t i ons t h a t p r o p erl y b e l ong t o t ht, "

i a just p ar t t h e f a l s e r e p r esentati on, w h i c h i s j u s t a n e l e m en t o f

DENR. Accused was acquitt ed. There is no showing that t o e M ayor
u surpation of auth or i t y .
possessed that "cr i m i n a l m i n d " w h e n he i ssued the subject permit<
to transport salvaged forest products to regulate and mon i tor t hea< Tristan i s w e a r i n g a t r a f fi c e n f o r ce r u n i f o r m , i n t r o d u ced
products in o r de r t o a v er t t h e o c cur r ence of i l l e gal l o gging i n t ht,: himself as a tr af fic enforcer, and asked a dr i ver of a car t o p r o duce
area. He is not liable for usurp at ion of function of the DENR becaus<; his driver's license. The crime comm i t t e d is us u r pa t i on of fu n c tion.
of good faith. U surpation of fur ction absorbs usurpat ion of auth or i ty . U s u r p a t i on
of authorit y c on st i t u t es "p r e tense of official p o s it io n," w h i ch i s a n
In De gamo v. O f f i ce of th e Om b u d s ma n, s upr a, th e O f f ice oi',
element of usurpat ion of fun cti on .
the President t h r o ugh E x ecut ive Secretary ap p r o ved the re lease of.
funds for th e r e h a b i l i t a t io n of t h e p r o v i nce of N e gros Or i en-.al. Iz S imulation cf public author ity is one of the modes of committ i n g
this connection, Department of Budget and Managemerit (DBM), serious illegal detention under Ar t i cle 267 or robbery in an inhabit ed
issued special allot m ent r e l ease order (SARO). Respondent, a DBM ' h ouse under A r t i cl e 299; hence, if t hi s cr im e i s comm i t t e d t h r o u gh
Undersecretary, acting on behalf of DB M S e cretary A b ad, upon ths simulation of public author i ty , offender shall not be held additionally
instructions of the President A q u i no, sent letter t o N e gros Oriental l iable for u s u r p a -ion of a u t h o r it y o r f u n c t ion b ecause the l a t ter i s
Governor wit h d r a w i n g the SARO. The Governor filed a complaint for . a bsorbed in the form er .
usurpation of author it y or fun ct ion against the DBM u n d er secretary
and argued that only E x ecutive Secretary had th e sole auth or ity tp~
I Pretending the exercise of authority to facilit a te the commission
of crime s u ch a s m u r d e r , h o m i c i d e, r a p e o r r o b b e ry w i t h r a p e
write on b e h al f o f t h e P r e s ident. I t w a s h e l d t h a t t h e r e s p cndent'
constitutes a g g r a v a t in g c i r c u m s t a nce o f c r a f t o r di s g u i se . I t i s
did not com mi t u s u r p a t io n of a u t h o r it y s i nce in w r i t i n g t h e l e t ter'
submitted t ha t u s u r p a t io n o f a u t h o r it y o r f u n c t io n i s a b sorbed in
he trut h f u ll y r e p r esented hi m self as a DB M U n d e r secretary actinII
murder, homicic.e or rape aggravated by t h e c i r c u m st ance of craft
by author it y of th e Secretary (i n o t her w o r ds, he did not r e p r esent
h imself a s t he E xe c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y) . N e i t h e r d id h e commit
( or disguise. In Pe o ple v. F o r n e ste and J a c o bo, G. R. N o. L - 3 2 8 60,
September 30 , 1 9 82, w h i l e v i c t i m w a s i n t h e i r h o u se , somebody
usurpation of f u n c t ion o f t h e E x e cut iv e Secretary i n r e p r e sentin~
called and identified t h e m selves as soldiers looking for contr aband.
the President. H e d i d n o t c l a i m i n t h e l e t t e r t h a t h e i s a c t i n g oz
When she opened the door, the offenders r an sacked the house and
behalf of th e P r e si dent. M o r e over, u n der t h e d o ct r in e of q u a li fi el
raped her at gu n p oi nt . D i s guise, that is, by pr et en ding to be publi c
political agency, departm ent secretaries may act for and on behalf of
the President on mat t ers wh ere the President is required to exercise
[ officers, was appreciated.
authority i n t h ei r r e spective depart m e n ts. Th us, DBM S ecretary oi I
I
DBM U n d e rsecretary actin g u n der th e au t h o r it y of DB M S e cretary USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS
may exercise the power to wi t h d r a w th e SARO alt h ough such power
Usurpation of legislative powers is committ ed by a public officer
belongs t o t h e P r e s i d ent . I n t h i s c a s e , r e s pondent a c t e d u n d er
who shall encroach upon the powers of the legislative branch of th e
authority ofSecretary Abad.
Government b y m a k i n g g e n e ral ru l e s o r r e g u l a t i o ns b e y o nd t h e
scope of his authori ty, or by attem p t in g to repeal a law or suspending
D octrin e of A b s o r p t i o n
the execution th ereof. (Artic le 289)
Tristan is w e ar in g a t r a f fi c enf orcer u n i f or m w h i l e seating oo
a chair besides a tr a f fic li g ht . Th e cr im e comm i t t ed is il l e gal use ot
USURPATION OF EXEC U T IVE FUNCT IONS
uniform.
Usurpation o f e x ecutive f u n c t i ons i s c o m m i t t e d b y a j u dg e
Tristan i s w e a r in g a t r a f f i c e n f orcer u n i f or m a n d i n t r o d ucel
[
h imself a s a t r a f f i c e n f o r cer t o a d r i v e r o f a m o t o r v e h i c le. T h<
who shall assume a p ower p e r t a i n in g t o t h e executive au t h or i t i es,
crime commit ted is usurpat i on of authorit y. Usurp a t i on of autho rity,'
I or shall obstr u ct, the l a t te r i n t h e l a w f u l e x e r cise of t h ei r p o w er s.
(Article 240)
absorbs illegal use of u n i f o rm . W e a r in g a t r a f f i c en f orcer u n i f orm'

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 154 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
In People v. Hilvano, G.R. No. L-8583, July 31, 1956, a councilor
d ischarged the du t ies of an a b sent m a yor over th e objection of t h e
vice-mayor. He appointed policemen, solemnized marriages and
c ollected the corresponding salary fo r m a y or . A ccused is not l i a b l e
for usurpation of executive power u n der A r t i cl e 240 of th e Revised
Penal Code because only a j u d ge can commi t t h i s c r i m e . H o w ever,
he is liable for usur p a t ion of function of a person in au t h or it y u n d er
Article 177 thereof.
USURPATION OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
Usurpation of j u d i c ia l f u n c t i ons is commi t t e d by an o ff ic er of
the executive br anch of th e Govern m ent wh o sh all a ssume ju di cial
powers or s h a l l o b s t r u c t t h e e x e c u t io n o f a n y o r d e r o r d e c i sion
rendered by any ju dge wi t hi n hi s j u r i s d i cti on. (Art ic le 241)
Mayor is an executive officer. Hence, he can commit usu r p a t i on
of judicialfunction (Munez v.Arino, A.M ¹. MTJ-94-985, February
2 1, 1995) by perform in g an act th e a u t h o r it y fo r w h i c h th e la w h a s
vested only i n a j u d g e . (M i n o so v. Pa m u l a g, A . M. N o . P - 0 5 - 2067,
August 81, 20 0 5 P a ce v. Le o nardo, A. M. N o . P - 0 8 -1675, August 6 ,
2008) such as issuing a wa r r an t of ar r est (M u n ez v. Arin o, supra)
A clerk of court is not an officer of the executive branch. Hence,
he cannot be held liable for usurp at ion of judicial function for issuing
the arrest of an accused in a c r i m i n a l c ase. (Albior v. A u g u i s, A. M.
No. P-01-1472, June 26; 2008) However, he is adminis tr a t i v e ly lia ble
(Minoso v. Pam u l a g, supra) M o r e o ver, it i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t h e c a n
b e held liable for usur p a t ion of the fun ct ion of a person in au t h o r i t y
under Ar t i cle 177 of the Revised Penal Code.
A Provincial A d j u d i cator r e n d ered ju d gm ent i n D A R A B C a s e
i n the perfor m a nce of a q u a si-ju dicial f u n c t i on, closely aki n t o t h e
function of a ju dge of a court of l aw . H e could not be held li a ble for
usurpation of ju di cial fu n c t i ons since he is merely exercising quasi-
judicial fu n ct i on. (see: Reyes v. People, G.R. Nos. 177105-06, August
12, 2010)
U surpa t io n of P o w e r s o r F u n c t i o n
Usurpation of a u t h o r it y o r of fi cial f u n c t ion i s a cr i m e a gain s t
public in terest whi le u s u r p a t i on of l e g is la ti ve power, us ur p a t i on of
executive functi ons and u s u r p a t ion of j u d i cial f u n c t i ons are cr i m e s
committed by public officer.
J9JC9B0M
IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 155
Usurpation of author it y or official function is commit ted by any
person. Usurpa ti on of legislative power is commi t t e d by a ny p u b l i c
officer. Usurpat ion of executive fun cti ons can only be commi t ted by
a judge. Usurp at ion of j u d i cial f u n c t i ons can only be commi t ted by
an executive off cer.
MACHINATION IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS
Machinatton i n p u b l i c a u c t i ons is c o m m i t t e d by a n y p e r s o n:
( 1) who solicit s g if t o r p r o m i s e a s a c o n s i d er at ion f o r r e f r a i n i n g
f rom taking part i n an y p u b lic auction; or (2) who att em p t s o cause
bidders tostay away from an auction by threats, gifts, promises, or
any othe a r t i fi ce, wit h i n t en t t o cause the reduction of th e p r ice of
the thing auctioned. (Artic le 185)
In Ouano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 40203, August 21, 1990,
p etitioner an d E c h avez had both or a ll y a g r eed that onl y t h e l a t t e r
w ould make a bid at th e second bidding called by the Rehabili t a t i o n
F inance C o r p c r a t i on , a n d t h a t i f i t w a s ac c e p t ed, t h e y w o u l d
divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To
ensure success of their scheme, they ha d also agreed to in duce the
only other p a r t y k n o w n t o b e i n t e r e sted i n t h e p r o p erty t o d e sist
f rom presenting a b id , as t hey succeeded in i n d u cing t hi s gr oup t o
withdraw from thesale,paying said group P2,000 as reimbursement
for its expenses. They are liable for machin a t i ons in public auctions.
In Di a z v. Ka p u n a n , G . R. N o. 1 9 9 1 4, December 8, 1 9 2 3, the
attorney appeared at the public auction of the foreclosed property of
h is client and was ready to bid P 16,000 for it . Th e at t o r ney and th e
creditors were rai sing th eir b ids for th e pr operty u n t i l t h e y entered
into an agreement that th e former w il l w i t h d r a w hi s bid and refrain
f rom bidding at, the publi c au ction of th e p r o p erty of th e d ebtor i n
consideratior o f P 1 , 0 00. B ecause of such a g r e ement, t h e c r e ditor
took over the property p u r s u ant t o hi s bid of P12,500. The attorney
is liable for ma "hination in p u b li c auction .
MO N O P O L IES AND CO M B I N ATION
The anti-t r ust l aw s or law against m onopolies or combinations
in restrain t o f t r a d e ar e a i m e d a t r a i s in g l e v els of competition by
i mproving th e consum ers' effectiveness as the fi na l a r b i ter i n f r e e
markets. These laws ar e designed to p r eserve free and un f e tt e re d
competition as th e r u l e of t r a d e. (Gokongtvei, Jr. v. S EC, G.R. No .
L-45911, 4pr-'l 11, 1979)
 156 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Section 19, Ar t i cle XI I of th e 1987 Constit u t i on pr ov i des: "The
State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when tr.e public interest so
requires. No combinati ons in restraint o f trade or un fair c ompetition
shall be allowed." Section 19, Arti c le XII of our Constitu t i on is "anti-
t rust" in hi st ory and spir it . It espouses competiti on. The desirability „
o f competition i s t h e r e a son fo r t h e p r o h i b i t io n a g a i nst r e s t r a i nt
of trade, the r eason for th e i n t e r d i c t ion of u n f ai r c o m p et i t i on, and
the reason for r e g u l a t ion o f u n m i t i g a ted m o n opolies. Competiti on
i s thus t h e u n d e r l y in g p r i n c i pl e o f S e ction 19 , A r t i cl e X I I o f o u r
Constitut i on. (E n e rgy R e gu l a t o ry B o a r d v. C A , G. R . N o . 11 3 0 79,
April 20, 2001)
While the Constit u t ion embraced free enterprise as all economic
creed, it d id n o t p r o h i b it p er se the operation of i n o nopolies wh ic h
call, however, be regulated in th e pu b lic in t erest. ', Tatad v. The Sec.
of the Dept. of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, November ~, 1997)
Article 186 of t h e R e v i sed Penal C ode does not a lso pr oh ibit
p er se th e o p er a t ion o f m o n opoly. W h a t i s p u n 'ishable u n der t h i s
p rovision i s m o n o polization o r c o m b i n a t io n i n r e s t r a i n t o f t r a d e .
There a r e t h r e e w a y s t o c o m m i t t h e crime of monopoly and
combination in restr a in t of tr a de, to wit: (1) combination in restra in t
of trade; (2) monopolization in restr a int of tr ade; and (3) combination
of manufactur er, producer, or processor or importer and oth er s.
C ombin a t io n i n R e s t r a i n t o f T r a d e
Monopoly or combinat ion in restr aint of tr ade can be committ ed
b y any person wh o e n t er s i n t o a n a g r e ement or t a k e s p ar t i n a n y
c onspiracy or c o m b i n a t io n i n t h e f o r m o f a t r u s t o r o t h e r w i s e t o
restrain t r a d e or c o m m e rce or t o p r e v ent b y a r t i fi c i a l m e a ns, fr ee
c ompetition in th e m a r k e t . (Article 186)
'A", "B" and " C" e xecuted a p u b l ic d ocument w h i c h e m b o died
their agreement to the effect that certain m erchan dise would be sold
at a cert ai n p r i c e an d n o t o n e of t h e m s h al l s el l h i s m e r c h a n dise
a t lesser p r i c e w i t h o u t t h e p r e v i ou s c o nsent o f —.he others. T h e
agreement wa s n o t c a r r i e d o ut , b e cause t hey w er e a r r e s t ed. Can
they be held cri m i n a ll y l i a bl e u n der th e Revised Penal Code on the ~
basis of a greement? An s w er: Y e s, u n d er t h e R e v s ed P e nal C o d e
a ny person who shall en ter i n t o an y cont r act or a greement or sh all i
t ake part i n a c o n sp i r acy or c om b i n a t ion i n t h e f o" m o f a t r u s t o r
otherwise in r e st r a in t of t r a d e or comm erce or pr event by a r t i f i cial ':,
means free competit ion i n t h e m a r k e t i s l i a bl e for m o n opolies and i
J9JC9B0M
IV. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST 157
combination i n r e s t r a i n t t r a d e . (C r i m i n a l L a w Re v i e w er b y C A
Justice Luis B. Reyes)
I n s om e i n s t a n ces, conspiracy c o n st i t u t e s t h e f e l on y i t s e l f
such a s b r i g a n d age (A r t i c l e 30 6 ) an d m on o p o l y.(Article 1 8 6 )
"Conspiracy to commit a crim e" and "crime involving conspiracy" are
n ot the same. Ex am p le: I f "A " a n d " B " c onspired to overt h row t h e
government, t he y ar e l i a bl e for t h e cr i m e of c onspiracy to c ommit
rebellion. If t h e y c omm i t t e d r e bellio n, they a re l i a b le for t he c r i m e
of rebellion. Conspiracy to commit r e bellion is a felony different and
distinct from the crime of rebellion. On the other hand, if "A" and "B"
conspired to restrain t r a de, they are liable for the crime of monopoly.
If they actually r e s t r a i ned t r a de, they ar e also li able for th e c r i m e
of monopoly.Conspiracy to restrain trade or the act of restraining
t rade constitu tes th e cr im e of m on opoly. Th ere is no such t h in g a s
conspiracy to commit th e cr im e of monopoly.
M onopoliz a t io n i n R e s t r a i n t o f T r a d e
Monopoly or combination in restraint of tr ade can be committ ed
by any person who monopolizes or combines with others to monopolize
a merchandise in order to al ter th e p r ice th ereof by spreading false
rumors o r u s i n g o t h e r a r t i f ic e to r e s t r a in f r e e c o mpetiti on in t h e
market. (Art i c le 186)
Comb ination of Ma n u facturer, Producer, or Processor or
I mporter an d O t h e r s
Monopoly of combination in restr aint of tr ade can be committ ed
by a manufacturer, producer, processor, importer or agent thereof,
wholesaler or re ta i l er of a merchandise, who combines, conspires or
a grees in an y m a n n e r w i t h a n y p e r son for t h e p u r p ose of m a k i n g
t ransactions p r e j u d i cia l t o l a w f u l c o m m e r ce , o r i n c r e a sin g t h e
market price thereof or article manufactured therefrom. (Artic le 186)
T he gasoline c o m p a nies, C a l t ex , E s so, G e tt y a n d S h e l l , a l l
foreign corporations an d F i l o il , a l o cal corporat i on, h av e i d ent ical
prices fortheir gasoline and oil products. When prices are increased,
they are increased by the companies at the same time and in exactly
the same amount s of i n c r ease. The corporate officers wh o actively
a nd consciously par t i c i p ate in combi n in g t h ei r c orporations for t h e
purpose of increasing the market prices oftheir gasoline are liable
f or the c r i m e o f m o n o poly an d c o m b i n a t ion i n r e s t r a in t o f t r a d e .
(1971Bar Exam)
 158 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
L iabil it y of O f f i c e r
Under A r t i cl e 18 6 of t h e R e v i sed Penal C o de, th e p r e sident,
director or manager or corporation or association oragent of foreign:
corporation or association is liable as principal th ereof for the crime
of monopoly and combi n a t ion i n r e s t r a in t o f t r a d e i f h e k n o w i n gly '
permitted or fa i l e d t o p r e vent th e c o m m i s sion of s u ch o f f e nses by
the corporation. Thus, lack of active parti cipation in the commission .
of monopoly and combin at ion i n r e s t r a in t of t r a d e is not a d efense,
Article 186 imposes an obligation upon corporate officers to prevent
the commission of monopoly in r e st r a in t of t r a de; failure to perform
s uch obligation constit u tes the cri m e .
F ALSELY MA R K E D M E R C H A N D ISE MAD E OF PREC IOUS META LS
Importation a n d d i s p o si tio n o f f a l s ely m a r k e d m e r c h a n di se
made of precis
asmetals is commit t ed by any person who kno win g ly ~
imports or sellsor disposes of merchandise made of precious metals
(such as g ol d o r s i l v e r) , o r t h e i r a l l o ys , w i t h s t a m p s , b r a n ds, or
marks, which f ail t o i n d i c ate the actual fi n eness or qual it y t h e r eof. I
(Article 187) Altering the marks of the fineness of precious metal and
then selling it is estafa un der A r t i cle 315.
There is false mark in g when the test of the merchandise shows "
t hat the actual qual it y or fi n e n ess thereof is less by more than t h r ee
one-thousandth i n c a se of w a tc h cases and fl a t w ar e m ad e of gold,
less by more t h a n o n e -half k a r a t , i n c ase of ot her a r t i cl e m ad e of '
gold, or l ess by m or e t h a n f o u r o n e -th ousandth , i f m a d e of s i l v er,
than what is shown by th e m a rk . (Ar t i c le 187)
J9JC9B0M
V . CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHE R
PROHIBITED DRUG S
(R.A. NO. 9165)
',
The elements of violation of Section 4, or Section 5 of R.A. No.
9 165 are as f o l l ows: (1) t h a t t h e o f f e n der i m p o r t s , or t r a n s p or t s ,
d elivers, s e l ls , t r a d e s , a dministers , d i s p e nses, g i v e s a w a y t o
another, distri b u t es, dispatches in tr a n s it , dangerous drugs, or acts
as broker in such tr a n saction; (2) that t hi s activity is not aut h o r i zed
b y law; and (3) that offender k n ows t ha t w h a t h e is dealing w it h i s
a dangerous drug.
Intent to perpetr ate the prohibi ted acts such as intent to donate
in the crime of giving away dangerous drugs (People v. Lacerna, G.R.
No. 109250, September 5, 1997) or animus possidendi in possession of
dangerous drugs presupposes knowledge that a ccused was dealing
with dangerous dr u gs. (U . S. v. Ta y co, G.B. N o. 47 28, February 8 ,
1909)
I Persons, wh o h a v e n o l e ga l w i l l s a s c h i l d r e n o f i n s u f ficient
u nderstandin g a n d i d i o t s , c a n no t p o s sess or a c q u ir e a c o m p l et e
possession; so where stolen property i s pl aced in th e h ouse or upon
t he premises of a p e r son w i t h ou t h i s k n o w l e dge or consent, he i s
not properly speaking in possession of such property, solong as he
does not assert a right to its control, and is not moved by the animu s
possidendi with r e f erence thereto. (U.S. v. Tayco and Sencho, supra)
In U.S. v. Lim P o c o, G. R. No. 7 97 3, Aug ust 1 6, 1 9 1 3, an i n n o cent
purchaser of apatent medicine, who is not aware that the medicine
contains opium, is not li a ble for possession of prohibited dru gs.
Lack of knowledge that her fiancee was a drug pusher and that
what was inside the sachet given to her was shabu is a defense in a
case involving possession of dangerous drugs. (2002 Bar Exam)
Proof that the accused transported, delivered or sold dangerous
drug gives rise to presumption that he is not author i zed to transport„
deliver o r s e l l s u c h d r u g s (P e o ple v. Ma n o l o , G . B . N o . 10 7 6 28,
February 2 8, 1 994); that h e k n e w t h a t w h a t h e w a s t r a n s porti n g ,
159
 160 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER 161
VOLUME II PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9165)
delivering o r s e l l i n g w a s a d a n g e r ous d r u g (P e ople v. Ju m a o -o<, '.
I ntent to i m p ort or u n l oad is established if the vessel carryi n g
G.R. No. 101834, February 14, 1994); and that animus possidendi it;
the dangerous drugs is already anchored in a local port. (U . S. v. Ah
present.(People v.Burton, G.R. ¹. 114896, February 19, 1997)
Sing, G.R. No. 18005, October 10, 1917; U.S. v. Jose, G.R. No. 11787,
August 25, 1916)
I MPORTATION OF DAN G E R O U S DRUG S

In order t o e s t a b l ish t h e c r i m e o f i m p o r t a t io n o f d a n g erous, T RANS P O R T A T ION OF DA N G E R O U S DRUG S

d rugs, the p r osecution m u s t s h o w t h a t t h e v e ssel &o m w h i c h t h
t, " Transport" m e a n s " t o c a r r y o r c o n v e y f r o m o n e p l a c e t o
drugs are landed or on w h i c h i t a r r i v e d i n P h i l i p p in e w a t ers cam<
another." (People v. Lo Ho W in g, G.R. ¹ . 880 1 7 ,Jan u a ry 28, 1991)
from a foreign po rt . ( U S . v. J o se, G.R. ¹. 117 8 7 ,Au gu st 25, 1916)
Carrying a suitcase containing heroine (People v. Leangsiri, G.R. No.
Exportin g d a n g e r ou s d r u g s (P e o ple v. J o n es, G . R. ¹ . 1155 8 1, 112659, January 24, 1996) or negotiating a forested area carrying
August 29, 1 997; People v. B u r t o n, G . R. ¹ . 1148 9 6 , Fe b ru a ry 19,
a sack contain in g m a r i j u an a (P eople v. Bu l u d d a, G . R. N o. 1 14198,
1 997) or shipm ent of m e r c h a n d ise from one por t t o a n o t her i n t h e
November 19, 1999) constitu t es tr a n s porta t i on of d a n gerous dru g s .
same country (U . S . v. Wa y ne Sh o up, G . R. ¹ . 1141 6 , Oc t ober 14,
In transportat ion of d a n gerous dr u gs, the pl ace of origin (P eople v.
1916) is no t i m p o r t a t i o n o f d a n g er ous d r u gs . H o w ev er, t h e d r u t
Al fonso, G.R. No. 78954, June 18, 1990), place of destination (People v.
trafficker could b e convicted of t r a n s port a t ion of d a n g erous dr ug<
Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 8801 7,January 28, 1991) or ownership (People
under Section 5. Intransportation of dangerous drugs, the point of
v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 188929, October 2, 2 001) is not materia l.
origin is not important. (Alf onso, G.R. 1Vo. 78954,June 18, 1990)
In As u n c ion v . C A, G . R . N o . 1 2 5 9 5 9, F e br u a ry 1 , 1 9 9 9, t h e
George was arrested at the N AI A a r r i v a l l o u nge for carr y ing e
accused was dr i v in g a ca r w i t h 0 . 1 216 gra m o f s h a bu . I n S a l es v.
backpack contain in g 15 gr ams of cocaine. Impor t a t ion of dangerou<
People, G.R. No. 191028, February 6, 2018, the accused was caught
d rugs is not commit t ed. In order to establish the crime of 0 import
l m p o a t 'l oI l in possession of 0.28 gram of dried Marijuana at the departure
of d a n g e r ou s d r u gs , i t m u s t b e s h ow n t h a t t h e d a n g e r ous d r u gs,
o
area of NA IA . T h e q u a n t i t i e s of d r u g s in As u n c ion case and S al es
are brought to th e P h i l i p p i nes from a f or eign count ry . I n t h i s case,
c ase are not considerable or co m m er cial, w h ich i n d i c ate t ha t t h e y
it wa s n o t s t a t e d w h e t h e r a r r i v a l l o u n g e i s i n t h e d o m e s tic or
p ossessed th e s am e f o r c o n s u m p t io n p u r p o se. H e n ce, t h e y w e r e
international t e r m i n a l o f N A I A a n d w h e t h e r o r n o t G e o rge i s an
c onvicted of possession of dangerous drug and not th e gr aver cr i m e
airplane passenger, who just ar r i ved from a foreign country . H ence,
t e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s p o ssession of d a n gerous d r u gs. (2018 Bar II;
of transportat ion of dangerous drugs.
Exam) In People v. Bu r t o n, G. R. No. 1 14896, Februa ry 1 9, 1 997, the
accused came from a hotel in P a r a n a que, where he stayed before he
I n Am s t er d am , X a n d Y b o u gh t a d o zen I olli p ops l aced wi th
c hecked in a t t h e N A I A a n d w a s b o un d fo r S y d n ey, A u s t r a l ia . A t
cannabis, as souvenir and "pa salubong" for th e ir f r i e n d s. They were '
the departur e area of the ai r p o rt , au t h o r i t i es discovered dangerous
accosted at t h e M a n i l a I n t e r n a t i o nal A i r p o r t . T h e y a r e l i a b l e fo r
d rugs in th e tw o p i eces of luggage of the accused. It wa s h eld t h a t
importation of dangerous drugs. (2018 Bar Exam)
i t is a p p ar en t t h a t h e w a n t e d t o b r i n g t h e p r o h i b i te d d r u g f r o m
The import a t io n of p r o h i b i te d d r u g s i s compl ete th e m o m ent Paranaque to Sydney. However, because he was not able topursue
the vessel enters the waters of the country pro vided that t he entry is his trip, he should be considered only to have attempted to transport
with the i n t en t t o i m p or t i t . (U . S. v. Chuloy and L ee Ram, G.R. No. the prohibited drug to Sydney.
12954, January 81, 1918)
In People v. Dimaa n o, G.R. No. 174481, February 1 0, 2016, the
I ntent t o i m p or t i s n o t e s t a b l i shed i f t h e v e ssel carr y in g t h e a ccused, who wa s caught i n p o s session of d a n gerous dr ugs at t h e
dangerous drugs isjust passing through local port (U.S. departure area of Manila Domestic Airport was also convicted of
. Ch l
a n L ee Ma m , ib i d .) Wi t h o ut i n t e nt to u n l o a d, the crime commi t t e d
and attempted tr a n sport a t ion of d.angerous drug. H ow ever, in People v.
is transportationof d'angerous drugs. Jones,G.R. No. 115581, August 29, 1997, the accused was also caught
in possession of dangerous drugs at the depart ur e area of NAIA, and

J9JC9B0M
 162 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
yet, he was convicted of consumm a ted t r a n sport a t ion of d angeroua
drugs. A t a n y r a t e , t h e p e n a lt y p r e s cr ibed fo r t r a n s p or t a t ion of
dangerous drugs is th e s am e as t h a t fo r a t t e m p ted t r a n sport a tion
of dangerous drugs.
Thhe accused cannot be convicted of attempted tr an sportat ion of :
dangerous drugs wh ere he was caught in p ossession thereori inside '
his car, wh ich i s no t i n t r a n s i t . Th e t h e ory of th e p r osecution that
there is clear in t ent t o t r a n sport th e d ru g is speculativ e.
(San Juan )
u. People, G.R. No. 177191, May 30, 2011)
S ELLING DAN G E R O U S DRUG S
Sell is defined as any act of g i v in g a w a y an y d a n g erous drug
a nd/or c o n t r o l le d p r e c u r sor a n d e s s en t ia l c h e m i ca l w h e t h e r f o r
money or any other considerati on. (Section 3 of R.A. No. 9165)
C onsumm a t e d S a l e
S ection 5, R .A . N o . 9 165 u ses th e w or d " s ell" i n d e fi n i n g t h e
crime of il l egal sale of dangerous dr u gs. Un der Section 3(ii), sell is
any act of giving away dangerous drug whether for money or any
other consideration. T h e c r i m e o f s a l e i s c o n s u m m a t ed b y m e r e
d elivery of t h e d r u g p u r c h a sed for m o n ey. A c t ua l p a y m en t i s n o t
a n element o f s e l l i n g d a n g e r ou s d r u gs . D e l i v er y o f d r u g s f o r a
consideration consum m a tes the cr i me. The fact t ha t n o m o ney was
a ctually d e l i v ered b y t h e p r e t e n ded b u yer t o t h e p u s h e r d i d n o t
prevent th e offenses from b e in g com m i t t ed. (People v. Concepcion,
G.R. No. 133225, July 26, 2001) Non-receipt of the b uy - bust m o ney
is not a defense. (People v. Angeles, G.R. No. 92850, Ju ne 15, 1992;
1993 Bar E x a m) Fa i l u r e to p r e s ent t he m a r k e d m o n ey in e v i d e nce
does not create a hiatu s in th e evidence for the prosecution.
(People
v. Pascual, G.R. No. 88282, May 6; 1992; 2000 Bar Exam)
A ttem p te d S a l e
T o consumm at e t h e c r i m e o f s a l e o f d a n g e r ou s d r u g s , t h e
accused must d e l i ver t h e d a n g erous dr ugs to th e p oseur-buyer for
consideration. I n Pe o ple v. Fi g u e r o a, G . R. N o . 1 8 6 1 4 1, A p r i l 1 1
2 012 t h ee accused showed shabu for s ale t o p oseur-buyer. Pr ior t o )
t he delivery of th e dangerous dru gs, the sale was aborted when th e
p olice officers im m e di at ely p l a ced accused under a r r e st. Th e cr i m e
committed is att em p ted sale.
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V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER 163
PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9165)
D uring t h e b u y - b us t o p e r a t i on , S o l it o o p e ned t h e t r u n k o f
the Toyota I n n ov a t o r e t r i ev e t h e b a g of ma r j i u a n a t o b e s o ld t o
P O2 Masahol. To cut th e laces that he had t ied the bag wi th , Solit o
t ook out a sw iss k n i fe, but h i s d o in g so pr om p ted PO2 M a s ahol t o
i mmediately a r r est hi m a n d c o n fiscate the bag ofmarijuana. The
crime committed is not sale ofdangerous drugs but attempted sale
of dangerous drugs since Solito was arrested prior tothe actual or
constructive delivery of the m ar i j u a na. (201 7 Bar Exam)
In Pe o ple u. Tu mu l a k , G R . N o . 20 6 0 5 4 , J u l y 2 5 , 20 1 6 ,
accus d intended to sellecstasy and commenced by overt acts the
comirission of t h e i n t e n ded c r i m e b y s h o w in g t h e s u b st ance to a
police officer. Showing a sample is an overt act of selling dangerous
d rugs since it r e v eals th e i n t e n t ion of th e o f f ender to sell i t t o t h e
poseur-buyer. M ore i m p o r t a n t l y , th e only r e ason why th e sale was
abort d i s b ecause the police officers identified t h e m selves as such
and placed accused under arrest — a cause that is other than her own
spontaneous desistance. Accused was convicted of attem pted sale of
dangerous drugs.
S eller and B u y e r o f D a n g e r o u s D r u g s
A buyer wh o r eceived th e d a n gerous dr ugs from a p u s her f or
a consideration isliable for possession of dangerous drugs (People
u.Espallardo, G.R. No. 88368, June 19, 1991) unless he is a police
officer or a civi l ia n a c t in g as a poseur-buyer. (People v. Ramos, Jr.,
G.R. No. 88 3 01, October 28, 1 991; People v. R a m o s, Jr ., G . R. N o .
88301, October 28, 1 991; 2015 Bar E x a m ) O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e
seller is liable for il l egal sale of dangerous drugs.
Buy-bust Oper ation
W hen Te e M o y , a p u s h er , a s ke d t h e p o s eur-buyer, a p o l i c e
o fficer, if h e w o ul d l i k e a " s c ore," he a n sw ered i n t h e a f fi r m a t i v e .
T ee Ivloy handed a m a t chbox contai n in g th e d a n gerous drug to t h e
p oseur-buyer, w h i l e t h e l a t t e r g a v e h i m a P 1 0 0 .0 0 m a r k e d b i l l .
Upon giving th e p r e-arr a n ged signal, the agents ru shed in side and
arrested Tee Moy. (1992 Bar Exa m )
T ee Moy a r g ue d t h e a r r e s t w i t h o u t w a r r a n t i s i l l e g al. T h i s
a rgument i s u n t e n a b le . A r r e s t i n g t h e p u s h e r i n t h e b u y - b u s t
operation w i t h ou t a w a r r a n t o f a r r e s t i s l e g i t i m a t e . A b u y - b u st
o peration i s a f o r m o f e n t r a p m en t w h e r eb y w a y s an d m e an s a r e
resorted for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in
the execution of t h ei r c r i m i n a l p l a n ; i t i s a p r o cedure or operation
 164 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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sanctioned by law an d w h ich has consistently pr oved itself to be as
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers. (People v. Chua Uy,
G.R. No. 128046; March 7, 2000)
Tee Moy argued that he was the victim of a frame-up instigate3
by the law enforcement officers. (1992 Bar Exam) Th is is unt e nable,
The affirm a t ive answer of the poseur-buyer to the query if he woul
like to score is decoy solicitat i on, w h ich is al l owed by l aw . Th e sale
< consideration. (P eople v. Ma o n g co, G. R. ¹ .
o f contraband i s a k i n d o f o f f e nse h a b i t u a ll y c o m m i t t ed , an d t h e
solicitation s i m p l y f u r n i s h e s e v i d ence of t h e c r i m i n a l ' s course of
conduct. A "decoy solicitat i on" i s not t a n t a m o un t t o i n d u c ement or
instigation. (People v. Bayani, G. R. No. 179150, tu n e 17, 2008) The
mere fact t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s d eceived th e p u s her i n t o b e l i eving
that th e f or mer w er e b u y ers of d a ngerous dru g does not exculpate
the latter f r o m l i a b i l i t y f o r s e l l in g t h e p r o h i b i ted d r u gs. (People v,
Marcos, G.R. No. 88825, May 8, 1990
)
S ellin g D r u g s t o a S t r a n g e r
I n r eal l i f e , s m a l l - qu a n t it y o r r e t a i l d r u g p u s h er s s ell t h e i r
p rohibited w a res to cu stomers wh o h av e th e m o ney t o pa y fo r t h e
drug, be they strangers or not. Itis probable for a pusher to sell
angerous drug to a total str a n g er. What m a t t ers is not the existing
familiar it y b et w een the buyer and the drug pusher, but r a t her t h eir
a greement an d t h e a c t s c on st i t u t i n g t h e s al e an d d e l i v er y o f t h e
marijuana leaves. {1998 and 19 92 Bar E x a m s; People v. Ma d r i a g a,
G.R. No. 82298, tuly 20, 1992)
S elling D r u g s at a P u b l i c P l a c e
Drug pushing when done on a small level may be commit tee at
any time and at an y p l a ce. The fact t ha t th e p a r t ies are in a p u b l ic
place and in the presence ofother people may not always discourage
them fro m p u r s u in g t h ei r i l l e gal t r a d e a s t h ese factors ma y e v en
serve to camouflage the same. (1998Bar Exam; People v.Madriaga,
supra)
D ELIVERY OF DAN G E R O U S DRUG S
Deliver is defined as any act of knowi n gly passing a dangercus
d rug to an oth er , p ersonally or o t h e r w i se, and by an y m e a ns, w ' t h
or with out c onsiderati on. (Section 8 of R . A. N o . 91 65) Whi le " sale"
may involve money or an y o t he r m a t e r ia l consideration,
"delivery"
m ay be with or w i t h ou t considerati on .
(People v. Enriquez G.R. No.
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V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER 165
PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9165)
99888, October 28, 1997) If t he a ccused is charged with i l l e g al sale
and delivery ofdangerous drugs, and the witness testifieson the
delivery of dr ug s to th e accused but no t o n t h e s ale t r a n saction of
another police officer thr ough cell phone vrith the accused, he cannot
be convicted of sale of dangerous drug but he is liable for delivery of
d angerous drugs since thi s cr im e ma y b e com m i t t e d even w i t h o u t
19 69 6 6 , Oc t o ber 2 8 ,
2018)
DISPATCHING DA N G E R O U S D R U G S IN TRANSIT
W hat i s p u n i s h a bl e u n d e r S e c t io n 5 o f R. A . N o . 9 1 6 5 i s
dispatching in transit any d.angerous drugs and not dispatching
somebody to buy or get,dangerous drugs from another. The vrord
"dispatch" m e a n s s e n d i ng o f f da n g e r o us d r u g t o a p ar t i c u l a r
destination. Example'-Follovring the instr u c ti on of "A," "8" delivered
one stick o f m a r i j u a n a t o " C . " " A" i s l i a b l e f o r d i s p a t ch in g t h e
dangerous d r ug i n t r a n s i t . "8" i s l i a bl e fo r d e l i v er y o f d a n g erous
drugs. "C" is liable for ill e gal possession of dangerous drugs.
GIVING AWAY DA N G E R O U S DRUGS
In giving away, the dangerous drug becomes an item or
merchandise p r esented a s a g i f t o r p r e m i u m { g i v e aw ay), v rhere
owiiership is t r a n sferr ed. In People v. La cerna, September 5, 1997,
G.R. No. 109250, accused testifiedthat he gave the plastic bag and
the knapsack to his co-accused because the latter got into the taxicab
first,and because there was inore room in the backseat than in the
front. It was held that by ha n d i n g the p la stic bag to his companion,
accused cannot be punished for giving avray marijuana as agift or
premium to another the re being no inte nt i on to donate or give away
the drugs. Accused however wa s convicted of i l l e gal p ossession of
dangerous drug.
TRADE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
Tradin g i s a t r an s a c t i on i n v o l v i n g t h e i l l e g a l t r a f f ic k i n g
of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals using electronic devices such as, but no t l i m i t e d to, text
m essages, email , m o b i l e o r l a n d l i n es , t v ro-way r a d i os, i n t e r n et ,
i nstant m essengers and chat r o oms or act in g as a br oker in an y of
such transactions vrhether for mo n ey or a ny o t h er consideration in
violation of dangerous drug l aw. (Section 3, par. jj af R. A. No. 9165)
 166 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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T he all eged d r u g l o r d s i n N a t i o n a l B i l i b i d P r i s on , w h o a r e
t ransactin g d a n g e r ou s d r u g s w ith o t h e r s t h r o u g h i n t e r n e t o r
cellphone, areliable for the crime of trade of dangerous drugs.
A DM INISTERING DA N G E R O U S DRUG S
Addministering i s a n y a c t o f i n t r o d u c ing a ny d a n g e rous d r u g
into the body of any p erson, wit h o r w i t h ou t h i s /her k n o w l edge, by
i njection, i n h a l a t i on , i n g e stion o r o t h e r m e a n s , o r o f c o m m i t t i n g
any act of in d i s pensable assistance t o a p e rs on in a d m i n i s t e ri n g
er1ng a
d angerous dru g t o h i m s e l f/herself u n l ess a d m i n i s t ered b
y a du1y
lic
icensed practitioner for purposes of medication.(Section 8
Thee person i nt o w h o m t h e da n g e ro us d r ug is b e i ng a d m i n i s t e red
.)
may be held l i a ble for us e of d a n gerous dr ugs u n der Section 15 of
R.A. No. 9165.
" A" wrapped "shabu" w i t h a l u m i n u m f o i l , an d b u r n e d i t w i t h
t he use of light er. "B" using a glass tube sniffed the smoke emit t i n g
f rom t h e a l u m i n u m f o i l . T h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d b y " A " i s i l l e g a l
administr a t ion of d a n g erous dr ug . B i s l i a bl e for u s in g d a n g erous
drugs.
B RO K E R A G E O F DA N G E R O U S DRUG S
Broker m e a n s t o a c t a s a g e n t i n ar r an g i n g a n y o f t h es e
t ransactions; it r e f ers to an a g ent e m p l oyed to m ak e b a r g ains an d
contracts for compensation; or a m i d d l e man or n e gotiator b et ween
contracting part i es; or a person whose business is to bring seller and
purchaser together. (Board Regulation No. 3,Series of 2008)
M A N U F A C T U R E OF DA N G E R O U S DRUG S
Manufacture is t he p r o d u c tio n, pre para ti o n, compoundin g, or
p rocessing of an y d a n g erous dru g a n d /or cont r ol led pr ecursor a n d
essential chemical. M a n u f a ct ur e can be either d i r ectly or i n d i r e ctly
or by extraction from substances of natural or i g in, or in dependently
y means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and
chemical synthesis. It shall in cl ude any packaging or repackaging of
such substances, design or configu r a t ion of it s f or m o r l a b e l in g or
relabeling of its contain er. (Section 8, par. u of R.A. No. 9165)
Manufacture ofdangerous drugs can b e proved by direct evidence
or circumst an t ia l e v i d ence. An y o f t h e f o l l o w in g c i r c u m s t ances is
prima f a cie p r o of of m a n u f a c t u re o f a n y d a n g e ro us d r u g : ( 1) t h e
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V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER
PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9165l
p resence of any contr olled precursor an d essential ch emical in t h e
clandestine laboratory; and (2) the presence of laboratory equipment
in the clandestine laboratory. (' Section 8 of R.A. No. 9165)
If a pezwon planted and raised opium poppy and thereafter,
m anufactured. opium out o f t h e s ai d p l a nt , i t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t h e
s hould be h e l d l i a b l e o n l y f o r m a n u f a c t ur e o f d a n g er ous d r u g s .
Planting is just a'part of the manufactur in g process or preparation of
dangerous dznigs; hence, cultivation of plant as a source of dangerous
drugs is absorbed in the crime of man u f acture of dangerous drugs.
C ULTIVATION OR CULTUR E OF DA N G E R O U S DRUG S
The c r i m e o f c u l t i v a t i on,o r c u l t u r e o f p l a n t s classified a s
dangerous drugs or as so urces thereof is commi t t e d by a ny p e r s on
who shall pl ar it, cultiv ate or culture mari j u a n a, opium p oppy or any
other plant classified as a dangerous drug or as a source from whi ch
any dangerous drug may be manufactured or derived.(Section 16 of
R.A. ¹. 9 1 65)
In Zannr1a v. CA, G.R. No. 110168, December 15, 1997, accused
f ailed to adequately expl ai n h i s p r e sence at th e s it e t e emin g w i t h
fully grown ma r i j u a na p la n t s. His claim t h a t he h as never seen nor
heard of marij u ana is in credulous.
DEN, DIVE OR RESORT
Den, dive or resort i s a p l a ce whe re any d a n g erous drug a n d /
or controlled precursor and essential chemical is administered,
delive "ed, stored for illegal purposes, distributed, sold or used in
any form. (Section 8, par. l of R.A. No. 9165)
Habituaat y i s an el ement of th e cr im e of m a i n t e n ance of den,
dive or resort. According to for mer Senator B a r b ers, a dru g den as
defined in t h e l a w i s a p l a c e w h er e d r u g s ar e ha b i t u a l ly us ed b y
p eople who fr e quented it . I f a v i s i t o r w o u l d u s e d r ug s i n a n of fi ce
on single oc"asion, the visitor isliable for use of dangerous drugs,
while the owner of the office is not liable for mai n t a i n in g a den, dive
or resort. (T he C omprehensive Dangerous Dr u gs Act by R o d e lio T. .
Dasci ! and David Roberto Aqui n o )
In Pe ople v. Ga l i c i a, G . R . N o . 2 1 8 4 0 2, F e b r u a ry 1 4 , 2 0 1 8 ,
f or ar a c cused to b e convi cted of m a i n t e n a nce of a d r u g d en , t h e
prosecution m u s t e s t a b l is h w i t h p r o o f b e y on d r e a sonable d o ubt
that the accused is maintaining a den where any dangerous drug is
 168 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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administered, used or sold. It m u s t b e established that t h e a l l eged
drug den i s a p l a c e w h er e d a n g erous dr u g s ar e re g u l a r ly s o ld t o
and!or used by customers of the ma i n t a i ner of the den. In t hi s case,
drug paraphern a lia and shabu were found inside the shanty. This is
not enough to establish t ha t th e sh a nt y i s a dru g d en. Accused was
acquitted of mai nt en ance of den.
The existence of opium j o i nt, could be established by facts and
circumstances tending t o p r ove t ha t i t w a s s uch a s th e conduct of
accused when apprehended, the condition of the room ir w h i c h t h e y
were found with astrong odor of opium, the water and towel showing
traces of opium, and the barr i caded nature of the house. (U.S. v. J'ao
Li Sing, G.R. ¹. 12 9 5 8 ,¹v em b e r 28, 1917)
The ff ollowing p e r sons ar e o f f enders i n c r i m e i n v o l v in g d e n ,
d ive or r e sort : (1) th e p e r son m a i n t a i n in g t h e d en , d iv e o r r e s or t
or the owner t h e r eof; (2) employees of a den, dive or r esort such as
caretaker, helper, watchman, and lookout provided that they are
aware of the natu re of the pla ce as such; and (3) visitor of den, dive
or resort who is aware of the nat ure of the place.
Anastacio, who w en t t o a d r u g de n t o j oi n a m a h j on g session
n ot know in g t h a t t h e s ession t h a t h e w a s i n v i t e d t o j oi n i s s h a b u
session, is not l i a ble for v i s i t i n g d en, dive and r esort because he is
not aware of the nature ofthe place. (2007 Bar Exam)
POSSESSlON OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
Animus possidendi, which is an essential element of possession
o dangerous drugs, presupposes that the possessor acted with
intelligence and knowledge. Phrsons, who have no legal
wills as
children of in sufficient u n d er st an din g and i d i ots, cannot possess or
acquire a complete possession; sowhere stolen property is placed in
the house or upon the premises of a person wit h out his know l edge or
consent, he isnot properly speaking in possession of such property,
so long as he does not assert a ri g ht to i ts contro l, and is not mo ved
y the animus possidendi wi th r e f e re nce thereto.
(U.S. v. Tayco and
Seneho, G.R. ¹. 4 7 2 8 ,Fe bruary 8, 1909)
P arties, Social G a t h e r i n g a n d M e e t i n g
T he penalty for possession of dangerous drugs is higher if i t i s
c ommitted du r i n g a p a r t y , or a t a s o cial gath er in g or m eeti ng, or in
the proxim ate company of at l east tw o (2) persons. (Section 18) The
phrase "company of atleast two (2) persons" shall mean the accused
J9JC9B0M
V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER 169
PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9185)
o r suspect plus at l e ast t w o (2 ) ot h ers, wh o ma y o r m a y n o t b e i n
possession cf any d a n gerous dr ug. (PDEA I m p l e m e nting Ru l es and
Regulation)
P ossession o f S h a b u a n d M a r i j u a n a
In Da v id v. Pe o ple, G . R. N o . 1 8 1 8 6 1, O c tober 1 7, 2 0 1 1, a n
accused may only be convicted of a single offense of possession of
dangerous drugs if h e or sh e wa s caught i n p o ssession of different
kinds of dangercus drugs (shabu and marij u a na) in a single occasion.
I f convicted, th e h i g h e r p e n a lt y s h a l l b e i m p o s ed, w h i c h i s s t i l l
lighter if t h a c c u sed is convicted of two (2) offenses having tw o (2)
s eparate penalties. This i n t e r p r e t a t ion is m ore in k e eping w it h t h e
intention of : h e l egislators as well as more favorable to the accused.
P ossession and Us e of D a n g e r ou s D r u g s
E ven t h o u g h a p e r s o n , w h o w as arrested f o r p o s s ession
of cocaine, wa s f o u n d p o s i t i ve f o r o p i u m , h e s h a l l n o t b e h e l d
additionally li a b le for u s e of d a n g erous d ru gs u n d er S ection 15 o f
R.A. No. 9165. Under t hi s pr ovision, where a person tested positive
f or dangercus d ru g i s a l s o f oun d t o h a v e i n h i s p o ssession of an y
dangerous drug, he shall be heldliable for possession of dangerous
d rug under Section 1 1 t h e r eof. Thi s m e ans t h a t o f f ender ma y n o t
be charged separately ofillegal poss ssion of dangerous drugs and
u se of dangerous drug since it is clear from th e Section 15 that t h e
provisions of Section 11 shall apply. I l l egal possession of dangerous
drugs abso "bs the use of dangerous drugs. (People v. Galicia, G.R.
1Vo. 218402. February 14, 2018)
T he fact t h a t t h e k i n d o f d a n g er ous d r u g s i s d i f f er ent f r o m
t hat for w h i c h G e orge wa s f o un d p o si t iv e i s o f n o m o m e nt . W h a t
is important i s t h a t h e i s i n p o ssession of "any" dangerous drugs to
exempt him from being prosecuted for use of dangerous drugs. (2018
Bar Exam)
However, Section 15, wh ich m a k es a u s er-possessor liable for
p ossession of dangerous dru gs, is net ap p l i cable if he is only f ou n d
in possession of p a r a p h er n a li a w i t h t r a c e s of s h a bu . I n Pe o ple v .
Martinez, G. R. N o. 1 9 1 366, December 1 3, 2 0 1 0, w h e re r e s id ue of
dangerous drugs is foun d an d t h er e i s a p o sit ive confirm a t ory t e st
result, the accused should be charged with use rather than possession
o f dangerous d "ugs. This would be in k eeping wit h t h e i n t ent of th e
law to rehabili t ate first ti m e offende s of drug use and provide them
with an opportu n it y t o r ecover for a second chance at life.
 170 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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P ossession and S al e of D a n g e r o u s D r u g s
Possession of marij u an a is absorbed in the sale thereof, except
w er e t h e s e l ler i s f u r t h e r a p p r e h ended i n p o s session of a n o .her
q uantity of t h e p r o h i b i ted d r u g s not covered by or i n c l ud.ed in t h e
sale and w h ic h ar e p r o b ably i n t e n ded for s ome f u t ur e d e al i ngs or
use by the seller. (People v. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, September 5,
1997; U.S. v. Look C ha w, G. R. No. 58 89, Ju ly 12, 1911; 1998, 1998,
and 1992 Bar Exa ms)
P ossession of Dangerous Drugs and Drug Paraphernalia
In U.S. v. Poh Ch i, G . R. N o. 6 687, September 1, 1 91 1, it x - as
held that op iu m an d t h e p i p e w er e found t ogether u n der t h e f l oor;
t hey were foun d i n t h e s a m e p l a ce, at t h e s am e t i m e , an d b y t h e
same person. As th e d efendant w a s convicted of i l l e gal possession
of opium, he could not be charged with illegal possession of apipe,
which is used in smoking opium. It is t ru e that th e law has provided
a certain puni sh m ent for the possession of a pipe used in the smoking
o f opium, and for p ossession of opium , bu t i t i s n 'ot believed that i t
was the intention of the legislature to have separate complaints hied
against a p er son wh o wa s f o un d i n t h e i l l e gal possession of opium
a nd a pipe at the same ti m e .
However, th e S u p r em e C o ur t i n Pe o ple v . C as acop, G.R. Xo .
210454, J a n u ar y 1 3 , 2 0 1 6 , d i d n o t a p p l y t h e Po h C h i p r i n c i p l e
that possession of dangerous drugs absorbed possession of drug
paraphernalia. In Casacop case, after the accused was apprehended
for selling d r u gs, p l a sti c sachets contai n in g s h a bu, an i m p r o v i sed
glass tooter contai n in g shabu r e sidue and th e r o l led al u m i n u m : "oil
with sh abu r e si due w er e f oun d i n h i s p o ck et. H e w a s c o r v i c ted of
three separate cr i mes of sale of d a n g erous dr ugs u n der Section 5,
possession of d a n gerous d ru g u n d e r S e ction 1 1 an d p o ssession of
rug paraphern alia u n der Section 12. (see also: People v. Piad, G.R.
No. 218607, January 25, 2016)
V ari a nc e R u l e i n d r u g s ca se
Well-settled in j u r i s p r u d ence tha t t h e c r i m e of i l l e gal sale of
angerous d r u g s n e cessarily i n c l u de s t h e c r i m e o f p o s session of
angerous drug. Th e same r u l i n g m a y a l so be applied to th e ot l:er
acts penalized under Section 4 or 5 of R.A. No. 9165 because for
t he accused to be able to t r a de, ad m i n i s t er, di spense d e l i v er , giv e
a way to a n o t h er , d i s t r i b u t e , d i sp atch i n t r a n si t o r t7
t can he be convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia because
angerous drug, he must necessarily be in possession of said dr u gs.
(People v. Bulawa n, G.R No . 20 4 441, June 8, 2016)
J9JC9B0M
V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER 171
PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9165)
1. P o s s e s sio n a n d S a l e of D a n ge r o u s D r u g s — In
People v. Manansala, G. R. No. 175989, April 8, 2 01 8, poseur-buyer
b ought m a r i j u a n a f r o m t h e a c c u sed. O n t h e b a s i s o f t h i s s a l e ,
search warr an t w a s i s s u ed. W hen t h e w a r r a n t w a s i m p l e m e nt ed,
marijuana was found in the premises of the accused. Information for
sale of dangerous drugs was filed against th e accused. The poseur-
buyer did not testify on th e sale of dangerous drug. Members of the
e nforcing t ea m t e s ti fie d t h a t t h e y r e c overed m a r i j u an a f r o m t h e
accused. Applyin g th e v a r i a nce r u le , th e accused was convicted of
p ossession of dangerous dru g s i nce t hi s i s a l e sser cr i me, w h ich i s
necessarily inclu ded in th e charge of sale of dangerous drug.
2. P oss e s sion a n d I m p o r t a t i o n o f D a n g e r o u s D r u g s
- In People v. Chan Liu, G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015, the
a ccused was c h a r ge d o f i m p o r t a t i o n o f d a n g e r ou s d r u g s i n t h e
i nformation. Th e c r i m e p r o v e n i s p o s session of d a n g erous d r u g s
and not impor t a t ion of d an gerous drugs since the place of origin of
t he vessel carryin g th e d r u g s is not sh own t o be a f or eign count r y .
A ccused is c o n v i cted o f p o s session of d a n g er ous d r u g s i n c e t h i s
i s a lesser cr i m e , w h i c h i s n e c essarily i n c l u de d i n t h e c h a r g e o f
importation of dangerous drug.
Author's op i n io n — It is submi t t e d t h at t h e a ccused in Cha n
Liu case should have been convicted of tr a n sport a t ion of dangerous
d rugs since the point o f o r i gi n i s n o t i m p o r t an t i n t h i s c r i m e , an d
t his crime is also necessarily in cl u ded in th e charge of import a t i on .
8. P oss e s sio n a n d D e li v e r y of D a n ge r o u s D r u g s
In People v. Ma o n g c o, G. R. N o . 1 9 6 9 6 6, O c t o ber 2 8 , 2 0 1 8 , t h e
accused was charged of delivery of dangerous drugs in the
i nformat i on . Th e c r i m e p r o v e n w a s p o ssession of d a n g e r o u s
drugs an d n o t d e l i v e r y o f d a n g e r o u s d r u g s s i n ce h e m e r e l y
surrendered the drug upon demand of the police officer. Accused was
convicted of possession of dangerous drug since this is a lesser crime,,
which is necessarily in cl u ded in th e ch arge of delivery of dangerous
ch'llg.
4. P oss e s sio n of D a n ge r o u s D r u gs a n d Drug
Paraph e r n a l i a — If the crime charged in i n f o r m a t i on is possession
of dangerous drugs but the crime proven by evidence is possession of
drug parapherna l ia. The accused cannot be convicted of possession
of dangerous drugs because it was not proven by evidence. Neither
it was not alleged in the information. (Fajardo v. People, G.R. No.
185460, July 25, 2012)
 172 CRIMINAL IWW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
U SE OF DAN G E R O U S DRUG S
Use of dangerous drugs is commit t ed by a person apprehended
or arrested for a d r u g -r elated cri me, who is found to be positive for
use of any da ngerous dr ug, after a confi r m a t or y t est p r o v i ded th at
he is not in possession of other dangerous drugs. (Sections 15 and 38
of R.A. No. 9165) If the user is in p ossession of dangerous drugs, he
shall be prosecuted for possession of dangerous drugs. (Section 15)
Apprehended for Drug-related Crime
The phrase "person apprehended or arrested" in Article 15 of R.A.
No. 9165 cannot lit er a lly m ean any person apprehended or arrested
for any cri me. Thi s p h r ase must be read in context an d u n d er stood
in consonance with R .A . No. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons
arrested or appr ehended for u n l a w fu l a cts li sted un der A r t i cl e II of
thhe law such as sale or possession of. dangerous drugs. Any p erson
apprehended or arrested for a crime not related to drugs (such as
r obbery-extortion) s h al l n o t b e s u b j e cted t o d a n g erous d r u g t e s t .
H ence, he c a n not b e c o n v i cted o f u s e o f d a n g er ous d r u g s u n d e r
Section 15. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014)
In People v. Ta b oy, G. R. N o. 2 2 8 515, June 2 5, 2 0 1 8, accused
i s found g u i l t y o f i l l e ga l u s e o f d a n g er ous d r u g a s t h e f o l l o w i n g
elements thereof were proven: (1) accused was arrested for engaging
i n the sale of shabu, w h ich i s an act p u n i s h able un der A r t i cl e I I o f
R.A. No. 9165; (2) he was subjected to a drug test; and (8) the resul-.
of said test yielded positive for shabu .
I f a person is caught i n t h e act of u s in g d a ngerous dr u gs, th e
po ice can arrest him for possession of dangerous drugs. If he is
ound positive for using dangerous drugs after confirmatory tests.
he shall be convicted of use of dangerous drug un der Section 15 and
not possession of dangerous drugs even though residue of dangerous
drugs is found. (People v. Ma r t i n e z, G.R. No. 191366 D
ecem er
u t if' h e i s i n p o ssession of dangerous drugs other t h a tb t h 1a 3n,
2 010) But
that
a b e i n g c on sumed by h im , he is li a ble of possession of dangerous
drugs.
Although Section 15 speaks of pe r son apprehended or arrested,"
one may be held li a ble for use of dangerous drug even th ough he is
n ot an ar r e stee. This is an exception to th e r u l e . U d
n e r Se ct i' o n 36
o . . No. 9165, a person found to be positivefor dangerous drug,
after being subjected to undergo mandatory or r a n dom dr ug te sting ,
shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15. The following persons
J9JC9B0M
V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND 0 i HER 173
PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9165)
s hall u n d e r go mandatory d r u g t e s t : (a ) a p p l i c a n ts f o r dr i v e r ' s
license; (b) applicants for f i rearm's license and for p e r mi t t o c a r r y
firearms outside of residence; and (c)officers and members of the
military, police and other la w e n f orcement agencies. The fo uowing
persons shall u n d ergo ra n d om d r u g t e st: (a) students of secondary
a nd tertiar y s chools; and (b) officers an d e m p l oyees of pub li c a n d
private offices.
The "ule on. mandatory t e st in g of c an di d a tes for p u b li c office
whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government
has been declared unconstit u t i o nal since Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165
adds another qu a li fi cat ion l a yer t o w h a t t h e 1 98 7 Consti t u t i on , at
the minim um , r e q u i res for m e m b ership i n t h e S enate. (Pimentel v.
COMELEC, G.R. iVo 16'1658,November 3, 2008)
Under Section 86(f) of R.A. No 9 1 6 5, all persons charged before
the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense han g a n i mposable
p enalty of i m p r i s on m ent o f n o t l e s s t h a n 6 y e ar s an d 1 d a y s h a l l
have to undergo a mandatory drug test.Those found to be positive
for dangerous drugs use shall beliable for use of dangerous drug.
H owever, this p r ovi sion has been declared as unconstit u t i o n al . T o
i mpose mandatory dru g t esting on th e accused is a blat ant a t t e m p t
to harness a medical testas a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of R.A. No. 9165. Dru g t e st in g i n t h i s case
would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate t h e mselves. (Laserna v. Da n g erous Dru gs Board, G.R.
No. 1586"-3, November 3, 2008)
P resumpt ion of Us e of D a n g e r o u s D r u g
Under Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165, the possessor of drug
paraphernalia s h al l b e "p r e s umed" t o h a v e u s ed d a n g e rous d r u g
i n violation of S c t i o n 15. Despite th e pr esum p t i on, it i s su b m i t t e d
t hat t h e p e r so n a r r e s te d f o r p o s s ession o f d r u g p a r a p h e r n a l i a
must be subjected to screening laboratory examination or test,and
c onfirmatory t e st . S ection 1 5 r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e o f f e n der m u s t b e
"found to be positive for use ofany dangerous drug after a confirmatory
test" to b e held liable for use of dangerous drug .
In U.S. v. Look Chaw, G.R. No. 5889, July 12, 1911, it was
held that possession of the pipe is not a cr im e difFerent from that of
s moking opium in a p i p e .
 174 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Confirm a t or y T e s t
Positive confir m a t or y t e s t i s a n e l e m en t o f u s e c f d a n g erous
drugs under Section 15. Under A r t i cle 36 of R.A. No. 9165, the drug
tests must b e p e r f o r med o nl y b y a u t h o r i zed d ru g t e s t in g centers,
(Nacague v. Su l p i c io Li n e s , G. R . N o . 17 2 5 8 9, A u g u s t 8 , 2 0 1 0 )
However, the absence of such test cannot be r a i sed as an i ssue for
the first t i m e on appeal. (Amb re v. People, G.R. No. 191582, August
15, 2012)
In People v. Andrade, G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014, the,
information ch ar ged th e accused of use of dangerous drug w i t h out
allegation that he was apprehended and found positive for dangerous
drugs after a confir m a t or y t e st. Th e t r i a l court g r a n t e d th e m o ti on
to dismiss on the ground t ha t t o be held li a ble for use of dangerous
drug it isessential that the accused was arrested or apprehended
for drug-related crime, or subjected to drug testing under Section
36, and t ha t t h e a c cused was f o un d p o sit ive for d a n g erous dr ugs.
The Supreme Court r u led that th e tr ial court in st ead of immediately
d ismissing the case should have given the prosecution an opportunity
t o amend the defect in th e I n f o r m a t i o n .
P enalty of R e h a b i l i t a t i o n
T he penalty for u s e of d a n gerous dr ugs comm i t ted by a f i r s t -
t ime offender i s a m i n i m u m o f s i x ( 6 ) m o n t h s r e h a b i l i t a t i on . T h e
penalty of rehabili t a t ion is not subject to the Indeterm i n ate Sentence
aw for not being a prison sentence.(2007 Bar Exa
) Th lt
o r e a b i l i t a t i o n cannot be gr a d u a ted one degree lower, hence, the
privileged miti g at ing circum st ance of minority cannot be considered,
(2018 Bar E x a m) P r e v e nti ve i m p r i s o nme nt m a y b e c r e dited in t h e
service of the penalty of rehabil i t a t i on. (People v. Santiago, G.R. No.
191061, February 9, 2011)
ATTEMPT OR CO N S P IR ACY TO CO M M IT DRUG TR A F F ICKING
C onspiracy o r attempt to c ommit t h e f o l l o w i n g u n l a w f u l
acts is p u n i s h able: (1) i m p o r t a t i on , s a le, t r a d i ng , a d m i n i s t r a t i on,
i spensation, d e l i v e ry , d i s t r i b u t i o n a nd t r a n s p or t a t i o n
of any
d angerous dr u g '; (( 2) ) m a i n t e n a nce of a d e n , d i v e o r r e s or t w h e r e
any dangerous drug is used in any form; (3) manufacture of any
d angerous drug; and (4) cul t i v a t ion or c u l t u r e of p l a n ts, w h ich a r e
sources of dangerous drugs. (Section 26 of R.A. No. 9165
o., ) Conspirac
onspiracy
or attem pt to com c m i t p o s s ession or u s e of d a n gerous dr ugs i s n ot
listed as a punishable act under Section 26.
J9JC9B0M
V. CRIMES RELATIVE TC OPIUM AND OTHER 175
PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9165)
T he conspiracy i n S e ction 2 6 o f P..A. No . 9 165 r ef ers to t h a t
a s a crime and not t o t h a t a s a m ode of in cu r r i n g cr i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y
f or purposes of a p p l y in g t h e c o l l ective r e sponsibilit y r u l e . I f t h e
accused merely conspired to sell d.angerous drug, the c ri me s hould
be designated as conspiracy to sel'. darg erous dr ugs un der Sectio~
26 of R.A. No. 9 165. Thi s i s c onspiracy as a c r i m e . I f t h e a c cused
corspired to sell dangerous drugs, and thereafter, sold the dangerous
d rug in f u r t h e r a nc e w i t h s u c h c o n s p i r a cy, t h e c r i m e s h o ul d b e
d esignated as sale of dangerous dr ugs u n der Section 5 of R .A. N o .
9165, and not conspiracy to sell d a n ge"ous drugs un der Section 26
in relation t o S ection 5 o f R .A . N o . 9 1 65. I n t h i s c a se, conspiracy
is ',ust a mode of in cu r r i n g c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y , an d t h u s , Section 26,
which penalizes conspiracy as a crime. isnot applicable. However,
erroneous designation i n t h e i n f o iTnation i s no t f a t al . Th e b ody of
the informati on, and not the desigr ation of the crime, i s controllin g .
(People v. Fabro, G.R. No. 114261, February 10, 2000)
PERSONS LIABLE UNDER R.A. NO. 9165
Aside from th e p u s h er, d a n gerous dr u gs tr a ff ic ke r, p ossessor
a nd user, pr ot ector/coddler an d fi n a n cer ar e a l s o l i a bl e fo r c r i m e
involving dangerous drugs.
P rotector/coddler i s an y p e r son w h o k n o w i n gl y a n d w i l l f u l l y
consents to th e u n l a w fu l a ct s i n v o l v in g d a n gerous dr ugs and u s es
his influence, power or p o si t ion i n s h i e l d i ng, h a r b or i ng, screening
or facilitating the escape of any person he knows, or has reasonable
grounds to believe on or suspects, has commit ted th ese acts in order
t o prevent t h e a r r e st , p r osecution, ar d c o n v i c t ion o f t h e v i o l a t or .
(Section 8 of R.A. No. 9165)
Financier is any person who pays for, raises or supplies money
f or, or underw r i t es any of the ill egal activi t ies prescribed under th i s
Act. (Section 8 of R.A. No. 9165)
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
To establish th e ch ai n of cu stody, th e p r osecution m ust sh ow
the movements of th e d a n g erous dr ugs fr o m it s c o nfiscation up t o
its presentation in c o u r t. T h e p u r p o se of establishing t he c h a in o f
custody is t o e n s ur e t h e i n t e g r it y o f t h e co r p us d e l ic ti. ( People v.
Magat, G.R. No. 179989, September 29, 2008) The following links that
must be established in th e ch ain of cu stcdy in a b u y - bust sit u a t i on
are: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
 176 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
recovered from the accused by the apprehending of6cer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending of6cer to the
investigating officer; thir d, th e t u r n o v er by t he i n v e stigating officer
o ft the
e ' ill eegal
I drugto the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth,the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
s eized from t h e f o r e n sic ch em ist t o t h e c o u r t . (People v. Eamad,
G.B. No. 174198, January 19, 2010; People v. Lim, G. R. ¹ . 281 9 8 9 ,
September 4, 2018; 2009 and 2016 Bar Exa ms)
l NVENTORY AND PHOTOGR A P H
To establish the first link in th e chain of custody, and that is the
seizure of the dru g f ro m t h e a ccused, the prosecution m ust comply
with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 as amended by R.A. No. 10640.
I nventory and photographing of confiscated dangerous drugs
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 as amended by R.A. No. 10640
must b e m a d e im m e d i a t e ly at t h e pr o p e r p l a c e a n d b e f o re t h e
required witnesses.
l. I mm e d iateness — Inventory and photographing of
c onfiscated d a n gerous d r u g s m u s t b e m a d e i m m e d i a t el y b y t h e
apprehending officers after seizure and con6scation th ereof;
2. P l a c e o f i n v e n t o r y a n d p h o t o g r a p h i n g — In v e nto ry
and photographing of confiscated dangerous drugs must be made:
(a) at the place where the search warrant is served; or (b) atthe
nearest police station or at the nearest of6ce of the apprehending
officersin case of warrantless seizures.
T here is n o r u l e u n d e r t h e o r i g i na l v e r s ion o f S e ction 2 1 o f
R.A. No. 9 1 65 on t h e p l a c e w h e re t h e c o nf iscated d r u g s s h a ll b e
inventoried and photographed. Before, there are cases decided by
the Supreme Court that the physical inventory and photograph must
be immediately conducted at t h e p l a ce of a r r e st. Ho w e ver, Section
21 of RA N o . 9 16 5 a s a m e n ded b y R A N o . 1 0 640 n o
io includes a
s pecification of l ocations w h er e th e p h y s ical i n v e n t or y an d t a k i n g
of photographs m ust b e conducted, to w i t : " p l a ce where the search
warrant i s s erved" if t h e re i s a w a r r a n t ; o r "n e a r est police station
or nearest o ffice of the apprehending officers" in case of warr a n t l e s s
seizures. Compliance with this rule is mandatory. (See: People v.
Que, G.B. ¹ . 212 9 9 4, Ja n u a ry 81, 2018)
As explained by Senator Sotto, who sponsored Senate Bill
No. 2273 thateventually becomes R.A. No. 10640, this new rule is
J9JC9B0M
V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER 177
PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9165)
designed to p r o v id e a d d i t i o nal l o cati ons of t h e p l a c e of i n v e n t ory
and photographin g of seized dr u gs, w h ich i s s afe an d secure fr om
extreme danger of i m m e d i at e r e t a l i a t ory a c t ion of d ru g s y n dicates
at the place of seizure.
3. T h r e e wi t nesses — Inventory and photographing of
confiscated dangerous dr ugs m us t b e m a d e i n t h e p r e sence of: (a)
accused or person from whom such it ems were confiscated or seized,
or his representative or counsel; (b) elected public official; and (c) a
representative of the N a t i onal Pr osecution Service or the media.
U nder t h e o r i g i n a l v e r s ion o f S e c t ion 2 1 o f R . A . N o . 9 1 6 5 ,
a t least four w i t n e sses (accused, elective official, m e di a an d D O J
representative) ar e r e q u i r e d t o b e p r e s en t w h i l e t h e d a n g er ous
drugs are being inventoried and photographed. However, R.A. No.
1 0640 has amended Section 2 1 of R .A . N o . 9 165 by r e p l acing t h e
four-witness rule by the th r ee-witness (accused, elective official, and
m edia or NPS representative) rul e .
R.A. No. 9165 as amended uses the disjunctive "or" in the phrase
"the National P r osecution Service of media." T hus, a representative
from the media and a representative from th e N a t i o nal Pr osecution
Service are now alt er n a t i ves to each other. (People v. Que, G.R. 1Vo.
212994, January 31, 2018)
Senator Poe, a co-sponsor of Senate Bill No. 2273 explained that
compliance with the rule on wit n esses during the physical inventory
is difficult and media representatives are not alw ays available in all
c orners of th e P h i l i p p i n es, especially i n m o r e r e m ot e ar eas. Th u s,
t he requirement on th e n u m b er of w i t n e sses was adjusted by R .A .
No. 10640.
T he first l i n k i n t h e c h ai n o f c u s t ody r u l e i s t h e s eizure an d
m arking o f t h e i l l e g a l d r u g r e c overed f r o m t h e a c c u sed b y t h e
a pprehending of6cer. To establish t h i s l i n k , t h e r u l e o n i n v e n t or y
a nd photography o f t h e c on fi scated d r u g s r u l e m u s t b e c o m p l i ed
with. Ifthe inventory and photography of the drugs were made in
the presence of two wit n esses, accused and media representative, in
v iolation of th e t h r e e-wi t n esses rule, th e accused will b e acquit t e d
because the seizure of the drugs is inv a l id. (2019 Bar Exam)
A dditional r e q u i r e m e n t s
Section 21 of R .A . N o . 9 165 also r e qu i res t ha t t h e w i t n e sses
must sign the inventory and be given copies thereof and that drugs
must be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for examinati on
 178 CRIMINAL IA.W REVIEWER
VOI,UME II
within t w e n t y - f our ( 2 4 ) h o u r s u p o n s u c h c o n fiscat on. (2 009 a n c
2016 Bar Exams)
N on-comp l i a n c e w i t h t h e R e q u i r e m e n t s
The original v e r sion of S ection 2 1 of R .A . N o . 9 16 5 does not
p rovide a rule on the effects of the violation t h e=eof. But u n der t h i s
provision as amended by R.A. No. 10640, non-compliance with the
r equirements s h al l n o t r e n d e r v o i d a n d i n v a l i d t h e s e i z u res a n d
custody over dangerous drugs provided that th e following requisite:
are present:
1. T h e i n t e g r i t y a n d t h e e v i d e n t i ar y v a l u e o f t h e s e i z ed
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team; and
2. Th e r e i s a j u s t i fi a bl e g r o un d f o r t h e n o n - compli ance of
s uch requirement .
According t o S e n ator S o t to, no n - observance of the p r e scribed
p rocedures s h o ul d n o t a u t o m a t i c a ll y m e a n . t h a t t h e
s eizure or
confiscation i s i n v a l i d o r i l l e g al, as lo n g as th e la w en f o r cement
officers couldj u s t if y th e same and could prove that the integrity and
t he evidentiary v a lu e of the seized items are not ta i n t ed. T hi s i s t h e
effect of the inclusion in the proposal to amend the phrase j 'ustifiable
grounds."
P reserv a t io n of th e I n t e g r i t y o f t h e C o n fi s c a ted D r u g s
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless
there is a showing of bad faith, ill w i ll , or proof that the evidence has
b een tampered with . To overcome a presumpt ion of regular it y in t h e
handling of exhibits by public officers, the accused has the burden to
show that the evidence has been tampered with. (People v. Miran d a ,
G.R. No. 174778, October 2, 2007)
Justifiable Grounds for Not Comply ing wit h th e Th r ee-Wit n ess
Rule
The justifiable grounds for n on -compliance must be pr oven as
facts, because the Court cannot pr esume what t h ese ground
roun s a r e, or
a e y even exist. Moreover, forthe above-saving clause t
oapp Iy,
th e prosecution m u s t e x p l ai n t h e r e a s ons b e h in d t h e p r o c edural
lapses, and t h a t t h e i n t e g r it y a n d e v i d e n t i ar y v a l u e of t h e s e i zed
evidence had nonetheless been preserved. (Peop.'e v. Paz, G.R. N o .
229512, January 81, 2018)
J9JC9B0M
V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER 179
PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9165)
T he following are justi fi able grounds for fail ur e to comply wi t h
the three-witness rule:
1. Th e a t t e n d a nce of elective official and media or NP S
representative was impossible because the place ofarrest was
a remote area;
2. T h e s a f e t y o f t h e s e r e q u i re d w i t n e sses dur in g t h e
inventory an d p h ot ograph of th e seized drugs was th r e at ened
by an immediate retaliatory action ofthe accused or any person
acting for and in hi s behalf ;
3. Th e e l e c ted official t h e m selves were involved in t h e
punishable acts sought to be apprehended;
4. T h e t i m e c o n s t r a i nt s an d u r g e ncy of th e a n t i - d r u g
operations, w h i c h o f t e n r e l y o n t i p s o f c o n f i d en t ia l a s s ets,
prevented the law enforcers from obtai n in g the presence of the
required wi t n esses even before the offenders could escape; or
5. E a r nest efforts to secure the presence of these
r equired w i t n e sses wi t h i n t h e p e r i o d r e q u i re d u n de r A r t i c l e
125 of the Revised Penal Code prove fut il e t h r o ugh no fault of
the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with
arbitrary detenti on. (People v. Lim, G.R. No. 281989, September
4, 2018)
T he police w er e a b l e t o e x p l a i n t h e f a i l u r e t o c o n d uc t a n
inventory and t ake photographs of the seized items. This is because
o f the intervening fact t h a t on e I l l u m i n a d o Acosta was shot at t h e
time of th e b u y - b us t o p er a t i on. (P eople v. Fl o r , G. R. No . 21 6 017,'
January 19, 2018)
In People v. Lim, supra, an a gent t e stified th at no m e m bers of
the media and barangay officials arri v ed at the crime scene because
it was late at ni ght an d it w a s r a i n i n g, ma k in g it u n s afe for them to
wait at th e h o use of th e accused. Another agent si m i l a rl y d eclared
t hat the i n v e n t or y w a s m a d e i n t h e P D E A o f fice considering t h a t
i t wa s l a t e i n t h e e v e n i n g a n d t h e r e w e r e n o a v a i l a bl e m e d i a
representative and ba r a n gay officials despite the ir e ffort to contact
t hem. He a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e r e ar e t i m e s w h e n t h e y d o no t i n f o r m
the barangay o ffic ials p r i o r t o t h e i r o p e r a t i on a s t h e y m i g h t l e a k
t he confidential i n f o r m a t i on . Th e S u p r em e C o ur t s a i d t h a t t h e s e
justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient
attempt to comply w i t h t h e l a w . Th e p r o secution l i k e w ise failed to
explain wh y t h e y d i d n o t s e cur e th e p r e sence of a r e p r esentativ e
f rom the DOJ. Accused was acquitt e d .
 180 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R V. CRDf ES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER 161
VOLUME II PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9165)
A policeman failed to comply w it h S ection 21 of R.A. No. 9165
document tacitl y a d m i t t i n g t h e o f fense charged, the constit u t i o n al
since the inventory an d ph otograph of the dr ugs were only m ade in
s afeguard must b e observed. The p r a ct ice of r e qu i r i n g o f fender t o
the presence of ba r a n gay t a n od a n d t h e s a m e w a s n o t
submitted sign such receipt, which is tant a m ount to an extr aj u di cial confession
t o the P N P C r i m e ' L a b or at or y w i t h i n 2 4 h o u r s ( b e cause h e w a s
for the commission of the offense, is a violation of his constit u t i o n al
sick). On appeal, th e d efense raised th e i s sue of i n a d m i ssibil it y of
r ight to r e m ai n s i l e nt . N e v e r t h el ess, accused cannot b e a cqui t t e d
e vidence for f a i l u r e t o c o m pl y w i t h t h e r u l e o n c h a i n o f
t d . if his crim i na l ac t o f s e l l in g d a n gerous d ru g h a s b een sufficientl y
e po iceman f a i led t o c o m pl y w i t h t h e r u l e o n t h r e e w i t n e sses
proven by other evidence.(People v. Castro, G.R. ¹. 106583, June
( accused, public officer, and m e di a or N P S r e p r esentative) and di d
19, 1997; 1992 Bar Exam )
not offer justi fi able grounds for such non-compliance. However, the
issue of non-compliance wit h Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
raised for the first ti m e on appeal. Hence, the defense of the accused POEA COORDINATION
should be rejected. (People v. Ba d i l l a , G . R. N o. 218578, August 31,
Silence of the Iaw as to the consequences of the failure on the part
2016; 2016 Bar Exam)
pf the law enforcers to seek the prior a u t h o r i ty of t he P DEA c annot
be interpreted as a legislative int ent to m ake an arrest wi t h out such
P roce d u r a l R e q u i r e m e n t s
PDEA participation ill egal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an
In People v. Lim, supra, the Supreme Court, En Banc, expressly arrest is inadmi ssible. (People v. Clari t e, G.R. ¹. 18 7 1 5 7,February
r equired police officer to m ak e a s w or n s t a t e m ent cont ai n in g t h e i r , '5, 2012) Lack of coordin a t ion w i t h t h e P D E A w i l l n o t i n v a l i d a t e
c ompliance wit h t h e r e q u i r e m e nt s of S ection 2 1 o f R .A . N o . 9 1 6 5 a buy-bust operation. Such coordination is not an indispensable
o r the j u s t i f i cation fo r n o n -compli ance t h ereof an d s t eps t a ke n t o requirement in b u y - bust operations. Neither Section 86 of Republic
preserve the integrity of the confiscated dangerous drugs; otherwise, A ct No. 9165 nor i t s I m p l e m e n t in g R u l e s an d R e g ul a t i ons m a k e s
the investigatin g fi s cal m u s t n o t i m m e d i a t ely fi l e t h e c ase before PDEA's participation a condit ion sin e qua non for th e conduct of a
t he court. I n s t ead, he m u s t r e fer t h e c ase for f u r t h e r p r e l i m i n a r y buy-bust operation.(People v. Mendosa, G.R. No. 189327, February
investigation. If t h e i n v e st i gat in g fi scal fi le d th e case despite such 29, 2012; People v. Caiz, G.R. ¹. 2 1 5 8 4 0,July 18, 2016)
a bsence, the cour t m a y e x e r c ise it s d i s cr etion t o e i t h e r r e f u s e t o
issue a commit m ent or der (or w a r r an t of ar r est) or di smiss the case
INFORMANT
outright forlack of probable cause.
The adverse evidentiary effect of non-presentation of an
informant wil l d epend on whether his identi ty is confidential or n o t.
MARKING
S ection 2 1 o f R . A . N o . 9 1 6 5 d oe s no t e x p r e ssly s p ecify t h e C onfidentia l I n f o r m a n t
m atter of ""markin
m k ' g o f t h e s e i zed it em s i n w a r r a n t l ess seizures to
The failure of the prosecution to present the confidential
e nsure it s i n t e g r i t y . H o w e v er , j u r i s p r u d en t ia l r u l e r e q u i r e s t h a t
informant was no t w i l f u l ly u n ju sti fied. Police informants wo rk
t he m a r k i n g o f d r u g s s h o ul d b e d o n e ( 1 ) i n t h e p r e s ence of t h e
incognito; to para de th em in c o u rt w o u ld d e s troy t h e ir u s e fu lness.
apprehended violator (2) i m m e d i a t ely u pon confiscation. (People v.
Therefore, hisidentity may remain confidential. There are strong
Sanckez, G.R. No. 175882, October 15, 2008)
practical reasons for such continued secrecy, including the continued
safety of th e i n f o r me r a n d t h e e n c our agement of o t h er s t o r e p ort
CO NFISCATION RECEIPT wrongdoings t o t h e p o l i c e a u t h o r i t i es (P e o ple v. De Je s u s, G . R .
Vo. 98852, Ja n u a ry 2 4 , 1 9 92) Th is r u l e i s a p p l i c able w h e th er t h e
Confiscation receipt signed by th e accused cannot be accepted
ormer is an i n t e l l i g ence agent (P eople v. Boco, G.R. ¹. 12 9 6 7 6 ,
as proof that d a n gerous dru g an d m a r k e d m o ney w ere seized from
tune 28, 1999), or civil i an i n f o r m er or s q u e aler. (People v. Nicolas,
i m. It i s i n a d m i s sible in e v i d ence as th ere i s n o sh ow in g t h a t h e
G.R. ¹ . 110116, February 1, 1995; 1992 Bar Exam )
w as assisted by counsel w he n h e s i g ned th e s a me. Since t hi s i s a

J9JC9B0M
 182 CRIMINAL IMW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
N on-confide n t ia l I n f o r m a n t
If the infor m an t a cted as poseur-buyer or assisted the poseur.
buyer in tr a n sacting wit h th e pu sher, his identity is not conjidential,
Withholding th e t e st i m ony of t h e i n f o r m a nt , wh o a cted as poseur-
buyer, d u r i n g t h e t r i a l c o u l d n o t a t t a i n o b j e c t iv e o f c o n cealing
h is ident it y f r o m t h e a c c used an d f o r t h e p e r s onal s ecur i ty . T h e
informan t m u s t b e w e l l k n o w n i f n o t fa m i l i a r t o t he a c c u sed;
otherwise he could not act as poseur-buyer. (People v. Roj o, G.R. No.
82787, July 5, 1989)
PLEA BAR G A INING
Under Section 10 of Art i cle XV II I of th e 1987 Constit u t i on, "all
courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitutior. shall
continue to exercise their j u r i s d i c t i on, u n ti l o t h e r w ise pr ovided
s.e by
l aw. The provisions of the existing Rules of'Court,j u d i c i ary acts, and
procedural l aws not inconsistent with t hi s Constitution shall r emain
operative unless amended or r epealed by th e Sup r eme Court o th
Congress." Th is i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n al r e c o gniti on o f t h e c o n c u r r e nt
power of Congress and th e S u p r em e Court t o a m en d or r e p eal rhe
p rovisions of the Rules of Court .
However, in Es t ipo na, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August
15, 2017, the Su p r em e C o ur t r u l e d t h a t t h e p o wer t o p r o m u l g ate
rules of pleading, pr a ctice and p r ocedure is now ex clusive domain
of the Supreme Court an d no longer shared wit h t h e E x ecutive and
Leegislative
' departments. Since the provision on plea bargaining
i s procedural , C o n g r ess cannot t h r o u g h l e g i sl at ion p r o h i bi t p l
argaining because the procedural rules made by the Supreme
C ourt a l l ow s i t . B y r e a so n t h e r e of, Section 2 3 o f R . A . N o . 9 1 6 5
w hich p r o h i b it s p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p e r t a i n i n g t o c r i m e s i n v o l v i n g
dangerous drugs (2005, 2004, and 1998 Bar Exa ms) was declared as
unconstitu t i o nal for b eing contr ar y t o th e r u l e m a k i n g a u t h o r it y of
t he Supreme Court .
T he Supreme Cou rt , i n s e p a r at e r e soluti ons i n A . M . N o . 1 8-
03-16-SC issued in 2018 and 2019, held, among others, that plea
bargaining in d ru g cases is allowed and probation may be availed of
only in the following in st ances:
1. W h e n t h e accused is charged with possession of dangerous
drugs under Section 11 ofR.A. No. 9165 and the quantity of" h b "
ani y o s a u
i s ess
1s I than 5 g r am s or i n c ase of m a r iju ana, it i s l ess than 3 00
grams.
J9JC9B0M
V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER 183
PROHIBITED DRUGS
(R.A. NO. 9165)
2. W h e n t h e a c cused is charged un der Section 5 of R .A .No.
9 165 v.ith t h e s a l e o f " s h a bu " a n d t h e q u a n t i t y f o u n d i n h i s / h er
possession is less than 1 g r am ; or i f m a r i j u a n a on ly , it i s l ess th an
10 grams.
3. W h e n t h e accused is charged under Section 18 (Possession
of Dangerous Drugs Dur in g Pa r t i es, Social Gather i ngs or Meetings)
i n relation t o Section 1 1 of R .A . N o . 9 165 an d t h e q u a n t it y o f t h e
dangerous drug in hi s/her possession is less than 5 grams; or in case
i t is mariju a na, the quant it y i s less than 800 gram s.
4. W h e n t h e a c cused is an e m p l oyee or a v i s i tor o f a d r u g
d en, dive or r e s or t p r o v i de d t h a t h e / sh e i s c h a r ged s olely u n d e r
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9165, and th ere is no other person charged for
maintaining the said drug den, dive, or resort.
Plea Bargaining is also allowed when an accused is charged
w ith possession of "shabu" weighing 5 to 9.99 grams; or of mariju a n a
weighing 300 to 499 gr ams. However, probation of the accused will
not be allowed in such in st ances.
No plea bar gai n in g i s a l l o wed i n t h e f o l l o w in g i n s t a nces: (1)
Possession of 10 grams or more of "shabu;" (2) Possession of 500
g rams or m or e of m a r i j u a n a ; (3) Sale of " shabu" exclusively, w i t h
a quantity of 1.00 gram or m o re; (4) Sale of mar i j u an a exclusively,
w ith a quant it y of 10 gr ams or m o re; and (5) Sale of all other k i n d s
of dangerous drugs.
I MMUNITY FROM P R O S E C U T IO N
N otwith st a n d in g th e p r ovi sions of Section 17, Rule 119 of th e
Revised Rules of Cri m i n a l P r ocedure and the pr ovisions of R.A. No.
6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act of 1991, any
p erson who has vi ol ated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19, A r t i c l e
II of this Act, who volun t a r il y g i ves inform a t ion about any vi olation
o f Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 , 13, an d 16 , A r t i cl e I I o f t h i s A c t a s w e l l
a s any violation of th e o f f enses menti oned if c o m m i t t e d by a d r u g
s yndicate, or any inf or m a t ion leading to the wh ereabouts, identit i es
a nd arrest of all or an y of t h e m e m b ers t h er eof; and wh o w i l l i n g l y
testifies against such persons as described above, shall be exempted
from prosecution or p u n i s h m en t f o r t h e o f f ense w it h r e f er ence to
which his/her i n f o r m a t ion of t e st i m ony w er e giv en, and may p l ead
or prove the giving of such infor m a t ion and testim ony in bar of such
prosecution: Provided, That t he following conditio ns concur:
 184 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
(1) T h e i n f o r m a t ion and testim ony are necessary for the
conviction ofthe persons described above;
( 2) S u c h i n f o r m a t io n an d t e s tixnony are not ye t i n t h e
possession of the State;
(3) S u c h i n f o r m a t ion and testim ony can be corroborated
o n their m a t e r ial poi n t s ;
(4) T h e i n f o r m an t o r w i t n e s s ha s no t b een p r e v i ously
convicted of a c r i m e i n v o l v in g m o r a l t u r p i t u d e , except wh en
there is no other d i r ect evi dence available for th e S t at e other
t han t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a n d t e s t i m on y o f s a i d i n f o r m a n t o x
witness; and
{ 5) T h e i n fo r m a n t or w i t n e s s sh a l l st r i c t l y axx<
faithfull y comply w i t h ou t d el ay, any condition or u n d er t a k ing,
reduced into wr i t i n g , l a w f u ll y i m p osed by the State as fur ther
consideration for th e g r an t of i m m u n i t y & o m p r o secution axx <
p unishment .
Provided, fur t h er, That t h i s ixnmuni ty m ay be enjoyed by such
informant or w i t n ess who does not appear to be the most gui lt y for
the offense with reference to which his/her infor m a t ion or testimony
was g i v en: Pr o v i d e d, f i n a l l y, Th a t t h e r e i s n o di r e c t e v i d e nce
available forthe State except for the information and testimony of
the said infor m an t or w i t n ess (S e ction 88of R.A. ¹. 9 16 5 )
In Pe o ple v. Am p a t u a n , G . R . N o 188707, J u l y 3 0 , 2 0 1 4,
it wa s h el d t h a t t h e a l l e g a t ion t h a t D u j o n i s e n g a ged i n i l l e gal
s ale, indeed even t h e f a c t t h a t D u j o n i s a d e t a i n e e ch ar ged w i th
violation of th e l a w , i s n o t a d i s q u a l i f ication f ro m i m m u n i t y s i nce '
such is not equivalent to aprevious *'conviction of a crime in v olving '
x noral tu r p i t u d e . D u j on , h a v in g ai l t h e q u a l i 6 c a t i ons an d n on e of ,
t he disquali6cations u n de r t h e l a w , i s e l i g i bl e for i m m u n i t y f r o m ::
prosecution.
J9JC9B0M
V l. CRIMES AGAlNST PUBLlC MORA L S
Articles 195 to 199 of the Revised Penal Code punished illegal
gambling. However, P.D. No. 1602 has repealed Ar t i cles 195 to 199
o f the Revised Penal Code. Now, P .D. No . 1602 pu n i shes all f o r m s
of gambhng.
ANTI-GAMB L ING LAW
P.D. NO. 1602 AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 9287
P.D. No. 1602 was enacted to increase the penaltiesprovided
in various Phi l i p p in e Ga m b l in g L aw s such as A r t i c les 195 to199 of
the Revised Penal Code on forms of Gambl ing and Bett i ng, R.A. No.
3063 on Horse Racing Bookies, P.D. No. 449 on Cockfight i ng, P.D .
No. 483 on Game Fi x i ng, P.D. No. 519 on Slot M a c h i n es. (Separate
opinion of Justice Davide in Del M a r v . PA G C OR, G.R. ¹ . 1 88 2 9 8 ,
August 24, 2001)
PUNISHABLE ACTS
I llegal g a m b l i n g i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s o n w h o , i n a n y
'
manner directly or i n d i r e ctly t a kes part i n a n y u n a u t h o r i zed game
scheme whether upon chance or ski ll , w h er ein w a g ers consisting of
money, articles ofvalue or representative of value are at stake ox
made. (1969 Bar Exam)
D irect P a r t i c i p a t i o n
Players, bet takers and bettors in gambling schemes, or referee,
umpire, ju dge or c o ach i n i l l e ga l s p o r ts , m a i n t a i ne r o r c o n d u ctox
of illegal g ambling, and owner o f t h e e s t a b l i shm ent w h er e i l l e gal
gambling is held, are all l i able for illegal gambling. But a m ere
b ystander or spectator in an i l l e gal gambl in g game is not crim i n a l l y
liable, because he does not t ak e p ar t t h e r e in , di r ectly or i n d i r ectly .
(Revised Penal Code by Luis Reyes)
185
 186 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R
VOLUME II
G ame of C h a n c e or S k i l l
Under the old rule, games, the result of which depends
wholly
or chiefly upon skill, w ere not considered as gambling.(U.S. v,
Hilario, G ;R . N o . 69 4 1, Ma r c h 6; 1 9 1 8) H o w e ver, u n d er P . D . N o ,
1602, games of skill ar e now in c l u ded in th e defini t ion of gambling,
The contr act "f u t u r e s" is p u r e l y s p e c ula ti ve t r a n s a ctions in
which t h er e ar e n o m i n a l c o n t r a ct s t o s el l fo r f u t u r e de l i v e r y, bu t
where in fact no delivery is int ended or executed. The nominal seller
does not have or expect to have a stock of merchandise he purports
to sell nor does the nom i nal b u yer expect to r eceive it or t o pay for
the price. Instead of t h at , a p ercentage or m a r gi n i s p a id , w h ich is ''i
increased or di m i n i s hed as th e m a r k e t r a t e s go up an d d o wn , an5
accounted for t o t h e b u y e r . T h i s i s s i m p l e s p eculati on, g a m b li ng
o r wagerin g o n p r i c e s w i t h i n a g i v e n t i m e ; i t i s n o t b u y i n g a n d
selling an d i s i l l e gal a s a g a i nst p u b li c p o l i cy. (O napal P h i l i p p i n es
Commodities, Inc. v. Court of Appe als, G.R. No. 90 7 07, February 1,
1998) This scheme is a game of chance.
Wager
Wager is an element of the crime of illegal gambli ng. However,
there is a v i e w t h a t g a m e s or s p orts specifically m e nt io ned i n t h e
law such as monte, jueteng, lottery and dog race are prohibited even
though money or other consideration of value is not at stake. (U.S. v.
Rafael, G.R. No. 7880, September 18, 1912) The Rafael case involved
t he i n t e r p r e t a t io n o f A c t N o . 1 6 2 7 , t h e o l d g a m b l i n g l a w . T h e
principle in Rafael case should not be applied in the inte rp re ta t i on of
P.D. No. 1602. To rule otherwise is to consider all games specifically
mentioned in P.D. No. 1602 including basketball, boxing, volleyball,
bowling, and p i n gpong as i l l egal gambl in g a l t h o ugh no w a g ers are
at stake. A reading of P.D. No. 1602 shows that w ager is an element
o f all forms of ill egal gambl i n g .
Lottery
Lottery sh al l b e c on sidered as i l l e gal g a m b l in g i f a v a l u a b le
consideration of some kind is paid, directly or ind i r ectly, for a chance
to draw a price. (The Revised Penal Code by Vicente Francisco; Caltex
v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-I 9 6 5 0, September 29, 1966)
In lot t e ry , t h er e m u s t b e p a y m en t o f s o m e t h in g o f v a l u e , or
agreement to p ay , for t h e c h a nce to wi n a p r i ce. If t h e p a y m ent is
the consideration for th e goods pur chased, and not a consideration
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 187
f or the chance to win a p r i ce, there is no lott er y . (U.S. v. Olsen ana'
Marker, G.R. No. L-11602, March 6, 1917) If the buyer m u st p ay a n
amount in addition to the regular price of the goods purchased, there
is lottery. I n s uch a c a se, the p a y m ent i s n o t o nl y a c o n sideration
f or the g oods b ou gh t b u t a l s o a c o n s i d er at ion f o r t h e c h a n c e of
winning a p r i c e. (P h i l i p p i ne Re fin i ng Co m p a ny v. P a l o m a r, G . R „
No. L-29062, March 9, 1987; Palomar v. CFI of M a n i l a B r a n ch I X V ,.
G.R. No. L-29881, August 81, 1988; Uy v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-28248,.
February 28, 196'9)
El Debate principle, which considered a plan whereby prizes can
be obtained wit h out any a d d i t i o nal consideration when a pr oduct is
p urchased as lottery or il l egal gambli ng, is not anym ore controlli n g .
Ycorporation isa major manufacturer of soap and toilet articles.
With the anr ouncement of general increase in prices of its products,
i t, also announced through its President a contest in connection wit h
o ne of its soap p r o ducts. Coupons w er e i n s er ted i n t h e w r a p p e r s,
some of which would win v a l u a ble prizes. The president is not liable
f or illegal ga m b l in g s i nce t h er e i s n o s h o w in g t h a t a n a m o u n t i n
addition to t h e r e g u la r p r i c e i s r e q u i re d t o j oi n t h e c o n t est. (1971
Bar Exam)
Illegal Number Game
I llegal n u m ber g am e i s an y f or m o f i l l e gal g a m b l in g a ct i v i t y
w hich uses n u m b er s or c o m b i n a t i on s t h e r eof as f a ctors i n g i v i n g
out jackpots s uch a s ju e t e ng, m a s i ao a n d l a s t t t v o. A l l f o r m s o f
gambling are punishable under P.D. No. 1602. However, ifgambling
constitutes illegal nu m ber game, P.D. No. 1602 is deemed amended
by R.A. No. 9287. The penaltyfor illegal number game is higher
compared to other forms of gambling.
GRAVE SCANDAL
Grave scan dal i s co m m i t t e d b y an y p er s o n who o f f ends
against decency or good customs by a highly scandalous conduct not
constitutin g other felony. (Art i c le 200)
Amelia. a famous actress, bought the penth ouse unit of a posh
c ondominium b u i l d i n g i n T a g u i g C i t y . E v er y n i g h t , A m e li a w o u l d
s wim naked in th e pr i v a te, but open air, pool of her penth ouse unit .
It must have been obvious to Am elia t ha t sh e could have been seen
from nearby bui l d i n gs. In fact, some residents occupying the higher
floors of the nearby residential bui l d i ngs entertai ned themselves and
 188 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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their fr i e nds by w a t c h in g he r s wi m n u d e f r o m t h ei r w i n d o ws. Thr,
crime commit ted by Am elia is grave scandal. Even though she swam
naked in a p r i v a t e p o ol, i t i s o b v i ous t h a t sh e could b e seen fr om
nearby buil d i n gs. Despite the fact t ha t her p r i v at e pool is visible to
the public, she exposed her n u d e body, wh ich i s h i g hl y scandalous
act that i s o f f ensive to d ecency or good customs. (2018 Bar E x am)
T hose who were watching her are not commi t t i n g a crim e . (1996Bar
Exam)
T RAFFICKING IN PERSO N S
R.A. NO. 9208 as amended by R.A. NO. 10364
T he specific c r i m e s o f t r a f fi c k i n g i n p e r s o n a r e d e fi n e d i n
S ection 4 o f R . A . N o . 9 2 0 8 . B u t t h e d e l i b e r a t io n i n t h e S e n a t e
shows that th e specific crimes of tr affi ck in g m us t cont ain th e t h r ee
essential elements of t r af fi c k in g i n p e r son as defined i n S ection 3,
to wit: (1) act of tra f 6 c ki n g, (2) means to commit t r a f f ic k i ng a nd (3j
e xploitive p u r p o se. H ow ever, t h e e l e m ent o f m ' cans of t r a f fi c k i ng
s hall be dispensed with if th e vi cti m i s a chi l d .
T raffick in g i n P e r so n i n G e n e r a l
Under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9208, the elements of traffick ing in
persons are as follows:-
1. A ct s o f T r a f f i c k i n g — R e cr u i t m e nt , o b t a i n i ng , h i r i n g,
providing, offering, transport a t i on, transfer, maint a i n i ng, harboring,
o r receipt of tr affi cked vict i m ;
2. M e a n s t o C o n u n i t T r a f f i c k i n g — By means of threat, or
use of force,or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or of positi on, t a k in g a dv a n t age of the vu l n er abi1ity
of the person, or th e gi v in g or r e ceiving of p a y m e nt s or b enefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person.
Kidnapping o r d e t a i n i n g a h u m a n b e i n g f o r t h e p u r p ose of
enslaving hi m i s s l a v ery u n d e r t h e R e v i sed Penal Code. However,
the offender can b e p r o secuted for t r a f fi c k in g i n p e r s ons. Th r e at,
or use of force, or other fo rm s of coercion, abduction is a m e a ns to
commit t r af fi ck in g in p ersons.
T he accused deceived th e v i c ti m b y s a y i n g t h a t h e r w o r k i n
Malaysia would be as restaurant enter t a i n er, when in fact, she would
be working as a prosti t u t e. Thi s is t r af fi ck in g in p er son. f raud and
deception are means to commit t r a ff ic k i ng in person. (People v. Laili,
G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011)
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 189
T here ar e a l l e g a t i on s t h e J a p a n ese I m p e r ia l A r m y d u r i n g
World Wa r II co e r c ed F i l i p i n o c o m f o rt w o m e n t o p r o v i d e s e xual
services to J a p a n e se so l d ie rs. H y p o t h e t i c ally, t h i s i s t r a f f i c k i n g
in persons. Ab u se of p o w er o r o f p o s i t i on i s a m e a n s t o c o m m i t
trafficking in persons.
Purchasing or s e l l i n g a h u m a n b ei n g f o r t h e p ur p o s e o f
enslaving him is slavery. However, the offender can be prosecuted
for traf6cking in p ersons. Giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person
is a means to coinmit t r af fi ck in g in p er sons.
Traf6cking in persons may be committed also by means of
taking adva ntage of the persons' vulnerability as mi n o rs ( People v.
De Dios, G.R. ¹ . 28 4 0 1 8,tu n e 6, 2 018) or as a pe rson, who needs
money. Before, human trafficking is punishable as slavery where
lack of consent of the victim i s an element. H ow ever, because of the
d ifficulty of p r o v in g sl av ery s i nce t h er e ar e occasions that v i c t i m s
g ave their consent to t h i s a ct , th e com m u n i t y o f n a t i on s i n clu di n g
t he Philippi nes made tr affick in g in p er sons a crime wit h or w i t h o u t
consent of t h e t r a f fi c ke d v i c t i m . H o w e v er , t h e y r e p l a ced " l ack o f
consent" with "t a k i ng a d v a n t age of vulnerability of the victim" as an
e lement of t r af fi c k in g i n p e r s on. I n s u m , e ven t h o ugh t h e v i c t i m s
consented to h u ma n t r a f f i ck i ng, if t h e t r a f 6 c ker t ook a d v a n t age of
t heir vulner abil i ty , t r af fi ck in g in p ersons is still comm i t t e d .
Acts of tr a f fick in g comm i t t e d for ex pl oit iv e p u r p ose against a
child, or when the adoption is ind uced by any form of consideration,
shall also be considered as 'traffick ing in persons' even if they do not
i nvolve any of the means to commit t r af fi c k i n g .
Since the victims are m i n or , means to commit t r a f f i ck ing such
as threat or use of force, coercion, or f r aud ne ed not be established
by evidence. Even wi t h out th e use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means, a minor's consent is not recognized by law, (People v. A guirre,
G.R. No.219952, November 20, 2017) or shall not be considered as
having been given out of his or her own free will. (People v. Ramirez,
G.R. ¹ . 21 7 9 7 8,ja n u a r y 80, 2019)
AAA was first l u red to prostit u t ion when accused offered her to
a male customer and paid her P400.00 for the transaction. Several
other tr a n sactions t r a n s p i re d t h e r e aft er. A c cused w o ul d t r a n s act
with the customers and then pay AAA each time for her service. It did
not matter that th ere was no threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception or abuse of power that was employed by accused when she
 190 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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involved AAA in her i l l i cit sexual t r a de. AAA was still a m i nor wh en
she was exposed to prostit u t ion by th e pr oddi ng, promises and acts
of accused. Traffick ing in p e r sons may be commi t ted also by means
of taking adv an t age of the persons' vulnerability as min o rs. Accused
was convicted of quali f ied t r a f f i ck in g i n p e r son. (People v. De Dios,
G.R. No. 284018, June 6, 2018)
3. E x pl o i t i v e P u r p o se —The act of trafficking is committe d
f or any of t h e f o l l o w in g p u r p o ses: (a) Sexual ex pl oit a t ion s uch as
prostitu t ion or pornography; (b) Labor exploitat ion such forced labor
or services, slavery, servi t u de; an d (c) O r gan e x pl oit a t ion such as
removal or sale oforgans.
Section 3 ofR.A. No. 9208 in defining trafficking in person used
the phrase "for the purpose of exploitation." Hence, the third element
o f this crime is exploitive pur pose. Recruiti ng, hir in g or tr a n sferri n g
the victim t h r o u g h t h e r e q u i r e d m e a'ns such as t a k i n g a d v a n t a ge
o f her vuln er abi l it y for p u r p ose of exploitat ion such as prostit u t i on
consummates the crime of tr affi ck in g in p erson. Actual exploit a t i on
is not necessary for pu r p ose of consumm a t ion th er eof.
Accused approached PO1 Nemenzo and offered him th e sexual
services of f ou r g i r l s , t w o o f w h o m w e r e m i n o r s , f o r P 2 , 4 0 0.00.
The police operation ha d b een th e r e s ul t o f p r e v i ous su r v ei l l ance,
B oth m i n o r v i c t i m s t e s ti fie d t h a t t h i s i n c i d en t w a s n o t t h e fi r s t
t ime t h a t a c c u sed p i m p e d t h e m o u t t o c u s t o m e rs . I t w a s h e l d
t hat t h e c r i m e o f t r a f f i c k in g i n p e r s o n i n v o l v in g p r o s t i t u t i o n i s
considered consumm ated even if no sexual in t ercourse (or no actual
sexual ex pl oit a t i on ) h a d t a k e n p l a c e s i nc e t h e m e r e t r a n s a ction
c onsummates t h e c r i m e . (People v. Ra m i r e z, G. R . No . 21 7 9 78,
January 80, 2019)
C onsent of th e v i c t i m is i m m a t e r i a l
T raffickin g i n p e r son ca n b e c o m m i t t e d w i t h o r w i t h o u t t h e
victim's c o n sen t o r k n o w l e d g e, a nd w i t h i n o r ac r o s s national
borders. Th us, consent of t h e v i c t i m s , wh o ar e m i n o r s , t o e n gage
i n prostit u t io n i s n o t a d e f ense in t r a f fi c k in g i n p e r s ons i n v olvi ng
recruitm en t a n d t r a n s p o r t a t io n o f t r a f fi c k e d v i c t i m s . (P e ople v .
Aguirre, G.R. No. 219952, November 20, 2017)
In People v. Ba n doj o, G.R. N o. 2 8 4 161, October 17, 2018, the
fact that AA A h a d a s ked accused for a r a k e t (of ear n in g m o ney b
v
having sexual relations with customers) and that she visited the said
a ccused in prison does not negate their cri m i nal li a b i l i ty . Tr affi ck i n
ing
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 191
in persons may be comm i t t e d w i t h o r w i t h o u t t h e v i c t i m s consent
or knowledge. Moreover, vi ct im s consent i s r e n d ered m e anin gless
clue to t h e c o e r cive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by
perpetrators of human t r af fi ck i ng. Even wi t h out th e use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his
o r her own free will .
W ithin or a c r oss na t i o na l b o r d e r s
Trafficking in person can be committed wit hin or across national
borders. A recruited B in Ch in a to be a prostit ut e in th e Phi l i p p i n es.
A took advant age of th e v u l n e r abi l it y o f B s i n c e th e l a t t e r i s v e r y
poor. A caused the tr a n sport a t ion of B to th e Ph i l i p p i nes where the
later engaged in p r o s t i t u t i on . A i s l i a b l e of t r a f fi c k in g i n p e r s ons
a lthough the recrui t m ent i s commi t ted in C h i n a .
S pecific Cr i m e s of T r a f f i c k i n g i n P e r s o n
T he specific t r af fi ck in g i n p e r s ons en u m e r a ted i n S e c t ion 4 ,
w hich mus t c o n t ai n t h e t h r e e e l e m ent s o f t r a f fi c k in g i n p e r s o n s
under Section 3,are as follows:
(a) To recruit,obtain, hire, provide, offer, transport, transfer,
m aintain, h a r b or , o r r e c e iv e a p e r s o n b y a n y m e a n s , i n c l u d i n g
those done under th e p r e t ext of d o m estic or ov erseas employment
or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose o f pr o sti t u t i o n ,
pornography, or sexual exploitation;
( b) T o i n t r o d u c e o r m a t c h f o r m o n e y , p r o fi t, or m a t e r i a l .
economic or other consideration, any person or, as provided for
under R.A . N o . 6 9 55 , an y F i l i p i n o w o m a n t o a f o r e i g n n a t i o n al.,
for marriagefor the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering. selling
or trading h i m t her t o e n g age in p r o s t i t u t i on , p o r n ography, sexual
exploitation, fcrced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage;
(c) T o offer or con t r act m a r r i a ge, real or s i m u l a t ed, for t h e
p urpose of acquir i ng , b u y i ng , offeri ng, selli ng, or t r a d i n g t h e m t o
engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor or slavery, involu n t ar y serv i t ud e or debt bondage;
(d) T o u n d e r t ak e or organize tours and travel plans consisting
o f tourism p a c k ages or a c t i v i t i e s fo r t h e p u r p ose of u t i l i z in g a n d
offering persons forprostitution, pornography or sexual exploitation;
(e) T o m a i n t a i n or h i r e a p erson to engage in prostit u t ion or
pornography;
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(f) To adopt persons by any form of consideration for
exploitativ e p u r p o ses o r t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e s a m e f o r p u r p o ses of
prostitu t i on, pornography, sexual exploitat i on, forced labor, slavery,
involunt ary servi t ude or debt bondage;
( g) T o a d o p t o r f a c i l i t a t e t h e a d o p t io n o f p e r s on s fo r t h e
purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involu n t ar y serv i t ude or debt bondage;
(h) T o r e c r u i t , hi re, adopt, transport, tr an sfer, obtain, harbor,
maintain, p r o v i de, offer, r eceive or a b d uct a p e r s on, by m e an s of
threat or use of force, fraud, deceit, violence, coercion, or inti m i d a t i on
for the purpose ofremoval or sale of organs of said person;
(i) To recruit,transport, obtain, transfer, harbor, maintain,
o ffer, h i re , p r o v i de, r eceive or a d op t a c h i l d t o e n g ag e i n a r m e d
activities in the Ph i l i p p i nes or abroad;
(j) T o recruit, t r a n sport, t r a n sf er, har b or, obtain, m a i n t a i n
offer, hire, provide or receive a person by means of defined in Section
3 of thisAct for purposes of forced labor, slavery, debt bondage and
involunt ary servi t u de, including a scheme, plan, or pattern in t ended
t o cause the person eith er :
( 1) T o b e l i ev e t h a t i f t h e p e r son d id. not perf or m s u ch
h
abor or s e r v i ces, he o r s h e o r a n o t h e r p e r son w o ul d s u f f er
serious harm or p h y sical restr a i nt ; or
( 2) T o a b u s e o r t h r e a t e n t h e u s e o f l a w o r t h e l e g a l
processes; and
(k)
( ) T o r e c r u i t , t r a n s p ort , h a r b or, obtain, t r a n sfer, m a i n t a i n ,
ire, offer, provide, adopt or receive a child for purposes of exploitation
or trading them, including but not limited to, the act of baring and/
or selling a child for an y consideration or for b a r ter for p u r p oses of
exploitation;
Trafficking for p u r p o ses of exploit a t ion of ch i l d ren sh all
include:
(1) A l l f o r m s o f s l a v ery or p r a c t i ces simi la r t o s l a v ery,
involunt ary servi t u de, debt bondage and forced labor, including
r ecruitm ent of chil d ren for use in ar med conflict .
( 2) T h e u s e , pr o c u r i n g o r offering of a c hild f o r
p rostitu t i on , f o r t h e pr o d u c t i o n o f p o r n o g r ap h y ,
or for
pornographic perform ances;
( 3) T h e u se, procuring or offering of a c h il d for t h e
production and trafficking ofdrugs; and
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
( 4) T h e u s e p r o c u r i a g o r o f e r i n g of a c h i l d f o r illegal
activities or work w h i ch , by it s n a t ur e or th e circum st ances in
which it is car r ied out, is li k ely to h ar m t h ei r h e a l th , safety or
morals, and
(I) To organize or direct other persons to commit the offenses
defined as acts of t r af fi ck in g u n der t h i s A ct . (S ection 4 of R. A. N o .
9208 as amended R .A. ¹. 10 8 6 4 )
T here ar e a s m a n y c r i m e s o f t r a f fi c k i n g i n p e r so n a s t h e r e
are victims of t r af fi ck i ng . In Pe ople v. XXX, G . R. N o. 235652, July
09, 2018, XXX and YY Y w er e convicted of t h ree counts of qualifi ed
t rafficking i n p e r s on s fo r m a k i n g t h e i r t h r e e b i o l ogical c h i l d r e n
(minors) perform acts of cybersex in pornographic websites for
different foreigner customers in exchange of money or ordering them
to dance naked in f r on t of th e comp u ter w i t h i n t e r n et connectivit y
w hile facilit a t in g th e w ebcam sessions and chat t in g w i t h a c e r t a i n
c ustomer. XXX is convicted of another count of qu al i fied tr a f fickin g
in person for t r a n sport in g an d p r o v i d in g he r ow n m i n o r b i o l ogical
c hild to a foreigner in M a k at i C it y for th e pu r p ose of prostit u t i o n .
QUALIFIED TRAFFICKING IN PERSON
The following are considered as qualified t r af fi ck in g in p er son
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208 as amended by R.A. No. 10364:
1. W h e n the trafficked person is a child (2012 Bar
Exam);
2. W h e n t h e adoption is effected through Int er -Countr y
Adoption Act Law (2012 Bar Exam);
3. W h e n t h e offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent,
s ibling, guardian or a p erson who exercises authorit y over th e
trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public
officer or employee;
4. W h en t h e t r a f f i c ked p e r son i s r e c r u i te d t o e n g age
i n p r o s t i t u t i o n w i t h a ny m em b e r o f t h e m ilitar y o r l a w
enforcement agencies;
5. W h en t h e o f f e n der i s a m e m b e r o f t h e m i l i t a r y o r
law enforcement agencies;
6. W h e n b y r e ason or on occasion of the act of traffickin g
in persons, th e o f f ended p a rt y d i e s , becomes insane, suffers
m utilat ion or is affli cted wit h H I V o r A I D S ;
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7. W h e n t h e o f f e n der comm it s one or m or e t r af fi cking
in person over a period of 60 or more days, whether t h ose day>
are continuous or not ;
8. W h e n t h e o ffender d i r e c t s or t h r o u g h a n o t h er
manages the traffi ck in g vi cti m i n c a r r y i n g out th e exploitative
purpose oftrafficking; and
9. W h e n t h e c r i m e i s c o m m i t t e d by a s y n d i cate, or in
large scale.
l. M i n or i t y — M i n or i t y can n o t b e a ppreciated a s
a
qualifying circum st ance in t r a f fi ck ing in person if not al l eged in the
informati on. (People v. A guirre, G.R. No. 219952, November 20, 2017)
T o appreciate th e q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t ance of m i n o r it y o f t h e
victim in t r af fi ck in g in person, knowledge of the accused with regard
to her m i n o r i t y i s i n c o n sequenti al. (P e ople v. Ba n d oj o, G.R. N o,
284161, October 17, 2018)
2. M i n or i t y a nd A d op t i o n — A do p t i o n or f a c i l i t a t i ng
the adoption o f c h i l d f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f p r o s t i t u t i o n c o n s t i t u t es
trafficking in person. The means to commit t r a f fi ck ing in person can
be dispensed wit h s i nce th e t r a f f i cked vi cti m i s a m i n o r . H o w ever,
trafficking is qualified when t r a f fi cked person is a child or when the
adoption is effected t h r o ug h I n t e r - C ountr y A d o p t ion Ac t a n d s a id
adoption isfor the purpose of prostitution. (2012 Bar Exam)
Even i f t h e a d o p t io n i s n o t e f f e cted t h r o u g h I n t e r - C ountry
A doption L aw, th e cr im e is still q u a l i f ied tr a f f icking in person since
t he victim being adopted is a mi n or .
CHILD TRAFFICKING UN DE R R.A. NO. 7610
Child trafficking is committed by any person who shall engage
in tr a d in g an d d e al in g w i t h c h i l d r e n i n c l u d i ng, but n o t l i m i t e d t o,
t e act of b u y in g an d s el l in g of a ch il d for m o n ey, or for an y o t h er
c onsideration, or b a r t er . Th e p e n a lt y i s h i g her w h e n t h e v i c ti m i s
under 12 years ofage. (Section 7 of R .A. No. 7610 -Child Abuse Law)
C hild t r a f f i c k in g u n d e r S e c t io n 7 o f R . A . N o . 7 6 1 0 c a n b e
c ommitted by any p er son wh o engages in t r a d in g an d dealing w i t h
children. This crime in cl u des the act of buying and selling of a child
or money, or for an y o t her considerati on, or b a r t er . Th e penalty is
igher when the victim i s u n der 12 years of age.
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 195
I f t h e t r a f fi c k e r s e l l s h i s d a u g h t e r f o r m oney, t h e c r i m e
committed is child tra ff ic king un d er R.A. No. 7610. If he sells her for
p urposes of sexual, labor or organ exploit at i on, the crime commit t e d
is qualified t r a f f i c k ing i n p e r s on u n d e r R . A . N o . 9 2 0 8. G i v i n g o r
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
h aving control over another person is a means to commit t r af fi ck i n g
in person.
ATTEMP TED TRA F FICKING IN PERSON S U N D E R R.A. NO. 9208
S ection 4-A of R .A . N o . 9 20 8 ( T r af fi ck in g i n P e r son L a w ) a s
amended by R.A. No. 10864 adopted the concept of attempted felony
under Arti cle 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Under Section 4-A, where
there are a ct s t o i n i t i a t e t h e c o m m i s sion of a t r a f fi c k in g o f f ense
b ut the offender failed to or di d no t execute all th e elements of t h e
c rime, by accident or by r e ason of some cause other than v ol u n t a r y
desistance, such overt acts shall be deemed as an attempt to commit
an act of traffick in g in p er sons.
In cases where the vi cti m i s a c h i l d , any of th e f ollowing acts
s hall also b e d e e med a s a t t e m p t e d t r a f fi c k in g i n p e r s ons u n d e r
Section 4-A of R.A. No. 9208 as amended by R.A. No. 10364:
( a) F a c i l i t a t i n g t h e t r a v e l o f a c h i l d w h o t r a v el s a l on e t o
a foreign cou n tr y o r t e r r i t o r y w i t h o u t v a l i d r e a son t h e r efor a n d
w ithout th e r e q u i re d cl earance or p e r mi t f r o m t h e D e p a r t m en t o f
Social Welfare and Development, or a wr i t t en per mi t or ju st i fication
f rom the child's parent or legal guar d i a n ;
(b) E x e c u t i n g , for a consideration, an affidavit of consent or a
written consent for adoption ;
(c) Recruitin g a w o m a n t o b e a r a c h i l d f o r t h e p u r p ose of
s elling the chil d ;
(d) S i m u l a t i n g a birt h for the pur pose of selling the child; and
(e) Soliciting a c h il d a n d a c quiring t h e c u stody t h ereof
through any means from among hospitals, clinics, nurseries, daycare
centers, refugee or evacuation centers, and low-income famil ies, for
the purpose o f selling the child .
ATTEM P T E D CHILD TRAFFICKING UN DE R R.A. NO. 7610
These acts constitu t in g at tempted trafficking in person involving
a child under R.A. No. 9208 (Traffick ing in Person Law) are the same
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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
acts described as attempted child t r a ff ic ki ng un d er Section 8 of R.A
N o. 7610 (Ch il d a b use L a w) . T h u s , a p e r son wh o c o m m it s a
f
thee ssaid acts may be prosecuted for at t e m p ted t r af fi ck in g in p erson
under R.A. No. 9208 or a t t e m p ted ch il d t r a f fi c k in g u n der R .A . No,
7610.
ACTS THAT PROMOTE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS UNDER R.A
NO. 9208
T he followin g a ct s w h i c h p r o m ot e or f a c i l i t at e t r a f fi c k in g i n
persons under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9208 as amended by R.A. No,
1 0364, shall be unl aw f u l :
(a) T o k n o w i n g l y l e ase or su b l ease, use or a l low t o b e u sed
any house, buil d in g or e st abli shm ent for t h e p u r p ose of pr omoting
trafficking in persons;
( b) T o p r o d u c e , p r i n t a nd i ss u e or d i s t r i b u t e u n i s s ued,
t ampered o r f a k e counseling c e r t i fi c a t es, registratio n s t i c k ers,
o verseas e m p l o y m en t c e r t i fi c a t e s or other certificates
of an y
government agency wh ich issues these certificates, decals and such
other ma r k er s as p r oof of compl i a nce wit h g o v er n m ent r e g u l at ory
a nd p r e - depart u r e r equirement s f o r t he p u r p o s e of pr o m o ting
trafficking in p ersons;
(c) T o ad v e r t i se , p u b l i sh , p r i n t , b r o a d cast, or di s t r i b u t e,
or cause t h e a d v e r t i s em ent , p u b l i c a t i on , p r i n t i n g , b r o a d casting
o r di st r i b u t io n b y a n y m e a n s , i n c l u d in g t h e u s e o f i n f o r m a t i on
technology and the internet, of any brochure, flyer, or any propaganda
material t hat p r o m otes tr affi ck in g in p ersons;
(d) T o a s s ist in th e conduct of mi sr epresentation or fr aud for
purposes of facilit a t in g th e acquisit ion of clearances and necessary
exit d o c u m e nt s f r o m g o v e r n m en t a g e n c ies t h a t a re
mandated
to provide pre-departure registration and services for departing
persons for the pu r p ose of promoting t r af fi ck in g in p ersons
(e) T o f a c i l i t a t e, assist or help in the exit and entry of persons
from/to th e coun tr y a t i n t e r n a t i o na l an d l o cal a i r p o r ts , t e r r i t o r i al
oundaries and seaports who are in possession of unissued, tampered
or f r a u d u l en t t r a v e l d o c u m e nt s f o r t h e p ur p o s e
o f pr o m o t i n g
trafficking in p ersons;
( f) T o co n fi s c a te, c onceal, o r d e s t r o y t h e p a s s p ort , t r a v el
documents, o r p e r s ona l d o c u m e n t s or b e l ongings
of trafficked
persons in fur t h e r a nce of traffick in g or to prevent them from leaving
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 197
t he country or seeking redress from th e government or ap pr opri at e
agencies;
( g) T o k n o w i n g l y b e n e fi t f r o m , fi n a n c ia l o r o t h e r w i se , o r
make use of,the labor or services of a person held to a condition of
involuntary servitude, forced labor, orslavery;
( h) T o t a m p e r w i t h , d e s t r oy , o r c a u s e t h e d e s t r u c t ion o f
e vidence, or t o i n H u ence or a t t e m p t t o i n f l u e nce w i t n esses, in a n
i nvestigation or prosecution of a case under this Act ;
(i) To destroy, c onceal, r e m o ve, c onfi scate o r p o s sess, or
a ttempt t o d e s t r o y , c onceal, r e m ove, c onfiscate o r p o s sess, an y
a ctual or purported passport or other tr av el, im m i g r a t ion or work i n g
permit or document, or an y o t he r a c t ua l or p u r p o r ted governm ent
identification, of any person in order to prevent or restrict, or attempt
to prevent or restr i ct, w i t h out l a w fu l a u t h o r i t y , th e person's liberty
to move or tr avel i n o r der t o m a i n t ai n t h e l a bor or services of that
person; or
(j) To uti l ize hi s o r h e r o f fi ce t o i m p ed e th e i n v e stigation,
p rosecution or execution of lawful or d ers in a case under this Act .
In People U. Saxo, G.R. N o. 2 2 7 7 04, Ap r il 1 0 , 2 0 1 9, a ccused
o wned a h o u s e w h e r e i t s r o o m w a s o f f e re d f o r l e a s e f o r e v e r y
paying customer of the complain a n ts, who engaged in sex for a fee.
Accused is aw ar e of t h ese pr osti t u t i o n a c t i v i t i e s si nce he cl eaned
t he room af ter t h e c o m p l a i n an t a n d h e r c u s t o mer fi n i s he d u s i n g
it. Moreover, h e s ol d c o n d om s t o c o m p l a i n a n t' s m a l e c u s t om ers
b efore using th e r o om . T h e t r i a l c o ur t c o n v i cted hi m o f q u a l i fi e d
trafficking in person for know i n gly leasing his house for the purpose
of promoting tr affi ck in g in persons under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9208.
The Supreme Cour t s ai d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o ur t c o m m i t t e d a s e r i ou s
error. The crime un der Section 5 of R.A. No. 9208 must be properly
denominated as "a c ts that p r o m o te traffic king in p e r s ons," and not
qualified tr affick in g in p erson.
IMMORAL DOCTRINE
Immoral d o ctri n e i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s on w h o p u b l i c l y
expounds or p r oclaims doctr i nes open'ly contr ar y t o p u b li c m or al s.
(Article 201)
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VOLUME II
OBS C E N E P U B L ICATION
Obscene publication is commi t t e d by t he a u t h o r s, or editor of,
and owners/operators of the establishment selling obscene literature
or by an y p e r son w h o s e l ls, g i ves a wa y o r e x h i b i t s fi l m s , p r i n t s,
engravings, sculpt ur e o r l i t e r a t u r e w h i c h a r e o f f ensive t'o morals,
(Article 201)
Selling Penthouse magazines or Hust ler m a gazines containing
n aked g i r l s constitut es obscene p u b l i c a t i on. ( Fe r n a n d o
and
Estorninos vs. CA, G.R. ¹. 15 9 7 5 1,December 6, 2006)
P edro
d an d M a r i a w e r e o f fi c e m at es. A n i n t i m a c y d e v eloped
between th em . On e d ay , P e dr o sent M a r i a a b o o k let cont a i ned in
a pay en v elope v er y s e cur ely s e aled an d s t a p l ed. Th e b o ok let i s
u nquestionably i n d e cent a n d h i g h l y o f f e n siv e t o m o r a l s . P e d r o
i s not l i a bl e for o b scene publ ication fo r g i v i n g a w a y p r i n t s w h i c h
a re offensive t o m o r a l s . W h a t i s p u n i s h e d b y A r t i c l e 2 0 1 i s t h e
d istribut ion o f i n d e cent l i t e r a t u r e , e t c., t o m a n y p e o pl e an d n o t
merely th e i solated, casual or occasional act of gi v in g such k in d of
l iterature t o a s i n gl e r ecipient. Th e p u r p ose of the pr ovision is t h e
protection of public mor als, that is, the morals of society as a whole,
a nd not m e r el y t h e m o r a l s o f a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u al . H e n ce, gi v i n g
i ndecent l i t e r a t ur e t o on e p e r son onl y i s n o t a v i o l a t ion of A r t i c l e
201. (People v. Tempongko, 1 C.A. Rep. 31 7) According to Luis Reyes,
the words "g i ve a w a y" i n p a r a g r a ph 3 o f A r t i c l e 2 01 s h o uld r e a d
"distribute." (196'6'and 1993 Bar Exams) However, Pedro can be held
l iable for unj ust vexati on .
OBSCENE EXHIBITION AND INDECENT SHOWS
Ob
bscene exhibition o r i n d e c e nt s h o ws i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y
person who exhibits indecent or imm oral plays, scenes, acts or shows
i n theaters, fairs, cinematographs or an y o t her p l a ce, whether l i v e
or in film . (Ar t i c le 201)
T he exh'b
e xhibitions
'
'
or s h ow s ar e obscene or i n d ece t i f t h
g1orify cri m i n al s or condone crim es; (2) serve to satisfy th e m a r k: et (1)
for violence, lust or por n ography; (3) offend any r ace or reli gion; (4)
tend to abet trafficking in and use of dangerous drugs
and (5) are
contrary t o l a w , p u b l i c o r d er , m o r a l s , g ood c u st oms, es tablished
policies, lawful or ders, decrees and edicts. (Artic le 201)
In People v. Aparici, C. A., 52 O . G. 249, the a ccused who
w as perform in g l e w d d a n c in g w h i l e w e a r i n g a l m os t n o . h i n g w a s
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 199
c onvicted of obscenity ( i n decent show). H ow ever, if t h e i n c i dent i n
Aparici c ase will h a p p en to day, the ha n d ler is l i a b le for t r a ff ic ki n g
i n person in v olv in g p o r n o graphy; w h i l e t h e n u d e d a n cer sh al l b e
t reated t r af fi cke d v i c t i m , w h o s h a l l n o t b e p e n a l i ze d f o r c r i m e
connected with t r af fi ck in g in p ersons. (Section 17 of R.A. No. 9802)
If the n u d e d a ncer is a c h i l d , sh e m us t n o t b e h el d l i a bl e for
i ndecent show u n der th e R e v i sed Penal Code since she is a v i ct i m
u nder R.A. No. 7610 (Chil d A b u se L aw ) an d R .A . N o . 9775 (Chi l d
P ornography La w ) .
To make a person liable for prostit u t ion or indecent show under
the Revised Penal Code, the prostit ut e or th e i n d ecent dancer must
n either be a traffi cked victim nor a chi l d .
Obscenity
Nudity itself is not inh erently in decent or obscene. Mere nudity
i n paintin g an d scul p t ur e i s no t o b scenity a s n u d e fi g u res may b e
considered as works of art. Books and magazines offered for sale in a
bookstore with a n ude woman on its cover were not obscene. (People
v. Serrano, CA-G.R. No. 5 5 66-R, No vember 24, 1950) The oblatio n
statue in the U n i v e r sity of the Ph i l i p p i nes is not obscene. However,
picture showing sexual in t er course or lascivious conduct is obscene.
(People v. Padan, G.R. No. L-7295, June 28, 1957)
O bscenity i s a n i s s u e p r o per f o r j u d i c ia l d e t e r m i n a t io n a n d
should be tr e ated on a case-to-case basis and on th e j u d ge's sound
discretion. (Fernando and E s torninos vs. CA, G. R. N o. 159751,
December 6 ; 2 0 0 6) T h e re a re s e ve ral t e s ts u s ed by t h e S u p r e m e
Court or law in determining whether a show, exhibition or material
is obscene wit hi n t h e c o n t e m p l a t ion of A r t i cl e 20 1 of t h e R e v i sed
Penal Code.
The publication or show is obscene if it h a s a t e ndency to
deprave or corr up t a p e r s on. (People v. Ko t t in ger, G.R. No. 20 56'9,
October 29, 1923) In Pe ople v. Apa r i c i, C. A ., 52 O . G. 249, accused,
who was dancing in a theater with her swaying hips and sometimes
raising her feet one after the other, was wearing nothing except nylon
patches over her breast and a too abbreviated pair ofnylon panties.
Several customers were how l in g an d 'shouting: "S igue mun a, sigue
nakakalibog." It w a s h e ld t h a t t h e a c c used had exhibi t ed i n d ecent
and immoral scenes and acts. Nudity it self is not inherently in decent
o r obscene. However, the art i s tic beauty in th e nude body of a livin g
woman may r eadily t r a n s f orm i n t o an i n d ecent and obscene object,
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by postures and mo v ements of such body wh i ch p r o cure perceptible ..'PORNOGRAPHY UNDER R.A. NO. 9208 AND R.A. NO. 9775
and discernable re action in th e pu b l ic or a u d i e n ce wi t n e ssing the
same.
Thhe publication or s h o w i s o b scene if i t s h o ck s th e o r d i n ary
and common sense of men as an i n d ecency. In Pe ople v. Ko ttinger,
supra, p i c tu r es w h i ch d e p i ct t h e n o n - C h r i s t i an i n h a b i t a n ts of t h e explicit sexual activi ties or any representation of the sexual parts of
Philippine as they actually l iv e is not in decent.
Pictures, sculptures and paint i ngs of women in the nude shown
in art exhibits and art gall er ies are not obscene. But if such pictures
were used not for th e sake of art bu t fo r comm ercial pu r p oses, they
are obscene. (People v. Go Pin, G.R. No. L-7491, August 8, 1955)
There i s n o p e r f ect d e fi n i t i o n o f " o b scenity " b u t t h e l a t e st
word is t ha t of Mi l l e r v. Ca l i f o rn i a, 418 U. S. 15, which establishel
basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to t h e p r u r i en t i n t e r e st ; (b) w h e t he r t h e w o r k d e p i cts or
describes, in a p a t e n tl y o f f ensive w ay , sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a w h o le, l a ck s s e r i ou s l i t e r a ry , a r t i s t ic , p o l i t i c al , o r s c i e n tific
value. (Fernando and Es tornin os vs. CA, G.R. No. 159751, December
6, 2006)
The
h e determ i n a t io n o f a n a v e r a g e p e r son o f t h e e a r l y 1 9 t h
c entury on w h a t i s an d w h a t i s n o t o b scene may be di f f erent f r om
that of an average person of the 20th century. What is obscene before
may be socially acceptable today.
OBSCENE PUBLICATION AND'INDECENT SHOW UNDER R.A.NO
7610
0 bscene publications an d in d e c ent s hows u n d er S e ction 9 o f
R.A. No. 7610 (Child Abuse Law) is committed: (1) by any person
w ho shall h i r e , e m p l oy, u se, persuade, in duce or coerce a ch il d t o
perform in obscene exhibit i ons and i n decent shows, whether l ive or
in video, or model in obscene publications or pornographic materials
or to sell or d i s t r i b ut e th e s ai d m a t e r i a ls; or (2) by an y a scendant,
guardian, or p e r son e n t r u s te d i n a n y c a p a city w i t h t h e c a r e of a
child who sh all cause and/or al low such ch il d t o be em pl oyed or to
p articipate in a n o bscene play, scene, act, movie or show or i n a n y
other indecent or obscene acts.
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 201
Under R.A. No. 9208 (Anti - T r affi ck in g in P ersons Act of 2003),
p ornography r e f er s t o a ny r e p r esentati on , t h r o u g h p u b l i c a t i on ,
exhibition, cinematography, indecent shows, informat ion technology,
or by wh a t e ver me a n s, of a p e r s on e n g a ged in re a l o r s i m u l a t e d
a person for pri m a r il y sexual pu r p oses.
In an XXX-rated film,the actor and actress are having sexual
i ntercourse. Sexual o r g an s a n d s e x u a l c o n t ac t a r e s h o w n . T h i s
XXX-rated film i s p or nographic since it contains real explicit sexual
activities.
I n an X - r a ted f i lm , th e a ctor an d a c t r ess are pr et ending t h a t
they are having sexual int ercourse. Sexual organs are shown but not
the actual sexual contact. This X-r ated film i s p or nographic since it
contains simulated explicit sexual activit ies.
I n an R - r a ted fi l m , t h e a c tor an d a c t r ess are doing acts t h a t
suggest that they a re havi ng sexual in t e r c ourse. The bed is moving
back and f o r th , w h i c h p r o d u ces squeaky n o i se, w h il e t h e a c t r e ss
is moaning. T h i s R - r a t e d fi l m i s n o t p o r n o g r a p hi c s i n c e s e xu al
activities t h e r ei n i s n o t ex p l i c it bu t m er e l y su g g e stive. Ex p l i c it
s exual activit ies are an im p or t an t el ement of pornography .
M edicine book cont a i n in g p i c t u r e s of p a r t s o f t h e b o d y o f a
wcmar i n c l u d i n g h e r p u d e n d um i s n o t p o r n o g r a p h ic s i n c e t h e
pictures w er e n o t p l a ce d t h e r ei n p r i m a r i l y f o r s e x u a l p u r p o ses.
Oblation statue i n U P i s n o t p o r n o gr aphic since it w a s cr eated for
artistic purpose.
U nder R .A . N o . 9 7 75, c h il d p o r nography r efers t o any
r epresentation , w h e t h e r v isual, a u d i o o r w r i t t e n c o m b i n a t i o n
thereof, by electronic, mechanical, dig i t a l, o pt ic al, m a g n etic or any
otner means, o f a c h i l d e n g a g ed or i n v o l v ed in r e a l o r s i m u l a t e d
e xplicit sexual activi t i e s.
" Explicit s e x ua l a c t i v i t y " i n c l u d e s a c t u a l o r s i m u l a t ed : ( 1 )
s exual int er course or l a s civious act i n c l u d i ng , bu t n o t l i m i t e d t o ,
contact involving genital to genit al, oral to genital, anal to genital or
oral tc anal, w h e t her b et w een persons, of the same or opposite sex;
(2) bestiality; (3) masturbation; (4) sadistic or masochistic abuse; (5)
lascivious exhibi t ion o f t h e g e n i t a ls, b u t t o cks, br easts, pubic a r e a
and/or anus; or (6 ) u s e of a n y o b j ect o r i n s t r u m en t f o r l a s civious
acts. (Section 4 of R.A. ¹. 97 7 5)
 202 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R
VOLUME II
A picture showing a naked baby is not pornographic unless the
exhibition of his sexual organ is lascivious.
CHILD POR N O G R A P H Y U N D E R RA NO. 9775
Child pornography under RA No. 9775 is committed by any
person who shall:
1. P r o d u c e , d i r e c t , m anufactur e o r c r e a t e , h i r e ,
employ,
use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in t h e creation or
p roduction of any form of child pornography ;
2. P u b l i s h , offer, transmit, sell, d i s t r i b u t e , b r o a d cast,
advertise, promote, export or i m p or t an y f orm of child pornography
)
3. I n t e n t i o n a ll y p r o v i d e a venu e f o r t he c ommission o f
prohibited acts as, but not l i m i t e d to, dens, priv ate rooms c u b i cles
c inemas, houses or in establishm ents pu r p o r t in g t o be a legit i m a t e
business.
4. P os s e s s w ith t h e i n t e n t t o s ell, d i s t r i b u t e , p u b l i s h ,
o r broadcast, possess wi t h ou t s u c h i n t e n t o r a c c ess an y f o r m o f
c hild p o r n o graphy . P o ssession of t h r e e o r m o r e a r t i c l e s o f c h i l d
pornography of th e s ame form s h al l be pr i m a f a c ie evidence of the
intent to sell, distr i b u te, publish or broadcast. (Section 4 of R.A. No.
9775)
I t i s a l s o c o m m i t t e d b y f i l m d i st r i b u t o r s , t h e a t e r s
and
t elecommunication companies, by themselves or in cooperation wit h
other enti t i es, who shall d i s t r i b u t e an y f or m o f c h il d p o r n ography.
(Section 4 of R.A. ¹. 9 7 7 5 )
It is also committed by a parent, legal guardian or person having
c ustody or control of a ch i l d , wh o sh all k n o w i n gl y p e r mi t t h e c h i l d
to engage, part i cip ate or a s sist i n a n y f o r m o f c h i l d p o r n o gr aphy.
(Section 4 of R.A. ¹. 9 7 7 5 )
A person, who is engaged in the lur in g or grooming of a child or
in pandering of any form of child pornography, is also liable for child
pornography. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 9775)
ac~
Grooming )7 refers to the act ofpreparing a child or someone
w o th e offender believes to be a child for sexual acti v it y or sexual
r elationship b y c o m m u n i c a t in g an y f o r m o f c h i l d p o r n o gr aphy . I t
includes online enticement or ent i cement t h r o ugh any other means.
ccT
L urin g r e f e r s t o t h e a c t o f c o m m u n i c a t i ng , b y m e a n s o f a
computer system, with a ch il d or someone who the offender believes
J9JC9B0M
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 203
to be a child for the pu r p ose of facilit a t in g th e commission of sexual
a ctivity or production of any form of child pornography .
"Pandering" refersto the act of offering, advertising, promoting,
r epresenting or d i s t r i b u t i n g t h r o u g h a n y m e a n s a n y m a t e r i a l o r
p urported m a t e r ia l t h a t i s i n t e n d e d t o c a u s e a n o t he r t o b e l i e v e
t hat the mat er ial or p u r p o r ted m a t e r ial cont a ins any f or m of ch i l d
pornography, regardless of the actual content of the material or
purported material.(Section 8 ofR.A. ¹. 9775)
C onspiracy t o c o m m i t c h i l d p o r n o g r a ph y i s a lso a c r i m e .
(Secti on 4 of R.A. No. 9775)
Mall owners/operators and owne rs or lessors of other business
e stablishment,s shall n o t if y —.he PNP or t h e N B I w i t h i n s e ven ( 7 )
days from obtaining facts and circumst ances that child pornography
is being committed in t h eir p r e m i ses. Photo developers, inform at i on
technology professionals,credit card companies and banks and any
person who has direct k n o w l edge of any for m of ch il d p o r n ography
activities s h a l l h a v e t he du ty t o r eport a n y s u s p e cted c h i l d
p ornography m a t e r i al s o r t r a n s a ct i ons t o t h e p r o p e r a u t h o r i t i e s
within seven (7) days from discovery th ereof. (Section 10 of R.A. No.
9775) Failure toreport is a crime.
Possession of pornographic materials
Mere possession of child p or n ographic m a t e r i al s such as USB
containing magazine I olita w i th p i c tu re of a naked child constitu t e s
the crime of ch i l d p o r n o g r a phy u n d e r R . A . N o . 9 7 7 5 ( A n t i - C h i l d
Pornography Law).
Mere possession of adult pornographic m aterials s u c h a s
Playboy magazine or CD containing the XXX rated film Ta b u, without
jntertion t o s e ll , ex h i b it , o r g i v e t h e m a w a y , i s n o t pu n i s h a b le as
obscene publication u n de r A r t i c l e 20 1 of t h e R e v i sed Penal C ode,
considering the p u r p ose of the law i s t o p r o h i bi t t h e d i sseminati on
o f obscene materi als to th e p u b l ic. Th e offense in an y of th e f o r m s
under Article 201 is commit ted only when th ere is publicity. The law
does not require th at a p e rson be caught in t he a ct of selling, giving
away or exhibiting obscene materials tobe liable, for as long as the
s aid materi al s ar e o f f ered fo r s a l e , d i s p l ayed o r e x h i b i te d t o t h e
public. (Fernando and Estornin os vs. CA G.R. No. 159751, December
6, 2006)
T he l a w m an d a t e s t h e for f e i t u r e a nd d es t r u c t i o n of
pornographic m a t e r i al s i n v o l ved i n t h e v i o l a t io n o f A r t i cl e 20 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, even if the accused tvas acquitted. (Nogales
v. People, G.R. No. 191080, November 21, 2011)
 204 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 205

CYBER CHILD POR N O G R A P H Y U N D E R R.A. NO. 10175

If child pornography is perpetr ated thr ough a computer system,
the crime commit ted is cyber child-p
ornography
u nder R.A. No. 10175
(Cyber Crime L a w) . The penalty for cyber chil d -pornography is one
degree higher than that pr escribed for child pornography under R.A.
No. 9775. Un der Section 7 of R .A . No . 1 0 175, a pr osecution u n d er
this Act shall be with out pr eju dice to any liabil it y for violation of any
provision of special laws. However, despite of Section 7 th ereof, the
accused cannot be prosecuted for child pornography u n der R .A. No.
9775 and cyber child pornography under R.A. No. 10175. Since the
elements of th ese crimes are id en t i cal, the r ul e on double jeopardy
will apply. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 208385, February
11, 2014)
T RAFFICKING IN PERSON INVOLVING PO R N O G R A P H Y
Pornography is a sexual exploitat ion wi t h i n th e context of R.A.
No. 9208 (Tr affick in g i n P e r son I a w) . In Pe o ple v . XXX a n d Y Y Y ,
G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018, accused were convicted of qualified
trafficking in persons for ordering their biological child (10 years old)
t o dance naked in f r on t o f t h e comp u ter w i t h i n t e r n e t connectivit y
w hile facili t a t in g th e w e bcam sessions and chat t in g w i t h a c e r t a i n
customer.
1. T r afficking in person and child pornography — The
differences between traffi ck ing in person involving pornography and
child pornography are:
1. T h e trafficked victim in R.A. No. 9208 isany person
regardless ofhis/her age. If the trafficked victim is a child, the
crime commi t ted is qu ali fied t r a f fi ck in g in p e r son. In R .A. No.
9 775, the pornographic victim i s a chi l d ;
2. In R.A. No.9775, child pornography is committed by
electronic, mechanical, d i g i t a l , op t i c al, ma g n e tic or a ny o t h e r
means. R.A. No. 9775 is comprehensive enough to include cyber
pornography by requiring a child to show her private parts to
a client t h r o u g h t h e I n t e r n et , c a r t oon p o r n o graph
y su ch a s
e a p a n ese hentai wh e re the re is no real child i n v o lved, and
p ossession of child pornographic mat er i a l s .
I n R . A . N o . 9 2 08 , t r a f fi c k i n g i n p er s o n i n v o l v i n g
p ornography i s c o m m i t t e d t h r o u g h p u b l i c a t i on ,
exhibition,
c inematography, i n d ecent s h o ws, i n f o r m a t io n t e c h n ology o r
by whatever means. R.A. No. 9208 does not include cartoon
pornography since in tr af fi ck in g in person there must be a real
trafficked victim. Neither does R.A. No. 9208 include possession
of pornographic materials.
2. A ct t h a t p r o m o t e s t r a f fi c k i n g i n p e r s on s an d c h i l d
pornography — Act that promote trafficking in person under R.A.
No. 9208 ir eludes knowingly leasing or subleasing, using or allowin g
to be used any house, buil d in g or establi shm ent for th e p u r p ose of
promoting tr affick in g in p ersons.
In Pl a n t e ras v. Pe o ple, G . R. N o . 2 3 8 8 8 9, O c tober 0 3, 2 0 1 8 ,
petitioner owns an d m a n a ges the cer:ain L o d ge. Pimps, customers
and prostitu tes who h an g out n ea r t h e s aid p l ace ut i l ize th e sam e
p lace for their i l l e gal activ i t i es. Petiti oner has knowledge about th e
activities that ar e h a ppening in side his establishment. He was just
a t the reception count er, w h ic h i s j u s t 1 . 5 m e t er s from w h er e t h e
prostitutes were being offered by the pimps to policeofficers, who
pretended to be customers. Accused is convicted of the crime of acts
that promotes tr a f fickin g i n p e r sons by all ow in g hi s establishment
to be used for the pur pose of promotir g tr affi ck in g in persons. Note:
T he pimps ar e l i a bl e for t r a f fi c k in g i n p e r s on. I f t h e o w ner of t h e
lodge is alsc a pimp, the crime commi t ted is tr affi ck in g in person.
Hypothetically, th e o w ner of l o dge in Pl a n t e ras case is lia ble
f or act t h a t p r o m o tes t r a f f i ck in g i n p e r s on , t h e p i m p s a r e l i a b l e
f or qualified t r a f f i ck in g i n p e r s on, th e cu stomers are l i a ble for u s e
o f trafficked v i c t im , an d t h e p r o s t i t u t e s sh al l n o t b e p u n i s h ed. I f
t he owner of th e l o dge is also a pi mp , he is l i a ble for t r a f fi ck ing i n
person, and not for the act that p r o m otes trafficking in person.
The c r im e o f c h i l d p o r n ography i n c l udes i n t entionally
providing a v e nue for t h e c o m m i s s icn of p r o h i b i t ed a c ts i n v o lvi n g
child pornography such as providing dens, private rooms, cubicles
or house where child pornographic film is being created or produced;
c inemas w h e r e c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h i c m ovie i s b e i n g s h o w n ; o r
establishments pu r p o r t in g t o b e a l e gi t i m at e b u si ness where chil d
pornographic magazines are being offered forsale.
Providin g v e n u e f o r t h e c o m m i s s i on o f th e a c t i n v o l v i n g
p ornography m a y co n s t i t u t e t h e crime of act that promotes
trafficking in person and child pornography.
In a et t h at p r o m o tes tra f f i c k i n in p erson, t he v i c t im c an b e
a child or adult. This crime presupposes that a t h ir d person is
committing tr a f f i c k i n i n p e rson invn!ving prostitutio n, pornography,

J9JC9B0M
 206 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 207
VOLUME II

slavery or removaL of organ, and the offender is providing a venue for

T o b e h e l d l i a b l e f o r c y b e r s ex , p e r so n e n g a ged i n cyber
such commission.
p ornograph r must not be a tr a f ficked victim or a chi l d .
In child p o r n o graphy, t he v i c t im m u s t b e a c h i l d T h i s c r i m e
is commi t te d by el e ctronic, m e chanical, d i g i t a l , o p t i c a l, m a g n e tic T raffickin g in p e r s o n
or any other means. This crime of child pornography by providing
If a person hi r ed, or m a i n t a i ned an other p erson, to engage in
venue presupposes that a t h i r d p e r son is comm i t t i n g a n ot her f or m
c yber pornography o r p r o s t i t u t i on , o r o f f ered he r t o c u s t omer f o r
of child pornography such as creation of child pornographic film, and
cyber pornography or prostit u t i on, the former is liable fc r traffickin g
the offender is providing venue for such commission.
i n person, the customer i s l i a bl e for us e of t r af fi cked vi ct im , w h i l e
I n Pla n teras c a s e, o ne o f t h e p r o s t i t u t e s b e i ng a l l o w ed b y the trafficked victim is not l i a ble for cybersex under R. A. No. 10175
t he accused to engage in p r o st i t u t i o n i n h i s l o dge is a m i n o r . because of the criminal exemption under Section 17 of R.A. No. 9802.
his
is not ch il d p o r n o gr aphy b e cause wha t i s i n v o l ved i n t h i s c ase is
prostitut ion and not pornography, and the crime is not commit ted by Child P o r n o g r a p h y
electronic, mechanical, digi t al, optical, magnetic or any other means.
I f the person engaged in cyber por nography or p r o sti t u t i on i s
Accused is convicted of acts that pr o m ote tr af ficking in person.
a child, it is subm i t ted that she is not li a ble for cybersex under R.A.
Pedro own s a b o a r d i n g h o u s e w h er e h e k n o w i n gl y a l l o .v d No. 10175 since. under R .A . No . 7 6 10, a ch il d a b u sed or e x pl oit ed
children to be vi deotaped by J ua n w h i l e si m u l a t i n g ex pli cit sexual is considered as a v i c t i m . B u t t h e c u s t omer of t h e c h il d e x p l oit ed
a ctivities. J u a n a n d P e d r o a r e l i a b l e f o r q u a l i fi ed tr af fi ck in g i n in cyber prostitution can be held liablefor cybersex under R.A. No.
person, and act that promotes trafficking in person, respectively. 10175, cyber child p or n o graphy u n der R .A . No . 9775 in r e l a t ion of
However, Juan and Pedro can be held liablefor child pornography R.A. No. 1C175, or child prostit u t i on u n der R .A. No. 7610.
t
by producing childpornography, and child pornography by providing
venue, respectively (2011 Bar Exam )
P ORN O G R A P H Y IN GENE R A L
For pu r p o ses of t he b ar e x a m, i f a q u e s t i on on p o r n o g raphy
CYBERSEX UNDER R.A. NO. 10175
shall be asked, the following guidelines should be observed.
Cybersex under R.A. No. 10175 (Cyber-crime Law) is committe d
1. T r a f f i c k i n g i n p e r s o n — The elements of tr afficking
b y any p e r s on, w h o s h a l l w i l l f u l l y e n g a ge, m a i n t a i n , c o n t r ol . or
in person under R . A. N o. 9 2 08 should f i r st be c onsidered. If a ct o f
operate, dir ectly o r i n d i r e c t ly , an y l a s civious ex h i b i t io n o f s e xu al
trafficking, means commit t r a f f i ck i ng, and p u r p ose of pornography
organs or sexual activity, with ' the aid of a computer system, for
is present, the crime committed is trafficking in person.
favor or consideration .
In People v. XXX an d Y Y Y , G . R . N o . 2 3 5 6 5 2, Ju ly 0 9 ,
C yber pr o s t i t u t i o n o r p o r n o g r a p h y 2018, accused were convicted of qualified tr affi ck ing in persons
ordering t h ei r b i o l ogical ch il d ( 1 0 y e ar s o ld) t o d a nce n a k ed
The e l e m en t o f CC' en g a g i n g i n a bu siness" i s n ecessary t o
i n f r c n t o f t he c o m p u t e r w i t h i n t e r n e t c o n n e ctivit y w h i l e
c onstitute th e cr im e of cybersex. The la w a c t u a ll y seeks to p u n i sh
f acilitat in g t h e w e b cam sessions and ch a t t i n g w i t h a c e r t a i n
c yber pr osti t u t i on , w h i t e s l a v e t r a d e , an d p o r n o gr aphy f o r f a v o r
customer. Offering a child to a customer for exploitive purpose
a nd c o n s i derati on . T h i s i n c l u d e s i n t e r a c t iv e p r o s t i t u t i o n
and s uch as pornography is t r af fi ck in g i n p e r son. Note: The crim e
pornography, i. e., by w e b c am. T he d e l i b e ratio ns of t h e B i c a m e ra l
c ommitted by the customer is use of trafficked victi m .
C ommittee of Congress show a l ack of i n t en t t o p e n a l ize a p r i v a t e
obscene show between tw o p r i v a t e p e r sons. (Dis ini v . S e cretary of 2. Ch i l d po r n o g r a p h y —I f t he c r i me is n ot t r a f f ic ki ng i n
Justice, G.R. No. 208885, February 11, 2014 persons, then t h e e l e m e nt s of ch i l d p o r n o g r a phy u n d e r R . A. N o .
) If a husband requested
through the in t e r net hi s w ife to show her vagina in consideration. of 9775 should be considered.
an expensive gift, they are not li a ble for cybersex.

J9JC9B0M

208 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
The concept of child por n ography is so comprehensive; it
includes cartoon child pornography such as Hentai, production
of child sex d olls, possession of ch il d p o r n o graphic m a t e r ials
such as USB contain in g m a gazine Lolit a, chatti ng wi th a child
c onstitut in g p a n d e r i ng , g r o o m in g o r l u r i n g . H o w e v er , c h i l l
pornography m u s t b e c o m m i t t e d b y el e c t ronic, mechanical,
digital, optical, magnetic or any other means.
I f c h i l d p o r n o g r a ph y i s p e r p e t r a t e d t h r o u g h a computer
system, the crime commi t t e d is cyber child por r o g r a phy un d er R.A
No. 10175.
3. R .A . N o . 7 6 1 0 —If the act is neither t r a ff ic ki ng in p e rson
(e.g., no act o f t r a f f i c k i n g), no r c h i l d p o r n o gr aphy (e .g., i t i s n o t
committed b y e l e ctr onic, m echanical, d i g i t al , o p t i cal, m a g n etic or
any other means), the elements of obscene publications and indecent
s hows involvin g a c h i l d u n d e r R . A . . N o . 7 6 1 0 ( C h il d A b u s e L a w)
should be considered.
An offender required his m i nor dau ghter to dance naked.
He is not l i a bl e for q u a l i f ied t r a f f i ck in g i n p e r son si nce he is
not ma i n t a i n i n g, r e cruit i n g, h i r i n g et c . a c h i ld f or p u r p o se of
pornography. N e i t her i s h e l i a bl e for ch il d p o r n ography since
the indecent show is not m ade t h r o ugh electronic, mechanical,
digital, optical, magnetic or any other means. Hence, the crime
committed is indecent show un der R.A. No. 7610 (Child Abuse
Law).
Selling m a g a z ine Lo l i t a c o n t a i n i n g p i c t u r e s o f n a k e d
c hildren i s n o t c h i l d p o r n o g r aph y s i n c e t h e m a t e r i a l i s n o t
made through electronic, mechanical, digit a~'., optical, magnetic
or any o t her m e a ns. He n c e, t he c r i m e c o r r m i t t e d i s o b s cene
publications under R.A. No. 7610.
4. C y b e r sex —If trafficking in person, child pornography
and obscene publications and i n d ecent shows un der R .A . No . 7610
a re not c o m m i t t ed , e l e m e nt s o f c y b e r sex u n d e r R . A . N o . 1 0 1 7 5
should be considered.
M aria, an a d u lt , sh owed her boobs thr o ugh th e i n t e r n et
for P 5 0 0 .00, a nd t h e n , h e r v agina f o r P 1 , 0 0 0 .00 t o h e r
customer, Alberto. This is not t r af fi ck in g in p e r son because he
is not hiri ng, mai n t a i n in g etc. Maria to engage in pornography,
Child pornography or indecent show under R.A. No. 7610 is
not committed since Maria .is not a child. Maria and Alberto
a re l i a bl e f o r c ybersex s i n c e t h e l a s c i v i o u s exhibition of
J9JC9B0M
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 209
s exual or gans w a s w i t h t h e a i d o f a c o m p u t e r s y s tem fo r a
consider ation.
5. R e v i s e d P e n a l C o d e — I f t r a f f ic k i n g i n p e r s o n, c h i l d
p ornography an d o b scene publ i cati ons an d i n d e cent sh ow s u n d e r
R .A. No. 7610 ar e n o t c o m m i t t ed , e l em ent s of i n d ecent s n ow , or
exhibition or obscene publication u n der A r t i cl e 20 1 of th e R evised
Penal Code should be considered.
Maria, a lawyer,for a consideration of P5,000 danced and
undressed herself in fr ont of Em w h i l e th e m u sic "making lo v e
out of nothing at a l l" is b eing pla ye d. This is not t r a f f ic ki ng in
p erson because Em i s n o t h i r i n g , m a i n t a i n i n g , etc. M a r i a t o
engage in pornography, and there is no taking advantage of
her vuln er abil i ty . A l a w y e r i s n o t v u l n e r a ble to be exploited.
Child pornography or indecent show under R.A. No. 7610
i s not com m i t t e d s i nce M a r i a i s n o t a c h i l d . C y b ersex is n o t
committed since lascivious exhibit ion of sexual organs was not
m ade with th e aid of a computer system. The crime commit t e d
is indecent show un der the Revised Penal Code.
I n t r a f f i c k in g i n p er s o n , c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y , c yber c h i l d
pornography, and obscene publications and indecent shows under
R .A. No. 7 6 10, t h e p e r s on , w h o s h o we d h e r n a k e d b o dy , i s t h e
victim, whil e th e person, who recru i ted h er, pr oduced pornography
etc., is crimi n a ll y l i a b le. If t r af fi ck in g i n p e r son, child pornography
and obscene publications and i n d ecent sh ows u n der R .A . No . 7610
a re not c o m m i t t ed , t h e p e r s on , w h o s h o we d h e r n a k e d b o dy , i s
c riminally l i a b l e f o r c y b e r sex o r i n d e cent s h ow , o r e x h i b i t i o n o r
obscene publication un der Ar t i cl e 201 of the Revised Penal Code. In
s um, she is a crim i nal r a t her t h a n a vi ct i m .
PROSTITUTION
Prostitu t ion is commi t ted by a woman who habit u a lly i n d u l ges
i n sexual i n t e r c ourse o r l a s c i v i ou s c o n duct f o r m o n e y o r p r o fi t .
(Articte 202)
CHILD PROSTITUTION UNDE R R.A. NO. 7610
C hild p r o s t i t u t i o n u n d e r R . A . N o . 7 6 1 0 ( C h i l d A b u s e L a w )
i ncludes engaging i n o r p r o m o t i n g , f a c i l i t a t i n g o r i n d u c in g c h i l d
prostituti on, such as acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; inducing
a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or
 210 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER VI CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MCRALS 211
VOLUME II

oral ad ve rt i s ements or o t h e r s i m i l a r m e a n s ; t a k i n g a d v a n t a ge of
i nfluence or relationship to procure a child as prostit u te; threatenin g
or using vi olence towards a ch il d t o en gage him a s a p r o st i t u t e; or
giving monetary considerati on, goods or other pecuniary benefit, to a
c hild with i n t en t to engage such child in pr osti t u t i on; or commi t t i n g
act of sexual int ercourse or lascivious conduct wit h a child exploited
in prostitu t i on; or deriving profit or advantage therefrom, whether as
m anager or owner of the establishment w h ere the child prostit u t i o n
takes place.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSON INVOLVING PROSTITUTION
Trafficking in person u nder S e c t io n 4 of R. A. N o . 9 2 0 8
includes that act of recruit in g, obtaini n g, hir i n g, providin g, offerin~
ering,
t ransporti ng , t r a n s f e r r i n g , m aintain i ng, h a r b o r i n g , or r eceiving
a child
i f f o r t h e p u r p ose of p r o st i t u t i o n o r p e r son b y an y m e a n s cf
c oercion, abduction, deception, taking advant age of the vulnerabil i t y
of the person, or, the giving of paym ents to achieve the consent of a
person having control over the victim for sexual exploitat ion such as
prostitution.
P rostit u t e
U nder A r t i c l e 2 0 2 o f t h e R e v i sed P e na l C o d e w omen
for
o r money o r p r o fi t , h a b i t u a l l y i n d u l g e i n s e x u a l i n t e r c ourse o"
l ascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostit u t e s.
Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 (Child A b use Law), chil dr en,
w hether m a l e o r f e m a l e , w ho, fo r m o n ey , p r o fi t ,
o r an y o t h e r
consideration i n d u l g e i n s e x ua l i n t e r c ourse or l a s civious conduct,
a re deemed to be children exploi'ted in prosti t u t i o n .
U nder Section 3 of R.A. No. 9208 (Traffick in g i n P er son L a w ) .
p rostitu t ion refers to any act, transaction, scheme or design involving
the use of a person by an ot h er, for sexual i n t e r course or lascivious
c onduct in exchange for money, profit or any ot her considerati on .
l. G e n d e r — A p r o s t i t u t e u n d e r t h e R e v i s ed P e n al C o d e
must be a woman. On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7610 and R.A.
N o. 9208, the gender of the prosti t ut e is not im p o r t a n t .
2. H a b it u a l i t y — A p r o st i t u t e u nder A r t i c l e 2 0 2
of
t he Revised P e na l C o d e m u s t b e h a b i t u a l l y i n d u l g e d i n s e x u a l
i ntercourse or lascivious conduct for m oney or profit .
A police raiding team apprehended a bachelor an.9a woman in
the act of cohabitation at a motel room. It was admit ted by the couple
that the woman r eceived five bottles of perfume in consideration of
t he intercourse. The w oman i s no t l i a bl e for p r o st i t u t i o n s i nce th e
element of habit u a l it y i s not pr esent. (1959 Bar Exam,I
H abitual it y i s no t a n el em ent of ch il d p r o st i t u t i on u n der R .A .
No. 7610, and p r o st i t u t i o n a s a n e l e m en t o f t r a f fi c k in g i n p e r s on
under R.4. No. 9208. In People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September
24, 2012, the accused, who offered the victim for money to another for
sex, was convicted of child p r o st i t u t i o n a l t h o ugh i t w a s an i s olated
case.
3. V i ct i m a n d O f f e n d e r i n p r o s t i t u t i o n — I n t h e c r i m e
o f prostitut i on, th e offender is th e p r o st i t u t e. I n c h il d p r o st i t u t i o n ,
trafficking i n p e r son i n v o l v in g p r o s t i t u t i on , an d u s c o f t r a f f i ck ed
v ictim, t h e o f f e n d er s a r e t h e c u s t o m ers, p i m p s , a n d o w n e r s o r
m anager of the house of prostitu t i on. A child e=ploited m prostit u t i o n
and trafficked prostitute are not offenders; they are considered as
victims.
Under S e ction 58 o f R . A. N o . 9 3 4 4, p e rsons below 1 8 y e a r s
of age shall be =xempt from p r o secution for pr o s ti t u t i o n u n d er t h e
Revised Penal Code. Section 17 of R.A. No. 9208 as amended by
h R.A. No. 10364 provides that v i c t i m s of tr a f f ic k i ng f or pu r p o s es of
prostitution are not covered by Art i cle 202 of the Revised Penal Code
and as such, shall not b e p r osecuted, fined, or ot h e rw i se penalized
u nder tl e said law .
Pimp
P imp can be held liable for corruption of minor, child prostitu t i o n
or qualified t r af fi ck in g i n p e r s on. In l a y m a n's t e rm , p im p i s c a ll ed
"bugatv" or "ma m a san."
1. Co r r u p t i o n of M i n or — Corrup t i on o f mi n or s i s
c ommitted b y a n y p e r s o n w h o s h a l l p r o m o t e o r f a c i l i t a t e t h e
p rostitution o r c o r r u p t i o n o f p e r s ons u n d e r age t o s a t i sfy t h e l u s t
of another. (Ar t ' cle 840) When th e v i c ti m i s u n d e r 1 2 y e ars of age,
the penalty for corruption of minor is graduated to one degree
higher. (Section 10 of R.A. No. 76'10) Ig. effect, this is a qualifying
circumstance.
T he person l i a bl e f o r c o r r u p t i o n o f m i n o r i s t h e p i m p w h o
s olicits customer for a prosti t u t e, who is a mi n o r .

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 212 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
b. Ch i l d P r o s t i t u t i o n —Child pro stit u t i on i n c l u d es actin
as a procurer of a ch il d p r o st i t ut e or t a k i n g a d v a n t age of infl u ence
or relationship to procure a child as prostit u te. (Section 5 of R.A. No.
7610)
Accompanyin g a c h i l d a n d of f e r i n g h e r s e x u a l s e r v i c es i r
exchange for money constitute child prostit u t ion under R.A. No. 7610.
(People v. Du l a y, G .R. N o. 19 8 854, September 2 4, 2 012) Note: The
accused in Du l ay case, who offered the victim to t he o ne who ra ped
her is not l i a bl e for r ap e as pr i n c i pal by i n d i s p ensable cooperation
s ince brin gin g t h e v i c ti m t o t h e r a p i s t i s n o t i n d i s p ensable to t h e
commission of the crime of rape.
In Pe ople v. De l a n t a r, G . R . N o . 1 6 9 1 4 3, F e b r u a ry 2 , 2 0 0 7 ,
accused, whom complainant, aminor, had looked up to as her father
i ntroduced her to clients and i n d u ced her to engage in prosti t u t i o n .
A ccused was convicted of child prosti t u t i o n .
Child prosti t u t i o n i n c l u des in du cing a person to be a client of
a child prosti t u t e . The i n d u cer is l i a ble as pr i n cipal by i n d u cement
while induced customer is liable as principal by dir ect par t i cip ati on.
(People v. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227868, March 12, 2019)
3. T r aff i c k in g i n p er so n i n v o l v in g p r o stitution — A
p imp, w h o c o m m i t t e d c o r r u p t i o n o f m i n o r o r c h i l d p r o s t i t u t i o n ,
m ay be pr osecuted for t h e g r a ve r c r i m e o f q u a li fied t r a f fi c k in g i n
person under R .A . N o . 9 208 i f t h e e l em ent of m a i n t a i n i n g, h i r i n g ,
recruitment or tr ansporta tion is present.
Regularly of fering th e se xu al s e r v ice o f t h e c h i l d f o r m o n e y
constitutes qualified tr af ficking in person. Main t a i n i ng or hir i ng t h e
c hild for the pu r p ose of prostit u t ion constit u tes qualified tr af fi ck i n g
in person under R.A. No. 9208 because the former took advantage
of the vu l n e r abi l it y o f t h e l a t t e r a s a c h i l d a n d a s on e wh o n e eds
money. Mi n o r it y i s q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t ance. (People v. Casio, G.R.
¹. 211 4 6 5, De cember 8, 2 0 14; People v. Hi r a n g, G . R. Vo . 2 2 8 528,
January 11, 2017)
Hiring an d m a i n t a i n ing gu e st re la ti o ns officer (GRO), some of
whom are minors, ina KTV bar, and requiring them to pay "bar fine"
i f they were taken out of the establishm ent to engage in prostit u t i on
c onstitute t r af fi c k in g i n p e r s on .(Young v. People, G.R. ¹. 21 8 910,
February 8, 2016)
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 213
Recruiting and tr ansporting a child for sexual service for money
constitutes qualified tr affi ck in g in person. In People v. Aguirre, G.R.
No. 219952, November 2 0, 2017, accused lured s everal m i n o rs i n t o
prostitution to have sex with foreigners with the promise of financial
benefit, the chance to use shabu and to tra vel abroad. The girls were
brought at an a p a r t m e nt a nd w e re i n s t r u c t ed to p r i m p t h e m s elves
to look good for th e f o r ei gners. Accused was convicted of qu al i fi ed
trafficking i n p e r sons since th e accused recrui ted an d t r a n s ported
the minors for purposes of prostitu t i on. The victi m's consent is not a
defense in qualified tr af fi ck in g in p erson.
Recruiting wi t h o ut l i c e n se a p e r s on to w o r k a s a r e s t a u r a n t
e ntertainer i n M a l a y si a b u t i n f a c t s h e w i l l w o r k a s p r o s t i t u t e
c onstitutes the crime of trafficking in person and illegal recruit m e n t .
(People v. I alii, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011; People v. Hashim,
G.R. No. 194255, June 18, 2012) This is q ualified trafficking in
p erson if the victim i s a m i n o r .
L oko a d v e r t i sed o n t h e i n t e r n e t t h a t h e w as l o okin g f o r
c ommercial m o d els for a T V a d v e r t i s ement . G a n da, a 1 6 -year ol d
b eauty, applied for th e p r o j ect. L ok o offered her a c o n t r a ct, w h i ch
Ganda signed. She was asked to report to an address which turned
out to be a high-end brothel. Ganda became one of its most featured
attractions. The cr im e c om m i t t e d b y L o k o i s t r a f fi c k in g i n p e r s on
f or recruit m e nt , o f f er in g an d h i r i n g G a n d a b y m e a n s o f f r a u d o r
deception for the purpose of sexual exploitation or prostitution.
F raud is comm i t t e d si nce L oko m i s r epresented to G a nd a t h a t s h e
w ould work as a commercial m odel but i t t u r n e d out l a ter t h a t h e r
p lace of work is a hi gh-end broth el. But even if the element of fr au d
o r deception is not p r esent, t r a f f i ck ing i n p e r son is st il l c o m m i t t e d
s ince the t r af fi cked v i c ti m i s a m i n o r . M i n o r i t y o f t h e v i c ti m i s a
q ualifying c i r c u m st ance. Th e c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y o r t h e p e n a lt y f o r
t rafficker is higher when the crime commi t ted is qualified tr affick i n g
in person. (2014 Bar Exam)
In People v. Monsanto, G.R. No. 241247, March 20, 2019, AAA
(minor) transferred from Val enzuela City to move in with accused in
M anila w it h t h e e x pectation t ha t h e w o ul d p r o v ide for her s t u d i es
and because they w e r e a l r e ady l o v ers. A s i t t u r n e d o u t , a c cused
manipulated and coerced AAA into engaging in prostitution with
f oreign m en , f r o m w h i c h i n c om e h e a l s o b e nefit ed. A c cused w a s
convicted of trafficking in p erson.
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VOI.UME II
H ouse of pr o st i t u t i o n
Owner or manager of brothel (house of prostitu t i on) can be hei <
liable for w h it e sl ave t r a de, child p r o sti t u t i on , qu alified sl avery, or
trafficking in person.
1. W h it e S l a v e T r a d e — White slave trade is commit t ed by
any person who in any manner, orunder any pretext, engages in the
business or profits by prostit u t ion or enlists the services of any other
person for the pur p ose of prostit u t i on. (Art i c le 341; 1946 Bar Exam)
I f the v i c ti m i s u n d e r 1 2 y e ar s of a ge, th e p e n a lt y f o r w h i t e
slave tr ade i s on e d e gree hi g h e r. (Section 10 of R . A. N o . 76 10) In
effect, this is a qualif y in g circum st ance.
2. Ch il d P r o s t i t u t i o n —Child p r o s ti t u t i on u n d er S e c t i o n
5(c) of R.A. No. 7610 includes deriving profit or advantage therefrom,
w hether a s m a n a ge r o r o w n e r o f t h e e s t a b l i s h m en t w h e r e t h e
prostitution takes place, orof the sauna, disco, bar, resort place of
)
entertain m ent or establishm ent serving as a cover or which engages
in prostit u t ion i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e a c t i v it y fo r w h i c h t h e l i c ense has
b een issued to said establishment .
3. Qualified S l a v e r y — Qualif ied slavery is c o m m i t t e d b y
any person who purchases, sells,kidnaps or detains a human being
f or th e p u r p ose of a s signin g t h e o f f ended p a rt y t o s om e i m m o r al
traffic. (Artic le 272)
4. Tr a f fi c k i n g i n P e r so n — Ow n e r s o r m a n a g e r s f
brot
rothel,
e who are m a i n t a i n i n g , h ar b or i ng, and pr ovi d ing pr osti t u t es
by taking advant age of their v u l n e r a b i l it y for t hey need money, are
traffickers.
If the prostit ute in the brothel is under 12 years of age cu t
for
or h a v i n g s e x ua l i n t e r course w it h h e r i s l i a b l e for s t a t u t o ry r a p e
a s principal by d i r ect p a r t i c i p a t ion w h i l e t h e o w ner or m a n a g e
f
th e brothel, who derived benefit of advant age therefrom, is liable as
principal by in di spensable cooperation. (People v. Tulugan, G.R. No.
227868, March 12, 2019)
If the prostit u tes in the brothel are childr en, who are not under
12 years of age, the owner or man ager is liable for child pr ostitut ion.
If th e p r o s t i t u t e s i n t h e b r o t h e l a r e a d u l t s , w h o vo l u n t a r i l y
engaged in pr osti t u t i on , th e ow ner or m a n a ger t h e r eof is li a ble for
white slave trade.
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 215
If the prostit u tes in the brothel are adul ts, who are purchased,
kidnapped or d et a i ned to in v o l u n t a r i ly e n g a ge in p r o s ti t u t i o n, t h e
owner or manager th ereof is liable for qu a l if i ed slavery.
W hether the crime commi t ted is child prostit u t i on, white tr a d e
s lave, or qualified sl av ery, th e o w ner o r m a n a ger of a b r o t hel can
be prosecuted for graver crime of trafficking in person or qualified
trafficking i n p e r son. Th e concept of t r af fi ck in g i n p e r son is b r o ad
enough to cover all th ese crimes.
Customer of prostitute
C ustomer of prostit ut e may be held liable for child prostit u t i o n
or use of trafficked person.
1. C h il d P r os t i t u t i o n — C h i l d p r o s t i t u t i o n u n d e r R . A .
N o. 7610 can b e c o m m i t t e d b y a c u s t o m e r w h o g i v e s m o n e t ar y
c onsideration, g o ods o r o t h e r p e c u n i ar y b e n e fi t t o a c h i l d w i t h
i ntent to e n gage such ch il d i n p r o s t i t u t i on , or c o m m it s t h e ac t o f
s exual int ercourse or l a s civious conduct w i t h a c h i l d e x p l o i ted i n
prostituti on. (Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610)
If the chil d exploited in p r o s t i t u t i o n i s u n der 1 2 y ears of age,
having sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with her, the offender
shall be prosecuted for statutory rape or acts ofthe lasciviousness
under the Revised Penal Code; but in case of acts of lasciviousness,
the penalty of re c l u s ion t e m poral i n i t s m e d i u m p e r i o d s h a ll b e
imposed. (Section 5 o f R . A . N o . 76 1 0) In Pe o ple v. Co n g r essman
Jalosjos,G.R. Nos. 132875-76, November 16, 2001, accused's acts of
kissing an 11-year oldchild, a self-confessed sex worker, on the lips,
fondling her breast, inserting his finger into her vagina and placing
his penis between her t h i g hs, all consti t ut e l a scivious conduct. H e
was convicted of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code
with penalty of re clusion temporal in i t s m e d i um p e r i od und er R.A.
No. 7610.
2. U se of T r a f fi c k e d Pe r s o n — Us e of t r a f j i c k ed pe rson
is committed by an y p e r son wh o b uy s or e n gages the services of a
trafficked person for prostit u t i on. (Section ll of R . A. N o. 9208)
I n traffick in g in p e r son inv olv in g slavery, two or t h r ee part i es
may be involved, to wit: the tra ffic ker and the slave. If one abducted
a person, and then harbored and maintained him as a slave, the
f ormer i s l i a b l e f o r t r a f f i c k in g i n p e r s on ; w h i l e t h e s l a v e i s t h e
trafficked vict im . I f a f r i en d of th e t r a f f i cker bor r owed th e slave to
c lean his house, the former is liable for act that pr om otes traffickin g
 216 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
in person. To kn o w i n gl y b enefit in g f r om , fi n a n cial or o t h e r w i se, or
making use of, the labor or services of a person held to a condition of
involunt ar y servi t u de, forced labor, or slavery constit u tes the crime
of act that pr om otes traffi ck in g in p er son.
In traffick ing in person involving prostit u t i on, there are always
three parties involved, to wit: tr a ff ic ker ( pimp or o wn er or m a n a ger
o f brothel), cu stomer, an d t h e p r o s t i t u t e . T h e t r a f f i cker i s l i a b l e
for traffick in g i n p e r son, the customer is l i a ble for use of tr af fi ck ed
p erson, while the prosti t ut e is the t r af fi cked vict i m .
If there are only two parties involved in prostit u t i on, a customer
and a minor prostit u te, the customer is not liable for use of trafficked "
v ictim because this crime presupposes the commission of traffick i ng
i n person b y a n o t he r o f f e n der. I n t h i s s i t u a t i on , t h e c u s t omer i s ;
l iable for ch il d p r o st i t u t i o n w h i l e c h il d e x p l oited i n p r o s t i t u t i o n i s
t he victim .
I f t h e r e a r e o n l y t wo p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n pr o s t i t u t i o n , a '
c ustomer and an a d ul t p r o st i t u t e, the customer is not l i a ble for u se :
of trafficked victim b ecause this crim e pr esupposes the commission
of trafficking in person by another offender. Neither is the customer
l iable for chil d p r o st i t u t i o n b ecause the pr ostit ut e i s not a c h i ld . If '
t he prostit ut e i s no t a c h i l d o r a t r a f fi c ked v i c t im , t h er e i s n o l a w
that puni shes a customer in en gaging the services of the prostit u t e,
H owever, th e a d ul t p r o s t i t u t e i s l i a b l e fo r p r o s t i t u t i o n u n d e r t h e
Revised Penal C o d e p r o v i de d t h a t s h e i s ha b i t u a ! ly e n g a g ed i n
p rostitu t i o n .
If there are only t w o p a r t i e s i n v olved in c yber p r o st i t u t i on, a
customer and an ad ul t p r o s t i t ut e ar e li a ble for cybersex under R.A,
No. 10175.
ATTEMPTED CHILD PROSTITUTION UNDER R.A. NO. 7610
Attempted child pr ost i t u t i o n u n der Section 6 of R.A. No. 7610
is committed by:
1. A n y p e r s o n w h o , not b e in g a r e l a t iv e of a ch i ld , is found
alone wit h t h e s a i d c h i l d i n s i d e t h e r o o m o r c u b i cl e o f a h o u s e,
a n i nn , h o t el , m o t el , p e n s io n h o u s e , a partelle o r o t h e r s i m i l a r
establishments, v e ssel, v e h i cl e o r a n y o t h e r h i d d e n o r s e c l u d ed
area under circum st ances which w o ul d l ead a r easonable person to
b elieve that t h e c h i l d i s a b ou t t o b e e x p l oi ted i n p r o s t i t u t i o n a n d
other sexual abuse; or
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 217
2. A n y p e r s o n w h o i s r e c eivin g s er v ices from a c h i l d i n a
s auna parlor or b a th , m a ssage clinic, health club an d ot her si m i l a r
establishments.
CHILD ABUSE IN A SECLUDED PLACE UNDER R.A. NO. 7610
C hild abuse under Section 10(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is commit t e d
b y any person wh o sh all k eep or h av e i n h i s c o m p any a m i n or , 1 2
years or under or who is 10 years or more his jun ior in any pu b lic or
private place, hotel, motel, beer joint , discotheque, cabaret, pension
house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other tour ist resort or
similar pl aces. However, t hi s cr im e i s no t c o m m i t t e d i f t h e p e r son
is related to th e ch il d w i t h i n t h e f o u rt h d e g ree of consanguinit y or
affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom and tr a d i t ion or
a cts in the perform ance of a social, moral or legal dut y .
T he person w h o i n d u c es, d e l i v er s o r o f f er s a m i n o r t o t h e
person, who violated Section 10(b), and th e own er, m a n ager or one
entrusted with th e operation of place of accommodation, who allows
the violator to t ake th e m i nor al ong w it h hi m t o such place are also
liable. (Section 10(cJand (dJ of R.A. ¹. 7 6 10)
Section 10 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 is designed to punish pedophiles.
A mil i t ar y r e t i r e e ha d i n h i s c o m p an y fo r t w o n i g h t s i n o n e
r oom in a beach resort a 14-year-old girl, wh ose parents were ki l l e d
a nd who is orphaned and li v in g in t h e st r eets in M a n i l a . The cri m e
c ommitted is ch il d a b u se. H ow ever, th e r e t i r e e ma y i n t e r p ose th e
defense that h e i s r e l a ted t o t h e c h il d w i t h i n t h e f o u r t h d e g ree of
consanguinity or affin it y or any bond recognized by law, local custom
a nd tradit ion or h e a c ted i n t h e p e r f o r m a nce of a social, m oral or
legal duty to t ake care of her. (1992 Bar Exa m )
Arnold, 25 years of age, was sitt in g on a bench in L u n et a Par k
when, wit h ou t h i s p e r m i s sion, L e i l a ni , 1 7 y e ars of a ge, sat beside
him and asked for fin a n cial assistance, allegedly for payment of her
tuition fee, in exchange for sex. Wh il e t hey w er e conversing, police
operatives arrested Arn old for child abuse.
To be held liable under Section,10(b) of R.A. No. 7610, it is
i ndispensable tha t t h e c h i l d i n t h e c o m p an y o f t h e o f f ender m u s t
b e 12 years or u n d e r o r w h o i s 1 0 y e a r s o r m o r e h i s j u n i o r i n a
public place. In this case, Leilani is 17 years of age, and only 8 years
younger than Arnold. Moreover, Leilani sat beside Arnold without
h is permission. H ence, he is not i n t h e c o m p any of a ch i ld . L a st l y ,
 218 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
applying the ejusdem generis prin c iple, Arno ld is not lia b le for chill:,
abuse because Lu n et a i s n o t a p l a c e si m i l a r t o h o t el , m o t el , beer
joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor, '
beach and/or other tou r ist r esort. (2016 Bar Exam)
Stages of child prostitution
Having sexual in t ercourse or lascivious conduct wit}. a child ic
a massage clinic for m o ney consu m m a tes child pr o s t i t u t i cn u n d er
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 even before payment is m a de.
G iving m o ney t o a c h i l d i n a m a s s age cl i ni c w i t h i n t e n t t o
engage her i n p r o s t i t u t i o n c o n su m m a tes c h il d p r o s t i t u t ion un d e r
Section 5(a) even before the commi ssion of sexual i n t e r course with
her.
If th er e i s n e i t h e r s e x ua l i n t e r c ourse nor l a s civious conduct:
with a child, nor m oney given for sex, but circum st ances would lea)
a reasonable person t o b e l i eve t h a t t h e c h i l d 'i n a m a s s age clini< '
is about t o b e e x p l oi ted i n p r o s t i t u t i on , t h e c u st omer i s l i a bl e for .
attempted c h i ld p r o s t i t u t i on u n d e r p a r a g r a ph 1 o f S e c t i on 6 . F o r:
example, if both th e offender and th e chil d ar e n a ked in a m a ssage:
clinic, this circumstance shows that the latter is about to be exploited; ''
h ence, the former is li a ble for at t e m p ted prostit u t i o n .
I f there i s n o c i r c u m s t a nce showing t h a t c h i l d i s a b ou t t o bc :
exploited, bu t t h e c u s t o mer re c eives services f rom t h e c h i l d i n s
massage clinic, h e i s l i a bl e for at t e m pted ch i ld p r o s t i t u t i on u n d er"
paragraph 2 of Section 6. For example, if the child is massaging the '-
customer i n t h e m a s s age cia.nic, the l a t te r i s l i a b l e fo r a t . e m pteJ '
c hild prostit u t i o n .
If th e c u s t omer i n t h e m a s s age cl i ni c h a s n o t y e t r e c eive <'
s ervices from t h e c h i l d , bu t t h e f o r m e r i s 1 0 y e ar s ol der t h a n t h <
latter or t h e c h i l d i s 1 2 y e ar s o f a g e or b e l ow , ch ild ab u se un der
S ection 10(b) is commi t t e d .
VAGRANCY
Article 2 0 2 o f t h e R e v i se d P e na l C o d e p u n i s he d v a g r ancy
( vagabond o r l o i t e r er ) a n d p r o s t i t u t i on . B u t t h i s p r o v i s io n a <
amended by R.A. No. 10158 merely penalizes prostit u t i on . I n su m,
R.A. No. 10 158 ha s d ecri m i n a l i zed v a gr ancy by o m i t t i n g p o r t i ons
of Article 202 involving cr i mes of vagrancy. A reading of the Senat~
d eliberation p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e p a s s a g e of la w d e c r i m i n a l i zin
zing
J9JC9B0M
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 219
vagrancy shows that t hey considered vagrants as victims of poverty
and that the law on vagr ancy serves to oppress the very people that
the government sought to pr otect.
In view of the new policy of the State decrimi n a l i z ing vagrancy,
which is e m b odied i n R . A . N o . 1 0 1 58, or d i n a nce, w h ich p u n i s h es
vagrancy, should be declared as contrary tolaw, and hence, invalid.
Settled is t h e r u l e t h a t w h a t t h e n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a tu re e x p r e ssly
allows by law , a l ocal legislat ur e ma y no t d i s a llow by or d i n a nce or
resolution. (L i n a v . P a n a , G . R. N o . 12 9 0 93, Au g u st 3 0, 2 0 0 1) The
spring cannot rise higher t han it s source.
R.A. No. 10158 shall be given retroactive effect. Under Sections
2 and 3 the re of, all p e n d i ng c ases for va g ra ncy s ha ll be d i s m i s sed
and all persons serving sentence for vagrancy shall be released
immediately. Sections 2 an d 8 of R .A . No . 10158 expressly provide
r etroactive application t o th e la w w i t h o u t d i s t i n c t i on, wh e t her t h e
o ffender is a habit ual deli n qu ent or n ot .
MIGRANT W O R K E R S AN D O V E R S E A S FILIPINOS ACTS OF 1995
RepublicAct No. 8042 as amended by RA No. 10022
T here are t h r e e c r i m e s u n de r S e ction 6 o f R . A . N o . 8 042 a s
amended by R.A. No . 10022, to w i t: ( 1) ill e gal recrui t m e nt w i t h o u t
license or authorit y u n der the first par agraph of Section 6; (2) illegal
recruitment i n v olv ing pr ohib i ted acts under Section 6 [a] to [n]; and
(3) crime of prohibited acts under Section 6 [1] to [7].
RECRUITMENT WITHOUT LICENSE OR AUTHORITY
T he elements of illegal recruit m ent w i t h out license or authorit y
under the firstparagraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Ov er seas Fil i p i nos Act) ar e (1) t ha t t h e o f f ender is a
non-licensee or n o n -holder of a u t h o r i t y ; an d ( 2 ) t h a t t h e o f f ender
u ndertakes recrui t m ent acti v i t i e s .
N on-license or n o n - h o l de r o f a u t h o r i t y
Recruitm ent for overseas employinent is not in itself necessarily
immoral or unl a w f ul . It is the lack of the necessary license or permit
that renders such recruit m ent activ i t ies unlaw f ul . (People v. Sendon,
G.R. No. 101579-82, December 15, 1993) Under Section 6 of R.A. No.
8042, recrui t m en t i s i l l e gal w h e n u n d e r t a ken b y a n o n - licensee or
n on-holder of auth or i t y .
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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
A uthorit y r e f er s t o a d o c u m en t i s s ue d b y t h e S e c r et ar y of
Labor and E m p l o y m ent a u t h o r i z in g th e officers, personnel, agents
o r repr esentat ives o f a l i c e n sed r e c r u i t m e n t / m a n n in g a g e ncy t o
conduct recru i t m en t a n d p l a c ement a c t i v i t i es i n a p l a c e st ated. in
the license or in a s p ecified place. (Implementing r u les of B .A . N o,
8042)
License refers to the document issued by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment a u t h o r i z in g a p e r son, par t n er ship or c orporation
to operate a p r i v a t e r e c r u i t m e n t / m a n n in g a g ency. (Implementing
rules of R.A. No. 8042)
Non-licensee refers to an y p e r son, par t n er ship or c orpor ation
with no v a l i d l i c e n seto e n g a ge in r e c r u i t m e nt a n d p l a c e ment, of
overseas Fi l i p in o w o r k er s o r w h o s e l i c ense is re v o ked, cancelled,
terminated, expired or o t h e r w i s e de l is ted fr om t h e r o l l o f l i c e nsed
recruitm ent / m a n n in g a g e n c i es r egistered w i t h t h e P h i l i p p i n es
Overseas W o r ke r A d m i n i s t r a t i on (P O E A ) . ( Im pl e menting r u l e s o /
R.A. No. 8042)
Certification issued by the POEA t ha t th e accused was neither
licensed nor auth o r i zed to recruit w o r k er s for overseas employment
is a public document i s sued by a p u b l i c officer i n t h e p e r f o r m ance
of an official d u t y ; h e n ce, it i s a pr i m a f a c ie ev i d e nce of t he f a cts
therein st a ted p u r s u an t t o S e ction 2 3 o f R u l e 13 2 of t h e R u l e s of
Court. (People v. Benedictus, G.R. No. 123906, March 27, 1998)
Testimony of th e a ccused that h e r t r a v e l a g ency only offered
v isa a s sistance, t i c k e t i ng , d o c u m e n t a t i o n , a irport t r a n s f e r and
c ourier services is an i m p l i e d a d m i s sion t h a t n e i t h e r sh e no r h er
agents had a license to recrui t ' compl ai n ant t o w or k a b r oad. (People
v. Adeser, G.R. No. 179981, October 26, 2009)
To be held liable for il l egal recru i t m e nt , it i s not r e qu i red that
the accused, who is a non-licensee, represented himself to the
victims
as a duly-licensed recruit er. (People v. Cabacang, G.A. N o. 118917,
July 1 7 , 1 995) M i s r e p r e sentation i s i m p o r t a n t i n es t a f a t h r o u g h
f alse pretense but not in i l l e gal recru i t m e n t .
1. R e cr u i t m e n t b ef o r e t h e i ss u a n c e o f l i c e n s e
Recruitment acti v i t ies undert a ken pr ior to the issuance of license is
illegal. License to recruit sh all not be given a retr oactive effect. The
law specifically p r o v i des t ha t e v er y l i c ense shall be v a lid fr o m t h e
date of issuance. (People v. Chua, G.R. No. 128280, April 4, 2001
)
2. R e v o k e d, cancelled license, terminated or expired
license — U nder t h e i m p l e m e n t i ng r u l e s o f R . A . N o . 8 0 4 2, n c n -
J9JC9B0M
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
licensee includes person, par t n er ship or c o r p or ation w h ose license
is revoked, cancelled, terminated, expired or otherw i se delisted from
t he roll of l i c ensed recru i t m e n t / m a n n in g a g encies. In s u m , u n d e r
this new implement in g r u l es, an agency with a suspended license is
a licensee.
Recruitm en t a c t i v i t y u n d e r t a k e n b y a g e nc y w i t h rev o k ed,
cancelled, or t e r m i n a ted li c e nse or a u t h o r i ty o r a de l i s t ed ag e ncy
c onstitutes the crime of ill egal recrui t m e n t .
R ecruitm ent a c t i v it y u n d e r t a k e n b y a g e ncy w i t h a n e x p i r e d
jicense is illegal recruit m e nt. (People v. Chua, G.R. No. 184058, March
10, 2010) However, despite the expiration of the license to recruit,
the agency is not p r o h i b i ted f rom w i n d i n g -up it s a f f a i rs. Receiving
payments, after th e e x p i r a t ion of t h e l i c ense, for services rendered
before s aid expirati on is not constitu t i v e of il l e gal recrui t m e n t. T h e
c ollection of un p ai d accounts should not b e th e b a sis of a cr i m i n a l
prosecution. (Aquino v. Co u rt of A p p e al, G . I l . N o. 91 896, November
21, 1991)
3. U n a ut h o r i z e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e —The law requires that
t he recruit m en t a c t i v i t i e s of a g ency's r e p r esentativ e sh oul d h a v e
first been auth or i zed by th e P O EA . U n d e r t h e P OE A R u l es, every
appointment of r e p r esentat i ves or a g ent s of l i c ensed agency shall
be subject toprior approval or authority of POEA. Approval by the
P OEA of th e a p p o i n t m en t o r d e s i g n a t ion d oes no t a u t h o r iz e t h e
agent or representative to establish a b r a nch or e x t en sion office of
t he licensed agency represented. Any r e v ocation or a m e n d m ent i n
the appointment should be commu n i cated to the PO EA . Ot h er w i se,
the designation or a p p oi n t m en t s h al l b e deemed as not r ev oked or
amended. (People v. Saley, G.B. No. 121179, July 2, 1998)
I llegal r e c r u i t m e nt s i n c l u d e t h o s e u n d e r t a k e n b y a g e n t s
o r representatives w h os e a p p oi n t m e nt s b y a l i c e n see o r h o l d e r
o f authorit y h a v e n o t b e e n p r e v i ou sly a u t h o r i zed b y t h e P O E A .
(People v. Alvarez, G.B. No. 142981, August 20, 2002) However, the
o bligation to r e g i ster i t s p e r sonnel w i t h t h e P O E A b e l o ngs to t h e
officers of the recrui t m en t a g ency. A m er e em pl oyee of the agency,
whose duty is to conduct int er v iew of applicants, cannot be expected
to know the legal requir em ents for its operation. If the agency failed
r egister its em pl oyee wit h t h e P OE A a n d t h e r e i s n o showing t h a t
the employee is aware of such non-registr a t i on, the employee is not
liable for illegal recrui t m e nt . (People v. Chowdury, G.B. No. 129577-
80, February 15, 2000)
 222 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
4. P e r so n a l r e c r u i t m e n t — Th e p r i n c i p le i n C ho w d u r y
i s not ap p l i cable if t h e a c cused is a ct in g on h i s ow n i n r e c u i t i n g
w orkers. I f t h e a c c u sed i s a n u n r e g i s t ered r e p r e sentat iv e o f a
licensed recrui t m en t a g ency an d i t a p p e ar s t h a t sh e wa s r u n n i n g
her own la b or r e cruit m e nt b us iness, s he cannot e scape liabili ty b y
claiming that she was not aware that before working as an employee
of the agency, she should first be registered with th e P O EA. (' People
v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 124489, February 5, 2 0 0 4; People v. Faja r do,
G.R. No. 128588, November 22, 2000)
Even t h o ug h t h e a c c u sed i s a r e g i s t ered r e p r esentat i ve, or
the manager of a l i c e n sed recru i t m en t a g ency, i f t h e r e c r u i t m e nt
o f complainant s w a s h i s p e r sonal u n d e r t a k i n g , an d h e d i d n o t d o
the recrui t m en t a c t i v it y fo r t h e a g ency, he is st il l l i a bl e for i l l egal
recruitm ent. (People v. Manungas, Jr., G.R. No. 91552-55, March 10,
1994)
I f t h e a c c u sed i s s ue d r e c ei pt s o n he r o w n w i t h o u -. u s i ng
t he official r e c eipt s o f t h e l i c e n sed r e cr u i t m en t a g e n cy, an d s h e
personally undertook to retur n th e money, such circumst ance shows
that she is engaged in recru i t m en t on her own . H e n ce, she is liable
f or illegal r ecru i t m e n t . (People v. Cabacang, G.R. No. 118917,July
17, 1995)
I f t h e a c c u sed i s c o n d u c t in g r e c r u i t m en t a c t i v i t i e s in her
residence, and not i n t h e of fice of th e l i censed recrui t m en t a g ency,
such circumstance shows that she is engaged in recrui t m ent on her
own. Hence, she i s l i a bl e fo r i l l e gal r e c r u i t m e nt . (P eople v. Va l le,
G.R. No. 126988, February 28, 2001)
R ecrui t m en t a c t i v i t y
Recruitment s h a l l m ea n a ny ac t o f c a n v a s sing, erlisting,
c ontracting, t r a n s p or t i ng , u t i l i z i n g , h i r i n g , o r p r o c u r in g w o r k e r s
and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment abr oad, whether for p rofit or n ot . (Section 6 of R.A.
No. 8042)
1. T ec h n i c a l m e a n i n g — R e c r u i t m e nt i s a legal t e r m ;
i ts m e a n in g m u s t b e u n d e r s t ood i n t h e l i g h t o f w h a t t he l a w
contemplates, not o f c o m mo n p a r l a nce (People v. V i l l a s, G .R N o ,
112180, August 15, 1997), and not how a dictionary defines it. (Flores
v. People, G.R. No. 98411, July 20, 1992)
Under th e R a n dom H o use D i ctionary, r ecruit m e a n s t o
"engage" or "hire." Accused argued that she did not in v it e much less
J9JC9B0M
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
entice people for possible employment overseas; it was complainant
who sought h r h e l p to ena ble h im to w o rk a b r o a d. It w as held tha t
t he term "recruit" or " r ecru i t m e nt " m u s t be u n d er stood in th e li gh t
of what t h e l a w co n t e m p l a t es a n d ri ot how a d i c t i o n ar y d e fi n e s
i t. There i s r e c r u i t m en t s i n c e sh e g av e c o m pl a i n an t t h e d i s t i n c t
impression that she had th e power or ab i l it y t o send people abroad
for work. (Flcres v. People, supra)
However, the te stim o ny of t he w i t n e ss that a ccused recruite d
his wife an " c h i l d r en , i s n o t e v i d ence t ha t a c cused is en gaged in
r ecruitment a c t i v i t y . U sing th e t e r m " r e c r u it " i n t e s t i f y in g i s a
conclusion of law. Wi t n ess must testify on specific act commit ted by
the accused ',e.g.,interviewing, and receiving placement fees), which
constitute s e c r u i t m e n t a c t i v i t y u n d e r t h e l a w . (P e ople v. Se gun,
G.R. No. 119076, March 25, 2002)
2. Re f er r a l - T h e ac t o f r ef e r r a l , w h i c h i s i n c l u d e d i n
recruitmen:, is th e act of passing along or for w a r d in g an a p p l i cant
a fter an i r . ' t i a l i n t e r v i e w t o a selected e m p l oy er , p l a c ement o r
bureau. (Rodolfo v. People, G.R. No. 146964 August 10, 2006) The.
f ollowing are referr als that constit ut e i l e gal recrui t m e n t :
1. B r i n g i n g t h e c o m p l a i n a nt s t o t h e a g ency, an d h e r
acceptance of fees including those for processing; (Rodolfo v.
People supra)
Approaching complainants and prodding them to
s eek employment a b r oa d a n d b r i n g i n g t h e m t o a r e c r u i t e r ;
People v. Meris, G.R. No. 117145, March 28, 2000) and
3. Su g g e s t in g t o complai n a nt s w h ere they could apply
f or overseas employment . (People v. Marti nez, G.R. No. 158627,
March 5, 2010)
3. C a p a c i t y t o d e p l o y —Il l e gal r e c ru i t e rs n e ed. not even
expressly represent t h e m selves to th e v i c t im s a s l i censed recruit er
(People v. Saley, G.R. No. 121179, July 2, 19 98) or as p ersons, who
have the ab i l i ty t o s e nd w o r k e rs a b r o a d. It i s e n o u gh t h a t t h e s e
recruiters gave the im p r e ssion t h at t l e y h a v e t h e a b i l i ty t o e n l i s t
w orkers for job p l a cement a b r oad i n o r d e r t o i n d u c e th e l a t t e r t o
tender payment of fees. (People v. Lapis, G.R. No. 145784-85, October
15, 2002;People v. Alvarez, G.R. No. 142981,August 20, 2002;People
v. Peralta, G.R. N o. 11 4905, December 12, 1997; Rit u a lo v. People,
G.R. No. 178887, June 25, 2009) In People v. Gomez, G.R. No. 131946,
F ebruary 8, 2 0 00, accused argued t ha t t h e c om pl a i n a nt s w ere t h e
ones who volunt a r il y w en t t o hi m t o pr ocure his services as a travel
 224 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
agent. It w a s h el d t h a t e ven i f a c cused did not p u r p osely seek out
the complainants to apply as workers in Japan, his subsequent false
misrepresentations that he had the capacity to procure employment
for th em , w i t h ou t a u t h o r i t y f r o m t h e P O E A , m a d e h i m l i a b l e for
i llegal recrui t m e n t .
4. Pr o m i s e or offer Under — Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, any
non-licensee or non-holder of author ity w ho, in any mann er, offers or
promises fora fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged in illegal recrui t m e nt . H ow ever, under the same
provision, "promising" for employment abro ad, whether for p=cfit or
not, is a recrui t m ent a ct i v i ty ; t hi s is not just pr esumed recrui t m ent
activity. Th us, if offer and promise by a non-licensee is accompanied
w ith ot her a cts such as r eceiving p l acement fees from th e x . k
e wor er,
ille
i egal r e cr u i t m en t i s n o t o n l y p r e s u med t o h a v e b een comrratted
but this crime shall be considered to have. been established by direct
evidence. (See: People v. Lapis, et al., G.R. No. 145784-35, October 15,
2002; People v. Racho, G.R. No. 227505, October 02, 2017)
T o give rise to the pr esum p t ion of i l l egal recru i t m en t i t m u t
bee established t ha t t w o o r m o r e p e r sons were offered or p r e m i sed
for a fee employment abroad. However, if there is an actual evic.ence
of illegal recrui t m e nt , i t i s no t r e q u i red t ha t t h er e are tw o or m ore
persons, who w er e p r o m i sed for e m p l o y m ent a b r o ad, w h e t l:er for
p rofit or not .
In People v. Pa n i s, G. R. N o . L - 5 8 6 7 4, Ju ly 1 1 , 1 9 8 6; P eople
v. Diaz, G.R. No . 1 1 2 175, J ul y 2 6 , 1 9 96, th e C o ur t h e l d t l " ar the
n umber of p ersons dealt w i t h i s n o t a n e s sential i n g r e dient of t h e
act of recruit m ent of work ers. Any of the acts mentioned in th
= basic
rule Section 6 of R .A . No . 8042 w il l c o n st i t ut e r e cr u i t m en t e ven if
only one p r o spective w o r ke r i s i n v o l v ed. Th e pr o v i so m e r I - I
own a rule of evidence that. where a fee is collected in consideration
of a p r o m is e o r o f f e r o f e m p l o y m en t t o t w o o r m o r e p r o s pective
workers, the indiv i d ual or ent it y dealing wit h t h e m sh all be deemed
to be engaged in the act of recrui t m e nt . The words "shall be deemed"
create that presumpt i on. The word "shall be deemed" should be given
the force of a di sp ut a ble pr esump t ion or of p r i m a f a c ie evidence of
engaging in recru i t m en t an d p l acement .
T o give rise to the pr esum p t ion of i l l egal recrui t m e nt , i t m u st
b e established t ha t t h e o f fer o r p r o m i s e of e m p l oym ent a b r cad to
two or m or e p ersons is m ade for a f e e. Ho wever, if t h e re is a c tual
evidence of il l egal r e cr u i t m e nt , i t i s n o t r e q u i r e d t h a t p r o m i se for
employment abroad is made for profit.
J9JC9B0M
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
5. P r e p a r a t o r y in t er v i e w - In C.I ' . S ha r p Cr ew
Managemerd, Inc. v. Es panol, Jr ., G. R. No. 1 55903, September 14,
2007, an owner of v e ssel and m a n n i n g a g ency, th e ap p l ication for
accreditation of w h i c h w a s s t il l p e n d in g fo r a p p r o v al, i n t e r v i ewed
seamen in im nnection w it h t h e i r p as t e m p l oym ent w i t h t h e f o r m e r
manning agency. However, the employment contr acts were entered
into,and ac-.ual deployment of the seamen was made only upon
approval ot'its applicaticn for accreditation. It was held -..hat the
new manning agency had no approved POEA license to recruit.
I ts accreditation wa s st il l p e n d in g a p p r oval at t h a t t i m e . Ye t t h e y
entertained applicants an d conducted pr epar at ory i n t e r v i ews. Th e
c onduct of preparatory i n t e r v i ews is a recrui t m ent acti v i t y .
6. ' Travel d o c u m e n t s — P rocuring t r av e l d oc u m e n t s
(e.g., passport, a i r l i n e t i " k e t s a n d f o r e ig n v i s a ) f o r c o m p l a i n a nt ,,
w ithout any m er e r e qu i r em ents, can h ar dl y q u a l if y as recrui t m e n t
activities. 'Darvin v. CA., G.R. No. 1 25044, July 1 8, 1 998) This i s
j ust an ev i d ence t ha t a c cused is e n g aged i n a c t i v i t i e s of a t r a v e l
a gency, and not of a r e c r u i t m en t a g ency. H ow ever, defrauding t h e
complainant by falsely pretending to possess the power and capacity
to process travel documents constit u te s estafa. (People v. An geles,
G.R. No. 1 2876, April 11, 2002)
If i n a d d ' t i o n t o p r o c u r i n g t r a v e l d o c u m e n ts , t h e a c c u sed
gave impression of havin g capacity to deploy complain a nts to wor k
abroad, illegal "ecrui t m ent i s com m i t t ed. (People v. Saley, G.R. No.
121179, Juiy 2, 1998) This is just an evidence that accused is engaged
iri activities of a recruitr r e nt a g e ncy, and not just of tra vel agency.
If in addi t ion to pr ocur in g t r a vel documents, accused required
deployment doc:uments (e.g., application forms, NBI clearances, and
medical certi fi cates), i l l e gal r e c r u i t m en t i s c o m m i t t e d . (P eople v .
Bodozo, G.R. No. 96621, October 21, 1992; People v. Ma n ozca, G.R.
No. 109779, March 18,1997)
7. P l a c e m e nt fees — The term "placement" isdefined in the
same way as "recru i t m e nt " u n der A r t i cl e 13 (b) of the L a bor Code.
Hence, the word "recruitment" in R.A. No. 8042 should be considered
s ynonymous w it h t h e t e r m " p l a c ement." S i g n in g r e ceipts w i t h o u t
objecting to th e use of p h r ase "placement fees" th erein i s ev idence
t hat one is engaged in recru i t m en t a ct i v i t y . (People v. Buemio, G.R.
No. 114011-12, December 16, 1996) However, the use of the phrase "in,
payment for travel services" instead of "in payment of placement fee"
will not au t o m a t i cally n egate complain a n ts' assertion t hat accused
illegally r e q u i t e d t h e m . I t m u s t b e r e m e m b ered t hat t h ese people
 226 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 227
VOLUME II

were desperate for employment abroad. They would blin dly sign an '
JuLy 20, 2001) On t h e o t h e r h a n d , no n - presentation of r e ceipt w i l l
document j us t t o a t t a i n t h e i r d r e a m o f s ecur in g a jo b i n a : " orei
not necessarily disprove the assertion of illegal recrui t m e nt . A c ase.
country. (P e ople v. Go m e z, F e b r u a ry 8, 2 0 0 0 , G . R . No . 13 1 943,'
f or illegal recru i t m en t i s m a d e, not b y t h e i s su ance or th e si gn i n g
February 8, 2 0 0 0) To r u l e o t h e r w i se is to a l l ow i l l e g al r e c ru i t er g:
o f receipts for p l a c ement f e es, but b y e n g a gement i n r e c r u i t m e n t
evade the penal consequence of R.A. No. 8042 by requi r in g w orkeo '.
activities w i t h ou t t h e n e c e ssary l i c e nse o r a u t h o r i t y . (P e ople v. ,
to sign receiptsfor travel services.
Alvarez, G.R. No. 142981, August 20, 2002)
P ayment for a share of stock in the agency as a prerequisite fa
The absence of receipts for some of th e a m o u nt s d el iv ered t o
the deployment of th e " s t ockholder" abr oad w oul d no t r u n c o unt@
the accused did n o t m e a n t h a t h e d i d n o t a c cept o r r e c eive such
against work ers' claim t h a t a ccused commi t ted i l l egal recrui t ment,
p ayments. N e i t he r i n t h e S t a t u t e o f F r a u d s n o r i n t h e r u l e s o f
T he w o r k e rs , w h o p u r c h a sed t h e " s h a r e s,' c o u l d n o t i n t e n d 4
evidence isthe presentation of receipts required in order to prove the
invest, but t o o b t ai n a j o b p l a cement. They w er e not i n v e stcrs but
existence of a recruit m en t agreement and the procurement of fees in
job seekers. (People v. Avendano, G.R. No. 96277, December 2, 1993J
illegal recruit m ent cases. Such proof may come from the testimonies
of witnesses. (People v. Pa b a l a n, G . R. N o . 11 5 850, September 30,
F or pr o fit or n o t
1996)
From th e l a n g u age of Section 6 o f R .A . N o . 8 0 42, th e act o( N on-issuance of r e c eipt s b y t h e i l l e g a l r e c r u i t er s w a s a l s o
recruitm ent ma y be "for p rofit or n o t." N o t a b ly, it i s th e l ack of th<
essential to th e scheme to defraud th e vi c t i ms. By al l m ear s, then,
necessary license or a u t h o r i t y , an d no t t h e f ac t of p a y m en t t o th<
should the lack of receipts not hinder the courts from vind i cating the
r ecruiter, that r e n d ers a recrui t m en t act i v it y u n l a w f u l .
(C.F. Sharp victims of the fraud. (People v. Camannong, G.R. No. 199497, August
C rew M a n a g ement, I n c . v. E spanol, J r . e t a l . , G . R . ¹ . 1559 0 3, 24, 2016)
September 14, 2007)
The followin g d oes not w a r r a n t t h e a c q u i t t a l o f t h e a c cused
The fact t h a t h e l p i n g w o r k er s fo r e m p ' o y m en t a b o ar d i s for
and is notfatal to the prosecution's case for illegal recruitment:
f ree w i l l n o t e x c u l p at e t h e a c c u sed f r o m c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y f or
illegal r ecru i t m e nt . F u r t h e r m o re, r e n d er in g f r e e services to other 1. F a i l u r e t o p r e sent p r oof of pay m ent; (P eopLe v. Hu, G.R.
people whom accused did not k n o w o r j u s t m e t m a y c ast d oubt oo No. 182282, October 6, 2008)
the credibilit y of t h e accused. One, who is not a social w o r ker or >
2. F ailure to askfor receipts for the fees paid by the workers
humanit a r i an , w o ul d n o t c o n d uct s uch t i m e -consuming ch a r i t abI<
to the accused; (PeopLe v. Comila, G . R. N o . 17 1448, February 2 8 ,
activities. (People v. Comila„ G . R. No. 171448, February 28, 2007)
2007)
Even i n t h e a b s e nce of m o n e y o r o t h e r v a l u a b les g i ven a>
3. P r esentation of the xerox copies receipts instead the
consideration for the "services" of the recruiter, the latter i>
original copies; (People v. Agustin, G.R. No. 118161,August 29,1995)
c onsidered as b e in g e n g a ged i n r e c r u i t m en t a c t i v i t i es. I t c a n be
gleaned from the language of the law that the act of recruit m ent mal 4. F ai l u r e t o s h o w t h e p l ace w h er e complain a nt s g ave t h e
be for profit or not. It is sufficient t hat th e accused promises or offer> money; (People v. Sendon, G.R. No. 95908, tune 8, 1992) or
for a fee employment t o w a r r a n t c o n v i ction for i l l e gal recr u i t m ent,
5. T u r n i n g o v e r t h e m o n e y r e c eived f r o m c o m p l a i n an t t o
(People v. Ja m i l o sa, G.R. N o. L6 9 076, Ja n u a ry 2 3, 20 0 7; People o,
Comila, G.R. No. 171448, February 28, 2007) other persons. (Rodolfo v. People, G.R. No. 146964, August 10, 2006)
U nlik e i n i l l e g a l r e c r u i t m en t w h e r e p r o fi t i s i m m a t e r i a l ,
Presentation of r eceipt wh e re t he a c cused acknowledged that
a conviction for es tafa re q u i r es a c l e ar s h o w i ng t h a t t h e o f f e nded
t he c o r r espondin g a m o u n t s s tated t h e r e on w ould s u p p or t t h e
testimonies o f t h e v i c t i m s o f r e c r u i t m en t t h a t t h e y t r a n s a cte party par ted w i t h h i s m o n ey or p r o p ert y u p o n t h e o f f ender's false
directly w i t h a c c u s ed, w h o p r o m i se d t h e m o v e r s eas j ob s a f t er
< pretenses, and suffered dam age th ereby. (People v. Chua, G.R. ¹ .
receiving money from t h em . (People v. Logan, G.R. Nos. 185030-33 187052, September 18, 2012)

J9JC9B0M
 228 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
ILLEGAL REC R U ITM E N T INVOLVING PRO H IBITED ACTS
Illegal recru i t m en t i n v o l v in g p r o h i b i ted acts is comm i t t e d b
any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority by perpetr a t in g any of the prohibi ted acts under Section 6
(a) to (n) of R.A. No. 8042 (Mi gr ant W o r k er s and Overseas Filipinos
Lack of th e n e cessary l i c ense or p e r mi t r e n d er s r e cr u i t m ent
for overseas em p l oym en t u n l a w f u l . (P e ople v. Se n d o n, G . R. N o ,
101679, December 15, 1993) However, if the accused is charged with
commission of any of the prohib i ted acts under Section 6 (a) to (n) of
R.A. No. 8042, there is no more need to prove whether he is a license<
o r not because it is no longer an element of the crim e. (People v. Ang,
G.R. No. 181245, August 6, 2008)
In People v. Nogra, G. R. No. 1 70834, Aug ust 2 9, 2 008, Loran
I nternati onal O v e r seas R ecru i t m en t C o . , L t d . i s a d u l y l i c e n se
<
recruitm en t a g e ncy w i t h a u t h o r i t y t o e s t a b l is h a b r a n c h o f fi ce,
However, under R.A. No. 8042, even a licensee or holder of authority
can be held liable for i l l egal recru i t m e nt , should he conimit or omit
to do any of the acts enumer ated in Section 6 (a) to (n).
C hargin g a g r e a t e r a m o u n t
Charging or accepting directly or indi r ectly any amount greater
t han that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescrib d b t h
Se e cretary of Labor and E m p l o y m ent is a pr ohib i ted act constit u t i ng
illegal recrui t m en t u n der Section 6 (a) of R.A. No. 8042.
A ccepting an amount greater than that specified in the schedule
of allowable fees is constit u t iv e of th e c r i m e of i l l e gal r e cr u i t m ent
under Section 6 (a) of R .A. No . 8042. However, the me chanical act
of receiving an a mo unt by a m e re c lerk or c ashier, who had neither
participation in fi x i n g such amount as placement fee nor kn owledge
that such amount is in excess of those allowed by law or r e gul ation,
i s not constit u t iv e of i l l egal recru i t m e n t . (People v. Gaoat, G.R. No,
97028, May 21, 1993) However, the responsible officers, of the owner
of the agency are liable.
Ackn o w ledging a greater amount
Making a worker pay or acknowledge any amount greater than
that actually received by him as a loan or advance is a prohibited act
constitut in g il l egal recrui t m en t u n der Section 6 (a) of R.A. No. 8042.
J9JC9B0M
229
VI. CRIMES ACAINST PUBLIC MORALS
There ar o c c a sions tha: th e r ecru i t m en t a g encies are lendin g
m oney or g i v i n g a d v a nc e s a l ar y t o t h e p e r s on s b e in g r e c r u i t e d
for purposes of d e f r a y in g e x p e n ses t o p r o c ess t h ei r d e p l o y m ent
papers such as medical expenses. If th e w o r k er s ar e r e qu i red by a
r ecruitment agency to pay or a ck n owl edge an am ount g r e ater t h a t
that actually received by him as loan or advance salary, the latter i s
c ommitting il egal recrui t m e n t .
F alse infor m a t i o n
F urnish 'n g o r p u b l i s h in g a n y f a l s e n o t ice or i n f o r m a t io n o r
d ocument in " el a t ion t o r ecru i t m en t or e m p l oy m ent i s a p r oh i b i t e d
a ct constitu t in g i l l e gal r ecru i t m en t u n d e r Section 6 ; b) of R.A. No.
8042.
The fur n i sh in g of t h e v i c t im s w i t h c e r t ai n d o cuments, w h i ch
t hey were r e q u i re d t o fi l l u p a l l e g e dl y i n c o n n e ct.'on w it h t h e i r
overseas employment, w hich a c t u a ll y d i d n o t e x i s t , c o n s t i t u t e s
illegal recruit m e nt. (People v. De Leon, G.R. ¹. 104 9 9 5,August 26,
1993)
F alse in f o r m a t i o n t o o b t a i n l i c e n s e t o r e c r u i t
Giving any false notice. testimony, inform a t ion or document or
commit any act of m i s r e pr e : en t a t ion for t h e p u r p o s of securing a
l icense or auth o r i ty , or d ocument in g h i r e d w o r k er s i s a p r o h i b i t e d
a ct constitu t in g i l l e gal r e cru i t m en t u n d e r Section 6 (c) of R.A. N o .
8042. This includes the act of reprocessing workers through a job
o rder that p e r t a i n s t o n o n e xi stent w o r k , w o r k d i f f e r ent f r o m t h e
a ctual overseas work , or w o r k w i t h a d i f f e r en t e m p l oyer w h e t h er
r egistered or not wit h t h e P O E A .
I nducement t o q u i t
Inducing or a t t e m p t in g t o i n d u ce a w o r ke r a l r e ady em ployed
t o quit h i s e m p l o y m en t i n o r d e r t o o f f e r h i m a n o t h e r u n l ess t h e
transfer is d s i g ned to liberate a worker f rom oppressive terms and
conditions of e m p l o y m ent i s a p r o h i b i t e d a c t c o n s t i t u t i n g i l l e g al
recruitment u n der Section 6 (d) of R.A. No. 8042.
Influencing one not to employ a worker
Influencing or att e m p t in g to infl u e nce any person or entity not
to employ any wor ker wh o has not applied for employment t h r ou gh
his agency or who has formed, joined or supported, orhas contacted
or is supported by any unior or w o r k e rs' organization is a prohibited
 230
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
act constitu t i n g i l l e gal r e cr u i t m en t u n d e r Section 6 (e) of R.A. Ns, '
8042.
R ecrui t in g t o w o r k i n h a r m f u l j o b
Engaging in t h e r e c r u i t m en t o r p l a c ement of w o r k er s i n j ob<
harmful to public health or mor al it y or to the dignity of the Repubii<
of the Philip p i nes is a prohibited act constitu t in g i l l egal recrui t ment
under Section 6 (f) of R.A. No. 8042.
If harmful job for w h ich th e wor ker is placed is an exploitation
(e.g., prostit u t io n o r s l a v e ry) c o nt em pl a ted b y R .A . N o . 9 2 08, ths
accused is liable for t r af fi ck in g in p e r sons under R.A N o . 9 208 an
illegal recru i t m en t u n d e r R .A . N o . 8 0 42. ( People i'.L a l i i, G . B. ¹ ,
< Under A r t i c l e 2 6 o f t h e L ab o r C o d e , tr a v e l a g e n c ies are
195419, October 12, 2011; P eople v. Hashim, G . B. N o. 1 942M, t u n <
18, 2012)
F ailur e t o su b m i t r e p o r t s
Failing to submit reports on the status of employment, placement
vacancies, remitt a nce of foreign exchange earnings, separation from
jobs, departu res an d such ot her m a t t er s or i n f o r m a t ion as may bs
required by the Secretary of La bor and E m p l o y m e nt is a pro hib itett
omission constit u t in g i l l egal recrui t m ent u n der Secticn 6 (h) of R.A.
No. 8042.
Substitu t io n o r a l t e r a t i o n o f e m p l o y m e n t contract
S ubstitut in g o r a l t e r i n g e m p l o y m en t c o n t r a ct s w i t h o u t t h e
approval of the D OL E t o th e pr ej u d ice of the worker is a pr ohibited
act constitu t i n g i l l e gal r e cr u i t m en t u n d e r S ection 6 (i ) of R .A . No,
8 042. The em p l oym ent c o n t r a cted a l t e red or s u b s t i t u t e d m u s t b s
approved and verified by the DO L E . The prohibi t ion on substit u t i on
or alteration i s f r o m t h e t i m e o f a c t ua l s i g n in g of th e em p l oyment
c ontract b y t h e p a r t i e s u p t o a nd i n c l u d i n g t h e p e r i o d o f t h e
expiration ofthe same.
In Pl a c e tvell I n t e r n a t i o n al S e r v i c es C orpo ration,
G.R.. No. 169973, June 26, 2006, R.A. No. 8042 explicitl y .p rC
o h i bits
t e s u b s t i t u t i o n o r a l t e r a t io n t o t he pr e j u d i c e o f t h e w o r k e r ,
o e m p l o y m en t c o n t r a c ts . T h e u nauthorized a l t e r a t i o n i n t he
e mployment c o n t r ac t o f r e s p o n dent , p a r t i c u l a rl y t h e d i m i n u t i on
in his salary f r o m U S $ 3 7 0.00 to SR 8 0 0 .00 per m o n t h , i s v oi d for
violating the POEA-approved contract, which set th e m i n imum
standards, t erms, and conditio ns of his employment.
J9JC9B0M
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 231
Altering employment contract toincrease the salary ofa person
r ecruited wi t h ou t a p p r oval of th e D O L E i s n o t i l l e gal r e cru i t m e n t
s ince the alteration th ereof is not preju di cial to hi m .
B ecoming a n o f f i ce r o r a g e n t i n b o t h recruitment agency
a nd travel a g e n c y
Becoming an of fi cer o r a g en t o f a r e c r u i t m en t o r p l a c ement
a gency and a t t h e s a m e t i m e a n o f f i cer o r b o ar d m e m ber o f a n y
corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly or
indirectly i n t h e m a n a g ement of t r a v e l a g ency i s a p r o h i b i te d act
constituting il l egal recrui t m ent u n der Section 6 (j) of R.A. No. 8042.
p rohibited f r o m engaging i n th e b usi n e ss o f r ec r u i t m e nt a n d
placement of ioorkers for overseas employment wh ether for p r ofit or
not. If the officer or B o ar d m e m ber of th e t r a vel a gency is also an
officer or agent of a r e c r u i t m en t a g ency, he can b e h el d l i a bl e f or
illegal recruit m ent u n der Section 6 (j) of R.A. No. 8042.
W ithholdin g t r a v e l d o c u m e n t s p r i o r t o d e p a r t u r e
W ithholdin g o r d e n y i n g t r a v e l d o c u m e nt s f r o m applicant
workers before depart ur e for m o n et ar y or fi n a n c ial considerations,
or for an y o t h e r r e a s ons i s a p r o h i b i t e d a c t c o n s t i t u t i n g i l l e g al
r ecruitment u n d e r S e c t i o n 6 ( k) of R. A. N o . 80 4 2 . H o w e v e r ,
w ithholding or denying t r a vel documents is not i l l e gal recrui t m e n t
if the r e a son th e r e of i s a u t h o r i z ed b y t h e L a b o r C o d e a n d i t s
implementing ru les and regulat i ons.
C onfiscating, concealing, o r d e s t r o y in g t r a v e l d o c u m ent s o f
t rafficked persons in f u r t h e r a nce of tr affi ck in g or t o pr event t h ev m
from leaving th e coun tr y o r s e ek in g r e d r ess from t h e g overnm ent
o r appropriate agencies constit u tes th e cr im e of a cts t ha t p r o m o t e
trafficking in persons under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9208.
Non-deployment of worker
t,
F ailure t o a c t u a ll y d e p loy a c o n t r a cted w o r ker w i t h ou t v a l i d
r eason is a p r o h i b i t e d o m i s sion c o n st i t u t i n g i l l e ga l r e c r u i t m e n t
under Section 6 (I) of R.A. No. 8042. The vali dity of the reason shall
be determined by the DOLE.
Non-deployment o f t h e p e r son r e c r u i ted per se i s no t i l l e gal
recruitment. There must be independent evidence from the DOLE
to establish th e r e ason for n on -deployment, such as th e absence of
 232 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
a proper job o r d er . I f t h e p r o s ecution f a i le d t o p r e s ent d o cument
from the D OL E t o e s t abl ish th e r e ason for th e accused's failure to
actually deploy pr i v at e complai n a n ts, the li censed recruiter cannot
be held l i a bl e fo r i l l e ga l r e c r u i t m e nt . (P e ople v. No g r a, G . R. N o ,
170884, August 29, 2008)
N on-rei m b u r s e m en t o f e x p e n s e s
F ailure t o r e i m b u r s e e x p e n ses i n c u r r e d b y t h e w o r k e r i n
connection w it h h i s d o cum ent a t ion an d p r o cessing for p u r p oses of
d eployment, in cases where th e deployment does not actu ally t a k e
pI ace without the work er's fault is a prohibited omission constituut img
illegal recrui t m en t u n der Section 6 (m) of R.A. No. 8042.
1. N on - d e p l o y m e n t —A l i c e nsee, w h o f a i l e d to d e p loy a
contracted worker, will not be crimin a lly liable for illegal recruit m ent
if: (1) th e r e a son fo r t h e n o n - d eployment i s v a l i d a s d e t e r m i n ed
by the D O L E , an d (2 ) r e i m b u r s ement of t h e e x p enses incurred b y
t he worker i n c o n n ection w i t h h i s d e p l oym ent d ocument a t ion an d
processing is made.
If the non-deployment of th e wor ker is w i t h ou t a v a li d r eason,
r eimbursement of hi s expenses is not a d efense. Conversely, if t h e
non-deployment of the worker is coupled with non-reim b u r sement of
expense, validity of the reason for non-deployment is not a defense.
If the non-deployment is due to the work er's fault (e.g., worker
was arrested for murder), the recruiter cannot be held liable for illegal
recruitm en t i n v o l v i n g n o n - d e p loyment or n o n - r e i m b u r s ement.
T he work er's f a ul t i s a v a l i d r e a son for n o n - deployment t h a t w i l l
exculpate the recruiter from liabi l it y for illegal recrui t m ent inv olving
non-deployment of w o r k er . T h e w o r k e r's f a ul t i s a l s o a d efense in
illegal recru i t m en t i n v o l v in g n o n - r ei m b u r s ement of e x p ense since
t he law r e q u i res absence of fa ul t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e w o r k e r a s an
e lement of this cri m e .
2. R e im b u r s e m e n t — To m a k e a c c used l i a b le f or i l l e g al
recruitm ent involvin g n on - r e i m b u r s ement of e x p e n ses, the
p rosecution m u s t est a b l i s h t h a t pr i v a t e c omplainant s
made
payments to the agency, and former failed to reimburse that amounts
despite of th e n on -deployment of th e l a t t er . (P eople v. Nogra, G.R.
No. 170884, August 29, 2008; People v. Sagayaga, G.R. No. 148726;
February 28, 2004)
T he r e i m b u r s e m en t c o n t e m p l a te d b y Sec t i o n 6 of R .A ,
No.
o . 8042 i s f u l l r e i m b u r s e m ent o f t h e e x p e n ses i n c u r re d b y t h e
J9JC9B0M
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 233
worker i n c o n n ection w i t h t h e d o c u m e n t a t io n a n d p r o c essing of
his deployment. H ence, part ial r e i m b u r s ement i s not a d efense. To
rule otherwise would b e offensive to th e a d m i n i s t r a t ion of j u s t i ce,
a s illegal recruit ers could easily escape crim i nal l i a b i l it y b y s i m p l y
returning an in significant por t ion of the amount t hey collected from
the worker. (People v. Sagayaga, G.R. No. 148726, February 28, 2004)
3. W i t h or w i t h ou t li c e n s e t o r e c r u i t — In Pe o p le v .
0cden, G .R. No. 1 7 3 1 98, Ju ne 0 1, 2 0 1 1, since il l e gal r e c ru i t m e n t
involving non-reimb u r sement of expenses can be commit ted by any
p erson, even by a l i c ensed recrui t er , a certi fi cation on w h e t her t h e
n a gency had a license to recruit or n ot, is inconsequential .
In Pe ople v. Mo l i n a , G . R . N o . 2 2 9 7 1 2, F e b r u a ry 2 8 , 2 0 1 8 ,
the recruit m en t a g e n cy , w h i c h a c c u sed h e a ded, w a s a l i c e n see.
N evertheless, accused is still li able for illegal recrui t m ent for fail u r e
to make reimbur sement of wor k er's expenses.
A llowing fo r e ig n m a n a g e m e n t o f r e c r u i t m e n t a g e n c y
Allowing a n o n - F i l i p in o ci t i zen t o h ea d or m a n age a l i censed
recruitment/m an n in g agency is a pr ohib i ted act constit u t in g i l l egal
recruitment u n der Section 6 (n) of R.A. No. 8042.
Under A r t i cl e 2 7 of t h e L a b o r C o de, only F i l i p i n o c it i z ens or
corporations, p a r t n erships o r e n t i t i es a t l e a s t s eventy-five percent
(75%) of the authorized and voting capital 'stock of which is owned and
controlled by Fili p in o citizens shall be permitted to par ti cipate in t h e
recruitment and p l a cement of workers, locally or overseas. A llowing
a non-Filipin o c i t i zen t o h e a d o r m a n a g e a l i c e nsed r ecru i t m e n t /
manning agency is a c i r c u m v en t ion of A r t i cl e 2 7 of th e C o de, and
constitutive of the crime of illegal recrui t m ent u n der Section 6 (n) of
R.A. No. 8042.
CRIME OF PROHIBITED ACTS
T he crim e o f p r o h i b i te d a ct s i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r son or
entity by perpetr a t in g any of th e u n l a w fu l or p r o h i b i ted acts under
Section 6 (1) to (7) of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
F ilipinos Act). The crime of ill egal recrui t m en t i n v o l v in g pr ohibit ed
acts is different from th e cr im e of prohib i ted acts.
R ecruitm en t a c t i v i t y b y a s u s p e n de d a g e n c y
I t is u n l a w f u l o r p r o h i b i t e d u n d e r S e ction 6 ( 6 ) o f R .A . N o .
8 042 for a s u s p e nded r e c r u i t m e n t / m a n n in g a g e ncy t o e n g age i n
 234 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
any kind of recrui t m en t acti v it y i n c l u d in g the processing of pendin
en ing
workers a p p l i cati ons. However, lack of k n o w l edge on th e par t of a
mere employee, who had no control, management or di r ection of the
recruitm ent a g ency, tha t t h e l i c ense of th e agency was suspended
is a defense in a c ase i n v ol v in g v i o l a t ion o f S e ction 6 (6 ) t h e r eof.
(People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 148198, October 1, 2008)
According to th e Su p r em e Court , a no n - l icensee or non-holder
of authority in c l u d es p e rs on, c orporation o r e n t i t y w h o s e l i c e nse
or author it y t o r e c r ui t h a s b een s u spended, revoked or c a ncelled.
(Romero v. People, G.R. No. 171644, November 28, 2011; Sto. Thomas
v. Salac, G.R. No. 152642, November 18, 2012)
This definit ion of no n-licensee or non-holder of authority is not
accurate since it is based on ant i q u a ted i m p l em ent in g r u les of P.D.
No. 1920. Under t h i s ol d r u l e , an a gency w it h a s u s p ended license
to recruit is a non-licensee. Hence, recruit m ent acti v it y of an agency
w ith suspended license is illegal recru i t m e n t .
I n 2 0 09, R .A . N o . 1 0 0 2 2 h a s a m e n de d R .A . N o . 8 0 4 2 a n d
i ntroduced th e c r i m e o f p r o h i b i te d a ct s u n de r S ection 6 ( 1 ) t o ( 7)
thereof. Under RA No. 8042 as amended by RA No. 10022, recruitm ent
activity by an agency with a suspended license constitutes the crime of
prohibited act under Section 6 (6) thereof and not illegal recrui t m ent
u nder th e f i r s t p a r a g r ap h o f S e c t ion 6 . U n d e r t h e i m p l e m e n t i n g
rules of R.A. No. 8042, non-licensee includes person, partn er ship or
corporation wh ose license is revoked, cancelled, terminated, expired
or otherwise delisted f rom t he r o ll of l i c ensed recruit m e n t / m a n n i n g
agencies. In s u m , u n d e r t h e n e w i m p l e m e n t in g r u l e s , a n a g ency
with a suspended license is a licensee.
I 225562, March 6, 2017)
In Pe ople v. Mo l i n a , G . R . N o . 2 2 9 7 1 2, F e b r u a ry 2 8 , 2 0 1 8 ,
t he complain a n t's ap p l i cation an d p a y m e nt s w er e m a d e a f ter t h e
agency's license was suspended and b efore it w a s l i f t ed . H o w ever,
these a p p l i cation and payments happened before the agency's
l icense expired. According t o t h e S u p r em e C ou rt , t h e r e c r u i t m e n t
agency, which accused headed, was a licensee when the recrui t m e nt
of private complain a nts was made as the agency's license expired.
With R.A. No. 10022 and the new impl ement ing rul es, the crime
committed by an agency will d epend on the status of its license.
1. Re v ok e d o r e x p i r e d l i c e n se —
An agency with a revoked,
cancelled, termin ated, expired li c ense or a de l isted agency is a non-
l icensee. Hence, if t h i s a g ency en gaged in r e c r u i t m en t a c t i v i t y o r
committed any of p r o h i b i ted acts u n der Section 6 (a) to (n) of R .A.
J9JC9B0M
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 235
. go. 8042, its responsible officers and employees are liable for ill egal
, recruitment.
2. S u sp e n d e d l i c e n s e — An a g e n cy w i t h a su sp e n d e d
l icense is a licensee. If thi s agency engaged in recru i t m en t a ct i v i t y ,
. its responsible officers an d e m p l o yees ar e l i a bl e fo r t h e c r i m e o f
' : prohibited act u n d e r S e ct ion 6 ( 6 ) o f R . A . N o . 8 0 42 . H o w ev er, i f
' tkis agency commi t te d an y o f t h e p r o h i b i te d a cts u n der Section 6
(a) to (n), its responsible officer and em pl oyees are liable for i l l egal
recruitment in v olv ing pr ohib i ted act.
In People v. Molin a, supra, the a gency with s u s pended license
, accepted application and paym ents. The agency failed to reimb u r se
,'.
"''the expenses of the complainant, who was not deployed. The
accused, who headed the agency, was convicted of illegal recruit m en t
involving prohib i ted act u n d e r S e ction 6 ( m ) o f R .A . N o . 8 042 f or
iion-reimbursement of expenses.
E xceeding 8% in t e r est pe r a n n u m
It is unlawful or pr ohib i ted under Section 6 (1) of R.A. No. 8042
to grant a loan to an overseas Filipino worker with i n t e r est exceeding
eight percent (8%) per a n n u m, w h i c h w i l l b e u s e d f or p a y m e nt o f
l egal and all owable pl acement f ees and m ak e t h e m i g r an t w o r k e r
issue, either personally or t h r o u g h a g u a r a n to r o r a ccommodation
party, postdated checks in relation to the said loan.
I f the loan wa s obt a i ned by t h e w o r k e r f r o m a b a n k o r o t h e r
l ending insti t u t i o n ( not f ro m r e cr u i t m en t a g ency), an i n t e r est r a t e
36% or more per an n um is u n c o nscionable. (Lo uh v. B P I, G . R. N o .
E xclusivit y o f fi n a n c i n g in s t i t u t i o n s , c l i n i c s o r sem i n a r
center
I t i s u n l a w f u l o r pr o h i b i t e d t o i m p o s e a c o m p u l s or y a n d
e xclusive a r r a n g ement w h e r eb y a n o v e r s eas F i l i p i n o w o r k e r i s
required:
1. To av a i l o f a l o a n on l y fr o m s p e c i fi call y d e s i g n at ed
institutions, entit ies or persons (Section 6/ 2j of R. A. ¹ . 8 04 2 ) ;
2. T o u n d e r g o h e a lt h e x a m i n a t i on s o nl y f r o m s p e cifically
designated medical clinics, instit u t i o ns, entit ies or persons, except in
the case of a seafarer whose medical examin a t ion cost is shouldered
by the principal/shipowner (Section 6 (4J of R.A. No. 8042); or
 236 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 237
VOLUME II

3. T o u n d e r g o t r a i n i n g , s e m i n ar , i n s t r u c t io n o r s c h ooling
is a violation of Section 37-A th ereof and constit u t iv e of the crime of
of any k i n d o n l y f r o m s p ecifically d esignated i n s t i t u t i o ns, ent i t i es
prohibited act under Section 6 (7)thereof.
o r per sons, e x cept f o r r e c o m m e n d at or y t r a i n i n g s mandated b
y
p rincipals/shipowners w h er e t h e l a t t e r s h o u l der t h e c ost o f s u ch
trainings.(Section 6/'5j of R.A. No. 8042) RECRUITMENT INVOLVING ECONOMIC SABOTAGE
I t i s n o t p u n i s h a bl e t o make l o an , m e d i ca l e x a m i n a t i on, Illegal recrui tment wh en commi t t e d by a sy n d i c ate or in l a r g e
o r schooling o r t r a i n i n g a r r a n g e m en t w i t h a n o v e r s eas F i l i p i n o scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
worker. H o w ever, i m p o sin g u p o n s u c h w o r k e r a co m p u l s o ry a n d
I n t r a f fi c k i n g i n p er s o n , i l l e g a l r e c r u i t m e n t a nd c h i l d
exclusive arr a n gement w i t h l e n d i n g c omp anies, medical cl i n ics or
pornography u n der R .A . N o . 9 7 75, th e q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m st ance of
seminar centers specifically designated by th e r e cr u i t in g a gency is
syndicate is present if there are at least three offenders. In syridicated
an unlawful act under Section 6 (2), (4) or (5) of R.A. No. 8042.
estafa under P.D. No. 1689, the circumst ance of syndicate is present
if there ar e a t l e ast fi v e o f f enders. I n o r g a n i zed/syndicated c ri m e
Refusal to renegotiate o r c o n d o n e a fter t e r m i n a t i o n of
contract group under Ar t i cle 62 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be at
l east two persons collaborati ng, confederatin g or m u t u a ll y h e l p i n g
It is u n l a w fu l o r p r o h i b i t e d Section 6 (3) of R .A . N o . 8 042 to o ne another for pu r p oses of gain in th e commission of any cri m e .
refuse to c ondone or r e n e goti at e a l o a n i n c u r r e d b y a n o v e r seas
In trafficking in person and illegal recruit m e nt, the circumstance
Filipino w o r k e r a f t e r t h e l a t t e r ' s e m p l o y m en t c o n t r ac t h a s b e en
of large scale is present if there are at least three trafficked or
p rematurely t er m i n a t ed t h r o ugh no fault of his or her ow n .
recruited victims. In syndicated estafa and child pornography, there
I n c a se s w h e r e t h e d e p l o y m en t d o e s n ot a c t u a ll y t a k e is no qualifying circum st ance of large scale. If there are five persons
p lace w i t h ou t t h e w o r k e r ' s f a u l t , t h e a g e n c y h a s o b l i g a t io n t o d efrauded by t w o a c c u sed w h o u s e d a s sociation t o s o l i ci t f u n d s
r eimburse p l a cement e x p e n ses i n c u r r e d b y t h e w o r k e r . F a i l u r e f rom them an d m i s a p p r opri at e t h em , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s n o t
to do so constit u tes i l l e gal r e c r u i t m en t i n v o l v in g a p r o h i b i te d act syndicated estafa.
u nder Section 6 (m ) o f R .A . N o . 8 0 42. I n c a ses wh er e th e w o r k er
T he concept of t h e q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t ances of s y n d i cate i n
was deployed but t h e e m p l o y m en t c o n t r act h a s b een p r e m a t u r ely
illegal recrui t m ent i s th e s ame as that i n t r a f fi c k in g i n p e r son and
t erminated w i t h o u t h i s f a u l t , t h e a g e nc y h a s t h e o b l i g a t io n t o
child pornography. Th e concept of th e q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m st ances of
condone or renegotiate a loan in cu r red by the wo r k e r. Fa i l u re to do
large scale in illegal recrui t m ent is the same as that in t r af fi ck in g in
so constitutes the crime of prohibi ted act under Section 6 (3) thereof.
person. Thus, jurispru dent ial ru les in large scale or syndicated illegal
\
re "ruitment are applicable to large scale or syndicated traffick ing in
Salary d e d u c t ion of i n s u r a n c e e x p e n s e s
person or syndicated child pornography, and vice versa.
It is unl a w fu l or p r o h i b i ted Section 6 (7) of R.A. No. 8042 for a
To ap p r eciat e s y n d i c at e i n i l l e g a l r e c r u i t m e nt , (P e o ple v.
recruitm ent / m a n n in g agency or' a foreign prin cipal/employer to pass
Hashim, G.R. ¹ . 194 2 5 5, tu n e 18, 2 012) trafficking in p e rson
o n the overseas Filipino wor ker or deduct from hi s or her salary th e
(People v. Lal l i, G . R. ¹. 19 5 4 1 9,October 12, 2011) and syndicated
payment of th e cost of in s u r a nce fees, premiu m or o t her i n s u r a n ce
estafa (Hao v. People, G.R. ¹. 18 8 8 4 5,September 17, 2014), the court
related ch a r g e s , as p r o v i de d u n d e r t h e c ompulsory w o r k e r ' s
sl all consider the number of offenders alleged in the information
insurance coverage.
and proven by evidence, and nct the number of accused charged or
Under Section 87-A of R .A . No . 8042 as amended by R .A. No. convicted.
10022, each migrant worker deployed by a recruitmentlmanning
In People v. Lalli, supra, two of the three accused were convicted
agency shall be covered by a compulsory insurance policy which h ll
of syndicated illegal recrui t m e nt , even though the th ir d accused was
e secured at no c ost to the said w o r k e r. Passing on t he w o r k e r o r
at-large. It was noted that the victim w o ul d not have been able to go
deducting from hi s or her salary th e p a y m ent of t hi s i n s u r a nce cost
to Malaysia were itnot for the concerted efforts of the three accused.

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 238 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
(People v. Hashim, supra; People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 187780, June 29,
2010)
In Hao v. People, supra, th e re a re only t h r e e accused charge
<
in the I n f o r m a t ion fo r sy n d i c ated estafa a nd y et t h e r e q u i r e me t
of the existence of syndicate of at least five persons is considered as
o testify,and their relatives, who were presented as witnesses, had
s atisfied because it wa s a l l eged and p r oven t ha t i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e
accused, other officersand directors of the corporation perpetrated
f raud against the complain a n t .
SYNDICATE
I llegal r e c r u i t m en t i s d e e m e d c o m m i t t e d b y a s y n d i c at e i f
carried out b y a g r o u p o f t h r e e (3) or m o r e p e r sons conspirin g or
confederating wit h one another .
T here ar e t w o r e q u i s i te s t o c o n s ider i l l e gal r e c r u i t m en t a s
syndicated, to wi t : ( 1 ) t h a t t h r e e o r m o r e ' persons commit i l l e g al
recruitm ent ; and (2) that th e offenders conspire or confederate with
o ne another in comm i t t i n g th e cr i m e .
Thhe number of v i c t im s r e cr u i ted i s not considered a fa ctor in
the determi n a t ion of comm i ssion of syndicated il l egal recru i t m ent.
Victims are not syndicate. The term "syndicate" pertains to crimin als,
a nd not to victi m s .
Even t h o ugh t h r e e o f f enders com m i t t e d i l l e gal r e c r u i t m e nt,
i t i s n o t s y n d i c ated i n t h e a b s e nce of c o n spiracy b e t w een t h e m .
C onspiracy i s an essential i n g r edient of syndicated i l l egal
recruitm e nt . ( See: People v. Gu e varr a, G . R. N o . 12 0 141,Apr il 2 1 ,
1999; People v. Lapis, et al., G.R. No. 145784-85, October 15, 2002)
T o appreciate th e q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t a nce of sy n d i cate, it i s
not essentialthat there be actual proof that allthe conspirators tools
a direct part i n e v er y a ct. I t i s s uf fi ci ent t h a t t h e y a cted in concert
pursuant t o t h e s am e objective. (People v. Sison, G.R. No. 187160,
August 09, 2017)
L ARG E -SCALE ILLEGAL RE C R U ITM E N T
I llegal r e c r u i t m en t i s d e e m e d c o m m i t t e d i n l a r g e s c al e i f
c ommitted a g ai nst t h r e e (8) or m o r e p e r sons i n d i v i d u a ll y o r a s a
group.
Thh e q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t a n ce of large s cale
w ill n o t b e
a ppreciated i f t h e p r o s ecution f a i l e d t o p r o v e t h a t t h e r e a r e a t
J9JC9B0M
239
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
l east three v i c t i m s o f i l l e ga l r e c r u i t m en t b e c ause: (1) t h e o t h e r
complainants were recruited dur in g the period when the agency was
still licensed to engage in recrui t m ent act i v i t i es; (People v. Hu, G.R.
No. 182282, October 6, 2008) or (2) the other complaina n ts failed to
i io personal knowledge of the actual circum st ances surrounding th e
charges filed by them for ill egal recrui t m ent in l a rge scale. (People v.
Ortiz-3Iiyake, G.R. Nos. 115888-89, September 16, 1997)
Large-scale illegal recrui t m ent can be established even though
two of the three complainants executed affidavit of desistance.
D ropping o f co m p l a i n t u p o n m ere a f fi d a vi t o f d es i s t a n ce of
c omplainants is being looked upon wit h d i s f avor par t i c u l a rly w h e r e
t he commission of t h e o f f ense i s d u l y s u p p o r te d b y d o c u m ent ar y
evidence. (People v. Romero, G.R. No. 108885, July 26, 1998)
I f th er e i s c onspiracy, th e t o t a l n u m b e r o f v i c t i m s r e c r u i t e d
b y all c o n s p i r a t o r s shall b e c o n s i d ered i n d e t e r m i n i n g i f t h e
c ircumstance o f l a r g e s cale w il l q u a l i f y i l l e g a l r e c r u i t m e nt . I n
People v. Luto, G.R. No. 113844, July 2 8, 1997, Luto only r e crui t e d.
2 workers wh il e hi s co-conspirators recrui ted 80 w o r k e rs. The acts
of his co-conspirators in recru i t in g 80 wor k ers will be tr e ated as his
a cts by r e ason of c o n spir acy. B ecause of c onspiracy, th e n u m b e r
o f workers recrui ted by L u t o w i l l b e c onsidered as 80 al t h ough h e
merely personally recrui ted 2 of them. Hence, Luto is liablefor large-
s cale illegal recrui t m e n t .
MULTIPLE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENTS
Delito continuado principle does not apply to illegal r ecruitm e n t
for being ma l u m p r o h i b i t u m w h e r e c r i m i n a l i m p u l s e , o n w h i c h
delito continuado is b a s ed, is i m m a t e r i a l. W i t h o ut a p p l y i ng d e l i t o
continuado p r i n c i p l e, t h e n umber o f i l l e g a l r e c r u i t m e n t s will
d epend on the number of victim s recrui t ed. If th ere are two victi m s,
t he offender can b e c h a r ged w i t h a n d c o n v i cted of t w o c o u nt s of
i llegal recrui t m e nt . H o w ev er, t h r e e vi ct im s m a y b e a l l eged in o n e
informatio'n t o c h a r g e t h e a c cused w i t h o n e c o un t o f l a r g e -scale
i llegal recrui t m e n t .
On the other ha nd, the nu m ber of il l egal recrui t m e nts will n ot
depend on the nu m ber of offenders. If t h er e are tw o offenders, they
are collectively liable by reason of conspiracy for one count of illegal
recruitment i n v o l v in g on e complai n an t o r f o r t w o c o u nt s of i l l egal
r ecruitment i n v ol v in g tw o complain a n t s .
 240 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOI.UME II
Delito continu ado pr i n c i p le does not generally a p p ly to e stafa
involving several complai n a n ts. I t i s a b a sic r ul e t h a t t h er e ar e as
many crim i na l i m p u l ses to defraud as th ere are persons defrauded,
Several crimi nal im p u l ses negate the application of delito continuado
principle because this rule presupposes that there is a single criminal
impulse that m o t i v a ted th e a ccused in c o m m i t t i n g s everal a cts in
violation of one penal provision. Wi t h out app l y ing de lito continuado
principle,accused is liable for as many crimes of estafa as 'here are
victim defrauded.
The number of the crimes of estafa will d epend on the nu mber
o f victims defr au ded, and not on t h e n u m b e r of off enders. If t h e r e
are two offenders inv olv in g t h r e e vi ct im s r ecr u i ted an d d efr a u ded,
t hey ar e collectively l i a bl e b y r e a son o f c o n spiracy fo r o
cy o r o n e c o unt
t
o f arge-scale
lar e - illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa.(See:
People v. Cagalingan, G.R. No. 198664, November 28, 2016)
Two vi c t i m s r e c r u i t e d
If thh ere are two victim s recru i t ed, and the prosecution filed :
1. On e i n f o r m a t i on al leging two victims the re in, the accused
can be convicted of on e c oun t o f s i m p l e i l l e gal r e c r u i t m e nt ; (S ee:
People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 105204, March 9, 1995) or
2. Tw o i n f o r m a t i o n s r espectively a l l e g in g t wo
victims
t er ein, the accused can be convicted of two counts of simple il l egal
r ecruitm en t . (See: People v. Avendano, G.R. Nos. 96'277-82 December
2, 1992)
T hree vi c t im s r e c r u i t e d
If thhere are three victims recru i t ed, and the prosecution filed:
1. O ne i n f o r m a t i o n a lleging t h r e e
v ictim ss t h er ei n ,
thee accused ca n b e c o n v i c te d of on e c o u nt of la r g e -scale il l e gal
recruitm ent; (People v. Dejolde, G.R. No. 219288, Janua ry 81, 2018;
People v. Cagalingan, G.R. No. 198664, November 28, 2016) or
2. T w o i n f ormations, the first of which alleged two victims
while t h e s e cond a l l e ged t h e r e m a i n i n g v i c t i m , t h e a c c u sed can
be convicted of tw o count s of s i m pl e i l l e gal r e cr u i t m e nt ; (P eople v.
Galardo, G.R. Nos. 140067-71,August 29, 2002
) or
3 T hree
h informa ti ons al l e ging one vic tim i n e a ch c ase, the
accused can be convicted of three counts of simple i llegal recruit m e n t .
(People v. Avendano, supra)
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241
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
Six v ictims r e c r u i t e d
If there are six vict im s recrui t ed, and the prosecution filed:
1. On e i n f o r m a t i on al l e ging six victi ms t h e re in, the accused
can be convicted of on e c o u nt of la r g e -scale i l l e g al r e c r u i t m e n t ;
(People v. Raeho, G.R. No. 227505, October 2, 2017) or
2. T wo i nf o r m a t i o ns, t h e f ir s t o f w h i c h a l l e g ed t h e f ir s t
three victims, while the second alleged the remain ing t h ree victim s,
the accused can b e c o n v i cted of tw o co u n ts of L ar ge-scale il l e gal
recruitment: (P eople v. Avendano, G.R. No s. 96 277-82 December 2,
1992) or
3. Si x in fo r m a t i o ns a l l e g ing o ne v i c t i m i n ea c h c a s e, t h e
accused will be convicted of six counts of simple i llegal recruit m e n t .
(People v. Galardo, G.R. Nos. 140067-71, August 29, 2002)
T he th ree v i c t im s r e spectively a l l e ged i n t h r e e i n f o r m a t i o n s
(People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 105204, Ma rch 9 , 1995) or the six victi m s
respectively alleged in six i n f o r m a t i ons (People v. Hernandez, et aL,
Q.R. No. 141221-86, Mar ch 7, 2 0 0 2) cannot be c um u l a t ed to m a k e
out a case of large-scale illegal recrui t m e nt . The conviction of illegal
recruitment i n l a r g e scale must be based on a fi n d i n g i n e ach case
of illegal recrui t m en t of t h r e e or m or e p ersons. (People v. Galardo ,
supra)
In People v. R a c ho, supra, p r o s ecution f il e d o ne i n f o r m a t i o n
a lleging 16 v i c t im s r e c r u i t ed. E v i d ence establishes 6 v i c t i ms . T h e
a ccused was convicted of one count of large-scale illegal recrui t m e n t .
(See also: People v. Na v a r r a, G . R. ¹. 1198 6 1, Fe bruary 1 9, 20 0 1;
People v. Abellanosa, G.R. No. 214840, July 19, 2017)
A ccused. was convi cted o f l a r g e -scale i l l e gal r e c r u i t m en t i n
People v. Sendon, G . R. N o s. 9 5 9 03-05, Ju ne 8 , 1 9 92 a nd a n o t h e r
count of l a r g e-scale il l egal r e cr u i t m en t i n Pe o ple v. Se ndon, G . R .
Nos. 101679-82, December 15, 1993. In Pe ople v. Avendano, supra,
the accused was convicted of three counts of large-scale illegal
r ecruitment .
In Pe o p l e v. Av en d a n o , su p r a , s ix i l l e g a l r ecr u i t m e n t
informations i n v o l v in g d i f f e r en t c o m p l a i n a nt s w e r e fi l e d a g a i n st
t he same accused. Th e a c cused w a s ' c onvi cted of t h r e e c ount s of
illegal recrui t m en t i n l a r g e scale and t h r ee counts of sim ple il l egal
r ecruitment .
 242 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
A mend in g i n f o r m a t i o n s
In Fr o n d a - B ag gao v. People, G. R . N o . 1 5 1 7 8 5 D
ecem er
10 2 0 07, pet i t i o ner c o n t e nd s t h a t t h e a m e n d m en t o f t h e f b o r .r
n formations for simple illegal recrui t m ent i nt o a single Infor m a t i on
for lar ge-scale i l l egal r e c r u i t m en t v i o l a te s he r s u b s t a n t ial r i g h t s
a s this w o ul d d e p r iv e h e r o f t h e r i g h t t o b a i l w h i c h s h e a l r e a dy
availed of. Such contention is misplaced. Obviously, petiti oner relies
on Section 14 of t h e R u l e 1 1 0 of t h e R u l e s of C r i m i n a l P r o cedure
which pr ovides t hat "a f t er th e pl ea a nd d u r i n g th e t r i a l , a f o r m a l
amendment may only be m ad e w i th le a ve of court a nd w h e n it c a n
en rt can,
be done w i t h ou t c a u s ing p r ej u d i c e to th e ri g h t s o f th e ac c u sed."
Petitioner has not yet been arr ai gn ed. Hence, she cannot invoke the
said provision. Considering t ha t p e t i t i o ner ha s not yet e n t ered her
plea, the four I n f o r m a t i ons could still be amended.
H owever, am en dm ent o f i n f o r m a t i on s t o u p g r ade th e ch ar g e
rom simple to large-scale illegal recrui t m en t af ter the ar r a i g n m e nt
o the accused may not be allowed since it is pr eju dicial to the r i g h t
of the accused.
ACCOM PLICE AND ACCESSORY
Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, the p ersons crimin a l ly l i a b l e
for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessor-.es.
R.. A. N o . 8 0 4 2 d o e s n ot p r o v i d e d e fi n i t i o n
"principal," "accomplice" and "a c cessory." H e n ce, provisions o f th e w o r d s
u nd r
A rticles 17 , 1 8 a n d 1 9 o f t h e R e v i se d P e na l C o d e o n p r i n c i p a l ,
accomplice and a ccessory w i l l s u p p l e m ent R .A . N o . 8 0 42 . (People
v. ho w d u r y, G .R. No. 129677-80, February 15, 2000
) However, th e
provisions un der A r t i c les 52 an d 5 8 of t h e R e v ised Penal C ode on
graduation of penalties by one and two degrees for accomplice and
accessory, respectively, are not applicable to illegal recrui t m e nt. 'The
pena ties un der R .A . N o . 8 042 ar e no t b o r r o wed f rc m t h e R e v i sed
enal Code; hence, these penalties cannot be gra dua ted o ne or tw o
e grees lower if i l l e gal r e cr u i t m en t i s c o m m ' t t d b
mi e y an a c c o m pLh c e
or accessory. (People v. On d o, G .R. N o. 10 1861,November 8 , 1 9M)
W hether t h e a c cused acted a s p r i n c ' I I'
t he
e penalty
e pr escribed for il l egal recru i t m en t sh all be imposed upon
him wi t h out r e du cti on .
J9JC9B0M
VI. CRIMES ACiAINST PUBLIC MORALS 243
RECRUITMENT FOR LOCAL EMPLOYMENT
In the definiti on of recruit m e nt and placement, Art i c le 18 (b) of
the Labor Cede uses the phrase "for employment, locally or abroad."
However, R.A. No. 8042 |M i g r an t W o r k er s an d Ov erseas Fili p i nos)
has amended th e p e r t i n en t p r o v i s i ons of t h e L a b o r C o de (P eople
v. Diaz, G.P.. No. 1 1 2176, July 2 6 , 1 9 9 6) i n c l u d i ng A r t i c le 1 8 ( b )
thereof. In the defini t ion of recru i t m e nt , Section 6 of' R.A. No. 8042
uses the phrase "for employment abroad." H e nce, illegal recruitm e n t
f or employrr en t a b r oa d i s n o w p u n i s h a bl e u n d e r R . A . N o . 8 0 4 2 .
D n the other ha nd, il l egal recru i t m en t for l ocal employment is st i l l
punishable under the L abor Code. The provisions of the Labor Code
on illegal recru i t m en t f o r l o cal e m p l o y m ent r e m ai n i n f o r ce. (See:
footnote no. 41 of th e La b o r C o de of th e Ph i l i p p i n es pu b l is hed b y
DOLE)
Illegal r e c r u i t m en t o f o v e r s eas F i l i p i n o wo r k e r s c o m m i t t e d
p rior to the f f e c t i v it y of R.A. No. 8042 is still p u n i sh able under th e
Labor Code. R.A. No. 8042 is not favorable to the accused since the
penalty un der t h i s l a w i s g r a ver t h a n t h a t u n d e r t h e L a bor C o de.
Hence, R.A. No. 8042 shall be given prospective effect because of the
constitutional r u l e against ex post facto law. (N a s i-ViDar v. People,
G.R. No. 176169, November 14, 2008)
R .A. No. 8042 and L a b o r C o d e
1. S- c o p e —The Labor Code applies to recruit m e nt f or l o cal
e mployment w h i l e R .A . N o . 8 04 2 i s a p p l i cable t o r e c r u i t m en t f o r
employment abroad.
2. C r i mes —
There are two crimes under the Labor Code, to
wit: illegal recrui t m e nt , and prohibi ted practices. Illegal recruitment
under Arti cle 88 of the Code is commi t ted by a n on-licensee or non-
holder of auth o ri ty by e n g a ging in r e c r u i t m e nt a c t i v i t y. Pr o h ib ited
practices under Art i c le 84 thereof is committ ed by licensee or holder
o f authorit , b y p e r p e t r a t i n g a n y o f t h e u n l a w f u l a c t s t h e r e in . I f
the prohibited practices under Article 84 are committed by a non-
licensee or non-holder of a u t h o r i t y , t h e c r i m e co m m i t t e d is i l l e g al
recruitmen-., and not prohibi ted pr actices.
There ar e t h r e e c r i m e s u n d e r R . A . N o . 8 0 42, to re i t: i l l e g al
r ecruitment, w i t h o u t l i c e n s e o r au th o r i t y , i l l e g a l r e c r u i t m e n t
involving p r o h i b i te d a c ts, an d p r o h i b i te d a c ts. Il l e gal r e c ruit ment
without License or auth or ity un d er t h e f ir s t p a r a g r a ph of S ection 6
of R.A. No. 8 042 i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n o n - l i censee or n on -holder of'
 244 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
authority b y e n g a gin g i n r e c r u i t m en t a c t i v i t y . Il l e g al r e c ru i t m ent
involving prohibited acts is committ ed by any person, whether a non-
l icensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of aut h or it y by p erp etr a t i n g
any of the prohibi ted acts under Section 6 (a) to (n) of R.A. No. 8042.
Prohibited acts is commi t t e d by a ny p e r s on by p e r p e tra t i ng a ny o f
the unlawful acts under Section 6 (1) to (7) of R.A. No. 8042.
8. Cr i m in a l a c t — T h e concept of "r e c r u i t m e nt"
under
S ection 6 of R.A. No. 8042 is th e same as t ha t of " r e cru i t m en t a n d
placement" or "r e cruit me nt activ it y" un d er A r t i c l es 13 (b) and 38 of
the Labor Code.
T he concept of t h e fi r s t e l e ven i l l e gal r e c r u i t m en t i n v o l v i n g
p rohibited acts u n der S ection 6 (a ) t o (I ) of R .A . N o . 8 042 ar e t h e
same as those of prohibi ted pr a ctices under A r t i cl e 34 of the L abor
C ode. The l a s t t w o i l l e ga l r e c r u i t m en t i n v o l v in g p r o h i b i te d a c t s
under Section 6 (m) an d (n ) of R .A . No . 8042 are not m e n t i o ned in
Article 34 of the Labor Code as prohibi ted practices.
The prohibited acts under Section 6 (1) to (7) of R.A. No. 8042
are not listed as crimes under the L abor Code.
Qualif y in g cir c u m s t a n ce — The qualifying circumstance
o f syndicate or lar ge-scale can be appreciated in i l l egal recrui t m e nt
w ithout license or author ity u n der Section 6, and illegal recrui t m e nt
involving prohibi ted acts under Section 6 (a) to (n) of R.A. No. 8042,
and illegal recrui t m ent for local employment u n der A r t i cle 38 of the
Labor Code.
In Pe ople v. Mo l i n a , G . R . N o . 2 2 9 7 1 2, F e b r u a ry 2 8 . 2 0 1 8 ,
accused, who h e a ded a l i c e nsed agency, i s f o un d g u i l t y o f i l l e g al
r ecruitm ent i n v o l v in g p r o h i b i te d a ct , an d t h a t i s , f a i l u r e t o m a k e
r eimbursement . T h e q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a nce o f l a r g e -scale w a s
appreciated.
T he circum st ance of s y n d i c at e o r l a r g e -scale cannot q u a l i f y
p rohibited a ct s u n de r S e ction 6 ( 1 ) a n d ( 7 ) o f R .A . N o . 8 04 2 a n d
prohibited practices under A r t i cl e 34 of the Labor Code.
5. Princ i p al , accom p l ic e an d a c c essory — Und n er Se ct i' c n
6of
o R.A.
. . No.
o . 8042, the persons crimin a lly liable for illegal reer ui men
t t
w i o u i ce n s e o r a u t h o r i ty , il l ega l r e c r u i t m e n t i n v o l v i n g p r o h i b i t c d
acts, and prohibited acts a re t h e p r i n c i p a l s,
accomplices and
a ccessories. However, t h er e i s n o p r o v i sion u n de r t h e L a b o " C o de
on accomplice and accessory. Moreover, since the penal provisi 'onso '
f
e a o r Code have not adopted the technical nomenclature of the
J9JC9B0M
245
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
p enalties of the Revised Penal Code, the i n t e n t ion of for mer la w i s
n ot to adopt th e penal pr ovi sions of the l a t ter la w s uch as th e r u l e
on graduation of penalties for accomplice and accessory.
I LLEGAL REC R U ITM EN T BY JURIDICAL PERS O N
A corporation can act only th r o ugh its officers or incorporators,
and that as regards a violation of the law comm i t t ed by an officer of
a corporation, in the exercise of his duties, he answers crimi n a lly for
h is acts, and not th e corporation t o w h i c h h e b elongs, for b i n g a n
artificial person it c a n not be pr osecuted cri m i n a l ly . (Campos, C.A..,
40O.G., Sup. 12, 7)
I f a c o r p o r a t io n v i o l a t e d a l a w w ith p e n a l p r o v i s i on , t h e
following sh al l b e l i a b l e fo r t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t ed : (1) th e of fi cers
s pecified by l a w a s c r i m i n a l l y l i a b l e f o r c o r p o r at e a c ts ; an d ( 2 )
t he officers an d e m p l o y ees of t h e c o r p o r a t i on , w h o a c t i v el y a n d
consciously part i cip ated in th e comm i ssion of corporate acts, which
c onstitute the cri m e .
A ctive and c o n scious pa r t i c i p a t i o n
Settled is t h e r u l e t h a t t h e e x i s t ence of th e c orporat entity
does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowin gly
a nd intenti onall y c a u ses th e corporation t o c o m mi t a c r i m e . T h e
c orporation ob v i ously a c ts , an d ca n a c t , o nl y b y a n d t h r o u g h i t s
human agents, and it is their conduct which the law must de-.er. The
employee or agent o f a c o r p or a t ion e n gaged in u n l a w f u l b u s i n ess
naturally a i d s an d a b et s i n t h e c a r r y i n g o n o f s u c h b u s i n ess and
will be prosecuted as pr i n ci pal if , w i t h k n o w l e dge of th e bu siness,
its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its
conduct and promotion, however slight his contribution maybe. The
l aw of agency, as applied in civil cases, has no application in crim i n al
cases, and no man can escape punishm ent w h e n h e p a r t i cip ates in
the commission of a crime upon th e gr ound t ha t h e si m pl y acted as
an agent of an y p a r t y . T h e c u l p a b i l it y o f t h e e m p l oyee th erefore
hinges on his k n o w l edge of the offense and hi s active par t i cipation
in its commission. W h er e it is shown t hat th e employee was merely
acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaw are that his
acts constituted a cri me, he may not be held cri m i n a ll y l i a ble for an
act done for and in behalf of his employer. (People v. C~rpuz, G.B.
No. 148198, October 1, 2008)
The defense of being a mere employee, who has no control,
m anagement or d i r e ction of bu si ness of th e agency, is not a sh i el d
 246 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
a gainst h i s c onviction f o r l ar g e - scale i l l e ga l r e c r u i t m e n t . A n
employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recrui t m ent
may be h el d l i a b l e a s p r i n c i pa l b y d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i on , t o gether
with it s e m p l oy er, i f i t i s s h o w n t h a t h e a c t i v el y an d c o nsciously
participated in th e recrui t m en t p r ocess.
Responsible officers
Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 as amended by R.A. No. 10022,
in case ofju r i d i c a l p e r sons, the officers hav ing ow n e rship, control,
management or d i r ection of t h ei r b u s i ness, who are r esponsible for
the commission of the offense of illegal
recruitment
.en or u nl a w ff u .I a ct,
shall be liable.
The terms "c ontrol, m a n a gement or d i r e ction" us ed in S ection
6 broadly cover al l p h a ses of bu siness operaticn. T hey i n c l ude th e
aspects of ad m i n i s t r a t i on , m a r k e t in g an d f i n a n ces, among oth ers.
(People v. Sagayaga, G.P. No. 148726, February 28, 2004)
The followin g officers have ownership, control, management or
direction of the recrui t m en t agency:
1. P r e s i d e nt ,(P eople v. M o l i n a, G . R. ¹ . 22 9 7
i2, February
8, 2018) or vice-president; (People v. Sagayaga, supra)
2. Tr ea s u r er , w h o w a s i n c h a r g e o f t h e m a n a g ement a n d
control of the fin an cial affairs and resources of the corporation such
as collecting all its receivables from applicants, safely keeping them,
and disbursing them by co-signing checks;
3. A ss i s t a n t g e n eral m a n a g er, operations m a n a ger (P eople
v. Nogra, G.R. No. 170884, August 29, 2008); or general manager,
who is at t h e f o r efr ont of t h e r e c r u i t m en t a c t i v i t i e s of th e a gency;
(People v. Suliman, G.B. No. 190970, November 24, 2014) and
r
4. O w n e r (P e o ple v. Su l i m a n, s upra) o r i n c o rporator of t h e
agency even though its incorporation was not cor summat ed. (People
v. Botero, G.B. No. 117010, April 18, 1997)
In People v. Ga s acao, G. R. N o. 1 6 8 445, No vember 1 1, 2 0 0 5,
a ccused is n o t a m e r e e m p l o yee of t h e m a n n i n g a g e ncy bu t t h e
crewing man ager. A s s u ch, he receives job applications, int er v i ews
applicants and informs them o f th e a g e n c y 's '
agency's r equiremen tt oii
payment of performance or cash bond prior t
o t h e ap p I i' c a n t s
ep oyment. As the crewin g m a n ager, he was at th e fo refront of the
company's recruitment ac ti vi t i es. E ven a ssum'
ing th at ac c u sed was
a mere em pl oyee, such f act i s n o t a s h i el d a g a i nst h i s c o n vdi ction
J9JC9B0M
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 247
for large scale illegal recru i t m en t s i nce he actively and consciously
participated in th e recrui t m ent p r ocesses.
Responsible employees
U nder Section 6 o f R . A . N o . 8 0 4 2 a s a m e n ded b y R . A . N o .
10022, in case of juri d i cal persons, the responsible employeeslagents
t hereof shall be li a ble for offense of ill egal recrui t m en t or u n l a w f u l
act. The law does not pr ov ide a defini t ion of th e t e rm s "r esponsible
employeeslagents." However, it is s ub m i t t e d t h at an e m p l o yee, who
actively and consciously par t i cip ated in th e i l l egal recrui t m e nt , can
be considered as a r e sponsible employee wi t hi n t h e c o nt em pl a t i on
of the law.
In People v. Cabais, G.R. No. 129070, March 16, 2001, accused
w as the one who i n f o r med compl ai n a nt s of job p r o spects in K o r e a
and the r e q u i r e m e nt s f o r d e p l o y m e nt . S h e a l s o r e c eived m o n ey
f rom them as placement fees. All of th e complai n a nts testified th a t
t hey personally m e t a c c u sed an d t r a n s a cted w i t h h e r r e g a r d i n g
t he overseas job placement offers. Complai n a nt s p a r ted w it h t h e i r
money, evidenced by r e c eipt s s i g ned b y a c c u sed an d c o -accused.
Thus, accused a c t i v el y p a r t i c i p a te d i n t h e r e c r u i t m en t o f th e
complainants,
Even the mere employee of a company or corporation engaged
in illegal recrui t m ent could be held li able, along wit h th e employer,
a s a principal in i l l e gal recru i t m en t once it wa s shown t h a t h e h a d
a ctively and consciously par t i cip ated in i l l e gal recru i t m e n t . (People
v. Bayker, G.R. ¹. 170 1 92, February 10, 2016)
Even if accused were a mere temporary cashier of the delisted
agency, that did not m ake her any less an employee to be held liable
for illegal recrui t m en t as pr i n c i pal by d i r ect par t i c i p ati on, together
with the employer, as it was shown that she actively and consciously
participated in t h e r e c r u i t m en t p r o cess. (People v. Chua, G .R. N o ,
184058, March 10, 2010)
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IS MALUM PROHIBITUM
Illegal recrui t m ent is ma l u m p r o h ib it u m. He n c e, the following
are not validdefenses:
1. L a ck of idea that what accused was doing was already
defined under the law as illegal recruitment; (People v. Caures, G.R
1Vos. 104789-44, November 18, 1997)
 248 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS 249
VOLUME II

2. L a c k o f i n t e n t t o d e f r a u d t h e c o m p l a i n a n t s ; (People v, '

b ut also inclu des th e act o f r e c r u i t m en t o f v i c t i m s fo r t r a f fi c k i n g .

Enriquez, G.R. No. 127159, May 5, 1999) and (People v. La l l i , G. R . No . 19 5 4 19, Oc tober 1 2, 2 0 11) Recruit m e n t
without license isalso a crime under R.A. No. 8042. (2004 Bar Exam)
3. L a c k o f a w a r eness of the illegal nat ur e of the recrui t m ent !
business of he r c o -accused. (People v. Ga m b o a, G . R. N o . 18 5 882 • The accused can be convicted of illegal recrui t m ent u n der R.A .
September 29, 2000) No. 8042 and t r af fi ck in g i n p e r son for th e s ame act of r ecru i t in g a
person for prostit u t ion wi t h out vi ol at ing the rule on double jeopardy.
I LLEGAL REC R U ITM E NT AND O T H E R CR IM E S T he prohibi t io n o n d o u b l e j e op ard y d oe s no t a p p l y t o a n a c t o i
series of acts constit u t i n g d i f f er ent o f f enses. (People v. La l l i, G . R .
Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 as amended by R.A. No. 10022, No. 195419, October 12, 2011) They ar e no t t h e s am e s i nce il l egal
the filin g of a n o f f ense pun i shable u n der t h i s Ac t s h al l b e w i t h out ', r ecruitment can be commi t ted wh e t her th e pu r p ose is to exploit th e
prejudice to the filing of cases punishable under other existing laws, victim or n ot, w h il e t r af fi ck in g in pe r s on c an be commit t ed w i th o r
rules orregulations. w ithout l i c ense to r e cr u it . M o r e over, u n de r S e ction 6 o f R . A . N o .
l. I l le g a l r e c r u i t m e n t a n d e s t a f a — In Pe o ple v. Or t i z -;.' 8042 as amended by R.A. No. 10022, the filin g of ill egal recrui t m e n t
Miyake, G. R . N o s . 1 1 5 3 3 8 -39, S e p t e m ber 1 6 , 19 9 7 , i n f al s e ly ', shall be w i t h ou t p r e j u d ice to t h e fi l i n g o f c a ses pu n i shable u n d er
pretending to possess power to deploy pers'ons for overseas placement,: other laws such as trafficking in p erson or estafa.
accused deceived th e c o m p l a i n an t i n t o b e l i e v in g t h a t s h e w o uld)
3. I l l eg a l r e c r u i t m e n t , t r a f f i c k i n g in p e r son and estaf a
provide her a job in Taiwan. Her assurances made complainant ''
— A non-licensee made false representation that the complainant wi l l
exhaust w h a t e ve r r e s o u r ces sh e h a d t o p a y t h e p l a c e m en t f ee ''
be deployed abroad to w or k a s a n u r s e . The wo r k er p a i d t h e n o n -
required in exchange for the promised job. Accused was convicted of
l icensee the amount of P 2 0,000.00 as placement fees. Upon ar r i v a l
illegal recrui t m ent an d estafa.
in the foreign country she was compelled to work as a prostit u te. The
A n of f ender c a n b e p r o s ecuted f o r i l l e ga l r e c r u i t m en t a n 5 crimes committed are as follows: (1) illegal recrui t m ent for engaging
e stafa w i t h ou t v i o l a t i n g t h e r u l e o n d o u b l e j e opardy s i nc e t h e se : i n recruit m en t a c t i v i t y w i t h o u t l i c e nse t o r e c r u it , f u r n i s h in g t h e
crimes are not i d e n t i c al. I l l e gal r e cr u i t m en t i s m a l u m p r o h i b i t u m c omplainant w i t h f a l s e i n f o r m a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o e m p l o y m e n t „
where crim i na l i n t en t i s no t n e cessary wh il e estafa is m a l u m in s r a nd placing her in a j ob, wh ich is h a r m fu l t o p u b li c m or a l it y or t h e
where cri m i n a l i n t e n t i s r e q u i r ed. (P eople v. De la C r u z, G . R. No, dignity of the Republic of the Philippines; (2) trafficking in person
214500, on e 2 8 , 2 0 17) Deceit an d d a m age ar e el ements of estafa f or recruit in g t h e c o m p l a i n an t t h r o u g h f r a u d o r d e ception for t h e
but they are not in gr edients of illegal recrui t m e nt . Lack of license to purpose of sexual exploitation or prostitution; and (3) estafa for
recruit is an element of illegal recrui t m ent but it is not an ingredient defrauding her.
of estafa.
Conviction f o r e s t a f a.' does no t b a r a c o n v i c t io n f o r i l l e gal
(
r ecruitm ent . C o n v e r sely, c o n v i ct io n f o r i l l e g a l r e c r u i t m en t d o es
not bar conviction for estafa. In s u m , th e accused can be convictel
f or illegal r ecr u i t m en t a n d e s t a fa. On t h e o t her h a n d , acqui t tal of ,
estafa will not n ecessarily r esult i n a cqui t ta l for i l l e gal recrui t m ent
in large scale. (People v. Yab ut, G . R. N o. 11 5719, October 5, 1 999)
Conversely, the acquit ta l of i l l e gal recru i t m en t w i l l n o t n e cessarily
r esult in acqui t ta l of estafa or exemption from subsequent cri m i n al :
prosecution for e s t a fa. (People v. Hu , G . R. N o . 18 2282, Oc tober 6,
2008)
2. I ll e g a l r e c r u i tment a n d t r a f f icking i n p e r s o n -
Trafficking in persons is not only limi t ed to transporta ti on of victims,

J9JC9B0M

Vll. CRIMES COMMITTED BY
PUBLIC OFFICERS
Malfeasance is th e p e r f or m a nce of some act w h i c h o u gh t not
to be done. M i s f easance is th e i m p r o per p e r f o r m a nce of some act
which mi ght l a w f u ll y be done. Nonfeasance is the omission of some
act which ought to be performed. (2016Bar Exam)
PUBLIC OFFICER
A public officer is a person who shall p erfo rm p u b l ic fun c tion>
or duties in t h e g overn m en t a s a n e m p l oyee, agent or su b or dinate
official, of any r an k or c l ass, by dir ect pr ovision of the l aw , popular
election, or appoint m ent by competent au t h o r i ty . (Ar t i c le 203; 194tl,
1999 and 2017 Bar Exa ms)
That d e fi n i t i o n i s q u i t e c o m p r e h ensive. I t e m b r a ces every
public servant f r o m t h e h i g h est t o t h e l o w e st. (M a n i e go v. People,
G.R. No. L-2971, April 20, 1961) Thus, a laborer discharging clerical
functions, an emergency helper in th e B u r eau of Forestry on a daily
wage basis, p e r f or m in g t h e d u t i e s o f j a n i t o r a n d m e s s enger are
public officers. (see: Revised Penal Co de by Ra m on C. A q u i n o) The
temporary perform a nce of public functi ons is sufficient to constitute
a person a public official. A laborer in the Bure au of Post temporarily
detailed as filer of money orders is a public officer. (Maniego v. People,
supra) A laborer, who was appointed to temporari ly d ischarge public
functions, is a public officer for pu r p oses of direct bribery. (1974 Bar
Exam)
If the BIR designated the accused as a depositary of a distrained
property, i t w i l l n o t g i v e t h e d e positar y a c h a r a cter e q u i v alent tp
that of a p u b l i c o f f i ci al. A l t h o ug h t h e t h i r d p e r son d e signated aa
depositary performed a public duty in connection with the distr ained
property, his aut h or it y i s not by d i r ect pr ovision of the law, popular
e lection o r a p p o i n t m e n t . (See: Az arcon v. Sa n d i ganbayan, G .R,
No. 116'033, February 26 , 1 997) He cannot be charged for v i o l a tion
of R.A. No. 8019 or an y o t h e r c r i m e w h er e th e offender m us t be a
public officer.
250
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 251
PUBLIC OFFICER UNDE R SP E C IAL LAW S
U nder R . A . N o . 8 0 1 9 , p u b l i c o f fi ce r i n c l u de s e l e ctiv e a n d
a ppointiv e o f fi c i al s a n d em p l o y e es, p e r m a n en t o r t e mp o r a r y ,
whether i n t h e c a r eer o r n o n - career ser vice category (Preclaro v .
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 11 1091, August 2 1, 1995), even nomi n a l ,
from government. This is also the concept of public officer under R.A.
No. 7080 (Plunder La w) and u n d er R . A. N o. 6713 (Code of Conduct
and Ethical Stand ards for Public Officials). R.A. No. 6713 expressly
mentions that pu b lic officer includes mil i t ar y an d police personnel.
G overnmen t i n c l u d e s t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e nt , t h e l o c a l
governments, t h e g o v e r n m e n t - owned a n d g o v e r n m e n t -controlled
c orporations, an d a l l o t h e r i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s o r a g e n cies o f t h e
Republic of th e P h i l i p p i nes an d t h ei r b r a n c h es. ( Section 2 of R . A .
¹. 3 0 19 and Section 3 of R.A. No. 6713)
For purposes of R.A. No. 8019 and R.A. No. 6718, government -
owned and controlled corporation in cl u des:
a. Cor p o r a t i on s created by special law such as Government
Service In s u r a nce S y st em (Agbayani v. Sayo, G.R. No. L-47880,
April 3 0 , 19 7 9), l o c al w a t e r d i s t r i c ts (B o r ja v. P e o p l e, G . R. N o .
16'4298, April 3 0, 2008) and Uni v e rs ity of the Phil i p p i n es (Serana v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008); and
b. Cor p o r a t i ons formed under the Corporation Code provided
that the Governm ent d i r e ctly or i n d i r e ctly owns or contr ols at least
a majority or 51% share of the capital stock. (Carandang v. Desierto,
G.R. ¹. 14 8 0 7 6, January 1 2, 2011)
Employees of governm ent c o r p or at i ons, w h ich h a v e r e v er t ed
t o private ownership such as Phil i p p ine Ai r l i n e s (Khan, Jr. v. Office
of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125296, July 2 0, 2006) and Phil i p p i n e
National Bank , are not pu blic officers.
A UP st u d ent r e gent i s a p u b li c officer al t h ough she does not
receive a salary. Compensation is not an essential element of public
office. (Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008)
The nature of one's appointm e nt, and whether the compensation one
receives from the government is only nom i nal (such as per diem and
allowance), is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed
is still considered a p u b l i c of ficer. (J a v ier v. Th e F i r s t D i v i s i on o f
the Sandi ganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147026'-27, September 11, 2009) Under
R.A. No. 6713, one can be a pu b lic official r egar dless of whether or
n ot he receives compensation, regardless of amount .
 252 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
P ri v a t e I n d i v i d u a l
A priv ate i n d i v i d ua l f o un d a c t in g i n c o nspir acy w it h a p u b l ic
officer may be held liable for the applicable offenses found in Section
3 of R.A. No. 3019 (Santill a no v. People, G.B. Nos. 175045-46, March
8, 2010) and cri mes comm i t t e d by p u b li c officer u n der t h e R e vise]
Penal Code such as m a l v er sati on. ( U .S. v. Ponte, G.A. No. L - 5 952,
October 24, 1911) Moreover, under Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019, it shall
be unlawful for any person kn ow i n gly to i n d uce or cause any public
official to commit an y of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof
As a general r u l e , a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d ua l ca n b e h el d l i a bl e for
violation of R .A . N o . 3 0 1 9 i f h e c o n spired w i t h a p u b l i c of fi cer in
c ommittin g t h i s c r i m e . (Go v. The F i f t h D i v i s i o n, S a n d i g a n b avan,
G.B. No. 17 2602, Ap r i l 18 , 2 0 0 7 ; Ga r c ia -Diaz v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan,
G.R. No. 198286, September 17, 2018) However, a priva te ind i v i d ual
alone cannot b e c h a r ged w i t h v i o l a t io n o f R .A . N o . 3 0 1 9 w i t h out
a co-accused, wh o i s a p u b l i c o f fi cer w i t h w h o m h e c o n s p i red in
committ in g t h i s c r i m e . ( 2 017 Ba r E x a m ) B u t a p r i v a t e i n d i v i dual
can be charged alone wit h v i o l a t ion of R .A . No . 3019 even w i t h out
a co-accused, i f t h e p u b l i c o f fi ce r w i t h w h o m h e c o n s p i r e d i n
committ in g t hi s cr im e died prior to th e fi l in g of inf or m a t i on. In t his
case, the Sandiganbayan has ju r i s di ction over the crim e even if the
Information merely charged a private indi v i d ual who conspired with
a deceased public officer in vi ol a t in g R.A. No. 3019. (People v. H enry
Go, G.R. No. 16'8589, March 25, 2014)
N o Dou ble J e o p a r d y
S ection 3 o f R . A . N o . 3 0 1 9 r e a d s : " In a d d i t i o n t o a c t s o r
omissions of p u b li c of fi cers a l r eady p e na li zed by e x i s ting l a w , t h e
following shall constitute corrupt pr a c tices of any public officer." t i s
clear then t ha t on e may be charged wit h v i o l a t ion of R.A. No. 8019
in addition t o a f e l ony u n der t h e R e v ised Penal Code for th e same
act. (Ramiscal, J'r. v. Sandig a nbayan, G.A. N o s. 169727-28, August
18, 2006) Th us , th e o f f ender i n a d d i t i o n t o v i o l a t io n o f S e ction 3
of R.A. No. 8019 can be held liable for falsification of document by
public official (Suero v. People, G.A. No. 156408, Janu ary 81, 2005);
or malversation t h r o ugh f al sification of document (People v. Paj aro,
G.R. Nos. 167860-65, Ju ne 17, 2008; 2009 Bar E x a m ); or f a i l u re to
render an accounting (Lumauig v. People, G.B. No. 16'6'680, Juiv 7,
2014); or plunder (See: Senator Revilla v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.B. ¹s . 2 12427-28,December 6, 2016); or direct bribery. (2014 3ar
Exam)
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 253
CAUSING UNDUE IN JURY OR GIVING UNW A R R A N T E D B E N E FITS,
ADVANTAGE OR PREFERENCE
V iolation of S ection 8 (e) of R .A . N o . 3 019 i s c o m m i t t e d b y a
public officerwho causes any undue injury to any party, including
the Government, or gives any private party any unwarranted
b enefits, advant age or p r e f er ence i n t h e d i s c h arge of h i s of fi ci al ,
a dministrat iv e o r j u d i c i a l f u n c t i on s t h r o u g h m a n i f est p a r t i a l i t y ,
evident bad faith or gr oss inexcusable negligence.
For purpose of the bar exam i n a t i on, a reviewee should master
Section 3(e) of R . A . N o . 3 0 1 9 s i n c e t h i s i s a c a t c h - al l p r o v i sion
c overing al l i n j u r y - causing o r b e n e fi t - gi v in g a c t c o m m i t t e d b y a
public officer by means of culpa or dolo.
Public O ff ic e r
The last s e n t ence of S e ction 3 (e) of R .A . N o . 3 0 1 9 p r o v i d es
that this p r o v i sion sh al l a p pl y t o o f f icers an d e m p l oyees of offices
or government corpor at i ons ch ar ged w i t h t h e g r a n t o f l i c e nses or
permits or other concessions. This last sentence is intended to make
clear the inclusion of public officers granting licenses or permits or
other concessions in Section 3(e). It should not be int e rp r e ted as an
exclusionary rule. In sum, Section 8(e) is not applicable exclusively to
p ublic officers charged with th e dut y of gran t in g li censes or permit s
or other concessions. It may apply to all k i nd s of public officers such
as a right-of-way agent of Office of Highway Di st r ict En gi neer, Pasig
(Mejorada v. Sand ig a n bayan, G.R. No. L- 5 1065-72, June 80, 1987);
Clerk of Court (S t i l g r o ve v. Sabas, A.M N o . P - 0 6 - 2257, March 2 8 ,
2008); or Municipal Treasurer. (Consigna v. People, G.B. ¹. 17 5750,
April 2, 2014)
In Consigna v. People, G.R. No. 175750, April 2, 2014, accused,
a municipal t r e a s ur er , i s c o n s i dered a p u b l i c o f fi cer d i s ch ar gin g
official functions when she mi sused such position to be able to tak e
o ut a loan f ro m c o m p l a i n a nt , w h o w a s m i s led i n t o t h e b e l ief t h a t
t he former, a s m u n i c i pa l t r e a s u r er , w a s a c t i n g o n b e h al f o f t h e
municipality. The accused misrepresented that the loan is to be used
t o pay for th e sal ar ies of th e em p l oyees of the m u n i c i p al it y an d t o
construct th e m u n i c i pal g y m n a s i um . Th e accused th r ough evident
bad faith caused damage to th e compl ai n a nt . She was convicted of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and estafa.
 254 VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 255
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II

I nten t i o na l o r C u l p a b l e O f f e n s e c ausing damage to the government t h r o ugh m a n i f est par t i a l it y a n d

T he off ense u n d e r S e c t io n 3 ( e ) o f R . A . N o . 3 0 1 9 m a y b e
committed either by dolo or as when the accused acted with evident
bad faith o r m a n i f est p a r t i a l i t y , or by cu l p a, a s w h en t h e accusers
committed gross inexcusable negligence. (Plameras v. People, G.A,
No. 187268, September 4, 2018)
An infor m a t ion fo r v i o l a t ion of Section 8(e) of R.A. N o 8 0 1 9,
which failed to allege "evident bad fait h, man i fest parti a l i ty o- gross
inexcusable in causing undue inju ry to the government, is quashable
on the ground that it does not charge an offense. (Olairez v. Desierto,
G.R. No. 142889, September 21, 2001; 1997 B ar Exam
) 3, 1995, the accused merely relied on the officialreports of his
A., a BIR collection agent, knowi ng th at B, a businessman, had
previously issued bouncing checks to the former collection agent, in
payment of BIR strip stamps for affixt ur e to-confiscated foreigr made
cigarettes which B wi n s in t he bid d i n g s, repeatedly accepted checks
from said B in payment of strip stamps and notwit h s t a n d i ng the fact
that the checks bounced and up to now, the Government has not yet
collected the value of th e checks. A is l i a b le for vio la t i on of Section
8(e) ofR.A. No. 8019 for giving unwarranted benefit, advantage an5
preference to B an d f o r c a u s i ng u n d u e i n j u r y t o t h e g o v e r n m ent
through ma n i f est par t i a l it y an d ev i d ent bad fa i th , w h i l e B is l i a ble
for violation of R.A. No. 8019 on the basis of conspiracy and viclation
of B.P. Blg. 22. (1970 Bar Exam)
In Gi a n g an v. Pe o p l e, G. R . N o . 1 6 9 3 8 5, A u g u s t 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 ,
Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest an5
sincere belief t h a t h e w a s t h e n s u m m a r i l y a b a t i n g t h e n u i s ance
that a regular u ser of the obstru cted road had just r eported to him,
A fur t her i n d i c a t ion of t h e g ood fait h o f G i a n gan w a s t h e t u r n i n g
o ver of the wooden posts to the police station, ma n i f esting t hat t h e
accused were actin g w i t h i n t h e s c ope of t h ei r a u t h o r i t y . T h E acts
committed w i t h g o o d fa i t h w e r e r e n d e r ed i n c o ns istent w i t h t h e
m anifest p a r t i a l i t y a n d b a d f a i t h t h a t t h e l a w p u n i s h ed. H e w as
acquitted of violation of Section 8(e) of R.A. No. 8019.
1. A r i a s P r i n c i p l e —In Ar i as v. Sandigan bayan, G.R. Nos.
81568 and 82512, December 19, 1989, the property bought by the
City is overpr i ced. When t h e a c cused was appointed as t r e a surer,
the sale of th e p r o p ert y h a d a l r e ady b een consum m a t ed. Accused
w as charged w i t h v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t io n 8 (e) o f R . A . N o . 3 0 : 9 f o r
evident bad fa i th . Th e o nl y e v i d ence presented by th e p r o secution
is his signature on the voucher. He w as a cquit t e d. H e a ds of offices
can rely to a reasonable extent on th eir su bordin a t es on preparation
of bids,purchase of supplies, or negotiations. Any executive head
of agencies or commissions can at t est t o th e v o l ume of papers t ha t
must be signed. Thus, executive head cannot be convicted on the sole
basis of signature or approval appearing on a voucher. To sustain a
conspiracy charge and conviction,evidence must be presented other
than her signature on the voucher.
In Ma g s uci v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . R. N o . L - 1 0 1 5 45, J a n u a r y
s ubordinates regardin g t h e c o m p l et ion o f t h e p r o j ect, an d o n t h e
b a-is thereof appr oved th e v o u cher i n v o l v in g t h e p a y m en t o f t h e
contractor w h er e i n f a c t t h e r e w a sn o constru ction m a de. Accused
w as acquitted o f e s t af a t h r o u g h f a l si fi cation o f d o c u m ent o n t h e
strength of the Ar i a s pri n c ipl e .
In Si s toza v. De s ierto, G . R. N o. 1 4 4 7 84, September 3, 2 0 0 2 ,
accused was negligent in reviewing the award of the supply of tomato
paste in favor of Elias General Merchan di sing, since he just cursorily
perused the pur chase order and r e a dily af fi xed hi s si gn at ur e up on
i t, He could have checked the supportin g documents more lengthi l y .
However, his actions were not of such nat ur e and degree to merit a
cr'minal pr osecution for v i o l a t ion of Section 8 (e) of R. A. N o. 8 019
through gross inexcusable negligence. Accused was acquitted on the
basis of Magsuci pri n c ip le .
The Arias case, which is known as reliance-on-the-subordinates
principle or signature-on-the-voucher principle, is always being used
by the accused as a defense in a case involving vi olation of R.A. No.
3019, However, the Supr eme Court r e j ected this defense in several
cases since the circumstance in the Arias case is different from those
cases.
The Ar i as d o c tri ne is n ot a n a b s o lu te r u l e . It i s n o t a m a g i c
cloak that can be used as a cover by a public officer to conceal himself
i n the shadows of his subordin ates and necessarily escape liabilit y .
(C'astillo-Co v. Ho n. S a n d i g a n b ayan, G . R. N o . 18 4 76'6',August 15,
2018)
There ar e f ou r r e q u i s i tes t o a p ply Ar i a s de f e nse, to w i t : ( 1 )
a ccused rely t o a r e a s onable e x t en t o n h i s s u b o r d i n a t es; (2) t h e
documents to b e s c r u t i n i zed b y t h e a c cused m us t b e v o l u m i n ou s;

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 256 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 257
VOLUME II

( 3) the act r e comm ended by t h e s u b or d i n a tes m us t b e w i t h i n t h a

s cope of hi s a u t h o r i t y ; a n d ( 4 ) t h e r e i s n o c i r c u m s t a nce t ha t w i ll
s how evident b a d f a i t h , m a n i f est p a r t i a l i t y o r g r o s s inexcusab
negligence.
a. S ub or d i n a t e s - Section 3 88 of the L o c al
G overnment C o d e p r o h i b i t s l o c a l g o v e r n m en t u n i t s f r o m "
making payments for goods not yet delivered and services not .
yet rendered. Ma k in g an a d v ance payment i n v i o l a t ion of thia
provision constit u te s a c r i m e u n de r S ection 8 (e) of R .A . No,
3019 by giving unwarranted preference, advantage or benefit:
to the governm ent t h r o u g h m a n i f est p a r t i a l i t y a n d e v i d enca ',
bad faith (P l a m e ras v. People, G.B. ¹ . 1872 6 8, September 4,
2018), and Section 8 (g ) of R .A . N o . 8 019 for e n t e r in g i n t o a .
transaction, wh ich i s m a n i f estly an d g r ossly disadvant ageoua:.
to the governm ent. (C astill o -Co v. Ho n. S an d ig a n b ayan, G.1l,
No. 184766, August 16, 2018)
In Ca s t i llo- Co v . Hon. S a n d i ganbayan, supra t ha
accused, a governor, ar gued t h a t sh e re l i ed o n t h e o p i n i on o f: .
her pr i v a te law yer th a t S e c tion 8 38 of t he L o c al G o vernment
Code does not apply to advance payment to the supplier, which -"
needed t ha t m o n e y t o b e g i n r e c o n d i t i o n in g t h e e q u i p m ent
to be pur chased by t h e p r o v i n ce. To escape crim i na l l i a b i l ity
arising from violat ion of Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 8019, accuse<i
invoked Ar i as case. It w as r u l ed t h at f or t he Ar i a s do ctri ne to
find application, both t h e s u p e r ior an d t h e s u b or di n at e must
be public officers w o r k i n g f o r t h e s a m e g over n m en t of fice or
agency. A pr i v a te lawyer, who is not wo r k i n g f or t he p r o vi nce,
is not a"subordinate" of the governor for purpose of applying
the Arias p ri n c ip le. Hence, her conviction was affirm e d .
In Ja ca v. People, G.It. N o. 16 6967, Janua ry 28 , 2 0 18, a
paymaster obtained cash advances despite the fact that she has
previous un l i q u i d a ted cash a d v ances, which i s a v i o l a t ion of
COA rules. The city t r e a surer certified t hat th e cash advances
are necessary an d l a w f u l . T h e c i t y a c count an t c e r t i f ied t h at
the expenditures are supported by documents and previous
c ash ad v ances ar e l i q u i d a t e d a n d a c c o u n te d f o r . T h e c i t y
a dministr a to r a p p r o ved t h e v o u c her a n d c o u n t e r si gned t h e
check. In a c ase of vi ol a t ion of Section 8 (e) of R .A. No. 8019,
the city a d m i n i s t r a to r i n v o k e d t h e Ar i a s pr i n c i p le s i n ce she
m erely r e l ie d o n t h e c e r t i fi c a t i ons of t h e c i t y t r e a s u rer a n d
city accountant . I t w a s h e l d t h a t t h e Ar i a s p r i n c i p le i s n o t
a pplicable because the city t r e a surer an d c it y a ccountant a r e
n ot subordin ates of th e c i t y a d m i n i s t r a to r s i nce th e t r i o a r e
le'
public offic rs , wh ose rank and position are equal.
b. V ol um i n o u s d o c u m e n t s —
In the Arias case, it was
ruled that heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on
their subordin ates in connection w it h t h e p r e p ar a t ion of bi d s,
purchase of supplies, or ent er in g i n t o n e gotiat i ons because of
the volum i n ous documents i n v o l v ed. H e n ce, Ar i a s de fense is
n ot invocable if th e d o cuments i n v o l v in g th e r e l ease of fu n d s
a re not so volumi n ous so as to preclude accused from stu dy i n g
each one carefully. (Sant i l l an o v. People, G.B. Nos. 175045-46,
March 3, >010)
c. U n a ut h o r i z e d r e c o m m e n d a t i o n — In C as t i l l o -
Co v. Ho n. S a n d i g a n b ayan, s upr a, th e a c c used, a g o v e rnor,
entered into an a g r eement t o p u r c h ase a reconditioned heavy
e quipment, d e spit e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e s o l u t io n o f t h e l o c al
l egislature merely auth or i zed her to buy brand new equipment .
The accused was charged with v i o l a t ion of Section 8 (g) of R.A.
N o. 8019 for enter ing i nt o a cont r a ct, wh ich is m a n i f estly an d
g rossly disadvant ageous to th e g overnm e nt . A ccording to t h e
a ccused, she di d s o o n l y b e c ause he r s u b o r d i n at e i n f o r m e d
her of the in sufficiency of the l oaned fu nds and r ecommended
that t h e p r o v i nc e p r o cur e r e conditi oned m a c h i n er y i n s t e a d.
She invoked the Ar i a s p r i n c i p l e. Supre me C ourt r e j e cted the
application of the Arias ruli n g. The said Resolution should have
prompted th e a ccused to be m or e ci r c u m spect i n t r a n s actin g
w ith s u p p l i e r o f h e a v y e q u i p m e nt . B e t w e e n t h e s aid t h e
r esolution an d t h e r e c o m m en dation o f h e r s u b o r d i n a te, sh e
s hould have obeyed the former .
d. E v i d e n t b a d f a i t h , m a n i f e s t p a r t i a l i t y or
gross inex cu sable n e g l i g e nce — In the Ar i a s case, the only
evidence presented against a city tr easur er, who was acquitt ed
o f violation of S ection 8 (e ) of R .A . N o . 3 09, i s h i s s i g n a t u r e
on the voucher in v olv in g pa y m ent by th e city of an overpr iced
land.
The Arias defense shall be rejected if other t h an t he a ccused's
signature on the voucher, circum st ances show evident bad faith , or
manifest parti a l it y such as in a case:
1. W h e r e t h e a c c u sed h a s f o r e k n o w l edge of e x i s t i n g
anomaly — e . g., m a y o r s i g n e d t h e i n s p e c t i on r eport a n d

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 258 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R
VOLUME II
t he d i s b u r s emen t v o u c he r d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t h e h a ] '
foreknowledge tha t t h e m a t e r i al s d el i v ered by s u p p l ier h av< '.
already been confiscated by th e D E N R (E s c ara v. People, G.lt,
No. 164921, July 8, 2005); or
2. W h e re ac c u s e d a p p r o ve d t h e voucher w i t h o ut
i ndication o f t h e r e t e n t i o n m o n e y r e q u i r e d b y l a w , a n d h <
even in spected t h e c o n s t r u c t ion s i t e o f h o s p i ta l b o a t b e i ng
constructed, i n w h i c h h e s h o u l d h a v e n o t i ced t h e f i n a n cial
weakness of the contr actor an d th e d efective works (R i v era u
People, G.R. No. 156577, December 3, 2014);
T he A r i a s p r i n c i pl e s h al l n o t a l s o a p p l y i f o t h e r t h a n t h e
a ccused's si g n a t u r e o n th e v o u c h e r , circumstances
show gr a ss
inexcusable negligence such as h i s f a i l u r e t o f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g ate,
examine t h e d o c u m e n ts , o r m a k e i n q u i r i e s o n t h e t r a n s a ction>
despite a deviation from or d i n ar y p r ocedure in connection wit h t he
release of the public fun d s.
T he a p p l i c a t i on of t h e Ar i a s d oc t r i n e i s
s ubject t o th e
qualification t h a t t h e p u b l i c o f f i cial h a s n o f o r e k n o w l edge of any
facts or circum st ances that w o ul d p r o mpt hi m o r h e r t o i n v estigate
or exercise agreater degree of care. In a number of cases, this Court
refused t o a p pl y t h e Ar i a s d o c t r i n e c o n s idering t h a t t h e r e w e r e
c ircumstances that s h o ul d h a v e p r o m p ted th e g overn m ent o f f
icial „
to inquire f u r t h er . (A b u b alear v. People, G.R. No. 20 2408, Ju ne 27,
2018)
In the following cases, the Arias defense was rejected for failure
of the accused to further in vestigate, examine the document or make
inquiries despite circum stances require them to do so:
1. D es p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d i s b u r s ement v o u chers
were in the name of Eelly Lu m b er but t he checks were payable
to another p e r s on, t h e- mayor i s s ued t h e c h eck a s p a y m ent
b w i t h ou t f u r t h e r i n v e s t i gat 'in g o r e x a m '
t o Kel l y L u m ber '
'
mining
thee documents; (C r uz v. Th e H o n . S a n d i g a n b ayan, G . R. No.
134493, August 16; 2005)
2. D es p i t e it s i n completeness or lack of mater ial dates,
the accused signed the certificates of acceptance, inventory, and
delivery of ar t i cl es, and despite no such deliveries were made,
is co-accused certi fied t o t h e c o r r e ct ness of t h e i n s p ection
report forms. They should h ave first i n v e stigated or examined
the documents (Li h a y l i h ay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31,
2013); and
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259
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED Biv PUBL:C OFFICERS
8. Th e e q u i p m en t o f t h e c o n t r a ct or s w a s i r r e g u l a r l y
i mmobilized p r i o r t o t h e sch e d u l e d p u b l i c b i d d i n g . T h e
contract, entered into by one of tee accused, contains a patently
i llegal s t i p u l a t i on . T h e r e are no appropriate documents
s uch as pur chase orders an d d el i v ery r e ceipts t o su pport t h e
disbursement of p u b li c f u n ds . D espit of these irr egular i t i e s,
accused, signed and approved advance payment to the
contractor wi t h ou t m a k i n g f u r t h e r i n q u i r y on th e t r a n saction.
(Abubakar v. People, G.R. No. 202408, Jun.e 27, 2018)
2. R el y i n g o n o f fi c i a l l e g a l o p i n i o n o r r e s o l u t i o n -
Reliance on an un official le g al opinicn m a de by a pr i v a te counsel of
the Governor regarding non-applicab'l it y of the law against advance
payment was no t c o n sidered by t h e S u p r em e C o ur t a s a d e f ense.
(Castillo-Co v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra) Hc we ver, reliance on an
official legal opinion or re solution m ay be an evidence of good faith;
hence, the same is a defense in viola: ion of Section 8 (e) of R.A. No.
8019.
In Vi / l a n u e va v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G % . N o . 1 0 5 6 0 7, J u ne 2 1
1998, accused, an OI C -m ayor, in i s suin g i n ayor's permit t o operat e
c ockpit to T e ves an d d e n y in g a p p l i cation for r e n e wal of p e r mi t t o
F leischer sought th e counsel of th e C it y F i s cal on th e m a t t er . T h e
City Fiscal opined t ha t s ai d a p p l i cat. on may be gr a n ted subject to
certain coriditions imposed by the PGC anc. the decision of the Court
.
of Appeals. It may not be said therefore that he acted with "m a n i fest
partiality and evident bad fai th" in g ra n t i r g a p e r m i t t o T e ves.
In Catindig v. People, G.R. No. 188141. September 18, 2009, in
granting benefits and a l l o wa nces to the board of d i r e ctors of wate r
districts, the Board of Directors of C~VD relied on LWU A R esolution
No. 818, which w a s s u bsequently d e clared i n a n o t her c ase as not
i n conformit y w i t h t h e l a w . I n r e l y i n g o n L W U A R e s o l u t i on , t h e
d irectors acted in good fai th , as they w er e of th e h onest belief th a t
L WUA Board Resolution No. 818 was vali d .
In Ga r c ia v. Of f i c e o f th e Gr n b u d s m a n, G. R . N o . 1 2 7 7 1 0 ,
February 16, 20 00, th e O m b u d s man a c ted correctly i n d i s m i s sing
p etitioner's ccmpl ain t b e c ause pr i v at e r e spondents ha d n o t a c t e d
i n bad fai-.h or w it h g r oss negligence in deducting w i t h h o l d ing t a x
from peti t i on er's p r o v i d en t f u n d b e n e f it s s h a r e o v e r a n d a b o v e.
h er personal cont r i b u t i on , a s t h e y w e r e g u i de d b y t h e o p i n ion of
t he Commissioner o f I n t e r n a l R e v n u e a t —.he ti me . Th e l a t t e r ' s
c hange of opinion, wh il e f av or in g p e t i t i o n er, w il l n o t m a k e p r i v a t e
respondents' act prior t h e r eto amount t o bad fait h as they relied on
 260 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
the prevailin g l egal opi n ion on t h e i s sue. Hence, they could not. be
held crimi n a ll y l i a ble th erefor.
8. E r r on e o u s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e L a w —An erroneous
interpretation of a p r o v i sion of la w r e g a r d in g th e e n t i t l e m ent of a
g overnment e m p l oyee who wa s w r o n g f u ll y w i t h h el d of he r R A T A ,
absent any s h o w in g o f s om e d i s h onest or w r o n g fu l p u r p o se, does
not necessarily a m o un t t o ba d f a i t h . (Y sidoro v. Ho n. Le onardo-De
Castro, G.R. No. 171518, February 6, 2012
) injury must be more than necessary, excessive,improper or illegal.
Two M o des of C o m m i s sion
There are two w ays by w h ic h a p u b li c official vi ol ates Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 8019 in the perform ance of his functions, namely: (1j
by causing undue inj ur y t o any pa r ty , in clu d ing the Government; or
(2) by giving any pr i v ate part y any u n w a r r a n t ed benefit, advantage
o r pr e f erence. The accused m a y b e . c h a r ged u n d e r e i t h e r m o d e
or under b o th . T h e d i s j u n c t iv e t er m " o r " c o n n otes t ha t e i t h e r a ct
qualifies as a v i o l a t ion o f S ection 3 (e) of R .A . N o . 8 0 19. (Br a za v.
on. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2018; Rivera v.
People, G.R. No. 156577, December 8, 2014)
F irst M o d e
Thhe first m ode of comm i t t i n g t h e c r i m e u n der S ection 3(e) of
R .A. No. 8019 i s c a u sin g u n d u e i n j u r y t o a n y p a r -.y, wh et her t h e
government or p r i v a t e p a r t y . T h e concept of "u n a r e inju r y" i s . h e
same as the civil law concept of "actual da m a ge." In is required that
undue inj ur y m u s t b e specified, quant i f ied and pr oven to th e point
of moral certain ty . Speculative or in ci dental i n j ur y i s not sufficient.
(Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149406; October 25, 2005;
I A . J i m e n ez, Inc. v. The Hon. Omb udsman, G.R. No. 155307, Jvne
6; 2011)
The inconvenience suffered by reason of the "long period of time"
that her e m o l u m e nt s w er e w i t h h el d (D o m i n go v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan,
supra), dismissal of the case in a pre li m i n a ry i n v e s tigation (Gare'.a-
Rueda v. Amor, G.R. No. 116'938, September 20, 2001), or difficult;:es
in attending several hear i ngs (Go v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
o. 131899, October 17, 2003) is not a quantifiable damage akin to
that of the Civil Code. Hence, the element of undue ir
ijury in Section
8 e is not pr esent.
In Jacinto v.Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 84571, October 2, 1989,
t he salar y o f t h e c o m p l a i n an t w a s w i t h h e l d f o r s o m e t i m e u p o n
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 261
i nstruction of th e accused because the for mer f a i led t o su b mi t h e r
daily time records duly appr oved, and her application for sick leave
was disapproved. The accused caused the removal of the name of the
c omplainant f r oni t h e p l a n t i l l a b e cause of hi s d i s satisfaction w i t h
the services of the complai n a nt . I t w a s h el d t h a t n o r e al or a c t u a l
damage was suffered by he r. She got her w i t h h e ld s alary r e l e ased.
H er name was restored in th e p l a n t i l l a . T h us, the complai n - n t d i d
not suffer undue inj ur y as an element r e qu i red by the law. Such an
The injury suffered by the complain a nt , if at a ll , is negligible. (2011
and 1991 Bar Exa ms)
S econd Mod e
The second mode of commit t in g th e crime un der Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 8019 is giving any p r i v at e part y an y u n w a r r a n t ed benefit,
advantage, or preference.
Accused gave unwarranted benefitsand advantages to several
contractors by a l l o w in g t h e m t o d e p loy t h ei r e q u i p m en t a h ea d of
the scheduled public biddi ng. Un der th e l aw, a public contract shall
be awarded to the lowest prequalified bi dder. The successful bidder
may be allowed to commence work o nl y u pon r eceipt of a n o t ice to
proceed. They are liable for violation of Section 8 (e) of R.A. No.
3019. (Abubakar v. People, G.R. No. 202408, June 27, 2018)
1. D a m a g e —I n the first mo de, there must be undue injur y ,
which is akin to damage contemplated by the Civil Code. The damage
must be quantifi able. (Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149406',
October 25, 2005) In the second mode, the element of damage is not
required. (Braza v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195082, February
20, 2018)
I n th e e x e r cise o f q u a s i -j u di cial p o w er , t h e p r o s ecution o r
ombudsman may di smiss a complaint for pr el i m i n ar y i n v estigation.,
In dismissing a c a se, th e c o m p l a i n an t m a y s u f f e r i n c o nvenience
in appealing th e c a se. In fi l i n g a c a s e against t h e r e sponc.ent, he
may suffer d i f fi c u l t i e s i n a t t e n d i n g s e v e ra l h e a r i n gs . H o w ever,
i nconvenience or d i f f i cul t ies i s n o t a q u a n t i fi a bl e d a m age aki n t o
that of the Civil Code. Hence, the prosecutor or ombudsman cannot
b e held l i a bl e f o r v i o l a t io n o f S e c t io n 3 (e ) o f R . A . N o . 8 0 1 9 b y
causing undue inj ur y t h r o ugh m a n i f est par t i a l i t y . (Garcia-Rueda v.
Amor, supra; Go v . Of f i ce of th e Om b u d s ma n, s upra) Ho w e ver, he
can be convicted of violation of Section 8(e) by giving unwarranted
p reference thr ough m a n i f est p a r t i a l i t y o r e v i d ent ba d f a it h t o t h e
 262 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
respondent in a pr el i m i n ar y i n v e stigation by dismissing the case, or
to the complain ant by fi n d i n g p r obable cause to charge the accused
in court. D a m age or in ju r y to t h e o ffe nded party is n ot an e l e ment
of this crim e.
In People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 177105-06, August 1 2, 2010, the
Court of A p p e als (CA) r e n d ered a d e cision r e i n st a t in g t h e t i t l e of
the complaina nt . Th e P r o v i n cial A d j u d i c ator despite k n o w l edge of
the CA decision st il l r e n d ered hi s decision in a D A R A B C a s e that
completely contra di cted the CA decision by i n v a l i d a t in g t i t l e of the
complainant. He displayed evident bad faith and ma n i fest part i ality
by his arrogant refusal to recognize and obey the CA decision causing
undue injury to the complain ant and giving un w a r r a n ted benefits to
private indi v i d u als in vi ol a t ion of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
2. P a r t y I nj u r e d o r B e n e f i t e d —I n t h e f i r s t m o d e , t h e
party to w ho m t h e u n d u e i n j u r y w a s c aused is th e offended party,
In th e second m ode, th e p r i v at e p a r t y w h o r e c eived u n w a r r a n t ed
benefit, advant age or preference is crim i n a ll y l i a ble w it h t h e public
officer on the basis of conspiracy. (Santillano v. People, G.R. Nos,
175045-46; March 3, 2010)
In the first mode, the undue injury is caused to any party, v-hich
i ncludes th e g o v er n m e nt , p u b l i c of fi cer , o r p r i v a t e p " r t y . I n t h e
second mode, the un w a r r a n ted benefits, advantage or preference ia
given to a priv a te party. Giving u n w a r r a n t e d benefits, advantage or
preference to the government or p u b li c official is not constit u t ive of
the crime under Section 8(e). The term "private party" may be ased
to refer to p ersons other t h a n t h ose holding p u b lic office (Ba u t istg
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136'082, May 12, 2000) or public officer
acting in a private capacity to'protect his personal interest. (Ambil
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 175457, July 6; 2011)
Accused is charged with causing the hiring of some 192 casu=i
government e m p l o y ees, a nd t h e c o n s equent a w a r d i n g o f t h e i r
o noraria a n d s a l a r i e s t a k e n f r o m t h e p e a c e an d o r d e r f u n d c f
t e m u n i c i p a l i ty . G i v i n g u n d u e b enefits by a w a r d in g h o n or aria to
public officers is not a violation of Section 3(e) since tl ey are not
private parti es. But giv ing un due advant ages by hir in g them at th at
time tha t t h e y a r e n o t y e t p u b l i c o f ficers is a v i o l a t ion o f S ection
8(e) because prior to the hiring they are private parties. (Bautista u,
Sandi ganbayan, supra)
G iving un w a r r a n t e d benefit t o th e m a yor by t r a n s f er r in g h i m
rom the provincial jail and detaining him at a residence is a violatioz
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
o f Section 8(e). Such pri v i l ege was accorded to the m ayor not in h i s
official capacity, but a s a d e t a i nee charged wit h m u r d er . T h us, for
purposes of applying the provisions of Section 8(e), the mayor was
a private party. (Amb il v. Sandig a n bayan, supra) The custodian can
additionally be held liable for infi d el it y i n t h e custody of prisoner.
R ENDERING UNJUST JUD G M E N T O R INTER L O C U T O R Y O R D E R
Rendering ur j u s t j u d g m ent or i n t erlocutory order i s commit t e d
b y a j u dg e w h o k n o w i n gl y r e n d er s a n u n j u s t j u d g m en t i n a n y
case submitted t c h i m f o r d e c i sion (A r t i c le 20 4) or i n t e r l o c utory
order (Ar t i c le 2 0 6 ); or r e n d e rs a m a n i f e s t ly u n j u s t u dgment o r
interlocutory order byreason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance
(Articles 205 and 206)
U njust Ju d g m e n t
For a judge to be held liable for kn ow i n gly r endering an unju st
j udgment, it m u s t b e e s t a b l i shed beyond cavil t h a t t n e j u d g m e n t
adverted to is unjust, contrary to law or unsupported by :h e evidence,
and that the same was rendered with conscious and deli aerate intent
to do an injustice. (Loyola v. Gabo, Jr., A.M R T J - 0 0 - 1524, January
26; 2000)
Where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an
u njust j u d g m en t u n d e r A r t i c l e 2 0 4 o f t h e R e v i se d P e na l C o d e ,
failure to allege iri the In f or m a t ion t hat th e j u d g m ent was rendered
knowing it to be unjust, is fata l. (People v. Puris im a, G .R. L- 4 2050-
6'6; November 20, 1978)
The plai n t if f g av e m o ney t o t h e j u d ge, wh o i n c o n sideration
t hereof, subsequently r e n d ered a n u n j u s t d e cision i n f a v o r o f t h e
f ormer. The ju dge is l i a ble for d i r ect b r i b er y an d r e n d er in g u n j u s t
judgment, while the pl ai n t if f i s l i a ble of corru p t ion of public officer.
(1975 Bar Exam )
T he plai n t if f g a v e m o ney t o t h e j u d g e i n c o n s i deration o f a
favorable decision, and subsequently the judge rendered a decision in
favor of the former, which is based on evidence. The judge is not liable
for rendering unj ust j u d g m ent even if he agreed for a consideration
t o render a decision in f a vor of t h e p l a i n t i f f w i t h ou t e g a r d t o t h e
evidence. Despite ofthe agreement to render a favorabl judgment,
there is no showing that th e decision is unjust since it -.vas rendered
on the merit based on evidence. However, Judge Ma" is liable for
direct bribery by accepting giftto perform a non-crim'ral act (U.S.
 264 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
v. Gacutan, G.B. No. L- 9 6 00, October 1, 1914); while the pla i n t i ff is
liable for corru p t ion of public officer.
E rror of J u d g m e n t
T o commi t t h e o f f e n s e of knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, the offender must be a ju dge who is adequately shown to
have rendered an u n j ust j u d g m e nt , not one who m er ely comm i t t ed
an error of ju d gment or t a ken th e u n p opular side of a controversial
point of law. The term k n o w i n gl y m e ans "sure leno~~ledge, conscious
and deliberate intention to do a n i nj u s t i ce." Th u s, the complainant
must not only p r ove beyond reasonable doubt t h a t t h e j u d g m ent is
patently contr ar y t o la w o r n o t s u p p or ted by th e ev id ence but t h a t
it was also made w it h d e l i b er ate i n t en t t o p e r p et r at e an i n j u s t ice.
Good faith an d t h e a b sence of mali ce, corrupt m c t i v es or i m p r oper
consideration ar e s u f fi cient d efenses that w i l l s h i e ld. a ju dge from
t he charge of rendering an u n j u s t d e cision. In o t her w o r ds, in t h i s
crime th e j u d g e m u s t b e m o t i v a t e d b y h a t r e d , r : v e n ge, gr eed or
s ome other s i m i l a r m o t i v e i n i s s u i n g t h e j u d g m = n t . Ba d f a i t h i s
t
therefore, the ground for liabil i ty. The failure of the juc.ge to correctl cy
interpret th e la w o r t o p r o p erl y a p p r eciate th e evidence presented
does not necessarily render him a d m i n i s t r a t i v ely li a ble (Be: Verified
Complaint for Disbarment of AM A L a n d , I nc. against CA Association
Justice Bueser, et al., OCA IP I N o . 12-204-CA- J, March 11, 2014) or
c riminally l i a b l e .
W ithout a H e a r i n g
A Talim J u d ge, upon compl ain t a n d a p p l i catio r o f t h e r e a l ty
corporation Bat m a n son, Inc., issued a writ of preli m i n ar y i n j u n c tion
against Darj eeling Ven t u r es, Inc., a competitor of B a t m a n son, Inc.,
without n o t ice and h e a r i ng . (2018 Bar E x a m) Ju d g e T a l im c a n n ot
be said to be un a w ar e t ha t a n o t ice and h e ar in g i s r e q u i red before
issuing a writ of preli m i n ar y i n j u n c t i on. The requir em ent of a notice
and hearing is a ba sic tenet. It w a s completely defiled when J u d ge
T alim, h a s t il y a n d w i t h o u t h e a r i n g , i s sued a w r i t o f p r e l i m i n a r y
injunction. (see: QBE Insurance Phils., Inc. v. Lavina, A.3f. No. BTJ-
06-1971, October 17, 2007) Hence, he is l i a b le for r e n d e ri ng u n j u s t
interlocutory order .
U njust R e solu t i o n
A p r o secutor w h o r endered a n u n j u s t r e s o l u t io n m a y b e
held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 by giving
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 265
unwarranted preference, advantage or benefit to a party through
m anifest parti a l it y or evi dent bad fai t h .
MALICIOUS DELAY
Malicious delay is c o m m i t t e d b y a j u d g e g u i l t y o f m a l i c i o us
delay in the admi n i s t r a t ion of ju st i ce. (Artic le 207)
DERELICTION OF DUTY
Dereliction of d uty is c o m m i t t e d by a p u b l i c o fficer, or o ff icer
o f the l a w w ho ma l i c i o u sl y r e f r a i n s f r o m i n s t i t u t i n g c r i m i n a l
prosecution of violators of the law i n d e r eliction of th e du t ies of his
office. (Article 208)
A, an A s s is tant P r o v i n c ial P r o s ecutor of C e b u, w as a ssigned
to conduct the pr el i m i n ar y i n v e sti gati ons of tw o cr i m i n a l cases: (I)
f or rape against X , a n d ( 2 ) fo r e s t af a a g a i nst Y . U n k n ow n t o t h e
complainants, both respondents were schoolmates of A i n th e ir h i g h
school years in Lanao del Norte. Despite the overwhelm ing evidence
against Y, A did not file the inform a t i on for estafa because according
to him, the folder of the case to which were attached the dishonored
checks and other documents offered in evidence by the complainant
w as stolen. Cont r ar y t o s u c h c l a im , t h e f o l der w a s k ep t i n a s a f e
in his house. (1991 Bar E x a m) A i s l i a b le for dereliction of duty f o r
maliciously refr ai n in g f rom i n s t i t u t i n g cr i m i n a l p r osecution of Y in
dereliction of the du t ies as a prosecutor, and in fi d el it y i n cu stody of
document.
TOLERANCE
Tolerance is commit t e d by a n o ff ic er of t he l aw w h o t o l e ra te s
the commission of offenses. (Article 208)
In dereliction of the duties of his office, the public officer, whose
duty is to pr osecute cri m i n a ls, kn ows th e comm i ssion of the cr i me.,
but he does not cause the prosecution of th e cr i m i n al . I n t o l er ance„
s uch officer k n ow s t h a t a c r i m e i s a b ou t t o b e c o m m i t t ed , bu t h e
tolerates its commission.
A mu n i c i pal m a yo r w h o o r g a n i zed cock fi g h t i n g i s l i a bl e f or
i llegal gambl i ng , an d n o t f o r t h e c r i m e o f t o l e r a nce for f a i l ur e t o
criminally p r osecute himself. (P eople v. M a l a b anan, G.B. N o .
I-48480, January 7, 1936) In the crime of tolerance, the offender,
 266 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
who is an officer of the law tolerat in g a crime, must be different from
the person, whose crime is being tolerated.
Police officers,who are protectors ofj ueteng operators, can be
held liable for d er eliction of d ut y o r t o l e r ance under A r t i cl e 208 of
the Revised Penal C ode. (Fi a n za v. Pl e b, G.R. N o. 10 9638, Ma rch
31, 1995) But protectors oftraffickers of dangerous drugs are liable
under Sections 4, 5,6, 8, and 16 of R.A. No. 9165. For example, a
person protecting a drug pusher isliable for sale of dangerous drugs
as protector.
Under Section 92 of R .A. No . 9165, any governm ent officer or
employee tasked with the prosecution of drug-related cases under this
act, who, th r ough p a t ent l a x i t y , i n e x cusable neglect, unr easonable
delay, d e l i b er at el y c a u se s t h e u n s u c cessful p r o s ecution a n d /or
dismissal of the said dru g cases, are liable for th e cr im e of de lay or
bungling in the prosecution of drug cases.
REVELATION OF SECR ETS AND BE T R A YAL OF TRUS T
Revelation of secrets i s commi t t e d by a n a t t o r n e y - at-law w ho
p rejudices hi s c l i e nt , o r r e v e al s a n y o f t h e s e c r et s o f t h e l a t t er
learned by him i n hi s p r ofessional capacity by any m a l i cious breach
of professional duty or i n ex cusable negligence or ignorance. (Article
209; 2012 Bar Exam)
Betrayal o f t r u s t i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n at t o r n e y - a t- law w h o ,
having u n d e r t a k e n t h e d e f e ns e o f a cl i e n t o r h av i n g r e c e ived
confidential in f o r m a t ion from hi m i n a case, undertakes the defense
of the opposing part y i n t h e s am e case, wit h out t h e consent of his
first client. (Art i c le 209)
DIRECT BRIBERY
There are t h r ee w ay s of comm i t t i n g d i r ect b r i b ery, to wi t : (1)
By agreeing to perform a crime; (2) by accepting a giftto perform
a [unjust] a ct ; an d (8 ) b y a g r e eing t o r e f r ai n f r o m p e r f o r m in g an
o fficial dut y .
1. P u bl i c O f f i c e r — T h e o f f e n d er i n d i r e c t b r i b e ry i s a
public officer.However, assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim
commissioners, e x p ert s o r a n y o t h e r p e r s o ns p e r f o rm i ng p u b l i c
duties can also commit d i r e ct bri b e ry. (Art i c le 210)
Under A r t i cl e 21 0 o f t h e R e v i sed Penal C o de, di r ect b r i b ery
can be committed by "any other persons performing p u b li c d u ties."
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 267
H owever, accordin g t o L u i s R e y e s , t h i s p h r a s e d o e s n o t c o v e r
a private i n d i v i d ua l b e c a use t h e a dditional p e n a l t y o f s p e c i al
temporary di squalification for b r i b er y h a s n o p r a c t ical ap p l ication
to a private person.
A pri v a te s ecretary of j u d g e w a s p e r s u a ded by a l i t i g a nt t o
have his case calendared as early as possible for a consideration
of P500. The pr i v ate secretary is n ot l i a b le for d i r e ct b r i b e ry s in c e
h e is neither a p u b li c officer nor a p er son perfor m in g p u b li c du t i e s
contemplated in A r t i cle 210. (1990 Bar Exam)
2. Ag r e em e n t — A g r e ement to c o m m it a c r i m e , or u n j u s t
act or not t o p e r f or m a n o f f i cial d u t y i s a n i n d i s p ensable element
o f direct bribery. Br i b ery exi sts when th e gift i s offered volunt a r i l y
by a private person, or w hen th e g if t i s solicited by a p u b li c officer
and the priv at e p erson volu n t a r il y d e l i v ers it t o t h e p u b li c officer.
(Spanish ju r i sp r u d ence cited i n P e ople v. S o pe, L - 1 6, Ja n u a ry 3 1 ,
1946) As long as there is an agreement, the public officer and bribe-
giver are li a ble for d i r ect b r i b er y an d c o r r u p t io n o f p u b li c officer,
respectively, regardless of who i n i t i a t e d th e n e gotiation l eading to
such agreement.
The agreement betw een th e p u b li c officer an d th e b r i b e-giver
t o commit a c r i m e m a y b e e x p r ess or i m p l i ed , an d t h e s am e m a y
be proven by d i r ect or c i r c u m s t a n t ia l e v i d ence. To hold ot h er w i se,
would allow the culpri t t o escape liabilit y w i t h w i n k s an d nods even
when the evidence as a whole proves that t h ere has been a meeting
of the minds to exchange official du t ies for money. (Tad-Y v. People,
G.R. No. 148862, August 11, 2005)
3. O f fi c i a l D u t i e s — I n d i r e ct b r i b e r y, t h e a c t, w h i c h t h e
public officer agreed to commit or omi t i s connected with hi s official
duties. The t e r m "o f j i c i al d u t i e s" in c l u d e a n y a c t i o n a u t h o r i z e d
by law. It i s s u f fi ci ent i f t h e of f i c er h a s t h e o ff ic ial p o w e r, a bi l i t y
o r apparent a b i l i t y t o b r i n g a b o u t o r c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e d e s i r e d
end. The acts referred t o i n t h e l a w , w h i c h t h e o f f ender a grees to
p erform or e x ecute, m us t b e u l t i m a t el y r e l a te d t o o r l i n k e d w i t h
the performance of his official d u t i es. It i s s uf fi ci ent i f h i s a c t i ons,
affected by th e p a y m en t o f t h e b r i be , ar e p a rt s of an y e st abli shed
procedure consistent w i t h t h e a u t h o r it y of th e governm ent agency.
However, where the act is entir ely out side of the official functions of
the officer to whom th e m oney is offered, the offense is not br i b ery.,
(Tad-Y v. People, G.R. No. 148862, August 11, 2005)
4. Gif t — The borrowing of a v e hicle by a p u b lic officer
f rom th e c o m p l a i n an t c a n b e c o n s i d ered a s a " g i f t " w i t h i n t h e
 268 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
contemplation of the law on b r i b ery and i n d i r ect br i b ery. (Garcia U
Sandi ganbayan, G.R. No. 155574, November 20, 2006)
Commission of crime
Direct bri bery is c o m m i t t e d by a n y p u b l i c o f f icer w ho a g rees
t o perform a n a c t , w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s a c r i m e , i n c o n n ection w i t h
the perform ance of hi s of fi cia l d u t i e s an d i n c o n s i d eration of gift
or present offered or pr o m i sed to, or r eceived by him , p ersonally Or
through the mediation of anoth er. (Art i c le 210)
Article 21 0 i n d e fi n i n g d i r e c t b r i b er y i n v o l v in g c o m m i ssion
of a c r i m e u s e s t h e p h r a se "s h a ll a g r e e." He n c e, t he ac t u s r e us
(criminal act) in t h i s k i n d of d i r ect br i b ery i s th e act of agreeing to
commit a c r i m e . N e i t h e r c o m m i s sion of t h e c r i m e n o r a c ceptance
of gift i s n e c essary fo r t h e c o n s u m m a t io n o f t h i s di r e c t br i b e ry,
Mere agreement to c omm it a c r i m e i n c o n s ideration of gi f t o f f ered
or promised (or present received) is sufficient to complete this direct
bribery.
If a st enographer a g r eed to com mi t f a l si fi cation of d o cument
b y alter in g t h e s t e n ographic n o tes t a ke n b y h i m d u = i n g t h e t r i al
of a case for m on et ar y considerati on, he i s l i a bl e for di r e ct bribery
involving c o m m i ssion o f c r i m e . I f t h e st e n o g ra pher f a l s if ied t h e
notes, he is a lso l i a bl e for fa l s if ic ation of d o c u ment in a d d i t i o n t o
direct bribery.
The evidence custodian i n c o n siderat ion of P 50 0 000.00 pa'd
by drug t r a f f i cker d estroyed 20 gr am s of sh abu confiscated
e dur
u ri in g
a b u y - b u s t o p e r a t i on . T h e e v i d ence custodian i s l i a b l e f o r d i r ect
b ribery; obst r u ct ion o f j u s t i c e fo r d e s t r o y in g a n o b j ect t o i m p a i r
its availabil it y a s e v i d ence in "a crim i na l c a se; violation of Section
8(e) of R.A. No. 8019 for givin g u n w a r r a n t e d pr eference, advantage
o r benefit t o a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d ua l t h r o u g h m a n i f est p a r t i a l i t y a n d
evident bad faith. (2005 Bar Exam) The trafficker is liable for sale
of dangerous drugs, corrupt ion of public officer, and violation of R.A.
No. 8019 based on c onspiracy. H e i s n o t l i a b l e fo r o b s t r u c t ion of
justice since only a thir d person or a person other than the one being
i nvestigated or tr ied in a cr i m i n a l court can commit t h i s cr i m e .
P erfor m a n c e of U n j u s t A c t
Direct b r i b ery i s a l s o c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p u b l i c o f f i c er w h o
accepts gift i n c o n s i d er a t ion o f t h e e x e cu t ion o f a n ( u n j u st ) a ct,
which does not constit ut e a cr i m e , wh e t h er it h a s b een executed or
accomplished, or not. (Art i c le 210)
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 269
Article 210 in defining direct bribery involving the performance
of an unj us t ac t u s e s t h e p h r a se "g i ft wa s ac c epted." H e n c e, the
actus reus o f th is k i n d o f d i r e ct b r i b e ry is t h e a ct of a c cepting t h e
g ift in consideration of p e r f o r m in g a n u n j u s t a ct . P e r f or m in g t h e
u njust act i s n o t n e c essary fo r t h e c o n s u m m a t io n o f t h i s d i r e c t
assault. Agreement to commit t h e u n j u s t a ct a nd ac ceptance of gift
in consideration thereof arerequired to complete this direct assault.
H owever, acceptance of gift n eed not h a p pen before or at t h e t i m e
the public officer agreed to perform th e u n j ust a ct. It i s suffi cient i f
he received the gift a f t e r w a r d s i n p u r s u a nce of a p r ior a g r eement.
(Tad-Y v. People, G.R. No. 148862, August 11, 2005)
Unjust Ac t — In Ma r i f o sque v. People, G.R. No. 156685,
July 27, 2004,a police officer directly received the bribe money
f rom th e compl ai n a nt s i n c o n sideration for hi s r ecovery fr om
alleged robbers, gas tanks, which was an act not constitu t in g a
crime. He was convicted of d i r e ct bribery by accepting a gift t o
perform an act, which is not a crime. Note: The act of recovering
stolen properties from t h e r o b b ers i s not un ju s t, a nd y e t, t h e
police officer was convicted of direct bribery.
However, according to L u i s R eyes, citing th e case of People v.
Pamplona, C.A., 51 O.G. 4116, in di r e ct brib ery by accepting gift t o
perform a non-crimi nal ac t, the act not constitu t i n g a crime must be
unjust; otherwise the crime commi t ted is i n d i r ect br i b ery. In T a d - Y
v. People, G.R. No. 148862, August 11, 2005, the Pamplona principle
w as reaffirmed.
A ct, which does not constit ut e a crime, must be unjust to mak e
the publicofficer, who accepted the gift to execute it,liable for direct
bribery. (Catalan v. Silvosa, A.C. No. 7860, July 24, 2012; People v.
Barrozo, A.C. No. 10207, July 21, 2015)
Acts w h i c h a r e nei t h e r i l l e g al n o r u nj u s t , b u t wh i c h a r e
performed in the course of the public official's duties and in exchange
of the gift or f a vor g i ven t o t h e p u b l i c offici al, f a ll s u n der in d i r e ct
bribery. (Concurring opi n ion of J u s tice Bri on, Re: Allegations made
under oath at th e Se n a te B l ue R i b b on C o m m i t t ee hearing a g a i n s t
Justice Gregory Ong, A.M. No. SB-14-21- J, September 28, 2014)
An accused in a h o m i cide case gave money to the j u dge of the
c ourt wh ere th e c ase is p en d in g fo r t h e p r o m p t d i s p osition of t h e
case. The judge is liable for indi r e ct bribery for accepting gifts offered
to him by reason of his office. He is not liable for direct bribery since
prompt disposition of the case, in consideration of which he accepted
 270 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
money, is nei t her c r i m i n a l n o r u n j u s t . Th e a ccused, who gave the
money, is liable for corru p t ion of public officer. (2001 Bar Exam)
Informat ion alleged that the judge demanded and received from
the complain ant m o n ey, wit h t h e a greement t ha t h e w o ul d di smiss
t he case for r o b b ery w i t h r a p e a g a i ns t h i s s o n , w h i c h w a s t h e n
pending in hi s C o u rt . Th e cr im e ch ar ged does not constit ute di r ect
bribery involving commission of crime. To commit t h is crim e, the act
which th e p u b li c of fi cer h a s a g r eed t o p e r f or m m u s t b e c r i m i n al.
Dismissing a case based on agreement i s not per se constit u t ive of
the crime of rendering an unj ust ju d gm ent in the absence of showing
that the dismissal was not made on the mer i ts. (People v. Abesamis,
G.R. No. L-5284, September 11, 1958) The crime commit ted according
to the. case of U .S. v. Ga c u t a n, G. R. N o . L - 9 6 0 0, October 1, 1 91 4
should be di r ect b r i b ery i n v o l v in g th e pe rforma nce of act, wh i ch is
not a crime.
It is su b m i t t e d t h e Ga c u t an c a se is n ot a n y m o re contro ll in .
ing.
R endering a j u d g m en t o n t h e m e r i t s i s n e i t h e r a c r i m e n o r a n
unjust act. Hence, the accused by agreeing to commit an a ct, which
is neither cr i m i n a l nor u n j u st , is li able for in d i r ect br i b ery, and not
d irect bribery .
Non-Performance of an Official Duty
If the object for wh ich th e gift was received or promised was to
m ake the pu blic officer r efr ai n f r o m d o in g somethin g w h ich i t w a s
his official duty to do, he is also liable for direct bribery. (Article 210)
The phraseology in A r t i cl e 210 shows tha t t h i s f or m o f d i r ect
bribery consumm a tes when the public officer agreed to refrain fr om
performing his official duty because of the gift received or promised.
Neither refr ai n in g from perfor m in g his duty nor acceptance of gift is
n ecessary for the consumm a t ion of the cri m e .
In Ba l d e r a ma v. Pe o ple, G . R. N o s . 1 4 7 5 7 8-85 J a n u a r 28
2008
08, ddemanding an d r e ceiving f ro m a t a x i cab operator p r o t ection
m oney in consideration for LT O officers refr ai n in g from perfor m i n g
their official duty of conducting inspections on the taxicab units
being operated by the for mer t o d et er m in e any possible violation of
LTO rules and regulati ons. Accused was convicted of direct bribery.
If the public officer agreed to refrain from performi ng his official
duty and such omission constit ut e a crime such as dereliction of duty,
the public officer is l i a ble for di r e ct bribery inv olving commission of
a crime.
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271
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
C rime In v o l v i n g M o r a l T u r p i t u d e
The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift
and deliberately commit s an u n j ust act or r e f r a ins from performing
a n official d ut y i n e x c h a nge for s om e f a v ors, denotes a m a icious l
intent on th e p ar t o f th e offender to r e n ege on the du t ies which he
o wes his fellowmen an d s ociety i n g e n er al . A l so, th e fact t ha t t h e
offender takes advantage of his officeand position is a betrayal of
the trust reposed on him by the public. In all respects, direct bribery
is a crime i n v o l v in g m o r a l t u r p i t u d e. (M a g no v. CO M E L E C , G .R.
1Vo. 147904, October 4, 2002; 2011 Bar Exam )
QUALIFIED DIRECT BRIBERY
Qualified d i r e c t b r i b ery i s committe d b y a p u b l i c o f fi c er
entrusted w i t h l a w e n f o r c ement, w h o r e f r a i n s f r o m a r r e s t in g or
prosecuting an offender wh o ha s commi t t e d a cr im e p u n i shable by
reclusion perpetua an d /or d eath in c o n s ideration of g i ft o r p i e s ent
g iven, offered or p r o m i sed t o h i m , o r a s k e d or d e m a n ded by h i m .
(Article 211-A of the Revised Penal Code; 2010 Bar Exam)
Offender
The offender i n d i r e c t b r i b er y i s a pu b l i c o ff ic er or pe r s ons
performing public duties. On the other hand, the offender in qualified
direct bribery is a pu b lic officer, who is ent r u s ted to enforce the law
with duty to arrest or prosecute a criminal such as police officers,
NBI agents, or prosecutors.
A ju dge cannot b e l i a bl e f o r q u a l i f ied b r i b er y a s t h i s c r i m e
requires that the offender must be a public officer entru sted with law
enforcement, who refrains from ar r esting or prosecuting an offender
in consideration of an y p r o m i se, gift o r p r e s ent. (B u e naventura v.
Mabalot,A.M No. P-09-2726, August 28, 2018) Moreover, refraining
f rom convictin g t h e o f f e n der i s n o t e q u i v a l ent t o r e f r a i n in g f r o m
arresting or p r osecuting h im , w h ich i s an i n d i spensable element of
qualifieddirect bribery. (2010 Bar Exam)
A, a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l, a r r e s t ed a p e r s on ( c i t i z e n's a rr est)
while the latter was actually commi t t i n g m u r d er, with th e intention
of brin gin g h i m t o t h e p o l i c e a u t h o r i t i es. W h i l e o n t h e wa y , i n
consideration of t h e su m o f P 5 0 , 000.00, A al l o w ed h is p r i s oner to
escape. (1965 Bar E x a m ) A is n o t l i a b l e f or d i r e ct b r i b e ry because
according to L u i s R e yes a p r i v at e i n d i v i d ual c a n not be considered
as a person performing public dut ies, who under the law can commit
 272 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
direct bribery. Neither is A liable for qualified direct bribery since he
is not a public officer entru sted to enforce the law with d ut y to arrest
o r prosecute a crim i n a l .
C rime p u n i s h a bl e by r e c l u s ion p e r p e t u a o r d e a t h p e n a l t
A, a p o l i c e o f f i cer, arrested B after the latter committed
murder, wh ich is p u n i s h able by re clusion perpetua t o d eath. Wh i l e
on the way, in consideration of the sum of P50,000.00, A allowed B to
escape. The crime commit ted is qualified direct bribery. The crim
f
deereliction of duty is absorbed in the crime of qualified bribery since
the former is an indispensable means to commit la t t er . B is liable for
corruption of officer.
A , a p o l i c e o f fi c er , a rrested B a f t e r t h e l a t t e r c o m m i t t e d
homicide. While on the way, in consideration of the sum of P50,000.00,
A allowed B to escape. A is not l i a ble for qu alified br i b ery since the
penalty fo r h o m i c id e i s o n l y re c l u s ion t e m poral. S i n ce r e f r a i n i n g
from arr esting an o f f ender is a c r i m e, A i s l i a bl e for d i r ect b r i b ery
and dereliction of du ty . Th e doctrine of absorption is not applicable
since Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penalty for
direct bribery is in a d d i t ion to th e penalty for th e crim e commi t t ed.
B is liable for corru p t ion of officer.
Consumm a t i o n of d i r e c t b r i b e r y a n d q u a l i f i ed d i r e c t b r i b e r y
In di r ect b r i b er y i n v o l v in g t h e co m m i s sion of c r i m e or n o n -
performance of duty, mere agreement to commit a crime or to refrain
rom performing his duty in consideration of gift offered or promised
or p r e sent r e c e ived is s u f f i c ie nt t o c o m p l e te t h e c r i m e . N e i t h e r
c ommission of c r i m e , or r e f r a i n i n g f r o m p e r f o r m i n g h i s d u t y ; n o r
acceptance of gift is necessary for the consumm a t ion of the c rim e .
In d i r ec t b r i b e r y i n v o l v i n g p e r f o r m a n ce o f a n
u njust a c t ,
acceptance o f gift i n c o n n e ction w i t h t h e a g r e e ment to c o m m it a n
unjust act is required to complete the cr i me. Perform in g th e u n j u st
a ct is not necessary for the consumm a t ion of the crim e .
In qualified direct br i b ery, A r t i cl e 210-A uses the phrase "who
refrains from arresting or prosecuting." Thus, the essence of qualified
direct bribery i s t h e r e f r a i n m en t f r o m a r r e s t in g or p r o secuting an
offender.. AActual r e f r a i n m en t i s n e cessary to consumm at e qu alifi ed
direct bribery. Agreement or a cceptance o f g i f t w i t h o u t a c t u a l
refraining from a r r e st in g or p r osecuting the offender is not enough
t o consummate this cri m e .
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 273
A, a po'=ice officer, who saw B c o m m i t t e d m u r d er , a greed not
to arrest him, and received P100,000.00 as a consideration thereof.
However, because of the in t e r v en t ion of m e dia, A wa s compelled to
arrest B. A is not liable for qualified bribery since he did not actually
r efrain f r o m a r r e s t in g B . H o w e v er , A i s l i a b l e f o r d i r ec t b r i b e r y
s ince mere agreement t o c o m mi t t h e c r i m e o f d e r e l i ction of d u t y
consummates this cri me. B is li able for corru p t ion of public officer.
Gi ftor present
In di r ect b r i b er y i n v o l v i n g t h e c o m m i s sion of c r i m e o r n o n -
performance of d u t y, t h e c o n s i d e ra ti on o f t h e a g r e e m e nt i s g i f t
offered, promised or received.
In dir ect b r i b er y i n v o l v ing pe r fo rm a n ce of an u n ju s t a c t, t h e
consideration of the agreement is gift ac cepted.
I n qu ali fied b r i b e ry , t h e c on sideration o f t h e r e f r a i n m en t t o
arrest orprosecute is the giftoffered or promised to him, or asked or
demanded b y him .
A, a p o l ice officer, saw B c o m m i t t e d h o m i c i de. A d e m a n d ed
f rom B the amount of P100,000.00; otherwi se, he would ar r est h i m .
B involuntarily gave A the money. A is not liable for qualified bribery
because B did not commit a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death penalty. The crime commit ted by A is robbery. Threat of arrest
is withi n t h e c o n t em p l a t ion of t h e w o r d "i n t i m i d a t i o n ," i n A r t i c l e
294, which is an el ement of r obbery (see: Sazon v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 150878, February 1 0, 20 0 9; People v. F r a n c isco, G.R. ¹ .
L-21890, March 26, 1924)
A, a police officer, saw B commi t ted m u r d er. A demanded from
B the am oun t o f P 1 0 0 ,000.00; other w i se, he w o ul d a r r est h i m . B
i nvoluntar il y g a v e A t h e m o n ey . A i s l i a b l e f o r q u a l i f ied b r i b er y
b ecause he r e fr a i ned f r o m a r r e s t in g B w h o c o m m i t t e d m u r d e r i n
consideration of gift or pr esent de manded b y him .
INDIRECT BRIBERY
Indirect bri bery is c o m m i t t e d by a n y p u b l i c o fficer w ho s hall
accept gifts offered to hi m b y r e a son of hi s office. (Art ic le 211; 1946
and 1956 B ar Exa m s )
I ntent to R e c e i v e
The e s sentia l i n g r e d i en t o f i n d i r e c t b r i b e r y i s t h a t th e
p ublic officer c oncerned m u s t h a v e a c cepted th e g if t o r m a t e r i a l
 274 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
c onsideration. T h er e m u s t b e a c l ea r i n t e n t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f t h e
p ublic officer t o t a k e t h e g i f t s o o f f e re d a n d c o n s i der t h e s a m e
a s his own p r o p ert y f r o m t h e n o n , s uc h a s p u t t i n g a w a y t h e g i f t
for s a f ekeeping o r p o c k e t i n g t h e s a m e . M e r e p h y s i ca l r e c eipt
unaccompanied by any other sign, circum st ance or act to show such
a cceptance is not s uf fi ci ent t o l e a d t h e c o ur t t o c o n clude t ha t t h e
crime of indirect bribery has been commit t ed. To hold otherwise will
encourage unscrupul ous i n d i v i d u al s t o f r a m e u p p u b l i c officers by
simply p u t t i n g w i t h i n t h e i r p h y s i cal c u stody some gi ft , m o ney or
other p r operty. (F o r m i l l e za v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . R. ¹ . L - 751 6 0,
March 18, 1988) This p r i n c i p le a pp li es not o nly to i n d .irect bri bery
but also direct bribery.(Tad-Y v. People, G.R. ¹. 14 8 8 6 2,Au g u s t
11, 2005)
B y Reason of Hi s O f f i c e
Don Gabito, a philan t h r o p i st, offered to fund several projects of
the Mayor. He opened an account inthe Mayor's name and regularly
d eposited various amounts r an g ing from P500,000.00 to Pl M i l l i o n .
F rom t hi s a ccount, t h e M a y o r w i t h d r e w a n d u s e d t h e m o n e y f or
constructing f eeder r o a ds, ba r a n gay cl i n i c s, re pairi ng s c hools and
for al l o t h e r m u n i c i pa l p r o j e cts. I t w a s s u b s equentl y d i s covered
t hat Don G a b it o w a s a c t u a ll y a j u e t en g operator an d t h e a m o u nt
he deposited were proceeds from hi s j u e t eng operations. (2005 Bar
Exam) The mayor is li a b le for in d i r e ct bri b e ry. Don Gabito is lia ble
for corruption of public officer.
D irect B r i b e r y a n d I n d i r e c t B r i b e r y
T here ar e t w o s t a n d a r d s t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e c r i m e
committed i s b r i b e r y o r i n d i r e c t b r i b e r y , to w i t : ex i s t e n c e or
inexistence of an a g r eement, an d t h e u n j u s t n ess or j u s t n ess of an
a ct agreed to be commit t e d .
1. A gr e e m e n t —If the re is an agreement t o commit a cri m e
or not to perform a n of fi cial d u t y ; or ac ceptance o f gift p u r s u a nt t o
an agreement t o p e rf o rm a n u n j u s t a c t, t h e p u b l ic o fficer is l i a b l e
for direct bri b ery. If t h er e is no agreement to do or not to do an act,
the public officer, who accepted gifts offered to him by r e ason of his
o ffice, is liable for in d i r ect br i b er y .
W here t h er e i s n o s h o w i n g t h a t p u b l i c of fi cers r e ceived t h e
money from a contractor by vi r t u e of an agreement to commit an act
in connection wit h cont r act w it h t h e l ocal government per t a i n in g to
the development of an economic and tourism hub and construction of
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 275
the Blank Sports Ar ena, the former is only liable for indi r ect bribery
while the lat .er for corru p t ion of public officer. (2017 Bar Exam)
The plai n t if f g av e m o ney t o t h e j u d g e w h o , i n c o n sideration
thereof, subsequently r e n d ered a n u n j u s t d e ci sion in f a v or of t h e
plaintiff. T h j u d g e i s l i a b l e f or d i r e ct b r i b e ry w h i l e t h e p l a i n t i f f
i s liable for c o r r u p t io n o f p u b l i c o f f i cer. M o r eover, th e j u d g e a n d
t he plaint if f ar e l i a bl e for t h e c r i m e of r e n d er in g u n j ust j u d g m en t
as principal b y d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t ion an d p r i n c i pa l b y i n d u c ement ,
respectively. (1975 Bar Exam)
T he p l a i n t i f f g a v e m o n e y t o t he j u d g e who s u b sequently
rendered a cecision against the p la i n t iff. The judge is not liable for
d irect bribery s i nce r en derin g a j u s t d e cision against th e p l a i n t i f f
indicates that the former did not receive the money in consideration
o f rendering a d e c i sion i n f a v o r c f t l : e l a t t e r . I t s e e m s t h a t t h e
plaintiff merely gave the money to the judge by reason of his position.
H owever, the judge is liable for ind r ect br i b ery. On the other han d ,
the plaintiff is liable for corrup t ion of public officer. (1998 Bar Exam)
2. U nj u s t n e s s o r j u s t n e s s o f t h e a c t — I f t h e r e i s a n
acceptance cf gift pursuant to an agreement to perform an unju st act,
the public officer is liable for dir e ct bribery. If the re is an acceptance
of gift pu r s u an t t o a n a g r e ement t o p e r f or m a ju s t a c t, t h e p u b l i c
officer is liable for in d i r e ct bribery.
The sh r if f received from the plaint iff and her lawyer necessary
amounts constitu t i n g th e s h e ri f fs f e es and e xpenses for execution
in addition t o P 2 , 0 00.00 i n c o n si deration o f p r o m p t e n f o r cement
of the wr it . T h e s h e r if f i s l i a b l e for in d i r e ct b r i b ery fo r a c cepting
gifts offered to him by reason of his office. He is not liable for direct
b ribery since the prompt enforcement of the wri t i s neither cri m i n a l
nor unjust The plaintiffand lawyer, who gave the money, are liable
for corruption of public officer. (2001 Bar Exam)
CORR U P T ION OF PUBLIC OFFICER
Corruption of p u b li c offi cial i s c o m m i t t e d by a ny p e r s on w h o
s hall offer or p r o m ise or sh all g iv e th e gi ft s or p r esents to a pu bli c
officer, w h o c o m m i t s d i r e c t b r i b e r y , q u a l i f ie d d i r e c t b r i b e ry o r
indirect briber y . ( Ar ti c l e212)
Corruption of public officer presupposes to the commission of the
direct bribery, qualified direct bribery or indirect bribery. However,
t he inform a t ion n eed no t a l l ege t h a t t h e p u b l i c officer commi t t e d
 276 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
bribery. It i s suffi cient t ha t t h e i n f o r m a t ion for corr u p t ion of public
officer avers t ha t t h e p u b li c officer, to w ho m t h e g if t w a s g i v en, is
placed under ci r c u m st ances that w o ul d m a k e hi m l i a b l e for d i r ect
or indirect br i b ery. (Dis ini v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G.R. ¹s . 16 9 8 2 3-24,
September 11, 2018)
n
n Dr'sini v. Sandiganbayan, supra, the infornia-
.ion stated that;
(1) Disini gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2)
in consideration of gif ts, President M a r cos caused the aw ard of the
contracts on Nuclear Power Plant to Bu rn s 0 Roe and Westinghouse
by takin g a d v a n t age of hi s positi on. Th ese allega-.ions support t h e
charge of corr u p t io n o f p u b l i c of fi cer s i nce P r e sident M a r cos was
p laced under ci r cu m st ances that w o ul d m a k e hi' m
m il ai a b le fo r d'i r e ct t
ri ery.
Ordinari ly , i f a n e l e m en t o f a c r i m e i s t h a t t h e o f f e nc.er is
a public officer, bu t h e c o m m i t t e d i t i n c o n s p i r acy w i t h a p r i v a t e
individual, both conspir at ors ar e equally l i a ble for r ha t c r i m e, e.g„
malversation. (U . S. v. Po n t e, G . R. N o . L - 5 9 5 2, O c tober 24, 1 9 11)
owever, in direct brib ery, only the public officer may be held liable
for it, w h i l e t h e p e r son wh o p r o m i sed, offered, oi g ave th e g i ft s or
presents, is li able for corr u p t ion of p u b li c officer, regardless o:" any
allegation of conspiracy. Indeed, it is axiomatic that all conspirators
a re crim i n a ll y l i a b l e a s c o -pr i n cipals. H o w ever, t h e y m a y n o t b e
necessarily ch ar ged w it h v i o l a t ion of t h e s am e offense. The public
officer maybe charged under one provision while the private person is
indicted under a different pr ovi sion, although the offenses originate
from the same set ofacts. (Go v. The Fifth Di v i s ior., Sandiganbcyan,
G.R. No. 1726'02, September 8, 2007)
Gift offer edby Private Individual
A cri m i n al of f e red mo n ey t o a p o l i c e o ff icer t o r e f r a i n : " r o m
arresting him for i l l e gal gambl i ng. Th ere are two possible scenarios
in the case, to wit:
1. Th e p o l i c e o f fi cer ac c e pted t h e o f f e r. I n . t h i s c a s e, t h e
public officer is l i a bl e for d i r ect b r i b er y ( an d d erel ction of d u ty , if
e commit ted t h i s a g r eed c r i m e), w h i l e t h e c r i m i n a l i s l i a b l e f or
corruption of public officer. (Spanishju r i s p r u d e nce cited in People v.
Sope, L-16, January 81, 1946)
2. T h e p o l i c e o f fi cer re je c ted th e of f e r. I n t h i s
case, the
criminal i s l i a bl e for a t t e m p t e d cor r u p t ion of p u b l i c officer
(Pozor
v. CA, G.R. No. L-6'2489, October 28, 1984; 2018 Bar Exam) while
p olice officer is not cri m i n a ll y l i a b l e .
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 277
Gift s olicited by P u b l i c O ff ic e r
The police officer requested solici,ted or demanded money from
a criminal to refr ain f rom a r r e st ing hi m for i l l e gal gambl i ng. There
are two possible scenarios in the case, to wit:
1. T h e c r i m i n a l v o l u n t a r i l y gr a n t e d th e re q uest, a nd g a v e
the money to thepolice officer. In t hi s case, the police officer is liable
f or direct b r i b er y ( a n d d e r e l i ction o f d u t y , i f h e c o m m ' t t e d t h i s
agreed crime), while crim i nal is liable for corrupt ion of public officer.
(Spanish juri sp r u d ence cited in People v. Sope, supra)
2. T h e c r i m i n a l re jected the request. In t h i s c ase, the police
o fficer is not li able for att e m p ted dir ect brib ery since this "r im e h a s
no attempted st age. According t o J u s t ice Fl or enz Regalado, direct,
bribery is aformal crime. The essence of direct bribery of the first
f orm is agreement by th e p u b li c officer to commi t a c r i m e . Th us, i t
has no attempted stage because there is no such thing as an "attempt
to agree." However, the police officer is liable for violation of Section
7 of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Eth i cal Standards for Public
O fficials), which p u n i s hes solicitin g m o ney f ro m an y p e r son in t h e
course of their official du t i e s.
D emand w it h T h r e a t
The police officer de m a n ds m o n ey f r o m a c o m p l a i n a n t, a n d
threatens t o a rr e st h im f o r i l l e g al g a m b l i ng i f h e w i l l n o t c o m p l y .
There are two possible scenarios in the case, to wit:
1. T h e co mp l a i n a n t co m p l i e s w ith t he d em a n d an d
involuntarily gives money to the police officer. In this case, the police
officer is liable for robbery.
2. T h e c o m p l a i n an t r e f u ses to give money. In t h i s case, the
police officer is liable for att e m p ted robbery.
T hreat t o a r r e s t i s co n s i d e re d a s i n t i m i d a t i o n , w hich i s
a n element of r o b b ery . T h e c r i m e o f r o b b er y i s c o m m i-.ted if t h e
money was in v o l u n t a r i ly g i v e n b y t h e p r i v a t e i n d i v i di ial t o t h e
police officer out. of fear of being ar r ested or pr osecuted. (see: Sazon
v. S andiganbayan, G . R. ¹ . 150 8 7 8 , Fe b ru a ry 10 , 2 0 0 9; People v.
Francisco, G.R. ¹ . L - 2 1 8 90, Ma rch26, 1924)
The police officer demands mo ney from a person, who has just
committed mu r d e r, and th r e atens t o arrest him f or s uch "ri me if he
will not comply. There are three possible scenarios in this case, to
Wit:
 278 CRIiYIINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
j .. T h e m u r d e r e r i n v o l u n t a r i l y g i v e s m o n e y t o t h e p o l i ce
officer; and th en, th e l a t ter r e f r a ins fr om ar r e s ti ng t he form e r. The
crime comm i t t e d i s q u a l i fi e d d i r ec t b r i b e ry . R e f r a i n in g t o a r r e st
an offender i n m u r d e r p u n i s h a bl e by re c l usion perpetua to d e a th
in consideration of g if t a s k e d or d e m a n ded by t h e l a w e n f o rcer is
q ualified direct bribery .
2. T he m u r d e rer i n v o l u n t a r i l y g i v e s m o ne y t o t h
offic er , but the latter still ar r e sts the former. The crime commit o e p oI'i c e
o ted is
robbery. Qualified dir ect br i b ery is not comm i t t ed since the essence
of this crime is actual refr a i n m ent f rom a r r e st ing an offender.
3. D es p i t e d em a nd, the mu r d erer refuses gave money to the
police officer.As a consequence, the latter arrests the former. The
c rime commi t te d i s a t t e m p ted r obbery. I t i s t h e s u b m i ssion of t h i s
writer t ha t q u a l i f ied di r ect br i b ery same as direct br i b ery ar e both
formal crim es. It has no att em p ted or fr u s t r a ted stage.
E ntr a p m e n t O p e r a t i o n
B IR o f fi c e r d emanded fr o m taxpayer P 2 0 , 0 0 0 .00
consideration for t h e r e l ease of th e certi fi cation of her p a y m en t in of
the capital gains tax for th e l and pu r c h ased by the lat t er. Taxpayer
reluctantly a g r eed. H ow ever, in e n t r a p m en t o p er at io n B I R o f f i cer
7
w as arrested w h i l e h e w a s i n t h e a c t o f r e c eivin g t h e a m o un t of
P20,000.00 from the taxpayer. BI R officer is liable for direct bribery.
(Merencillo v. People, G.P. Nos. 142869-70, April 18, 2007) Taxpayer
is not l i a bl e for c o r r u p t io n o f p u b l i c of ficer because of lack of evil
i ntent. He is a victim r a t h er t h a n a cr i m i n a l .
Hypothetically, if BI R o fficer in Me rencillo demanded from
taxpayer P 2 0 ,000; oth er w i se, h e w i l l n o t r e l e ase th e c e r t i f i cation
o p a y m en t o f c a p i t a l g a i n s t a x o n t e c h n i cal g r o u nd , t h e c r i m e
committed isrobbery.
PERSUASION, INDUCEMENT OR I NFLUENCE TO CO M MIT
OFFENSE OR VIOLATE RULES UNDER R.A. NO. 3019
Violation of S ection 3 (a) of R .A . N o . 3 019 i s c o m m i t t e d b y a
public officer who shall persuade, induce or influ ence another public
o c e r t o p e r f or m a n a c t c o n s t i t u t i n g a n o f f e nse or a v i o l a t ion of
r u es an d r e g u l a t i on s i n c o n n e ction w i t h h i s o f fi c ia l d u t i e s . T h e
public officer, who shall a l low h i m s elf to be pe rsuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit such vi olat ion or offense is also liable.
J9JC9B0M
VII CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 279
D eliber at e I n t e n t
S ection 8ca) of R.A. No . 8 019 r e qu i res a d e l ib er ate i n t en t o n
the part of t h e p u b li c of ficial concerned to v i o l ate t h ose r u les and
r egulations, o r t o c o m m i t a n o f f e n s e i n c o n n e ction w i t h o f fi c i a l
duties. (Reyes v. Atienza, G.B. No. 152248, September 28, 2005)
B y Means of Con si d e r a t i o n
The deliberation in th e Senate regarding the bill on an t i - gr aft
shows that t h e m o d e of c o m m i t t i n g t h e c r i m e u n d e r S ection 3 ( a)
o f R.A. No . 3 01 9 i s p e r s u a d i ng , i n d u c in g o r i n fl u e n c in g a p u b l i c
o fficer by an o t her p u b li c of ficer t o com mi t a n o f f ense or t o v i o l a t e
rules and regul at i ons by m e an s of co nsideration, reward, payment
o r remun er a t i on . (Baviera v. Zo l eta, G.It. N o. 1 69098, October 12,
2006)
By means of consideration, reward, payment or remuneration is
not written in Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 8019 as a mode of violating
this provision. H ow ever, because of the Ba v i e ra v. Z o l eta case, by
means of cons deration, reward, p a y m ent or r e m u n eration s h a ll b e
deemed written in Section 3 (a).
A police officer arrested Pedro for the crime of homicide.
A mayor called the police officer, informed him that Pedro is his
nephew, and. said to him " a r b or ko na l a ng i t o, pare; pakawa l an m o
na." The police officer r e l e ased Pedro. Vio la t i on of S e ction 8 (a) of
R.A. No. 8019 is not committed since the mayor did not influence the
police officer to commit a crime in connection with his duty by means
of consideraticn, rew ard, payment or r e m u n e r a t i on. The mayor and
the police officer are liable as accessories in the crime of homicide
since there is -b use of public function .
A publi c of ficer, wh o i s p e r s u a d in g a n L T O o f fi c er , t o i s s u e
temporary p e r mi t f o r a pa s t s p e c ial t r i p i n f a v o r o f h i s r e l a t i v e ,
who is operating a passenger jeepney, in violation of LTO r ules
a nd regulat ons is not l i a ble for th e cr im e u n der Section 3(a) if t h e
persuasion is riot made by means of consideration, reward, payment
or remunerati on. (1985 Bar Exa m )
Direct Brib ery, Corr u p t i o n of Public Officer, and Section 8(a)
The distinctions between vi ol at ion of Section 3(a) of R.A. No.
3 019, and d i r ect b r i b er y a n d c o r r u p t i o n o f p u b l i c o f f icer ar e a s
follows:
 280 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
1. I n d i r e c t b r i b e ry , t h e p u b l i c of ficer a g r eed t o c o m mi t a
crime, or unjust act or not to perform an official du ty . In v i ol at ion of
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019, the public officer is induced, persuaded
or influenced to commit an offense or to violate rules and regulation.
In both crim es, there must be material consideration, and the crime,
unjust act, n on-perform ance of d u ty , an d v i o l a t ion of r u l e s agreed
upon are function-related.
2. I n di r e c t b r i b e ry , th e person corru p t in g th e pu b li c officer
is any person wh ile in v i ol a t ion of Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 30:9, the
person inducing, persuading or in fl u e n cing a pu b lic officer is also a
public officer.
3. T h e p u b l i c o f f i cer, w h o w a s b r i b ed , i s l i a b l e f o r d i r e ct
bribery wh ile the person, who corrupted him, is liable for corruption
of public officer. On th e other h a nd, both th e i n d u cing public officer
and the in d u ced public officer ar e l i a ble u n der Section 3(a) of R.A.
No. 3019.
4. Th e p e r son offering gift to a public officer to corrupt him is
liable for at t e m p ted corru p t ion of pu b lic officer if th e l a t ter r e fused
to be b r i b ed. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a p u b l i c of fi cer i s l i a b l e u n d er
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 for inducing, persuading or infl u encing
another public officer even though the latter refused to allow himself
to be induced, persuaded or influ enced. This crime has no attempted
stage.
I nducing o r c a u s ing p u b l i c o fficer t o c o m mi t c r i m e of
c orrup t i o n
Under Section 4(b) of R.A No. 3019, it shall be unlawful for any
person know i n gly t o i n d u c e or c a use any p u b li c official to co mmit
any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In Section 3(a), the inducer must be a public officer; while in
S ection 4(b), th e i n d u cer i s a n y p e r s on, w h ic h i n c l u des a p r i v a t e
i ndividual .
In Section 3 ( a), t h e i n d u c em ent , p e r s uasion o r : n fl u e n c e is
made by means of consideration, reward, payment or r em u n er a tion.
That is not requi red in Section 4(b).
In Section 3(a), a public officer is induced to commit any offense
o r to vi ol ate r u l e s an d r e g u l a t io n i n c o n n ection w i t h h i s d u t y . I n
Section 4(b), pu b li c of ficer i s i n d u ced t o c o m mi t a n o f f e nse under
Section 3.
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 281
A building contractor offered a bribe to a DPWH en g i neer. The
latter refused the offer, not b ecause of moral scru ples but b ecause
he thought he was being ent r a p p ed. (1988 Bar E x a m) T he bui l d i n g
contractor is liable for att em p ted corrup t i on of public officer. (People
v. Ng Pek, G.R. No. L-1895, October 2, 1948, En B a n c; Pozar v. CA,
G.B. No. L- 62489, October 28, 1984) H o w e ver, he is n o t l i a b le f o r
v iolation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 3019 since there is no showin g
t hat he is i n d u c in g th e D P W H e n g i n eer t o c o m mi t a c r i m e u n d e r
Section 3 thereof. On th e ot her h a n d , th e en gineer is not l i a ble for
direct bribery since he did not a gree to do something in connection
with his functi on. Neit her is he li ab l e :"or violation of R.A. No. 3019
s ince he did not commit an y act pu n i shed under th e said law .
A private secretary of a judge, who volunteered to persuade his
boss to rule in f avor of a l i t i g an t w i t h ou t a s k in g any consideration,
is not liable for corru p t ion of public officer or any other felony since
v olunteering t o d o s ometh in g i s no t y et. a cr i m i n a l a ct . N e i t her i s
she liable for Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8019 because she has not yet
persuaded the ju dge to commi t a n o f f ense under Section 3 t h er eof.
(1990 Bar Exam) Nor is s he liable und er Section 3(a), since there is
n o actual persuasion to com mi t a n o f f ense and she is not a p u b l i c
officer.
REQUESTING OR R E CEIVING GIFT I N C O N NECTION WITH
LICENSE OR PERMIT UNDER R.A. NO. 3019
Section 3(c) of R.A. No . 8019 is comm i t t e d b y a p u b l i c officei
who shall directly or ind i r ectly request or receive any gift, present oi
other pecuniary or m a t e r ial benefit, for h i m self or for an oth er, from
any person for whom th e p u b li c office", in an y m a n ner or capacity,
has secured or obtai n ed, or w i l l s e cure or obt a in , any G ov er n m ent
permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given.
U nder th e l ast p a r a g r aph of S ection 3, th e p er son giv in g t h e
g ift, present, s h a r e , p e r centage o r b e n e fi t i n S e c t i o n 3 ( c ) s h a l l ,
together with th e offending public officer, be punished.
In Tecson v. Sand ig a n bayan, G. R. No. 1 23045, November 1 6,
1999, a municipal mayor who signed and issued a Mayor's Permit
t o the com pl a i n a nt , a n d r e q u e sted a n d r e c e ived t h e a m o u n t o f
P4,000.00 to be used by him i n a fi e sta is li able under Section 8(c).
In Lucman v. People, G.R. No. 288815, March 18, 2019, DENR
officerdemanded P2,500,000.00 and actually received P1,500,000.00
f rom priv at e c o m p l a i n a nt s i n c o n s i d erat on o f t h e g r a n t o f t h e i r
applications for free patents is liable under Section 3 (c).
 282 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOI.UME II
R EQUESTING O R R EC E I V IN G G I F T IN CO NN E C T IO N W I T H
GO V E R N M E N T C O N T R A C T O R T R A N S A C T IO N U N D E R R .A. NO.
3019
Section 3(b) of R.A. No . 3019 is comm i t te d by a p u b l i c officer
who shall di r ectly or i n d i r e ctly r e quest or r eceive any gi ft , pr esent,
share, percentage, or benefitfor himself or for any other person in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government
and any other party, wh erein the public officer in his official capacity
h as to intervene under the l a w .
U nder th e l ast p a r a g r aph of Section 8, th e p e r son giv in g t h e
gift, present, share, percentage or benefit r eferred to in Section 8(b)
shall, together wit h t h e offending public officer, be punished.
R equest or R e c e i v e
R equesting g i f t c o n s u m m a t e s t h e c r i m e ; h e n ce , f a i l u r e t o
receive gi ft s i s n o t a d e f e n se. (P r e claro v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . A,
¹. 1 1 1 0 91,Au g u st 2 1 , 1 9 9 5) On t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e c e iving g i f t s
consummates the cr i me; hence, lack of dem and or r e q uest is not a
defense. After all , Section 8(b) or (c) of R.A. No. 8019 uses the word
"or" between requesting and receiving. (Peligrino v. People, G.B. No.
136266, August 13, 2001)
C ontract or T r a n s a c t i o n
Section 3(b) is limited only to contracts or transactions involving
monetary consideration wh e re the public officer has the autho ri ty to
intervene under th e l aw . (S oria n o, Jr. v. Sa n d i g a nbayan, G.R. No.
66962, July 81, 1984)
l. I nvestigat
n io n — A p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a tion i s n o t a
contract or t r a n s action w i t h i n t h e c o n t em p l a t ion of Section 3
R.A. No. 3019. Thus, apublic prosecutor who demanded mone f (b) of
t he respondent in consideration of a favorable resolution dismissing
the case for p r e l i m i n ar y i n v e s t i g at ion i s no t l i a bl e for v i o l a t ion of
Section3(b)of R.A. No. 8019. (Soriano, Jr. v.Sa ndiganbayan, supra)
In People v. Sandiga nbayan a nd J u s t i ce Secretary Perez, G.R.
o. 188165, December 11, 2018, information forviolat
f S t
3(b), R .A . N o
o.. 8019 a l l e ged t h a t J u s t i c e S e cr etar y N a n i P e r e z
demanded and received the amount of $2,000,000.00 from Mark
J imenez in c o n sideration o f h i s d e s i st in g f r o m p r e s sur in g h i m t o
e xecute affidav it s i m p l i c a t in g t a r ge t p e r sonali t ies i n v o lved i n t h e
plunder case against former President Estrada.Sandiganbayan
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 288
quashed the inform a t ion considering that pr e l i m i n ar y i n v estigation
cannot be considered as "contract" or "t r a n s action" contemplated in
Section 8(b) because there is no "monetary consideration" as in credit
t ransaction is i n v olv ed. The Su p r eme Cour t af fi r m e d t h e r u l i n g of
the Sandi ganbayan.
In Me jia v. Pa m a r a n , G . R. N o . L - 5 6 7 4 1, Ap r il 1 5 , 1 9 8 8, t h e
S upreme Cour t a f fi r m e d t h e c o n v i c t ion o f t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t f o r
r equesting m oney i n c on sideration of a p r o m i se t ha t t h e y w i l l g e t
a favorable resolution of t h ei r c a ses in court . I n s u m , t h e j "u d i c i a l
proceeding" w h e r e t h e a c c u s ed h a s t h e d u t y t o i n t e r v e ne a s a
b ranch clerk o f c o ur t w a s c onsidered as w i t h i n t h e c o n t ext of t h e
phrase "contract or t r a n s a c tion" i n S e c t i on 8(b) of R.A. No. 8019.
However, in Soria no case and Perez case, prelimin a ry i n v e stigation,
anadministr a t iv e p r o ceeding, i s no t c o n sidered as a "t r a n s a ction"'
contemplated b y S e ction 8 (b) of R .A . N o . 3 0 19 . H e n ce, a j u d i c i al
proceeding should not be considered as a contract or transaction
contemplated by the law. Me jia case is deemed abandoned.
A c onsult an t o f B an g k o S e n t r a l n g Pi l i p i n a s ( B S P ) w h o
received valuable gift from a bank u n der i n v estigation of BSP is not
liable for vi ol a t ion of Section 3(b) of R .A . No . 8019 since the bank
investigation same as a pr el i m i n ar y i n v e st i gation is not a cont r a ct
or transaction wi t hi n th e contempl at ion of this provision. Moreover,
t here is no showing t h a t t h e consult an t h a s th e r i gh t t o i n t e r v e n e
under the law in th e said investigation. (2008 Bar Ex a m )
2. BI R E x a m i n a t i o n —A B I R e x a m i n e r w h o r e c e ives or
requests money from a taxpayer in consideration of assessing a
l esser tax l i a b i l it y i s l i a b l e fo r d i r ect b r i b e ry . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
t he taxpayer is l i a ble for cor r u p t ion of p u b li c officer. H ow ever, th e
BIR examiner is also liable under Section 8(b) of R.A. No. 8019 since
assessing tax l i a b i l ity is a t r a n s a ction w i t h i n t h e c o n te mp la t i on o f
this provision. (P e ligr i no v. Pe o ple, G . B. N o . 18 6 2 66; Au g u st 1 8 ,
2001; Merencillo v. People, G.B. Nos. 142869-70, April 18, 2007) The
t axpayer is a lso l i a ble u n der S ection 8 (b) of R .A . No . 8 019 on t h e
basis of conspiracy. Under the last paragraph of Section 3, the person
giving the gift, pr esent, share, percentage or benefit i n Section 3(b)
shall, together wit h t h e offending public officer, be punished.
8. C on s t r u c t i o n Co n t r a c t — A gov er n o r , m ayor a n d
sanggunian m e m b e r w h o r e c e i v es m o n e y f r o m a co n t r a c t or i n
connection w i t h g o v e r n m en t c o n t r a c t o r t r a n s a c t io n f o r th e
development of an economic and tou r ism h ub , w h ere they have th e
right to i n t e r v ene u n der th e l aw , ar e l i a ble for v i o l at ion of Section
8(b) of R.A. No. 8019. (2017 Bar Exam)
 284 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
The contractor for gi v in g m oney to th e said public officers and
the wife of the governor who receives the kickbacks for her hu sband
a re also liable for v i o l a t ion of Section 3(b) of R.A. No . 3019 on t h e
basis of conspiracy. Under the last paragraph of Section 3, the person
giving the gift, pr esent, share, percentage or benefit i n Section 3(b)
shall, together w it h t h e o f f ending pu b lic officer, be puni shed. (2017
Bar Exam)
Right t o I n t e r v e n e u n d e r t h e L a w — I n t h e c r i m e
u nder Section 3(b) of R .A . N o . 3 0 19, it i s i m p o r t an t t h a t t h e
public officer has the r i gh t t o i n t e r v ene, in an official capacity
under th e l a w , i n c o n n e ction w i t h a c o n t r a c t o r t r a n s a ction
in connection w i t h w h i c h h e r e q u e st s o r r e c e i ves m o n ey.
(Merencillo v. People, G.R. ¹s . 1 4 2 8 6'9-70, April 18, 2007) such
as a DOST consult a n t's dut y t o e v a l u at e th e accomplishment
o f th e c o n s t r u c t io n o f b u i l d i n g , a nd b i l l i n g s a n d t o m a k e
recommendation. (Preclaro v. Sandi ganbayan, G.R. No. 111091,
August 21, 1995) or BIR exami ne r's duty to verify tax lia bil i t i e s
of professionals part i cu l a rl y d octors. (Peligrino v. People, G.R.
No. 186'266; August 18, 2001)
A n LT O of fi cer b o r r o wed v e h i cles from t h e C o m p a ny , w h i ch
r egularly t r a n s a ct s w i t h h i s O f fi c e i s n o t l i a b l e f o r v i o l a t io n o f
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 unl ess such borrowing is shown to be
connected wit h a s p ecific t r a n saction (e.g., registration of a specific
vehicle) where he i n t e r v en ed. (Garcia v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G.R. No.
155574, Nove'mber 20, 2006)
An assistant p r i n c i p al , w h o a c t s t o f a c i l i t at e t h e r e l e ase of
salary d i f f er ent i al s o f p u b l i c s c hool t e achers w i t h t h e a g r e ement
that they w o ul d r e i m b u r se her expenses, is not l i a ble for v i o l a tion
o f Section 3(b) of R .A . N o . 3 019 si nce it i s n o t p a r t o f h i s d u t y t o
i ntervene i n t h e p a y m en t o f t h e i r s a l a r y d i f f e r en t i a l s .
(Jaravata
v. Sandiganbayan, G . R. N o. L, -56170, Janu a ry 8 1, 19 84; 2010 Bar
Exam)
Direct Bribery and Section 8(b) of R.A. No. 8019
I n direct b r i b e ry , t h e p u b l i c o f fi cer a g r ees i n c o n s i d eration
of giftoffered, promised or received to commit a crime, unjust act
or not toperform his official d u ty. In S e ction 3
(b) of R.A. No. 3019,
t h e public officer r e q u ests or r e c eives gi ft , p r e sent, o r b e n efi t i n
connection w i t h a n y co n t r a c t o r t r a n s a c tion, w h e r e in t h e p u b l i c
officer author it y i n t e r v en e.
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 288
If alabor arbiter rejects an offer of a luxury car for a favorable
ruling in a n i l l e gal d i s m i ssal case, the P r e sident of t h e c o m p any ,
w ho made t h e o f fe r i s l i a b l e f o r a t t e m p t e d c o r r u p t io n o f p u b l i c
o fficer. But i f t h e l a b o r a r b i t e r a c cepts th e o f f er , h e i s l i a b l e f o r
d irect bribery w h i l e th e P r e sident i s l i a bl e for cor r u p t ion of p u b l i c
o fficer. However, the l abor ar b i ter an d t h e P r e sident ar e not l i a b l e
for violation of Section 8 (b) of R .A . No . 3019 since the pr oceeding
in an i l l e gal d i s m i s sal c as e i s n o t a " c o n t r a ct " o r " t r a n s a ction"
contemplated in t hi s pr ovision because no "monetary consideration"
as in credit tr a n saction is involved. (2019 Bar Exam)
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 reads: "In addit ion to acts or omissions
ofpublic officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer." It is clear then tha t
one may be charged with v i o l a t ion of R.A. No. 3019 in addi t ion to a
felony under th e R e vi sed Penal C ode for th e s am e act . (Ramiscal,,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra) Furt h e r m o r e, direct bribery or ind i r e ct
bribery is ma l u m i n s e , w h i l e v i o l a t i on of R . A. N o . 3 0 19 p a r t a k e s
the character of ma l u m p r o h i b i t u m. Mo r e over, vio lation of S ection
3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 is n e i t her i d e n t i cal nor n e cessarily i n c l u siv e
of direct br i b ery. (M e rencillo v. People, G.R. Nos. 142869-70, A pril
1 8, 2007) Hence, the accused can be p r o secuted for d i r ect b r i b er y
o r indirect b r i b er y a n d v i o l a t io n o f S e ction 3 (b) of R .A . N o . 3 0 1 9
without offending the rule on double jeopardy. (2010 Bar Exam)
Section 8 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 8019
In Section 3(b) and (c), the pu b li c officer r e quests or r eceives
g ift, present o r b e n efi t f r o m a p e r s on . H o w e v er, i n S e c t ion 3 ( b ) ,
the gift, p r esent or b e nefit i s r e q u ested or r e ceived i n c o n nection
with any contr act or t r a n s action i n v ol v in g m o n et ary consideration
w ith th e g overn m e nt , w h e r ei n t h e p u b l i c of fi cer h a s t o i n t e r v e n e
under the law. On th e ot her h a nd , in Section 3(c), the gift, pr esent
o r benefit is requested or received in connection wit h an y p er mi t or
license obtained or to be obtained by the public officer.
ACCEPTANCE OR SOLICITATION OF GIFT UNDER R.A. NO. 6713
Solicitation or acceptance of gifts under Section 7 (d) of R.A. No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Et h i cal Stan d ards for Public Officials) is
committed by a public official, who shall solicit or accept, directly or
i ndirectly, any gift, grat u i t y , favor, entert a i n m e nt, loan or anyt h i n g
of monetary v a l u e f r o m a n y p e r son i n t h e c o u rse of t h ei r o f f i cial
duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any
transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.
 286 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Giftrefers to a thing or a right to dispose of gratuitously, or
any act or l i b e r a l i ty , i n f a v o r o f a n o t her w h o a ccepts it , an d s h all
include a simulated sale or an ostensibly onerous disposition thereof.
(Section 3 of R.A. No. 6713)
Soliciting
l' ' '
o r a c cepting l oa n i s a l s o p u n i s h able . L o ann covers
c o v er
both simple loan and commodatum as well as guarante es, financing
arrangements or accommodations i n t e n ded to ensure it:- approval,
(Section 8 of R.A. ¹. 6 71 8 )
Use of a car by t h e j u dge w it h a u t h o r it y o f th e ow n e r, who is
a party to a case pending in hi s court is considered as acceptance of
gift. (Capuno and The lma v. Judge Jaram i l l o, Adm. Ma t t er No. RTJ.
98-944, July 20, 1994)
Solicitation or acceptance of gift
Solicitation of g i f t w i t h o u t r e c eiv in g i t b y a p u b l i c o f f icer in
the course of dut y i s a v i o l a t ion of S ection 7 (d ) of R .A . N o . 6 713,
The mere fact that th e gift solicited is not yet received by the public
o fficer is not sufficient to exonerate hi m .
Accepting gift wi t h out solicitat ion by public officer in the course
of duty is a violation of Section 7 (d) of R.A. No. 6718. Mere fact that
the gift accepted is unsolicited is not sufficient to exonerate him,
(Mabini v. Raga, A.M N o . P - 0 6 -2150, June 21, 2006)
Bribery, R.A. No. 6718 and R.A. No. 8019
D ifferences am on g b r i b e ry , v i o l a t io n o f R . A . N o . 6 7 1 8 a n d
violation of R.A. No. 3019 are as follows:
1. C r i m in a l a c t — Acceptance or receipt of gift by a p u b l i c
o fficer ma y c on st i t ut e v i o l a t io n o f S e ction 8 (b ) o r ( c ) o f R .A . N o,
3019 or R.A. No. 6713, in d i r ect br i b e ry, or d i r ect br i b ery i n v o l ving
unjust a ct . R equest or s o l i cit a t ion o f g i f t m a y c o n st i t ut e v i o l a tion
of Section 3 (b) or (c) of R.A. No. 8019 and R.A. No. 6713 but not
i ndirect bribery or di r ect br i b er y .
2. Co n n ec t i o n o f t h e g i f t —In violation of Section 3 (b) or
(c) ofR.A. No. 8019, the gifts are received or requested in connection
with go v ernment c ont r a ct or t r a n s a c tion, or l i c e nse or p e r m i t . I n
violation o f R . A . N o . 6 7 1 3 , t h e g i f t s a r e a c cepted o r s o l i c i ted i n
the courseof official d u t i es. In i n d i r e ct b r i b e r y, a nd d i r e ct b r i b e ry
involving u n j u s t a ct , t h e g i ft s ar e a ccepted by r e ason of h is o ffice,
and to perform an un ju st act, respectively.
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 287
8. P r os e c u t i o n —If the act constitut es violation of Section 3
(b) or (c) of R.A. No. 8019 and direct or indirect bribery, the accused
can be prosecuted for both cr i m es. If th e act constit u tes violation of
Section 8 (b) or (c) of R .A . No . 3 0 19, and v i o l a t ion of Section 7 (d)
o f R.A. No. 67 13, th e accused shall b e p r o secuted u n der R .A . N o .
3019, which prescribes a heavier penal ty . U n der Section 11 of R.A.
N o. 6718, if the vi ol at ion is p u n i s h able by a h e avier penalty u n d er
a nother law, he shall be prosecuted under the la t ter st at u t e .
4. D e f e n s e s —T o exonerate a p u b l ic o fficer f r om c r i m i n a l
liability u n der Section 8 (b) or (c) of R.A. No. 3019 for receiving gift
or present in connection with governm ent contract or tr a n saction, or
license or permit : (1) the value of the un s olicited gift m u st be small
or insignificant; and t he s ame is given as a m e re ord in a ry t o k en of
gratitude or f r i e n d ship ac cording to l o c al c us to ms or u s a g e; or ( 2)
value of the gift is not ma n i festly excessive and the same is given on
t he occasion of a f a m il y c elebration or n a t i o nal f e stiv i ty ; or (3) t h e
g ift if given by a member of the public officer's immediate fami l y .
To exonerate a public officer from cri m i n a l l i a b i l it y u n der R.A .
No. 6718 for receiving or accepting gift in the course of official duties,
(1) the value of th e g if t g i v e n on o ccasion of f a m il y c elebration or
n ational festivity or unsolicited gift must be nominal or insignificant ,
and the same is not g i ven i n a n t i c i p a t ion of, or i n e x c h ange for, a
favor from a public official; or (2) the gift is given by family member
or relative of the public officer.
Lawful accept a n c e of u n s o l i c i te d g if t u n d e r R . A . No . 8019
For purposes of prosecution under Section 3(b) or (c) of R.A. No.
3 019, the value of the gift r eceived or r equested in connection wi t h
government contract or t r a n saction, or li cense or permit ne ed not be
alleged in th e i n f o r m a t ion (M e n d o za-Ong v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G.R.
1Vos,146868-69, October 28, 2008) or proven by evidence.(Mejia v.
Pamaran, G.R. No. L - 56741, Apri l 15, 1 988) The value of the gift i s
not an element of this crime. However, for purposes of defense under
Sections 14 and 2 (c) of R.A. No. 3019, the value of the gift or present
i s important .
U nder 14 of R .A . No . 80 19, receiving gi ft s i n c o nnection w i t h
government contract or transaction, or license or permit is not a crime
under Section 8 (b) or (c), if the following r equi sites are present: (1)
the gift is unsolicited; (2) the value of the gift is small or insignificant ;
and (8) the gift is given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or
friendship according to local customs or usage.
 288 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
The prosecution need not al l ege in th e i n f o r m a t i on, and pr ovs
by evidence the value of the gift for pu r pose of conviction. (Mendoza-
Ong case, supra; Me jia c a s e s upra) Bu t t h e a c c u s ed c an p r e s ent
e vidence t ha t t h e v a l u e o f t h e u n s o l i c i ted g i f t g i v e n a s -
mers
ordinary t oken of grat i t u d e or fr i e n dship according to local customs
o r usage is small or in si gnifi cant for p u r p ose of acquitt a l .
An LTO public officer who received a pack of cigarettes without
solicitation from one who obtained a driv er's license is not liable for
violation of Section 8(c) of R.A. No. 8019.
I n a case for r e q u estin g o r r e c eivin g g if t i n c o n n ection w i t h
securing a g over n m en t p e r m i t o r l i c e n se, th e b r i b e-giver en gage2
your services as his counsel. What action will you take in his defense?
(1978 Bar Exam) As counsel, I will t a ke the defense that the gift was
o f small or i n s i g ni fi cant v a l u e g i ve n w i t h ou t s o l i ci t a t ion f r c m m y
client as a mere ordin ar y t o ken of grat i t u d e or fr i e n dship according
to localcustoms or usage.
D uring on e o f t h e s p e eches of P r e sident D u t e r t e , h e s t a t ed
" ou guys from Da vao know th at. If you are able to solve a crime and
a family would l i k e to be generous to you, or would n ote their jeeling
of gratitude for what you accomplished, then by all means, accept it,"
Several personalit ies including Vice-President Robredo and Senator
Lacson rebuffed Dut ert e for let t in g cops accept gifts. It is submi t t e d
that th e a d v ice of th e P r e s i dent i s i n a c c ordance wit h t h e l a w . A
police officer is l a w f u ll y a l l o wed to accept un solicited gifts of small
or insignificant v a lu e gi ven as a m er e or d i n ar y t o ken of gr a t i t u d e.
This is a l e gislat ive r ecognition of th e cu stom of F i l i p i nos of being
g enerous to public officers who served them wel l .
Lawful ac c e p t a n c e o f u n s o l i c i t ed g i ft u n d e r R . A. N o . 6 7 1 8
U nder Section 3 ( c ) o f R . A . N o . 6 7 18 , gif t i s n o t w i t h i n t h e
contemplation of thi s law i f t h e f ollow ing r equi sites are present: (1)
g ift accepted is u n s olicited; (2) th e v a l u e of t h e g i f t i s n o m i n a l or
i nsignificant; an d (3 ) th e g if t i s n o t g i v e n i n a n t i c i p a t ion of , or i n
exchange for,a favor from a public offic
ial.(M abini v.Raga, A.M
No. P-06-2150, June 21, 2006)
Acceptance of un s o l ic ited g i f t s i s a n i m p o r t a n t r e q u i s i te s o
as not to m ak e t h e p u b li c officer cr i m i n a ll y l i a bl e u n der Section 7
(d) of R.A. No. 67 18. Th us, solicit a t ion of g if t b y a p u b l i c officer is
p unishable u n der R .A . N o . 6 71 3 r e g ar dless of w h e t her o r n o t t h e
gift is of nominal or insignificant value. Thus, a judge, who solicited
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 289
donation in th e a m o un t of P 8 ,000.00 for th e a l l eged refur bi shm ent
of his office, v i o l a tes Section 7 ( d ) o f R . A . N o . 6 7 1 8 ( R e: J u d g e
Benjamin H . V i r r ey, A d m . M a t t e r N o . 9 0 - 7-1159-MTC, O ctober 10,
1991) a lthough the amount of donation is nomi n al or ins ig nificant.
Acceptance of un s o l ic ited g i f t s i s a n i m p o r t a n t r e q u i s i te s o
as not to m ak e th e p u b li c officer cr i m i n a ll y l i a bl e u n der Section 7
(d) of R.A. No. 6718. Th us, solicitat ion of g if t b y a p u b l i c officer i s
punishable under R.A. No. 6713 regardless of whether or not the gift
i s given in an t i c i p at ion of, or in ex change for, a favor from a p u b l i c
official. Thus, a ju dge, who solicited P100.00 from each of the court
employees to repair a ty p ew r i t er , violates R.A. No. 6718. (Legaspi v„
Judge Garrete, Adm. M a t ter No. M T J - 9 2 718, March 27, 1995)
In Mabini v. Raga, supra, complainant presented a letter signed
by Branch 28 employees, including respondent, thanking Governor
Rono for hi s " d o n a t i on" o f P 1 , 5 00.00. H o w ever, t h er e i s n o p r o o f
whatsoever that a solicitat ion took place. T he cash gift of P1,500.00
w as received n o t b y r e s p o n d en t L i l i a a l o n e , b u t t o g e t he r w i t h
eleven other em p l oyees of Br a nch 28 , t o p u r c h ase lechon f or t h e i r
Christmas party; hence, the indivi d ual benefit of the employees may
be considered no m i n a l. N e i t h e r do es it a p p e ar f r o m t h e e v i d e nce
tha-. the nominal gift was given in an t i c ipa t ion of, or in exchange for,
a favor. Th u s, respondent Li l ia cannot be held liable under R.A.No.
6718.
Family cele b r a t i o n o f n a t i o n a l f e st i v it y u n d e r R . A . No . 80 19
U nder Section 2 ( c ) o f R . A . N o . 3 0 19 , accepting g i ft s i s n o t
considered as "receiving gift" in connection with government contract
or transaction, or license or permit under Section 3 (b) or (c) thereof, if
the following requisites are present: (1) gift was received on occasion
of a family celebration or n a t i o nal festiv i ty ; and (2) the value of the
gift is not ma n ifestly excessive.
T he p r o secution n e e d n o t a l l e g e i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n , and
prove by ev i d ence th e v a l u e o f t h e g i f t f o r p u r p ose of conviction.
(Mendoza-Ong case, supra; Mejia ca s e, supra) But t h e d e f e nse can
present evidence tha t t h e v a l u e o f t h e g i f t g i v e n o n o ccasion of a
family celebration or n a t i onal festiv it y i s not m a n i f est excessive for
p urpose of acquitt a l .
What i s m a n i f e stl y e x cessive i s r e l a t i ve . Th e c i r c u m st ances
o f a person and of social position h av e t o be t a ken i n t o account i n
determining w h e t her th e gift i s actu ally excessive and also the fact
 290 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER 291
".II. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
VOLUME II

of whhet her it m i g h t i n fl u e nce action one way or another on the part

There is no violation of Secticn 8(b) of R.A. No. 8019 since there is
of a public official. (8 Senate Record 258-259 f1960J; (Mendoza-Ong
n o showing =hat the bu sinessmen have a pending t r a n saction w i t h
case, supra)
the BIR involving th eir ta x l i a b i l i t . es.
A BIR e x a m i ner w a s u n d e r t a k in g a n e x a m i n a t ion of t h e t ax An accused in a cri m i na l case gave a Chri st mas gift consisting
liabilit y o f a t a x p a yer u n d e r h i s 1 9 8 8 i n c ome ta x r e t u r n s . W h en
of big basket of assorted canned goods and bottles of expensive
t axpayer l e a r n e d t h a t e x a m i n e r ' s s on wh o h a d j u s t r e t u r n e 5
wines to the judge of the court wh ere his case is pending. The judge
from th e U n i t e d S t a tes wa s going t o b e m a r r i ed , h e sent t h r o u gh
is liable for indir ect bribery since it is obvious that the gift was given
t he examiner a n o - f r ost r e f r i g er ator a s hi s w e d d in g g i ft . Th e B I R
b y reason o: hi s f u n c t i on . T h e a c cused i s l i a bl e fo r c o r r u p t i o n o f
examiner is li a ble un der Section 8(b) of R.A. No. 8019 for receiving
public officer. In th e al t e r n a t i ve, the ju dge can be held li able under
gift in connection w it h t r a n s a ction i n v ol v in g th e assessment of his
R.A. No. 6718 since the gifts were given in an t i ci p at ion of a favor in
tax liabi l it y w h er e h e ha s th e d u t y t o i n t e r v e ne. Ap p l y in g Section
connection with th e pending case (1997 Bar Exam)No te: There is no
2 of R .A . N o . 8 0 19 , t h i s g i f t , w h i c h w a s g i v e n o n o c casion of a
violation of Section 8(b) of R.A. Nc. 8019 since a judicial proceeding
family celebration i n b e h alf of th e f a m il y of t h e ex am i n er , shall be
is not a con t r act o r t r a n s a ction i n v o l v in g m o n et ar y c onsideration
considered as wi t hi n t h e cont em pl a t ion of Section 8(b) because the
contemplated in t hi s pr ovision.
value thereof is m a n i f estly excessive, and t he s a me w as g i v en b
g iven y a
t axpayer, who is not a relat ive of the examin er . (1984 Bar Exam)
Gift given by a r e l a t i v e
Family c e l e b r a t i o n o f n a t i o n a l f e s t i v it y u n d e r R . A . No . 67 13 U nder Section 2 (c) of R .A . No . 80 19, accepting a g if t f r o m a
m ember of th e p u b li c of f icer's imm e di ate f a m il y i s n o t c o n sidered
U nder S ection 8 ( d ) o f R . A . N o . 6 7 1 8 a c ceptin g g i f t i s n o t
as "receivingg i f t s . " U n d e r S c t i o n 8 ( d) of R.A. No. 6718 accepting
considered as "r e ceiving gif t" wi t h i n t h e m e a n i ng of a v i o l a t i on of
g ift from a n i e m ber of th e f a m il y o r r e l a t iv e of th e p u b li c officer i s
Section 7 (d) th ereof if th e f o l l ow in g r e q ui sites are pr esent: (1) gift
not also treated as "r eceiving gif t ." H e n c e, accepting fam i ly g i ft b y
is given on th e occasion of a fa m il y celebration such as bi r t h day or
a public officer is not a cr im e u n der Section 8 (b) and (c) of R.A. No.
national festivity l i k e C h r i s t m as; (2) the value of the gift is nominal
3019 or unc. r Section 7 (d) of R .A . No . 6 7 18. Even i f t h e v a lu e of
or insignificant; and (8) the gift i f no t g i ven in a n t i c i p a t ion of, or in
family gift is significant, th ere is no violation of the law. It is absurd
exchange for, a favor from a public official. It is the submission of this
t o punish a pu b lic officer from ac "epting an expensive car from h i s
writer that even if the gift is solicited, if the said three requisites are
son as a gift.
present, the public officer is not cri m i n a ll y l i a b le. For several years,
F ilipinos ha s m a i n t a i ne d a t r a d i t i o n o f g i v i n g g i f t d u r i n g f a m i l y
celebration or n a t i o nal f e st i v i ty . Th e l a w r e cognizes thi s t r a d i t i on APPROVING OR GRANTING LICENSE, PERMIT, PRIVILEGE OR
although the one, who received the gift, is a public officer. B ENEFIT TO UNQ U A L IFIED PERSO N
BIR Commi ssioner Tor res wr ote solicitat ion l e t t ers addressed V iolation of S e ction 8 ( ) o f R . A . N o . 8 0 1 9 i s c o m m i t t e d b y a
t o the s everal b u s i n essmen r e q u estin g d o n a t i on s o f g i f t s f o r h e r public officer w h o s h al l k n o w i n gl y a p p r ov e o r g r a n t a n y l i c e n se,
office Chri s t mas p a r t y . S h e u s e d t h e B u r e a u's official s t a t i onery. permit, privi l e g e or b enefit r o a p e r son, wh o i s no t q u a li fied for or
T he r e sponse w a s p r o m p t a n d o v e r w h e l m i n g s o m u c h s o t h a t entitled to it, or a mere representative or dummy of such unqualified
Comm issioner'soffice was overcrowded with rice cookers, radio sets, person.
freezers,electric stoves and toasters. Her staff also received several
Good faith i s a defense in cr im e u n der Section 8(j) of R.A. No.
envelopes containin g cash for t h e e m p l oyees' Chri s t ma s l u n cheon.
3 019. A public officer who, in i s su ing a bu i l d in g p er m it , commi t t e d
The Commi ssioner i s l i a b l e u n d e r S e ction 7 ( d ) o f R .A . N o . 6 7 13
on the followin g gr o u n ds: (1) th e v a lu e of th e g i ft s ar e si g nificant. mistake because of a doubtful or difficult question of law is not liable
1 under thi s Section. (Me ndio la v. People, G.R. 1Vo. 89988, March 6 ,
an ( ) t e g i f t s w er e gi ven in a n t i c i p a t ion of a f avor i n connection
with the tax li abi l i t i es of these businessmen. (2006 Bar Exam) Note: 1992)

J9JC9B0M
 292 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
S ection 3 (c) an d (j ) of R .A . No . 30 1 9
I f t h e p u b l i c officer receives m oney i n co n s i d e r a t i on of
approving a l i c e nse i n f a v o r o f a p e r s on , w h o i s un q u a l i f i e d, t h e
crime commi t ted is vi ol at ion of Section 3 (c) for receipt of money in
connection with th e appr oval of license or Section 8 (j) for approving
license to unqualified person.
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH PUBLIC OFFICER
UNDER R.A. NO. 3019
V iolation o f S e c t ion 4 (a ) o f R . A . N o . 8 0 1 9 i s c o m m i t t e d by
any person who shall capit a l ize or exploit or t a k e a d v a n t age of his
family or .close personal rel at ion w i t h an y p u b li c official by d i r ectly
or indirectly requesting or receiving any pr esent, gift or m a t e r ial or
pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business,
transaction, application, r equest or con t r act w i t h t h e g o v er nm ent,
in which such public official has to in t erv ene.
F amily r e l a t i o n s hall i n c l u d e t h e s pouse o r r e l a t ives by
consanguinity or affi n i t y i n t h e t h i r d ci vi l degree.
The word "close personal relati on" shall i n c l ude close personal
friendship, social a n d f r a t e r n a l c o n n e ct i ons,
and p r o f essional
employment all g i v in g r i se to in t i m acy w h ich assures free access to
such public officer.
In Disini v. San d ig a n bayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24 and 174764-
65, September 11, 2013, the allegations in the in f or m a t ion charging
the vi ol a t ion o f S e c t io n 4 ( a ) o f R . A . N o . 3 0 1 9 , i f h y p o t h e t i cally
admitted, would establish t h e, elements of th e offense, considering
that: (1) accused, being the cousin in law of I m e lda M a r cos, and the
family p h y sician of th e M a r c oses, had close personal r el at i ons and
intimacy with Pr esident M a r cos, a public official; (2) accused, taking
advantage ofsuch family and close personal relations, requested and
received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from
estinghouse, the en t i t i es t hen h a v i n g b u s i ness, tr an saction, and
application w i t h t h e G o v e r n m en t i n c o n n ection w i t h t h e N u c l ear
ower Plant Pr oject; (8) President M a r cos interv ened to secure and
obtain for B u r n s & R o e th e engineering and ar ch i t ectural contract,
a nd for Westinghouse the construction of the Power Plan t .
A ccused can b e c h a r ged of v i o l a t io n o f S e ction 4 ( a ) o f R . A .
No. 3019 in addition to indirect bribery. (Disini v. Sandiganbayan,
supra)
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293
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
NEGLECT OR REFUSAL TO ACT WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD
UNDER R.A. NO. 3019
Violation of Section 8(f) of R.A. No. 8019 is committed by a public
officer who shall neglect or r efuse wi t h ou t suffi cient j u s ti fi cation to
act within a reasonable time on any mat ter pending before him after
due demand or request for the purpose of: (1) obtaining, directly or
indirectly, from any person int erested in the ma t ter some pecuniary
or material benefit or a d v a n t a ge; (2) favo in g hi s ow n i n t e r e st; (8)
g iving un du e a d v a n t age i n f a v o r o f o t h e r i n t e r e sted p a r ty ; o r ( 4 )
d iscriminat in g against other i n t e r ested part y .
FAILURE TO REPLY UNDER R.A. NO. 6713
U nder S e ction 5 o f R . A . N o . 6 7 1 8 . a I p u b l i c o f f i ci al s a n d
employees shall, within fift een (15) working days from receipt thereof,
respond to l e t t e rs , t e l e gr am s o r o t h e r m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c ati ons
s ent by the pu b l ic. The r eply m u s t cont ain th e a ction t a ken on t h e
request. Under this provision, response to.'etters, telegrams or other
m eans of commu n i cati ons sent b y t h e p u b l i c m u s t b e i n w r i t i n g .
A verbal r e pl y t o a f o r m a l a n d w r i t t e n i n q u i r y i s n o t s u f fi c i e n t .
(Pamintuan v. En t e - Alcantara, A . M . ¹ . P- 0 4- 1 9 12, December 17 ,
2004; Pamintu an v. Lo ja , A . M . N o . P - 0 4 -1912, December 17, 2004)
The public officer must s t r i c tl y com ply w i t h t h e r u l e on fi f t e en-day
period in responding to a l e t t er . (M u yco v. Saratan, A. M. N o. P-08-
1761, April 2, 2004) Violation of Section 5 cf R.A. No. 6718 is a crime.
A CCEPTING EINPLOY M E N T IN A PRIVATE ENTE R P R ISE UN D E R
R.A. NO. 3019
Violation of Section 8(d) under R .A. No. 8019 is commi t ted by
a public officer wh o sh all accept or h av e any m e m ber of hi s f a m i l y
accept employment in a priv ate enterpr ise wl ich has pending official
business with hi m d u r i n g t h e p e n d ency th e"eof or w i t h i n on e year
a fter its term i n a t i o n .
F amily r e l a t i o n s h a l l i n c l u d e t h e s p o u s e o r r e l a t i v e s b y
consanguinity or affi n it y i n t h e t h i r d ci vi l d egree.
Under th e l ast p a r a g r aph of Section 4 t h e p e r son offering or
giving to the public officer the employment u n der Section 3(d) shall,
together with th e offending public officer, be punished.
In Rosal v.IIon. Salvador, G.R. No. 286, August 80, 1974,
the son-in-law of a j u d g e accepted an a p p oi n t m ent a s em ployee of
 294 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 295
VOLUME II

the PCSO whil e a case filed by PCSO was pending before him . Ths
complaint a g a i nst t h e j u d g e w a s d i s m i ssed because th ere wa s ns e nterprise r e g u l a t ed , s u p e r v i sed o r l i c e n sed b y t h e o f fi ce r i s a
s owi n g thh a t t h e h e h
h a d cau s e d his son-in-law to accept appointment violation of R.A. No. 6718 but not R .A. No. 8019.
as employee in PCSO. If the act constitu tes violation of Section 7 (b) (1) of R.A. No. 6718
and Section 8 (d) of R.A. No. 8019, the accused shall be prosecuted
An e n g i n eer, f o r a n d i n b e h a l f o f t h e p r o v i n ce wh e r e h e
under the latter since this law prescribes a heavier penalty. (See:
is of fi ci all y a s s i g n ed, s igned w i t h ot h e r p r o v i n c ia l o f fi c i al s a
Section ll of R . A. N o. 6718)
contract w it h a p r i v a t e constr u c t ion company for t h e c onst r u ction
of a pr ovin cial r o ad . H e a l s o a p p r oved p ar t o f t h e t e r m i n a t i on of
t e cont r act an d t h e w o r k . H e r e c o m m ended hi s son an d h e w a s ILLEGAL REC O M M E N D A T ION U N D E R R.A. NO. 6713
accepted as a f or eman i n t h e c o n st r u ct ion company. Th e en gi neer
Violation of Section 7 (b) (8) of R.A. No. 6718 (Code of Conduct
is liable under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 3019. (196'4 B a nd Ethical Standards for Public OfFicials) is commit ted by a publ i c
E
rres
esponsi
onsiblee o f fi c er s o f t h e c o n s t r u c t io n c o m p an y a r e a l s o l i a b l e
o fficial, who shall recommend any person to any position in a priv at e
under this provision.
e nterprise which has a r e gular or p e n d in g official t r a n saction wi t h
their office. The pr oh i b i t ion i s a p p l i cable du r in g t h ei r i n c u m b ency
OW N I NG, CONT R O L L ING, MANA G ING OR BEING EMP L O Y E D IN A or within one year after resignati on, reti r em ent, or separation from
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE UNDER R.A. NO. 6713 publicoffice.

V iolation of Section 7 (b) (1) of R.A. No. 6713 (Code f C Mere recommendation o f any person to any position in a priva te
and Ethiical Standards for Public Officials) is commi t ted o eo wn du c t e nterprise, which has a regular or p en d ing official t r a n saction wi t h
by a
o w control, m a n age or accept em pl oymentublic
o fficial, w h o s h al l own, as
office of the public officer, constit u tes the cr im e u n der Section 7 (b)
officer, employee, c onsultant , c ounsel, b r o k er , a g e nt , t r u s t e e or (3) of R.A. No. 6718. If the pr i v at e ent er p r ise employed a member of
nominee in any pr i v at e enter p r ise regulated, supervised or licensed the family of the pub l ic officer because of the said recommendation,
by his office unless expressly allowed by law. The prohibition applies the public officer is held li able under Section 8 (d) of R.A. No. 8019.
d uring t h e i n c u m b ency of p u b l i c of fi cer o r w i t h i n o n e y e a " a f t er What is punishable under R.A No. 6718 is the act of recomrr.ending.
resignation, reti r e m ent, or separation from pu b lic office. On the other hand, what i s pr oh i b i ted un der Section 8 (d), R.A. No.
3019 is acceptance of employment or c a u s ing hi s re l a t i ve to accept
Section 7 (b) (1) of R.A. No. 6713 and Section 3 (d) of R 4. Ao. employ ment.
U nder t h e R u l e s I m p l e m e n t in g t h e C o d e o f C o n d u c t a n d
A cceptance of employment by a p u b lic officer in a Ethical Standards for Public Officials, recommending any person to
ic o c e r i n a p rrii va t e
enter pr ise
' w hhich
i has pending offic ial b u s i n ess is a vio lation of R.A. a ny position in a p r i v at e ent er p r ise which has a regular or pendi n g
No. 3019. Acceptance of employment by pu b lic officer in any pr i v a t e official transaction with hi s office is an admini s t r a t ive offense unless
enterprise regulated, supervised or hcensed b h i s o ffi such recommendation or referral is mand ated by law, or international
of R.A. No. 6713. agreements, commitment and o bliga ti on, or as pa rt of th e fu n c tions
of brs office.
T he prohibi t ion u n d e r R .A . N o . 8 019 i s d u '
uring th e p e nd e n cy
o e o f f i cial business with the public offi 'th'
a er it s t e r m i n a t i on. The prohib i t ion u n der R.A. No. 6713 is curin g UNLAWFUL PRACTICE OF PROFESSION UNDER R.A. NO. 6713
incumbency of the public officer or within one year after resignation, V iolation o f S e ction 7 ( b ) ( 2 ) o f R . A . N o . 6 7 1 3 i s c o m m i t t e d
retirement, or separation from p u b lic office. by a public official, who during their incumbency shall engage in
C
Causing
'

' to acce t
a relative t he privat e p r a c t ice of . h ei r p r o f ession u n l ess a u t h o r i zed by t h e
p em pl oym ent in a pr i v ate enterprise C onstitution or la w w h er e such p r a ctice wil l no t conflict or t end t o
w ich has pending official business with th e public officer is a
violation of R.A. No. 8019 but not R.A. No. 6718. Owning private conflict with their official functions. Violation of this prohibition is
punishable.

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 296 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
The prohibit ion to engage in pri v ate practice of profession (e.g.,
medical or law pr ofession) shall apply du r in g th e in cu mbency of the
concerned professional.After resignation, retirement, or separation
from public office, he/she can pr actice his/her pr ofession. However,
professional concerned cannot pr a ctice his pr ofession in connection
with any m a t t e r b efore the office he used to be wit h fo r a p e r ioc of
one (1) year after resignati on, reti r em ent, or separation from public
office. Violation of this li m i t e d pr oh i b i t ion is also punishable.
Private practice of law
P ractice of la w m e an s an y a c t i v i ty , i n o r o u t o f c o u rt , w h ch
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice oflaw is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or r e n der an y k i n d o f ser vice, which device or
s ervice requires th e use i n a n y d e g ree of legal k n o w l edge or sk i l l .
The practice of law is not li m i t ed to the conduct of cases or liti gation
in court. I t i n c l u des l egal a d v ice an d c o unsel, an d p r e p a r a t ion of
legal inst r u m e nt s an d cont r a cts by w h i c h l e gal r i g ht s ar e secured,
which may or ma y no t be pending in court . (L e gal Et h i cs by A
Agpalo; Ulep v. Legal Clin i c, A.C. No. L553, June 17, 1993)
uburn
This concept of "p r a c t ice of l a w " w a s u s ed to d e t e r m i ne if a
nominee to th e p o sit ion of C h a i r m a n o f t h e C O M E L E C p o ssesses
the required q u a li fi ca t ion of h a v i n g b een e n gaged in t h e p r a c t i ce
of law for at l e ast ten y e ars (Cayetano v. Mo nsod, G.R. ¹. 10 0 1 1 3,
September 3, 1 9 91) or i f a c o r p o r a t i on i s i l l e g a lly p r a c t i c ing l a w ,
(Ulep v. Legal Clin ic, supra)
The concept of "p r a c t ice of la w " s h o uld n ot b e c o nf used wi-.h
that of "pr i v a te practice of la w ." W h at is p r o h i b i t ed u n d er R. A. No.
6713 is not practicing profession but engaging in the priv a te p
of profession. racti "e
A public prosecutor is practicing law in the process of
s o p r fo r m i n g
i s u t y . f h e w i l l a p ply for the position of Chair man of COM E L E C ,
the period of time du r in g w h ich he occupied the position as a public
p rosecutor s h al l b e c o u n t e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g i f h e p o s s esses t h e
required qualification of hav ing been engaged in the pr actice of law
f or at l e ast t e n y e a rs . Bu t a p u b l i c p r o secutor i s p r o h i b i te d f r o m
engaging in pri v a te practice of law such as appearing as a lawyer for
the defendant in ci vil case for professional fee.
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 297
It should be clarified that "private practice" =f a profession
which is prohib ted by R.A. No. 6718 does not pert ai r t o an i solated
court appearance; rather, itcontemplates a succession of acts of
t he same nature h ab i t u a ll y or cu st om ar il y h o l d in g one's self to th e
public as a l a w y er . (O f f ice of th e Co u rt A d m i n i s t r a t or v. L a d a g a ,
A.M. No. P - 99-1287, Ja n u ary 26 , 2 0 0 1) In B u s i l a c B u i l d e r s, I n c .
and Camari ll o v. Agui l ar, AM . N o . R T J - 0 8 -1809, October 17, 2006,
isolated instances when th e r e spondent j u dge appeared as counsel
for himself in Ci v i l Ca s e No. 12 6 35 do n ot c o nstit u te t h e " p r i v a t e
practice of the legal profession," a s contemplated by law.
The word p r i v at e pr a c ti ce o f law i m p l i e s t h at o ne m u s t h a v e
presented himself to be in t h e a ct iv e and cont i n ued pr a ctice of th e
legal profession an d t h a t h i s p r o f e ssional s e r v i ce- =are av a i l abl e
t o the publi c fo r c o m p ensation a s a s o u rce of h i s l i v e l i h ood or i n
conside 'ation of h i s s ai d s e r v i ces. (People v. Vi l l a r . ieva, G. A. N o .
L-1945C', May 2i, 1965) In Li m-Santiago v. Sagucion, A.C. No. 6705.,
M arch 81, 2006, a p u b li c p r osecutor, wh o p e r f or med acts t ha t a r e
usually rendered by lawy ers wit h th e use of their leg l k n o w l e dge in
consideration of ret ai n er's fee, is engaged in pr i v at e pr actice of law
in violation of R.A. No. 6718.
E ngaging i n t he p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e o f l a w pr e s u p p oses t h e
existence of lawyer-client r e l a t i on ship. H e nce, a public pr osecutor,
who teaches la~ or wr ote law books or arti cles, is not engaged in the
private practice of his profession within the contemplation of R.A.
No. 6718.
C onstitut i o na l P r o h i b i t i o n o n P r i v a t e P r a c t i c e of L a w
Engaging in priv ate pra.ctice of profession in vie l ation of Section
13, Article VII ; Section 2, A" t i cle IX ; or Section 14, ,>wticle VI of th e
1987 Constitu t io n consti t u t es th e c r i m e u n d e r S ection 7 (b ) (2) of
R.A. No. 6713.
l. E x ec u t i v e o ffici a l s a nd c o n st i t u t i o n a l
commis s i o n e r s — U n d e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i on , t h e f o tllowing officers
are prohibited d u r i n g t h e i r t e n u r e t o e n g ag e in p r a ct i c e of a n y
profession" directly or i n d i r e c tl y: (1) The P re sident. Vic e-President,
the Members cf th e C a b i n et, an d t h ei r d e p u t ies or assistants; and
(2) Member of a Consti t u t i o nal C o m m i s sion. The pr ohibi t ion is not
limited to private practice oflaw but also private practice of other
p rofession such as medicine, engineering, and denti st r y .
2. L eg i s l a t i v e ofhcers — Senators or Members of the House
o f Representatives are not absolutely prohib i ted by the Constit u t i o n
 298 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
to engage i n p r i v a t e p r a c t ice l aw . T h e c o n st i t u t i o na l p r o h i b i t i on
is lim i t e d t o ap p e a r i ng p e r s onally a s c o u n sel b e fore a ny c o u rt o f
justice or before the Electoral T r i b u n a ls, or quasi-judicial and other
administr a t iv e bodies. Appearance includes filin g a f o r ma l m o t i on,
o r plea, or answer in court . (Flores v. Zurbito, G.R. No. 12890, March
8, 1918; Legal Ethics by Ruben Agpalo)
C onstitu t i o na l P r o h i b i t i o n o n P r i v a t e P r a c t i c e of L a w
E ngaging in p r i v a t e p r a c t ice of p r ofession in v i o l a t ion of t h e
law constitu tes the crime un der Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6718.
1. J u di c i a l o f fi c e r s, solicit or s an d p r o s e cu t or s —Under
Rule 188, Section 85 of the Rules of Court, "no ju d g e or other official
or employee of th e su perior c o u r ts or o f th e Of h c e of th e So l i c itor
General, shall engage in p r i v ate practice as a me mber of the bar or
give professional advice to clients."
2. L oc a l e x e c u t i v e a nd l e g i s l a t i v e officers — U n d e r
S ection 9 0 o f t h e L o c a l G o v e r n m en t C o d e ( R .A . N o . 7 1 6 0) , a l l
governors, city and mu n i cipal may ors are prohibited from practicing
thheir profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise
of their f u n c t i ons a s l o cal c h ief executives. Sanggunian me m b e rs
may practice th eir p r o f essions, engage in an y occupation, or t each
in schools except du r in g session hours: Provided, That sa n ggunian
m embers who are also members of the Bar sh all n ot :
r]
( i) A pp e a r a s c o u n se l b e f or e a n y c o u r t i n a n y c i v i l
case wherein a local governm ent u n i t o r an y of fice, agency, or
instrum en t a l it y of th e governm ent is the adverse party
() A p p ear a s counsel in an y c r i minal case wherein
an officer or e m p l oyee of th e n a t i o nal or l o c al g overnm e nt i s
accused of an offense commit ted in r e l a t ion to his office;
(8)
( ) Co l l e c t any fee for their appearance in admini st r a t i v e
proceedings involving the local government u ni t of w h ich he is
an official; and
( ) U se p r o p e r t y a n d p e r s o n ne l o f t h e G o v e r n m e nt
except when th e sa n ggun i an me m b er c oncerned is d e fending
t he interest of the Governm en t .
D octors of medicine may p r a ct ice their p r ofession even dur i n
uring
o fficial h o u r s off work o n l y o n o c c asions of e m e r g ency: P r o v i ded,
That the offi cials
' I concerned do not derive monetary compensation
therefrom.
J9JC9B0M
299
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
In Javellana v. DILG, G.R. No. 102549, August 10, 1992, Section
9 0 of th e L o ca l G o v e r n m en t C o d e i s c o n s t i t u t i o n al . T h e s t a t u t e
d oes not t r e nch u p o n t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s p o we r a n d a u t h o r i t y
to prescribe r u le s on t h e p r a c t ice of l a w . T h e L o ca l G o v er n m ent
Code simply pr escribes rules of conduct for p u b li c officials to avoid
conflicts of interest between the discharge of their pu b lic dut ies and
the private practice of their pr ofession, in those instances where the
law allows it. It does not discrim i n at e against la w y ers and doctors.
C onfiict w it h o f f i c ial f u n c t i o n
Engaging in p r i v a t e p r a c t ice of p r ofession, wh ich conflicts or
t ends to conflict w i t h h i s o f f i c ia l f u n c t i on , c onsti t u t e s t h e c r i m e
under Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6718.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Santos, G.R. No. 166116, March
3 1, 2006, th e r u l e i s t h a t a l l p u b l i c o f fi c er s a n d e m p l o yees ar e
prohibited from engaging in the private practice oftheir profession.
T he exception i s w h e n s u c h p r i v a t e p r a c t ice i s a u t h o r i zed by t h e
C onstitution or l a w . H o w e v er , even i f i t i s a l l o wed by l a w o r t h e
Constituti on, pr i v at e pr a ctice of profession is stil l p r o scribed when
s uch practice w i l l c o n fl i c t o r t e n d s t o c o n fl i c t w i t h t he o f fi c i a l
functions of the em pl oyee concerned. B y actively p a r t i c i p at in g i n
the management of Golden Child M o n t essori, a priv ate school, while
serving as P r i n c i pa l o f L a g r o E l e m e n t ar y S c h ool, a g o v e r n m e n t
school, respondent has t r a n s gressed the pr ovi sions of Section 7 (b)
(2) of R.A. No. 6718.
Under the Revised Civil Service Rules, no officer shall engage
directly in an y vo c ation or p r o fession wi t h o ut a wr i t t e n pe rm is sion
f rom the h ead of t h e D e p a r t m e nt : P r o v i d ed, t ha t t h i s p r o h i b i t i o n
w ill be a b s ol ut e i n t h e c a s e o f t h o s e of fi cers w h o m d u t i e s a n d
responsibilit ies requir e t h a t t h e i r e n t i r e t i m e b e at t h e d i sposal of
the Government. (Ja vellana v. D I L G , G . R. N o. 10 2549, August 10 ,
1992)
Engaging i n p r i v a t e p r a c t ice of p r o f ession w i t h o ut a w r i t t e n
permission from the head of the Departm e nt in v i o la t i on of the Civil
Service Rule is an admi n i s t r a t iv e offense but it is not constit u t iv e of
the crime under Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6718.
E NTERING I NT O A D IS A D V A N T A G E O U S G OVE R N M E N T
CONTRACT UNDER R.A. NO. 3019
Violation of Section 3 ( g) of RA N o 3 0 1 9 i s committed by a
public officer who shall en ter on behalf of th e Government i nt o an y
 300 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
contract or t r a n s action m a n i f estly an d g r ossly di sadvant ageous to
the same.
This c r i m e i s c o m m i t t e d w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e p u b l i c o f f i cer
profited or wil l p r o fit t h e r eby.
Unlike Section 3 (e) of R .A . N o . 3 0 19, Section 3 (g) d oes not
require the giving of unwarr a n ted benefits, advantages or preferences
to private part ies who conspire wit h p u b li c officers, its core element
being the en gagement i n a t r a n s a ction or c o n t r act t h a t i s g r o ssly
and manifestly disadvant ageous to the government. (PCGG v. Office
of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 193176, February 24, 2016)
Overprice Project
Payment of overpriced property bought by the government
(Santillano v. People, G.R. ¹s . 1 7 5 045-46;March 8, 2010) or entering
into a cont r act i n v o l v in g a n o v e r p r ice pr oject (2017 and 20 16 Ba r
Exams) constitu t es v i o l a t i on of S e c tion 3 ( e) s in ce t he r e s ponsible
public officer g i ves u n w a r r a n t e d a d v a n t a ge, pr eference or b enefit
t o a pr i v at e i n d i v i d ua l t h r o u g h m a n i f est p a r t i a l it y o r e v i d ent b a d
faith ( S a n t i l l an o v. Pe o ple, supra) an d a v i o l a t i on o f S e c ti on 3 ( g)
since the contract is m a n i f estly an d gr ossly disadvantageous to the
government. The priv ate indi v i d ual in th e said contract is also liable
for violation of R .A . No . 3019 because of conspiracy. (Santi l l ano v,
People, supra)
ln order to show t h a t t h e r e wa s an ov er p r i cing i n t h e s u bject
transaction, a canvass of different suppli ers with th eir corresponding
prices of properties identical to that alleged overpriced property must
be procured. Failure todo so will cause the acquittal of the accused for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. (Sajul v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. ¹. 135 2 9 4, N o vember 20, 2000; Cau n an v. People, G.R. Nos.
181999 and 1 8 2 0 0 1-04; a nd M a r q u e z v. S a n d i g a n b ayan, F o u r t h
Division, G.R. ¹s . 18 2 0 2 0 -24, September 2,2009)
1. N o Do u bl e Je o p a r d y — Al t h o u gh v i o l a t i on o f S e c tion
3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and v i o l a t ion of Section 3(e) of th e same law
s hare a c o m mo n e l e m e nt , t h e a c cused bein g a p u b l i c o f ficer, t h e
latter is not i n c l u sive of the for m er . Th e essential elements of each
are not included among or do not form p ar t of t h ose enumer ated in
the other. For double jeopardy to exi st, th e elements of one offense
s hould ideally e n compass or i n c l ud e t h ose of th e o t h er . W h a t t h e
rule on d ouble jeopardy p r o h i b i ts r e f e rs to i d e n t i ty o f e l e m e nts in
the two offenses. (Braza v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032,
February 20, 2018)
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301
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
2. Be h e s t L o a n —The following cri t e r ia m ay be u t i l i z ed as
a frame of reference in d et er m i n i n g a b e h est l o an: (1) it i s u n d e r -
collateralized; (2) the borr ower corporation i s u n d er capital i zed; (3)
d irect or i n d i r ect e n d o r sement b y h i g h g o v e r n m en t o f fi ci al s l i k e
presence of marginal notes; (4) stockholders, officers or agents of the
borrower corporation ar e i d en ti fied as cronies (of high governm ent
o fficials); (5) d e vi a t ion o f u s e o f l o a n p r o c eeds fro m t h e p u r p o se
i ntended; (6) U s e o f c o r p or at e l a y e r i ng ; (7 ) n o n -feasibilit y o f t h e
p roject for w h i c h fi n a n c in g i s b e in g sought ; an d (8 ) ex t r a or di n ar y
speed in which th e loan r elease was made. (PCGG v. Desierto, G.R.
No. 139296, November 28, 2007)
G rantin g o f b e h es t l o a n b y g o v e r n m en t b a n k o r e n t i t y t o
a private i n d i v i d ua l i s a v i o l a t io n S e ction 3 ( e ) o f R .A . N o . 3 0 1 9
by giving u n w a r r a n t e d a d v a n t a ge, p r e f erence or b e n e f it t o t h e
borrower and Section 3 (g) by entering int o a contract of loan, which
i s manifestly disadvantageous to the government .
The fact that PN B a p peared to be unduly exposing its finances
b y extending i n i q u i t ou s l o an s t o H M O I , d e s p it e t h e l a t t e r b e i n g
undercapitalized a n d , n o t w i t h s t a n d in g t h e i n a d e q u ac y o f t h e
collateralsbeing offered to secure the loans is basis to find probable
c ause that v i o l a t ion of R .A . N o . 3 0 19. Th e H M O I l o a n s a p pear t o
bear the badges of a behest loan. (PCGG v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 198176, February 24, 2016)
D BP gu a r a n t eed t h e f o r e ig n b o r r o w i ng s o f G a l l eo n f o r t h e
p urpose of acquir in g ne w a n d s econdhand v essels despite v a r i ou s
red flags such as: (a) it s g u a r a n tee accommodation r e quest covers
100% of its project cost, which is in excess of DBP's normal pra c tice
of financing only 80% of such cost; (b) its net profit margin was
experiencing a steady decrease due to high operating costs; (c)its
paid-up capital is only P9.95 Mi l l i on; and (d) aside from its proposal
to source the in crease in equit y f r o m t h e e x pected profits fr om t h e
operations of the vessels to be acquired, Galleon has not shown any
concrete proof on how it w i l l b e f u n d in g it s equity b u i l d - up. The Ad
Hoc Committ ee c oncluded t h a t t h e a c c o mmo dations e xte nded b y
DBP to Galleon w ere in t h e n a t u r e of b ehest loans. Thus, th ere is
probable cause to charge respondent of violation of Section 3 (e) and
(g). (PCGG v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 198176;February
24, 2016)
 302 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
FRAUDS AGAINST THE PUBLIC TREASURY
The offender in th e cr im e of fr au d against th e pu b lic t r easury
must not b e a n i n t e r n a l r e v e nu e of ficer o r c u s to m of fi cer. U n d er
A rticle 213 of t h e R e v i sed Penal C o de, when t h e c u l p r i t i n f r a u 2
against the public tr easury is officer of Bu r eau of I n t e r nal Revenue
o r th e B u r e a u o f C u s t o ms , t h e p r o v i s i ons o f t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i ve
Code shall be a p p l i ed. (Ar t i c le 218) Ho we ver, an i n t e r n al r e v e nue
officer or cu stom officer can be h el d l i a bl e for c r i m e com m i t t e d b y
public officer other t h a n f r a u d a g a i nst th e p u b li c t r e asury such as
malversation.
C ontract or sc h em e t o d e f r a u d t o t h e g o v e r n m e n t
Fraud a g a i ns t t h e p u b li c t r e a sury i s c o m m i t t e d b y a p u b l i c
o fficer who, i n h i s of fi cia l c a pacity o f d e a l in g w i t h o n e f u r n i s h i n g
supplies, or o f m a k i n g c o n t r a c ts, or a d j u s t m en t o r s e t t l e m ent of
a ccounts r el a t in g t o p u b l i c p r o p ert y o r f u n d s , sh al l e n t e r i n t o a n
agreement w it h a n y i n t e r e sted part y o r s p eculator or m a k e use of
any other scheme, to defraud the Governm ent. (Art ic le 218
)
F raud a g a i n s t t h e p u b lic t r e a sury an d S e c t ion 8 (g ) of R .A
No. 8019
The offender in Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 8019 is a public cfficer,
w ho ha s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o e n t e r i n t o a c o n t r a c t i n b e h a l f o f t h e
government. Wh ile the offender in fr au d against the public tr easury
i s considered a p u b li c officer, wh o i s m a k i n g c o n t r a cts r e l a t in g t o
public p r o p ert y ( e .g., mayor), o r a d j u s t i n g o r s e t t l i n g a c c ounts
r elating to it (e.g., treasurer), or dealing wit h su p p l i ers of good ' b t
si u
e must not be an in t e r nal r evenue officer or custom officer.
In R.A. No. 3019, the public officer enters into a contract, which
is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. vVhile
in fraud against the public tr easury, the public officer enters into an
agreement, or uses of any other scheme to defraud t he government.
F raud a g a i nst th e p u b l i c t r e a s ur y a n d m a l v e r s a t i o n
T he cr i m i n a l a c t o f t h i s c r i m e o f f r a u d a g a i n s t t h e p u b l i c
treasury is"entering into an agreement" or "making use of he
f sc m e.
u s, e n t e r in g i n t o a n a g r e em en t i n v o l v i n g s u p p l i e s
w ith a
person, who is not a bo na /d e s u p p l i e r, to defra ud t he g overnment
consummates the crime. Actual ly, defrauding the government is not
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 303
necessary to complete thi s cr i me. The pu b lic officer can be charged
with fraud. against the public tr easury, and vi olation of Section 3(g)
o f R.A. No. 3019 by e n t e r in g a c o n t r a ct , w h i c h i s m a n i f e stly a n d
g rossly disadvantageous to th e g o v er n m e nt . I f t h e g o v er n m ent i s
actually defrauded, accused can be held liablefor malversation.
A c it y m a y o r , e n t e r e d i n t o a n a g r eement t o d e f r a u d t h e
g overnment i n v o l v in g P l mi l l i o n w o r t h o f T - s h i r t s w i t h B , w h o
h as no c a p acit y t o d e l i v e r t h e m . T h e c ity m a d e f u l l p a y m e n t
d espite only a f o u r t h o f t h e T - s h i r t s h a d b een d e l i v ered an d t h a t
the rest of the deliveries were so-called "ghost deliveries." A and B
m isappropriated th e a m o un t c o r r e sponding t o t h e g h ost d e l i v ery .
On the basis ofconspiracy, A and B are liable for malversation and
v iolation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 by causing undue inj ur y t o
t he government t h r o ugh m a n i f est p a r t i a l it y an d ev i dent bad f a i t h .
(See: 1988 Bar Exam; Mo n t a no v. People, G.R. No. 188541, February
14. 2011; Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 209845, July 1, 2015)
F ailure to i ssue r e c e i p t
Fraud against the public treasury i s also committ ed by apublic
officer, who is en t r u s ted w it h t h e c o llection of t a x es, licenses, fees
and other i m p o sts, and sh al l f ai l v o l u n t a r il y t o i s sue a r e ceipt f or
a ny sum of m o ney collected by h i m o f fi c i a ll y a s p r o v i ded by l a w .
(Article 218; 1975 Bar Exam) This is also called illegal exaction.
A sheriff r e ceived on F e b r u ar y 3 , 1 9 7 1 f r o m c o unsel for t h e
plaintiff in a ci vil case P12.60 for sheriff's fee for service of the
c omplaint an d s u m m on s t h e r eof u pon t h e d e f endants. H e m e r el y
i ssued a pr i v at e r eceipt for t h i s a m o u nt . H o w ev er, respondent di d
not issue the official receipt even after he had received on February
5 or 6, 1971 th e booklet of of fi cial r e ceipts. Th e sh eriff com m i t t e d
illegal exaction for f a i l u r e t o i s sue r eceipts for m o ney collected by
him officially. (Ganaden v. Bolasco, A.M No. P-124, May 16, 1975)
C ollecting d i f f e r en t f r o m o f p a y m e n t
Fraud ag ai nst the public treasury i s a lso commit t ed by p ub l i c
officer, who is en t r u s ted w i t h t h e c o llection of t a x es, licenses, fees
and other i m p osts, shall collect or r eceive, directly or i n d i r ectly, by
way of payment or oth er w i se, thi ngs or objects of a natur e different
from tha t p r o v i ded b y l a w . (A r t i c le 218) Th is c r i m e i s a l s o c alled
illegal exaction.
 304 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 303
VOLUME II

D eman d in g e x c essive am o u n t
October 28, 1984) Since falsification of communi ty t ax certificate is a
Fraud aga i nst the public tr easury i s a lso commit t ed by p u b l i c necessary means to m i sappropri ate th e pu b li c f u n ds, the t r easurer
officer, who is en t r u s ted w i t h t h e c o l lect' is liable for complex cr im e of m a l v e r sation t h r o ugh f a l si fication of
c ion o f t axes,, licenses,
1 fees
andoother
an t h e r iim
m p o sts, shall demand, directly or in d i r ectl
i ree y , th e p a y m e n t public document. (People v. Barbas, G.R. No. L-41265, July 27, 1984)
o s u m s d i f f e r en t f r o m o r l a r g e r t h a n t h o s e a u t h o r i zed b y l a w .
(Article 218) This crime is also called illegal exaction. A letter of th e p r ov i n cial t r e asur er's office told th e l a n downer
t hat hi s r e a l e s t at e t a x d u e i s P 5 0 0 .00 w h e n a c t u a ll y i t i s o n l y
Article 213 uses the w ord "d e m a n d in g." T h us d P 400.00. Th e t r e a s u re r a l s o m a d e i t a p p e a r i n t he o r i g i n a l o f
a mount larger or different from that pr escr b d b u1s, e m a n d i n g a n t he official r eceipt g i ven t o h i m t h a t P 5 0 0 .00 wa s p ai d bu t i n t h e
c ri e y aw c o n s u m m a t e s
thee cri
crime. Actual collection of the excess am d uplicate, the t r u e a m o un t o f P 4 0 0 .00 was st at ed. Th ereafter, t h e
a moun ti s' not n ecessar
am
'

c onsummate the crim e . ~ y to

teller m i s a p pr opr i a ted t h e e n t i r e a m o u n t o f P 5 0 0 . 00. ( 1 977 Ba r
A rticle 2 1 3 u s e s t h Exam)
h e wor d s CCcollecting o r r e c eiving." T h u s ,
collecting or receiving property d i f f erent from t ha t collectible under T he amoun t o f P 4 0 0 .00 collected a s p a y m en t o f r e a l e s t a t e
t he law (e.g., receiving j ew elr y i n s t ead of m o ney a s t a x p a ' m e n t) tax 's a public fu nd. The tr easurer is an accountable officer. Hence,
c onsummates the crim e. as ax payment
misappropriation o f P 4 0 0 .00 i s m a l v e r s at ion (P e ople v. Po l i c her,
supra)
D octrin e of a b s o r p t i o n
T he excess amount of P 1 0 0.00 is no t a p u b l i c f u n d s i nce t h e
A m u n i c i pa l t r e a s u re r d e m a n de d a n d c o l l ected P 5 0 0 .00 a s collectible amount of tax is only P400.00. Such amount is considered
fees for registration of cattlefrom the offended as private property, mi sappropri a t ion of wh ich is not ma lv ersation.
e o en e party despite the
f act thaat t h e coc o l lec
e t i b l e a m o un t u n d e r t h e l a w w a s o n l y P 4 0 0 .00.
A fter t h e c o l l ection t he t r e a s urer m i s a p p r opr i a ted t h The treasurer defrauded the taxpayer in paying an amount
o n, th
P 100.00.
.00. The c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s e s t af a t h r o u g h f a l s e p r e t e nse. higher t ha t t h e d u e f o r t a x , a n d a s a c o n s equence, th e t a x p ayer
Demanding an excessive amount i s uffered d a m a ge. H e n ce, t r e a surer i s l i a b l e f o r e s t a f a . ( U . S . v.
i s no t i 'll eg a1 exaction since such Lopez, supra) Since falsifying l e t t er of d e m a nd a nd o ff ic ial r e c eipt
demand constit u tes the deceit or false pretense w h ich is an element
of esta a.In sum, estafa absorbs illegal exaction sin b y makin g u n t r u t h f u l s t a t e m en t t h e r ei n i s a n e c essary m e ans t o
ispensable means to commit the former. (see:ce t h ev.
U.S. 1 att .t er i s defraud the taxpayer, the treasurer isliable for complex crime of
G.R. No. L-8968, Ma r ch 21, 1908) o ez estafa thr ough f a l sification of d ocument. (P eople v. Ba r b as, supra;
U.S. v. Austero, G.R. No. I- 5 0 7 2, October 27, 1909)
N ote: T he c r i m e o f m a l v e r s a t i on '
i n th e L o pez case i s n o t
committed because excess amount of P 1 0 0.00 is
o . i s n o t a p u blic fund P ROHIBITED TRAN S A C T IO N S
since the collectible amount of tax is only P400.00.
Am
municipaltreasurer demanded and Prohibited t r a n saction i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n a p p o i n t i ve p u b l i c
P400 for n c o1 e1ct ed t h e a mo u n t o f o fficer wh o s h a ll , d i r e ctl y o r i n d i r e c t ly , b ecome i n t e r ested i n a n y
or residentialtax from X, a taxpayer, covered b a c
t ax certificate. However r, covere y a co m m u n i t y transaction of exchange or speculation w i t h i n t h e t e r r i t or y s u bject
owever,h e e rretained th e comm u n it y t a x c e r t i f i
ffor failure of X to p rovide n ecessary i n f o r m a t i on . T h i c ate to his jurisdiction du r in g his in cu mb ency. (Artic le 215)
f alsified th eeccommunit
o y t a x c e r t i f i c ate an d i s s ued th e s am e surer
e rt ea to Z, E lective o f fi c ia l c a n n o t c o m m i t t h e c rime o f pr o h i bited
another ta xpayer, after collecti n P 4 0 0 . 00. Th
transaction.
co ected from Z as tax payment is a public fund. The
collect
e o c e r . ence, misappropri a t ion of the amount collected T ransaction of e x ch ange or s p eculation i n c l u des bu y in g a n d
rom Z i s m a l v e r s a t i on. (P e ople selling stocks, commodit i es, l a nd, h o p in g t o t a k e a d v a n t age of an
v. P olicher, G . R. N o . L - 4 1 0 0 8
1 expected rise or fall in p r i ce. (Revised Penal Code by Luis Reyes)

J9JC9B0M
 306 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
POSS E S S ION OF PRO H IBITED INTEREST
Possession of prohibited interest is committ ed by a public officer
who, directly or i n d i r e ct ly, shall become int erested in an y con t r act
or business in which it i s hi s official duty to i n t e r v ene. (Artic le 216)
A m u n i c i pal m a y o r b e c ame i n t e r ested an d t o o k p a r t i n t h e
l easing of fi sh pond ow ned by t h e m u n i c i p a l i ty , w h e r ei n h e h a d t o
intervene by reason of his office. He was convicted cf possession of
prohibited in t erest. (U.S. v. Uda r be, G.A. N o. L-9945, No v e
mbe 12,
1914)
If th e m a yor bo u g ht f or c o n s ideration s h a re of t h e ccompany ompan
e ngaged in the business of construction of road for the mu n i cipalii t y,
municipa
t he cr im e c o m m i t t e d i s p o s session of p r o h i b i te d i n t e r e st . I f t h e
mayor re ceived wit h o ut c onsideration s h a re of s to ck f r om t h e s a i d
company in connection wit h a t r a n s action wit h th e m u n i c i p al i ty , he
is liable for possession of prohibited int erest and violation of Section
8(b) of R.A. No. 3019, which pu n i s hes receiving share in connection
w ith an y g o v er n m en t c o n t r act o r t r a n s a ction, w he r i n t h e m a y o r
h as to intervene under the law .
The provision on possession of prohibited in t erest is applicable
to experts, arbit r a t ors and pr i v ate accountants who, in like ma nn er
s hall t ak e p ar t i n a n y c o n t r ac t o r t r a n s a ction connected w it h t h e
estate or pr operty i n t h e a p p r a i s al, di s t r i b u t ion or a d j u d i cation of
which t hey s h al l h a v e a c t ed, an d t o t h e g u a r d i an s an d e x ecutors
w ith r e spect t o t h e p r o p e rt y b e l o n gin g t o t h e i r w a r d s o r e s t a t e.
(Article 216)
UNLAWFUL I NTEREST IN , A B U S I NESS, CONTRACT
OR
TRANSACTION UNDER R.A. NO. 3019
Violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 8019 is committed by bl'
o ce r w h o d i r e ctl y or i n d i r e c tl y s h al l h a v e fi n a n c ial o r p e cu n i ar y
officer
i nterest in any bu si ness, contract or t r a n saction in connection wi t h
which he int ervenes or takes part i n hi s official capacity.
I ndir ect i n t e r e s t
P ecuniary i n t e r es t m a y b e d i r e c t a n d i nd i r e ct . T h u s , t h e
interest of the wife of the mayor in the company that operates cockpit
is withi n t h e cont em pl a t ion of Section 8(h) of R .A. No. 80 19. Since
such interest is presumed to be conjugal property, the int erest of the
mayor inthe company is direct.(Teves v. Sandiganbayan, G.A. No.
154182, December 17, 2004)
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 307
I nterven t io n i n h i s of fi cial c a p a c i t y
A publi c of ficer w h o i n t e r v e nes i n c o n t r a ct s o r t r a n s a ctions
which have no r e l a t ion t o h i s o f fice cannot v i ol at e Section 8 (h) of
R.A. No. 80:9. (M a c a r i o la v. H o n. As u nc ion, Adm. Ca se No. 188-J;
M ay 81, 198-".) Intervention in th e t r a n saction as an element of t h i s
c rime must o e m ad e i n h i s o f f i cial capacity. I n t h i s s i t u a t i on , t h e
public office= acted in his pr i v at e capacity .
P ossession of p r o h i b i t e d i n t e r e s t a n d S e c t i o n 8 ( h ) o f R . A .
No. 8019
I n p o ssession o f p r o h i b i t e d i n t e r es t u n d e r A r t i c l e 2 1 6 o f
the Revised Penal C o de, th e p u b l i c of fi cer h a s an o f f i c ial d u t y t o
intervene ir a c ontr a ct or bus iness, in whi ch he becomes interested.
A ctual intervention is not an element of thi s cri m e .
I n u n l a w fu l i n t e r es t u n d e r S e c t io n 8 ( h ) o f R . A . N o . 8 0 1 9 ,
the public of fi cer in t e r v enes or t a k e s p a r t in h i s o f f ic i al c a p a city
i n business, contract o r t r a n s a ction, i n w h i c h h e h a s fi n a n c ial or
p ecuniary in t er est. Actual i n t e r v en t ion is an element of this cri m e .
Z leased a buil d in g ow ned by th e m u n i c i p al it y t h r o ugh X, t h e
m ayor at that t i m e. Th ereafter, Z won as mayor of the mu n i cipali t y .
U pon assumpt io n o f o f fi ce , Z s h o u l d h a v e t e r m i n a t e d h i s l e a s e
agreement w i t h t h e m unicipa ity . F o r m ai n t a i n i n g t h e l e a s e
t ransaction w i t h t h e m u n i c i p a l it y i n wh i c h h e h a s t h e d u t y t o
intervene asincumbent mayor, he isliable for possession of prohibited
i nterest. If Z ex t ended the lease contract w it h t h e m u n i c i p al i ty , h e
can be held I'able for vi ol at ion of Section 3 (h) of R .A. No. 8019 for
i ntervenir - i ri the l e ase t r a n saction w i t h t h e m u n i c i p a l it y i n h i s
o fficial capacity as mayor .
P rohibite d i n t e r e st u n d e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o r l a w
V iolation of S ection 8 (h) of R .A . N o . 8 0 1 9 i s a l s o comm i t t e d
b y a publi c of ficer wh o d i r e ctl y o r i n d i r e ctl y s h al l h a v e f i n a n cin g
o r pecuniary i n t e r est i n a n y b u s i n e ss, contr act o r t r a n s a ction i n
v iolation of the prohibi t ion u n der th e Constit u t i on or any l a w .
Actual n t e r v e n t i o n i n b u si n e ss , c o n t r ac t o r t r an s a c t i on
in which t h e p u b l i c o f fi cer h a s a n i n t e r e s t i s a n i n d i s p ensable
element of violation of Section 3 (h) of R.A. No. 8019. (Palma Gil
v. People, G.B. No. 78 6 18, September 1, 19 89) H o w e ver, t h e re a re
e xceptions. Actual i n t e r v e n t ion i s n o t a n e l e m en t o f t h i s c r i me, i f
the Constitution or law prohibits him from having interest therein.
(Teves v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. ¹. 15 4 1 8 2, December17, 2004)
 308 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Under th e 1987 Consti t u t i on , th e f oll owing p ersons shall not,
d irectly or in d i r ectly, be int erested finan cially in an y cont r act v i t h
or in any fr a n chise or special pr i v i l ege granted by the Government,
o r any s u b d i v i sion, a gency, or i n s t r u m e n t a l it y t h e r e of, i n c l u d i n g
any government-owned or -controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
d uring h i s t e r m o f o f fi ce : ( 1 ) t h e P r e s i d ent , V i c e P r e s i dent , t h e
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants; (2) Senator
o r Member of t h e H o u se of R e pr esentatives; and (8) M e m ber c t a
Constitut i onal Com m i ssion.
In T eves v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, s u p r a, a m a y o r w a s
convicted
under th e second m ode for h a v i n g p e cu ni ar y o r f i n a n c ial i n t e r est
in a cockpit w h ic h i s p r o h i b i ted u n der Section 89 of R.A. No. 71
60.
(Local Government Code)
A , an i n c u m b en t m u n i c i pa l c o u n cilor , m a d e a n o f f e r t o t h e
municipality of w h ich he is councilor, to pave one of its streets for a
very reasonable price, which offer was not h ow ever accepted. (1957
Bar Exam)
Becoming int er ested in a contr act w it h t h e governm
t h
puublic
i c o f f i cer h a s t h e d u t y t o i n t e r v en e consti t u te s p ossession of
prohibited int erest. A has the duty t o i n t e r v e ne in contract wi th t h e
m unicipalit y a s c o u n cil or . H o w ev er, A i s n o t l i a b l e fo r t h i s c r i m
because he ha s n o c o n t r ac t w i t h t h e m u n i c i p a l i ty . H i s p r o p osed
contract was rejected. Neither is he l i a ble for at t e m p ted possession
o f prohibited i n t e r est s i nc e t h i s i s a f o r m a l c r i m e , w h i c h h a s n o
attempted stage.
U nder th e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e C o de, councilors ar e p r o h i b i ted t o
have an i n t e r est i n a n y c o n t r a ct, wit h t h e m u n i c i p a l i ty . V i o l a t i on
o f this pr o h i b i t io n consti t u t e s a c r i m e u n d e r S e ction 8 (h ) o f R . A .
No. 8019. However, A is not l i a ble for t hi s cr im e because he has r o
c ontract w it h t h e m u n i c i p a l i ty . N e i t h e r i s h e l i a bl e for a t t e mp t t o
v iolate R.A. No. 8019. The crim e u n der t h i s la w ha s not a t t e m p t ed
s tage since i t d i d n o t a d o p t t h e t e c h n i ca l n o m e n cl at ur e o f t h e
penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
P rohib i t io n u n d e r t h e C S C r u l e s
T he Civil Service Rules prohibits a public officer from enga ' n
i n priv a t e bbu s i n ess, vocation, or profession
ate
w ithout a w r i t t e n
p ermission from th e h ead of depar t m e nt . D i s r egarding t h i s r u l e is
not a violation of Section 8(h) of R.A. No. 8019, which punishes a
pu li c officer for h a v in g i n t e r est pr o h i b i ted by la w or C o n st i t u t i o r.
J9JC9B0M
VII. R I M ES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 309
and not m er e a d m i n i s t r a t iv e r u l e s (M a c a r r o la v He n A su n c r o n
Adm. Case No. 188- J, May 8 1, 1982) However, the vio la tor is l i a b le
administr a t i vel r.
U NLAWFUL INTEREST IN A T R A N S A CTION APPROVED BY T H E
BOARD, PANEL OR GR O U P U N D E R R.A. NO. 3019
Section 8(i) of R.A. No. 8019 is commi t ted by any public officer
who shall, directly or indir ectly, become interested, for personal gain,
o r having a material i n t e r est in any t r a n saction or act requir in g th e
approval of a board, panel or group of which he is amember, and
which exercises discretion in such approval .
Violation of Section 8(i) is commi t ted even if the offender votes
against the same or does not par t i ci p ate in th e ac tion of the board,
committee, panel or group.
I nterest fo r p e r s onal g a i n s h a l l b e p r e s u me d a g a i nst t h o s e
p ublic officers responsible for th e a p p r oval of m a n i f estly u n l a w f u l ,
inequitable, orirregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or
group to which they belong.
In Vi l l a v . S a n d i g a n b ayan, G . R. N o . 8 7 1 9 6, A p r i l 2 4 , 1 9 9 2 ,
S ection 8(i) of R.A. No. 8019 was not v i ol ated because the B i d d i n g
Committee did not ex ercise discretion in t h e a w ar d of th e contr act
for purchase of the equipm ent, w h ich ha d to be giver. to the lowest
bidder.
T here is no violation of Section 8(j) if th e t r a n saction requir es
the approval ofthe accused alone, and not of a board, panel or group
of which he is a member. However, he is liable under Section 7(a)
of R.A. No. 6718 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
O ffici al) , w h i c h p r o h i b i t s h a v i n g d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t fi n a n c ia l o r
m aterial i n t e r est i n a n y t r a n s a ction r e q u i r i n g t h e a p p r oval of t h e
office of the public official.
UNLAWFUL INTEREST IN A TRANSACTION UNDER R.A. NO. 6713
Violation of S ection 7 (a ) of R .A . N o . 6 71 8 (Code of Conduct
a nd Ethical St a n d a rds for P u b li c Of fi ci als) is comm i t t e d by p u b l i c
o fficials, wh o s h a l l d i r e c tl y o r i n d i r e c tl y h a v e a n y f i n a n c ia l o r
material in t e r est in an y t r a n s action requi r in g th e appr oval of th eir
office. Financial an d m a t e r ia l i n t e r est i s defined as a pecuniary or
proprietary interest by which a person will gain or lose something.
(Implementing r u les of R.A. No. 6718)
 310 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER 311
VII. "RIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
VOLUME II

If the public officer has in t er est in a cont r act or bu siness with

the government d e spite th e f act t h a t h e h a s t h e du t y t o i n t e r v ene
therein, he is liable for the crime of possession of prohibited int erest
under Ar t i cle 216 of the Revised Penal Code.
If th e p u b l i c of fi cer h a s i n t e r est i n a c o n t r a ct , b u s i n ess or
transaction w it h t h e g ov er n m e nt , an d t h en , he in t e rvenes or takes
part in his official capacity the rein, he is liable for violation of Section
8 (h) of R.A. No. 8019.
I f t h e p u b l i c o f fi ce r h a s i n t e r e s t i n a cont r a ct , b u s i n ess
o r t r a n saction w i t h t he g o v e r n m e nt , d e s p it e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
Constitution or la w p r o h i b i ts h im f r o m h a v i n g s u ch i n t e r e st, he is
liable for violation of Section 8 (h) of R.A. No. 8019.
If the public ofFicer has direct or i n d i r ect Financial or m a t e ri al
interest in any tr a n saction with the government despite the fact that
the approval of the transaction by board, panel or group of wh i ch he
is a member is re qui r e d, he is l i a b le for v i o la t i on of S ection 8 ( j) of
R.A. No. 8019.
If the public officer has dir ect or i n d i r ect fi n an cial or m a t e r i al
interest i n a n y t r a n s a ction w i t h t h e g o v e r n m en t d e spit e t h e f a ct
that the ap p r o v al of th e tr a n s action by hi s office is r e q ui r e d, he is
liable for violation of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6718.
If the act v i o l a tes both R .A . No . 6 718 and R .A . No . 80 19, the
public officer sh all b e p r osecuted un der th e R .A . No . 8 0: 9 s i nce it
prescribes a penalty h i g her t ha n t h a t p r e scribed by R.A. No. 6718.
UNLAWFUL INTERVENTION OF RELATIVES OF HIGH-RANKING
OFFICIALS UNDER R.A. NO. 3019
Violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 8019 is commit ted by a spouse
o r any r e l a t i ve, by consanguin it y o r a f fi n i t y , w i t h i n t h e t h i r d c i v i l
d egree, of th e P r e s ident o f t h e P h i l i p p i ne s t h e V i c e P r e sident. f
t e P h i l i p p i n es, the Pr esident of th e Senate, or th e Speaker of t h e
House of Representatives, to int erv ene, directly or in d i r ectly, in any
usiness, transaction, contract or appl ication wit h t h e Governm ent.
However, the crime under Section 5 is not commi t ted under the
following inst ances:
1. I f t h e a cc u s e d h a s b e e n a lready d e a l i n g w i t h th e
Government along the same line of business prior to the assumption
of office of the said official who is related to him;
2. If the transaction, contract or application is already
existing or pending at th e t im e of such assumption of public ofFice;
8. I f t h e s a i d p u b l i c of ficer ha s n o d i s cretion i n a p p r o v i n g
t he application fi le d b y t h e a ccused, who i s r e l a ted t o hi m a n d i t s
approval depends upon compliance with r e q u i sites provided by law ,
or rules orregulations;
4. I f a cc u s ed , w h o i s r e l a t e d t o s u c h p u b l i c o f fi c er , i n
intervening i n b u s i n e ss, t r a n s action , c ontract o r a p p l i c a-.ion i s
l awfully perform in g an act in an official capacity or in th e exercise of
a profession
U NLAW F U L IN T E R E S T O F M E M B E RS O F C O N G R E S S I N A
BUSINESS ENT E R P R ISE BE N E FITED BY LAW U N D E R R .A. NO.
3019
V iolation of S ection 6 o f R . A . N o . 8 0 1 9 i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y
M ember of t h e C o n g r ess wh o s h al l a c q u ir e o r r e c eive d u r i n g t h e
term for which he has been elected any personal pecuniary i n t e r est
i n any s p e cifi c b u s i n ess e n t e r p r is e w h i c h w i l l b e di r e c tl y a n d
particularly f av ored or benefited by any la w or r e solut ion au t h or ed
by him previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the
same term.
T he crime u n der Section 6 cannot be commi t t ed by an y o t h er
p ublic officer v-ho r ecommended th e i n i t i a t i o n i n C o n g r ess of t h e
enactment o r a d o p t io n o f a n y l a w o r r e s o l u t i on , an d a c q u i re s or
receives any su "h interest dur in g hi s in cu mb ency.
Violation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8019 is also committed by
such member cf C on gress or ot her p u b li c officer w ho, h av in g such
interest prior t o th e ap pr oval of such law or r e solution au t h ored or
recommended by him, continues to have such interest for 80 days
after such approval to ret ain such in t er est .
MALVERSATION
Malversation i s com m i t t e d b y pu b l i c of f ic e r w h o , b e i n g
accountable for p u b li c f u nd s or p r o p erty b y r e a son of th e d u t ies of
his offi
ce, appropriates the same, or takes or misappropriates, or
consents to the taking th ereof by other person or permits him to take
it through abandonment or negligence. (Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code; 1999 Bar Exam)

J9JC9B0M
 312 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
P ublic P r o p e r t y o r F u n d s
Dencio, who is th e m u n i c i pal t r e a surer of th e t o wn . wa s al so
the treasurer of a charity ball of the chur ch. Because he was short of
payroll funds for the munic ipal employees, he used part of the church
f unds to replenish the payr oll f u nd s w it h t h e i n t e n t ion of ret u r n i n g
the same when the public funds came. (1990Bar Exam) Ma versaticii
i s not comm i t t e d s i nce m oney m i s ap pr opr i ated i s no t p u b l i c f u n d.
T he crime commi t ted is estafa th r o ugh m i sappropri a t i o n .
1. C ust o d i a L e g i s — P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , w hich i s u n d e r
custodia legis, is i m p r e s sed with t h e c h a r a c ter of p u b l ic p r o p erty.
(People v. De la Serna, 40 Off. Gaz. (Supp. 12j 159) Thus, Red Cross,
Anti-Tuberculosis, and Boy Scouts f u nd s delivered to an a s sistant
cashier of a provincial treasurer for his custody acquire the attr i b u t es
of public funds (People v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-6068, April 26; 1954)
Under Ar t i cle 222 of the Revised Penal Code, the provisions on
malversation shall apply to any adm i n i s t r a tor or depository of funds
or property at t a c hed, seized or deposited by public autho ri t y, even if
s uch property belongs to a pri v ate in d i v i d u a l .
T wo i n d i v i d u al s c a r r y i n g r e s p ectively a l o o s e fi r e a r m a n d
licensed fir e ar m w e r e c r e a t in g t r o u b le . P olice officers confiscated
the loose fi r e ar m a n d t o o k t h e l i c e n sed fir e a rm e x p l a i n i n g t h a t
h e had to b r i n g i t t o t h e p o l ice headquart ers for e x a m i n a t ion b ut
promised t ha t h e w o u l d r e t u r n i t i n f i v e d a y s . M i s a p p r opr i a t i on
of a loose firearm c onfiscated by t h e p o l ice officer i s m a l v e r sation
since the firearm wa s u n der custodia legis. Mi s appropria t i on of the
1'icensed firearm is not m a l v er sation because the same for not being
a loose firearm wa s n ot u n d er cu s todia l egis. The crime commi t t e d
is estafa t h r o ug h m i s a p p r op r i a t io n s i n c e t h e p o l i c e o f f icer wh:
o
ookk the
h fir
fi earm , acquired j u r i d i cal possession over it b y r e a son of
commodatum. (1986 Bar Exa m )
A court sheriff who levied a private property owned by
de fendant i n a c i v i l c a se, and t h en , m i s a p pr opr i ated th e s am e i s
)
liable for m a l v e r sation s i nce th e p r o p ert y i s u n d er cu s t odia l e gis.
(2001 Bar Exam) Whe ther the proceeds of auction sale is owned by a
government ent it y or a pr i v at e company, a sheriff can be h l d l i a ble
for malv ersation fo r m i s a p p r op r i a t in g i t s i n c e t h e s am e i s u n d e."
custodia legis. (2008 Bar E x a m)
PCGG sequestered p r i v at e p r o p er t ies of R u s ta n D e p a r t m en-.
Store, and then, the custodian th ereof misappropri ated it. The crime
committed is m a l v er sation si nce the pr opert ies are u n der cu s todia
legis. (2001 Bar Exam)
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
'A" mortgaged his licensed gun to "B." "B" gave the gun to "C" a
mayor. The"eafter, the gun was confiscated by police authorit ies at a
check point. But th e gun wa s lost, since its custodian died. The gun,
a private p"operty, wa s not u n der cu s todia l e gis sin ce C as m a yor
did not confiscate it . H e n ce, it i s no t i m p r e ssed wit h t h e ch ar acter
of public property. A pub lic official, who is not responsible for public
f unds or p r o p ert y a n d w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y t o s a f e guar d t h e s a m e ,
cannot be convicted of malversation.(Salamera v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 121099, February 17, 1999)
2. C a sh A dv a n c e — A c a s h a d v a n ce f or t r a v e l e x p e nses
(travel ailowance) is not a public fund since the public officer received
i t in the form of loan. Hence, there is tr an sfer of ownership from th e
government to the public officer mak ing the cash advance as private
property. The public officer can use it as his own money in connection
with his tr a veL L i q u i d a t ion of cash advance for tr a vel is equivalent
to payment of loan. Hence, failure to liqui d ate by presenting receipts
of travel expenses is not m a l v er sati on. (Panganib an v. People, G.R.
No. 211548, December 9 , 2015) But the public officer must retu rn t h e
u nliquidated amount to th e governm en t .
However, c as h a d v a n c e f o r l i v e l i h oo d p r o g r am (P e o ple v .
Icdang, G.R. No. 185960, January 2 5, 2012) or cash advance to buy
working t o ol s fo r p r o v i n c ial p r o j ect (P e ople v. D e v a l os, G . R. N o .
145229, April 20 , 2 0 0 6) is p u b l i" p r o p e rt y. T h e re is n o t r a n s f er o f
ownership since the public officer did not r eceive the cash advance
in the foriri of loan. The pu b lic officer is r equi red to use the m oney
not for his personal benefit but f or a s pecific public purp ose. Hence,
failure to l i q u i d at e u pon d e m ar d g i v e s r i se t o t h e p r e su m p t ion of
malversation.
3. C on f i s c a t e d D a n g e r ou s D r u gs — Firearms or explosives
s eized from p e r s ons n o t a u t h o r i ze d t o p o s sess th e s a m e , w h i c h
are in the custody of peace offi"ers,are public properties. (People
v. Magsinc, C. A . , 5 0 O. G . 6 ' 75) M i s a p p ro pri a t i on o f s u c h p u b l i c
properties constitu tes the crime of malv ersation .
C onfiscated, se i z e d or su r r e n d e r e d d a n g e r ou s dr u g s ,
d rugs pa r a p h er n a l ia , t h e p r o c eeds o r p r o p e r t i e s o b t a i ne d f r o m
dangerous dr ug s t r a f fi c k in g a r e a l s o p u b l i c p r o p er t i es. H o w ever,
m isappropriatio n o r m i s a p p l i c ation o f s u c h p u b l i c p r o p e r t ies o r
failure to i n d e r accounts th erefore is not ma l v ersation the Revised
Penal Code. The crim e comm i t te d is mi s a ppropria t i on or fa i l u re to
render accounts under Section 27 of R.A. No. 9165.
 314 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Police officers, after arr esting a drug im p or ter and confiscating
b ags cont ai n in g . h er oi n , allowed t h e dru g t r af f ic k e r t o escape
and ret a i ned s om e o f t h e c o n fi scated h e r o in . T h e y a r e l i a b l e f or
m isappropri at io n o f d r u g s u nder S e c t io n 2 7 o f R. A . N o . 9 1 6 5
and acting a s a p r o t ector or c o d dler u n de r S e ction 4 t h e r eof. The
trafficker is l i a ble for i m p o r t a t ion of dangerous drug u n der Section
4 thereof. (2005 Bar Exam )
Accountable Officer
U nder S e c t io n 1 0 1 o f G o v e r n m en t A u d i t i n g C o d e o f th e
Philippines (P.D. No. 1 445), an ac c ountable o f f i c er i s one who
h as custody or c o n t ro l o f p u b l i c p r o p ert y b y r e a son of t h e d u t i e s
of his office. U n der S ection 34 0 of. the L ocal G over n m en t C o de, a
local accountable officer is one who has possession or custody of
local governm en t f u n d s b e c ause of t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i r f u n c t i ons
or has pa r t i c ipa t ed in th e us e or a p p l i c a t i on of t h e r eof. (Zoleta v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015)
1. Con t r o l —Un d er t he G o v e rn m e nt A u d i t i n g C o de of the
Philippines, accountable officer is a p u b l i c o ff ic er w h o h a s co n trol
o f public p r o p ert y b y r e a son o f t h e d u t i e s o f h i s o f fi ce. A p u b l i c
officer of the n a t i o nal governm ent w h o ha s pa r t i c i p a ted i n t h e u s e
or application o f p u b l i c f u n d s i s a n a c c ou n t a ble oi f ic er s i n c e h e
has control of p u b li c p r op erty b y r e a son of th e d u t i e s of hi s office.
Under Local Governm ent C o de, one has par t i c i p ated in t h e u s e or
application of public property is an accountable officer.
A public officer with au t h o r i ty to dis pose (U.S. v. Webster, G.R.
No. L-2732, August28, 1906), orcontrol public property or fund (U.S.
v. Wickersham, G.R. No. L-6781, November 6, 1911) is an accountable
officer wit hi n t h e cont em pl a t ion of th e G overn m ent A u d i t i n g C ode
and Local Government Code.
In Panganib an v. People, G.R. No. 211543, December 9, 2015,
the Supreme Court r u l e d t ha t a m a yor i s not an accountable officer
since his duty is not to collect money or property from the public. The
Panganiban case is a s t r ay d e c ision. It i s j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l ly s e tt l e d
that a mayor is an accountable officer for pu r p oses of malversation.
The mayor is responsible for all governm ent f u nds pe "taining to the
municipality; hence, he is an accountable officer. (People v. Panteleon,
G.R. Nos. 158694-96, March 13, 2009; Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No.
205698, February 14, 2018)
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 315
T he mayor an d t r e a surer h av e th e d ut y t o p a r t i c i p ate in t h e
release of funds. Their si gnat u res are needed to disburse municipal
funds. No payment can be made wit h out t h ei r si gn at u r es. They had
control and responsibility over the funds; hence, they are accountable
officers. (Manuel v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158418, February
8, 2012)
A pub li c of fi cer w i t h r e s p ect t o c a s h a d v a nce fo r l i v e l i h ood
(People v. Ic d a n g, G . R. N o . 1 8 5 9 6 0, J a n u a r y 2 5 , 2 0 1 2) o r c a s h
advance to buy properties forthe province (People v. Devalos, G.R.
No. 145229, April 2 0, 20 0 6) is an a ccountable officer because of h is
authority to d i s b urse t he same for s p e cific p ub l ic p u r p o se. He h a s
control over these cash advances.
2. Cu st o d y — U n d e r G o v e r n m e nt A u d i t i n g C o d e o f t h e
Philippines, one wh o h a s c u st ody of p u b l i c p r o p ert y b y r e a son of
the duties of hi s of fice i s a n a c count able officer. U n de r t h e L o c al
G overnment C o de , on e w h o h a s p o s s ession o r c u s t od y o f l o c a l
g overnment f u n d s b e cause of t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i r f u n c t i on s i s a n
accountable officer.
E ven though th e pu b lic officer could not di sburse public fun d s
without any order from superior aut h o r i ty , he is still an accountable
o fficer if he received money belonging to the Governm ent for w h i c h
he was bound to account (U.S. v. Velasquez, 82 Phil. 157) or has
authority t o r eceive money pert ai n in g t o th e govern m e nt. (Revised
Penal Co de by L u i s R e y es)B y r e c e iving t h e p r o p e r t y, t h e s a m e
s hall be placed under th e cu stody of th e p u b li c officer m a k i n g h i m
an accountable officerunder Government Auditing Code and Local
Government Code.
A principal of a public high school entr u sted wit h p u b li c fu n d s
is an accountable officer. (Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074, August,
81, 2011) A pol ice officer is a n a c c ounta ble o fficer w i t h r e s p ect t o
the service prearm i s s ued to h i m . (Cifranca, Jr. v. Sa n d i g a n bayan,
O.R. No. 94408, February 14, 1991) A sheriff is an accountable
officer with r e spect to a gar n i shed pr i v at e pr operty, w h ich is u n der
custodia legis. In t h e se situ a t i o ns, the p r i n c i p a l, police officer and
sheriff, who have custody over the public properties, are accountable
officers, although t h e y h a v e n o con t rol or a u t h o r i t y t o d i s pose the
same.
The following are accountable officers: cashier, treasurer,
c ollector, pr opert y of fi cer a n d a n y o t h e r o f fi ce r o r e m p l o yee w h o
 316 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
a re tasked w i t h t h e t a k i n g o f m o n e y o r p r o p e rt y f r o m t h e p u b l i c
which they are duty -bound to keep temporar ily u n t i l s uch money or
property are properly deposited in an official depository banks (e.g.,
Landbank1 or s i m i l a r e n t i t i es ; or u n t i l t h e y s h a l l h a v e e n d orsed
such money or p r o p erty t o o t h e r a ccountable officers or concerned
offices. (Panganiban v. People, G.R. No. 211548, December 9, 2015)
3. W it h o u t A u t h o r i t y t o R e c e i v e a n d D i s b u r s e — If the
public officer ha s n e i t he r a u t h o r i t y t o r e c eive th e p u b li c p r o p erty
n or authorit y t o di sburse it, he is not an accountable officer. In t h i s
s ituation, he has no control or custody over the public property .
The duty of the accused as an employee of MWSS is to prepare
payroll an d d i s t r i b u t e t h e s a l a r ie s of t h e M W S S e m p l o yees. She
is not an accountable officer (Ilumin v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . R. N o .
85667, February 2 8, 1 995) since she has no a u t h o r i ty t o ccoon ntro
r o lor
diispose the salaries of the employees. Moreover, payroll officeris
holding the money for i m m e d i ate dist r i b u t ion to employees.
P erez was a c l er k o f t h e B u r e a u o f P os t e n t r u s te d w i t h t h e
c ombination and key of a safe, but he is neither in charge of the c h
e cas
b ook nor has any authority to open the safe and withdraw money
therefrom. D u r i n g t h e a b sence of hi s su p eri or, he opened th e safe
and abstracted t h e r e from c ash an d c h e cks. (1967 Bar E x a m ) T h e
crime comm i t t e d i s q u a l i f ied t h ef t a n d n o t m a l v e r s a t ion b ecause
P erez is not an accountable officer. He had no author it y to wi t h d r a w
funds from th e safe wi t h out a u t h o r it y f r o m hi s superior officer. His
p ossession of the key an d t h e combi n a t ion of th e safe gave him n o
control over its contents. His relat ion to the contents of the safe was
m erely tha t o f a g u ar d w h ose dut y w a s t o see tha t n o on e bu t h i s
s uperior officer ha d a ccess to th e f u n d s . H i s p o si t ion i s s i m i l a r t o
that of a w a t c h ma n o f a w a r e h ouse to w ho m t h e k e y i s e n t r u s t ed
with no ri ght t o d i spose of its contents. (U.S. v. Wickersham, supra)
Moreover, Perez has no author it y to receive money pertai n in g to the
government .
T he a c c u se d w a s a forage m aster, having charged of
Government forage (foods for animals), subject to the orders of the
quartermaster, w h o w a s d i r e c tl y r e s p onsible t o t h e g o v e r n m ent
therefor and wi t h out w h ose order to forage could be issued. Without
authority f r o m t h e q u a r t e r m a s t er , accused sent ou t t h e f o r age to
i ndividuals for w h i c h t h e G o v er n m en t r e ceived no p ay . Th e cr i m e
committed by t h e a c cused is q u a li fied t h ef t a n d n o t m a l v e r s ation
because he is not an accountable officer since he has no auth or ity to
sell the forage or part th e p h y sical custody th ereof. (U.S. v. Webster
l
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 317
supra) Neither is he autho ri z ed to receive property perta i n i ng to the
government
4. N on - A c c o u n t a b l e P u b l i c O f f i cer —If the public officer
i s not an accountable officer, as a r u l e t h e c r i m e com m i t t e d i s n o t
m alversation, but q u a l i f ied t h e : t . 'U.S. v. Wickersham, supra; U . S.
v. Webster, supra) B u t, if t he p u b l ic officer acquired the pub l ic fun d
or property th r o ugh talse pretense, the crime commi t ted is estafa.
In Il u m i n v. Sz n d i g a n b ayan, s u pr a, ac c used, pay ro ;1 officer
of MWSS, alt ered t l e tr u e am o u n ts of t h e n e t p a y s a p p earing o n
the payroll opposite his n ame and t h a t of p a yee. With t h i s f a l sified
payroll, he obtained from th e M W S S th e a m o un t of P 1 ,000.00 over
a nd above th e a m o un t l a w f u l l", d u e t h e e m p l o y ees l i sted i n t h e
payroll.The accused is liable fcr complex crime of estafa by means
of deceit through falsification of public document .
5. P r iv a t e I n d i v i d u a l —A non-accountable officer or private
individual can be held liable for malversation if he conspires with an
accountable officer in com m i t t i n g .h e cr i me. (People v. Paj aro, G.R.
Nos. 167860-65, Jur e 17, 2008)
A private i n d i v i d ual can be h eld l i a ble for m a l v e r sation if h e ,
in any capacity w hatever, has cnarge of any n a t i o n al, pr ovincial or
municipal fu n ds, revenues, or pr operty. (Ar t i c le 222 of t he Revised
Penal C ode) Thus, the P r e s ident of B a w i , a n N G O e n t r u s t ed w i t h
g overnment f u n d s fo r t h e r e h a b i l i t a t io n o f T a c l oban C i t y , ca n b e
held liable for malversation. (15™5and 2017 Bar Exams)
M odes of Conun i t t i n g M a l v e r s a t i o n
l.
M alversation i s a c o n c ep . s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f e s t af a t h r o u g h
misappropriation un der A r t i cl e 315 and th eft u n der A r t i cle 308.
1. M al ve r s a t ion through Misappropr i at ion — If the mode
o f committ in g m a l v e r sation i s a p p r o p r i a t ion o r m i s a p p r opr i a t i on ,
t he concept o f t h i s c r i m e i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f e s t a f a t h r o u g h
m isappropriati on .
L ending l oa n i s a n a c t c f o w n e r s h ip . P e r f o r m in g a n a c t o f
ownership over a pr o p e r ty by o n e w h o i s n o t t h e o w n e r t h e r e o f
without aut h or it y i s m i s appropr i a t i on. Gr a n t in g loans to mu n i c ipal
employees out of the pu b lic fu nds is m a l v er sati on. (Manuelo v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158418, February 8, 2012)
A court sheriff who lent money, which is the proceeds of the
action sale, to his officemate is l i a ble for m a l v e r sation. The m oney
 318 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
i s invested w i t h t h e c h a r a c te r o f p u b l i c f u n d s i n c e i t i s u n d e r
custodia legis. Le n d i ng m o n ey w i t h o ut a u t h o r i t y i s c o n s idered as
misappropriat i on, w h ich i s a n e l e m ent of m a l v e r sati on. (2008 Bar
Exam)
A m u n i c i pa l t r e a s u re r e n c a shed w i t h p u b l i c f u n d s c h e cks
d rawn i n f a v o r o f h i s w i f e . T h e c h e cks b o u nced, th e d r a w e r n o t
having enough cash in t h e d r a w ee bank . Th e m u n i c i pal t r e a surer,
in encashing pr i v at e checks from pu b li c fu n ds, violated regulations
of his office. (1999 Bar Ex a m) Di s b u r s i ng pub l ic fund in v i o l a t i on of
regulation is considered as m i s appr opr i a t i on, w h ich i s a r e l e m ent
of malversation.(Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 98885, May
14, 1991)
A provincial cashier wh o gr a nt s loans to pr ovin cial em ployees
t hrough t h e " vale" s y s te m i s l i a b l e f o r m alversation t h r o u g h
misappropriat i on. To toler ate such a p r a ctice is to give a i c e nse to
every disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation w it h t h e use
of public fun ds. Th ere is no law or r e g u l a t ion a l l o w in g accountable
officers to extend l o ans t o a n y one against " v a l es" or ch it s g i ven in
exchange by t h e b o r r o w e rs. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e C o m m i s sion
on Audit time and again, through repeated office memoranda and
rulings had war ned against the acceptance of "vales" or chits by any
disbursing officerbecause such transactions are really form of loans,
(Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. ¹. 98 8 8 5,May 14, 1991; Meneses
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100625, May 20, 1994; Duero v. People,
G.R. No. 162212, January 80, 2007)
However, Ca b ello ca se a nd Me n e ses c ase wi ll o n l y a p p l y i f
the treasurer u sed th e m o ney u n der h i s c u stody t o l en d m o ney to
employees under the "vales system."In Reuda, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 129064, November 29, 2000, th e m u n i c i pal collectors did
not remit the cash collections to the treasurer. They merely gave the
treasurer "chits or "vales" representing cash advances. The treasure
has no cu stody o ver t h e m o n e y c o l l ected b y m u n i c i pa l c o l l ectors
because the same were not tu r ned over to him. Th us, he is not liable
for malversation.
Hypothetically, i f t h e m u n i c i pa l c o llectors in t h e Re u da ca se
turned over the money that they collected to the treasurer, -nd then,
the treasurer granted cash advances or "vales" to the municipal
collectors out the general fu n ds of the m u n i c i p a li t y, t he t r e a s ure is
liable for malv ersation .
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 319
2. M a lv e r s a t i o n th r o u g h Ta k i n g —The concept of "taking"
as an element of m a l v e r sati on, i n t e n t i o nal o r p a s sive, is d i f f erent
f rom that of m i s a p pr opr i a t i on. Accord.'ng to L ui s R eyes, the publi c
fur ds orproperty need not be misappropriated, as the word "take"
i s separated by th e w or d " or" f r o m t h e w or d " m i s a ppropri a t i on" i n
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
If the mode of commit t in g m a l v ersation is "tak i n g," the concept
o f this crim e i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t h e f t . T a k i n g i n m a l v e r s ation i s
akin to th e ta k i n g o f a n o t h e r's p r o perty i n th e f t . ( R e u d a, J r . v .
Sandiganbcyan, G.R. No. 129064, November 29, 2000; Salamera v .
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 121099, February 1< 1 999)
For example, a teller in th e office of the city t r easurer who was
l eaving th e O f f ice w it h p u b l i c f u n d s collected by h i m i s l i a b l e f o r
consummated cr im e o f m a l v e r s at i on (The Revised Penal Co de b y
Justice Luis Reyes) t hrough ta k i n g .
I n malversation t h r o ugh t a k i n g , th e ta1dng can be commi t t e d
b y the accountable officer himself or by another person. If the tak i n g
is done by another person, malversation can be commit ted by means
of dolo or euipa.
a. I n t e n t i o n a l M a l v e r s a t i o n —Malversation thro ugh
taking i s c o m m i t t e d b y m e an s of d o lo, if t h e p u b l i c p r op ert y
was taken by the accountable officer, or by another person with
consent of th e a ccountable officer. In O' .S. v. Po nte, G .R. No .
L -5952. October 24 , 1 9 11, th e m u n i c i pa l t r e a s urer w i t h t h e
h elp of a j a n i t o r a n d f i v e p o l i cemen t ook t h e s afe contai n i n g
m oney fro m t h e m u n i c i pa l t r e a s u ry . T h e t r e a s urer i s l i a b l e
for malv ersation t h r o ugh t a k i n g . Th e j a n i t o r a n d p o l i cemen,
although they are not accountable officers, are liable not
for robbery by u s i n g fo r u p o n t h i n g . T h e y ar e a l so l i a ble f or
m alversation because of conspiracy ru l e .
Hypothetically,
ifthe accused in the case ofPonte are only
janito" and policemen, they areliable for robbery by using force
u pon thi n g .
b. P a ss i v e M a lv e r s a t i o n — M a l v e r sation t h r o u g h
taking is committed by means of culpa, if the public property or
fund was taken by another person and the accountable officer
permit-.ed th e t a k i n g t h r o u g h n e g l i g ence o r a b a n d onment .
(2012 Bar Exam) Culpable malversation is also called passive
malversation .
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VOLUME II
G enerally, th e R e v i sed P enal C od e i m p oses a l o we r p e n a l t y
o r cri me s c o m m i t t e d t h r o u g h c r i m i n a l n e g l i g ence. H o w ev er , i n
m alversation, th e p e n a lt y i s t h e s a m e r e g a r d l ess of w h e t he r t h e
o ffense i s c o m m i t t e d w i t h c r i m i n a l i n t e n t o r t h r o u g h c r i m i n a l
negligence. (1959 Bar Exam)
In Office of the Court Adm i n i s t r a t or v. Soriano, A M. N o. 2864-
P , May 16, 1985, it wa s h eld t h a t i f a d e p ut y cl er k of court di d n ot
exercise the stri ctest supervision on hi s designated collection clerk,
t he former w o u l d s u f fe r t h e c o n sequences of f a i l ur e t o r e m i t t h e
c ollections by th e l a t t e r t h r o u g h n e g l i gence. In sh o rt , by f a i l i n g t o
exercise strict supervi sion on th e collection clerk, th e clerk of court
c ould be liable for m a l v er sation by p e r m i t t i n g o t her p erson to t a k e
public fund t h r o ugh negligence.
In People v. Pi l i, C . A . , 53 O . G . 4 5 3 5, t he p o s t m a s ter p l a c ed
the cash, warr a nt s and checks of the post office in hi s t a ble dr aw er
i nstead in hi s i r o n s a fe. On t h e n i g h t o f t h a t d a y , hi s d r a w e r w a s
f orced open an d t h e c a sh , w a r r a n t s a n d c h e cks w er e s t o l en . F or
failure to p l ace th e p u b li c f u n d s i n t h e i r o n s a fe, th e accused was
c onvicted of m a l v er sation fo r p e r m i t t i n g o t h e r p e r son t o t a k e t h e
property t h r o ugh n e g l i gence. ( Revised Penal C ode, Book 2 by L u i s
Reyes
A Cit y t r e a s u rer l e a ves k ey s fo r h i s s e r v ice car a n d l o c k o f
his office inside the case. Thieves stole the keys and used the same
t o take th e v e h i cle an d s t eal m o ney i n h i s of fi ce. Th e t r e a surer i s
liable for malv ersation, wh ich can be commi t ted by m eans of culpa.
Permitt in g ot h ers to t ak e p u b li c pr operty b y a n accountable officer
through negligence or abandonment consti t u tes m a lv er sati on. Th e
thief is liable for carnapping. (2005 Bar Exam) Note: If the treasurer
consents to the t a k in g by th e t h i ef, they ar e li a ble for m a l v ersation
because of conspiracy. (U .S. v. Ponte, G.B. No. L - 5 9 52, October 24,
191 1)
T o be h el d l i a b l e f o r p a s s iv e m a l v e r sati on, i t i s i m p o r t a n t
t hat t h er e i s a t h i r d p e r so n w h o t o o k t h e p u b l i c f u n d s , an d t h e
accountable officer permi t t ed the tak in g by the th ir d person thr ough
a bandonment o r n e g l i g ence. For e x a m p le, i f t h e a d m i n i s t r a to r of
Manila Zoo failed to lock the cage of birds and as a consequence, the
birds escaped, he is not liable for malversation by means of
o cu lpa.
e i r s w e r e no t t a k e n by a t h i ef . T hey si m pl y escaped from t h e
c age. The accountable officer di d n o t p e r m i t t h e t a k i n g o f p u b l i c
properties by a n o t her p e r son t h r o ug h n e g l i gence or ab a n d onment
since there is no "tak i ng" t ha t t r a n s p i red in th e fi rst p l ace.
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
A rticle 2 1 7 o f t h e R e v i se d P e na l C o d e i n d e f i n i n g p a s s iv e
malversation st ates "Any pu b l ic officer who, by reason of the duties
of his office, is accountable for public fu nds or property x x x through
a bandonment or n egligence, shall p e r mi t a n y o t her p e rson t o t a k e
such public funds, or property." The word "take" is a concept. different
f rom m i s a p p r o p r i a t i on . H o w e v e r , Supreme C o u r t co n s i d e r ed
m isappropriation a s w i t h i n t h e c o n t e m p l a t ion o f t h e w o r d " t a k e "
in passive m a l v e r sati on . I n Tor r e s v. Pe o ple, G. R. No . 1 7 5 0 7 4 ,
A ugust 31, 2011, it wa s h el d t h a t m a l v e r s ation ma y b e comm i t t e d
e ither th r o ugh a p o s i t iv e ac t o f m i s a p p r op r i a t ion o f p u b l i c f u n d s
pr property or p a s s ively thr o ugh n e gligence by all o w ing a n o t her t o
commit such misappropri a t i on. In s um, passive malversation can be
committed by an accountable officer who through abandonment or
negligence shall per mi t an y o t her p e r son to ta ke or m i s appropria t e
p ublic funds, or property .
In Sa r i g u n i b a v. San d i g a n b a yan, G.R . N os . 1 54 2 3 9 - 41,
F ebruary 1 6 , 2 0 0 5 , t h e a c c u sed, a m a y o r w a s n ot ch a r ged o f
i ntentional m a l v e r sation s i nce he di d n o t m a k e u s e of t h e m o n ey
w hich was chargeable to the CD F of Con gressman Ram i ro. He w a s
properly charged for culpable malversation for di st r ibu .ing the said
money tobarangay captains without informing them that the money
should be used for the peace and order campaign, as a consequence
of which the bar an gay captains mi s appropria t ed them f or p e rsonal
use.
I f th e a c c u sed i s c h a r ge d o f i n t e n t i o na l m a l v e r s at i on , b u t
evidence shows that th e cr im e is commi t te d t h r o ugh negligence, he
can be convicted of cul p able m a l v er sation because of —.he variance
rule. Dolo or culpa is just a mo de of commit t i n g m a l v e rsation. Even
i f the mode charged diff ers from m ode pr oved, accused can still b e
convicted of malv ersati on . (Torres v. People, supra) An a ccountable
o fficer may t h u s b e c o n v i cted of m a l v e r s ation even i f t h e r e i s n o
d irect evidence of m i s ap pr opr i a t ion an d t h e o n l y e v i c e nce is t h a t
there is a sh or t age in t h e of fi cer's account w h i c h h e h a s no t b e en
a ble to explain sat i sfactorily . Al l t h a t i s e ssential i s p r oof t ha t t h e
accountable officer has received public funds but t ha t w h en demand
therefor is made, he is unable to satisfactorily account ibr th e same.
(Sarigumba v. Sandi ganbayan, supra)
X, a patrol m an, was accused of grave th r e ats before the court.
H e was arrested an d d e t a i ned i n t h e m u n i c i pal j a il . B a sed on t h e
certifi
cation of the chief ofpolice that X performed continued service
without absence, X was able to draw his salary during the period of
 322 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
his confinement. The mayor ap pr oved the payroll and th e t r easurer
paid hi s s a l a ry . ( 1959 Ba r E x a m ) Th e c h i e f o f p o l i ce is 1 'able for
f alsification of cer ti fi c at e of s er v i ce. Th e m a yor an d t r e a su rer ar e
liable for m a l v er sation t h r o ugh cu l pa s i n ce they a l l o wed X to t a k e
or misappropri at e p u b li c f u n d s t h r o ug h n e g l i gence. X i s 1:able for
estafa. Note: I f t h e re is conspiracy in t h i s p r o b le m, a ll of t h e m a re
liable for int en t i onal m a l v er sati on .
' A," a p r o v i n c ia l t r e a s u r er , d e l i v e re d P 1 0 , 000.00 t o " B" 0
provincial cashier. "B," with t he help of another employee, issued tc
'A "a receipt for P1,000.00 only. As 'A" was in a hurry, he did not notice
the discrepancy i n t h e r e c eipt . Th e f o l l ow in g d ay , th e b o okkeeper
of the treasurer's officediscovered a shortage of P9,000.00 in the
a ccount of ' A . " 'A" insisted he e n t r u s ted P 1 0,000.00 to "B " b u t a s
he was in a h u r r y , h e m e r el y g l a n ced at t h e r e c eipt an d t h o u ght
that it w a s al l r i g h t . ( 1972 Bar E x a m ) " B" is l i a b le f or i n t e n t i o nal
malversation wh il e 'A." for culpable malv ersation .
P resump t io n of M a l v e r s a t i o n
Mere absence of f u n d s i s n o t s u f fi c i en t p r oo f o f c o n v er sion;
neither is the mere failure of the public officer to turn over the funds
at any given t i m e s u f f i cient t o m a k e even th e pr i m a f a c ie case. In
fine, conversion m u s t b e p r o v ed. H o w ev er, a n a c countable officer
may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof
o f misappropri a t ion so l ong as t h er e i s ev i dence of short age in h i s
account which he is unable to explain. (Legrama v. Sandig a nbayan,
G.R. No. 1786'26, June 18, 2012)
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction
is sufficient p r oof t h a t t h e a c count able officer ha d r e ceivec. public
funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand
therefor w a s m a d e , a n d t h a t h e c o u l d n o t s a t i s f a ctoril y e x p l a in
his fail ur e t o d o so. (I c d a ng v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . R. N o . 18 5 960,
January 25, 2012) Failure of an accountable public officer to
xplain
the missing funds shall be prima facie evidence of misappropria t i on.
(Article 217 of Revised Penal C o d e) Ho w e ver, t h i s p r e s u m p t i on i s
disputable by evidence showing t ha t h e ha d f u ll y a ccounted for the
alleged cash shortage. (Legrama v. Sandiga nbayan, supra)
D emand is not a n e l e m ent of t h e c r i m e of m a l v e r sati on. It i s
o nly a requisite for the application of the presumpt i on. Wi t h out t h i s
p resumption, th e accused may s t il l b e p r o ved gu i lt y u n d e r A r t i c l e
217 ba ased on direct evidence of malversation .
(Munib v. Peopie, G.R.
Nos. 16'8957-58, April 7, 2009)
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VII. CPIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 323
p ayment l n G o o d F a i t h
In Ta b u e na v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . R . N o . 1 0 3 5 0 7, F e b r u a r y
17. 1997, En. Banc, Pre sident M a r c os i ns t r u c t ed a ccused, General
Manager of M I A A , over th e ph one to pay di r ectly to th e pr esident's
office and in cash what th e M I A A o w es the PN CC, to which accused.
replied, "Yes, sir, I wi l l do i t . " A b o ut a w e ek l a t e r, accused received
a memorandum r e i t er a t in g such verbal in s t r u c t i on. In obedience to
p residential i n s t r u c t i on, accused caused the r elease of P55 M i l l i o n
of MIAA f u n d s i n f a v o r o f P N C C . I t w a s h e l d t h a t a c cused acted
in good faith i n c o m p l y in g w i t h t h e d i r e c t iv e f r o m t h e P r e s ident .
Where the payment of public funds has been made in good faith, and
there is reasonable ground to believe that the public officer to whom
the fund had been paid wa s ent i t l e d t h e r eto, he is deemed to hav e
a cted in good fai th , t h er e i s n o c r i m i n a l i n t e n t , an d t h e p a y m e n t ,
i f it tu rn s o .t t h a t i t i s u n a u t h o r i z ed, renders hi m o nl y c i v i ll y b u t
not criminally l i a b le. He is enticled to the justi f y in g circumstance of
o bedience tc lawful or d er .
R estituti o n
Restitution may or may not be considered as defense or a
mitigating circum st ance.
1. D e f e n s e — U nder t h e l a w , t h e r efu n d o f t h e su m
m isappropriat ed. even b efore th e c o m m e ncement o f t h e c r i m i n a l
p rosecution, does not exempt th e gui lt y p er scn from l i a b i l it y for t h e
crime. This is because damage is not an element of malversation, and
payment, after the consummat ion of the crime of malversation, is not
one of the modes of extinguishing cri m i na l l i a b i l i t y . (Perez v. People,
G.R. No.164768, February 12, 2008;Eimpo v.Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Ão. 95604, April 29 , 1 9 9 4; Va lenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 20 5 698,
February 1 4, 2 0 1 8) S ub sequent r e i m b u r s e ment c a n n ot a f f e ct t h e
existence of the crime. (U.S. v. Fe'iciano, G.R. No. L-5628, February
8, 1910)
However, resti t u t i on if c o u p l ed wi t h o: h er c i r c u m s tance may
b e considered a s a d e f e nse e i t he r b e c ause i t n e g a tes d ol o o r i t
r ebuts the presumpt ion of ma lv ersation. Wh ether or not r esti t u t i o n
i s sufficient t o e x c u l p at e a n a c c ount able p u b li c of fi cer s h o ul d b e
decided on the basis of the facts thereof. (Cabello v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 98885, May 14, 1991)
a. R e st i t u t i o n M a d e U pon D e m a n d — U pon
e xamination o f t h e a c c ou nt s o f a mu n i c i p a l t r e a s ur er , t h e
 324 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
a uditor foun d a s h o r t age of P 1,000.00. When i n f o r med of t h e
shortage, the treasurer took out P 1,000.00 from his wal let and
turned over the amount to the audit or, who accepted the same,
(1978 Bar Exa m) Th e t r e a s urer is n ot l i a b le for m a l v e r s ation.
I mmediately r e f u n d in g th e m i s s in g m o ney upon d em and w i l l
negate the presump t ion of m a l v er sation. H ence, restit u t ion is
a defense. (U.S. v. Feliciano, G.R. ¹. L - 5 6 2 4 , February8, 1910)
b. A l lo w e d R e s t i t u t i o n — In Pa n g a n i b an v. Pe ople,
G.R. No. 211543, December 9, 2015,good faith is a valid defense
i n a pr osecution for m a l v e r sation of p u b li c f u n d s as i t w o u l d
negate cri m i na l i n t e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e a c cused. Accused's
full li q u i d a t ion of hi s cash adv ance for t r a vel by m e an s of an
arrangement (deduction from s a l ar y an d t e r m i n a l l e ave pay),
which is all owed by th e C OA , u l t i m a t el y t r a n s l a ted i nt o good
f aith. Accused was acquitt e d .
c. F u n d s W e r e N o t U s e d f o r P er s o n a l I n t e r e s t
and Re st i t u t i o n — In Vi l l a c o rta v. People, G.R. No. L- 68268,
November 12 , 1 9 86, th e m u n i c i pal t r e a s urer r e l eased public
funds to governm ent e m p l oyees for a l l o w ances, commut a t i on
leave, travel expenses etc., which was disallowed by th e audit
team. The accused did not pu t t h e m i s s in g f u n d s t o p e r sonal
use; in fact, when he demanded payment from said employees,
they redeemed th eir c h i t s an d m a d e r e st i t u t i on . Th e accused
w as able t o o v e r t h r o w t h e p r e s u m p t io n o f m a l v e r sati on. H e
was acquitted.
In Quizo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 77120, April 6, 1 987, the
accused, a post officeteller, incurred a shortage because the audit
team disallowed cash advances, amount representing accommodated
private checks, and an actual cash short age of P1.74. However, the
a ccused reimbur sed the am ount on th e day of the au di t t h r e e d a s
t hereafter an d a n o t her t h r e e d ays l a t er . Th e S u p r em e Cou rt , i n a
spirit of leniency, held that th e accused had successfully overth r own
t he presumpt ion of g u i l t . N o n e o f t h e f u n d s w a s u sed by h i m f o r
his personal i n t e r est. Th e cash a d v a nces were given i n g ood fait h
and out of goodwill to co-employees. There was no negligence, malice
or intent t o d e f r a ud , an d t h e a c t ua l c ash shor t age was only P 1 .74
w hich, t o g ether w i t h t h e d i s a l l o we d i t e m s , w a s f u l l y r e s t i t u t e d
w ithin a r easonable time. Accused was acquitt ed .
2. M it i g a t i n g C i rcumstance — In Quizo case, the accused
did not u s e fo r p e r s onal i n t e r est t h e p u b l i c f u n d s s i nce th e c ash
advances were given to other governm ent em pl oyees and exchanges
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 325
o f privat e c h e ck s w i t h ca s h a re m e r e a c c o m m o d ati on . T h u s ,
r estitution an d t h e c i r c u m s t a nce of n on -personal use of th e f u n d s
were treated as a defense. However, Manuel v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,,
G.R. No. 158413, February 8,2012, the mayor and treasurer allowed
loans from the public funds not only in favor of mun i cipal employees
b ut also to themselves. In sum, they used the public fu nds for th eir
personal interests. In t h i s case, restit u t ion wa s not considered as a
rlefense, but merely a mi t i g a t in g circum st ance.
Restitution of f un d i s a m i t i g a t i n g ci r c u m st ance analogous to
v oluntary s u r r e n der i f i t w a s i m m e d i a t el y a n d v o l u n t a r i l y m a d e
before the case was inst i t u t ed. (Na v a r ro v. Me neses III, C BD A d m .
Case No. 818, January 80, 1998, En B a n c; Perez v. P eople, G.R. ¹.
164768, February 12, 2008; 1999 Bar Ex a m) In Pe o ple v. Le grama,
supra, t h e a c c u s ed w a s c h a r g e d o f m a l v e r s a t i on i n v o l v i ng t h e
a mount of P1.1 mi l l i on. U pon f i l in g of i n f o r m a t i on, she volunt a r i l y
s urrendered and posted cash bonds. Accused was able to return t h e
a mount of P800,000. The Supreme Court said t hat a l t h o ugh par t i a l
restitution is aki n t o v o l u n t ar y s u r r e n d er, both sh all be considered
a s separate mi t i g a t in g cir c u m st ances. Thus, the special m i t i g a t i n g
circumstances of partial restit u t i on and surr ender were appreciated.
The penalty was lowered by one degree.
In Valenzucla v. People, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018,
t he accused wa s f o u n d g u i l t y o f m a l v e r s a t ion i n t h e a m o u n t o f
P 2,572,808.00. How ever, th e p a r t i a l r e s t i t u t i o n i n t h e a m o u n t o f
P300,000.00 was treated as a mitigating circumstance.
InPerez v People G R N o 1 6 4 7 6 3 F e b r u a ry 12 2 0 08 a c c used
misappropriated th e m i s s in g f u n d s u n de r h i s c u s t ody because he
was impelled by the genuine love for his brother and his fami ly . Per
his admission, accused used part of' the funds to pay off a debt owed
by his brother. Another portion of the misappropriated funds went
to his medications for h i s d e b i l i t a t i n g d i a b etes. F u r t h er , a ccused
restituted all but P 8,000.00 of the funds in less than one month an d
a half and sai d s m al l b a l a nce i n t h r e e (3) m o n th s f r o m r e ceipt of
demand of COA. Th e m i t i g a t in g ci r c u m st ances of lack of i n t e n t i on
t o commit so grave a wr ong and resti t u t ion w ere appreciated. T h i s
isa special mit i g a t in g cir cum st ance.
3. N ot a D e f e n s e o r a M it ig a t i n g C i r c u m s t a n c e -
Restitution, w h i ch i s m a d e a f t e r a n u n r e a s onable period of t i m e ,
cannot be considered as a defense or a m i t i g a t in g ci r c u m st ance in
malversation.

326 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
R andy, an N B I a g e n t , w a s i s s ued b y t h e N B I t w o fi r e a r m s.
After a year, the NBI D i r e ctor made an inspection of all the firearms
issued. Randy, who reported for work t ha t m o r n i ng, did not show up
during th e i n spection. He w en t o n a b sence wit h out l e ave (AW OL).
After two years, he surr endered to the NB I t h e tw o fi r e a rm s issued
to him. He was charged wit h m a l v e r sation of governm ent p r operty
before the Sandiganbayan. Randy put up the defense that actually
t he firearm s w er e st olen by h i s f r i e n d . (1994 Bar Exam) R
d
liabl
ia e f o r m a l v e r s ati on. To establish th e e l em ents of m a l v er sation
a nd justify convicti on, th e p r o secution ha s o nl y t o p r o v e t h a t t h e
a ccused received pu b li c f u n d s o r p r o p e r ty ; an d t h a t h e c o ul d n ot
account for t h e m , di d n o t h a v e t h e m i n h i s p o ssession, and could
not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same. His
a llegation t h a t t h e fi r e a r m s w e r e s t olen f r o m h i m i s u n w o r t h y of
belief in v i e w o f h i s f a i l u r e t o r e p or t t o h i s .superiors th e a l l eged
theft. That o m i s sion an d hi s s u b sequent d i s appearance lead to no
o ther conclusion t h a n t h a t h e a p p r o p r i a te d t h e fi r e a r m s f o r h i s
own benefit a n d a d v a n t a ge. R e st i t u t i o n a f t e r t h e c o m m i s sion of
malversation affects only th e ci vi l l i a b i l it y of t h e offender bu t does
not extinguish hi s cr i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y . (F e licilda v. G o rospe G .R N .
1 02494, July 8, 1 9 9 2) M o r e o ver, r e s t i t u t i o n, w h i c h i s m a d e a f t e r
unreasonable period oftime, cannot be considered as a mitigating
circumstance an al ogous t o v o l u n t ar y s u r r e n d er. (C i f r a n c a, J r . v .
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94408, February 14, 1991)
FAILURE TO RENDER ACCOUNTING
Failure to render accounts is commit t ed by
(1) a public officer,
whether i n t h e s e r v ic e o r s e p a r a te d t h e r e f rom b y r e s i g n a t ion or
any other cause, who fails to r e n der account to th e C om m i ssion on
Audit or p r o v i n cial a u d i to r a s r e q u i r e d b y l a w o r r e g u l a t io n a f t er
two months from the time such accounts should be rendered (Article
2 18) or (2 ) b y a p u b l i c o f fi cer w h o u n l a w f u l l y l e a ves or a t t e m p t s
) ; or
t o leave t h e P h i l i p p i n e s w i t h o u t s e c u r in g a c e r t i fi c at e f r o m t h e
Commission on A u di t s h o w in g t h a t h i s a ccounts h ave been finally
settled. (Article 219)
In Pe ople v . L u m a u i g , G . R . N o . 1 6 6 6 8 0, J u l y 7 , 2 0 1 4 , t h e
accused received cash advance for payment of the insurance coverage
of motorcycles purchased by th e M u n i c i p a l it y i n 1 9 94. U n der C OA
Circular, accused is requi red t o l i q u i d at e th e same w i t h i n 2 0 d a ys
after the end of the year or on or before Janu ary 20, 1995. To avoid
criminal l i a b i l it y u n d e r A r t i c l e 21 8 of t h e R e v ised Penal C ode, he
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 327
m ust liquid ate th e cash advance wi t hi n t w o m o n t h s f r o m J a n u a r y
20, 1995 or on orbefore March 20, 1995. The accused was liable for
failure to r ender account because it t ook hi m o ver si x y e ars before
settling his accounts. Demand before an accountable officer is held
liable for a violation of the crime is not requ i r ed. Ar t i cle 218 merely
provides that the public officer be required by law and r egulation to
render account.
1. M a lv e r s a t i o n a n d F a i l u r e t o R en d e r A c c o u n t i n g
— Same as i n m al v e r s a t i on , t h e o f f e n de r i n fa i l u r e t o r e n d e i
accounting un der A r t i cl e 218 of th e R evised Penal Code is also an
accountable officer. (P eople v. L u m a u i g, G . A. No . 16 6 6 80, J u ly 7 ,
2014) If an accountable officer misappropriated the cash advance
t hat he r eceived, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s m a l v e r s at i on . (People v.
Icdang, supra; People v. Devalos, supra) Ho we ver, if an a ccountable
officer did not mi sappropri ate the cash advance since he was able to
account the same, but the accounting was delayed for more than tw o
m onths after such accounts should h av e been r e n dered, the cr i m e
committed is f a i l ur e t o r e n der a n a c count i ng. (People v . Lu m a u i g ,
supra)
2. M i t i g a t i n g Ci r c u m s t a n c e — In Pe o ple v . L u m a u i g ,
supra, the accused, a mayor, received cash advance for the payment
of freight a n d i n s u r a n c e c o v er age o f 1 2 u n i t s o f m o t o r c y cles.
However, instead of m o t or cycles, he was able t o secure tw o b u s es
and five patrol cars. However, he failed to liquid ate the cash advance
for six years. And so as not to prolong the issue, he paid the amount
representing the cash advance to the m u n i c i pal t r e asur er. Accused
w as convicted of f a i l ur e t o r e n de r a ccount i ng . Bu t t h e r e s t i t u t i o n
o f the un l i q u i d a ted cash a d v a nce wa s considered as a m i t i g a t i n g
c ircumstance analogous to volunt ar y su r r e n d er .
TECHNICAL MALVERSATION
I llegal use of public funds or property is commi t ted by a publi c
o fficer who applies a public fund or property under his admini st r a t i on
to any public use other t h a n t h a t f o r w h i c h s uch f un d o r p r o p erty
was appropriated by law or ordin ance. (Article 220) This crime is also
called technical mal versation.
1. A pp r o p r i a t i o n L a w or O r d in a n c e — T o b e h e l d
liable for technical m a l v ersation, th ere must be a la w or or d i n ance
appropriating fu nds or money for a specific project. (1996 Bar Exam)
For example, if the money was part of the general fund, and there is no
 828 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
law or ordi n ance appropri a t in g i t fo r specif ic expenditure, applying
it to the payr olls of di ff erent ba r a n gay wo r k e rs in t he m u n i c i p ality
is not t e chnical m a l v e r sation even t h o ug h t h e m o n e y i s i n t e n ded
by internal ar r a n g e ment for u se in p a v i ng a p a r t i c u l ar r o a d. (Dela
Cuersta v. Sandi ganbayan, G.R. Nos. 16'4068-69, November 19, 2018)
I n Dela C u e rsta v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, s u pr a, th e i n f o r m a t i ons
alleged that accused as members of the Philipp ine Coconut Aut h ority
gave P8 mill ion fi n a n cial assistance to COCOF ED , a pr i v at e entity,
w ithout a n a p p r o p r i at e b u d g et . T h e r e i s n o a l l e g a t ion t h a t t h e
P8 million g r a nt s t o C O C O F E D h a d b een a p p r op r i a ted by l a w or
ordinance for some specific expendit u re. H e n ce, the accused is not
l iable for technical malv ersati on .
2. Ma lu m P r o h i b i t u m — In Ys i d o r o v. Pe o ple, G. R. N o.
192380, November 14, 2012, the mayor who applied 10 boxes
of food appropriated for feeding program to the beneficiaries of
shelter a s si st ance p r o g ra m i s l i a b l e f o r t e c h n i ca l m a l v e r s ation.
Mayor s act, no matter how noble or mi n i scule the amount di v erted,
constitutes th e cr im e of t e chnical m a l v er sation. Cr i m i n a l i n t en t is
not an element of technical m a l v ersation. The law p u n i s hes the act
of divertin g p u b l i c p r o p ert y e a r m a r k e d b y l a w o r o r d i n a nce for a
particular p u b li c p u r p ose to another p u b li c p u r p ose. The offense is
malum prohibi t um, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently
immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids
its commission based on considerati ons of pu b lic policy, order, and
convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law and
not the character or e f fect t h e r eof t ha t d e t er m i nes w h e t her or not
the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or cri m i na l i n t ent is
completely ir r el evant. Du ra lex sed lex. (2015 Bar Exam)
Intentional f e l o nies ar e ma l a i n se b e c a use u n d er A r t i c le 3
of the R evised Penal C od e t h e y m u s t b e c o m m i t t e d b y m e a n s of
dolo. However, the Su pr em e Court m a d e an exception to t h i s r ule.
Technical malv ersation is m a lu m p r o h i b i t um. H ence, dolo is not an
'
e lement of technical malv ersati on .
A mu n i c i pal m a y or , w h o a p p l i e s a p u b l i c f u n d a p p r o p r i ated
y cal am i t y - assistance o r d i n a nc e f o r t y p h o o n v i c t i m s t o r e p a ir
the muni cipal h al l d a m a ged by th e t y p h o on, is l i a ble for t e chnical
malversation. Good faith is not a defense since technical malversation
is malum pr o hi b it u m. (2019 Bar Exa m )
3. V ar i a n c e Rule in malversation — In Dela Cuersta v,
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 164068-69, November 19, 2018, without
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
allegation t ha t t h e P 8 M i l l i o n w e r e a p p l ied t o a p u b l i c u s e ot h er
t han that f o r w h i c h s u c h s u m s h a d b ee n a p p r o p r i a ted b y l a w o r
ordinance, the accused cannot b e t r i e d fo r t e c h n i cal m a l v er sation
under crimi nal i n f o r m a t i ons for vi o la ti on of Section 8(e) of R.A. No.
3019.
In th e c r i m e o f m a l v e r s a t i on , t h e o f f e n der m i s a p pr opr i a t es
public funds for h i s ow n p e r s onal us e or a l l ow s an y o t he r p e r son
to take such public fu nds for th e l a t t e r's personal use. On the other
hand, in technical malversation, the public officer applies public funds
under his adm i n i s t r a t ion not for hi s or a n o t h er's personal use, but
to a public use other than t h a t for w h ich th e fun d was appropri at ed
by law or o r d i n a n ce. T h us , a n a c cused acqui t te d o f m a l v e r sation
cannot be convicted of technical m a l v er sation si nce the l a t ter does
not include, or is not n ecessarily i n c l u ded in th e f o r mer ch ar ged in
the informa t ion because they ar e d i s t i n c t i v ely d i f f er ent f r o m e ach
other. (Parungao v. Sandig a n bayan, G.R. No. 96025, May 15, 1991;
1996Bar Exam) Ombudsman cannot charge respondent for technical
malversation if the complaint in a preli m i n ar y i n v estigation charged
him of malversation. (Garcia v. Off ice of the Ombudsman, G.R. ¹ .
197567, November 19, 2014) Moreover, acquittal or conviction for
malversation i s no t a b a r i n p r o s ecutin g th e accused for t e chnical
malversation. There is no double jeopardy because these crimes are
different and di st i nct from each other .
4. M a lv e r s a t i o n a n d S e c t i o n 8 ( e ) o f R . A . N o . 8 0 1 9 -
Intentional m a l v e r sati on, w h i c h i s m a l u m in s e , i s c o m m i t t e d b y
means of dolo, while passive malversation is commi t ted by means of
culpa. Violation of Section 8 (e) of R.A. No. 8019 is also be committed
by means of dolo (evident bad fait h or m a n i f est par t i a l i ty ) or culpa
(gross inexcusable negligence). Hence, an accountable public officer
c an be hel d l i a bl e f o r m a l v e r s at i on, i n t e n t i o nal o r c u l p a b le, a n d
violation of Section 8 (e) of R.A. No. 8019 for misappropriating public
funds, which caused damage to the government through evident bad
faith, manifest par t i a l it y or gr oss inexcusable malversation .
In People v. Paj aro, G.R. Nos. 167860-65, June 17, 2008, the
accused was convicted of malv ersation and vi olat ion of Section 8 (e)
o f R.A. No. 8019 for mi sappropri a t in g pu b lic fun d s .
On the other hand, technical malversation is malum prohibitum.
(Ysidoro v. People, supra) For being a malum prohi b it u m, dolo, culpa,
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
is not an element of technical malversation. Hence, an accountable
public officer, who commits technical malv ersation, may not be held
 330 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Vill a r osa v. Hon,
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 221418, January 28, 2019) unless additional
c ircumstance establishes manifest par t i a l i t y , evident bad fait h an d
gross inexcusable negligence.
In Vil l a r o sa v. Hon. Ombudsman, supra, accused used tobacco
f und to f i n a nce th e r e g u la r o p e r a t i on s of t h e m u n i c i p a l i ty , w h i ch
a re not i n a c c o r d ance w i t h t h e l a w c r e a t i n g s u c h f u n d . T h i s i s
technical m a l v er sati on. H o w ever, vi ol at ion of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
N o. 3019 was dismissed. Evident bad fai th , m a n i f est par t i a l it y a n d
gross inexcusable negligence are el ements of Section 8 (e) of R .A.
No. 3019. Bu t t h e y a r e n o t e l e m e nt s o f t e c h n i cal m a l v e r s ation.
Hence, the commission of technical malv ersation wil l not m ean that
the accused perpetr a ted t h e a c t w i t h e v i d en t b a d f a i t h , m a n i f est
partiali ty , or gross inexcusable negligence.
FAILURE TO MAKE DELIVERY
Failure to make delivery o f public funds or property is committed
b y an y p u b l i c o f fi c er : ( 1 ) w h o , b e i n g u n d e r o b l i ga t o n t o m a k e
p ayment f r o m G o v e r n m en t f u n d s i n h i s p o ssession, fails t o m a k e
s uch payment ; o r ( 2 ) w h o , b e in g o r d e red b y c o m p etent a u t h o r i t y
to deliver a p r o p e rt y i n h i s c u s t ody o r u n d e r h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i on,
refuses to make such delivery. (Art i c le 221)
EXTENDED APPLICATION
Thhe provisions on malversation, technical malversation, failure
to render account, an d f a i l u r e t o m a k e d e l i v ery s h al l a p p ly : (1) to
private in d i v i d u al s w ho , i n a n y c a p acity w h a t ev er, h ave charge of
any national, pr ov in cial or m u n i c i pal f u n ds, r evenues or pr operty;
and (2) to any administrator or depository of funds or property
a ttached, seized o r d e p o sited b y p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y ,
e ven i f s u c h
property belongs to a priv ate in d i v i d u al. (Ar t i c le 222
)
Mr. Gul ang is th e P r e sident of a ch a r i t a ble in st i t u t i on , w h i ch
received funds from the government for the rehabili t a t ion of Tacloban
City, which had been devastated by Typhoon Yolanda. His company
failed to properly account for P10 Mi l l ion worth of funds. Mr. Gulang
c an be cr i m i n a ll y c h a r ged i n t h e O f fi c e o f t h e O m b u d s ma n w i t h
malversation and f a i l u r e of officer to render accounts. Under Ar t i c le
222 of the Revised Penal Code, the pr ovisions on ma lv ersation and
f ailure t o r e n de r a c count s h al l a p p l y t o p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u al s w h o,
in any capacity whatever,have charge of any government funds,
r evenues or property . (2017 Bar Exam)
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
I f th e c o ur t d e s i g n ate d t h e a c c u sed a s a d e p o s it or y o f a n
attached property, it w il l g ive the depositary a character equivalent
t o that of a p u b li c official, and a b r e ach of hi s obli gation i s si m i l a r
to the violation of th e obl i g at i ons i m p osed by pu b li c office. (U.S. v.
Rastrollo, G.R. No. 2 02, September 21, 1901) It w a s cl early w i t h i n
t he scope of that court's jur i s diction and ju di cial power to constitu t e
the judicial deposit an d g iv e th e d epositary a ch a r a cter equiv alent
to that o f a p u b l i c of fi ci al. (A z a r c on v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . R. ¹ .
116088,February 26, 1997) Thus, he can be charged of malversation
under Arti cle 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
On th e o t he r h a n d , i f t h e B I R d e s i g n a ted t h e a c cused as a
depositary of a d i s t r a i ned p r oper ty , i t w i l l n o t g i v e th e d epositary
a character equ i v al ent t o t h a t o f a p u b l i c of fi ci al . W h i l e t h e B I R
had authority to requ ir e a th ir d p erson in possession of a distrain ed
p roperty to sign a r e ceipt for s uch p r o p er ty , th e la w d i d n o t g r a n t
it power t o a p p oint t h e t h i r d p e r son a s a p u b l i c o f ficer. A l t h o u gh
t he third p erson designated as depositary p er f or med a p u b li c d u t y
i n connection w it h t h e d i s t r a i ned p r operty , hi s a u t h o r it y i s n o t b y
direct provision of the law, popular election or appoint m e nt . H ence,
the accused cannot be charged wit h m a l v e r sation commi t t ed by an
accountable pu b li c officer u n de r A r t i c l e 2 1 7 o f t h e R e v i sed Penal
C ode. But h e c a n b e c h a r ged w i t h m a l v e r s a t ion c o m m i t t e d b y a
private indiv i d ual u n der A r t i cl e 217 in r el at ion to A r t i cle 222 of the
Code. (See: Azarcon v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G.R. N o. 1 16088, February
26, 1997) He cannot be charged for violation of R.A. No. 3019 or any
other crime wh ere the offender must be a public officer.
I NFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF DOCUME N T
Infidelity i n th e cu s t ody of d o c u m e nt i s c o m m i t t e d b y : ( 1 ) a
p ublic offi cer w h o r e m o v es, d e s t r oy s o r c o n c eals d o c u m ent s o r
papers officially ent r u s ted to h im , w h ich causes damage, serious or
iot, to a t h i r d p a r t y o r t o t h e p u b li c i n t e r est (Article 226; 1951 Bar
Exam); (2) a p u b l ic o fficer w ho b e i ng c h a r g ed w i th t h e c u s t o dy of
papers or property sealed by proper authority breaks the seals or
permits them t o be br ok en (Article 2 27); or (3) a p ub l ic officer who
opens or permits tobe opened a closed papers, documents or objects
entrusted to his custody wi t h out p r o per au t h o r i ty . (Ar t i c le 228)
A tty. Gadia, a Registrar of Deeds, who was entr u sted with t h e
safekeeping of TCT No. T-256662, caused the removal of its original
copy from the vault of the RD and, thereafter, concealed the same
to facilitate the issuance of TCT No. T-285369. This caused damage
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
to Dr. Ang and eroded public tr ust an d confidence in th = Register of
Deeds. Damage under A r t i cl e 22 6 of th e R e v i sed Penal C ode may
also consist in m e r e a l ar m t o t h e p u b l i c or i n t h e a l i e n a t ion of it s
confidence inany government agency. The Sandiganbayan convicted
the accused of in fi d e l it y i n t h e c u s t ody of d ocum er t a n d v i o l a tion
of Section 8(e) of R.A. No . 80 19. (see: Zapanta v. Peopte, C~.R. Nos.
192698-99, April 2 2, 2015)
Differences b e t w een i n f i d e l it y i n t he c u s t od y c f d o c u m ent
and estafa u n der A r t i c l e 8 1 5 (8)(c) of th e R e v i sed Penal C ode are
as follows: (1)in both crimes, the offender removed, iw>ncealed or
destroyed document; (2) in infi d el it y of the custody of do "ument, the
o ffender is a p u b l i c of ficer e n t r u s te d w i t h t h e d o c u m ent : w h i l e in
e stafa, the offender i s a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u al ; (8) i n e s t a fa, i n t ent to
d efraud is an element; but t h i s is not an element of in fi delity in t h e
custody of document .
A util it y w o r k e r i n g o v er n m en t w h o d estroys office files as an
act of revenge against hi s s u p er v i sor i s no t l i a bl e for t h e c r i m e of
infidelity i n t h e cu stody of paper because the files are not officially
entrusted to him by re a son of his office. Official custody of the paper
is an element of t h i s c r i m e . E s t afa by d e str oying office files is not
committed because int ent t o d e fr au d a n o t h er, w h ich i s an el ement
o f this cr i me, i s l a c k i ng . T h u s , th e c r i m e com m i t t ed b y t h e u t i l i t y
worker is mali cious mischief. (2012 Bar Exam)
REVELATION OF SECRETS
Revelation of secrets is commi t t e d by a p u b l i c o ffic er w h o: (2)
wrongfully delivers papers orcopies of papers of which he may have
charge and which should not be publi shed (Art ic le 299), or (2) reveal
s ecrets of the governm ent or a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d ual k n ovm t o hi m by
reason of his official capacity. (Art i c les 229 and 280)
DIVULGING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION UNDER R.A. NO. 3019
Violation of S ection 8 (k ) o f R .A . N o . 8 019 i s c o m m i t t e d by a
public officer who shall divu lge valuable inform a t ion of a confidential
character acquired by hi s office or by hi m o n a ccount of hi s official
position t o u n a u t h o r i zed p e r s ons, o r r e l e a sin g s u c h i n f o r m a t i on
i n advance of it s a u t h o r i zed r e l ease date. Th e p e r son u r g i n g t h e
divulging or u n t i m el y r e l ease of the confidential i n f o r m a t ion u nder
Section 8(k) shall, together with t h e offending public officer, be
punished.
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
DISCLOSU R E O R M I S U S E O F C O N F I D E N T IAL INFO R M A T IO N
UNDER R.A. NO. 6713
Disclosure or mi suse of confidential i n f o r m a t ion u n der Section
7 (c) of R.A. No . 6 718 (Code of Con duct an d E t h i ca l S t a n d a rds of
P ublic Officials) is comm i t t e d by p u b li c officials, who shall not u s e
o r divulge confidential or c l a ssified i n f o r m a t ion officially k n ow n t o
them by reason of their office and not m ade avail able to the publi c,
either: to furt her t h eir p r i v at e in t er ests, or give undue advantage to
anyone; or to prejudice the public int erest.
Revelatio n o f s e c r e t s , e s p i o n a ge , a n d v i o l a t i o n o f R . A . N o .
6718, R.A. No. 8019
Disclosure of secrets k no wn t o p u b l i c o ff icer by r e a s on of h i s
official capacity constit u tes the crime of revelation of secrets.
Disclosure of confidential in f or m a t ion pert a i n in g to the defense
o f the Philip p i nes to a representative of a foreign nation by a publ i c
o fficer, who in possession thereof by reason of his office, constitu t es
espionage.
Disclosure of valuable confidential inf or m a t ion to unauthorized
persons, or re leasing such in fo rm a t ion in a d v a n ce of its a u t h o r i z ed
release date is a violation of R.A. No. 8019.
D isclosure of confidential o r c l a s sified i n f o r m a t io n b y p u b l i c
officer to f u r t h e r h i s pr i v a t e i n t e rests, or give un d u e a d v a n t age t o
anyone; or to pr e ju d i ce the pu b l ic i n t e rest c onstitu t es t he c r i me o f
disclosure or misuse of confidential infor m a t ion under R.A. No. 6718.
I f the disclosure of confidential i n f o r m a t ion vi ol ates both R.A .
No. 6718 and R .A . No . 80 19, the p u b li c officer sh all b e p r osecuted
u nder the R .A . No . 8019 since it p r e scribes a penalty h i g her t h a n
that prescribed by R.A. No. 6718.
O PEN DISOB E D IENC E
Open disobedience is committed by any judicial or executive
officer wh o s h al l o p e nl y r e f use t o e x ecute th e j u d g m e nt , d ecision
o r order o f a n y s u p e r io r a u t h o r i t y m a d e w i t h i n t h e s c ope of i t s
jurisdiction and issued with al l th e l egal forma l i t i e s. (Artic le 281)
If a sheriff refused to im pl em ent a w ri t of execution or a police
officer refused to impl ement a w a r r an t of ar r est issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the crime committed is open disobedience.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 335
VOLUME II

A counsel ofa party, who refused to obey an order issued by the

i ncluding th e or der for t h e i s su ance of w ri t o f e x ecution cannot b e
court, is not l i a bl e for open d i sobedience since this cr im e can only
a ccorded legal existence in order to in d ict th e accused for the cri m e
be committed by j udicial orexecutive offi
cer. However, the counsel of open disobedience. (The law firm of Chavez Miranda v. Fria, G.B.
is admi n i s t r a t i v el y l i a b l e . I n Mi r a n d a v. Ca r p i o , A. C . N o . 6 2 8 1 ,
No. 188014, August 7, 2013)
January 15, 2020, a lawyer, who disobeyed the order of the court
for him t o su r r e n der th e t i t l e t o th e compl ai n ant wa s suspended to
D isobedience an d o pe n d i s o b e d i e n c e
p ractice law for six mon t h s .
I f a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l d i s obeys th e c o m m u n i t y q u a r a n t i n e
I n a c r i m i n a l c a se, X , p r e s i d in g R T C j u d g e , d i s a ll owed t h e
o rder of the President, a person in au t h o r i t y , in connection with t h e
c omplainant f r o m t e s t i f y in g t h a t t h e a c c used, hi s w i f e , s hot h i m
c orona virus cr i si s (e.g. social di st an cing), th e c r im e com m i t t e d i s
w ith a p i s t o l o n t h e g r o u n d o f t h e m a r i t a l d i s q u a li fi cation r u l e .
disobedience under Arti c le 151 of the Revised Penal Code. If a public
However, in a p e t i t i o n f or ce r t i o r a r i, th e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls s ta te d
official (e.g., mayor) disobeys the commun it y qu a r a n t in e order of the
that mari tal pr i v i l ege rule does not apply wh ere a spouse committed
P resident, in connection with th e corona virus crisis (e.g. prohibit i n g
t he crim e a g a i ns t t h e o t h e r , a n d d i r e c ted J u d g e X t o a l l o w t h e
t he use of tricycles as public t r a n sport a t i ons), the crime commi t t e d
w itness to t e sti fy . H o w ev er, J u dg e X d e fied t h e fi n a l o r d e r o f C A
is open disobedience under Art i c le 281 of the Revised Penal Code.
and disallowed the wi t n ess to testify. Judge X is liable for the crime
of open disobedience. Judge X can a lso be h eld l i a bl e for v i o l a t i on
of Section 8(e) of R.A. No. 8091 for gi v in g u n w a r r a n t e d pr eference, DISOBEDIENCE TO ORDER OF SUPERIOR OFFICERS
advantage or benefits t o p r i v a t e p a rt y ( a ccused) th r ough m a n i f est
Disobedience to o r de r o f s u p e r io r o f f i cer i s c o m m i t t e d b y a
p artiality an d evident bad fai t h .
public officer w ho, af ter s u spending th e ex ecution of th e o r d ers of
In Pe ople v . A e y e s, G . R. N o . 1 7 7 1 0 5 -06, A u g u st 1 2 , 2 0 1 0 , his superiors for any reason, disobeys such superiors despite the fact
arrogant r e f u sal t o r e c o gnize an d o b e y t h e C A d e c i s ion c a u sing that the latter di sapproved the suspension. (Artic le 282)
undue inj ur y t o t h e c o m p l a i n an t an d g i v i n g u n w a r r a n t e d b enefits
T he s h e r if f s u s p e n ded t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of th e w r i t o f
to priv at e i n d i v i d u al s c onst i t u te s e v i d ent b a d f a i t h a n d m a n i f est
execution in v olv in g th e d e m ol i t ion o f a b u i l d i n g b e in g cl a i med by
partiality contempl ated in vi ol a t ion of Section 8(e) of 3,.A. No. 8019.
a third person. He is not l i a ble for open disobedience. Since a thi r d
(2018 Bar Exam)
p erson is cl ai m in g t h e b u i l d i n g , th e s h e r if f a c ted i n g ood f a it h i n
s uspending th e i m p l e m ent a t ion of th e w r i t . B u t i f t h e c o ur t f o u n d
W ithout j u r i s d i c t i o n
that the claim of the th ir d p erson is unm er i t o r i ous and disapproved
Thhe court i n a c i vi l c ase issued an or der for th e i s suance of a t he suspension o f i m p l e m e n t a t io n o f t h e w r i t , t h e s h e r i f f m u s t
w rit of execution. The br a nch clerk of court r e f u sed to issue a wr i t obey the order of the court ; fa i l ur e t o do so constit u tes the crime of
o f execution despite of th e f act t h a t i t i s h i s m i n i s t e r ia l d u t y t o d o disobedience toorder of a superior officer.
so. The branch cl erk o f c our t w a s c h a r ged of open di sobedience in
court. Wh il e th e c r i m i n a l c ase for open d i sobedience was pending, Crime of disobedience
the Supreme Court d eclared t ha t t h e court i n t h e c i vi l case has no
Disobedience is a c r i m e a g a i nst p u b li c o r d er . T hi s c r im e can
j urisdiction. On e of t h e e l e m ent s of o pen d i sobedience is t h a t t h e
be committed by any person. Open disobedience and disobedience to
order di sobeyed m u s t b e i s s ued "w i t h i n th e s c o pe of ju r i s d i c t io n
order of superior officer are crimes commi t ted by public officer.
of the su pe rior a u t h o r i t y ."Th is e l e m e nt i s l a c k i n g . W i t h o u t a n y
jurisdiction, there would be no legal order for accused to impl ement
or, conversely, di sobey. Even i f t h e j u d i c ia l d e cl ar a t ion o f l a c k of REFUSAL OF ASSISTANCE
j urisdiction h a pp ened after t h e a c cused disobeyed the or der h e i s
not crimi n a lly l i a b le. The condition of lack of ju r i s di ction is present Refusal of assistance is committ ed by a pub l ic officer who fails
to lend his cooperation towards the admi n i s t r a t ion of justice or other
at th e v er y i n c e p t ion o f t h e p r o c eedings. H e n ce, al : p r o ceedings
public service upon demand from competent au t h o r i ty . (Art i c le 283)

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VOI UME II VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 337

Refusal to give assistance and open disobedience

A chief of police refused obey the request of cit excreta and other stuff or substances not normally eaten; (3) Electric
r eques o city pr osecutor shock; (4) Ci gar ett e b u r n i n g ; b u r n i n g b y e l e c t r i cally h e a ted r o d s,
to assist hh is personnel i n s e r v i n g s u m m o n
s t o a r e s p ondent
d in i hot oil, acid; by the r u b b in g of pepper or other ch emical substances
p relimin ary i n v estigati on. He is liab l e for re usa t o g ive assistance,
f l o n mucous mem b r a n es, or a c id s or s p i ces di r ectly o n t h e w o u n d ;
owever, ifthe chief of police disobeys a direct order of th
to assistits sheriff
h or er o e ccurt ( 5) The subm er sion o f t h e h e a d i n w a t e r o r w a t e r p o l l u t e d w i t h
in i m p l e m e n t in g a w r i t o f e x ecution, th e crime
committed is open disobedience. excrement, ur i ne, vomit, and/or blood unti l th e b r in k of suffocation;
(6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position;
Refusal to d i s ch a rg e e l e c t iv e of fi ce (7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the in sertion of foreign objects
into the sex organ or rectum, or electricaltorture of the genitals;
Refusal to discharge elective office is committ ed b ( 8) Mut i l a t io n o r a m p u t a t i o n o f t h e e s s ent ia l p a r t s o f t h e b o d y
whoo,hav mi e y a n y p e r s on
having been elected by popular election to a public office, refuses such as the genitalia,ear, tongue; (9) Dental torture or the forced
w it ou t e g a l m o t ive to be sworn in or to discharg t h d t ' e xtraction of the teeth; (10) Pull in g out of fi n g er n a i ls; (11) Har m f u l
o ce. (Artic le 284) This crime cannot be co f
e commi tt ed b y an a p p o i n t i ve exposure to th e e l em ent s such a s s u n l i gh t a n d e x t r em e cold; (12)
officer. T he use of p l a s ti c ba g an d o t h e r m a t e r i al s p l a ced over t h e h e a d
to the point of a sphy x i a t i on ; (13) The use of psychoactive dr ugs to
TORTURE UNDER R.A. NO. 9745 change the perception, mem ory, al er t n ess or w il l o f a p e r son, such
"s: (i) Th e a d m i n i s t r a t io n o f d r u g s t o i n d u c e confession or r e d u ce
"Torture" r e f ers t o a n a c t b y w h i c h s evere pai n o r s u f f e r ing, mental competency; or (ii) The use of drugs to in d uce extreme pain
w hether
et her p hhy ssi
i cal or m e n t a l , i s i n t e n t i o n all y i n f l i c t ed or certain sy m p t om s of a di sease; and (14) Other a n a l ogous acts of
p p o s e s of ob t a i n in g f r o m h i m orr aa t h iirr d p er s o n i' nf f o r m a t i on p hysical tort u r e .
or a confession; puni sh in g hi m f o r a n ac t h e or a t h d
2. M en t a l T o r t u r e —Mental or psychological tortu re refers
to acts commit ted by a p e r son in a u t h o r i t y o r a g ent of a p e r son in
discrimin a t ion of a n k i n d w ' authority w h i c h ar e calculated to affect or confuse the m in d a n d/or
y , when such pain or su ff er ing is in fl i ct ed
b y or at th e i n st i g a t 'i o n o f or with t h e consent or acquiescen undermine a person's dignity and morale, such as:
p erson in aauthority
uth or a g ent of a p e r son in a u t h 't . ceo fa Mental or psychological torture includes: (1) Blindfolding; (2)
au o r i y . ((Se c t i o n 8 of
B.A. No. 9745) Threatening a p e r son or h i s r e l a t iv e w i t h b o d i l y h a r m , e x ecution
o rtur e s h a l l i n c l u d e . physical
TQ or other w r o n g fu l a c ts; (3) C onfi n em ent i n s o l i t ar y c e ll s or s e cret
to
o rr tur
u ree a n
and m ental or detention p l a c e s; ( 4 ) P r o l o n g ed i n t e r r o g a tio n; ( 5 ) P r e p a r i n g a
p sychological tort u r e .
prisoner for a "show tr i a l , " pub l ic dis play or pub l ic hum i l i a t i on of a
1. P h y s i c a l T or t u r e — Physical t o r t u r e i s detainee or pr i soner; (6) Causing u n scheduled t r a n sfer of a p erson
treatment or pu n i s h m ent in fl i c ted b a f or m o f
deprived of liberty from one place to another, creating the belief
o a person in au t h o r it y u pon another in h i s/her custod t » that he shall be sum m a r il y executed; (7) Mal t r e a t in g a member/s of
p, exh a u s t i on , d i s a bi l it y o r d y s f u n c t ion o f a person's family ; (8) Causing th e t o r t u r e sessions to be wi t n essed
nc ion o o ne or m o r e
parts of the body. b y the person's fa m i ly , r e l a t i ves or a n y t h i r d p a r t y ; (9 ) D e n ial of
P hysical t o r t u r e i n c l u d es : ( 1. ) S y s t e m a t i sleep/rest; (10) Shame infli ct ion such as stri p p ing the person naked,
g ing, punchi ng, k i c k i n g , s t r i k i n g w i t h t b t , h p arading him i n p u b l i c pl aces, shaving the vi ct i m's head or pu t t i n g
or o er similar objects, and jumping on th e stomach; h m arks on h i s b o d y a g a i nst h i s w i l l ; ( 1 1 ) D e l i b er at ely p r o h i b i t i n g
(2) Food
d eprivation or f o r cible feeding w it h s the victim to communicate with any member of his family; and (12)
i sp o i1e d f oo,
d , animal or human Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.(Section 4 of
R.A. No. 9745)

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 338 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
O ther F o r m s of T o r t u r e
Other cruel, inh u ma n and degrading tr eat m ent or pu n i s h m ent
r efers t o a d e l i b e r at e a n d a g g r a v a ted t r e a t m en t o r p u n i s h m e n t,
which is not constit u t iv e of the crime of tort u re, infli cted by a person
in authority or agent of a person in aut h or it y against a person under
his/her custody, which a t t a in s a l evel of severity causing suffering,
gross humil i a t ion or debasement to the lat t er. (Section 5 of R.A. No.
9745)
Crim i n a l act
Torture i n c l u des p h y sical t o r t u r e, or men ta l o r p s y c h ological
t orture. T h e d e fi n i t i o n o f t o r t u r e i s v e r y s w e e p i ng ; an d t h u s , i t
includes all forms of tor t u r e. H ow ever, the crime of tor t ur e does not
include pain or suffering ar i s ing only fr om, inh er ent in or in cidental
to lawful sanctions.
AAA was arrested for commit t i n g a bailable offense and detained
in solitary confinem ent. H e was able to post bail af ter tw o w e eks of
detention. Dur in g the period of detention, he was not given any food.
Such deprivation caused him p h y s ical discomfort. Food depriv ati on
a nd confinement i n s o l i t a r y c e l l a r e c o n s i d ered a s p h y s i cal a n d
psychological t o r t u r e u n d e r S e ction 4 (2) of R .A . N o . 9 7 45. H e nce,
the crime commi t t ed, is tortu re. (2018 Bar Exam )
C rimi na l i n t e n t i o n
The purposes of the offender in t o r t u r i n g th e cr i m i n a l su spect
or third person is:
1. T o ob t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n o r a c o n f e ssion f r o m s u s p ect or
third person; or
2. T o pun i sh hi m fo r a n act committed by hi m or a t h i r d
person; or
3. To i n t i m i d a t e or coerce him or a t h i r d p er son o r
4. T o d i s crim in ate him .
V ictim of t o r t u r e
Section 2 of R.A. No. 9745 declares the policy of the State: (1)
to ensure that t h e h uman r i g h t s of al l p e r sons, inclu ding suspects,
detainees and p r i s o n ers a r e r e s p e cted at a l l t i m e s
) a nd t ha t n o
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339
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
person placed under i n vestigation or h eld i n c u s tody of a ny p e r s on
in authority or , agent of a person in a u t h o r it y s h all be subjected to
physical, psychological or m e n tal h ar m x x x ; an d (2)to ensure th at
secret detention pl a c es, solit ary, i n c o m m u n ic ado o r o t h e r s i m i l a r
f orms of detention, where tort ur e may be carried out wit h i m p u n i t y ,
are prohibited.
In defining t or t ur e i n g en er al, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9745 uses
the phrase "act by which severe pain or suffering x x x is intentionally
inflicted on a person for purposes of x xx punishing him f or an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed
x xx."
In defi n in g t o r t u r e , S e ction 4 u s e s t h e p h r a s es "t r e a tment
or punishment i n f l i c ted x x x up o n a n o t h e r i n hi s l h e r c u s t o dy,"
"threatening x x x h i sl h e r r e l a t i v e(s) with b o d il y h a r m , e x ecution
or other wr ongfu l a c ts" and "m a l t r e ating a m e m b erls of a p e r s on's
family."In d e f in i n g c r u e l , i n h u m a n a n d de g r a d i ng t r e a t m e nt o r
punishment, Section 5 u s e s t h e p h r a se " a g g r a v ated t r e atment o r
punishment x x x against another person in custody."
T his i s a p o o r l y w r i t t e n l a w , w h i c h r e q u i r e s a p a i n s t a k i n g
a nalysis of several provisions just to identify the victim in th e cri m e
o f torture. At a n y r a t e , i t a p p e ars t ha t t h e p r i n c i pal v i c ti m i n t h e
c rime of torture is a person under the custody of person in auth or i t y
or his agent s uch a s a n a r r e s t ee, detention p r i s oner o r c o n vi cted
p risoner. S e c ondary v i c t i m s ar e m e m b er s of h i s f a m i l y . C a u si n g
mental or psychological torture to a person under custody (principal
v ictim') by malt r e at in g a m ember of his fam il y (secondary victim) i s
a violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9745.
T he P u b li c A t t o r n e y' s O f fi c e fi l e d r e c k l es s i m p r u d e nce o r
negligence and tor t ur e u n der R .A . No . 9745 against Sanofi officers
in selling Dengvaxia vaccines worth P3.5 billion, DOH Secretary
Garin and others in approving and implementing the dengue
m ass imm u n i z a t ion p r o g ra m u s i n g s u c h v a c cines, w h ich a r e t h e
proxiinate cause of the death of several chil dr en. For purposes of the
bar examinati ons, if a question is asked if pr osecution for tor t ur e is
correct, examinee should answer in th e negative. The childr en, who
allegedly died by r e ason of th e i m m u n i z a t ion u s in g th e D en gvaxia
vaccines, are not person under the custody of person in auth or ity or
his agent. T hey ar e n o t c r i m i n a l s u s pects, ar r estees or p r i soners.
Hence, prosecuting them for t o r t u r e is i m p r oper .
 340 341
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
VOLUME II

s hould have known t hat a cts of tort ur e or other cru el, inh u ma n an d
The offender un der Section 4 of R .A. No. 9745 on t or t ur e a degrading tr e at m ent or p u n i s h m en t s h al l b e com m i t t ed, are being
S ection 5 on cruel ,i n inhuman
h o. on tortur e and committed, or have been commit ted by his subordin ates or by others
and degrading treatment or ' h
r s o in au t h or it y or an agent of a person in au t hoor rpunis
i s a peerson i t y . m e nt within hi s a r e a of r e sponsibilit y a n d , d espite such k n o w l edge, did
no-.take preventive or corrective action either before, during or
U nder S e c t io n 1 3 o f R . A . N o o.. 9 7 4 5, p rrii n c i pa l b y d i r e c t i mmediately a f t e r i t s c o m m i s sion, w h e n h e h a s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o
p ar icipation, and p r i n c i pal by i n d u cement t h
n, e co n c ep t of f w h ich is p revent or investigate allegations of torture or other cruel, inhu m a n
th e same as tha t u n d e r A r t i c l e 1 7 of t h R
o e evise d P en a l C o d e , are a nd degrading t r e a t m en t o r p u n i s h m en t b u t f a i l e d t o p r e v en t o r
liiable. Likewise, the law expressly st t
s a es th at any superior mi l i t a r y investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or due to
police orlaw enforceme m ent officer or senior governm ent official w h ol negligence, shall also be liable as principal .
i ssued an order to anny lower
1 ran k in g personnel to commit tor t ur e for
w hatever purpose shall be held equally l i a ble as prin cipal . S ection 1 3 o f R . A. N o. 97 4 5 e x p l i c i t l y ma k e s superiors
c riminally l i a b l e u n d e r t h e d o c t r i n e o f c o m m a n d r e s p onsibili t y .
U nder A r t i c le s 1 7 a n d 1 8 o f t h e R e v i sed P e na l C o d e
one T l-,us, liabilit y u n d e r t h e d o ct r in e of com m an d r e sponsibilit y i s n o
w ho concurs w i t h t h e c r i m i n a l d
e sign o f t h e p r i'n c 'i a l b
b longer simply a d m i n i s t r a t iv e (based on neglect of dut y), but i s now
participation is liable as
is i a e a s p r i n c i pal by indispensable cooperation if the cr'minal. (Concurring o pin i on of J u s t ice Bri on in R u b r i c o v. G loria
crime would not h av e been accomplishe d 't h
is e w i ou t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i on Mwcapagal-Arroyo, G.R. ¹ . 188 8 7 1,February 18, 2010)
(indis
in i spensable cooperation), or a s a n a c
accomp 1ice i 'f h is previous or
ssimult
imu taneous p a r t i c i p a t io n m e r e l y s u p l i e s t h e X, a police officer, placed a hood on the head of W, a suspected
p ies e prin c i pal m o r al
o r ma e r i a ai i n a n e f fi c a c i ous w a y ( d i s p ensable cooperation). drug pusher, and watched as Y and Z, policetrainees, beat up and
H owever, under Section 13 of R .A . No . 9745 b h
o. tortured W t o ge t h i s c o nfession. 'X" is liable as principal for the
in
i ndisi speensable cooperation an d a ccomplice , o t t h e p r i n c i pal by
' e ar e 1i abl e as prin cipals. c rime of t o r t u r e . U n d e r S e c t ion 1 3 o f R . A . N o . 9 7 45 , i m m e d i a t e
e xpress y states t ha t a p e r son wh o cooperated i n t h senior public official of th e PN P s h al l b e h el d l i a bl e as a p r i n c i pal
e in e execution
or ur e y p r e v i ous or sim u l t a n eous acts shall be liable to the crime of t o r t u r e i f h e ha s k n o w l edge that a cts of t or t ur e a r e
a s principal w i t h ou t d i s t i n c t ion a s t o w h e t her t h e b eing commit ted by h i s s u b or di n a t es, and di d no t t a k e p r e v enti v e
indispensable or not. artici
action durin g it s commi ssion. Section 18 of R.A. No. 9745 explicitly
Under Section 13 of R.A . No. 9745, an accessory is also liable m akes superiors cr i m i n a ll y l i a bl e u n de r t h e d o ct r in e of com m a n d
.A. responsibility. (2011 Bar Exam)
o r tortu re. The concept of an accessory under t h i s
ssame
ame as tha t u n der A r t i cl e 19 of the Revised n ePenal
r i sCode
p r o v with
i s iont hi sr ee
the
I ndepen d en t C r i m e
v ariations. U n de r R . A . N oo.. 9 7 4 5 a
, an accessory must be a public
offic er , ,the
hh accessoryy acts of har Torture as acrime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by
arboring, concealing or assisting in the
escape of the pr i n c i pal i n t h e act of t o r t u r e m u s t b d any other crime or felony commi t ted as a consequence, or as a means
e o the official s public functions, and relati onship between the ir the conduct or commission thereof. In wh ich case, torture shall be
p rincipa a n d accessory is not an exempt i n treated as a separate and in dependent cri m i na l act wh ose penalties
p ing circum st ance.
s hall be imposable wi t h out p r e j u d ice to any other cr i m i na l l i a b i l i t y
A superior of fi cer o n t h e b a si s o f c o m m an d r e s
also liable for torture responsib'1' i ity is p"ovided forby domestic and international laws. (Section 15 of R .A.
o r ure a
a s p r i n c i p al . U n d e r S e ction 1 3 o f R . A . N o .
9745, the i m m e d i at e com m a n din g officer of t h e u n i t c ~ n~er~~d of Xo. 9745)
e or the immediate senior public official of the PNP and other
law enforcement agencies shall be h eld l i a bl e as a A pplicat ion of th e P r o v i s i on s of th e R e v i sed P e n a l C o d e
ri T he provisions of th e R evised Penal Code insofar as they ar e
applicable shall be suppletory to this Act. Moreover, if the commission
e , a e e
d irectl
ec y oor
r indirectly,
indir the commission thereof borhallowed,
i s sub w h e t her o:" any crimes against persons and crimes against personal liberty
now e ge o o r, owing to th e ci r c u m st ances at th e t i m e , a nd security o f t h e R e v i sed Penal C ode is a t t e n ded by an y o f t h e

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 342 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
acts constitu t in g t o r t u r e an d o t h e r c r u el , i n h u m a n a n d d e g r a ding
t reatment or p u n i s h m e nt , th e penalty t o be i m p osed shall be in i t s
maximum per i od. (Section 22 of B.A. No. 9745)
M ALTR E A T M E N T OF PRISON E R
Maltreatment o f p r i s o ner i s committed b y a p u b l i c o f f i cer
who overdoes himself i n t h e c o r r ection or h a n d l in g of a d e t e n t i on
p risoner or convicted pr i soner u n der hi s ch ar
b th
of p
o u u n i s h m e nt s no t a u t h o r i zed by t h e r e g u l a t i ons, or b y i n fl i c t i n g
s uch punishments in a cr uel and h u m i l i a t i n g m a n n
. Th
qua i e i the purpose thereof isto extort a confession, or to obtain
some informat ion from th e pr i soner. (Art i c le 285)
T h e penalty for m a l t r e a t m en t i s i n a d d i t io n t o t h 1 ' b ' I ' t
o e ia i i y o
e o en e r for th e physical inj u r ies or damage caused. (Article 285)f
The offender can also be charged with th e crime of tortu re since this
i s an independent cri m e .
M altr e a t m e n t o f a n A r r e s t e e
X, a police captain, arrested Y on suspicion of robbery. X
i nterrogated Y b u t Y d e n i e d k n o w l e dge an d p a r t i c i p a t ion i n a n y
c rime of robbery. X t h e n o r d ered Z, h i s a s sistant, t o t o r t u r e K A s
a result of the tor t u r e , Y confessed despite his in n ocence. (1979 Bar
Exam) M altr e a t m e nt of prisoner is not commit t e d. The victim in th i s
case is not yet a p r i s oner because he is no t et b k d '
ye o o e i n t e po l i ce
station and placed in jail even for a moment. (People v. Barinh
e v. a n n g , C.A.,
) e n c e , X i sl i a bl e as pr i n c i pal by i n d u c ement ar d Z
as principal by direct par t i ci p a t ion in th e crime of grave co
a ve coercior . I n
a i i o n o g r a v e coercion, Xi s also liable for tort ur e un der R.A. .No.
9745. Torture is a crime independent from grave coercion. Torture is
c ommitted even if th e vi cti m i s j ust an a r r e t . Wh t '
s ee. a i s i m po r t ant
i s that he is under of the police captain, a person in au t h o r i t y .
Forcibl y b r o ugh t t o th e p o lice headquarters, a person was
tortured and maltr eated by agents of the law in order to compel hi
m to
con ess a crime imputed to him. The agents failed, however, to draw
from i m a c o n f ession wh ich wa s t h ei r i n t e n t ion t bt '
e emp oyment of such m e ans. (1999 Bar E x a m) Ma l t r e a t th h
m e n-. of
p risoner is no t c o m m i t t e d s i nce th e v i c ti m i s n o t a p r i s o n er. T h e
crime commit ted is grave coercion and tor t ur e u n der R.A. No. 9745.
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 343
P ersonal M a l t r e a t m e n t
M altreatm ent m u s t r e l a t e t o t h e c o r r ection or h a n d l i n g of a
p risoner un der hi s c h a rge or m u s t b e fo r t h e p u r p ose of extort i n g
a confession, or of o b t a i n in g s om e i n f o r m a t io n f r o m t h e p r i s oner .
A jailer wh o in fl i c ted i n j u r i e s on t h e p r i s oner because of personal
grudge against h i m i s l i a b l e f o r p h y s i cal i n j u r i e s o nly (P e ople v .
javier, C.A., 54 O.G. 6622; 2012 Bar E x a m) and n ot m a l t r e a t m e nt
o f prisoner si nce h e di d n o t c o m m i t t h e c r i m e i n h i s c a p a city a s
c ustodian. I n a d d i t i o n t o p h y s i cal i n j u r i es, th e j a i le r ca n b e h e l d
liable for t o r t u r e s i nce t h i s c r i m e ca n b e c o m m i t t e d fo r p u r p o ses
of discrimin a t in g th e p r i s oner. T or t ur e i s a c r i m e i n d ependent for
physical inju r i e s.
ABUSE OF CHASTITY
Abuse of chastity is committ ed by: (I) pub l ic officer who solicits
or makes im m o ral o r i n d e cent a d v ances to a w o ma n i n t e r e sted in
matters pending before such officer for decision, or w it h r e s pect to
which he is required to submit a r eport to or consult w it h a superior
o fficer; or (2) a w a r den or ot her p u b li c officer di r ectly ch arged wi t h
t he care an d c u s t od y o f p r i s o n er s o r p e r s on s u n d e r a r r e s t w h o
s ol.'cit or m a k e i m m o r a l o r i n d e cent a d v a n ces to a w o m a n u n d e r
his custody, or his wife, daughter, sister or relat ive wi t hi n th e same
degree by affini ty . (Ar t i c le 245; 1967 Bar Exam)
Arrestee
I n abuse of c h a s t i ty , t h e v i c t i m i s a n a r r e s t ee, p r i s oner o r
relative of the a r r e stee or pr i s oner. Th us, an a r r e stee who has not
yet been booked in th e p olice station an d p l aced in p r i son can be a
victim of abuse of chastity but not m a l t r e a t m ent of pr i soner.
C onsumma te d S t a g e
A provincial guard, who is in charge of the provincial jail, made
love and unchaste proposal to a woman prisoner confined in jail
but failed to seduce her. The guard is liablefor abuse of chastity.
Actual seduction is not an e l em ent of t h i s cr i m e. Abuse of chastity
is consumm ate d a s t h e p r e c is e m o m en t t h a t t h e p u b l i c o f fi cer
s olicited or p r o p osed i m m o ra l o r i n d e c ent a d v a n ces t o a w o m a n
under hi s c u st ody b ecause th e l a w u s e s t h e w o r d " s o licit." (1967
 344 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Bar Exam) I f t he gua rd commi t t e d in d ecent acts against the victim ,
he can be prosecuted for acts oflasciviousness, attempted rape or
consummated rape.
Abuse of Ch a st i ty , M a l t r e a t m e n t o f Pr i s o n er a n d T o r t u r e
In maltr eat m ent of prisoner, the offender is a public officer who
is in charge of the pr i s o ner. I n t o r t u r e , t he o ffender is a p e r s on in
authority or his agent, who has custody over a person such as arrestee
or prisoner. P erson in a u t h o r i t y i n c l u d es i m m e d i a te c omm a n d i n
a n in g
officer of t h e u n i t c o n cerned of t h e A F P o r t h e i m m e d i at e s enior
public official of t h e P N P a n d o t h e r l a w e n f o r cement a g encies. In
a buse of chastity, th e offender is pub lic officer, who has the duty t o
d ecide on a m a t t e r p e n d in g b efore hi m ( e.g., judge); or i s r e q u i r ed
submit a r e p or t t o or co n s ult w i t h a s u p e r i or o fficer ( e.g., sanitary
i nspector); o r i s d i r e c tl y c h a r ge d w i t h t h e c a r e a n d c u s t od y o f
arrestee, or prisoner.
I n mal t r e a t m en t o f p r i s o n er , t h e v i c t i m i s a d e t e n t i o n o r
convicted prisoner. In tor t u r e, the pri n ci pal victim is a person under
the custody of person in a u t h o r it y or hi s agent w h i l e th e secondary
v ictims are m e mb ers of hi s f a m i ly . I n a b use of chastity , th e v i c t i m
is a person, who has int erest in th e m a t ter for decision, reporting or
consultation by th e pu b lic officer; or an a r r e stee, or prisoner or hi s/
her relativ e.
In mal t r e a t m ent of p r i s oner, th e p u r p ose of the offender is to
punish prisoner in a manner not author i zed by regulation or in a cruel
and humi l i a t in g m a n ner or to obtain a confession or infor m a t i on. In
torture, the pur pose of the offender is to pu n ish cr i m i n a l su spect or
person for crime commi t ted by other p erson, to obtain confession or
information or to discrim i n ate him . In abuse of chastity, the purpose
of the offender is to satisfy his i m m o ral desire.
A buse of chastit y a n d m a l t r e a t m en t o f p r i s o ner ca n o nl y b e
committed by means of dolo. Tort ur e can be commi t ted by means of
dolo or culpa.
O ffender s h a l l b e pu n i s h e d f o r maltreatm en t o f p r i s o n er
i n addition t o h i s l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e p h y s i cal i n j u r i es. T or t ur e i s a n
independent crime. Hence, a jail guard, who physically tortured a
*
prisoner un der hi s cu stody, can be h eld l i a bl e for m a l t r e a t m ent of
p risoner, physical inj u r ies and tor t u r e .
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 345
ANTICIPATION OF DUTIES OF A PUBLIC OFFICER
Anticipation of d u t i es of a p u b li c offi cer i s c o m m i t t e d by a n y
person who assumes the perform ance of the du t ies and powers of a
p ublic office or employment w i t h ou t fi r s t b e in g sw orn i n o r h a v i n g
given the bond required by law. (Ar t i c le 286; 2012 Bar Exam)
U nder Ar t i cle I X-B of Section 4 of th e Consti t u t i on , all p u b l i c
officers and employees shall take an oath or affirm a t ion to uphold and
d efend this Consti t u t i on . F a i l ur e t o t a k e a n o at h b e f ore assumin g
office constitutes anti cipation of dut ies of public office.
Accountable officers are required to post bond before assuming
t heir d u t i e s a s r e q u i r e d u n d e r S e c t io n 1 0 1 o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t
A uditing C o d e . F a i l u r e t o p o s t t h e r e q u i r e d b o n d c o n s t i t u t e s
anticipation of duties of public office. However, not all public officers
are required by law to give bond as a requisite for the assumption of
t he performance of duty ;
FAILURE TO SUBMIT SALN UN D E R R.A. No. 6713
Under Section 17, Arti cle XI of the Constit u t i on, a public officer
or employee shall, upon assumpt ion of office and as often thereafter
a s may be required by l aw , su b mi t a d e cl ar at ion u n der oath of h i s
a ssets, liabili t i es, and net wor t h .
I t i s i m p e r a t i v e t h a t e v e r y p u b l i c o f f i c ia l o r g o v e r n m e n t
employee must make and submit a complete disclosure of his assets,
liabilities an d n e t w o r t h i n o r d e r t o s u p p r es s an y q u e s t i onable
accumulation of wealth . T hi s serves as the basis of the government
a nd the p eople i n m o n i t o r i n g t h e i n c om e a n d l i f e s t yl e o f p u b l i c
officials in c o m p l i a nce w i t h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o na l p o l icy t o e r a d i cate
corruption, and to pr omote tr a n sparency. (OCA v. Usman, A.M ¹ .
SCC-08-12, October 19, 2011)
Failure of p u b li c officer t o s u b mi t S A L N (C a v i t e Cr u s a de for
Good Government v. ¹ va t o ,A. M. N o . R T J - 0 0 -1562, November28,
2001); or failure to disclose her business interest in her SALN ( R a b e
v. Flores, Adm. M a t ter No. P-97-1247, May 14, 1997) discrepancies,
inconsistencies and omissions in her S AL N (C o n cerned Taxpayer v.
Doblada, A.M No . P - 9 9-1842, June 8, 2005) is a violation of Section
8 of R.A. No. 6713.
 346 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
The crime of fail ur e to file SAL N i s ma l u m p r o h i b i t u m. He nce
~)
b eing outside the country is not an excuse for fail ure to comply wi th
the mandate under the Constit u t ion and law to submit SA L N . (1986
Bar Exam)
Failure to file SALN as required by law is a violation of Section
8 of R .A . N o . 6 7 1 8 a n d S e c t io n 7 o f R . A . N o . 3 0 1 9. (C o ncerned
Taxpayer v. Doblada, A. M. N o. P-99-1842, June 8, 2005) Since both
laws provide a penalty for f a i l ur e t o fil e SA L N , t h e offender should
o nly be prosecuted and pu n i shed either u n der one or the other .
However, it i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t S e ction 7 of R .A . No . 3019 h
een modified by Section 8 of R.A. No. 6718. Public officers are now
submitt in g S A L N i n c o m p l i a nce w i t h i m p l e m e n t in g r e g u l a t ion of
R .A. No. 6 718 i s sued by t h e C i v i l S e r v ice C o m m i s sion. T hey a r e
required to file SALN "on or before April 80, of every year" as required
under R.A. No. 6713 and not "w i t h in th e mo n th of Ja n u a ry of every
other year" as mandated under R.A. No. 8019.
Moreover, un der Section 1 1 of R .A . No . 6 7 13, if t h e v i o l a t ion
is punishable by a h e a v ier p e n alt y u n d e r a n o t her l a w , h e sh all be
prosecuted under the la t ter st a t u te. Appl y in g t hi s r ul e in r ev erse, if
t he violation is p u n i s h able by a l i g h te r p e n a lt y u n d e r a n o t her l aw
(R.A. No. 3019), he shall be prosecuted under R.A. No. 6718. In this
case, the penalty fo r f a i l u r e t o s u b mi t S A L N u n d e r R .A . N o . 8019
is lighter t h a n t h a t p r e scribed for th e s ame fai l ur e u n der R .A . No.
6713.
Section 8 o f R . A . N o . 6 7 1 8 e x c l u des p u b l i c officials and
employees,who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or
temporary work ers from the requir em ent of filing SALN . One, who is
appointed by the President as Honorary Consul to a foreign country,
is not required to fil e SAL N w i t h i n 8 0 d ays from assump t ion of his
duties. (2001 Bar Exam )
DISCLOS U R E OF RELATIONS HIP UNDER R.A. NO. 6713
Violation of S ection 8 (b ) o f R .A . N o . 6 71 3 ( Code of C onduct
and Ethical St a n d a rds of Pu b lic Of ficials) is commi t ted by a p u blic
official, wh o f a i l e d t o p e r f or m h i s d u t y t o i d e n t i f y a n d d i s c lose,
t o the best of hi s k n o w l e dge and i n f o r m a t i on , hi s r e l a t i ves in t h e
o vernment i n t h e f o r m , m a n n e r an d f r e q u ency pr escribed by t h e
Civil Se rvice Comm i s sion. This is c onnected with t h e ru l e ag a inst
nepotism. In Sulu Islam ic Association of Masjid La m b a yong v. M ali',
G.R. No. M T J - 9 2 -619, September 10 , 1 9 98, a j u d g e r ecommended
J9JC9B0M
V:I. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 347
the appointment of hisniece as process server. He failed to disclose
his relationship to h is n i e ce in vio la t i on of Section 8 (b) of R.A. No.
6718.
If a person, obtains or uses SALN or st at ement ident i f y in g and
disclosing relationship subm i t t ed by a public officer: (a) any purpose
contrary to mo r a ls or p u b l ic p o lic y; or ( b) a ny c om m e rc ial p u r p o se
other than b y n e w s an d co m m u n i c a t i o ns me d ia f or d i s s emina ti o n
to the general publ ic, the former is cr i m i n a ll y l i a ble un der R.A. No.
6718.
SALN an d s t a t e m en t i d e n t i f y i n g an d d i s closing r e l a t i onship
shall be m ad e a v a i l a bl e fo r i n s p ection a t r e a s onable h o u rs. Such
statements sl all be made available for copying or reproduction after
ten (10) workirig days from the time they are filed as required by law.
Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay
a reasonable fee to cover the cost of reproduction and mai l ing of such
statement, as well as the cost of certifi cati on. Such stat ement shall
be available to the public for a per od of ten ( 10) years after receipt
of the statement. After such period. the statement may be destroyed
unless needed in a n o n g o in g i n v e sti gati on. (S ection 8 of R . A . ¹ .
6718) Violation of th e r u l e on a cce:sibil it y of S AL N a n d s t a t e m ent
i dentifying and disclosing relati onship is a cri m e .
Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 6 > 18, all public documents must be
made accessible to, and readily ava lable for inspection by, the public
within reasor able work ing hours. However, the right to infor m a t i on
is subject to recognized restricti ons such as those involving nati onal
s ecurity, t r a d e s e cr et s a n d b a n k i n g t r a n s a ctions, c l assified l a w
e nforcement m a t t e rs , an d o t he r c l a ssified i n f o r m a t i o n . (Chavez v.
PCGG, G.R. ¹ . 18 0 7 1 6, De cember 9, 1 9 9 8; Aq u i n o - Sarm i e nto v .
Morato, G.R. No. 92541, November 18, 1991)Violation of Section 5 of
R.A. No. 6713 in relat ion to Section 8 th ereof is a crim e.
CONFLICT OF INTERES T A N D DIVEST M E N T UN D E R R.A. NO. 6713
A publi c of fi cial s h al l a v oi d c onfi ic t o f i n t e r est a t a l l t i m e s .
When a conflict of i n t e r est ar i ses, he shall r e sign from hi s position
i n any priv ate bu siness enterpr ise wi t hi n t h i r t y ( 80) days from h i s
assumption of office and/or divest himself of his shareholdings or
i nterest w i t h i n s i x t y ( 6 0 ) d a y s f r o m s u c h a s s u m p t i on . Th e s a m e
r ule shall ap pl y w h er e th e p u b li c official or e m p l oyee is a p a r t n e r
i n a par t n e r sh ip . Th e r e q u i r e m en t o f d i v e s t m en t s h al l n o t a p p l y
t o those who serve the Governm ent i n a n h o n o r ar y capacity nor t o
 348 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
laborers and casual or temporary workers.(Section 9 of R.A. ¹,
6 713) Violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6713 is a crim e.
Conflict of i n t e rest ar i s es w h en a p u b l i c o f f i c ial or e m p l o y e e
is a member of a b o a rd , an of fi cer, or a s u b s t a n t ia l s t ockholder of
a private corporation or owner or has a substantial interest in a
b usiness, and th e i n t e r est o f s uc h c o r p or at ion o r b u s i n ess, or h i s
rights or duties therein, may be opposed to or affected by the faithful
performance of o f f i cial d u t y . Su b s t a n t i al s t o c kholder m e a n s a n y
person wh o o w ns , d i r e ctly o r i n d i r e c t ly , sh a res of s t ock s uf fi cient
t o elect a director of a corporati on. This t erm sh all also apply to th e
parties toa voting trust. (Section 3 of R.A. No. 6713)
Divestment i s t h e t r a n s f er o f t i t l e o r d i s p o s al of i n t e r e st i n
p roperty b y v o l u n t a r i l y , c ompletely a n d a c t u a l l y d e p r i v i n
ispossessing
dis 0 oneself of his ri ght or t i t l e to it i n f a vor of a person or
p ersons other t ha n h i s sp ouse and r e l a t i ves wi t hi n t h e f o u rt h c i v i l
degree of consanguinit y or af 6 n i t y . (Section 3 of R.A. No. 6713)
In Rabe v. Flo res, Adm. M a t t e r N o . P - 97-1247, May 1 4, 1 997,
the requirement for p u b lic officers, in general, to divest th e m selves
o f business interests upon assumpt ion of a public office is prom t d
y the need to av oi d conflict of i n t e r e sts. H ow ever, in t h e a b sence
of any shoiving t h a t a b u s i n ess in terest w il l r e s ul t i n a c o n f.'ict of
interest, divestment of the same is unnecessary. In the present case, it
seems a bit far -fetched to im a gine that t h er e is a conflict of in-.crest
because an Int er p r eter II I o f th e Regional T r ia l C o ur t ha s a stall in
the mark et. A court, generally, is not engaged in the regulat ion of a
public mar k et, nor does it concern i t self w it h t h e a ct i v i t ies th r e o f.
Thus, she is not liable under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6713 for fail ure to
divest herself of the business interest. However, respondent is liable
under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 for fail ur e to disclose such int erest
in her SALN . W h il e she may not be compelled to divest herself of her
business interest, she had the legal obligation of div u l ging i t .
P RO L O N G ING PE R F O R M A N C E O F D U TIES AND PO W E R
Prolonging perform a nce of du ties and p owers is commit t ed b
i e y
p ubli
blic officer
ffi wh o cont i n ues to exercise the du t ies and p ow ers of
his office, employment or commission, beyond the period provided by
law, regulations or special provisions applicable to the case. (Article
AA was appointed for a t w o -year t er m t o s erve the un e xpire d
portion of a resigned public of6cial. Despite being disqualified after
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 349
the lapse of the tw o-year t e rm , A A cor ti n ued to exercise the dut i es
a nd powers of t h e p u b l i c o f fice t o w h i c h h e i s a p p o i n t ed. A A i s
criminally l i a bl e for p r o l onging perfor m a nce of du t ies and powers.
(2012 Bar Exam)
ABANDONM ENT OF OFFICE OR POSITION
Abandonment of office or position is committed by a public officer
who abandons hi s of fice b efore th e a c ceptance of h i s r e s i g n ati on
t o the det r i m en t o f t h e p u b l i c s e r v i ce. Th e c r i m e i s q u a l i 6 e d i f
h e abandons hi s of fice i n o r d e r t o e v a d e t h e d u t y o f p r e v e n t i n g ,
p rosecuting or p u n i s h in g an y c r i m e a g a i nst n a t i o nal securi ty , an y
c rimes against the law of nat i ons, and certain cr i mes against publi c
Cksorder. (Article 238)
T he cri mes m e n t i o ned i n A r t i c l e 2 3 8 w h i c h t h e o f f e n der i n
quali6ed abandonment of office has the duty to prevent, prosecute or
punish pertain to all cr i mes against n a t i onal securit y (e.g., treason)
and law of nati ons (e.g., piracy). But w i t h r e s pect to cri mes against
public disorder, —.hey are only confined to t h ose covered by Chapter
1, Title 8 of Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code such as rebellion, coup
d'ctat, sedition, c onspiracy or p r o p o s al to co m m i t r e b e l l i o n, c oup
d' etat, and conspiracy to commit s e ditio n.
Abandonment of office to evade the duty to prosecute treason is
qualifiedabandonment of office. (2002 Bar Exam) Abandonment of
office to evade the duty to prosecute direct assault is also punishable
under Arti cle 238 since it i s d e t r i m e n ta l t o t h e p u b li c service. But
the crime is not qualified abandonment of office since direct assault
is not a crime against pu b li c disorder covered by Chapter 1, Ti tl e 3
of Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
To avoid trying cases for rebellion filed against alleged members
of the Maute group, the judge of the court. where the case is pending
tendered his resignation to the Supreme Court and immediately went
to the United St ates of Am er ica w i t h ou t w a i t i n g for th e acceptance
of his resignation. The crime commi t ted is qualified abandonment of
office because rebellion wh ich th e j u dge has the dut y t o p u n ish is a
crime against pub lic disorder covered bv Ch apter 1, Ti tl e 3 of Book
2 of the Revised Penal Code.
If the pu b li c officer di d no t a b a n don hi s office, but h e evaded
h is duty to pr osecute a cr im e such as r ebellion, he is l i a ble for t h e
crime of tolerance.
 350 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
RESIGNATION IS NOT A DEFENSE
Resignation f ro m t h e pu b l i c o ffice i s n o t .
a d e f ense i i i
malversation since it is not l i s ted in A r t i cl e 89 of the Revised Penal
C ode as a m od e of e x t i n g u i s h in g c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y . T h i s c r i m e i s
committed if at th e t im e of m i sappropri a t ion of public property, the
accused is still accountable officer. (2006 Bar Exam )
U nder S ection 1 2 o f R . A . N o . 8 0 1 9 , n o p u b l i c o f fi cer s h al
b e allowed t o r e s ig n o r r e t i r e p e n d in g i n v e s t i gati on, c r i m i n a l o-
a dministr a t i ve, or p e n d in g a p r o s ecution a g a i nst h i m , o r f o r a n y
offense under R.A. No. 8019 or u n der th e p r ov i sions of the Revised
P enal Code on Bribery .
H owever, a p u b l i c o fficer f a c in g c r i m i n a l i n v e s t i g a t io n o r
p rosecution ha s t h e r i g h t t o r e s i gn . S ection 1 2 o f R . A . N o . 8 0 19
m erely p r e v ent s t h e a c t o f r e s i g n a t ion o r r e t i r e m en t f r o m b e i n g
used by a public official as a protective shield to stop or pre vent the
investigation or prosecution of violation of R.A. No. 8019 or bribery,
T o be sure, no p erson can b e compelled t o r e n der s er v ice for t h at
would b e a v i o l a t i o n o f h i s c o n s t i t u t i o na l r i g h t . A p u b l i c o f fi cia'
h as the r i g h t n o t t o s e r v e i f h e r e a l l y w a n t s t o r e t i r e o r r e s i gn
Nevertheless, if a t t h e t i m e h e r e s i gns or r e t i r es, a p u b li c official
is facing a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r c r i m i n a l i n v e s t i g at ion o r p r o s ecution,
s uch resignation or r e t i r e m en t w i l l n o t c a use th e d i s m i ssal of t h e
c riminal o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c eedings a g a i ns t h i m . H e c a n n ot
use his resignation or r e t i r e m en t t o a v oi d p r osecution. (Estrada v.
Desierto,G.B. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001)
DISOBEYING REQUEST FOR DISQUALIFICATION
Disobeying request for disqualifi cation is commit t ed by a public
officer who s ha ll c ont i n ue a p r o c eeding after h a v i ng b e en la w f u l ly
required to refr ain f ro m so doing before the question of ju r i s diction
is decided. (Article 242)
ORDERS OR REQUESTS BY EXECUTIVE OFFICERS TO JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY
Orders or r e q uests by executive officers to j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i ty
is commi t te d b y a n e x e c u t iv e of fi cer w h o s h al l a d d r ess a n o r d er
or suggestion to an y j u d i c ial a u t h o r it y w i t h r e s p ect to an y case or
business coming within its exclusive jurisdiction.
(Article 248)
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 351
UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENT
Unlawful. appointment i s c o m m i t t e d b y a p u b l i c o f f i c er w h o
shall knowing y n om i n at e or appoint to any pu b lic office any person
lacking the legal quali fications therefor. (Art ic le 244)
T o b e I e l d l i a b l e f o r u n l a w f u l a p p o i n t m e nt , t h e p u b l i c
officer knew t h a t h i s n o m i n ee or a p p oi ntee di d no t h a v e th e l e gal
q ualifications at th e t i m e h c m ad e th e n o m i n a t ion or appoin t m e n t .
In ascertaining the legal qualificati ons of a parti cular appointee to a
public office, there must be a law providing for the qualifications of a
p erson to be nominated or appointed th er ein. To ill u m i n at e fu r t h e r ,
J ustice Rodolt'o Palattao succinctly d i s cussed in h i s b ook t h a t t h e
q ualification of a p u b li c officer t o h ol d a p a r t i c u la r p o sit ion i n t h e
government is pr o vi ded for by l aw , w h i c h ma y r e fer t o educational
attainment , c i v i l s e r v i c e e l i g i b i l it y o r e x p e r i e n ce. Fo r i n s . a n ce,
f or one to b e a p p oi n ted a s j u d ge, h e m u s t b e a l a w y er . S o i f t h e
J udicial an d B a r C o u n ci l n o m i n a tes a p e r son fo r a p p o i n t m en t a s
judge knowing hi m t o be nct a m e m ber of th e P h i l i p p in e B ar , such
act constitutes a violation of the law u n der consideration . i'People v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164185, July 28, 2008)
In Pe opie v. S a n d i g a n b ayan, s u p r a, th e a c c u s ed. a mayor,
d esignated O r l a n d o a s mu n i c i p a l a dm i n i s t r a t o r d e s p i t e the
constituti onal p r o h i b i t io n on a p p o i n t m en t o f a c a n d i d at e wh o l o st
in any election for one year. According to the Sandiganbayan,
a ccused i s n o t l i a b l e f o r u n l a w f u l ap p o i n t m en t b e c a us e t h e
t emporary p r o h i b i t io n i s n o t s y n o n y m ous w i t h a b s ence or l ack o f
l egal qualificati on, w i t h i n t h e c o n t e m p l a t ion o f A r t i c l e 24 4 of t h e
Revised Penal Code on un l a w fu l a p p oi n t m e nt . Th e Su pr eme Court
however fi nd s n o l e gal b a sis t o s uch i n t e r p r e t a t i on. L ack o f l e g al
q ualification a s a n e l e m e n t o f c r i m e o f u n l a w fu l a p p o i n t m e n t
i ncludes temp or ar y d i s q u a l i f i cation. I n s u m , a p p o i n t i n g a l o s i n g
candidate i n t h e g o v e r n m en t d e s p it e t h e o n e -year c onsti t u t i o n al
prohibition constit u tes the "r im e of un l a w fu l a p p oin t m e nt..
PLUNDER UNDER R.A. NO. 7080
Plunder is c omm i t t e d by a n y p u b l i c o ff icer w ho s h a ll a m a s s,
accumulate or a c qu ir e i l l - gotten w e a lt h t h r o u g h a c o m b i n a t ion or
series of overt or c r i m i n a l a ct s (pr edicate cri m es) in th e a g gregate
a mount or t o t a l v a l u e o f a t l e a s t P 5 0 ,000,000.00 by h i m s elf or i n
connivance with ot her persons.
 352 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
The legislative declaration i n R .A . N o . 7659 t ha t t h e c r i m e of
p lunder un der R .A . No . 7080 is a h e i n ous offense impl ies that i t i s
a malum in se. For when t he acts puni s hed are inhe re ntly i m m o r a l
or inherently w r o ng, they are ma la in s e and it does not matt er t h a t
such acts are puni shed in a special law, especially since in th e case
of plunder th e p r e d i cate cr i mes ar e m a i n l y ma l a i n se . I n d e e d, it
would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are
mere prosecutions for v i o l a t i ons of th e B o u n cin g C h eck Law ( B . I ' .
Bl g. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywa l k i n g, wit h o ut re gard to the
inherent w r o n g ness of th e a c ts. (E s t r a da v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G .R.
¹. 1 4 8 5 60,November 19, 2001)
B y express pr ovision of R .A . N o . 7 0 80, an d b y a d o p t in g t h e
technical n o m e n clat ur e o f t h e p e n a l t y u n d e r t h e R e v i sed P e n al
C ode, the penal provisions of the Code apply to pl u n d er .
M ain p l u n d e r e r
The mai n p l u n d e rer m u s t b e a p u b l i c of fi cer w h o, ac t i ng b y
himself or in connivance with other persons, acquires, accumulates or
amasses ill- gotten wealth.
However, a public officer can be held li a ble for pl u n der even if
t he one who master m i n ded the pl u n der of pu b lic fu nds is a pr i v at e
individual (e.g., the al l egations t ha t N a p o l es, a p r i v at e i n d i v i d u al,
masterminded t h e p l u n d e r o f p o r k b a r r e l s b y l e g i s l at ors). 'What
is import an t i s t h a t t h e p u b l i c of fi cer i n c o n n i v a nce w it h a n o t h er
person a c q u i re d i l l - g o t t en w ealth. T h e p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l ,
who
m astermin ded t h e p l u n d e r in g o f p o r k b a r r e l , w i l l b e t r e a t e d a s
secondary offender.
S econdary o f f e n d e r s
The participants of the cr im e of pl u n der (secondary offenders)
c an e a p u b l i c o f fi cer o r a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u al . P a r t i c i p a nt s w h o
h ei p t h e public officer in c o m m i t t i n g p l u n der ar e a lso li able under
.A. No. 7080 on th e b a sis of conspiracy. (U . S. v. Po nte, G.R. No.
1-5952, October 2 4, 1 9 11) Mo re over, u n d er S e c tion 2 o f R . A . N o .
7 080, any p er son wh o p a r t i c i p a ted w i t h t h e s a i d p u b l i c of fi cer i n
t e com m i ssion of an o f f ense contr i b u t i n g t o t h e c r i m e of p l u n d er
s a I l i k e w ise be p u n i s hed for s uc h o f f ense. The la w i n u s i n g t h e
wor "person" as a parti cip ant i n t h e comm i ssion of plun der did not
distinguish a public officer from pr i v at e in d i v i d u al . Hence, the word
" person" i n c l u des p r i v at e i n d i v i d u a l a p p l y i n g t h e p r i n c i pl e t h a t
where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Ubilex non disting ui t necnos distinguere debemus.
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIIVES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 353
In Na po les v. Sandiga n bayan, G. R. No. 224162, November 7 ,
2 017, Napoles wa s c h a r ged of p l u n d e r a l t h o ug h sh e i s a p r i v a t e
i ndividual because of fi n d in g of conspiracy w i t h S e n a tor E n r i i e i n
m isappropriat in g h i s P r i o r i t y D e v el opment A s s i st ance F u nd . T h e
Supreme Court sustained the ruling ofthe Sandiganbayan denying
h er petition for bail .
T he par t i ci p a nt s i n p l u n d e r c a n b e m e m b er s o f t h e f a m i l y ,
r elatives b y a f fi n i t y o r co n s a n g u i n i t y , b u s i n e s s a ssociates, o r
subordinates of the main p l u n d erer or any other persons.
Predicate crimes
The predicates of plunder are as follows:
1. M i sa p p r o p r i a-.ion , con v e r s i on , mi su s e, or
malversation of public funds or ra i ds o n the public tre asury;
2 Rece i v i n g d i e c t l y o r m d i r e c tl y a n y c o m m i s sion
gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary
b enefits from any p er son and/or ent it y i n c o nnection wit h a n y
government c o n t r act o r p r o j ect o r b y r e a son of t h e of fice or
position of the public officer;
3. I l l e g a l o r f r a u d u l en t c o n v eyance or d i s p osition o f
a ssets belonging to government ;
4. B y ob t a i n i n g , r e c e i v in g o r a c c e p t in g d i r e c tl y o r
i ndirectly a n y s h a r e s o f s t o ck , e q u it y o r a n y o t h e r f o r m o f
i nterest o r p a r t i c i p a t io n i n c l u d i n g t h e p r o m i s e o f fu t u r e
e mployment in any bu siness enterpr ise or un d ert a k i n g ;
5. B y es t a b l i s h i n g a g r i cu l t u r a l , i n d u s t r i a l or commercial
m onopolies or o t h e r c o m b i n a t i on s a n d /or i m p l e m e n t a t ion o f
decrees and or d ers i n-.'ended to b enefit p a r t i c u la r p e r s ons or
special interests;or
6. B y t ak i n g a d v a n t age of official p ositi on, a u t h o r i t y ,
relationship, connection or infl u ence to unju stly enrich hi m self
or themselves atthe expense and to the damage and prejudice
of the Fili p ino people and the Republic of the Phi l i p p i n es.
1. M a l v ersation — T he c o n c ept o f m a l v e r s a t i on a s a
predicate crime of plunder is the same as that of malversation under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. (Gloria M a c a pagal Ar r o yo v.
People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016)
 354 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Th'
his malversation can be commi t ted by culpa or do lo. Lending
a service government v e hi cle wort h P 2 m i l l i o n by t h e p u b lic officer
to his d r i v er , w h o d i d n o t r e t u r n t h e s a m e , c onsti t u te s c u l p able
malversation, which is a predicate crime of plunder. (2014 Bar Exam)
2. M i sa p p r o p r i a t i o n — A p u b l i c o f f i c e r,
w ho i s n o t a n
accountable officer, cannot com mi t m a l v e r s ati on. H o w ever, he can
commit a n a c t o f m i s a p p r op r i a t i on , w h i c h i s a p r e d i cate cr im e of
plunder. U n der R .A . No . 7080, "misappropri at ion or conversion" is
a n overt ac t o f p l u n d er . H e n ce, m i s appropri a t ion m a y c o n s t i t u t e
malversation or qualified theft, which can be classified as a predicate
crime of plunder .
3. M i s u se of fund — Misuse of government fund in the
amount of P 100 m i l l i o n b y d i v e r t i n g t h e constru ction of r oad fr om
the poblacion as required by the ord in a n ce to the farm of the public
o fficer is a pr edicate crime of p l u n d er . M i s use of P10 mi l l ion f u n ds
for construction of buil d ing by not awar d ing the project to the lowest
bidder is apredicate crime of plunder. (2014 Bar Exam)
4. Ra i d on p u b l ic treasury — The plunderer must be
benejitted from the raid on public tre asury to consider this predicate
crime of plunder as present. The int er p r e t a t ion of the term "r a id o n
a pu i c t r easury" should be made in association with t he words that
immediately preceded it, and that are "misappropria t i o n, conversion,
misuse or malversation of public fund s."All of these predicate crimes
p resuppose that t h e p l u n d e rer b e nefi t te d f r o m t h e m .
Macapagal Ar r o yo v. People, supra) (See: Gloria
5. R e c e i v i n g commissio n — C ol l e c t i n
i ngBelle
commission by Pr esident E s t r ada f rom t h e sales of o r Shares
r ec e i vin
ing
Velarde account, i s a p r e d i cate cr im e of p l u n d er . Th e c o m m i ssion
was r eceived b y t h e P r e s i d en t i n c o n n e c t ion w i t h g o v e r n m ent
contract. (People v. Joseph Estrad a, S an d i g a n bayan C ri m i n a l Ca s e
¹. 2 6 5 68, September 12, 2007)
R eceiving b i - m o n t hl y c o l l ections b y P r e s i d ent E s t r a d a f r o m
" jue eng," a f or m o f i l l e ga l g a m b l i n g i n t h e a g r e
t f
P 545 291 00 0.00 which w a s d e p osited i n t h e E r a p M u s l i m Y o u t h
F oundation, is a predicate crime of 1
p un d er . . The s h ar e w a s r e ceived
by reason of hi s p o si t ion a s P r e sident. (P eople v. Jose h E
supra) v. o s ep stra da,,
Receiving the t o tal a m o un t of P3 0 m 11
i io n b y t.he ch a i'r m a n o f
a bid
i commi
co m m i t t e e f r o m b i d d ers, wh o s u bsequently l ost t h e b i d , i s a
J9JC9B0M
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 355
p redicate crime of p l u n d er . Th e concept of t h i s p r e d i cate cr im e i s
similar to that of i n d i r ect br i b ery. (2014 Bar Exam)
6. U n la w f u l d i sp o s i t i o n of gov e r n m e n t asset
Congressional deliberation shows that th e pl u n der law was enacted
a s a reaction to t hc. alleged plu n der com m i t t e d d u r i n g t h e M a r c os
time. There w er e a l l e gations, w h ich ar e st i ll be i ng d i s p u t ed, t h a t
the alleged c r o n ies o f M a r c o s w e r e o b t a i n i n g be h e st l o a r. f r o m
government i n s t i t u t i on s (e.g., L a n db an k) . Th e t e r m "b e h est !oan"
m eans tha t P r e s i d en t M a r c o s m erely o r d e re d t h e g o v e r n m e n t
institution to lend loan to his cronies wit h out considering thc u sual
l oan requir ement s s uch a s s e cur i t i es, capacity t o p a y , f e a si oili t y
of the project to be f u n ded by t h e l oan e tc. For ac a d emic pu r p o se,
r equiring an in st i t u t i on to gr ant behest loan is unl a w fu l d i ~ m i t i o n
o f government asset, which is predicate crime of plun d er .
O rdering t h e G S I S a n d t h e S S S b y P r e s i d en t E s t r a d a t o
purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation is unlaw ful di sposition
of government asset, which is pr edicate crime of plu n d er. (People v.
Joseph Estrada, supra )
7. M on op o l y a n d a c q u i s i t io n of sh a res of stock —There
are allegations, which are still being disputed, that President Ivlarcos
has adopted the crony capitali sm, where the alleged cronies cfid ar cos
through the help o:" the government w o ul d m o n opolize a par t i cul ar
b usiness (e.g.,providing t el ephone services), and i n r e t u r n . h e w a s
given shares of s t ock o f t h e i r c o m p a n i es. For ac a d e mic pu r p o se,
e stablishing t h es e m o n opolies, an d r e c eivin g s h a r e s of s t cc k a r e
predicate crimes of plunder .
8. Mu lt i pl i c i t y o f of f e n s e s — B r i b e r y, m a l v e r s a t ion o f
p ublic funds or p r o p ert y an d v i o l a t i ons of Section 3(e) of R A . N o . .
3 019 are predicate cr i mes of p l u n d er . A n i n f o r m a t io n fo r p l u n d e r
containing th ese predicate crimes does not vi ol ate th e r ul e against
duplicity o r m u l t i p l i c it y o f o f f e n ses. (Serapio v. Sa n d i g a n c a yan,
G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2008)
C ombinat io n or S e r i e s of P r e d i c at e C r i m e s
T he ac t o f r e c e i v in g b y G o v e r n o r D a t u k i c k b a c k f r o m a
c ontractor i n t h e a m o u n t o f P 5 0 m i l l i o n i n c o n n e ction w ' t h a n y
government contract or projectfor the development of an economic
and tourism hu b ( 2 017 Bar E x a m) is a p r e d i c ate crime of plu n d e r.
However, he is not i a ble for plunder. To be held liable for plunder. the
public officer m us t a m a ss, accumul at e or a cquir e i l l -gotten wealth
 356 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 357

throu gh a combination or series of overt or cr i m i n a l a cts. The wor]

"combination" m eans at l e ast tw o d i f f er ent
pre dica te cr i m es; while 2. Su p p = se the discovered net worth is less than P 50 milli on,
the term "s e ries" m e ans at l e a st t wo p r e d i c ate crim es f t h will your answer still be the same?
in . (E je r c ito v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . B. N o s. 15 7294-95o N e sam e
) Thus, a s i n gl e p r e dicate cr im e a m o u n t in g t o 5 0 m i l l i on M y answer is not th e s a m e . 'A." is not li able for p l u n der sin ce
p esos is not constitu t iv e of the crime of plunder. The int e the element that "t he amount of il l - gotten zvealth of the public officer
er. e i n t e n t i o n of
f the is at least P50 mill i o n" is not pre sent.
awma er s is t ha t i f t h er e is only one predica t '
e crime,, th e of enderf
as o e p r o s e cuted u n der t h e p a r t i c u la r c r i m e However, 'A." committed the following cri m es:
e, wwhich
i c ' i s a 1r e a dy
covered b y existing laws. What is pu ni sh able und
of p1 un d er , w h i c h m e ans that t h ere should be at least,1 two or more,
o th 1. V i ol a t i o n of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for causing
predicate crim es. (See deliberation of t he B i c a m e ral Co m m i t t ee on d amage t o t h e g o v e r n m en t t h r o u g h e v i d en t b a d f a i t h a n d
Justice, May 7, 1991) m anifest p a r t i a l it y b y d i v e r t i n g t h e c o n st r u c t ion o f a P 1 0 0 -
m illion wcrt h r o a d ;
2. V i o l a t i o n of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for giv i n g
I ll- -gotten wealth means any asset pr oper t b unwarranted preference, advantage and benefit through
r y, u s i n ess enterprise e vident bac. faith an d m a n i f est p a r t i a l it y b y a w a r d i n g a P 1 0 -
or material possession of any pers o ' th '
n wi i n th e p u r vi e w o f p l u n der
acquired by hi m d i r e ctly or i n d i r e ct l th million worth of pr oject to one who is not the lowest bidder;
y roug h d u m mi e s , n o m i n ees,
a gents, subordinates and/or business associates b a n 3. I n d i r e c t b r i b ery by receiving the total anicunt of P30
c
es y an y combin b ' ation
or series ofpredicate crimes of plunder. (Section 1 of B.A. No. 7080) million from t h r ee bidders by reason of his position;
I n pl u n d er , t h a t t h e a g g r egate a m ou n t 4. P a s s i v e m a l v er sation by a l l o w in g hi s d : i v er t o t a k e
i ll-
-goot t en wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired o r ot t a 1 v a1u e o f t h e
by the the vehicle thr ough negligence;
o r acquir e y t e pu bh c
ublic
officeris at least P50,000,000.00.
c fp
5. In t e n t i o n a l m a l v e r sation b y m i s a p p r opr i a t in g P 1 0
© a s city engineer mi sused government f u d ' million un der his custody.
u n i n th e amount of
P100 million
mi ion by b diver i t in g the construction of road from the poblacion
a s required b y t h e o r d i n a nce t o h i s f a r m . 'A " a s c h a ' Note: U n d e r t h e l aw , i l l - g o t t en w e a l t h p e r t a i n s t o as s e t ,
ccommittee
ommi e e m i s u sed P1 0 m i l l i o n f u n d s fo r c on st r u ct ion of b u i l d i ng property, b u s i n e ss "acquired" b y t h e p u b l i c o f f ic er d i r e c t ly o r
by not awar d in g th e pr oject to the low i ndirectly. A di d r o t a c q u ir e t h e P 1 0 0 -mi l l i on -wort h o f r o a d s i n ce
es t b'dd
i er . 'A" committed the
c rime of malv ersation t h r o ugh cu lpa b 1 i t is stil l o w n c.d by th e g ov er n m e nt . Th e d i v e r ted r oa d i s n o t h i s
.

a y e n d i n g h i' s s e rvice vehicle

worth P2 mi l l ion to his dr i v er, who did not r et ur n t h e same. p rivate pr operty . A d i d n o t a c q u i r e t h e P 2 - m i l l i o n -w ort h v e h i c l e
Cj PJ
since it was stolen by his driv er. There is no showing that A acquir ed
A a s chai r ma n of bid comm i t t ee received the total am the P10 million f u nd s aw a r ded to one who is not th e lcm est bidder.
P 30 million from e o a a m o u n t of
m tthree bidders, who subsequently l ost th e b i d .'A" Substantial por t ion of t h a t a m o un t w i l l b e u sed by th e a w a r dee in
also malversed P10 mil l ion in hi s custody.
constructing th e governm ent b u i l d i ng . T h us, th e va lue of the r oad,
c
@
A has a net wort h of m or e t ha n P 50 m i l l i on, w h ich was wa a nd vehicle, an d t h e a m o u n t g i v e n t o t h e a w a r d ee, sh al l n o t b e
beyond his legiti m at e income. (2014 Bar Exam) c onsid.ered in " e t e r m i n i n g i f t h e P 5 0 m i l l i o n t h r e sho d a m o un t i n
plunder has been reached.
1. W h a t i s t h e c r i m e com m i t t e d b y ' A ?"
'A" h ad c o m m i t t ed
series and combination of re ' government T he am oun t o f P 3 0 m i l l i o n r e c eived f r o m b i d d e.~, an d P 1 0
predicates
re of misusing f
receivin g corn mi 'ssi o n , an d com m i t t i n g m a l v er s t ' n u n ds , million misappropriated shall be considered in determining if the
of
o m a ion. . H
m ore t ha n P5 0 m i l l i o n i s p r e s u med to be i ll - o t t e n. w
isenet worth P 50-million t h r e s h ol d a m o un t h a s b e e n r e a ched. H c w e v er, t h e i r
n w a s w a y eyond his legitimate income. Hence, the total amount is l ess than P5 0 m i l l i on . I n f a ct, hi s net iv orth i s l ess
crime committed by 'A" is plunder. than P50 million. Hence, A did not commit plunder.

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 358 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 359
VOLUME II

8. P a t t e r n —Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080, for purpose In Ar r o yo v P e o p l e s u p r a a c a s e f or p l u n d e r i n v o l v i ng t h e

»
of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prcvc misappropriation of PCSO funds amount ing to P860 million was filed
eac a n d e v er y c r i m i n a l ac t d one by th e accused in f u r t h e r a nce o-" a gainst ten (10) accused includin g P r esident A r r o yo. H owever, th e
t e scheme or conspiracy to amass a ccumu l t ' information did not i d e n t if y P r e sident A r r oy o or any ot her accused
a e or acquire il l -gotten
wealth. Establishing beyond reasonable doubt a pa t t er n of ill- overt or a s the principal p l u n d er er. H e n ce, the case was di sm i ssed. It w a s
c riminal acts indicative of the overall un l aw f 1 held that because plunder i s a c r im e t h a t o nl y a p u b li c official can
h
is su
sufficie
c i e n t t o p r ove pl u n d er. H o w ever, patt ern of overt a cts is not commit by amassing, accumulat i ng, or acquiring il l -gotten wealth in
an e ement of plund er. Section 4 merely provides a rule on evidence. the aggregate amount or t o ta l v a lu e of at l east P50,000,000.00, the
( osep E j e r c i to E s t r a d a v. Sa n di ganbayan, G . R . N o . 148 5 6 '0 i dentification in t h e i n f o r m a t ion of such pu b li c official as th e m a i n
November 19, 2001)
plunderer am ong th e s everal i n d i v i d u al s t h u s c h a r ged is l o gically
To il l u s t r a te , s u p p osing t h a t t h e a c c u sed n ecessary u n de r t h e l a w i t s e l f . T h e i n d i v i d u al s c h a r ged t h e r e i n
Infor s e i s ch ar g ed in ' an w ere 10 publi c of ficials; h ence, it w a s o n ' y p r o per t o i d e n t if y t h e
n ormation f o r p l u n d e r w i t h h a v i n g c or n ' tt d 5 0 'ds o n t h e
mi e r ai main plunderer or p l u n d er ers am ong the 10 accused who herself or
puublic
i c tre
t r e a sury. The prosecution need not prove all these 50
ein ssufficient to pr ove by pat t er n at l e ast tw o of the erse
being r ai'd,s ,'i t
a ids beyond h imself ha d a m a s sed, accumul at ed, or a c q u i re d i l l - g otten w e a l t h
r easonable d oubt p r o v i de d o n l y t h a t t h e y a m o u n t d t with the total value of at least P50,000,000.00.
t 1
,000.00.(Joseph Ejercito Estrada v.Sandiganhayan ibid) W ith d u e r e s p ect t o t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t , i t i s su b m i t t e d
In Pe o ple v. Jo seph E s t r a d a , C r i m i n a l Ca s e N o . 2 6 5 5 8 , t hat identi fi cat ion o f m a i n p l u n d e r er s a m on g t h e a c cused i s n o t
September 12, 2007, one of the predicate crimes alle ed indispensable in the prosecution for plu n der since all accused can be
s a e g e i n the the plunders. If 8, 5 or 9 accused out of 10 can be the main pl u n d ers,
i nform ation is m i s a p pr opri a t ion of p o r t i o n o f t h '
e excise tax share
of Ilocos Sur i n t h e a m o u n t o f P 1 8 0 m i l l i on . T h i s w a s no t p r ohv en it follows t ha t 1 0 o u t o f 1 0 o r a l l a c c used can b e t h e p l u n d er er s.
e yond r e a s onabl e d o u b t . Howeve The inform a t ion i n t h e A r r o y o c ase a l l eged t h a t a c c used are a l l
r , t h e f o11ow i n g p r ed i c a t e public officers conspiring wi t h on e a n o ther am a s s, accumulate and
crimes wer e a l l eged an d p r o ve n b y e v i d e nce (1) series of a ct s cf
r eceiving co llections f r o m " j u e t e n " i n t h e acquire P365,997,915.00 through any or a combination or aseries of
P54oo,2911 , 0 0 0 .00; and (2) series consisting of two acts of ordering the overt or crim i na l a c ts. T h u s, the i n f o r m a t i on i d e n t i f i ed th em a ll a s
OSIS and the SSS to pur chase shares of stock of Belle Corporation plunderers. In f a ct , J u s t ice L eonen an d J u s t ice Sereno dissented.
a n c o l l e c t in g o r r e c e i v in g c o m m i s sion f r o m t h e s a l e s o f B e l l e But for purposes of the bar examinations, the majority ruling i n
Shares in the amount of P189 700 000.00. Th' Arroyo case should be followed.
is pattern of cr i m i n al
acts indicates an overall un unlawful scheme or conspiracy to arr ass ill-
gotten wealth in th e am ount of m ore than P50 mi l l i on. E Single plunderer
an mi ion. strada was
convicted ofplunder.
Plunder can b e co m m i t t e d b y t h e p u b l i c officer act in g a l on e.
(Ejercito v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . R . ¹s . 15 72 9 4 - 95, N o v e mber 3 0 ,
I denti fi ca t ion of th e m a i n p l u n d e r e r
2006, Concurring opinion of Justice Panganiban)
If ther e are several accused in p l u n der case, who acted under
a single conspirac p ' y, or whh eel conspiracy, or c h ai n c o nspiracy, th e C onspiracy in P l u n d e r
m ain p l u n d erer m u s t b e i d e n t i fi ed . T h 1
e . e aw on p u1n d e r r e q u i r es Plunder can be comm i t t e d by t h e p u b li c officer in c onn i v ance
thata aa p a r t i c u la r p u b l i c of ficer m u s t b e i d e n ti fied a s t h e
en i e w ith o t he r p e r s o ns. I f t h e p u b l i c o f f i ce" c o m m i t t e d p l u n d e r i n
amassed acc quired or accumul a ted i l l -gotten w e alt h ai rs t teh o n e w h o
connivance with other persons, the "other persons" or the participants
o f at l e ast P 5 0 mil l i on . S u r e ly , t h e l a w r e q u ea ires '
ir e amount
(secondary offenders) are also liable on the basis of conspiracy.
a rge or p l u n der against several in d i v i d u als that t h th e cr i mi n a l
s in
a s a e re must b e a Moreover, the parti cipants, with w hom th e public officer connived in
m ain l u
p underer and her co-conspirators. (See:Arroyo v. Peo le G. committing plu n d er, are liable under R.A. No. 7080. Under Section 2
No. 220598, April 18, 201 7)
of this law, any person who par t i c i p ated wit h t h e said public officer

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 360 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
in the commission of an offense contrib u t in g to the crime of plunder
shall lik ew ise be punished for such offense.
W here t h e p u b l i c o fficer c o n n i v e s
w ith o t h e r p e r s on s i n
committ in g pl u n d er, their l i a b i l i t i es are subject to single "onspiracy
o r m u l t i p l e c o n s p i r a cies. T h e r e a re tw o s t r u c t u r e s o f m u l t i p l e
conspiracies, namely: wheelor c i r c l e conspiracy a d h '
n c a i n conspiracy,
S ingle Consp i r a c y
In single conspiracy, the pu b lic officer conspired wit h a s i n gle
individual or gr o up in c o m m i t t i n g p l u n d e r. T he m a in p l u n d e rer in
t is case must be a p u b li c officer. Bu t t h e p a r t i c i p a nts in t h i s case
c an be public officers or pri v ate in d i v i d u a l s .
Hypothetical p r o b l em: A Sen a t o r c onspired w i t h pr i v a t e
individual, M a r i a , in acqui r in g i l l - gotten wealth t h r o ugh a series of
misappropriat ion of his pork ba r rel am ou n t in g to P80 mi l l i on. They
t otal amount of i l l - gotten wealt h a c qu iired re b y t h e conspirators shall
be considered for p u r p oses of determ i n i n g i f P 5 0 - m i l l ion t h r e shold
amount ha d b een r e ached. In t h i s c a se, since th e t o ta l a m o un t of
i I-gotten wealth acquired by th e Senator and M a r i a i s P80 m i l l i on,
t ey ar e l i a ble for p l u n d er . A l t h o ugh t h e S enat
e e n a o r m e r eI y a c qu ired
ill-
i -gotten w e alt h i n t h e a m o un t o f P4 0 m i l l i on , th e act of M a r i a i n
acquiring ill-gotten wealth amoun t in g to P40 million shall be treated
a s the act of the
th Senator
S belly corporation on h i s o r d er . A a n d B re c e ived P20 m i l l i o n e ach
c of due to conspiracy. Because of the collective
responsibilit y r u l e , t h e i l l - g otten w e a lt h a c q u i re d b y t h e S e n ator
shall be considered as P8 0 m i l l i on , a l t h o ugh i n r e a l i t y h e m e r ely
acquired P40 mil l i on. Since the Senator is liable for plu n d er, M a r i a,
with whom the Senator connived, is also liable for plu n der al t h ough
s e is a pri v ate in d i v i d u al . In J u a n Po n ce Enrile v. People, G.R. No.
2 13455, Au gu ss t 1 1 , 2 0 1 5 ,in th e cr im e of pl u n d er, th e am ount of ill-
gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is in:material
or as ong as the total am ount a m a ssed, acquired or accumul ated is
a t least P50 mil l i o n .
In sin gl e c onspiracy i n v o l v in g p l u n d er , t h e m a i n p l u n d e r er
must be identifi ed. (seer Gloria Ma c a pag l A
.P l ,
n the above-stated hypothetical problem, the prin cipal pl u n d erer is
t e e n ator.
Hypothetically, i f i n t h e c a s e of Gl o r ia Ma c a p a gal Ar r o yo v.
People informa ti on p r o pe rly a l l e ged, and evidence established that
sing e conspiracy among the ten accused existed, and that President
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 361
Arroyo is the main p l u n d erer w h i l e th e n in e accused are secondary
offenders, they could be held liable for plunder even with out showin g
the particular am ount of i l l - gotten wealth acquired by each accused
out of the P360 mil l i on. Because of conspiracy, the collective acts of
all of the ten accused in acquir in g P 360 m i l l ion sh all be considered
as the acts of President Ar r oyo although she merely acquired certain
p ortion of this amoun t .
W heel Conspi r a c y
Under the wheel or circle conspiracy, there is a single person or
group (the hub) dealing in di v i d u a lly w it h t w o or m ore other persons
or groups (the spokes). (Fernan, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 145927, August
24, 2007) In w h eel conspiracy i n v olv in g p l u n d er , th e p u b li c officer
(main plunderer or the hub) amasses, accumulates and acquires ill-
g otten wealth i n conn i v ance with o t h er s (the spokes). The rim t h a t
enclosed the spokes was the common goal in th e overall conspiracy,
i.e., t he amassing, accumulati on and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
Hypothetical problem: Pedro, the President of the P hi l i p p i n e s,
conspired with A , p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u al , in connection w it h h i s sh ar es
o n the jueteng collections in th e am ount of P40 mi l l i on; and wit h B ,
private in di v i d u al , i n c o n nection w i t h h i s P 4 0 m i l l i o n c o m m i ssion
pertaining to t r a n saction wh ere GSIS and SSS bought th e sh are of
out of these t r a n sactions. T hi s i s n o t a s i n g l e c onspiracy because
t he conspiracy of th e P r e sident w i t h A i n c o n n e ction w it h j u e t e n g
c ollections is different from his conspiracy with B in connection wit h
h is commission. Thi s i s a w h e e l c onspiracy since th e P r e sident i s
dealing with A and B individually. The President is the hub while A
and B are spokes. Since there is w h eel conspiracy in t h i s case, the
total amount of P80 mil l ion acquired by the President, A and B shall
be considered for p u r p oses of determ i n i n g i f P 5 0 - m i l l ion t h r e shold
amount had been reached. Since the total amount of ill-gotten wealth
acquired by P r e sident, A a n d B i s P 8 0 m i l l i on , t h e y ar e l i a bl e for
p lunder. Al t h o ugh th e P r e sident m e r ely acquired i l l - gotten w ealt h
i n the total a m o un t o f P 4 0 m i l l i o n , th e ac t o f A i n a c q u i r i n g P 2 0
million and the act of B in acqui r in g P20 m i l l ion shall be tr eated as
acts of the President. Because of the collective responsibility r ule due
to wheel conspiracy, the ill -gotten wealth acquired by the President
s hall be considered as P8 0 m i l l i o n a l t h o ugh i n r e a l i t y h e m e r e l y
acquired P40 m i l l i on . S i nce th e P r e sident i s l i a bl e for p l u n d er, A
and B, with whom the President connived, are also liable for plunder
a lthough they are pr i v ate in d i v i d u a l s .
 362 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
In w h eel c onspir acy i n v o l v in g p l u n d er , t h e m a i n p l u n d erer
must be identi fi ed. (see: Gloria M a c a pagal A r r o yo v. People, supra)
In the above-stated hyp oth etical p r obl em, th e p r i n c i pal p l u n der is
the President.
T he Hu b M u s t B e a P u b l i c O f f i c e r
In plunder, the main plun d erer (the hub) must be a public off
icer
(Gloria M a c ap agal A r r oyo v. Pe o ple, supra); but t h e p a r t i c i p a nts
(the spokes) can be public officers or p r i v at e i n d i v i d u a ls. (En r i le U,
People, supra)
A contractor, a pri v ate in d i v i d u al , gave a governor P50 mi l lion
t hrough hi s w i f e fo r t o u r i s m p r o j ect, a m a yo r P 2 5 m i l l i o n fo r t h e
tourism project and P10 mil l ion for sports project, and a sanggunion
member P2 5 m i l l i o n f o r t h e t o u r i s m p r o j ect an d P 2 5 m i l l i o n f or
sports project. (2017Bar E x a m )
In thi s case, th ere i s n o w h eel conspiracy i n v o l v in g p l u n der,
he contractor c a n not b e c on sidered as a h u b o r m a i n p l u n d erer
since he is not a p u b li c officer. In t h e a b sence of wheel conspiracy,
t he am oun t i n d i v i d u a ll y a c q u i r e d b y t h e p u b l i c o f fi c er s s h al l b e
c onsidered to d e t e r m i n e i f t h e P 5 0 - m i l l io n t h r e s h old a m o un t h a d
been reached.
The governor acquired i l l - gotten w ealth i n t h e a m o un t of P50
million by a sin gle predicate crime of receiving ki ck back. Hence, he
is not li a ble for p l u n der s i nce a combi n a t ion or s e r ies of pr edicate
crimes is an in di spensable element th er eof.
T he mayor a c q u i re d i l l - g otten w e a lt h i n t h e a m o u n t o f P 8 5
million by a series of predicate crimes of receiving ki ckback. Hence,
he is not l i a bl e fo r p l u n d e r s i nc e th e a m o un t o f i l l - g otten w e alth
acquired is n o t a t l e a s t P 5 0 m i l l i o n , w h i c h i s a n i n d i s p e nsable
element th ereof.
The sa ngguni an m e m b e r a c q u i r e d i l l - g o tten w e a l t h i n th e
amount of P50 million by a series ofpredicate crimes of receiving
kickback. Hence, he is liable for plund er. The contractor is also liable
for plunder since he parti cipated and contri b u ted in th e commission
o this cri m e .
3. C h a in Conspiracy — Under the chain conspiracy, usually
involving the distr i b u t ion of narcotics or other contr aband, in which
there is successive communication and cooperation in such the same
way as wit h l e g i t i m at e b u s i n ess operations between m a n u f acturer
an w h o l e saler, then wh olesaler and r et a i l er, and t hen r et a i ler and
consumer. (Fernan, Jr. v. People, supra)
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 363
A contractor, a pr i v ate in d i v i d u al , gave a sanggunian me m ber
P25 million for the tourism project and P25 mill ion for sports project,
the amount of which are deposited in the name of his secretary, who
personally ma i n t a i ned a bank a ccount for hi s sh ar e in governm ent
projects. (2017 Bar Exam)
This is not a single conspiracy since the conspiracy between the
Sanggunian me m b er a nd t he c ontra c tor is d i f f e rent t he conspiracy
between Sanggunian memb er and his secretary. There is chain
conspiracy i n v ol v in g p l u n d er . Th e sa n g g u n i an me m b er c o nspired
w ith th e c o n t r a ctor i n a c q u i r i n g i l l - g otten w e a lt h i n t h e a m o u n t
o f P50 m i l l i o n t h r o u g h a s e r i e s o f p r e d i c ate c r i m e s o f r e c eivi n g
kickbacks. Subsequently, th e sa n g gu n i an m e m b er c o nspired w i t h
h is secretary i n h id i n g h i s i l l - g o t te n w e a l t h , b y d e p o si t in g t h e
proceeds of plunder under the account of the latt er. Because of chain
c onspiracy, they are all liable for plund er. The main plun derer in thi s
case if the Sanggunian me m b e r. T h e c o n t r a c tor and the secretary,
who participated w it h t h e s ai d p u b li c officer i n t h e c o m m i ssion of
an offense contrib ut ing t o t h e c r i m e o f p l u n d e r s h a ll l i k e w i s e b e
p unished for plu n d er .
PREVENTIVE SUSP E N S ION UN D E R R.A. NO. 3019
Under Section 8 of R A N o 8 0 1 9 a n y i n c u m b ent pu b lic officer
against whom any crim i nal prosecution under a valid inform a t ion for
crime of corruption under R.A. No. 8019, crimes commit ted by public
o fficer under t h e R e v i sed Penal C ode or fo r a n y o f f ense inv olvi n g
f raud upon g overnm ent o r p u b l i c f u n d s o r p r o p ert y w h e t h e r a s a
simple or as a complex offense and in w h a t e ver st age of execution
and mode of par t i ci p at i on, is p ending i n c o u rt , sh all b e su spended
from office.
T here ar e t h r e e r e q u i s i tes t o p r e v e n t i v el y s u spend a p u b l i c
officer under Section 18 of R.A. No. 8019, to wit: (1) a public off icer
i s charged w it h v i o l a t io n o f R . A . N o . 3 0 19 ; c r i m e s com m i t t e d b y
public officer u n der t h e R e v i sed Penal C ode such as m a l v er sation
o r direct b r i b er y o r o f f e nse i n v o l v in g f r a u d u p o n g o v e r n m en t o r
p ublic funds or p r o p er ty ; (2) th e p u b li c of ficer i s b e in g c r i m i n a l l y
prosecuted under valid i n f o r m a t i on; and (3) pre-suspension hearing
is conducted. (1999 Bar Exam)
 364 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
I ncum b en t p u b l i c o f f e n d e r
Th
h e rule o n p r e v e n t iv e s u spension i s n o t o n l y a p p l i c able to
appointive officer but also to elective officer. Under Section 3 of R.A.
No.
o. 3019 , any incumbent public officer charged with crime under this
a w, crimes commi t te d by p u b l i c officer, or offense involvin g f r a u d
upon government or public property shall be preventively suspended
rom office. The law in u s ing the word "in cumbent pu b lic officer" did
not distinguish an appoin t ive officer from an elective officer. Hence,
the word "incumbent public officer" includes elective officer applying
the principle that w h ere the law does not distin g u i sh, courts should
not distin gui sh. Ub i l ex n on d i s t i n g u it n e cnos distin guere debemus.
(2000 Bar Exam)
V alid I n f o r m a t i o n
I nformation for v i o l a t ion of R .A . N o . 3 019 i s not v a l i d w h e r e
t e c o m p l a in t f i l e d f o r p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i on
c harged t h e
accused with t h e l esser crim e of f a l sification of document (L u c i a n o
v. Maria n o, G.R. L - 3 2 9 50, t u l y 3 0 , 1 9 7 1) or w h e re no p r e l i m i n a r y
investigation wa s conducted. (People v. Al b a no, G.R. N o. L - 4 5 376,
tuly 26, 1988)
H eari n g
The imposition of the preventive suspension is not a t t' or
- operative. There m ust fi r s t b e a v a l i d i n f o r m a t i on, au
self-o
se orna
deter m iicn ed
at a pre-suspension hear i ng. (L a y us M D . v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G.R.
No. 134272, December 8, 1999) Upon t he f il i ng of such in f o r m a t i o n,
t e t r i a l c o ur t s h o ul d i s sue an o r de r w i t h p r o per n o t ice r equi r i n g
t e accused officer to show cause at a s p ecific date of hear in g w h y
e should not b e o r d ered suspended from offi ce. Wh ere ei t her t h e
p rosecution seasonably fi l e s a m o t i o n f o r a n
r an o r d e r of
or the accused in t u r n f i l e s a m o t i o n t o q u ash t h e i n f osuspension,
r m a t ion or
c a e n ges th e v a l i d it y t h e r e of, such show cause order of t h e t r i a l
court would no longer be necessary.(Mi guel v.Hon. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 172035, tu ly 4, 2012)
T he court d u r i n g t h e p r e - suspension h e a r in g i s r e q u i r e d t o
a scertain w h e t h e r o r n o t ( 1 ) t h e a c c u sed ha d b ee n a f f o r ded d u e
p relimin ar y i n v e s t i g at ion p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n
a gainst h i m , ( 2 ) t h e a c t s f o r w h i c h h e w a s c h a r ged c onsti t ut e a
violation of the pr ovi sions of R.A. No. 3019 or cri m
'tt d b
pu i c o c e r s , or offense involving fr aud upon governm ent or public
funds or property, (3) the information against him i s quashable.
(Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124471, November 28, 1996)
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VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
U surpatio n of public a u t h o r i t y (Miranda v . H on .
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154098, July 27, 2005) or election offense
(Juan v. People, G.R. No. 132378, January 18, 2000) is an offense
involving f r a u d a g a i ns t t h e g o v e r n m e nt . F a l si fi cation of vo u c her
(Bustillo v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . R. N o . 14 6 2 17,Ap r i l 7 , 2 0 0 6 ) o r
plunder is an offense involving fr aud upon public fun d s.
Mandator y su sp en sion
T he preventive su spension is m a n d a t or y o nce th e v a l i d it y o f
t he inform a t ion i s d e t e r m i n e d i n a p r e - s u spension h e a r i ng , a n d
there are no "ifs" and " b u ts" about it . (L i b a n an v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan,
O.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994; Bunye v. Escareal, G.R. ¹. 110 2 1 6,
September 10, 1993)
Period of suspension
Even though the law is silent o n the dura t i on of the preventive
suspension, the su spension should no t b e i n d efi n i te . Section 13 of
R.A. No. 3019 does not provide the period of preventive suspension.
Hence, the du r a t ion of s u spension u n der t h e A d m i n i s t r a t iv e Code
may be adopted infixing the duration of suspension. Thus, the period
of preventive suspension for nat io nal officers, elective or appointive ,
shall not exceed 90 days pursuant to Adm i n i s t r a t iv e Code. (Gonzaga
v. Sandiganbayan, G . R. N o . 96 1 31, September 6, 19 9 1; D e loso v .
Sandi ganbayan, G.R. No.86899, May 15, 1989) The Sandiganbayan
h as no d i scretion t o s h o r t e n t h e p e r i o d o f s u s p ension b y t a k i n g
into account th e p r obabil it y t h a t t h e a c cused may use hi s office to
h amper his p r osecution. H o w ever, th e p r e v ent iv e suspension m a y
last for less than 90 da ys i f t h e c ase is decided wit h in t h a t p e r i o d .
(Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503, August 4, 1994)
The du r a t io n o f p r e v e n t iv e s u spension for lo c al g o v ernment
officers is eith er 9 0 d a y s or 6 0 d a y s . In Pi m e n t el v. Ga r c h it orena,
G.R. Nos. 98340-42, April 10, 1992, the Supreme Court used the
Administr a t iv e Code in fixing the dur a t ion of preventive suspension
under R.A. No. 3019 involving an elective local official. Accordingly,
such suspension may not exceed the maximum period of 90 days.
(Talaga, Jr. v. Ho n. Sandiga nbayan, 4th Di v i s io n, G.R. ¹. 1 69 8 8 8 ,
November ll, 2 0 0 8 )
But, in Ri o s v. Th e 2 nd D i v i s i on of t he S a n d i g a n b ayan, G. R.
N o. 129918, September 2 6 , 1 9 9 7 , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t u s e d t h e
provision of the Local Government Code in fi xing th e period of
p reventive su spension u n de r R .A . N o . 3 0 1 9 i n v o l v in g a n e l e ctiv e
 366 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS 367
VOLUME II

l ocal official. U n de r S e ction 6 3 (b) of t h e L o cal G o v er n m en t C o de

CC
any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall n o)t he failed to receive during suspension. These are merely preventiv e
extend beyond sixty (60) days." (Nicart, Jr. v. Ho n. San d i g a n bayan, measures before fi n a l j u d g m e nt . (B a y ot v. S a n d i g a n b ayan, G . R .
Third Di vi si on, G.R. ¹ . 14 7 2 7 2,July 14, 2006) Nos. L-61776 to L-61861, March 23, 1984; 2000 Bar Ex a m )
N ot being a p e nal p r o v i sion, th e p r e v ent iv e su spension fr o m
S uspension fro m t h e c u r r e n t o f f i c e office of the public officer charged with cr i m es menti oned in Section
The word "o ffice," from w h i c h t h e p u b l ic o fficer ch a rg ed shall 13 of R.A. No. 3019 does neither vi ol ate the constit u t i o nal pr ovision
be preventively suspended under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, could on ex post facto law (No te: the rule on pre ventive suspension can bee
a pply to an y of fi ce, w h ic h h e m i g h t c u r r e n t l y b e h o l d in g an d n o t given a retroact effect;Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, supra; 1999 Bar
necessarily the par t i c u lar office under w h ich he was charged. Exam) nor offend the constitu t i o n al r i g ht t o be p re sumed innocent.
(Bunye v. Escareal, G.R. ¹. 110 2 1 6,September 10, 1993) In fact, the
The preventive suspension of the following pu b lic off suspended public officers, whose culpabilit y r e m a in s t o be p r oven,
icers was
sustained: are still e n t i t l e d t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o na l p r e s u m p t io n o f i n n o cence.
(Juan v. People, G.B. No. 132378, January 18, 2000; 2000 Bar Exam)
1. A m ay o r , w ho wa s c h a r ged w i t h a c t s c o m m i t t e d
b y him a s a g overnm ent a u d i to r o f t h e C o m m i s sion on A u d i t
(Bayot v. Sandi ganbayan, G.R. No. L- 6 1776 to L-61861, March
23, 1984);
2. A gov e r n o r , w h o w a s c h a r ged w it h a ct s com m i t t e d
by him a s m u n i c i pa l m a y or (D e l o so v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G .A.
No. 86899, May 15, 1989); and

3. A V i ce- G o v ern or , w ho w a s c h a r g e d w i t h a ct s
committed by h i m a s a m e m b e r o f t h e Sa n g g u n i a ng B a y a n .
(Libanan v. Sandigan bayan, G.B. ¹. 112 3 8 6,Ju ne 14, 1994)
A government em pl oyee of PDI C wh o al l egedly comm i t ted t h e
crime when he wa s an em p l oyee of PNB , w h i c h wa s a government
entity at t hat t i m e can be preventively suspended. (2006 Bar Exam)

Constitu t i o n a l it y o f th e r u l e o n s u sp e n si on

Preventive s uspension c a n no t a m o u n t t o
a depri v a t io n o f
property wi t h out due process of law. Public office is "a public agency
or trust," and it is not the pro perty envis ioned by the Constitu t i o nal
provision. (L i b a n an v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . B. N o . 11 2386; Ju n e 14,
1994)

T he suspension fro m t h e e m p l o y m ent o r p u b l i c office d u r i n g

the trial or in o r der to i n s t i t u t e p r oceedings shall not be considered
a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not i m p osed as a result of
judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquit t ed, the official concerned shall
be entitled to reinst at ement an d to th e salaries and benefits, which

J9JC9B0M

UNINTENTIONAL AB O R T IO N
Unintentional ab o r t i o n i s c ommitte d b y a ny p e r s o n
unintenti onally causes an abortion by vi olence. (Artic le 257) who
Thhe elements of uni n t e n t i o nal abort ion are as follows: (1) that
t here is a p r e g n an t w o m a n ; ( 2 ) t h a t v i o l e nce i s u s e d u p o n s u ch
pregnant woman wi t h out i n t e n d ing an abortion; (3) that the violence
is int en t i on all y e x e r t ed ; an d ( 4 ) t h a t a s a r e s u l t o f t h e v i o l e nce
the e t u s d i es, ei t he r i n t h e w o m b o r a f t e r h a v i n g b een e x p elled
therefrom. (People v. Paycana, Jr., G.R ¹ . 1 790 3 5 A ' l 1 6 ,2
the fetus dies after having been expelled from the mater nal womb,
it is import ant t h a t t h e v i c ti m i s not v i a bl e.
K nowl e dge of p r e g n a n c y
<4 tP
A i nQicted l e s s s erious p h y s i ca l i n j u r i e s
u pon a t h r e e -
month pregnant woman without knowledge of her pregnancy. As
a consequence, the woman s u f f ered an a b or t i on. K n o w l edge of th e
pregnancy of the woman is not an element of uni n t e n t i onal abortion.
"is i a ble not only for less serious physical inj u r ies but also for the
consequences thereof, to wi t , f or t h e u n i n t e n t i o n al a b o rt i o n. ( U . S.
complex crim e o f l ess seri ous p h y sical i n j u r i e s an d u n i n t e n t i onal
a orti on .
I nten t i o na l o r C u l p a b l e v i o l e n c e
U nintenti ona l a b o r t i o n i s an i n t e n t i o n I f I
a e ony s ince the
offender
o en e r inten
i n t e n 't i on a lly empl oyed violence against a pregnant w om an
( e.g., fistic blows), but u n i n t e n t i ona lly c aused aborti on. I f b ot h t h e
etus and pregnant w oman di ed, offender is liable for complex crime
o o m i c i de with u n i n t e n t i o nal aborti on. (People v. Genoves G.R.No.
368
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 369
L,-4281 9, April 15, 1935) If the act of violence is committ ed by means
of c ulpa, the c ri me c omm i t t e d is r e c k l e ss imp r u d e nce resulti ng i n
unintentional aborti on. (People v. Mangl i c m ot, CA, 57 O.G. 8668)
T o be held l i a bl e fo r a c o m p lex c r i m e o f d i r ect a s sault w i t h
u nintentional a b o r t i on , t h e p r o s ecution m u s t e s t a b l is h t h a t t h e
v iolence em pl oyed b y t h e a c c u se d u p o n a p e r s o n i n au t h o r i t y
(teacher) is th e p r o x i m at e c ause of th e a b o r t i on. (G elig v. Pe ople,
G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010)
A bortion an d u n i n t e n t i o n a l a b o r t i o n
I n u n i n t e n t i o na l a b o r t i on , t h e e mployment o f v i o l e nc e i s
i ntentional bu t t h e c a u s in g o f a b o r t i o n i s u n i n t e n t i o n al . I f b o t h
t he violence and th e causing of abor t ion ar e i n t e n t i o n al, th e cr i m e
c ommitted is aborti on .
Abortion c a n b e com m i t t e d b y u si n g ab o r t i v e substance
o r violence or a n y o t h e r m e a n s u p o n t h e p r e g n an t w o m a n w i t h
i ntent t o ca u s e a b o r t i on . H o w e v e r , u nintentiona l a b o r t i o n o r
reckless imp r u d ence resulting in un i n t e n t i o n al ab o r t i on c a n o n l y
b e committe d b y i n t e n t i o n a ll y o r r e c k l e ssly u s i n g v i o l ence u p on
t he woman w i t h ou t i n t e n t t o c a use aborti on; t hi s c r im e cannot b e
c ommitted by using abortive substance upon the pregnant w om a n .
p roxim at e C a u se R u l e
Under Ar t i c les 4 and 257 of the Revised Penal Code, a person
who intenti onally em p l oyed violence, which is a felony, is li able for
direct, natural an d logical consequence thereof. Both A r t i c les 4 and
257 provide rules on proxim ate cause.
1. V i ol e n c e — I f t h e c o n s e quence of t h e e m p l o y m e nt o f
violence i s t h e uni n t e n d ed d e a th o f th e vi c t i m , h e i s l i a b l e f o r
homicide or m u r de r b ecause of Ar t i cl e 4. I f t h e consequence of th e
employment of violence upon a pregnant woman isunintended death
of the fetus, Artic le 4 is not appli c able. In t h is s it u a t i o n, Art i c le 257
a pplies, and thus, the accused is liable for un i n t e n t i onal aborti on .
2. T h r e a t —If the consequence of the employment of thr e at
u pon a pr egnant w o m a n i s u n i n t e n ded d eath o f t h e f e t us, A r t i c l e
257 is not applicable because threat is not w i t h i n t h e contemplation
o f the w or d " v i o l ence" i n t h i s p r o v i s i on , w h i c h i s a n e l e m en t o f
unintenti onal aborti on. In t hi s situ a t i on, Ar t i cle 4 applies, and thus,
the accused is liable for abortion u n der A r t i cl e 256, since this is the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony of threat. With
 370 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 371
VOLUME II

the application of A r t i cl e 4, i n t en t t o a b ort , w h ich i s an el ement of

intentional aborti on, is conclusively presumed. n atural, a n d l o g i ca l c o n sequence o f t h e c r i m e o f a s s i s t ance t o
s uicide. With t h e a p p l i cation of A r t i cl e 4, i n t en t t o a b o rt , w h ich i s
an element of aborti on, is conclusively pr esumed. This is a complex
ex reme st r ess on "B " c a u sed b y t h e t h r e a t , t h e w o m a n s u f f er ed c rime of assistance of suicide wit h a b o r t ion si nce these two cri m es
an abortion. 'A" is not l i a b le for u n i n t e n t i o n al a bort i on or r e c kless where produced by a s i n g l e ac t o f g i v i n g a p o i s onous substance.
i mprudence r e s u l t in g i n u nintenti ona l a b o r t i o n b e c a use t h r e at Because of Article 4, "A."is liable for the wr on gful act done, and that
c annot be considered as v i o l ence, wh ich i s a n i m p i s, complex crime of assistance to suicide and aborti on, al t h ough i t
t t 1
o i s c r i m e . H o w ever, t h r eat i s a f elony w i t h i n t h differs from the wr ongful act in t e n ded, and that is merely to commit
e con temp 1ation
of A r t i cl e 4 of th e R e vised Penal Code. Hence, " A" is li a ble for t h e
o assistance to suicide.
wrongful a ct s d one, an d t h ose are, t h r ea t a n d a b o r t i on , a l t h o u gh
"B" in attemp t i n g to commit s uic ide is not commit t i n g a felony.
t ey differ from the wrongful act int ended, and that is, threat. Intent
t o abort, which is an element of abort ion i s ' y presumed. H ence, Article 4 is not applicable. Wit h out th e application of Art i cl e
conc1usive 1 4, she is not l i a bl e for t h e d i r e ct , n a t u r a l a n d l o g i cal consequence
Since a single act p r o d uced t h r eat an d a b or t i on, t hi s i s a c o m plex
crime. of an attempt to commi t s u i c i de. Ki l l i n g th e fetus should be treated
as accidental as far as B is concerned.
I f thr eat p r o duces death (e.g., thr eatened victim j u m p e d fr om
the boat and died as a consequence), the crime commit ted is homicide
while threat is absorbed. (U.S. v. Valdez, G.R. No. 16486, M ABORTION
1921)) If th
t r eat p r o d uces aborti on, th e cr im e comm i t t e d i s complex Abortion is committ ed by: (I) a person who intentio nally causes
crime of t h r eat an d ab or t i on. Ab or t ion w i l l n o t a b sorb t h r eat si nce a n abortion w it h v i o l ence against th e p r e gnant w o m an , or w i t h o u t
t ese crimes pertain to two different vi cti m . T h
i s. e v i ct'i m i' n t h
hr e at is he. o n s ent o r w i t h h e r c o n sent (A r t i c le 25 6); (2) by t h e p r e g nant
the pregnant w oman w h i l e the vi cti m i n a b or t ion is the fetus. w oman, wh o p r a c t i ces an a b o r t io n u p o n h e r s elf o r c o n sents t h a t
3. T a k i n g P oi s o n — T a k i n g p o i s o nous s u b s t a nce in a r other person sh oul d d o s o w h e t he r t h e p u r p ose i s t o c o nceal h er
a ttempt t o c o m mi t s u i c id e i s n o t w i t h i n t h e c o n t e m p l a t ion o f t h e d ishonor or n ot ; (3) by th e p a r ent of th e p r e gnant w o ma n w i t h t h e
wor "violence" in Ar t i cle 257 or "felony" in Ar t i cle 4. Hence, Articles consent of said w o ma n fo r t h e p u r p ose of concealing her d i s h onor
257 and 4 are not applicable. (A t cle 258); or (4) by a physician or mid w i fe who, taking advantage
cc
of their scientific kn owledge or skill , causes an abortion or assist in
PP cc~ PP
Agave B , hi s pr e g n a nt a n d t e r m i n a l l y - i ll w i f e , s l e eping causing the same; or (5) by a p h a r m a cist w h o , w i t h ou t t h e p r o p er
p ills to assist her in comm i t t i n g sui cide. "B" t k t h 'll pr script ion from a ph y sician, dispenses any abortive. (Artic le 259)
ssuicide
uici e, bu t s h e di d n o t d i e . A s a c o n sequence, however th e f e t u s
died. (1986, 2012, and 1946 Bar E x a m s ) Abortion is commit ted by employing violence upon the pregnant
cc PP
w oman, giving her abortive substance or by other means with i n t e n t
A andQ c B
C PP
ar e n o t l i a b le for uni n t e n t i o nal abortion or reckless to cause abortion, and as a result th ereof, the fetus dies, either in th e
i mprudence r e s u l t in g i n u nintent i ona l a b t ' w omb or after h a v in g been expelled th erefr om; or by k i l l i n g a n o n -
abortive
a ortiv e su
s bstance cannot b e c on sidered as v i o l ence, b wh ich i s a n
v iable fetus outside the mat er nal w o mb. Abortion can be committ ed
i mportan t e l e m en t o f t h i s c r i m e . A c c o r d in g t o J u s t i c e F l o r e n z by the pregnant woman herself, her parents, physician (1979 Bar
E=am), midwi f e, or any other person.
v iolence required by A r t i cle 257 for un i n t e n t i onal aborti on .
CC
A co m m i t t e d t h e c r i m e o f a s s istance to s ' d . A r ' 1 K illing a f e tu s i n s ide th e w o m b
o f thee R eevi se d P e n a l C o d e i m p o ses a p e n a l t s uici e . tic e 253
If th e v i c t i m ( e m b r y o o r f e t u s ) d i e d o r i s k i l l e d in s i d e t h e
a nother a y too o ne w h o assists
er too c o m m i t s u i c i d e a l t h o ug h s u i ci d f 1 t maternal w o m b , t h e c r i m e i s a b o r t i o n o r u n i n t e n t i o n al a b o r t i o n
e ai s o c o n su m m ate.
ince assistance to suicide is a felony within the contemplation f regardless of its viability or its intrauterine life. In sum, regardless
Ar ' eof, A is a l s o l i a b le for a b o rt i on w h i c h is t h e d i r e ct of whether th e i n t r a u t e r in e l ife of the fetus is six months (People v.
P

J9JC9B0M
 372 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Robinos, G.R. No. 188458, May 29, 2002; People v. Vill a n u e va, G.R.
¹. 95 8 5 1 , Ma r c h 1, 1 9 9 5; 2015 Bar E x a m ); seven mont hs (People
v. Paycana, Jr ., G .R N o . 17 9 0 35,Apr il 1 6 , 2 0 0 8
) ; or eight m o n t n s
(People v. S alu f r a n i a, G . R. ¹ . L- 5 08 8 4 , Ma r c h 8 0 , 1 9 88); or n i n e
months (People v. Lopez, G.R. ¹. 136 8 6 1 , ¹v em b e r 15 , 2000), the
a ccused is liable for abor t ion or u n i n t e n t i o nal ab or t ion i f t h e f e t u s
died inside the womb.
CCg PP
maltreated his p r e gnant w i f e . A s a consequence, she was
rushed to a hospital w h ere she had a caesarean operation and fetus
was delivered stil l b orn . Th e expert t e s t i m ony sh
th t t h f
a d e v e l oped to th e s t age of v i a b i l i t y . Th e c r i m e s comm i t te d a r e
abortion since the fetus died inside the maternal womb, and physical
injuries. Since these crimes were produced by a single act, A is liable
for complex crime. (1979 B ar Exa m )
K illing a n o n - v i a bl e f e tu s o u t s ide th e w o m b
A p r e g n an t w o m a n , t ook a n abortive s ubstance. A s
c onsequence, the fetus w it h a n i n t r a u t e r i n e l if e of six m o n th s w aas
expelled from th e m a t e r na l w o mb . Th e f e tu s is not v i a b le. For n ot
being viable, the fetus would die a few m o m ents after it s expul sion
rom the womb. H ow ever, w i t h ou t w a i t i n g for t h e n a t u r a l d e ath of
t he non-viable fetus, the pregnant woman ki l led the fetus by buryi n g
it alive. The crime conimi t ted is abortion. (People v. Detablari„C A, 40
A ccused, fo r k i l l i n g a n on-viable f e t u s ,
w as convi cted o f
abortion. In Pe o ple v. Pa y c ana, s u pr a, t h e S u p r e me C o u rt c i t i n g
the case of De tablan sa id t h a t e v e n if t h e c h i l d w h o w a s e x p e lled
p rematurely an d deliberately w ere al ive at b i r t h , k i l l i n g th e v i c t i m
is a ort ion due to the fact that a fetus wit h an i n t r a u t e r in e life of six
months is not viable.
A non-viable fetus is neither an inf ant for pur pose of infanti cide
nor a child for purpose of murder. Kil l i n g a non-viable fetus is always
a orti on .
K illing a v i a bl e f e tu s ( i n f a n t ) o u t s id e th e w o m b
A non-viable fetus cannot be treated as an infant. Hence, killi n g
a non-viable fetus outside the womb is not i nf a t '
'd . 0 th
an , v i a e e tus shall b e considered as an i n f an t ( p r o v i ded thh a t
his age is less than 3 days). Hence, kill in g a viable fetus or an inf ant
outside the womb is in f a n t i c i de.
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 373
In U .S. v. Ve d r a, G . R. N o . L - 4 7 7 9, N o v e mber 2 0, 1 9 0 8, t h e
accused„an unmarried woman, buried alive her newly-born and
fully-developed c h i ld ( v i a b l e) t o c o n c e al h e r d i s h o n o r. S h e w a s
convicted of in f a n t i c i de. In Pe ople v. Paycana, supra, t he S up re me
Court citin g th e case of Vedra said t h at in t h e c r i me of in f a n t i c ide,
i t is necessary t ha t t h e c h i l d b e b or n a l i v e an d b e v i a b le, t ha t i s ,
capable of independent existence.
K illing a 3-d a y - old ch il d o u t s id e th e w o m b
U nder th e R e v i sed Penal C o de, k i l l i n g c h il d l es s t h a n t h r e e
days of age is infan t i ci de. In sum , for p u r p ose of the Revised Penal
Code, an infant i s a ch il d l ess than t h r e e days old. K i l l i n g a 3 -day-
o ld child is not in f a n t i cide but m u r d e r .
V iability of a F e t u s
T he vi a b i l it y o f t h e f e t u s i s a n i s s u e i f t h e s a m e i s k i l l e d
o utside the maternal w o mb. A fetus is viable if he can sustain a li f e
independent from th e m o t h er. Th ere are two m a t t ers to consider in
determining the viabil it y of the fetus, to wit: testimony of expert and
intrauterine life of the fetus.
1. E x pe r t t e s t i m o n y — R e gardless of t he d u r a t i o n o f i t s
intrauter in e l i fe, an ex p ert a s sessment of th e do c tor o n t h e v i a b l e
condition of the fetus must be given considerable weight. (1979 Bar
Exam) If t he d octor examin ed the fetus and t e stified that o r g a ns of
the fetus are already fully developed to sustain an i n d ependent lif e,
t he court can consider the fetus as viable alt h ough hi s i n t r a u t e r i n e
life is 6 m o n th s or l e ss. The vi a b i l it y o f t h e f e tu s w i l l a l s o depend
on the technology that can su st ain it s l i f e . Because of the advance
techno ogy, achild can be viable today although 50 years ago, a child
with the same condition may not be tr eated as viable.
2. I nt r a u t e r i n e l i f e o f m o r e t h a n 6 m o n t h s —A f e t u s
with an in t r a u t e r in e life of six months or less is not viable. (People v.
Detablzn, CA, 40 O.G. No. 9, p. 30; People v. P aycana, Jr., G.R. ¹ .
179035, April 16 , 2 0 0 8; 2015 B ar E x a m ) If t he i n t r a u t e r i ne l i fe of
the fetus is mo re than six mo n t h s, he is considered as viable. Thus,
a fetus with an i n t r a u t e r in e l ife of six months and 15 days is viable.
(2015 Bar Exam)
F or p u r p o ses o f t h e b a r e x a m i n a t i o ns , i f t h e f a c t s i n t he
q uestion m e n t i on s th e t e s t i m on y o f a n e x p e rt , t h e s am e m us t b e
 374 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R
VOLUME II VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 375

u sed in deter m i n i n g t h e v i a b i l it y o f t h e f e t us. If t h e

e e us. e question
no in c u e t e a s s essment of the doctor, the examinee should does
focus crime, is lacking. N ei t her i s a t t e m p ted or f r u s t r a ted u n i n t e n t i on al
on the i n t r a u t e r in e l i f e of t h e f e t us . I f t h ' t abortion commi t te d since this is a f o r ma l c r i m e . H ence, "A" is only
fetus
etus 'is not also mentioned in the question, then the examinee must
l iable for physical inj u res commi t ted against his w i f e .
q ua i y i s a n s w e r .
T he "seven m o n t h s " r u l e u n d e r t h e C i v i l C o d e s h o ul d n o t
INFANTICIDE
be c onfused with t he "six mo nt h s" ru le u nd er crim i n al l a w .
Infanti cide i s commi t t ed by a ny p e r s on w ho s ha ll k i l l a c h i l d
U nder Art i cle 40 of the Civil Code b i r t h d t less than three days of age. (Article 255; 1946'and 1948 Bar Exa ms)
e, i r e er m i n e p e r sonality.
Under
n er A Art
r t i cle 41 of the Civil Code, if the int r a u t e r ine life of the fetus
is seven months or more, it is considered born if it is alive at the time
V ictim of i n f a n t i c i d e
o its complete delivery from the moth er's womb. 0 th
i e i n tr a u t e r i n e l i f e of th e f e tu s i s l ess th n e ot h e r ha n d , T he victim i n a b o r t ion i s a n e m b ry o or f e tu s k i l l e d i n s ide th e
e ss a n s e v e n m o n t h s , it i s womb, and non-viable fetus k i l l ed out side th e w o mb . On th e ot h er
c onsidered born i f i t i s s t i l l a l i v e a ft e 2 4 h
er ours a ter i t s c om plete
e livery from t h e m o t h e r's womb. According to E l mf e r R ab u a hand, the victim i n i n f a n t i c ide is inf ant or a ch il d w it h a l i f e of less
C ivilist t h e c u t t i n g o f t h e u m b i l i ca l c or d t h aot c om
e cu g er a u y a , t h e
n n ects th e c h i l d than three days. An infant must be born alive and viable. (see: People
from his/her mother completes such delivery. v. Paycana, Q.R. No. 1 79085, April 16 , 2008)

The "seven months" rule under the Civil Code d R equisites of in f a n t i c i d e

e iv i e tye .t eOr nmines
if thee fetus
e u s i si s consid
c onsidered born fo r p u r p o ses of perscnali the
other hand, th e "six m o n t hs" r u l e i n t h D t bl There are three requisites to make kil l in g as infanti cide, to wit:
e e a a n ca s e
i th e fetus, who is ki l led outside the womb, is viable for d etermines 1. T h e in f a n t mu s t b e k i l l e d o u t s i de th e m a t e r n al w o m b .
o m , i s v i a e or pur
urposes of
abortion and inf a n t i c i de. A n unborn f e tu s i s n o t a n i n f a n t . H e n ce, k i l l i n g a n u n b or n f e t u s
E mbr yo, f e tuus, a n d i n f a n t a r e p e r s on s s i n c e a b o r t io n a n d regardless of its vi a bi l it y or i n t r a u t e r in e l if e is not i n f a n t i c i de, but
i nfanticide aar re
e cri mes a g a i nst p e r s ons u n d e r t h e R ' abortion;
Code. e e v i s ed P enal
2. Th e in f a n t mu s t be viab le. Even tho ugh t he fetus is born
a live, if i t i s n o n - v i a b le, i t s h a l l n o t b e c o n s i d ered a s a n i n f a n t
A ttemp te d or F r u s t r a t e d A b o r t i o n f or purposes of th e cr im e of i n f a n t i c i de. K i l l i n g a n o n - v i able fetu s
CC PP outside the womb is still abor t i on; and
A m au l e d h i s p r e g n a nt w i f e w i t h i n t e n t t o ab o r t . A s a
consequence, the wife suffered inju r ies b t t h f t 3. T he in f a n t mu s t b e less than t h r ee days old. For m e d ical
e crime commi t ted against th e f etus is at t e m p ted abo t p urpose, a 3 - m o nt h o l d c h i l d i s a n i n f a n t . B u t f o r p u r p o s e o f
e xtent of e a o r i o n i'f ht he
o t h ee ii n
n j' u
u rr y s u s t a i ne d b y t h e w i f e i s n o t e n o u h t i nfanticide, an in f an t i s a ch il d l ess than 3 d ays old. A ch il d w i t h a
it from t he womb or t o k i l l i t ; o r f r u s t r a t e d abor t ion if t h e s ame is1 life of three (3) days or more is not an infant; hence killing a child,
enough to expel or k i l l i t . I n c ase of doubt , w ho is not an in f a nt , is not i n f a n t i c ide but p a r r i c ide or mu r d e r .
"A" should b
emp e abortion. The crime committed against the wife is Live-in partners k i l led t h eir newly-born child t o c o nceal
p hysical inj u r i es. Thi s is a complex cr im e o f h '
' me o p y s i c aI i n j u r i e s w i t h dishonor. If th e vi cti m i s a n on -viable fetus, the crime commi t ted is
a ttempted or fr u s t r a ted aborti on .
a bortion; if the victim is a viable inf ant w it h a l if e of less than th r ee
"A" mauled his ' s pregnan t w i f e w i t h o u t i n t e n t t o a b o r t . A s days, the crime committed is infanticide. If the victim is a baby with
a consequence, th e w i f e s u f f e red i n j u r i e s b u t t h a life of three days or more, the crime committed is parricide. (2006'
a or e . f Bar Exam)
e crime commi t ted against th e fetus is not at t e m p ted or
f rustrated abortion since intent t o b t
o a or, w h'
i chh is an element of this Killing of a three-day old baby is not infanticide since his life
is i s not l ess t h a n t h r ee days old. Th e cr im e committed is m u r d er

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 376 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
qualified by treachery. Mi nor chil d r en, who by reason of their tender
y ears, cannot be expected to pu t a d e f ense. When an
n aa du l t p er s o n
i lle
egaal ly a t t a ck s a chi ld, t r eachery exists. (People v. Fall o r i n a, G.R.
No. 187847, March 4, 2004; 2012 B ar Ex a m )
I ntent to a b o r t
I ntentionally u s ing vi olence upon the pr egnant w o m a h' h
kili led the fetus, is abortion if there is intent to abort; or uninte n t i o nal
abortion, i f t h e r e i s n o in t e n t t o a b o r t . U s i n g v i o l e n ce u p o n a
woman constit u tes a cr i m e, w h ich can be m e r ged w it h a b o r t ion or
unintentional abortion to form a complex crime un der Ar t i cle 48.
The accused treacherously w it h i n t e n t t o k i l l s t a b bed several
times with a b l a ded weapon a n i n e -month p r e gnant w o ma n on h er
stomach. The woman is nine-months pregnant; hence, accused is
aware that t h e w o ma n i s p r e gn a nt . Th e accused is l i k e w ise aware
that stabbing her stomach would also hit an d k i l l t h e u n b orn f etus.
H ence, in t en t t o k i l l t h e w o m a n a n d a b o r t t h e f e t u s i s c l e a r l y
e stablished. Accused was convicted of complex crime of mur der wi t h
intentional a b o rt io n. (People v. Lo pez, G.R. No. 18 6 861, No vember
16, 2000)
There is no intent to abort the fetus if the purpose of the accused
is merely to malt r eat his pregnant w i fe; but the wife and the unborn
fetus died as a consequence. In this case,the accused is liable for
complex crime of par r i c ide wit h u n i n t e n t i onal ab o rtio n. (see: People
v. Genoves, G.R. ¹. L - 4 2 8 1 9, April 15 , 1986)
There is no intent to abort th e fetus if the accused is not aware
that the woman is pregnant. In U .S. v. Zefrey, G.R. No. 5597, March
5 1 91 0, accused
a infl i c ted l ess serious p h y sical i n j u r i e s o n t h r e e-
month pr e gnant w o m an . A s a c o n sequence, she suffered abortion.
U nintenti onal a b o r t io n i s c o m m i t t e d a l t h o ug h t h e a c cused i s n o t
aware that the victim is pr egnant. Accused is liable not only for less
serious physical i n j u r i e s bu t a l s o fo r t h e c o nsequences thereof, to
wit, for the un i n t entional a b ort io n.
Although in k i l l i n g th e pr egnant w o m an, the accused is aware
t at t h e u n b or n f e tu s w i l l d i e , th e p r osecution m us t s t il l e s t a b lish
i ntent t o a b or t t h e f e t u s . Th e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e a c cused to k i l l h i s
pregnant wife will not mean that t h ere is intent to abort the fetus. In
People v. Salufr a n i a, G. R. No. 50884, March 3 0, 1988, the Solicitor
General a r g ue d t h a t t h e a c c u sed in t e n d ed t o c a u s e a n a b o r t i o n
because he boxed his p r e gnant w i f e o n t h e s t o m ach w h i c h c aused
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 3I7
h er to fal l a n d t h e n s t r a n g led h e r . ' The Supreme Cour t s ai d t h a t
intent to cause an abortion on th e p ar t of th e accused has not been
sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together
with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient
proof to show intent to cause an abortion. In fact, accused must have
merely int en ded to k i l l t h e v i c t i m b u t n o t n e cessarily t o c a use an
a bortion. Accused v;as convicted of complex crime of par r i cide wi t h
unintentional abort ' on. (See also: People v. Desalisa, G.R. No. 95262,
January 4, 1994)
P arricid e w i t h a bo r t i o n , p a r r i c i d e w i t h in f a n t i c i d e a nd
d ouble pa r r i c i d e s
1. "A" maul d h i s pr e gnant w if e wi t h out i n t ent to k il l her or
abort the unborn fetus. As a consequence, the wife and unborn fetus
died. (1994 Bar Exam )
" A" is l i a bl e f o r p a r r i c i d e e ven t h o u g h t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e
a ccused is m e r el y t o m a l t r e a t h i s w i f e . A p p l y i n g A r t i c l e 4 , A i s
liable for the w=ongful act done (parr i cide') although it d i f f ers fr om
the wrongful act i n t e n ded (m a l t r e a t m e n t). W it h t h e a p p l i cation of
Article 4, i n t en t t o k i l l a s a n e l e m en t o f p a r r i c id e i s c onclusively
presumed. "A" is also liable for uni n t e n t i onal abortion for employing
v iolence i n t e n t i o n a ll y a g a i n s t h i s w i f e c a u s i n g u n i n t e n t i o n al l y
a bortion. Since a s n gl e act p r o d uced t h ese cri m es, A i s l i a bl e f or
complex crime of pcvri cide wi th u n i n t e nt ional a b ort io n.
2. "A" mau ed his wife, who was pregnant for six months,
without in t ent t o k il l or ab ort . As a consequence, the wife died, and
the fetus v-as expeJed prematurely. After afew mi n u t es, the fetus
died.
Killing of hi s w if e is p a r r i c ide because of Ar t i cle 4. The fetus,
w ho died o u t s id e —.he maternal w o m b , i s n o t v i a b l e b e cause h i s
intrauterine l if e is not m or e t h a n s ix. months. K i l l i n g of n on -viable
f etus is uni n t e n t i onal ab or t i on. A u sed vi olence int en t i onally u p on
his pregnant w i f e , w h ich c aused abo"tion u n i n t e n t i o n al ly . Si nce a
single act produced these two crimes, A is liable for complex crime of
p arricide and uni n t e n t i o nal aborti on .
3. "A" m a u l e d h i s w i f e , w h o w a s p r e g n an t f o r si x a n d
half m o n t h s, w i t h o ut i n t e n t t o k i l l h e r o r ab o r t t h e f e t u s . A s a
consequence, the w:fe died, and the fetus was expelled prematur ely .
After 86 hours, t he infa nt d i e d . (2016 Bar Ex a m )
Killin g of hi s w i f e i s p a r r i c ide because of A r t i cl e 4. Since th e
c hild died ou t s 'de th e m a t e r na l w o r r b , h e i s v i a bl e for h i s i n t r a -
 378 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R
VOLUME II
uterine life being m ore t ha n si x m o n t hs , and hi s age is less than 3
days, kill in g hi m i s i n f a n t i c i de. Since the single act pr oduced these
two crimes, A is liable for complex crime of parric ide and infa n t i c ide.
4. "A" mauled h is w i f e , w ho w as p r e g nant f or s ix a n d h a l f
months, wit h out i n t en t t o k i l l o r a b o rt . A s a consequence, the wife
died, and the child wa s expelled pr em a t u r e ly. A f ter th r e e days, the
child died.
Killing th e w i f e i s p a r r i c id e because of A r t i cl e 4 . Th e second
k illing i s n e i t h e r a b o r t i o n b e cause th e f e t u s k i l l e d i s v i a b l e n o r
infanticide because the child i s not l ess than 3 d a ys. The k i l l i n g of
a child wit h a l i f e of t h r e e days or m or e is also par r i cide by r eason
o f relationship. Since a si n gle act p r o d uced th ese two cr i m es, A i s
liable for complex crime of double parr i cides.
S eparat e crimes of parricide and intentional abortion
CC g PP
A ma u l e d h i s w i f e , w ho w a s p r e g na nt f or si x mo n t h s. As a
consequence, the wife died, and the fetus was expelled premat u r ely.
After a few m i n u t e s, A sta bbed and k i l l e d t he f e t u s. A is l i a b le for
p arricide and a b or t i on . T h i s i s n o t a c o m p lex c r im e s i nce th e t w o
crimes were produced by different acts.
C oncealm ent of D i s h o n o r
The penalty for i n f a n t i c ide is t h a t p r e scribed for p a r r i c ide or
murder. If a p a r en t o r l e g i t i m a t e g r a n d p a r ent k i l l e d hi s ch il d l e ss
than three days old, the cr im e comm i t t e d is i n f a n t i c ide pu n i shable
b y the p e n a lt y p r e scribed for p a r r i c i de. I f o t h e r p e r son k i l l e d a n
infant less than t h r e e days old, th e cr im e comm i t t e d i s i n f a n t i ci de
punishable by the penalty prescribed for murder. (People v. Jaca, G.B.
No. L-84866, August 18, 1981) At present, the penalty for murder,
parricide and i n f a n t i c ide is re c lusion perpetua to d e a t h. H o w e ver,
i f th e m o t h e r o r m a t e r n a l g r a n d p a r en t c o m m i t t e d i n f a n t i c ide t o
c onceal dishonor, the law pr escribed a lesser penalty .
Concealment o f d i s h o no r i s n o t a n e l e m e n t o f i n f a n t i c i de.
(1946 and 19 4 8 Ba r E x a m s ) or a b o r t i o n; b ut i t i s a n ex t e n u at ing
circumstance because it will r e d u ce the penalty pre scribed for:
1. I n fa n t i c i d e commi t ted by m o t her of the in f an t
2. I n f a n t i c i d e c o m m i t t e d b y m a t e r n a l g r a n d p a r en t o f t h e
infant. (Article 250)
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 379
8. Ab or t i o n c o m m i t t e d by m o t h er of t he f e t u s; (Ar t i c le 259;
2011 B ar Exam)
T he circumstance of concealment of d i s h onor w i l l n o t r e d u ce
the penalty for:
1. A b or t o n c o m m i t t e d by th e m a t e r nal gr a n d p ar ents of th e
fetus.
2. I n f a n t i cide or abortion committed by the father(1982Bar
Exam), o r fraternal g ra n d pa re nts of the fetus or inf a n t .
The lowest penalty for abortion under Ar t i cle 256 commit ted by
a.ny person including m a t e r nal g r a n d p ar ent i s equal to th e penalty
for abortion c o m m i t t e d b y t h e m a t e r n a l g r a n d p a r en t t o c o n ceal
d ishonor under Ar t i cle 258. Hence, concealment of dishonor will n ot
r educe the penalty for abortion commi t ted by mater nal gran dparent .
The rule on. concealment af dishonor is based on the condition
during the old tim es where being a single mother or being pregnant
w ithout a l a w f u l h u s b an d i s n o t a c ceptable by t h e s o ciety. I f t h e
man, who impregnated the woman, refused to marry her, the woman
might commit abor t ion or i n f a n t i c ide to conceal dishonor. However,
b ecause of her circum st ance, th l a w p r o v i des a lesser penalty .
Purpose of the three-day rule
The r e a son b e h i n d t h e 3- d a y r u l e i n i n f a n t i c i d e i s t h e
appreciation of the circum st ance of concealment of dishonor.
I f an u n w e d m o t h e r k i l l e d h e r c h i l d i m m e d i a t el y u p o n h i s
b irth to concea d i s h on or, th e c r im e c om m i t t e d i s i n f a n t i c ide w i t h
extenuating circumstance of concealment of dishonor. The penalty
for infanticide shall be dr a stically r e d uced from re c lusion perpetua
to death p e n a lt y t o pr i s i o n m a y o r i n i t s m e d i u m a n d m a x i m u m
periods. (2011 Bar Exam)
I f an u n w e d m o t he r d i d n o t i m m e d i a t ely k i l l t h e c h i l d u p o n
birth, the degree of motivat ion —.o kill him t o conceal her dishonor is
e xpected to wane. A f t e r t h e m o t her t ook care of her chil d for t h r e e
days or more, her love over him is expected to overshadow her int ent
to kill just to conceal her dishonor. If th e m ot her st il l decided to kill
t he child af ter 3 d a y s or m o r e , she i s no t a n y m or e en t i t l e d t o t h e
lenient penalty for inf a n t i cide commit ted to conceal dishonor. In thi s
case, she shall be puni shed for pa r r i c ide wh ere the circum stance of
concealment of di shonor cannot be considered. In sum , her penalty
would be reclusionperpetua to death. (1965 Bar Exam)
 380 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
PARRICIDE
Parricide is commit t ed by any person who shall ki ll h is f at h er,
mother, or child, whether legit i m at e or illegit i m a te, or his legitim ate
other ascendants, or descendants, or hi s l e gi t i m at e spouse (Art icle
246) without the quali f y ing circum st ance of infant i cide. (1947, 1948,
1957, 196'0, and 1999 Bar Ex a m s )
L egitim at e R e l a t i o n s h i p
In parr i ci de, if th e v i c ti m i s a p a r en t o r c h i l d of t h e a ccused,
the r e l a t i onshi p m a y e i t h e r b e le g i t i m a t e o r i l l e g i t i m a t e; i f t h e
victim is th e spouse, grandparent or g r a n d child of th e accused, the
relationship must be legitim a t e . (People v. Gamez, G.R N o . 20 2847,
October 28, 2013; People v. Macal, G.R. No. 21106'2, January 18,
201 6)
An of f ender, w h o k i l l e d h i s i l l e g i t i m a t e m o t h e r ( 2 0 12 B a r
Exam); o r i l l e g i t i m a t e son o r d a u g h t e r ( 1 982 an d 19 9 9 B ar
Exams) i s l i a b le for p a r r i c i d e. But o n e , w ho k i l l e d h is i l l e g i t i m a t e
grandchild (illegit i m at e daughter of his legiti m at e son), is not liable
for par r i c i de. ( 2 012 Ba r E x a m ) T h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s m u r d e r
o r homicide, dependin g u p o n t h e c i r c u m s t a nce of t h e c a se, w i t h
o rdinary aggravat in g ci r c u m s t ance of rel at i onship. As a q u a l i f y i n g
circumstance under A r t i cl e 246 on p a r r i c i de, relati onship b et ween
g randparent an d g r a n d chil d m u s t b e l e gi t i m a te. As an a l t e r n a t i v e
circumstance un der A r t i c l e 15 , r e l a t i on ship b e t w een g r a n d p arent
a nd grandchild may be legiti m at e or i l l e gi t i m a t e .
Thhe rule on no t t r e a t i n g i l l e g i t i m at e g r an d r e l a t i on ship as a
qualifying circum st ance in par r i c ide is based on the social cond t'
on i ion
be or w here gra nd pa re nts w e re u s u a l ly n ot a c cepting i l l e g it i m a t e
efore
grandchild i n t h e f a m i l y . T h e a c t o f k i l l i n g c o m m i t t e d a g a i nst or
by an il l e git i m a te gra n d c h i ld i s n o t a s s e r i o us as an a ct of k i l l i n g
committed against or by a legitim a te grandchil d. He nce, illegitim a te
g rand rel at i onship u n de r t h e l a w w i l l n o t q u a l i f y t h e k i l l i n g i n t o
p arricide to upgrade the penalt y .
An offender, who killed his illegitimate grandchild, who was
as eep, and taking his wallet after w a rd, is liable for mur der qualified
y treachery and aggravated by relati onship, and theft. The crime is
not parricide since the relationship of the offender in this crime with
is ascendant o t her t h a n h i s c h i l d m u s t b e l e g i t i m a t e . (2 012 B
a e. ar
Exam)
m) R bb
Robbery wi th h o m i c i de is n ot c o m m i t t e d s i n ce t he o ri g i nal
esign of the offender is to kill th e victim and not to commit r obbery,
(1970 Bar Exam)
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 381
K illin g l e g i t i m at e b r o t he r i s n o t p a r r i c i d e s i nce he i s j u s t a
c ollateral relative of the accused. However, the ordinary aggravati n g
circumstance of r el a t i onship u n der A r t i c l e 1 5 w i l l b e a p p r eciated.
(2012 Bar Exam)
An offender, who ki l led his il l egit i m at e spouse (1948 and 1999
Bar Exams), or common-law wife (2012 Bar Exam), is not liable for
parricide. Th e o r d i n ar y a g g r a v a t in g c i r c u m s t a nce of r e l a t i on shi p
w ill not b e a p p r e ciated. Sp ousal r e l a t i o n shi p a s a q u a l i f y i n g o r
o rdinary aggravat ing circum st ance must be legiti m a t e .
I n parri cide involving spouses, the best proof of the legiti m a t e
r elationship b e t w een t h e o f f e n der a n d v i c t i m i s t h e i r m a r r i a g e
certificate. Hov-ever, in pr ov in g th e l egit i m at e spousal relati onship
b etween th e a c cused i n p a r r i c i d e an d t h e v i c t i m , t h e c o ur t m a y
consider ora l e v i d e n ce, i f t h e s a m e i s n o t c o n t e s t ed (1978 Bar
Exam), the a d m i s s ion of t h e a c c u sed (P eople v. M a c a l, G . R. N o .
211062, January 18 , 2 0 1 6) or t he p r i n c i p le of s emper pr a esumit u r
pro mat r i m o nio o r t h e p r e s u m p t i on e s t a b l i s hed by t h e R u l e s o f
Court that a m a n a n d a w o m a n d e p or t in g t h e m selves as husband
a nd wife have en t ered i n t o a l a w f u l c o n t r act o f m a r r i a g e . (People
u. Aling, G.R. No. L-88888, Mar ch 12, 1980; People v. Ignacio, G.R
No. 107801, Ma r ch 26 , 1 9 97; People v. Fl o r e ndo, G.R. No. 18 6 845,
October 8, 2008)
A Muslim, .vho killed his third wife under an invalid polygamous
marriage celebrated in accordance with the M u s li m r i t e, is not liable
for parricide since their spousal relationship is illegitimate. (People
v. Subano, G.R. ¹. 48 1 4 8 ,September 8G, 1942) However, a Muslim ,
who killed hi s t h ir d w i f e u n der a v a l i d p o lygamous marriage
c elebrated in a " cordance wit h t h e C ode of M u s li m P e r sonal L a w s ,
i s liable for parr i cide since their spousal relati onship is legiti m a t e .
In People v. Sulearno, G.R. No. L-63154, June 19, 1984, the
victim obtained a divorce recognized by the Code of Muslim Personal
L aws regarding her fi rst m a r r i a ge. Thus, her second mar r i age wit h
the accused is valid. The accused, who killed his second wife, is liable
f or parricide since their spousal relat i onship is legit i m a t e .
B lood Rela t i o n s h i p
R elationship i n p a r r i c ide is by b l ood except w h er e th e v i c t i m
is the spouse of the accused. (Crim i n a l Za w Co n s pectus by Ju s t ic e
Florenz Regalado) In sum, relationship by affinity as a rule is not a
qualifying circums ta nce in parr i c i d e .
 382 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
O ne, who k i l l e d a n a d o p te d s on , i s l i a b l e f o r h o m i c id e a nd
n ot parr i cide since th e r e l a t i o n ship b y a d o p t ion i s n o t w i t h i n t h e
contemplation of Ar t i cle 246 of the Revised Penal Code. Other view:
Killing an adopted son is parr i cide because under Section 17 of R.A.
No.
o. 85522 ,t t h e a d o p tee shall be considered the legit i m at e son of th.
adopters "for all in t e nts and pur po ses." (1999 Bar Ex a m )
K is m a r r i e d t o H , w h i l e D i s t h e i r d a u g h t er . D , w h o w a s
impregnated by H, gave birt h t o a baby boy named V. Exactly t h r ee
days after bir th , K k i l l ed V. What is the crime commi t t ed? (2012Ba~
Exam)
K is not l i a bl e for i n f a n t i c ide since V i s no t a c h i l d l ess t h m
t hree days of a ge . N e i t h e r i s K l i a b l e f o r p a r r i c i de. V b e i n g t h e
son of K's d a u g h ter an d K ' s h u s b an d i s t h e i l l e g i t i m ate gr a n d son
by consanguini ty a nd t h e st e pson (son by a f f i n i t y) of K . H o w e v er,
i legitim at e g r a n d r e l a t i o n shi p a n d a f fi n i t y r e l a t i o n shi p ( e x cep-.
spousal relati onship) is not a q u a l i f y in g ci r c u m st ance in p a r r i c ide.
K is liable for mu r der qu a li fied by t r eachery.
P ersonal R e l a t i o n s h i p
T he qu a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t a nce o f r e l a t i o n shi p i n p a r r i c i d e i=
p ersonal. H e n ce, i t c a n b e a p p r e ci ated a g a i nst t h e w i f e b u t n o -
noc
a gainst a c o -conspirat or , w h o i s n o t r e l a t e d t o h e r h u s b a nd , t h e
victim. (People v. Bucsit, G.R. No. 1 7865, March 15, 1922)
I f the h u sband i s k i l l e d by a s t r a n ger i n c o n sideration of t h e
r eward a d v anced by t h e w i f e o f t h e v i c t i m , t h e s t r a n ger i s l i a b l e
f or mur der q u a li fied by t h e c i r c u m s t ance of rew ar d w h i l e t h e w i f e
is liable fo r p a r r i c id e w i t h o r d i n a r y a g g r a v a t in g c i r c u m s t a nce o-
reward. (1957 Bar Exa m )
An unm a r r i e d m o t her w i t h t h e h el p of he r b r o t her k i l l e d her
two-week old child to conceal dishonor. Since the victim is her child.
the ki l l in g i s p a r r i c id e a l t h o ugh t h ei r r e l a t i o n ship i s i l l e g i t i m a t e.
T aking a d v a n t ag e o f t h e d e f e n seless condition o f t h e v i c t i m b y
reason of hi s t e n der ag e is tr e a c hery. H e n c e, the m o t h er i s l i a b l e
or parri cide w it h o r d i n ar y a g g r a v a t in g c i r c u m st ance of t r e achery
while her brother is li a ble for m u r der q u a l i f ied by the circum st ance
o t r e a chery . R e l a t i o n shi p a s a qual i f y in g c i r c u m s t a nce c a n not
b e appreciated against h e r b r o t h e r s i n c e th e s am e i s p e r s o
her
e r as th e m o t h e r o f t h e v i c t i m . C o n cealment o f d i s h onor i s n o t
an attenuat in g ci r c u m s t ance since thi s can ' In appreciating a q u a l i f y in g or a g gr avat in g cir cum stance, the
on1y be appreciated
abortion and in f a n t i c ide and not in p a r r i c i de. ( 1965 Bar Exa m )
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 383
Knowledge of Relationship
O ne who k i l l c.d a person not k n o w i n g t h a t h e i s h i s f a t her i s
liable for p a r r i c i de . T h e q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a nce o f r e l a t i on ship
s hall be appreciated because knowledge of his relati onship wit h t h e
victim is not an element of parr i ci de. Moreover, even if the int en t i on
of the accused:s merely to commit ho m i cide, he is liable for parri ci de
because of Art i cle 4. In s um , h e is l i a ble for th e w r o n gful act done,
a nd that i s , p a r r i c i de, a l t h o ugh i t d i f f e r s f r o m t h e w r o n g fu l a c t
intended, and that is, homicide. (1947 and 19 70 Bar Exa m s )
Note: I n dire ct assault, kno wl e dge of the position of the victim
a s a person in a u t h o r it y o r a n a g ent of a p e r son in a u t h o r it y i s a n
indispensable element th ereof.
glUF'.DER
Murder i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s on w h o s h a ll k i l l a n o t h e r
p erson w i t h ou t t h e q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a nce i n i n f a n t i c id e a n d
parricide, and w i t h a n y o f t h e f o l l o w in g q u a l i f y in g ci r c u m st ances:
( 1) n c o n s i d er at ion o f a p r i c e , r e w a r d o r p r o m i s e ; (2 ) E v i d e n t
p remeditati or : ( 8 ' . t r e a chery ; ( 4 ) t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e o f s u p e r i o r
strength; (5) aid of ar med m en; (6) employing means to weaken th e
d efense; (7) employing means or persons to insure or afford impun i t y ;
(8) cruelty;(9 outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse; (10) by
m eans of in u n d a t i on , fi r e , p oison, explosion, shi p w r e ck, st r a n d i n g
o f a vessel, derailment or assault u pon a r a i l r o ad, fall of an air sh i p ;
(11) by means of motor vehicles; (12) with the use of any other means
i nvclving g r ea t w a s t e a n d r u i n ; o r ( 1 8 ) o n o c casion of c a l a m i t y .
(Article 248; 1958, 1960, 1999, and 20 12 Bar E x a m s )
D isregard o f d w e l l i n g i s n o t a qu a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a nce i n
murder. (2014 Bar Exa m )
C alamity i n c l u de s i n u n d a t i on , f i r e , p o i s on, e x p l osion, s h i p -
wre"k, stran ding of a vessel, derailm ent or. assault upon a r a i l r o ad,
fall of an airship, earth q u a ke, volcano erupti on, destructive cyclone,
o r epidemic. C r u e lt y i s p r e s en t i f t h e o f f e n der d e l i b er at ely a n d
inhumanly au gm ented the suffering of the vict im . (Ar t i c le 248)
Intention of the Offender
1t
d in
'
cou=t must consider the intention of the accused. If the accused
b urned the b ody of th e v i c ti m t o k i l l h i m , t h e " r i m e c o m m i t te d i s
 384 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
murder qualified by the circumstance of by means of fire. If he burned
the victim a f ter i n fl i c t i n g a m o r t a l w o u n d t o a u g m ent hi s p h y sical
suffering, cruelty is present. If he burned the dead body of the victim
after s t a b b in g h i m t o de s t r o y th e c o r p u s d e l i c t i ,
means to afford im p u n it y can be appreciated. If he bu r ned the dead
employmentof
body of the victim after stabbing him to scoff or outrage the corpse of
t he victim, scoffing may qu al ify th e k i l l i n g i nt o m u r d e r .
I ntent t o K i l l
T here are t h ree concepts of i n t en t t o k i l l , t o w i t : ( l ) i n t e n t t o
k ill as an element of m u r der or h o m i ci de; (2) lack of ir tent to k il l t o
appreciate the m i t i g a t in g ci r c u m st ance of praeter in t e ntionem; and
(3) intent to k i l l a s a r e q u i s ite of th e q u a l i f y in g cir cu m st ance of by
means of fire, explosion, or poison.
l. I n t e n t t o k il l a s a n el e m e n t — I n t e n t t o k i l l i s a n
e lement of h o m i c i de, or m u r d er . H o w e v er, th e s i g n i f
i cance of th i s
i ntent v a r ie s depending u po n c i r c u m s t a nce of th e v i c ti m a n d t h e
issue involved.
a. V i c t i m i s al i ve —T he accused with a boloo or k 'f
or n i e
haa cked or stabbed the vi ct im , or f i r e d hi s gu n a t h i m w i t hout
killing him.
If the act described above is commit ted w it h i n t ent to kill ,
t he crime comm i t t e d i s a t t e m p te d h o m i cide or m u r d e r i f t h e
victim did not su st ain a m o r t a l w o u nd ; or fr u s t r a ted homicide
or mur der i f t h e v i c t i m s u s t a i ned a m o r t a l w o u n d (P e ople v.
Kalalo, G.R. No. 89808, March 17, 1984)
If the act described above is commi t te d w i t h ou t ' t
ou i n en t t to
t
i, th e cr i m e co m m i t t e d is t h r e at (U . S. v. S i m e on, G.R. ¹ .
16'08, April 15, 1904), discharge of firearm (People v. Agb
. Nos. 8636'6-86868, September 28, 1982), physical in ju r i e s
(Roque v. People, G.R. No. 198169, April 6, 2 0 15) or discharge
of firearm wi t h p h y s i c al i n j u r i e s. (People v. Da v i d, G . R. N os.
89708, 89709, April 16, 1984)
I ntent to kill is not presumed where the victim d ' d
td
T he
e prosecution
ros m u s t p r ov e i n t en t t o k i l l b e y on d r e asonable
oubt. Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon
used by the offender and the parts of the victim's body at which
the weapon was aimed, as shown by th e wounds inflicted.
(Roque v. People, supra)
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 385
b. V i ct i m d i e d — The accused committed a felony such
threat, physical inj u r y , u n j ust v exati on, or al ar m an d scandal,
a nd as a c o n sequence, th e v i c ti m d i e d , a ccused is l i a bl e f o r
consummated homicide or m u r der because of Ar t i cle 4. Int ent
to kill as an element of thi s crime is conclusively presumed.
2. L a ck o f i n t e n t t o k i l l a s a m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e
— The accused boxed th e v i c t i m w i t h o u t i n t e n t t o k i l l , b u t a s a
c onsequence the victim di ed .
L ack of i n t e n t t o k i l : w i l l n o t e x o n e r at e t h e a c c u sed f r o m
c riminal l i a b i l i t y f o r h o r n ' c i de . B y b o x i n g t h e v i c t i m , w h i c h i s
a felony, and a s consequence the v i c ti m d i e d , i n t en t t o k i l l a s a n
element of homicide is conc usively presumed.
Lack of in t e nt to k i l l w i l l mi t i g a t e the crim i n a l li a b i l i t y of t h e
accused because of circ um s ta nce of pr a e ter i n t e n t io nem or l a ck o f
i ntent t o c o m mi t s o g r a v e a w r o n g t h a n t h a t c o m m i t t e d . (Wacoy
v. People, G.R. ¹. 2 18 7 9 2 , Ju n e 2 2, 2 015) The r u l e on c onclusive
presumption of intent to kill does not apply if the issue is appreciation
of the mitigat ing circum st ance of praeter intentionem.
3. I n t e n t t o k i l l a s a r e q u i si t e o f q u a l i f y i n g
c ircu m s t a n c e - I n t en t t o k i l l i s a l s o a r e q u i s it e t o a p p r eciate t h e
qualifying circum st ance of by means of fire, explosion or poison.
Under A r t i cle 248 of the Revised Penal Code, kil l in g a p erson
"by means o f fi r e " i s m u r d e r . K i l l i n g a n o t h e r b y m e a n s o f f ir e
presupposes that fire was used as a means to kill. There is no murder
q ualified by th e ci r c u m st a r c e of by m e ans of fir e w i t h ou t i n t en t t o
kill. (People v. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994)
The accused out offun used fire as means to inflictinjury upon
his friend, but th e l a t te r d ied as a consequence. Intent to k il l a s an
element of h o m i cide i s conclusively p r e su m ed. Bu t t h e c o n clusive
p resumption o f i n t e n t t o k i l l i s n o t ap p l i c a bl e f o r p u r p o ses of
mitigation of crimi nal liabil : ty . Since there is no intent to kill, praeter
intentionem s h al l b e a p p r e c i ated a s a m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t ance.
H owever, th e ci r c u m st ance of "b y m e an s of fi r e " s h al l n o t q u a l i f y
the kill in g t o m u r d er . T h e a t t e n d a nce of m i t i g a t in g c i r c u m st ance
of pr a e ter i n t e n t i o nem e x c l u d es t h e ap p r e c i a t i on o f qu a l i f y i n g
c ircumstance of b y m e a n s o f fi r e . T h e s e t w o c i r c u m s t a nces ar e
incompatible si nce by m e an s o f fi r e a s a q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m st ance
presupposes the presence of intent to kill while praeter intentionem
 386 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
requires th e a b sence of i n t en t t o k i l l . (P e ople v. P g
G.R. N .
74824, November 17 , 19 8 8) T h e r u l e i s t h e s a m e w i t h r e g a r d s t o
murder by means of poison or explosion.
Under A r t i c l e 2 4 8 , k i l l i n g a p er s o n " wi t h tr ea c h e ry" i s
murder. K i l l i n g a n o t her w i t h t r e a c h ery d oes not p r e s uppose that
treacherous means w ere em p l oyed to k i l l . T h e t er m "w i t h " m e a n s
t hat s o m et h in g i s a c c ompan y in g s o m e t h in g e l se . T h u s , w h a t i s
important t o ap pr eciate tr eachery is t ha t t h e k i l l i n g i s p erpetr at ed
with t r e a chery, a l t h o ugh t h e t r e a cherous m ode ma y b e e m p l oyed
m erely to inflict in j u r y .
Th e accused, not i n t e n d in g t o k i l l t h e v i c t i m , t r e a cherously
s hot the v i c ti m w h i l e t h e v i c ti m w a s t u r n i n g h i s b ack a t h i m . H e
aimed at an'd hit t h e v i c ti m o n l y o n t h e l eg . Th e v i c t im , h o w ever,
died because of loss of blood. (1999 Bar Ex a m) Th e accused is liable
for mu r d er . I n t en t t o k i l l a s a n e l e m ent o f m u r d e r i s c onclusively
p resumed. Bu t t h e c o nclusive p r e sum p t ion of i n t en t t o k i l l i s n o t
a pplicable for p u r p o ses of c r i m i n a l m i t i g a t i on . S i nce t h er e i s n o
intent to kill, praeter intentionem shall be appreciated as a mitigating
c ircumstance. Because the act w a s c om m i t t e d w i t h t r e a chery, t h e
accused although he di d no t i n t en d t o k i l l t h e d eceased is guilty of
murder. (People v. Abej uela, G.R. No. L-82702, August 6, 1979) There
is no incompatibi l it y b e t w een treachery and the praeter intentionem
since the former refers to the manner of execution of the crime while
t he lat ter p e r t a in s t o t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e a c cused not t o k i l l t h e
victim. (People v. Cagoco, G.R No . 88 5 11, October 6', 1988)
M ult i pl e Q u a l i f y i n g C i r c u m s t a n c e s
T here a r e t h r e e r ules t o b e c onsidered i f t he k i l l i n g i s
attended by several qu al i f y in g cir cu m st ances, to wit: (1) doctrine of
absorption; (2) the rule on quali f y in g circum st ance and aggravating
c ircumstance; and (3) rule on inf a n t i c i de, parri cide, and mu r d er .
1. D o c t r in e o f A b s orption — I f t h e re a re t wo or m o r e
circumstances b a se d o n t h e s ame i n c i d e n t ,
only o n e w i l l be
appreciated while the others are absorbed. If the off
killed d
i e theevivi ct i m , t ook advant age of their superior str ength to render
h im defenseless, the c r im e c o m m i t t e d i s m u r d e r q u a l i fie d b y t h e
circumstance of treachery. Abuse of superior str ength is absorbed in
treachery. If t h e accused, who k i l l e d th e v i c t im , t ook a d v a n t age of
the darkness of the night to render the victim defenseless th e crime
committed i s m u r d e r q u a l i fi e d b y t h e c i r c u m s t a nce of t r e a chery.
Nightt im e is absorbed in tr eachery.
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 387
Doctrine of absorption w il l n o t a p pl y i f t h e tw o ci r cu m st ances
a re not based on t h e s a m e i n c i d ent . I f t r e a ch ery i s b a sed on t h e
defenseless positicn of victim (the hands of the victim w ere tied by a
rope) when he was ki l l ed, wh il e ni g h t t i m e was pu r p osely sought by
t he accused to afford im m u n i t y , t r eachery will not absorb night t i m e .
(People v. Ong, G.R. No. L-87908, October 28, 1981)
2. R u l e o n Q u a l i f y i n g C i r c u m s t a n c e an d A g g r a v a t i n g
Circumsta n ce s — I f t w o o r mor e ci r c u m s t a n c es a t t e n d ed t h e
k illing, one w i' I b e a p p r e ciated t o q u a l if y t h e k i l l i n g i n t o m u r d e r
and the others to aggravate the cr i m i na l l i a b i l it y of th e accused. If
the offender k i l l ed. the vi cti m w i t h t h e c i r c u m s t ances of t r eachery
and evident premedit at i on, treachery shall be appreciated to qualify
the killing i nt c m u r d er ; and evident pr e m edit a t ion to aggravate his
criminal li abi l i ty . I'1 948 Bar Exam )
As a r u l e , q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t ances in m u r d er un d e r A r t i c l e
248 are also listed as ordinary aggravat ing circums ta nces i n Art i c l e
1 4. However, t h e r e a r e e x c e p t i ons. S c offin g a t t h e c o r p s e a n d
employment of means to afford impun ity are qualifying circumstances
in murder, but t hey are not ordi n ar y ag gravat ing circumst ances. In
this situati on, the appreciation of the quali f y ing circums tance must
be given priorityover that of ordinary aggravating circumstance.
a. O ut r a g i n g o r S c o f f in g of th e P e r so n o r C o r p s e
of the V i c t i m — T he c oncept of o u t r a g i ng or s c o ffing of t h e
person or corpse of the victim is comprehensive enough to cover
cruelty an d i g n o m i ny . I n Pe o ple v. Ma n e r o, et a l ., G . R. N o s .
86883-85, January 29, 1993, accused fiaunted the brain ofthe
v ictim arid sang a song after b r u t a l s l a y in g of th e p r i e st. Th e
S upreme Cour t s a i d t h a t t h e k i l l i n g i s a t t e n ded b y c r u e l t y ,
ignominy an d scoffing. N ote: These three circum st ances shall
be appreciat d a s one.
Hov ever, there are some differences betweer. cruelty or
ignominy, and scoffing oroutraging.
In cruelty an d i g n o m i ny , th e i n t e n t io n of th e a ccused is
t o augment t h e p h y s i cal a n d m o r a l s u f f e r in g o f t h e v i c t i m ,
respectively: hence, these circumstances cannot be considered
i f the su bject act w a s c o m m i t t e d a t t h e t i m e t h e v i " t i m w a s
already dead since a dead person suffers no more. On the other
hand, outraging or scoffing is either at th e person of the victim
or at the corpse of the victim . H ence, scoffing can be considered
even though the outrageous act was committed at the time that
the victim is al r eady dead.
 388 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VO LUPI E II
Cutting th e h ead of a d y in g v i c ti m a f t e r t h e i n fl i c t ion of
m ortal w o un d on hi m i s c r u e lt y or scoffing . (People v. Gerero,
G.R No . 21 3 6 0 1, Ju l y 2 7 , 2 0 1 6) On t h e o t h e r h a n d , c u t t i n g
the head of a dead victim after killing him is scoffing but not
cruelty.(People v.Binondo, G.R. No. 97227, October 20, 1992)
Raping a dy in g v i c ti m a f t e r t h e i n f l i c t ion of m o r ta l w o un d on
her is cr u e l ty , i g n o m i ny , an d s c offing. (People v. La s pa r d a s,
G.R. No. L - 4 6 146, October 2 3, 1 9 7 9) I n s e rt i ng a t o o t h b r u s h
into th e a n a l o r i fi c e o f a d y i n g v i c t i m i s c r u e l t y . (P e ople v.
Bernabe, G.R. ¹. 18 5 72 6 , Oc t o ber 1 6 ; 2 0 0 9
) On t h e o t h e r
hand, sodomizin g a d e a d v i c t i m a f t e r k i l l i n g h e r i s s c offing
but not cruelty or i g n o m i ny . (People v. Butler, G.R. No. 50276,
January 27, 1983)
S coffin g o r o utragin g i s a q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t a nce
in m u r der u n de r Ar t i cl e 2 4 8 b u t it i s
n ot a n o r d i n a r y
a ggravatin g c i r c u m s t a nce u n de r A r t i c l e 1 4 . I g n o m in y i s a n
o rdinary a g gr av at in g c i r c u m s t ance, but i t i s n o t a q u a l i f y i n g
circumstance in m u r d er . C r u e lt y i s a q u a l i f y in g cir cum st ance
in murder and ordinary aggravating circumstance.
In People v. La s p a r d a s, G . R. N o . L - 4 6 1 46, O ctober 2 3
1979 9,the
the S Supreme Court appreciated abuse of superior strength
a s a circumstance that q u a li fies th e k i l l i n g i n t o m u r d e r w h i l e
s coffing a t t h e c o r p s e o f t h e v i c t i m ( s o d omi zin g t h e v i c t i m
after k i l l i n g he r ) as a n o r d i n a r y a g g r a v a t i ng c i r c u m s t a nce.
According to Regalado, this ru l in g is erroneous since scoffing is
not listed in Ar t i cle 14 of the Revised Penal Code as an ordinary
aggravating cir cum st ance. The court sh ould h ave appreciated
scoffing as a qualifying circum st ance in Art i cle 248 while abuse
of superior str ength as an or d i n ar y a g gr avat ing circum st ance,
a nd not the other way ar ou n d .
I f t h e o f f e n de r a f t e r i n fl i c t i n g f a t a l w o u n d u p o n t h e
victim, undr essed her to augment her emotional suffering, this
circumstance can be appreciated either as ignominy or scoffi
ng
t he person of t h e v i c t i m . I f t h e o f f e nder k i l l e d t h e v i c t i m
with treachery, the crime commi t ted is murd er. Un dr essing the
d ying victim m u s t b e a p p r eciated as an or d i n ar y a g gr avat i n g
circumstance of i g n o m i ny , an d n o t s c offing a t t h e p e r son of
the victim. A r t i cl e 14 of the Revised Penal Code has not li sted
scoffing as an o r d i n ar y a g g r a v a t in g c i r c u m st ance. If offender
killed the victi 'm wi t h ou t o t h e r c i r c u m s t a nce, un dr essin
y'lng victim must be appreciated as qualifying circumstance g thee
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 389
o f scoffin- , a n d n o t i g n o m i n y . A r t i c l e 2 4 8 o f t h e R e v i s e d
P enal Code on mu r der has not l i s ted ignominy as a quali f y i n g
circumstance.
b. E m pl o y m e n t o f M e a n s t o A f f o r d I m p u n i t y -
The c ircumstance of employment of m e a ns to afford i m p u n i t y
is present where the accused after ki l l i n g th e victim b u r ied hi s
lifeless bcdy to conceal the corpus delicti. (1993 Bar Exam )
I f the cffender was wearing a mask to conceal his identit y
at that t i m e t h a t h e k i l l e d t h e v i c t i m , t h i s c i r c u m s t ance can
be apprecia-.ed as either disguise or employment of means to
afford i m p u n i t y . I f o f f e nder k i l l e d t h e v i c ti m w i t h t r e a chery,
t he cr im e c o m m i t t e d i s m u r d e r . W e a r i n g a m a s k m u s t b e
appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance of
d isguise, and n o t e m p l o y m en t o f m e a n s t o a f f or d i m p u n i t y .
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code has not listed employment
of means to afford impunity as an ordinary aggravating
circumstance. What i s l i s ted in t h i s p r o v i sion is commi t t i n g a
crime with th e aid of persons to afford imp u n i t y . If the offender
killed the vi cti m w i t h ou t o t her ci r c u m st ance, wearing a m a sk
must be appreciated as qualify ing circum st ance of employment
of means to aff ord i m p u n i t y , an d n o t d i s g u i se. Ar t i cl e 248 of
the Revised Penal Code on mur der has not li sted disguise as a
qualifying circum st ance.
T here i s n o m a t h e m a t i ca l f o r m u l a i n ap p r e c i a t in g a
circumstance either as qualify ing or aggravating circumstance.
S uch appreciation w il l a l w ay s be dependent on th e p a r t i c u l ar
situations of the case. Cuttin g th e ear of a dying victim can be
considered as qualifying orordinary aggravating circumstance
o f cr u el ty , o r q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a nce o f s c o f fi ng . T a k i n g
a dvaiitage of the dark n ess of the night to hide his identity m a y
b e treated as ordin ar y a g gr av at in g cir cu m st ance of nigh t t i m e
or qualify in g ci r c u m st ance of em pl oyment of m e an s t o a f f ord
i mpuni ty. An d so on, and so forth .
3. R u le on I n f a n t ic i d e , P a r r ic i d e , M u r d e r a n d
Homicide — T o be h e ld l i a b le f or p a r r i c i d e, t he k i l l i n g m u s t n o t
constitute infanticide. In s um , th e ch il d k i l led by t h e o ffender
must not be less than t h r e e years old. (T he Revised Penal Code by
Justice Luis R e yes) To be he ld l i a b le f or m u r d e r, t he k i l l i n g m u s t
not constitute parricide or infanticide. (People v. D imapilit, G.R. ¹.
210802, August 9, 201 7) To be held liable for homicide, the killing
 390 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
must not c o n st i t ut e i n f a n t i c i de, p a r r i c i de, or m u r d er . (L i c y a yo u.
People, G.R. No. 169425, March 4, 2008)
The provision on i n f a n t i c ide shall be given pr i o r it y over t h ose
on parricide and m u r d er . Th e pr ovi sion on pa r r i c ide shall be given
p riority over that of m u r d e r .
1. Fa t h e r k i l l e d h i s c h i l d l e s s t h a n t h r e e d a y s o l d.
(1999 and 19 82 Ba r E x a m s ) Th e q u a l i f y i ng c i r c u m s ta nces cf
infancy, relati onship, an d t r e a chery ar e p r e sent i n t h i s c ase.
T he court m u s t a p p r eciate cir cu m st ance of in f ancy t o q u a l i f ,
the kil l in g i n t o i n f a n t i c i de. Th e c i r c u m st ance of r e l a t i onship
shall be considered to impose the penalty for par r i c i de. (People
v.Jaca, G.R. No. 84866, August, 18, 1981) Treachery for being
inherent in i n f a n t i c ide is absorbed. (U.S. v. Oro, 19 Phil. 548)
The penalty for infan t i cide is the same as that for parri cide
or murder (before, the penalty for par r i c ide is higher than t h at
for murder). If th e accused is related to the in f a nt , the penalty
for pa r r i c id e s h al l b e i m p o sed fo r t h e c r i m e o f i n f a n t i c i de.
O therwise, th e i m p o sable p en a lt y f o r i n f a n t i c id e i s t h a t f o r
murder. (People v. Jaca, supra)
2. I f t h e q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a nces of r el at i onship a n d
by means o f p o i son ar e p r e s ent , t h e c o ur t m u s t a p p r e ciate
circumstance of r e l a t i o n shi p t o q u a l i f y t h e k i l l i n g i n to
parricide. By means ofpoison shall be considered as an ordinary
aggravating circum st ance. (People v. Bucsit, supra)
3. I f t h e qual i f y in g c i r c u m s t a nces o f t r e a c h ery a n d
evident pr em edit a t ion ar e p r esent, th e court m u s t a p p r eciate
c ircumstance of t r e a chery t o q u a l if y t h e k i l l i n g i n t o m u r d e r .
E vident p r e m e d i t a t i o n s hall b e c onsidered a s
ordinary
aggravating circum st ance.
HOMICIDE
Hoomicide i s c ommitte d b y a n y p e r s o n w h o k i l l s a n o t h e r
without t h e q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a nce i n i n f a n t i c i de, p a r r i c i de, or
murder. (Artic le 249) The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
H owever, u n der S e ction 1 0 o f R . A . N o . 7 6 10, w h e n t h e v i c t i m i s
below 12 years of age, the penalty of homicide is reclusion perpetu .
In s um, tha t t h e v i c t i m i s b e l o w 1 2 y e a r s o f a g e i s a q u a l i f yua.
in
o ag e i s a q u a i y i n g
circumstance.
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 391
MUTILATION
M util a t io n i s c o m m i t t e d b y p e r s o n w h o s h a l l i n t e n t i o n a l l y
mutilate another by depri v in g h im , ei t her t ot a ll y or p a r t i a l ly , of hi s
reproductive organ. (Art ic le 262)
Other i n t en tiona l m u t i l a t i on i s c o m m i t t e d b y a p e r s o n w h o
i ntentionally m u t i l a t e s another b y d e p r i v in g h i m , e i t her t o t a ll y or
partially, of his non-reproductive organ. (Art ic le 262)
Vasectomy
Vasectomy denies a ma n h i s p c we r o f r e p r o duction, however
s uch procedure does not deprive h i m , "either tot ally or p a r t i a l ly , of
some essential or gan fo r r e p r o ducti on." B i l a t e ral v a sectomy could
not have am ou n ted t o t h e c r i m e o f m u t i l a t i on . (A g u i r r e v. S ec. of
DOJ, G.R. No. 1 70728, March 3, 2008)
Under 12-year old Victim
T he penalt y f o r o t h e r i n t e n t i o na l n i u t i l a t i o n ( i n v o l v in g n o n -
reproductive organ) is pr i s i on m a y or i n i t s m e d i um a nd m a x i m u m
p eriods. H ow ever, u n de r S e c t ion 1 0 o f R . A . N o . 7 6 10 , w h e n t h e
victim i s b e lo w 1 2 y e ar s o f a g e , th e p e n a lt y o f o t h e r i n t e n t i o n al
mutilation is reclusion perpetua. In sum, that t he vic tim is below 12
years of age is a qualify in g circum st ance. This circum st ance cannot
be appreciated in mu t i l a t ion of reproductive organ since the penalty
under A r t i cl e 26 2 o f t h e R e v i sed P enal C ode i s a l r e ady re c lusion
perpetua.
I ntent to M u t i l a t e
I ntent t o m u t i l a t e i s a n i n d i s p ensable element of m u t i l a t i o n .
I f the accused int en t i on ally u sed vi olence upon th e v i c ti m w i t h o u t
i ntent t o m u t i l a t e , bu t a s a c o n s equence, part s o f h i s b o d y w a s
mutilated, the crime commi t ted is serious physical inj u r i e s.
P hysical V i o l e nce A g a i nst W o m a n
Physical violence against wom an, w it h w h o m th e offender has
a marital, sexual or d a t in g r e l a t i on ship or he r c h i l d , is p u n i shable
under Section 6 (a ) o f R . A . N o . 9 2 6 2 . Ho w e v e r, if s u c h p h y s i c al
v iolence against th e w o ma n r e s u lt s t o m u t i l a t i o n or , i t c o n stit u t e s
a ttempted, f r u s t r a t ed , o r co n s u m m a t e d p a r r i c i de , m u r d e r o r
h omicide, the offender sh all b e p u n i s hed for such cr im e u n der t h e
Revised Penal Code,and not for violence against woman under R.A.
No. 9262.
 392 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
PHYSICAL IN JURIES
Physical i nj u r i es i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s o n w h o , w i t h o u t
intent to kill or m u t i l a t e, s hall woun d, beat, or assault anothe r.
S erious Ph y s i cal I n j u r i e s
Th e crime is serious physical inj u r ies if the victim assaulted or
wounded suffered insanity, i m b ecili ty , i m p ot ency, blin dness, loss of
faculty forspeech, hearing or smelling, loss of any part of the body
o r use thereof, deformity, incapacity for habit ual w o rk , perm an ently
o r for more t ha n 9 0 d a ys, or i n capacity or i l l n ess for m or e t ha n 3 0
days. (Article 268)
Admin i st e r in g i n j u r i o u s su b st a n ces or b e v e r a g e s
Adm inistering i n j u r i ous substances or beverages i s corn ' t t d
b y a person
er w ho, w i t h ou t i n t e n t t o k i l l , i n fi i ct s u po n a n o t her a n y
s erious ph y sical i n j u r y , b y k n o w i n g l y a d m i n i s t e r in g t o h i m a n y
i njurious s u b stances or b e v er ages or b y t a k i n g a d v a n t ag e of h i s
weakness of mind or credul i ty . (Ar t i c le 26'4)
I t is s u b m i t t e d t h a t i f a p e r s o n w h o , w i t h ou t i n t e n t t o k i l l ,
infiicts upon another l ess serious physical i n j ur y o r s l i gh t p h y s ical
injuries, by knowingly admi n i st er ing to him any inju r i ous substances
or beverages, the former is liable for less serious physical inj u r ies or
slight physical inj u r i es under A r t i cl e 265 or 266.
D eliberately i n f ecting th e v i c ti m w i t h c o r ona v i ru s w i l l r e s u l t
in inju r ies on hi s l u n gs. H ence, such acts constit ut e m a l t r e a t m ent
or physical i n j u r i es. If t h e i n j u r i e s on t h e l u n g s are se rious i n t h e
sense that it caused illness or incapacity for labor of the victim for
m ore than t h i r t y d a ys, the offender can be prosecuted for the cri m e
of administering in j u r i ous substances.
However, if the victi m d ied as a consequence of this deliberate
v iral i n f e ction, th e o f f ender i s r e s p onsible for h i s d e at h a l t h o u gh
there is no i n t en t t o k i l l . I n s u m , a p p l y in g A r t i cl e 4 of th e Revised
Penal C o d e o n pr a e t e r i nt e n t i o n em, t h e of f e n d er i s l i ab l e f o r
t he w r o n gfu l a c t c o n s t i t u t i n g h o m i c id e a l t h o ug h i t d i f f e r s f r o m
the wr ongful a c t i n t e n d ed, an d t h a t i s , t h e a c t o f v i r a l i n f e c t i on
constitut ing ma l t r e a t m e nt or p h y s i c al i n j u r i e s. Because of A r t i c l e
4, intent to kil l as an element of homi cide is conclusively presumed.
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 393
Less S erious Ph y s i c al I n j u r i e s
The crime is less serious physical inju r ies if the victim assaulted
or wounded suffered incapacity for labor or il l n ess requir ing medical
attendance for 10 days or m ore but no t m or e t ha n 30 d ays. (Artic le
265)
Slight P h y s i c al I n j u r i e s a nd M a l t r e a t m e n t
The crime is sli ght p h y s i cal i n j u r i e s if th e v i c ti m w o u n ded or
a ssaulted suffered i n c apacity fo r l a b o r o r i l l n e s s fo r 1 t o 9 d a y s ,
o r there i s n o i n c a p acity o r i l l n e ss. I f t h e o f f e n der s h al l i l l - t r e a t
another by deed with out causing any in j u r y , the crime commi t ted is
m altreatment . (Article 26'6; 2012 Bar 5<',ram)
QualifyingCircumstances
T he qualify in g cir cu m st ances in p a r r i c ide or m u r der w i l l a l s o
q ualify the crim e of serious physical inj u r i es un l ess it is commi t t e d
by a parent who infi i cts it u pon his child by excessive chastisement.
(Article 2 6 8) T he h i g h e st p e n a l ty f o r s e r i o us p h y s i c al i n j u r i e s i s
reclusion temporal in i t s m e d i um a nd m a x i m u m p e r i o d s. However,
under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610, when the victim is below 12 years
of age, the penalty for serious physical inju r ies is reclusion perpetua.
I n sum, t h a t t h e v i c t i m i s b e l o w 1 2 y e ar s o f a g e i s a q u a l i f y i n g
circumstance.
Q ualifyin g c i r c u m s t a nces i n l e s s s e r i ou s p h y s i cal i n j u r i e s
are: (1) man i fest i n t en t t o i n s u l t o r o f f en d t h e i n j u r e d p e r son, (2)
ignominy, (3) t h a t t h e v i c t i m i s t h e o f f e n der's p ar ent , a scendant,
guardian, curator, teacher, or persons of rank, and (4) that the victim
i s person in aut h or i ty . H ow ever, in th e case of persons in aut h or i t y ,
the deed must not constit ut e the crime of assault upon such persons.
(Article 266) In s uch case, the crime commit t ed is complex crime of
direct assault w i t h l e ss serious physical i n j u r i es, and not q u a li fi ed
l ess serious physical inj u r i e s .
There is no qualify in g circum st ance in slight ph y sical inj u r i e s.
Bullyin g
Under R.A. No. 10627, "bullying" refers to an y s evere or
repeated use by one or more students of a writt en, verbal or electronic
expression, or a physical act or gesture, or any combinat ion th ereof,
directed at another student that has the effect of actually causing or
p lacing the la t ter i n r e a sonable fear of ph y sical or em oti onal h a r m
 394 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 395
VOLUME II

o r damage to his property; creating a hostile envir on m ent at

for the other st u d ent ; i n f r i n g in g on th e r i g h t s of th e ot her s t u dent h t hat they a r e n o t c o m p osed of g r o up s o r g a n i zed fo r t h e c o m m o n
at school; or m a t e r i a ll y an d s u b st a n t i a ll y d i s r u p t in g th e education purpose of reciprocally assaultin g and at t a ck in g each other. (Artic le
process orthe orderly operation of a school. 2 51) Tumult u ous affray is also called. as free-for-all ru m b l e .

However, R.A. No. 10627 does not pu n ish bu l l y in g as a crim e.
I t m e r e y r e q u i r e s t h e s c h o ols t o a d o p t m e c h a n is m t o a d d r e ss
bullying an d t o r e p or t b u l l y i n g i n c i d ents t o t h e p o l ice au t h or i t i es.
ut, u l l y i n g ma y consti t ut e a cr im e pu n i shable under th e Revised
P ena C o d e s uc h a s p h y s i cal i n j u r i es , u n j u s t v e x a t i on , t h r ea t o r
c oercion. I f t h e u n j u s t v e x a t io n o r t h r e a t i s c o m m i t t e d w i t h t h e
u se of comm u n i cation o r i n f o r m a t i o n t e c h n ology t h
thisis ccrime shall be u p g r a ded one degree high e pena l yt f or
b c a use o f S ection
er e
o . A. N o . 1 0 1 75. I n s u m , t h e c r i m e com m i t t e d i s cyber u n j u st
v exation or cyber th r e at .
DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
D eath caused in a t u m u l t u o u s a f f ra y i s com m it t d b
o r persons ident i f ied a s r e sponsible for i n fl ' t i e y p er s o n
or in i c i n g s e r i ou s p h y sical
i njuries or u s in g v i o l ence upon t h e d e ceased, who i s k i l l e d b y a n
unidentified person in th e course of tum u l t u ous affr ay. (Art ic le 261)
D uring a f i e sta, A b o xed B , w h o f e l led on t h e t a bl e of C a n d
D. D boxed A, who fell on th e t a bl e of E an d F . F b o xed B. Th en, a
f ree-for-all ru m ble erupted wh ere A, B, C, D, E and F are assaulti n g
e ach other in a confused mann er. F wa s stabbed and k i l l ed . T h e r e
are two possible scenarios in thi s case, to wit:
1. A w i t n e s s t esti fied that h e saw A , B an d C b ox ing F, but
he failed to identify who among them stabbed and ki l led F. A, B and
C shall be convicted of death caused in a tu m u l t u ous affray wit h t h e
penalty lesser than t ha t for h o m i cide. (1997 Bar Exa m )
2. A w i t n e s s t e sti fied that h e saw A an d B b o x in g F, an d C
stabbing and kil l in g F. A and B are liable for slight physical inju r i es,
and C is liable for homicide. C is not entit led to the lesser penalty for
death caused in a t u m u l t u ou s affray because "fail u re to identi fy the
killer" i s an element of this crim e; but C was identified as the kil l e r.
(People v. Mar a m a r a, G . R. No. 11 0994, October 22, 1999; Wacoy v.
People, G.R. No. 213792, tu n e 22, 2015)

The p rovision o n d e a t h c a u se d i n t u m u l t N o conspir a c y

u ous a r a y i s a n
e vi en t i ar y m e a s ur e d e s i gned t o r e m e d y a s i t u a t i o nffw h e r e t h e
evidentiar
p articipant th ereof, who killed the victi m w a s n t ' d A , B, and C a r e m e m b ers of A l ph a Ph i f r a t e r n it y w h i l e D , E
t'fi d b and F are members of Phi Beta frat er n i ty . These two fratern i t ies are
o e c o n f u s i on. Since there is uncertai nt y on wh et her th e one, who
e mp oyed violence against the vi cti m k i l l e d h ' at war. A, B an d C assaulted D, E an d F i n s ide the campus of Beda
1 fl ' U niversity. R u m bl e er u p t ed. A w i t n ess t estified t h a t h e sa w A , B
p hysical
si inj u r ies on h i m , t h e f o r mer w i l l b e p u n i shed for d eath
cause i n a t u m u l t u ou s affray w it h t h e p en alty l esser than t ha t f or and C boxing F, but h e f a i led to i d en t if y wh o a m on g t hem st abbed
h omicide or mu r d er . and killed F. (2010 B ar Exa m )

A , B an d C a r e l i a b l e fo r h o m i c i de. They ar e n o t e n t i t l e d t o
C riniinal a c t t he lesser penalty fo r d e at h c a u sed in a t u m u l t u ou s a f f ray on t h e
I n d e at h c a u se d i n a t u m u l t u o u s following reasons:
a ffray, t h e unidentified
participant o f t h e f r e e - for-all r u m b l e k i l l e d t h ' t' 1. T h e r e i s n o t u m u l t u ou s affray because A, B, C, D, E, and
h'
i enti f e p a r t i c i p a n t th e r e of i nf li c t ed s e rio us p h y s ical in u r i e s o r
F are composed of two groups organized for th e common pu r pose of
ence upon e e c e ased. U s in g v i o l ence ma y c o n st i t u t e reciprocally assaultin g and a t t a ck in g each other. The ru m ble is not
l ess serious or s l i gh t p h y s i cal i n j u r i es. Th e ' d
s. e i en t'fi
i e d p ar ti c i p a n t s fr ee-for-all.(Peop le v.Corpuz G.R. No. L-36234 Februar 10 1981
a re i a e f o r d e at h caused in a t u m u l t u ou s affr ay .
2. T h e r e i s n o c o n f u sion as t o w h o a r e r e sponsible for t h e
F ree-for-all R u m b l e k illing of F. Th ere is i m plied conspiracy since A, B a nd, C a r e
members of Alpha Phi f r a t e r n i t y , wh o assaulted members of a rival
There is tu m u l t u ou s affray w he n several persons
f raternit y P h i B e t a i n c l u d i n g F . B e c a use of c onspiracy, t he y a r e
eac o er i n a c o n f u sed and t u m u l t u ou s m a n ner p r o v i ded
c ollectively l i a bl e for t h e d e at h o f F e v e n t h o ugh t h e a c t ua l k i l l e r

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 396 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
w as not i d en t i f i ed. They ar e no t e n t i t l e d t o t h e l e sser penalty f o r
death caused in a t u m u l t u ou s affray since all conspirat ors, who are
responsible for h o m i ci de, are i d e n t i f i ed. ( U .S. v. Ta n d o c, G.B. No .
L-15685, March 16, 1920)
C onfu s i o n
There is n o c o n fu sion an d t u m u l t u ou s a f f ra y i f t w o p e r s ons
(Wacoy v.People, G.R. No. 218792, June 22, 2015) or one group of
persons (People v. Da l a baj an, G.B. ¹ . 10 5 6 ' 68, October16; 1997),
a ttacked and killed a single victim. Wi t h out confusion or tum u l t u o u s
affray, al l pe r s o n s , who a s saulte d t h e d e c eased,
a re l i a bl e f o r
mur e r o r h o m i c ide and not for th e l esser crime of death caused in
a tumult u ous affr ay .
PHYSICAL IN JURIES INFLICTED IN A TUMULTOUS AFFRAY
P hysical inj u r ies infl i cted in a t u m u l t u ou s affr a
by person or persons identified as responsible for using violence
upon a par t i cip ant of a t u m u l t u ou s af f r ay, wh o suffered serious or
ess serious physical inj u r ies commit ted by an unidentified person in
the course thereof. (Artic le 252)
The provision on physical inju r ies inflicted in tum u l t u ous affray
is an evidentiary m easure designed to remedy a situ a t ion wh ere the
participant t h e r e of, wh o i n f l i c ted serious
s er i ou or
I ess serious p h y sical
injuries upon the victim, was not identified because of the confusion.
S ince t h er e i s u n c e r t a i nt y o n w h e t h
er th e on e,, w ho e m p l o y ed
v iolence a g a i ns t t h e v ictim c o m m ' t t d ' e lement of t h i s c r i m e ; bu t C w a s i d e n t i fie d a s o ne , wh o i n fl i c t e d
mi e ser i o u s o r l Ies s s e r i o u s
p h ysical
sical in
i n juu r i e s or m e r ely sl i gh t p h y s ical i n j u r i es, the former w i l l
b e punished for p h y s i cal i n j u r i e s in fl i c ted i n a t u m u l t u o u s a f f r ay
w ith a p en alt y l e sser t ha n t h a t f o r s e r i ous or l ess seriou s h '
s serious p y s i c al1
injuries.
P art i c i p a n t s
In death
a th ccaused or ph y sical i n j u r i e s in fl i c ted in a t u m u l t u o u s
affray, there are th ree ki nds of par t i cipants, to wit: (1) th
e par icipant, who died or suffered serious or less serious physical
injuries; (2) th e un i d e n t i f ied p a r t i c i p a nt w h o k i l l e d t h e v i c t i m o r
i nflicted serious o r l ee ss
s s serious p h y s ical i n j u r i e s o n h i m ; ( 3 ) t h e
identified p art i c ipant w ho used violence upon victim .
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 397
C rim i n a l acts
In death caused i n a t u m u l t uous affray t h e un i d entified
participant ki l l ed the victim wh i le the identified part ic ipa nt infli c te d
s erious, less serious or slight ph y sical inj u r ies upon hi m .
I n p h y s i cal i n I u r i e s i n f h c te d i n a t u mu l t u o u s a f f r a y t h e
unidentified p a r t i c i p ant in f li c t e d s e r i o us or l e s s s e r i o us p h y s i cal
injuries on v i c t i m w h i l e t h e id e n t if ied p a r t i c i p a nt us e d v i o l e nce
(slight physical injuries) upon him.
D uring a fi esta, A b oxed B, wh o f el l on t h e t a bl e of C an d D .
D boxed A, who fell on th e t a ble of E an d F . F b oxed B. Fr ee-for-all
rumble erupted where A, B, C, D, E and F are assaulting each other
in a confused manner. F wa s stabbed and suffered serious physical
injuries. T h er e are th ree possible scenarios in the case, to wit:
I A w i t n e s s testified that he saw A B an d C boxing F bu t h e
failed to identify wh o am ong them st abbed F, wh ich caused serious
physical injuries on him. A, B and C shall be convicted of physical
i njuries infli cted in a t u m u l t u ou s affray w i t h a p e n a lt y l esser th an
that for serious physical injuries.
2. A w i t n e s s t esti fied that h e saw A an d B b o x in g F, an d C
s tabbing F, w h i c h c a u sed serious ph y sical i n j u r i e s on h i m . A a n d
B are liable for s l i gh t p h y s i cal i n j u r i es, and C i s l i a bl e for serious
physical inj u r i es. C is not ent i t led to the lesser penalty for ph y sical
injuries inflicted in a t u m u l t u ou s affray since "failure to identify the
person who in fl i c ted serious physical i nj u r i es" is an i n d i s p e nsable
serious physical injuries on F.
2. A w i t n ess testified that he saw A and B boxing F, and C
stabbed F at hi s left ar m, wh i ch caused serious physical inju r i es on
him; but the witness failed to identify who among them stabbed F
on his right a rm . A an d B ar e l i a ble for slight p h y sical inj u r i es, and
C is liable for serious physical inj u r i es. C is not enti t led to the lesser
penalty for p h y sical i n j u r i e s in fl i c ted i n a t u m u l t u ou s af f ray s i n ce
"failure to identify the person who infli cted serious physical inj u r i e s"
i s an in d i spensable element of t h i s c r i m e ; bu t C w a s i d e n ti fied a s
one who inflicted serious physical injuries on F.
N o con s p i r a c y
If there is conspiracy among the par t i cipants in th e r u m b le, to
i nflict serious or l ess serious physical i n j u r i e s on th e v i c ti m or t h e
 398 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 399
VOLUME II

participants of the r u m bl e in clu d in g the victim ar e composed of two

g roups organized for the common pu r p ose of reciprocally assaultin g
and attacking each other, the accused are not ent i t led to th e lesser
p enalty of physical inj u r i es infl i c ted in a t u m u l t u ou s affr ay .
Note: In exceptional circ um s ta nce, there are two r u l e s, to w i t :
in case of d e at h a n d s e r i ou s p h y s i cal i n j u r i e s u n d e r e x ceptional
circumstance, the accused shall be subjected t
o a pro tective measure
of de stierro; a nd in c a s e of l e ss serious or sl h t h
o physical inju r ies commi t ted against Pi n il i b ecause of the absence of
1g p ys l c a l i n j u r i e s
under exceptional circumstance, the accused is exempt from 1crim i n al
iability . I n t u m u l t u o u s a f f r ay , t h er e ar e t w o r u l e s, to w i t : d e a t h
c aused in a t u m u l t u ou s af f ra y a n d s e r i o u s ' his intention is m er ely to commi t a c r i m e against Reyes because of
1 serious
or ess physical
injuries infli cted in a t u m u l t u ou s aff ra y. The re is no crime ofhslight
p ysical inj u r ies inf li cted in a t u m u l t u ou s affr ay .
GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE
G'iving assistance to suicide is c ommi t t e d b
y any person w h o
a ssists another t o com mi t s u i c i de, or by an y p e r son wh o l e nds hi s
assistance to another to th e extent of doing the k i l l i n g h i m s elf. The
pena ty is lesser if the suicide is not consumm a t ed. (Artic le 258)
Francis an d J o a n w e r e s w e e t h eart s b u t t h
o jected
ob ect to th eir r e l a t i on ship because they were first cousins. They
o rgcd a pact i n w r i t i n g t o c o m mi t s u i c i de. Th e a greement w a s t o
s hoot each ot her i n t h e h e a d w h i c h t h e y d i d . J o a n d i e d . D u e t o
m e ical assistance, Francis survived. Francis is 1' bl f
ia e o r a s s i st ance
to suicide. (2008 Bar Exam)
DISCHARGE OF FIREARM
Discharge offirearmsiscommitted by any person who shoots
at another w i t h a f i r e a r m , u n l ess th e act constit u tes f r u s t r a ted or
a ttempted pa r r i c i de, m u r d er , h o m i cide or an y o t h e r g r a ver c r i m e .
rticle 254)
L ack of I n t e n t t o K i l l
Lack of i n t e n t t o k i l l i s a n i m p o r t a n t e l e m en t o f d i s c h ar ge
of fi r e a rm . D i s c h a r g in g fi r e a r m w i t h i n t e n t t o k i l l
mp e o r r u s t r a t e d hom i cide or mu r d er. A pers
'h
r us ra ed h o m i cide ma y b e f o un d g u i l t y o f u npl erson a w f u l cdha' r gg
he d with
un aw u
firearms r ms aagainst a n o t he r i f i n t e n t t o k i l l w a s n o t p r o visc e n arge
b e o of
nd
reasonable doubt. (1949 Bar Exam)
In People v. David, G.R. Nos. 39708, 39709, April 1 6, 1934, the
accused shot at Reyes with a f i r e ar m t o k i l l h i m . On e of the bull et s
hit Pi n il i b y r e a so n of ab e r r a t io i c t u s. As a c o n s e quence, Reyes
suffered mortal w o u nd s w h i l e P i n i l i s u f f ered l ess serious physical
i njuries. Th e a ccused is l i a bl e fo r f r u s t r a t e d h o m i c ide comm i t t e d
against Reyes because of th e pr e sence of in t e nt to k i l l . H e i s a l s o
liable for com plex cr im e o f d i s ch arge of fi r e ar m w i t h l e s s serious
intent to kill. A lt h o ugh the shot that hit P i n i li w as not aimed at him ,
the accused is liable for the crime commi t ted against Pin il i al t h ou gh
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
H ypothetically , i f a s i n g l e b u l l e t h i t R e y e s a n d P i n i l i , t h e
a ccused is l i a bl e of a s i n gl e c r i m e , an d t h a t i s , c o m plex c r i m e o f
f rustrated h o m i c ide w i t h u n l a w f u l d i s c h arge of fi r e ar m a n d l e s s
s erious physical inj u r i e s .
In Dado v. PeopLe, G.R. No. 131421, November 18, 2002, during
an operation against c a t t l e -ru st l i ng , E r aso an d D a do, m embers of
C AFGU, saw a n a p p r o aching p er son m i s t a ken a s a c a t t l e -ru stl er .
Eraso fired hi s a r m a l i t e s everal t i m e s a t t h e a p p r oaching person,
while Dado discharged his .45 caliber pistol once. As a consequence,
the victi m d i e d . E r a s o w a s c o n vi cted of h o m i c i de. Hi s c o n vi ction
b ecomes fi n al . W i t h r e s p ect t o D a d o , h e w a s n o t c o n v i c te d o f
homicide because: (1) there is no conspiracy to kill the victim; (2)
there is no show in g t h a t b u l l e t fi r e d b y D a d o f r o m t h e .4 5 caliber
pistol hit the victim; and (8) there is no intent to kill since Dado
d id notaim to k il l t h e v i c t im . Since Dado shot at th e vi cti m w i t h h i s
firearm wi t h ou t i n t e n t ion to k il l h i m , th e cr im e commi t ted is ill egal
discharge of firearm.
N on-comm i ssion of a G r a v e r C r i m e
Non-commission of a gr aver cr im e is an i m p o r t an t el ement of
d ischarge of firearm. If th e accused shoot at another w it h a fi r e a r m
in the course of robbery, he shall be h el d l i a bl e for r o bbery, w h i ch
is a crim e g r a ver t h a n d i s c h arge of fi r e a r m . I f t h e a c cused shoot
a t another w i t h a fi r e a r m i n t h e c o u r se of a t t e m p ted r o bbery, h e
c an be held liable for the discharge of firearm, wh ich is gr aver th an
attempted robbery.
I ntent to T h r e a t e n o r I n f i i c t I n j u r i e s
I f the accused fired hi s fi r e ar m t o t h r e a te n t h e v i c t im , h e i s
liable for discharge of firearm. In People v. Agbuya, G.R. Nos. 86866-

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 400 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 401
VOLUME II

36368, September 23, 1932, the accused discharged his shotgun at

the victim from a distance of some 200 DUEL
met ers.. B ecause of the limited
range of the shotgun, it is impossible for the accused to kill the victim Duel i s c o m m i t t e d b y c o m b a t a n ts i n a du e l . T h i s c r i m e i s
f rom a d i s t a nce of 20 0 m e t e rs. T h d ' t
e i s a n c e b etween the accused c ommitted w h e t he r o r n o t o n e k i l l s o r i n fl i c t s i n j u r i e s u p o n h i s
and the victim was so great t h a t i t i d ' f fi
is i cu lt t o i m p u t e an i n t e n t i on adversary. The seconds shall in all events be punished as accomplices.
o n tthe
e p ar
a tr tof
o th e former to k il l t h e l a t t er . It i s
i s no ti m
' p r o b abl
ble that (Article 260)
t he
e gunn was
w di scharged chiefly w i t h a v i e w t o f ' h t
wa . T h e c r i m e comm i t t ed is discharge of firear m . o ri g en t h vi c t i m
e T he second is th e person designated by combatants, who w i l l
a way.
ensure that the duel shall be carried out un der honorable condition .
If th e a c cused fi r e d h i s fif irearm t o i n fl i c t i n j u r i e s u p o n t h e
victim, and as a consequence, the latter suffered Challenging t o a d u e l i s com m i t t e d b y an y p er s o n who
e i n j u r i es, the former challenges another, or i n c i tes another t o give or accept a challenge
ia e or c o m p l e x c r i m e of d i s c harge of fir e a rm w i t h
l ess serious physicals i c a i n j u r i es. (People v. Ar q u i z a,rmG.R.
wi serious or
Nos. 4 21 2- to a duel, or scoffs at or decries another pu b l i cly for h a v in g r efused
29, December 19 1 9 1935; U .S . v. 3 f a r a s i g an G . R . N . L - 2 8 0 , os. 8- to accept a challenge to fight a du el. (Art i c le 261)
19, . . .

.
. o. -

, July
) If t h e v i c ti m m e r el y s u f f ered sl i gh t h '
,

i s submitted t ha t t h e accused should b h l d 1 ' pb ysica l f 1 i n j u r i e s, it

HAZING UNDER R.A. NO. 8049
rearm. Since slight p h y sical i n j u r i es is a l i gh t f e l ony, it c a n not be
made a component of acompound crime. Hazing refers to any act that results in physical or psychological
suffering, h a r m , or i nj u r y i n f li c t e d o n a r e c r u it , n e o p h y t e ,
If th e a c cused f i re d h i' ss firear
fi m t o i n fl i c t i n j u r i e s u p o n t h e applicant, or member as part of an initiation rite orpractice made
victim, a n d a s a c o n s e quence, th e l a t t e r d i e d i n t
a s a pr er equisit e fo r a d m i s sion o r a r e q u i r e m en t f o r c o n t i n u i n g
c usive y presumed. With th e pr esence of intent to k 'l l h
e n o i , omic i d e membership in a fr a t e r n i t y , sorori ty , or organization .
is committ e , w h'
i ed h i l e d i scharge of firearm is negated.
Hazing includes paddling, wh i p p i ng, beating, bran di ng, forced
A ttempted, f r u s t r a te d o r c o n s u m
umma te d h omicide, ' 'd , calisthenics, exposure t o t h e w e a t h er , fo r c ed c o nsumpti on of a n y
o r ess serious phy sical i n j u r i e s can be m e r ged w it h d i r or s e r i ous
i i r ee a ss a u l t food, liquor,beverage, drug or other substance, or any other brutal
t o form aa ccomplex
o cr i me . Seri ous or l ess seriou s h si 1t ' treatment o r f o r ced p h y sical a c t i v it y w h i c h i s l i k e l y t o a d v e r sely
c an be merr ge i ous
e d w i t h d i s c h a rge of fi r e ar m t o f o r m p y s i cal i n j u r i e s
o rm a comp ex cr i m e. affect the physical and psychological health of such recruit, neophyte,
e r e i s n o c o m p l ex c ri me of h o m i c i de w i th d 1
H oweverr, t h er
' i e wi isc harge of applicant, or member .
f irearm c orn mitted a g a i ns t o n e v i c t i m b e c a use t h e
g yII exist together. In homicide, intent to kill is an element Hazing shall a l so i n cl ude any a c t i v i t y , i n t e n t i o n all y m a d e or
while in discharge of firearm l a ck of int e nt to k i ll is an element. otherwise, by one person alone or acting w it h o t h e rs, that t e nds t o
humiliate orembarrass, degrade, abuse, or endanger, by requiring a
C omplex crime of homicide with d i scharge of firearm is l e a l l
recruit, neophyte, applicant, or member to do menial, silly, or foolish
p ossible if t h er e are tw o v i c t im s i n v o l v ed. For exam l e X
tasks. (Section 2 of R A . N o . 80 4 9 as am e n ded by R . A. N o. 11 0 53;
m. e c a u se ofaberratio i c tus, B was hit a n d 2002 Bar Exam)
ie . e crime commi t t e d ag ai nst A i s

because intent t o k i l l i s c o n clusivel Elements of Hazing

r
oduce d wo crimes, X is l i a ble o T he elements o f t h e c r i m e o f h a z i n g a r e : ( 1 ) T h a t t h e r e i s
lleo
e of complex crim e of homi cid e ' th
d isch arge offirearm. ewi initiat ion r i t e o r p r a c t ice m ade as a p r e r e qui site for a d m i s sion or
a requirement for cont i n u i n g m e m b er ship i n a f r a t e r n i t y , sorority ,
or organization; and (2) Tha t d u r i n g t h e i n i t i a t io n r i t e or p r a ctice,
physical or psychological suffering, ha rm , or i n j u r y i s in fl i c ted on a
recruit, neophyte, applicant, or member of the fraternity, sorority or
organization;

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 402 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 403
VOLUME II

I niti a t io n R i t e o r P r a c t i c e
r equisite not for ad m i ssion but for cont i n u in g m e m b ership th er ein .
Initiat ion or in i t i a t i o n r i t e s r e f e r t o c e r e m o n i e s Thus, R.A. No. 11053 expanded the concept of hazing by covering
r tices,
'
rituals or o ther acts, whether formal or infor m 1 t h nies, t
prac
i nitiat io n r i t e o r p r a c t i c e m a d e n o t o n l y a s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r
per
erf orm or take part in order to be accepted into a fraterni ty, sorority, admission bu t a l s o a s a re q u i r e m e nt f o r c o n t i n u i n g m e m b ership
or organization a s a f u l l - f l edged m e m b er . I t i n c l u des ceremonies, i n a frater n i ty , sorori ty , or or ganizati on .
p ractices, rit u a ls, an d o t he r a ct s i n a l l s t a g e
s of mer n b e r sh i' p i n a
ra erni ty , sorori ty , or or g a n i z ati on. (Section 2 of RA . No . 80 49 as D eath, R a pe , Sodomy , or M u t i l a t i o n
amended by R.A. No. 11058)
P rior to R .A. No . 11058, hazing is p u n i s h able un der R .A . N o .
O rgani z a t i o n 8 049 if as a consequence of hazing, death, rape, sodomy, mut i l a t i on
o r serious, less serious or sl i gh t p h y s i cal i n j u r i e s r esults. R.A. N o .
Organization refers to an organized bod 8049 does not prescribe penalty for m er e in fl i c t ion of psychological
includes, o y oo f p e o p1e w h i c h
s, but
u is i s not
n o lii mi t e d to, any club, association g r ou p f t harm.
a nd s or orir it y, A r m e d F o r c e s , ra ern i ' yt ,,
o f th e P h i l i p p i n es, t h ee P h ii liip pi n e
N ational P o l ice , the P h i l i p p in e M i l i t a r y A c a d emy, t h e P h i l i R .A. No . 8 04 9 a s a m e n de d b y R . A . N o . 1 1 0 58, d eclares al l
National P o l ic e A c a d em ine forms of hazing sh al l b e p r o h i b i t e d i n f r a t e r n i t i es, sorori t i es, an d
and o t h e r s i m i l a r u n 'i f o r m e d s e r v i ce-
y, an
'

learning insti t u t i o ns. (Section 2 of RA. N o. 8049 ervice- organizations. Section 14 thereof prescribes for penalties for all
o. as amended by R A .
No. 11058) f orms of h a z i n g . H o w e v er , t h e p e n a l t y i s h i g h e r w h e r e d e a t h ,
r ape, sodomy, and m u t i l a t i o n r e sult f r o m h a z i n g .
T he Phili p p in e M e r c h an t M a r i n e A c a demy i s i n c l u ded in t h e
term organization wi t h in t he meaning of the law. (People v. Bayabos, M alum P r o h i b i t u m
G.R. No. 1 71222, February 18, 2015)
Prior to R.A. No. 8049, good faith is a defense in homicide where
C ompany or p r i v at e corporation is covered b t h e h the victim is kil led dur ing hazing. The consent of the victim and lack
Under R.A. No. y e azi n g 1aw .
o. 8049 ,i ninnno
o cas
case shall hazing be made a requirem . t of intent to k il l on th e part of th e accused would negate dolo, which
f or em pl o y m e n t i n an y b u s i n ess or corporation . iremen
is an import ant element of homicide. Hence, the crime commit ted is
only reckless impru d ence resulting in h o m i cide. (Vill a r e al v. People,
R equisite for A d m i s sion or C o n t i n u i n g M e m b e r s h i p G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012) Now, the participants of hazing
F ailure t o a l l ege t h at t h e p h y s i c a l o r p s y c h ological h with or wi t h out d olo are liable for hazing un der R.A. No. 8049 if the
w as em pl o y e d a s prer a arm neophyte died as a consequence thereof.
r e q uisite for admission (or a re '
continuing m e m b er shi 'p) would r a r equ i r em en t fo r
ou p r eve n t t h e s u ccessful pr osecution Instead of amending the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes
o t h e c r i m i n a l r e s p onsibil it y o f t h e a c c u sed e i t h e r
, ei e r a s p r i n c i p a l intentional f el ony cl assified as m a l a in s e w h e re l a ck of d o l o is a
or as a ac co
ccomplice, fo r t h e c r i m e o f h a z i n g . P l a i n r e f d efense, th e C o n g r ess cr eated a s p e cial l a w o n h a z i n g , f o u n d ed
erm azi n g i s i n s u f f i c ie nt a nd i n c o mple te, as it i s b u t upcn the pri n ciple of ma lum pr o h i b i t um wh e re lack of dolo is not a
a characterization of th e acts allegedly comm i t ted and t h u s a m e r e
defense.
conclusion of law. (People v. Bayabos, supra)
T he deliberation of the Senate shows that w hat is i m p or t ant i s
Prior to R .A . N o . 11 053, the cr im e of h a z in g i s c onfined t
not the intention to kill th e neophyte dur in g hazing but the result of
s ituation w h e r e t h e infl i c t io n o f p h y s i ca l o r p s c h o l oni n e o a
he
yc o ogica 1 h arm the act of hazing. Recognizing the m a lum pr o h i b i t u m cha ra cteristic
is a p r e r eq u
uii si t e f or a dmissio n i n
a fraternit of hazing, R.A. No. 8049 provides that any person charged with the
organization. . How
However, th ere are occasions where th e o said crime shall not be enti t led to th e m i t i g a t in g cir cum st ance that
i e n eo p y t e a s m e m b er , an d t h en , h a zing w i l l b e there was no intent ion to commit so grave a wr on g.
m ade as a r e q u i r e m ent fo r c o n t i n u i n g m e m b er sh i . F o r
h azinga g a
a ii nnsst j u n i o r s t u d en t of P h i l i p p in e M i l i t a r y A c a d emy i s a Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the
vic:im to be inj u red shall not be a defense in hazing. The very act of

J9JC9B0M
 404 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
inflicting physical or psychological pain is a puni shable act. Death is
just an aggravating circumst ance (Dun go v. People, G.B. No. 209464,
July 1, 2015; 2018 Bar E x a m) Se ction 12 of R.A. No. 1 1053, which
has amended R.A. No. 8049, provides that the defense that the
recruit, neophyte, or applicant consented to being subjected to hazing
shall not be available to persons prosecuted for hazing. Any form of
approval, consent, or a g r eement, w h e t her w r i t t e n o r o t h e r w i se, or
o an e x p r ess waiver of t h e r i g h t t o o b j ect t o t h e i n i t i a t io n r i t e o r
proceeding, which consists of hazing, made by a recruit, neophyte, or
app icant pr ior t o an i n i t i a t i o n r i t e t h a t i n v o l ves infli ct in g p h y sical
or psychological suffering, harm, or in ju r y, shall be void and with o ut
any binding effect on the par t i e s.
P ersons Li a bl e for H a z i n g
l. P r e se n c e — Ge n e ra l l y, m e r e p r e s ence at t h e s c e ne o f
t e cr im e does not in i t s elf am ount t o conspiracy. (Dun go v. People,
supra) H o w e v e r, u n d e r R . A . N o . 8 0 4 9 a s a m e n d ed b
11053 ,mmere presence can be a source of criminal li ab i l i ty . Section R.A. N14.
punishes all persons who are pr e sent i n t h e c ond u ct of t he h a z i n g .
However, th e p e n a l t y i s h i g h e r i f t h e p e r s o ns , wh o a r e p r e s ent
d uring th e h a z i n g , a r e :
1. Of fi c e r s of th e f r a t e r n i t y , soror i ty , or or g a n i z a t i on ;
2. F or m e r o f fi c e rs , n o n r e sident m e m b e s
e rs, or a 1u m n i
3. M em b e r s t h e r eof wh o ar e i n t o x icated or u n der t h e
i nfluence of alcohol or il l e gal d r u g s .
2. A c t u a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n —T he penalty f or h a z i ng is a l s o
h igher i t h e p e r s o n a c t u a l l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e
h azing. The act ua l p a r t i c i p a n t s ar e l i a b l e for h a z i n g even i f t h e y
a re not m e m b er s of th e f r a t e r n i t y , soror i ty , or or g a n i z a t i o n .
R.A. No . 8 0 49 , a s a m e n de d b y R . A . N o . 1 1 0 53, p r e sents a
novel provision t ha t i n t r o d u ces a disput a ble pr esum t i o n o f a ct u al
participation; and wh ich modi fies the concept of con '
ereo provides that the presence of any person, even. S ift such
p erson is not a mem ber of the fr a t e r n i t
i y, sorori 'ty , or or g a n i z a t i o n ,
during the hazin g i s pr i m a f a c ie evidence of participation the re in as
a principa u n l ess such person or persons prevented th
o e th e
e a c s p u n i s h a ble herein or p r o m p tl y r e p or ted e co
sam m i s s i on
a w en orcement au t h o r i t i es if t hey can do so wi t h out pe esamri l t oe ttohte h
i re
person or t heir fam i l y .
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 405
T his p r o v i sion i s u n i q u e b e c ause a d i s p u t a bl e p r e su m p t i o n
a rises from t h e m e r e p r e sence of th e o f f ender d u r i n g t h e h a z i n g ,
w hich can b e r e b u t t e d b y p r o v i n g t h a t t h e a c cused took s t eps t o
prevent the commission of the hazing or pr om p tl y r e p orts the same
to the author i t i e s.
Generally, m er e p r esence at t h e s c ene of th e c r i m e d oes not
in itself amount t o conspiracy. Exceptionally, u n der R .A. No. 8049,
the participation of th e offenders in th e cr i m i n a l conspiracy can be
proven by the pr i ma f a c ie e vidence due to their p r e sence during the
hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein or
reported the matter to the auth or i t i es. (Dungo v. People, supra; 2018
Bar Exam)
3. P l a n n i n g —The law p u n i s h es all pe r sons, who actually
plar ned the conduct of the hazing.
The original version of R.A. No. 8049 merely puni shed officers,
former officers, or alu m ni of t he fra t e rn i t y , sorority or organization,
who actually p l a n ne d t h e h a z i ng . U n d e r t h i s l a w a s a m e n ded by
R .A. No. 11053, any p e r son i n c l u d in g a n o n - m ember i s c r i m i n a l l y
liable for plann in g the conduct of hazing.
E ven though t h ese pl a n n ers w er e no t p r e sent w h e n t h e a c t s
c onstitutin g h a z in g w e r e c o m m i t t ed , t h e y s h al l s t i l l b e l i a b l e a s
prir cipals. (2018 Bar Exam)
4. Ad v i se r —
T he law also punishes the adviser of a fraternit y ,
s orority, or or ganization wh o is p r esent w hen th e acts constit u t i n g
t he hazing were commi t ted and f a i led to t ak e action to pr event t h e
saine from occurring or failed topromptly report the same to the
law enforcement a u t h o r i t i e s i f s uch a d v i ser or a d v i s ers can d o so
w ithout peril to t h eir p erson or th eir f a m i l y .
T he l i a b i l it y o f t h e a d v i se r a r i s es, no t o n l y f r o m h i s m e r e
p resence in t h e h a z i ng , bu t a l s o h i s f a i l u r e t o p r e v en t t h e s a m e .
(Dungo v. P eople, supra; 2018 Bar Ex a m )
5. I n d u c e m e n t — O f f ic e rs o r m em b e r s o f a f r at e r n i t y ,
sorority, or organization, who kn ow i n gly cooperated in carr y in g out
t he hazing by i n d u c ing th e v i c ti m t o b e p r esent t h e r eat, are l i abl e
for hazing. T h ese officers or m e m b er s ar e p e n a l i zed, not b ecause
o f their d i r ec t p a r t i c i p a t ion i n t h e i n fl i c t i o n o f h a r m , b u t d u e t o
t heir in di spensable cooperation in th e cr im e by i n d u cing the victi m
to attend t h e h a z i n g . (D u n go v. Pe o ple, supr a; 20 1 8 Ba r E x a m )
However, this rule is only applicable if the inducer is an officer, or
member of a fraternity,sorority, or organization.
 406 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
T he accused c l ai m t h a t t he i n f o r m a t i o n a v e r s a c r i m i n a l
charge of hazing by actual par t i c i p a t i on, but the only offense proved
during the tr ial was hazing by inducement. The infor m a t ion alleged
that th e a c cused du r i n g a pl a n n e d i n i t i a t i o n r i t e a d b '
th
offi c e r s of AP O f r a t e r n i t y u s e d p er sonal v i ol ence upon a n eophyt e
o faculty m e m b er s a s w el l a s ba r a n g a y, m u n i c i p a l, or c i t y o f f ic ia l s
resultin g t o h i s d e a t h . T h e "p l a n n e d in i t i a t i o n ri t e " a s s t a t e d i n
t he in f o r m a t io n i n c l u de d t h e a c t o f i n d u c in g v i c t i m t o a t t e n d i t .
A ccused not o nl y i n d u ced v i c ti m t o b e p r e s ent a t t h e r e s o rt , b u t
they actually b r o u gh t h i m t h e r e . Th e h a z in g w o ul d no-.' have been
accomplished w ere i t n o t f o r t h e a ct s of t h e a ccused tha t i n d u c ed
the victim t o be pr esent. H e n ce, they are l i a ble for h a z i ng. (Du n go
v. People, supra)
6. I n cu m b e n t Of f ic e r s — T h e i n c u m b e nt o f f ic e rs o f t h e
f raterni ty , sorority, or organization concerned shall be jointly l i a b l e
with those members who actually p a r t i c i p ated in th e hazing.
7. Ow n er or Lessee —The law punishes the owner or lessee
of the place where hazing is conducted as principal for hazing, when
h e has actual k n o w l edge of the hazing conducted th erein but f a i l ed
to take any a ct ion t o p r e v ent t h e s am e f rom occurr in g or f a i l ed t o
promptly report th e same to the law enforcement au t h o r i t ies if they
can do so w i t h ou t p e r i l t o t h e i r p e r son or t h e i r f a m i l y . ( 2 018 B a r
Exam)
U nder the old v er sion of R .A. No. 8048, only th e ow ner of t h e
place of hazing i s l i a b le. H o w ever, u n der t h i s l a w a s a m e n ded by
R.A. No. 11053, a lessee can also be held liable for hazing. Under
the old ru le, such owner is only l i a ble as an accomplice. Now, he is
r esponsible as p r i n c i p al . M o r e over, u n der t h e n e w r u l e , p r o m p t l y
reporting th e m a t t e r t o t h e a u t h o r i t i es is an a d d i t i onal defense for
such owner.
8. P ar e n t s —U nder the law, if t he hazing is held in t h e
ome of one ofthe officers or members of the fraternity, sorority, or
organization, the parents shall be held liable as principals for hazing
when they have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein
b ut failed t o t a k e a n y a c t io n t o p r e v en t t h e s am e f r o m o c cur r i n g
o r fa i le d t o p r o m p t l y r e p o r t t h e same t o t h e l a w e n f o r c ement
authorit ies if such parents can do so without peril to t h eir p erson or
t eir family.
Under the old version of R.A. No. 8048, parent is only li a ble as
an accomplice.Under this law as amended by R.A. No. 11053, he is
responsible as p r i n c i p al. Mo r e o ver, u n d er t h e n e w r u l e p r o m p t l y
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 407
reporting the matter to the authorities isan additional defense for
such parent.
9. S ch o o l A u t ho r i t i e s — S chool a u t h o r i t i e s i n c l u d i n g
shall be liable as an accomplice for hazing conducted by frat er n i t i es,
s ororities, and other or g ani zati ons, if i t ca n b e shown t h a t : (1) t h e
school or barangay, mun i c ip a, o r c i ty o fficials allowed or consented
to the conduct of hazing; or (2) where there is actual knowledge of
hazing, but such officials failed to take any action to prevent the same
from occurring or f a i led to p r o m p tl y r e p ort t o t h e la w e n f orcement
authorities if th e same can be done wi t h out p e ri l t o t h ei r p e r son or
t heir fami l y .
Even though school authoritiesand faculty members have had
no direct part i cip ation in h a z i ng, they may n o n eth eless be charged
as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing occurred; (2) the accused
are school auth or i t ies or f a cu lt y m e m b ers; an d (3) t hey consented
to or failed to t ak e pr eventive action against h a zing in sp it e actual
knowledge thereof (People v. Bayabos, supra) or to report the matt e r
to the author i t i e s.
T he co r r e s p on d in g r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e p r i n ci p a l ,
accomplice, and accessory are di st i nct f r o m e ach ot h er . As l ong as
the commission of th e o f f ense (hazing) can be d ul y e s t ab l i shed in
evidence, the d et er m i n a t i o n o f t h e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e a c complice can
proceed independently of t h a t of th e p r i n c i p al. (People v. Bayabos,
supra)
U nder Section 7 o f R . A . N o . 8 0 4 9 a s a m e n ded b y R . A . N o .
11053, the faculty adviser or advisers, who accepted his role after
being selected by an accredited fraternity,sorority, or organization,
s hall be responsible for m o n i t o r in g t h e a c t i v i t ies of th e f r a t e r n i t y ,
sorority, or organization. In case of violation of any of the provisions
of this Act, it is presumed that the faculty adviser has knowledge
and consented to the commission of any of the u n l a w fu l a cts stated
therein.
Under Sections4, 5, 10,and 11 of R.A. No. 8049 as amended by
R.A. No. 11053, initi a t ion r i tes are allowed if the fr at er n i ty , sorority
or organization obtained approval from school auth or i ty , or pu n o ng
barangay, or city or m u n i cipal mayor, upon written application
a nd undert a k in g t h a t n o h a r m o f a n y k i n d s h a l l b e c o m m i t t e d .
During ap pr oved i n i t i a t io n r i t e s , at l e ast t w o s chool or ba r a n gay,
city or municipal representatives must be present. If hazing is still
committed despite their presence, no liability shall attach to them
 408 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
unless it is proven that they failed to perform an overt act to prevent
or stop the commission th ereof.
Failure to provide school representatives dur in g th e appr oved
initiation r i tes is also punishable.
10. O b s t r u c t i o n of Ju s t i c e —The law also punishes former
officers, nonresident members, or alu mn i of th e fr a t er n i ty , sorority,
o r organization w h o , a f te r t h e c o m m i s sion of h a z in g w i l l p e r f o r m
a ny ac t t o h i d e , c o n ceal, o r o t h e r w i s e h a m p e r o r o b s t r u c t a n y
investigation that w i l l be conducted thereafter.
A fter the death of H o r acio "Atio" Castil lo, I II , a h a zing victi m ,
a social media g r ou p c ha t o f t h e m e m b er s A e gis J u r i s F r a t e r n i t y
showed that they were discussing how to cover-up the incident such
as advice to search for CCTV cameras that may have captured a
footage of members when they loaded Atio'sbody inside a car and to
clean the fr a t e r n it y l i b r a r y a n d r e m ove th e p a d dies. This i n c ident
was included in th e Senate probe. At th e t i me, th ere is no provision
under R .A . N o . 8 0 4 9 o n o b s t r u c t io n o f j u s t i ce. A s a n o f f s h oot of
this in cident, R .A . N o . 1 1 053 p r o v i des a p r o v i sion on o b s t r u c t i on
of justice involving h a z i ng. H ow ever; m ere conversation to commit
o bstruction of j u s t ic e i s n o t p u n i s h a b le. T hey h av e t o c o m mi t a n
overt act of obstruct in g the in v estigation in v olving hazing.
11. F o r c i b l e R e c r u i t m e n t —T he l a w a l s o p u n i s h e s a n y
person who shall int i m i d a te, threaten, force, or employ, or ad.minister
any for m o f v e x a t i o n a g a i ns t a n o t h e r p e r son f o r t h e p u r p ose of
recruitm ent in joi n in g or pr om ot ing a par t i cu lar fr a t e r n i ty , sorority,
or organization.
The persistent an d r e p eated pr oposal or i n v i t a t io n m a d e to a
person who ha d t w i c e r e f u sed t o p a r t i c i p at e or j o i n t h e p r o p osed
fraterni ty, sorority, or organizati on, shall be pri ma fa c ie evidence of
v exation for pur poses of this crim e .
12. Corporate or Comp a n y O f ficers — U n d er R . A . N o .
8049, in nocase shall hazing be made a requirement for employment
in any business or corporation. The president, manager, director, or
ot er responsible officer ofbusinesses or corporations engaged in
hazing as a requir ement for e mp lo yme nt is also crimi n a l ly l i a b l e .
C ommon D e f e n s e
I n h azing, t a k in g a c t ion t o p r e v en t t h e o ccurr ence of h a zi n g
o r reportin g th e m a t t e r t o t h e p o l ice is a d e f ense by th e f o l l ow i n g
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 409
offenders: (1) adviser; (2)owner or lessee of the place of hazing;
(3) parents of the member or officer of fraternity, sorority or
o rganization; a n d ( 4 ) s c h oo l a u t h o r i t i e s a n d f a c u l t y m e m b e r s ,
barangay, m u n i c i p a l, or c i ty o ff ic ia ls if t h e y b e i ng c ha rg ed on t h e
b asis of their kn o w l edge of the conduct of hazing. Taking preventiv e
measure or report in g th e m a t t e r t o th e " u t h o r i t i e s wil l a lso negate
t he presumption of actual p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
H omicide an d H a z i n g
The differences between homicide (or mu r d er) and hazing:
a. I n h om i c i d e , w ha t i s c r i m i n a l i s t h e k i l l i n g o f a p e r son.
Hence, intent t o k i l l i s a n i n d i s p ensable element t h e r eof. Death of
the victim consumm a tes the cri me. In h a z i ng, what i s pr oh i b i ted is
t he infliction of p h y s ical or p s y chological sufferin g on n e ophyte i n
furtherance of'the latt er's admission or entry i nt o an organization or
r equirement for cont i n ued m emb ership. H ence, intent t o k i l l i s n o t
m aterial. Death of th e neophyte is only i m p o r t an t t o d eter m in e t h e
proper imposable penalty. Even if the act of inflict in g inj u r ies on the
hazing victim i s not t h e p r o x i m at e cause of his death, th e cr im e of
h azing is still comm i t t e d .
b. I n h om i c i d e , pr a e t er in t e n t i o nem i s a p p r e c i able as a
mitigating circum st ance. In hazing, the law expressly disallows the
appreciation of this circum st ance.
c. H om i c i d e i s m a l u m in s e . C o n sent of t h e v i c t i m t o t h e
i nfliction of h ar m m a y n e g ate dolo or cr i m i na l i n t e nt , w h ich w o u l d
m ake the k i l l i n g p u n i s h a ble a s r e c k l ess i m p r u d ence r esult in g i n
homicide. (Vil l a r e al v. Pe ople, G.R. ¹ . 15 12 5 8 , Fe b ru ary 1, 2 Q12)
Hazing is ma t um p r o h i b i t u m. C onsent of t he n e ophyte, which m a y
establish absence of dolo on the part of the accused, is not a defense.
d. I n h o m i c i d e , th e b a sis of cr i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y i s t h e a c t u a l
a nd conspiratorial par t i c i p at ion of the offender in k i l l i n g the victi m .
In hazing, crimi nal responsibility is based on: (1) inducing the victim
to be present, (2) presence during th e i n i t i a t i on r i t e s wh ere hazing
w as committ ed; (3) actual pa r t i c i p a t ion in in fl i c t in g p h y sical har m ;
( 4) presumed p a r t i c i p a t io n o f t h o s e w h o a r e p r e s ent d u r i n g t h e
hazing; (5) the presence of adviser; (6) participation in the planning;
( 7) knowledge by th e p a r en t o f f r a t m e m ber i n t h e h o m e of w h o m
h azing occurred, ow ner o r l e s see of th e p l ace of com m i ssion, an d
school authori t i e s.
 410 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
R egulated H a z i n g
N ot al l f o r m s o f i n i t i a t i o n r i t e s a r e p r o h i b i t e d b y t h e l a w .
Section 2 of R.A. No. 8049 provides that ini t i a t ion ri tes of fraterni t i es,
sororities or organizations shall b e a l l o w e d p r o v i de d t h a t t h e
following requisites are met:
( 1) T h a t t h e f r a t e r n i t y , s or or it y o r o r g a n i z ation ha s a p r i o r
written notice to the school author i t ies or head of organization;
(2) T h e s a i d w r i t t e n n o t i c e m u s t b e s ecured at l e ast s even
d ays before the conduct of such in i t i a t i o n ;
( 3) T h a t t h e w r i t t e n n o t i c e s h al l i n d i c a te : (a ) T h e p e r i o d
of the i n i t i a t i o n a c t i v i t i es, w h ic h s h al l n o t e x ceed t h r e e d a ys; (b)
T he names of t h ose to b e s u bj ected t o s uch a c t i v i t i es; an d (c) A n
undertaking that no physical violence shall be employed by anybody
during s uc h i n i t i a t i o n r i t e s . (D u n g o v. Pe o ple, s u pr a; 20 0 2 B a r
Exam)
R .A. N o . 8 0 4 9 qu a l i fi e s t h a t t h e ph y s i c a l ,
m ental a n d
p sychological t e s t i n g a n d t r a i n i n g p r o c e d u r e
a nd p r a c t i ces t o
d etermin e a n d e n h a n c e t h e p h y s i c a l ,
mental a n d p s y c h ological
f itness of p r ospective r e gular m e m b er s of t h e A F P a n d t h e P N P ,
as approved by the Secretary of N a t i o nal D efense and the N a t i onal
P olice Commission, duly r e commended by th e C h ief of St aff of t h e
AFP and the Director General of the PNP, shall not be considered as
hazing. (Dungo v. People, supra)
VIOLENCE A G A INST W O M E N A N D C H I L D R E N U N D E R R .A. NO.
9262
The victim in R.A. No. 9262 is a woman with w hom the offender
has marital, sexual or dating relati onship or the child of this woman.
R elation sh i p
Sexual relationship re f e rs to a si n g le sexual act wh i ch m ay o r
m ay not result in th e bearing of a common chil d .
Dating r e l a t i onship r e f e rs to a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e in t h e p a r t i e s
l ive as h u s b and an d w i f e w i t h o u t t h e b e n efit o f m a r r i a g e o r a r e
r omantically i n v o l ved over t i m e a n d o n a c o n t i n u i n g b a sis d u r i n g
t he course of th e r e l a t i on ship. A c a s ual a c quai n t a nce or o r d i n a r y
socialization between two in d i v i d u als in a business or social context
is not a dating relationship. (Section 3 of R.A. No. 926'2)
J9JC9B0M
VIII CRIME> AGAINST PERSONS 411
C hild of th e w o m a n
A child inclu des the biological chil dren of the victim an d oth er
children under her care (e.g., adopted child). It is not necessary that
the violence is d i r e cted against t h e c o m mo n c h il d o f t h e o f f ender
and the wom an. W ha t i s i m p o r t an t i s t h a t t l : e ch il d i s b i ologically
related to the woman. Lack of relationship between the child and the
o ffender shall not ex clude th e vi olence of the l a t te r a g ainst f o r m er
from the coverage of R.A. No. 9262.
Cons piracv
The mother-in-law of th e vi cti m can be I:eld liable for vi olence
a gainst a . w o m an , i f s h e c onspired w i t h h e r s o n w h o h a s m a r i t a l
relationship w i t h t h e v i c t i m i n c o m m i t t i n g p s y chological vi olence
against the woman. (Go-Tan v. Tan, G.A. No. 168852, September 30,
2008) The act of th e h u s b and i n c o m m i t t i n g p sychological violence
against his wife is i m p u t a ble to hi s m o t her by r e ason of conspiracy
a lthough th e conspir at ors ar e no t s i m i l a r l y s i t u a te d i n r e l a t ion t o
t he object of the crim e.
Offender in V i o l e n c e A g a i nst a W o m a n
In mari tal or sexual relat i onship between t he offender and the
victim un der R .A. No. 9262, the former m u st, be a person (e.g. man
o r lesbian) while the lat ter m ust be a wom an .
T he first f or m o f d a t i n g r e l a t i on ship i s a l i v e -in r e l a t i onship .
I t refers to a situ at ion wh er ein th e par t ies live as husband and wi f e
w ithout the benefit of m a r r i a ge. The offender and the victim i n t h i s
s ituation m u s t b e a m a n a n d a w o m a n s i n c e t he y m u s t b e l i v i n g
together as h u s b an d an d w i f e w i t h o u t t h e " e n e fi t o f m a r r i a ge. A
lesbian cannot be ahusband of a woman. The gender of a husband is
male while that of a lesbian is female.
T he second for m o f d a t i n g r e l a t i o n ship r e f er s t o a s i t u a t i o n
w herein t h e p a r t i e s ar e r o m a n t i c a ll y i n v o l ved o ver t i m e a n d o n
a continu in g b a si s d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h =- relati onship. D a t i n g
relationship covers boyfriend and gir l f r i end r el at i onship .
In Ga r c ia v. Dr i l o n , G . R . N o . 1 7 9 2 6 7, J u n e 2 5 , 2 0 1 3 , t h e
Supreme Cour t s ai d t h e u s e o f t h e g e n d er -neutra l w o r d " p e r son"
w ho has or h a d a s e x ua l o r d a t i n g r e l a t i o n ship w i t h t h e w o m a n
encompasses even lesbian relati onships.
With the Garcia case, the victim in R.A. No. 9262 must be a
"woman," wh il e t h e o f f ender i s " an y p e r son" r e gar dless of gender.
 412 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
T hus, datin g r e l a t i on ship i n c l u des lesbian r e l a t i on ship. W i t h t h i s
interpretati on, a lesbian can also be a victim. If th e woman in fl i ct ed
injuries a g a i ns t t h e l e s b i an , t h e l a t t e r c a n f i l e v i o l e nce a g ainst
w oman against t h e f o r m er . A l e s b ian can b e a v i c ti m i n R . A . N o .
92662bbecause she is a w o m an , w h i l e he r f e m al e pa r t ner can be an
offender since she is a person.
Vio lence
The crimes punishable under R.A. No. 9262 include physical
violence, psychological v i o l ence, sexual v i o l ence a n d/or e conomic
violence.
Habitual it y i s n o t a n e l e m en t o f t h i s c r i m e . S ection 3 (a) of
R .A. No. 9262 p u n i s hes "any ac t o r s e r ies of a cts" t h a t c o n st i t u t e
violence against w o m en . T h i s m e an s t h a t a s i n g l e act o f v i o l ence
such as harassment contempl ated in Section 5(h) would be enough.
T he object of th e la w i s t o p r o t ect w o men an d c h i l d r en . Pu n i s h i n g
only violence tha t i s r e p e atedly co m m i t t e d w o ul d l i c ense isolated
violence. (Ang v. The Honorable CA, G.R. ¹. 18 2 8 8 5,April 2 0, 2010)
The fact that vi olence is commit ted wh ile the woman or child is
pregnant (D i n a m l i n g v. People, G.R. No. 199522, Ju ne 22, 2015) or
violence against th e w o man com m i t t e d i n t h e p r esence of her chil d
is an aggravating circumstance under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9262.
Committ in g vi olence against the child in th e presence of the woman
is not an aggravat ing circum st ance under Section 6.
P hysical V i o l e n c e
Physical violence against a woman or her child is commi t ted by
a person who shall cause physical harm to the woman, with whom he
h as marit al, sexual or da t in g r el a t i on ship or her ch i l d .
(Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9262) However, if phy s ical vio lence constitut es atte mp ted,
f rustrated o r c o n s u m m a t e d p a r r i c i d e o r m u r d e r o r h o m i c i d e o r
mutilati on, i t s h al l b e p u n i s h a ble i n a c cordance wit h t h e R e v i sed
Penal Code. (Section 6; par. a)
Ph ysical violence against w o ma n a lso includes th r e atening to
cause the woman or h e r c h i l d p h y s i cal h a r m ; a t t e m p t in g t o c ause
the woman or her chil d ph y sical ha rm ; or pl acing the woman or her
child in fear of im m i n en t p h y sical ha rm . (Section 5)
S exual vi o l e n c e
Sexual violence against a woman or her child is commi t ted by a
person who shall cause or attempt to cause the woman with w hom he
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIIUIES AGAINST PERSONS
has marit al, sexual or dat in g r el at i onship, or her chil d to engage in
any sexual activity wh i c h aoes not constitute rape, by force or threat
of force, physical harm, or th r o ugh in t i m i d a t ion dir ected against the
woman or her child or her/his i m m e di ate fam i ly. (Section 5, par. g)
The penalty for sexual vi olence against w oman is only p r i s io n
mayor. If sexual violence constitutes rape, the offender shall be
prosecuted for t h e g r a ver c r i m e o f r a p e u n d e r t h e R e v i sed Penal
Code.
E conomic V i o l e n c e
E con.omic violence i s c o m m i t t e d b y a p e r s o n w h o , w i t h t h e
p urpose or e f f ect o f c o n t r o l l i n g o r r e s t r i c t in g t h e m o v e m en t o r
c onduct of the woman or her child shal l :
1. D ep r i v e o r t h r e a t e n t o d e p r i v e t h e v i c t i m o f fi n a n c i a l
support legally due her or her f a m i l y , or d el iberately pr ovi d ing her
children insufficient fi n a n cial support; or
2. Pr ev e n t t he w om a n i n e n g a g i n g i n a n y l e g i t i m a t e
p rofession, o c cupation , b u s i n es s o r a c t i v i t y o r co n t r o l l i n g t h e
victim's own money or pr opert i es, or solely controll in g th e conjugal
or common money, or properties.
X, inflicted injuries upon A, his live-in partner, and stripped
her naked in p u b li c v i ew . A s a r e s u lt , A d e cided to l iv e separately
f rom X an d a s ked hi m t o c o n t i nu e p r o v i d in g fi n a n cial s u p port f o r
B, their daug hte r. H o we ver, X t h r e a t e ned to wi t h d r a w t h e s up port
unless A woul d a g ree to l iv e w i t h h i m a g a i n . Bu t A w a s s t e adfast
i n refusing t o l i v e w i t h X a g a i n , a n d i n s i s ted on h e r d e m an d f o r
support for B. As t h e e x - l o vers could n ot r e a ch a n a g r e e ment, X
did not give f u r t h e r s u p p o rt . X i s l i a b l e fo r p s y chological vi olence
against the woman. The physical violence that resulted in her public
r idicule an d h u m i l i a t i o n a n d m e n t a l o r e m o t i o na l d i s t r ess sh al l
be considered as an el em ent of th e c r i m e of p sychological violence
against wom an. X i s a l so l i a ble for t h e c r i m e of economic violence
against woman and her child for refusing to give financial support
to the child of the woman to control her conduct. ( 2018 Bar Exam )
Deprivation of financial support per se may constitute economic
v iolence against wom a n .
A ccused h a s a d a t i n g a n d s e x u a l r e l a t i o n shi p w i t h AA A
resulting in BB B's bir th . He failed to provide BBB support ever since
the latter was just a year old. Accused is charged with psychological
 414 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
violence against a woman under Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for
failure to give support w h ich "caused mental or em oti onal an guisn,
public r i d i cule or h u m i l i a t i o n t o A A A a n d B B B . N o e v i d ence was
p resented to show that depr i v a t ion of support ca u d 't h
A~M
BBB anany mental or emotional angui sh. However, the accused can be
convicted of economic violence against w o m an un d e r S ection 5 ( e),
which is necessarily in cl u ded in th e charge of psychological vio>ence
against woman u n der Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262. Depriv at ion or
d enial of support, by itself, and even wit h out th e addit i onal elemer t
of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein as
economic violence. (Melgar v. People, G.R. No. 228477 I ' b
e ruary l ~ ,
2018)
Deprivation of financial support is only puni shable as economic
v iolence against w o m a n u n d e r S e ction 5 ( e ) R .A . N o . 9 26 2 i f t h e
w oman i s e n t i t l e d u n d e r t h e l a w f o r s u p p o rt . T h e o f f ender m u s t
d eprive th e w o m a n f i n a n c ia l s u p p or t " l e g a ll y d u e " t o h e r o r h e "
f amily. T h u s , o ne, wh o f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e fi n a n c ial s
t t h'
gir r i e n , i s n o t l i a ble for economic violence against woman because
t he latter is not ent i t led to be supported under the la w .
P sychological V i o l e n c e
P sychological v i o l ence i n c l u des a n a c t m a d e t o c o n t r o l t h e
w oman or h e r c h i l d o r a c t t h a t c a u se d s u b st an t ia l e m o t i on a
p sychological distress; or emotional men tal an guish to the wc m a n .or
1. C on t r o l l i n g t h e W o m a n o r H e r Ch i l d — Psychological
violence is a commit ted by a pe rson w ho shall:
a. Com p e l o r a t t e m p t t o c ompel a w o man or he r c h i l d
(a) to engage in conduct w h i c h s h e/he has th e r i gh t t o d e sist
from, or (b) to desist from conduct w h ich she/he has the r i g ht
to engage in; or
b. Res t r i c t o r a t t e m p t t o r e s t r ic t t h e v i c t i m ' s f r eedom
of movement or conduct by force or t h r eat of force, physical or
other harm or t h r eat of physical or other harm , or i
directed against the victim. (Section 5/eJof R.A. No.ntimidate.
9262) on
T his c r i m e a l s o i n c l u de s d e p r i v i n g o r t h r e a t e n in g t o
e prive th e v i c ti m o r h e r c h i l d o f c u s t ody t o h e r / hi s f a m i l y ;
or a legal right with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the movement or conduct of the victim. (Section 5feJ
of R.A. No. 9262)
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 415
Psychological violence is also commit ted by a person, who shall
inflict or th r e aten to infl ict ph y sical harm on oneself for the purpose
of controlling actions or decisions of the woman. (Section 5(fJ of R.A.
No. 9262)
2. S u b st a n t i a l E m o t i o n a l o r P sy ch o l o g i c a l D i s t r e s s
— Psychological vi olence is a lso comm i t t e d b y a p e r son w h o s h a l l
engage in p u r p oseful, k n o w i n g , or r e c k l ess conduct, personally or
t hrough a n o t h er , t h a t a l a r m s o r c a u ses substant ia l e m o t i onal o r
psychological distress to the woman or her chi ld. The following acts
that alarm or c ause substantial em ot i onal or p sychological distress
to the victim is psychological violence:
1. Stalking or f ollowing victim i n p u b lic or p r i v ate
places;
2. Pee r i n g i n t h e wi n d o w o r l i n g e r i n g o u t s i d e t h e
r esidence of the victi m ;
3. Ent e r i n g o r r e m a ining i n t h e d w e lling or o n t h e
p roperty of the victim ag ainst her/his wi l l ;
4. D e s t r o y i n g th e p r operty an d p ersonal belongings or
inflicting har m t o an i m al s or pets of the victim ; an d
5. E n g a g i n g i n a n y f o r m o f h a r a s s m ent o r v i o l e nce.
(Section 5(h J of R.A. No. 9262)
T he acts of a t t a c h in g t h e f a c e of h i s e x - gi r l f r i en d o n a
nude body of a woman in a picture, sending the picture toher
t hrough cell ph one text m e ssage and t h r e at ening to post it i n
the internet for all t o see, which causes substantial em otional
and psychological distress toher, can constitute psychological
violence a g a i ns t w o m a n . T he sa id a c ts ar e con s i d e r ed
harassment w i t h i n t h e contem pl a t ion of th e ph r ase "any form
of harassment" in Section 5, par. h. (Ang v. The Honorable CA,
G.R. No. 182885, April 2 0, 2010)
3. E m o t i o n a l o r M e n t a l A n g u i s h — Psychological violence
can also be committed by a person who shall repeatedly, verbally and
emotionally abuse a woman or her child,or deny financial support,
custody o r a c c ess t o h e r c h i l d , o r a n y o t h e r a c t s ( e .g., p h y sical
violence) that cause mental or emoti onal an gui sh, public ri di cule or
humilia t ion to the vict im . (Section 5(iJ of R.A. No. 9262)
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
w hile m e n ta l o r e m o t i o nal a n g u is h i s t h e e f f ect caused to or t h e
 416 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
damage sustained by the offended party . To establish psychological
violence as an element of th e cr i me, it i s n ecessary to show proof of
c ommission of any of the acts enum er ated in Section 5(i) or si m i l a r
such acts. To establish mental or em oti onal angui sh, it is necessary
t o present t h e t e s t i m on y o f t h e v i c t i m a s s u c h e x p e r i ences ar e
personal to this par ty. (Di n a m l i n g v. People, G.A. No. 199522, June
22, 2015)
P hysical and p s y c h o l o g i cal v i o l e n c e
In Di n a m l i n g v. Pe o pl e, supr a, i t w a s s t a t e d t h a t i t i s n o t
n ecessary t o p r o v e t he a ctual p h y s i ca l v i o l e nc e d o n e b y t h e
perpetrator a s a n e s sential e l e m en t o f t h e p s y chological v i o l ence
u nder Secti o n . 5 ( i) . H o w e v er , t h e r e i s a n e x c e p t io n t
th 1.
e n t e p h y s i ca l v i o l ence d on e b y t h e a c c u sed ca used m e n t a l
a nd emotional s u f f e r i ng , s uc h a c t s o f p h y s i cal v i o l ence m u s t b e
proven as an el ement of v i o l a t ion of Section 5(i). Accused's acts of
p ublicly p u n c h i ng , k i c k i n g a n d s t r i p p i n g t h e v i c t i m o f h e r p a n t s
and underwear, alt h ough obvious acts of physical violence, are also
instances of psychological violence since it wa s a l l eged and pr oven
that they resulted in her public ri di cule and hu m i l i a t ion and mental
or emotional distress. (2018 Bar E x a m )
Physical violence against w o man i s p u n i s h a ble un der Section
( a). However, i f p h y s i cal v i o l e nce caused m e n ta l o r e m o t i o n al
anguish t o t h e v ictim , t h e offender
m ay b e p r o s e c ute d f o r
psychological violence against woman under Section 5 (i). Physical
violence will be considered as an element of psychological violence.
(Dinamli ng v. People, supra)
Economic and psychological violence
Deprivation o f f i n a n c ia l s u p p or t i s p u n i s h a bl e a s ec o nomic
violence against w o m a n u nder S e c t io n 5 (e ) . H o w e v er , i f th e
deprivation of f i n a n c ia l s u p p or t c a u s e d m e n t a l o r
emotional
anguish to the offended woman, the offender may be prosecuted for
psyc ol o gical violence against wo man u n d er Section 5 (i). E
(i). violence.
conomic
violence will be considered as an element of psychological
(Melgar v. People, supra)
Concubinage and bigamy
Concubinage an d b i g amy ar e pu n i s h a b le u n d er t h e R e v i s ed
ena ode. However, ifconcubinage or bigamy caused mental or
e motional a n g u is h t o t h e o f f e n de d w i f e , t h e o f f e n d in g h u s b a n d
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 417
m ay be p r osecuted fo r p s y ch ological v i o l ence against w o m an . I n
AAA v. BB B, G. R. N o. 212448, Janua ry 1 1, 2 01 8, the accused was
prosecuted for psychological violence against woman under Section 5
(i) for having an il:icit affair with a Singaporean that causes mental
o r emotional anguish to his w i f e .
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9844 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Law), a child refers to a person under the age of 18 years. The concept
of this child and that of a minor for the pur pose of the Revised Penal
. Code is the same.
However, R.A. No. 7610 (Child A b use L aw ) has expanded th e
concept of a ch i ld . U n de r Section 8 of t h i s l a w , a c h il d i s a p e r son
below 18 years ofage; or a person over 18 years of age but is unable
to fully t ak e care of t h e m selves or p r o t ect t h e m selves from abu se,
neglect, cruelty, exploitat ion or discrim i n a t ion because of a physical
or mental disabili-.y or conditi on .
A n a d ul t v i c t i m , w h o i s s u f f e r i n g f r o m p o l i o , s h al l n o t b e
c onsidered as a c h i l d i n t h e a b s e nce of e v i d ence, t esti m onia l o r
d ocumentary, of a r y m e d i ca l e v a l u a t io n o r m e d i ca l fi n d i n g f r o m
a qualified p h y s i ci an , p s y chologist o r p s y c h i a t r is t a t t e s t in g t h a t
h er physical conditio n r e n d e red her i n c a pable of f u ll y t a k i n g c a r e
of herself or ofprotecting herself against sexual abuse. (People v.
Abello, G.B. ¹ . 15 1 952,March 25, 2009)
S ection 8 o f R . A . N o . 9 2 6 2 ( V i o l e nce a g a i ns t W o m e n a n d
Children L a w ) , Section 8 o f R . A . N o . 9 20 8 ( T r a f f i ck in g i n P e r s on
Law), and Section8 of R.A. No. 9775 (Child Pornography Law) have
adopted the defini t ion of a child under R.A. No. 7610. However, R.A.
No. 9775 has further expanded the concept of achild.
Under Section 8 of R.A. No. 9775, a child shall also refer to: (1)
a person regardless of age who is p r esented, depicted or por t r a y ed
as a child as defined. herein; and (2) computer-generated, digitally or
manually crafted images or graphics of a person who is represented
or who is made to appear to be a child as defined. herein.
Producing a v i deo of an a d ul t f e m a le, wh o p r e t ended to be a
m inor st u d ent w h i l e sh e w a s h a v i n g s e x ual i n t e r course w it h h e r
t eacher, consti t u t e s t h e c r i m e o f c h i l d p o r n o g r a p hy , T h e a d u l t
female shall be treated as a child.
 418 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Offender of child abuse
Section 5 of R .A . N o . 7 6 10 ex pr essly m e n t i ons "a d u l t " a s a n
o ffender i n s e x ua l a b u se. H o w ev er , w i t h r e s p ect t o o t h e r c r i m e s
under R. A. N o. 7 6 1 0, the l aw i s s i l e nt o n t h e a g e of t h e c f f e nder.
However, it seems that the in t e n t ion of the law is to protect children
from a b u s e, exploitation , o r cr u e lt y c o m m i t t e d b y a d u l t s . T h e
passage of R.A. No. 7610 is based on th e u n e qual p ower condit i on
b etween children and adu l t s .
A , 15 years of age, boxed B, 17 years of age. It is submi t ted th at
A, who is a m i n or , cannot be held l i a ble for ch il d a b use under R.A.
No. 7610.
F our cr i m e s u n d e r S e c t io n 1 0 ( a )
U nder Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse or cruelty i s
c ommitted by any p e r son wh o sh all com mi t an y o t her a cts of chil d
abuse, cruelty or expl oit a t ion or be responsible for other condit i ons
prejudicial t o t h e c h i l d' s d evelopment i n c l u d in g t h ose covered by
Article 59 of P.D. No. 608 but not covered by the Revised Penal Code.
1. C hi l d a b u s e c o m m i t t e d b y p a r e n t s —U nder S t '
n e r ec i o n
1 0a
( a)oof R.A. No. 7610, child abuse includes those covered by Ar t i cl e
59 of
o P.D. . . No.
o . 6 0 8 such as in d i ct in g cr uel and u n u s ual p u n i s h
t (Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and In v e stigation of C h i l d
upon e c h i l d or deliberately subjects him to indi gn at i ons and other
excessive chastisement comm i t t e d by hi s p a r ent t h a t e m b a r r ass or
h umili ate hi m .
Only parents can commit the crime under Ar t i cle 59 of P.D. No
608 in relation to R .A. No. 7610. "Parents" as used in P .D. No. 608
shall include the gu ar d ian an d th e h ead of th e i n s t i t u t i o n or f o ster
home which ha s cu stody of th e c h i l d . H o w ev er, chil d a b use u n d er
R.A. No. 7610 can be committed by persons other than th
o er an e parents
of the child.
2. I n de p e n d e n t a c t s — S e ction 1 0 ( a ) o f R A . N o 7 6 10
punishes four distinct acts, to wit: (1) child abuse, (2) child cruelty, (8)
child exploitation and (4) being responsible for conditions prejudicial
t o the child's development. Accused can be convict d
d S t'
(a) i h e c o m m i t s a n y o f t h e f o u r a c t s t h e r e in . T h e p r o secution
n eed not prove that t h e a cts of chil d a b u se, child cr u e't y an d c h i l d
exploitation h av e r esulted i n t h e p r e j u d ice of th e ch il d b ecause an
a ct prejudicial to th e development of th e ch il d i s d i f fer n t f r o m t h e
ormer acts. (Patulot v. People, G.R. No. 285071, J anuary 7 2 0 1 9 )
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VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
8. C a t c h - a l l p r o v i s ion —
Section 10(a) refers to child abuses
or cruelty not c onsti t u t i n g a c r i m e p u n i s h able u n der Sections 5 t o
9 of R.A. No. 7610 such as sexual abuse or child t r a f fi ck ing (People
v. Rayon, G.Pi. No. 19 4286, Ja n u a ry 8 0 , 2 0 1 8) and a f e l o ny u n d e r
the Revised Penal Code such as parental in d i f f e rence. (De Guzman
v. Perez, G.R. No. 15 6 018, Ju ly 25 , 2 0 0 6) In s u m , S ection 1 0(a) of
R.A. No. 76 10 is a c a t c h - all p r o v i s ion co vering a l l k i n d s o f a b u s e
involving a child, which is not covered by other penal provision.
4. H a b i t u a l i t y i s n o t a n e l e m e n t — Un d e r S e c tion 8 ( b )
of R.A. No. 7610, child a b use refers to th e m a l t r e a t m e nt , w h e t h er
h abitual o r n o t , o f t h e c h i l d . I t i s i n c o n sequential t h a t t h e c h i l d
abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 8 of R.A.
No. 7610, the abuse may be h a b i t ua l o r n o t . (O l i v a r ez v. CA, G . R.
No. 168866, July 29, 2005; 2004 B ar Exa m )
Child a b u s e
Child a b u s e (Se c t i on 1 0 of R .A . ¹ . 76 1 0 ) i n c l u d e s
maltreatment, wh et her h a b i t ua l or n ot , of th e ch i ld . M a l t r e a t m ent
includes psychological and phy sical abuse (Section 8) or inflic tion of
physical injur y such as lacerations, fractured bones, burns, intern al
i njuries, severe i n j ur y o r s e r i ou s b o dily h ar m s u f f e red b y a c h i l d
Abuse Cases) such as bang ing t he h e a ds of t he m i n o r s t u d e n ts by
their teacher. (De Ocampo v. The Hon. Secretary of Justice, G.R. ¹ .
147932, January 25, 2006)
1. Co r p o r a l p u n ish m e n t - C hild a bu s e i n cl u d e s
d isciplinar y a c t s b y t he f a t h e r s u c h a s b e l t i n g , p i n c h i n g , and
strangulating his 8-year-old child, which caused her to limb (I ucido
v. People, G.R. ¹. 2 1 7 7 6 4 , Au g u st 7, 20 1 7) cr by t e a c her s uch a s
slamming hi m on th e fl oor w h ich caused him —.o lose consciousness.
(Rosaldes v. Pe ople, G.R. N o . 17 3 9 8 8, Oc t ober 8 , 2 0 1 4) I n t e nt t o
d iscipline stu dent i s no t a d e f ense since Ar t i cl e 288 of th e F a m i l y
C ode prohibit s t h e i n f l i c t io n o f c o r p o ra l p u n i s h m en t b y t e a c h er .
(Rosaldes v. People, supra)
In R osaldes v. Pe o ple, s u pr a, t h e v i c t i m , a seven-year o l d
student accidentally b u m p e d th e k n e e of th e a ccused, his teacher,
who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, she asked
h im to apologize to her. When he did not obey, she went to hi m a n d
pinched him on his th i gh. Th en, she held him ap by his ar m p it s and
pushed him to the floor. As he fell, his body hit a desk. As a result,
he lost consciousness. She proceeded to pick hi m u p by hi s ears and
 420 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Artic le 233 of the Family
Code prohibit s th e i n fl i c t io n of co r po ral p u n i s h m e nt by a t e a c her.
A school teacher i n e m p l o y in g u n n e cessary vi olence on her m i n o r
student, who even fainted, is liable for child abuse under R.A. No.
7610.
j c PP
is a school teacher. One of her p u p i ls, "B" tr i p p ed another
c assmate "C," causing "C" to fall on the floor and suffer a contusion
on the forehead. So, "T,"with her bamboo pointer whipped B" on
P
the
he tthigh, which produced a linear br u i se. T is liable for child abuse
because a teacher i n t h e e x er cise of her a u t h o r it y i n lo c o pa re ntis
cannot inflict any corporal p u n i s h m ent on her st u d ent even th ough
moderate. (1981 and 2018 Bar Ex a m s )
2. D e gr a d i n g th e di g n i t y o f t h e ch i l d — C h i l d a b u s e
i ncludes commission of a c ts, em otional m a l t r e a t m e nt , o r u t t e r i n
, or u . e r m g
words which ddebases,
b degrades, ordemeans the intrinsic worth and
ignity of a child as a hu man being (Section 3) such as:
1. Th e s t a t e m ent "Pu t a ng ina m ong bata ka namu m u r o
a nasa akin at su s unu gin ko yong pam i l ya m o" ( Ju m a q u io v .
Villarosa, G.R. ¹. 165 9 2 4 , Ja n u a ry 19, 2009); or
2. St a l k i n g , f o r c i bl y e m b r a c in g an d f o r c in g t h e c h i l d
to accept offender's love. (Araneta v. People, G.R. No. 17 4205,
June 27, 2008)
A ccused assaulted the victim, the identical twin br other of
t he person who sexually h a r assed his daughter, rendering hi m
unconscious. Accused then draped his body with a prepared
tarpaulin reading RAPIST AERO HUWAG TULARAN. S
thee acts are commi t te d w i t h i n t e n t t o d e base "int r i n sic wor ince
th
a nd dignity" of t h e v i c ti m a s a h u m a n b e i ng, or t o h u m i l i a t e
or embarrass h im , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s c h il d a b use u n der
ection 10 of R.A. No. 7610. (201 7 Bar Exam)
The st a t em ent "p u t a n g in a mo " a n d m a k i n g h a c k i n g
g estures wit h a b o l o , w h i c h a r e d i r e c ted against t h e m o t h e r
of two chi l d r en, are n o t c o n s ti t u t i v e of c h i ld a b u se i n v o lv i n g
egrading the dignity of a child. Since the thr eatening acts are
not directed against th e chi l d r en, i n t en t t o degrade, debase or
demean their dignity is not established. (Escolano v. People,
G.R ¹ . 2 2 6 9 9 1,December 10, 2018)
In Bongalon v. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013,
a ccused saw the victim (m i n or) and his companions hur t in g hi s
J9JC9B0M
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 421
minor dau ght ers. An gered, accused struck v i c ti m a t t h e b a ck
with his hand and slapped his face. Since the accused committ ed
the act at the spur of the moment, they are perpetrated with out
i ntent to degrade the dignity of the victim. Wi t h out such intent ,
the crime commit ted is not child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 but
merely slight ph y sical inj u r i es. (2017 B ar Exa m )
The Bongalon pr i n c i ple is onl y a p p l i cable if t h e accused
assaulted a c h i l d i n t he h e a t o f a n g e r o r a s s p o n t a n eous
reaction to th e m i sbehavior of th e ch i ld . I n J a b a lde v. People,
G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016,the accused was informed that
her daughter's head was punctured, and whom she thought
was already dead. The accused slapped, stru ck, and choked a
minor as a r e s ul t o f t h e f o r m e r's em oti onal r a ge. Absence of
a ny inten t ion t o debase, degrade or demean the di gn it y of t h e
c hild, the accused's act was merely slight p h y sical inj u r i e s.
In Es c olano v. Pe o ple, G . R. N o . 2 2 6 9 9 1, D e cember 1 0 ,
2018, complain a n ts, wh o ar e m i n o r s , t h r e w k e t c hu p s a chets
against th e d a u g h ter of t h e a ccused. But i t w a s t h e a ccused,
who was hit by th e sachets tw i ce. Accused exclaimed, "Putang
ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong pinag-aralan, wala kayong
utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko ang
aso ko, pakakagat ko k a yo sa a so ko ." Ut t e r i n g "p u t a ng i n a "
t o the m i n o r s i n t h e h e a t o f a n g e r i s n o t c h i l d a b u se. T h e
expression "put a ng in a m o" is a c ommon e nough ut t e r a n ce in
t he dialect t h a t i s o f t e n e m p l o y ed, not r e a ll y t o s l a n der b u t
rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is
j ust an expletive that p u n ct u a tes one's expression of profanit y .
T hreatening t o r e l ease her dog t o c h ase and b i t e t h e m i n o r s
made in th e h eat of an g er is n ot c h i ld a b u s e. Accused merely
intended t ha t t h e y s t o p t h ei r r u d e b e h a v i or . A b sence of an y
i ntention t o d e g r ad e t h e d i g n i t y o f m i n o r s , a c cused i s o n l y
l iable for other li ght t h r e a t s .
In Calaoagan v. People, G.R. No. 222974, March 20, 2019,
a ccused infli cted t h e i n j u r i e s i n t h e h e a t o f a r g u m e nt . A A A
and BBB, m i n o rs, claim t h a t i t w a s g r oup of th e accused that
f irst annoyed the for m er's group; wh il e accused claims that i t
was AAA and BBB's group that initiated the shouting match.
N evertheless, i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e a l t e r c a t ion b e t w een A A A ,
B BB, an d a c cused onl y o c cur re d w h e n t h e i r g r o u p s m e t o n
t he street w i t h ou t an y p r i o r confr on t a t i on. As observed in t h e
cases of Bongalon, Jab a l d e, and Es colano, when t he i nf li c t i o n
 422 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 423
VOLUME II

o f physical inj u r i e s against a m i n o r i s d one at th e spur of t h e A ccused f a i l e d t o g i v e i m m e d i a t el y t h e r e q u i r e d m e d i c a l

moment, it is i m p er a t ive for the pr ose a ttention t o he r a d o p ted ch i ld , w h e n h e w a s a ccidentally b u m p e d
cu tion ot p r ov e a specific
intent todebase ,de r d
degrade, or demean the in t r i n sic w b y her car, result in g i n h i s h ea d i n j u r i e s and i m p a i red v i sion t h a t
child ; otherwise, the accused cannot be convicted under tSection h f th
c ould lead to ni ght b l i n d n ess. The accused used to w hi p hi m w h e n
h e failed t o come h om e on t i m e f r o m s c h ool. A l so, to p u n i s h h i m
f or carelessness in wa sh in g di shes, she sometimes sent hi m t o b e d
without s u p p er . T h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s c h i l d ab u s e . (2004 B a r
criminally l i a ble under this provision. Wit h out such int ent, the Exam)
crime commi t te d i s no t c h i l d a b use u n der R .A . N o . 7 610 but
merely slight physical injuries.
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (R.A.No. 9344)
8. Ph y s i c al in j u ry — Child abuse involving infliction of
physical in j ur y i s a c r i m e i n d e p endent f U nder Section 60 of R .A. No. 9344, in t h e conduct of t h e
om c hi 'ld b
dern
egrading, demeaning
degradin or d ebasing the rdi gnity ofa use t h e involving
c h i ld. I proceedings beginning from the initial contact with the child, the
o e c i .
involving in fl i c t ion of p h y sical i n j u r y , i n t en t t o d ebase,n
child abusee involv ' competent authorities must r e f r ain f r o m b r a nding or l a b eling
degrade or demean the child is not an element t h ereof. children as young criminals, juvenile delinquents, prostitutes or
Throwing boiling cooking oil, which directed against th attaching to them in any manner any other derogatory names.
o f a bab y a n d 8 -year-old
- child, wh ich consequently bu r ned s the e mfaces
oth er Likewise, no discriminatory remarks and practices shall be allowed
and skin of th e m i n o rs, is not consti t u t i v e of ch il d a b use involvin p articularly w it h r e spect to the child's class or ethnic origin .
d egrading th e d i g n it y o f a c h i l d . S i Under Section 61 of R.A. No. 9844, the following and any other
i nce th r owi n g b o i l i n g oi l i s n o t
i rected against th e ch i l d r en, i n t en t t o d
s imilar acts shall be considered pr eju di cial an d d e t r i m e n ta l t o t h e
e ir i g n i t y i s n o t e stabli shed. However, thed,accused
d b is still l i a b l e
psychological, emotional, social, spiri t u al , moral and physical health
of child abuse involving i n f l i c t ion o f h '
1 and well-being of th e c h il d i n c on fl ict w i t h t h e l a w a n d t h e r e fore,
egra e , e b a s e o r d e m ean i s n o t a n e l e m en t t h e r eof.
(Patulot v . prohibited:
People, G.R No . 28 5 071, Janu a ry 7, 2019)
1. E mp l o y m e n t of t h r e ats of wh at ever k in d and n a t u r e ;
In the case of Bongalon and t he case Patulot, the accused had
no intent todebase, de rade or d 2. E mp l o y m e n t o f a b u sive, coercive and p u n i t i v e m easures
ongalon case, the Inf o r m a t i on c ha rg ed the accused of h ' l d b s uch as cursing, beating, stri p p i ng, and solitary confinement ;
i nvolvin g degrading,
e ra se o c i a u s e
debasing ordemeaning the child. S'
to debasee, dee g r aded or d emean, w h ich i s el emen te c f i th .' i n ce i n t e n t 8. E m pl o y m e n t o f d e g r a d i ng, i n h u m a n e n d c r u e l f o r m s o f
a lished, the accused was convicted ofsli nh t o h i s cr i m e , w a s
not establis punishment such as shaving the heads, pouring ir r i t a t i n g , corrosive
e o s i g p y si c a l i n j u r i e s, o r harmful substances over the body of the child in conflict w it h t h e
c i a u se . n the other h a nd , in t h e case of Patu l o t, t h e
I nformation charged the accused of chil d b law, or forcing him/her to walk ar ound the commun it y w ear ing signs
o c i a use
o p y s i c a i n j u r y . T h er e i s no a l l egation of de rinvolving
adin i n f l i cti on w hich embar r a ss, hu m i l i a t e , an d d e g r ade h i s/her p er sonalit y a n d
d b
demeanin g thee cch i l d i n t h e I n f o r m a t i on . S i nce i n t en t t o d e b a se, dignity; and
d egrade or demean is not an element of t hi s crim e t
o i s c r i m e , th e accused was 4. Com p e l l i n g th e ch il d t o perform i n v o l u n t ar y servi t ude in
convicted of child abuse.
any and allforms under any and all instances.
4. N e gl e c t —Under Section 8(b) of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse
i ncludes unr easonable depri v a t ion of h i s b a ' A n act i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t ion 6 0 o r 6 1 o f R . A . N o . 9 8 4 4 i s
uc a s oo a nd shelter; o r f a i l u r e t o i m m e d i a t el punishable under Section 62 unless a higher penalty is provided for
ive
t reatment to an in j u r e d child rresul tit n' g ii n s e rious impairment in the Revised Penal Code or special laws. For example, compelling
of his the child t o p erform i nvoluntary servitude constitutes qualified
grow an evelo pm enn t o r i n h i s p e r m a n ent i n capacity or death .
trafficking in person under R.A. No. 9208. The offender shallnot be

J9JC9B0M
 424 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R
VOLUME II

prosecuted under R .A. No. 9844 since a hi g her p en alty i s p r o v i ded

for this act in R.A. No. 9208. Employment of degrading, inhuman
end cruel f o rm s of p u n i s h m en t u p o n a m i n o r p r i s o ner constit u t es
maltreatment o f p r i s oner u n d e r A r t i c l e 28 5 o f t h e R e v i sed Penal
Code. The custodian shall be pr o secuted for v io la ti on of Section 61
of R.A. No. 9344 since Section 62 thereof prescribes a penalty for
maltreatment o f a m i n o r p r i s o ner h i g he r t h a n t h a t p r e s cribed by
the Revised Penal Code. Incidental ly, the custodian is also liable for
t orture, wh ich i s a n i n d e p endent cr im e no t s u bject to th e doctr i ne
of absorption.

KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETE NT ION

Kidnappin g a n d s e r i ous i l l egal d e t ention i s c o m m i t t e d b y a
p rivate i n d i v i d ua l w h o s h al l k i d n a p o r d e t ai n a n o t h er , o r i n a n y
o ther ma n ner d e p r iv e hi m o f h i s l i b e rt y p r o v i ded t h a t a n y o f t h e
following circum st ances is present:
1. Th e k i d n a p p in g or detention shall h ave lasted more than
three days;
2. Si m u l a t i o n of pub lic au t h or i t y ;
8. T h e p u r p o s e of th e k i d n a p p in g or d e t e n t ion i s e x t or t i n g
ransom from the victi m or any ot her person; or
4. T h e v i c t i m i s a fem ale or public officer;
5. Th e vi c t i m i s a mi n o r e x c ep t w h e n t h e a c c used i s h i s
parent;
6. T h e vi c t i m i s su b j e c te d t o s e r i o u s p h y s i ca l i n j u r i e s ,
threats to ki ll , to tor t ur e or dehu m a n i z ing acts; or

7. W h e n t h e v i c ti m i s k i l l ed or di es as a consequence of the
detention or is raped. (Artic le 267; 1978 B ar Exa m )

Two Indispensable Elements of Illegal Detention

K idnappin g a n d s e r i ou s i l l e gal d e t e n t io n a n d s l i g h t i l l e g a l
detention a r e cr i m e s ag a i n s t l i b e r t y . H e n c e , t h e r e a re t w o
indispensable elements of t h ese cr i m es, to w i t : d e p r i v a t i on of t h e
l iberty of the victim an d i n t en t t o deprive libert y .

Deprivation of Liberty — Under the Spanish Penal Code,

t he m o d e s o f com m i t t i n g i l l e g a l d e t e n t i o n ar e "secuestrare"

425

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 426 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
(sequestration), w hich m e a n s i mp r i s o n m e t ,
en , a n d encer r a r e "
(enclosing), which i s no t c onfi ned t o i m p r i s onm ent; bu t i t i n c l u d es
deprivation o f l i b e r t y . (P e ople v. Ba l d a g o, G . R. N o s . 12 8 1 0 6-07,
January 24, 2003) There is deprivati on of liberty if the child was left
in a place from which she did not know her way back home (People
v.Jacalney, G.R. No. 168552, October 8, 2011) even if she had the
freedom to r oa m a r o un d t h e p l ace of d et ent i on. For u n d e r s uch a
situation, th e ch i l d's fr eedom r e m a in s a t t h e m e rcy an d con t rol of
t e abductor. (People v. Baluya, G.R N o . 18 1 822, April 18, 2011)
Ille gal detention i s com m i t t e d as l ong as t h er e is d epr i v a t i on
o f liberty of t h e v i c ti m i n w h a t e ver f or m a n d f o r w h a t e ver l e n gt h
of ti me. (P e ople v. Ba l d a go, G . R. N o s . 12 8 1 0 6 -07 J
2008 ) However, to consider depr i v a t ion of l i b e rt y a s a n e l em ent of
consummated illegal detenti on, there must be an appreciable period
o f time wit hi n w h i ch th e vi cti m wa s deprived of his liber t y .
If there is no appreciable period of time wit hi n w h ich the victim
was deprived of his liber ty, but i n t en t t o depr ive liberty was clearly
established, the crime commit ted is attempted kidn appi ng. In People
v.De la Cruz, G.R. No. 120988, August 11, 1997, accused asked the
seven-year old victim i n s ide the school compound to accompany her
t o the school denti st. Th e v i c ti m t o l d t h e a ccused that sh e w a n t e d
to go over to her neighbor, but th e l a t ter r e f used a d h 1 ' h
T he.e nei h bo r who
neighbor, w became suspicious, asked the accused whereh she
was going with the victim . The accused answered that she asked the
victim to bri n g h e r to her moth er. The neighbor told th
dh
s e wi b r i n g h e r t o a t e a c h er. Th e a ccused agreed. The i n c i dent
appened for only a very brief span of time. There is no showing that
t he victi m w a s i n d eed d epr i ved of h e r l i b e r t y . H o w e v er, he r a c t s
s howed int e n t ion t o d e p r i v e t h e v i c t i m o f h e r l i b e r t y . H e n ce, t h e
c rime commit ted is att em p ted ki d n a p pi n .
p p» g .
If thhere is no appreciable period of time wit hi n w h ich the victim
w as deprived of his li ber ty , and it a p p ears that th e i n t e n t ion of th e
accused in s eizing t h e v i c t i m i s t o k 11 h'
i i m , th e cr i me c o m m i t t e d
is mur d er . I n Pe o ple v. Sa c ayana n, G . R. N o . L - 1 5 0 24 D
o. -
, e c e m b er
h e victim ha d been t a ken only ab out 4 0
m e t ers- rf o m h i s
h ouse whewhen hhe was shot. Nothing was said ordone b th
ow a ey a d i n t e n ded to deprive their vi cti m of his liberty for
some time and for some ome purpose. There was n o appreciable i t
betweenn his i s b e in g t a ken an d hi s being shot from w h ich k i c n a p p i n gl
m ay be inferred. The crime commi t t ed, th er efore w a s m u r d e r .
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2. I nt e n t t o D ep r i v e L ib e r t y — T o c o n s i d er i n t e n t t o
d eprive li b ert y a s a n e l e m en t o f i l l e gal d e t e n t ion a s p r e sent, t h e
deprivation of l i b e rt y m u s t n o t b e i n c i d.ental to th e c om m i ssion of
other crim e such a s m u r d er , r a pe, or r o b b ery, w h ic h t h e o f f ender
p rincipally i n t e n ded to commi t .
It is basic that for kidn apping to exist, there must be indubitabl e
p roof that t h e a c t u a l i n t e n t o f t h e m a l e f a ctor w a s t o d e p r iv e t h e
offended party of her lib er ty. (People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09,
December 6, 1995) I f t he d e p r i v a t i on of l i b e r ty i s i n c i d e ntal to t h e
commission of other cri me, the lat ter absorbs illegal detenti'on. (see:
People v. Deli m, G.R. No. 142778, Janua ry 28, 2003)
If the deprivation of liberty is just in cidental to the commission
o f murder or r o b b ery, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s m u r d e r o r r o b b ery ,
while i n c i d e n ta l k i d n a p p i n g a n d se r i o u s i l l e g a l d e t e n t i o n i s
absorbed. Illegal detention is incidental to the commission of murder
or robbery if the depriv a t ion of liberty ar ose from:
1. T h e t r a n s p o r t a t ion of th e v i c ti m t o t h e p l ace wher e
the victim wil l be kil led (People v. Estaci o, Jr., G.R. No. 1 71 655,
July 22,2009) or robbed (People v. Moreno, G.R. No. 94755,
April 10, 1992);
2. Th e p r o l o n ge d c o m m i s sion o f r a p e , c o e r cion o r
robbery. (People v. Puno, G.R. No. 97471, February 1 7, 1998)
I f the pr i n ci pal i n t e n t ion of th e offender is to r ape the vi ct i m ,
and the deprivation of her li b erty is just i n c i dental to the pr olonged
s exual intercourse, which lasted for two hours, the crime commit t e d
is rape, while incidental serious illegal detention is absorbed. (People
v. Nuguid, G.R. No. 148991, Janua ry 21, 2004)
If the prin cipal i n t e n t ion of the offender is to coerce the victim
t o reveal the wh er eabouts of an affi d a vi t an d d epr i v a t ion of li b er t y
i s just i n c i d ental t o t h e d e m a n d t o p r o d uce th e s a me, th e c r i m e
c ommitted i s coercion, wh il e i n c i d ental s er i ous i l l egal detention i s
absorbed. (People v. Vill a m a r, G .R. No. 1211 75, November 4, 1998)
T he circum st ance tha t t h e a c cused are t r y i n g t o p r e v ent t h e
p olice au t h o r i t i e s f r o m a r r e s t i n g t h e m f o r t h e c r i m e o f m u r d e r
(People v. Wong, G.R. No. 82529, May 12, 1 978); or robbery (People
v. Astor, G.R N o s. L-71765-66, April 29, 1 987) is considered as
incidental. Hence, kidnapping is absorbed in m u r der or r obbery.
However, i n Pe o p le v. Co n c epcion, G . R . N o . 2 1 4 8 8 6, A p r i l
4 , 2018, th e c i r c u m s t a nce t h a t a c c u sed i s t r y i n g t o p r e v en t t h e
 428 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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p olice authori t ies from a r r e st in g hi m f o r t h e cr im e o f r a p e wa s not
crime
considered as incidental. H e nce t h e a a ccuse
ccused w a s c o nv icted of rape
and illegal detenti on . d f p
P ublic Officer A c t i n g i n H i s P r i v a t e C a p a c i t y
As a rule, il legally a r r e st in g a p erson despite lack of pr obable
cause is arbit r ar y d et ent i on. H ow ever, arbi t r ar y d et ent ion can only
b e committed by p u b l i c of ficers i n p u r s u i t o f t h e i r d u t y t o a r r e s t .
Hence, arbitr ar y d e t en t ion i s com m i t t e d i f a p o l ice officer ar r ested
the victim w i t h ou t p r obable cause for pur poses of investigating hi m
(U.S. v. Hawchaw, G.R. No. L-6 909, February 20, 1 912) or brin g in g
h im to the proper investigating au t h o r i t y .
(U.S. v. Gellada G.R.
anuary 8 1, 1910) In t h is case, the police officer commit t e d
t he crime in pu r s ui t of his duty t o ar r e st .
But i f t h e p o l i c e officer a r r e s ted t h e v i c t i m f o r p u r p o ses of
e xtorting m o n ey , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s e i t h e r r o b b er y ( U . S . v .
Flores, No. 6427, March 28, 1911) or kid n a ppi ng for ra n s om (People
v. G onzalez, Jr., G.R ¹ . 192 2 8 8 , Fe b r u a ry 17 , 2 0 16) wi th s p e cial
aggravating circumst ance of taking advant age of his public position.
i trary d e t en t ion i s n o t c o m m i t t e d s i nce th e p o l ice officer, wh o
a rrested the victim to extort m oney i s act i n g
g in ih's p r i v a t e capacity.
A lthough th e c r i m e o f k i d n a p p in g ca n o nl y b e c o m m i t t e d by
a priv a te in d i v i d u a l , th e f a c t t h a t t h e a c c used is a p u b l i c o ff ic ial
o es not a u t o m a t i c all y p r e c l ud e t h e fi l i n g o f a n i n f o r m a t i o n f o r
i napping against h im . A p u b li c officer, who detained a person for
t he purpose of extort in g r a n s om, cannot be said t o be acting i n a n
official capacity. (People v. Borj a G . R. N . 1 9 9 7 10 A
o. , ug u s t 2, 2 0 17)
e police officer i n c o m m i t t i n g k i d n a p p in g '
g is ac t'ing a s a p r i v a t e
individual .
In People v. Sa n t i a n o, G . R. N o . 1 2 3 9 7 9, D e cember 3, 1 9 9 8 ,
officers of th e N a r c o t ics C om m an d s e i zed th e v i c t i m , a d e t e n t i on
p risoner that t h ey p r e v i ously ar r e sted for possession of mar i j u a n a,
or purposes of detaining a nd m a l t r e a t i ng h im i n a s e c luded place.
The crime comm i t t e d i s n o t a r b i t r a r y d e t e n t ion s i nce th e accused
d id not commi t t h e c r i m e i n p u r s u i t o f t h ei r d u t . T h
or i n a p p i n g a n d se r i o u s i l l e g a l d e t e n t i o n yq.u a l iey
fi ead reb yIi atbl
h ee
c ircumstance of serious physical inj u r i e s .
Note: The vic tim w a s f o u nd d e ad in c a se of Sa nt '
r ia c o u r t f o u n d i n s u f fi c i ency o f e v i d e nce t h a t t h e a c c ubsed ahr e
responsible for the killing of the victim.
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 429
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gPECIP,L COMPLEX CRIME
A s a g e n eral r u l e , p r i n c i p les fo r s p e cial c o m p lex c r i m e a r e
uniform. However, there are four dist i nct r u les pertai n ing to special
complex crime of ki d n apping w it h h o m i c i de, mur der or r a p e.
1. O r i gi n a l D e s i g n —To be held liable of a special complex
crime it i s i n d i s pensable that t h e o r i g i na l d e sign of th e accused is
to commit th e p r i n c i pal component t h e r eof. In r ap e w it h h o m i c i de,
the original d esign of th e of fender i s to ra p e th e v i c t i m. (P eople v.
Laspardas, G.R. No . L - 4 6 1 46, October 2 8, 1 9 7 9) In r o b b e ry w i t h
rape, the or i g i na l d e sign i s t o c o m mi t r o b b e ry. (P eople v. D i n o l a ,
G.R. No. L - 5 4 567, M a rc h 22 , 1 9 90) I n k i d n a p p i ng w i t h r a p e , t h e
original design is to kidnap the victim. (People v. Mirandilla, Jr.,
G.R. No. 186'41 7,July 27, 2011)
H ence, in r o b b er y w i t h h o m i c i de, th e o r i g i na l d e sign o f t h e
a ccused must be to commit r o bbery. If hi s or i g i nal design is to k i l l ,
he is liable ofseparate crimes of homicide or murder and theft and
not a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. (People v.
Atanacio, No. L-11844, November 29, 1960)
H owever, in special complex crime of ki d n a p p ing w it h m u r d e r
o r homicide, t h e o r i g i n a l d e s ig n o f t h e a c c u sed i s n o t m a t e r i a l
because of the Me rcado pri n c iple. The accused is liable for a special
c omplex cr im e o f k i d n a p p in g w i t h m u r d e r o r h o m i c i d e a s a l o n g
as the victi m i s k i l l e d i n t h e c o u rse of th e d e t en t i on. T hi s special
c omplex crime i s com m i t t e d r e g ar dless of w h e t her t h e k i l l i n g w a s
purposely sought (the ori gi nal design is to k i l l) , or k i l l i n g is just an
afterthought (origi nal design is to kid n a p ). (People v. Mercado, G.R.
¹. 11 6 '239,November 29, 2000)
2. V i ct i m o f Ho m i c i d e —In rape with h o m i c id e, the victim
o f homicide can be a p e r son other t h a n t h e v i c ti m o f r a p e. I n t h i s
c ase, the accused ki l le d th e f i r s t v i c t i m t o f a c i l i t at e i n r a p i n g t h e
s econd victim . A c cused wa s convicted of s p ecial complex cr im e of
rape wit h h o m i c i de. (People v. La o g, G . R. N o. 17 8 8 21, Oc tober 5,
2011)
I n r o bbery w i t h h o m i c i de , t h e v i c t i m o f h o m i c id e ca n b e a
bystander (People v. Ba r u t , G . R. N o. L - 4 2 6 6 6, Ma r ch 18 , 1 9 7 9); a
responding police officer (People v. Pelagio, G.R. No. L-161 77, May
24, 1967); or even a co-robber. (People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124,
April 5, 2016)
The victim was shot while accused was robbing the passengers
of a jeepney. Even if v i c t i m's bag was not t a k en , accused are liable
 430 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 431
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f or special complex cr im e of r o bbery w i t h h o m i c i de. In t h '

i ci e . n is special the same occasion and. from th e same sit u s, t hey a re l i a b le for t w o
corn le
comp ex crime, it is i m m a t e r ia l t h a t t h e v i c ti m f h '
o o m i c'd
i e' i s o t h
her separate crimes of kidn appi ng, and slight i l l e gal detenti on. Accused
an the victim of r o bbery, as long as homi cide occurs by reason of
the robbery or on t h e occasion th ereof. were animated by two sets of separate c rimi n al in t e n ts and crimi n a l
(People v. Ma d r e lejos, G.R. r esolutions in k i d n a p p in g an d i l l e g ally d e t a i n in g t h e t w o v i c t i m s .
No. 225328, March 21, 2018)
The criminal i n t en t i n k i d n a p p in g C h r i s t opher wa s separate fr om
However, the r ul e is di ff erent i n k i d n a p p in g w it h h o m i c ide or a nd independent of the crim i nal i n t ent and resolution in k i d n a ppi n g
r ape. Under A r t i cle 267 o'f the Revised Penal C d , and detaining George for less than t h ree days.
c rime o k i d n a p p in g w i t h h o m i c ide or r ap e is comm i t t e d 1w he n t h e
victim i s kil l ed or dies as a consequence of th d t t' Contrary v iew — In Pe ople v. Re yes, G .R. No. 1 78300, Ma r c h
o e e en i o n or is r a p e d.
The word "victim" i n this provision pertains to kidnapped or d t ' 17, 2009, the accused was convicted ofone count of special complex
victim. H e o r e a i n ed c rime k d n a p p in g f o r r a n s o m w i t h h o m i c i d e a l t h o ug h t h e y a r e
. Hence, in kidnapping with homicide or rape, the victim of
homicide or rape must be the kidnapped or detained victim. several kidnapped victims, two of whom were killed.
8. M u l t i p l e K i d n a p p i n g s — In robbery, if the accused is 4. M ur d e r as a Component —Under Article 266-B, special
motivated by a single criminal impulse to rob a particular place complex crime is committed when by reason or on the occasion of the
(e.g., gasoline station), they are only liable for one count of robbery rape, "homicide" is committed. Under Article 294, special complex
although th ere are several vi ct im s because of the d elito continu a d o crime is commi t te d w h e n b y r e a son or on o c casion of t he r o b bery,
princip e.
(People v.De Leon, G.R. No. 179948, tune 26, 2009) the crime of "homicide" shall have been committed. It should be
noted the law specifically ment i oned "homicide" as a component of a
I n s p ecial c o m p l e x crime of rob b e ry w i t h ho m i c i d e , i t i s
special complex crime in v olv in g robbery or r a pe. Hence, there is no
immaterial t ha t t w o or m or e persons are ki l l ed. (Peo l e
s pe ial complex crime of robbery wit h m u r d e r or r ape wit h m u r d e r .
G.R. No. o. 20212 4, April 5, 2 016) In s pecial complex crime .ofJ ro bbery
with r ape, i t i s l i k e w i s e i m m a t e r i al t h t t Treachery or abuse of superior str en gth shall be considered as
a w o o r m o r e p e r sons ar e
rape . Ev en if t h e re a re four v i c t i m s r a p ed on ' a generic aggravating circum st ance in robbery with h o m i cide or rape
on occasion o ro Yibery,
accused are o nl y l i a b l e fo r a s i n g l e c o un t o f s e ' 1f
thee accu Yi o
with homi cide. (People v. Ju g u eta, G.R. No. 20 2124, Apr il 5 , 20 1 6 ,
o specia c o m p1ex
crime o r o bbery wit h r a pe. (People v. Patali n, G.R. No. 125589, J . En Banc) T hey cannot be treated as a circumstance that will q ua l i f y
27, 1999) o. , uly the kil l in g i n t o m u r d e r s i nce t h er e i s n o s p ecial complex cr im e of
B ut i n k i d n ap p'i ng , t h e r e a r e a s m a n y c r i m i n a l i m p u l ses t o robbery with murder (People v. Vivas, G.R No. 100914, May 6, 1994)
deprive liberty on the part of the accused as there are kidnapped o r rape with m u r d e r .
victims. i nce t h e a ccused i n k i d n a p p i n g s e v e ra l v i c t ' U nder A r t i cl e 267, th ere is a special complex cr im e w hen t h e
e y seve r a l c r i m i n a l i m p u l s es, t h e p r i n c i l e o f d l ' victim is "kil l ed or dies" as a consequence of the detention. Homicide
continuado wh h is b a sed on t h e s i n g ul arity o f t h e
w hich is not s p e cifically m e n t i o ned b y l a w a s a c o m p o n en t o f s p e ci al
impulse, is not a p p l i cable. Since the d e l i to co t ' ' criminal c omplex crim e i n v o l v in g k i d n a p p i ng . I n s u m , "killi ng" t h e v i c t i m
d 1
n o a p p l i c able, th e a c cused i s l i a b l e fo r a s m a n k i d may constitute homicide or mur d er, which can be made a component
ere are i n a p p e d vi ct i ms. If th ere are five kidnapped victims, the o f a special complex crime inv olving k i d n a p p i n g .
accused are liable for five counts of k i d n a p p in g for r a n s om. (People
v. Tadah, G . R N o . 18 6 2 2 6, Fe b r u a ry 1 , 2 0 1 2 Treachery can be considered as a q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m st ance in
k idnapped vict im s k i l l ed , t h er e ar e t w o c o u nt s )ofIf s there are two kidnapping w i t h m u r d e r . I n Pe o ple v. Me r c ado, G. R. N o. 1 1 6289,
coun s o specia ' 1 c o m p l ex
e o i d n a p p i n g w i t h h o m i c id e or m u r d er . (P eo l N ovember 29, 2 0 00, th e k i l l i n g o f v i c t i m a s a c o n sequence of h i s
r. c o pe v . R'imorin,
G.R N oo. . 12 4 8 09, May M 16 , 2 0 0 0; Pe ople v. L a r r a n a g a, G .R N o s . k idnapping w a s c o m m i t t e d u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n ces w h i c h m a k e i t
188874-75, February 8, 2004) murder. His limbs were tied and his mouth gagged before he was
t aken aw ay . W h e n h i s b o d y w a s d i s covered, hi s l i m b s w e r e s t i l l
In People v. Pa ga l a san, G. R. N o s. 1 3 1 926 and 1 8 8 9 9 1, J
an , u non
e t ied and hi s m o ut h g a gged, indicatin g t h a t t r e a chery a t t e n ded th e
18, 2008,alth
a ough accused kidnapped George and Christopher killing of the victim. The accused. was convicted of special complex

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crime of ki d n a p p in g w i t h m u r d e r ( q u a l i fied b t h
i e y t e ci r c u m s t a nce of her. but the accused subsequently r a ped her as an afterthought, the
a ccusec. is liable for special complex crime of ki d n a p ping w it h r a p e .
(People v. Mir a n d i l l a , J r . , G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011; People v.
KIDNAPPING AND RAPE
Anticamaray, G.R. ¹ . 1 7 8 7 7 1,June 8, 2011)
1. F or c i b l e a b d u c t i o n —Where the accused kidna
O ne night , t w o A m e r i ca n s o l di ers of t h e U . S . A r m y f o r c i b l y
victim for the p urpose of rapin ' ngh e r , b h f ' ed t
r ape, the cr im e com m i it t eed i iss fo r ' b ut e a i l e d to' consum t ake tw o F i l i p i n o h o s t esses from A n g e l es, P a m p a n ga, an d b r i n g
orci l e a b d u ction si nce accused i them inside Clark Ai r B a se. Once inside the base, they are taken to
m otivated by l ew d design at t h e t i m e t h a t h e ssee w a s
a dance, but fin d ing th e h all too crowded they i m m e di at ely proceed
esign, which is an element of forcible abd t o the soldiers' qu a r t er s w h er e t h e g i r l s w e r e r a p ed . T h er e i s n o
t' showing that th e A m e r i c ans abducted the hostesses for purposes of
former. (People v. Egan, G.R N . 18 9 8uc
the for
for 8 8,ion,
M th eI atter absorbs
, o. , ay 28, 2002) raping th em. Rape was commi t ted as an af t e r t h ou ght . H e nce, they
T here is no special complex crime of kidnapping with at te m t e d are liable for special complex crim e of k i d n a p p in g w it h r a p e. (1959
Bar Exam)
kidnapping must s b e at h t e c o n s u m m a t ed stage.
e.
2. Kidna p p i n g an d a t t e m p t e d r a p e —Where the accused KIDNAPPING AND HOMICIDE/MURDER
kidnapped th e v i c ti m n o t f o r t h e p u r p ose of ra i n
accused subsequentl h 1. C om pl e ~ c r i m e o f a t t e m p t e d o r f r u s t r a t e d m u r d e r
y a tte m p t e d t o r a e h e r a s
imes o f k'd through k i d n a p p i n g — W here the a ccused kid n a p ped the v i c t i m
i n a p p in g an d a t t e m p ted r a e a r e c o
(People v. Lactao, G.R N o. . 56 7 6 8, 0 p ar e committed. for the purpose of killing h i m , and the n, he tried to kill h i m , complex
, ct o b er 29, 1998) crime of attem pted or fr u s t r a ted m u r der t h r o ugh k i d n a p p ing un der
This is not forcible abduction ction since accused is not motiv ated b Article 48 i s com m i t t ed . I n t h i s c a se, ki d n a p p in g wa s a n e cessary
lewd
ew ddesi
e s i gn, w hen th e v i c ti m w a s a b d u cted. This i
means to commit a t t e m p ted or fr u s t r a ted m u r d er. (People v. Roxas,
napping w it h a t t e m p ted r ape un der A r t i cl e 48 b G.R. ¹ . 172 60 4 , Au g u s t 17 , 2 0 1 0; Pe o ple v. Gu n g o n, G. R. N o .
the two crimes were not
p ro uc e y a si n gl,e a c t an d he r detention 119574, March 19, 1998)
is not commit
mi ted
e asas a m e a n s to rape the victim. (Peo le v.
G.R. No. 129894, August 11, 2000) 2. K i d n ap p i n g a n d at t e m p t ed o r fr u s t r a t ed m u r d e r
— Where the accused k i d n a p ped th e v i c t i m n o t f o r t h e p u r p ose of
3. R a p e o r com p lex crime of ra e
o rape through forcible killing him bu t h e subsequently t r i ed to kil l hi m a s an aft erthought,
n- e re t e a ccused ki dn a
ppaed th o p po t wo separate c r i m e s o f k i d n a p p i ng , an d a t t e m p t e d o r f r u s t r a t e d
er, a n s e w a s i n f a c t r a p ed c c us d '
m urder are commi t t e d .
omp ex crime of rape through forcibleed is liable for
abduction. eith er
Ifforcible
a u c t i o n i s a n i n d i s p ensable m e an s t o c o m m i t r a e t h e I H owever, if serious physical inj u r i es, tort ur e or dehum a ni zi n g
e nce, e c r i m e comm i t t ed is onl r a acts is commit ted in th e course of detention, the crime commi t ted is
v Mejoraday GR No 10 2 7 05 Jul 80 kidnapping and serious il l egal detenti on. Serious physical inj u r i e s,
G.R Noo.. 94 1 28, F eb r u a r y 8, 1 9 9 8 ; Pe ople v. A l m a n torture or dehuma ni z ing acts is not a separate crime, but an element
124916;July 11,2002) If forcible ' abduction is' a necessar
'
of kidnapping.
commit rape, the accused is liable of a corn l ex ecessar
p p ou gh 3. K i d n a p p i n g a n d h o m i c i d e o r m u r d e r — W hether th e
killing was purposely sought or the ki l l i n g was just an afterthought,
e v. u os, .R. No. L - 4 0 995, J une 2 5 1 9
C G R No 148424-27 D ecember 11, 2008; 2018 Bar Exam ) i f th e v i c t i m i s k i l l e d i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e d e t e n t i on , t h e c r i m e
committed is a special complex crime of ki d n ap p ing w it h m u r der or
S pecial c o m p l e x c r i m e o f k i d n a
Where the accused kidna in homicide. This is the Me rcado prin c ip le .
i n a pp eed tth e v i c t'i m not for the purpose of raping
'

rpose o rapin g

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VOLUME II
AND SECURITY

K IDNAPPING, RAPE AND HO M ICIDE/MU R D E R

Note: The r ul e t h a t " t h e cr i m e is m u r d e r w h e re the v i c tim i s
If the
h e accused kidnapped the victim, raped her, and then ki l l ed kidnapped for the purpose of kil l ing h im" is an abandoned principle.
h er, the accused is l i a bl e for s p ecial complex cr im e of k i d n a p p i n g
w ith h o m i c i de. W h e t he r t h e k i l l i n g w a s p u r p o sely sou h t 1. A p p r e c i a b l e P e r i o d o f D et e n t i o n —Special complex
k illi n g w as j u st an af t e r t h o u g ht ( o ri g i n al d e sign is to r a p e ), if t h
he crime of k i d n a p p in g w i t h m u r d e r o r h o m i c id e i s a c r i m e a g a i n st
v ictim is k i l l ed in t h e course of the d t libertv. Hence, to commit t hi s crime in accordance with the Me rcado
e en t'ion,, th e crime commi t t e d
is a special complex cr im e of k i d n a p p in g w i t h h o m i c i de. (Me rcado p rinciple, there must be an appreciable period of time w i t hi n w h i c h
princip el With r espect to rape, it shall be conside the victim was deprived of liberty. If the victim in a few min u tes died
nsi er e d a s a component
o i s s p e cial complex crime. In sum, the accused is liable fo after the accused gagged the mouth of m i nor v i c ti m w i t h s t ockin gs;
corn plex is i a e o r s p e cial placed him in a box; sealed it w it h m a s k in g t ape and placed the box
ex crim e o f k i d n a p p in g w i t h h o m i c i d e an d r a p e. (P eople v .
Larranaga, G.R. Nos. 188874-75, February 8, 2004, En Banc ) in the attic, the crime commi t ted is mur d er. (People v. L ora, G.R. ¹.
L-49480, Mar ch 3 0, 19 82; 2005 and 20 16 Bar E x a m s) I f t he v i c t i m
was killed after being dr a gged about 40 m et ers from hi s h ouse, the
MER C A D O P R INCIPLE
crime commit ted is mu r d er. (People v. Sacayanan, supra)
Where t h e p e r s on k i d n a p p ed i s k i l l e d i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e
2. I n c id e n t a l d e p r i v a t i o n o f l i b e r t y —If the in t e n t i on of
detention, r egardless of w h e t her t h e ki l l i n g wa s p r
was purpose.y sought t he accused is only to k il l t h e v i c t im , an d th e depr i v a t ion of li b ert y
or was merely an af t e rthought, accused is liable for speciall complex h
crime of k i d n a p p in g w i t h m u r d e r . (P e ople v. M e r c a do G . R . N . is just incidental to such kill i n g , Me rcado principle is not applicable;
erca o, h ence, the c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s m u r d e r , an d n o t k i d n a p p in g w i t h
116289 N oovember
ve 29, 2000 citing People v. Ramos G.R. N . 1 1 8 o.
murder. Wi t h ou t i n t en t t o d e p r iv e l i b e r ty , th e offenders cannot be
er 12, 1998); or kidna pping with h o m i c ide (People v. Montani r,
G.R. No. 1 8 7 584, A priri l 4, 2 h eld li able fo r k i d n a p p i ng , w h i c h i s a c r i m e a g a i ns t l i b e r ty . T h e
2 011);or K i d n a p p i ng f o r r a n s o m w i t h detention is considered as incidental if the same merely arises
homicide (People v. Dio na l d o, G.R N o . 2 0 7 9 49 J u l
eop e v. Elizalde, G.R No. 210484, December 5, 2 016)'or y 28,k'd2014; d f rom th e t r a n s p ort a t ion of t h e v i c ti m t o t h e p l a ce w h er e h e sh a l l
r ,; be executed. (People v. Estacio, Jr., G.R No. 171 655,July 22, 2009;
omicide and rape:(People v.Larranaga, G.R Nos. 138874-75,g
with homici or x n ap p i n
February 8, 2004) People v. Ong, G.R. No. L-84497, Janua ry 30, 1975)

In case of People v. Mercado, the accused abducted th In Pe ople v. Ji m i n e z, G . R. N o . L - 3 6 6 1 3 -14, J u ly 2 4 , 1 9 8 1 ,

because he iimplicated t he m i n t h e c o m m i s sion of ur co bbery. e e v i cti m
On e of
during a r aid on m a r i j u an a pl a n t a t i on, bandits headed by N a r d ong
them upon arri v in g at the safe hous P utik a b d u c te d t w o N B I op e r a t i v es . U p o n r e a c h in g t h e c r e e k ,
t
esae t d " P are, may regalo ako sa t hey were k i l l ed . T hey ar e l i a bl e for t w o c o u nt s of c om plex cr i m e
iyo, may papatayin t a yo." The victim w as bro ught in a s afe house in
Tanay, Rizal where he was tortured. Th of direct assault w i t h m u r d e r . I t i s n o t a s p e cial complex cr im e of
e . en , th e v i ct i m w a s b r o u ght k idnapping wit h m u r d er because the NBI a g ents were taken by th e
in Moronor o n g wh e r e h e w a s e xecuted. The c irc ums ta nces of th'
ances o
s how that a t h e or i g i n a l d e s ign o f t h e a c cused is t o k i l l t h is case a ccused solely for th e p u r p ose of ki l l in g t he m an d not for d et ai n i n g
Intent to depr ive li b ert y w a s a lso established since i o thi e victim. t hem illegally for any l e n gth of t i m e or for th e p u r p ose of obtainin g
detained s ince e v i c t i m w a s ransom for their release. The main pur p ose of the accused was to kill
i ne i in
n aa s afe
f h house. Accused were convicted of special corn l e x
c rime of kidnapping w it h m u r d e r . e o spectra complex t he agents, their f or cible t a k in g h a v in g been only i n c i dental to t h e
killing. It was not the pu r p ose of the accused to commit th e crime of
J uan a n d P e d r o h a r b o r e d a l o n g - s t a n d i n illegal detention .
rud
o e oped wit h t h e i r s i s t er , an d l a t e r a b a n d oned h er . T h e
laid met i culous p l an s t o k i l l h i m . T h e y a b d u c ted J ose in In Me r c a d o, d e p r i v a t i on o f l i b e r t y i s n o t i n ci d e n t al s i n c e
t he victi m w a s d e t a i ne d i n a s a f e h o u se. T h er e ar e t w o c r i m i n a l
inter t i o ns, to wi t : t o d e p r i v e l i b e r t y a n d t o k i l l . H e n c e, a ccused
e commi e i s s p e c ial complex i s liable for s pecial complex cr im e of k i d n a p p in g w i t h m u r d e r . I n
i n ap p ing wi t murder even if the original design is to k'll
him. (1978 Bar Exam) n ls 0 1 Estacio and Ji m i n e z, the d e p ri v a t i on of l i b e r ty i s i n c i d e ntal s i n c e
t he v i c t i m s w e r e m e r e l y t r a n s p o r te d t o t h e p l a c e w h e r e t h e y

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 436 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 437
VOLUME II
D SECURITY

will be k i l l ed . T h ey w er e no t d e t a i ne d i n a s a f e h ouse. Th ere i s a

s ing e crim i na l i n t e n t i on , and t h a t i s t o k ' l l h ' received it ccnspired w it h a b d u ct ors in c o m m i t t i n g k i d n a p p in g for
o i i m . H ence,, the
h crime ransom. Hence, the recipient is liable as principal and not merely as
c ommitted is m u r der on l y .
an accomplice. (People v. Octa, G.R. No. 295196, July 18, 2015)
Thee detention i s a l s o c o n sidered a s i n c i d e n ta l i f t h e s a m e
m erely arises from the tr an sport a t i o P ersons Li a bl e for K i d n a p p i n g fo r R a n s o m
n o f th e v i ct i' m fr o m o n e place to
another
anot er tto
o evade tthe police author i t ies from ar r esting th em. (People
v. 8'ong, G.R. No. 82529, May 12, 1978) In kidnapping for ransom, the accused, who ab d u c ted t h e
victim for r a n som, are liable as prin cipal by di r ect par t i ci p ati on .
3. D e m a n d f o r R a n s o m Af t e r Co m m i t t i n M
the case of r a , an d t h e c a s e of Es t a c io, th e ia cicnused
o L oora
g ur d er —In
d
In kidnapping for ransom, the accused, whose only participation
ransom p aym se em a n d ed is to de mand r a n s om or r e c eive the r a n s om p a y m e nt, i s l i a b le a s
me
me ent f r o m t h e r e l a t i ves of th e v i' c tii m
m a f t
a e r mur d e r i n g
him. principal b y d i r ect p a r t i c i p at i on . D e m a n d in g o r r e c eivin g r a n som
money in di cates th e c o m m o n al it y o f p u r p ose of h i s a ct s t o gether
I f th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s m u r d e r t h w ith o t h er . H e n ce, h e i s n o t a m e r e a c complice bu t p r i n c i pal b y
er, e dem an d f or ransom
a er k i l l i n g t h e v i c t im , w i l l n o t c o n v
aft reason of implied conspiracy. (People v. Octa, G.R. No. 195196, July
n ver t th e cr i m e f r om mu r der t o
k idnapping for r a n som w it h m u r d er . K i d 18, 2015) Bu-. if the accused acquired knowledge of, and concurred in
r er . ' napping is a crime against
l iibert
er ty.. HHeennce,
c th e essence of t hi s c r i m e i s d e p r i v a t ion o f l i b e r t y . the criminal r esolution of the abductor after th e l a t ter d et ained th e
S ince the vi cti m i s a l r e ady d ea d t h victim, there is no conspiracy. Knowl edge and cri m i nal concurrence
' a, e a cc u s ed cannot any m ore u se
d
deprivation of l i b er t y as mode of asking ransom payment from the merely constit ut e c o m m u n i t y o f d e s i gn . I f t h e a c cused demanded
relatives of the vict im . A de ad body has no liberty t h a t t h e a ccused o r received r a n so m p a y m en t p u r s u an t t o t h e i n s t r u c t io n o f t h e
can deprive of. (People v. L ora s u p abductor, he is only liable as accomplice on the basis of community of
ra; P eo pl e v .. E stacio, J'r., supra)
I t is subm i t t e d t h a t t h e a ccused can be held 1 b l f design. (People v. Castro, G.R. No. 182726, July 28, 2002, En Banc)
e e ia e o r e s tafa,
emp e , r u st r a t e d , o r c o n s u m m a te d s i n e h In kidnapping for ransom, the accused, who guarded the
r epresentation t h a t t h e v i c t i m i s s t i l l 1' e e e m p1o y edd fi a l s e
s i a i v e i n a s k i n g m o n ey f r o m v ictim i n s id e a s afe h ouse to p r ev ent h i m f r o m e s caping, is l i a b l e
h'is relative.
a s principal by d i r ect pa r t i c i p a t i on. Hi s acts of guar ding th e vi ct i m
indicate im p l ied conspiracy. (People v. Li c a yan, G.R. No s. 140900-
KIDNAPPING FGR RANSGM 140911, August 15, 2001) However, there is no impli ed conspiracy if
t he accused was not guarding the victim, but she was merely havin g
Ransom means mone y, pr' iceor consideration paid or demanded c onversatiorx unrelated t o k i d n a p p in g w i t h t h e a b d u c t ors. Bu t b y
for
o r the redemption
red of a capt u red person tha t w i l l r e l e ase him f r o m b eing aware that t h e v i c ti m i s b eing detained against hi s w i ll , a n d
captivity. Ki d n apping for ransom is commi t ted alt h by not reporting the matter to the police authorities,the accused
re y wanted Ch r i s t m a s gifts or pam a s ko." (Peoplev. hS h alim ba o
acquired kn ow l edge of an d o n c u r r e d i n t h e c r i m i n a l r e solution of
G.R No . 1 2 1 865 Se ptember 1 4 1 9 9 9 ) N o specific form o f r a n s o m t he abductors. B e in g p r e sent i n t h e s a f e h o use w h er e t h e v i c t i m
i s required to consumm at e th e f elony of k i d n a w as detained, th e accused supplied m o ra l ai d t o t h e a b d u ctors i n
o i n ap piinn g f o o rr r a n s o m a s
g as e r a n s o m is i n t e n ded as a bargaini n an efficacious w ay . H e n ce, she i s l i a bl e a s a c complice. (People v .
chi i
vic im s r e e d om. The am oun t of an d p u r p ose for th e rha n som is Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2018)
immaterial. (People v. Mamant ak s
, supra)) Wh et h er or not the ransom I n c as e o f d o u b t , w h e t h e r t h e r e i s i m p l i e d c o n s p i r acy o r
i s actually p aid t o or r eceived b t h
y h e p e r p et r a t ors is of no m om ent . community of design in kidnapping for ransom, the same must be
is su ficient that the k i d n a p p ing was commi t ted f
e or
exactin ing ransom.
r (People v. Reyes G.R. N . 1 78800, Mth e purpose of the resolved in favor of the accused. Hence, he shall be convicted as
o. , arch 17, 2009) accomplice on the basis of ccmmu n it y of design and not as principal
While receipt of the ransom mone o n the basis of im p l ied conspiracy. If th e accused was not guar di n g
money was not a mat eri,al element
o f thee crime
cr i m e ,i ti t w a s n e v e r t h e l ess a p r o o f t h a t t h e a c c u sed w h o the victim, but he was merely caught in th e h ouse where the victim
i s detained an d w h er e fi r e a r m s ar e a v a i l a b le, he i s o nl y l i a bl e as

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VOLUME II IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 439
AND SECURITY
an accomplice.(People v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 183489 and 148970
P
January 15, 2002)
D urat ion of d e t e n t i o n
A ccused assisted i n b r i n g i n g v i c t i m t o t h e b a s e m ent o f t h e I n k i c n a p p in g a n d s e r i ou s i l l e ga l d e t e n t i on , t h e d e t e n t i o n
house owned by them, and supplied food to him. I m p l ied conspiracy
must have lasted for m ore th an t h r e e days. If t h e d e t e nt ion l a s te d
is present in this case. The venue of detention ' ' d '
en ion is in i s p e nsable bl in the f or exactly t h r e e d a y s , t h e c r i m e i s n o t k i d n a p p in g a n d s e r i o u s
p lanni
arming to commit kidnapping for ransom. Th k'd
e i n a p p ers would illegal detention but s l i gh t i l l e gal detention i n t h e absence of other
n ot have executed their plan to k i dn a t h ' t'
p e vic im wi t h o u t a s p ecific q ualifying cir cu m st ance. In i n f a n t i c i de, the v i c ti m m u s t b e a c h i l d
p ace of detention. Pr ovi din g such pl ace in di c t
less than three days old. If t he age of the chi d is exactly th r e e days
a p r i o r a gr eement w it h t h e ab ductors concerning tthe h t tcommission
h
old, the crime committed is not infanticide but murder qualified by
of the crime. (People v. Salvador, G.R No. 201448, April 10 2018)
the circumstance of treachery.
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION
minor, the cu"ation ofhis detention is immat eri al. (People v. Damayo,
Slight illegal detention is committed by a private individual, G.R. No. 282-"61, September 26, 2018) If the v'ctim is kidnapped and
who kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him i llegally detained for th e p u r p ose of extort in g r a n som, the dur a t i on
of his liberty but without the attendanc of his d e t e n t ion b e comes i n consequenti al. (P e ople v. M a m a n t a k ,
'y ance o f any o ft t h e c i r c u m s t a nces
at w i qu alif t h e crim e i n t o k i d n a p p in g a n d s e r i ou s i l l e a l G,R. ¹. 1 7 46 59,July 2 8, 2008) The presence of any other qualifyi n g
detention. (Artic le 26'8) s i ega c ircumstan"e (e.g., th e v i c t i m i s a w o m a n ,'i wil l m a k e t h e c r i m e
k idnapping and serious ill egal detention r egardless of the dur a t i on
T o be held liable for slight i l l egal detention ' t ' ' d'
ion, i i s i n i s p e n sable of the detention. However, the victim m u st b= deprived of liberty for
a e det en t i o n h a s not lasted for
m ore t h a n t h r e e d a y s , a n appreciable period of t i m e t o i n d i c ate i n t en t t o d e p r iv e l i b er t y ,
t he victim i s n o t a m i n o r , a f e m a l e o r a p u b l i c of fi cer, an d t h e r e
w hich is a n e s sence of sl i gh t i l l e gal d e t e n t ion o r k i d n a p p in g a n d
i s ne i t he r s i m u l a t i o n o f p u b l i c a u t h
u o r i t y , n o r s e r i o u s p h y s i cal s erious illegal detention for being a crime against lib er t y .
i njuries, nor thr eat to ki ll . Even thou h
g n o n e of th e a bov e m e n t i o n ed
c ircumstances were p r esent i n t h e c o m m i s sion of t h e o f f ense t h
p ublic Offi ce r
i n ap p in g i i t i s c o m m i t t e d f o r p u r p o ses of e x t o r t i
r ansom from t h e vvi ci ti m o r a n y o t h e r p e r son ( 1 974 and 19
m the x 9or
7Binagr If th e d e t a i ned vi c t im i s a p u b l i c o f f i c er, th i s c i r c u m s ta nce
Exams), or if the victim is kil l ed or dies in the course of the detention. will qualify th e crime into k i d n a p p in g and serious illegal detention.
However, th f a c t t h a t th e offender is a public officer w ill not qualif y
the crime int o k i d n a p p i ng. (2011 Bar E x a m) Bu t t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e
ILLEGAL DETENTION IN GENERAL
o f publi c p o s i t io n c a n b e c o n s i d ere d a s a sp e c i a l a g g r a v a t i n g
If accused depr i ved t h e v i c t i m o f l i b e r t y f o r a n a p p r e ciable circumstance. (Artic le 62)
p eriod of time and th e depriv a t ion of 1'b t
i er y i s not j ust i n c i dental to
tthe
e commission
commissio of other crime, he is liable for illegal detention. There v olun t ar y R e l e a s e
are three ki nds of i l l egal detent i on, to w i t : k i d n a
i If the offender i n s l i gh t i l l e gal d et en t ion v o l u n t a r il y r e l eases
e en ion, s i g t i l l e g a l d e t e n t i on , an d u n l a w f u l a r r e st . I f t he person so l o cked u p o r d e t a i n e d w i t h i n t h r e e d a y s f r o m t h e
i llegal d e t en t ion i s a c c ompanied w i t h a
ualif yin g c ommencement o f t h e d e t ention, w i t hout h a v ing a t t ained t h e
ic e , t e c r i m e committe d i s k i d n a p p i n g a n d purpose intended, and before the insti t u t i on of crim i n al pr oceedings
serious ill e ga l d et en ti o n ; o t h e r w i s e, t he c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s s li h
against h i m , t h e p e n a l t y i s l e s s er. (A r t i c l e 26 8 of t h e R e v i s ed
illegal detention un d er A r t i c l e 2 6 8. If t h e p u r p o se of t he o f f e nder
Penal C o de> In s u m , t h i s v o l u n t a r y r e l e a se is n o t a n e x e m p t i n g
i n detainin g t h e erson is to
p o deliver hi m t o p r o per a u t h o r i t i es b t circumstance in s l i gh t i l l e gal d et ent ion (P eople v. Pagalasan, G.R.
t ere is no r easona s onable ground to m ak e a ci t i z en's arrest, the cr i m e ¹s . 1 8 1 926'and 188991,tu n e 1 8, 2008) but it is just an attenuati n g
committed is unlawful arrest under Article 269.
circumstance. However, thi s c i rcumstance of v oluntary r elease
cannot be appreciated in k i d n a p p ing and serious illegal detention.

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 440 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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This special m i t i g a t in g c i r c u m s t a nce of v o l u n t ar y r e l e ase is
found in t h e t h i r d p a r a g r ap h o f A r t i c l e 26 8 o f t h e R ev='sed Penal
Code on sli ght i l l e gal d e t en t i on . H e n ce, it ca n o nl y b e c on sidered
i n sl i gh t i l l e ga l d e t e n t io n u n d e r t h e fi r s t p a r a g r
2688 ,an and not i n k i d n a p p in g for r a n som u n der A r t i cl e 26h t. fHaAdr tt h e
1
egislature int ended that th e t h i r d p a r a g r aph of A r t i cle 268 should
apply not only to slight i l l e gal detention u n der A r t i cle 267, it woul d
have either so expressed or at least made of said third paragraph
a separate A r t i cl e w he n i t e n a c ted th e R e vised Penal C ode, or i t s
amendatory l a ws. (Asistio v. S an Di e go, G.R N o . L- 2 1 9 91 M a r
A and B kidnapped C and detained him. They demanded
ransom from C's wi fe. The next d ay , C ha d a r e l a pse of his i l l n ess.
Fearing h e m i gh t d i e i f n o t t r e a t e d a t o n c e by a d o c t or , 4 a n d B
released C dur in g th e ea r ly mo r n i n g of t he t h i r d d ay of d e t e nt i o n.
In a crim i nal case filed against A and B fo r k i d n a p p i ng for ra n s om,
they ar g ued t h a t t h e c r i m e i s b a i l a b le . A r g u m en t i s u n t e n a b l e.
o untary r e l e ase s h al l n o t b e c o n s i d ered a s s p e cial m i t i g a t i n g
circumstance since the crim e comm i t t e d ' k ' d ' or inti m i d a t ion a s a m o d e of c o m p u l s ion, t he c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s
is i n a p p i n g for r a n s om.
T his circum st ance can only b e ap p r eciated if t h e c r im e fcom m i t t e d
i s slight i l l egal detent i on. For p u r p oses of determ i n in g i f th e cr i m e
is bailable or not, th e court sh al l consider th e n on-bailable penalty
o death prescribed forkidnapping for ransom, and not the bailable
pena ty (of pr i s i o n m a y o r i n i t s m i n i m u m a n d m e d '
n by
p rescribed for s l i gh t i l l e gal d e t en t ion m i t i g a ted m et hi eu m t ieg ra'i todi n
mip
circumstance of volunt ar y r e l ease. (1974 and 19 97 Bar Ex a m s )
DAN kidnapped a minor. On the second day, DAb, released
t e m i n o r e ven b efore an y c r i m i n a l i n f o r m a t io n w a s f i le d a g ainst
i m. At t h e t r i a l o f h i s c a se, DA N r a i s e d t h e d e fense tha t h e d i d
n ot incur any cri m i na l l i a b i l it y due to the circum st ance f
il t
re ease. The circumstance of volun t ary re l e ase is not an a bsolutory
c ause but an a t t e n u a t in g ci r c u m s t ance. Moreover, the a t t e n u a t i n g
c ircumstance of volunt ar y r e l ease can only be apprec' t d '
i eg a e en t i o n . I n t h i s c a se, th e c r im e c om m i t t e d i s k i d n a pI ihn
g detention s i nce th e q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t ance of
minority is present. (2004 B ar Ex a m )
P lace of D e t e n t i o n
T h e penalty fo r s l i gh t i l l e ga l d e t e n t io n s h al l b e i n c u r r e d b y
anyone who shall fur n ish the place for the perpetr at ion of the crime.
( rt i c e 26'8) In k i d n a p p i ng f or r a n s o m, p ro v i d i ng t he p l a ce whe re
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 441
AND SECURITY
the victim w il l be detained in dicates impl ied conspiracy. Hence, the
provider shall be held l i a ble as pr i n ci p al. (People v. Salvador, G.R.
No. 201443, April 10, 2013)
I llegal D e t e n t i o n an d C o e r c i o n
The differences between il l egal detention an d coercion are as
follows:
1. I l l e g a l d e t en t ion is a cr im e against l i b erty w h i l e coercion
i s a crime against securit y ;
2. I n i l l e g a l detenti on, the victim is being deprived of liberty
f or an ap p r eciable l engt h o:" time; w h il e i n c o ercion, th e v i " t i m i s
being compelled to do something against hi s w il l or p r e v ented from
doing something not pr ohi b i ted by law . (1999 Bar Ex a m )
If the accused compelled th e v i c ti m t o e x ecute an af f id a v it o f
desistance in c o n n ection w t h a r a p e c a se, an d h e u s e d v i o l ence
grave coercion. But if th e accused compelled the victim , a female, to
execute an affidavit of desistance in connection with a rape case, and
he used deprivation ofliberty for two days as a mode of compulsion,
t he crime com m i t t e d i s k i d n a p p in g an d s e r i ou s i l l e gal d e t ent i on .
If the accused also demanded rei m b u r s ement of l i t i g a t ion expense
d)g
s) i n the a m o un t o f P 1 0 , 000 in. th e r a p e c ase, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d
is kidnappin g fo r r a n s om . ( 1 991 Ba r E x a m ) T h e a m o u n t o f a n d
purpose for th e r a n som i s i m m a t e r i al . (P eople v. M a m a n t a k, G . B .
No. 1 74659, July 28, 2008)
UNLAWFUL ARREST
Unlau fu l a r r est i s corrm i t t e d by a ny p e r s on who s ha ll a r r e s t
or detain a n o t her fo r t h e p u r p ose of d el iv er in g hi m t o t h e p r o p er
authorities (or fi l i n g a c a se i n c o u rt ) w i t h ou t b e in g a u t hor zed by
law, or reasonable ground th er efor. (Art ic le 269; 2012 Bar Exam )
The d i f f er ences be t w e en i l l e g al d e t e n t i on ( k i d n a p p i ng a n d
s erious i l l e ga l d e t e n t i on , s l i g h t i l l e g a l d e t e n t i on , a n d u n l a w f u l
arrest) and arbitrary detention are asfollows:
1. I n i l l e g al detention includ ing unl a w ful ar r est, the offender
is a private indi v i d ual or pub lic officer who commits the crime in hi s
private capacity.
 442 C RIMINAL LAW RLVIEW E R
VOLUME II
In arbit r ar y d etent i on, the offender is a public officer, who has
a uthority t o a r r e s t (People v. Br i n g a s, G. R. No . 18 9 0 98, Apr il 2 8 ,
2010) or cause the arrest of crim i na l su spect.
2. I n k i d n a p p i n g a n d s e r i ou s i l l e gal d e t e n t io n a n d s l i g h t
illegal detention, the offender is not ar r est ing the victim bu t mmere e r el y
d epriving h i m o f h i s l i b e r t y . I n u n l a w f u l a r r e s t a n d a r bi i rary
trar
d etention, the offender is arresting the vict i m .
I n unl a w fu l a r r e st , th e p r i v a t e i n d i v i d ua l o r p u b l i c officer i n
its private capacity arr ests or detains the victim w i t h out r e asonable
ground or legal author ity for pur p oses of delivering him to the proper
j udicial auth or i t y .
I n ar b i t r ar y d e t e n t i on , t h e p u b l i c o f f icer, wh o h a s a u t h o r i t y
to make arr est, detains th e vi cti m w i t h ou t l e gal gr ou nds (People v.
Bringas, G.R. No. 189098, April 2 8, 2010) in purs uit of his autho ri t y
to arrest. (People v. Sant i a n o, G.R. ¹ . 128 9 7 9 , De cember 8, 1998)
Thus, if a police officer arr ested a person and t h r e at ened to elevate
his case to th e p r o secutor's office u n l ess he p r o d uces money, an d
a s a c onsequence th e a r r e s tee i n v o l u n t a r i l y g a v e m o n e y t o t h e
extortionist, th e cr im e i s r o bbery r e g ar dless of wh e t her t h e a r r e st
was unlawful (U.S. v. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-9102, November 5, 1918)
or lawful. (Pablo v. People, G.R. No. 152481, April 15 , 2 005; People
v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-21890, Mar ch 26, 1924
)
I ntent t o d e l i v e r t h e p e r so n a r r e s te d i s n o t a n e l e m en t o f
a rbitrar y d e t e n t i on . T h u s , a r r e s t in g a p e r so n t o d e t e r m i n e i f h e
c ommitted a c r i m e i s a r b i t r a r y d e t e n t io n a l t h o ug h t h e a r r e s t i n
s ing
o fficer h a s n o i n t e n t t o m a k e a j u d i c i a l d e l i v e ry . ( s ee: U . S .
v.
Hawchaw, G . R . ¹ . L - 69 0 9 , F e b r u a r y 2 0 , 1 9 1 2 ) H o w ev er , t h e
element of "in pu r s u it of his duty to arr e st" in arb i t r a ry d e te nti on is
p resent if th e pu r p ose of the public officer in a r r e st ing th e vi ctim i s
to deliver the suspect to judicial aut h or i ty . (U.S. v. G ellada, G.R. ¹.
L-5151, January 81, 1910)
3. A r b i t r a r y d e t e n t ion i s a c r i m e a g a inst f u n d a m e n ta l l a w
o f the lan d ( th e C onsti t u t i o n). A p u b l i c officer, wh o i s v e sted w i t h
the authority to detain or to order the detention of a person accused
of a crime, is acting in b eh alf of th e St at e in a r r e st ing or d e t a i n i n g
a person. I f s u c h p u b l i c of fi cer d e t a i ne d a p e r so n i n v i o l a t io n o f
h is constit u t i o na l r i g h t a g a i n s t u n r e a sonable s ei zur e (o r n o t i n
a ccordance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Crim i n al
Procedure), the crime commi t ted is "a rb i t r a ry d e tention."
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 443
AND SECURITY
Unlawful arrest is a crime against personal liberty and security .
A public officer, who is not vested with th e a u t h o r it y t o det ain or t o
o rder th e d e t en t ion o f a p e r son (e.g., stenographer, r esear"her or
municipal tr easurer), is not acting in behalf of the State in m ak in g a
warrantless arrest. Such public officer acting in his pr i v ate caps. city
(or a priv ate i n d i v i d u al) could not v i o l at e th e C on st i t u t ion P e o p l e
v. Marti, G.R. ¹. 815 6 1 , Ja n u a ry 18 , 1991); hence, if he ar=ests or
detains a person not in accordance with the said crim i nal pr o cedural
rule, the crim e comm i t t e d is "u n l a w f u l a r r e s t." T he essence of this
crime is not a violation of fundamental law of the land but deprivati on
o f liberty of the vict i m .
Illegal detention i s a lso a c r i m e a g a i nst p e r sonal li b e r ty a n d
security. (1948 and 19 60 Bar Ex a m s )
K IDNAPPING OF MINOR S
Kidnapping an d f a i l u r e t o r e t ur n a m i n o r is co m m i t t e d b y a
person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor, deliberately
fails to restore the latter to his par ents or guar d i ans. (Artic le 270)
If the victim of il l egal detention is a mi n or, the offender can be
held liable for kidn apping and serious illegal detention, slight ill egal
d etention, or fail ur e to ret ur n a m i n o r .
1. K id n a p p i n g a nd S e r i o u s I l l e g a l D e t e n t i o n — If
t he victim i s a m i n o r ( o r f e m a l e), th e d u r a t i o n o f h i s d e t en t ion i s
immaterial. (People v. Maman t a k, supra) Even though the detention
has not lasted for more than t h r e e days, if the vi cti m i s a m i nor (or
female), the crime commi t ted is stil l k i d n a p p in g and serious illegal
d etention. I n t h i s c a se, th e c i r c u m s t a nce of m i n o r i t y ( o r b e i n g a
female) qualifies the crime. (2004 B ar Exa m )
In People v. Fabro, G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017, the accused
arrived at the school in Pampanga supposedly to fetch her nine-year
o ld niece. In stead of b r i n g in g h e r h o m e , th e a c cused brougl.t h e r
n iece to Nu eva E c ij a an d k ep t h e r t h e r e for f ou r d a y s d espite t h e
begging of her parents to release her. Crime commit ted is kidnappin g
a nd serious i l l e gal d e t en t i on . Th e a c cused's claim t h a t h e r n i e c e
voluntaril y w en t w i t h h e r t o N u ev a Ecija cannot hold w a t er, as th e
c hild was not i n a p o s i t io n t o g i v e consent. W h er e th e v i c ti m i s a
minor, lack of consent is presumed. She is incompetent to assent to
seizure and i l l egal detenti on. The consent of such child cou.'d place
accused in no better position t ha n i f t h e act ha d been done against
 444 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
her will. In k i d n a p p i ng, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of
his/her liberty. If th e vi cti m i s a ch i ld, it a lso includes the int en t i on
of the accused to deprive the p ar ents w it h t h e cu stody of th e chil d.
In this case, accused intended to deprive the child of her liberty, and
h er parents, with th e custody of their d a u g h t er .
See also: People v. Acbangin, G.R. No. 117216, August 9, 2000;
People v. Baluya, G.R. No. 181822, April 1 8, 2011; People v. Siapno,
G.R. No. 218911, August 23, 2017.
2. Sli g h t I l l eg a l D et e n t i o n — I f th e
victim o f 'l l
e ention is a m i n or , th e cr im e comm i t t e d i s generally k i d n a p p i n g 1
and serious illegal detention because of the qualify ing circum stance
of minority. However, the offender can be held liable for slight ill egal
detention of the mi nor if th e cir cu m st ance of minor it y is not al l eged
i n the inform a t ion or th e offender is the parent of the vict i m .
I f a person locked her boyfr i end against hi s w i l l i n h e r h o u se
for 10 hours while work in g at her office, she is liable for slight il l egal
d etention. If a person locked her m i nor son against hi s w il l i n t h e i r
o use for 1 0 h o u r s w h i l e w o r k i n g a t h e r o f fi c e
h I' bl
o r s ig t i l l e g a l d e t e n t i on . A m o t h e r i n t h e e x e r cise of p a r e n t al
authority ca n c o mpel he r so n t o s t a y i n s i d e t h ei r h o u se. Ex ercise
o f parental a u t h o r i t y c a n n o t b e a s o u r c e o f t h e c r i m e o f i l l e g al
detention. However, if she chained the leg of his mi nor son to a tr ee
or appreciable l en gt h o f t i m e , sh e i s l i a b l e f o r i l l e ga l d e t e n t i on .
is is not an exercise of parental au t h o r it y over the child anym or e.
Since the o f f ender i s t h e p a r e n t o f t h e v i c t i m , t h e c i r c u m s t a n ce
o m i n o r it y c a n not q u a l if y t h e c r i m e i n t o k i d
i lle
ega d m other
al d e t e n t i on . W i t h o u t a q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t ance, th e
is only l i a bl e for s l i gh t i l l e gal d e t en t i on . Bu t o t h e r c i r c u m s t ances
m ay qualify th e crim e commi t t ed by th e par ent. For exam l e f t h
dete ntion lasted for m or e t ha n t h r e e d ays or her c h il d i s a f e m a l e,
t e mother is still li a ble for serious illegal detention even though the
v ictim is his mi nor d au ght er .
3. F a il u r e t o R e t u r n a M i n o r —F ailure to retu rn a
n a minor
can be
e cco
o m m i t t e d by th e par ent of th e m i nor or a n
ny o th
e r p e r son.. If
e o ender is the parent of the mi no r t h e p en al t
I
y is esser. .((A r t i'cl e
271) H oow
weve vre r, a parent can only commit t h i s c ri me if t he custody of
t he minor is given by the court to th e other par en t .
A and B w e r e l e g a lly s e para te d. Th e ir c h i ld C , a m i n o r , w a s
p aced in the custody of A, the mother, subject to monthly visitations
by B, his father. On one occasion, when B had C in his company,
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 445
AND SECURITY
B decided not t o r e t u r n C t o h i s m o t h e r . I n s t e a d, B t o o k C w i t h
h im to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w h er e h e i n t e n de d fo r t h e m t o r e s i d e
permanently. B i s l i a b le for t he c ri me of f a i l u re to r e t u rr a m i n o r .
(2002 Bar Exam)
If the parents of a minor child are separated and there is no
j udicial o r de r p e r t a i n i n g t o h i s c u s t o dy , t h e f a t h e r w h o f a i l s t o
return th e ch il d t o hi s m o t her i s no t l i a bl e for i l l e gal detenti on, or
f ailure to r e t ur n m i n o r s i n ce he i s m e r el y e x ercising hi s p a r e n t a l
a uthority. Un der A r t i cle 211 of the Fam il y Code, the father and t h e
mother shall joi n tl y ex ercise parental a u t h o r it y over th e persons of
their common childr en; in case of disagreement, the father's decision
s hall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contr a r y .
a. E n t r u st i n g P h y s i c a l C u s t o d y — To be held li abl e
f or fail ur e t o r e t u r n a m i n o r , t h e p a r e nt s o r g u a r d ia n m u s t
h ave entru sted th e p h y s ical custody of t h ei r c h il d or w a r d t o
the accused. Whether this custody lasted for months or only for
a couple ofdays. the crime is committed as long as the offender
h ad, at one poin t i n t i m e , p h y s ical an d a c t ua l cu stody of t h e
minor. (People v. Marquez, G.R No. 181440, April 1"-,2011)
In Pe ople v. Ma r q u e z, s u p r a, t h e a c c u s ed b o r r o w ed a
three-month old baby from her mother to buy her some clothes,
milk, and food. The mother agreed because itwas nct unusual
for the accused to brin g t h ei r ch il d some th i n gs wh e never she
c ame to the parl or. The accused failed to ret ur n t h e " h i l d . Th e
c rime commit ted is fail ur e to ret ur n a m i n o r .
In People ~. Mendoza, G.R. No. 67610, July 3 1, 1989, the
Information a:eged that accused befriended a one-year old
c hild an d h i s p a r e nt s a t t h e L u n e t a P a r k , c a r r i e d t h e c h i l d
away wi t h ou t t h e k n o w l e dge and consent of hi s p a r e n ts, an d
deliberately fai:ed to return hi m t o his moth er. Accused cannot
be convicted of fai l ur e t o r e t ur n a m i n o r fo r l ack of a l l egation
that the paren-.s entrusted their child to the accused. However,
w ithout a l l e ga-.ion t h a t t h e a c c u sed i s e n t r u s t e d w i t h t h e
p hysical c u s t ody o f t h e m i n o r v i c t i m , t h e a c c u sed ca n b e
c onvicted of kidn apping and serious illegal detenti or .
b. Fai l u r e t o R e t ur n — In k i d napping and serious
i llegal detention quali fied by the circum st ance of minori ty, th e
crimina l a ct i s a b d u c t i ng t h e m i n o r o r d e p r i v i n g h i m o f h i s
liberty. In the crime of failure to return a minor, the criminal
omission i s t h = failure t o r e t u r n t h e m i n o r t o h i s p a r e nt s or
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g uardians a f t e r t h e y e n t r u s t e d t h e p h y s i cal c u s t ody o f t h e
victim to the accused.
W hile one of th e e ssential e l em ents of f a i l ur e t o r e t u r n
a minor i s t h a t t h e o f f e nder w a s e n t r u s ted w i t h t h e c u s tody
o f th e m i n o r , w hat i s a c t u a l l y b e i n g p u n i s h e d i s
n ot t h e
kidnapping but t h e de l i b erate failure of th at p e r s on to restore
the mi nor t o h i s p a r e n t s o r g u a r d i a ns . Th e w o r d d e l i b erate
must i m pl y s o m et h in g m or e t h a n m e r e ne g l i g ence —it mus t
be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly da r in g or i n t e n t i o n ally
and maliciouslywrong. (People v.Marquez, supra)
Failure to return a minor had been fully consummated
u pon deliberate f a i l u r e , b y t h e a c cused, to r e t u r n t h e m i n o r
to his parents upon demand. Hence, the alleged "'Easunduan
sa Pagtalikod sa Ea r a p a t an a t P a g pa pa apon sa b
executed a f t e r t h e consummati on ang Anak"
o f t h e c r i m e w ill n o t
extinguish t h e c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y o f t h e a c c u sed..(People v .
Marquez, supra)
In People v. Bernard o, G.R. No. 144316, March 1 1, 2002,
when Roselle entr u s ted Roselyn t o accused before setting out
on an errand for accused to look for ice water, the first element
was accomplished and when accused refused to return the baby
to Roselle despite her conti n u ous pleas, the crime of fail ur e to
return th e m i nor was effectively accomplished.
In People v. Ty, G. R. N o. 1 2 1 519, October 30, 1 996, the
complainant e n t r u s ted he r d a u g h ter t o a c l i n i c's care. Th ere
was no deliberate refusal or f a i l ur e on th e p ar t of th e accused
to restore the custody of th e complain a n t's child to h er. Wh en
t he accused learned t h a t c o m p l a i n an t w a n t e d h r d
a c a f t e r fi v e l o n g y e ar s o f a p p a r en t w a n t o n n e g l ect, ht
t h ey
tried their best to help herein complain ant fin d th e child as the
latter was no longer under th e cli n i c's care.
INDUCING A MINOR TO ABANDON HIS HOME
nducing a mi nor to abandon his home is committ e" by anyone
who shall i n d u c e a m i n o r t o a b a n don t h e h o m e of h i s p a r e nt s or
g uardians or t h e p e r s ons en t r u s te d w i t h h i s c u s t o dy. T h i s c r i m e
can be commi t ted by an y p e r son or b y t h e f a t h e r o r t h e m o t her of
the minor. If th e offender is th e p ar ent of th e m i n or , th e penalty is
esser. However, a parent can only commi t t h i s cr im e if th e custody
o f the minor is given by the court to th e other par en t .
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 447
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M, a 17-year old or p ha n g i r l , h a s been l i v i n g i n t h e h o use of
a couple A and B since she was a child and regarded by the couple
a s their own ch i ld . On p r o m ise of m a r r i a ge, M l ef t h om e to j oin C ,
but three days lat er, M w a s i n t e r cepted before she could join C . C
i s not liable for i n d u cing a m i nor t o ab a ndon her h ome since M d i d
not abandon th e h om e of he r p a r e nt s or g u a r d i an s or t h e p e r sons
entrusted with his custody. A and B are not persons legally entru st ed
with the custody of M (1970 Bar Exam)
TRAFFICKING IN PERSON FOR LABOR EXPLOITATION
Trafjicking in person under R.A. No. 9208 includes recruitment,
obtaining, h i r i ng, p r oviding, offering, t r a nsportation, t r ansfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons by means of threat, or
use offorce, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
a buse of power or of position, tak in g adv an t age of the vu l n er abil i t y
of the person, or, the giv in g or r eceiving of pay m ents or benefits t o
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person
or where th e t r a f fi c ked v i c ti m i s a c h i l d f o r t h e p u r p ose of l a b or
e xploitation, such a s f o r ced l a b or , sl av ery, i n v o l u n t ar y s e r v i t u d e ,
and debt-bondage.
A n offender w h o c o m m i t s t h e c r i m e o f s l a v er y e x p l o i t a t i o n
of child labor or services rendered under compul sion in p a y m ent of
d ebts under the Revised Penal Code, can be prosecuted for trafficki n g
in person. R.A. No. 9208 is comprehensive enough to cover all forms
of slavery under the Revised Penal Code.
Consent of th e v i c ti m i s a d e f ense in s l a v ery, exploit at ion of
c hild labor, or s e r v i ces rendered u n der c o m p u l sion i n p a y m en t o f
debts. However, trafficking in person can be committed with or
w ithout consent of the vict i m .
SLAVERY
Slavery is c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s o n w h o p u r c h a s es, sells,
kidnaps ordetains a human being for the purpose of enslaving him,
or assigning the offended party to some immoral tr af fic. (Artic le 272)
In slavery under the Revised Penal Code, consent of the victim
is a defense, while in trafficking in person involving slavery, consent
of the victim is not a defense.
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Trafficking in Person involving Forced Labor and Slavery
Under R.A. No. 9208, slavery re fers to the s ta t us or condition
o a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right
of ownership ar e exercised; forced labor re f e rs to t he e xt r a c ti on of
work or services from any person by means of enticement, violence,
intimi d a t ion or thr eat, use of force or coercion, including deprivation
o ree om, abuse ofauthority or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or
deception includin g any wo rk or s e r v i ce extracted from a ny p e rson
under the menace of penalty.
Accused deceived 5 complain a n ts, who were mostly mi n ors, for
t ey are made to believe that t hey w il l be wor k in g as house helpers
in a g a y a n D e Or o Ci t y w i t h a n e n t i c i ng s a l a ry of P 1 , 5 00.00 per
month. She told them t ha t t h ey w o uld be allowed to go home once a
w ee . However, the complain a nts were tr a n spo t d t M
' C'
Thee co
complainants would not have agreed or would not have been
allowed by their parents if accused would directly offer them work at
Marawi C i ty . Th e accused deliberately fab r i cated a story to delude
h er victim s an d t h e i r p a r e n t s . W h e n c o m p l a i n an t a s ke d fo r t h '
as e or eir
y, ey were told that it had alr eady been given to accused. This
is slavery. Accused was convicted of t r af fi ck in g i n p e r son qu a li fied
by the circumstance of minor it y and l a rge scale. (I'eople v. Nangcas,
G.B. No. 218806, June 18, 2018)
I nvolu n t ar y S e r v i t u d e
Under R.A. No. 9 208, involuntary servitude refers to a condition
of enforced and compulsory service induc d b
ce y m e a n s of a n y scheme,
p lan or pa t t e rn , i n t e n ded to cause a person to b 1'
s e i n o t en t e r i n t o o r c o n t i n u e i n s u c h c o n d i t i on , thhe or fsh
h e or
anot er p erson would suffer serious harm or other forms of abuse or
r a r m , o r coercion ' including
p ysica restraint, orthreat of abuse or harm o
1 d'
'
de
e priving
riv i access to t r a vel d ocuments an d w i t h h l d '
i o i n g sa 1a r i e s , or
e a use or threatened abuse ofthe legal process.
E xploit a t io n of C h i l d L a b o r
Exploitation of child labor is committed by anyone wh
a nyone w o r e t ta i' n s
i n i s s e r v i c e a g a i nst h i s w i l l a n d u n d e r t h e p r e t ex t of
r eimbursement of a d e b t i n c u r r e d b h
y i s a s ce nd a n t , g u a r d i an , or
person entru sted wit h hi s custody. (Art ic le 278)
The cr
c reditor wh o r e sorts t o f o r ced labor of a c h i l d u n d e r t h e
pretext of reimbursing himself for the debt incurred by the child' s
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 449
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f ather comm it s th e c r i m e of ex pl oit a t ion of ch il d l a b or , w h ich i s a
form of slavery.(2009 Bar Exam)
1. Ch i l d Ex p l o i t a t i o n —
M aria borrowed money from Juan.
Despite the lapse of the agreed period of two months, Maria failed to
settle her obligati on. Juan r e q u i red M a r i a t o a l low he r 1 0 -year old
d aughter An nie to work as a housemaid in his house for two month s
in payment of her debt. Despite Ma r i a's objection, Juan insisted and
b rought the child to his house to work as a mai d .
J uan comm it s c h il d e x p l o i t a t ion u n d e r S e ction 1 0 (a) of R . A .
No. 7610, exploitation of child labor under Ar t i cle 278 of the Revised
Penal Code, and qualified tr a f ficking in p erson under R.A. No. 9208
for obtaining child of his debtor by means of coercion for the purpose
o f labor exploit a t ion o r d e b t -bondage. However, J ua n ca n o nl y b e
p rosecuted for on e c r i m e o f t h e r u l e o n d o u bl e j e opardy. Fo r t h e
protection of the child, accused should be prosecuted for the gra ver
crime of trafficking inperson. (2006 Bar Exam)
2. Ch i l d T r a f f i c k i n g — Selling or abandoning a child by hi s
p arent to a n o t her p e r son for v a l u a bl e consideration u n der A r t i c l e
59 of P.D. No. 603 is now punishable as child trafficking under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7610. This cr im e i s comm i t t ed by an y p e r son
who engages in trad ing and dealing wit h ch i l d ren in clu d i ng, but not
limited to, the act of bu y in g an d sellin g of a ch il d for m o n ey, or for
any other consideration, or bart er . If th e p u r p ose of sale of minor i s
labor, sexual or organ exploitat i on, the crime commi t ted is qualifi ed
trafficking in p erson under Section 4 in r e l a t ion to Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9208.
Services rendered u n de r c o m p u l sion i n p a y m en t o f d e bts i s
c ommitted b y a p e r so n w h o c o m p els th e d e b tor t o w o r k f o r h i m
a gainst hi s w i l l a s h o u s ehold servan t o r f a r m l a b o rer i n o r d e r t o
require or enforce the payment of adebt. (Article 274)
1. H o u s e hoM S e r v ant o r F a r m L a b o rer —In services
r endered u n d e r c o m p u l s ion i n p a y m e n t o f d e b t s , t h e d e b t o r i s
c ompelled by t h e c r e d i to r t o w o r k a s h o u s ehold s er v an t o r f a r m
laborer. In ex pl oit a t ion of chil d l a b or, th e m i nor u n der th e custody
of the debtor is compelled to work by th e credit or. It i s not r equir ed
that the mi nor m ust w or k as a household servant or farm l aborer to
commit exploit a t ion of child labor .
 450 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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D uring th e ol d t i m es, i f on e f a i le d t o p a y h i s l o a n b o r r o w ed
from a ha c iendero, t he f o rm er w o u ld c o m p el t he l a t t e r t o w o rk a s
farm laborer in hi s ha c ienda, or ho usehold servant in h i s m a n s io n,
a nd the children of the latter to work for h im . The crimes commit t ed
a re services rendered u n der c o m p u l sion i n p a y m en t o f d e bt s a n d
exploitation of child l a b or. N ow , th e offender can be prosecuted for
the graver crime of tr af fick ing in p ersons.
2. T r a f f i c k i n g i n P e r s o n — Un d e r R . A . N o . 9 2 0 8 , d e b t
bondage refers to the pledging by the debtor of his personal services
or labor or those of a person under his control as security or payment
for a debt, w hen t h e l e n gt h an d n a t u r e o f s er v ices are not c l early
defined or when th e v a lu e of th e services as reasonably assessed is
not applied toward the li q u i d a t ion of the debt.
Maria borrowed money from her Ju an. Despite the lapse of the
agreed period of tw o m o n t h s , M a r i a f a i l e d t o set tl e her ob l i g at i on.
J uan required M a r i a t o w or k a s a h o u s emaid i n h i s h o use for t w o
m onths i n p a y m en t o f h e r d e b t . D e s p it e M a r i a ' s o bjection, J u a n
i nsisted and b r o u ght M a r i a t o h i s h o use to w or k a s a m a i d . J u a n
c ommitted t h e c r i m e o f s e r v i ces r e n d ered u n d e r c o m p u l s ion i n
payment of debts and t r af fi ck in g i n p e r son in v olving debt-bondage.
However, Juan cannot be held l i a ble for both cr i mes because of the
rule on double jeopardy.(2006 Bar Exam)
CHILD ABUSE INVOLVING ABA N D O N M E N T U N D E R R.A. NO.7610
Child abuse under Section 10(b) in relat ion to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 7610 includes: (1) failure to im m e di at ely give medical treat m ent
to an in ju r e d c h i l d r e s u l t i n g i n s e r i o us i m p a i r m e nt o f h i s g r o w t h
a nd development o r i n h i s p e r m a n en t i n c a p acity o r d e a t h ; o r ( 2 )
u nreasonable depri v a t io n o f h i s b a si c n e eds for s u r v i v al , s uch a s
food and shelter .
A BA N D O N M E N T O F PER S O N S IN DAN G E R
Abandonment of persons in danger is committ ed by any person
w ho fails to r e n der assistance to any one whom h e s h al l f in d i n a n
uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can
render such assistance w i t h ou t d e t r i m en t t o h i m s e lf , u n l ess such
omission shall constit ut e a more serious offense. (Article 275
) Reckless I nf h c t i on of I n j u r y
If thhee wounded vi c ti m i n a n i n h a b i t e d p l ace i s a m i n o r , t h e
a ccused, who failed t o g iv e m e d i cal t r e a t m en t t o h i m r e s u l t i n g i n
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 451
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s erious impai r m en t of his growth an d development, is liable for th e
graver crim e of ch il d a b u se. Accused should not b e h el d l i a bl e for
abandonment of person in danger since this crime is not puni sh able
if "omission shall constitute a more serious offense."
O ne early m o r n i n g , w h i l e t h e p h y s i cian w a s j o g gin g a t t h e
Rizal Park, hesaw a man in danger of dying. He ignored to give help
to the dying man. After an h our , th e man di ed. The physician is not
liable for abandonment since Rizal Park is not an un i n h a b i t ed place,
which is an im p or t an t el ement of thi s cri me. (1977 Bar Exam )
ABA N D O N M E N T O F O N E'S OWN VICTIM
Abandonment of one's own vi c t im is c omm i t t e d by a ny p e rson
w ho fails t o h e l p o r r e n d e r a s s i st ance t o a n o t h er , w h o m h e h a s
accidentally wou n ded or inj u r ed. (Art i c le 275)
Child abuse
If the vi ct im , wh o wa s accidentally i n j u r e d by t h e accused, is
a minor, th e accused, who fai led to give m e dical t r e a t m en t t o h i m
resulting in s e r i ous i m p a i r m en t of hi s g r o wt h an d d evelopment, is
liable for the gr aver cr im e of child abuse.
A ccidental I n f l i c t io n of I n j u r y
I n abandonment u n d e r A r t i c l e 2 7 5 , t h e a c cused m u s t h a v e
accidentally i n j u r e d or w o u n d ed t h e v i c t i m . I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n, t h e
a ccused is not li a ble for ph y sical i n j u r i es because of the exempti n g
circumstance of accident. But he is liable for the crime of abandonment
f or failure to help or render assistance to his victi m .
I ntent i o na l I n f l i c t io n of I n j u r y
If the accused intentionally i n j u r e d or wound ed the victim, the
f ormer is no t l i a bl e fo r a b a n d onm ent fo r f a i l u r e t o h el p o r r e n d er
assistance to his victim . A r t i cle 275 is only applicable if the accused
accidentally i n j u r e d o r w o u n d e d t h e v i c t i m . B u t h e i s l i a b l e f o r
physical inj u r i es, or hom i cide, depending upon th e cir cum st ance of
the case.
If th e accused re cklessly i n I u r ed or w o u n d ed t he v i c t im a n d
failed to render assistance to his vict im , he can be convicted of:
 452 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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1. R e ckless
k impr u d ence result in g i n p h y s i cal i n j u r i e s w i t h
the qualifying circum st ance of failur e to lend on the spot assistance
under Arti cle 365 of the Revised Penal Code (People v. De Los Santos,
G.R. No. 131588, March 27; 2001; Tapdasan, Jr. v. P eople, G.R. ¹.
141344, November 21, 2002); or
2. T w o s e p a r at e cr i mes of reckless impr u d ence result ing in
p hysical inj u r ies under A r t i cl e 365 and abandonment
n uunnd e r A rt i c 1e
275 of the Code. (La m e ra v. T h e H o n . C o u rt of A p p e a l s, G.R. No .
93475, June 5, 1991)
With the Lame ra pri n c ip le, recklessly injur i ng or wound ing the
victim is within the contemplat ion of the phrase " accidentally inju r e d
or wounded the victim" in A r t i c le 275 on the crime of abandonment.
a. Qualified R e c k l ess I m p r u d e n c e — Under Ar t i c le 8 65,
failure to lend on the spot to the inj u red par t ies such help as may be
in his h ands to give constit u tes a q u a l i f y in g ci r c u m st ance because
the pr esence th er eof r a i ses t h e p e n a lt y f o r r e c k l ess i m p r u d e nce
by one d e gree. (P eople v. De L o s S a n t o s, s u pr a) T h e q u a l i f y i n g
c ircumstance of f a i l ur e t o l en d a i d o n t h e s pot h el p a p p l ies t o a l l
quasi-offense punishable under A r t i cl e 365. But th e same shall not
be considered if no t a l l e ged in t h e I n f o r m a t i on. (I b a b ao v. People,
G.R. No. L-36957, September 28, 1984)
The assistance required by Ar t i cle 365 is one h h "
b
t e hands
the a n d soof the offender to give."It must be taken into consideration
t e t ype and degree of assistance that th e offender, at th e t im e an d
place of the incident, is capable of giv i ng. (People v. Gonzaga, G.R.
¹. 19 5 6 7 1,Jan u a ry 21, 2015)
InAbueva v.People, G.R. No. 184887, September 27, 2002, the
accused exerted effortsto see to it that the victim had been attended
to. There were several people assisting the victim. The inj u red party
w as carried f ro m t h e t e r m i n a l , t o a v e h i c le, t he n t o t h e h o s p i t a l .
H e merely left u pon assur ance that v i c ti m w a s b r o u gh t I
d t
e o s p i t al . A c cused i s n o t a h i t - a n d - ru n d r i v er . T h e q u a l i f y i n g
circumstance of failure to lend on the spot help was not considered.
b. A b a n d a n m e n t a n d R e c k l ess Im p r u d e n c e —In Lamera
v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, supra, the accused is charged of reckless
i mprudence resulting in phy sical inj u r i es. However, the inform a t i on
o es not a l l ege t h e q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a nce of f a i l u r e t o r e n d e r
assistance. Accused is convicted of the cr im e as charged. He is also
g wi ab a n d o n m ent for fai l ur e to render assistance. Accused
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 453
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f iled a motion to q u ash i n f o r m a t ion for a b a n donment for f a i l ur e t o
render assistance on the ground of double jeopardy. According to the
Supreme Court, th ere is no double jeopardy because crimes charged
are different f ro m each other on th e f o ll ow in g r e asons: (1) reckless
imprudence is a quasi-offense while abandonment, a cr im e against
security; an d (2) q u a si-offenses are comm i t t e d b y m e an s of cu l pa ;
crimes against security ar e comm i t t ed by m e ans of dolo. Moreover,
f ailure to l end h elp t o on e's victi m u n d e r A r t i cl e 865 is n ei t hei a n
offense by itself nor an element of the offense therein penalized. Its
presence merely i n c r eases the p e n a lt y b y o n e d e gree. Such bein g
t he case, it m u s t b e s p e cifically a l l e ged i n t h e I n f o r m a t i on . T h e
Information a g ainst accused in t h i s c ase does not so al l ege. Upon
the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to another whom
o ne has accidentally w o u n ded or in j u r ed is an offense under Ar t i c l e
275.
However, i f t h e a c c u sed i s c h a r ge d o f r e c k l ess i m p r u d ence
resulting i n p h y s i cal i n j u r i e s w i t h t h e q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m st ance of
failure to r e n der assistance and convicted of th e cr im e as charged,
it i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e La m er a p ri n c i p l e i s not a p p l i cable.
Since fail ur e t o r e n d e r a s si stance qu a li fies t h e c r i m e o f r e c k l ess
i mprudence of w h i c h t h e a c c used wa s c onvicted, i t i s n o t p r o p e r
t o prosecute and convict hi m f o r a b a n d on m ent on t h e b a sis of t h e
same failur e t o r e n der a s sistance. In t h i s s i t u a t i on , ab andonment
shall be considered as an element of th e cr im e of qu alified reckless
imprudence. Inform a t ion for abandonment should be quashed since
such crim e i s n e cessarily i n c l u ded i n t h e c h a r g e of q u a si-offense
qualified by the circum st ance of failur e to render assistance.
ABANDO N M E NT OF A PERSON IN DANGER
Abandonment o f a p e rson i n d a n g er i s a l s o c o m m i t t e d by a
person who finds an abandoned child under seven years of age but
f ails to deliver said chil d t o th e a u t h o r i t ies or to hi s f a m i ly , or fa i l s
to take him to a safe place. (Article 275)
I n a b a n d onm en t o f a p e r s o n i n d a n g e r , t h e v i c t i m i s a n
abandoned child under 7 years ofage, and the punishable omission
is failure to deliver him th e au t h o r i t i es, or his fami ly, or to take him
to a safe place.
I n chil d a b use u n der R .A . N o . 7 6 10, th e v i c ti m i s a n i n j u r e d
c hild a n d t he p u n i s h a bl e o m i s s io n i s f a i l u r e t o gi v e m e d i c a l
treatment to him resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development.
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY
AND SECURITY
ABA N D O N ING A MINOR
Abandoning a minor iscommitted by any person who abandons offender cannot be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7610 since crime is also
a child below seven years of age, the custody of whi ch is i n c u m b e nt
penalized under the Revised Penal Code. (De Guzman v. Perez, G.R.
u pon him. If the minor died or his life has been i d No. 156013, July 25, 2006) Neither can the offender be prosecuted
i n a n g e r , , th e penalty
1
under P.D. No . 60 8 s i nce Revised Penal C ode pr escribes a h i g h er
A bandoning a m inor i s n ot c o m m i t t e d i f s u cz p enalty for concealment or abandonment of a legit i m at e chil d .
constitutes a m or e seri ous offense such as m u r d e r o r c h i lomission
d a b u se. Child abuse includes abandoning the child by his parent un d er
( rtic e 2 76) For e xample„ if t h e a b a ndonment of t h e c h i ld i s such circumstances as to deprive him of the love, care, and protection
intentionally made to kill him, and as a consequence, death results, he needs. (Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610 in relation to Artic le 59 of P.D.
the crime committed is murder or parricide. No. 608)

ABANDO N M E NT OF MINOR BY CUSTODIAN PARENTAL INDIFFERENCE

Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody Indifference of parents is committed by the parents who shall
is committed by an y p e r son w ho, h a v in g ch ar ged of th e r e a r in g or neglect their children by not giving them the education which their
e ducation of a m i n or , del iv ers said m i n station in life requires and financial condition permits. (Article 277)
inor ot a p u bl'i c in s t i t u t i o n o r
o ther
ot er p eer sons,
r s o n s wi ti h ou t t h e c onsent of t h e on e wh o e n t r u s ted such This crime is now punishable under Article 59 of P.D. No. 603, which
child to his care or in th e absence of th I t t p rescribes a graver penalt y .
e a e r,, w i t h o u t t hhe c onsent
o f the pr oper a u t h o r i t i e s .
(Article 2 77) If the f f d Under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse includes
c i t o a n o t h e r p e r son for a consideration, the cr im e comm i t t e d i s
child trafficking under Article 7 of R.A. No. 7610. those covered by Article 59 ofP.D. No. 608 but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code. Since parental i n d i f f er ence is also covered by
t he Revised Penal C o de, it i s e x c l u ded f ro m t h e c ov erage of R . A .
CONCEALM ENT OR ABANDO N M E NT OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD N o. 7610. H e n ce, t h e a c c used s h o ul d b e c h a r ge d w i t h p a r e n t a l
Concealment or abandonment of a legitim ate child ' i ndifference under th e R e v i sed Penal C ode in r e l a t ion t o P .D . N o .
b y aany
n person
er s who shall conceal or abandon an e c le
i it'
is c ommitted 608 and not child abuse under R.A. No. 7610. (De Guzman v. Perez,
w ith in t ent t o e gl
n o cause such child to lose its civil status. (Artie.'e c h'ld
ima"te 847)
1 G.R. No. 156018, July 25, 2006)
The practice ofabandoning new-born infants and very young C hild a b use i n c l u des f a i l in g o r r e f u s i ng , w i t h ou t j u s t i f i a bl e
children at th e door of hospitals c h h grounds, to en r oll t h e c h i l d , b y h i s p a r ent or ca u s i n g, a bati n g, o r
institutions was formerly so well known in S ain.d This h p ermitt in g t h e t r u a n c y o f t h e c h i l d f r o m t h e s c h ool w h er e h e i s
emp a e y t h e l aw, which punishes abandonment of enrolled. (Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610 in relation to Art ic le 59 of P.D.
a legitimate child. Thus, selling his son to a couple for moretar No. 608)
i d t io i ot o t it t ' '
ofth crime
legitimate child. (U . S. v. Capil l o, G.R. eNo. L-9o279
f a bM
andonment of a
e crime committed is child trafficking under Sect' arch 2, 19 15) EXPLOITATION OF MINOR
7610. c ion 7:o"R.A.
: .N o. . .

Note: C oncealing or abandoning t he child w i t h ' t
c i ose h i s c i v i l s t a t u s consti t u tes th e cr im e u n dertoA r t i ckl e
59(1) of P.D. No. 603. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 which punishes
child abuse covered by Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 "b
vise e n a C o d e." For concealing a legitimate ch'ld, the
Exploitatio n o f m i n o r i s co m m i t t e d b y : ( 1 ) a p er s o n w h o
causes a c h il d b e lo w 1 6 y e a r s o f a g e t o p e r f or m a n y d a n g er ous
feat of balancing, physical str en gth , or cont or t i on ; (2) a d angerous
performer, who employs a child 16 years of age, or his descendant
b elow 12 y e ar s of ag e i n p e r f o r m i n g d a n g erous exhib i t i on ; (3) an
ascendant, guardian, teacher or person entrusted in any capacity
with the care of a child below 16 years of age, who delivers such
child gratuitously or in consideration of any price, compensation, or

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 456 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 457
VOLUME II AND SECURITY

promise to adangerous performer, habitual vagrant or beggar; or (4)

any person who induces a childbelow 16 years of age to abandon the regardless of its ownership; and (3) allowing or requir in g the child to
home of its ascendants, guar d i a ns, cur at ors or t e achers to follow a drive with out a l i cense or wit h a l i c ense which th e par ent k n ows to
angerous performer, or to accompany a habit ual vagrant or be have been illegally procured. (Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610 in relation
a n or e g g ar . to Article 59 of P.D. ¹. 6 08 )

D angerous p e r f o r me r i s o n e w h o p e r f o r m
ms any d angerous TRESPASS TO DW E L L ING
ea o a an c i n g , p h y sical st r en gt h o r c o n t o r t ion such an a c r obat,
g ymnast, rope-walker, diver, wi l d -ani mal t a me r o r Trespass to dwelling i s c ommi t t e d by a ny p r i v a te p e rson who
r, or circus manager.
In exploitation of minor, the guardian or curator convicted shall enters the dwell in g of another against th e l a t t e r's wi ll . T r e spass to
e removed from officeas guardian or curator and th dwelling is qualified if the offense be committed by means of violence
c i t f h
ma y e d e p r i v e d , temporar il y or p er p etu al ly, in th e discretion or intim i d a t i on. (Art i c le 280)
of the court, of their p ar e n tal a u t h o r i ty . (Ar t i c le 278) A bsolutor y C a u s e — T respass t o dw el l i n g i s n ot
Inducing a m i n o r t o a b a n d o n h i s h o m e u n d e r A r t i c l e 2 7 1 c ommitted w h e n s u c h p e r so n e n t er s a n o t h e r' s d w e l l i n g f o r t h e
i s commit ted b y ayn p erson who induces a minor to abandon th purpose of preventing some serious harm t o h i m s elf, the occupants
h ome of h i s' s parents n on e
arents o r g u a r d i an s o r t h e p e r s ons e n t r u s te d w i t h of the dwelling or a t h i r d p e r son or w hen such person shall enter a
h is custod .
s o y. T h ' i s cr i m e c a n b e comm i t t e d by a p a r en t i f c u s t ody of d welling for th e p u r p ose of rendering some service to h u m a n it y or
t he minor i s g i ven t o t h e o t her p a r en t b y a j u d i c ial or d er. Bu t t h e justice; or when a n y one shall e n ter c afes, taverns, in ns, and ot h er
p enalty is l esser. How ever, if t h e p u r p ose of in d u cement i s for t h public houses, while the same are open. (Article 280; 2006 Bar Exam)
c hild to follow a ddangerousn is or e
perform er, or t o a ccompan
v agran t o rr beg y a h
e ga r , t he c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s e x p l o i t a t io n o fab't
i u aI A priv at e p erson wh o e n t er s th e d w e l l in g of a n o t her a g a in st
under Art i cle 278. i on o m i n o r t rie latt er's w il l a n d b y m e a n s o f v i o l ence or i n t i m i d a t io n fo r t h e
p urpose of p r e v en t in g s om e h a r m t o h i m s el f i n c u r s n o c r i m i n a l
An y person who delivers a child for a consideration to d liability. (2012 Bar Exam)
e ra ion o
p e rformerr,hhabitual
b' vagr a nt, beggar, or to any other personangerous is liable
f or child tr affi ck in g u n der Section 7 of R.A. No. 7610. If th e 2. V i ol a t i o n c f B c m i c i l e an d T r e s p ass to Dw e l l in g —
The
o.
of the deliver y oof t hee c h i l d is labor exploit a t ion t h e cr. i m et e p u urr p o s e differences between trespass to dwelling and violation of domicile
i s qu a lii fiee d t r af fic k i n g i n p e r s o n u n d e r S e c t ion 4 i n r e l a t i o'ttn d
to are as follows:
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208.
a. T r es p a s s t o d w e l l i n g i s c o m m i t t e d b y a p r i v a t e
If the chi
c hild i s
1 7 y e ar s of a ge, r e quiring hi m t o pe r f orm individual while violation of domicile is committed by a public
dangerous exhibit ion is not exploit a t ion of m i nor u n der A r t i cl e 278 officer(2009 Bar Exam);
of the Revised Penal Code, but i t m a y c o n st i t ut e ch il d ex ploit a t i on
under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. b. Tr es p a s s t o dw e l l i n g i s co m m i t t e d b y en t e r i n g
t he dw el l in g a g a i ns t t h e w i l l o f t h e o w n e r , w h i l e v i o l a t i on
Child aabbuse
use iincludes i m p r o p erl y e x p l o i t in g t h e c h i l d b y h i s o f domicile i s c o m m i t t e d b y e n t e r i n g a d w e l l i n g a g a i nst t h e
parent by using him, directly or indi r ec tly , s u c will ofthe owner thereof, searching papers or other effects
h as for pu r p o ses of
egging and other acts which are inim i cal to his interest
' n eres a n d w e l far e . found th erein w i t h ou t t h e p r e v i ous consent of such own er, or
(Section 10 ofof R.A.
. . No. No. 7610 in relation of Art i c le 59 to P.D. No. 608 s urreptit i ou sly e n t e r in g i t , a n d r e f u s in g t o l e av e a f ter b e i n g
T his act of r e q uiri rini ng a c h i l d t o b e g m a y a l s o consti t ut e q u a li fi e d)
required to do so;
trafficking in person. (Sections 4 and 6 of R.A. No. 9208)
C hild a b u s e c ommitte d c. V i ol a t i o n or i n t i mi d a t i o n qu a l i f i e s t r e s p a ss to
b y p a r e n t i n c l u d es : ( 1 )
dwelling w h i l e n i g h t t i m e an d f a i l u r e t o r e t u r n a n y p a p ers or
gi g e c h i l d t o l ead an immoral or dissolutecausing
life; (2)
permitt in g t h e c h il d t o p o ssess, handle or ca r ry a d effects not constituting evidence of a crime qualify violation of
rry a ea dl y w eap o n , domicile. (1957 and 2002 Bar Ex a m s )

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AND SECURITY

3. P r o h i b i t i o n —The concept of "e ntry a g a i n st t he w i l l o f

the owner of the dwelling" in vio la ti on of domicile is the same as that
in trespass to dwelling. In th e following cases, entry was considered
as having been made against th e w il l of th e owner because there is
implied prohi bi t ion to enter:
a W h er e t he e n t r y w as m ade b y c u t t i n g a
string
fastening the door (U.S. v. Lin d i o, G.R. No. 4386, February 19,
1908; U.S. v. Ticson, G.R. No. 8273, August 14, 1918
);
b. W h e r e t h e entry was made by employing force
against th e closed door of th e h o use ( U.S. v. P a r a y, G . R. ¹ .
6804, November 23, 1910);
c. W h e r e e n t r y w a s m a d e at a l a t e h ou r o f t h e n i g h t ,
w hile the occupants ar e a sleep, by scaling a w al l a n d f o r ci n g
to open the window which was closed and barred (U.S.
Barberan, G.R N o . 67 90, December 16, 1910);
d. Wh e r e t h e a c c used ent er s t h e d w e l l in g o f a n o t h er
at a late hour of th e n i g ht , af ter th e i n m a t es have ret i red an d
closed their doors (U.S. v. Panes, G.R. No. 8469 S t
b
1918); and
e. W h e r e e n t r y w a s m a d e a f ter t h e l a d y of t h e h o u se
t ells accused to w ai t o n t h e p o rch an d cl oses the door behin d
her as she ent ers th e d r a w i n g r o om. (G a b r iel v. Pe ople, G.R.
¹. L- 6 7 8 0, October 15, 1964)
In trespassing, the entr y i s m a d e w i t h ou t p e r m i s sion of th e owner
or the caretaker thereof in disregard of a manifest prohibition to
enter;
4. I n t r e s p ass to dw el l i ng, th e cir cum st ance of by m eans of
v iolence or in t i m i d a t ion q u a li fies th e cr i me. Th ere is no qu al i f y i n g
circurr stance in tr espassing. (1961 Bar Exam )
VIOLATION OF DATA PRIVACY UNDER R.A. NO. 10173
R.A. No. 10178 (Data Pr i v acy Act) applies to the processing of
all types of personal i n f o r m a t ion an d t o an y n a t u r a l a n d j u r i d i c al
person involved in p ersonal i n f o r m a t ion p r ocessing including t h ose
personal inf or m a t ion contr oll ers an d p r ocessors who, alth ough n ot
f ound or e s t a b l i shed i n t h e P h i l i p p i n es, us e e q u i p m en t t h a t a r e
v.
located in th e P h i l i p p i n es, or t h ose who m a i n t ai n a n o f fice, branch
or agency in th e P h i l i p p i nes subject to r e q u i r e m ents. (Section 4 of
R.A. No. 10173)
INFORM A T ION NOT CO V E R E D BY DATA PRIVACY ACT
Data Privacy Act does not apply to inf or m a t ion w h ich the data
subject is not enti t led to have privacy th ereon.
I nfor m a t i o n o n p u b l i c o f fi cer s

TRESF ASSING T he D at a P r i v ac y A c t d o e s n o t a p p l y t o i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t
any indivi d ual wh o is or was an officer or employee of a government
Trespassing i s committed by any person institution t h at r e l a t es to the position or fun c tio ns of the indiv i d u a l .
uninhabited closed premises or fenced estate wi t h outw p hoe r emni st esion
r s of
an
(Section 4 of R.A. No. 101 78)
t e o w ne r o r t h e c a r e t a ker t h e r e of, i f t h e p r o h i b i t io n t o e n t e r b e
manifested. (Artic le 281) I nformatio n o n p u b l i c o f fi c i al s n o t p r o t e c ted b y t h e D a t a
P riva"y Ac t i n c l u de: (1) Th e f act t h a t t h e i n d i v i d ua l i s o r w a s a n
Thh e distinctions between trespass to dwell ' o fficer or e m p l o yee o f t h e g o v e r n m en t i n s t i t u t i on ; ( 2 ) T h e t i t l e ,
w e in g an d t respassing
are as follows:
business address and office telephone number of th e i n d i v i d u al ; (3)
1. T r e s p a ss to dw el l in g can only be comm i t ted b a The classification, salary r a n ge and r e sponsibili t ies of th e position
mi e y a private
p erson..Tres
res p assing can be committed by any person; h eld by t h e i n d i v i d u al ; an d ( 4 ) T h e n a m e o f t h e i n d i v i d ua l o n a
document pr e pa red by t he i n d i v i d u al in t h e c o u r se of employment
2. I n t r e s p a s s t o d w e l l i n g , t h e p r i v a t e p e r son e n t er s t h e
dwellin g o f a n o t h er. w ith the government . (Section 4 of R.A. No. 10178)
. nI trespassing, the person enters an uninh abi t e d
closed premises orfenced estate; Life of a public officer is an open book. The privacy of a public
3. I n t r e s p a ss to dw el l i ng , th e en tr y w a s m a d o fficer is li m i t e d compared to t ha t o f a p r i v at e i n d i v i d u al . A p u b l i c
wi oof thee oowner or in disregard of an express or implied prohibi tti othn .
will officer has no right of p r i vacy on data or i n formation, which is
c onnected with hi s st an d in g as a public servant .

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AND SECURITY
A p er son, w ho g a t h ere d t h e n a m e s ,
office
c e ad
a d rresses,
es s e s , and
an
t elephone nu m b ers of a l l I nforma t io n o b t a i n e d b y c e n t r a l m o n e t a r y a u t h o r i t y , I a w
them in the in t e r n et, is not violat in g th e D ata Pr i v acy Act . e nforcement an d r e g u l a t o r y a g e n c i e s
The Data Pr i v acy Act does not apply to i n f o r m a t ion necessary
Inform a t i o n o n s e r v i ce co n t r a c t w i t h g o v e r n m e n t
i n order t o c a r r y o u t t h e f u n c t i on s o f p u b l i c a uthorit y w h i c h
T he D at a P r i v a cy A A ct d o e s n o t a p p l y t o i n f o r m a t io n a b o u t includes the processing of personal data for the performance by
an indivi dual wh o i s or w a s p e r f or m in g s er v ice under cont r act for the independent, central m o n et ar y a u t h o r it y an d l a w e n f orcement
a government i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t r e l a t e s t a nd regulatory a g e ncies of t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a ll y a n d s t a t u t o r i l y
th e se r v i c e s p e r f or m ed,
i ncludi
inc u i nng t h r s of th e contract, and thoe n ame
t heet teerm of the in d i v i d u al mandated functions. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 10178)
given in th e course of the perfor m a nce of th ose services. (S
o ose s e r v i ces. (Section 4 G athering of r e cords of c r i m i n a l c o n v i cti ons by t h e N a t i o n a l
of R.A. ¹. 10 1 78)
Bureau of Investigation is not covered by the Data Pr i v acy Act .
I n the spirit of t r a n sp ar ency and to ensure that th e t a
o t be i n g w a s t e d b y p u b l i c o f f i ci als, thae p ueb l ax
m oney i s n ot pa y er's
ic should T he D a t a P r i v a c y A c t s h a l l n o t b e c o n s t r u e d a s t o h a v e
have access to inform m ation c oncernin g s e r v ice cont r act w i t h t h e amended or repealed R.A. No. 1405, otherwise known as the Secrecy
government. of Bank Deposits Act; R.A. No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign
C urrency Deposit A ct ; an d R .A . No . 95 10, other w ise kn own as t h e
I nform a t i o n o nn license,
i per i nit or d i s c r e t i o n a ry b e n e f i t Credit Inf or m a t ion System Act. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 10178)

The Data Pri v a cy Act does not apply to in f or m a t i on

' n r e 1at i n g t o I nform a t io n t o p r e v e n t m o n e y l a u n d e r i n g
a nyd i si s c r e t i onary benefit of a fi n an cial n a t
na ure suc h a s the
of aa license
o e r m i t g i v e n b y t h e g o v e r n m en t t o a n hi n grant
i c e n s eoror permit d' ing The Data Pr i v acy Act does not apply to i n f o r m a t ion necessary
n in i v i'd u a ,
includin g the na n a m e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d t h e e x act n a t u r e o f t h 1e for banks and ot her fi n a n c ial i n s t i t u t i on s u n der th e j u r i s d i ction of
benefit.(Section 4 of R.A. No. 10178) the independent, central monetary authority or Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipi nas t o comply w i t h R . A . N o . 9 5 10, an d R .A . No . 9 1 60, as
Gathering inf or m a t ion on n a mes of
in iv i u a s w i' thh l i c ense to
p ossess firearms is not a violation of B t Pd ' d 1
amended., otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act and
a a r i v a c y AA c t . other applicable laws. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 101 78)
J ourna l i st ic, ar t i s t ic, li t e r a r y o r r e s e a r c h i n f o r m a t i o n Reports of covered transaction or a d eposit exceeding
The Data Privac yAc t d oes n ot a p p l y t o p e r sonal i n f o r m a t i o n P500,000.00 by bank, a covered person, to the Anti-Money
processed for j o u r n a l i s t ic, a r t i s t ic , l i t e r ar y o r r e s e arch Laundering Council without consent of the depositor are not covered
ur by the Data Pr i v acy Act .

T he D at a P r i v a c y A c t s h a l l n o t b e c o n s t r u e d a s t o h a v e Information collected from residents of foreign jurisdictions

amended or repealed the provisions of R.A. No. 53
pu i s h e rs, edit ors or d u l y a c credited o. , w hich affords the The Data Privacy Act does not apply to personal information
repor ters off an y n e w spaper, o riginally collected f ro m r e sidents o f f o r eign j u r i sdictions i n
magazine or periodical of general cir c u l a t ion p r o tection from b ei n
a ccordance wit h t h e l a w s o f t h o s e f or eign j u r i s d i cti ons, i n clu d i n g
ource o a ny news r e p or t o r i n f o r m a t i o n
a ppearing in s ai d p u b l i c ation w h i c h w a s r e l a ted i n a n a ny applicable data p r i v acy l a ws , w h ic h i s b e in g p r ocessed in t h e
e i n a n y c o nfid
fidence Philippines. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 10178)
p er, e d i t or, or reporter.
(Section 5 of RA. ¹. 10 1 78)

CRIMES UNDER THE DATA PRIVACY ACT

The crimes punishable under R.A. No. 10173 (Data Privacy

Act) are as follows:

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1. U n au t h o r i ze d p r o c essing o f p e r s o na l i n f o r m a t io n a n d
s ensitive personal infor m a t i o n ; A bar review center, wh ich collects the email ad dr esses of law
s tudents f ro m l a w s c h ools w i t h ou t c o n sent o f t h e s t u d e nt s ( d a t a
2. A cc e s s in g p e r s onal i n f o r m a t i o n a n d s e n s i t iv e p e r sonal subjects), is c o m m i t t i n g t h e c r i m e o f un a u t h o r i z ed p r o c essing of
information due to negligence;
personal i n fo rm a t i o n .
3. I m pr o p e r d i s p osal of p ersonal i n f o r m a t ion an d s ensiti v e
p ersonal inform a t i o n ; W ithout c o n s ent of th e d a t a s u b j e c t
Data sub,'ect refers to an individ u al who se personal informa ti o n
4. Pr o c e s sing of personal infor m a t ion and sensitive pers
in formation for un a u t h o r i zed purposes; ersona 1 is processed.
Consent cf the data subject re fers to any f r e ely given, specific,
5. U n a u t h o r i zed access or inten t i onal br each;
i nformed i n d i " a t io n o f w i l l , w h e r eb y t h e d a t a s u b j ect a g r ees t o
6. C o n cealment of s ecurity b r eaches involving sensitive the collection and processing of personal information about and/
personal information; or relating to him or her, Consent shall be evidenced by written,
electronic or recorded means. It may also be given on behalf of the
7. Malicious disclosure; and data subject by an agent specifically authorized by the data subject
8. Un a u t h orized disclosure. to do so. (Section 8 of R.A, No, 101 78)
I f th e b a r r e v i e w ees v o l u n t a r i l y w r o t e t h e i r n a m e s , e m a i l
UNAUTHORIZED PROCESSING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION addresses and cellnumbers on a paper as requested by a bar review
c enter, D a t a P r i v a c y A c t i s n o t v i o l a t e d s i n c e t h e c o l l ection o f
The
he crime of un a u t h o r i zed processing of personal i n f o r m a t i o n
personal inform at ion was made with the consent of the data subjects.
is committed b y p e rsons who process personal inf or m a t ion w i t h o u t
The consent is evidenced by a wr i t t e n me a n s, and that i s, the paper
t he consent of th e d at a su bject o r w i t h t b '
ou e i n g a u t h o r i z e d u n d er containing inf or m a t ion w r i t t e n by th e data subjects themselves.
this Act or any existing l aw. (Section 25 of RA. N o . 101 78)
Authorized processing of personal information
P ersonal i n f o r m a t i o n
T he p r o cessing o f p e r s o na l i n f o r m a t i o n s h a l l b e al l o w e d ,
P ersonal i 'nformati
f on r efers t o subject to co m p l i a n ce w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n ts of D a t a P r i v a cy A c t
a ny i n f o r m a t i -h h
recorded in i n aa m a t e r ia l f or m o r n o t , f r o m w h i c h t h eai dion
e n t itwy oetf er
an and other laws all ow in g disclosure of infor m a t ion to th e pu b lic and
individual isapparent or can be reaso
nably an d d' adherence to the principles oftransparency, legitimate purpose and
y the en t it y h o l d in g t h e i n f o r m a t i on , or w h e n irectly
put t ascertained
proportionali ty . Personal inf or m a t ion m ust be:
other infor
o rmation would directly and certainly identify an indiv th i d u a' lh.
(Section 8 of RA. ¹ . 101 7 8) Nam (a) C o l l e c te d f o r sp e c i fie d a n d l eg i t i m a t e p u r p o s es
a rne, a dd r e s s a n d
d p r o f ession of a determined and declared before, or as soon as r easonably
p erson are considered as personal inf or m a t i on. 'o .Identifi b '1'
a a su j ect is an i m p o r t an t el ement of personal inf norimaa t ii oint y. of t h e
e practicable after collection, and later processed in a way
c ompatibl e w i t h su c h d e c l a r ed , s p e c i fied, a n d l e g i t i m a t e
P rocessing of pe r s ona l i n f o r m a t i o n purposes only;

Processing r e f e rs t o a n y o p e r a t i on o r a n y s e t o f ( b) P r o c e ssed fairly an d l a w f u l l y ;

t'
information including, but onot
opera
performed uupon
on personal
er l i m iions
t ed ( c) A c c urate, r e l evant a n d , w h e r e n e c essary f o r
to, th e c o l l ection, recordin ' purposes for w h ich i t i s t o b e u sed th e p r ocessing of personal
g, organization,
or
' '

s torage,
modification, retrieval, consultation, use, consolid t' u p d a t in g
,
o
orr
information, kept up to date; inaccurate or incomplete data
,

erasure orr destruction of data. (Section 8 of R.A.soNo. ion, blocking,

i a 10178) k'
must be rectified, supplemented, destroyed, or their further
processingrestricted;

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 464 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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(d)
( ) A d e q u a t e a n d n o t ex c e s sive i n r elation t o t he
purposes for which they are collected and processed;
( e) R e t ained only fo r as l ong as
n ecessary f o r t h e
fulfillm ent of th e p u r p oses for wh ich th e data was obtained or
for the establishment, exercise ordefense of legal claims, or for
legitimate business purposes, or a s provided by law' a nd
( f) K ep t i n a f o r m w h i c h p e r m i t s i d e n ti fi ca t ion of d a t a
subjects for n o l o n ger t h a n i s n e cessary for t h e p u r p o ses for
which th e d at a w er e collected and p r o cessed: Provided, T h a t
p ersonal i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e cted f o r o t h e r p u r p o ses m a y l i e
processed for h i s t or ical, st a t i s t i cal or s cientific p u r p oses, and
in cases laid d ow n i n l a w m a y b e s t o r e d fo r l o n ger p e r i ods:
rovided, further,That adequate safeguards are guaranteed
by said laws auth or i z ing th eir p r ocessing.
T he p e r s o n a l informat i on
controller m ust e n s u r e
imp ementation of p ersonal i n f o r m a t ion p r ocessing pr i n ci pl es
set out herein. (Section 11 of R.A. No. 101 78)
Criteri a for la w f u l p r o c e s sing of pe r s o n al i n f o r m a t i o n
The processing of personal infor m a t ion shall be permi t ted only
i f not o t h e r w ise p r o h i b i ted b y l a w , a n d w h e n a t l e a s t on e o f t h e
following conditions exists:
(a) T h e d a t a su bject has given his or her consent
7
(h)
(b Th e p r o c essing of personal in f or m a t ion is necessary
a nd is r e l a ted t o t h e f u l fi l l m e n t o f a c o n t r ac t w i t h t h e d a t a
su ject or i n o r d e r t o t a k e s t e ps at t h e r e q u e st of t h e d a t a
subject prior to enter ing i nt o a contr act
( c) T h e p r o c essing i s n e cessary for c o m p l i a nce w it h a
legal obligation to wh ich the personal inf or m a t ion controller is
su ject;
( d)
) TThhee pr o c e s sin g i s n ecessary t o p r o t e c t v i t a l l y
i mportan t i n t e r e st s o f t h e d a t a s u b j ec t i n c l d '
u in g 1'f
i e and
(e3) hTh
( e processing is necessary in order to respond to
national emergency, to comply wit h th e r equ i r em ents of public
o rder an d s a f e ty , o r t o f u l fi l l f u n c t i on s o f p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y
which necessarily includes the processing of personal data for
the fulfil l m ent of it s m a n d a te; or
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 465
AND SECURITY
(f) T he p r o cessing i s n e c essary f o r t h e p u r p o ses o f
t he legiti m at e i n t e r ests p u r s ued by t h e p e r sonal i n f o r m a t i on
controller o" by a third party o" parties to whom the data is
disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by
f undamental r i g h t s a n d f r e e doms of t h e d a t a s u b j ect w h i c h
require protection un der th e P h i l i p p in e Consti t u t i on. (Section
12of R.A. ¹ . 10 1 78)
A school may lawfully require students, who are enrollin g,
t o pr ov id e p e r s onal i n f o r m a t i o n s u c h a s t h e i r n a m e s a n d
a ddresses. This i s l a w f u l p r o cessing of p e r sonal i n f o r m a t i o n
b ecause the data subject has given hi s or her consent and t h e
p rocessing is n ecessary an d i s r e l a te d t o t h e f u l f i l l m en t o f a
contract wit h th e d ata subject.
U NAU T H O R IZED PR O C E S S ING OF SENSITIVE PERSO N A L
INFORMATION
The cr im e o f un a u t h o r i z ed p r o c essing of s e n s it ive p e rsonal
information is commit t ed by persons who process sensitive personal
information v - i t h ou t t h e c o n sent o f t h e d a t a s u b j e ct, or w i t h o u t
being author zed u n der t h i s Ac t or an y e x i s t in g l aw . (Section 25 of
RA. No. 10178)
S ensitive p e r s o na l i n f o r m a t i o n
Sensitive personal inf or m a t ion r e fers to personal inform a t i o n:
( 1) A b o u t a n i n d i v i d u a l' s r a ce, e t h ni c o r i g in , m a r i t a l
s tatus, a ge , c o l or , a n d r e l i g i c us , p h i l o sophical o r p o l i t i c a l
affiliations;
(2) A b o u t a n i n d i v i d u a l's health , education, genetic or
sexual life of a person, or to any proceeding for any offense
committed or a l l eged to have been commi t ted by such person,
the disposal of such pr oceedings, or th e sentence of any court
in such proceedings;
( 3) I s s u e d b y go v e r n m en t a g e n c ie s p e c u l ia r t o a n
individual w h i c h i n c l u d es, bu t n o t l i m i t e d t o , social securit y
numbers, pr evious or c m - r en t h e a lth re c o rds, l i c enses or i t s
denials, suspension or revocation, and tax r et u r ns; and
(4) Specifically established by an executive order or
an act of Congress to be kept classified. (Section 8 o f RA. ¹.
101 78)
 466 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
An association o f l e n d i n g i n s t i t u t i o ns , w h i c h c o l l ects c ourt
records on convictions of persons for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg.
2 2 without consent of the convicts (data subjects), is commit t in g t h e
crime of un a u t h o r ized processing of sensitive personal in f o r m a t i o n.
H owever, the Supreme Court can publ ish its decisions affirm in g t h e
conviction of t h e a c cused w i t h ou t v i o l a t in g t h D t P '
i ng e a a r i v a c y- A c t .
The decision is not personal infor m a t i on. It is a judicial inf or m a t i on,
which is accessible to the publi c.
L awful p r o c essing o f s e n s i t i v e p e r s o na l i n f o r m a t i o n
privileged inform a t i on and
The processing of sensitive personal inform a t ion and priv i l eged
information shall be prohibi t ed, except in th e following cases:
( a) T h e d a t a s ubject h a s g i v e n h i s or he r c o n s ent,
specificto the purpose prior to the processing, or in the case of
privileged infor m a t i on, all p a r t i es to th e exchange have given
their consent prior to pr ocessing;
(b) T h e pr o c e ssing o f t h e same is provided for by
existing laws and r egul a t i ons: Provided, That s uch regula tory
enactments guar an tee the pr otection of the sensitive personal
information and th e pr i v i l eged infor m a t i on: Provided, furt h e r,
That the consent of the data subjects are not required by law or
regulation per m i t t i n g t h e p r ocessing of the sensitive personal
i nformation or the pr i v i l eged infor m a t i o n
(c) T h e p r o c essing i s n ecessary t o p r o t ect t h l 'f
ea o f the data subject or another person, and e i the d
e a ndata
su ject i s no t l e g ally or p h y s i c ally a b le to e x p r e ss his or h e r
consent prior to the processing;
( ) T h e p r o cessing is necessary to achieve the lawful and
n on-commercial o bj ectives of p u b l i c o r g a n i z ati ons an d t h e i r
associations: Provided, Tha t s uch p r o cessing is onl y c onfined
and related t o t h e bo na fid e m e m b e rs of t h e se organizations
or th ei r a s s ociations: Pr o v i d e d, f u r t h e r, T h a t t h e s e n s i t i v e
p ersonal i n f o r m a t i o n a r e n o t t r a n s f e r re d t o t h ' d
rovi e , j i n a y, T h a t c onsent of the data subject was obtained
prior to processing;
((e)) T h e proc r o e ssing is necessary for purposes of
treat ment, iscarried out by a medical practitioner or a me d'
ica1
medical
treatment i n s t i t u t i on , an d a n a d e q u at e l evel of p r o t ection of
personal inform a t ion is ensured; or
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 467
AND SECURITY
(f) T he processing concerns such personal i n f or m a t i on
as is necessary for the pr otection of lawful r i g ht s and in t erests
of natural or legal persons in court proceedings, or the
establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims, or when
provided to government or pu b lic auth or i ty . (Section 13 of R.A.
No. 10178)
Privileged i n f o r m a t ion r e f e rs t o a n y a n d al l fo r m s o f d a t a
w hich under the Rules of Court an d other per t i n ent l aw s constit u t e
privileged communication. (Section 8 of R.A. No. 101 78)
An asscciation of h e alt h i n s u r a nce companies, which collects
i nformation o n h e a lt h r e c ords of p a t i e nt s f r o m h o s p i t a ls, w i t h o u t
consent of th e p a t i e nt s (d ata subjects) is comm i t t i n g un a u t h o r ized
p rocessing of sensitive personal inf o r m a t i o n .
During t h e c r i si s i n v o l v in g t h e c o r on a v i r u s , p e r sons u n d er
investigation or infected persons are being compelled to provide
health auth or i t ies personal inf or m a t i on. This is a law ful p r ocessing
o f personal and sensitive personal i n f o r m a t i on . H o w ever, t hey a r e
n ot allowed t o d i s close tha t p e r s onal i n f o r m a t i on , an d t h e h e a l t h
condition of the infected patient to the public; such disclosure without
consent of the data subjects constit u tes unau t h o r i zed disclosure.
If an 'nfected person volutnarily
revealed to the public that he is
tested positive for corona vir us, everyone can share the inf or m a t i on
in social med.ia without vi olat in g the Data Pr i v acy Act. By revealing
s uch inform at i on, the infected person is not any m ore enti t led to th e
privacy thereon.
A ccessing p e r s o n a l in f o r m a t i o n or se n si t i v e pe r s o n a l
i nform a t i o n d u e t o n e g l i g e n c e
T he c r i m e o f a c c e ssing p e r s ona l i n f o r m a t i o n o r se n s i t i v e
p ersonal i n f o r m a t io n d u e t o n e g l i g ence i s c o m m i t t e d b y p e r s on s
who, due to negligence, provided access to personal i n f o r m a t ion or
sensitive personal infor m a t ion wi t h out being author i zed under Data
Privacy Act or any exist in g l aw. (Section 26 of R.A. ¹. 101 78)
I mpr o pe r d i s p o sa l o f pe r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n or se n s i t i v e
p ersonal i n f o r m a t i o n
Improper disposal of personal information or sensitive personal
information is ccm m i t t e d by p er sons who k n o w i n gly or n e gligently
dispose,discard or abandon the personal information or personal
s ensitive i n f o r m a t io n o f a n i n d i v i d u a l i n a n a r e a a c c essible t o
 468 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
t he public or h a s o t h e r w ise pl aced th e p er sonal i n f o r m a t ion of a n
individual i n i t s c o n t a i ner fo r t r a s h c o l lection. (Section 27 of R A .
No. 101 78)
P rocessing of per so nal or s e n s i t iv e p e r s o na l i n f o r m a t i o n f o r
u nauth or'ized pu r p o s e s
P rocessing of p e r sonal o r s e n s i t iv e p e r sonal i n f o r m a t io n f o r
unauthorized purposes is commit ted by persons processing personal
i nformation o r s ensitive p e r s onal i n f o r m a t io n f o r p u r p o ses n o t
a uthorized by the data subject, or other w ise auth or i zed under Dat a
Privacy Act or un der exist ing l aws. (Section 28 of R.A. ¹. 1 01 7 8 )
Unaut h o r i z ed ac c e ss o r i n t e n t i o n a l b r e a c h
Unauthorized a c c ess o r i n t e n t i o na l b r e a c h i s "om m i t t e d
by p e r sons w ho k n o w i n gl y a n d u n l a w f u l l y ,
o r v i o l a t in g d a t a
c onfidential it y an d s ecur it y d a t a s y s t ems, breaks i n a n v w a y i n t o
any system w h er e p e r sonal an d s e n si t iv e p er sonal in f o r m a t i on i s
stored. (Section 29 of R.A. No. 10178)
C oncealment o f s e c u r i t y b r e a c h e s i nvolvin g
p ersonal i n f o r j n a t i o n sensitive
Concealment of security b r eaches involving sensitive personal
information is commi t ted by persons who, after having kn ow l edge of
a security breach and of the obligation to notify the Nat i onal Pr i v acy
C ommission, in t e n t i on all y o r b y o m i s sion conceal th e f a " t o f s u ch
security breach.(Section 80 of R.A. ¹. 101 73)
Malicious disclosur e
Malicious disclosure is commit ted by any personal i nform a t i o n
controller or p e r sonal i n f o r m a t io n p r o cessor or an y o f i t s of fi ci als,
employees or a g e n ts, w h o , w i t h m a l i c e o r i n b a d f a i t h d i s c l oses
u nwarran te d o r f al s e i n fo r m a t i o n
r elati v t
i nformation or p e r s onal s ensit iv e i n f o r m a t ione o bot a i ned
an y b yp er
h ismo noar l
her. (Section 31 of R.A. No. 101 73)
P ersonal i n f o r m a t i o n controller
r efers t o a p e r s o n or
organization who contr ols the collection, holding, processing or use
o p e r sonal i n f o r m a t i on , i n c l u d in g a p e r so n o r o r g a n i z a t ion w h o
instructs an ot her p e r son o r o r g a n i z a t ion t o c o l l ect, h o ld, pr o cess,
u se, transfer or d i sclose personal i n f o r m a t ion on hi s or he r b e h a l f .
The term excludes:
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IX. CRIMES AGA:NST PERSONAL LIBERTY 469
AND SECURITY
( 1) A p er s o n o r or ga n i z a t io n w ho p er f o r m s s u c h
functions as instru cted by another person or organization; and
( 2) A n i n di v i d u a l w h o c o l l e c ts , h o l d s , p r o c esses o r
u ses personal in f o r m a t ion i n c o n nection w it h t h e i n d i v i d u a l 's
personal, f a m il y o r h o u s ehold a f f a i rs. (S ection 8 o f R . A . N o .
101 73)
Personal i n formation processor refers to any natural or juri d i c al
person qualified to act as such u n der t h i s Ac t t o w h o m a p e r sonal
information controller may outsource the processing of personal
data pertain ing to a data sub'ect. (Section 8 of R.A. No. 101 78)
U nauth o r i ze d d i s closur e
U nauthori ze d d i s c l osur e i s com m i t t e d b y a n y p er s o n a l
i nformation contr o ller or p e r sonal i n f o r m a t ion p r ocessor or an y o f
i ts officials, employees or agents, wh o d i scloses to a t h i r d p a r t y a
personal infor m a t ion or sens't ive personal i n f o r m a t ion not covered
by Section 31, without th e consent of the data subject. (Section 82 of
R.A. No. 10178)
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF ACTS OR LARGE SCALE
The penalty is higher i:" the offender committed combination
o r series of acts in v i o l a t ion of t h e D a t a P r i v acy A ct ; or w h e n t h e
p ersonal i n f o r m a t io n o f a t l e a s t o n e h u n d r e d ( 1 0 0 ) p e r s on s i s
harmed, affected or involved as the result of such violation. (Sections
88 and 85 of R.A. No. 101 78)
GRAVE THREAT
Grave threat is co m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s on w ho s h a ll t h r e a t e n
another with th e infl ' c t ion of a wrong amount ing to a crime upon his
person, honor or property, or that of his fam i ly . (Art i c le 282)
X went to the house of A to kidnap him for pur poses of extortin g
ransom. However, X discove"ed that A is already dead. X brought
the dead body of A to a secluded place. Thereafter, X demanded
m oney from B , t h e f a t h e r of A , a n d t h r e a t e ned to k i l l A i f h e w i l l
refuse to comply with his demand. X is not liable for kidnapping
for ransom since A i s a l r e ady dead. The essence of ki d n a p p in g for
r ansom i s d e p r i v a t i o n o f l i b e r t y o f t h e v i c t i m . H o w e v er , a d e a d
body has no liberty that X can deprive of. Neither is X liable for
g rave th r e at . I n t h i s c r i m e , t h e o f f e n der m u s t t h r e a t e n a n o t h e r
 470 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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with th e in fl i c t ion of a w r on g consti t u t i n g a c r i m e up o n, the person
of a family m e m ber for p u r p oses of demanding m on ey. In t hi s case,
c annot th r e a ten B w i t h t h e in fl i c t i o n of cr i m i n a l w r o n g upon t h e
person of A s i n c e A i s a l r e ad y d e ad ; a d ea d b ody i s n o t a p e r s on
upon whom criminal wrong can be inflicted. But X can be held
l iable for att em p ted estafa since he falsely made it appear t hat A i s
s till alive and he would k i l l h i m u n l e ss B comply w i t h h i s d em a n d .
T he intent ion of X is to defr au d B .
G rave t h r ea t i s c o m m i t t e d e v e n w i t h o u t d e m a n d in g m o n ey
o r imposing a c o n d i t i on , an d a t t a i n i n g i t s p u r p o se. H ow ever, t h e
penalty fo r g r a v e t h r e a t i s h i g h e r: ( 1 ) i f t h e t h r e a t i s m a d e f o r
purposes of demanding money or imposing other condition, lawful or
unlawful; (2) the purpose of the grave threat has been attained; and
( ) the grave threat is committed in writing or through a middleman.
(Article 282)
If grave threat is committed through text message, or Facebook
messenger, the qualifying circumstance of using information or
communication t e chnology u n der S ection 6 o f R .A . N o . 1 0 175 can
be considered. In such a case, the cr im e can be described as cyber
grave threat, and th e penalty for t h i s cr im e sh all be gr adu ated one
degree higher.
In grave th r e at, th e t h r ea t m u s t b e m ad e w it h t h e d e l i b erate
purpose of creating in t h e m i n d of t he p e rson th r e a te ned the belief
that the threat will be carried into effect. (U.S. v. Paguira n, G.R N o .
L-5348, November 16, 1909; Reyes v. People, G.R N o s. L-21528 and
L-21 529, March 28, 1969)
In U.S. v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 457, February 18, 1902, accused
s aid to th e v i c t im s t h a t h e w o u l d k i l l t h e m i f t h e y d i d n o t r e t u r n
h is jewels. Cr im e c o m m i t t e d i s o t h e r l i g h t t h d'
t. A
i a e o r g r a v e t h r eat b ecause there is no showing t ha t t h e t h r e at
w as made w it h t h e d e l i b er ate p u r p ose of cr eatin g i n t h e m i n d o f
t he person thr eatened the belief that th e t h r eat w i l l b e carr ied in t o
effect.
T h e crime of g r a v e t h r e at s i s c o n s u m m a te d a s s oon a s t h e
threat comes to the k n o w l edge of the person t h r e at ened. (People v.
Villanueva, C.A., 48 O.G. 1376)
LlGHT THREAT
Light threat is committed by any person who shall thr
anoth er with the infliction of a wrong not constituting sa acrimerea ten
upon
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Ix. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 471
AND SECURITY
the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family for purposes
of demanding money or im posing any other conditi on. (Art ic le 283)
Threat m ad e b y B I R o f fi cer t h a t h e w o u l d fi l e a t a x e v a sion
case unless the of ended party pay hi s ta x obl i g at ion in accordance
w ith his comput a t ion is not l i gh t t h r e at . F i l i n g a compl aint for t a x
evasion is not a wr o n g wi t h i n t h e c o n t e mp l a t i on of A r t i c le 2 88 on
l ight th r e at .
Accused demanded money from the complainant w it h t h r eat t o
report to the Bureau of Internal Revenue his tax evasion. Accused
are liable for light threat. (People v. Hao E Chao, C.A., 54 O.G. 5884)
Repol"ting ta x e v a sloll t o p l "opel" authol'ltles l s Got w l "ong. Ev el'y
citizen has the right to disclose ta.x evasion by a taxpayer to the
government. But making money out of such right to report makes
the reporting thereof "a tvrong not constituting a crime" within the
c ontemplation of Ar t i cle 288 on light t h r e a t .
Gra~e threat and terrorism
A ny p e r son w h o s h a l l t h r e a t e n t o c o m m i t a n y o f t h e a c t s
constitut in g t e r r o r ism is l i a ble for t h r eat to commit t e r r o r ism (R .A .
No. 11479).
Grave Threat and Light Threat
I n gr av e t h r e at , t h e o f f e n der t h r e a t e ned t o i n fl i c t a w r o n g
constituting a crime upon his person, honor or property or that of his
family. On th e ot her h a nd , in l i gh t t h r e at , th e offender t h r e at ened
to inflict a wr ong not constitu t ing a cri me upon his person, honor or
property or that of his family.
Grave threat can be committed with or w i t hout demanding
m oney or i m p o sing condit i on. L i gh t t h r e a t m u s t b e c o m m i t t e d f o r
purposes of demanding money or imposing condition.
A creditor wrote a letter to a debtor, who is a lawyer, demanding
payment of his obligation covered by a dishonored check otherwise,
he will kill him. The creditor is liable for grave threat. Killing is "a
wrong constitut i ng a cri m e" wi t h i n t h e contempla t i on of Art i c le 282
o n grave threat .
A client wr ote a l e t ter t o a l a w yer d emanding P1,000.00;
o therwise, d i s b a r m en t c o m p l a in t w i l l b e fi l e d a g a i n s t h i m f o r
violating his oath as a lawyer. The client is liable for light threat
under Article 288, (Batolanon v. Leorente, G.R No. L-17994, August
 472 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
81, 1968) Filing disbarment case is not wrong. Such filing is a matter
of right. Bu t m a k i n g m o ney ou t o f s uch r i gh t t o fi l e a d i s b a r ment
case makes th e fi l i n g t h e r eof "a w r o n g n o t c o n s tit u t i ng a e r i n ;e"
w ithin th e contemplat ion of Ar t i cle 283 on light t h r e a t .
A creditor wrote a letter to a debtor, who is a lawyer, demanding
payment of his obligation covered by a dishonored check; otherwise,
complaints for disbarm ent, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and estafa shall
be filed against him . The creditor is not li able for light t h r e at. Filing
complaints for d i s b ar m e nt , v i o l a t ion of B .P . B lg . 22 an d estafa f
f ailure t o p a y o b l i g a t i on , w h i c h i s d u e a n d d e m a n d a ble i s n o t ear
a or prosecute him, or to r eport hi s cr i mi r al act i v it y t o a u t h o r i t ies i n
" wrong" wit hi n th e contempl a t ion of Ar t i cle 283 on light t h r e a t .
Robbery, Grave Threat, and Other Light Threat
In robbery,the offender takes personal property from the victim
b y means of violence or inti m i d a t ion such as threat of physical harn ,
or threat of a r r est or p r o secution. H e m u s t s ecure on t he spot t h e
delivery of the money or other personal pr operty, th r o ugh the effect
of fear or fri ght p r o d uced in th e m in d of the person in t i m i d a ted dke
to immin e nce of the inju ry or h a rm t h r e a t e ned to be inflic te d. (U.8.
v.Osorio, G.B. No. L-6660, January 17, 1912) In sum, the offender
t r e at ened t o i m m e d i a t el y i n fl i c t i n j u r y u p o n t h e v i c t i m o r t o
immediately arr est or prosecute him if he wil l not heed his demand.
The effect of the threat in robbery must be immediate.
In Pe o p le v. Fr a n c i s c o, G .R . N o . L -2 13 9 0 , M ar c h 26,
1 924 aa ssani t ar y i n s p e cto r d i s c overed d u r i n g a n i n s p e c t io n c f
t he m e r c h a n d is e i n v i c t i m ' s s t o r e t h a t t h e l a r d w a s u n fi t f o r
consumpti on. H e t h e n d e m a n de d f r o m c o m p l a i n an t t h e p a y m e nt
of money with threats of prosecution and arrest. For fear ofbeing
a rrested, pr osecuted, an d c o n v i ct ed, v i c ti m i m m e d i a t el y p a i d t h e
a mount deman d ed. He is li a ble for r obbery .
In U .S . v . Sa n c h e z, L- 9 1 0 2, N o v e m ber 5 , 1 9 1 3 , t w o p o l i c e
officers demanded m o ney f r o m a C h i n e se, wh o a l l e gedly v i o l ated
Opium L aw , accompanied by t h r e at s to t ak e hi m b e fore the pr oper
authorit ies and have him prosecuted. For fear of being sent to prisor
for a long t erm , th e C h i n ese gave them m o n ey. They ar e l i a ble for
robbery.
In Pablo v. People, G.R. No. 152481, April 1 5, 2005, three
policemen fr i s ked v i c t i m s , an d a c cused t he m o f i l l e gal p o ssession
of a deadly weapon. The policemen th r e at ened victim t h a t h e would
be brought to th e police station w h er e he w ould be i n t e r r o gated by
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 473
AND SECURITY
the police, mauled by other pr i soners and heckled by the press. The
a pprehending policemen took pr opert ies from th e v i c t im . T hey a r e
liable for robbery.
In grave threat or o t her l i gh t t h "eat, the offender exerts
p ressure on the vi ctim t o obt ain m o ney o= property, at some fut u r e
t ime by t h r e a t en in g h i m w i t h i n fl i c t i o n o f f u t u r e i n j u r y o r h a r m .
(U.S. v. Os orio, G . R. ¹ . L- 66 6 0 , J a n < ary 1 7 , 1 9 1 2) In s u m , t h e
offender threatened to inflict in j ur y u pon or k il l th e vict im , or arr est
a future time if he will n ot heed his demand. The effect of the thre at
i n the crime of grave thr eat or l i ght t h r ea t is not i m m e d i at e.
In Pe ople v. Mo r e n o, (C . A.) 3 4 O G 17 6 7 , t h e a c c u sed s ent
letters to complain ant d e m a n d in g P 5 ,000.00 under t h r eat of death
and burning of houses. Complainant sent P4,000.00 on different
o ccasions. Accused was convicted of grave thr e at .
Accused threatened to report th e offended party to the Bu r eau
of Internal R evenue for ta x ev asion u n l ess money is given . (People
v. Hao Y . C hao, C.A., 54 O . G. 5 884) Accused is not a s k i ng f or t h e
i mmediate part in g of money. The crime commi t ted is li ght t h r e a t .
In Sa zon v. Sa n d i g a n b ayan, G . R. N o . 1 5 0 8 73, F e brua ry 1 0 ,
2009, on October 1, 1992, th e accused, a D E N R of fi cer, discovered
l ogs in the premises of the complainant and asked that the supportin g
documents b e s h ovrn b y t h e l a t t e r . O n O c t o ber 7 , 1 9 92 , accused
d emanded payment of a p a r t i c u lar su m o f m o ney w h i l e offering t o
"fix"the problem. On October 13, 1992, accused made a final demand.
On October 14, 1992, complainant p a r ted w it h t h ei r P 1 00,000.00 to
the accused during an entr a pm ent operation. Accused was convicted
o f robbery. T h e g r e as e m o ne y w a s t a k e n b y t h e a c c u sed f r o m
complainant th r ough in t i m i d a t i on. By using her position as an officer
of DENR, accused succeeded in coercing —.he complainant t o choose
b etween tw o a l t e r n a t i v es: to p ar t w i t h t h e i r m o n ey , or s u f fer t h e
burden and hum i l i a t ion of prosecution and confiscation of the logs.
Sazon principleshould be re-examined sincethe accused is not
demanding from th e compl a i n an t t o ir n r r.ediately g ive money. It i s
s ubmitted that th e cr ime commi t t ed is only li ght t h r e a t .
Two maids filed complaint s against a r et i ree for r ape and acts
of lasciviousness. The investigator, in cor spiracy wit h t h e m a i ds, is
regularly demanding and obtaining money from the retiree under
t hreat of b e in g p r o secuted. T h en , th e i n v e s t i gator an d t h e m a i d s
e qually di v i ded th e m oney to t h e m selves. The investigator and th e
 474 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
maids are li a ble for l i gh t t h r e at . Th e com m i ssion of r ap e an d a cts
of lasciviousness by th e r e t i r e e against th e m a i d s w i l l n o t e x cl u de
t he commission of l i gh t t h r e a t b y t h e i n v e s t i g ator an d t h e m a i d s
against the reti r ee. These crimes can co-exist. (1992 Bar Exam) T h e
investigator is also liable for violation of R.A. No. 8019.
B lackm a i l
Blackmail ma y be defined as any u n l a w fu l ex t or t ion of money
by an appeal to the fears of the victim, especially extort ion of money
by threats of accusation or exposure. The gravamen of the offense is
t he intent t o ext ort m o ney or ot her t h i n g of v a l ue. The extort ion i s
committed by obtain in g pr operty f rom an o t her w i t h ou t hi s consent,
induced by wrongful use of fear.(U.S. v. Equia, G.B. No. 18540,
October 24, 1918)
There is no crime of blackmail u n der the book of statutes in the
Philippines. Blackmail, wh ich is the extort ion of money i s a conc
t
roader than t h r e at . T h r eat can b e considered as a m er e specie of
blackmail. Blackm ail i n c l u des not only li ght t h r eat but also robbery
and threat to publish li b el. (1954 and 1956 Bar Ex a m s )
T hreat t o P u b l i sh a L i b e l a n d L i g h t T h r e a t
B lackmail i n c l u de s t h e e xtortion o f m o n e y f r o m
a person
b y th r e at s o f a c c u sation o r e x p o s ur e i n t h e p u b l i c p r i n t s . T h i s
c onstitutes t h e c r i m e o f t h r e a t e n in g t o p u b l i s h ,
or offering to
p revent th e p u b l i c at ion o f a l i b e l f o r c o m p ensation u n de r A r t i c l e
856. Threatened to publish in a weekly periodical certain love letters
w ritten by a m a r r i e d w o ma n a d d r essed to a person, who is not h i s
husband, unless she paid P4 ,000.00 to t hem consti t u tes a cr im e of
threat to publish a l i bel u n der A r t i cl e 856. (U.S. v. Equia, G.R. No.
18540, October 24, 1918)
I n blackmail, m oney may be extor ted by t h r e ats or somethi n g
v aluable obtained fro m a p e r son a s a c o n d i t ion of r e f r a i n in g f r o m
m aking a n accusation a gainst h i m ,
o r d i s closing s o m e secret
calculated to op er ate t o h i s p r e j u d i ce. (Pena v. A p a r i c io, A. C. N o .
7298, Ju ne N, 2 0 0 7 ) I f a m a r r i e d w o m a n w r o t e l o ve l e t t e rs to a
man, who is not her husband, and the offender th r e at ened to expose
t he letters t o he r h u s b an d u n l ess she p ay s P 4 ,000.00 to h i m , t h e
crime commit ted is light t h r eat u n der A r t i cle 288. Exposing the love
l etter to her hu sband is a wr ong not constit u t i n g a cr i m e .
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 475
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OTHER LIGHT THREATS
There are th ree forms of other l i gh t t h r e a t u n der A r t i cl e 285,
to wit: (1) threat with a weapon; (2) oral threat in the heat of anger;
a nd (8) oral th r eat of a harm not constit u t i n g a cr i m e .
T hreat w i t h a W e a p o n
Other l i g h t t h r e a t i s co m m i t t e d b y an y p er s o n w h o s h a l l
threaten another with a weapon, or draw such weapon in a quarrel
w ithout d em a n d in g m o ney or i m p o sing a condi t i on, u n l ess it i s i n
lawful self-defense. (Article 285, par. 1 ) T he e lements of th is c ri m e
a re as follows: (1) threat must be made with a weapon or by draw i n g
a weapon in a quarrel; (2) there is no demand for money or imposition
of condition; and (8) the th r eat is not m ade in l a w fu l self-defense.
l. I m p li e d T h r e a t —As a general rule, threatening a person
with a weapon wit h out dem and for money or imposition of condition
is other light t h r eat w it h a w eapon under par. 1 of Art i cle 285. Even
t hough th e a c cused i s n o t u t t e r i n g t h r e a t e n in g r e m a r k s s u c h a s
"papatayin k i t a ," h e i s i m p l i e d ly t h r e a t e n i ng t h e v i c t i m w i t h t h e
infliction of i n j ur y b y d r a w i n g , h ol d in g or b r a n d i sh in g th e w e apon
i n a threatening ma n n er .
In U.S. v. Ca s tanares, G .R. No. L - 8 7 44, October 5, 1 907, the
accused having taken offense at some remark an d l a u g h t er, drew a
revolver and threatened to kill complain a nt, who thereupon fled. The
t rial court convicted th e accused of gr ave t h r e at, bu t t h e S u p r e m e
C ourt found him l i a ble for other li gh t t h r e a t .
In U.S. v. Simeon, G.R. No. 1608, April 1 5, 1904, complainant
was walking from the station toward his house, when he encountered
the accused, who, while about tw o y a rds aw ay; r a i sed his bolo as if
about to strik e or stab him w i t h i t . C o m p l a i n ant ra n a w ay. Accused
i s liable for other li ght t h r e a t .
2. Se r i ous Threat —However, if threat with a weapon is
serious and i t d e l i b er at ely cr eates in t h e m i n d o f v i c ti m t h e b e l i ef
that the th r eat w ould be carried int o effect, the accused can be held
liable for grave thr eat. In Ca l u ag v. People, G.R. No. 171511, March
4, 2009, the complain ant wa s on her wa y t o th e ba r a n gay to report
the mauling ofher husband by the accused. The accused blocked her
and poked his gun at her forehead and uttered "Saan ka pupunta
gusto mo itoP' A ccused was convicted of grave thre at.
 476 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
3. W ' i t h o u t D ez n a n c l o f M o n ey
o r I z n p o s i t i o n of
Conditio n — O t h er l i g h t t h r e a t w i t h a w ea p o n u n d e r p a r . 1 o f
A rticle 2 8 5 m u s t b e committe d w i t h o u t d e m a n d fo r m on e y o r
imposition of condition and not in the exercise of lawful self-defe- e ense.
If the offender th r e atened the victi m w i t h a w e a pon and de manded
money from him, the crime commit t ed is attemp ted or consumma te d
r obbery. If t h e o f f ender t h r e a t ened th e v i c ti m w i t h a w e a pon a n d
imposed condition f r o m hi m (e . g ., d a n c ing), t he c r i m e c o m m i t t e d
is coercion. If th e offender t h r e a t ened th e v i c ti m w i tih a a w
wee aapon
p o n 'i n
l awful self-defense, justifying circums ta nce shall be considered.
O ral T h r e a t i n t h e H e a t o f A n g e r
Other li g ht th r e at al so is commi t t e d by a ny p e r s on w ho s ha ll
o rally t h r e aten an ot her w i t h s om e h ar m ( n ot) constit u t i n g a c r i m e
i n th e h e a t o f a n g e r w i t h o u t d e m a n d i n g m o n e y o r i m p o s in g a
condition, and who by subsequent acts show that h e di d not p er sist
in the idea involved in his t h r e at. (Art i c le 285, par. 2) T h e e lements
of this crime are as follows: (1) thr eat m u s t b e or ally m a de; (2) the
threat i n v olves th e in fi i c t ion of h ar m c o n st i t u t i n g a c r i m e s uch as
threat to kill; (3) the threat is made in the heat of the moment (4)
tthe offender did not subsequently persist in th e i dea involved in hi s
threat; (5) there is no demand for m oney or i m p osition of condition;
a nd (6) the act does not constit ut e gr ave th r e at .
1. H a r m Co n s t i t u t i n g a C r i x ne — In Caluag v. Peop/e, G.R.
No. 171511, March 4, 2009, the Supreme Court, Second Division,
said that i n l i g h t t h r e a t an d o t her l i gh t t h r e at s u n der A r t i c les 283
a nd 285, the w r on g t h r e a t ened does not a m o un t t o a c r i m e ; w h i l e
grave threat u n der A r t i c l e 2 82, th e w r on g t h r e a t ened constit ut e a
crime.
It is submi t ted t hat th e Ca l u ag c ase is not controlli n g .
According to Justice Luis Reyes, the word "not" in the defini t i on
of other li ght t h r ea t u n der A r t i cl e 285, par. 2 is a m i s t ak e because
the Spanish text th ereof used words "constituya delito, "which words
when tran slated into En g l ish m e ans "constit u t i n g cr i m e." In People
v. Medrano, G.R. No. L-24364, February 22, 1968, the Supreme
Court, En B a n c , s a id t h a t o r a l l y t h r e a t e n i ng a n o t h er i n t h e h e a t
of anger wit h s ome h arm co n stit u t i ng a c r i m e i s o th er l i g ht t h r e a t
under Ar t i cle 285, par. 2.
The Supreme Court i n t h e C a l u a g i s o nl y s i t t i n g i n D i v i s i on;
hence, i t c a n n o t a b a n do n t h e p r i n c i p l e i n Med r a n o w h e r e t h e
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 477
AND SECURITY
Supreme Court i s s i t t i n g En B a n c . M o r e o ver, t he S p a n i sh t e xt o f
the Revised Penal Code prevails over the En g l ish text t h er eof.
In U.S. v. Paguir a n, G. R. No. L-5348, November 16, 1909 and
U.S. v. Estrada, G .R. No. 4418, March 25, 1908, threat to ki ll m a d e
i n the h ea t o f a n ge r i s c o n sidered as o t he r l i g h t t h r e a t a l t h o u g h
killing th r e atened to be commit ted is a wr o ng c onstitu t i ng a crim e .
Moreover, ot h e r l i g h t t h r e a t s u n d e r p a r . 1 of A r ti c l e 2 8 5
i nvolve thr eat w it h a w e a p on. Such t h r eat w i t h a w e a pon amoun t s
to a t h r ea t t o i n f l i c t h a r m c o n s t i t u t i n g a c r i m e s u c h a s p h y s i cal
injuries or h omicide. In sum, even though the offender in th is crim e
is not u t t e r i n g t h r e a t e n in g r e m a r k s s uc h a s "p a p a t a yin k i t a , " h e
i s impliedly t h r e a t enin g th e v i c ti m w i t h t h e i n fi i c t ion of a n i n j u r y
b y draw i ng , h o l d in g o r b r a n d i s h in g t h e w e a pon i n a t h r e a t e n i n g
m anner. I n fi i c t io n o f a n i n j u r y t h r e a t e ned t o b e c o m m i t t e d i s a
w rong constitu t i n g a cr i m e .
2. He a t of Anger — Oral threat of a harm constituting a
crime (e.g., threat to ki ll) made in the heat of anger constitu tes other
l ight t h r eat u n der A r t i cl e 285, par. 2. If th e oral t h r eat is not m a d e
i n the heat of anger, the crime commi t ted is grave thr e at .
3. P e r s i s t e n c e i n t h e I d e a I n v o l v e d i n t h e T h r e a t — In
U.S. v. Estrada, G.R. No. 4418, March 25, 1908, the accused, who was
o ffended by the remark s m ade by the vict im , t h r e at ened to kill h i m .
While accused was searching for a r evolver, complain ant concealed
himself. On the following day accused called at complain an t's house
a nd stated that th e t h r eat had been ut t e red wi t h out p r e m edit a t i on ,
a nd that i t w a s n o t s e r i ou sly m a de. T h ese subsequent acts of t h e
a ccused in t a l k i n g w i t h t h e c o m p l a i n an t s h o w t h a t h e h a d n o t
persisted in ca r r y in g ou t t h e t h r e at . Th e cr im e comm i t te d i s ot h er
l ight th r e a t .
E ven th ough t h e o r a l t h r e a t o f a h a r m c o n s t i t u t i n g a c r i m e
(e.g., threat t o k i l l ) i s m a d e i n t h e h e a t o f a n g er , i f t h e a c cused
subsequently p er sists in t h e i d e a of k i l l i n g h i m , w h i c h i s i n v o l v ed
in the t h r e at , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s s t i l l g r a v e t h r e at . I n R e y es
v. People, G .R. Nos. L-21528 and L - 2 1 529, Ma r ch 2 8, 1 969, duri n g
a demonstrat ion o f e m p l o yees against c o m p l a i n an t A g u s t in , w h o
caused the ter m i n a t ion of service of the accused, the latter shouted
repeatedly "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawa w a la ka. Agustin
lumabas ka, pap a tayi n k i t a." D e m o ns tr a t o rs carri ed pla cards wit h
threatening st a t em ents. They pe r s istently t r a i l e d t h e c ompla ina nt
in a m o t orcade up t o h i s r e s i d ence. The d em onstr a t ion conducted
in front of complain a n t's residence, culmin a t in g in re peated threats
 478 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
f lung by accused in a l ou d v o i ce. Circum st ance shows that t h r e a t s
w ere made w it h t h e d e l i b er ate p u r p ose of creating i n t h e m i n d o f
t he person t h r e at ened th e b e l ief t h a t t h e t h r e a t w o u l d b e c a r r i e d
i nto effect. Indeed, complainant is so apprehensive of his safet t h t
hee even sought police protection. Accused is liable for grave thr eat .
4. N o D em a n d f o r M o n e y o r I m p o s i t i o n of C o n d i t i o n -
Other light t h r eat in the heat of anger under Ar t i cle 285 p ar . 2 m
t
be
e committed wi t h out d em and for m oney or im p osition of condition.
If the threat is m ade with d emand for m oney or i m position of
condition, the crime committed is robbery or coercion regardless of
whether or not the threat is made in the heat of the anger.
In Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009,
the accused shouted InvectIves at complaInant, saying "Putang dna
mong matanda ka,walang hiya ka, kapal ng mukha mo, papatayin
ka naming; wala kang kadaladala, sinabihan nakita na kahit sa
i saan
ita m a t i emp u h an, pa p a t a y in ki t a . " T h e r e a fte r, a c c used g ra bbed
the gold n ecklace of t h e c o m p l a i n an t a n d s a i d "P u t a n g in a k a n g
matanda ka! Hi n d i ni y o ka m i ma i p a p a k u l o ng ka h i t ka i l a n ! " T h e
a ccused wer e c h a r ged o f r o b b e ry . H o w e v er , t h e S u p r em e C o u r t
r uled out in t ent t o gain because of the circum st ance of hate and il l -
feeling of th e accused against th e c om pl a i n a nt . T h u s , th e accused
were found guilty ofgrave coercion.
Hypothetically , i f ev i d e n c e i n C on s u l t a case e s t ab li shes
i ntent to gain such as the accused sold the necklace taken from t h e
complainant, it is subm i t t ed t hey can still be convicted of robbery.
Oral Th r e a t w i t h Ha r m N o t C o n s t i t u t i n g a C r i m e
Other li g ht th r e at is a l so commi t t e d by a ny p e r s on w ho s ha ll
orally t h r e a ten a n o t her t o d o an y h a r m n o t c o n s t i t u t i n g a f e l o ny,
(Article 285, par. 8) The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) the
threat must be made orally; (2) the harm threatened to be inflicted
does not constitute a crime; and (3) there is no demand for money or
imposition of conditi on .
A has threatened to publish the love letter of B, a m a rried
woman, in anewspaper unless payment of P10,000.00 is made. The
crime committed is threat to publish a libel under Article 356.
A has threatened to expose to her husband the love letter of
B addressed to C unless payment of P10,000.00 is made. The crime
committed i s l i g h t th r e at u n d e r A r t i c l e 2 83 b e cause the t h r e at i s
made with demand for money,
J9JC9B0M
IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 479
AND SECURITY
A has or a lly t h r e a t ened t o e x pose the l ove l e t ter of B t o h e r
husband. The cr im e com m i t t e d i s ot h er li g h t th r e at in v o l v i ng o r a l
threat under Art i c le 285, par. 3. because the threat is oral and made
w ithout demand for m oney or im p osition of conditi on .
A has t h r e at ened in w r i t i n g to e x p o se the l o ve le tt er of B t o
her husband. Li ght t h r eat u n der A r t i cl e 283 is not commi t ted since
t here is n o d e m an d f o r m o n e y o r i m p o s i t io n o f c o n d i t i on . O t h e r
l ight t h r ea t i n v o l v in g o r a l t h r e a t u n d e r A r t i c l e 2 85 , p ar . 3 i s n o t
c ommitted since the t h r eat w a s not m a d e or al ly . H e n ce, the cr i m e
committed is unj ust vexation un d er Ar t i c le 287.
Grave T hreat, Light T h r e a t, and Other L i g ht T h r e a t
T he differences among the cri mes of grave th r e at, li ght t h r e a t
and other li ght t h r e ats are as follows:
1. M a n n e r o f C o m m i s s i o n — Grave threat and light t h r e at
c an be committed orally or in w r i t i n g . Ot her l i gh t t h r eat of the fir st
f orm is commi t ted w it h t h e use of weapon. Other li ght t h r eat of th e
s econd form and t h ir d f or m m u s t be m ade orally .
2. I m p os i t i o n of C on d i t i o n — Grave t h r e a t ca n b e
c ommitted w i t h o r w i t h o u t d e m a n d f o r m o n e y o r i m p o s i t io n o f
condition. Li ght t h r ea t m u s t b e comm i t t e d w it h d e m an d for m o n ey
o r imposition of c o n di t i on . O t h e r l i g h t t h r e a t m u s t b e c o m m i t t e d
w ithout demanding money or im posing conditi on .
3. C r i m i n a l o r N o n - c r i m i n a l Wr on g — I n g r a v e t h r e a t
and other li ght t h r eat of the first or second form, offender th r e atens
t o inflict a w r o n g c onst i t u t i n g a c r i m e . I n l i g h t t h r e a t , an d o t h e r
l ight th r eat of the t h ir d f o rm , offender th r e at ened to infl ict a w r o n g
n ot constitu t in g a cri m e .
W ri t t e n T h r e a t
If the thr eat is made in wr i t i n g , the offender is liable for either
grave threat un d er A r t i c le 2 82 in c a se the w r o ng t h r e a t e ned to be
inflicted constitu tes a crime; or light th r e at under Art i c le 283 in case
t he wrong th r e at ened to be infli cted does not constit ut e a cri m e .
T hreat w i t h a W e a p o n
If the t h r eat i s m ad e w it h a w e a p on, th e offender is l i a ble for
either gr a ve threat un d er A r t i c le 2 82 if t he t h r e at is s erious and it
deliberately creates in the mind of victim the belief that the threat
 480 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME IJ
would be c a r r ie d i n t o e f f ect; or o t h e r l i g h t t h r e at w i t h a w e a p o n
u nder par . 1 o f A r t i c l e 28 5 i f t h e t h r e a t i s n o t s e r i o us. Bu t i f t h e
f. e x er cising such ri ght or f rom so doing such act. (Artic le 286)
threat wit h a w eapon is made with d em and for mo ney or imp osition
o conditi on, the crime commi t ted is ro bbery or coercion.
O ral T h r e a t t o I n 8 i c t a W r o n g C o n s t i t u t i n g a C r i m e
I f th e o r a l t h r e a t o f a h a r m c o n s t i t u t i n g a c r i m '
r ime i s m a e ,
thee offender i s l i a bl e fo r e i t h er gr a v e t h r e at u n d e r A r t i c l e 2 82di ,n
c ase he subsequently p er sists in t h e i d e a i n v o lved in h i s t h r ea t t o
d eliberately create in t h e m i n d o f v i c ti m t h e b e l ief t ha t t h e t h r e a t
would be carried into effect; or other light t h r e at in t he heat of anger
under par. 2 of Ar t i cle 285 in case the th r eat is m ade in th e heat of
anger and he does not subsequently p er sist i n t h e i dea i n v olved in
is threat.
B ut i f t h e oral t h r ea t t o i n fl i c t a c r i m i n a l w r o n g o r h a r m i s
m ade with d e m and for m o ney or i m p o sit ion of conditi on, the cr i m e
committed is robbery or coercion.
Threat to Inflict a Wrong Not Constituting a Crime
If threat to in fl ict w r on g or h ar m no t consti t u t i n g a cr i me, the
offender is liable for either li g ht t h r e at un d er Ar t i c le 283 in case the
t r eat i s m a d e w i t h d e m an d fo r m o ney or i m p o si t ion of c d't'
c on i i o n ;
o er i g h t t h r e at of a h a r m c o n stit u t i ng a c r i m e un d er p a r. 3 o f
Article 285, in case the threat is made wit h out demand for money or
imposition of conditi on .
Threat with Deman d for Money
condition,the offender is liable for either robbery or coercion in case
t e e e c t o f t h e i n t i m i d a t ion i s i m m e d i a te; or gr a ve thre at in c a s e
t he effect of the in t i m i d a t ion is not i m m e d i a t e .
G RAVE CO E R C IO N
another from doing something not prohi b i ted by law, or compels him
m eans of violence, threats or in t i m i d a t i on, and w i t h ou t a ut h '
i o u a u ority off
Grave coercion is qualified if it is committed in violation of the
exercise of the rig ht ofsuf frage, for
or the purpose of compelling
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 481
AND SECURITY
a nother t o p e r f or m a n y r e l i g i o n s a ct, or t o p r e v e n t h i m fr o m
The goats of 6 e n t e r e d t h e g a r d e n of H a n d d e s t r o y ed t h e
vegetables grow in g t h e r e on. H c a u g h t t h e a n i m a l s a n d t e t h e r e d
them near th e h ut . Soon 6 a r r i v e d an d t old H to r e l e a se the goats
as they were his. H refused, telling 6 t o p ay fir st for the value of H's
damaged vegetables. With t h r e ats of bodily ha rm , G compelled H to
turn the goats loose. (1981 Bar Exa m) 6 i s l i a b le for gra ve coercion.
With v i ol ence, G c o mpelled H t o t u r n o v e r t h e p o s s ession of t h e
goats. It is of no moment that the refusal of H to release the goat was
"just or unju st." Wh ether it wa s or was not the duty of H t o t u rn t h e
goats over on dem and, 6 w a s g u i l t y o f t h e c r i m e of g r ave coercion
u nless he was clothed w it h j u d i c ial or a d m i n i s t r a t iv e a u t h o r i ty . I t
i s a maxim of the law t hat no man is aut h o r i zed to take the law i n t o
his own hands and enforce his ri ghts w it h t h r e at s of violence. (U.S.
v. Mena, G.R. ¹ . L - 4 8 1 2, October80, 1908)
In Na v a r r a v. Of h c e of th e Om b u d s m a n, G. R . N o . 1 7 6 2 9 1 ,
December 4, 2009, beforethe expiration of the lease contract, armed
armed men and the lessor took over the leased premises and forced
t wo buil d in g c u s t odians t o l e av e f o l l ow in g w h i c h t h e g a t e s w e r e
welded. Respondents can be prosecuted for grave coercion. Whether
t he lessee is indebted to lessor is i m m a t e r i al . I t i s el ement ary t h a t
i n no case may possession be acquired thr ough force or int i m i d a t i o n
a s long as there is a possessor who objects thereto, and that he w h o
b elieves that h e ha s an a c t ion or a r i g h t t o d e p r iv e an other of t h e
holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court if the
h older should refuse to deliver the t h i n g .
Robbery, Grave Coercion, and Grave Threat
The differences among robbery, coercion, and grave threat are
as follows:
1. Cr im i n a l Ac t — In r o bbery, the cri m i n al a ct is t a k i n g o f
p ersonal property w i t h ou t consent of its owner .
I n coercion, t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i s c o m p e l l in g a n o t h e r t o d o
s omething a g a i ns t h i s w i l l or p r e v e n t i n g a n o t h e r f r o m d o i n g
something not pr ohib i ted by law. ( 1 946 Bar Ex a m )
In grave t h r e a t, t he cri m i n a l a ct is t h r e a t e ning a p erson wit h
the infliction of wrong amount in g to a crime to demand for money or
to impose condition or m e r ely for th e s ake of creating fear of being
harmed in the mind of the victim without imposing any condition.
 482 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
2. I n t i m i d a t i o n —In robbery and coercion, the inti m i d a t i o n
i s a c t ua l o r i m m e d i a t e . I n gr a v e t h r e a t , t h e i n t i m i d a t i o n i s
c onditional or fu t u r e .
In robbery and coercion, the in t i m i d a t ion is personal. I
r ea , h e i n t i m i d a t ion i s not n ecessarily p ersonal because it m ay
e caused by an i n t e r m e d i a ry. (People v. Alfeche, G.R. ¹. 1 02 0 7 0 ,
July 28, 1992) H ow ever, if t h e t h r e a t i s m a d e w i t h ou t d e m an d or
c ondition, i t i s g r a v e t h r e a t e v e n i f t h e i n t i m i d a t i o n i s a c t u a l o r
immediate rather t han condit i onal or f u t u r e . (1967 Bar E x a m
) k ill hi s son and w if e should he fail t o give th e am ou nt . A f r a i d
a. R obb e r y a n d G r a v e C o e r c i o n — A c c used, w h o
poked a gun a t t h e v i c t i m , an d c o m pelled hi m t o g i v e m o n ey
against hi s w i l l , i s r o b b e ry . ( 1 96'7Bar E x a m ) A c c u s ed, wh o
poked a gun at th e vi cti m an d compelled him t o d ance against
his will; or pr event hi m f r o m l e av ing the house, is coercion.
R obbery i s n o t c o m m i t t e d b y a m a n
wh h d f
i e r y f o r t i t l e t o hi s a n cestral estate by t a k i n g th e la w i nht o
bitterl
i s own hands and at t e m p t i n g t o collect what h e t h o u ght w a s
due him . A n i m u s fu r a n d i wa s l a c k i n g . (C o nsulta v. Pe o ple,
G.R No. 1 7946'2,February 12, 2009) However, taking property
b y means of violence or in t i m i d a t ion w i t h ou t i n t en t t o g ain i s
grave coercion. (People v. Al f e che, G.R. No. 10 2 0 7 0, Jul 2 8.
) is n o t p e r m i s s ible to take the law into one's own hands,
a n t o s e i z e t h e p r o p e rt y f r o m t h e p o s sessor w i t h ou t b e i n g
authorized to d o so by c o u rt o r d e r .
(U.S. v. Abrille, G.P. No.
L-12722, August 29, 1917)
I sagani lost his gold necklace bearing his in i t i a ls. He saw
o y wearing the said necklace. Isagani asked Roy to ret ur n t o
him the necklace as it belongs to him, but Roy refused. Isagani
t en d r e w h i s g u n a n d t o l d R o y , " I f y o u w i l l n o t g i v e b a c k
the necklace to me, I w i l l k i l l y o u l " O ut o f f e ar f or h is l i f e a nd
a gainst hi s w i l l , Roy g ave th e n e ckl ace to I s agani. I s agani i s
n ot i a bl e for r o bbery because he is th e owne r f t h
a en by f o r ce. In r o b b ery, th e p r o p erty m u s t b e o w ned by a
person other than th e offender. However, he is liable for
coercion. Tak in g t h e l a w i n t o o n e's han d i s no t l a w f u l . ( 1rave
998
and 2018 Bar Exa m s)
CC >P
A s t ol e th e bicycle of "B." For a consideration pro m i s ed
y " ," "C"agreed to recover the bicycle from "A.""C" b
of violence y means
nce and int i m i d a t ion forcibly t ook th e bicycle from "A ."
" pai " " th e a greed am ou n t . "C" is not l i a bl e for r o bbery
J9JC9B0M
IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 483
AND SECURITY
since the tak in g of th e pr operty wa s m ade wit h t h e consent of
"B, "the owner thereof. However, "C" is liable for grave coercion
by taking the law i nt o hi s hand. (1989 B ar Exa m )
b. R ob b e r y a n d G r a v e T h r e a t —A, B, and C, arme d
with guns, went tosee Pedro and demanded P100,000.00. When
Pedro refused, A pointed hi s gun at hi m w h i l e B h i t h i m w i t h
the butt of hi s gun . Pedro gave the am ount d e m a n ded. D a n d
E wrote Orlando a letter asking P50,000.00 and thre atening to
that the two would m ak e good their t h r e at, he gave the money
when D called him t h a t d a y. A, B, and C are liable for robbery.
The inti m i d a t ion used to take property is actual and personal.
D and E a re n ot l i a b le for ro bbery because the int i m i d a t i on i s
not actual an d i m m e d i a te. Since the i n t i m i d a t ion i s f u t u r e or
conditional, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s g r a v e t h r e at . ( 1 967 a n d
1987 Bar Exams)
c. G r a v e T h r e a t a n d G r a v e C o e r c i o n —According
to Regalado, if the act desired was n ot i m m e d i a t e l y
consummated, it w o uld be grave th r e at; if th e desired purpose
was correspondingly achieved, it is grave coercion.
A ccused sent a l e t t e r t o h i s t e n a n t , w h o i s n o t p a y i n g
rentals, demanding to vacate his rented apart m e nt ; otherwi se,
he will kill her son. Out of fear, the tenant vacated the place. He
is not liable for coercion because the int i m i d a t ion is not actual
or immediate. Since the i n t i m i d a t ion i s f u t u r e or c ondi t i on al ,
the crime committed isgrave threat.
A group of p i ck et ers stopped a t r u c k i n t h e p r e m i ses of
the picketed fir m a n d r e f u sed t o a l l o w i t s d r i v e r t o p r o ceed
p eacefully on h i s w a y a n d t h e y v o i ced th e t h r ea t t h a t i f t h e
d river proceeded on his way, he would be hurt, notwi t h s t an d i n g
the fact that th e d r i ver t ol d hi m t h a t t h e t r u c k di d not belong
t o th e c o m p any . A s a c o n s equence of t h e t h r e a t , t h e t r u c k
remained in the premises for two days. The picketers are liable
for coercion. (1964 Bar Ex a m )
d. T h r e a t w it h o u t D e m a n d o r C o n d i t i o n —I f th e
threat is made with out dem and or conditi on, the crime is grave
threat, and not r obbery or coercion. As a r u le, in g r ave t h r e at
i ntimi d a t ion m u s t b e c o n d i t i o na l o r f u t u r e . B u t i f t h r e a t i s
made with out d e m an d or condi t i on, th e cr im e i s gr ave t h r e at
a lthough the in t i m i d a t ion is actual or i m m e d i a t e.
 484 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 485
AND SECURITY

In Reyes v. People, G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529, March

28, 1969, theaccused shouted repeatedly "Ag warning: "We ha ve closed this p o r t i on of th e d o o r. Do n o t o pen i t
y, g u sti n , p u t a ng inc
mo. Agustin, m a w a w a l a ka . Ag u s t in l u m a b a s h or else something ma y h a p p e n t o y o u ." G i o v a nni i s n o t l i a b l e f o r
71 a, papa tayi n
kita. Th e accused was convicted of grave threat. Note: He is grave coercion. The statement "Do not open it or else something may
not liable for r o b bery or c o e rcion s in ce t he i n t i m i d a t i on w a s happen to yo u" is v a g ue, and t h u s , it c a n n ot be i n t e r p r e t ed as a n
n ot m ad e t o t a k e p r o p e r ty , c o m pel on e t o d o s o m e t h in g o r intimid at ion or t h r e at , w h ic h i s a n e l e m ent of g r av e coercion. Th e
p revent him f ro m d oing somethi ng. Al t h o ugh th e i n t i m i d a t i on c rime commi t te d i s o t h e r l i g h t c o ercion or u n j u s t v e x a t i on . (2 00 7
i s i m m e d i at e a n d p e r s o n al , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s g r a v e Bar Exam)
t hreat because it cr eates fear of being h a r med i n t h e m i n d of
If the act, w h ich w o ul d h av e constit u ted l i gh t c oercion un d er
the victim .
the fir st p a r a g r a ph of A r t i c l e 2 8 7 , i s m a d e w i t h o u t v i o l e n ce o r
intimid at i on, th e cr im e comm i t t e d is ot h er l i g ht c oercion or u n j u s t
LIGHT COER C IO N vexation u n der t h e se cond pa r a g r a ph o f A r t i c l e 2 8 7. T h u s , if o n e
s eizes anyt h in g b e l on gin g t o h i s d e b t o r ( t h r o u g h d e ceit) fo r t h e
Light coercion is committ ed by any perso
belon i n w ho seizes anythi n g p urpose of apply in g t h e s am e t o t h e p a y m en t o f t h e d ebt w i t h o u t
e onging to his debtor by means of violence f
ce or th e purpose of v iolence, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s o t h e r l i g h t c o e r cion o r u n j u s t
app ying the same to the payment of the debt. (Art ic le 287
) vexation. (People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 7712, March 28, 1956) Light
c oercion is not commi t ted since there is no violence or int i m i d a t i on .
accused compelled hi s d e btor d e l i ver t o h i m c l o th , r i ce, and o t h er
articles of merchandise in payment of his indebtedness. The accused V exation W i t h o u t C o e r c i o n
employed physical violence when he forcibly removed the goods from
the store. Crime commi t ted is li ght coercion. C uttin g o f t h e el e c t r i c , w a t e r an d tel e p h o n e l i n e s of
complainant's bu si ness establishm ent b e cause th ese li nes crossed
h coercion is similar to exploitat ion of child labor or services
ight h is property l i n e w i t h ou t c o ur t o r d e r c o n st i t u t e s u n j u s t v e x a t i on
r endered un der c om p u l sion i n p a y m en t o f d eb t i n t h e s e nse t h a t (Kwan v. CA, G.R. No. 118006, November 28, 2000) although the
thes
hese crimes are commit ted by creditors who collect the amount du e element of compulsion or restr a in t i s not pr esent in t hi s case.
to debtors by force or unl a w fu l m e a n s.
Unjust vexation is broad enough to include any human conduct
that could u n j u s ti fi a bly a n noy or ve x a n i n n o cent p erson al t h ou gh
OTHER LIGHT COE R C ION GR UN J UST VEXATION no physical or m a t e r ia l h a r m r e s u l t ed . T hi s i s a n a c t t h a t c a u sed
O ther li ghht
t coercion o r a nnoyance, irr i t a t i on, tor m ent, di st r ess, or dist u r b ance to the mi n d
u n j u s t v e x ation i s a l s o
under Art i cle 287. unishabl of the person to whom it was directed. (People v. Sumingwa, G.R.
No. 188619, October 18, 2009)
Coercion Without Violence or I Unjust v e x a t i o n m a y exi s t ev e n w i th o u t co m p u l s i o n or
ntimidation
I f th e a ct , w h i c h w o u l d h a v e c o n s t i t u t e d g r a v e restraint (M a d erazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26, 2006)
wi o u vi o l e nce or int i m i d a t i on, the crime commit ted is other or coercion as long as the act irritates, annoys or vexes the offended
light coercion. Inn su sum, a person who prevents another from doing party. H ow ever, it i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e c r i m e i n v o l v in g v exatious
s omething not p r o h i b i ted b y l a w o r c o m p els hi m t o d o s o m et h i n g a ct wi t h ou t c o er cion s h o ul d b e d e s cr ibed a s u n j u s t v e x a t i on . I t
a gainst his will, whether it is right or wrong w i t h o u t seems that it is im p r oper to call it as "other light coercion" if the re is
imi a i o n , is liable for other li ght coercion or unjustl vexation. h no coercion in the fi rst p l ace.

P inky was a lessee of a market st all owned b G i o v If one padlocked the apar t m en t u n i t t o coerce the lessee from
w ne y iovanni.'. When
Wh
P inky r e f u sed
e t oo p a
ay h e r r e n t a l , G i o v a nn i n a i l e d s o m n ot ent er in g t h e r e in , t h e c r i m e i s o t h e r l i g h t c o e r cion o r u n j u s t
barrica d
' ades on one of the sides of the market stall and posted this vexation. If one urinated at the victim while the latter is sleeping,
the crime should be called unjust vexation. It is not proper to call

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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY
VOLUME II AND SECURITY

t his as ot her l i g h t c o ercion s i nce th e o f f ender i s n o t c o ercing t h e

victim.
J ust Vex a t i o n
B C an and D, w i t h o u t a n y r i gh t w h a t s o e ver s q u a t t e d
on a piece of l a nd , th e p r o p ert y o f Z . T h e y c a n not b e c h a r ged for
squatting. U n de r P .D . N o . 7 72 , s qu a t t i n g w a s a c r i m e . H o w ever.
R.A. No.8368 repealed P.D. No. 772 and decriminalized squatting.
Neither can they be charged of unjust vexati on. Other w i se, the rule
on decriminalization of squatting will be circumv'ented. R.A. No.
8368 shows the policy of the State not to treat squatt ' s.
squa e r s as crim ina 1
'
expired, th e accused should h av e f i le d a n u n l a w f u l d e t a i ner c a se
against her.
C yber Bu l l y i n g
C yber b u l l y i n g i s n o t a cr i m e p u n i s h a bl e u n d e r t h e l a w .
H owever, cyber bu l l y in g m a y c onsti t ut e u n j u s t v e x a t i on, t h r eat or
libel. If th ese crimes are commi t t ed w it h t h e use of commu n i cation
or inform at ion t e chnology, th e p en alt y t h e r efor sh all b e u p g r a d ed
o ne degree higher because of Section 6 of R .A . No . 10 175. In s u m ,
the crime commi t ted is cyber unj ust v exat i on, cyber th r eat or cyber
libel.

.
(1962 Bar Exam)
I n unjust vexation, being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent COMPULSORY PURCHASE OF MERCHANDISE
element of the crime. Good faith is a good defense to a charge for
unjust v e x a t ion b e cause good f a it h n e g a tes m a l i c e. Compulsory purchase of merchandise is committed by a ny
(Maderazo v. person,agent or officer of any association or corporation who forces
People, supra)
or compels, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permits to be forced
Having a n o isy b i r t h d a y p a r t y , w h i c h c a used ann oyance and or compelled alaborer or employee employed by him or by such firm
irrit a t ion t o a s l eepy n ei ghbor, is no t u n j u s t v e x a t ion because the o r corporation, to purchase merchandise or commodities of any kin d .
element of ma l ice is not pr esent. In d e t er m i n i n g on w h e t her or n ot (Article 288)
t e a n n o y in g ac t i s u n j u s t v e x a t i on , t h e c o ur t s h a l l c o n sider t h e
c riminal m i n d o f t h e a c cused in c o m m i t t i n g s uch a ct . an d no t t h e
annoying effects of t ha t ac t o n t h e c om p l a i n a nt . I f a c a n d i d ate for PAYMENT OF WAGES BY MEANS OF TOKENS
m ayor d e l ib er ately c r e a ted u n n e cessary n o is e d u r i n Payment of wa g e s by m e a ns of t o k e ns i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y
r ing a p a r t y t o
irritate another mayoralty candi date wh ile the latter was delivering person who pays the wages due a laborer or employee employed
a campaign speech, the former i s l i a ble for u n j ust v e x a t i on. In t h i s by him, by m e an s of t o k ens or objects other t h a n t h e l e gal t e n der
c ase, the mind of the accused is crim i n a l . c urrency o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s, unless expressly requested by the
laborer or employee. (Article 288)
W ithout C o u r t O r d e r
The main pu r p ose of the law in p en ali zing coercion and unj u st
FORMATION, MAINTENANCE, AND PROHIBITION OF
v exation i s p r e cisely t o e n f orce th e p r i n c i I t h t
ip e a n o p er s o n m a y C OM B INATION OF CAPITAL OR LABO R TH R O U G H V IOLE N C E
ta e th e law i n t o hi s h a nd s and t ha t ou r g overn m ent i s one of law,
OR THREATS
n ot of men. It is u n l a w fu l for any p er son to take into his own h a n ds
the admini st r a t ion of justi ce. (Maderazo v. People, supra) F ormation , m a i n t e n a nc e a n d p r o h i b i t i o n o f c o m b i n a t i o n
of capital o r l a b o r t h r o ug h v i o l ence or t h r e ats a r e c o m m i t t e d b y
In Ma d e razo v. People, supra, f or u n j u s t v e x a t i on to e x i s t, i t
a ny person w h o , f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f o r g a n i z i ng , m a i n t a i n i n g o r
i s not necessary that th e offended party be pr esent when th e cr i m e
preventing coaliti ons of capital or l a b or , st r i k e of l a b or ers or l o ck -
was commit t ed. I t i s e n o ugh t h a t s h e w a s e m b a r r a ssed, annoyed,
out of empl oyees, employs vi olence or t h r e at s i n s u c h a d e gree as
irritated or disturbed when she learned of acts of accused in reopening
to compel or fo r ce t he l a b o re rs or e m p l o yers in t h e f r e e a nd l e g al
t he stall and effecting the tr a n sport a t ion of the goods therein to th e
exercise of t h ei r i n d u s tr y o r w o r k p r o v i de d t h a t t h e a c t d oes not
p olice station. E v i c t in g t h e o f f e n ded p a rt y w i t h o u t c o ur t o r d e r i s
constitute a more serious offense. (Article 289)
u njust vexation. Since the lease contract of th e offended part y h a s

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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 489
VOLUME II
AND SECURITY

DISCOV E R ING SEC R E T S TH R O U G H S E IZURE OF

CORRESPONDENCE The nature of th e conversation is i m m a t e r ia l t o a v i o l a t ion of
t he anti -w i r e t ap ping l aw . T h e s u b st ance of th e s am e n eed not b e
Discovering s e c r ets t hrough s e i z u r e specifically a l l e ged i n t h e I n f o r m a t i on. (R a m i r e z v. C A, G . R . ¹ .
of co r r e s pond
o
committed by a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d ua l w h o s e izes papers or l eence is
t t er s of 93833, September 28, 1995) Thus, recording an attempt of public
a nother i n o r d e r t o d i s cover hi s s e crets. T h o fficer to extort m oney is a violation of the law .
s. e crime is committed
whether
w ether or not the contents of the letter were revealed. Th
a e . e p r o v i s i on M MDA o f f icer i s e x t o r t i n g m o ney f r o m a d r i v e r o f a v e h i c l e
o n i s c o v erin g s e crets t h r o u g h s e i z ur e o f c o
c orrespon dence i s n o t who committed t r a f fic violation along ED SA. The officer th r e atened
applicable topapers or letters seized by the spouse of it
o se o a c i the driver t h a t h e w i l l c o n fi scate he r d r i v e r' s l i c ense u n l ess sh e
seized by his parent, guardian, orperson entrusted
with his custody. (Artic le 290) w ill give hi m P 5 00 . H o w ever, M M D A o f fi cer i s no t a w ar e t h a t h i s
a ct of extor t in g m o ney i s b e in g v i deo r ecorded by t h e d r i v er . T h e
d river violated the A n t i - W i r e t a p p ing L aw . Th e recording of pr i v a t e
R EVEALING SEC R E TS W ITH ABUSE OF CO N F IDEN C E c onversations w i t h ou t t h e c o n sent o f t h e p a r t i e s cont r a v enes th e
Revealing secrets with abuse o provisions of R.A. No. 4200.The law covers even th ose recorded by
fofficeiscornm i' tte d b y a m a n a g e r , persons privy to th e pr i v at e commu n i cati ons. The law i s applicable
emp
e m looyee,
e e or
o servant w ho, in such capacity, learns the secrets of his
principal or master and reveals such secrets. (Article 291) e ven i f t he co n v e r s a t io n b e i n g r e c o r de r p e r t a i n s t o criminal
extortion. (Mamba v. Garcia, A.M. No. MT J - 9 6 - 1110, June 25, 2001)
On the other h a n d , M M D A o f fi cer i s l i a bl e for a t t e m p ted r o bbery.
REVEALING INDUSTRIAL SECRETS However, in pr oving at t e m p ted robbery, the prosecution cannot use
Revelation of i n d u s t r i a l s e crets i s c o m m i t t e d b an the recording since the same is not admissible in evidence. But it can
i n char g,
e em p1 o y ee or workman of a manufacturing i e y an y p er s o n r ely on testimonial evidence to establish th e elements of att em pt ed
establish
es a i s m e n t w h o reveals the secrets of the industry to the prejudice d t 1 robbery.
of the owner th ereof. (Artic le 292) In Mamba v. Garcia, supra, police officers inside the chamber of
respondent judge solicited money from complain ant in consideration
ANTI-WIRETAPPING ACT of the w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e c a se for i l l e gal p o ssession of u n l i c ensed
firearm a g a i n s t t h e l at t e r . Com p l a i n a n t t a p e r ecorded t h e
R.A. NO. 4200 conversation. According the Supre me Court En B a n c , the recording
of private conversations, which in v olved the crime of direct brib ery ,
The elements of t h e c r i m e o f w i r e t a p p in g ar e a s f o l l ows: (1)
without the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of Anti-
t hat t h er e i s a p r i v a t e co m m u n i c a t i on; (2) t h a t o f f e nder t ap s a n y
wire or cable o r use Wiretapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in
uses ddevice or arrangement to secretl any proceeding. The law covers even those recorded by persons privy
i nterceep, t or r ec ord such p r i v at e com m u n i c a t i on; (3) t hayt over
o rr e he a r ,
o f f ender
to the private commu n i cati ons.
o verhears, intercepts, or records the priv ate communi c t '
'th
a u o r i y r o m a l l t h e p a r t ies thereto and wi t h out w r i t at e ion n a uwit h o rou
it t
u wr i e n a u t o r i t y Tapping W ir e or U s i n g D e v i c e
f rom a competent court .
T apping w i r e o r c a b l e , o r u s i n g d e v i c e o r a r r a n g e m ent t o
P rivate C o n u n u n i c a t i o n s ecretly overhear, i n t e r cept, or r e cord a p r i v at e com m u n i cation i s
a crime.
Heated e x ch ange o f w o rd s b e t w ee n t h e p o l i c e ma n a n d a
reporter in a p ublic' p 1. Deliberate Installation ofDevice — The phrase "device
l ace 'in the presence of several persons '
p rivate
' c ommunication. Hence t ap e record' n si s n o t a or arrangement" i n t h e l a w m u s t b e s i m i l a r t o w a l k i e - t a lk i e, t a p e
ing suc h e x ch a n g e is not r ecorder, e tc . A n e x t e n s ion t e l e p h on e c a n no t b e p l a c e d i n t h i s
prohibited bylaw. (Navarro v. CA, G.R. No. 121087, A ugust 26, 1999
) category. Extension telephone cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. It "was not deliberately installed"

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 490 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
f or purposes of secretly overheari ng, i n t e r cepting, or r ecording t h e
c ommunication. The telephone extension was not i n s t a l led for t h at
purpose. It j u s t h a p p ened t o b e t h er e fo r o r d i n ar y of fice u se. The
device contemplated by th e law r e f ers to in st r u m e n ts, the pr esence
o which cannot be presumed by the party being overheard. Since
telephone extension is of c o m mon u s a ge
a person sh s ould ass u m e
a e p ar t y h e i s c a l l i n g h a s a n e x t e n sion t e l ephone, and t h a t
he runs t h e r i s k o f a t h i r d p a r t y l i s t e n in g t o t h e i r c o n v er sation.
(Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.A. No. L-69809, October
16, 1986; 2018 and 1998 Bar E x a m s )
A dash ca m i n a d v e r t e n tl y r e c or ded a c o n v ersation b e t w een
M MD a n d t h e d r i v e r o f t h e c a r w h e r e t h e f o r m e r i s e x t o r t i n g
m oney f r o m t he l a t t e r i n connection
w ith a n alleged t r a f fi c
violation. App l y in g th e Ga a n an p r i n c i p l e, since the d ash cam w a s
n ot deliberately i n s t a l led fo r p u r p ose of secretly o v er h earin g t h i s
p articular conversation, there is no violation of th A t '- W'
e n i - i r et a p p i n g
L aw.
Iff a CCTV c a m era, w h ic h w a s i n s t a l led i n f r on t o f t h e h o u se
y the owner t h e r eof t o d e ter c r i m i n a l s f r o m e n t e r in g t h e h o u se,
inadvertently recorded a private conversation where one threatened
t o kill a n o t h er , t h er e i s n o v i o l a t ion of t h e A n t i - W i r e t a p p in g L a w
e cause t h e c amera w a s n ot d e l i b er at el y i n s t a l l e d t o
overhear this par t i c u lar conversation. secretly
Dashh cam an d C C T V c a m er a a r e o f c o m mo n u s a ge. H e nce,
a person should a ssume t h a t t h e p l a c e w h er e h e i s c o m m i t t i n g a
c rime is covered by a d ash cam or C CT V c a m er a an d t h a t h e r u n s
r is o f t h e v i deo recording of hi s cr i m i n a l i t y . D ash cam an d C C T V
camera, which are not deliberately in st al led to overhear a parti cular
c onversation, are not devices contemplated b t h A n t - W '
y e i - i re T a p p i n g
However, if the wife deliberately and secretly inst alled a CCTV
camera inside the master bedroom to cover the act of infidelity of her
us and with th eir m a id, the conversation recorded is not admissible
i n evidence because of violation of the ant i - w i r e t
i -wire appin g Ia w .
2. V i de o R e c o r d i n g —Anti-wir e t a pp i ng law does not cover
v i eo r ecording. I t i s c o n fi ne d t o a u d i o r e c ordi ng. T h u s , a C C T V
footage can be used as an evidence ofthe crime of theft (Oikonomos
International Resources Corporation v. Navaj a, Jr., G.B. No. 214915,
December 7, 2 015) or mur d e r .
J9JC9B0M
IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 491
AND SECURITY
3. I nt e r c e p t i o n o f W V i r e l es s C o n n n u n i c a t i o n — The
interception of the cellphone conversation between President Glori a
M acapagal-Arr oyo an d C o m elec Com m i ssioner V i r g i l i o G a r c i l l a n o
in the "Hello Garci " scandal is not a violation of the anti- wi r e ta pping
law because it is a wireless communication. Neither is it a cybercrime
since the interception was commi t ted pr ior t o th e effectivity of R.A .
N o. 10175. However, if t h e i n c i d ent h a p p ened after t h e e f fectivit y
of R.A. No. 10 175, such acts sh al l c on sti t ut e cybercrim e of i l l e gal
inter =eption under R.A. No. 10175. .
4. P a r t y t o t h e C on v e r s a t i o n — Th i r d p a r t y (S a l c e do-
OrtaRez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. ¹. 1 10 6 6 2 , Au g u st 4, 1994) or a
party to the pr i v at e conversation, who secretly recorded it, is li abl e
for the cr m e o f w i r e t a p p i ng . R .A . N o . 4 20 0 m a k e s n o d i s t i n c t i on
a s to w h e t h e r t h e o f f e n der m u s t b e a p e r s o n o t h e r t h a n t h o s e
involved in th e p r i v at e comm u n i cati on. Even a person who records
his pr i v at e c onv ersation w i t h a n o t h e r w i t h o u t t h e k n o w l e dge of
the latter w i l l q u a l if y a s a v i ol ator u n der R .A . No. 4200. A perusal
of the legislative records wil l s how t h a t i n e n a c t in g R .A . No . 4200
o ur la w m a k er s c o n t em p l a ted t o m a k e i l l e g al , u n a u t h o r i zed t a p e
r ecording of pr i v at e conversations or comm u n i c ati ons t a ken ei t h er
by the parties themselves or by th ir d p er sons. (Bamir ez v. CA, G.R.
No. 9888-', September 28, 1996)
C ourt O r d e r
Under Section 3 of R .A . No . 4 2 00, th e court m a y a u t h o r ize a
peace officer to tap any wire or cable, or use device or arrangement for
the purpose ofsecretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording private
communication in cases involving th e cr i mes of t r eason, espionage,
p rovoking war an d d i s l oyalty i n c ase of w ar , p i r a cy, m u t in y i n t h e
high seas. rebellion, conspiracy, and p r o posal t o com mi t r e b elli on,
i ncit='ng to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, incitin g
to sedition,kidnapping, and espionage under C.A. No. 616.
U nder Section 16 of RA No. 11479, the provisions of Ant i - W i r e
Tapping La w t o t h e c o n t r ar y n o t w i t h s t a n d i ng , a l a w e n f or cement
agent or mi l i t ar y p e r sonnel m ay, upon a w r i t t e n or der of th e Court
of Appeals secretly wir et ap, overhear and listen to, intercept, screen,
read, sur teil, record, or collect, with th e use of any mode, form, kin d
or t;pe of electronic, mechanical or other equipment or device or
technology no w k n o w n o r m a y h e r e a f ter b e k n o w n t o s c i ence or
witl: th e u s e of an y o t h e r s u i t a bl e w ay s an d m e an s for t h e a b ove
purposes. any p r i v at e com m u n i c ati ons, conversation, discussion/s,
 492 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LISERTY 493
VOLUME II AND SECURITY

d ata, i n f o r m a t i on , m e s sages i n w h a t e ve r f o
spoken or wr i t t e n w o r d s : r m,, k'i nd
between
ween members of a j u d i c i a ll y d e clared an d o u t l a w ed
terrorist organization by th e Court of App eals;
2. b e tween members of adesignated person as defined in RA
No. 10168 (Financing terr or ism A ct); or
3. b etw e e n a ny p e r s o n charged w i t h o r
c ommitt in g an y of th e c r i mes defined and p enali z d s uspected o f
e u n d e r R A N o..
11479.
or n a t u r e A prosecution for cybercrime offenses shall be without prejudice
to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code
or special l a ws. (Section 7) D e s pite S ection 7, t he o f f e nder cannot
be prosecuted for cy b er ch i l d po r n o g r a phy u n d e r R . A . N o . 1 0 1 7 5
and child pornography under R.A. No. 9775 or eyber libel under the
Revised Penal Code in relation of R.A. No. 10175 and libel under the
R evised Penal Code because this w il l o f f end th e constit u t i o nal r u l e
on double jeopardy. (Disini v. Secretary of Ju s t ice, G.R. No. 208835,
February 11, 2014)

S urveillance, i n t e r ception a n d r e c o r d i n O ffenses A g a i n s t t h e Co nfi d e n t i a l i t y , I nt e g r i t y , an d

r in g of communications
b etween law e r s and
lawyers a cl i en ts, doctors and p a t i e n ts, jour n a l i sts and A vailab i l it y o f C o m p u t e r D a t a a n d S y s t e m
their sources and confidential bu si ness correspondence shall not be
Computer d a t a r efer s t o a n y r ep r e s e n t a t i on o f f act s ,
authorized.
i nformati on , o r c o n cepts i n a f o r m s u i t a b l e f o r p r o c essing i n a
The law enforcement agent or mi l i t ar y personnel shall li k e wise computer system in clu d in g a pr o g ram su i t a b le to cause a computer
be obligated to: s ystem t o p e r f or m a f u n c t i o n a n d i n c l u d e s el ectronic d ocument s
and/or electronic data messages whether stored in local computer
1. fi l e a n e x p a r t e a p p l i c a t ion w i t h t h e C o u r t o f A
eals systems or onlin e.
for the issuance of an order, d to compel t elecommun ications ' service
providers a nd i n t e r n e t s e r v i ce p r o v i d service Computer system refers toany device or group of interconnected
ers ot p r odu c e alll l c u s t o m er
in ormation and i d e n t i f i cation r ecords as well as call o r related devices, one or m or e o f w h i ch , p u r s u an t t o a p r o g r a m ,
o s , c o n t en t a n d o t h e r c e l l u l a r o r i n t e r n e t m e tan
a ddattaexot f daata
ny performs automated processing of data. Itcovers any type of device
person suspected of any ofthe crimes defined and penalized under w ith d a t a p r o c essing c a p abi l i t ie s i n c l u d i ng , b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o ,
the provisions of this Act; and c omputers an d m o b il e p h o nes. Th e d e vice consisting of h a r d w a r e
and softwar e ma y i n c l ud e i n p u t , o u t p u t , a n c. storage components
2. fu r n i s h t h e N a t i o n a l T e l e comm u n i cati on s C o m m i s sion
(NTC) a copy of said application. The NT C shall l i k e w ise be notified w hich may stand alone or be connected in a network or other simi l a r
u pon t e issuance of the order for the purpose of ensurin i m m e d ' devices. It also includes computer data storage devices or media.
compliance. O ffenses against th e confidenti a l i ty , i n t e gr it y an d a v a i l abi l i t y
of computer data and systems are:
O ther P e r s ons L i a b l e
1. I l l e g alAccess — Illegal access is committed by any person
A ny person wh o sh all a i d , p e r m i t , or c a use to b d who shall access the whole or any part of a computer system wi t h out
the actss decl s e o e one any of
e cl ared to be unlaw ful i n Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 is a s right.
criminally l i a bl e. o. is also
E thical h a c k er s a r e p r o f e s sional s w h o e m p l o y t o o l s a n d
techniques used by crim i na l h a ck ers but w o uld n e i t her d a m age the
CYBER CRlME PREVENTIGN ACT GF 2012
target systems nor steal i n f o r m a t i on . Since the ethical hacker does
R.A. NG. 10175
his job with p r ior per m i ssion from the client, such permission would
The followi
o llowing c o n s t i t u t e cybercrime insulate him from the coverage cybercrime jaw on illegalaccess.
against th e confident i a l i ty , i n t e g r i ty , an d a voffenses:
a i l a b i l it y (1)
o f cOffenses
o m p u t er (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, supra)
data and systems; (2) Computer-related offenses; and (3) conten-
Xwas able to get hold of the Facebook's password of and without
s (cy er i e , cybersex, and cyber child pornogra h ).
ap Y). authority from A, accessed his personal message containing photos

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494 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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ofA and B using dangerous drugs in Amsterdam, and shared these
photos on Facebook. X is l i a ble for th e cybercrime of i l l egal access.
(2018 Bar Exam)
O ne, who hacks his neighbor's int er net access by cracking hi s
Wi-Fi password, is l i a bl e for c y b ercrim e of i l l e gal access. Int er n et
c onnection i s p a r t o f t h e c o m p u t e r s y s t e m ,
a ccessing of w h i c h
without a ri ght is pu n i sh able under R.A. No. 10175.
Moreover, the h a cker can be h el d l i a bl e for t h e ft . I n t h e c a se
of Laurel v. Ab rogar, G. R. No. 1 55076, Janua ry 1 3, 2009, personal
property, the t a k ing of w h ich i s a n e l ement of t h eft, i n cludes
intangible property, As early as 1910, the Supreme Court declared
in U.S v. Genato, G.R. No. L-5197, February 10, 1910 that ownership
over electricity which an international long-distance call consists of,
as well as telephone service, is protected by the provisions on theft.
Thus, accessing wir eless internet connection wi t h out consent of the
p erson to whom it belongs constit u tes unl a w ful t a k i n g .
The hacker can also be held liable for the crime of access device
f raud u n der R .A . N o . 8 4 84 . Bu t R . A . N o . 1 0 5 15, w h ic h p u n i s h es
interception of cable int er net system, is not applicable since a WiFi
i nternet c o n nection i s a c a b l e l ess i n t e r ne t s y s t em . A c c ordin g t o
N BI P a l mer M a l l a r i , a c y b er cr im e expert , i n 2 0 1 3 w h e n R .A . N o .
1 0515 was en acted, th e u s e o f w i r e l ess i n t e r ne t s y s tem w a s n o t
yet widespread in t h e P h i l i p p i n es. H ence, in t erception of w i r e l ess
i nternet system was not in cl u ded in th e l a w .
2. I ll eg a l I n t e r c e p t i o n —I llegal int e rc eption is commit t e d
b y any person who shall i n t e r cept by technical means wi t h out r i g h t
o f any non-public tr a n s m i ssion of computer d ata to, from, or w i t h i n
a computer s y s te m i n c l u d i n g e l e c t r o m a gneti c e m i s sions f r o m a
c omputer system carr y in g such computer dat a .
C omputer h a c k i n g constitut es
i llegal a c c e ss or i l l egal
interception.
T apping the telephone wire to int ercept the lan dl ine telephone
communication between two part ies wit h out consent of both of them
c onstitutes vi olation of t h e a n t i - w i r e t a p p in g l a w . I n t e r cepting t h e
w ireless cellphone commu n i cation betw een pa r t ies w i t h ou t a r i g h t
constitutes cybercrime of ill egal in t erception.
D ata I n t erferenc f e — D a ta i n t e r f e r e nce is c o m m i t t e d
by any person wh o sh all i n t e n t i o n a ll y or r e c k l essl
delete lt , d
e ete, o r d e t e r i o r a t e c omputer d a t a ,
e lectronic d o c u m e n tt or
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 495
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electronic data message without r i g ht , in cl u d ing the in t r o du ction or
transmission of vir u ses. This is considered as c yber vandalis m .
4. S y s t e m I n t e r f e r e n c e —System interference is committed
by any person who shall i n t e n t i o n a ll y a l te r or r e c k l essly hi n der or
interfere with th e functioning of a computer or computer netv.ork by
i nputti ng, tr a n s m i t t i n g , damaging, deleting, deteriorat i ng, alteri n g
or suppressing computer d at a or p r o g r am , electronic document, or
e lectronic data m e ssage, wit h ou t r i g h t o r a u t h o r i t y , i n c l u d in g t h e
introduction or t r a n s m i ssion of vir u ses.
In May 2 0 00, a F i l i p ino computer w i zard u n leashed the
most prevalent and costly computer virus known as "Love Bug,"
This mass-mailed "I Love You" Worm affected nearly 45 million
computer users worldwide. This entailed as much as US$15 billion
to repair the damage. There is no qualm that the act of spreading
computer virus is wrongful in character. However, the culprit was
not prosecuted fo" a crime since there was no law in the Philippines
in 2000 pu n i s h in g " c ybercri m e." N u l l u m c r i m e n n u l l a p o e na s in e
lege. At present, tra ns mi ssion of computer vir us that n t e r f e r es with
computer d at a or s y stem consti t u tes cybercrime p u n i s h able un d er
Section 4 of R.A. No. 10175.
5. M i su s e o f D e v i c e s —M isuse of device is commi t t ed b y
a ny person who shall use, produce, sell, procure, import, di st r i b u t e ,
or o the rv isc. makes a v a i l a b l e, or p o s s ession w i t h i n t e n t t o u s e
w ithout r i g h t [ t o j a n y o f t h e f o l l o w i n g : (1 ) a d e v i ce, i n c l u d in g a
ccmputer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose
of commit t in g an y c y b ercri me; or (2) a c o m p u ter p a ssword, access
cede, or similar d at a by w h i c h th e w h ole or any p ar t of a comput er
system is capable of being accessed with i n t en t t h a t i t b e u sed for
t l. e purpose of commit t in g any cybercrim e .
6. C y b er s q u a t t i n g —C ybersquatti ng is commi t t e d by a n y
p erson who shall a cqu ir e a d o m ai n n a m e over th e I n t e r n et i n b a d
faith to profit. mi slead, destroy reput a t i on, and deprive others from
registering the same, if such a domain name is: (a) similar, identical,
o r confusingly si m i la r t o an exi st in g t r a d e m ar k r e gi stered with t h e
a ppropriate g overn m en t a g e ncy a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d o m ai n n a m e
registrati on: (b) identi cal or i n an y w a y s i m i l a r w i t h t h e n a m e of a
person othe" t h a n t h e r e g i st r a nt , i n c ase of a p e r sonal n a me; an d
(c) acquired wi t h ou t r i gh t o r w i t h i n t e l l e ctual prope "ty i n t e r ests in
it.
Squatting is the act of occupying an unoccupied land or building
without consent of the own er. On th e other h a nd, cybersquatting is
 496 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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the act of registering an un r e gistered internet domain n a m e i n b a d
f aith t o p,
r o fi t m i slead, destroy reputation, and deprive a person, to
whom the domain n ame belongs, from registering the same.
F or example, Rex Book Store publish ing corporation is enti t l e d
to the internet domain n ame "w w w . r ex pu b l i s i n g.co . h." H
it a i e t o r e g i s ter t h e s a me. Rica p u b l i s h in g company r e g i st ered
t he d o m a i n name "www.rexpubli s i n g.corn.ph."
a nd u s e d t h e
w ebsite with such n am e to sell it s books onli ne. The registr a t ion i s
m ade in bad faith si nce the public is being made to believe that t h e
registrant of the website wit h such n ame is selling books publi shed
b y Rex Book Store. Wit h th e r e gi st r a t ion of t hi s domain n a m
in name, R ex
o o S t or e cannot a n y m or e r e gi ster such dom ain n a m e . T h us, t h e
r esponsible officers of Rica publi sh in g are li able for cybersquat t i n g .
Mr.. SS, a bu sinessman an d i n f o r m a t io n t e c h n ologist
, c Iaime d
too hav
a v e d evised an i n n o v at ive bu siness model. He wo ul d d i l i g ent l y
compile a l i s t o f k n o w n p e r s on al i t ie s an d e n t i t i e s i n t h e f i e l d o :"
e ntertainm en t , a rts, c u l t u r e a n d s p o r t s , a n d a c q u i r e n u m e r o u s
d omain n a m e s i n t h e i n t e r n e t u s i n g t h e n a m e s o f t h e s e k n o w r
personalitiesand entities for the purpose of selling these registered
names to said personalities and enti t ies in the fu t u r e. Mr. S is liable
for cybersquatting because he acquired unr egistered domain names.
w hich belong to others, over the I n t e r net to profit .
(2019 B ar Exa m ' '
C omput e r - r e l a t e d O f f e n s e
The following are comput er -related offenses:
1. Com p u t e r - r e l a t e d F o r g e r y —Computer-related forgery
is commit ted b y a n y p e r son w h o s h al l i n p u t , a l t er , or d e l e te a n y
c omputer data w i t h ou t r i gh t r e s u l t in g i n i n a u t h e n ti c data w it h t h e
intent t h a t i t b e c o n sidered or a c ted u pon fo r l e gal p u r p oses as if
it were a u t h e n t ic, re g a rd less w h e t h er o r n o t t h e d a t a i s d i r e c t l y
readable and intell i gi ble; or who shall k n o w i n gly use computer d a ta
which is the product ofcomputer-related forgery for the purpose of
perpetuating a fr a u d u l ent or di sh onest design.
2. C o m p u t e r - r e l a t e d F r a u d — C ompute r- re lated fra ud i s
c ommitted by any person who, wi t h out a u t h o r i t y , shall i n p ut , al t e r ,
or delete computer data or program or in t e r f ere in the functioning of
a computer system wit h f r a u d u l ent i n t en t causing damage thereb .
T he p e n a l ty i' sI lower if damage no has yet been caused. e ere y.
3.
Computer-related Identity Theft —Computer-related
identity theft is committed by any person who shall intentionally
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IX. CPIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 497
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acquire, use, misuse, transfer, possess, alter or delete identifying
i nformation b e l o n gin g t o a n o t h er , w h e t h e r n a t u r a l o r j u r i d i c a l ,
without ri g ht. The penalty is lower if no damage has yet been caused.
Using the name of another person and his pi ct u res in opening
a Facebook account w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y c o n s t i t u t e s c y b ercrim e o f
i dentity t h e f t .
Unsolicited commercial commu n i cati ons are commit ted by any
person, wh o s h al l t r a n s m i t c o m m e r cial e l ectronic com m u n i cati on
with th e use of computer sy stem w h i c h seeks to a dver t i se, sell, or
offer for s a l e p r o d u ct s an d s e r v i ces. T r a n s m i ssion o f u n s oL'cited
commercial commu n i cati ons is also known as "spam."
In Di s i n i c a s e, t he p r o v i s ion o f R . A . N o . 1 0 1 75 p r o h ' b i t i n g
s pam i s d e c l a red u n c on sti t u t i o n al . I t w a s h e l d t h a t t o p r o h i b i t
t he tran smission o:" unsolicited ads wo ul d d en y a p e r son th e r i g h t
to read hi s e m a i ls, even u n s olicited. commercial ad s a d d r essed to
h im. Th e S t at e cannot ro b h i m o f t h i s r i g h t w i t h o u t v i o l a t in g t h e
c onstitut i on all y g u a r a n t ee d f r e e do m o f e x p r e s sion. U n s c l i c i t ed
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Other Cyber Crime Offense
Other cybercrime offense is also commit ted by any person who
shall will f u ll y abet or aid in the commission of any of the cybercrime
o ffenses or any person who w i l l f u l l y a t t e m pt s t o commit an y of t h e
cybercrime offenses. (Section 5)
T he pr ovi sion o n a i d i n g o r a b e t t i n g c y b e r cr im e i n r e l a t i o n
to cybe r l i b e l , c h i l d p o r n o g r a p hy , a n d u n s o l i c i te d c o m m e r ci al
communication w a s d e clared u n c onstit u t i o na l i n t h e Di s i n i c a s e .
The terms "aiding cr abetti ng" constit ute broad sweep that generates
chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace
p osts, comments, an d o t h e r m e s sages. Hence, t hi s p r o v i sicn t h a t
punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity since
it encroaches upon freedom of speech on grounds of over breadth or
vagu.eness ofthe statute.
A blogger who originally posted a libelous or child pornographic
message is liable for cybercri me. But n e t i z ens, who merely reacted
to the defamatory or child pornographic message on Facebook
by clicking the button for "Like," " Comment," or " S h a re" c r o n a
 498 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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T witter account by retweeting it, are not liable for aiding or abetti n g
cybercrime.
B ut the pr ovision on ai d in g or ab et t in g cybercrime in r e l a t i on
to other cybercrimes such as illegal access, illegal int erception, data
i nterference, etc., is declared constit u t i o n a l .
P rescrip t io n fo r C y b e r C r i m e
Under Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period for acrime under
s pecial la w p u n i s h e d b y i m p r i s o n m en t o f 6 y e a r s o r m o r e i s 1 2
y ears. M ost o f t h e p e n a l t i e s u n d e r S e c t io n 8 o f R . A . N o . 1 0 1 7 5
prescribe for cybercr i mes such a s cyb ersex defined u n der S ection
4 thereof ar e i m p r i s o n m en t o f m o r e t h a n s i x y e a r s . H e n ce, as a
g eneral rul e th e p r escrip t iv e per iod for cybercr im e u n der R .A . N o .
10175 is 12 years.
O ne of th e c y b ercr i mes defi ned u n d e r S e ction 4 o f R . A . N o .
10175 iscyber libel.Section 8 of R.A. No. 10175 prescribes penalties
for all cybercrimes under Section 4 except cyber libel. It seems that
t hrough ov er sight C o n g r ess f a i led t o p r o v i d e a p e n al t f
n a y or cy b er
i e . Hence, an offender, who commi t t ed li bel t h r o ugh the in t e r n et ,
c annot be p r o secuted fo r c y ber l i b e l u n d e r S e c t ion 4 o f R . A . N o .
1 0175 sim pl y b e c a use t h e r e i s n o p e n a l t y u n d e r S e c t io n 8 f o r
c ommitt in g i t .
H owever, libel t h r o ugh t h e i n t e r ne t i s s t i l l p u n i s h a ble u n d er
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 6 of R.A. No. 10175,
u sing i n f o r m a t io n o r c o m m u n i c a t ion t e c h n ology i n c o m m i t t i n g a
c rime wil l u p g r ad e th e p e n a lt y f o r i t b y o n e d e g r ee. In s u m , o n e ,
w ho commi t ted l i be l t h r o ug h t h e i n t e r n e t s h al l b
t d f
i e u n d er the Revised Penal Code with the qualif y ing circum st ance
under R .A . N o . 1 0 1 75 . H e c a n n o t b e p r o s ecuted fo r l i b e l u n d e r
ection 6 of R .A . N o . 1 0 176 since t hi s p r o v i sion does not d efine a
crime but merely provides a modifying circum st ance that wil l adju st
t e p e n a lt y on e d e g ree h i g her f o r a c r i m e p u n i s h a bl e u n de r t h e
Revised Penal Code.
S ince an o f f ender i n c o m m i t t i n g i n t e r n e t l i b e l c a n o n l y b e
prosecuted for libel qualified by the circumstance of using informa t i on
o r commu n i cation t e c h n ology u n d e r t h e R e v i se d P e na l C o d e i n
r elation to R .A . N o . 1 0 1 75, A r t i cl e 9 0 of t h e C ode on p r e script i on
applies.
By the same token, the period of prescript ive for homicide wit h
the special aggravating circumstance of use of loose firearm under
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IX. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY 499
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S ection 29 of R .A . No . 1 0 883 is st il l g o v er ned by A r t i cl e 90 of t h e
Revised Penal Code, and not by Act 3326.
In Totentino v. People, G.R. No. 240310, August 0 6, 2018, the
Supreme Court ap ply A r t i cl e 90 of the Revised Penal Code to cyber
libel.
Under Ar t i cle 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of libel
shall prese"ibe in one year whi le crime pun i s hable by pris ion mayor
shall prescribe in 15 ye ars. I t i s t h e o p i n i on of t h i s w r i t e r t h a t t h e
o ne-year p"escriptive p er iod for l i bel u n der A r t i cl e 90 sh al l a p p l y .
However, the Supreme Court in T olent ino vs. People, supra, applied
the 15 years r ule. In the said case, the Supreme Court r u l e d :
"Anerit p e t i t i o n er' s c l a i m t h a t th e ac t i o n h a s p r e s c r i b ed,
although Republic Act (RA) No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention
Act of 2012, does not categoricallystate the prescriptive period for
s uch action, th e n e w p r e s cri p t iv e p e r io d fo r t h e c r i m e o f l i b e l i n
relation to R.A. No. 10175 can be derived from th e penalty i m p osed
o n the said. crime. Section 6 o f R . A . N o . 1 0 17 5 p r o v i des t ha t t h e
" penalty t o b e i m p o sed sh al l b e o n e ( 1 ) d e gree h i g her t h a n t h a t
provided for by the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, and
s pecial laws, as th e c ase may b e." A s s u ch , th e f o r me r p e n a lt y o f
p rision c o " r eccional i n i t i t s m i n i m u m a n d m e d i u m p e r i o d s i s
increased to pri sion corrr eccional in it s m a x i m u m p e r iod to pr i sion
mayor in i: s mini mu m p e r i od. The new penalty, th er efore, becomes
a fflictiv e , :"ollowin g S e ction 2 5 o f t h e R P C . C o r o l a r i ly , f o l l o w i n g
Article 90 of the RPC, the crime of libel in r el at ion to R.A. No. 10175
n ow pr escribes i n f i f t ee n ( 15) y e a rs. T h u s , r e spondent E v a R o s e
Pua's filing of t he. complaint on A u g ust 8, 2017 against peti t i oner's
F acebook post dated April 29, 2015 was well wi t h i n t h e pr escripti v e
period for libel in r e l a t ion to RA 10 175."
The case of Tolentin o cannot be f oun d i n t h e S u p r em e Cour t
website on s i g ned r e soluti ons. Th e R e solution w a s m e r el y s i g n ed
b y Acting D i v i s ion C l er k o f C o ur t L i b r a d a C . B u e na . I n s u m , i t i s
considered as an unsigned resolution.
Under Section 6 (c), Rule 13, the Supreme Court shall adjudicate
cases by un s igned r esolution wh e n t h e C o u rt d i s p o ses of the c ase
o n the m er i t s , bu t i t s r u l i n g i s e ssenti all y m e a n i n g ful o nl y t o t h e
parties; has no significant doctr i nal v a l ue; or is m i n i m a l i n t e r est to
the law profession, the academe, or the publi c.
 500 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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It is th e opin ion of t h i s w r i t e r t h a t t h e p h r a se "no signif ic ant

doctrinal v a l ue" d o es not m e an t h a t l e g al f in d i n g o f t h e S u p r e m e
C ourt in an u n si gned resolution has no doctrinal va lue at all. It h a s
a doctrinal value but the value is not signiifiicant when the resolution
was rendered by the Supr eme Court . I t i s su b m i t t e d t ha t th e l ow er
courts are still bound follow th e doctr in e in a n u n s i gned resolution
such that enunciated in Tolent ino case.
X . CRIMES AGAINST PROP E R T Y
I t is s u ggested t ha t f o r p u r p ose of t h e b a r e x a m i n a t i on , t h e
Tolentino case should be considered by the examinees.
THEFT
Theft is committ ed by any person who takes personal property
o f another w i t h o u t t h e l a t t e r ' s c o n sent w i t h i n t e n t t o g a i n b u t
without. violence against o r i n t i m i d a t io n o f p e r s ons or f o rce u p on
things. (Artic le 808; 1947 and 1949 Bar Ex a m s )

P ersonal P r o p e r t y
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code uses the words "personal
property" i n de f in i n g t h e f t . W h e n t h e R e v i s ed P e n al C o d e w a s
e nacted, personal pr operty ha d a t e c h n i cal m e a n in g u n der t h e ol d
Spanish Civil Code. Applying the rule on statu t ory construction, the
lawmakers ar e p r e sumed t o b e a w ar e of t h e t e ch n i cal m e an in g of
words "personal property" under the old Civil Code, and by using
t his t er m i n d e fi n i n g t h e f t u n d e r t h e R e v i se d P e na l C o d e t h e y
deemed to have adopted such technical concept.

T he concept of p ersonal p r o p erty u n d e r t h e ol d C i v i l C ode i s

t he same as t h a t u n d e r t h e p r e s ent C i v i l C o de . H e n ce, th e t e r m
"personal property" in the Revised Penal Code should be interp re te d
i n the context o f t h e p r e sent C i v i l C o de. Consequently, a n y t h i n g ,
tangible or i n t a n g i ble, corporeal or i n corporeal, which is capable of
appropriation and not classified as real property, can be the object of
t heft. Bu siness may be ap pr opr i a ted u n der B u l k S a les L aw . T h u s ,
the bu si n ess o f p r o v i d in g t e l e comm u n i cation a n d t h e t e l e p h one
service isa personal property. (Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. 1Vo. 155076,
January 18, 2009) The only requirement for a personal property to
b e the object of t h ef t u n d e r t h e R e v i sed P enal C ode i s t h a t i t b e
capable of appropri a t i on. I t n eed not be capable' of "asportation" or
"being carried au a y " ( M e d ina v. P e ople, G.R ¹ . 182 6 4 8 , Ju n e 17 ,
2015) since asportation is not an element of theft. (Laurel v. Abrogar,
ibid.) Electricity is not capable of asportation since it is not tangible.

501

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One cannot carr y a w a y e l ectri ci ty . H o w ev er, it ca n b e a n object of
theft since it i s c apable of appr opr i a t i on . N o te: Stealing electricity
is now punishable as illegal use of electricity u n der R .A. No. 7834.
1. Allegation R e q u i r e m e n t — In offenses against propert
(t heft orestafa), if the subject matter of the offense is generic and
not id en ti fi a ble (e .g., m o n e y), an e r r o r i n t h e d e s i g n a t i on o f t h e
offended party is fat al. How ever, if the subject mat ter of the offense
i s specific and i d e n t i f i a ble (e.g., check or j e w e l r y
) , an error i n t h e
designation of the offended party is i m m a t e r i al . (Senador v. People,
G.R. No. 201620, Mar ch 6, 2018)
In oral defamation, a crime against honor, the identity of
the person against whom the defamatory words were directed is
a material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the person
injured is fatal. (People v. Uba, 106 Phil. 382)
2. Va l u e of the property —Value of the stolen property is
n ot an element of th eft, but th e same is im p or t an t t o deter m in e t h e
p roper imposable penalt y .
The value of j ew elr y i s n o t a m a t t e r o f p u b l i c k n o w l edge nor
is it capable of u n q u e stionable demonstr a t ion an d i n t h e a b s ence
of receipts or any other competent evidence besides the self-serving
v aluation (P l m i l l i o n ) m a d e b y t h e c o m p l a i n a nt , t h e c o u rt s m a y
e ither apply t h e l o w est p en alt y u n d e r A r t i c l e 309 or fi x t h e v a l u e
of the property t a k en b a sed on th e a t t e n d ant c i r c u m s t ances of th e
case. In t hi s case, the court i m p o sed th e l owest penal ty. (People v.
Mej ares, G.R. No. 225735, Jan u ary 10, 2018)
Taking of Personal Property
I f the property is tan gible, tak ing is deemed complete from th e
moment the offender gains possession over the th i ng, even if he has
no opportunity to dispose of the same. (People v. Bustinera, G.R. No.
148288, tu ne 8, 2004)
I n un l a w fu l t a k i n g , i t i s n o t n e c essary t h a t t h e p r o p e rt y b e
a ctually c a r r i e d a w a y o u t o f t h e p h y s i cal p r e sence of t h e l a w f u l
possessor, or that the thief made his escape w i t h t h e
stolen
property. (People v. Salv il l a, G .R. No. 86 168, Apr il 26 , 1 990) Thu s ,
the accused shall be convicted of consummated theft even though
h e was i m m e d i at ely a p p r e h ended b y p o l ic e officers a f te r g a i n i n g
p ossession of the property w i t h ou t consent of the owner w it h i n t e n t
to appropriate.
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 503
1. Co ns t r u c t i v e P o ssession — Theft is consummated when
the offender u n l a w f u l l y a c q u i r e s p ossession of p e r s onal p r o p ert y
even if for a short ti me; or if such property is under the dominion and
control of the thi ef. In t h e ft, actual m a n ual possession of property is
not require d. Construc ti ve possession of the th i ef over the pro perty
is enough. (Laurel v. Abrogar, supra)
X, a cargador, riding on a truck haul i ng cases of milk belonging
t o Sikat C o . , t h r e w o u t t w o c a ses as t h e t r u c k p a s sed a c e r t a i n
street. A policeman w i t n essing the act i m m e d i at ely pl aces X under
a rrest. The m ere act of t h r o w i n g by t h e offender tw o cases of mil k
while ri d ing on a t r uck i s consumm a ted th e ft. T h r o w in g out of said
cases is in the legal sense taking the same. (People v. Naval, 46 O.G.
2641) Theft is consummated since the offender already acquired
c onstructive p o ssession over t h e c a se s o f m i l k w h e n t h e y w e r e
t hrown from th e t r u c k . (1955 Bar Exa m)
F orest r a n ger V e l a sco was p a t r o l l in g B a l ar a W a t e r shed an d
Reservoir when h e n o t i ced a big pil e of cut l ogs outside the gate of
the watershed. Curious, he scouted around and after a few mi n u t e s,
he saw Rene and Dante coming out of the gate with m or e newly cut
l ogs. Under P.D. No. 330, cutt in g l ogs in a p u b li c forest constit u t e s
q ualified t h e ft . R en e an d D a n t e a r e l i a bl e fo r t h ef t n o t o n l y w i t h
r espect to th e n e w l y -cut l ogs found i n t h e i r p o ssession but a l so t o
t hose found o u t s id e t h e g a t e . T h e f a c t t h a t t h e y w e r e c a u gh t i n
p ossession of newly cut l ogs gives rise to the presump t ion t hat t h e y
also stole the logs found outside the gate. (2006 Bar Exa m )
2. A sp o r t a t i o n , N o t a n E l e m e n t o f Th e f t — To "ta ke" in
t heft does not r e q u ir e a sport a t i on, t a k i n g a w a y o r c a r r y i n g a w a y .
(Medina v. People, G.R No. 182648, June 17, 2015) It is n ot a n
indispensable requisite of theft that a pickpocket should carry, more
or less far away, a wallet taken from its owner. Theft is im m e di ately
c onsummated f ro m t h e p r e c ise m o m ent t h a t t h e t h i e f p i c ked t h e
wallet from th e pocket of th e v i c t im . (People v. Me rcado, G.R. Nos.
L-45471 and L- 4 5472, t u n e 15, 1988)
Since asportation isnot an element of theft, a personal property
can be the object oftheft as long as it is capable of appropriation
although it is not capable of "asportati on." (Medina v. People, supra)
Intangible property is not capable of asportation. How can one carry
away electricity if he cannot even touch it? Yet, in t a n gible property
can be an object of theft .
3. A b i l i t y t o F r e ely Di s pose, Not an El e ment of Th eft
— Ability t o f r e ely d i spose the p r operty i s n o t a n e l e m ent of t h e f t .
 504 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
H ence, gaining p ossession over th e b u l k y g o ods and p l a cing t h e m
inside a ca r i n t h e p a r k i n g a r e a o f S M c o n s u m m a te s t h e c r i m e
d espite the inabil it y t o fr eely dispose them for fai l ur e to br in g t h em
out of the parking area. (People v. Valenzucla, G.R. No. 160188,
June 21, 2007)
Property Belongs to Another
T he subject o f t h e c r i m e o f t h e f t i s a n y p e r s o na l p r o p e r t y
belonging t o a n o t h er . H e n ce, as l on g a s t h e pr o p e r ty t a k e n d o e s
n ot belong to th e accused, who has no v a li d cl ai m t h er e ov er, it i s
i mmaterial w h e t her s ai d o f f ender st ole i t f r o m t h e o w n er , a m e r e
possessor, or even a t h ief of th e p r operty. (M i r a n d a v. People, G.R.
No. 17 6298, Ja n u a ry 2 5 , 2 0 1 2; 19 5 8 Ba r Ex a m ) A n ow n e r o f a
n ecklace cannot be held li a ble for t h eft for s u r r e p t i t i o u sly t a k i n g i t
without th e k n o w l e dge and consent of t h e s t or e ow n er . (2018 B a r
Exam)
I ntent t o G a i n
T he s u b sequent r e c over y o f t h e stolen p r o p e rt y w i l l n o t
preclude the presence of intent to gain as an element of theft. Actual
g ain is i r r e l ev ant a s t h e i m p o r t an t c o n sideration i s t h e i n t e n t t o
gain or anim us l u c ra n d i. In t e nt to g ain is an in t e r n al a ct pre sumed
from the u n l a w fu l t a k i n g . (People v. Asamu d d i n, G .R ¹ . 2 13 9 1 3 ,
September 2, 2015)
The gist of theft is the int ent to deprive another of his personal
property for gain. T hi s cannot be wh ere the t a ker h onestly believes
t he property i s hi s ow n or t h a t o f a n o t h er , and t h a t h e ha s a r i g h t
to take possession ofit for himself or for another, for the protection
of the latt er. (2018 Bar E x a m) H o w e ver, the belief of the accused f
e accuse o
i s ownership over th e p r o p ert y m u s t b e h o n est an d i n g ood fai t h
and not a m ere sham or p r e t ense. If th e cl aim i s d i sh onest, a mer e
pretense, taking th e p r operty of a n o t her w i l l n o t p r o t ect the ta k e r.
(Gaviola v. People, G.R. No. 16 3927, Ja n u a ry 27 , 2 006) This b elief
o f ownership as a defense in theft is in accordance with th e m i s t a k e
of fact doctrine.
l. In tent to A p p r o p riate — Un l awful taking should
be u n d e r stood w i t h i n t h e Sp a n i s h c o n c ep t o f ap od e r a m i e n t o
(appropriati on). In o r der t o consti t ut e ap o deramie nto, the phy s ical
taking m us t b e coupled w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o a p p r o p r i at e t h e o bject.
(People v. Va l e nzuela, G.R. N o . 16 0 1 88, Ju n e 2 1 , 2 0 0 7) I n t e nt t o
appropriate is tantamount to intent to gain since the thief will gain
f rom the property by appr opr i a t in g i t .
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 505
2. In t e n t t o D e p r i v e —Intent to a pp ro pri a te is equivalent
t o intent t o d e p r iv e th e o w ner of t h e t h i n g s i nce by a p p r opr i a t i n g
the property, the th ief is depriv ing the owner of his property. In t en t
t o deprive th e ow ner of th e t h i n g can be p er m a n ent or t e m p or a r y .
(People v. Valenzuela, ibid.) I n s u m , t a k i n g p r o p e rty w i t h i n t e nt t o
t emporarily d e p r iv e th e o w ner o f t h e t h i n g w i t h ou t h i s c onsent i s
theft.
In People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004, it
w as held t ha t w h e n a p e r s on, ei t her w i t h t h e o b j ect of going t o a
certain place, or learning how to dr i ve, or enjoying a free ride, takes
possession of a vehicle belonging to anoth er, wi t h ou t th e consent of
i ts owner, he is gu i lt y of t h ef t ( now ca r n a p p i ng) because by t a k i n g
p ossession of the personal pr operty belonging to another and u s i n g
it, his i n t en t t o g ai n i s e v i d ent s i nce he de r i v es t h e r e from u t i l i t y ,
satisfaction, enjoyment, and pleasure.
T he term g ai n i s n o t l i m i t e d t o a p e c u n i ar y b e nefit, bu t a l s o
includes the b enefit, w h i c h i n a n y o t h e r s e nse ma y b e d e r i ved or
expected from t h e ac t w h i c h i s p e r f o r m ed. T h us , th e m er e us e of
the th in g w h i c h w a s t a k e n w i t h o u t t h e o w n e r ' s c onsent a l r e a dy
constitutes gain. (People v. Carino, G.R. No. 232624, July 9, 2018)
T aking W i t h o u t C o n s e n t
The elements of theftare the same as those of robbery except
that in th e form er, the ta k in g is m ade wi t h out consent of the owner
while the la t ter i s m ade by m e ans of violence or in t i m i d a t ion or by
u sing force upon thi n g .
C lepto w en t a l o n e t o a h i g h - en d b u s y s h o p a n d d e c i ded t o
take one of th e sm a l ler p u r ses wi t h ou t p a y in g for i t . Ov e r c ome by
conscience, she decided to leave her own purse in place of the one she
took. The crim e comm i t t e d i s t h e ft . T hi s c r im e i s consum m a ted at
the precise moment t h at C l e p to took the pur se wit h o ut t he consent
o f the owner. The argument t ha t th e owner did not suffer inj ur y d u e
to the replacement of the stolen property is unt en able. Replacement
i s not a m o d e e x t i n g u i s h in g c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e f t l i s t e d i n
Article 89 of t h e R e v i sed Penal C o de. M o r eover, th e r e p l acement
was not m ade w it h t h e c onsent of th e o w n er . T h us, the ow n er d i d
not acquire ownership over the replacement pur se. (2014 Bar Exam)
F inder of L ost P r o p e r t y
T heft i s l i k e w i s e c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s o n w h o fi n d s l o s t
property but fails to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its
owner. (Artic le 308)
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VOLUME II
X found i n t h e s t r e e t t h e a m o u n t o f P 2 , 0 0 0.00. H e d i d n o t
r eport his fin d in g of th e m oney to th e pr oper au t h o r i t ies nor did h e
return th e same to the owner w h ose address is inscribed in th e bag
containing the money. Instead, he used the money for his ber efit. X
is liable for theft. (1976; 2011, 2012, and 20 15 Bar Ex a m s )
I. L o st Property — On her way home, Eva saw an injured
c how-chow puppy b e h in d a b u sh . S i nce th e p u pp y d i d n o t h a v e a
collar, she brought it h om e so she could have it as a pet. Her son in
fact begged Eva to keep the puppy. The following day, Eva b
ought a
c ollar for th e pu ppy an d br ou ght i t t o a v e t er i n a r ia n for t r e a t m e n t .
Then she brought the puppy home as a pet. Eva is not liable for theft
because there i s n o s h o w in g t h a t t h e p u p p y i s o w n e d b y a n o t h er
person. Ifnobody owned the puppy, it cannot be considered as a "lost
property" w i t h i n t h e c o n t e m p l a t io n o f A r t i c l e 30 8 o f t h e R e v i sed
Penal Code on theft .
However, if th e p u pp y i s o w ned by a c e r t ai n p e r son, Eva can
be held liable for t h ef t a l t h o ugh she is not a w ar e of th e i d en t it y of
the owner. The Revised Penal Code does not r e qu ir e k n o w l edge of
the owner of the lost pr operty. (People v. Panotes, CA 86 O.G. 1008)
Since Eva is no t a w a r e a s t o t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e o w ne r o f t l : e l o st
puppy, she should have delivered the same to the proper auth or i t i es.
(2010 Exam)
2. St o len P r o p e rty — St olen property is w ithi n t h e
contemplation of the term "l o st property" in A r t i c le 308 of the Code.
The word "l o st" is generic in n a t u r e , a nd e mb r a ces loss by stealing
or by any act of a person other t han th e own er, as well as by the act
o f the owner himself or thr ough some casual occurrence. If anyth i n g ,
t he finder w h o f a i l s d e l i b er at ely t o r e t u r n t h e t h i n g l o s t m a y b e
c onsidered m or e b l a m e w o r th y i f t he l o s s w a s b y s t e a l i n g t h a n
through some other m e a ns. (People v. Ro d r i go, G .R. N o. I - 1 8 5 0 7 ,
March 81, 196'6;. 1998 Bar Exam )
3. F in d e r i n L a w — If t h e f i n d er s u r r e n d e rs lost p r c p errty
to a policeman, th e l a t t e r s h a l l a c q u ir e t h e p o s i t io n o ccup'~d b
i y
former. In s u m, as far as t he l aw is c oncerned, the policeman shall
be considered as th e fi n d e r o f t h e l o s t p r o p er ty . I f t h e p o ' i c eman
f ails to deliver th e lost pr operty t o th e ow n er, he is l i a ble for t h e ft .
Appropriat ing the property by the policeman is of the same character
of that made by one who origin ally found th e same. (People v. Avila,
G.R. No. L-19786, March 81, 1928)
AB accidentally left her purse with P500.00 inside a taxi cab.
T he driver b r o u ght t h e p u r s e an d m o ney t o t h e p o l ice station a n d
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 507
h anded them t o t h e d e s k s e r geant w i t h t h e r e q u est t h a t t h e y b e
delivered to AB, the owner, whose name and address were on a piece
of paper inside the pur se. The sergeant did not do as requested but
spent the money. The sergeant is li able for th eft. (1978, 1998, 2001,
and 2015 Bar Exa m s )
A vagrant f o un d a b a g c o n t a i n in g i d e n ti fi ca t ion c a rds an d a
d iamond r i n g a l on g R o xas B l v d . K n o w i n g t h a t i t w a s n o t h i s , h e
w ent to a n e a r est p olice stat ion t o s eek h elp i n fi n d i n g t h e o w n er
of the bag. At t h e p o l ice st at i on, th e v a g r an t p r o p osed to a p o l i ce
investigator "in case you don't find the o wner let' sjust pawn straigh t
to the pawn s hop a nd p a w n th e ri n g f o r P 5 0 , 0 00.00." The v a g ra nt
never saw the investigator again. The vagrant is not l i a ble for th eft
since he delivered th e l ost r i n g t o p o l ice au t h o r i t i es. Hi s p r o posal
t o misappropri at e t h e r i n g i s n o t p u n i s h a bl e a s t h ef t u n d e r t h e
l aw. Wi t h ou t e x t e r n a l i z in g h i s c r i m i n a l m i n d , t h e v a g r an t i s n o t
c riminally l i a bl e since a felony i s a c om b i n a t ion of cr i m i n a l i n t e n t
and crimi nal act. The police investigator is not l i a ble for th eft sin ce
there is no showing that he did not deliver th e lost rin g to its owner
or has misappropri ated it . The fact that th e va gr ant di d not see the
investigator again does not give riseto a reasonable inference that
he already stole the property. (2008 B ar Ex a m )
T heft an d M a l i c i ou s M i s c h i e f
Theft i s l i k e w i s e com m i t t e d b y a n y p e r so n w h o m a l i c i ously
damages the property of another, and then, removes or makes use of
the fruits or object of the damage caused by him. (Ar t i c le 808)
If the offender did not r e m ove or use the fr u it s or object of th e
damage caused by h im , th e c r im e comm i t t e d i s m a l i ci ous mi schief
under Ar t i cle 329.
Theft an d T r e s p a ssing
T heft i s l i k e w i s e c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s o n w h o e n t e r s a n
e nclosed estate o r a f i e l d w h e r e t r e s p ass i s f o r b i d den o r w h i c h
b elongs to another and w i t h ou t t h e consent of it s ow n er, and t h e n ,
hunts or f i s hes upon th e s am e or g a t h er s f r u i t s , cereals, or o t h er
forest or farm p r o ducts. (Artic le 808)
I f th e o f f e n der d i d n o t h u n t , fi s h a n d g a t h e r f r u i t s i n t h e
e nclosed est at e o r fi e l d , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s o t h e r f o r m o f
t respass under A r t i cl e 28 1.
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Theft of Co m m e r c i a l D o c u m e n t
1. C om m e r c i a l Do c u m e n t —Checks and other commercial
papers are s u b j e cts of t h e f t . A ch e c k i s i n a v er y r e a l s e n s e a
personal property, an d t h a t w h e n a b s t r a cted w it h t h e i n t e n t ion of
c onverting i t t o u s e by t h e p e r son t a k i n g i t , t h e a b s t r a ction of t h e
check constitutes ataking of personal property from the possession
o f another, defi ned an d p e n a l i zed a s t h e c r i m e o f t h e f t . ( U .S . v .
Wickersham, G.R. ¹ . L - 6 7 8 1, ¹ vem b e r 6; 19 11)
a. S t e a l i n g C h e c k P a y a b l e to Ca s h —When accused
as Branch Manager of the complain ant received checks payable
to cash from customers of the complaina nt f or t he deliveries of
c ement, he was obliged to t ur n t h e m o ver t o t h e compl ai n an t
for he had no right to ret ain t h em . That he kept the checks and
d eposited them i n h i s a ccount an d i n t h e a ccounts of an other
p erson, k n o w in g a l l t h e w h i l e t h a t t h e s e c h e cks an d t h e i r
p roceeds were not h i s , o nl y p r o ves th e p r e sence of u n l a w f u l
t aking. The crime commi t t e d by th e accused is qualified theft .
(People v. Mir t o, G.R ¹ . 198 4 7 9 , October 19, 2011)
b. St e a l i n g C h e c k P a y a b l e to Or d e r —If the checks
are payable to order of specif'ied person, the thief cannot encash
them or deposit t hem t o hi s account si nce he is not th e p ayee
thereof. H ow ever, even i f s u c h c h e cks ar e o f n o c o m m e r cial
v alue as far as the thief is concerned, he is still l i a ble for th eft .
Failure to gain because the accused cannot encash the payable-
to-order check is of no moment. The imp or t ant consideration is
that there was intent to gain. It is one of the essential elements
of theft. (People v. Papa, G.R. ¹. L - 5 4 0 9 0, May 9, 1988)
F or the pu r p ose of determ i n in g th e penalty for t h e ft , t h e
value of the check was held to be its face value, or the amount
for which it was drawn and which could have been realized
upon it by it s legal owner. The accused took unendorsed check
( payable to th e or der of specified person) from it s o w ner w i t h
t he intention of convert in g it t o hi s own u se. The fact tha t t h e
accused could not encash the check since the payee thereof did
n ot endorse it t o h i m d o e s no t m e a n t h a t i t s f a c e v a lu e w i l l
not be considered for pur p oses of determi n in g th e extent of his
criminal liabi l i ty . So far as the lawful h older of a check payable
to order is concerned, its face value is the same whether he has
actually endorsed it or n ot. (U.S. v. Wickersham, supra)
I f the accused made m i sr epr esentat ion t o th e b an k t h a t
he is the payee of the stolen check, wh ich is pay able to order
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 509
to encash it, and as a consequence, he was able to encash th e
c heck, the deceit sh al l b e a s p ar t o f t h e c o m m i s sion of t h e f t .
I n sum, th e c r im e com m i t t e d i s t h ef t an d n o t e s t afa t h r o u gh
false pretense.
2. No n -r ea l i z a t i o n of G a i n — St e a l i ng un f u n d e d ch e c k
payable to the company of the accused and presenting it for
encashment t o t h e d r a wee ba nk , w h i c h d i s h onored it b y r e a son of
insufficiency of funds, constitu tes impossible crime of theft. There is
factual impossibility t o accomplish the crime of qualified th eft since
the check is unfu n d ed. (Jacinto v. People, G.R. ¹. 162 5 4 0,Ju ly 18 ,
2009)
Stealing fu n d ed t r a v e l l e r's c heck b e longing to t h e F i r s t N a -
tional City B ank by a cargo checker of PAL is qualified theft. Even if
the accused failed to encash the same due to external cause such as
apprehension by police, he will be held liable for consumma ted theft.
I t is of no moment that t h ere was real or actual gain. The import a n t
c onsideration i s t h a t t h e r e w a s a n i n t e n t t o g a i n . I t i s o n e of t h e
essential elements of t h e ft. (Peopte v. Seranil l a, G . R. No. L - 5 4090,
May 9, 1988)
The Ja c in to ca se a nd Se r a n i l l a c a s e a re n o t r e c o ncilable. If
the Seranilla pr i n c i p le was observed in t he Ja c i n to c ase, the crime
i s consummated t h ef t d e spit e th e f a i l u r e t o r e a l ize gain f r o m t h e
stolen check for b e ing u n f u n d ed. T h us , t o a p ply Ja c i n to pr i n c i p le ,
the circumstances of the case must be similar to Ja c i n t o, e.g., stolen
check i s u n f u n d ed . O t h e r w i se, t h e Se r a n i l l a p r i n c i p le m u s t b e
applied.
3. R e a l i z a t i o n o f G a i n — R a p e i s c o n s u m m a t ed a t t h e
precise m o me nt t h a t t h e p e n i s o f t h e a c c u sed t o u c hed t he l a b i a
o f th e p u d e n du m o f t he v i c t i m . E j a c u l a t io n i s n ot i m p o r t a n t
t o consumm at e t h e c r i m e . H o w e v er , t o u c h in g t h e v a g i n a l l i p s ,
p umping a n d , u l t i m a t e ly , ej acul at ion o f t h e a c cused ar e p a r t s o f
t he commission of r a pe . B y s a m e t o k en , t h ef t i s c o n su m m a ted a t
the precise moment t h a t t h e p r o p ert y w a s t a k e n w i t h o u t c o nsent
o f the owner w i t h i n t e n t t o g a i n . A c t u a l g ai n i s n o t i m p o r t an t t o
consummate the crime. But the ta k in g of the property w it h i n t ent t o
g ain, and acts commit ted for the realization of actual gain are part s
o f the comm i ssion of t h e ft . T h u s , e m p l oym ent o f d e ceit t o r e a l i z e
gain from the stolen commercial document is part of the commission
of theft.
 510 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
T heft an d D e c e i t
X, a bank t e l l er; received from A, a depositor, a check payable
to cash in the a mo unt of P 1 m i l l i o n to be deposited to her account.
H owever, X d e p osited t h e b e a re r c h eck t o t h e a c c ount o f Y , h e r
f riend. Af ter s even d ays, X t o l d Y t h a t t h e a m o un t o f P 1 m i l l i o n
w as wrongfully cr edited to her account an d u r ged her t o w i t h d r a w
the money. X gave Y expensive Hermes bag after the withdrawal
of the amount. (2014 Bar Exam) Since the possession of X over the
bearer check is de facto, depositing it to the account of Y instead of
A shall be considered as t a k in g w i t h ou t c onsent. H e nce, the cr i m e
committed is theft wit h t h e qualifying circumstance of abuse of
confidence. (People v. Mirto, supra) Using a stolen bearer check to
defraud the bank is not estafa since it was only em pl oyed to realize
actual gain from stealing the check. Deceit is part of the commission
of theft.
In Pe ople v . Y u s a y , supra, t h e t a k i n g o f t h e p a w n t i c k e t s
w ithout t h e c onsent of t h e o w n er , w i t h i n t e n t t o g a i n , constit u t e s
the crime of theft. The accused pretended that h e was th e owner of
t he p a w ned j e w els, an d w i t h ou t m a k i n g u s e of t h e c o r r esponding
pawn t i c k et s o t he r t h a n t h e i r r e s p ective n u m b e rs, h e s u cceeded
i n redeeming t h e m t h r o u g h t h e i d e n t i fi c a t ion o f h i s p e r s on. T h i s
pretension constit u tes th e cr im e of estafa. Th eft of th e t i c k ets is a
necessary means to commit estafa, because witho ut t he n u m b e rs of
the stolen pawn ti ck ets, he could not have identi fied the jewels and
consequently, woul d not h av e been able to r e deem t h em . T hi s i s a
c omplex crime of estafa th r ough t h e f t .
In People v. Mi r t o , G . R . N o . 1 9 3 4 7 9, O c to ber 1 9, 2 0 1 1, t h e
a ccused stole checks p a y able t o c as h i s s ued t o h i s e m p l o y er . H e
d eposited th e c h eck t o h i s a c count . I n d o i n g so , h e m a d e a f a l s e
representation to th e bank t h a t h e i s th e l a w fu l h o l der or bearer of
check. The accused was convicted of qualified theft, and not a complex
crime of estafa thr ough th eft. False representation to realize gain is
just a consequence of theft. Deceit is part of the commission of theft.
The Yusay case and Mir to case are not reconcilable. If the M i r t o
principle wil l b e ap p l ied to th e Y u say case, the crime comm i t t ed is
theft of pawn shop ti ck et, an d deceit em pl oyed to r ealize gain shall
be treated as part of th e comm i ssion of th e ft . T h us, to apply Y' usay
principle, the cir cum st ances of th e case must b e si m i l a r t o Yu s a y,
e.g., s tealing pawns hop tic ket a nd u s i ng i ts n u m b er to d e fra ud t h e
pawnshop. Otherw i se, the Mi r t o pr i n c i p le must be applied.
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 511
F alsif i c a t i o n a n d D e c e i t
I f th e a c cused di d n o t s t ea l a p a s sbook or a c h e ck , u s in g a
f alsified c o m m e r cial d o c u m en t t o d e f r a u d t h e b a n k c o n s t i t u t e s
complex crime of estafa thr ough falsification of document .
In De C a s t ro v. Pe ople, G . R. N o. 1 7 1 6 72, Febru a ry 2 , 2 0 1 6 ,
as a ban k t e l l er , a c cused t ook a d v a n t age of t h e b a n k d e p ositors
w ho had t r u s ted i n h e r e n o ugh t o l e av e t h ei r p a s sbooks wit h h e r
upon her instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled.
out withdrawal slips that she signed, and misrepresented.. to her
fellow bank employees that th e signatures had been verified in
due course, She was able to obtain money from the bank. Since
falsifying withdrawal slipsis a necessary means to defraud the
bank, sl e is liable for a complex crime of estafa through falsification
of commercial document.
X , a b a n k o f fi c er , m a d e a fi c t i t i o u s l o a n b y f a l s i f y i n g t h e
s ignature of t h e b o r r o wer o n t h e p r o m i s sory n o te. W hen t h e l o a n
was approved, the bank i s sued a check to th e borr ow er. X f a l sified
the sigr atur e of t h e b o r r o wer m a k i n g i t a p p ea r t h a t h e e n d orsed
the check to h i m . X u s ed th e fa l s ified c h eck to obta in m o n ey f r o m
the bank. Since falsifying pr o m i ssory note and check is a necessary
m eans to d e f r au d t h e b a n k , s h e i s l i a b l e f o r a c o m p lex c r i m e o f
estafa through falsification of commercial documents. (Tanenggee v.
People, G.R. No. 1 79448, June 26, 2013)
If th e a c cused, wh o t r i e d t o e n c as h a fa l s i f ied c h e c k, w a s
a pprehended b y p o l i c e a u t h o r i t i e s p u r s u an t t o a n en t r a p m e n t
o peration a f t e r r e c e i v in g t h e m o n e y f r o m t h e b a n k , t h e c r i m e
committed is fr u s t r a ted estafa (see: People v. Castillo, C.A., 65 O.G.
1 065) th r o ugh f a l s i f ication o f d o c u m e nt . I n t h i s , t h e a c c u sed b y
making misrepresentation that the check is genuine and by receiving
the mor eyfrom the bank that would have eventually caused damage
thereto had performed all acts of execution. However, estafa was not
c onsummated since the bank di d no t s u f fer d a m age due to the pr e-
determined apprehension of the accused.
If th e a m o u n t o f c h e c k w a s al t e r e d, a n d t h e a c c u s ed, w h o
a ttempted t o d e p o si t t h e f a l s i fi e d c h e ck , w a s a p p r e h e n ded b y
N BI a g e n ts , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s a t t e m p t e d e s t af a t h r o u g h
f alsification o f c o m m er cial d o cum en t . (Koh Tieck Heng v. People,
G.R. Nos. 48535-36, December 21, 1 990; 1997 Bar Exam )
 512 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Theft, Fa l si f i cation, an d D e c e i t
A s to le a p a s s book, f a l s ified t h e w i t h d r a w a l s l i p , a n d u s e d
t he stolen p assbook an d f o r ged s li p t o w i t h d r a w m o n e y f r o m t h e
bank. (1986Bar E x a m) Stealing the passbook is theft. Falsifying the
withdrawal s li p i s f a l sificati on. Since falsification of document i s a
necessary means to commit th eft or realize gain, the offender is liable
for a complex crime of theft thr ough falsification of document. (People
v. Salonga, G.R. No. 181181, June 21, 2001; People v. Soriano, G.R.
¹. L-6080, December 29, 1958) Using a stolen passbook to defraud
t e bank is not estafa since it was only em pl oyed in order to realize
a ctual gain from st ealing the passbook. Alt h ough such acts had th e
character of es tafa, t h e y w e re n o m o r e t h a n t h e f u r t h e r a n ce a nd
c onsequence of th e t h e ft . T h u s , t h ef t a b s orbed such d eceitful a c t .
(Decision of November 22, 1888 by Supre me Court of Spain c it ed in
People v. Yusay, G.R. No. L-26957, September 2, 1927)
A, an a s sistant c a s hie r, s to le u n s i g ned cashier c heck, forged
t he signatur e of th e cashier t h e r eon, and encashed it a t t h e b a n k .
t ealing th e check is t h e ft . F o r g in g th e s i g n at ur e of th e cashier i s
falsification of commercial document, wh ich is a necessary means to
commit t h eft or r e a l ize gain. H ence, accused is liable for a complex
crime of theft t h r o ugh fal sification of commercial document. (People
v. al o n g a, supra) D e f r a u d i ng t he b a nk to r e a l i ze actual gain f r o m
stealing the check is not estafa but just a consequence of theft. (1888
Spanish ju r i sp r u d ence)
QUALIFIED THEFT
Qualified theft is commit t ed by any person who takes personal
property of another w i t h ou t t h e l a t t e r's consent w it h i n t en t t o gai n
an w i t h a n y of th e following qu al i f y in g cir cum st ance:
1. G r ave abuse of confidence;
2. D ome s t i c servant ;
3. O n t h e o c c a sion o f fi r e , e a r t h q u a ke , t y p h o on, v o l canic
eruption, o r a n y
oth e r calamity, vehicular
a ccident o r civil
disturbance;
4. Coc o n u t s t a ken from th e pr e m i ses of a plant a t i on, or fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery;
5. T h e p r o p e rt y st olen is mail m a t t er . (Ar t i c le 810)
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X. CRIiVIES AGAINST PROPERTY
Before, if th e pr operty st olen is m o tor v e h i cle, or l a rge cattl e,
the cri me c o m i n i t t ed i s q u a l i f i ed t h e f t u n d e r A r t i c l e 3 1 0 o f t h e
R evised Pen.al Code. N ow , s t e a l in g m o t o r v e h i cl e i s c a r n a p p i n g
w hile stealing large cattle is cattle ru st l i n g .
T he penalt y f o r t h e f t i s h i g h e r i f t h e p r o p e rt y s t o le n i s a
property of the Nati onal L i b r ar y or of the Nati onal M u s eum. (Article
81 1)
1. G r a v e Ab u s e o f Ca n f id e n c e — I f t h e p r o p e r ty o f t h e
e mployer is accessible to th e e m p l oyee, and th e l a t t e r s t ole it , t h e
crime com m i t t e d i s q u a l i fi e d t h e f t (Z a p a n t a v. P e o ple, G . R. ¹ .
170868, March 20, 2018) because of the circumstance of abuse
of confidence.(Yongco v. People, G.R. ¹. 209878, July 80, 2014)
Making the property accessible to the employee is an indication
that th e em p l oyer has confidence i n h im t h a t h e w i l l n o t s t e al t h e
property. The einployee abused.such confidence by stealing it.
I f t h e p r o p e rt y o f t he em p l o y e r i s n o t a c c e ssible t o th e
e mployee, and t h e l a t t e r s t o l e i t , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s s i m p l e
theft. The quali f y in g cir cum st ance of abuse of confidence cannot be
appreciated.~tray v. People, G.R. ¹. 205180, November 11, 2018)
Making the property non-accessible to the employee is an indication
that the employer has no confidence in him t ha t he will not steal the
property
Breaking t h e m a i n d o o r b e c ause accused wa s d e n ied access
t o coinplainan t's h ouse means th e l a t t e r h a s n o c onfidence in t h e
f ormer. Quali fied t h ef t w i t h a b u s e of confidence is not com m i t t e d .
(Viray v. Pe ople, supra) T h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s r o b b e ry by u s i n g
f orce upon thi n g .
Employer-employee relationship is not an el ement of qualifi ed
theft w i t h a b u s e o f c o n fi d ence. In Pe o ple v. Se r a n i l l a , G . R . N o .
L-54090, May 9, 1988, stealing funded traveller'scheck belonging
to the bank b y a c a r g o checker of PA L i s q u a l i fied t h e ft . Th e f a ct
t hat th e b a n k w h i c h i s t h e o w n e r o f t h e s t o le n c h eck i s n o t t h e
employer of accused is ofno moment. The relation of independence,
guardianship, or vigilance between the accused. and bank, the
offended party, makes the offense that of a qualified theft.¹te:
Since the check owned by th e bank i s accessible to the employee of
P AL, thi s i s a n i n d i c a t ion t h a t t h e f o r m e r h a s confidence that t h e
l atter wil l not st eal it .
 514 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 515
VOLUME II

2. D o m e s t i c s e r v a n t —B ut i f t h e a c c u s ed is a d o
u se i s a omestic t he act o f e n g a gin g i n I n t e r n a t i o r a l S i m p l e R e s al e ( I SR) o r t h e
servant , qualified t h eft i s com m i t t e d r e g ar dless f t h
o 'b'1'
e ac c e ssi i ity
o f the
e pr
r oo peerrt y st olen, and the absence of abuse of confidence. unauthorized rout in g and completing of in t e r n a t i onal long-distance
calls using l i n es, cables, antennae, and/or ai r w a v e f r e quency and
In People v. Ma n l a o , G . R . N o . 2 8 4 0 2 8, S e ptember 8 , 2 0 1 8 , connecting t h ese call s d i r e ctl y t o t h l o c a l o r d o m e s ti c ex change
accused, a housemaid, adm i t te d t a k i n g t h e st olen i t e ms. H ow ever, facilities of tl e countr y w h e r e call i s d e st i n ed. (La u r el v. Ab r o gar,
a ccording to her she was merely tri ck ed. She narrated th t
supra)
ca e o i n fo r m h e r t h a t c o m p l a i n an t fi g u r e d i n a n a c c i dent,b adn d
as e e r to look for dollars in complainant's cabinet. Instead, Internati onal l o n g -distance call s t a k e t h e f o r m o f e l e c t r i cal
s he took th e j e w e lr y a n d b r o u gh t t h e m t o a f a i r - s k i n ne d w o m a n energy. However, these calls were not personal properties belonging
i n a l o o c an. Her ex cuse was not gi ven cr edence for bei n i l l o i c 1 to a te l e commun i c ation c o m p a ny s u c h a s P L D T s i n c e t h e l a t t e r
' y iinn v iew o f c o m p l a i n a n t ' s p r e v i o u s
especiall could not h a v e a c qu i red o w n er shi p o ver s uch c a l ls. Th e c ompany
warnin
s cammers a nd d explicit d i r e ct ive not t o e n t e r t ai n s uch p h onea calls.ai merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes, and t r a n s m it s s aid.
H er conviction for qualified th eft was affi r m e d . calls using its complex commun icat='ons infrastru ct ure and facilit i es.
The company, no t b e in g t h e o w n e r o f s a i d t e l e phone calls, could
8. O n O c c a s i o n o f Ca l a m i t y — A fi r e b r ok e o u t i n a n ot validly cl ai m t h a t s u ch t e l ephone calls w ere t a ken w i t h ou t i t s
department s t o re, A, t a k i n g a d v a n t a ge of t h consent by the phr eak er. (La u r el v. Abrogar, supra) Te lephone calls
t e s t or e an d c a r r i e d a w a y g o ods w h ic h h e l a t e r sfo ld . Th e c r i m e
be ong to the persons making the calls.
committed i s t h ef t q u a li fied b y t h e c i r c u m s t ance of on occasion of
However, the phreaker can be held liable for theft of business of
providing telephone service under the Re vised Penal Code. PLDT' s
I f A se t th e departm
d en t s t or e o n fi r e , e n t e red t h e s t or e a n d business of providing telephone service is a personal property, which
c arried a wa y g o ods w h i c h h e l a t e r s o l d , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s
can be the obje "t of theft. Note: The phreaker can now be held liable
complex crime of theft t h r o ugh ar son.
for access device fraud un der R.A. No. 8484 instead of theft .
4. C o c o n ut — Stealing of coconuts when the The ac t o f c o n d u c t in g I S R o p e r a t i on s i s t h e f t . (L a u r e l v .
area sti1'll o n t h e
e y of
r ee or e p o s i ted on the ground w i t h i n t h e p r e m i ses
e s o a p a n tta t i o n Abrogar, s u p r a) U si n g a d evi c e t o co n t r o l t h e de s t i n a t i on o f
q i e h ef t . W h e n t h e coconuts are stolen in an y o t her p l a ce, internati onal telephone call under the telecommun ication system of
it is sim ple t h e ft . St a ted di f f erent ly , i f t h e cocon t
e coconu s were t a ken i n PLDT w i t h ou t it s consent to earn by ch a r g in g user of th e ph one at
r on o a o use along t h e h i g h w a y o u t s i d e t h e coconut 1 t k
u p a n ta t 'i o n , it the expense of PLDT is tak ing the property of PL DT , and that is, the
e simp e theft only. (Em pelis v. Ho n. In t e rmediate Appellate business of providing telecommuni cation. service.
Court, G.P. 1Vo.L-66186, September 28, 1984; 19M B a r E x a m
)
T heft of I n t a n g i b l e P r o p e r t y ILLEGAL USE OF ELECTR ICITY UNDER R.A. NO. 7832

T he t er m " t a k i ng"" mean s g a i n i n g p h y s i cal o r c o n s t r u c t i v e C ommiss'on of an y o f t h e a ct s p r o h i b i ted u n de r S ection 2 o f

possession over p ersonal property w i t h i n t e nt to a ppro r i t . B R .A. No . 7 88 2 ( A n t i - electricit y a n d E l e c t r i c T r a n s m i s sion L i n e s/
'f Material s P i l f e r age A c t ) c o n s t i t u t e s t h e c r i m e o f il l e g a l us e o f
p p e r y i s i n t a n g i b le, the t h ief cannot gai n h '
o gain p y s i c a lp o s s ession electricity, w h i ch is p u n i s h a ble und er S ection 7 t h e r e of. This crim e
o ver it . H o w e v er, h e ca n a c u i r e
q ire co n s tr u c tive possession o ver a n
intangible p r o p ert y s u c h a s u s i n g a n y d e v i c e ( e. is committed by any p er son, wh ether n a t u r a l or j u r i d i c al, public or
f raudulent l y oo btain
t a ' intangible property (e.g., gas) (Laurel . t k )ar private.
v. Abro
G.B. No. 155076, ja n u a r y 18, 2009)
1. pl ag a l u s e of electricityis commit t e d by person who shall
A ph hreaker i s o n e w h o e n g a ges i n t h e a c t o f tap, make or cause to be made any connection wit h ov erhead lines,
in e ac o m a n i p u l a t i n g
phones and
n ille
i e g a l l y m a r k et s telephone services. Phreaking includes service drops, or other electric service wires, without previous
a uthority o r c o nsent of t h e p r i v at e electric u t i l i t y o r r u r a l e l ectr i c

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 516 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 517
VOLUME II

cooperative concerned. (Section 2 of R A . ¹ o.. 788 2 ) T '

) a p pingthe
eleectric wire of M e r a lco to steal electricity constit u tes il l egal u.se of
e
electricity.
2. I l l e g a l us e of e l e ctricity i s c o m m i t t e d b y a p e r s o n w h o
shall
a atap, make k or cause to be made any connection to the existing
e ectric service facili t ies of an y d u l y r e g i s t ered consumer w i t h o u t
the latter *s or the electric u t i l i t y ' s consent or a u t h o r i t y . (S ection 2
of B.A. ¹ . 788 2 ) T a p p i ng t he electric wi re of offender's neighbor to
s teal electricity constit u tes ill egal use of electricity .
8. Il l e g a l u se of electricityis commi t t e d by person who shall
t amper, install or use a t a m p ered electrical m t
me er, j umper, curre nt
r eversing transform er, short ing or shun t in g w ir e 1
g wire, oop connection or
any other device which interferes with the proper or accurate registry
or metering of electric current or other w ise results in its diversion in
a manner wh ereby electricity i s stolen or w a sted (S e ction 2 of R.A.
¹. 78 82)
P ersonal pr operty t h e t a k i n g o f w h i c h i s a n
element of theft
i ncludes intangible property such as electricity. Th us, the followin g
a cts constitute theft: (1) controlling the destinat ion of the int a n gibl e
property todeprive the owner thereof, e.g., putting a jumper to divert
electricity; or (2) tampering w it h an y app ar a tus used for generat
nera i n g
measuring intangible property or
w rongfull y r e d i r e c t in g i t
f rom s uc h a pp aratus , e . ., putting a magnet on electric meter
e.g
to manip u l at e i t s r e a d i ng. (I a u r e l v. Ab r o g a r, G . R. N o . 15 5 0 7 6;
January 13, 2 0 09) In U . S . v . Ca r l o s, G . R. No. 6 295 S
o. , e p t e mbber 1 ,
1 911 , hthe consu1ner of electric cu r r en t m a n a ged t
g e o e v ad e p a y m e n t
o part o i s a c c o u nt s by u sing th e so-called "jum p er" to deflect th e
c urrent f ro m t h e h o us e electric m e t er . H e w a s c o n vi cted of t h e f t .
H owever, stealing electri city b y u s i n g a j u m p e r o r m a g n e t i s n o w
punished as illegal use of electricity u n der R .A. No. 7882.
In Manila Electric Company v. Macro Textile Mil ls Cor
x i e i s o rp o r a t i o n ,
G.R. No.o. 126248, Jaa n u ar y 18, 2002, MK R A L C O never presented the
t ampered m e ter s w i t c h i n c o u r t I n s t e a d , M K R A L C O c l a i m
s e evi c e a n d r e sorted to the presentation of a sim u l a t ed
switch. Th ee wires presented in c o ur t d e served scant consideration
considering that the person, who removed th
e wire, se al ed i t i n
e o ce . e d id n o t l e t t h e c onsumer see the w i r e
e wire or w i t n e ss thh e
sealin
sea ingof the envelope containing the wire. This created doubt as to
w hether the w ir e was in deed the same wi r t k
w ire a e n fr om consumer' s
premises. Thus, M K R A L C O f a i led to substan t i ate it s al l egations of
tampering and pilferage against consumer.
In M a n i l a El e c t r ic C o m pa ny v. TE A M E l e c t r o n ics Company,
G .R. No. 18 1728, December 18 , 2 0 07, M e r a lco clai med t h a t a f t e r
the inspection on September 28, 1987, the tamp ered electric meters
w ere corrected. Pet i t i oner c l a i me d t h a t w h e n t h e s u b j ect m e t e r s
were again inspected on June 7, 1988, they were found to have been
tampered anew. Held: It is hard to believe that a customer previously
a pprehended for t a m p e red m e t er s an d a s sessed P7 m i l l i o n w o u l d
f urther j eopardize it self i n t h e e yes of pet i t i o n er. I f i t i s t r u e t h a t
there was evidence of tamper ing foun d on September 28, 1987 and
again on Jun e 7, 1988, the better v iew w o ul d be t ha t t h e d efective
meters were not actually corrected afte: th e fi rst i n s pection.
In Ri d j o T a pe k C hem i c a l C o r p . v. CA, G. R . N o . 1 2 6 0 7 4,
February 24, 1998, it is to be expected that the parties were
c onsciously aw ar e t h a t t h e s e (m eter i ng) devices or equi p m ent a r e
s usceptible t o d e fects an d m e ch anical f a i l u r e . H e n ce, it c o ul d n o t
be said that p e t i t i o n ers were ignorant of th e f act t ha t s t oppages in
electric meters can also result from in h r e n t d efects or flaws and not
o nly from t a m p er in g or i n t e n t i onal m i sh a n d l i n g .
In Ma n i l a E l e c tr ic C o m pa ny v. TE A M E l e c t r o n ics Company,
G .R. No. 1 8 1 728, D ecember 18 , 2 0 07, t h e w i t n e s ses for M e r a l c o
claimed that afterthe inspection, the tampered electric meters were
c orrected, so t ha t t h e y w o u l d r e g i ster t h e c o r r ect consump t ion of
respondent. Logically, then, after the correction of the allegedly
t ampered m e t e rs , t h e c u s t o m er's r e g i st ered c o n su m p t io n w o u l d
g o up. However, pieces of evidence clearly show t h a t t h e r e wa s n o
p alpably d r a s ti c d i f f er ence bet w een t h e c o n s u m p t io n b e f or e a n d
after the in spection, casting a cloud of doubt over peti t i oner's claim
o f meter-tamperi n g .
4. Il l eg a l u se of electricity is committ ed by a person who shall
damage or destroy an electric m et er, equipm ent, w ir e or conduit or
allow any of them to be so damaged or destroyed as to interfere with
the proper or accurate metering of elec-.ric current. (Section 2 of R.A.
¹. 78 8 2 ) De li berately causing damag o r d e s t r o yi ng electric meter
c onstitutes m a l i c i ou s m i s c hi ef. H o w e v er , i f t h e e l e c t ri c m e t e r i s
destroyed tointerfere with the accurate metering of electric current,
t he crime commi t ted is il l egal use of electricit y .
5. I l l e g a l us e of el e c t r i c ity i s c o m m i t t e d b y p e r s o n w h o
shall kn ow i n gly use or r e ceive th e d i r ect benefit of el ectric service
obtained through any of the above-mentioned acts. ( Section 2of RA .
No. 7882)

J9JC9B0M
 518 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 519

In Nativ id ad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-14887 J anuary 31,

1961 ,i in accordance with a p r e v i ous un d erstandi n 8. T h e acc e p t a n c e of m on ey an d/ o r ot h e r v a l u a b l e
accused, meter-reader -ofthe Meralco, misread nthe with
in gelectric
w i consumer,
meter so c onsideratior. b y a n y o f f i ce r o r e m p l o y e e o f t h e e l e c t ri c u t i l i t y
as to e c r ease the amount w h ich such consumer had to c oncerned or t h e m a k i n g o f s u c h a n o f f e r t o a n y s u c h o f fi cer o r
u n de r - r e a d t h e e l e c t ri c m e ter i n c o n sum er'a s. A
k nowin g1 y u" n employee for no-. reporting the presence of any of the above-
a nd falsel re
a se y reported the readings. Accused was convicted sumer sofpremises
theft of mentioned ci."cumstances enumerat ed. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 7882)
electriccurrent.

I t should be noted that th e deliberate act f ' Effects ofprima facieevidence

ec ricmeter by a meter reader in conspiracac o misrea d'
electric
e ing of
Theprima af cie evidence of illegal use of electricity shall be the
no one of crimes of illegal use of electricity yund
is not with
w i th e cu st o m e r
n er S e ct i' o n R,A. basis for the holding of a prelim i n ar y i n v estigation by the prosecutor
No. 7832. Heence, the ¹t i vi d a cJ,
case is still a controllin d t ' a nd the subs q u ent f i l in g i n court of th e per t i n ent i n f o r m a t i on, th e
ading of electric meter to steal electricity constitutes the crime immediate d'sconnection by the electric utility to such person after
of theft under the Revised Penal Code.
due notice and the lifting of any temporary restraining order or
injunction which may have been issued against a private electric
Prima facie evidence
utility or rural electric cooperative. (Section 4 of R,A. ¹. 78 8 2)
The p r e sence o f a n y o f t he f o l l o w i n g c i r c u m s t a n ces
constitute pr i m a f a c ie evidence of crime of i l l e gal u se of electricit shall Requisites of prima facie evidence
by the person benefitted th ereby: e o e ec r i c i t y
The pr i ma f a c ie p r e s ump t i on of i l l e g al u se of e le ctric ity w i l l
1. T h e p r e s e nce of a b o r e d h ol e o n t h e g l a s s cover of t h e arise only u p o n t h e s a t i s f action of t w o r e q u i s i t es, to w i t : ( 1 ) T h e
e lectric meter, or at th e back or an y t h a ccused benefits f r o m t h e i l l e ga l u s e o f e l e c t r i c i ty ; a n d ( 2 ) T h e
n y o e r p a r t of said 'd meter ;
2. T h e p r e s ence inside the electric m eter of salt , su a r a n d d iscovery of t h e c i r c u m s t ance m e n t i oned i n S e ction 4 o f R .A . N o .
o sa , sugar an
o ther elementss t h a t cou l d r e s u l t i n t h e i n a c c ur at 7832 must be personally w i t n e ssed and att ested by an officer of th e
e r e gi st t'
the meter's i i nternal p a r t s t o p r e v en t i t s a c c u r at e r e g i's ra ion o
st r a t io n off law or by an au t h o r i zed ERB r e pr esentative of such discovery.
c onsumption of electricit y ;
P erson benefit te d f r o m i l l e ga l use of el e c t r i c i t y
3. Th e existence
xi of any w i r i n g connection w h ich affects th e
normal operation or registr a t ion of the electric meter . The prima fa c ie p resumpti on a p p l i es to t he p e rson benefitte d
4. Th e p r e s ence of a t a m p e r ed, br ok en, or f ak e seal on t h e b y th e i l l e ga l u s e o f e l e c t r i c i ty , a n d t h a t i s , t h e a c t u a l e l e c t r i c
meter, or m u t i l a t ed, alt er ed, or t a m p ered m et consumer and nct t h e r e gistered consumer. Ex a m p le: "A" has been
d'
grap , o r c om p u t e r i zed chart, graph or log; m e er recor i n g c hhar t o r renting the buil d ing of "B" for 10 years. The electric meter of Meralco
t hat has been registering th e electricity consump t ion i n t h e r e n t e d
5. T h e p r e s ence in an y p a r t o f t h e b u i l d in g or i t s p r e m i s es building i s r e g i st ered i n t h e n a m e o f " B . " M e r a lco em pl oyees and
w ich i s s u bj ect t o t h e c o n t ro l o f t h e c o n sumer o r o n t h
r or on ERB representatives discover the presence inside the electric meter
rrent r eversing t r a n sf or m er, j u m p er , short in g ee a1 nectric
d/or of salt, w h ich r e s u lt s i n t h e i n a c cur ate r e gistr a t ion of t h e m e t e r 's
shunting wi re, and/or loop connection or an
'1
y o the r s i m i a r d
'

d e v i ce; internal parts and prevents its accurate registr at ion of consumption
6. Th e mu t i l a t i o n alter ation, r econnection, d i sconnection, of electricity. This circumstance gives rise to prima facie presumption
b y passing
a s s i n o r tampering t hat " A , " t h e a c t u a l c o n s u me r o f t h e e l e c t r i c it y i n t h e b u i l d i n g
o f i n s t r u m e n tss, transf
r a n s o r m e r s , and
accessories' that h e i s r e n t i n g , i s i l l e g ally u s i n g e l ectri ci ty . T h i s p r e sum p t i on
7. T h e d e s t r u c t io n of , or a t t e m p t t n=ay justif y t h e fi l i n g o f i n f o r m a t i o n f o r i l l e ga l u s e o f e l e ctri cit y
accessory of the metering device b o de st r o y , a n y i n t e g r a l u nder Section 2 of R .A . N o . 7 832 against "A " b u t n o t a g a i nst " B . "
i ce o x w h'i ch e ncases an e l e ct r i c T he presumpt ion w i l l n o t a p pl y t o " B " s i n ce th e i n a ccuracy in t h e
meter, orits metering accessories; and
r egistration of electricity consumpt ion has not benefitted hi m .

J9JC9B0M
 520 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
R equire d w i t n e ss to th e d i s c ov e r y
In order for t h e d i scovery of a t a m p e r ed, br oken or f ak e seal
on the m e te r t o c o n s t i t u t e pr i m a f a c i e e v i d e nce of i l l e g al u s e o f
e lectricity b y t h e p e r so n w h o b e n e f it s f r o m s u c h i l l e ga l u s e , t h e
discovery thereof must have been personally w i t n essed and attested
to by an of fi cer of t h e l a w o r a d u l y a u t h o r i zed r e p r esentative of
the ERB. (Me ralco v. Ra m o s, G.R. No. 1 95145, February 10, 2 016)
Absent any showing t ha t a n of fi cer of th e la w or a d u l y a u t h o r i z ed
r epresentative o f t h e E R B p e r s o n a ll y w i t n e ssed an d a t t e s ted t o
the discovery of P e r m a n ent L i g h t ' s t a m p e red electric m e t er , su ch
discovery di d n o t c o n st i t ut e pr i m a f a c ie ev i d e nce of i l l e g al u se o f
electricity t ha t j u s ti fies i m m e d i ate disconnection of electric service.
(Meralco v. Castillo, G.R. No. 182976, January 1 4, 2018)
The p r e s ence o f g ov er n m en t a g e n t s
w ho m a y a u t h o r i z e
immediate di sconnections go i nt o t h e e ssence of du e p r ocess. The
discovery of Mer alco inspectors of tamper ing of meter is not enough
to create a pr i m a f a c ie e vidence of il l e gal u se of e lectricity by t h e
p erson, wh o b enefitted t h e r e f r om . I n d e ed, M e r a lco should n o t b e
a llowed to ac t v i r t u a l l y a s p r o s ecutor an d j u d g e i n i m p o s in g t h e
p enalty o f d i s c onnection d u e t o a l l e ge d m e t e r t a m p e r i n g . T h a t
would not si t w el l i n a d e m o cr a ti c count ry . A f t e r aD, Me r a l co is a
m onopoly t h a t d e r i v e s i t s p o w e r f r o m t h e g o v e r n m e nt . C l o t h i n g
i t wit h u n i l a t e ra l a u t h o r i t y t o d i s c onnect w o ul d b e e q u i v a l ent t o
giving it a l i c ense to ty r a n n ize it s h a p l ess customers.
(Quisumbing
v. era l c o , G .R. No. 1 4 2943, Apr il 8, 2 0 0 2; Me r a l co v. Ch u a, G . R
¹. 16 0 4 2 2,Ju ly 0 5, 2010)
THEFT O F E L E CTRIC POWE R T R A N S M ISSION LINE AND
MATERIALS
C ommission of an y o f t h e a ct s p r o h i b i te d u n de r S ection 8 o f
R.A. No . 7 88 2 ( A n t i - electricit y a n d E l e c t r i c T r a n s m i s sion L
/
a erials P i l f e r age A ct ) c o n st i t u t e s t h e c r i m e o f th e ft o f e l e ctric
poiver transmission li nes and m a t er i a ls, wh i ch is pun i s ha ble under
Section 7 thereof.
Thh eft of e l e ct ri c p o we r t r a n s m i s sion l i n e s a n d m a t e r i al s i s
committed by any person who shall :
1. Cu t , s a w , s l i ce, separate, split , severe, smelt, or r e m o v e
any e ectric power tr an s m i ssion line/mater ial or meter from a tower,
po e, any other instal l a t ion or place of install a t ion or any other place
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
or site where it may be right f u ll y or la w f u ll y st ored, deposited, kept,
stocked, inventoried, situ ated. or located, with out th e consent of th e
o wner, whether or not th e act is done for pro6t or gain ;
2. T a k e , c a rr y a w a y or r e m ove or t r a n sf er, w it h o r w i t h o u t
the use of a motor vehicle or other means of conveyance, any electric
power tr a n s m i ssion l i n e/m at er ial or m e ter f r o m a t o w er , pole, any
other install a t ion or pl ace of install a t i on, or any pl ace or site where
it ma y b e r i g h t f u l l y o r l a w f u D y s t o r ed, d eposited, k e pt , s t o cked,
inventoried, situ a ted or l o c ated, wit h o ut t h e c o nsent of t he o w n e r,
w hether or not th e act is done for pro6t or gai n ;
8. S tore, possess orotherwise keep in his premises, cLstody
or control, an y e l ectric po w er t r a n s m i s s ion l i n e / ma te rial or m e t e r
without th e consent of the owner, wh ether or not th e act is done for
profit or gain; and
4. L oa d , c a r r y , s h i p o r m o v e f r o m o n e p l a c e t o a n o t h e r ,
whether by l a nd, air or sea, any electrical power t r a n s m i ssion lin e/
m aterial, wh e t her or no t t h e act i s d one for p r o6 t or g a in , w i t h o u t
6rst securing a clearance/permit for the said pur pose from its owner
o r th e N a t i o n a l P o w e r C o r p o r a t io n ( N P C ) o r i t s r e g i o na l o f 6 c e
concerned, as the case may be.(Section 8 of R.A. ¹. 7882)
Under Section 4 (b) of R.A. No. 7882, the possession or custody
o f electric power t r a n s m i ssion li n e/mat er ial by an y p erson, nat u r a l
o r ju r i d i c al, no t e n g a ged i n t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i on , t r a n s m i ssion or
distribut ion of electric power, or in t he m a n u f a c tu re of such e1ectric
power tran sm ission line/material shall be pr im a fa c ie evidence that
such lin e/material i s t h e f r u i t o f t h e of f e n se d e 6ned in S e c tion 8
h ereof and therefore such line/material may be con6scated from th e
person in possession, control orcustody thereof
g uali fying ci r c u m s t a n c e
If the offense is commit ted by, or in conniv ance with, an officer
or employee of the po wer c ompany, pri v a te e lectric ut i l i t y o r r u r a 1
electric cooperative concerned, such officer or em pl oyee shaD, upon
c onviction, be pu n i shed w it h a p e n a lt y on e (1) degree higher t h a n
the penalty pr escribed for iDegal use of electricity or th eft of electric
p ower tr an s m i ssion lines and mat er i a l s.
If the offender committed two or more acts constituting illegal
u se of electricity o r t h e f t o f e l ectri c p ower t r a n s m i ssion l i nes an d
materials, the penalty next hi gher in degree prescribed for this
crime shaD be imposed.
 522 CRIMINAL LAW REVI EWER
:c,
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 523
VOLUME II

ROBBERYIN GENERAL
3 U n in h a b i t e d H o u se T h e t i t l e of the crime uncer Art i c le
Robbery i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r so n w h o t a k e s a p e r s onal 302 is robbery i n a n "u n i n h a b i t ed p l a c e" o r p r i v a t e b u i l d i n g. T h e
p roperty b e l on gin g t o a n o t h e r w i t h i n t e n t t o g a i n b y m e a n s o f term uni n h a b i t ed o l a c e" is e q u i v a l e nt t o "d e spoblado.' Ho w e ve r,
vio ence against or i n t i m i d a t ion of an y p e r son ' the Spanish text th ereof, which is controll i ng, uses the words "lugar
thing. (Artic le 298; 1947 and 19 48 Bar Ex a m s ) , or using f o r c e up on
no habitado," w h i " h me a ns unin h a b i t ed house for being an antonym
of "casa habitado" o in h a b i t e d house.(People v. Jarariil l a, L-28547,
ROB B E R Y BY USING FORC E U PO N THINGS February 22, 1974)

Robbery i n a n i n h a b i t e d h o u s e or p u b l i c b u i l d i n g o r e d i f ic e Uninhabitec. place (d espoblado) i s a c o n c e pt d i f f e r e nt f r o m

devoted to religious worship is commi t ted by any person who takes a uninhabited h o use (l u g ar n o h a b i t a d o o r ca s a no h a b i t a d o ). I f a
p ersonal property belonging to another w it h ' t ' b r esidential house is located in a forest, the house is inhabited wh i l e
tt
force
orce uupon thin g i n a n i n h a b i ted house or pub lic bu i l d in g or edifice t he place i s u n i n h a b i t ed . I f a n a b a n d o ned h o use i s l o cat d i n a
devoted to religious worship. (Art ic le 299) subdivision, the 1:ouse is uninh abi ted wh il e the place is inhabit ed.
The penalty for r o bbery in a n i n h a b i ted h ouse is lesser where The main r eason why th e law p r o v i des a provision on robbery
t e value of the property taken does not exceed 50,000 pesos,or i nvolving inh abited house separate from that i n v ol v ing un i n h a b i t ed
w here none of th e offenders are a r m e d . h ouse is t o l a y d o -ivn th e b a si s o f i m p o s in g p e n a l ty . I n r o b b e r y
(Article 299 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by RA . No . 10 951; 2011 B ar Exa m i nvolving i n h a b i te d h o u se, th e p e n a lt y i s b a s e d n o t o n l y o n t h e
) a mount of t h e p r o p ert y s t o len bu t a l s o o n t h e c o n d i t i oii t h a t t h e
Robo bbery in a n u n i n h a b i te d p l ace (un i n h a b i ted h ouse) or i n a
private bui l d in g i s com m i t t e d by an y p e r son wh o t a k es a p ersonal o ffender is ar m ed. If t h e o f f ender i s a r m ed, t h ere is a r i s k t h a t h e
p roperty belonging to another with i n t ent to gain b ' will use the same in h u r t i n g t h e occupants of th e i n h a b i ted house.
gain y u s i n g fo r ce upon The intention of the law is to discourage arming by i m p osing a high
t hin
ings
s in
in an
an u
uni
n i n h a b i ted house or in a priv ate buil d i ng. (Art ic le 302)
p enalty i f t h e o f f e r d e r i s a r m e d . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n r o b b e r y
Robber y of cer eal s , f r u i t s , o r f i r e w o od i s c o m m i t t e d i f t h e i nvolving u n i n h a b i te d h o u se, th e p e n a lt y i s m e r el y b a sed on t h e
property t a k e n i n r o b b er y b y u s i n g f o r c e u po n t h i n g s i s c e r eals, amount of the prop r t y s t ol en. Since there are usually no persons in
fruits, or firewood. (Artic le 808)
an uninhabited house that can be hurt by th e offender, the law does
not consider being armed as a basis of imposing penalty
Things
4. H a b it a b l e S t r u c t u r e —A structure to be considered as a
T he w o r d t hings i n r ob b e r y b y u s i n g f o r c e u p o n t h i n g s p rivate buil d ing contempl ated in r o bbery by u s ing force upon th i n g
p ertains to the bu i l d i n g , or r eceptacle or f u r n i t u r e i n t h e b u i l d i n g .
must be habit ab''e. Thus, a chi cken coop for not b e in g h a b i t a ble i s
T he buil d in g r e f ers t o a n i n h a b i te d h o u se, public b u i l d i n , e d i fi c e
not a private buil d i ng. Breaking the coop and taking chicken therein
d evoted to reli 'g'
i o u s w orship, uni n h a b i ted house or priva t b ' l d '
i s not robbery by u s in g f orce upon t h i n gs. The cr im e comm i t ted i s
I n robberr y b y u u s 'i n g f o r ce upon t h i n gs, th e r e ceptacle or f u r n i t u r e
f rom where the property was taken must be inside the buil d i n g . theft. (People v. Jamnilla, ibid.)
A bodega (People v. Sa l d u a, G . R. N o . L - 4 0 0 0 8, December 8 ,
1. In h a bi t e d H o u s e —Inhabited house means any shelter,
ship or vessel constitu t in g th e dw ell ing of 1978), and store (Ma r q u ez v. People, G.R. No. 181138, December 8,
oug e inhabit a nt s t h e r eof ar e t e m p o r a r il y a b s ent t h e r e f r om 2012) for being hal'itable are private buildings. Breaking —.he door
when the robbery is commi t t ed. (Art ic le 801) of a bodega or store, enter in g t h e r e in , an d t h en , t a k i n g p r opert i es
t herein is robbery by using force upon th i n g s .
2. P ublic Buil d in g — P ublicbuil d i n g i
owned
n e byy thee Gove i nc1udes every bu i l di'n g 5. S p e c i a l L a w s — Motor vehicle is not a building wit h in t h e
o v e r n m en t or belonging to a pri v ate person
b t u seu.
or rented e Government, al t h o ugh t e m p or a r il y unoccu >uied
e b y t he b u. contemplation of A: t i cle 299 and 302 (See: Revised Pena'. Code, Book
the same. (Article 801) 2, CA Justice Luis Reyes) unless the car has comfort r c o m, ki t c hen
and bed. Thus,:aking the car stereo after breaking the w'ndow of

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 524 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 525
VOLUME II

the motor v e h i cle i s no t r o b b ery b y u s i n g f o rce u pon t l n n g . S u ch

t aking constit u tes simple theft . U sing an i n s t r u m en t t o o p e n t h e d oor w i t h ou t b r e a k in g t h e
door (e.g., using credit card to move the latch bolt of the door knob) is
B ut n i o tor v e h i cl e i s w i t h i n t h e c o n t e m p l a t io n o f t h e w o r d not constitu t ive of the quali f y in g circum st ance of breaking the door.
" t i ng " i n c a r n a p p ing by u s in g force upon t h i n g . H ence, tak ing t h e
(People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-39408, October 81, 1988)
car after breaking its window is carnapping by using force upon
t ing. In People v. Fe r n a n d ez, supr a, a c c used ente red t he s t o re o f
complainant by praying the door out of the groove in which the lower
Piracy and highway robbery/brigandage under P.D. No. 532 e xtremity o f i t w a s p l a ced, and t h e n p u s h in g i t i n w a r d . T h en , h e
can be committed by using force upon things. The term "-hings" in stole properties inside. Since there is no actual breaking of the door,
p iracy under P .D. No. 532 pert a ins to th e vessel, while in h i g h w a y t he crime commit ted is only th e f t .
robbery/brigandage it p e r t a in s t o t h e m o tor v e h i cle, calesa, etc. on
t e gh wa y s . But breaking the hinges (1986 Bar Exam) or padlock of the door
of the bu i l d in g (M a r q u ez v. People, G.R. No. 18 1 1 88, December 8,
Force 2012) is tant am ount to br eak ing th e door. Thus, stealing properti es
inside isrobbery by using force upon things.
The word "force" in robbery pertains t
th
y t e o f f e n der t o e n t e r t h e b u i l d i n g o r t o o p e n t h e df u r n i t u1
re or a. E n t r y i n t o t h e B u i l d i n g —In breaking the wind ow
r eceptacle in t h e b u i l d i n g t o s t ea l t h e p r o p ert y t h e r e in . T h er e i s as a qual i f y in g c i r c u m s t ance of r o bbery b y u s i n g f o rce u p on
f orce upon things in robbery in an in h a b i ted house or public buildi n t hings under A r t i cl e 299 or 3 02, th e offender m ust b r eak t h e
or edificedevoted to worship: ll i c u ng window to enter the bu i l d i n g a n d to t a k e p r o perty t h e r e i n. In
breaking the wi n dow as an ordin ary aggravat ing circum stance
I f th e offfender
f enters th e h ouse or bu i l d in g i n w h i c h t h e under Arti cle 14, the offender must break the window to commit
r obbery is comm i t t ed, by an y o f t h e f o l l ow in g m e ans: (a) un l a w f u l
a crime. In s u m , e n t r y i n t o t h e b u i l d i n g i s i n d i s p e nsable to
entry; (b) forcible e ntry; (c) use of false keys or p kl k appreciate breaking the window as a qualifying circumstance.
mil
oo s; ( ) use of f i ctitious name; or (e) simul a t ion of public auth or ity. O n the other h a n d , en tr y i n t o t h e b u i l d i n g i s no t r e q u i red t o
or o pu i c a u ority
a ppreciate br eak in g t h e w i n d o w a s a n o r d i n ar y a g g r a v a t i n g
2. If the robbery be committed: (a) by breaking of doors, circumstance.
w ardrobes, chests, or an y o t h e r k i n d o f l o c ked or sealed f u r n i t u r e
One evening, A c l i m b e d t h e w a l l o f a h o u s e, b ro ke t h e
e; or (b) y aking such furniture or objects away to be glass of a window and from outside was able to get a watch
broken or forced open outside the place of the robbery. (Artic le 299)
a nd the w a l le t o f t h e o w n e r o f t h e h o u s e contai n in g m o n ey .
T he qu a l i fyi n g ci r c u m s t a n ces of u s i n g f o r c e u po n t h T he crime com m i t t e d i s t h e ft . B r e a k in g t h e w i n d o w i s n o t a
robbe r y in an i n h a b i ted h ouse are th e same a t h ings in circumstance that w il l q u a l ify th e t a k in g i nt o robbery by using
e as o s ei n r o bbe b ery i n
u ninhabited house or pr i v at e bu i l d i n force upon t h i n g s since this cr i me r e q u i r es th at t h e b r e a k i n g
ng except use of fifictitious name
and si m u l a t io n o f p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y . (A r t i c l e 8 0 2) S i n c e t h e r e i s of window is used as a mode to enter the building. (People v.
usually no person in an uninhabited house, the offender cannot use Adorno, CA 40 O.G. 567; People v. guarani lla, G.R. No. L-28547,
fictitious naine or s i m u l a t i on of a u t h February 22, 1974) In this case, A did not enter the build in g. He
t d
into tthe
into e buil '
uilding for pu r p oses of stealing properties therein. took the watch and th e w a l let w h i l e he was outside the house.
I. U n l a w f u l E n t r y . — Unlawfu l e n t r y i s H owever, breaking th e w i n dow t o commi t t h ef t i s an or d i n a r y
offender en
enters is presen t i f t he aggravating circum st ance. (1964 and 19 71 Bar Ex a m s )
ers t he building through an opening not intended for
entrance or egress such as a win d ow . b. Op e n i n g R e c e ptacle o r Fu r n i t u r e — Article
2. Br e a k i I i g th e V V n d o v r — Forcible entry is pr esent if t h e 299(a) uses the ph r ase "T he m a l e factors shall e nter the house
VVi
offender entersthe building by breaking any wall, roof, or fl xxx by breaking x x x the window." Because of the words "enter
breaking any door or window. (Article299 oor or the house," entry into the building is an element of robbery
) involving using force upon the buil d i ng. In thi s sense, breaking

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 526 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 527

the window as a q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t ance can be described as

forcible entry. a. P i ck l o c k —If picklock is used in committ i ng robbery
by using force upon t h i n gs, possession of picklock is absorbed
Article 299(b) uses the phr ase "The robbery be committed i n robbery since the former is just an element of the lat t er .
under any of the folloiving cir c u m s tances: By the breaking o
fx U sing p i c k l ock t o o p e n a l oc k e d c a b i n e t a n d t a k i n g
xx furn i t u r e or r eceptacle." Since the w o r ds "e nter the ho u se"
p roperty t h e r ei n i s n o t r o b b er y b y u s i n g f o r c e u pon t h i n g s .
i s not used by t hi s pr ovi sion, entry i n t o th e b u i l d in g is not an
To constitute robbery by u s in g force upon th i n gs, the picklock
e ement of robbery in v olv ing u sing force upon the fu r n i t u r e or
m ust be u sed t o e n t e r t h e b u i l d i n g , an d n o t m e r el y t o o p e n
r eceptacle in the bui l d i n g .
a receptacle or f u r n i t u r e . ( U .S. v. Ma c a m a y, G. R. No . 11 9 52,
I n r o b b er y i n v o l v i n g u s i n g f o r c e September 25, 1917) In t hi s si t u a t i on, th e cr im e comm i t t ed i s
u pon t h b 'ld'
th e offender forced the building to enter therein and to take theft and illegal possession of picklock. (1968 and 2008 Bar
p roperties th er ein. I n r o b b ery i n v o l v in g u s in g f orce upon t h e Exams)
urnit ur e or r eceptacle in th e b u i l d i ng, th e offender forced the b. E nt r u s ted key —X left for a vacation. But before
urniture or receptacle to open it and to take properties therein. doing so, he entrusted the key to the door of his house to Y. One
A bbroke a wi n dow a nd, w i t h ou t e n t e r in g th e h o u se, took day, Y opened the house with the said key and took properties
a wooden chest lying just underneath the window. He brought t herein. Th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s n o t r o b b er y b y u s i n g f o r c e
o ut th e c h est t o t h e y a r d w h e r e h e b r o k e i t o p e n a n d t o o k upon things. The key entrusted by X to Y is not a false key.
Entrusted key is picklocks or simi lar t o ols, stolen key or a key,
away the contents th ereof. Appl y in g th e A d o r no '
orno princip ' 1e,, the
h which is not in t e n ded by the owner to be used in un l ocking hi s
quuaalif
i yin
i n g ci r c u m s t a nce of br eak in g t h e w i n d o w s h al l n o t b e
h ouse. On the contr a ry , th e ow ner i n t e n ded to use this key t o
consi ered since A did not break the win dow to enter the house.
o pen the door of hi s h ouse. Hence, entering th e b u i l d in g w i t h
owever, taking the chest away to be broken outside the place
t he use of the ent r u s ted key is t h eft an d not r o bbery by u s i n g
of the robber y can n bb e a p p r e c i ated as a cir cu m st ance that w i l l force upon th i n gs. But th e qu a l i f y in g cir cu m st ance of abuse of
q ualify t h e t a k i n g i n t o r o b b er y b y u s i n g f o r c e u o n t h '
confidence may be appreciated. (1976 Bar Exam )
Accor dini ng to LLu i s R e y es, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s r o b b ery b y
u sing force upon t h i n g s w hen chest was t a ken t h e r e from a n d c. D u p l icate key — If inthe above-example, X caused
broken outside even if the culp ri t di d not enter th e bu i l d in g by the duplication of th e key t h r o ugh Mr . Q u i k i e , a nd u s ed tha t
using force upon th i n gs. (1982 B ar E x a m ) d uplicate k e y i n e n t e r i n g t h e h o u s e a n d t a k i n g p r o p e r t i e s
therein, th e c r im e c o m m i t t e d i s r o b b ery b y s u i n g f o rce up on
A entered th e h o us e t h r o ug h a n o p e ned d oor an d t o o k things.
properties therein. The owner of the house sudd
en y1 1o kc e d t h e 4. S im u l a t i o n of Au t h o r i t y —
As a qualifying circumstance,
oor. r oke the wi n d ow, and escaped with t h 1 t
e oo s t h r o u g h s imulation of a u t h o r it y ( p r e t en din g t o b e a p o l ice officer) must b e
e r o k e n w i n d ow . The cr im e comm i t t ed is t h eft. Robbery by
using force upon thi ngs is not commi t ted since the window was e mployed as a m e a n s t o e n t e r t h e b u i l d i n g . I f t h e s i m u l a t i o n o f
authority wa s m ade after th e accused barged int o th e h ouse of th e
not r o k e n to enter the buil d ing for pur poses of takin
a ing property victim, such ci r cu m st ance wil l n o t q u a l if y t h e t a k i n g i n t o r o bbery
t herein. O rrdinary
dinar aggravating circumstance of breakin
b y using f orce upon t h i n g s . I n s u c h c a se, th e c r im e c o m m i t t e d i s
window c annot be considered since the w i n dow was br oken tho
e ither t h ef t o r r o b b ery b y m e a n s of v i o l ence or i n t i m i d a t i on , a n d
e scape and not to commit a cr i m e .
s imulation of a u t h o r it y w i l l b e considered as ordi n ar y a g gr avat i n g
3. False Keys — False keys include circumstance of disguise. (1992 B ar Ex a m )
icklocks o
n uine e y s s t olen from th e owner a n d an y k
those intended
ended by th e ow ner for u s e in t h e l ock f or cib l othe h S pecial Ag g r a v a t i n g C i r c u m s t a n c e
the offender. (Article 805) e oc o r c i y o p ened by
In robbery in an i n habited house (public building or edifice
d evoted t o w o r s h i p) , t h e c i r c u m s t a nce o f a n u n i n h a b i t e d p l a c e

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 528 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 529

and band i s s p ecial a g g r av at i ng. (A r t i c le 8 0 0) To a p p r e c iate t h i s

special aggravat in g ci r c u m s t ance, th ere m u s t b e a c o m b i n a t ion of a store, which i s separate from t h e h o use of th e compl ai n a nt , i s a
band and an u n i n h a b i ted place. Uni n h a b i ted place alone or a band private buil d i ng. (Mar quez v. People, G B. ¹. 18 11 8 8 , December 8,
alone is just an ordin ary aggr avat in g circum st ance in robbery in an 2012)
in a i t e d h o u se.
Taking in Robbery by Using Force upon Things
There is no special aggravat ing circum st ance for robbery in an
uninhabited house or priv ate buil d i ng. However, circumstance of an Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code uses the wo rd "t a k e" in
u ninhabited place or a band is ordin ary aggravat ing in t h i s cr i m e . definingi'obbery by using force upon things. The concept of "taking"
in theft or robbery by means of violence or int i m i d a t ion is the same
Robbery in the Dependency of an Inhabited House as that inrobbery by using force upon things. Like theft and robbery
by means of v i ol ence or i n t i m i d a t i on , a b i l it y t o f r e el y d i s pose the
R obbery by u s i n g f o rce upon t h i n g s can b e com m it t d ' p roperty an d a sport a t ion (carr y in g a w ay ) ar e no t e l e m ents of t h i s
e pen ency o f a n i n h a b i t e d h o u s e o r p u b l i c b u i l d i n g o r e d ith
fi c e
robbery by using force upon things. Hence, taking out the property
devoted to worship. (Art i c le 299)
from the building is not important to consummate robbery by
Dependencies o f a n i n h a b i t e d h o u s e u sing f orce u po n t h i n g s . R o bbery b y u s i n g f o r c e u p o n t h i n g s i s
bl b 'l d
buildin
u i i n g dee d i cated to r e l i g i ous w o r ship i n c l ud e al l i n t e r io r c o u r t s ,
'

c onsummated once th e a ccused ent ers th e b u i l d i n g , or o p en s t h e

o e r ep a r t m e n t s or en closed places contiguous to the bu i l d in g or
e difice, having an in t e r ior en t r a nce connected therewi th , and w h i ch
orm part of the wh ole. However, orchards and other l a nds used for
cu tivation or production are not dependencies of
h b ld'
i c o se , c o n t i g u ous t o t h e b u i l d i n g a n d h a v i n g d i r ect connection
There is no robbery in the dependency of an uni n h a b i ted house
o r pri v at e b u i l d i n g . E n c l osed p l ace connected t o a n u n i n h a b i t e d
h ouse or private buil d ing w il l be considered as priv ate bui l d i n g .
furnit ur e or r e ceptacle in t h e b u i l d i n g b y t h e m o d e m e n t i oned by
l aw, and gains possession over the property in the buil di ng, furn i t u r e
or receptacle.
B ut i f t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e r o b b er s i s t o b r e a k t h e l o c k e d
r eceptacle o r f u r n i t u r e o u t s i d e t h e b u i l d i n g , t h e c r i m e w i l l b e
c onsummated o n l y u p o n r e m o v a l o f t h e r e c e p t a cle o r f u r n i t u r e
from t h e b u i l d i n g . W i t h r e s p e ct to t h i s m o d e o f c o m m i t t i n g t h i s
c rime, tak in g t h e p r o p ert y a w a y o r r e m o v in g i t f r o m t h e b u i l d i n g
is an element of r obbery by u s in g f orce upon t h i n g s as required in
Articles 299 and 302.

For p u r p o ses of aggravating circumstance of disregard of If the furn i t u r e or receptacle or fur n i t u r e was inside the house,
dwelling, a st or e u sed as a h o use ' actual breaking thereof,and actual taking of jewelries or money
i s no t a d w e 11'
in g sG.R.
i nce ¹.i t i s5 3n8o2t
exclusively used for rest and comfort. (U.S. v. Baguio, therefrom is in d i spensable for pu r pose of consumm a t ion of robbery
by using force upon thing.

For purposes of trespass to dwelling (People v. Lamaha n , G . R If the furrii t ur e or receptacle was taken out of the house, actu-
No. 4 8580 Auu gust 3 1985) and r obbery by u s ing v.
u s t 3, a m a a ng ,
force upon t h i n g s al breaking t h e r eof, and actual t a k i n g of j ew el r ies or money th er e-
(People v. Tubog, G.R. No. L-26284, November 17, 1926) from is not i m p o r t an t f o r t h e p u r p ose of consumm a t ion of r obbery
e ing is an i n h a b i ted house. Exclusive use for rest and by using force upon thing.
c omfort is not requi r e d .
During th e ol d t i m es wh ere t h er e ar e few m e ans of t r a n spor-
W h ere the first fi oor of th e b u i l d in g i s a st or e t h e tation (e.g.,calesa) that could carry furniture or wardrobe to a far
is a s ore, e second is a
dwellinng, and
an the 1
e latter isaccessible from the form place, there was a cr i m i na l p r a c t ice wh ere the t h i e ves would carry
e considered
becon ' as dependency of an inhabited house. er, t h e st or e shh aiiii t his receptacle out f r o m t h e h o u se, br eak t h e m o u t s i de, and t h en
(U.S.
G.Il. No. L-13715, January 22, 1919) A building used v. Ventura,
exclusively as take jewelries or money therefrom. They cannot afford to manually
carry this furniture or wardrobe to a farplace because of its heavy

J9JC9B0M
 530 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
w eight. M or eover, they can easily be ar r e sted if t h e y w o ul d m a n u -
a y carry th e w a r d r obe wit hi n t h e v iew of the suspicious public.
If thh e accused removed a br a n d new w a r d r o b f
ro e rom a oepart-
ment store wi t h out i n t e n t ion of br eak in g i t o u t s i de, the crim e com-
m itted is t h e ft . I n r o b b ery by u s in g f orce upon t h i n g i n v o l v in g t h e
r emoval of war dr obe, the int en t ion of the accused is to brcak it o u t -
si e the buil d ing and to steal the properties inside such as j ewelries.
I f the in t en t ion is to steal the w a r d r obe it s l f t h
e i se , e crime con mitted
is theft.
P OSS E S S ION OF PICKLOC K OR SIMILAR TOO L S
P ossession of pi c k locks or s i m i l a r t o ol s i s committed by any
person who possesses picklocks or si m i l a r t o ols especially adapt ed
to the commission of the crime of robbery wi t h out l a w fu l cause. The
ma er of t hi s tools and locksmith ar e also liable. (Artic le 804~
/
Under Ar t i cle 305, false key includes picklock or simi l ar t o o ls,
or stolen key. Using a fa l se key to enter t he b u i l d i ng is an e le me nt
o robbery by using force upon thing under Article 299 or 302.
Possession of pic k l ock or s i m i l a r t o o ls is p u n i s h b l
a e u n der A r tice
' 1
ut possession of stolen key is not punishable under A
rti "le 304.
S tealing t h e k e y i n s i d e t h e h o u s e an d u s i n g i t t o o p e n t h e
drawer wh ere th e p r op erty w a s t a k e n t h e r e f rom i s no t r o bbery by
u sing force upon t h i n g . T o consti t u t e
bb b f ng, and
things, the false or stolen key must be used to enter the buildi
not merely to open a r eceptacle or f u r n i t u r e . (People v. Ferr.andez,
. No. L - 8 9408, October 8 1 , 1 9 8 8) In t h i s s i t u a t i o n, t h e c r i m e
c ommitted is t h e ft . St ealin g th e k e y w i l l b e t r e a ted as p ar t o f t h e
c ommission of t h e ft . I l l e gal p ossession of p i c k l ock or s i m i l a r t o o l s
i s not commit t ed. Stolen key is not a p i c k l ock or considered simi l a r
too s especially adapted to the commission of the crime ofrobbery
contemplated in A r t i cle 304.
ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION
Robber y w ith v i ' olence against o r i n t i m i d a t io n i s
'
b y any person who t a kes a p ersonal pr operty b elon i n committed
to h of
en o g a i n y m e a n s o f v i o l ence against or i n t i m i d " tion
any person. (1969 Bar Exam) Th r e a t, slight p h y s ical inju r i es or less
serious physical injuries is absorbed in robbery. (Article 294)
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 531
The penalty f o r r o b b er y r s h r g her ( 1 ) w h e r e t h e v r ol ence or
intimi d at ion e m p l oyed t o c o m mi t i t i s c a r r i e d t o a d e g ree clearly
u nnecessary for t h e c o m m i s sion of t h e c r i m e ; or (2 ) w h er e i n t h e
c ourse of it s e x ecution, th e o f f ender i n f l i ct s u po n a n y p e r son n o t
r esponsible for its commission any of the physical inj u r ies result i n g
to deformity, loss orloss of use of non-integral parts of the body or
m ore than 90 or 30 days incapacity; or (3) where insanity, imbecilit y ,
i mpotency, or b l i n d n ess, per m a n en t i n c a p acity , o r l o s s o f u s e o f
integral parts of the body resulted as a consequence of physical
i njuries. In t e gral p a rt s of t h e b ody p e r t ai n t o t h e e ye, h a nd, a r m ,
f oot, and leg of the victi m .
V iolence or I n t i m i d a t i o n
I nitial v i o l e nce o r i n t i m i d a t io n n e e d n o t b e p r e s en t w h e n
t he property w a s t a k e n f r o m t h e v i c t i m . E v e n t h o ug h t h er e i s n o
v iolence or i n t i m i d a t ion w h e n t h e o f f ender t ook th e p r o p erty f r o m
t he vict im , i f t h e l a t t e r a t t e m p t e d t o r e g ai n p o s session an d t h e
f ormer uses violence or in t i m i d a t ion to p r event it , th e cr im e is stil l
robbery by means of violence or inti m i d a t i on. (Ablaza v. People, G.R.
No. 217722, September 26; 2018)
Snatching money from the hands ofthe victim and pushing her
to prevent her from recovering the seized property is simple robbery.
However, if there is no violence exerted to accomplish the snatching,
the crime commit ted is not robbery but only on simple theft. (Ablaza
v. People, supra)
In People v.Basao, G.R. No. 128286, July 20, 1999, the taking
of the personal properties from the victim wa s an aft er t h ou ght. Th e
personal propertieswere taken after accused has already successfully
c arried ou t h i s p r i m a r y c r i m i n a l i n t e n t o f k i l l i n g t h e v i c t i m a n d
t he takin g di d no t n ecessitate th e use of violence or force upon hi s
p erson nor f o rce u pon a n y t h i n g . C on siderin g t h a t t h e v i c t i m w a s
already heavily w o u n ded when hi s personal properties were tak en ,
there was no need to employ vi olence against or i n t i m i d a t ion u p on
his person. Thus, accused is liable for separate crimes of murder and
theft.
I n r o b b er y w i t h i n t i m i d a t i o n o f p e r s o ns , t h e i n t i m i d a t i o n
c onsists i n c r e a t i n g f e a r i n t h e m i n d o f a p e r s o n i n v i e w o f a
risk or e v i l t h a t m a y b e i m p e n d i ng , r ea l o r i m a g i n ed. (S a zon v .
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 15 0 878, February 1 0, 2 0 0 9) The re is n o
testimony that accused used violence in snatching the necklaces of
t he complainant . M o r eover, the act of th e perpetr at ors in g r a bbin g
 532 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 533
VOLUME II

h er necklaces were so su dden. H e nc e i t c o u l d

ear or duress in the victim's mind as to d not h av e. p r odd u c ed case, the robbers acquire constructive possession of the money when
eprive h
e r o f t h e ex ercise of t he cashier placed it on the counter in f r on t of t h e m .
e r will. Wi t h out vi olence or int i m i d a t ion in sn t e h i
the crime commi t ted is only t h e ft. (Ablaza v. J'eople a nsupra
g t h e)property,
p y,
P ersonal P r o p e r t y B e l o n g in g t o A n o t h e r
The fear ear oof inj ur y t o p e r son or p r o p er ty , w h ich i s th e essence
o f inti m i d a t ion as an e l em ent of r o b b A discovered tha t h i s s t o len p a i n t i n g w a s i n t h e h o use of B .
ro ery , m u s t c o n t i n ue to operate A decided to take m a t t ers i nt o hi s own h a nd s and one ni ght , br ok e
in t the
e m i n d o f t h e v i c t im a t t h e t i m e o f th d l i
e e ' v er y o t e m o n e y .
eat o p r o secution and confiscation of the logs b D fE h N R ffi into house of B b y d e s tr o ying t he w a ll a n d t o ok t h e p a i n t i n g . A i s
s y o cers not liable for robbery by u s ing force upon th i ngs since the property
i s a n i ntimi d a t io n w i t h i n t h e
meaningg o f r o bb er y . (S ( azo n v.
Sanandi ganbayan, G.B. ¹ . Z 5 ' 0 8 78, February 10, 2009) taken belongs to him and not to another person. However, A is liable
for trespass to dwelling since he entered the house of B a g ainst his
Two police officers demanded P500.00 fr will. Entr y against the will of the owner of the dwelling presupposes
a llee ge
edly v i oo laated
t th e O p iu m I a w , a ccompaniedo m byat hCh
r e iats
n esto
e , twa hk o
eas ot o pposition o r p r o h i b i t i o n b y s a i d o w n e r . E n t e r i n g t h e h o u s e b y
him before thee proper r author i t ies and have hiin pro secuted. For feare destroying its wall shall be deemed considered as having been made
of being sent to prison for a long term t h Ch i
e n es e pa i d a negotiated against the im p l ied prohib i t ion of B. (2014 B ar Ex a m )
amount of P150.00. Accused were convicted of robbery. (U.S. u.
Sanchez, G A. ¹. L- 9 1 0 2 , ¹ v em b e r 5, Z918) If A used violence or i n t i m i d a t ion i n t a k i n g h i s ow n p r o p erty
from B, the crime commit t e d is not ro bbery by m e a ns of violence or
A t r a f fi c i n v e s t i g a t or c onfiscated t h e dr i v e r ' s l i
e i v er s intimi d a t ion but gr ave coercion.
cornp lainant aft figur ing in a vehicular accident.
ainant after He then dec ense o f
and eventual e e n em a n d e d
a llly r eceived f ro m h i m t h e a m o u n t o f P 2 , 0 0 0.00 f r o m If A did not use violence or int i m i d a t ion or force upon thi ngs in
complainant i n e x c h a nge fo r t h e r e l e a se of h i s d r taking his own property from B, A is not crim i n a l ly l i a b le since he is
e o is '. li
ccuse e m p l o yed i n t i m i d a t ion t o obt ai n m on e fr iver s l i c ense. just merely exercising his ri ght as an owner to possess his property .
n money
s e a c p e r f o r m e d b y t h e l a t t e r c a u sed fear i n t h e m i n d1 o f t h e
om complainant
(2018 Bar Exa m)
former that he mi ght not be able to dri
e o i v e a t a x i an d earn a li v in g for
s ami ly. Accused was convicted of robbery. (Flores v. P eo le G . R . I ntent t o G a i n
¹. 22 2 8 6 '1,April 28, 2018) v. eop e,
Intent t o g a i n , o r an i m u s l u c r a n d i , a s a n el e m e nt o f t h e
Taking of Personal Property c rime of r o b b ery , i s a n i n t e r n a l a c t ; h e n ce, p r e su med f r o m t h e
unlawful t a k in g of thi n gs. Actual gain is ir r el evant as the import an t
Thh e robbers armed w it h w e a p ons h d d consideration is th e i n t en t t o g a in . (Sazon v. San d ig a n b ayan, G.R.
thee female a em a nd ed money from
emale clerk of a convenience store, and the clerk ha d compli ed 1Vo. Z50878, February 10, 2009)
w ith t h ei r i n s t r u c t i ons an d p l a ced th e m on e f r o m t h e
a paper baag an and then In S y v . Gut i e r r e z, G . R. N o . 1 7 1 5 7 9, N o v e m b er 1 4 , 2 0 1 2 ,
e n placed the bag on th e counter i n f r
t wo me n t h eese actions b r o u gh t t h e m o n e y w i t h i n t h e d otm if ntiho n properties allegedly stolen are subject toestate proceeding. The fact
and control ofthe defendant and. completed the takin . Robb that these properties were taken u n der cl aim of own ership negates
consummated even th
en though t h e p e r p e t r a t ors we r e i n t e r r u t d b the element of i n t en t t o g a i n . On e w h o t a k e s th e p r o p erty o p enly
police and so did not i n errup e y a nd avowedly un der cl aim of t i t l e offered in good faith i s not gu i l t y
so i n ot p i c k u p t h e m o ney offered by th e v i c t im . T h e
c rime is consumm ated wwhhen the r o bbers acquire possession of t h e of robbery even th ough th e claim of own er ship is u n t e n able. "Actus
property, even iffor a short ort titme, an d i t i s n o t n e cessar non facitreum, nisi me ns sit rea."
p ropert y b e t a k en i n to the hands of the robbers, or that theyt hshould t th
A entered th e h o use of B an d t h e n t o o k a n d s e i z ed personal
h ave actually carried the pro er t aw a , or a e y s oul d
pe y away, out ofthe physical presence property by c o m p u l sion f rom B wi t h t h e u s e of v i o l e nce, believing
o
o ef the lawfu l o s s
a w 1 possessor, that or they should have m d th
himself to be the owner of the personal property so seized. A is not
. ( eop e u. S alv il l a, G . B. ¹ . 86' 1 6 '8,April 2 6; 1 9 9 0) In t h i s
criminally l i a ble for robbery since the presumpt ion of intent to gain,

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 534 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
an element of t h i s c r i m e , is r e b u t ted because he took th e p ersonal
property under a bona fide belief that he owns the property. (Gav ola
v. People, G.R N o . 16 8 9 27, Ja n u a ry 27 , 2006) However, A is l i a b le
for grave coercion because he used violence in seizing the pr operty.
(see: eople v. Bautista, CA-G.R N o . 48890, December 1 7, 1986; 2012
and 1958 Bar Exa ms )
S tages of Robb e r y
Since ability to fr eely dispose the property is not an elemen. of
t eft, the Supr eme Court in Pe ople v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 160188,
June 21, 2007, declared that there is no frustrated theft. If the thief
acquired possession over the property, physically or constructively,
theft is consummated; otherwise, it is attempted.
Since the concept of taking as an element of theft is the same
as that of taking as an element of robbery, the Valenzuela principle
can be applied torobbery. In sum, if the robber acquired physical or
constructive possession over th e p r o p ert y b y m e a n s of v i o l ence or
intimi d a t i on, robbery is consumm a t ed; otherw i se, it is att em p t ed.
1. Con s u m m a t e d R o b b e r y — In Pe o ple v. Sa l v i l l a , G . R .
No. 86163, April 26, 1990, the accused took the properties from
t e v i c t im s b y v i o l ence and i n t i m i d a t io n bu t f a i l e d t o b r i n g t h e m
o ut from t h e l u m bb er e r compound s i nc e t h e y w e r e a p p r e h end d b
p olii c e a u t h o r i t i es. In s um , t h ey h av e no opport u n it y t o d i s pose the
p roperties. That f act d oes not a f f ect th e n a t u r e of t h e c r i m e , f r o m
t he moment t h e o f f enders ga i ned p ossession of t h t h '
e cu prits had no opportu n it y t o di spose of the same, the unla w f u l
taking is complete.
2. A t t em p t e d R o b b e r y — In U . S . v . Go n z a l ez, G . R. N o .
2092 A pri ril 1155 , 1 9 0 5 , a c cused e n t e red t h e h o u se, an d e m p l o y ed
v iolence against a n o c cupant t h e r e of. Bu t t h e y f a i l e d t o o pen t h e
trunk cont a i n in g m o n ey. A f r ai d o f b e in g s u r p r i sed by a u t h o r i t i e s,
t ey desisted from consumm a t in g th e cri me. The
attempted robbery. ey were convicted of
3. A t t em p t e d R o b b e r y w i t h H om i c ' d
i ci e -— I n P e o pl e v .
ivas, No. 30993, December 2, 1929, accused broke the lock of
the safe where the mo mo
m oney was kept. . They w ere compelled to d ' ct
t o takee th ee m o n e y b e cause the vi c ti m fi r e d a s hot i n t h e a ior . Tehsei sy
k illed th e v i c t i m . T h e y w e r e conv i cted of a t t e m p t e d r o b bery w i t b .
homici e.
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 535
In People v. Barr a, G. R. No. 198020, July 1 0, 2013, the victim
refused to give his money to the accused and no personal property
was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason that the victim
was shot. Accused was convicted of attempted robbery with homicide.
In Pe ople v. Am b a , G . R . N o . 1 4 0 8 9 8, S e p te mber 2 0 , 2 0 0 1 ,
accused through the overt acts of pulling and grabbing something
f rom th e v i c t i m h a d d e m o n s t r a te d h i s i n t e n t i o n o f c a r r y i n g o u t
the robbery. However, the accused failed to consummate the crime
b ecause the victim r esisted. Accused killed th e victim. He was
convicted. of attempted robbery with homicide.
In People v. Marquez, G,R. Nos. 138972-73, September 13,
2001, thearmed robbers failed.to take property from the passengers
in a bus because of the intervention of one passenger, who is a police
officer. In the course of the struggle with the police, one victim was
hit by a b u l let an d d i ed. They w ere convicted of fr u s t r a ted robbery
with homicide.
Marquez p r i n c i p le i s a s t r a y d e c i s ion. S i n ce t he a c c used in
the Marquez case did not acquire possession over the property of
the offended p a r ty , a p p l y in g t h e Vi v a s pr i n c i p l e, Am b a p r i n c i p l e
and Ba r r a p r i n c i p l e, t h e a c c used s ho uld h a v e b e en c o n v ic ted o f
attempted robbery wit h h o m i c i de.
S pecial Co m p le x C r i m e I n v o l v i n g R o b b e r y
Special complex c r i m e i s p r o d u c ed if w h e n b y r e a s on or o n
o ccasion of t h e r o b b e ry , s e r i ou s p h y s i cal i n j u r i e s i s i n d i c t ed , or
h omicide has resulted or w hen th e r obbery is accompanied by r a p e
or intentional mu t i l a t ion or arson (Article 294) or when by reason or
o n occasion of the att em p ted robbery, homicide is commi t ted by th e
robber. (Artic le 297)
In robbery w i t h h o m i c i de, th e r o bbery i s t h e cent ra l p u r p o se
and objective of the m a l efactor and th e k i l l i n g i s m e r ely i n ci dental
t o the robbery. The in t ent t o rob m ust p r ecede the tak in g of hu m a n
life, but t h e k i l l i n g m a y o ccur b efore, du r in g or a f t e r t h e r o bbery .
(People v. Ladia n a, G.R N o . 17 4 6 60, May 80, 2011) However, even
if the malefactor int ends to kill and rob another, it does not preclude
his conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
(People v. Daniela, G.R No. 189280, April 24, 2008)
The word " h o m i c i de" i s u se d i n i t s g e n e ri c sense. H om i cide,
thus, in cl u des m u r d er , p a r r i c i de, an d i n f a n t i c i de. (People v. D i u ,
G.R No. 201449, April 8, 2018)
 536 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Conviction for robbery is justi fied even if the stolen property is
not presented in court. A f ter a ll , th e pr operty st olen may h ave been
abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered
by the owner. The actual value of the property stolen is not requir ed
to be proven. The motive forrobbery can exist regardless of the exact
amount or value involved. (People v. Ebet, G.R. No. 181 68o, November
6, 2010; People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June 26; 2009; People
v. Diu, G .R. No. 20 1 449, Apr il 8, 2 0 1 8; People v. Ma d " e lejos, G.R.
No. 228828, March 21, 2018)
H omicide is said to h ave been comm i t te d by r e ason or on t h e
o ccasion of robbery if, for in st ance, it was commi t ted to (a) facilit at e
the robbery or the escape of the culprit ; (b) to preserve the possession
y the culprit of th e loot; (c) to prevent di scovery of the commission
o t e r o b b e ry ; or (d ) t o e l i m i n a t e w i t n e sses in t h e c o m m i ssion f
t hee crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and sion o
the
h omicide, the la t ter cr im e ma y b e comm i t t e d i n a p l ace other t h a n
the situs of the robbery. (People v.Ebet, supra)
Mr. R entered the house by breaking the window and took
money and jewelries the re in. The owner of the house shouted "stop
or I w i l l s h oot," a nd p o i n t ed t he g un a t h i m , a n d c o cked it. M r . R
killed th e o w n er . ( 2 019 Ba r E x a m ) In r o b b e r y, i n i t i a l v i o l e nce or
i ntimi d at ion n ee d n o t b e p r e s en t w h e n t h e p r o p e rt y w a s t a k e n
from the vict im. (Ab l a za v. People, G.R. No. 21 7 722 S t ¹. L - 5 1 5 1, J a n u ary 31 , 1 910) But if t h e p o l ice officer arre sted the
b 2 ,
) H ence, the violence employed by M r. R a g a i n st t he o w n er t o
m aintain h i s p o ssession over t h e m o n e y q u a li fies th e t a k i n g i n t o
robbery. Special complex cr im e o f r o b bery w i t h h o m i c ide i n c l u des
k illing, w h ich i s m a d e t o p r e serve th e possession by th e c u l p ri t o f
the loot. (People v. Ebet, supra) S ince Mr. R k i l l e d t he o wner of th e
p roperty t o p r e serve hi s p o ssession of t h e l o ot , M r . R i s l i a b l e of
robbery with h o m i ci de.
However, if the violence, which ki l led the victim, was employed
t o maintain possession of the loot after t h t k '
j~ull f th
fu y completed, the violence will not quali fy the taki ng into robbery,
a n k i l l i n g w il l n o t m a k e t h e offender. liable for r obbery wi t h
homicide. In t h i s case, the accused is l i a ble for t h ef t an d s ep ar at e
crime of homicide, mur der or di r ect assault w it h h o m i c i d e.
In People v. Ja r a n i l l a , G. R. N o. L - 2 8 5 47, Februa ry 2 2, 1 9 7 4,
a ccused took th e r o osters w i t h ou t v i o l ence or i n t i m i d a t io n f r o m a
cage eside a house, and boarded on a truck. A person reported to
the police authori t ies at the station that he saw the three suspicious-
o o ing me n c a r r y i n g r o o sters. Th e p o l i cemen, w it h t h e r e p o r t i n g
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTy 537
individual, went to the place where the accused were seen, they and
the -.ruck were not there anym ore. The policemen followed the tru ck
and intercepted it. One of the accused fired his gun at one of the
policemen and as a consequence, he died. Accused were convicted of
theft and di r ect assault w i t h h o m i c i de. Since in t a k in g th e roosters
from their coop, no violence against or i n t i m i d a t ion of persons was
e mployed, A r t i cl e 2 9 4 o n s p e cial c o m p lex c r i m e o f r o b b er y w i t h
homicide is not applicable.
A ccused i s c h a r ge d o f R o b b er y w i t h Qu i n t u p l e H o m i c i d e .
However, the r obbery i s not p r o v ed; but t h e k i l l i n g of fiv e p ersons
t hrough fi v e s u c cessive sh ot s i s e s t a b l i sh ed. A c cused sh oul d b e
convicted of five counts of homicide. (1978 Bar Exam )
R obbery, K i d n a p p i n g , an d A r b i t r a r y Detention
As a r u l e , a r r e s t in g a p e r so n e ve n w i t h o u t p r o b a bl e c a u se
i s ar b i t r ar y d e t e n t i on . H o w e v er , a r b i t r a r y d e t e n t i o n c an o n l y
b e commit ted b y p u b l i c officers i n p u r s u i t o f t h e i r d u t y t o a r r e s t .
Hence, arbitr ar y d e t en t ion i s com m i t t e d i f a p o l ice officer ar r e sted
t he victim w i t h ou t p r obable cause for pur poses of investigating hi m
(U.S. v. Hawchaw, G.R. ¹. L - 6 9 0 9 , February 2 0, 1912) or brin g i n g
him to the proper investigating authority. (U.S. v. Gellada, G.R.
victim for purposes of extorting money, the crime commit ted is either
robbery (US v. Flores, ¹. 6427, March 23, 1911) or kidnapping for
ransom (P eople v. Go n z alez, J'r., G . R. N o . 19 2 2 8 8, F e b r u a ry 1 7 ,
2016) with special aggravating circum st ance of takin g advant age of
pubic position .
Robbery and Kidnapping for Ransom
I n robbery by means of violence or inti m i d a t ion and ki dn appin g
for ransom, the offender is extorting money or property from
the vict im . H o w e v er, i n r o b b er y t h e o f f ender i s u s i n g v i o l ence or
i ntimi d a t ion a s a m o d e o f e x t o r t i on ; t h e i n t i m i d a t io n i n r o b b er y
must be actual or i m m e d i a te. On th e other h a nd, in k i d n a p p ing for
ransom, the offender is using the victi m's depriv a t ion of liberty as a
mode of extorting r a n som from hi m or an y ot her person.
In People v. Li d a s a n, G . R . N o . 2 2 7 4 2 5, S eptember 4, 2 0 1 7 ,
accused forcibly abducted the v ic tim f r o m h e r h o u se in V a l e nz uela
City for the purpose of extorting P30 million ransom, and then she
w as brought t o t w o s afe houses at L a s P i n a s C i ty , w h er e she w a s
 538 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
detained and de prived of her l i b e r ty u n t i l s he w as fin a l ly r e s cued
by the operatives after a week. The crime commit ted is ki d nnapping appin
for ransom.
In People v. Puno, G.R. No. 97471, February 17, 1993, accused,
driver of the vi ct im, and hi s n ephew held up th e vi cti m i n s ide her
car in Quezon City. The victim handed the accused P7,000.00. The
accused told herthey wanted P100,000.00 more. The victim agreed
t o give them t h a t b u t t h e y w o u l d d r o p h e r a t h e r g a s s t a t ion i n
M akati w h er e th e m o ney is . Th e ca r s ped off t o w a rds th e N o r t h
superhighway. In Pampanga, the victim forciblyissued checks. The
c ar tur ned ar ound t o w a rd s M e tr o M a n i l a t o r e t u r n t h e v i c ti m t o
her house. Later, th e d r i ver ch anged his m in d an d t u r n e d th e car
again towards Pampanga. The victim was able to escape. The crime
c ommitted i s r o b b ery. Th e a c cused for f o r cibly t a k i n g a w a y t h e
v ictim, even for an appreciable period of ti me, for th e pr i m ar y a n d
ultimate purpose of robbing her, is liable for robbery. The incidental
deprivation of t h e v i c t i m' s l i b ert y d oes not constit ut e k i d n a pping
or serious illegal detention. The amount given to the accused is not
equivalent t o r a n som considering t ha t t h e y im m e d i a t ely obtained
them from the complainant personally.
However, the offender in extort in g money from the victim can
be held liable either for r obbery or k i d n a p ping; for both cr i m es; or
complex crime proper.
1. R ob b e r y A b s o r b e d I ll e g a l D e t e n t i o n — I f t he
deprivation of liberty is just incidental to the commission of robbery,
t he crime commi t te d i s r o b bery w h i l e i n c i dental k i d n a p ping a n d
serious illegal detention is absorbed.
Illegal detention is i n cidental t o th e commission of robbery if
the deprivation of liberty arose from the transportation of the victim
to the place where the vi cti m w i l l b e r o bbed. In People v. Mo reno,
G.R. No. 94755, Apri l 10 , 1992, accused forcibly seized the victim
i n M a n il a a n d b r o u gh t h i m t o M e y c a u ayan, B u l a can w h er e h e
w as robbed and k i l l ed. The accused was convicted of robbery wi t h
homicide.
Illegal detention is i n cidental to th e commission of 'f
bb
thee d e p r i v a t ion of l i b erty i s m ade to pr event th e police authorities
from ar r esting t h e a c cused for c o m m i t t i n g r o b bery. I n Pe o ple v .
ro ery inside a factory. Before they could leave the premises after
the commission of the robbery, the police authori t ies were already
at the scene of the crime. Since they cannot escape, they detained 21
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 539
victims. After 22 hours of captivity, the hostages were rescued. Since
the principal int ention of the accused is to rob the victims, and th e
deprivation of their liberty is just incidental to the prevention of the
responding police officers from arresting them, the crime committ ed
is robbery, which absorbed incidental ki dnapping and serious illegal
detention.
Note: The d octrine of a b s orption in t h e As t o r ca se does not
apply where the victim was deprived of liberty to prevent the police
authorities f ro m a r r e s t in g h i m f o r t h e c r i m e o f r a p e . (P eople v .
Concepcion. G.R. No. 214886, April 4, 2018)
2. Com p l e x C r i m e o f R o b b e r y Th r o u g h K i d n a p p i n g
— If the accused committed r oboery, but t h e r eafter, they detained
t he victim s fo r s e v eral h o ur s -.o demand a d d i t i onal m o n ey, a n d
l ater forestall t h ei r c a pt ur e by t h e p o l ice, the cr im e commi t ted i s
a complex crime of robbery th r ough k i d n a pping and serious illegal
d etention. The detention was availed of as a means of insuring th e
consummation of the robbery. The detention was not merely a matter
of restraint to enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate as
a means of extort ion fo r a n a d d i t i o nal a m o u nt . H e n ce, the As t o r
principle is not applicable. (People v. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86168, April
26, 1990)
3. S e pa r a t e C r i i nes of Robbery and K i d n a p p i n g —If the
accused committed robbery by band, but th ereafter, they took one of
the victims an d d et ained hi m f o r s even days in a n o t her p l ace for
purposes of demanding ransom, they are liablefor separate crimes
of robbery by band and kidnapping for ransom. (People v. Basao,
G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012)
I f the victim wa s abducted for p u r p oses of ki l l in g her an d i n
the course of th e detention, th e accused took her cash an d p i eces
o f jewelry, and. thereafter, inflicted mortal w o und u pon th e vi ct i m ,
who did not di e as a consequence, the accused are li able for t h e ft
and complex crime of k i d n a pping w it h f r u s t r a ted m u r d er. (People
v.Roxas, G.R. No. 172604, August 17, 2010) Ifthe properties were
t aken by m e an s of v i o l ence or i n t i m i d a t ion i n t h e c o u rse of t h e
detention and t;he victim died, tl e accused are liable for robbery and
s pecial complex crime of kidnapping with m u r d e r .
Robbery, and Direct Bribery and Corruption of Public Officer
In case v here a pe rson gave money or p r o perty to t he p o lice
officer to avoid arrest and prosecution, the crime committed is either
direct bribery or robbery.
 540 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME D
A ccording t o L u i s R e y e s , robbery i s c o m m i t t e d w h e n t h e
victim did not commit a cr ime and he is inti m i d a t ed with a r r e st and
prosecution to deprive him of his personal property; direct briberv is
committed when the victim h as commit t ed a crime and gives money
or gift to avoid arr est or pr osecution.
However, Florenz Regalado argued that the correct basis of the
distinction between robbery and direct bribery iswhether the giver
of bribe did so volunt ar i ly , in w h ich case it is bribery; or that he gave
the sum or gift by r eason of force or int i m i d a t i on, in w h ich case it is
robbery.
It issubmitted that the better view is that of Regalado. In. U.S.
v. Flores s G.R. No. L-6427, March 28, 1911 and People v. Frar ecisco,
G.R. No. L-218'90, March 26, 1924, the Supreme Court said in
bribery, t he t r a n s action is m u t u a l a nd v o l u n t a ry w h i l e in r o b b e ~,
the transaction is neither volun t ary nor m u t u al, but is consummated
by the use offorce or intimidation.
1. V olu n t a r i n e s s i n p a r t i n g t h e m o n e y — Even t h o u g h
t he suspect di d n o t r e a l l y c o m mi t a c r i m e , i f h e v o l u n t a r i l y g a v e
money to the p u b li c officer to bu y p e ace and to av oid th e h a ssle of
proving hi s i n n o cence i n c r i m i n a l i n v e s t i g at ion a n d. prosecution,
the latter i s l i a bl e for d i r ect b r i b er y w h i l e t h e f o r me r i s l i a bl e for
corruption of
public officer. (1965 Bar Exam)
2. I nv ol u n t a r i n e s s i n p a r t i n g t h e money — T h r e a t
to arrest i s a n i n t i m i d a t i o n w i t h i n t h e c o n t e m p l a t ion o f r o b b ery.
Hence, the policeofficer is liable for robbery for threatening to ~est
the victim regardless of whether the latter commi t ted a crime or not.
This is known as " hul i d a p . "
If th e "v i c t im h a d n o t c o m m i t t e d a c r i m e ," b u t t h e p o l i c e
authorities threatened to arrest him for illegal possession of opium,
and obtained money by reason of such threat, the crime comxr itted
is robbery (U.S. v. Fl o ress G.R. ¹ . L- 6 4 2 7 , M a rch 28, 1 9 11) with
s pecial a g gr avat in g c i r c u m s t a nce o f t a k i n g a d v a n t ag e o f p u b l i c
position. (U.S. v. Sanchez, L-9102, November 5, 1918; 1971 Bar
Exam)
If the victim h ad c omm i t t ed a crime of selling uns anit ar f d
ary o o
but
utt the policeofficer threatened to arrest him unless money is gi
money is given,
a n t e v i c t i m i n v o l u n t a r il y g av e th e m o n ey, the cr im e commi t t e d
is robbery. However, the robbery victim is still l i a ble for the crime of
selling unsanit ary food. But if the person selling unsanit ary food had
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 541
voluntar il y o f f ered to pay th e p o l ice officer m on ey, the t r a n saction
w ould h a v e c o n st i t u t e d d i r e c t b r i b r y a n d c o r r u p t i o n o f p u b l i c
officer. (See: People v. Francisco, G.R. ¹. L -2 1 8 9 0, Ma r ch 26, 1924)
In Pablo v. People, G.R. No. 152481, April 1 5, 2005, the victim
was caught by police officers, in the act of concealing deadly weapon,
in vioiorion of on o r d i n a n c e, and bro ug ht i n s i de a pa t r ol c ase. The
police officers frightened the victim by tell ing him t ha t for carr y ing a
deadly weapon outside his residence he would be brought to a police
s tation w h er e h e w o u l d b e i n t e r r o g atec. by th e p o l i ce, m a u led by
other prisoners and heckled by th e p r ess. One of the police officers
a sked how m u c h m o n e y h e h a d . W i t h o u t a n s w e r i ng , t h e v i c t i m
g ave his P1,000.00 to t h em . Th e c r i m e c om m i t t e d i s r o bbery w i t h
s pecial a g gr av at in g c i r c u m s t a nce o f t a k i n g a d v a n t ag e o f p u b l i c
position. Accused applied sufficient in t i m i d a t ion on the victim si n ce
they performed acts th at ~en endered fear in th e m i n d of t he v ic tim
and hindered the free exercise of his wi ll . Th e accused succeeded in
coercing th e v i c ti m b e t w een tw o a l t e r n a t i v es, to w i t : t o p a r t w i t h
t heir money or suffer th e bu r den anc. humi l i a t ion of being taken t o
the police station. The success of the accused in t a k in g th e vi ct im' s
m oney wa s p r e m i sed o n t h r e a t s o f p r o s ecution a n d a r r e st . T h i s
i ntense infusion of fear was in t i m i d a t i on, plain and si m p l e .
Robbery and Section 8(b) of R.A. No. 8019
Requesting a gift in connection with a contr act or a tr an saction
( e.g., construction o f b u i l d i n g ) w h e r e t h e p u b l i c o f fi cer h a s t h e
duty t o i n t e r v en e i s a v i o l a t io n o f S e ction 3 (b) R .A . N o . 8 0 19. A
public prosecutor wh o d e m a n ded mo n ey f r om t h e r e s pondent in a
p relimin ary i n v estigati on, otherw i se, he would charge him i n cour t ,
is not l i a bl e for a v i o l a t io n o f S e ction 8 (b) R .A . N o . 8 019 because
p relimin ar y i n v e s t i g at io n i s n ot a "contract" o r "transaction"
contemplated in t hi s pr ovision because no "monetary consideration"
such as credit transaction is involved. (Soriano, Jr. v. Sandi ganbayan,
G.R. ¹ . 6 5 9 5 2, t'uly81, 1984; People v. Sandi ganbayan and Ju s t ice
Secretary P erez, G.R. N o . 1 8 8 1 65, D ecember 1 1 , 2 0 1 8) However,
the public prosecutor can be charged cf robbery, or light threat,
depending on whether th e effect of thr eat to pr osecute is imm ediate
or not.
Robbery and K i d n apping fo r r a n som A gainst a C r i m i n al
Suspect
If a police officer is ex t o r t i n g m o ney f r o m a c r i m i n a l s u spect
a nd uses depriv a t ion of l i b e rt y a s a m o d e o f e x t o r t i on , th e c r i m e
 542 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
c ommitted i s e i t h e r r o b b ery o r k i d n a p p in g fo r r a n so m d e pendin g
u pon whether the detention is law ful or n o t .
1. L a w f u l d e t e n t i o n —If the deprivation of liberty is lawful
s ince the victi m w a s l a w f u ll y a r r e s ted for com m i t t i n g a c r i m e a n d
b ooked as a d e t e n t io n p r i s oner i n a c c ordance w it h t h e r u l e s , t h e
police officer, wh o ex t or ted m o ney f r o m h i m , i s l i a b l e for r o b bery.
The police may t h r e a ten th e p r i s oner t ha t h e w i l l b r i n g hi s case to
the inquest prosecutor, or upgrade his case, e.g., from possession of
dangerous drugs to sale of dangerous drugs, unless money is given.
This threat is within the meaning of the word "intimidation," which
is an element of robbery. This is not kidnapping for ransom. A lawful
deprivation of liberty of a detention prisoner by virtue of a legitimate
apprehension cannot be a source of a crime against liberty including
kidnapping forransom.
2. Un l a w f u l d e t e n t ion — Unlawful deprivation of liberty of
a criminal suspect can be a source of criminal li abi l it y for ki d n a ppi n g
f or ransom. Th e d e p r i v a t ion o f l i b e rt y i s u n l a w f u l i f t h e c r i m i n a l
suspect was unlawf u ll y a r r e sted for pur p oses of extortion, or he was
lawfully a r r e sted for c o m m i t t i n g a c r i m e b u t t h e a r r e s t in g officer
instead of booking him as a detention pri soner brought him to a safe
h ouse for the pur pose of extorti on .
Police officers blocked th e car o f t h e v i c t i m , w h o i s a l l e gedly
a known d r u g p u s h er, an d f o r cibly s eized h im , an d t h e n , d e m a n d
o r r a n s o m w as m a d e t o h i s w ife. T h e
c rime c o m m i t t e d i s
k idnapping for r a n som since the depriv a t ion of l i b erty i s u n l a w f u l .
(People v. Gonzalez, Jr., G . R. N o. 19 2 288, February 17 , 20 1 6) T h e
apprehension of the kidnapped victim for sale of dangerous drugs
does not aut om a t i cally n e g ate th e c r i m i n a l l i a b i l it y o f a c cused for
kidnapping for r a n som. The buy-bust operation carr ied out against
a drug traffickerand her kidnapping are events that can reasonably
coexist. (People v. Borj a, G.R. No. 19 9 7 10, Au gust 2 , 2 0 1 7) This i s
known as "tohhang for ra n som."
A and B, police officers, stopped a car driven by X for entering
a one-way street. After presenting her dr i v er's licensed, A asked X t o
follow them to the police precinct. Upon ar r i v in g t h ere, A. instructed
t o 'guard X i n on e of th e rooms and got th e car key from X; X w a s
not allowed to make any phone calls but was given food and access
to the bathroom. After two days, A showed up and brought X to a
private house and demanded for ransom. When A went to the place
to get the ransom, he was arrested by NB I a g ents. (1992 Bar Exam)
J9JC9B0M
y CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 543
A is l i a ble for k i d n a p p in g for r a n s om . A l t h o ugh t h e c r i m e of
kidnapping can only be commi t t ed by a p r i v at e i n d i v i d u al, the fact
t hat A i s a p u b li c official does not aut om a t i cally p r eclude the fi l i n g
o f an infor m a t ion for k i d n a p p in g against h i m . A p u b l i c officer wh o
d etained a p e r son for t h e p u r p ose of e x t o r t i n g r a n som c a nnot b e
said to be acting in an official capacity. (People v. Borj a, supra) A did
not commit th e cr im e of hi s ar b i t r ar y d e t en t ion since the act is not
committed in p u r s ui t of dut y as a police officer. (People v. Santiano,
G.R. No. 123979, December 8, 1998) Robbery is n ot c ommitted
since A used the mode of deprivation of victim's liberty rather than
violence or intimidation for purposes of extortion. B is also liable for
kidnapping for ransom since his participation indicates conspiracy
to commit this crime.
Extortion and Other Crime
The hold-up victim cannot use the defense of extortion in a case
involving the crime (e.g., homicide or illegal possession of dangerous
d rugs) for w h i c h h e w a s a r r e sted or p r o secuted. Even t h o ugh t h e
c laim of e x t o r t io n i s t r u e , i f t h e a l l e ged d em and fo r m o ney m a d e
upon t h e a c c u sed b y t h e p o l i c e o f f i cers o c cur red af t e r h e t v a s
arrested, s uch c i r c u m s t a nce w i l l n o t e x c u l p a te t h e a c c used f r o m
c riminal I ' a b i l i t y . I n s u c h a c a se, th e ext or t i on ate dem and, w h i c h
was made after th e offense had al r eady been consumm at ed, is not
determinat ive of the guilt or i n n ocer ce of accused. (People v. Narito,
G.R. No.96949, March 8, 1998) Whatever happened after hisarrest
c annot ex t : n g uish o r d i m i n i s h h i s c u l p a b i l i t y : "or t h e o f f e nse h e
committed. (People v. Si b u g, G . R. iVo. 10 8v20, Ja n u a ry 24 , 19 9 4)
However, the apprehending officer who extorted money from the
criminal suspected is liable for robbery.
R obbery an d E s t a f a
In U.S. v. Navarr o, G.R. No. L-6254, February 7, 1911, several
persons entered the store of the victim, one of whom pretended to
be an internal-revenue agent and exhibited a badge. The intruders
commenced a search of th e st ore and af ter a l i t t l e w h i l e p r et ended
to find a sm all q u a n t it y of op iu m i n on e of th e boxes. The owner of
the store was thereupon th r e at ened wit h a r r e st, and at th e point of
r evolvers he was ordered to accompany the party to the municipali t y .
A t t h i s m o m e nt , t h e f a k e i n t e r n a - r evenue a g ent i n t e r f ered a n d
offered to release the storekeeper if he would pay him P500.00. The
s um of P260.00 was finally ext or ted from th e Ch i n a m an. The crim e
 544 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
committed is robbery. 1Vote: The ordinary aggravati ng circums tance
of disguise is present in t hi s case.
E mploying false pretense to create in t h e m i n d s of th e v i c t i m
a sense of danger of being arrested for a crime that he did not
c ommit is considered as an i n t i m i d a t ion w i t h i n t h e
e con temp Iation
of rrobber
o o er y. .TT a k i n g p r o p ert y f r o m t h e v i c ti m b y m e an s of t h r eat t o
arrest, through false representation t hat accused are police officers,
constitutes robbery and not estafa. (U.S. v. Flores, supra 1 9 8 7 B a r
Exam) Ordinary aggravating circumstance of disguise or fraud is
1
present in t hi s case.
I n robbery, t h e a c c u sed d e m a n de d f o r t h e p r o p e r t y f r o m
t he victi m u n d e r t h r e a t o f b e i n g a r r e s t ed; an d t h u s , t h e v i c t i m
i nvoluntar il y p a r t e d h i s p r o p ert y o r d e l i v e red t h
orce or i n t i m i d a t i on . I n es t a f a , t h e a c c u se d e m p l o yedt d e cdeit,
c unning, f r au d o r m i s r e p r esentation t o o b t
a in th e p r op e r t y , a n d
thus, the victim delivered the property volun t ary by reason of deceit.
(U.S. v. Flores, supra)
A , w h i l e v i s i t i n g h i s f r i e n d J u a n i n t h e l at t e r ' s h o u s e ,
s urrepti t i o u sl y p l a c e d i n t h e d r a w e r
o f Ju an's t a b l e
subversive papers ofcommunist origin. At midnight, B, a fakesome NBI
a gent, searched th e h o use by m e an s of a f a l si fied search w a r r a n t
and found the subversive papers in J u a n's table. B th r e a t e ned and
i ntim i d a ted J u a n , t e l l i n g h i m t h a t u n l e s s h e g i v e s hi m P 5 0 0 . 0 0
h e will a r r es t h i 'm and charge him for being a communist. Juan,
t o avoid being ar r e sted and t a ke n t o j a il , gave P500.00 to the f a k e
agent. Out side th e h ouse, B g a ve A p a rt o f t h e m o n ey he got f r o m
Juan. (1966 Bar Exam)
The cr i m e s c o m m i t t e d b y A an d B i s
r obbery b y m e a n s
o f i n t i m i d a t i on and f a l si fi ca t i on
of d ocumen t.
. H o wever, s i n c e
f alsification i s a n e c e ssary m e an s t o c o m m i t r o b b er y t h ese two
crimes will be merged together to form a complex crime proper. The
ordinary aggravating circumstance of disguise or fraud shall be
appreciated since B p re tended that he is an NBI a g e nt .
A and B ar e n ot l i a b le for e stafa or d i r e ct b r i b e ry s i n ce these
c rimes p r e supposes t h a t t h e d e l i v er y o f t h e m o n e y w a s
voluntarily by th e vi cti m du e to deceit i made
ei i n e s ta f a or an a g r eement in
d irect bribery. In t h i s case, the delivery wa s m ade involu n t a r il y b y
reason of inti m i d a t ion consisting of th r eat to be arrested.
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 545
EXECUTION GF DEEDS BY ME A N S GF VIGLENCE GR
INTIMIDATIGN
E xecution o f d e eds b y m e a n s o f v i o l e nce or i n t i m i d a t io n i s
committed b y a p e r so n w h o c o m p els a n o t her . o s i gn , e x ecute, or
deliver a p u b l i c i n s t r u m en t o r d o c u m ent b y m e a n s of v i o l ence or
intimi d at ion w it h i n t en t t o defr aud h im . (Ar t i c le 298)
I ntent t a D e f r a u d
In AB B - C 3 1 V B r o a d c asting C o r p o r a t i on v. O mb u d s m a n ,
G.R. No. 138347, Ap r il 2 3 , 2 0 1 0, in t h e c o m p la int o f L o p ez group,
o wner of A B S - C BN , i t a l l e ged t h at : t h e d a y a f t e r t h e d e c l ar a t i on
of mar t ia l l a w , P r e s i d ent M a r c o s t h r o u g h m i l i t a r y t r o op s cl osed
A BS-CBN s t a t i cn ; w h e n t h e t e l evi sion an d r a di o st a t i ons of K B S -
R PN were consumed by fi re , B enedicto group r el ayed th eir p l a n t o
the Lopez group to temporar ily use ABS-CBN st a t ion to operate TV
Channel 9 . I n t h i s c o n n e ct i on , a l e t t e r a g r e e m en t w a s e x e cut ed
b etween RP N a n d A B S - C B N r e g a r d i n g t h e l e a s in g o f t h e A B S -
C BN s t a t i o n a n d f a c i l i t i e s . A c c or d in g t o t h e L o p e z g r o u p , t h a t
B enedicto forced, coerced and i n t i m i d a t e d t h e m i n t o s i g n i n g t h e
l etter-agreem e r t . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e L o p e z gr ou p d i s o w ned t h e
l etter-agreement t h a t t h e y w e r e s u p p o sedly f o r ced i n t o s i g n i n g .
T hey c h a r ge d B e n e d i ct o f o r c o m m i t t i n g e x e c u t i o n o f d e e d b y
m eans of v i o l e nce an d i n t i m i d a t i o n . A c c or d in g t o t h e S u p r e m e
Court, i n t en t t c d e f r a ud , w h ich i s a n e l em ent of t h i s c r i me, is not
present because. even if, i n i t i a l ly , as claimed by L o pez group, they
w ere forced t o s i g n t h e l e t t e r - a greement, t h e L o p e z g r ou p m a d e
c laims based th ereon an d i n v o ked t h e p r o v i sions t h e r eof. I n f a c t ,
the Lopez group wa n ted them to h onor th e l e t t e r -agreement and t o
pay rentals for the use of the ABS-CBN facili t i es. By doing so, Lopez
g roup effectivel; , a l t h o ugh t h e y w er e careful no t t o a r t i c u l at e t h i s
fact, affirmed th eir si gnat u res in t hi s lett er -agreement.
Document
The Sp a n ish t e x t o f A r t i c l e 2 9 8 u s e s " e s crit u ra p u b l i c o o
documento," which ind i c ates that "in s t r u m e n t" as an element of the
crime under t hi s pr ovi sion must be pub lic w h il e "document" can be
private, commercial, or public.
A broke into B's house, forced him to br ing out some land tit l es
a nd after p i c k in g ou t a t i t l e c o v er in g 20 0 s q u ar e m e t er s i n t h e i r
barangay, compelled B to type out a Deed of Sale conveying the said
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 547
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lot to him for P1.00 and other valuable considerations. All the whil e,
carried a palti k c a l i ber .45 in f ul l v i e w of B, wh o s igned the deed paragraph 1 or 2 ofArticle 294. But band or uninhabited place can
out o f e ar . Th e cr im e com m i t t e d i s execution of deed by m e ans of be considered as an ordina "y aggravating circumstance in these
vio ence or inti m i d a t i on. Al t h ough th e docum crimes.
ocumen ti s' p r i v' a te, absence
o f showing t h a t i t w a s n o t a r i z ed, A r t i cl e 29 8 o f t h e C to,d e bi s s t i l l In People v. Apduha n, Jr . , G.R. No. L-19491, August 30, 1968,
app icable. Since A used an illegally man u f a ctur ed firearm, which is there is r o c r i m e a s " r o b bery w i t h h o m i c id e i n b a n d . " I f r o b b ery
a oose firearm, in commit t i n g the crime, the modifying circumstance with homicide is commi t ted by a band, the in d i ctable offense would
of using loose firearm shall be considered. (2001 Bar Exa m ) still be denominated as "robbery wit h h o m i ci de" and band would be
appreciated as an crdi n ary aggravat in g circum st ance.
R obbery, Theft, and Execution of Docum e n t
Simple robbery wit h s p c i a l ag gr avat ing circum st ance of band
In robbery or theft,the property stolen is personal property. is called robbery by band .
H owever, in t h e c r i m e o f e x ecution of d d b
ee s y m e a n s o f v i o l ence
o r int i m i d a t i on , t h e d o c u m en t o r p u b l i c i n s t r u m en t i r a y i n v o l v e U se of Un l i c e n sed F i r e a r m
rea or p e r s onal p r o p er ty . I n r o b b ery or t h e ft , i n t ent to g a in .is an
i ndispensable element. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h a t i s i m p o r t a n t i n U nder A r t i cl e 29 6 of t h e R e v i sed Penal C o de, when a t l e a st
execution of deeds by means of vi olence or in t i m i d a t ion i s i n t ent t o four ar med m a l efactors t ak e p ar t i n t h e c o m m i s sion of a r o b bery ,
efraud. it shall be deemed to have been commi t ted by a b a nd; when any of
t he arms u sed in t h e c o m m i ssion of th e o f f ense (robbery by b a n d )
b e an u n l i censed fir e a rm , t n e p e n a lt y t o b e i m p o sed upon al l t h e
R OB B E R Y BY BAND OR IN AN UNINHABITED PLAC E m alefactors (m embers of t h e b a n d ) s h al l b e t h e m a x i m u m o f t h e
A s a rule t h e f oIiowing
il corresponding penalty provided by law (forrobbery by band).
are special aggravat ing circum st ances
i n robbery wit h v i ol ence or int i m i d a t i o n : In robbery by band, the penalty forrobbery under Article 294
1. U n i n h a b i t e d pl ace; s hall be applied in i t s m a x i m u m p e r i o d . (Article 295) If a m e m b e r
o f the b an d u s e d u n l i c ensed fi r e ar m i n c o m m i t t i n g r o b b ery , t h e
2. B an d ; imposable penalty is the maxim um pe riod of the maxim um period of
3. the penalty for robbery. (Art i c le 296)
A ttackin g a m o v i n g t r a i n , s t r ee t c ar , m o t o r v e h i cl e or
a irs i p ; The special a g g r av at in g c i r c u m s t a nce of " u s e o f u n l i c ensed
4. E n t e r i n g t h e p a s s enger"s compar t m e nt s i n a tr a i n o r , firearm" under Article 296 can only be appreciated in robbery by a
i n any m a n n er , t a k i n g t h e p a s sengers t h e r eof by s u r p r i s e i n t h e band under A r t i cle 295, and not if th e cr im e comm i t t e d is a special
respective conveyances; or complex crime of robbery w it h h o m i c ide un der A r t i cl e 294. (People
v. Apduhan, Jr ., G.R. No. L-19491, August 30, 1968; People v. Cruz,
5. Com m i s s io n o f r o b b er y o n a s t r e et , r o a d h i h G.R. No. L-371 73, November 29, 1984) However, it is submit t ed tha t
a lley, a n d t h e i n t i m i d a t i o n is made with the use, of
roa ,
fi
i g w a y, o r
Article 294 involving unlicensed firearm is deemed modified by RA
295) o a r e a r m . ( Ar t i c l e
No. 10591. The modifying circum st ance of use of loose firearm under
RA No. 10591 shall beconsidered in robbery by band.
A pplicat i o n
T hese s pe c ia l a gg r a va t i n g c i r c u m s t a n ces u n de r A r t i c l e 2 9 5 S eparate P r o s e c u t i o n s
can only be appreciated in robbery under paragra hs 3 to 5 f Under Ar t i cle 296 of the Revised Penal Code, when unlicensed
Article 2 96' theey cannot be appreciated in special corn I firearm is used in r obbery by ba nd, the penalty sh all be im posed in
robber y wwiith h oom i ci d e , r a pe, m u t i l a t i on , a r son or s e r i ous ph y sicalf its maxi mu m p e r iod wi t h o ut p re ju d i ce to t he cri m i n a l l i a b i l i t ~ for
i njuries involvin gi n saniti y , ii m b e c i l i t y , im p otency, or blindness under illegal possession of such unlicensed firearm. Applying this provision,
the offender shall be prosecuted for i l l egal possession of unlicensed

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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 549
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firearm and robbery wit h special aggravat ing circum st ances of band
an u s e o f u n l i c ensed fi r e a rm . H o w e v er, u n der Section 29 of R .A.
o. 10591, accused cannot be prosecuted separately for robbery
and illegal possession of loose firearm since the firearm was used
in commit t i n g r o bbery. Since port ion of A r t i cl e 295 of th e R
e na C o de, w h ic h t r e a te d p o ssession of u n l i c ensed fi r e ar m a s a
separate and d i s t i nct o f f ense, is not c onsistent w i t h S e c tion 2 9 of
R.A. No. 10591, such por t ion of A r t i cl e 29 5 of th e C od.e is deemed
a mended by R.A. No. 10591. Section 45 of R.A. N . 1 0 5 9
a t this Act repeals all l aws that ar e inconsistent herewi t h .
BRIGANDAGE
Brigandage i s c o m m i t t e d b y a t l e a s t f o u r a r m e d
forms a band of robbers for the purpose of corn 'tt' r me m e n w-ho
m i i n g r o bbery in
e i g w a y , o r k i d n a p p in g p ersons for th e p u r p ose of extort ion or
to obtain r a n som or for an y o t her p u r p ose to be att a i ned by m eans
of force and violence. The offenders are called highway robbers or
brigan s. (Ar t i c le 806; 1946 and 2013 Bar Ex a m s )
Armed
highway robbers or brigands consumm ates the crime of brigandage.
Actual commission of robbery on th e h i g h wa y i s no t a n e l em ent of
brigandage. The m ai n o bject i n e n a ct in g th e l a w o n b r i g a n d age is
to prevent the formation of such bands. (U.S. v. Decusin, G.R No.
1351, September 25, 1903)
Since it is difficult to pr ove that the pu r p ose of four armed men
in hanging or roaming on the highw ays is to commit robbery therein,
the law provides a rule on presump t i on. Un der A r t i cle 306, if any of
t he arms carried by any of the ar med men is an u n l i censed firearm ,
it shall be presumed that t hey are hi gh way robbers or bri gands.
I f any p er son pr esents at t h e m e e t in g ( a g a t h e r in g or g r o u p ,
w hether in a fi x e d p l ace or m o v i ng) carr ies an u n l i c ensed firear m ,
it shall be presumed that th e pu r p ose of said meeting, insofar as he
is concerned, is to commit a f e lony. Thu s, he shall be prosecuted for
illegal assembly. (Artic le 146) If any of four arm ed persons (roaming
on highways) carr ies an u n l i c ensed fi r e a rm , i t s h a l l b e p r e s u m ed
that said persons are highway robbers or brigands. Thus, all of them
shall be prosecuted for brigandage. (Article 806)

Brigandage may be commit ted wi t h out the use of firearms. The HIGHWAY ROBBERY/BRIGANDAGE (PD NO. 532)
erm "ar m ed" as u sed i n t h e fi r s t p a r a g r ap h of A r t i c l e 30 6 c
o ic e covers Highway robberyl b r i g a n d age is committ ed by any person who
arms and weeapons in general, not necessarily firearms. (P
laa Rosa s . e o pl e v . De seizes another fo r r a n s om , e x t o r t io n o r o t h e r u n l a w f u l p u r p o ses,
os a , et al., CA . , 49 O. G. 286'3; The Revised P
l C d b L or takes away property of another by means of violence against or
eyes) e Cod e d o es not d efine or r e q u i re a ny p a r t i c u l ar a r m s o r
w eapons; any weapon wh ich by r eason of its in t r i n sic nat ur e or th e intimi d at ion of person or force upon thin gs, or other unl aw ful means
purpose or w h ich it w a s m ade or used by the accused i on the highway. (Section 2 of P.D. No. 582) However, to be held
inflictin cuse , i s capa b lefof l iable for h i g h w a y -r obbery/brigandage, t h er e m u s t b e a s h o w i n g
i ng serious or fatal i n j u r i e s upon th e vi cti m of t h
bee consi
considered as arms for purposes of the law on cuadri o l l ea .cr(People
i m e m av.y t hat accused are h i g h w a y r o b b ers or b r i g a nd s w h o a r e r e g u l a r l y
Lozano, G.R. Nos. 187870-71, September 29, 2008; 1954 Bar Exam ) hanging or r o a m i n g o n h i g h w a ys , an d c h a n cin g i n d i s cr i m i n a t el y
upon tr avelers, who t hey can ro b or s eize for ex t or t i on . (2018 B a r
F orma t io n of B a n d Exam)
D urin g t h ee old times, there were several crimi n al bands formed
f or purpose of regularly r o a m in g or h a n g in g on r o ads w t H ighw a y
calesa that a s wai i n g fo r a
a theh e y could ambush to rob indiscrim i n a te l t r Highway refers to any road, street, passage, highway and
e a n id os , h i g h w ay ro bbers, brigands or highway pirIa t e s.
. T The
h b ridges or o t h e r p a r t s t h e r e of, or r a i l w a y o r r a i l r o a d w i t h i n t h e
group led by Robin hood in S he r w o od Forest in a f ic t i o n a li z ed story Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for
is an example ofthis band of brigands. Th I the movement or c i r c u l a t ion of p er sons or t r a n sport a t ion of goods,
passe
assedt o b
to p r e v ent th e for m a t ion of th ese bands of highway robbers. articles, or property or both. (Section 2 of P.D. No. 532)
Article 304 uses the phrase "who forms a band of robbers." The
ver "form" in t h i s p r o v is ion means that m e re form a t i on of band of

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 550 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Form ation of Band and Com m i ssion of Robbery
Formation of brigandage on the highway is covered by Article
8 06 of t h e R e v i sed P e na l C o de, bu t n o t b y P . D . N o . 5 8 2 . M e r e
formation of band of brigands is not pu n i shable under P.D. No. 582.
Hence, the brigands by forming a band on the highway shall be
prosecuted for brigandage under the Code.
Actual commission of robbery on th e h i ghway by br igands
or highway robbers is covered by Article 306 of the Code and P.D.
No. 532. However, in People v. Puno, G.R, No. 97471 F b
e ruary 17,
1993 ,t the Supreme Court saidthat P.D. No. 582 has amended the
provision on brigandage by increasing the penalty. Thus, if the acts
o highway robbers violate Article 306 of the Code and P.D. No. 582,
they shallbe prosecuted forhighway robbery/brigandage under P.D.
No. 582 and notbrigandage under the Revised Penal Code.
In summary, formation ofband of brigands or highway robbers
constitutes brigandage under the Revised Penal Code. On the other
and, actual commission of robbery or seizure of person for extortion
on the highway by br i g ands or highway robbers constitute hi ghw ay -
robbery/brigandage under P.D. No. 532.
B rigands or H i g h w a y R o b b e r s
The concept ofhighway robbery/brigandage under P.D. No. 532
i s the same as t h a t o f b r i g a n d age u n der A r t i cl e 30 6 f t h C d .
( eop e v. Puno, ibid.) Br i g a n ds or hi g h w ay r o bbers whether u n d e r
the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 532 are those who are regularl y
anging o r r o a m i n g o n h i g h w a y , a n d c h a n c ing in d i s c r i m i n a t e ly
u pon travelers, who they can rob or seize for extorti on .
1. I n d is c r i m i n a t e V i c t i m — In People v. Pu no, supra, t h e
a ccused is th e d r i v e r o f t h e o f f ended p a r ty . W h i l e d r i v i n g t h e c a r
with the offended party, th e accused stopped the car and l et h is co-
accused to board it . T h e y r o bbed th e offended part y i n s id e th e car
while traveling on a highw ay. They conspired to rob a
o n the hi g h w ay . T hey ar e not h i g h w a y r o bbers w h osespecific callingvictim
is to
regu arly and in d i s c ri m i n a t e ly c hance upon victim on t he hi h w a .
Since thee vi
victim is pre-determined and not ind iscrim i n a t e, the crime
committed is simple robbery under Ar t i cle 294 of Revised Penal Code
and not highway robbery/brigandage under P.D. No. 532. However,
t he special aggravat in g ci r c u m s t ance of comm i ssion f
a i g w a y w i t h t h e u s e of a Qrearm i n m a k i n g i n t i m i d a t ion bb u n d er
Article 295 was appreciated.
J9JC9B0M
y. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 551
2. R e gu l a r i t y — A p ost a l v a n co n t a i n i n g m a i l m at t e r ,
including checks and treasury warrants, was hijacked along a
n ational h i g h w a y o y t e n m e n , t w o o f w h o m w e r e a r m e d . T h e y
u sed force, violence and i n t i m i d a t io n a g ainst occupants of th e v a n
a nd took the ent ir e van an d it s contents. Th ere is no showing t h a t
the ten me r w e r e a b a n d o f o u t l aw s o r g a ni zed for t h e p u r p ose of
depredation upon the persons and properties o f i n n ocent a n d
defenseless inhabita nts who t r a vel from one place to another. What
was shown is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. It was not stated
in the facts given that th e ten men pr e v iously a tt e m p t ed at s im i l a r
robberies by them t o establish the "i n d iscriminate" commission
thereof. (Piloteo, J'r. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79548, October 16',
1996'; 2018 Bar Exam) Note; The fact that only two out of ten are
armed indicates that they are not regularly committing robbery on
highways.
To pay the unpaid beerhouse bill
in the amount of P2,000.00,
A, B, C, and D ag reed to commit robbery. Armed with weapons,
t hey ha i le d a i i r s t t a x i ca b an d r o b bed t h e d r i v e r i n t h e a m o u n t
of P1,000.00. Since they need P1,000.00 more to pay the bill,
t hey h a i le d a n o t he r t a x i ca b a n d r o b b e d t h e d r i v e r a g a i n . T h e y
a re liable for t w o c o u nt s o f r o b b ery b y b a n d . E v e n i f t h e v i c t i m s
a re indiscri m i n at e r a t h e r t h a n p r e - d eter m i n ed, si nce th e "e is n o
showing t h a t t h e a c c u sed ar e p r e v i o us ly c o m m i t t i n g r o b b e ry o n
the highway, the crime is not highway robbery/brigandage. The
robberies that they commi t ted to pay the unpaid bill are two isolated
incidents. Highway robbers or bri g ands are those who are regularl y
and indiscrim i n at ely commi t t i n g r obberies on highw ays. The law on
b rigandage is designed to p r o t ect t r a v el ers against t h ose wh o a r e
making robbery on the highway as a profession.
A, B, and C stopped a car on the highway in order to rob its
p assengers. The three passengers put up r esistance and were k li e d
a fter w h i c h t h e y w e r e d i v e sted of v a l u a b l es. T he y a r e l i a b l e f o r
robbery w i t h h o m i c i de. T h e y a r e n o t l i a b l e f o r h i g h w a y r o b b ery/
b rigandage s i nc e t h e r e i s . n o s h o w i n g t h a t t h e y a r e r e g u l a r l y
committ in g robb r y on th e h i g h w ay . (1971 Bar Exa m )
C hristophe , J o h n , Ri ch ard, and L uk e ar e fr a t er n it y b r o t h er s.
T o protect t h e m selves from r i v a l f r a t e r n i t i es, t hey al l c a r r y g u n s
wherever =hey go. One night, afterattending a party, they boarded
a taxicab, held the driver at gu n point and took the latt er's earnings.
They are neither liable for brigandage under the Revised Penal Code
nor for highway-robbery/brigandage since they are not brigands or
 552 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 558
VOLUME II

hi
h ighway robbers,, who are re u l a r l
g ar y hanging orroaming cn highwa 's consummates the cr i me; in r o bbery by b an d an d h i g h w a y r o bbery/
an chancing upon travelers who they can rob.The
wi sp e c i a a ggravatin g c i r c u m s t ance o f b a n d s i n c e brigandage, a c t ua l c o m m i s sion o f r o b b er y i s a n i n di s p e n sable
t here are four ar med men t a k i n element thereof.
art i
owever, i t h e d r i v e r i s k i l l e d i n t h e c our
5. P r es u n i p t i o n —I n b r i g a n d a ge, the re is a p r e s u m p t i o n
i e i s r o e ry w i t h h o m i c i d e w i t h o r d i n a r t hat t h e a r m e d m e n a r e b r i g a n d s i f o n e i s i n p o s s ession o f a n
circumstance of band. (2010 B a r
ar E x a m ) unlicensed firearm. In highway robbery/brigandage, and robbery by
3. N u m b e r o f o f f e n d er s —I n the crime of hi h w a band, there is no rule on presumption. (1954, 2000,and 2018 Bar
b rigandage, the number r
m er oofooff d '
e n ers i s n o t a n e s sential ee lee Exams)
(People v. Mendoza, G.B. No. o. 1 044611, February 2 8,, 1996) Hi h w a
r obbery/brigandage can be commit ted b s i n l e ) i wa
mi e y si n g l e offender because the
uses e w o r s " a n y p e r son" in r ef erence to the offender. Highway- Robbery by
Brigandage robbery/
Robbery b y B a n d, 8 '' ' band
8 riganda
' Brigandage, and Highw a y R o bb e r y Brigandage
ge
,

Highway Anywhere
The similarities and d i f f e r ences
among r roob b er
e r y by b and,
a
b rigandage and highwayy robb e / brigandage
' Four armed men Any person
ro ery d are as follows:
1 . P l a c e o f Commission
omm' — In brigandage, the band is Indiscriminate Any victim
o rmed to commit r obbery on a h i g h way. I n h i g h wa victim
brigandage, robbery iscommitt robber
mi ed on a hig hway. In robber b Regularity Isolated or not

2. N u m b e r o f O f f e n d e r s —I n bri Formation Actual Actual robbery

n brigandage and r obbery by robbery
b and
n , t h e of fen
d er s m u s t b e a t l e ast ffour
o armed m en. I n t h e cr i m e
o
o f ig
hi h w a robbery/brigandage,
way r the number of offe d Presumption
essential element. er o o e n er s i s n o t a n

Ch aracter of the Offenders — In bri anda e

A IDING AND ABETTING HIGHW A Y R O B B E R S tBRIGA N D S
highway robbery/brigandage, the offenders are bri a n d s or
Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects
indiscrimin a t ely chancing n ig ways and
a ncing upon tr t a v elers
I who t h e h ighway r o bbers/brigands, or w h o d i r e c tl y o r i n d i r e ctl y a b et s t h e
fo o o ca
d th us, tooc o m mi t t h e se cri m es, the commi c ommission of p i r a cy, shall b e considered as a n a ccomplice of t h e
robbery must not be an an isolated
iso a e 'i n c 'd '
i d en t an d th e victim m u st n principal offenders, and thus, the penalty prescribed by P,D. No.
us n
582 for highway/robbery brigandage or piracy shall be graduated
one degree lower.

Aiding or p r o tecting p i r ates or h i g hway r obbers/brigands

includes giving t he m i n f o r m a t io n ab out th e i n ov ement of p olice or
If the
h e place of commission is ' not a hi h w
a i g h w ay, the crime commit t e d other peace of f i c e r o f t h e g o v e r n m e nt, or a c q u i r i n g o r r e c e ivin g
ery y an regardless of whether the victim i
e vic im is indiscrim i n a t e property taken by pirates orhighway robbers/brigands or in any
or predetermined or or th e i n c'd
i d en t i s isolated or not . m anner derives any benefit t h er efr om .
4. C o n summation —In bri a nda e
g g It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the
men or e purpose of committ ing robbery on the highway acts ofan accomplice in highway/robbery brigandage or piracy has

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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 555

p erformed k n o w i n g ly , u n l ess th e cont r ar y i s p r o v en .

ven. (S, ection 4 of c rime of carnapping, the int e n t ion of the law is not to decrim i n a l i z e
c arnapping. Hence, the court, where a case for carnapping committ ed
Article 30 7 of t h e R e v i sed P enal C ode defines an d p u n i s h es prior to R.A. No. 10888 is pending, shall not loose jurisdiction to tr y
ai ing and abetting a band ofbrigands. However, in People v.Puno, and punish th e accused under R.A. No. 6589. Since R.A. No. 10888
supra, the Supreme Court said that P.D. No. 532 has amended p rescribes penalt ies g r a ver t h a n t h a t i m p o s able u n d e r R . A . N o .
A rticle 30 7 o f t h e R e v i sed P enal C o d b 6589, the former shall be given a prospective effect.
Hen ence, one who aids or abets brig ands or hi g h way r obbers must be
p rosecuted Carnapping is the taki ng, with i n t ent to gain, of a motor vehicle
e for
or h i i gh w ay r ob b e r y / b r i g an dage as ac c omplice un d e r
P.D. No. 532. H e w i l l n e i t h e r b e p r o secuted for h i g h w a y r o b bery/ belonging to a n o t her w i t h ou t t h e l a t t e r ' s consent, or b y m e an s of
brigandage under P.D. No. 582 as accessory (2001 B violence against or i n t i m i d a t io n of p er sons, or by u s in g f orce upon
a i in g a n E. things. (Section 8 of R.A. No. 1 0 883) Concealment of carna pping is
a ett in g a b an d o f b r i g a nds as pr i n c i pal u n d e r A r t i c l e
307 of the Revised Penal Code.(2012 Bar Exam) also punishable under the law. (Section 4)

In the story of Robinhood, his band wil l rob the ri ch, ar d then, C oncept of C a r n a p p i n g
gives their st olen goods to th e p oor. T h ose, who r eceived the loots
Concept of carnapping is th e same as t ha t of t h ef t or r o bbery
from Robinhood's band, are liablefor highway robbery/briganda e
b y means of violence or in t i m i d a t ion or by u s in g force upon th i n g s .
as accomplice under P.D. No. 582.
Thus, jurispr u d ence and ru les that per t ai n t o t h eft and r obbery ar e
Soo me cri m i n al s a r e g i v i n g m o n e y t o t h applicable to carnapping. (People v. Sia, G.R No. 187457, November
i s actuall
is ac ua y a o ei r n ei' ghb o rs T h i s 21, 2001; People v. Asamuddi n, G.R. No. 218918, September 2, 2015)
a s t r a t egy of c r i m i n als t o o b t ain t h e 1
nei hbor
neig o r s m a k i n g t h e m a 24-hour security system. e Inoyralt y c f t heir'
A person, who possesses or deals wit h i n t en t t o g ai n p r operty
m oney, ese e neficiaries will p r o v ide infor m a t ion to the cri m ifn a l s
derived from the proceeds of theft,or robbery is liable for fencing.
if the former r detect
e e c aan o
n ongoing police operation against t h 1 tt H owever, th e t er m " c a r n a p p i ng" ca n b e c onsidered as w i t h i n t h e
If the cri riminals ar e b r i g a nd s o r h i g h w a y r o b b ers, th e n e i g hbors,
c ontemplation o f t h e w o r d " t h e ft " o r " r o b b ery" i n P . D . N o . 1 6 1 2 .
w o supplied inf or m a t ion as to th e m ovement of o l '
i c e au thh o"'r i t i es, H ence, buyin g c a r n a p ped v e h i cle w i t h i n t e n t t o g a i n i s f e n c i n g .
are ia e or ighway robbery/brigandagemen as o p o 1' '

accom
(Di mat v. People, G.R.No. 181184, Janu ary 25, 2012)
o. . If the cr i m i n al s ar e not b r i g a nds or h i h wpaice un d cr P .D.
neighbors r i g w a y rrobb o ers, the 1. T a k i n g — I n t h e f t , r o b b e ry a n d c a r n a p p i n g, t a k i n g i s
o rs, w o
who su s u p p l ied i n f o r m a t io n a s t o t h e m o v em
aut
a u horities t o f a c i l i t at e t h ei r e s cape, ar e l i a bl e fo r o b s ttr u cf t ion1' of deemed complete fr om th e m o m e nt t h e o f f e n der g a i ns p o ssession
justice under P.D. No. 1829. of the th i ng , even if h e ha s no opport u n it y t o d i s pose of the same.
(People v. Sia, G.R. No. 187457, November 21, 2001)
O ne who k n o wi n g1y a c qu i r e d m i s a p p r op r i a ted p r o p ert y a n d
profited therefrom is liable as an accesso ' The person, who is in p ossession of a recently st olen pr operty
n e w o k n o w i n gl y acquired stolen pr operty w i tth h i n t e n t t of g ain i s without justifi able explanati on, is presumed to be the author of theft.
liable for the crime of fencin . One wh S ince the concept of ca r n a p p in g i s t h e s am e as t h a t o f t h e ft , t h i s
rom r i g a n ds, highway robbers, or pirates is liabl e as an accomplice presumption of auth or ship of th eft ap p l ies to carnapping. (People v.
e crime o rigandage/highway robbery or piracy. Garcia, G.R. ¹. 1 8 8 470,April 1, 2008)
I n th e a b sence of a n e x p l a n a t ion o f h o w o n e h a s c om e i n t o
CARNAPPING UNDER R.A. NO. 10883 the possession o f s t o l e n e f f e cts b e l ongin g t o a per s o n w o u n d e d
a nd t r e acherously k i l l e d , h e m u s t n e c essarily b e c o n sidered t h e
C arnapping w a s p u n i s h a ble u n de r R .A . N o . 6 5 8 . H a uthor of t h e a g g r ession an d d e at h o f t h e s ai d p e r son an d o f t h e
o.
o . . No. 10883 expressly repeals R.A. No.9. o v - e v er ,
6589. Thi s r obbery com m i t t e d o n h i m . T h e a p p l i c a t ion o f t h i s p r e s u m p t i on
is a partial r e peal or r e p eal w i t h r e - enactment. B validly applies to a case of carnapping. (People v. Sia, supra; People
m en . y r e - e n a ctin g t h e v. Garcia, G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2008) Thus, on the basis of

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 556 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
presumption of au t h or ship of th e u n l a w fu l t a k i n g , th e accused can
e convicted of q u a li fied c a r n a p p in g o r c a r n a p p in g w i t h h o m i c i d e
or rape. (People v. Prado, G.R. No. 95260 Ma r c h 8 1 9 9 6 ; P
lasos, G.R ¹ . 189 8 2 8 ,tu n e 6, 2001; People v. Latayada, G.R. lNo.
146865, February 18, 2004)
2. Motor V e h i c l e — M o t o r v e h i c le r e f e rs t
prope
r o ell eed b y a n y p o w e r ot her t ha n m u s cular power using o anythe
v e public
h i c1 e
highways. Trailershaving any number of wheels, when propelled or
intended to be propelled by a t t a c h m ent t o a m o tor v e h i cle shall be
c assified as a separate motor vehicle with no po wer r a t i n g .
a. E x cl u d e d M o t o r V e h i c l e — T he f o l l o wi ng m o t o r
vehicles are excluded from the coverage ofR.A. No. 10883:
R oad r o l l e rs , t r o l l e y c a r s , street s w e epers,
s prinklers, l aw n m o w e r s , b u l l d ozers, gr a d ers, f o r k l i f t s ,
a mphibian t r u c k s , a nd c r a ne s i f n o t u s e d o n pu b l i c
highways;
2. V eh i c l e s wh ich ru n only on r a ils or t r a cks; and
3. Tractors, trailers and traction engines f
o any
kind
in u s e d exclusively for agricult u ral pu r p o ses. (Section 2
of R.A. No. 10888)
The unlawful t a k in g of motor vehicles is now covered
by the ant i -carnapping la w an d no t b y t h e p r o v i sion s on
qua i e d t h ef t or r o bbery. H ence, taking m otor vehicle is
carnapping and no t q u a li fied t h e ft. (People v. Bu s tinera,
G.R. No. 148288, June 8, 2004; 2016B ar E x a m) Ho w e ver,
if the motor vehicle is expressly excluded from the coverage
o f R.A. No. 10883, tak in g such v ehi cle is qu a li fied t h e f t .
Unlike R.A. No . 10883, Ar t i cl e 310 of th e Revised Penal
Code has no provision on exclusion of motor vehicle. Thus,
u nlawful t a k i n g o f a t r a c to r e x clu sively for a g r i c u l t u r a l
p urpose is no t c a r n a p p in g s i nce t hi s i s a m o t o r v e h i c l e
excluded from the coverage of R.A. No. 10883. But this
tractor is a motor vehicle wit hi n th e context of Ar t i cle 310
qualified theft. (see: People v. Bustinera, supra)
b. No t E x c l usively Used for Private Purposes
— Going over th e e n u m e r a t i on s of ex clu d ed
h ' 1 , 't ld
rea i y e n oted that any vehicle which is motorized using the
streets which are p ublic , not exclusively for pr i v ate use, comes
'
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 557
w ithin t h e c o ncept of m o to r v e h i cle. A t r i c y cle, w h ich i s n o t
i ncluded in t h e e x ception, i s t h u s d e emed t o b e t h a t k i n d o f
motor vehicle as defined in the anti-carnapping law the stealing
of which comes wit hi n i t s p enal sanction. (Izon v. People, G.R.
¹. L - 5 1 8 70, August81, 1981)
T o be considered as a motor vehicle contemplated by t h e
c arnapping l aw , i t i s i m p o r t an t t h a t t h e s am e is u s ing pu b l i c
highways, and not a street exclusively for private use. (Izon
v. People, ibid.) If a m o t o r c ycle is being u s ed ins ide a f actory
exclusively for p r i v a t e p u r p oses, it s h al l n o t b e t r e a ted a s a
motor v ehicle with in t h e c ontext of the carna pping la w. But i t
s hall be tr eated as motor v ehicle wi t hi n t h e context of A r t i c l e
310 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, unlawful t a k i n g t h ereof
c onstitutes qualified th eft .
3. L i ce n s e t o U s e P u b li c H i g h w a ys, Not R e q u i r e d -
License to use a tricycle on public highways is not required to make it
a "motor vehicle" within the definition given by the carnapping law.
T he law pr o t ects a vehicle, which u ses the st r eets wit h o r w i t h o u t
the required l i cense. The cr im e of c a r n a p p in g i s no t m e a sured by
the kind of streets or hi gh w ays wh ere the vehicle is being used; but
b y the v er y n a t u r e o f t h e v e h i cle i t s elf an d t h e u s e t o w h i c h i t i s
devoted. Oth er w i se, cars' using th e s t r e ets bu t s t i l l u n l i c ensed or
unregistered as when they have just been bought from the company,
or only on test ru ns, may be stolen wit h out th e penal sanction of the
carnapping law. This obviously, could not have been the intention of
the law. (Izon v. People, supra)
In People v. La l l a v e, CA, 66 O . G. 3192, a moto rized bicycle is
c onsidered a m o to r v e h i cle w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f q u a l i f ied t h e f t .
The Lallave case was decided prior to the passage of the carnapping
l aw. I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t i f t h e m o t o r i zed b i cycle i s u s i n g p u b l i c
highways, the same shall be tr e ated as motor vehicle contemplated
by the carnapping law. Applying the Izon principle, license to use this
motorized bicycle on the public hi gh w ays is not r equi red to m ake it
a "motor vehicle" wit hi n t h e defini t ion given by the carnapping law .
"A" bought a bicycle and equipped it w it h a m ot or. It could also
be operated by the use of pedals. One evening, "A" left his motor bike
in front of a restaurant. Without his knowledge or consent, "B" took
the motorbike and operated it using the pedals. The crime committ ed
is carnapping. The fact t hat A u sed the pedal of the bicycle will not
affect its character as a motor vehicle. (1972 Bar Exam)
 558 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
X CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 559
VOLUME II

4. B e lo n g i n g t o A n o t h e r P e r s o n — I n C h u a v . C
t f
c arnapping need not establish th e f act t ha t c om pl ai n ant t h e r ein i s
t he absolute ow ner o f t h e m o t o r v e h i c le. W ha t i s m a t e r i a l i s t h e
e xistence of evidence which w o ul d s how t h a t r e s p ondent t ook t h e
motor vehicle belonging to another .
I n robbery by means of intim i d a t ion or violence and carnapping,
it is not necessary that the person unlaw f u lly divested of the personal
p roperty be the owner t h e r eof. What i s s i m pl y r e q u i red is t ha t t h e
property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of
the property of the person dispossessed suffices. (People v. Garcia,
G.R. No. 188470, April 1, 2003)
5 I nte n t t o G ain —After taking the vehicle, the accused
removed the wheels therefrom, and then abandoned the vehicle. The
crime committed is carnapping since the accused took the vehicle
w it ou t c o n s ent o f t h e o w n e r w i t h i n t e n t t o g a i n a l t h o u g h t h e
c riminal i n t e n t ion i s m e r el y t o g ai n f r o m t h e p a r t s o f t h e v e h i cl e
t a en. I n t en t t o g a i n w i t h r e s p ect t o t h e v e h i cle i n i t s e n t i r et y i s
not required. (People v. El l a sos, G.R. No. 189328, tu n e 6, 2 001) In
s um, in carnapping, the "tak i ng" pert a ins to the motor vehicle whil e
"intent t o g a in " m a y p e r t ai n t o t h e m o to r v e h i cle or p a rt s t h e r eof.
I f th e a c cused m e r el y t o o k t h e w h e el s o f t h e v e h i c le, t h e c r i m e
c ommitted is only th ef t .
R eturn of th e M o t o r V e h i c l e
The accused took motor v ehicle wi t h ou t cons
t f th
an ther
and er ea f t e r , ret u r ned the vehicle to the owner. Accused raised the
"'
d efense that t a k i n g"' and "int e nt to gain )7a s el ements of carnappin g
are not present.
Taking as an element of carnapping is p r e sent. The concept of
carnapping is th e s am e as t h a t o f r o b b ery an d t h e ft . H
e . en c e , r uIe s
pp ica e o t h e f t o r r o b b ery ar e also applicable t
o carnapping.
l t a k i n g s h o ul d b e u n d e r s t ood w i t h i n t h e S a . I n
'
Intent t o g a i n as an e l e m e nt of c a r n a p p i ng is a l s o p r e s ent.
B y temporar il y u s in g t h e m o to r v e h i cle, th e i n t en t t o g ai n o n t h e
p art of t h e a c cused i s e v i d ent s i n c e h e d e r i ves t h e r efrom u t i l i t y ,
satisfaction, enjoyment, and pleasure. (People v. B ustinera, G.R. ¹.
148233, June 8, 2004)
T his rul e i s a p p l i cable wh e t her t h e m o tor v e h i cle was t a k e n ,
without k n o w l edge of the owner, for a joy r ide (People v. Bustinera,
ibid.; 20 1 6 an d 19 6 1 Ba r E x a m s ) , o r b y me a n s o f v i o l e n ce o r
intimi d a t i on. (1 958 Bar Exam) I n this situati o n, the crime committe d
is carnapping although the accused returned the motor vehicle to
the owner.
Qualified Carnapping
The penalty for carnapping is higher when the owner, driver,
or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
commission of the carnapping, (Section 3 of R.A. ¹. 108 8 8) The
killing (or rape) merely qualifies the crime of carnapping, which for
lack ofspecificnomenclature may be known as qualified carnapping
or carnapping in an aggravated form. (People v. Mej ia, G.R. Nos.
118940-41 a nd G . R . ¹ . 1194 0 7 , Ju l y 7, 1 9 9 7 ; 2 0 12 B a r E x a m )
H owever, qualified car n ap pin g i s a ct u a ll y a s p ecial complex cr i m e
since the law prescribes a single penalty for commi t t i n g tw o cri m es,
to ivit: carnaping and ho m i c ide or ra p e. In f a c t, the Supre me Court
s ometimes described qualified carnapping as special complex crim e
of carnapping w it h h o m i c ide (People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 280909,
tune 17 , 2 0 1 9; Pe ople v. Ma c a r a n a s, G . R. N o . 22 6 8 4 6, Ju n e 2 1 ,
2017; People v. Nocum, G .R. No. 17 9 041, Apr il 01 , 2 0 1 8; People v.
Aquino, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014,'People v. Mallari, G.R.
No. 179041, Apr il 1 , 2 0 1 8) or s pecial complex cri me of c arn a pping
with ra p e. (People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 0 5, 2016)
1. O r igi n a l D e s i g n —T he concept of special complex crime
o f robbery w i t h h o m i c id e or r a p e i s t h e s am e a s t h a t o f q u a l i fi e d
carnapping. Same as the rule in r o bbery w it h h o m i c ide or rape, the

t heft
e , unlawfu
un
accused can only be convicted of qualified carnapping if th e origin al
p o h e w or d apoderamiento." I n design i s t o c o m m i t c a r n a p p in g (P e o ple v. L a t a y a d a, G . R . ¹ .
o rder t o
apoderamiento, the physical taki ng m u st be coupled with tconstitut he ' e
146865, February 18, 2004; People v. Nocum, G.R. No. 179041, April
p p p r i a e h e o b j ect or in t ent t o deprive the owner of the th i n g ,
1, 2018) and th e k i l l i n g w a s c om m i t t e d i n t h e c o u rse of executing
permanent or t e m p o r a ry. (P eople v. Va l e nzuela, G.R; N o. 16 0 1 88
the act of carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (People v. Gonzales,
) m , t ak i n g m o t o r v e h i cle pr operty w i t h i n t e n t G.R. No. 280909, June 1 7, 2019)
to temporarily depr ive the owner of the th in g w i t h out hi s consent is
carnapping. In People v. Calacroso, G.R. No. 126368, September 14, 2000,
accused boarded a t r i c y cle dr i ven b y t h e v i c ti m t o a t t en d a d a n ce

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 560 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 561
VOLUME II

p arty. Because of a dispute regarding th e f ar e r at e t h e

a e, e v i ct't i m w a s
a a y s a b bed by the accused. After the victim was fatally stabbed,
a ccused took t h e t r i c y cle. Th e t a k i n g a w a y o f t h e t r i c y cl e of t h e
victim followed the kil l in g apparently as an aftert h ought of accused.
n a ct , t h ei r o r i g i na l d e sign wa s not t o c o m mi t c a r n a
i b t t
a ance party. Accused was convicted of separate crimes of
h omicide and simple carnappi n g .
Xrode on the tricycle, poked a knife at the driver, and instructed
him to go near the bridge. Upon reaching the bridge, X alighted from
the tricycle and suddenly st abbed the dr i ver several t i m es v.ntil he
was dead. X fied from th e scene takin g th e t r i c y cle wit h h i m . S i n ce
there is no showing of a motive or reason to kill th
o i e v i cti m , i t a p pears
a t t e o r i g i na l design of X i s t o commi t c a r n a p p ing and he k i l l e d
t he driver t o f a c i l i t at e t h e c o m m i s sion t h e r eof. H e nc e t h e c r i
committed e iis q u a li fied carn apping or car n apping in th e a
form. (1998 Bar Exam ) e aggravate
ravated
2. Ow n e r , D r i v er, or Occupant of the M otor V ehicle
— In robbery with homicide, the victim of homicide can be a person
other t h a n t h e v i c t i m o f r o b b er y s u c h a s a b y s t a n der (P e ople v .
Barut, G.R. No . L - 4 2 666, M a r ch 18 , 1 9 7 9) or a c o - robber. (People
v. iu , G . R . N o. 20 1 449, Apr il 8, 2 0 1 8) In r a p e w i t h h o m i c i d e, the
victim of h o m i cide can be a p e r so n t h
o er t h a n t h e victim of r a p e .
(People v. Laog, G.R. No. 178821, October 6, 2011)
However, in q u a li fied c a r n a p p i ng, th e v i c ti m o f h o m i c ide or
r ape must be the driver, owner or occupant f t h
o e c a r n a p ped vehicle.
If thee victi
victimm is not t h e d r i v er , owner or occupant of t h e d
vehicle ,thhe offender isliable for separate crimes of simple o e car n a p p e d
carna
e o s im p e carnapping in
a nd homicide or mu r d er .
A , possessing only a s t u d en t l i c ense to d r i v e
n s a pa r e d c a r w i t h t h e k e y l ef t i n t h e s w i t ch . H et p r o ceeds to
drive it a w ay , i n t e n d in g t o s el l i t . J u s t t h e n , B, t h e o w n er o f t h e
c ar arr i v es. Fai l in g t o m a k e A s t o
op, B bo ar ds a t a x i a n d p u r s u e s
A w ho,
h in h i s h a s t e t o e s c a e
p, a n d b e c ause of h i s i n e x per ence,
vio ently collided with a j eepney full of passengers. The '
n d was wr ecked; one passenger was k i l l ed; teh ejeepney
another passenger was crushed and had to be amputated, the egcar
o
driven by A w a s a l s o d a m a ged. A i I bl f
is ia e o r s i m ple carnapping.
~ ~ua i ed c a r n a p p in g i s n o t c o m m i t t e d s i n c e t h e p e r son k i l l e d i s
not the owner, river, oroccupant of the carnapped
m o tor ve h i' cIl e..
p p ying Article 4 of the Revised Penal Cod A
o mici e a n
I I' bl
serious phy sical i n j u r i e s s i nce t h ese ar e th e d : r e ct
natural, an d l o gical consequence of carnappi ng. T hi s i s a c o m pl ex
crime of homi cide w it h s e r i ous ph y sical i n j u r i e s si nce a si n gle act
produced two felonies. A is also civilly lia b le for damage to property.
(1960 and 1998 Bar Exa m s )
8. M u r d er o r H ox n i c i d e — S i n ce S e ction 3 o f R . A . N o .
10888 uses the words "is kil l e d" in defining qualified carnapping, no
distinction must be m ade between homicide and m u r d er. H ow ever,
the words "is ki l l e d" refer only to t he consumma t ed felony of eithe r
murder or homicide. If attempted or frust r a ted mur der or homicide is
c ommitted in the commission of the carnapping, the crime committ e d
is simple carnapping by means of violence or inti m i d a t i on. (People v.
Mej ia, G.R. Nos. 118940-41, July 7, 1997)
4. No n- b a i l a b l e C r i xn e — An y p e r s o n c h a r g e d w i t h
carnapping shall be denied bail when th e evidence of guilt is str on g
i n the following cases: (1) when the crime of carnapping is commit t ed
by criminal groups, gangs or syndicates or by means of violence or
i ntimi d a t ion of an y p e r son or p e r sons or f o rce upon t h i n gs; or ( 2 )
when th e o w n er , d r i v er , p a ssenger or o c cupant o f t h e c a r n a p p ed
vehicle is kil led or r a ped in th e course of the carnapping. (Section 8
of R.A. No. 10888)
Author's Opi n ion — Under Section 3 of R.A. No. 10888, simple
c arnapping commi t te d by g r o up, gang on sy n dicate, or carn appi n g
b y means of violence or in t i m i d a t ion or b y u s in g f orce upon t h i n g s
when the evidence of guilt is str ong is not bail able. However, under
Article III, Section 13, of Constitution, only offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is stro ng, is not bailable.
Under Section 8 of R.A. No. 10888, the penalty for simple
c arnappin g ( e ve n i f c o m m i t t e d b y cr i m i n a l g r o u p s , g a n g s , or
syndicates) is imprisonment for not less than 20 years and 1 day but
not more than 80 years while that for carnapping by means of violence
o r int i m i d a t ion or b y u s i n g f o rce upon t h i n g s i s i m p r i s o nm ent f o r
not lessthan 80 years and 1 day but not more than 40 years. These
penalties cannot b e c o n sidered as re c l u s ion p e r pe tua w i t h i n t h e
contemplation of the constit u t i o nal pr ovi sion on bail .
T he penalty for s i m pl e car n app in g an d ca r n a p p in g by m e a n s
of violence or in t i m i d a t ion or b y u s in g f orce upon t h i n g s is subject
t o the second rule of th e I s l aw . For ex a m p le, if th e cr im e i s si m p l e
carnapping, the maxi mu m p e n alty un d er the Is law m u st not exceed
80 years while the minimum shall not be less than 20 years and 1
day. Thus, the court can sentence the accused to suffer 23 years of

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VOLUME II X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 568

imprisonment as mini mu m penalty to 27

y ears as maximum penalty . inside a theatre. It was held that th e accused already commenced to
Caa n yo u c o n s i der t h i s d i v i s i bl e p e n a l t '
a y f or si m p 1e c a r n a p p i n g c arry out hi s f elonious int en t i on, and t ha t i f h e di d no t p e r f orm a l l
as rec
reclusion
usion perpetua
er e fo r p u r p o s es of a p p l y i ng t h e c o n s ti t u t i o n a l
provision of non-bailabil it y of an offense? the ac-.s of execution which should have produced the crime of theft,
it was because of the ti m ely ar r i va l of the MP . Th e overt acts of the
Reclusion perpetua is an i n d i v i s i b le penalty. (People v. Lucas, accused consisted in forcing open the padlock locking the gearshift to
G.R Nos. 1081 72-78, January 9 1 9 9 5 ) Th a ring attached to the dashboard which was placed there to avoid the
p
P e court must i m p ose thi s
enalty a s i t i s .. (A r t i c l e 68 o f t h e Re v i sed
pena Penal C o d e) A l t h o u g h jeep from being stolen. The crime commit ted is only att empted theft .
under Art i cle 27 of the Revised Penal Code, this
enalt The case of De L a C r u z h a p p e n ed p r i o r t o t h e a m e n d m e n t
rs an ay to 40 years, the court cannot sentence the
accused to suffer 35 years of re clusion perpetua. To fix t he p e nalt o f Art i cl e 3 1 0 o f R e v i sed P e na l C o d e i n t r o d u cin g q u a li fie d t h e f t
i nvolving m o to r v e h i c le, an d a n t i - c ar n appin g l a w . I f a n i n c i d e n t
in i v is i l e p e n al ty . That is th e reason why in People v. Castillo and similar to th e De la C r u z case happens today, the offender is lia ble
Castillo, G .R. No. 1 1 8912, May 2 8 2 0 0 4 t h S f or "attempted q u a l i f ied t h e ft" a nd n o t a t t e m p t e d s i m p le t h e ft o r
t hat e u p r e m e C o ur t s a i d attempted carnapping.
a I ssl aaww , w
whici c h r e q u i r e d t h e fi x i n g o f m i n i m u m a n d m a x i m u m
penalty, is not applicable to the penalt M itigatin g ci r c u m s t a nc e of con f e s s io n or ag gr a v a t i n g
y o f rec l usion perpetua since it
i s an indivi sible penalty. Thu s t h e d '
e i v i s i'bl e p e n a1t y ffo r car n appi n g circumstance of tr eachery cannot be considered since an Am e r ic an
'

cannot be t r e a ted as re c lusion perpetua. It i s t h e r e f o re s ub p enalty c a n no t b e a p p l i e d i n i t s m i n i m u m p e r i o d o r m a x i m u m

o . . o . 10883 m aking simple p eriod. I t i s n o t a d i v i s i bl e p e n a l ty ; an d h e n ce, A r t i cl e 6 4 o f t h e
committed b y group, gang or syndicate or carnapping bcarnapp' m ing
Revised Penal Code on proper imposable period cannot be applied.
v iolence or int i
n imi d a t ion or by u s in g f orce upon t h i n g s non-baila f
i s unconstitu t i on al . i ngs non- a i a b l ee 3. D oc t r i n e of A b s o r p t i o n — F elonies c a n n ot a b s o r b
carnapping. For being punishable under special law, carnapping
S pecial R u les for C a r n a p p i n g s hall al w ay s be considered as a s e p ar at e an d i n d e pendent c r i m e .
Taking cash, killing the victim, and taking his tricycle on the same
T he conce pt o o ff carnappin
c g is th e same as t h at occasion constitute carnapping and special complex crime of robbery
. T h u s, jurispr u d ence an d r u l e s t h a t p e r t a i a of th ef t or
r obber y.
with homicide. (PeopLev. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 174658, February 24 ,
robber y aree aap p l i c a bl e t o c a r n a p p i ng . H o w ev er, t h er et arteh sf e c i a l
2009; People v. Na p a l i t , G . R. N o s. 14 2 9 19 and 14 8 8 7 6, Fe bruary
r ules which are only applicable to carnappi n g .
4, 2003, En B a n c) F a i l u r e t o r e t u r n t h e s e r v i ce m o to rcycle of t h e
1. V i ct i m o f H om i c i d e o r R a p e — T o b e h e l d company an d m i s a p p r opr i a t in g i t s m o n e y o n t h e s a m e o c casion
lifi d ' constitute carnapping and qualified theft. (People v. Asamuddin,
napping, t}1e victim o f h o m i c id e or r a p e m u s t b t h
o wner d r i v e r ,o emus et e G.R. No. 2 1 8 9 13, S eptember 2, 2 0 1 5) Abdu ct in g t h e v i c t i m a n d
or occupants of the carnapped motor vehicle.
2. Ameri can P e n a l t y — Since R.A. N . 10883 d'd t aking his vehicle on th e same occasion constit ut e k i d n a p p in g an d
the p enalties from th e R evised Penal Code o. Arti 1 i n o t borr ow carnapping. (P eople v. Mu i t , G . R N o. 181 0 4 8, Oc t o ber 8 , 2 0 0 8 ;
A rticle 5 1 oof t h e C o d e o e, ic e 6 i n r e l a tion to People v. Roxas, G.R. No. 172604, August 17, 2010)
e o de on a t t e m p te d f e l ony c a n not b e a p p l ie d t o
carnapping. Thus, the crime of carnapping has During the nationw ide tr an sport str ik e to protest the phase out
e e pena ty prescribed for carnapping cannot tbe reduced two of old public utility vehicles, striking jeepney drivers Percy, Pablo,
degrees lower as mandated b t h e 1 'f h
y e a w i t e c r i m e ' is at the attempt ed P ater an d S e n cio, each a r m e d w i t h g u n s , h a i l e d s everal M M D A
'

stage. e buses then pr ovi d in g f r ee t r a n sport t o t h e s t r a n ded pu b li c t o st op

In People v. De la C r u z, C . A., 48 O . G. 3 202 t h e a c them from p l y in g t h ei r r o u t es. They l ater on comm a n deered one of
d d the buses without al l ow in g any of the passengers to alight, and told
ke
d j eep of C a ptain Pa r ker b y a n A m e r i can M P .
Thee 'ee
jeep'ss padlock had been forced o en and 1 ' the driver to br in g the bus to Tan ay, Rizal. Upon reaching a remote
pen an ying between thefront area in Tanay, Percy, Pablo, Pater, and Sencio forcibly divested the
n e g e ars i t was an iron bar. Captain Parker was then
passengers of their cash and valuables. They ordered the passengers

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 564 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTy

t o leave thereafter. Then t h e y b u r n ed t h b

e e u s.. Wh en a tanod of the
baran
arangay of the area came around to intervene, Pater firedat him, p ublic up r i s in g i s d e emed t u m u l t u ou s s i nce t h er e ar e f ou r a r m e d
instantly k i l l i n g h im . (201 7 Bar Exam) men. However, sedition was not asked in the 2017 Bar Exa m. At any
rate, sedition is acrime separate and independent from the other
T he crime commi t te d i s r o bbery and c rimes commit t ed. Sedition cannot absorb cri mes commi t ted in t h e
not k'd
i n ap p i n g b e cause
Percy,
ere P Pablo,
b l Pater, and Sencio commandeer'ed e 'e th eb u s f o r p u r p o ses course of the comm i ssion of th e f o r m er. (People v. H a d ji , G . R. N o .
o ro in g t h e p a s sengers (People v. Mo reno G. B. N . 9 4 7 5 , A L-12686, October 24, 1968)
10 19 92), and not to t r a n s p ort t h e m t o a n o t her p l ace for pu r p oses
of detention. (People v. Pu n o, G . B. 1Vo. 97471, Februar
' a Laaw Conspectus by F l o r e nz Begalado) I t
Criminal 1 CATTLE-RUSTLING UNDER P.D. NO. 533
n en
i er y , w i c i s a n e l e m en t of k i d n a p p i ng, is not pr esent since t t o d eprive
the S tealing l a r g e c a t tl e w a s p u n i s hed a s q u a l i f ied t h ef t u n d e r
d eprivation of liberty is just incidental t t h Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Now this act constitutes cattle-
o e commission ofrobbery.
Since death results by reason or on occasion of robb rustling under P.D. No. 588. Cattle-rustling is the taking away by any
o ro e r y , ht e c r i m e means, method or scheme, with out th e consent of th e owner/raiser,
mmi e i s a s p e cial complex crime of robbery with h o m i cide. This
composite crime is commi t ted even th ough the victim of homi cide is of any of the large cattle whether or not for profit or gain, or whether
a responding Bar a n gay T an o d.(People v. Pelagio, G.B. No. L-161 77, c ommitted w it h o r w i t h ou t v i o l ence against or i n t i m i d a t ion of a n y
May 24, 1967) Even though only Pater killed the Tanod, Percy, person or force upon th i n gs. It i n cl u des the ki l l in g of large cattle, or
P ablo, and Sencio ar e a lso l i a bl e fo r r o b b ery w i t h h taking its meat or hi ding wi t h out th e consent of the owner/raiser.
i om i'cid e s i n c e
ey ai le d t o a t t e mp t t o p r e v en t t h e s a me. ( P Every person h a v in g i n h i s p o ssession, control or c u s t ody of
G.B. 1Vo. e . co p l e v .. D el a Cr uz ,
o. 1681 7 8 , De c e mber 24 , 2 0 0 8; Pe ople v. C t large cattle shall, upon demand by competent authorities, present
187078 , March 14, 2 012) Because the cr im e com m i t t e d i,s G.B. N .
r o b bery
certificate of ownership, permit t o b u y o r s e l l l a r g e cattle or
with h o m i cide, all o t he r f e l onies such as a r son an d d i r ect a ssault
clearance for shipment of large cattle. Failure to exhibit the required
committed by reason or on occasion of robbery shall be integrated
into the special complex cr im e of r obbery w i t h h o m i c i de. (People v. documents shall be prim a' facie evidence that the large cattles in his
Jugueta, G.R No . 20 2 1 24, Apr il 5 , 20 1 6 E B possession, control orcustody are the fruits of the crime of cattle-
;P rustlin g.
o. 181685, November 15, 2010; People v. De Le on, G. A. N o .
1 79948, J'une 26, 2009; People v. Diu, G.A. N . 20 1 449, A
o. , pr i l 8, 2018) L arge Ca t t l e
Tak
a king m o to r v e h i cl e i s c a r n a p p i ng . I n t e n t t o g a i n , a s a n
element of carnapping, is present since Percy, Pablo, Pater and Sencio Large cattle shall i n c l ude th e cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass,
uti ized it for pur poses of commit t i n g a cri me. The term " or other domesticated member of the bovine family. The owner
i me. e er m ga i n " i s n ot includes the h er d sm an, caretak er, em pl oyee or t e n a nt of a ny f ir m
y imi e o p ec u n i a r y b e nefi t b u t a l s o i n c l u des th e b
which in an y ootheer se n s e m ay be d e ri v ed or ex pected es e enefit, or entity engaged in the raising of large cattle or other persons in
f
which h is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which wasthtaken lawful possession of such large cattle.
w ithout th e ow n er's consent constit u t e s Horse isnot considered a cattle because it is a member of Equidae
ain. (P
family, and not of the Bovine family. However, P.D. No. 588 expressly
u nder special l aw , i ti ss h aal l b e co n d
e considered as a crime separate from mentions a "h orse" as l a rge cattle. Th us, h orse shall be t r e ated as
ro e r y w i t h h o m i c i de. (People v. Mu i t, G .B. No. 181048 0
large cattle for p u r p oses of the cr i me of c att l e-rustling because the
00 ; P eop
o e v. Boxas, G.B. No. 1 72604, August 17, 2010
law says so.
)
Note: Ha i l i n g se v e r a l M M DA b u se s
which Stealing goats is simple theft. The crime of cattle rustl ing is not
rou es y o u r a r m e d men constitutes sedition. There is public committed since goats are not l a r g e catt le. The t er m " l a r g e cattl e"
u prising to pr event th e M M D A f r o m f r e ely exercising it s d u ty . T h e includes carabaos, horses, mules, asses, and all members of the
bovine family. According to the dictionary, the word "bovine family"

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 666 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
VOLUME II

refers to animals related to or resembling oxen or cows. While goats S ince th e c o ncept o f c a t t l e - r u s t l in g i s t h e s a m e a s t h a t o f
m ay be included in th e t er m " cat t le" or belong to the bovine famil y , t heft, r o b bery , a n d m a l i c i ou s m i s c h i ef, j u r i s p r u d ence an d r u l e s
t hey cannot be included in th e t er m " l a r ge cattle." T ' that per t ai n t o t h e ft , r o bbery or m a l i c i ous m i schief ar e ap p l i cable
iin r m l ar g e c a t t l e " w o ul d r e n der m e a n i n gless the1 addjective
n thee t eer t o cattle-rustl i ng . T h u s , t h e r u l e d i s t i n g u i s h in g t h ef t a n d e s t a f a
"large." The l aw , e v i d ent ly , ha s m a d e a d i s t i n c t ' o b t
1 t hrough m i s a p p r opr i a t io n d e p e n d in g u p o n t h e c h a r a c te r o f t h e
ca e a n d s m all catt le.(People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-40087, April
cattl
p ossession applies to cattle-rustl i n g .
80, 1976; 1976 Bar Exam)

Q ualified C a t t l e - R u s t l i n g
W ithout C o n s ent of th e O w n e r
Under Section 8 of P.D. No. 538, if a person is seriously injured
T he gravamen in the crime of cattle-rustling is th " t k '
i ing' o arge cattle or "taking" its meat or hiding without the or killedas a result or on the occasion of the commission of cattle-
consent of the owner. (People v. Escarda, G.R. ¹. 12 0 548 0 rustling, the imposable penalty for cattle-rustling is higher. This is
o. o , c t obe r a special complex crime of cattle-rustling with homicide or serious
26, 2001)
physical injuries. It can likewise be called qualified cattle-rustling.
Concept of Cattle-Rustling However, there is no special complex crime of cattle rustling with
rape. Moreover, i t i s n o t r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e v i c t i m o f h o m i c id e or
The concept of cattle rustling is similar to theft or robbery. s erious ph y sical i n j u r i e s i n q u a l i f ie d c a t t l e -ru st l in g m u s t b e t h e
Thus, the rule that a person, who is in possession of a recently stolen owner or raiser ofthe large cattle.
p roperty w i t h ou t s a t i s f actory e x p l a n a t i on , i s p r e s u med t o b e t h e
author of theft, is applicable to cattle-rustling. (Pil-ey v. People, G.R
¹. 1 5 4 9 41,Ju ly 9, 2007) OCCUPATION OF REAL PROPERTY OR USURPATION OF REAL
RIGHTS
K illi n g a dog owned by other person is malicious ir ischief (and
cruelty to ani mal u n der RA No . 84851. However, kil l in g l a r ge-cattle Occupation o f r e a l p r o p e rty o r u s u r p a t i o n o f r e a l r i g h t s i n
without consent of the owner is catt l e-rust l i ng. I n t ent t o gain is not property iscommitted by any person who takes possession of a real
a n element of this form of catt l e-ru st l i ng. H ence, the conce t of t h i s property or u s u rp s r eal r i g h t s i n p r o p ert y b el onging to a n other by
means of violence against or i n t i m i d a t io n of p e r sons. (Art ic le 812;
crime is also similar to t ha t of m a l i cious mischief.
1952 Bar Exam)
Section 10 of P .D . N o . 58 3 r e p ealed or m o d i f ied A r t i c les 308
and 310 of o thee ReR e v' i s ed Penal Code, which are inconsistent wit h t h R eal Pr o p e r t y
Decree.ee. P.D.. No. 588 is not a special law. The penalty for eitns w i ' 1
.
is
o rrowe f r o m R e v i sed Penal Code, indicating t haor i se vio
t th ation
i n t en t of In simple robbery under Ar t i cle 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
the lawmaker was to amend the Revised P violence and int i m i d a t ion is employed to take personal property. In
ena1oC d e w i t r e s pect to occupationofreal property under Article 812, violence or intimidation
e o ense of qualified t h ef t of l a r g e cat t le. (C anta v. Pheo l , G; R .
na v. i s employed to occupy the real property or to usurp r eal r i g h t .
o. , February 2 8 , 2 0 0 1) It d o e s n ot s u p e r s edecope, t he c r i .R.
me
o f qualified t h e f t . I t m e r e l y m o d i fi e d t h e p e n a l t i e s p r o v i ded f o r
B elonging to A n o t h e r
qualified theft of la r g e catt le u n d er A r t i c le 8 10 b i m o
r ic e y impos i n g stiffer
enalties
pena i e s thh e r e on u n der special cir cum st ances.(P X leased his house and lot to A and family. Because of quarrel
o. 120548, October 2 6, 2001) Hence, Artic le 19 eopfl e v. -. E s carda, between à and A, X w en t t o s aid pr operty, forcibly ent ered th er ein
e, ic e R
ena o d e on accessory (Taer v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 85204 JRevised o tne
and by means of violence against and intimidation of the occupants
o. , un e 18
), ic e 18 o f t h e C o de on mi t i g a t i ng c ir c um s ta nce (People v., thereof seized it b ack f r o m A . A i s n o t l i a bl e for occupation of r eal
Macatanda, G.R. No. 51868, November 6 1 9 8 1 p roperty since the element t h a t t h e p r o p erty b el ongs to another i s
d Ar '
o e in relation to the first r ul e of the I n d et er m) i n at e Sentence Law not present. Th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i n t h i s c a s e i s g r av e coercion.
(Canta v. People, supra) a re applicable to cattle-rustli n g . (1 952 Bar Exam)

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 568 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
V iolence or I n t i m i d a t i o n
Without consent from th e ow n er, A, B, C, D, E, and F en t e re d
upon a part of t r act of land carr y in g w it h t h e m i r on b a rs, picks and
other tools and materi als to build th eir respective houses which they
began to construct t h e r eon. All t h i s w a s done in th e p r esence of X,
t he owner of th e t r ac t of l a n d , w h o , af r ai d b ecause of the a t t i t u d e
of the in t r u d ers, did no t d o a n y t h i n g t o p r e v ent t h em . Occupation
o f real p r operty i s n o t c o m m i t t e d s i nce th e i n t r u d er s di d n o t u s e
violence or inti m i d a t ion in occupying the property. (1 963 Bar Exam)
The remedy of Xi s t o file an ejectment case against the squatte rs .
1. T hre a t o r V io l ence to O c cupy - "A" and "B " b t h
f armers, entered the land owned by 'X" and plantedpalay thereon.
When 'X" came to know about it, he confronted "A" and "B" and
inquired why the latter occupied his land and planted palay the reon.
"A," with a bo lo i n ha n d, replied that t he l a nd belongs to th f
Cjgl f J o e a m i'1y
of , an d no t t o ' X " a n d a t t h e s am e t i m e sai d , " If you touch th i s
land and my palay, blood mill flom on this ground." (1989 Ba r E x a m)
The threat ut t ered by A to occupy the land of X constitu t es the crime
of occupation of r ea l p r o p er ty . I t d i d n o t g i v e r i s e t o t h e c o m pl ex
c rime o f u s u r p a t i o n o f r e a l p r o p e rt y w i t h g r a v e t h r e a t s u n d e r
A rticle 48. The thr eat is the in t i m i d a t ion contempl ated in th e crim e
of usurpation ofreal property. Hence, the latter absorbs the former.
Threat does not c onsti t ut e a d i s t i n c t c r i m e . (C a strodes v. Cu b elo,
G.R. No. L-47033, t u n e 16, 1978)
2. T h r e a t o r V i o l e n c e t o P r e v e n t R e - o c c u p a t i o n —I f
the accused has already occupied the real pr operty of th e owner fo r
an appreciable period of ti me, a nd he used violence or int i m i d a t i o n
t o prevent the said owner from r eoccupying the pr operty, the cri m e
c ommitted is no t occupation of r ea l p r o p er ty . Th e accused may b e
held liable forgrave threat, grave coercion or discharge of firearm
depending upon the circum st ance of the case.
P o ccupied a p a r c e l o f l a n d w h e n t h e o w n e r t h e r e of w e n t
abroad. When t h e o w ne r r e t u r n e d a n d t r i e d t o e n t e r t h e l a n d , P
s uccessively shot him for around 10 times to scare him from enteri n g
the land. The l a n downer wa s not h i t . P wa s c ha rg ed of usurp a t i o n
o f real pr operty an d a t t e m p t e d h o m i cide for s aid a cts. U s u r p a t i on
of real pr operty i s n o t c o m m i t t e d s i nce P d i d n o t s h o ot t he o w n e r
for purposes ofoccupying the property. Because P already occupied
the property, he merely committed the criminal act to prevent the
owner from r eoccupying th e p r oper ty. P d i d n ot c o m m it a t t e m p t e d
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 569
homicide since he shot the owner not to kill bu t m e r ely to scare him .
The crime commit ted is illegal discharge of firearm. (1 977 Bar Exam)
3. T hr e a t o r V iol e n c e t o O c c u p y a n d t o P r ev e n t
Re-occupation — Jorge is the owner of 10 hectares of land in the
f oothills w h i c h h e p l a n t e d w i t h l a n z o n es. On h i s l a s t v i si t t h e r e ,
he was shocked to discover tha t h i s l an d ha s been t aken over by a
g roup of 15 f a m i l ies w h ose members had f or cibly d r i ven a wa y h i s
c aretaker, h a d a p p r o p r i a te d t h e f r u i t s f o r t h e m s elves, an d w e r e
n ow threaten ing to k il l h i m s h o ul d h e tr y t o ej ect t h em . The cri m e
committed is occupation of r eal p r o p erty fo r e m p l oy ing vi olence or
i ntimi d a t ion against th e car e.aker of J orge to occupy the pr operty ,
and grave threat for employing threat to prevent Jorge from re-
occupying the property. (1988 B ar Ex a m )
V iolence as a B a sis of I m p o s in g A d d i t i o n a l P e n a l t y
The penalty for occupation of real property is fine based on the
value of the gain obtained by the accused in addit ion to the penalty
incurred for th e acts of viol erce executed by h im . Th e p h r ase "acts
o f violence," w h ic h i s t h e m o d e o f c o m m i t t i n g o c cupation o f r e a l
property, i n c l u des h o m i ci de, r a pe, t h r e at , e tc. (P eople v. Al f e che,
G.R. ¹ . 102 0 7 0, Ju ly 23 ,,1992)
A group of homeless persons occupied the houses built by t h e
National H o u sing A u t h o r it y ( A H A ) f o r c e r t ai n m i l i t a r y p e r sonnel.
T o gain en tr y i n t o t h e h o u ses, the gr oup i n t i m i d a ted th e securit y
guards wit h t h e fi r e a r m s an d d e st r oyed th e p a d l ocks of th e d oors
of the houses. They claimed that t h e y w er e ent i t led to free housing
from -;hegovernment. They are liable for occupation of real property.
T he ph r ase " a ct s o f v i o l ence," w h ic h i s t h e m o d e o f c o m m i t t i n g
occupation of r e a l p r o p e r ty , i n c l u des coercion. H e n ce, occupation
of real property absorbs coercion. (2018 Bar E x a m) H o w e ver, if t h e
g roup is composed of at l e ast. four ar med m en , th e p u b li c u p r i s i n g
t o prevent th e N H A o f fi c er s f ro m f r e ely p e r f or m in g t h ei r f u n c t i on
o f implementin g t h e h o u s in g p r o gram o f t h e g overn m ent s h al l b e
deemed to be tumu l t u o us. Hence, they are also liable for sedition. It
is submitted that t hey can be prosecuted separately for sedition and
occupation ot real pr oper ty . Th e p h r ase "acts of violence," which is
the mode of commit t in g occupation of real property, does not include
sedition. Jurisprudence treats sedition as a crime separate from
those committed in the course thereof. (see: People v. Umali, G.R.
¹. L - 5 8 03, November29, 1954)
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VOLUME II
Robbery and Occupation of Real Property
The mai n d i f f e r ence betw een r o b b ery b y m e a n s o f v i c l e n ce
and inti m i d a t ion and occupation of real pr operty is t ha t t h e f or m er
i nvolves real p r o p ert y o r r e a l r i g h t s i n p r o p e r ty , w h i l e t h e l a t t e r
i nvolves personal pr operty . Th e m o des of comm i t t i n g b ot h c r i m e s
are the same. (People v. Alfeche, ibid.)
O ccupation of r ea l p r o p e r t y w i t h r a p e o r h o m i c i d e
Under Ar t i cles 294 of the Revised Penal Code punishes among
others si m pl e r o b b er y o r t a k i n g p e r s o nal p r o p e rty b y m e a n s o f
violence or intim i d a t i o n, and robbery with h o m i c ide or rape.
Under Art i cle 312 of the same Code punishes occupation of real
property or th e t a k i n g p ossession of any r eal p r op erty by m e a ns of
violence against or i n t i m i d a t i o n .
In Pe ople v. A l f e c he, G. R. No . 10 2 0 7 0, Ju l y 2 3 , 1 9 9 2 , t h e
Supreme Court h el d t h a t t h e p h r a se "by means of vio lence against
or intim i d a t i on of persons" in Art i c le 312 must be construed to refer
to the same phrase used in Ar t i cle 294.
I f slight p h y s i cal i n j u r i es, t h r ea t o r c o ercion i s com m i t t e d t o
t ake personal p r o p ert y f r o m t h e o w n e r , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s
robbery, for which Article 294 prescribes a single penalty. Accused
cannot be prosecuted for slight p h y s ical i n j u r i es, th r eat or coercion
since this crime is absorbed in robbery. If physical inj u r i es, threat or
c oercion is commit ted to occupy real pr operty, the crime comm i t t e d
i s occupation of r eal p r o p er ty , bu t t h e p e n a lt y i m p o sable is a fi n e
i n addit ion t o t h e p e n a lt y p r e s cribed fo r s l i gh t p h y s i cal i n j u r i e s,
threat or coercion. Accused cannot be prosecuted for slight p h y sical
injuries, threat or coercion since this crime is absorbed inoccupation
of real property .
U nder A r t i c l e 2 9 4 , w hen t h e r o b b e r y s h a l l h a v e b e e n
a ccompanied by r a p e , t h e a c cused shal l b e p r o secuted for s i n g l e,
special and indivi sible crime of robbery wit h r a pe. Robbery and rape
a re not separate crim es. Note: Single, special and i n d i v i si ble cri m e
c an also be called as special complex crim e .
A rticle 312 is also penalizing a s i n g le, special and i n d i v i si bl e
crime. If occupation of real pr operty is also accompanie d 't h
e offender shall be punished for single, special and indivisible crime
o occupation ofreal property with rape. Occupation of property and
rape are not separate crimes.
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 571
H owever, there is a single penalty for robbery wit h r a pe; whil e
the penalties for occupation of real property with rape are that
prescribedfor rape plus fi
ne.
If by reason or on occasion of occupation of real property,
homicide is commi t t ed, th e offender sh all b e p r osecuted for sin gle,
s pecial an d i n d i v i s i bl e c r i m e o f o c cupation o f r e a l p r o p e rt y w i t h
h omicide. Accused can n e i t h e r b e c h a r ge d w i t h s e p a r at e c r i m e s
o f homicide an d o ccupation of p r o p e rt y n o r c o m p lex c r i m e u n d e r
Article 48.
In Ablaza v. People, G.R. No. 217722, September 26, 2018, the
Supreme Court affi r m e d the Al feche principle.
W ith d u e r e s pect t o t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t , t h i s w r i t e r h a s a
different in t e r p r et a t ion of Ar t i cle 312.
This w r i t e r a g r ees t h a t c o n cept o f t h e p h r a se "b y m e a ns o f
violence against or in t i m i d a t i o n" in A r t i c le 3 12 is the same as tha t
of the terms "b y means of vio lence or i n t i m i d a t i o n" in A r t i c l e 2 9 4 .
However, the concept of this phr ase in Ar t i c l es 294 or 312 as a mode
of committing robbery oroccupation of real property is different from
"rape" or "homic ide" as a component of the special complex crime of
robbery with r ape in A r t i cl e 294.
F or exarr pl e a n o f f e n der w a s a bl e t o t a k e t h e m o ney of t h e
victim b y m e an s of v i o l ence and i n t i m i d a t i on . T h en , th e o f f ender
r aped the v i c t im . T h i s i s a s p e cial complex cr im e of r o bbery w i t h
r ape. Violence or i n t i m i d a t io n i s t h e m e a n s e m p l oyed t o c o m m i t
robbery. Rape is not a means used to commit r obbery; but it is just a
component of thi s special complex cri me. In fa ct, robbery is alr eady
c ompleted when the rape was commi t t e d .
T here is r o bbery w i t h h o m i c id e or r a p e b e cause A r t i cl e 2 9 4
says so. On the other h a nd , t h er e is no occupation of r eal pr operty
with ra p e o r h o m i c i de in A r t i c l e 3 1 2 b e c ause the w o rd " r a p e" o r
"homicide" is not v-rit ten in t h i s pr ovi sion.
However, for pu rpose of th e bar e x amination, the Al feche
principle should and must be followed.
T eresita is th e ow ner of a t w o -hectare land i n B u l a can w h i c h
she planted with r ice and corn. Upon her arr i val from a th r ee-month
v acation i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t es, she wa s s u r p r i sed t o d i scover t h a t
her land had been taken over by Manuel and Teofilo who forcibly
evicted her tenant-caretaker Juliana, after threatening to kill the
latter if she wculd resist their t a k in g of the land. Thereafter, Manuel
 572 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
a nd Teofilo p l o w ed, cu l t i v a t ed, an d a p p r o p r i a te d t h e h a r v est f o r
t hemselves to t h e e x c l u sion o f T e r e s i ta . T h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s
usurpation of real property and the penalty is fine in addi t ion to th e
penalty for coercion. However, if they k i l led Ju l i ana when the lat t er
refused to surr ender possession of the land, the crime commi t ted is
s pecial complex crime of occupation of r eal p r operty w i t h h o m i c i de
and the p en alt y i s a fi n e i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e p e n a lt y f o r h o m i c i de.
(1996Bar Exam)
ALTERING BOuNDARIES OR LANDMARKS
Altering bounda ries or la n d m a r k s is commit t ed by any person
who alters the boundary m a r k s or m o n u m e nt s of tow ns, provinces,
or estates, or any other m a rk s i n t e n ded to designate the boundaries
of the same. (Article 313)
ESTAFA OR SWINDLING IN GENERAL
Swindling or estafa is commi t t ed by a ny p e rs on who defraud s
another with un f a i t h f u l n ess or abuse of confidence, by means of false
pretenses or f r a u d u l en t a c t s e x ecuted p r i o r t o o r s i m u l t a n e ously
with the commission of the fraud (parting of property by the victim),
or thr ough f r a u d u l en t m e a ns. (A r t i c le 31 6; 1 9 4 7, 1 948, and 1 9 6 9
Bar Exams)
Mode of Co m m i s sion
The offense of estafa, in general, is commi t ted eit her by abu se
o c onfi dence o r b y m e a n s o f d e c e it . D e c eit i s n o t a n e s s e n t i a l
r equisite of estafa by a b use of confidence (such as estafa t h r o u gh
misappropriat i on); the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud
or deceit, which is a usual element in est afa by abuse of confidence.
(Brokmann v. People, G.A. ¹. 19 9 1 6 0 ,February 6; 2012)
Damage
D amage is an element of estafa under Ar t i cle 315 f t h R
ena o d e . D a m a ge, as an element of estafa, may consist o ein:evi
(1)sethe
d
offended party being deprived of his money or property as a result of
the defraudation; (2) distur b ance in property r i g ht ; or (3) temporary
prejudice. (Ehitri v. People, G.B. No. 210192, July 4, 2016)
In U.S. v. Se vill a, G. R. N o. 1 8 0 56, Ma r ch 1 6, 1 9 22, accused,
a corporate treasurer, took money out of the funds of the company
f or personal u se , an d r e p l a ced i t w i t h h i s p e r s o nal c h e cks, a n d
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTy 573
instructed th e cashier no t t o d e posit t h e m o n t h e b an k a ccount of
the company un ti l th e end of the mon th . Accused is liable for estafa
t hrough m i s a p p r o p r i a t i on . T h e d i s t u r b a n c e i n p r o p e r t y r i g h t s
caused by the mi sappropr i a t i on, th ough only t e m p or a ry, is in i t s elf
sufficient to constit ut e dam age, which is an element of estafa. (1949
Bar Exam)
In Lu H ay c o v. Cou r t o f A p p e a l s , G. R . N o s . L - 4 9 6 0 7 -13,
August 26, 1985, accused obtained a specialpower of attorney from
complainant to m a n age her company. The special power of attorn ey
authorized t h e a c c u sed t o d e p o si t a n d v i t h d r a w f u n d s i n t h e
name of the company to be used in it s b u s i n ess. However, accused
deposited P139,000.00 paid by the customers of the company in his
own personal accounts w it h t w o b a n k s . Su r e ly, t h er e wa s at l e a st
a disturbance in th e p r operty r i g h t s of th e complai n a nt . W h i l e t h e
funds received by the accused were all deposited in his own personal
b ank a c counts, t h e c o m p l a i n an t c o u l d n o t d i s p os e o f t h e s a i d
amounts. At least, this could be considered as a temporary prejudice
suffered by complain ant w h ich is sufficient .o constit ut e damage.
X, treasurer ofa company, placed P1,003,000.00 of the corporate
funds in th e m o ney m a r k e t i n h i s n a me w . t h ou t t h e k n o w l e dge of
t he officers of t h e c o m p a ny . U p o n m a t u r i t y o f t h e m o n e y m a r k e t
placement, Xreturned the amount of P1,000,000.00 tothe company,
b ut kept t o h i m s elf th e i n t e r est i n come of P250,000.00. At th e en d
of year, when au dit ex a m i n a t i ons of his accounts were undert ak en ,
t he audit ors f oun d n o s h o r t age i n h i s a c ccunt abi l i t i es. X i s l i a b l e
f or estafa t h r o u g h m i s a p p r op r i a t io n s i n c e t h e p r o p e rt y r i g h t o f
the company was di st u r bed when X u sed its f u nd s for hi s personal
b enefit. Qualified t h eft i s not comm i t t e d sir ce X as a t r easurer h a s
juridical possession over corporate funds. (1989 B ar Exa m )
X deposited t o h i s b a n k a c c oun t a c h e c k i n t h e a m o u n t o f
P10,000.00 with the falsified endorsement of Y. A week later, X went
to the bank to wit h d raw P 10,000.00. While wit h d r a w in g the amount ,
he was arrested. The crime commi t ted is estafa thr ough falsification
of commercial document. His argum ent t ha t Y d i d not suffer damage
i s untenable. For one w eek, th e p r o p erty r i gh t o f Y w a s d i s t u r b ed
in the sense th at, he cannot us e such m o ney fo r t h e p e r i od. Such
disturbance is enough to constit ut e "damage" which is an element of
estafa. Moreover, in falsification of commercial document, damage is
not an element. ( 1997 Bar Exa m )
In Ehitri v. People, G.R. No. 210192, July 4, 2016, the amount
of P400,000.00 given to the accused could hardly be considered
 574 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
a s the d a m ag e s u st a i ned b y t h e p r i v a t e c o m p l a i n a n ts , w h i c h i s
a n indispensable element o f e s t a fa . T h e a m o un t w a s v o l u n t a r i l y
given pur su an t t o a j o i n t v e n t u r e a g r e ement fo r t h e c o n st r u ct i on
of garment f a ct ory, an d w i t h w h i c h t h e a c cused complied. Absent
the element of misappropri a t i on, the priv ate complainants could not
have been deprived of their m oney th r ough defraudati on. Moreover,
t he al l egation o f l o s t p r o fi t s , w h i c h c o ul d h a v e a r i s e n f r o m t h e
aborted joint v e n t u r e, is conjectural i n n a t u r e an d could b ar ely be
contemplated as prejudice suffered.
ESTAFA BY ALTERATION
Estafa by alteration is committed by any person who defra d
a
anot her: (1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence by altering
the substance, quantity, or q u ality of a n ything of v a lue which
h e delivers by v i r t u e o f a n o b l i g a t ion t o d o so , even t h o ugh s u ch
obligation be based on an im m o ral or i l l e gal consideration; or (2) by
means of fraudul ent acts of alt er in g th e qu a l i ty , fi n e ness or weight
o f anythin g p e r t a i n in g t o h i s a r t o r b u s i n ess executed pr ior t o o r
s imultaneously w it h t h e p a r t i n g of p r o p erty by t h e v i t '
vic im. . (A r t'i cl e
81 5)
In People v. Manansala, G.R. No. L-38948, November 18, 1983,
t he accused sold to th e o f f ended part y o p i u m . U p o n r e ceipt of t h e
payment, accused delivered th e cont a i ner w h i c h t h e y r e p r esented
to contain the opium, when in fact, it m er ely contains molasses. The
accused isliable for estafa by altering the substance from opium to
molasses even though the obligation to deliver is illegal since sale of
o pium is prohibi ted by law .
Xpointed to the offended party a parcel of land for sale. Finding
t he land suitable for his purposes, offended party bought it. It t u r n e d
out that i n t h e d eed of sale ent ered i nt o b y t h e m , A h a d s w i t c h ed
parcels of land, with th e r esult t h a t w h a t th e offended party bought
was another parcel which was wort h l ess for his purposes. A is liable
for estafa by altering the substance of the property to be delivered
from a suitable lot to a wor t h l ess lot. ( 1966 Bar Exa m
) T he false pretense made by a ccused that P r i melink w a s
X deceitfull y p o i n t e d t o t h e o f f e n ded p a rt y L o t N o . 1 a s h i s
security for loan wh ere in fact the pr operty t h a t h e was mor t gaging
i s Lot N o . 2 . F o r f a i l u r e t o p a y , t h e o f f e n ded p a r t y b o u gh t t h e
p roperty, w h ich h e believed as Lot N o . 1. Th e offended part y l a t e r
o n discovered from th e R e gistry of D eed t ha t t h
b oug
ou h t ' is Lot No. 2 composed mostly of uneven and hilly terrain. t h
He
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 575
i s not liable tor estafa by alt er a t i on. To be held liable for this cri m e,
it is import ant t h a t th e obligation to deliver property alr eady exists,
and th e o f f ender i n m a k i n g d e l i v er y h a s a l t e r e d t h e s u b s t a nce,
quantity or quality of the thing delivered. In this case, the obligation
to deliver is not vet ex i st in g at t h e t i m e t h a t X e m p l oyed deceit by
pointing at a property di ff erent from th e Lot t ha t h e mor t gaged and
later sold. (People v. Ga n asi, CA ., 61 O. G. 86 08) Mo r e over, estafa
b y alter at ion i s c o m m i t t e d w i t h a b u s e of c onfidence, In s u m , t h e
accused must h av e abu sed th e confidence reposed by th e offended
party when he delivered an altered property. In t h i s case, the
accused employed deceit to defraud the offended party by pointing
a t a pr opert y d i f f er ent f r o m t h a t b e i n g m o r t g a ged an d s o l d . (see:
Revised Penal Cede by Luis Reyes) However, since the deceitful act
committed by the accused is not puni shable under Ar t i c les 815, 316,
and 817 of the Revised Penal Code, he is liable for other deceit under
Article 818. (People v. Ganasi, CA, ib id . )
ESTAFA BY USING FICTITIOUS NAM E
Estafa thr ough false pretense is commit ted by any person who
defrauds another by using ficti t i ous names, which are executed prior
t o or s i m u l t a n eously w i t h t h e p a r t i n g o f p r o p e rt y b y t h e v i c t i m .
(Article 81o) The crime of using fictitious name is absorbed in estafa
by using fictit i ous nam e.
ESTAFA THROUGH FALSE PRETENSE
E stafa t h r o u g h f a l s e p r e t e ns e i s a l s o c o m m i t t e d b y a n y
person who shall defraud another by falsely p retendingto possess
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, power, influence, or by means of otl er si m i la r deceits,
w hich are executed pr ior t o o r s i m u l t a n eously v it h t h e p a r t i n g of
property by the vict im . (Ar t i c le 815)
F alse Pr e t e n s e
authorized to sell m e m b er ship s h a res i s e st afa. F a lse pr et ense of
q ualification t o s el l s e cur i t i e s i s w i t h i n t h e c o n t e m p l a t ion o f t h e
provision on estafa. (Lopez v. People, G.A. No. 199294, July 31, 2013)
Where the accused states that t h e f u t u r e p r ofits or in c o me of
an enterpri se s hall be a c e r t a in s u m , b u t h e a c t u a l ly k n o w s t h a t
tl:ere will be none, or that they will be substantiallv less than he
 576 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
r epresents, th e s t a t e m ent s c onst i t ut e a n a c t i o n a ble f r a u d w h e r e
t he hearer believes hi m an d r e l i e s on th e s t a t em ent t o h i s i n j u r y .
I n th e p r esent case, it i s a b u n d a n tl y c l ear t h a t t h e p r o fit s w h i c h
accused and her co-conspirators promised to offended party would
not be realized. They are liable for estafa. (Joson v. People, G.R. No.
178836; July 23, 2008)
C ause and E f f ect R e l a t i o n s h i p
To be held liable for homicide, there must be a cause-and-effect
relationship b e t w een t h e c r i m i n a l a c t c o m m i t t e d b y t h e a c c u sed
a nd th e d e at h o f t h e v i c t i m . T h e c r i m i n a l a c t s u c h a s s t a b b i n g
t he victim m u s t b e th e p r o x i m at e cause of his death. To show t h i s
c ausal connection, the cr i m i n a l ac t of s t a b bing th e v i c ti m m u s t b e
c ommitted prior to or si m u l t a n eous wit h an d not subsequent to t h e
d eath of the victi m .
In estafa, there must be a cause-and-effect relationship between
t he f a ls e p r e t e nse c o m m i t t e d b y t h e a c c u sed a n d t h e d a m a g e
s uffered by victim . The cri m i n a l act constit u t i n g deceit must be th e
p roximate cause of d a m age sustained by t h e v i c t i m . T o s how t h i s
causal connection, the false pretense must be commi t ted pr ior t o or
simultaneous wi th , an d no t s u b sequent t o t h e d a m age suffered by
the victim w hen he part ed h is money or property.
If the obligation of the accused is pre-existing, there is no estafa
since the offended party di d not p ar t hi s m oney or property because
of the falsepretense perpetrated by the accused. He already parted
his money or property beforehand when the accused employed false
pretense. There is no causal connection between the false pretense
employed bythe accused and damage suffered by the complainant.
In Am b i to v. Pe ople, G.R. No. 1 27 327, Februa ry 1 3, 2 0 0 9, in
the prosecution fo r e s t af a b y m e a n s o f d e ceit, i t i s i n d i s p ensable
t hat th e f a lse pr et ense or f r a u d u l en t ac t i s c o m m i t t e d p r i o r t o o r
simultaneously with th e par t in g of property of the offended party..In
this crime, it is essential that such false statement or representation
constitutes th e v er y c a u se or t h e o n l y m o t i v e w h i c h i n d u c es t h e
o fended party t o p ar t w i t h h i s m o n ey or p r o p er ty . I n t h e a b sence
o s u c h r e q u i s i t e , any s u b sequent a c t o f t h e a c c u s ed, h o w ever
raudulent and suspicious it m i gh t appear, cannot serve as basis for
prosecution forestafa.
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 577
ESTAFA BY PRETE N D ING TO HAVE BRIBED A PUBLIC OFFICER
Estafa thr ough false pretense is also commit ted by any person
who shall defraud another by falsely pretending to possess influence
over a public officer (Article 815, par. 2(ag), or to have bribed a
public officer (Ar t i c le 815, par. 2(cj), wh i ch a re e xecuted prior to o r
s imultaneously wit h th e pa "ting of property by th e vict i m .
Filing a case for es-.afa by pretending to have bribed a
government em p l oyee is w i t h ou t p r e j u d ice to th e r i gh t o f o f f ended
party to br in g action for calu mn y a g ainst th e offender. (Art ic le 815)
In sum, the victim defrauded and such publicofficer defamed by the
representation t h a t h e w a s b r i b e d can su e th e o f f ender for e st af a
and defamation, respectively.
If the accused actually bribed the public officer using the money
of the complainant, he should be acquit ted for estafa t h r o ugh f al se
pretense. However, the accused and complain ant can be prosecuted
in another case for corru p t ion of public officer as prin cipal by di r ect
p articipation an d p r i n c i pal b y i n d u c ement, r e spectively, w h il e t h e
p ublic officer for dir ect briber y .
Malo, a clerk of court of a t r i a l cou rt , pr o m i sed the accused in
a drug case pending b efore th e cou rt , t h a t h e w o u l d c o n v i nce th e
judge to acquit hi m f o r a c o n sideration of P 5 m i l l i on . Th e accused
agreed and delivered the rr oney, through his lawyer, to the clerk of
c ourt. The ju d ge, not k n o w in g of th e deal, proceeded to rule on t h e
evidence and convicted the accused. (2014 Bar Exam )
M alo cannot b e c h a r ged of e s t af a b y m e a n s o f d e ceit u n d e r
A rticle 315(2)(a). There m ust b e ev i d ence that t h e p r e t ense of t h e
accused that he possesses influence is false. In th e absence of proof
t hat r e p r esentation o f t h e a c c u sed w a s a c t u a ll y f a l s e , c r i m i n a l
intent to deceive cannot be inferr ed. (The Revised Penal Code, Book
Two, 2008 Edition by Luis Reyes, p. 814) The fact that Malo failed to
comply with th e agreement that he w il l convince the judge to acquit
the accused does not justify a conclusion that M a l o has no influ ence
over the judge. (see: People v. Wilson Yee, C.A., 55 O.G. 1228)
Neither is Malo liable for estafa under Article 315(2)(c) since
he did not d e f r au d a n o t her b y f a l s ely p r e t en din g t o h av e br i bed a
public officer. He merely promised to bribe the judge.
H owever, Malo can be held liable for other deceit under Ar t i cl e
318 since it appears that he received the money wit h out i n t e n t ion of
talking to the judge.
 578 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 579
VOLUME II

ESTAFA THR O U G H M ISA P P R O P R IATION

Estafaa fa t h r o u g h m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n , conversion
i s com m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s o n who shall defraud another or denial
w'th
unfaithfu l n ess o r a b u s e o f confi d ence e nce b y m i sa p p r o p r i a t i n g o r
c onverting o r d e n y i n g h a v i n g r e c e ived p e r s onal p r o p ert y u n d e r
'g '
o bli at io n t oo d eIl 'i v e r o r r e t u r n t h e s a m e p r o p ert y r e c eived t o t h e
prejudice of a n o t h er. (A r t i c le 8 1 5) T h i s i s a f o r m o f e s t a f a w i t h
unfaithfulness orabuse of confidence. (2012 Bar Exam)
O bligation to D e l i v e r o r R e t u r n
There is " o b l i g a t i on t o d e l i v er o r r e t u r n t h
u n e sa m e p r o p e r ty
received" if the accused received the property in tru s t, on commission,
or a mi n i s t r a t i on, or under a lease contract, or deposit. The accused
in receiving th e p r o p ert y u n d e r s u c h o b l i g a t ion p r e supposes th at
he acquires ju r i d i cal or de ju r e p o s session in d o i ng s o. Th is c r i m e
i s commi t te d e ve n t h o u g h s u c h o b l i g a t io n i s t o t a l l y o r p a r t i a l l y
guaranteed by a bond.(Article 815)
Refusal
f to remit rentals for properties owned by corporaticn
t o corporate officers, who are not vali dly elected, does not constit u t e
esta a t r o u g h m i s a p p r o p r i a t i on. (P e ople v. A r a m b u l o G. B . N .
186597 , June 1 7 , 2 0 1 5) A c c used h as n o o b l i g a t i on t o d e l i v er t h e
rentals received from tenants to un elected officers.
I n e s t af a t h r o u g h m i s a p p r o p r i a t i on , t h e
o blii gaat ii o n of t he
se i s o del i v e r o r r e t u r n t h e s a m e p r o p e rt y h '
e receive .
o i g a t i o n o f t h e a c cused is t o d e l i ver o r r e t uyr n a d i f f e r ed.
If thee obli
p roperty , a i l u r e t o p e r f or m h i s o b l i g a t io n i s n o t e s t af a t h r o u
misappropriat i on . no es a a rougn
The bank has no obligation to retur n to the depositor in case he
d eci e t o w i t h d r a w h i s d eposit th e very m o ney deposited wit h t h e
same serial number. The bank's obligation is to return th
e urn e a m o u n t of
y e p osi ed plus i n t e r est but i t ca n use moneys wit h d i f f er en t
serial n u m b er s i n d o i n g so . T h u s f 'I
ai ure o f th e b a n k t o p e r f o r m
i ts obligation is not estafa. .The li a b i l i t
it
i i y o f th eb a n k 'i s m erely civiL
oreover, the relationship of bank an d depositor is debt
r i s e or an d
s e b t or , t h e b an k a c q u i r e d o w n e r shi p
th
si e . p p r o p r i a t i on by th e b an k of th e m oney deposited is not
misappropriat ion or conversion since it is merely exe
't 'h
r o r i a t e which is an at t r i b u t e of ownership . xercising i s right
' '
a ccused m er el y a c q u i re d p h y s i cal p o s session over t h e p r o p e r t y ,
w hich he had the obligation to imm edi at ely retu rn . Fail ur e to retur n
the property sh al l b e t r e a ted as t a k i n g t h e r eof w i t h ou t c onsent of
t he owner, and th us, the crime commi t ted is th eft .
C onversion, M i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n , or D e n i a l
T he essence o f e s t af a u n d e r A r t i c l e 3 1 5 , p a r . 1 ( b ) i s t he
misappropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of th e o w n er . Th e w o r d s "convert" an d " m i s a ppropri at e"
connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as ifit
w ere one's own, or of devoting it t o a p u r p ose or use different f r o m
that agreed upon. To misappropri ate for one's own use includes not
only conversion to one'spersonal advantage, but also every attempt
to dispose of th e p r o p ert y o f a n o t he r w i t h ou t r i g h t . (T a b a r i a g v .
People, G.R. No. 165411, June 18, 2009)
1. A p p oi n t i n g a S u b - a g ent —Article 1892 of the Civil Code
allows the appoint m ent by a n a g ent of a substi t ut e or sub-agent in
t he absence of an e x p r ess agreement t o t h e c o n t r ar y b e t w een t h e
agent and the principal. Appoint ing sub-agent, who misappropriat ed
the property, w il l n o t m a k e t h e a p p oi n t in g a gent l i a bl e for estafa.
E xercising ri ght t o a pp oint su b-agent un der th e law i s not a cr i m e .
Since properties were given by the agent to the sub-agent to achieve
the very same end for which they were delivered to the former in. the
first place, there is no conversion since the same were not devoted
to a pur pose or use di f f erent f r o m t h a t a g r eed up on. (T a b aniag v .
nt People, ibid.) B ut if an a gent, who is not pro hibi t ed from appointi n g
a sub-agent, appo nts a s u b -agent. without e x p r ess auth or it y f r o m
t he principal, he is r esponsible for th e acts of th e sub-agent. Thu s,
the agent is civ il ly li a b le to t he p r i n c i p al for t he v a l ue of the goods
received by th e s u b -agent. (Serona v. Ho n . C o u rt of A p p e als, G.R.
No. 180428, November 18, 2002)
H owever, a n a g e n t w i l l b e h e l d l i a b l e f o r e s t a f a t h r o u g h
m isappropriat io n f o r ap p o i n t i n g a su b - a g e nt , w h o t h e r e a f t er
misappropriated the property:
a. I f t h e a ge n t a c t e d i n co n s p i r ac y w i t h t he s u b -
a gent i n c a r r y i n g o u t t h e a c t u a l m i s a p p r opr i a t i on . B u t t h e
mere fact that t h e a g ent f a i led to r e t ur n t h e p i eces of jewelry

to a
appropriate, upon demand is not p r oof of conspiracy wit h t h e su b -agent or
misappropriat ion or conversion (Tabaniag v. supra ); or
T here i s n o estafa i f t he o b l i g a t i o n o f t h e
e accuse
e ia e y r e t u r n t h e p r o p e rt y r e c e ived. I n t h i s s i t u a t ido nis t thoe b. I f t h e r e i s a n a g r eement pr o h i b i t i n g th e agent fr om
appointing a sub-agent. (People v. FLores, CA 47 O.G. 6210)

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 580 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
2. R et a i n i n g t h e Pr o p e r t y of t h e P r i n c i p a l —In People
v. Leachon, G.R. No. L - 8 6 1 12, Ma r ch 8 1 , 1 98 2, the a ccused was a
salesman of the offended part y. For t he f a i t h f ul p e r f o rm a n ce of his
duties as agent, th e a ccused executed i n f a vo r o f s ai d c o mp any a
bond. Accused collected for said company the sum of P566.57, which
it was his duty t o t u r n o ver an d d e l i ver t o hi s p r i n c i p al. I n st ead of
oing so, however, h e mi s appropria t ed a nd converted said a mo unt
to i s own use. He is liable for estafa thr ough mi sappropri a t i on. The
b ond guarantees his ci vi l l i a b i l i t y o n l y , b u t d o e s not e x e mp t h i m
f rom cri m i na l r e sponsibilit y a r i s i n g f r o m t h e m i s a p p r opr i a t ion or
c onversion of the money or property belonging to his pr i n cipal .
T he right of t h e a g ent t o r e ceive a com m i ssion di d no t m a k e
him a joint owner w it h t h e p r i n c i pal so as to enti tl e hi m t o h old out
a ny sum h e c h ose. Retai n in g t h e p r o ceeds of sale of g oods of t h e
principal by th e agent is m i s appropr i a t i on. ( U.S. v. Reyes, G.R. No.
12748, August 25, 1917; Mur ao v. People, G.R. No. 141485, J
o. , un e 80 ,
2 005)Hoowwever, an agent can retain the proceeds of sale of oods
o wned b y t h e r'
e principal or a part w i t h ou t com m i t t i n g estafa thr ou gh
m isappropriation u n der th e followi n g :
a. If t h e p r i n c i p a l a u t h o r i zed th e a g ent t o r e t ai n h i s
commission out of th e am ou nt s he collected (People v. Aquino,
G.R. No. 28987, September 7, 1928);
Note: In the Leachon c ase, to enable the accused to pa f o r
his livin g andd transport a t ion expenses, the principal advanced
to him m o n ey. T h ese ar r a n g ements i n d i c ate t h a t d e d u cti ons
rom his collections are not allo wed. Hence t he A
ence, e qu i n o ca s e is
not applicable.
b. I f t h e a g e n t i s m e r e l y e x e r ci sing h i s r i g h t
Article 1914 of the Civil Code to retain money or goods received d
i n consequence of th e a g ency; as w h e n t h e p r i n c i pal f a i l s t o
reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him
o r damages suffered wit h out hi s fa u l t .
c. I f t h e a g e n t m e r el y r e t a in s t h e m o ney collected to
protect his int erest since the pri n cipal failed to previously give
earned commissions. (People v. J u m a w a n, L - 2 8 0 60 F b
e ruary
I f an a g ent r e ceived f ro m h i s p r i n c i pa l a s u m o f m o
a specified m o m o n e y , f or
e p u r p ose
os in connection w it h t h e b u s i n ess established b
the two, and on acc o unt off certain contr oversies between e sa i s e y h eirs of t h e d e c eased l i e u t en an t a n d a s k e d t h e a c c u sed t o h e l p
them w i t h
J9JC9B0M
581
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
reference to the said business, he retained the said funds for his own
protection against his pr i n ci p al, un ti l t h er e could be an adjustment
of their accounts, said agent is not liable for estafa because the
criminal i n t ent is absent. (1949 Bar Exa m )
8. N o Est a f a T h r o u g h N e g l i g e n ce —Malversation can be
committed by m e an s of d ol o or cu l p a . P e r m i t t i n g o t h er p e r s on t o
take or misappropri ate property th r ough negligence or abandonment
constitutes malversation. (Torres v. People, G.R. No. 1 75074, August
8 1, 2011) H o w ever, estafa t h r o ug h m i s a p p r opr i a t ion ca n o n l y b e
committed by means of dolo. In estafa through misappropria ti o n, the
p rofit or gain must be obtained by the agent personally, thr ough hi s
o wn acts, and hi s m er e negligence in per m i t t i n g s u b -agent to t a k e
advantage or b enefit from t he e nt r u s t ed pro perty cannot constitu t e
estafa. (Tabaniag v. People, supra; 1999 B ar Ex a m )
A urelia i n t r c d u ced R o s a t o V i c t o r i a , a dealer i n j e w e l r y .
R osa agreed t o s el l a d i a m o n d r i n g a n d b r a c elet fo r V i c t o ri a o n
a commission b a s is. U n a bl e t o s e l l t h e r i n g a n d b r a c el et , R o sa
d elivered both i t em s to A u r e li a t o r e t ur n t h e m t o V i c t o r ia. A u r e l i a
d utifully r e-.urned th e b r a celet t o V i c t o ri a bu t s ol d t h e r i n g , k e p t
t he cash proceeds thereof to herself, and issued a check to Vi ctori a
which bounced. (1999 Bar Exam )
Rosa is not. liable for e s t afa t h r o ugh m i s a p pr opr i a t i on. Rosa
as agent in r e t u r n i n g th e i t em s to A u r e li a only sh ows that she had
r eason to b eli eve t ha t t h e l a t t e r h a d t h e a u t h o r i t y t o r e c eive t h e
s ame. Thi s b e l ief w a s i n s p i r e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t A u r e l i a w a s t h e
o ne who in-.roduced Rosa to V i c t or ia . H e n ce, Rosa can at m o st b e
h eld negligent in r e t u r n i n g th e r i n g t o one who has no auth or it y t o
receive the same. Consequently, for negligently assuming A u r e l i a 's
a uthorit y t o r e c eive th e j e w e l ry , R osa c a n not b e h e l d c r i m i n a l l y
liable. Settled it i s in ou r j u r i s p r u d ence that t h er e can be no estafa
through negligence. (Lim v. People, G.R. No. 102784, April 7 , 19 97)
As a rule, estafa cannot be commi t ted by m eans of negligence.
However, a principal by in di spensable cooperation can be held liable
for reckless i m p r u d ence r e sul t in g i n e s t a f a t h r o u g h f a l si fi cati on .
In Samson v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-10864 and
L -10876, March 81, 1958, there are two fake claim a nts of survi v i n g
heirs b e nefit fo r t h e se r v i c e r e n d e r ed b y a m i l i t a r y l i e u t e n a n t
who died during the World War II . Th e former classmate of the
a ccused made representation that claim a nt s were the real surviv i n g
t he claimant s t o o b t ai n t h ei r c h e cks. Th e cl ai m p a p ers of th e t w o
 582 C RIMINAL LAW REVIEW E R
VOLUME II
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
i mpostors are supported by r e sident cert i f i cates. Wit h out checkin g
t heir i d e n t i t i es, accused successfully h 1
e pe d th ese two i m p o stors
to obtain th e checks. The i m p ostors encashed th simple loan and not trust receipt. Failure to perform obligation under
e e c h eck s en d or s e d
o em m a i n g i t a p p e a r t h a t t h e t r u e p a y ees are t h e this loan agreement is neither estafa th r ough m i s appropri at ion nor
endorsed e e on e s w h o
e t h e m . T h i s i s F a l sifi cation of document. Th a violation of th e t r u s t r e ceipt l a w . T o r u l e o t h e r w ise is t o v i ol at e
h ei e accuse
ed th ee i i m p o s t o r s t o e n cash th e ch ecks by i d e n t i f y in g t hde m
also
e pe as the constitu t i onal pr ovi sion on non-im p r i sonment by r eason of non-
t rue payees and b y e n d or sin g t h e c h ecks. Th e i m o s t o r s payment of d e bt. (Ng v. Pe o ple, G.R. N o. 17 8 9 05, Apr il 23 , 2 0 1 0 ;
former cia ssmate of the accused commit ted comp l ' d h Colinares and V e l o so v. CA, G . R. N o . 90 8 2 8, Se ptember 5, 2 0 0 0 ;
throu mp ex crime o f i
estaia
rough falsification of commercial documents. Th Yang v. People, G.R. No. 195117, August 14, 2013)
d ' 1 as
for
or rreckless imprudence resulting in estafa through falsification
J ulio obtained a l e t ter of c r e dit f r o m a l o cal b an k i n o r d e r t o
principal by in di spensable cooperation.
i mport a u t o t i r e s f r o m J a p an . T o s ecure p a y m en t o f h i s l e t t e r o f
c redit, J u li o e x ecuted a t r u s t r e c eipt i n f a v o r o f t h e b a n k . U p o n
Demand Not Necessary arrival of the t i r es, Julio sold them bu t di d not del iver th e pr oceeds
D emand t too ret ur n o r t o m a k e a c c ount in g i s n o t to the bank. Julio is liable for estafa through misappropriation in
n o m e n t'i o n e d
in Ar t i cl
ic ee 315 of o th e R e v i sed Penal C ode as a n e l e m ent o f es t f d relation to P.D. No. 115, (1988 and 1995 Bar Exams)
t hrou gh m i s a pp r op r i a t i o n . The im p or t a nce of demandm en o e s t aa
in t hi s estafa The obligation of the entrustee under the trust receipt agreement
has something to do with evidence. Failure to account
u n u p o n d~ emandd is to turn over the proceeds of sale of the entrusted goods, or return
p p e r y r e ceived under obligation to retur n w i t h o u t
i o u s at'i sf a c t o r y the unsold goods to the entruster. Violation of this undertaking
xp ana ion is circumstan t ial evidence of misappropri a t ion ( Magt ir a
v. People, G.R. No. 17 0 964, Ma r ch 7 , 2 0 1 2) w h i c h constitutes estafa in relation to the trust receipt law. On the other
crime oofe sestafa
crime t afa t htr o ugh m i s appropri a t i on. (T r ia v. People, G.R. No. hand, the obligation of th e entrustee-debtor under the le tter of
204755, September 1 7,2014; 2015 Bar Exam) Verbal inquiry about credit is to pay the bank the amount owing to it. Violation of this
t he money en t r u s ted t o t h e a c cused is t a n t a m o un t t o a d e m a n d . undertak in g constit u tes a cause of action for collection of money.
(Asej ov.People, G.R. No. 157488, duly 24, 2007) T urning over th e p r o ceeds of sale is a d e f ense in v i o l a t ic n of
Demand i s n o t n e c essary w h er e t h e r e i s d i r e c t e v i d ence of trust r eceipt law (B a n k of C o m m e rce v. Serrcn o, G.R N o . 15 1 8 95,
m isappropriati on, e.g., deed of sale showin g t h a t a c cused sold t h e February 16; 2005) and in civil c ase for collection of money.
property en t r u s ted t o h i m . (P eople v. A r a m b u lo G . R . N . Returning the unsold goods is a compliance with th e obligation
tune 17, 2015)) De e m a n d i s also not an element of mal v
a versa t'ion. . B ut under the trust receipt but not that u n der the letter of credit. Hence,
failureto o acco
account upon demand made by a duly authorized offi returning the unsold goods to the bank is a defense in a criminal case
also a p r'i m a ff a ci'e ev i d e nce of malve rsatio n. (Mu n ib ov.rize o
P eo le cer
G . is
R. for estafa in relation to the trust receipt law but not in a civil case for
Nos. 16'3957-58, April 7, 2009)
collection of the amount covered by letter of credit. The bank did not
become the real owner of the un sold goods, which were tu r ned over
VIOLATION OF TRUST RECEIPT LAW b y the debtor. The bank merely acquired securitv t i tl e over retu r n e d
g oods for obligation u n der t h e l e t ter of cr edit . Th e debtor r e m a i n s
To be held li ' ab 1e for estafa in relation to the Trust Receipt Law ,
the owner of the retur ned goods and holds it at his own ri sk. (Vintola
the accused must have the obligation to turn over the
e procee ds o f s a l e v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, G.R. No. L-78671, March 25,
of thee eentrusted goods, or ret ur n t h e u n ld
s o g o od s t o t he en t r u s t er , 1 988) The debtor can st il l s ell th e g oods to a cu stomer despite th e
but
u hee hh a s v i o l a ted thi s u n d er t a k i n g . Thu s t h e off e d
same are already in t he possession of the banl-.
e goods for resale, and not for consumpt i on. In t hi s case,
P.D. No. 115 is not in conflict with the constit u t i o nal prohibi t i on
a rication o f s t ee l c o m m u n i c a t i on a gainst impr i sonment for non-payment of debt. The criminal liabil i t y
t owers. Hence
Hence, tthe
h transaction between the accused and the bank is springs from the violation of the tr ust r eceipt, which is separate and
distinct from the loan transaction. (Lee v. Rodil, G.R. No. 80644, July
5, 1989) The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse

J9JC9B0M
 584 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 585
VOLUME II

o f confidence in th e h a n d l in g of m o ney or goods to th e

o e prree j udi c e o
er regar ess of whether the latter is the owner or not. The law f
does not seek to enforce payment of the loan. Thus, there can be no
vio ation o a r i gh t against im p r i s onm ent for non-paym er t f d b t .
e enactment of P.D. No. 115 is a valid exercis
f th I'
o f th e St at e a n d i s , th us, constit u t i o n al. (People v. N 't f
G.R. No.
t a a n , G.R.
8155 9, April 6; 1992; Tiomico v. The Hon. Court of Appeals,
122539, March 4, 1999; 1995 B ar Exa m )
Violation of the tr ust r eceipt law is ma l u m p r o h i b i t um si n ce it
is punishable under special law. (Ong v. CA, G.R. No. 119858, April
29, 2003; People v. Ni t a f a n, G . R. N o . 8 1 5 5 9, A r i l 6 19 92 )
t hou gh t h e acc u s e d shall be pr osecuted for estafa in r e l a , ion to t h e
trust receipt law, the prosecution need not pr ove "intent to defraud"
to cause the conviction of the accused. (People v. Rosental, G.R. V o .
2256'97, September 05, 2018)
SYNDICATED ESTAFA UNDER P.D. NO. 1689
The elements of syndicated estafa under P.D. No. 1689 are:
1 E st a f a o r o t h e r f o rm s of sw i n d l in g u n der A r t i c les 315 to
3 18 of the Revised Penal Code is commi t t e d ;
2. I t i s c o m m i t t e d by a syndicate of five or more persons; and
3. D efr a u d a t i o n r e s u lt s i n t h e m i s a p p r opr i a t ion of m o n eys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative,
"samahang n a y on," or f a r m e r s ' a ssociations, or o f f u n d s s o l i cit ed
by corporati ons/associations f r o m t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c . (P e ople v .
Tibayan, G.R N os. 20965'5-60, January 14, 2015
) satisfied because i t w as a l l e ged and p ro ven t h a t i n a d d i t i o n to t h e
Syndicat e
A syndicate i s de fi ne d a s c on sisti n
i ng o f fi v e or m o r e p e r s ons
ormed with the in t e n t ion of carry in g out the un l a w fu l or i l l egal act,
t ransaction, enterpr ise or scheme. In il l egal recrui t m e nt , tr affi ck i n
i men , r a c ing
p nography, a s y n d i cate is onl y c o m posed of
at le ast t h r e e o f f e nders. In s y n d i c a t e d/organized c r i me g r o u p, a
syndicate is composed of at least two offenders.
T here are some enforcement auth or i t ie s wh o o i n t h t f h
p ine a i t er e
eas ve ( ) victims of estafa,the offender can be "harged
of syndicated estafa under P.D. No. 1689 which i
o. , w ic i s n o t b a i l a b le. I t
sseems
eems thatat tthey
h e are confused of the concept of syndicat
scale crime. ica e an d 1arge-
I n traffick ing in person under RA No. 9208, illegal recruit m e n t
under R.A. No. 8042, and ch il d p o r n o graphy u n der R .A . No . 9775,
the qualify in g ci r c u m st ance of syn dicate is p r esent if th e r e a r e a t
l east t h r e e o f fenders. I n s y n d i c ated e st afa u n d e r P . D . N o . 1 6 8 9 ,
t he circumstance of sy n d i cate i s p r e sent i f t h e r e ar e a t l e ast fi v e
No.. o ffenders. I n o r g a n i zed/syndicated c r i m e g r ou p u n d e r A r t i c l e 6 2
o f the R e v i sed P e na l C o de , t h er e m u s t b e a t l e a s t t w o p e r s o n s
c ollaborating, confederatin g o r m u t u a l l y h e l p i n g o n e a n o t her f o r
p urposes of gain in th e commission of any cri m e .
I n t r a f fi c k i n g i n p er s o n an d i l l e g a l r ec r u i t m e n t , th e
circumstance of large scale is present if there are at least three
t rafficked or r e cr u i ted v i c t i m s . I n e s t afa u n der P .D . No . 1689 an d
child pornography, there is no qualifying circum st ance of large scale.
In sum, if th ere are at least five (5) victims of estafa, the crime
is not syndicated estafa under P.D. No. 1689. Syndicated estafa has
s omething to do w it h t h e n u m ber of offenders and not th e n u m b er
o f vi ct i ms . E v e n e l e m e n t ar y p u p i l s k n o w t h a t v i c t i m s a r e n o t
s yndicate. The t er m s y n d i c ate p er t a in s t o g r ou p o f c r i m i n al s a n d
n ot group of victi m s .
T o appreciate syn dicate i n s y n d i c ated estafa, th e court s h a l l
c onsider th e n u m b e r o f o f f e n d ers a l l eged i n t h e i n f o r m a t io n a n d
p roven b y e v i d e nce, an d n o t t h e n u m b e r o f a c c u sed ch a r ged o r
convicted. (Hao v. People, G.R. ¹. 183 3 4 5 , September 17, 2014)
In Hao v. People, supra, th e re a re only t h r e e accused charged
in the I n f o r m a t ion fo r s y n d i cated estafa an d y et , th e r e q u i r e m ent
of the existence of syndicate of at least five persons is considered as
accused, other officers and di r ectors of th e corporation perpetr at ed
f raud against the complain a n t .
In ord.er for any group to be considered a syndicate under P.D .
No. 1689, theperpetrators of an estafa must not only be comprised of
at least five indivi d u als but must have also used the association that
they formed or m a n a ged to defraud it s ow n st ockholders, members
or depositors. (Home Development Mu t u a l F u n d v. Sa gu n, G.R. ¹ .
205698, July 31, 2018)
T he s w i n d l i n g s y n d i c at e u s e d t h e a s s o ci atio n t h a t t h e y
m anaged to defraud th e g eneral p u b li c of f u nd s contr i b u ted to t h e
a ssociation. I n d e ed, P .D . N o . 1 6 8 9 s p e ak s o f a s y n d i c at e f o r m ed
with the i n tention of carrying out th e u rilawful scheme for the
m isappropriat ion of th e m o ney cont r i b u ted by th e m e m b ers of th e

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VOLUME II
a ssociation. I n o t h e r w o r d s , o nl y t h o s e w h o f o r m e d o r m a n a g e d
a ssociations that r eceive contri b u t i ons from th e general pu b lic wh o
misappropriated t h e c o n t r i b u t i on s ca n c o m mi t s y n d i c ated estafa.
(Home Development Mu t ua l F u n d v. Sagun, supra)
Th ere are three requisites to consider a group of swindl ers as a
syndicate under P.D. No. 1689:
1. They m u s t be at leastfivein number;
2 They m u s t ha v e f o r m ed or m a n a g ed a r u r a l b a n k ,
cooperative, "samahang nayon," farmer's association or any
other corporation o r a s sociation t h a t s o l i c it s f u n d s f r o m t h e
general public;
3. Th e y formed or managedsuch association with the
intention of carrying out an un l a w fu l or i l l egal act, transaction
enterprise or s cheme, i.e., they us ed the v e ry a s sociation t h a t
t he
ey formed
f o r m a n a g ed a s t h e m e a n s t o d e f r a ud i t s o w n
stockholders, m e m b er s a n d d e p o sit ors. (H o m e D e v elopment
Mutual F und v. Sagun, supra)
In Ho m e D e v e lopment M u t u a l F u n d v. S a g u n
sup
t h ere are o nl y f o u r o f f i c er s o f G l o b e A s i a t i qu e c h a r ged f o r
s yndicated estafa. Th e fi f t h r e s p ondent, w h i c h w i l l c o m p l e t e
the requirement of at least five swin dl ers in syndicated estafa,
i s Atty. A l v a r ez. However, At t y . A l v a rez was officer of H D M F
whose only c o nnection w i t h G l o b e A s i a t i qu e w a s b y r e a s on
of his ha v ing re n d e red n o t a r i al s e r v i c es for t h e l a t t e r. S i n c e
A tty. A l v a r e z w a s n o t r e l a t e d t o G l o b e A s i a t i qu e e i t he r b y
employment o r b y o w n e r s h ip , h e c o ul d n o t b e c o n sidered as
part ofthe syndicate supposedly formed or managed to defraud
its stockholders, m e m b ers, d epositors o r t h e p u b l i c . H e n c e,
respondents sh oul d n o t h a v e b e e n c h a r ged w i t h s y n d i c a t ed
estafa.
Funds Solicited from the General Public
T he f ac t t h a t t h e e n t i t y i n v o l v e d w a s n o t a r u r a l b a n k
cooperative, samahang nayon o r f a r m e r s' association does not ta k e
t he case out of t h e c overage of P .D . N o . 1 6 89. T h I
o ther e aw a p pI'ie s t o
ot er cor or
corporations or associations operating on funds solicitedfrom
the general pu b l ic. (People v. Ba l a s a, G.R No . 10 6 3 57 S
3, 1998) TThus, the entity c an be a commercial bank. (Galvez v. Hon.
CA, G.R No. 187919, February 20, 2013)
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
If the money misappropri ated is not solicited from th e general
public, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s s i m p l e e s t af a u n d e r t h e R e v i s ed
Penal Code. (Hao v. People, supra)
There are three parties involved in syndicated estafa, to
w it: (1) th e c or poration o r a s sociation; (2) g eneral p u b li c s uch a s
s tockholders and m e m b ers of th e a ssociation; they ar e th e v i c t i m s
and (3) the owners and m e m b ers of the association, who used such
association to defraud the general public; they are the offenders. The
association or corporation can neither be a victim nor the offender in
syndicated estafa. The association is just an in s t r u m ent u sed by the
offenders to defraud the victim . A bank cannot charge its employees
w ith sy n d i cated estafa for m i s a p pr opr i a t in g i t s m o n e y . (Galvez v.
Hon. CA, supra) The crime commit t ed by a bank e mp loyee or officer
is estafa or theft depending upon the nat ur e of th eir positi on .
In Ho m e D e v e lopment M u t u a l F u n d v . Sag u n , G .R . N o .
205698, July 31, 2018, based on evidence, GLOBE ASIATIQUE
(GA) allegedly recru i ted " special bu y ers," wh o ar e not m e m b ers of
Pag-IBIG. For a fee, these "special buyers" would apply membership
i n P a g -I B I G , a n d t h e n , t h e y w o u l d o b t a i n h o u s i n g l o a n s f r o m
P ag-IBIG b u t t h e y w i l l n o t o c c up y t h e h o u s i n g u n i t s i n v o l v e d .
T hen GA w i l l s el l t h e u n i t s t o r eal b u y e rs, wh o w o ul d assume th e
balance on the loan of th e "special buy er." Because of thi s complex
s cheme involving f r a u d u l ent b u y e rs, a h uge am ount of m o ney w a s
t ransferred from t h e c offers of th e P a g -I BI G f u n d b y H D M F , a n d
released to the GA. Officers of GA including Delfin Lee were charged
o f syndicated estafa. In t h i s c r i m e , i t m u s t b e established that G A
s olicited fu nds from t h e g en eral p u b li c an d a t l e ast f iv e sw i n d l er s
u sed GA to defr aud it s m e m b ers or st ockholders. However, in t h i s
c ase, GA did not solicit f u n d s from th e g eneral p u b l ic. The H D M F ,
t he complaina nt , wa s not i t s elf a s t ockholder or m e m ber of GA . I t
was the HDMF itself, not GA, that had solicited (Pag-ibig) funds
f rom it s m e m b ers. Th e f u n d s su pposedly m i s appropr i a ted di d n o t
b elong to GA's stockholders or m e m b ers, or t o t h e g e n eral p u b l i c ,
but to the H D M F . T h u s, the respondents did not commit syn dicated
estafa. However, they should be charged with si m pl e estafa.
S windling ma y f al l w i t h i n t h e a m b i t o f P .D . N o . 1 689 if i t i s
committed th r o u gh a n a s s o ciation. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , e s t a fa i s
c ommitted r e g ar dless of th e n u m b e r o f t h e a c cused wh en : (a) t h e
e ntity s o l i ci t in g f u n d s f r o m t h e g e n e ra l p u b l i c i s t h e v i c t i m a n d
not the means through which the estafa is committed, or (b) the
offenders are not ow n ers or em p l oyees who used the association to
 588 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 589

perpetrate the crime. (Home Development M u t u a l F u n d v. S a g u n

u ua u n v. agun,
supra) ( P8,000,000,000,000,000.00) or $59 t r i l l i on . A f te r 1 0 y e a rs, he w i l l
b e the ri chest ma n i n t h e p l a n e t b e cause of an i n v e st m ent of o n e
P onzi or P y r a m i d S c h e m e million pesos. It should be noted that the net worth of Jeff Bezos, the
In a Ponzi or pyram i d ing scheme, the offenders offer impossibly richest man in th e wor ld, is only $147 billion in 2 0 20.
ig r e t u r n s a n d p a y t h e s e r e t u r n s t o e a r l y i n v e s t ors (P eople v .
a asa, supra) to f r a u d u l e n t ly i n d u c e others to i n v e st t h e i r S uspension of P a y m e n t
i nves ei r m o n e y
therein.n . Th
The investment pr o gram i s u n s u st ai nabl e T he su spension o f a l l c l a i m s a s a n i n c i d en t t o c o r p o r a t e
a e , e.g.,. . t h e in c ome
o f thee b uu si' n e s s o f t h e o f f e n der i s c o m p a r a t i v el y l o w e r t h a n t h e rehabilit a t ion of the company of the accused after the consummat i on
interest on the investment. In retu r n i n g the investments and its hi h of the cr im e of s y n d i cated estafa does not i n c l ud e th e s u spension
interests toth e old 1 investors, the offenders are not using the profits of of crim i nal ch a r g es f or s y n d i c ated estafa f il e d a g a i n st h i m a s a n
their business (People v. Menil, Jr ., G.R. Nos. 115054-66 S o fficer of the distressed corporation. There is no reason why crim i n a l
12 2000)) , bu t t h e y a r e e m p l o y in g t h e f u n d s r a i sed f ro m t h e n e w proceedings should be suspended during corporate rehabilitation,
investors. (People v. Romero, G.R. ¹. 112 9 8 5 , A r i l 21 1 9 9 9 more so, since the prim e pu r p ose of the cri m i na l action is to pun i sh
windlers af ter c o l lecting several i n v e s t m ent s a b scond )before Th
t he offender in o r der t o d eter hi m a n d o t h er s f rom com m i t t i n g t h e
anyone else shows up t o c o l l ect. I n l a y m a n ' s t e r ms , th e i n v e stors s ame or s i m i l a r o f f e n se, t o i s o l at e h i m f r o m s o c i ety, r e f or m a n d
are "nil u l u t o sa sa r i l i n i l a n g m a n t i k a . " T h ' r ehabilit at e hi m o r , i n g e n e r al , t o m a i n t ai n s o cial or d er. I t w o u l d
i s is ca ll ed p yr a m i d i n g
b ecause investors to earn m oney are also convincing th eir r e l a t i v es be absurd that one, who has engaged in criminal conduct, could
a nd fri ends t o i n v es t w i t h a r e d u ce d ' t t. D' e scape punishment by the mere fil in g of a petit ion for rehabil i t a t i o n
such a scheme looks l ik e a p y r a m i d ; h e nce it s n a m e . M e m b ers of by the corporation of which he is an officer. (People v. Mateo, G.R.
a syndicate operatin g a P o nzi or p y r a m i d i n g scheme are l i a ble for No. 210612, October 9, 2017) Once syndicated estafa consumma tes,
syndicated estafa. (People v. Balasa, supra) the criminal liability i mmediately attaches to the accused. Since
suspension of payment after the consumm a t ion of syndicated estafa
In Peo
eople v. Romero, supra, the corporation of the accused was
is not a m o d e of e x t i n g u i sh in g c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y , such su spension
e ngage i n s o l i c i t in g f u n d s an d i n v e s t m e nt s f ro m t h e p u b l ic . T h e
cannot be used by the accused as a defense.
corporation guarant eed an 800% ret ur n on i n v estment
'th'
s . Complainant in v ested his money with the corporation in15
2 1daays. the The Ma t eo p ri n c iple is a p p l i c able to v i o l a t i on of B . P. B l g. 2 2
amount of P 150 000.00.. Ch Check issued to complai n ant r e p r esentin g (Rosario v. CO, G.R. ¹. 133608, August 26', 2008), estafa under
return of investment bounced. This is a Ponzi scheme. Accused are Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (Panlilio v. RTC, Branch 51,
liablefor syndicated estafa. City of M a n i l a , G .R. No. 17 3846, February 2 , 2 0 1 1) and a ny o t h e r
crime.
If th e i ' nterest for a n i n v e s t m en t i s s o h i g h
25%o pere r month on a c o mpounded basis, thi s i s a s t r on h g i n d i2cation
01
Estafa Involving More Than P100,000.00
o f pyramid ing scheme. The in t er est for bank l o
an o a n o n1y r a n ges from T he p en alt y f o r s y n d i c a te d e s t af a i s l i f e i m p r i s o n m en t t o
7 %o to
o 10%o pe er r a n n u m (.58% or .88% per month). If the ff
e o en d e r s ar e death. If the accused are not members of a syndicate but the amount
y engage i n a l e g i t i m at e business, then why w o uld t h
investm w ou ey so1i c i t of the fr au d i s m or e t h a n P 1 0 0 ,000.00, they sh al l n e v er t h eless be
m ents from th e general p u b li c w it h a 20%o or 25% e r
interest wh ere t
r e they can si m pl y o b t ai n l oan f r o m t h e b an k w i t h a n held liable for the acts prohibi ted by P.D. No. 1689, but th e penalty
i nterest, which merely r a n ges from .58% ol .83% per mont h . is only re c lusion t emporal to re c l u sion perpetua. (PeopLev. Balasa,
supra; People v. Romero, supra)
I f one invested P1 m i l l i o n w i t h 2 0 % pe r m o n t h ' t
he rolled over his
h investment and its interests on i n eres ,t , a n d The elements of estafa under P.D. No. 1689 are:
e over
f or 10 years, t hl b
e a r s his money will balloon to more than P3 quadrillion 1. E s t a f a or other forms of swindling under Articles 315 to
3 18 of the Revised Penal Code is commit t e d ;

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 590 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
2. I t i s c o m m i t t e d by less than five persons; but th e amount
involves exceeds P100,000.00; and
3. D efraudation
f r e su lt s i n t h e m i s a p pr opr i a t ion of m o n eys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative,
"samahang nayon," or far m e rs' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations f ro m t h e g e n e ra l p u b l i c. (S ee: Ga lvez v.
Hon. CA, G.R. No. 187919, February 20, 2018)
The president, t r e a sur er , an d s e cretary o f A B C C o r
o transaction, failure to perform obligation th ereunder is neither theft
w ere c a r ged w it h s y n d i cated estafa. The I n f o r m a t io n 1orporation
i on a e g e d th att
e y e f r a u ded several p e r sons; they m a d e t h e
e e c o m p1a' i n a nt s a n dd
t hee puu b li icc i n g e n e ra l t o b e l i eve t h a t t h e i r c o r p or a t ion i s e nt g aged
in foreign exchange trading where in fact the corporation has no
license to engage in foreign exchange trading and the defraudation
amounting to P20,000,000.00 pertains to funds solicited from the
pu ic in general by such corporation. The crime committed is not
syndicated estafa under P.D. No. 1689 since there are only four
offenders,However, they are liable for the cri
f t f
o. 8 9 s i n c e t h e est afa comm i t t e d by t h e m r e s u l ted i n d
the
d efraudation of funds solicited from the general public and t h e
amount exceeds P100,000.00. (2010 B ar Exa m )
ESTAFA THR O U G H M ISA P P R O P R IATION AND THEFT
T h e basic difference between t h ef t a n d e s t af a i s t h a t i n t h e
esta a, t e o f f e nder r eceives the personal pr operty w i t h c o nsent of
the owner under obligation to ret ur n or deliver it, but t h e r eafter, he
c onverts, or m i s appr opr i a tes th e s am e or d e n ies it s r e ceipt, w h i l e
i n the theft, the offender t a kes the pr operty w i t h ou t consent of t h e
owner. ut there are occasions where the accused can be held liable
for theft al t h ough he i n i t i a ll y r e ceives th
th e proper y w i t consent of
t e owner .
T he S u p r em e C o u r t h as consistentl y r u l e d t h a t
misappropriation i s e s t a f a . (P i d e li v. Pe o p l e, G . R. N o .
Februar y 18 o.
8 , 2 0 0 8) M i s a p p ro pri a t i on of p r o p e rt i s e ' t h
estafa deepen
en diing upon the character of the possession of the
o ver the misappropri a ted property .
I f the accused received th e p r o p ert y w i t h t h e c
o wner, but e consent' o f thh e
u h ee acq
a c uu ii rr e
e d merely de f a c to or ph y s i c al p o s session in
d oing so, f a i l u r e t o r e t u r n run
r unnin g a w a y o r m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o
thereofshall bee considered as tak in g w i t h ou t consent of the own er ;n
h ence, the crime commi t ted is th ef t .
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 591
I f t h e a c c u sed r e c eived t h e p r o p e rt y w i t h t h e c o n s en t o f
the owner, an d a c q u i red ju r i d i c a l, d e ju r e or le g a l p o s session i n
doing so b y r e a son o f a t r a n s a ction i n v o l v in g t r u s t , c o m m i ssion,
administr a t ion or obl i g ation t o d el iver or r e t u r n , m i s ap propri a t i on
or conversion thereof isestafa. (1951 and 1952 Bar Exa ms )
I f one r eceived th e p r o p ert y w i t h t h e c o n sent o f t h e o w n e r ,
and acquired ownership in doing so by reason of sale,loan or other
1
n or estafa. In t h i s c ase, the cause of action of th e f o r mer o w ner i s
merely civil in ch ar acter .
1. Ph y s i ca l P o s session - I f t h e acc u s e d r e c e i v e d
t he property to br ing i t t o a g o ldsmith for examination and t o
immediately return it t o t h e o w n er, h is p ossession is physical,
and thus, misappropriation thereof or failure to return it shall be
considered as taking without consent of the owner, which constitutes
the crime of theft. (U;S. v. De Vera, G.R, ¹, I - 1 6 961, September19,
1921; 1947 Bar Exam) Receipt of the property with consent of the
owner is not theft. Theft happens when the accused failed to return
the property or misappropriated it.
2. Le ga l P oss e s s ion — U nder A r t i c l e 3 1 5 , o n e o f th e
e lements o f e s t a f a t h r o u g h m i s a p p r o p r i a t io n i s th a t of f e n d er
r eceived p e r s onal p r o p e rt y b y r e a s o n o f t r u s t , c o m m i s sion, o r
a dministr a t i on , or o b l i g a t ion t o d e l i ve r o r r e t u r n t h e s a m e . T h i s
e lement pr esupposes that th e o f f ender acquired both p h y sical an d
juridical possession in r e ceiving th e p r o p er ty . J u r i d i cal possession
over the misappropri ated property is now an in d i spensable element
of estafa through misappropriation. (Chua-Burce v. CA, G.R. ¹ .
109595, April 2 7 , 2 0 0 0) Me re r e ceipt of m o n ey is n ot e no ugh. It i s
therefore essential to prove that th e accused acquired both physical
p ossession and j u r i d i cal p o ssession of t h e t h i n g r e c eived; or t h a t
n ot al l
168 h e received pr i v at e compl ai n a n t' s m o ney i n s u c h a m a n n e r a s t o
48 7, create a fiduciary r el at i onship between th em. (Paulo v. People, G.R.
th f No. 225799, October 1 5, 2018) Jur i d i c al possession means that t h e
accused
a ccused has th e l e gal r i gh t t o p o s sess the p r operty o w ned b y t h e
c omplainant .
In Chua-Bu r ce v. CA, ibid., the accused was acquitted of estafa
through misappropri a t ion on the ground that the element of juri dical
possession was absent. As a bank cash custodian or an employee of
the complainant, she had no juridical possession over the missing
funds.
 592
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
8. Ow n er sh i p — I f t h e a c c u s ed a cquir ed o w n e r s hip o v e r
the alleged misappropr'iated property, he is not li able for th eft since
the element of t a k i n g w i t h ou t c onsent of th e ow ner i s not p r e sent.
One cannot steal hi s ow n p r o p er ty . N e i t he r i s h e l i a bl e for e st afa
because there is no obligation to r e t ur n t h e v ery p r operty r eceived.
An owner has the right to appropr i ate his property, and the exercise
o f such r i g h t c a n n o t b e t r e a t e d a s m i s a p p r opr i a t io n w i t h i n t h e
contemplation ofArticle 315.
O bligation t o R e t u r n
M isappropriat i on
o f p r o p e r t y w hich i s r ece i d th
o i g a t ion t o r e t u r n t h e s am e u n de r a l e ase agreement or d e posit
obli
or commodatum, is e s t a fa b e cause the p o s session of t h e a c c used
is jur i d i c a l. B u t m i s a p p r o p r i a t i on o f g o l d , w h i c h r e c e ived u n d e r
obligation to immediately return t he same to the owner after bring in g
it to the goldsmith for ex a m i n a t i on, is t h eft because the possession
of the accused is de facto. I n sum, the concept of obligation involvin g
the duty to r et ur n m e n t i o ned in A r t i cl e 315 as an element of estafa
does not include a mere request to bring the gold to the goldsmith
for examination (U.S. v. De Vera, supra); or receiving dollar to be
changed into pesos. (1972 Bar E x a m; People v. Fri a s, C.A., 66 O.G.
9411)
1) W
Without a l e ga l a r r a n g em ent s uch a s d e posit, or l e a se, th e
possession ofthe person who received property (gold, or dollar,'from
t he owner shall be characterized as physical; hence, failure to retur n
it shall be treated as taking wi t h out consent, which constit u tes theft
and not estafa.
I f the offender borr owed a cell p h one from th e offended par t y
f or an e m e r g ency c a ll , h i s o b l i g a t io n t o i m m e d i a t el y r e t u r n t h e
phone after th e call i s not w i t h i n t h e c ont em pl a t ion of A r t i cl e 315.
He merely a c q u i re d p h y s i cal p o ssession over t h e p h o n e b e cause
o th e De V e ra c a se. Runn i ng a w a y a f t e r r e c e iving t h
e c e11ph on e
sshall
a bb e c o n s i d ered a s t a k i n g w i t h o u t c o n sen t w h i h
i c c o n stit ut es
theft.
e . Ree c e i v i n g th e pr operty w it h c onsent of the owner is not t h e f t .
ut theft h a ppens when th e offender ru n a w a y w i t h t h e cell ph on e
without consent of the owner. (See: 2012 Bar Exam )
The De
D Vera principle on physical possession '
is on 1y app 1'ica bl e
i e o i g at i o n of the offender is toimmediately return th
urn e pr o p e rt y..
o en er borrowed a horse to return the same after a couple of
days, De Vera pr i n c iple is n ot a p p l i c able. In t h i s c ase, the offender
acquired juridical possession by reason of commodatum or obligation
t o return the property contemplated in A r t i cle 315. Thus s el l in ~ th e
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 593
horse to another p er son i s estafa t h r o ugh m i s a p propri ati on. (1992
Bar Exam)
E xnployer-Exnployee R e l a t i o n s h i p
A s a rule, the possession of the em ployee such as bank t e l l er ,
collector, or cash custodian is only physical. Hence, misappropriat i on
of property is qualified theft. Abuse of confidence is present since the
property is accessible to the employee. (Benabaye v. People, G.R. No.
208466, February 25, 2015; Matr i do v. People, G.R. No. 179061, July
18, 2009; Ba l e rta v. Pe ople, G.R. No. 20 5 1 44, No v ember 26, 2 014;
1946, 1952, and 1976 Bar Ex a m s )
H owever, i f t he em p l o y e e i s a h i g h - r a n k i n g o f fi c e r with
discretion on how to use property o r f u nd of the company to fur t h e r
its i n t e r est, h i s p o s session i s j u r i d i c al ; h e n ce, m i s a p pr opri a t i on
thereof i s e s t a fa . T h u s , t h e f o l l o w in g o f fi c ers, w h ose p o ssession
o ver th e c o m p an y p r o p e rt y i s j u r i d i c al , a r e l i a b l e f o r e s t af a f o r
m isappropriat in g said property :
1. A b an k pr es i d e nt w h o h el d t h e mon e y i n t r u st or
administr a t ion for th e bank i n h i s fi d u ci ary capacity with discretion
on how to administer such fund (People v. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August
6; 2014);
2. A cor p o r a t e tr e a surer wh o r e c eived t he m o n ey f or s a f e -
keeping and admi n i s t r a t ion ( U .S. v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 18056, Marc h
16, 1922; 1989 Bar Exa m);
3. A corp o r a t e o ff ic er wi t h di s c r e t ion o n h o w t o u s e t h e
bending machine owned by the corporation wi t h out it s par t i cipation
(Aigle v. People, G.R No. 174181,tune 27, 2012); and
4. Li a i so n o ff ic er of a p a w n s h op w i t h di s c r e tion o n h ow t o
use the money given by the company to secure or renew licenses and
permits. (Gamboa v. People, G.R. No. 188052, April 21 , 2014)
However, in Re mo v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 192925, December
9, 2016, i t w a s r u l e d t h a t a co r p o r a t e d i r e c tor ha s n o j u r i d i c a l
p ossession over c o r p or at e f u n d s . H i s p o s session i s p h y s i cal, a n d
thus, misappropri a t ion th ereof shall be considered as taking without
c onsent, which constit u tes theft .
Agency
If the accused received money with authority to use it to buy
palay (Cargani ll o v. People, G.R. No. 182424, September 22, 2014),
 594 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II X CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 595

o r wit h f u l l ff reedom an d d i s cr etion o n h o w t o u s e i t t o f a c i l i t a t e

i ts rem i t t a nce t o B I R a s p a y m en t o f t a x the rule on double jeopardy since estafa and th eft are not i d entical.
a x an d r ed u c e t h e a m o u n t
ue (Velayo v. Pe ople, G.R No . 20 4 0 2 5, No v e mber 2 6 ,h2 0 1 4 However, the refiling must be made within t he period of prescription
p ossession is jur i d i cal by reason of contract of agenc . T h u ), his s ince the pendency of the estafa case did not i n t e r r u p t t h e r u n n i n g
n cy. u s, f ai
'1ure of prescriptive period fortheft.
g o r et u r n i t i s e s t a fa. (Tr ia v. People, G.R. No. 20 4755,
September 1 7, 2014)
P art n e r s h i p
In People v. Lo cson, G . R. No. L - 3 5 6 81, October 1 8, 1 932, the
r eceiving t e l l e r o f a b a n k m i
misappropriated the money received A n in d u s t r ia l p a r t n er , w h o m i s a p p r opr i a ted th e p a r t n e r sh i p
b y him
h i f r o m t h e d e p ositor fo r t h e b a n k . H funds, cannot b e h e l d l i a b l e f o r t h e f t ( U . S . v . Re y e s, G. R N o.
e was fo u n d 1iable for
qua i e t ef t o n t h e t h e ory t ha t t h e possession ' n o of the t 11 2867, September 11, 1906) because his possession over the s ame is
p ysica . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n Gu z m a n v. C A G . R e. Ne e. rLi-s o n l y
n v juridical. (People v. Tan T ay C u a n , CA, 5 7 OG 6 9 6 4) Ho we ver, an
Jul
u y 31, 1956, the Supreme Court convict d . o . L - 9 572,
industrial p a r t n er , wh o m i s appropri a ted th e share of the capitali st
,

e a t r a v eIl i' n g s a les agent

or esta a or hi s fai l ur e to retur n t o his pr i n cipal the proceeds of the partner (P eople v. Cl e mente, C A, 65 O G 6 8 9 2) or t h e p a r t n e r s hi p
goods he was commissioned to sell. fund to be used in buying and selling mango (People v. Dela Cruz,
In Ch u a - Bu r ce v . C A, G . R . N o . 1 0 9 5 95 A r i l 2 7, G.R. No. 21 782, September 8, 1924) is liable for estafa because his
Su re
upreme Court explained the distin ction b t pri , 2000, t h e possession over the same is jur i d i cal .
bank e ween th e possession of a
ank tellerin Locson case and an agent ' G In U .S . v. Cl a r i n , G. R . N o . 5 8 4 0, S e ptember 1 7 , 1 9 1 0, f o ur
n in uzma n ca se for purposes
of determ'
o e t e r m i n i n g cr i m i n a l l i a b i l it y for estafa or th eft as follows: individuals ent ered i nt o a con t r act of p a r t n e r ship for t h e b u s i ness
In Lo c son c a s e, p a y m e nt b y t h i r d p e r s o ns t o t h e t e l l e r i s ofbuying and selling mangoes. When one of the partners demanded
f rom th e o t her t h r e e th e r e t u r n o f h i s m o n e t ar y c o n t r i b u t i on , t h e
o e u n s r e c e i v ed, and has no independent ri ght or t i t l e to retai n Supreme Court r u l e d t h a t " t h e a c t ion t h a t l i e s w i t h t h e c a p i t a l i st
or possess the same as against the bank. H p artner for t h e r e covery of h i s m o ney i s n o t a c r i m i n a l a c t ion f o r
an . .ence, misappropri at ion of
such funds is qualified th eft. (1975 and 20 14 Bar Ex a m s ) e stafa, but a c i v i l on e a r i s in g f r o m t h e p a r t n e r s hi p con t r act for a
liquidation of the partn er ship and a levy on its assets, if there should
In Gu z m an c a s e, an
' e e n d a a g en t c a n a s s e rt , a s a g a i ns t h is
' p , an i nd
p rincipal,
is ow
own be any. Simply p ut , if a p a r t n er d em a nds his money back, the dut y
ependent, autonomous, right u n der Ar t i c le 1914 of t o return t h e c on t r i b u t io n d oes not d evolve on th e o t her p a r t n e i s ;
the Civil Code t o retain t hee mo ne
money or goods received in consequence t he duty n o w b e l ongs t o t h e p a r t n e r s hi p i t s elf a s a s e p ar at e a n d
o t e a g e n cy; as when th e p r i n c i pal f a il s t o r e i m b u rse hi
f h distinct personalit y ."
e as ma e, and indemnify him for damages suff
w ithout h i s f a u l t . H een
n ' e s su e r e d In 1997, a case with c i r c u m s t ances similar t o th e Cl a r in ca s e
ence, misappropriation of proce d
'

estafa. e s o f sa 1e i s
was decided different ly . In Li t v a n ag v. Co u rt of Ap p e als, G . R. No.
In Ch u a - Bu r ce v.. CA,
C A su pr a, a s a b a n k c a s h c u s t o dian, t h e 114398, October 24, 1997, three indi v i d u als entered into a contract
accused, who ischarged with estafa had of partnership for the business of buying and selling cigarettes. They
'd a greed that one would contr i b ut e m oney to buy the cigarettes whil e
e missing fun ds. M i s appr opr i a t ion of such f un d i s t h e ft . I n s u m
the crime cha rged i s e stafa w h i l e t h e t he other t w o w o ul d ac t a s a g ent s i n s e l l i n g . W h e n t h e c a p i t a l i st
i e he crime proven by evidence is p artner d e m a n de d f r o m t h e i n d u s t r i a l p a r t n e r s h e r m o n e t a r y
theft.
e t. H en c e , sh e w a s a c qu i t te d o f e s t a fa. Th e a c cu
c ontribut io n b e c a us e t h e y s t o p p e d i n f o r m i n g h e r of b u s i n e s s
r u e since theft is not necessarily in clu d d ' updates, this ti me, this Court h eld the in d u st r ial pa r t n ers are liable
u e i n t h e charge of estafa. In for estafa.
sum, these two crimes are not identical .
Note: T he corn pl a i n a n t i n t h e Ch u a - B u r c e case ca In Or b e v. Mi a r a l , G . R . N o . 2 1 7 7 7 7, A u g u st 1 6 , 2 0 1 7, t h e
'
cornplaint aa gainst the employee for qualifi d t h f t ' h n r ef il et h e Supreme Court ruled that said OCP erred gravely when it dismissed
i e e wi t o u t violating the case based on the Clarin case, which has already been superseded

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 596 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 597

by Liw
L ' a n ag ca s e. Li w a n ag ap p l i es to t h e p a r t n e r s h ip a g r e e ment
e xecuted b e t w een p e t i t i o ner a n d r e s p o n dent . P e t i t i o n er's i n i t i a l
contributi ons were all for specific purposes: for the buyi ng and selling
of garments and for the salaries of the factory worke rs, respectively.
W hen respondent f a i led t o account for t h ese amount s or t o r e t u r n
these amounts to pet i t i oner u pon d e m a nd, t h er e is p r obable cause
t o hold that r e spondent m i s appr opri a ted th e am ou nt s an d ha d n ot
used them for t h ei r i n t e n ded p u r p oses. The I n f o r m a t ion for e st afa
s ould t hu s proceed. Even assuming t ha t a cont r act of par t n er shi p
was indeed entered into by and between the part i es, when money or
property had been received by a partner for aspecifi
speci c p u r p ose andd
e a er m i sappropri ated it, such par t ner is gui lt y of estafa.
Quasi-contract
A corporation w r o n gl y d e l i v ered b ags of c e m en t t o G l
en o
ar wa r e i n s t e ad o f t h e a c t u a l b u y e r t h e r e o f. H o w e v e r, Xorioso
hardw , the
manager of Glorioso har dw a re, sold th e b ags of cement t o a n o t h er
person. ( 1 986 Ba r E x a m ) A c c o r d i ng t o L u i s R e y e s, t h e p h r a s e
"under any other obliga tion i n v o l ving th e du ty to ma k e de livery of,
or to ret urn th e sa m e" i n A r t i c l e 3 1 5 i n c l u d es q ua si-contracts. In
quasi-contracts, th e p e r son w h o r e c eive
s t h e t h i n g a Iso a c q u i r e s
uridical
j uri i c a l p o ssession t h e r eof. T h u s , X i s l i a b l e f o r e s t af a t h r o u g h
m isappropriati on .
Sale
A sold a washing machine to B o n credit w i t h t h
that coul d r e t u r n t h e ap p l i a nce wi t hi n t w o w e ekse if
a B cou
un der s ta n d i n g
after te
the same B d e c ided n ot t o b u y i t . T w o w e e k s l a p s ed w i t h o ut B
returning th e a p p l i a n ce. A fo un d ou t t h a t B h a d s o ld t he w a s h i n g
machine to athird party. (196'9, 1974, and 2002 Bar Exams)
A s B chhose to r e t ai n t h e w a s h i n g m a c h in e t h e t
e re o ore i n defi n i te , b e came a u t o m a t i call y a s a l eeu nr d a en rs action,
which
he was obligated to p ay t h e p r i ce a s a g r eed upon. Since B acquire d
o wnership over the washing m a chine by r eason of sale, selling it t o
another person is not misa ppro p r i a t i o n since he is merely exercising
h is righ t a s t h e o w n e r t h e r e of. M o r eover, being th e o w ne r o f t h e
was in g m a c h i ne, B h a s no o bl i g a ti on to r e t u r n i t t o t h e
i o e p r ev i o u s
is o i g a t i on is merely to pay the price thereof. Th
is not c ommitted b ecause th e e l e m e n t s o. u s, e s t afa
o f " ob l 'i g at i o n t o r e t u r n "
an m i s a ppropriation" are not present.(Sison v. P eople G.R N .
CC
cop e,
L-48198, January 1 8, 1948) The obligation of A is only o.
civil .
I f —.he complainant p a r t e d h i s m o n e y i n e x c h a nge of s h a r e s
of stock of iGen-Portal, acorporation, as evidenced by deed of sale
o f shares of stock, neither th e accused nor th e corporation has t h e
o bligation t o r e t u r n t h e m o n e y t o t h e c o m p l a i n a nt . ( N o te : i G e n -
P ortal ha s acquired ow n er ship over t h e m o ney i n v e sted since th e
t ransaction i s s a l e) . S uch i n v e s t m en t d i d n o t c r e at e a fi d u c i a r y
relationship between th e complai n an t an d a ccused. I f i G e n -Portal
suffered loss of sales which led to its closure, and the money invested
w as not r e t u r n e d t o c o m p l a i n a nt , a ccused is no t l i a bl e fo r e s t a f a
through m i s a p p r op r i a t i on . M o r e over , t h e m o n e y w a s d e p o sit ed
u nder t h e a c c oun t o f i G e n - P or t al . T h e a c c u sed di d n o t a c q u i r e
possession ov er t h e m o n e y , m a t e r i a l ly o r j u r i d i c a l l y. S i n c e t h e
personality of iGen-Portal is separate and distinct from accused, the
veil of corporate fiction cannot be pierced by mak in g t hem l i a ble for
estafa. (' Paulo v. People, G.R. No. 225799, October 15, 2018)
L easehold T e n a n c y
Under a pa r t n e r s h ip a g r e e ment, a cap i t a l i s t w i l l p r ov i d e
seedlings and carabao while a la n d owner-farmer w ill p l a nt t h e
seedlings on his land and harvest the crops, and they will divide
the profits after selling the harvest. However, the landowner after
selling the harvest misappropriated the proceeds thereof. Since
possession of landowner over the proceeds of the harvest is jur i d i cal
due to th e p a r t n e r shi p a g r eement, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s e st afa.
(1956'Bar Exam)
Under a share tenancy agreement, a landowner will provide
seedlings, carabao an d l a n d w h i l e a te n a n t - fa r m er w i l l p l a n t t h e
seedlings on such land and harvest the crops, and they will divide the
profits after selling the harvest. However, the tenant after selling the
harvest misappropri ated the proceeds thereof. Under share tenancy
relationship, the landowner owned the crops harvested. Thus, if the
tenant sold the crops with out gi v ing the share of the landowner, the
former is liable for estafa. This ru le i s not any m o re controlli n g .
T he share t e n a ncy h a s b een o u t l a we d fo r b e in g c o n t r ar y t o
public policy. Under R.A. No. 6657, share tenancy shall automatically
be converted i nt o l e asehold t e n an cy. U n de r t h e le a sehold t enancy
relationship, the tenant-farm er as a lessee owns the crops harvested.
H is obligation i s m e r el y t o p a y t h e l a n d o w ner r e n t a ls, an d no t t o
deliver th e l a n d own er's share. H ence, failur e t o pa y r e n t al s i s n ot
estafa. (People v. Vanzuela, G.R. No. 178266, July 21, 2008) The
liability o f the tenant- fa rm er lessee is only civil.

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598 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Loan
In a contract of loan (mutu u m ), the obligation of the debtor is to
return to th e creditor am ount of m oney borr owed but not necessary
t he very m o ney w i t h t h e s a m e s er ia l n u m b e r l e n t . H e n ce, fail u r e
t o ret ur n t h e a m o u n t o f m o n e y b o r r o we d i s n o t e s t a f a t h r o u g h
misappropriation on the following groun d s:
The o b l i g a t i on to return the very property received,"wh i c h
i s an in d i spensable element of e st afa t h r o ug h m i s a p propr i a t ion i s
not present; (Kiong Yam v. M a l i k, G.R. Nos. L-50550-52 0 t b
1979) 8 D eposit of M o n e y
2 . I n simple loan (mutuum), the borrower acquires ownership
of the money borrowed, Being the owner, the borrower has the ri ht to
appropriate the money borrowed and his act of appropriation shall
not be considered as misappropriation.(Guingona v. The City Piscal
of Manila, G.R No, L-60088, April 4, 1984)
3. Un d e r the Constitution, no person shall be imprisoned for
debt
Liquidation si m pl y m e ans th e sett l in g of an i n d ebtedness. An
employee who liquidates a cash advance for travel ' ' f t
v e is i n a c p a y i n g
ac i s eb t i n t h e f o r m o f a l o a n o f m o n e y a d v a nced to h
his employer, as per diems and allowances. Similarl y, if the amount b considered as mutuum or lo an rath er t h an commodatum or contract
o t e c a s h a d v a nce he r eceived is l ess t ha n t h e a m
th
o r actual t r a v el, he ha s th e r i gh t t o d e m an d r e i m b u r s ement f r o m .
his employer the am ount h e spent coming from hi s personal f
e r words, th e m o ney a d v anced by e i t he r p a r t y i s a c t u aun ll yds.a
. is mut u u m, th e d e positary in r e c e iving t he m o n ey d e posited shall
loan to the other. Hence, petiti oner was un der no legal obligation to
return th e same cash or m on ey, i.e., the bills ( wi th t h e s a me serial
n umber), w h ich h e r e ceived fro m t h e p r i v a t e r e spondent. (K '
on e n . ( i m v.
eop e, o. 84719, January 25, 1991) This rule is ap l i c a ble to
a case involving malversation wh ere the mayor, who liqui d ated cash
a vance for travel thr ough salary and reti r em en t a d ed t'
aequi e of malversation.(Panganiban v. People, G.R. ¹. 211548
December 9, 2015)
Deposit
In estafa, it is import ant t h a t th e offender has the obli
return th ee sam e property t h a t h e r e ceived. In a cont s e o i g at i o n t o
same r act of d
(commodatu
( t ur n) , t h e o b l i g a t i on of t h e d e positary is to r e t uo rn e
t op tohseti
e positor the very p r op erty d eposited. Hence, failur e t o r e t ur n t h e
propertydeposited is estafa.
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 599
The phrase or a ny o ther obligation in v o lv ing the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same" in Art i c le 315 refers to contracts of
bailment, such as,contract of lease of personal property, contract of
deposit, and commodatum, w he rein jur i d i c al possession of the thin g
was transferred to the lessee, depositary or borrower, and wherein
t he latter i s ob l i g ated to r e t ur n —:.he same thi n g . (Murao v. People,
G.R. No. 1 4 1485, J u n e 8 0 , 2 0 0 6) If a p e r s o n, w ho i s e n g a g ed i n
warehouse business, sold merchandise deposited in hi s w a r eh ouse,
he is liable for estafa thr ough m i s appropri a t i on. (2005 Bar Exa m )
Deposit involving money without obligation to return the very
money with t h e s ame serial n u m ber d eposited is a m i s n omer since
t his tr an saction is not act u a lly a cont r act of deposit. U n der A r t i c l e
1962 of the Ci vi l C o de, a deposit is constit u ted f rom th e m o m ent a
person receives a th in g belonging to an other w i t h t h e ob l i gation of
safely keeping it an d of ret u r n i n g th e same.
In a t r a n s a ction i n v o l v in g d e posit o f m o n ey , i n t h e a b s ence
o f a s p e cia l a g r e ement t h a t t he d e p o s i t ar y h a s t h e o b l i g a t i on
t o ret ur n t o t h e d e p o sitor t h e v e r y m o n e y w i t h t h e s a m e s e r i a l
number deposited, their contr act al t h ough called as deposit shall be
of deposit. Unless there is aspecific stipulation to return the very
m oney deposited, the obligation of the depositary is merely to retur n
the equivalent a m o un t o f m o n e y d eposited. Since th e t r a n s action
acquire ownership over it . H e n ce, fail ur e t o r e t u r n t h e e q u i v a l ent
a mount of m oney deposited is not estafa because the element t h a t
the offender has the obligation to r et ur n t h e v ery pr operty r eceived
is not present. (see: People v. Montemayor, G.R. No. L-1 7449, August
80, 1962)
T he following omission is not estafa thr ough mi sappropri at i on :
failure of th e school to r e t ur n t h e m o ney d eposited by th e s t u d ent
to cover possible damage to laboratory equipment; (People vs. Mon-
temayor, supra) fa i l u re of t he b a nk t o r e t u r n t h e m o n ey d eposited
by depositor,and failure of lessor to return the money deposited by
lessee to cover possible damage to the rented apartment. In those
cases, the t r a n sactions are l o ans or mu t u u m ra t h e r t h a n d e p o sits
or commodatum. Th e l i a b i l i t i e s of t he s c hool, bank a nd l e s sors as
b orrowers are civil .
 600 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
MONEY MARKET PLACEMENT
The m o n e y m ar k e t p l a c e m en t i s a m a r k e t d e a l i n g i n
s tandardized s h o r t - t e r m c redit i n s t r u m e n t s (i n v o l v i n g l a r g e
a mounts) w h er e l e n d ers an d b o r r o w er s d o no t d e a l d i r e c tl y w i t h
each other but t h r o ugh a m i d dle man or de aler i n t he open-marke t.
It i n v olves commercial p a p er s w h i c h a r e i n s t r u m e nt s e v i d encing
indebtedness of any p e r son or e n t i t y , w h i c h ar e i s su ed, endorsed,
sold or tr an sferred or in an y m a n ner conveyed to another person or
entity, with or w i t h ou t r ecourse. (Sesbreno v. Hon. Court of Appeals,
G.R No . 84096', January 26; 1995)
T here ar e t h r e e p a r t i e s i n a m o n e y m a r k e t p l a c ement : t h e
l ender, the borrower, and the m i d d l em an .
L oan Be t w e e n L e n d e r a n d B o r r o w e r
Thh e transaction between th e l ender an d b or r ower i n a m o n e
money
market placement is loan. Thus, non-payment of loan would not
give rise to crimi nal l i a b i l it y for estafa th r o ugh m i sappropri a t ion or
conversion. (Sesbreno v. Hon. Court of Appeals, supra) The borrower
would not b e g enerally l i a bl e for e s t afa t h r o ug h m i s a p pr opr i a t i on
i f he o r s h e f a i l s t o r e p a y t h e l o a n , s i n c e t h e l i a b i l i t y i n s u c h
instance is ordinar il y ci vil i n n a t u r e . H ow ever, it is possible to hold
t he borrower i n a m o n e y m a r k e t p l a c ement l i a bl e for est afa if t h e
creditor was i n d u ced to extend a l oan u pon th e f a lse or f r a u d u l en t
misrepresentations of the borr ow er. Such estafa is one by means of
deceit. (Gabionza v. Co urt of App e als, G.R. No. 16 1 057, September
12, 2008)
Agency Between Lender and Middleman
T he t r a n s a ction b e t w ee n t h e l e n d e r a nd t h e m i d d l e m a n
i n a m o ney m a r k e t p l a c ement i s a n a g e n cy. T h er e i s a fi d u c i a r y
relationship between lender an d t h e m i d d l e m an. Th e obli gation of
the middlemen to de l i v er th e m o n ey of t he l e n d er to t h e b o r r o we r
is withi n t h e cont empl a t ion of th e p h r ase "obligation in v o l v i ng t h e
duty to m ake delivery" in A r t i c l e 3 1 5. If t h e m i d d l e m an i n s t e ad of
delivering the money of the lender to the borrower m i sappropri a t ed
i t b y bu y i n g a c ar, t h e c r i m e c ommitte d i s
e stafa t h r o u g h
misappropriat i on. H ow ever, if t h er e is no evidence, the mi d d l em an
misappropriated the money placed by the lender, the former cannot
b e held accountable for estafa thr ough m i sappropr i a t i on. (Cruzvale,
Inc. v. Eduque, G.R. Nos. 1 72785-86, J'une 18, 2009)
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 601
On March 31, 1995, afinancing company (middleman) received
from complainant (lender) the sum of P500,000.00 as money market
p lacement f c r 6 0 d a y s w i t h 1 5 % i n t e r e st , a n d t h e p r e s i d ent o f
company (middleman) issued a check covering the principal and
i nterest dated M a y 3 0 , 1 9 95. On t h e m a t u r i t y d a t e , h o w ever, t h e
company ( m i d d l e m an ) f a i l e d t o d e l i v e r b a c k m o n e y p l a c ement
w ith i n t e r e s t t o t h e co mp l a i n a n t g en d e r ) n ot w i t h s t a n d i n g
r epeated demands. Th e P r e sident i s n o t l i a b l e fo r e s t af a t h r o u gh
misappropriat ion since there is no showing that he misappropri at ed
t he money placed by the complain ant (l ender) in stead of deliverin g
it to th e b o r r ow er. (1 996 Bar E x a m ) Ho w e v e r, if t h e c h e ck i s sued
by the financing company (middleman) was dishonored, the officer,
who signed it., can be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
D iscretion t o C h o ose the B o r r o w e r
A money market placement may involve an agreement where
the middleman has th e obli gation to pl ace the m oney of the lender
t o a p a r t i c u la r b o r r o w er , ( e .g., Sa n M i g u e l C o r p o r a t i on.) I f t h e
middleman p l aces the m o ney t o a d i f f e en t b o r r o wer (e.g. Jollibee
C orporation) w h i c h i s d e v i a t io n f r o m t h e s p e cified i n s t r u c t ion o r
agreement, th e f o r mer m a y b e exposed to cr i m i n a l p r o secution for
estafa thr ough m i s appropr'iation. (See: Meralco v. Atil a n o, G.R. No.
166758, June 27, 2012)
A money mar ket p l a cement ma y i n v o lve an a greement w h e r e
the middleman has no obligation to place the money of the lender to
a particular borr ower. Un der t hi s ar r a n g ement, the mi d dl eman has
the discretion to choose the borrower wh ere the money of the lender
will be pl aced. Fail ur e of th e b o r r ower t o r e t ur n t h e m o ney pl aced
will no t e x p cse th e m i d d l e man t o c r i m i n a l a c t ion fo r e s t a fa. (See:
Meralco v. Ati lano, supra)
In Me r a l c o v. At i l a n o , s u p r a , M er a l c o ( l e n d e r) d i d n ot
present any ev idence that w o ul d p r ov e t ha t i t i n d eed gave specific
instructions for CIPI ( m i d d l eman) to invest only in the Lopez Group
(borrower). Absent an y p r oo f o f s p ecific i n s t r u c t i ons, CIP I c a n n ot
be said to have misappropriated or diverted Meralco'sinvestments.
I n m oney m a r k e t t r a n s a ctions, th e d e a ler i s g i v e n d i s cr etion on
w here i n v estment s ar e t o b e p l a c ed, absent an y a g r e ement w i t h
or instru ctior f r o m t h e l e n der t o p l ace th e i n v e stm ents i n s pecific
securities.
 602 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Discretion to select itself as borrower
I n a money market placement involving an agreement where
t he mi d d l eman h a s t h e d i s c r et ion t o c h o ose th e b o r r o wer w h e r e
the money of th e l e n der w i l l b e p l a ced, the m i d d l eman can choose
itself as the borrower. In d o ing so, the agency relati onship be-.'.ween
the middleman and l ender w il l b e converted i nt o loan r el a t i onship .
T he mi d dl em an, w h i c h a s s u med t h e p o s i t io n o f b o r r o w er , 's not
criminally l i a ble for estafa th r o ugh m i s appr opri a t i on. As borrow
s orrower,
t e m i d d l eman becomes the owner of th e m o n ey, and it s f a i l ur e t o
pay the lender gives rise to civil obligati on .
I f th e m i d d l e m an , w h i c h u s e d t h e i n s t r u m en t r e p r e senti n g
money market p l acement in p a y in g hi s debt by wa y of set-off, is in
e ffect selecting it self as th e borr ow er. F a i l ur e of th e m i d d l e man i n
its capacity asborrower to pay the lender is not estafa.
In Sesbreno v. Hon. Court of Appeals, supra, Delta corporation
(third p e r son) i s sued p r o m i ssory n ot e p a y a ble t o P h i l fi n a n ce. On
t he ot he r h a n d , P h i l fi n a n c e i s s ue d p r o m i s sory n o t e p a y a bl e t o
D elta. Complain ant (l ender) made a money mar ket p l acement w i t h
P hilfinance ( m i d d l em an) f o r a t e r m o f 3 2 d a y s a t 2 0 % i n t e r e st .
Philfinance then sold to the complain ant a sh are in pr o m i ssory note
issued by Delta. Unk n own to the complain ant, Philfi n a nce and Delta
a greed to set-off the two promissory notes. As a result, Delta's liabilit y
u nder i t s p r o m i s sory n o t e w a s e x t i n g u i s h ed. L a t er , P h i l f i n a n ce
f ailed to pay th e m a t u r i t y v a l u e of compl ai n a n t's investment w h e n
i t became due. Ph i l f i n a nce an d D e l t a w e r e m u t u a l l y d e b t or s a n d
creditors of each other by vir tu e of the promissory notes they issued.
B ut when t h e y a g r eed to set-off th e p r o m i ssory n ot es, Phil fi n a n ce
stepped into th e s h oes of D e lt a an d b e came complain a n t's debtor .
I n sum, Ph i l f i n a nce, wh ich i n i t i a l l y t h e a g ent of t h e c om pl a i n a n t ,
b ecomes th e d e b tor o f t h e c o m p l a i n a nt . C o m p l a i n an t i s s e e k i n g
the return of hi s i n v estment f ro m P h i l fi n a nce not in it s capacity as
m iddleman bu t a s d e b t or . N o n -p aym ent o f l oa n b y P h i l fi n a n ce i n
his capacity as borr ower i s not e st afa t h r o ugh m i s appropri a t ion or
conversion.
Sesbreno p rinciple can o nly b e a p p l i ed if t h e m i d d l e m an c a n
a ssume th e p o s i t io n o f t h e d e b t or . I f u n d e r t h e m o n e y m a r k e t
placement agreement, th e d ealer i s ob l i ged to i n v est th e m o ney of
the lender to a specific borrourer, the midd le man cannot assume the
p osition of th e b o r r ower or d e b t or . I n s u m , t h e m i d d l e man ha s n o
discretion to choose itself as a d e b tor. A d e a le r, w ho d e via tes from
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINS: PROPERTY 603
the specified instru ct i on, may be expcsed to crimi nal pr osecution for
estafa through mi sappropri a t ion because of the principle in the case
of Meralco.
The Se sbreno p r i n c i p le i s n o t a p p l i c a b le i f t h e m i d d l e m a n
d id not. assurre th e p o si t ion o f d e b t o r . ''Cruzvale, Inc. v. Ed u q u e ,
supra) In Za m o r a v. Ed u q u e, G. R. No. 1"? "005, January 2 5, 2 01 2,
c omplainan t O e n d er) g i v e s m o n e y t o E a s t A s i a ( m i d d l e m an ) t o
b uy fo r c o m n er cial p a p er s i s s ued b y V i t r o P a c i fi c C o r p o r a t i on
(borrower). East Asia bought commercial papers from M e tr o Pacific
and gave compl ai n an t s a l e i n v o i ces and. custodian r e ceipts. E a st
Asia acted as dealer and custodian of commercial papers. East Asia
h ad a fi d u ci ary o b l i g a t ion t o t h e l e r d e r =, both a s m i d d l e man a n d
custodian of c o m m er cial p a p ers. E ast A s i a w a s o b l i ged t o d e l i v er
the commercial papers, or proceeds thereof to the complainant.
S uch obligation t o d e l i ve r i s w i t h i n t h e contempl ation o f Art i cl e
815. Responsible officers could be prosecut d fo r estafa in case they
misappropriated the commercial papers cr the proceeds thereof. The
Sesbrer7o principle is not a p p l i c able : n t h i s c a se because East As ia
did not assume the position of a debtor. East A sia is st il l t h e agent
of the lender wit h th e obligat ion to deli ve.-commercial papers or the
proceeds thereof to the lender.
Estafa Through Misappropriation and Carnapping
T he concept o f c a r n a p p in g i s t h e s a m e a s t h a t o f t h e f t o r
r obbery. H ence, th e r u l e d i s t i n g u i s h in g t h ef t f r o m e s t afa t h r o u g h
m isappropriat ion is applicable to carnappin g .
1. S er v i c e C o n t r a c t —If thc accused received the car fro m
the owner for r e p a i r in g i t s c a r b u r e tor (S a n t os v. People, G .A. ¹ .
77429, Janu ary 29 , 1 9 9 0} or f or r e p a i n t i n g ( 1 9 91 Ba r E x a m }, h i s
possession over th e s am e i s ph y s i c al, an d . thus, m i s a ppropria t i o n
t hereof or f a i l u r e t o r e t u r n s h a l l b e c c n s i d ered a s t a k i n g m o t o r
vehicle with out consent of the owner, which constit u tes carnappin g.
2. L e ase Ag
reement — One, who hired the truck of the
o ffended part y u n t i l n o o n o f t h e s am e da y fo r t h e su m o f m o n e y ,
a cquires ju r i d i cal p o ssession th er eot. H e nce, fail ur e t o r e t u r n t h e
truck constit u tes estafa (People v. 1voven:, 4 6 O . G. 1 6 87} and n o t
carnapping. However, even if the possession of the accused is juridical
because of acontract of lease, ifviolence is committed by accused as
lessee against.the driver of the lessor to forcibly take the rented
c ar, and as a consequence, the dr i ver d i ed, th e cr im e commi t t ed i s
carnapping with homicide, and not estafa and homicide. The use of
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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
violence is not compati ble wit h t h e concept of estafa. (See: People v.
Garcia, G.R. ¹. 138 4 7 0 , Apr il 1, 2 008)
3. B ou n d a r y A r r a n g e m e n t — A f r a n c h i s e h o l d er m u s t
personally operate a passenger jeepney or taxi.That is the reason
why government regul at ion pr ohib it s operator of passenger jeepney
o r taxi f r o m l e a s in g i t . O t h e r w i se, th e r u l e s o n f r a n c h ise can b e
c ircumvented since a person not qualified to operate a public ut u i li i it y
c an still operate by s i m pl y l e a sing p assenger jeepney or t ax i f r o m
a franchise holder. Th us, in th e eye of the l aw , th e dr i ver of t ax i or
passenger jeepney under boundary arrangement is onlyan employee
o f the operator r a t h e r t h a n a l e s s ee. For b e in g a n e m p l o yee, hi s
possession over motor v ehi cle is phy sical (People v. I saac, G.R N o .
I- 7561, April 80, 1955), a nd thus, misappropria t i on thereof or failure
to return it s h all be considered as taking t h er eof wi t h out consent of
the owner, which constit u tes carnappi ng. (People v. Bustinera, G.R.
No. 148238, tu n e 8, 2004; 1980 B ar Exa m )
E stafa T h r o u g h M i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n and C a t t l e - R u s t l i n g
T he concept of ca t t l e -ru st l in g i s t h e s am e a s t h a t o f t h e f t o r
r obbery. H ence, the r u l e d i s t i n g u i sh in g t h ef t f r o m e s t af a t h r o u g h
m isappropriation is applicable to cattle-rust l i n g .
Miguel took the horse without the consent of Aniceto, the owner
t hereof, and t h e r eaft er, sold i t t o P e p i ng . Th e c r im e com m i t t e d i s
cattle-rustli ng. But if M i g uel borrowed the horse for a couple of days
f rom Aniceto, and thereafter, sold it to Peping, the crime commi t t e d
is estafa th r o ugh m i s a p pr opr i a t i on . I n a c o n t r act of c o mm o datu m ,
th eb borrower acquired thejuridical possession of the thing borrowed.
(1992 Bar Exam)
H annibal l en d h i s c ow s t o T r i s t a n o n t h e c o n d i t io n t h a t t h e
l atter w i l l g i v e a g oa t t o t h e f o r m e r w h e n t h e c ow s ar e r e t u r n e d .
I nstead, Tri stan sold th e cows and pocketed th e m o n ey. Tr i s tan i s
l iable for estafa t h r o ugh m i s a ppropr i a t ion u n der A r t i cl e 315 of th e
Revised Penal Code. He received the cows under obligation involvi n
ving
th e duty to return th e same thing deposited, and acquired legal or de
ju r e possession in doing so since their t r a n s a ction is c ommodatu m .
S ellin gt hh e cows as if h e o w ned i t c o n s t i t u t e s m i s appropr i a t ion or
conversion within th e contemplat ion of Art i cle 315. ( 2016Bar E x a m )
D omingo is th e c a r e t aker o f t w o h o r ses owned by H a n n i b a l .
D ue t o t h e n e g l ect o f D o m i n g o , o n e o f t h e h o r s e s w a s s t o l e n .
Knowing that he will be blamed for the loss, Domingo slaughtered
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 605
the other horse, got the meat, and sold it to Pastor. He later reported
to Hannibal t hat th e tw o horses were stolen.
D omingo i s l i a b l e f o r cat t l e - r u s t l i ng . A l t h o u g h D o m i n g o
received th e h o rs e w i t h t h e c o n sent o f t h e o w n er , h i s p o ssession
is merely p h y sical or de f a c to si n ce t he f o r m er i s a n e m p l o yee of
the latt er . Sl au ght er in g t h e h o r se, w h ich h e p h y s i cally p ossessed,
a nd selling its meat to Pastor shall be considered as takir g wi t h ou t
c onsent of th e o w n er , w h ich consti t u tes cat t l e-ru st l in g u n der P . D .
No. 533. (2016 Bar Exam )
E stafa T h r o u g h F a l s e P r e t e n se an d T h e f t
I n e s t af a t h r o u g h m i s a p p r o p r i a t i on , t h e o f f e n de r l a w f u l l y
received the property,but thereafter, misappropriated, or converted
it or denied its receipt. In estafa thr ough false pretense, the offender
unlawfully received the property by means of deceit. But even though
the accused received the property by means of deceit,if he merely
a cquired p h y s i cal p o s session i n d o i n g s o , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d
i s not es-.afa t h r o ugh f a l s e p r e t ense bu t t h e f t . I n s u m . r e c eivi n g
the property t h r o u g h d e ceit i s e s t af a t h r o ug h f a l s e p r e t ense; but
acquiring physical possession through deceit is considered as takin g
without consent of the owner, and thus, the crime commit ted is theft.
In U.S. v.De Vera, supra, itwas held that accused who, having
secured possession of a g ol d ba r f r o m i t s o w n e r u n d e r t h e pr e t ext
t hat he would have it exami ned by a goldsmith and t hen ret ur n it t o
said owr er, but in st ead disappeared with th e gold bar, was guilty of
theft. He i s n e i t her l i a bl e for est afa t h r o ugh m i s a ppr opri a t ion n or
estafa th "ough false pretense.
A. borrowed money from B in t h e a mo unt of P100,000.00 using
a fake title to guarantee h s obligation. A employed deceit, to acquire
ownership over the money borrowed. Hence, he is liable for complex
crime of estafa by false pretense through falsification of commercial
document.
A misrepresented that B in s t r u c t ed h im t o g et h is c ell p h o ne
from C wh e n i n f a c t t h e r e w a s no i n s t r u c t i on m a d e by B. C g a v e
the cell phone to A, who la t er sold it to a no ther person. A employed
deceit to acquire p h y sical possession over th e cell p h one since hi s
representation is merely to get it on behalf of B. Ac quiri ng p hysical
p ossession over t h e p r o p e r t y t h r o u g h d e c ei t c o n s t i t u t e s t a k i n g
without consent of the owner. Hence, he is liable for t h e ft.
 606 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
A company delivered five t y p e w r i t er s to p r ospective buyer for
demonstrati on. With out auth or ity from the company, X, its salesmar ,
m isrepresented t ha t h e w a s d i r e cted t o r e t ak e t h e m a c h i nes a n d
p ulled out th e fiv e t y p e w r i t er s f ro m t h e b u y er , wh o decided not t o
buy them. I n s t ead of r e t u r n i n g t h e t y p e w r i t er s t o th e company, X
pawned them. (1972, 1976, and 1977 Bar Exa m s )
A lthough X u s e d d e c ei t t o o b t a i n t h e p r o p e r t y f r o m t h e
prospective buyer, he merely acquired ph y sical possession in doing
so. The receipt of the machines did not vest in him the juridical
possession necessary for the crime of estafa. Indeed, he had no
authority from his employer, the owner of said machines, to retri eve
the same from said prospective customers. He evidently had misled
them into believing that in retaking said machines he was acting
o n behalf of his employer. From a legal viewpoint, he had taken t h e
m achines wi t h ou t c onsent of t h e o w n e r t h e r e of. H e nce, the cr i m e
committed is theft. (People v. Maglaya, G.B. No. L-29243, November
28, 1969)
X , servant of B, f a l s e ly r e p r e sented to t he o w n er of t h e s t o re
that he was sent th ere by B to b uy certa in g oods. By reason of such
r epresentation, t h e o w n e r o f t h e s t o r e d e l i v ered t h e g o ods t o X .
absconded with t h em . X i s l i a bl e for t h ef t s i nce he employed deceit
to acquire physical possession over the goods. (1967 Bar Exam )
E stafa T h r o u g h M i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n a n d M a l v e r s a t i o n
If a policeofficer, who arrested a person for illegal possession
o f l o o s e fi r e a r m , confiscated t h e firearm , an d thereafter,
misappropriated it , th e c r im e com m i t t e d i s m a l v er sation si nce th e
firearm un der custodia legis is invested with t he character of public
property, and the confiscating officer is accountable thereto.
(People
v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-6'063, April 26 ; 1 9 5 4; 1986'Bar Ex a m) I f t h e
p roperty c onfiscated i s d a n g er ous d r u gs , t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s
misappropriation of confiscated dangerous dr ugs u n der Section 27
of R.A. No. 9165.
The police officer asked for the licensed firearm of the offended
p arty, on t h e p r e t ex t t h a t i t s h o u l d b e d e l i v e red t o t h e P N P f o r
examination, and t h a t i t w o u l d b e r e t u r n e d i n f i v e d a ys, and once
in possession of the pistol, he sold it. The crime commi t ted is estafa
t hrough m i s a p p r opr i a t i on . M a l v e r s a t io n i s n o t c o m m i t t e d s i n c e
t e fi r e ar m w a s no t u n d er cu s todia l e gis because the police officer
did not c on fi scate i t . T h e f t i s n o t c o m m i t t e d s i n c e a r r a n g ement
involving obli gation t o r e t u r n t h e fi r e a r m a f t e r f o u r d a y s c onfers
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 667
juridical possession to th e police officer by r e ason of c ommodatu m .
(see: People v. Bautista, C.A., 48 O.G. 3430; 1986 Bar Exam)
FALSIFICATION OF D O C U M E N T , M ALVERSATION, E S T AFA
AND THEFT
There a r e t h r e e r u l e s i n co n n e c t i on w ith f a l s i fi cat io n o f
document i n r e l a t i o n t o e s t a fa , m a l v e r s ati on , a n d t h e f t , to w i t :
Article 48 of th e R evised Penal Code, rul e on separate cr i mes and
doctrine of absorption .
I . C O M P L E X C R IM E
Under A r t i cl e 48 , i f f a l si fi ca t ion o f d o c u m ent i s a ne c essary
means to commit m a l v e rs atio n, estafa or the f t, accused is liable for
a complex crime.
M alver sa t i o n
Deputy of pr ovin cial t r e asurer i s sued cedula ( now commun i t y
t ax certificate) t o fi r s t t a x p a yer a f t e r r e c eivin g t a x p a y m e nt , a n d
retained the dup l i cate and t r i p l i c ate copies of the same. He alt ered
the duplicate copy of t h e s aid ce d u la an d i s s u ed it t o t h e s e c ond
taxpayer after receiving tax payment, and then, misappropri ated the
payment. F al sify in g th e ce dula is f a l s ification of p u b l ic d ocument.
Using th e f a l si fied d o cument t o o b t ai n p a y m en t f r o m t h e s e cond
taxpayer an d m i s a p p r opr i a t in g t h a t p u b l i c f u n d s i n h i s c a p a city
as tax collector or an accountable officer is malversation. Since
f alsification o f p u b l i c d o c um ent i s a n e c essary m e an s t o c o m m i t
malversation, accused is l i a bl e for c o m p lex cr im e o f m a l v e r sation
through falsification of public document. (People v. Barbas, G.R. No.
L-41265, July 27, 1934)
E stafa t h r o u g h f a lse p r e t e n s e
T he Assistant D i r e ctor of the B u r eau of Equ i p m ent of D P W H ,
falsified official documents t o d efraud th e D PW H i n t o p a ying
t he claim s f o r fi c t i t i ou s e m e r gency r e p a ir s o r p u r c h ase of s p a r e
p arts. M a l v er sation i s n o t c o m m i t t e d s i nce th e a c cused is not a n
accountable officer. Falsification of document is a necessary means
to commit estafa through false pretense since the accused used the
falsified official documents to defr aud D P W H . A c cused is liable f'o r
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public docun:ent.
(Arias v. People, G.R Nos. 237106-07, June 10, 2019)
 608 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
A imitated the signature of the depositor on check and succeeded
in cashing said check. A i s l i a bl e for estafa t h r o ugh f a l sification of
commercial document . (1961 Bar Exa m) In c o m p lex crime of estafa
t hrough f a l sification of a c o m m e r ci al , p u b li c or of fi cia l d o cum ent ,
b efore the falsified document is actually u sed to defraud the vi ct i m ,
t he cr im e o f f a l s i fi c a t io n h a s a l r e a d y b e e n c o n s u m m a te d s i n c e
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crim e
o f falsification of p u b l ic, official or c o m m er cial document. I n o t h e r
w ords, th e c r i m e o f f a l si fi ca t ion h a s a l r e ad y e x i s t ed. U s in g t h a t
falsified public, official or comm ercial document to defr aud an oth er
is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not
b y the f al sification of t h e d o cum en t . (Desmoparan v. Pe ople, G.R.
No. 2885'98, March 27, 2019)
Theft
U pon opening a l e t t e r c o n t a i n in g 1 7 m o ney o r d ers, th e m a i l
carrier forged the signat u res of the payees on the money order an d
encashed them. (2008 Bar Ex a m) T he possession of the mail carr i e r
over the money orders is de facto. Misappropriation thereof shall be
c onsidered as tak in g w i t h ou t c onsent. H ence, the crime comm i t t e d
is qualified th eft. T a k in g m ai l m a t t e r i s a q u a l i f y in g cir cu m st ance.
Deceit employed in order to gain from stealing the money orders will
not convert t h ef t i n t o e st afa si nce th e l a t te r i s j u s t a c o n sequence
of the c o m m i s sion o f t h e f o r m e r . (1 8 8 3 S p a n i sh J u r i s p r u d e nce)
Forging t h e si g n a t u r e s o f t h e p a y e es c o nstit u t es f a l s i f ication o f
p ublic documents, w h i c h i s a n e c e ssary m e an s t o c o m m i t t h e f t .
A pplying A r t i cl e 48, he is l i a ble for complex crime of t h eft t h r o u g h
falsification of document. (People v. Salonga, G,R. No. 131181, June
21, 2001)
SEPARATE CRIMES
Ifffalsification of document is a means to conceal malversation,
estafa ortheft, the accused is liable for separate crimes. Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code is not applicable.
M alver sa t i o n
I f an a ccountable officer ( cashier, t r e a sur er, or p os t m a s t e r )
committed malversati on, and t h e r eaft er, for pu r p oses of concealing
t he cr im e o f m a l v e r s a t io n f a l s i fie d d o c u m e nt , A r t i c l e 4 8 i s n o t
applicable because falsification is not a necessary means to commit
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 609
m alversation . I n f a c t , m a l v e r s a t io n w a s a l r e a d y c o n s u m m a t e d
w hen fal sifi cat ion w a s c o m m i t t e d . H e n ce, th e c o m m i s sion of t h e
latter is not ne"essary to commit th e for m er. Th us, if falsification of
vouchers(People v. Cid, G.R. ¹s. 45649-45652, October 17, 1988;
2009 Bar Ex a m ); re port ( 1 9 88 Bar E x a m ), pa y r o ll (Regis v. People,
G.R. No. 4 6 0 64, D ecember 24, 1 9 8 8; 1 9 58 Ba r E x a m ) , o r b a n k ' s
reconciliation st at ements (1 964 Bar E x a m) is commi t t e d to conceal
malversation, the accountable officer is liable for separate crimes of
malversation and falsification .
If the amount m i sappropri a ted was not yet in th c possession of
an accountable officer,and he falsified a document, which ne used in
order to acquire possession over itfor purposes of misapp"opriating
it, the crime commi t ted is a complex crime of malv ersation t h r o u gh
falsification of do"ume nt. (People v. Barb as, G.R N o . L- 4 1 265, Jul y
27, 1984) Ifthe amount misappropriated was in the possesaion and at
the disposal ofan accountable officer and he could have appropriated
i t to h i m s elf w i t h ou t t h e n e cessity of f a l s i f y in g d ocument such a s
receipt, accused is liable for separate crimes of malversation and
falsification of document. (U . S. v. Geta, G.R. No. 17 144, September
29, 1921)
Q, a postmaster, stolea treasury warrant payab:e to R valued
at P30.00, increased the amount to P230.00 by adding figure "2"
b efore "3," an d f o r ged R ' s n a m e a s w e l l a s t h a t o f S , m a k i n g i t
appear thatR had endorsed that warrant to S and then later cashed
i t. Q t h e r e a fter m i s a p p r opr i a ted t h e a m o u n t r e p r e sented b y t h e
altered warrant. (1980Bar Exam) Falsification was not a necessary
means for th e com m i ssion of th e c r im e of m a l v er sat on, i n a s mu ch
as the amounts embezzled were in th e possession of the defendant
a nd he could h a v e a p p r op r i a ted t h e m j u s t t h e s a m e w i t h ou t t h e
necessity of falsify in g th e m o ney or ders, and t ha t i f t h e d e f endant
also commi t te d f a l si fi cati on, i t w a s d o n e f o r t h e s o l e p u r p ose of
c oncealing th e c r .'me of m a l v e r sati on . H e n ce, accus d c o m m i t t e d
separate crimes c f malversation and falsification of public document.
(People v. Uil l a n u eva, G.R. ¹ s . L- 8 9 0 4 7 -39052, October 81, 1988;
U.S. v. Geta, supra; People v. Gar a l d e, G.R c Uo. 27040, September
29, 1927; See contrary vieui P eople v. Silv a l l a n a, G.R. >Uo. L-48120,
July 27, 1985; People v. Conivi, Jr., G.R. No. L- 4 8895, Seotember 4,
1985; People v. Pepito, G.R. ¹s . 1 1 2 7 6 1 -65,February 8, 1997)
 610 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Estafa
Complex crime of estafa t h r o ugh f a l sification of documents is
committed when one falsifies certain documents to be able to obtain
money or goods from another person. In other words, the falsification
is a necessary means of commit t in g estafa. However, if falsification
is committed to conceal the misappropri a t i on, two separate offenses
of estafa and falsification are commit t ed. (Patula v. PeopLe, G.R. No.
164457, April 11, 2012)
Theft
p ossession of a c a s h ier o ve r t h e m o n i e s c ollected f r o m t h e
customer of the company is only de facto or physical. Misappropriatio n
of property physically possessed by the cashier shall be considered as
t aking wi t h out consent of the company. Thus, the crime commit t ed
is qualified t h e ft. (C r uz v. Pe ople, G.R. No. 17 6 '504, September 3,
2008; Matri do v. People, G.R. No. 1 79061, July 18, 2009; Benabaye
v. People, G.R. No. 20 3 46'6, February 2 5, 20 1 5; Ba l e rta v. Pe ople,
. No. 205144, No vember 26, 2 0 14) F a l s ification of c o mme rcial
document such as bank statement (People v.Benito, G.R. No. 86$79,
ovember 28, 1982) or d u p l i c a te copy of official r e ceipt ( 1 955 B a r
Exam) c ommit t ed to c o nceal q ua l if ied t h e ft s h a ll b e t r e a t ed as a
separate crime.
CO M M O N E L E M E N T D O C T R INE
Under the common element doctri ne, the use of damage as an
e ement of f a l sification of p r i v a t e d o cument p r e cludes th e r e -u se
thereof to complete the elements of estafa, which was subsequently
committed, and vice versa.
S ingle crim e r u l e
Twwo crimes cannot co-exist because if the element of damage is'
use i n one crime, the other crime is not commit ted because of lack of
t e element of damage. (see: C onspectus on Crimin al L a u
d by Justice
R egalado) Hence, the offender i s n e i t her l i a bl e for c omplex cr i m e
is only one crime under the common element doctrin e.
A, son of B, knowing that X'owed B P1,000.00 which had already
m atured, wr ote a collection l e t ter t o X f I 'f '
o , a si y i n g B' s signature i n
t e l e t ter w h i c h A h i m s el f d e l i v ered t o X ' th
th
o wi o u t B' s k n o w l e dge.
pai t e a m o u n t t o A an d t h e r eupon appropri ated the money for
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X. CRIMES AGAII'IST PROPERTY 611
h is personal use. The crimes commi t ted ar e f al sification of pr i v a t e
d ocument an d e s t af a t h r o u g h f a l s e p r e t ense. H ow ever, a p p l y i n g
the common el ement d o ct r i ne, th e u s e o f d a m ag e as a n e l e m ent
of falsification of p r i v at e document p r ecludes the r e-use thereof to
complete th e e l ements of e s t afa. H e n ce, estafa i s n o t t e c h n ically
c ommitted b ecause th e e l e m ent. of d a m ag e i s n o t p r e s ent . A i s
only liable for f a l sification of p r i v at e document. ( 1982 B ar E x a m )
Exempting circumstance of relationship cannot be considered since
t he crime commi t ted is falsification w h il e th e cr i mes under A r t i c l e
332 of the F.evised Penal Code are swi n d l i ng, t h eft, an d m a l i cious
mischief. (2008 Bar Exam)
D amage as a Co m m o n E l e m e n t
The common element doctrine is only a p p l i cable if d a m age is
an element common to both crime:-..
If falsification of pr i v a t e d o c ument i s a n e c e ssary m e a ns t o
commit or conceal estafa, the common element doctrine is applicable
because damage is an element corrimon to both crimes.
If falsification of pu b l i c, officiaL or, commercial d ocument is a
necessary means to commit or conceal estafa, malversation or theft,
the common element doctr in e is riot ap p l icable because damage is
not an el ement c o m mon t o b oth cr i m e s. I n f a l s if ic ation of p u b l i c ,
official or commercial document, damage is not an element.
If falsification of private document is a necessary means to
commit o r c o n c eal ma l v e rsation or t h eft, th e c o m m o n e l e m e nt
d octrine i s n o t a p p l i c a bl e b e c ause d a m ag e i s n o t a n el e m e n t
common to b ot h c r i m es. In ma l v e r s a tion o r t h e f t , d a m a ge is n o t
an element. In Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July
2 9, 2015, th e G o v ernor c a u sed th e f a l si fi cation o f p r i v a t e l e t t e r
requesting :"or financial assistance. He was able to use this falsified
private document to r elease public funds to a fi ct i t i ous beneficiary.
A pplying A r t i cl e 4 8 , s i nc e f a l sification o f p r i v a t e d o cum ent i s a
necessary means to commi t m a l v r s a t i on , he i s l i a bl e for complex
crime of m a l v e r sation t h r o u g h f a l si fi cation o f p r i v a t e d o cument .
Note: Doctrine of common element is not applicable since damage is
not an element of malversation.
Fe is the manager of a rice mill in B u l a can. In order to support
a gambling debt, Fe m ade it a p pear t ha t t h e r i ce mil l w a s earn i n g
less than it a ct u ally wa s by w r i t i n g i n a "t a l a a n" or l e d ger a fig ur e
lower than what. was collected and paid by their customers. Fe then
 612 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
pocketed the d i f f erence. (2007 Bar E x a m ) Si n ce t he p o ssession of
F e over th e m o ney collected from t h e c u st omer of t h e r i c e m i l l i s
de facto, misappropriation thereof shall be considered as taking
w ithout c onsent o f h i s e m p l o y er . H e n ce, th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s
qualified th eft. B y m a k i n g a n u n t r u t h f u l s t a t e m ent i n t h e l e d ger,
Fe also committed falsification of priv ate document. Art i cle 48 is not
applicable since falsification of document was commit ted as a means
to conceal theft an d n o t a s a n e cessary m e ans to commi t t h e r eof.
Hence, Fe i s l i a bl e fo r s e p a r at e c r i m e s o f t h e f t a n d f a l si fi cation
of private document. No t e: T h e c o m m on e l e ment p r i n c i p le is n o t
applicable since in theft like malversation, damage is not an element.
F irst cr im e r u l e
Und
nder the common element doctri ne, the accused is liable for
f alsification of pr i v at e document or estafa, whichever is commi t t e d
first.
A ccused f a l si fied a l e t t e r o f g u a r a n t e e
and u se d i t a s a
su stit ut e for money to buy sugar from th e offended party. Accused
c ommitted f a l sification o f p r i v a t e d o c u m en t a d
t f th
a se pretense. Applyin g th e common el ement doctr i ne, th e use ofh
damage as an element of falsification of priv ate document precludes
the re-use thereof tocomplete the elements of estafa. Hence, estafa
is not technically comm i t ted because the element of da m age is not
present. Accused is only li a ble for falsification of priv ate document.
( .S . v Chan Tiao, G.R. No. 12609, October 30, 1917) because it was
committed ahead of estafa.
A n agent m i s a p pr opr i ated t h e m o ne y r e ceived b r
a enc an
agency a n d f alsified unofficial receipt (pri v ate document) to concealf
the crime of estafa. The crimes committed are estafa and falsification
of pr i v at e d o c u m ent. H o w e v e r,
a pplying t h e common e l e m ent
doctrine, the use of dam age as an el ement of estafa pr ecludes the
re-use thereof to complete the elements of falsification of private
ocument. F a l s i f ication o f pr i v at e d o c u m en t i s
not t e c h nically
c ommitted because the el ement of d a m a g e
amage is n o t p r e s e nt.. HH e n ce,
accused is only li a ble for estafa. (see: Peop/e v. Beng, 40 O.G. 1913)
because it was commit ted ahead of falsification of private document.
F alsification of do c u m en t u sed as a substi t ut e for m o n e y
F alsifyin g t h e notarized letter o f gu a r a n t e e
ation of public or comm ercial document. U s in g t hori sc f ahlesified
falsification ck i s
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 613
d ocument t o d e f r au d t h e v i c t i m i s e s t a fa . S i nce f al sification i s a
necessary means to commit estafa, this is a complex crime.
Falsifying the letter of guarantee or a deman d l e t t e r i s
f alsification of p r i v at e document. U s in g t h i s f a l sified document t o
defraud the victim is estafa. Applying the common element doctrine,
the use of damage as an element of falsification of private document
precludes the re-use thereof to complete the elements of estafa. A is
liable for falsification of priv ate document because it was committ ed
ahead of estafa.
F alsification as a M e a n s to C o n c eal a C r i m e
Misappropriation of money by an agent is estafa. Falsifying an
official receipt to conceal estafa is fal sification of pu b lic document.
Accused. isliable for separate crimes of estafa and falsification.
M isappropriation of m o ney b y a n a g en t i s e s t a fa. F al sifyin g
a n un official r e c eipt t o c o n ceal e s t af a i s f a l s i fi cation o f p r i v a t e
d ocument. A p p l y i n g t h e c o m m o n e lement d o c t r i ne , t h e use of
damage as an element of estafa precludes the re-use thereof to
complete the elements of falsification of pr i v ate document. Accused
is liablefor estafa because itwas committed ahead of falsification of
private document.
F alsification of p a y r o l l
A capataz (payroll officer) enrolls two fictitious names in the
payroll and collects their supposed daily wages every payday. (2017
Bar Exam)
If the capataz is a public officer, the payroll shall be considered
a s a public document. Enroll in g tw o fi ct i t i ous names in a payroll i s
falsification of public document since the capataz made an untruthful
s tatement i n a n a r r a t i o n o f f a ct s t h e r e in . A p a y r ol l o f fi cer w h o
collects wages for distri b u t ion as salaries of public employees is not
an accountable officer. U sing the falsified document to d efraud t h e
government by collecting wages for fictit i ous employees constitutes
estafa through false pretense and not malversation. Applying Arti cle
48, since falsification of public document is a necessary means to
c ommit estafa, th e tw o c r i mes shall be m e r ged together to f or m a
complex crim e of e s t afa t h r o ugh f a l sification of p u b l i c d ocument.
(Ilumin v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 8M67, February 23, 1995)
 614 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
If th e ca p a t az i s a p r i v a t e e m p l o y ee, t he p a y r o ll s h a l l b e
c onsidered as a p r i v a t e d ocument . E n r o l l in g t w o fi c t i t i ou s n a m e s
in a payroll is f al sification of pr i v at e document. U sing the f al sified
document to defraud hi s em ployer constit u tes estafa th r ough f al se
p retense. Appl y in g t h e c o m mo n e l e m ent d o c t r i ne, u s in g d a m a g e
as an element of falsification of pr i v at e document pr ecludes the re-
use thereof to complete the elements of estafa. Hence, estafa is not
technically committed because the element of damage is not present.
The capataz i s o n l y l i a b l e f o r f a l s i f i c ation o f p r i v a t e d o c u me nt.
(People v. Reyes, G.R N o . L- 8 4 5 16, No vember 10, 1981) because it
was committed ahead of estafa.
E STAFA THRO U G H ISSUA N C E OF BO U N C ING CH E C K
Estafa th r ough i ssuance or postdating of a b o u n cing check is
committed by an y p e r son wh o defr a uds another by m e ans of fal se
p retenses or f r a u d u l en t a ct s o f p o s t d a t in g a c h e ck , o r : s s u i n g a
chec
c eck in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds
i n the ba nk , or h i s f u n d s d eposited t h er ein w er e no t s u f fi cient t o
cover the amount of th e check, provided that th e check is issued or
postdated prior to or simu l t a n eously with th e par t in g of property by
the victim. (Art ic le 815)
1. D ec e i t — To be h e ld l i a b le f or e s t a fa t h r o u gh i s s uance
of bouncing check, the accused must have used the check in order
to defraud the complainant . W ha t t h e la w p u n i s hes is the fr aud or
d eceit, not the mere issuance of the wort h l ess check. However, thi s
eceit is presumed if drawer of the check fails to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check wit hi n t h r ee days from receipt cf notice
o dishonor. (People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 1 57948, Se te m ber 4 2 0
2. U n a ut h o r i z e d S i g n a t u r e — I n e x c hange for m o n e , X
i ssued a funded check to A. Bu t X w i t h i n t en t t o d efr aud w r ote hi s
signature very differently from that registered in the bank in order
or the drawee bank to dishonor it. When the check was presented,
the bank d i sh onored i t b y r e a son of un a u t h o rized s' g
t .X '
n ei e r i a e for estafa through issuance of bouncing check nor
violation of B.P. Bl g.
. 22 s'i n ce t h e check was not dishonored by reason
ofinsufficiency of funds. However, he is liable for estafa through false
pretense. (1954 Bar Exam; People v. Bisquera, C.A., 51 O.G. 248)
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 615
ANTI-BOUNC ING CH E C K S LAW
B.P. BLG. 22
T he liabil it y o f t h e d r a w e r u n d e r B . P . B l g . 2 2 i s n o t m e r e l y
civil in ch ar acter since the law i m p oses a penalty for i s suance of a
worthless check. (2014 Bar Exam)
I f th e d r a w e r i s s ued a b o u n c in g c h eck t o d e f r au d a n o t h er
person, he can be prosecuted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and estafa
through issuance of bouncing wi t h out of fending th e r ul e on double
jeopardy. The constitu t i onal pr ovision on double jeopardy shall not
b e offended by thi s dual p r osecution since these crimes are not th e
same in character. In sum , th e charge of estafa does not include or
i s not n ecessarily i n c l u ded i n t h e c h a r g e of v i o l a t ion of B .P . B l g .
22. Estafa is ma l um i n se w h i le v io la tion of B . P. Blg. 22 is m a l u m
prohibi t um. Un l i k e in v i o l a t i on of B. P. Blg. 22, deceit employed by
the offender and damage suffered by the offended party and their
causal connection are elements of estafa. Moreover, Section 5 of B.P.
B lg. 22 provides that p r o secution u n der t h i s l a w s h al l b e w i t h o u t
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised
Penal Code. (1988, 1987, and 2018 Bar Exa ms)
Single act ofissuing an unfunded check to defraud the payee
is not a complex crime of estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Arti cle
48 of the Revised Penal Code speaks of grave or less grave felonies
produced by a single act. Since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is an offense
punishable under special law, it cannot be made as component of a
complex crime. (1987 Bar Exam)
1. M al u m P r o h i bitum an d M a lu m i n S e — In e stafa,
the fact t h a t t h e i n s t r u m en t i s s ued i s a g u a r a n tee check (P eople
v. Cuyugan, G. R. No s. 14 6 641-48, November 18, 2 0 0 2) or a
memorandum c h eck (P a c heco v. C A, G. R. N o . 12 6 6 7 0, De cember
2, 1999) is a valid defense. In malum in se principle, the criminal
i ntent of t h e o f f ender i s m a t e r i a l i n d e t e r m i n i n g h i s c u l p a b i l i t y .
T hus, th e t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i on s s u r r o u n d in g t h e i s s u a nce of t h e
checks ar e r e l e v an t i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e a c c u sed
for estafa. Th e f act t h a t t h e i n s t r u m en t i s a g u a r a n t e e check or
m emorandum check negates crim i na l i n t e nt , w h i ch i s essential i n
estafa.
I n B .P . B l g . 2 2 , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i n s t r u m en t i s s ue d i s a
guarantee check (Me riz v. People, G.R. No. 18 4 498, No vember 18,
2001), or accommodation check (Ruiz v. People, G.R. No. 160898,
November 18, 2005) or memorandum check (Dico v. Court o f
 616 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
A ppeals, G.R . ¹ . 1165 6 6 , Ap r i l 14 , 1 9 9 9 ; 1 9 9 5 a n d 1 9 9 4 B a r
xams), or there is an arr angement not to deposit the. check
v. People, G.R. No. 188825, tu n e 80, 2000) is not a valid defense. (Cueme
In
malum pr o h i b i tu m p r i n c i p le, the cr i m i na l i n t en t of th e offender is
not material i n d e t er m i n i n g hi s cu l p abil i ty . T h us, th e r eason, and
t erms and condit i ons su r r o u n d in g t h e i s s u ance of th e c h ecks ar e
i rre evant in determ i n in g th e li abil it y of the accused f ' I t'
f
g. . What is i m p or t an t i s t h a t a ccused issued a wor t h l ess
check. (Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177488, September 24, 2012)
2. U t i l i t a r i a n P r i n c i p l e — T h e p r i n c i p le u n d e rl n
c oncept o f ma l a pr o h i b i t a is the stare decisis governing a long history the
of cases involving v i ol at i ons of B .P . B l g . 22 . (Saguigui t v. Pe o l e ,
G.R. ¹. 144054 J une 80, 2006) However, in some cases involving
v iolation of B .P . B l g . 22 , t h e S u p r em e C our t u s e d t h e u t i l i t a r i a n
doctrine instead of the malum prohib i t um pr i n c iple in deciding them.
Thhe ut i l i t a r i a n th e o ry or pr o t e ctive t h e ory ii nn cr i m
' '
i n a I I aw
a rm s a t t e pr i m a r y f u n c t io n o f p u n i s h m ent i s t o p r o t ect the
society against actual and potential w r o n gdoers.
I n ut i l i t a r ia n p r i n c i p le, th e cr i m i n a l i n t en t o f t h e o ffender i s
i mportant. Thus, the reason, and terms and conditions surroundi n g
t e i s suance of th e checks should be considered in d e t er m i n in g i f
t he accused is an actual or p o t en t ial w r o n gdoer against w hom t h e
society must be protected, or a victim wh o needs protection against
suc w r o n g doer.
If the deffense of the accused is that check is a guarantee check
or memorandum check, ma lum pr o h i b i t um p r i n c i pl '
I' bl .
e e f e nse of th e accused is i l l e galit y o r l a c k o f c onsideration,
utilitar ian p r i n c iple applies.
For example, X i ssued a w o r t h l ess check as ransom paymer t
for the release of his son, who wa s ab ducted b Z t h e
a
p u e or vi ol a t i o n o f B . P . B l g . 2 2 i n v o l v in g s uc h c h eck. I f
malum p r o h i b i tu m p r i n c i pl e w i l l b e a p p l i ed, X w i l l b e c o n v i cted
s ince the reason behind the issuance of the check is inconsequentia' .
owever, making X cri m i n a ll y l i a ble would go against public policy
and common sense. (Idos v. CA, G.R. No. 110782 S
o avoi t h e a b s u r d a p p l i c a t ion of m a l u m pr o h i b i t u m , t h e
u tilitarian principle must be applied. Under t hi s pr nc pie, he
wi e a cq u i t t e d s i n c e h e i s n o t a n a c t u a l o r
wron gdoer a gai n st w h o m t h e society must be protected.o rTh po
> ot
e nt i a l
f or issuin g teh echeck,
che ec e . e reason
and that is,as payment for ransom, shall be
J9JC9B0M
I(, CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTy 617
considered in determ i n in g th e cri m i nal l i a b i l it y of X. B.P. Blg. 22 is
not violated since the check was not issued for a valid consideration.
Moreover, the exempt in g c i r c u m st ance of u n contr ollable fear of a
greater injury can be considered.
In Ma g no v. C A, G . R. No. 9 6132, June 2 6, 1992, the accused
obtained loan from a lending company to be used as warranty
deposit for leasing equipment f rom a l easing company. The deposit
is refundable upon term i n a t ion of the lease agreement. The accused
i ssued a c h eck t o g u a r a n t e e hi s l o an . T h e l e ase a greement w a s
terminated and th e equi p m ent l e ased was ret u r ned to th e l easing
c ompany. H o w e v er , t h e c h ec k w a s d i s h o n ored. T h e a c c u sed i s
not liable for v i o l a t ion o f B . P . B l g . 22 . T o c o n vict t h e a c cused of
v iolation of B.P. Blg. 22 is to unj u s tl y en r ich th e complainant, wh o
is an officerof both the lending company and leasing company. The
warranty d eposit should h av e been r ef u n ded to th e accused since
the lease agreement wa s t e r m i n a t ed . Si nce th e w a r r a nt y d e posit
is refundable, it could not be t r e ated as chargeable to the accused.
T hus, th e c h ec k c o v er in g s u c h w a r r a n t y d e p o sit , w h i c h i s n o t
anymore chargeable to the accused, cannot be considered as having
b een issued for a value or to apply on account. Using the ut i l i t a r i a n
doctrine instead of the mala prohib ita pr i n c ip le, the Supreme Court
acquitted the accused.
F or pu r p oses of v i o l a t io n o f B . P . B l g . 2 2 , t h e r i g h t o f t h e
l ending company t o c o llect th e m o ney covered by t h e c h eck f r o m
the accused is offset by the obligation of the leasing company to
r efund the deposit to the accused taking into consideration that t h e
complainant is an officer of both companies.
There are two forms of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The first for m
i nvolves issuance of unfunded check while th e second is the failu r e
to maintain sufficiency of the fund of the check.
ISSUANCE OF UNFUNDED CHECK
T he crime of v i o l at ion of t h e fi r s t p a r a g r aph o f S ection 1 o f
B .P. Blg. 22 i s c om m i t ted b y a n y p e r son w ho, k n o w in g about t h e
i nsufficiency of h i s f u n d o r c r e di t w i t h t h e d r a w e e b a nk , m a k e s
o r draws an d i s sues any c h eck t o a p pl y o n a c count o r f o r v a l u e ,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit.
T he el ement s o f t h e o f f e ns e u n d e r t h e fi r s t p a r a g r ap h o f
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) The accused makes or draws,
 618 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
and issues an y c h eck t o a p pl y o n a c count o r f o r v a l u e ; (2 ) T h e
accused knows at th e t i m e of th e i s suance that h e or sh e does not
h ave sufficient f u n d s i n , o r c r e di t w i t h , t h e d r a w e e b an k f o r t h e
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (8) The check
is subsequently di shonored by th e dr a wee bank for i n s ufficiency of
funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason
h ad not the dr aw er, w i t h out an y v a li d r e ason, ordered the bank t o
stop payment. (Sycip, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 125059, March 1 7, 2000)
Check
A check is a bil l of exchange, a negotiable inst r u m e nt , dr a w n
upon bank which ispayable upon demand.
1. F or e i g n C h e c k —Foreign check is covered by B.P.
B lg. 2 2 . A f or e i g n c heck i s s ue d i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s b u t
d ishonored by th e d r a wee bank i n a f o r e ign countr y can s t il l b e a
b asis for p r o secution u n d e r t h e b o u n c in g c h ecks l a w .
w. (2011 B ar
Exam) However, if the foreign check was issued in a foreign country
a nd dishonored also in a foreign country, the court has no territ or i a l
jurisdiction over th e cr im e of v i ol at ion of B .P. Blg. 22. (De Vil la v .
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991)
2. N e g o tiable Order of Withdrawal — A negotiable order
o f withdr awal or N O W i n s t r u m en t i s t a n t a m o unt t o a w i t h d r a w a l
s lip. It is not valid when payable to cash or bearer. Like a with dr a w a l
s lip, the n am e of t h e p a yee m us t b e s p ecified i n t h e i n s t r u m
en.t.
o wever, unlik e a w i t h d r a wa l s l ip , a N O W i n s t r u m en t a l l ow s t h e
depositor to w i t h d r a w m o ney f rom hi s b an k w i t h ou t h i s p a ssbook.
M oreover, wi t h d r a wa l s li p i s a b s olut ely no t n e g otiable, w h il e t h e
n egotiabilit y o f a N O W i n s t r u m en t i s o n l y r e s t r i c t ed. Th e w o r d
"negotiable" used to d escribe t hi s o r der o f w i t h d r a wa l i s c onfi n ed
to the first n egotiation for th e p u r p ose of clearing. In s um , i n st ead
of cashing the check from the dr awee bank, the payee can negotiate
t his in st r u m en t w i t h a n o t h e r b a n k w h e r e h e h a s a n a c count b y
d epositing i t t o h i s a c count . T o c l ear t h e c h e ck, th e p a yee m u s t
indorse it to his bank .
In Pe ople v. Re yes, G . R. N o . 1 5 4 1 5 9, M a r c h 8 1 , 2 0 0 5 , t h e
a ccused argued t h a t a N O W i n s t r u m e n t i s n o t a c h e c k s i n c e i t
i s not n e g otiable i n s t r u m e nt . H e n ce, h e i s n o t l i a b l e f o r e s t a f a
t r ough i s suance of bouncing check. Th e S u p r em e Cour t r e j ected
the argument. Same as NOW inst r u m e n ts, only the first negotiation
of crossed checks for purposes of clearing is allowed. Yet despite
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 619
t he restri ction o n t h e n e g o t i abil it y o f c r o ssed checks, t hey w e r e
c onsidered a s n e g o t i abl e i n s t r u m e n ts . T h u s , t h e r e s t r i c t io n o n
the negotiable character of t h e N O W i n s t r u m en t w i l l n o t p l ace it
beyond the coverage of the provision on estafa through issuance of
bouncing check. Negotiabilit y i s n o t t h e g r a v a men of th e c r im e of
estafa thr ough bouncing checks. It i s th e f r au d or d eceit employed
by the accused in issuing a wort h l ess check, which includes a NOW
instrument, that is penalized.
In th e Re y es c a se, t he S u p r e me C o u rt c o n s i d ered a N O W
instrument a s a c h eck fo r p u r p oses of estafa t h r o ugh i s suance of
bouncing check. Applying the Reyes principle by analogy, a NOW
instrument m ust a lso be considered as a check for pur poses of B.P.
Blg. 22. In Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108788, June 17, 1994,
it was held that the crossed checks or restricted checks are negotiable
i nstruments w i t h i n t h e c o v erage of B .P . B l g . 22 . H e n ce, a N O W
instrument can be considered as restri cted check contemplated in
the Cruz case within t he coverage of B.P. Blg. 22.
8. M em or a n d u m Ch e c k — A m em o r a n d um c h e ck m a y
c arry wit h i t t h e u n d er st anding t hat i t w i l l n o t be pr esented at th e
bank but wil l be redeemed by the maker hi m self when the loan falls
due. This un d erstanding ma y b e m a n i f ested by w r i t i n g a cross the
check "Memorandu m," "M emo" or "M e m." M e m or an dum i s deriv ed
from the Latin word "memorandus, "which means to be remembered.
Such memorandum check is just areminder that the drawer has a
debt to the payee. The payee is not supposed to present such check
to the bank for p a y m ent, but h e sh all r e t ur n i t t o t h e d r a wer u p on
p ayment of hi s d ebt. H o w ever, w it h t h e p r o m u l g a t ion of B .P. Bl g .
2 2, such u n d er standing m a y n o l o n ger p r e v ai l t o e x e mp t i t f r o m
penal sanction i m posed by th e l aw . To r e qu ir e t ha t t h e a greement
surrounding the issuance of check be first looked into and thereafter
exempt such issuance from the puni t ive provision of B.P. Blg. 22 on
the basis of such u n d erstanding w o ul d f r u s t r at e th e v er y p u r p ose
for which t h e l a w w a s e n a cted — t o p r e v ent t h e p r o l i f er ation of
unfunded checks. (People v. Ni t a f a n, G . R. N o. 75 9 54, October 22,
1992; 1994 and 1995 Bar Exa ms)
Issuance
Issuance means first d e l i v ery, p h y sically or co n structively, of
a check complete in its form to the person who takes it as a holder.
An essential element of "issuance of the check" is that the check
delivered must be complete in its form. To consider a check complete
 620 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
in its form, it m u s t be im m e dia tely demandable. A postdated check
is incomplete in i t s f or m s i n ce i t i s n o t i m m e d i a t ely d e m andable.
The physical delivery of a po stdated check, which i s i n complete in
its form, is not t a n t a m ount t o i ssuance thereof. However, there are
f our legal effects w hen t h e p o st dated m a t u r es: (1) th e c h eck w i l l
become immediately demandable; (2) the check will be considered as
complete in it s f o rm ; (3) th e dr a wer d eemed to have constructively
delivered th e c h eck t o t h e p a y ee or h o l d e r t h e r e o f; a nd ( 4 ) t h e
c onstructive delivery of th e check, which is complete in it s f orm , i s
equivalent to issuance thereof.
The issuance of present-dated check is the physical delivery of
the said check complete in it s f or m t o th e p erson who t a kes it as a
holder. On the other h a nd, the issuance of a postdated check is the
c onstructive delivery of the said check complete in its form upon it s
maturity to the person who takes it as a holder.
A postdated check must be pr esented for payment on or a f t er
the date a p pearin g t h e r eon. I f t h e p o s t d ated ch eck i s p r e s ented
b efore the d at e of m a t u r i t y , t h e d r a w e e bank w i l l d i s h onor i t f o r
the reason "po stdated." T h e d r a w e r i s n o t l i a b l e f o r v i o l a t i on o f
B.P. Blg. 22 because the check was not d i s h onored for th e r e ason
of insufficiency of funds. However, if the check was presented on or
after the date appearing t h ereon and th e same was dishonored for
the reason of insufficiency of funds, the dr awer is cri m i n a ll y l i a b l e.
Postdated check is wit hi n th e contemplation of B.P. Blg. 22. (Yu Oh
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125297, t'une 6, 2008
) the n cessary cash, Santos drew up a check for P10,000.00 infavor
V aluable Co n sid e r a t i o n
D eliberation s i n t h e Ba ta s a n P a m b a n s a i n di c a t es t h a t
CC
account i n B . P . B l g . 2 2 r e f e rs to p r e - e xisting o blig atio ns; wh i l e
"for value" m e ans an o b l i g ation i n c u r r e d s i m u l t a n e ously w i t h t h e
issuance of the check. (C hecks by An t o n io U. U i r a y, F i r s t E d i t i o n ,
p. 286) In Ngo v. People, G.R. No. 155815, July 14, 2004, the accused,
who issued the checks to settle his debt (pre-existing obligation) to
the company, was convicted ofviolation of B.P. Blg. 22. (1958 Bar
Exam)
I n or der t o c o n s t i t ut e e s t af a t h r o u g h i s s u ance of b o u n ci n g
check, the postdating or issuing a check must be the efficient cause of
the defraudation. It must be shown that the offended party to whom
the check was delivered would not h av e p a r ted w it h h i s m o ney or
property w ere i t n o t fo r t h e i s suance of the check by th e offender.
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 621
(People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 1 57 943, September 4, 2018) Issuance of
bouncing check to cover pre-existing obligation is not estafa.
T he c a u sa l c o n n e ction b e t w ee n t h e d e c ei t e m p l o ye d b y
the cffender and damage suffered by the offended party is an
indispensable element of all estafa thr ough false pretense including
that commi t ted t h r o ugh i s suance or postdating of bouncing check.
Hence, to be held li a ble of t hi s specie of estafa, it i s i n d i spensable
that the offender issues or postdates the unfu n ded check to defraud
another prior t o or s i m u l t a n eously w it h t h e p a r t i n g of pr operty by
the victim . I f t h e o b l i gation of th e d r a wer i s p r e -existing, th ere i s
n o estafa since th e p a yee or h o l der of t h e c h eck di d n o t p a r t h i s
money or property because of the issuance or postdating thereof. He
a ready parted his property before the drawer issued or postdated
the check. (1958, 1976, and 1977 Bar Exams)
I n homicide, th ere m us t b e a c a u sal connection between t h e
act of the accused in stabbing the victim and his death. To establish
t his cause and effect li nk , th e stabbing must be commi t ted pr ior t o
o r simult a neous wit h t h e d e ath of th e v i c t im . S t abbing th e v i ct i m
subsequent t o h i s d e at h i s n o t h o m i c i de. B y p a r i t y o f r e a soning,
issuance of the check subsequent to th e p a r t i n g of th e p r operty by
the offended part y i s no t e s t afa since th ere is n o cause and effect
relationship between th e i ssuance of the check as a f or m of d eceit
a nd the damage sustained by the complainant .
Santos was indebted to Perez for P10,000.00 unable to secure
of Perez against the PNB. At th e t im e he drew up the check, Santos
knew that he had no funds deposited at the PNB an d t hat he would
not at, any time be able to deposit any money to cover the face value
of the check. U pon p r e sentment o f t h e c h e ck, i t w a s d i s h onored.
Santos is not li able for estafa since the check was issued to cover a
p"e-existing obligation. (1964 Bar E x a m) Ho w e ver, he is l i a b le for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds
In violation of B.P. Blg. 22 of the first f o rm , th e fund or credit
with th e d r a wee bank m u s t b e i n s uffi cient not o nl y a t t h e t i m e of
presentment for p a y m ent or d eposit t h ereof but also at the t im e of
its issuance.
1. T h e D a t e of I ssu a n c e and P r e s e n t m e n t — I n
connection with th e second element of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, it is
 622 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
i mportant t ha t t h e accused knows the in sufficiency of funds on th e
date of issuance. Hence, the check must be unfu n ded on the date of
issuance thereof. In connection with th e th i rd element of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, it is import ant t ha t th e fund is insufficient to cover the
check on the date of presentment, and as a consequence, the check
was dishonored by the bank. Hence, thecheck must be unfunded on
the date of presentment th ereof. In sum, in vi olation of B.P. Blg. 22,
t he check must be un f u n ded at th e t i m e of it s i s suance and at t h e
t ime of its presentment for payment or deposit wit h th e bank .
But for pu r p oses of the val i d it y of i n f o r m a t i on, it i s sufficient
t hat t h er e i s a l l e gation of k n o w l e dge of i n s ufficiency of f u n d s a t
the time of issuance. Failure to allege knowledge of insufficiency of
f unds at the time of presentment t h ereof for payment w il l not m a k e
the Information defective. (People v. Laggui, G.A. No. 76262, March
16; 1989; 1991 Bar Exam)
2. D a te of Postdating or Maturity — In postdated check,
the date of physical delivery thereof is not the date of issuance since
when the check was physically delivered, it is incomplete in its form
for not being payable upon demand, which is an essential character
of a check. Thus, the date of issuance is the date when the check was
constructively delivered t o the payee upon its matu r i t y .
I n violation of B.P. Blg. 22 of the first form in v olving postd t d a nd delivered th e goods to X, i t i s i m p o r t an t t o e s t ablish t ha t t h e
ch os a e
c eck, th e a c cused m u s t h a v e k n o w l e dge of t h e i n s u f fi ci en
fu nds on the date of issuance, which i s th e d at e of it s m a t u r i t y o rf
constructive delivery, and not th e date of its postdating or physical
delivery. Conversely, in estafa th r ough issuance of bouncing h k
c i gc e c ,
thee caccused must have knowledge of the insufficiency of funds at the
time of it s p ostdating or p h y s ical deliv ery, an d not o n t h e d at e of
issuance, matur it y or constructive delivery .
Under Ar t i cl e 815 of th e Revised Penal Code, estafa t h r o u gh
issuance of b ouncing c h eck i s c o m m i t t e d b y po s t d a t i ng a c h e c k ,
or issuing a check i n p a y m en t o f a n o b l i g a t ion w h e n t h e o ff ender
had no funds in t h e b a n k, or h is f u n d s d eposited the re in w e re n ot
sufhcient to cover the amount of the check. The letters of Article 815
show that th e check has no fund, or in sufficient f un d at th e t im e of
the postdating.
Estafa thr ough issuance of bouncing check, the postdating o r
t e physical delivery o f a check must be the efficient cause of parting
o f money or p r operty of t h e o f f ended par t y .
(People v. Reyes, G.A.
No. 1$7948, September 4, 2018) The essence of this crime is deceit.
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 623
Hence, it is important t hat at the time that the accused is convincing
the complainant to part hi s pr operty or m oney, the former is awar e
that the check is unfun ded and his int en t ion is to defraud the latt er
by postdating and phy sically delivering th e check. In S a les v. Hon.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47817, August 29, 1988, accused was
acquitted of estafa t h r o ugh i s suance of bouncing check because of
the failure on th e par t of th e p r osecution to show t hat t h e accused
had insufficient funds in the bank to cover the checks at the time she
p ostdated (and physically delivered) them to the complainant .
On January 1, 1990, X physically delivered a check dated
February 1, 1990 in payment of goods sold and delivered tohim by
A. Unfort u n at ely, the check when presented on its mat u r it y d ate or
February 1, 1990 bounced for lack of sufficient fu n ds. X is liable for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 since postdated check is covered by this law.
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds on the date of issuance (date of
maturity or constructive delivery or Febru ar y 1, 1990 ) is presumed
if X failed to make good of the check wi t hi n f ive bank ing days upon
r eceipt of n o t ice of d i s h onor. H o w ever, X i s n o t l i a b l e fo r e s t a f a
through issuance of bouncing check since there is no showing that on
January 1, 1990 orthe date of postdating or physical delivery of the
check is already unfu n ded, and despite of the unfun ded condition of
the check, X used it t o defr aud A. Since on January 1, 1990, A sold
mind of X on t ha t d at e is to defraud A by p o stdating check despite
knowledge ofits unfunded condition. (1990 Bar Exam)
The criminal mind of the offender should be adjudged at the
time of the postdating and physical delivery of the check and not
when the check was pr esented for pa y m e nt . F a i l ur e t o m ak e good
o f the checks at t h e t i m e o f i t s p r e s entm ent f o r p a y m en t i s n o t
evidence that the mind of the accused is criminal when he postdated
them. The crimin a l it y of an act should not depend on a future event.
Unfulfilled promise is not the fraud or deceit contemplated in Ar t i cl e
815 of the Revised Penal Code.
On June 1, 2011, X bought a car from a company and paid
i t in cash an d i n c h eck d a ted J ul y 8 1 , 2 0 11. He t h e n b r o u ght t h e
car to a friend's house and hid it in an underground garage. The
check was dishonored for in sufficiency of funds when pr esented for
payment on due date. X was asked to honor and pay the check or
to return t h e c ar, bu t h e r e f u sed. X is not l i a ble for carnapping or
estafa thr ough m i s appropri a t ion since he acquired ownership over
the carby reason of contract of sale.Xis not liable for estafa through
issuance of bouncing check since there is no showing that the check
 624 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 625

i s already un f u n ded on th e d at e of p o stdatin g or o n J

une 1,. 201 1
used this un f u n ded check to cause th garnishment, s p u r i ou s check, u n a u t h o r i zed si gn at u re, postdated,
u se e c o m p a n y t o p ar t i t s
c ar. However, X can be held liable for estafa throu h f I stale-dated cr validity restricted, the drawer is not liable for violation
saa r ou g a se pretense
s ince byh i di in
i n g t h e ca r i m m e d i atel y u p o n b u y i n g i t i t s h of B.P. Blg.22 and estafa through issuance of bouncing check.
intention isi st o defraud the seller from th e very st art , i s o w s t h a t hi s'
throu h d 2. D A U B — DA U D (dr a w n aga i n s t u n c o l l e cted d e p osit)
s imilar t o i m a ginary
' s ar r ou g eceit
tr an saction. Xi s also liable for violation of B.P. means that th e account has sufficient f u nds on it s face but not y et
Blg. 22. (2013 Bar Exam)
available to —.he drawer because the deposit, usually a check, had not
3. K n o w l e d ge o f t h e P a y e e — Complainant's k n o w l e dge yet been cleared. The dishonor of th e check due to D AU D d oes not
o f insufficiency of f u n d s o r c r e di t t o expose the drawer to possible prosecution for estafa and violation of
th h k
deceit, which is a n e l em ent of estafa. I t s h o ul d be n oted however, B.P. Blg. 22. (BPI v. Suarez, G.R. No. 167750, March 15, 2010) Like
t e d efense in t h i s c ase is no t k n o w l d Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, B.P. Blg. 22 also speaks only of
e ge o f 'i n s uffi c iency of f u n d
y t e c o m p l a i n ant b u t l a c k o f d e ceit o insufficiency of funds and does not treat of uncollected deposits. The
n t h e p ar t of t h e a cc u s e d .
e comp ainant, wh o i s a w a r e o f t h e u n f u n de d condit ion o f t h e law cannot be int er p r eted in such a wa y as to expand its pr ovision
c heck, wa s n o t d e f r a u ded s i nc e t h e d r a w e r d i d to encompass the situation of uncollected deposits because it would
r i n ot m a de f af l s e
r epresentation that th e check is fu n ded t ' m ake the la w m o r e on erous on th e p ar t o f t h e a c cused. Cri m i n a l
n e o c o n v i n cehhim t o p ar t h i s
money. (People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154159, March 31, 2005; People v. statutes are strictly construed against the Government and liberally
Holzer, G.R No . 182328, July 20, 2000) in favor of the accused. (Dy v. People, G.R. ¹. 15 8 8 1 2,November 14,
2008; Tan v. People, G.R No . 1 41466, January 19, 2001)
I n B.P. Bl g.
. 2 2, knowledge of the accused (drawer) th at c heck
i s unfunded is an el ement of v i ol at ion t h e r eof. On th e ot her h a n d , In R a m o s v . Pe o pl e, G . R. N o s . L - 6 4 1 2 9-31, N o v e mber 1 8 ,
knowledge of the complai n a nt ( p a yee) that t h e c h k 1991, accused, a bank manager, allowed the encashment of the
a e c ec i s u n f u n d e d
no a e e n s e in B .P. Blg. 22.(Cruz v. Court of A c heck deposited by hi s co-accused despite the fact t ha t i t i s d r a w n
08788 June 17 1994) eals G.R. N . against un collected fun ds. Accused accommodated her co-accused,
notwithst an ding bank p olicy against such pr actice and the specific
Knowledge of the complainant of the unfu n ded condition of the
check negates deceit on th e par t of th e acc instruction from hi s superior to stop givin g D A U D a c commodation
u se . L akc of de c e i t i s a
e ense in estafa but not in v i o l a t ion of B.P. Bl d.
. 22 a nd despite her k n o w l edge that p r i o r c h ecks deposited by he r c o -
o . . g. si n ce t h e l a t t e r accused turned out to be unfu n ded. These circumstances show that
is malum pr o h i b i t u m. (2002 and 2013 Bar Exa ms)
the accused in conspiracy wit h h r c o - accused defrauded the bank .
Dishonor In fact, there was one check where proceeds of its wi t h d r a wal w ent
into the personal account of the bank manager. She was found guilty
To be held liable for violation of B.P. Bl . 22 of estafa.
suance o g. an d e s t afa thr ough
o uncing check, i t i s i n d i s p ensable t ha t t h
d ishonored e a e ch means
eck is 3. D A I F a n d St o p Pa y m e n t —The crime of violation of first
e yb the
t drawee bank by reason of DAIF, which
d rawn against insufficient fu n d . paragraph of Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 is committed if the check issued
by the accused is subsequently c i sh onored by th e d r a wee bank for
1. Clo
osed Account — Dishonor of t h e c h e ck by r e a s on of insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the
closed account is covered by B.P. Bl . 2 2. Th
g. . e t e r m " c l osed accounts" same reason had not the dra we r, wit h o ut a ny v a l id r e ason, ordered
wi in e mea n i ng o f the p hrase
h d oes not have sufficient fu n d s the bank to stop payment.
in or credit with th e drawee bank" in B.P. Bl . 22. (Y
ppeals, G.R No . 125297, June 6, 2003; 1996 Bar Exam) T he p h r a s e "for th e sa m e r e a s o n" m e a n s f o r r ea s o n o f
insufficiency of funds or credit. In sum, to be held liable for violation
Drawee bank d i s h onored check p r esented for
p resen e f o r p a y m en t f o r a o f B.P. Blg. 22 involving stop payment, it i s i n d i spensable that t h e
r eason other t h a n D A I F
o r closed account, such as D A U D u n d e r check wou d have been dishonored :or th e r eason of insufficiency of
funds or credit had not the drawer ordered the bank to stop payment.

J9JC9B0M
 626 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
To violate B.P. Blg. 22, the reason behind th e dishonor of the check
m ust be a combination of stop-payment order and DA I F .
I f the check was dishonored by reason of stop payment/DA I F ,
the accused is liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. On the other hand,
if the check was dishonored by reason of stop payment/funded, the
accused is not liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. (Tan v. People', G.R.
No. 141466, Jan u a ry 19, 2 00 1) A check di shonored by th e d r a w ee
bank due to "sto p payment 17 c a n n ot be a basis for prosecution under
t he bouncing checks law if dr aw er's deposit was sufficient to fund it .
(2011 Bar Exam)
P resumpt ion i n B .P . B lg. 22 and E s t a f a
S ection 2 of B . P . B l g . 2 2 p r o v i des a r u l e o n p r e s u m p t ion o f
nowledge of insufficient f u n ds, which is an element of vi olation of
B.P. Blg. 22. On the other h a nd, Ar t i cl e 815 of the Code provides a
rule on presumption of deceit, which is an element of estafa through
issuance of bouncing check.
1. P r es u m p t i o n o f D e c e i t — U n d e r A r t i c l e 8 1 5 o f t h e
Revised Penal Code, the failure of the drawer of the check to deposit
t e a m o un t n e cessary t o c over h i s c h eck w i t h i n t h r e e d ay s f r o m
receipt of notice from the bank an d/or the payee or holder that sai d
c eck has been di shonored for l ac k o f i n s uf fi ciency of f u n d s sh al l
e prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.
T he p r e sum p t io n o f d e c ei t i n e stafa t h r o ug h i s s u a n ce
bouncing check can stil l b e r eb u t ted by: (1) proof that t h e check isof
issued in payment of a pre-existing obligati.on or (2) evidence of good
ait . Ho w e ver, s imply empty pro m i se to pay complainant the value
o th e bu m c h ecks issued in o r der t o i n d u ce her t o p a r t w i t h h e r
p roperty i n f a vor o f a ccused is not a n e v i d ence of good fait h t h a t
will rebut the presumption of deceit. (see: Peo le v. 0' e da, G.R. N
-58, tu ne 3, 2004, Corona; Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 166810,
tune 26; 2008, De Castro; Recuerdo v. People, G.R. No. 16'821 7 J
p e, o. , une
27, 2006)
2. P r es u m p t i o n o f K n o w l e d g e
o f I n s u f f i c i e nc y o f
Funds — U nder Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22, the maki n g, drawi ng a nd
issuance of a check payment which is refused by the drawee because
of insufficient f u n d s i n o r c r e di t w i t h s u c h b a nk , w h e n p r e sented
within 9 0 da y s fr o m t h e d a t e o f t h e c h e c k, s h a ll b e p r i m a f a c i e
evi ence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit un l ess
s uch maker o r d r a w e r p a y s t h e h o l d e r t h e r eof t h e a m o un t d u e
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 627
thereon, or makes arr angements for payment i n f u l l b y th e dr aw ee
of such chec- w i t h i n f i v e b a n k in g d ay s a f ter r e ceiving no t ice that
such check Ims not been paid by the drawee.
The p r e s u m p t io n o f k n o w l e d g e o f i n s u f fi c i en t f u n d s i s
rebuttable. Proof of lack of such knowledge is a defense in violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. (Li m v. People, G.R. No. 130038, Sep:ember 18, 2000;
Dingle v. I n t e r m ediate Appellate Court, G . Pi. No. L- 7 5 243, M a r c h
16, 1987)
T here ar e t h r e e r e q u i s i tes t o a v a i l o f t h e p r e s u m p t io n o f
knowledge cf insufficient fu nds in B .P. Blg. 22, to urit:
1. T h e c h eck was presented within 90 days from the issuance
of the check,
2. Th e a c c used received a wri t ten notice of dishonor; and
8. T h e a c c u sed fail s t o pa y t h e h o l der t h e=eof, or t o m a k e
arrangemer ts for payment in full by the drawee of such check withi n
five banking days after receiving notice of dishonor.
P resentm en t of th e C h e c k
1. P r es e n t m e n t w i t h i n 9 0 D a y s —To presume knowledge
of insufficient f u nd s as an el ement of vi ol ation of B .P. Blg. 22, th e
c heck mus t b e p r e s ented fo r p a y m en t w i t h i n 9 0 d a y s f r o m t h e
date of issuance. If th e check is pr esented beyond the period, such
knowledge is not p r e sum ed, Bu t t h e p r o secution "a n s t il l p r e sent
e vidence, d "ect or ci r c u m st an t i al , t h a t t h e a ccused at th e t i m e of
issuance of check knew that it was unf u n d ed. (Kong v. CA, G.R. ¹.
117857, February 2, 2001) Hence, the action for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 can proceed despite the presentation ofthe check beyond 90-day
period. (2018 Bar Exam) For example, knowledge of insufficiency of
funds is established from th e f act t h a t t h e a ccount of th e accused
was closed more than four years prior to the issuance of the subject
checks (Nagram pa v. People, G.R. No. 14 6 211, August 6, 2 002) or
w here th e a c cused r equested th e c o m p l a i n an t n o t t o e n c ash t h e
check wit h : h e p r o m ise that he would replace it wit h cash. (Arceo v.
People, G.R. ¹ . 142 6 4 1, Ju ly 17, 2006)
The essence of estafa by issuing a bouncing check is using an
unfunded check t o d e f r au d t h e v i c t i m . P r e sentation of t h e c h eck
within 9 0 cl ays is neit her a n e l e m ent of e st afa nor a r e q u i r ement
to avail of the rule on presumption of deceit as an l e m e n t of estafa
through issuance of bouncing check. Thus, action for estab can
 628 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
proceed despite the presentation of the check be ond 90-d
e yon - ay p e r'i od.d .
(2018 Bar Exam)
2. P r es e n t n i e n t W i t h i n S i x M o n t h s — A check m u st b e
presented withi n a r e asonable time from issu . B
i ssue. y c u r r e n t bb a nkk'i n g
p ractice, a check becomes stale after m or e t ha n si x m o n t hs. If t h e
check is p r e sented fo r p a y m en t a f t e r s i x m o n t h s f r o m i s s u a n ce
thereof, i t w i l l b e d i s h o n ored fo r b e i n g st a l e d a t e d. H e n c e, t h e
accused is not li a ble for estafa t h r o ugh issuance of bouncing check
and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because the check is not dishcnored by
reason of insufficienc y off funds,f which is an i n d i spensable element
of these crimes. (see: Pacheco v. CA G. R . N o. 12 66'70 D
b
99; Wong v. C A, G . R. No . 11 7 8 57, Fe bruary 2, 2 0 0 1; 20 11 B a r
Exam)
Notice of Di sh on or
Notice of dishonor i s r e q u i red t o a v ai l o f t h e p r e sum p t ion of
eceit at the time of issuance or postdating of the check, which is an
element of estafa; and the presumption of kn owl edge of insufficient
funds at th e t i m e of i s suance of the check, wh ich i s an e l ement of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
l. W r i t t e n N o t i c e —In B . P. B l g. 2 2, notice of di s honor of
a check to the m aker m ust be in w r i t i n g . A m er e oral n o tice to th e
rawer or maker of th e di shonor of his check is not enough. (Sia v .
G.R. No. 149695, April 28, 2004)
I n estafa, verbal notice of dishonor th r ough phone is sufficient
to give rise to pri ma f a c ie evidence of deceit. (Lopez v. People, G.R.
No. 16'6'810, June 26, 2008)
2. Gr ac e Pe r i o d f r on i R e c e ipt — I n B . P. B l g. 2 2, t h e
accused must make good ofthe check within five banking days from
receipt of notice of dishonor. Sunday i s no t a b a n k in g d ay . H e nce,
i t shall no t b e c onsidered i n c o m p u t i n
i ng th efi ve--da y g r a c e p e r i o d
t o make good of th e check. H ow ever, t h ere ar e ba nk s (e
which areopen on Sundays. Ifthe check is drawn on a bank,, BDO),
which
operates on Sundays, Sunday shall be considered as a banking day.
Letter containing notice of dishonor and demand t
ree days will neither shorten the grace period of five
three n banking
o p ay w daysi'th'i n
n or invalidate the notice. In B .P. B l . 2 2
g. , w hatt i' s i m p o r t an t i s t h e
notice of dishonor and not the demand to pay. (Arceo v. Peopte, G.R.
No. 142641, July 1 7, 2006)
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 629
In estafa, the accused must make good of the check within thr ee
days, bankin g or n o n -bank i ng , f ro m r e ceipt o f n o t ice of di shonor,
written or verbal, to negate the presumption of deceit.
3. E f fec of Lack of Notice — Notice of dishonor i" not an
element of violation of B.P.Blg. 22 on the following reasons:
1. T h e e l e m e nt s of v i o l a t ion of S ection 1 of' B.P. Bl g .
22 are logically found in Section 1, and not in ot her pr ovision.
The notice of dishor or is not wr i t t en in Section 1; it is found in
Section 2, which provides the rule on presumption of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds;
2. I n Ba u ti s t a v. Co u r t o f A p p e a ls, G.R. N o. 14 8 375,
July 6 , 2 0 0 1, t he S u p r e me C o urt s a id t h a t v i o l a t i or o f B . P .
B lg. 2 2 c o n s u m m a tes u p o n t h e d i s h o no r o f t h e c h e c k f o r
insufficiency of funds or credit.
Settled is the rule that a consumma ted crime contains all
the ingredients provided by law i n defi n in g it . H ence, matter s
that t r a n s p ired a f ter t h e c o nsum m a t ion of t h i s o f f ense such
as receipt of notice of dishonor could not be considered as an
e lement th r e o f .
3. I n v i o l a t o n o f B . P . B l g . 22, if t h er e i s n o n o t ice of
dishonor, th e accused wil l b e d e p r i ved of du e p r ocess of law
f or failure to give hi m o pport u n it y t o ex ercise his r ' ght u n d er
the law to avoid cri m i nal l i a b i l it y by m a k in g good of the check
or arrangement for payment within five banking days from
r eceipt of such n o t i ce. In s u m , t h e a ccused wil l b e a cqui t t e d
because of deprivation of due process of law (Yu Oh v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 125297, tune 6, 2008; King v. People, G.R.
No. 181540, December 2, 1999); and not by reason of failure of
the prosecution to prove all elements of violation of B.P.Blg. 22.
At any rate, tl e Supreme Court in Campos v. P ople, G.R.
No. 187401, September 17, 2014 stated that notice ofdishonor
is not an element o:" violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Although notice of dishonor is not an element of violation
of B.P. B l g . 2 2 , i t i s ev i d e n t i a ry i n d i s p e nsabletc e s t a blish
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused received notice of
dishonor. Absent proof that the accused received written notice
of dishonor, a prosecution for violation of the B.P. Blg. 22 cannot
prosper be "ause of deprivation of due process of law o" right to
avert crim'nal action. (Sia v. G.R. No. 149695, Aprit 28, 2004)
 630 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
In Resteriov.People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012,
t he Supreme Cour t s ai d t h a t i t c a n n o t p e r mi t a d e p r i v a t i o n
of the accused of this st at u t ory r i gh t b y no t gi v in g th e pr oper
notice of dishonor. (2015 Bar Exam)
What is required under the law and jurisprudence so as not
to deprive the accused of his right to avert crim i nal prosecution
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is notice of dishonor and not demand
letter. Thus, lack of demand letter is not a defense in violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. (2014 Bar E x a m) H o w e ver, a demand letter m a y
contain a notice of dishonor.
A n a c q u i t ta l b a s e d o n l a c k o f p r o o f o f g u i l t b e y o n d
reasonable doubt by reason of failure to establish receipt of
notice of dishonor, which is i m p o r t an t t o afford due process of
law, does not preclude the award of civil dam ages. (San Mateo
v. People, G.R. ¹. 2 0 0 0 9 0,Ma r ch 6, 2018)
I n estafa, if t h er e i s n o n o t ice of d i shonor, deceit as an
element of estafa, is not presumed. But despite the lack of notice,
the accused can be convicted of estafa since the prosecution can
still prove the existence of deceit. For example, if th e accused
knows that h i s c h ecking account i s c l osed, and d espite such
k nowledge, he used the check to defraud th e complainant , h e
is still liable for estafa despite lack of notice of dishonor, which
is not an element of t hi s cr i me. (see: Lopez v. People, G.R. No.
16'6810, June 26, 2008)
4. R eceipt ofNotice of Dishonor — To cause the conviction
o f the accused for v i o l a t ion of B . P . B l g . 22 , i t m u s t e s t a b lish t h e
a ccused received th e n o t ice of d i s h onor an d n o t m e r el y t h a t t h e
complainant sent the notice to him. The registry return card (registry
receipt) must be properly aut h en t i cated in order to serve as proof of
receipt of the notice. (People v. Oj eda, G.R. ¹s . 10 4 2 3 8 -58 J
os. -6, un e 8 ,
2004)
Th
he following pieces of evidence will not prove that the accused
received the notice:
1. U n au t h e n t i c ated registry r eceipt (S u a rez v. People,
G.R. No. 172573, June, 19, 2008);
2. R e g i s tr y r e c e ip t w i t h i l l e g i b l e
signature ( C h a n -
Azajar v. Co u r t o f A p p e a l s, G . R. N o . 14 0 6'6'5 N
ovem ber 1 3 ,
2000);
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 631
3. C e rtification that registered mail was returned to
sender witscut proof that despite of receipt of post office notice
he unjustifiably r e f u sed to claim t h e r e gi stered mail (K i n g v .
People, G.R. No. 181540, December 2, 1999); or
4. Regi s t r y re t u rn r e ceipt with t he notation "N/S Party
Out." (San Mateo v. People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6; 2018)
I f the check is corporate, the notice of dishonor m ust b e
sent to the one who signed the check and not to the corporation.
C rimina l " e s ponsibilit y u n d e r B . P . B l g . 2 2 i s p e r s o na l t o
t he si gn atory ; h e n ce, p e r sonal k n o w l e dge o f t h e n o t i c e o f
dishonor is necessary. Consequently, constructive notice to the
corporation is not enough to satisfy due process. (Lao v. Court
of Appea~'s, G.R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997) Since the penalty
is imposable against thesignatory and not the corporation, itis
only fair t ha t th e letter contain ing the notice of dishonor must
be addressed to him.
Other than provmg that the accused received the notice of
dishonor, the prosecution must lik ew ise show the date when he
received it.Without proof of date of receipt, there is no way to
a scertain when th e fi v e-day period under th e law w o ul d st ar t
and end. It cannot simply presume that the date of the demand
letter was likewise the date of receipt thereof. Hence, the
accused must be acquitt ed. (Chua v. People, G.R N o . 19 6 853,
July 18, 2015)
Exertir g efforts to reach an amicable settlement wit h h er
creditor after th e checks which she issued were dishonored by
the drawee bank is a circumstantial evidence of receipt of notice
of dishonor. Accused would not h av e ent ered int o th e a l l eged
arrangements if she had not received a notice of dishonor from
her creditor and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her
funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.(Campos
v. People, G.R. No. 187401, September 17, 2014)
5. Di s p e n s at ion of N o t ice of D i sh onor — Under Section
1 14 of the N e got able I n s t r u m e nt s L a w , n o t ice of d i shonor i s n o t
r equired to be given to th e dr a wer w h ere the l a t ter has no ri ght t o
expect or require that the drawee bank will honor the check. Since
b ank account of t h e a c cused wa s a l r e ady c l osed even before t h e
i ssuance of the subject check, he had no r i gh t t o expect or r e qui r e
the drawee bank to honor his check. He is not entitled to be given
a notice of dishonor. Hence, deceit as an element of estafa is still
 632 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
presumed although t h ere is no notice of dishonor. (Lopez v. People,
G.R. No. 166810, tune 26, 2008)
The Lopez case involved estafa th r o u gh i s s uance of bouncing
check. But it is submi t ted that th e Lo pez principle can be applied to
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Under Section 112 of the N egotiable In st r u m e nts L aw , noti ce
of dishonor is dispensed with w h en, after the exercise of reasonable
diligence, it cannot be given to or does not reach the part ies sought
to be charged. If th e a d dr ess of the offender is u n k n o wn , n ot ice of
d ishonor is not n e cessary to convict a p e r son for v i o l a t ion of B . P .
Blg. 22. (Y'ulo v. People, G.R. No. 142762, March 4, 2005)
Payment
Payment is a mode of extinguishing civil liabili t y, but it is not a
mode of criminal exti n ction li sted in A r t i cle 89 of the Revised Penal
Code. But payment may be used as adefense in violation of B.P. Blg.
22 and estafa.
1. P ay m e n t i n B . P . B l g . 2 2 — T h e f u l l p a y m e nt o f t h e
amount appearing in the check wit hi n five bank ing days from notice
of dishonor is a complete defense (People v. Suarez, G.R. No. 1 72573,
tune 19, 2008; King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999)
regardless of the strength of the evidence offered by the prosecution.
(Meriz v. Pe o p l e, G . R. N o . 13 4 4 9 8, No v e m ber 1 3 , 2 0 0 1 ) S u c h
payment will not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender
w hich he incur red w hen th e b an k d i s h onored the check but i t w i l l
avert crim i nal pr osecution under B.P. Blg. 22. Averting prosecution
within the grace period is a right given by law. (Sia v. People, G.R.
No. 149695, April 28, 2004; 2011 Bar Exam )
Full payment of a check after the expiration of the grace period
but before the filing of Information is also a complete defense in
B .P. Blg. 22. The spi ri t o f t h i s l a w , w h i c h i s t h e p r o t ection of t h e
credibility and stabil it y of the bank in g system, would not be served
b y penalizing people who h av e evidentl y c orr ected th ei r m i s t a k e s
and restituted damages even before charges have been filed against
them. In sum, by making payment of the check before the filingof
the Information, the purpose of the law has already been attained.
(Lim v. Pe ople, G.R. N o . 1 9 0 8 34, N o v ember 2 6 , 2 0 1 4) T h u s , t h e
following payments are valid defense:
1. P ay m e n t a f t er r eceiving subpoena from the office of
city prosecutor. (Lim v. People, ibid.)
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
2. P ay m e n t t h r o u g h n o t a r i a l f o r e closure t w o y e a r s
before the filling of cases. (Griffith v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 129764,
March 12, 2002)
3. P ay m e n t si x m o n th s before the fi l in g of case. (Cruz
v. Cruz, G.R. No. 154128, February 8, 2007)
Payment of a check after the fil in g of Inform a t ion is not a
defense in B.P. Blg. 22. Since there is no showing of int enti on
to mitigate or t ot ally a l l evi ate the il l e f fects of his issuance of
the unfunded check, then th ere is no equitable and compelling
reason to preclude the prosecution of accused. In such a case,
the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent. (Lim v .
People, supra)
2. P a y m e n t in Estafa — In estafa, damage and deceit are
the essential elements, and the check is merely the accused's tool in
committin g deceit that causes damage to the complainant. I n s u ch
a case, paying th e v a lu e of th e d i sh onored check w il l n o t f r e e t h e
a ccused from criminal liabil i ty . It will merely satisfy the civil liabilit y
of the crime but not the crim i nal li abi l i ty . (Li m v. People, supra ) The
l aw puni shes the offended because of the cr i m i n a l it y i n h i s m i n d ,
which had manifested when he defrauded the complainant by using
a n unfu n ded check. Despite th e p a y m en t o f t h e c h eck b efore t h e
filing of inform at i on, the pur pose of the law in p u n i s h in g evil act of
defrauding the victim w il l not be att ai n ed.
The essence of estafa is to punish fr a ud, and not to protect the
i ntegrity of the check. Payment before the fil in g of I n f or m a t ion w i l l
serve the purpose of B.P. Blg. 22, and that is, to protect the integrity
of the check, but not for purposes of penalizing estafa. Thus, such
paymenr. is a defense in B.P. Blg. 22 but not in estafa.
H owever, t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of deceit ma y b e r eb u t t e d b y
showing the accused fully paid the entir e amount of the dishonored
checks, which is indicative of good faith. (People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos.
104238-58, tu ne 3, 2004)
It is submi t ted t hat i f t h er e is actual evidence of deceit, proof
o f payment i s no t a d e f ense in e st afa. Proof of deceit t h r o ugh t h e
issuance ofunfunded check and the damage suffered by complainant
as a consequence will cause the conviction of the accused for estafa
d espite ful l p a y m en t o f t h e c h eck a f ter t h e c onsumm at ion of t h i s
crime.
P ayments m a d e a f t e r t h e p r o m u l g a t io n o f d e c i sion b y t h e
Court of Appeals is not an evidence of good faith. The consent of
 634 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
t he private complainant t o a ccused's payment of he r c i vi l i a b i l i t y
pendente lite does not entit le the la t t er to an a cquitt a l. Subsequent
payments do not obli t er ate th e cr i m i n a l l i a b i l ity al r e a dy i i i c u r r e d .
(Recuerdo v. People, G.R. ¹. 1 6 '821 7,
June 27, 2006)
3. S u s p e n s i o n of P a y m e n t — Su s p e nsion of paym ent
order issued by SEC before the check was presented for payment i s
a defense in violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Considering that t h er e was a
lawful order from the SEC, the contract is deemed suspended. When
a contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it
a gain becomes operative when a condit ion occurs — o r a s i t u a t i o n
a rises — w a r r a n t i n g t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e s u s p ension o f t h e
c ontract. When a cont r act i s su bject t o a s u spensive conditio~, i t s
b irth t a kes place or its effectivity commences only if an d w hen t h e
event that constit u tes the condition happens or is fulfil l e d. Thus, at
the time complainant pr esented the check for encashment, it had no
right to do so, as there was yet no obligation due from accused. Thus,
accused is not liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. (Gidwani v. People,
G.R. No. 195064, Ja n u a ry 1 5 , 2 0 1 4) In s u m , t h e c h e ck cannot b e
c onsidered to h ave been issued to ap ply on a ccount or fo r a v a l u e
if the obligation of th e d r a wer t o f u n d t h e c h eck is i n t h e s t at e of
suspension due to the order of the SEC.
It is submitted that suspension of payment before the expiration
of the fivebanking days from receipt of notice of dishonor is also a
defense in violation of B.P. Blg. 22 since it w il l d epr ive the accused
of his right to avert crim i nal prosecution because he cannot anymore
make good of the check wit hi n th e period.
Suspension of pa y m ent o r der i s sued by SE C a f t er expir at io n
of the five banking d a ys f r om r e ceipt of n o t ice of dis honor i s n ot a
defense in v i o l at ion of B . P . B l g . 22 . S i nce t h er e i s n o s u spension
o rder when th e check was pr esented for p a y m ent, th e d ra w r w a s
not precluded from fun d ing the check at that t i m e. Because there is
no suspension of payment when the notice of dishonor was received,.
the drawer w a s n o t a l s o p r e cluded f r o m m a k i n g g ood t h e c h eck
within th e five bank in g days grace period. (see: Rosario v. Co, G.R.
No. 1886'08, August 26, 2008)
4. N ov a t i o n — N o v a t i o n i s similar t o p a y m e n t ' n th e
s ense that both of t h e m a r e m o des of ext i n g u i shing ci vi l l i a b i l i t y ;
but not the criminal liability of the offender. Settled is the rule
t hat payment m a d e w i t h i n t h e fi v e - day gr ace period or before th e
filii ng of i n f o r m a t ion i n c o ur t i s a d e f e nse. By t h e s am e p a r it y o f
r easoning, novation made wit hi n th e said period or before the fili n
e ing
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 635
o" Information ma y a lso be considered as a defense in v i ol ation of
B.P. Blg. 22. (2 014 Ba r E x a m ) Mo r e o ver, compromise agreement
(or novation) can be considered as an ar r a n gement for full payment
within the five-day grace period which is a mode of averting crimi n al
prosecution un der Section 2 of B .P . B lg . 22. (Id os v. C A, G . R. No .
110782, September 25, 1998)
H owever, the acceptance of partial p a y m ents, wi t h out f u r t h e r
change in th e o r i g i nal r e l a t ion b e t w een dr a wer an d p a yee cannot
produce novation. (Deganos v. People, G.R N o . 16 2826, October 14,
2018; 2014 Bar Exam)
FAILURE TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS
The violation of the second paragraph of Section I of B .P. Blg.
22 is committed by a person who makes or draws and issues a check
with sufficient fu nds or credit w it h t h e d r a wee bank, but he fails to
keep sufficient fu nds or credit for 90 d ays from th e d ate appearing
t hereon, w h ic h c h eck i s s u b sequently d i s h onored b y t h e d r a w e e
bank for such insufficiency.
In violation of first p a r a gr aph of Section I o f B .P. Blg. 22, the
drawer kn ows the "in s ufficiency of fund s" t o cover the check at t h e
time of its issuance; while in vi ol ation of the second paragraph, the
drawer has "sufficient funds" at the time of issuance but fails to keep
s ufficient f u n d s o r m a i n t ai n c r e di t w i t h i n 9 0 d a y s f r o m t h e d a t e
appearing on the check.
In sum, in violation of the first paragraph, the check is unfunded
a : the time of issuance; while in v i ol at ion of second paragraph, th e
check isfunded. The act punishable under the first paragraph is the
i ssuance of a bum check; wh il e th e om ission pu ni shable under t h e
s econd paragraph i s t h e f a i l ur e t o m a i n t ai n t h e s u f ficiency of t h e
check for 90 days.
X issued a fun ded check to A. Af t er t he i ssuance of the check,
X closed her account. By r eason thereof, the check was dishonored.
The argument of X that she is not li able for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
s ince at th e t i m e of i s suance, she had adequate fu nds in t h e b a n k
i s not tenable. X is l i a ble for vi ol ation of B .P. Blg. 22 for fa i l ur e t o
rraintain the sufficiency of the funds for 90 days from the issuance
thereof. (1996'Bar Ex a m )
I n the offense under th e fi r s t p a r a g r a ph, pr esentation of t h e
check wi t h i n 9 0 d a y s f r o m i t s m a t u r i t y d a t e i s n o t a n e l e m ent
 636 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
thereof. But such presentation w i t h i n t h e said period is required to
apply the presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds, which is an
element of the crime. Thus, there is no presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds if the check was presented beyond the period.
But the prosecution may st il l p r ove such k n owl edge thr ough other
evidence. (Bautista v. C o u rt o f A p p e a ls, G.R. N o. 1 4 8 875, Ju ly 6 ,
2001) On the other hand, under the second paragraph, presentation
of the check wit hi n 9 0 days from it s m a t u r i t y d at e is an element of
the crime. The obligation of the drawer to maint ain the sufficiency of
the funds is confined to 90 days from the date of its issuance. Thus,
presentation of the check beyond the period is a defense.
Persons Liable for V i o l a t i o n of B .P . B lg. 22
1. Cor p o r a t e C h e c k —A check for P 20,000.00 was drawn
by the Federal Financing Corporation in favor of CC, duly signed
by DD, th e c orporate Pre sident, and EE , th e c orporate T r e asurer.
O n the date of th e pr esentation of th e said check w it h t h e d r a w e e
bank, the check was dishonored but the aforesaid corporate officials
were no longer connected w it h t h e c o r p or at i on . (1980 Bar Exam)
T hey are li able for v i o l a t ion of B .P . B lg . 22 a l t h ough t h e y ar e n o t
anymore connected w it h t h e c o m p any a t t h e t i m e t h a t t h e c h eck
w as dishonored. Under B .P. Blg. 22, in case the check is dr awn b y
a corporation, company or e n t i t y , t h e p e r son wh o a c t u a ll y s i g n ed
t he check in behalf of such dr awer sh all be li a ble th ereunder. Th i s
p rovision r e cognizes th e r e a l it y t h a t a c o r p o r a t ion ca n o n l y a c t
t hrough it s of fi cers. H e n ce, th e p e r sons wh o a c t u a ll y s i g ned t h e
corporate check shall be held cr i m i n a ll y l i a b le. This pr ovision does
not contain a n y c o n d i t i on , q u a li fi ca t i on , o r l i m i t a t i on. (M i t r a v .
People, G.R No. 191404, July 5, 2010)
2. Co n s p i racy A — sought financial assistance from B, who
accommodated him by i s suing in h i s f a vor a postdated check. Both
of them k new t h a t s ai d ch eck wa s u n f u n d ed. The tw o t h e n a s k ed
C to change the check w it h c ash on t h e a ssurance that i t s h al l b
s a e
f unded on the due date. When C presented the check to the bank
for encashment on i t s d u e d a te, i t w a s d i s h onored as th e account
was closed. B is l i a b le for v i o la tion of B . P. B l g. 22 d espite the fact
that he merely accommodated A. For being a malum prohib it u m, t he
circumstance behind the issuance of the check will not be considered
to determine the crimi nal li abil ity of B as drawer for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. A is also liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. As a general rule,
o nly the d r a wer or t h e p e r son wh o si gned th e check i s c r i m i n a l l y
liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. However, A, who is not a signatory
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 637
t o th e c h eck, can b e h e l d l i a b l e u n d e r t h i s l a w o n t h e b a si s o f
conspiracy with B. The conspiracy principle is applicable to violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 despite the fact that t hi s crime is classified as malum
prohibitum. (Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005)
In sum, the act of B in i s s uing a bouncing check in vio lation of B.P.
Blg. 22 because of conspiracy is i m p u t a ble to A, hi s co-conspirator,
who did not sign the check. (1992 and 2010 Bar Exams)
a. L a c k of Con spiracy — A asked B to lend him
money to buy a new spare tire.B issued an unfunded check to
A. B is aware that the check is not funded but he anticipated a
replenishment of his account soon. A negotiated the check for a
new tire. When presented, the check bounced for lack of funds.
B is liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Accommodation check is
within th e coverage of this l aw. A i s not l i a ble for vi olation of
B .P. Blg. 22 since there is no showing that he is aware that th e
check was unfunded when he negotiated it to the tire company.
(2008 Bar Exam)
I f th e w i f e w a s p r e s ent w h e n t h e h u s b an d i s s ued a n
unfunded check in v i o l at ion of B .P. Blg. 22, the former i s n ot
liable since passive presence is not an evi dence of conspiracy.
(Ladonga v. People, supra.)
b. E n dor s e r — Ac c o rding t o l e g i s l a ti ve d e l i b e ration
on the passage of B.P. Blg.22, the presumption of knowledge
of insufficient funds is only applicable if the accused is the
d rawer. H o w ever, t h i s p r e s u m p t io n i s n o t a p p l i c able i f t h e
accused is the p ayee of th e check, who endorsed the same to
the complainant. (see: Bautista v. C ourt of Appeals, G.R. ¹.
148875,July 6,2001) Under the Bautista case,an endorser can
be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
What is punishable under BP Blg. 22 is issuing, drawing
or making a n u n f u n d ed check. The law u s ed the term " m a k e s
or draws an d i s sues." W it h t h e Ba u t i s ta ca s e, endorsing a n
unfunded check shall be considered as within the contemplation
o f the word "m a k es" in B .P. Blg. 22. However, it i s su bm i t t e d
t hat an e n d orser can only b e h el d l i a bl e for v i o l a t ion of B . P .
B lg. 22 if h e i s a w ar e t ha t t h e check is u n f u n ded at th e t i m e
o f issuance or he conspires wit h t h e d r a w er i n v i o l a t in g t h i s
law. Evidence must b e p r esented to p r ove t hi s k n o w l edge of
insufficiency of fu nd s since under th e Ba u t i s ta case, the rule
on presumption of knowledge of insufficiency is not applicable
to an endorser.
 638 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
A issued a check, which was postdated to January 25,
1986 to B. La t e r o n, A r e q u e sted B no t t o p r e s ent t he c heck
until Janu ary 30, 1986 by which t im e the check would be f 11
ou e u y
unded. B agreed. On Janua ry 2 5, 1986, B endorsed the check
t o C an d a s sured hi m t h a t t h e c h eck w a s g ood an d m a y b e
encashed on the date indicated thereon. C presented the check
on January 30, 1986. The check was dishonored by the bank for
lack of funds. Notice of dishonor was sent to A and B .
A is li able for v i o l ation of B .P . B lg. 22. Since this cr i m e
is ma l um pr o h i b i t u m, h i s a g r e e ment w i t h B not t o de p o s it
the check u n ti l J a n u ar y 3 0 ,, 1986 shall no t b e c onsidered in
determining his criminal liability for issuing an unfunded check.
B is a l s o l i a b le f or v i o l a t i on o f B . P . B l g . 2 2 . W h e n B
endorsed the check, he was aware that the same is unfunded on
the date of matu r i t y , and t ha t i s J a n u ar y 25, 1986. Endorsing
the check despite knowledge the same is not funded on the date
of its issuance is within th e contemplation of the word "makes"
in B.P. Blg.22, which is punishable as a crime. (1984 and 1986
Bar Exams)
I n estafa, th e en dorser wh o u sed an u n f u n ded check t o
defraud another p erson is cr i m i n a ll y l i a b le. A d r aw s a ch eck
upon the r e quest of B, t h e p a y e e, who t o ld A t h a t h e w o u l d
m erely show t h e c h eck t o h i s c r e d i tor t o g a i n m o r e t i m e t o
pay his account. B n e g o tia ted t he c heck of A c o n t r a ry t o t h e
agreement. The check bounced upon pr esentation by C B b v
fraudulently endorsing the check is li able for estafa. A cannot
be prosecuted for estafa since he neither conspired w ith B i n
committing estafa nor used the bum check to defraud another .
(2011 Bar Exam)
Penalty for Vi o l a t i o n o f B . P . B l g . 2 2
In V ac a v . Co u r t o f A p p e a l s, G . R . N o . 1 3 1 7 14 N
b
1 6 1 998, a ccused a r e f l , r s t-time
offenders. They a re F i l i p i no
entrepreneurs who presumably contr i b ut e to the nati onal economy.
Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all "good faith,"
that they had not comm i t t ed a vi ol ation of B .P. Blg. 22. To redeem
va uable human m a t e r ial an d p r e v ent in g u n n ecessary deprivati on
of personal liberty, the Supreme Court i mposed fine instead of
imprisonment.
The case Lim v. People, G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000
affirmed theVaca principle.
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 639
Adopting th e p r i n c i ple i n V a c a case and L i m c a se, Supreme
Court issued Admi n i s t r a t ive Circular No. 12-2000 which establishes
a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P.
Blg. 22, such that w h er e th e circum stances of both th e offense and
the offender clearly i n d i c ate go od fa i t h or a cl e ar mi s t a ke o f f a c t
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be
considered asthe more appropriate penalty. (Yu v. People, G.R, No.
184172, September 20, 2004)
O n February 14, 2001, Supreme Court i s sued Ad m i n i s t r a t i ve
Circular ¹ . 18 - 2 001 which modified Administrative Circular No.
12-2000 by stressing that th e clear tenor of Admi n i s t r a t iv e Circular
N o. 12-2000 i s n o t t o r e m o v e i m p r i s o n m en t a s a n a l t e r n a t i v e
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of
t he penalties provided for in B .P. Blg. 22. Un der t hi s new circular ,
the judges concerned may, in th e exercise of sound discretion, and
taking i nt o consideration th e p eculiar c i r c u m st ances of each case,
determine wh ether th e i m p osition of a fin e a l one would best serve
the interest of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or other w ise be contrary t o th e i m p e r a t i ves of justice;
should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the
fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
Code on subsidiary im p r i s onment .
The penalty of fin e is pr oper w h ere th e accused acted in good
faith (Vaca v. CA, supra; Li m v . People, supra); or where there is no
showing that accused acted in bad faith (Agu ir re v. People, G.R. No.
144142, August 28, 2001); or where there is no showing that accused
was not a fi r s t - t im e offender (Recuerdo v. People, G.R. No. 188086,
January 22, 2008; Ongson v. People, G.R. No. 1M169, August 12,
2005); or whe re the health conditi on of the accused is not good (So
v. CA, G. R. N o. 18 8 8 69, Au g u st 29 , 2 0 0 2); or wh e r e th e a c c used
made substantial p a y m ents (L a g m an v. Pe ople, G.R. No. 14 6 288,
December 7, 2001); or where the accused exerted effort to settle the
case. (Tan v. Mendez, G.R. No. 188669, June 6; 2002)
The penalty of im p r i sonment is proper wh ere there is showing
that a ccused acted i n b a d f a i t h (N a g r a m pa v. P e o ple, G . R. N o .
146211, August 6, 2 0 0 2) or w h e re t h e a c cused refused to p r e sent
e vidence on h i s b e h al f a n d a p p e aled t h e d e cision t o r e d uce t h e
penalty t o fin e ( M a g d ayao v. People, G.R. No. 15 2881, August 17 ,
2004); or wh ere th e accused commit ted m u l t i pl e v i ol ations of B.P.
Blg. 22 (Li m v. People, G.R. No. 148281, October 26; 2001); or where
 640 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
the accused is atlarge. (De Joya v. The Jail Warden of Ba.:angas
City, G.R No . 15'9418, December 10, 2003)
Estafa and v i o l a t io n of B .P . B lg. 22
While sourced from th e same act, i.e., the issuance of a check
s ubsequently d i s honored, estafa an d v i o l a t ion of B . P . B l g . 2 2 a r e
s eparate an d d i s t i n c t f r o m e a c h o t h e r b e c ause t h e y p e r t a i n t o
d ifferent causes of action. Th e d i f f erences between th e tw o ar e a s
follows:
1. D am a g e an d deceit are essential elements for estafa, but
are not so for violation under B.P. Blg. 22, which puni shes the mere
issuance of a bouncing check;
2. U n d e r B . P . B l g . 2 2 , m e r e i s s u ance of a c h ec k t h a t
diishonored gives rise to the pr esumpt ion of k n o w l edge on the paris
t
of the drawer t ha t h e i ssued the same wi t h out sufficient f u nd s and
hence, punishable which is not so under the Penal Code.
3. A d r a w e r o f a d i s h onored check may be convicted under
B .P. Bl g . 2 2 even i f h e h a d i s s u e d t h e s a m e f o r a p r e e x i s t i n g
o bligation, w h il e s uch c i r c u m st ance negates cri m i na l l i a b i l it y f o r
estafa;
4. Sp e c i fi c and different penalties are imposed in each of the
two offenses;
5. E s t a f a i s e s s e n t i a ll y a c r i m e a g a i n s t p r o p e r ty , w h i l e
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is principally a crime against public interest
as it does injury to the entire bank in g system;
6. E st a f a i s ma l u m i n s e , w h i le v i o l a ti on of B . P . Blg., 22 is
malum prohi bi t um. (Batac v. People, G.A. No. 191 6'22, June 6; 2013)
ESTAFA BY NOT PAYING FOOD, REFRESHMENT OR
A CC O M M O DA T IO N
Estafa by not p a y i n g f o od, r efreshment or a ccommodation i s
committed by any person who defrauds another by: (1) false pretense
or fraudulent act in obt a i n in g food, refreshment or
accommod "tion
a t a n e s t a b l i s h m en t w i t h o u t p a y i n g t h e r e f or ; ( 2 ) u s i n g f a l s e
p retense in o b t a i n in g c r e di t f o r t h e s a me ; an d (3 ) f r a u d u l en t a c t
in abandoning or sur r e p t i t i o u sly r em oving any pa rt of h is b aggage
r om a h o t e l o r s i m i l a r e s t a b l i s h m en t a f t e r o b t a i n i n g t h e s a m e
therein without p a y i n g t h e r e f or. (A r t i c l e 31 5 ) E st a b l i s h n ie nt
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 641
includes hotel, i nn , r e st a u r a nt , b o ar d in g h o u se, lodging h ouse, or
apartment h ouse.
The street name of this crime is "123" because the culprit aft er
e ating i n t h e r e s t a u r an t a n d c o u n t i n g 1 2 3 w i l l r u n t o e v a d e h i s
obligation of paying the food bought.
Commonwealth Act No. 157 int r o duced this crime of estafa by
not paying food, refreshment or accommodation in paragraph 2 (e)
in Art i cle 315 of the Revised Penal Code. However, R.A. No. 10951
deleted paragraph 2 (e) in Arti cle 315 of the Code. Hence, defrauding
the victi m b y n o t pa y i n g f o o d, r e f r eshment or a c c ommodation a s
described in Commonwealth Act No. 157 is not anymore punishable
as estafa under Article 315, but it shall constitute other deceit
under Art i cle 318.
X called u p Y ; p r o p r i etor of a r e s t a u r a nt , an d i n q u i r e d h o w
much would h e s p end fo r a p a r t y o f 2 0 p e o ple w h er e si x s pecific
viands were to be served. Upon inf or m a t ion t ha t t h e cost would be
P600.00, X and his party proceeded to Y'srestaurant and ordered
t he food as agreed upon. When th e b il l c a me, X f o un d out t h a t h e
was being charged P700.00. Y told hi m h e comm i t ted a m i s t ake in
i nforming hi m t h a t t h e c ost w a s o nl y P 6 0 0 .00. X r e f u sed t o p a y .
A fter an al t ercation, Y said he would accept P600.00 but X r e p l i ed
t hat th e i n c i dent ha d e m b a r r a ssed him . X r e f u sed to pay a s i n gl e
centavo and t h r e atened to sue Y for d a m ages. X is l i a ble for oth er
d eceit. Emb a r r a ssment b y r e a son of th e a l t e r cation i n v o lv in g t h e
mistake of the food cost is not an excuse in not paying the owner of
the restaurant, wh o a l r eady agreed to accept th e lesser amount of
P600.00. (1979 Bar Exam)
E STAFA BY TAKING ADVA N T A G E OF SIGNAT U R E
Estafa by taking advantage of signature
i s committedby a person
who defrauds another wit h u n f a i t h f u l n ess or abuse of confidence by
taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in
blank, and by wr i t i n g a document above such signature in bl ank, to
the prejudice of the offended party or any third person.
This is a f o r m o f e s tafa w it h u n f aithfulness or abuse of
confidence. (2012 Bar Exam)
 642 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME Il
ESTAFA BY INDUCING ANO T H E R TO SIGN
Estafa by indu cing another to sign is commit t ed by any person
w ho defrauds another by i n d u c in g a n ot her t o s ign a d o cument b y
means of deceit. (Article 815)
1. I n du c i n g t o S i g n D e e d o f S a l e —A signed a n o t a r i a l
d ocument, w h ic h h a d b e e n m i s r e p r esented t o h i m b y X t o b e a
p ower-of-attorney, w hen i n t r u t h i t w a s a d e e d of s al e of c er t a i n
property belonging to A. The crime commi t ted is estafa by in ducing
another to sign a document by means of deceit.(1949 Bar Exam;
U.S. v. Berry, G.R. ¹. L - 2 2 7 8 , December 4,1905
) damage would have been caused by the execution ofthe document.
2. A t t r i b u t i n g a S t a t e m e n t o f S a l e —A mar r i e d couple,
who did not know how to read and write, asked the accused to prepare
a Special Power of At t o r ney to r epresent them i n a s ui t p e n d ing in
a court. Accused made a Deed of Sale of properties in his favor. The
couple signed the document on t h e b e lief t ha t t h e y executed SPA.
A ccused is liable for f al sification of document by a t t r i b u t i n g t o t h e
couple's statements of sale of properties, w hich t h ey d id n ot in f a c t
make. (U.S. v. Capule, G.R. ¹. L- 74 4 7 , Jan u a ry 2, 1918)
A ccording to L u i s R e yes, th e d i s t i n ct ion seems to be t h a t i n
t e case of U.S. v. Berry, the accused induced by means of deceit the
offended party to sign the document; whereas, in the case of U.S. v.
Capule, supra, t here was no inducement, for the offended party was
w illing and r e ady f ro m t h e b egin n in g t o sign th e document i n t h e
belief that it contained statements made by them .
3. A t tr i b u t in g a S t a t e m ent o f A u t h o r ity t o S ell —In
Intestate Estate of Gonzales v. People, G .R. No. 181409 F b
2 010 , accused presented a ready-made SPA to offended party, w h o
was already blind and 79 years of age, making her believe that said
document i n v o lved onl y h e r t a x es. H o w ever, th e SP A a u t h o r i z es
t e daughter of the accused to sellthe properties of the offended
party. Accused used the SPA t o sell th e p r operties of th e offended
p arty t o a n o t her p e r s on. Th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s c o m p lex c r i m e
o estafa t h r o ugh f a l sification of p u b l i c d ocument. F a l sification of
public document was consumm ated when accused pre
t d th
o the offended par ty , w h o s i g ned th e s am e a s a s t a t e m ent
o e r i n t e n t i o n i n c o n n ection w i t h h e r t a x es. Accus d t t 'b t d
too thee o f f e n ded part y a st a t e ment of a u t h o r ity to s ell, w h i ch is n o t
m a e y h e r . W h i l e t h e f a l si fi cation w a s c onsum m a ted u pon t h e
execution of the SPA, the consumm a t ion of the estafa occurred only
when the accused later u t i l i zed the SPA t o sell th e pr operti es
and
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 643
thereafter pocketed the proceeds ofthe sale. Damage or prejudice to
the offended party was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as
no damage was yet caused to the pr operty r i g ht s of offended party
when she was m ade to sign th e d ocument) bu t b y t h e s u bsequent
use of the said document. That is wh y th e falsification of the public
document was used to facilit ate and ensure (that is, as a necessary
means for) the commission of the estafa.
If the accused induced the offended party tosign a deed of sale
of the properties either in hi s f avor or i n f a vor of t h ir d p a r t i es, the
Applying t h e Be r r y p r i n c i p l e, t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s e s t a fa b y
inducing another to sign a document by means of deceit.
I f th e a c cused di d n o t u s e a n i n d u c e m en t s u c h a s i f t h e
offended party herself had been the one who asked that a document
be prepared for her si gn at u re, th e cr im e commi t ted is f al sification
or complex crime of estafa thr ough falsification. In Ca pu le case, the
accused is liable for falsification of dead of sale for attr i b u t in g to th e
offended parties a statement of sale. In In t e state Estate of Gonzales
c ase, the a c cused i s l i a b l e f o r c o m p lex c r i m e o f e s t af a t h r o u g h
falsification of SPA for att r i b u t i n g to the offended party a statement
of authority to sell and using such falsified document to defraud the
offended party.
X drew a p r o m i ssory n ot e an d a s k e d h i s t e r m i n a ll y i l l a n d
dying business partner A t o s i g n i t . T h e p r o m i ssory note bound A
to pay X P1,000,000.00 on or before June 30, 2011. A died before
t he. promissory n o t e's du e d a t e . X c o l l e cted P 1 ,000,000.00 f r o m
A 's estate. X d i d n o t c o m m i t a n y o f t h e a c t s o f f a l sification. T h e
s ignature on the note is genuine. It was not shown that X at t r i b u t e d
t o 4 st at ement i n t h e n ot e ot her t h a n t h ose in f act m a d e by h i m .
N either di d X c o m m i t e s t af a s i nc e t h er e i s n o s h o w in g t h a t h e
employed deceit or fr aud in r e qu i r in g A t o sign the promissory note
and in collecting the money from the estate of A. The fact that A was
terminally ill and dying when he signed the note will not mean that
X was already defrauding him . The promissory note is presumed to
have been issued for consideration. The health condition of A is not
e nough to overcome such presumpti on. The death of A p r ior t o t h e
m aturity d at e of th e n ot e w il l n o t e x t i n g u ish ci vi l l i a b i l it y a r i s i n g
from contract. (2013 Bar Exam)
 644 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
y. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 645
VOLUME II

ESTAFA THRO U G H F R A U D U L E N T G A M B L ING

Estafa t h r o ugh f r a u d u l ent g a m b l in g m e ans i s c o m m i t t e d b y
any person who defrauds another by r e sort in g t o some fr a u d ul ent
practice to ensure success in a gambling game. (Article 315)
ESTAFA B Y R E M O V ING, CONCEALING
OR D E S T R OYING
DOCUMENT
Estafa b y r e m o v i ng, concealing o r d e s t r oying d o c u m ent i s
committed by any person who defrauds
a nother b y r e m o v i n g ,
concealing or destroying, in whole or in part , any court record, office
files, document, or any other papers. (Article 815)
A ny p u b l i c o fficer w h o shall r e m o ve , d e s t ro y o r c o n c e al
ocuments or papers officially ent r u s ted to hi m sh all be held li abl e
f or infidelity i n t h e c u stody of documents u n der A r t i cl e 226 of t h e
Revised Penal Code.
I nfidelity in t h e custody of document is commi t ted by a pu b l i c
of cial entru sted with the custody of the document. Intent to defraud
is not an element of t h i s c r i me . E st afa by r e m ovin g c o n cealing o
estroying document is commit ted by a priv ate indivi d ual (2011 Bar
Exam) o r a p u b l ic o fficer, w ho i s n ot o f f ic ially e n t r u s t ed w i t h t h e
documents. Intent to defraud is an element of this crim e.
OTHER FO RM S OF SW IN DLING
M ortgaging a u s u r i ou s contr act of l oa n w o ul d n o t m a k e t h e
creditor-mortgagee liable forestafa under Article 316. A usurious
interest in a contr act of loan is void bu t t h e cr editor, who i m p osed
such invalid i n t e r est, is not comm i t t i n g a c r im e u n der th e Revised
Penal Code. (2012 Bar Exam)
Pretending to be an Owner
Other f or m o f s w i n d l i n g i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s o n w h o
pretends t o b e t h e o w n e r o f a r e a l p r o p e rt y a n d c o n v eys, sells,
encumbers, or m o r t g ages the same. (Art i c le 816,
ar. 1' 2 012 B
Exam)
D efrauding an other b y f a l s ely p r e t en ding t o b e th e o w ner of
personala pr roper
o c ryt s old,
1 which is executed prior to or simu l t
wi p a r i n g o f m o n ey , c onsti t u te s e st afa u n de r A r tmu
i c l ea n3e15
ous
. OyI n
t he other hand, defrauding another by f a l sely pr etending to be th e
owner of re al p r o perty s o ld c onstitu t es t he c r i m e of o t h er f o rm o f
swindling under Ar t i cle 816.
Selling a non-existing real property (e.g,, an island) is estafa
under Art i cle 315. If the real property is existing, but the accused in
selling it pr et ended to be the owner th ereof, the crime commit ted is
other form of swindl ing un der Ar t i cle 816. The son, who induced his
father to buy a l an d p r eviously owned by h im , comm it s other for m
of swindling. However, the exemptin g circum st ance of relationship
shall beconsidered. (2012 Bar Exam)
Free f rom E n c u m b r a n c e
Other form of swind l ing is also committed by an owner of a real
property who disposes the same with express representation that it
is free from encumbrance despite knowledge that it i s encumbered.
This crime is committed although such encumbrance is not recorded.
(Article 816, par. 2; 2012 Bar Exam)
1. A ct o f o w n e r s h i p — The ter m " s h all d i spose" in A r t i c l e
316(2) includes selling, encumbering, or mort gaging. (Revised Penal
Code by Justice Luis Reyes)
A s security fo r a P 1 0 , 000.00 loan w h i c h X r e c e ived f ro m Y ,
X executed a deed of chat tel m o r t g age on hi s h o use in f a vor of Y,
i n wh ic h d eed X c l a i m e d t h a t t h e h o u s e w a s f r e e f r o m a l l l i e n s
a nd encumbrances. The registr ar , however, refused to register th e
d eed because the h o use ha d b een p r e v i ously e n cu m bered on t h e
property.
X is liable for other f or m of sw i n d l in g u n der A r t i cl e 816(2). Y
had granted the loan to X i n t h e belief that th e security offered was
good and sufficient to guar antee his investment because it was free
f=om any lien or en cu m br ance. Had he k n ow n t h a t i t w a s a l r e ady
encumbered, the likelihood was that he would not have granted the
loan, which p r oves the f r au d of w h i c h h e w a s a v i c t i m . (P eople v.
Galsim, G.R N o . L - 1 4577, February 29, 1960)
2. R e a l P r o p e r t y —To commit t h i s c r i me of other fo rm o f
swindling under A r t i cle 815(2), the property disposed or mortgaged
w ith ex p r ess r epresentation o f e n c u m b r a nce free m u s t b e a r e a l
property. Al t h ough the t i tl e of the contract is chattel mor t gage, the
true nature of the transaction is real estate mortgage since a house
is a real property. (1964 Bar Exam )
3. Ex p r e ss Representation —Other form of s windling
u nder A r t i cl e 8 1 6 (2) i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r so n w h o , k n ow i n g

J9JC9B0M
 646 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
t hat th e r ea l p r o p ert y i s e n c u m b er ed, shal l d i s p ose of th e s a m e ,
a lthough such en cum b r a nce be not r e c orded. Th e la w w a s t a k e n
f rom A r t i c l e 4 5 5 o f t h e o l d S p a n i s h P e n a l C o de . H o w e v er , t h e
words "corno lib re" in t h e S p a n i sh P e nal C o de, which m e a ns "f re e
from encumbrance" do not appear in the E ng li sh text of the Revised
P enal Code, nonetheless, the same are deemed incorporated in t h e
Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime is the disposition of
legally encumbered real property by th e offender under the express
representation that th ere is no encumbrance thereon. Hence, for one
to e criminally liable for estafa under the law, the accused must
m ake an express representation in th e deed of conveyance that t h e
property sold or disposed of is free from any encumbr ance. (Naya v.
Abing, G.R. No. 146770, February 27, 2008; Estrellado-Mainar v.
People, G.R. No. 184820, July 29, 2015)
Failure to allege in the inform a t ion t hat th e accused expressly
represented in the deed of salethat the real property is free from
e ncumbrance is f a ta l t o t h e p r o secution of t h e a c cused. (Naya v .
Abing, supra)
Divina mortgaged her lot to her neighbor Dino for P1,000,000.00.
L ater D i v in a sold th e s ame lot t o A n gel for P 2 , 000,000.00. In t h e
D eed of Sale, she expressly st a ted t h a t t h e p r o p ert y i s f r e e f r o m
a ny lien o r e n c u m b r a nce. Th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s o t h e r f o r m o f
swindling. (1998 Bar Exam)
T he owner who disposes of his encumbered real prope t 'f
i i s r e e from encumbrances is not liable for other form of swindl i n g
since there is no showing of an express representation that it is fr ee
from encumbrance. The words "as i f' means that the representation
is only "implied." (2011 and 2012 Bar E x a ms) H o wever, it i s
submitted that he is liable for other deceit.
4. F a l se R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f O w n ership a n d N o n -
encumbr a nc e — I n other f o r ms of s w i n d l i ng u n d er A r t i c le 8 1 6
a nd (2l of th e R evised Penal Code, th e offender performed an a c(1) t i s not i m p o r t a nt . T h ef t i s c o m m i t t e d a l t h o ugh t h e t h i e f t ook t h e
o f ownership s u c h a s s elling, e n c u m b erin g o r m o r t g a g in g r e a l
property, and m ade f alse representation i n d o in g so w h ich causes
damage to t h ir d p e r son. I n p a r a g r ap h 1 , t h e f a lse r epresentation
pertains to ownership. The accused, who is not the owner of the real
property, represents that h e o wn s it . O n t h e o t her h a nd , th e f a l se
representation i n p a r a g r ap h 2 p e r t a i n s t o n o n -encumbrance. Th e
accused, who is the o
e owner of the real property, expressly represents
in the deed of conveyance that the property is free from encumbrance.
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 647
In Estre! lado-Mainar v. People, G.R. No. 184820, July 29, 2015,
it was held that the accused is not liable under paragraph 1 since he
did not preter d to be the lawful owner of'property. The complainant
is aware that the title involving the property sold is still in the name
of the father of t h e a ccused. Neither i s h e l i a ble u n der p a r a graph
2 since he did no t m a k e a n e x p r ess representation i n t h e d eed of
c onveyance that t h e p r o p ert y s old or d i s posed of is f r e e f rom a n y
encumbrance.
Swindling by Taking
Other form of swindling is also committed by an owner of a
personal property who wrongfully takes it from its lawful possessor
to the prejudice of the latter or a third person. (Article 81 6,par. 8)
To commit this other form of swindling, it is important that the
property unlawfully taken is a personal property. When an offender
wrongfullytakes his real property from itslawful possessor to the
prejudice of the latter, other form of swindling is not committed
s ince th e p r o p ert y w r o n g f u ll y t a k e n i s n o t a p e r s o nal p r o p er t y .
(2012 Bar E x a m) Oc cupation of r e al p r o perty u n d er A r t i c le 8 12 is
n ot commit ted since the offender is th e owner of th e pr operty. Th e
crime committed in t hi s case is un ust vexation .
The lawful possessor of personalproperty can be a lessee or
mortgagee.
The diff'erences between th e ft a n d s w i n d l i ng t h r o u gh t a k i n g
are as follows:
1. I n t h e f t , the offender must not be the owner of the personal
property tak en. In sw i n d l i ng, the offender must be the owner of the
personal property .
2. I n t h e f t , t h e p e r son from w h o m t h e p r o p erty w a s t a k en
p roperty f r o m t h e o w n e r , l a w f u l p o s sessor o r a n o t h e r t h i e f . I n
swindling, the person from whom the property was taken must be a
lawful possessor.
8. I n t h e f t , t h e p r o p e rt y i s t a k e n w i t h o u t c o n sent o f t h e
o wner. In t h i s sense, the owner w i l l b e p r e j u dice by th e act of t h e
thief. On the other hand, in swindl i ng, the property was taken to the
prejudice of the lawful possessor or a thir d p erson.
 648 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
A ccepting C o m p e n s a t ion for U n p e r f o r m e d S e r v i c e s
Other form of sw i n d l i n g is a lso committ ed by any p e rson who
a ccepts compensation given u n der th e b elief th e p a y m ent i s m a d
i sm a e
for services or labor performed by him, when in fact he did not do so.
(Article 816(4j)
Swindl in g by S u r e t y
Other form of swindling is also committed by a surety who sells,
m ortgages, or i n a n y o t h e r m a n n er , en cu mbers th e r ea l p r o p ert y
used to guarantee the fulfi l l m ent of the obligation covered by a bond
given by him in a cr i m i n a l or civil action w i t h out express aut h 't
u ori y
frrom the court or before the cancellation of his bond or before being
relieved from the obligation contracted by him. (Art i c le 816(GJ)
E xecution of F i c t i t i ou s Co n t r a c t
Other form of swindling is also committed by any person who
executes a fi c t i t i ou s cont r act t o t h e p r e j u d ice of a n o t h er. ( A r t i c l e
816(6j)
FRAUDULENT INSOLVENCY
Fraudulent in s o l v ency i s c ommitted b y a ny p er s o n
who
absconds with hi s property to th e pr eju dice of his creditors. (Artic le
814)
In f r a u d u l en t i n s o l v ency, t h e a c t p r o h i b i te d i s a b s c onding
(hiding or concealing) with his property, real or personal, which may
or may not involve the execution of a fictitious contract. In other form
of swindling, the act prohibited is the execution of fictitious contract.
I n fraudulent i n solvency, the offender is the debtor who commi t t e d
a n act t o p r e j u d ice hi s c r e dit ors. I n o t h e r f o r m o f s w i n d l i n g , t h e
offender and the victim are any persons.
SWINDLING A MINOR
Swindling a mi n o r is c o m m i t t e d by a ny p e r s on w ho i n d u c es
a minor t o a ssume an ob l i gation or t o g i v e a r e l ease or execute a
t ransfer of a property r i gh t i n consideration of some loan of mon e ,
credit or other personal property by taking advantage of h'
0 is
in experience or emotions or feelings to his detr i m e nt . T hi s cr ime is
c ommitted wh ether th e l oan clearly a p pears in th e document or i s
shown in any other form. (Article 81 7)
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 649
OTHER DECEIT
Other deceit i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s o n w h o d e f r a u ds o r
damages another by any deceit not constitu t in g estafa, other form of
swindling, or swindl ing a mi n or. (Art i c le 818)
Catch-all P r o v i s i on
F or on t o b e l i a ble for "other deceits" under A r t i cl e 818, it i s
required t ha t t h e p r o secution m u s t p r ov e t h e f o l l ow in g essential
e lements: (a) false pretense, fraudul ent act or p r e t ense other t h a n
t hose enum er ated i n A r t i c l e s 8 15 , 8 16 , a n d 3 1 7 ; (b ) s u c h f a l s e
pretense, fr a u d u l en t a ct or pr e t e n se m u s t b e m a d e o r e x e c uted
p rior to or s i m u l t a n eously w it h t h e c o m m i s sion of th e f r a u d ; a n d
(c) as a result, th e offended party s u f f ered damage or pr eju dice. It
is essential t ha t such false statement or f r a u d u l ent r e p r esentation
c onstitutes t h e v e r y c a u s e o r t h e o n l y m o t i v e f o r t h e p r i v a t e
complainant t o p ar t w i t h h e r p r o p er ty . ( G u i n h aw a v. People, G.R.
No. 162822, August 25, 2006)
A rticle 818 includes any k in d of conceivable deceit other t h a n
those enumerated in A r t i c les 815 to 817 of the Revised Penal Code.
I t is i n t e n ded as th e c at ch-all p r o v i sion fo " t h a t p u r p ose wit h i t s
broad scope and intendment. (Guinhawa v.People, ibid.)
M asked R to b u y a q u a n t i t y o f r i c e a t P 3 0 . 00 a c a v a n. M
assured R that he (M) had a buyer for the rice at P40.00 a cavan.
A fter the rice was bought, it t u r n e d out t ha t M h a d n o buyer for i t .
M is liable for other deceit. ( 1946 Bar Exa m )
In consideration of P 1 5,000.00 which R g a v e to S , t h e l a t t e r
agreed to execute the next day a deed of conveyance over a lot in favor
of R. On th e f o ll owing d ay, S di d no t c o m ply w i t h t h e a g r eement,
instead he evaded it. When pressed by R for compliance, S refused.
Later on, S sold the same lot to another buyer. Other form of deceit
(misrepresenting to bethe owner of real property) under paragraph
1 of Article 317 is not commi t ted because S is still th e owner of th e
lot when he sold it to another buyer. Since S did not execute a deed
of conveyance, ownership was not tr a n sferred to R when S received
the amount of P15,000.00. But S can be held li able for other deceit
under Article818. (1969 Bar Exam)
T he person wh o a ssured he w i l l p a y i n t e r est on t h e a m o u n t
but failed to do so as promised is not li able for estafa, other form of
s windling cr other deceit. Fail ur e to pay th e i n t erest is not a cri m e
 650 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
b ecause of th e c o n st i t u t i o na l p r o v i sion o n n o n - i m p r i s onment b y
reason of non-payment of loan. (2012 Bar Exam)
R escinding a cont r act of s ale i s no t c onsti t u t iv e of th e c r i m e
o f estafa or o t her d eceit. I n f a ct , u n de r t h e C i v i l C o d e rescissio
of contr act i s a l l o w ed. W h e t her r e s cission of con t r act i s m a d e i n
o
accordance with law i s an issue that can be resolved in a civil case.
(2011 Bar Exam)
Estafa Th r o u gh Fa l s e P r e t e n se and Ot h e r D e c e i t
I n e s t af a u n d e r A r t i c l e 3 1 5 , t h e fa l s e r epresentation i s
committed by using ficti t i ous name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, infiuence, qualificati ons, pr operty, cr edit, agency, business
or imaginary t r a n s actions, or b y m e a n s o f o t h e r s i m i l a r d e ceits.
Following the pr i n ciple of ejusdem generis, other deceit as a means
to commit estafa m us t b e s i m i l a r t o p r e t e n d ing t o p ossess power.
imaginary t r a n saction etc. If th e deceit is not si m i lar t o pr et endin
ing
too possess power or i m a g i n ary t r a n s action, the crime commi t ted i s
other deceit under Ar t i cle 318.
In Gu i n h a wa v. Pe o ple, supra, f r a u d u l e nt r e p r e sentation o f
the seller t h a t t h e v a n t o b e s ol d i s b r a n d n e w c o n st i t u tes ot h er
deceit under A r t i cle 318. On th e other h a nd, in Pe ople v. Rub aton,
C .A., 65 O.G. 5048, issue of May 19, 1969, false representation th at
accused has a palay by reason of which the victim pa r ted his money
in consideration of the palay constitu t es estafa under Art i c le 315. In
Rubaton case, the tr a n saction is i m a g i n ar y si nce there is no palay
to be sold. In Guinh awa case, the transaction is not imaginary since
t here is a van actually sold and delivered to complainant .
F raud or deceit may be commi t ted by omission. It i s t r u e t h a t
m ere silence is not i n i t s el f c oncealment. C oncealment w h i c h t h e
l aw denounces as fr a u d u l ent i m p l i e s a p u r p ose or d e sign t o h i d e
facts which the other part y sought to k n ow. Fai l ur e to reveal a fact
which the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may generally be
classifiedas a deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to deceive.
Suppression of a material fact w h ich a pa rt y i s bound in good faith
t o disclose is equivalent t o a f a l s e r e p r esentation. Th e seller of a
laptop computer who failed to inf orm th e bu yer th at t he l a p top had
a defect is liable for other deceit. (2012 Bar Exam)
X , a collector of antiques, saw in a Chinese store a silver coin for
sale which according to his catalogue of antiques is worth $100.00.
The price asked by the owner was P8.00, but by false representations
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 651
he convinced the owner to sell the coin to hi m for P 1.00.00. Several
d ays later th e seller f ound out t h a t t h e r ea l v a lu e of th e coin w a s
$100.00. Xis li a ble for other deceit. (1950 Bar Exam)
Val, a Nigerian, set up a perf ume business in the Phi l i p p i nes.
T he investors would buy th e raw m a t e r i als at a low p r ice from Val .
The raw mat eri als consisted of powders, which the in vestors would
mix wit h w a t e r an d le t s t an d u n t i l a g e l w a s f o r m ed. Val m ad e a
written commi t m ent to the investors that he would buy back the gel
at a higher price, thus assuring the investors of a neat profit. Wh en
the amounts to be paid by Va l t o t h e i n v estors reached mil l i ons of
pesos, he sold all the equipment of his perfume business, absconded
with the money, and is nowhere to be found.
T he crim e c o m m i t t e d i s e s t af a t h r o u g h f a l s e p r e t ense. V a l
defrauded th e i n v estors by f a l sely p r e t endin g t o p ossess business
or imaginary t r a n sactions. The fact t ha t h e sold all th e equipment
o f his perfume bu siness, and absconded wit h t h e m o ney w hen t h e
amounts to be paid by him to the investors reached milli ons of pesos
shows that th e t r a n saction or hi s bu siness is imaginary. (2016 Bar
Exam)
E stafa T h r o ugh I s s u ance o f B o u n c in g C h ec k a n d Ot h e r
Deceit
If the check is postdated, it i s i m p o r t an t t o m a k e th e d r a w er
l iable for estafa through bouncing check to establish that at the tim e
of the postdating (not matu r i ty ) th ereof, the funds were not sufficient
to cover it . T h e e ssence of t hi s c r i m e i s d e f r a u d in g t h e p a yee by
postdating a check. In s um , d espite k n o w l edge of the i n sufficiency
of funds, the drawer postdated the check to defraud the payee, who
parted his money or pr operty by r e ason th ereof. If th e p r osecution
failed to show th e i n s ufficiency of fu nd s at t h e d at e of postdatin g,
t he drawer is not l i a ble for estafa t h r ough bouncing check. But h e
is liable for other deceit. (Sales v. Ho n. Court of Appe als, G.R. No.
L-47817, August 29, 1988)
F ortune T e l l i n g
Other deceit is a lso commit t ed by a ny p e r s on w ho i n t e r p r e ts
dreams, makes forecasts, tells fort u n es, or t a kes advant age of th e
credulity of the public in any other simi lar m a n ner for profit or gain.
(Article 818)
 652 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
C RIMES INVOLVING CHATTEL MO R T G A G E
Under the Ch at tel Mo r t g a ge Law ( Act N o. 1 508), all personal
property shall be subject to m o r t g age, and a m o r t g age executed in
pursuance of this law sh all h e t e r med a ch at tel m o r t g age.
e . (Sect'
e ci on
2) A c hattel mor t gage is a conditi onal sale of personal pr operty a s
security for the payment of a debt, or the performance of some oth
obligation
' s ome o e r
o specified th erein, the condition being t ha t t h e sale shall
be void upon the seller paying to th e p u r c haser a sum of m oney
money or
oing some other act n a m ed. (Section 8) A c h a t t el m o r t g a ge shall
be valid against t h ir d p erson if th e same is recorded in the office of
the register of deeds of the pr ov i nce wh ere th e m o r t g agor resides,
or where the property is situ ated in case of non-resident mort gagor.
(Section 4)
There ar e t w o c r i m e s i n v o l v in g c h a t t e l m o r t g a ge, t o
wit:
removal of mortgaged property and sale or pledge of mortgaged
property.
Rem o val of Mortgaged Property
Removal of m o r t g aged pr operty i s c o m m i t t e d b y a n y p e r s on
w ho knowingly r e m oves a personal pr operty m o r t g aged under t h e
C hattel M o r t g age Law t o a p r o v i nce or cit y o t her t h a n t h e on e i n
which it w a s l ocated at th e t i m e of th e execution of th e m o r t g age
without t h e w r i t t e n c o n sent o f t h e m o r t g a gee, or h i s e x e cutors,
administrators or assigns. (Artic le 819)
F ailure t o l o c at e t h e m o t o r v e h i cl e m o r t g a ged u n d e r t h e
Chattel Mort gage Law at the residence of mortgagor in
Quezon City
i s not competent evidence that i t w a s r e m oved from said Ci ty . T h e
act that constit u tes t hi s cr im e is not h i d i n g th e m o r t g aged vehicle
from the mort gagee but r emoval t h ereof from th e city w h ere it w
e re i w a s
loocated at the t im e of th e execution of mor t gage contract. Evidence
must be presented that t h e v e hi cle is now l ocated in a p l ace other
than Quezon City.
Sale or Pledge of Mortgaged Property
S ale or p l e d g e o f m o r t g a ged p r o p ert y i s c o m m i t t e d b y a
mortgagor who sells or pl edges personal property a l r eady pledged,
or any part thereof, under the terms of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
w ithout th e c onsent of t h e m o r t g a gee w r i t t e n o n t h e b a c k o f t h e
mortgage and noted on the record thereof in the office of the register
of deeds of the province where such property is located. (Article 819)
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 653
Registration and validity of the chattel mortgage are additional
elements ofthe crime of sale or pledge of mortgaged property.
1. W i t h out Consent of the Mortgagee — Under paragraph
2 of Ar t i cl e 319 of t h e R e v i sed Penal C ode, th e s ale of t h e t h i n g
mortgaged may be made provided that the mortgagee gives his
w ritten consent an d t h a t t h e s a m e i s r e c orded i n t h e r e g i str y o f
deeds. (Servicewide Specialist, I n c. v. Th e H o n. C o u rt of A p p e als,
G.B. No. 116868, December 10, 1999) Under pa r a g raph 1 of Art i c l e
319, removal oi mortgaged property may be made provided the
m ortgagee gives hi s w r i t t e n c o n sent. H o w e v er, r e cordin g i s n o t
required to lawfully remove the mortgaged property.
T he mor t gagor w h o g a v e t h e p r o p ert y a s s e cur it y u n d e r a
c hattel m o r t g age did no t p a r t w i t h h i s o w n e r shi p over t h e s a m e.
He had th e r i g h t t o s el l i t a l t h o ug h h e w a s u n de r t h e o b l i g ation
to secure the w r i t t e n c onsent of th e m o r t g agee or he l ay s h i m s elf
open to criminal prosecution under the provision of Article 319 of
the Revised Penal Code. And even if no consent was obtained from
the mortgagee, the validity of the sale would still not be affected.
(Dy, J'r. v. Cour: of Appeals, G.R. No. 92989, July 8, 1991)
2. Id en t it y of t h e P r op er t y — A n e ss e n t i al e l e m e n t
common to the tw o acts puni shed under A r t i cl e 319 of the Revised
Penal Code isthat the property removed or repledged should be the
same or identical property that was mortgaged or pledged before
such removal o r e p l e d ging. (People v. Chupeco, G.R. Ão. 1-1 9568,
March 81, 1964)
3. R eg i s t r a t i o n of Ch a t t e l Mo r t g a g e —0 is the owner of
a car. H e m o r t g aged it t o B u n d e r t h e C h a t t e l M o r t g a ge L aw t o
secure a loan oi P2,000.00 that he obtained from B. The lawyer of
B w ho had p r e pa red t he d ocument f or h i m f o r g ot to r e g ister it i n
the office of the Register of Deeds. 0 sold th e car to C as free from
liens and encumbrances but failed to pay B th e loan of P2,000.00 on
its date of mat u r i t y . 0 i s n o t l i a bl e for sale of mort gaged property.
(1981 Bar Exam,) Although it m ay be true that r e g istra ti on was not
a necessary requisite to the validity of a chattel mortgage under
the old law (Act No. 1508), nevertheless, the same has been deemed
amended by the provision of Article 2140 of the New Civil Code, and
which now makes it in d i spensable that th e document be registered.
Hence, selling ar u n r e gistered mortgaged property is not a violation
of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. (People v. grata, C.A., 58
O.G. 6287)
 654 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
4. V a l i d i t y o f C h a t t e l Mo r t g a g e — In J a c a v . D a ~ a o
Lumber Company, G. R. No. L - 2 5 771, Ma rch 2 9, 1 982, the d eed of
c hattel m o r t g age i s v oi d b e cause it p r o v i des t h a t t h e s e cur it y i s
f or the p a y m ent o f o b l i g a t i ons b efore contr acted an d w h i " h
h ereafter
er t becontracted by the Mortgagor in favor of the Mortga
e o r g a g e e.
A vvalid mortgage cannot be made to secure a debt to bethereafter
contracted. Since the deed ofchattel mortgage executed is void, —.he
m ortgagor could not have violated Ar t i cle 819 of the Rev's d P — I
e vise e: a
Code.
5. D ou b l e Sa l e or Mo r t g a g e —Double sale of real property
constitutes other form of swindling under. paragraph 1 of Article
317 of the Revised Penal Code since at the time of the second sale
the accused is not the owner of the property anymore. In sum, the
accused pretended that he is still the owner of the property when
he sold it for the second time when in fact the owner thereof is the
buyer under the first sale,
Double sale of p e r sonal p r op erty c o n s tit u t es e s ta fa t h r o u g h
false pretense under Ar t i cle 815 since the accused falsely pretended
to possess property w hen h e sold it t o t h e b u yer u n der th e second
sale when in fact that pr operty is already owned by the buyer under
the first sale.
Double m or tgage of r ea l p r o p erty c o n s ti t u t es o t h er f o r m o f
swindling under par agraph 2 of A r t i cle 817 if th e owner of the real
property m ad e an e x p r ess representation i n t h e s econd m or t g a ge
that the same is free from encumbra nce despite the existence of the
first mortgage.
Double mortgage of p e r sonal p r op erty c o nstit u t es t h e c r i m e
o f mortgaging of a m o r t g aged property u n der A r t i cl e 819. What i s
prohibited in A r t i cl e 319 is not onl y s ale or p l e dge of a m o r t g aged
property but also mortgage of a mortgaged property because the
panish text o f t h i s u s e s th e w or d "h i p o t eca." (People v . V d a. d e
Agoncillo, CA-G.R. No. 9118 R, April 8, 1 954)
ARSON
Arson i s committ ed by a ny p e rson who bur ns p ro perty. The re
are laws on arson, and that is, Ar t i cle 820 of the Revised Pena C ode
on destructive arson, and P.D. No. 1613 on simple arson.
Simple arson under P.D. No. 1618 is commit ted by any person
who burns or sets fire to the property of another. (Section 1
) the commission or another violation of law .
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 655
Destructive arson under the Revised Penal Code is committ ed
b y any person who shall bu r n :
1. On e ( 1 ) o r m o r e b u i l d i ngs or edi fices, consequent to one
s ingle act o f b u r n i n g , o r a s a r e s u l t o f s i m u l t a n eous b u r n i n g s,
committed on several or different occasions.
2. A n y b u i l d i n g of public or private ownership, devoted to the
public in general or where people usually gather or congregate for
a definite purpose such as, but not l i m i t e d to, official governmental
function o r bu si n e ss , p r i v a t e t r a n s a c t i on , c o m m e r c e, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incid.ental to a
definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient
dwellings,public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said
building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
8. A n y tr a i n o r l o c omotive, ship o r v e ssel, airship or
airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use,
entertainm ent or leisure.
4. A n y b u i l d i n g , f a c t ory , w a r e h ouse i n s t a l l a t ion a n d a n y
a ppurtenances thereto, wh ich ar e d evoted to th e s er vice of pu b l i c
utilities.
5. A n y b u i l d i n g t h e b u r n i n g of w h i c h i s fo r t h e p u r p ose of
concealing or destroying evidence of another vi olation of law, or for
t he purpose of concealing bank r u p tcy or d efr au d in g creditors or t o
collect from insur ance.
6. A n y ar s e n al , s h i p y a rd , s t o r ehouse or m i l i t a r y p o w d e r
o r fi r e w o rk s f a c t ory , o r d i n a n ce, s t or ehouse, ar ch ives o r g e n e r al
m useum of the Government .
7. I n an i n h a b i t e d p l a ce , a n y s t o r e h ouse o r f a c t or y o f
inflammable or explosive materials.
If the burning of building is perpetrated by two or more persons
or by a group of persons, the crime is destructive arson regardless
o f whether t h eir p u r p ose is merely to b ur n o r d e stroy th e bu i l d i n g
or the burn in g merely constit u tes an overt act in th e commission or
another violation of law. (Article 820) If the burning of building is
perpetrated by a single indi v i d u al, the crime is destructive arson if
his purpose is merely to burn or destroy the buil di ng, or other crime
s uch as mur d er, or th e b u r n i n g m e r ely constit u tes an overt act i n
 656 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Not I n c l u d ed in A r t i c l e 8 2 0
D estructive ar son i s ch a r acterized as a h e i n ous cr i me; w h i l e
simple arson un der P .D . No . 1 613 is a c r i m e m a n i f esting a l e sser
d egree of p e r v e r si ty . S i m p l e a r s o n c o n t e m p l ates t h e
malicious
burning o f p r o p e rty no t i n c l u d e d i n A r t i c l e 32 0 o f t h e R e v i s e d
Penal Code. (People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 142565, July 29, 2008;
People v. Ma l n g a n, G . R. N o . 17 0 4 70, September 26, 20 06; People
v. Macabando, G.R. No. 18 8708, Ju ly 8 1 , 2 018) Thus, it is n ow a n
i mportant e l ement o f s i m pl e a r son u n der P .D . N o . 1 613 t ha t t h e
b urning of property does not constitut e destructive arson under th e
Revised Penal Code.
1. B u r n i n g H o u s e —Burning of in h a b it ed house is simple
arson under Sectiori 3 of P .D . No . 1 613 because it i s no t i n c l u d ed
in Arti cle 320 of the Revised Penal Code. (People v. Soriano, supra;
People v. Ma l n g a n, supra; P eople v. Ma c a b ando, supra; 19 62 B a r
Exam) But burning a house to collect fire insurance is destructive
arson since this is mentioned in Article 320 of the Revised Penal
Code. (1971 and 1994 Bar Exams)
2. B u r n i n g P e r s onal P r o p e rt y — B u r n i ng a t r ai n
or locomotive, ship or ve s s e l, a irship o r a i r p l a n e , d e v oted f o r
t ransportation or c o nveyance, or fo r p u b l i c u se, ent ert a i n m ent o r
leisure is destructive arson un der A r t i cl e 320 of the Revised Penal
Code. Any other personal properties are not covered by Ar t i cle 320.
Hence, burn in g a b u s d e v oted for t r a n s p ort a t ion i s s i m p l e a r s on
under P.D. No. 1613. (2017 Bar Exam)
Out of hate, X got the leather suitcase of stepson and burned it
together wit h al l i t s contents. The crime commi t ted is arson under
P.D. No.
o. 1613.. The e ex e m p t i n g c i r c u m st ance of relationship cannot
be considered since the cr im e i s no t t h e ft , sw i n d l i ng, or m a l i cious
mischief. (2004 Bar Exam)
8. B u r n i n g H i s O w n Pr o p e r t y —Simple arson under P.D.
No. 1613 is also commit ted by any p erson, who sets fire to his own
p roperty u n der c i r c u m st ances wh ich e x pose to d a n ger t h e l i f e o r
property of another. Actual in ju r y t o , or d a m a ge to the propert
another a s a consequence of the bur n i n g of p r o perty o wn ed by t hof, e the building constit u tes two mu r d ers, offender is liable for complex
accused is not required to be held liable for simple arson. As long as
t e u r n i n g e x p oses to danger th e l i f e or p r o p erty of a n o t h er, t h e
accused, who burned his own pr operty, is liable for arson.
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 657
Arson w i th R e s u l t i ng D e a t h
In U.S. v. Bu r n s, G. R. No. 16648, March 5, 1 921 the accused
was convicted of a complex crime of arson wit h h o m i cide. However,
under Arti cle 320 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No.
7659 and Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613, the penalty is higher if arson is
accompanied with r e sul t in g death. In s um , th e result in g death is a
q ualifying circumstance. Burns prin ciple is not anymore controllin g
since the present laws prescribe a single penalty for ar son if death
results as a c o nsequence of th e c o m m i ssion t h e r eof. In Pe o ple v .
Abayon, G.R. No. 204891, September 14, 2016, it was ruled that
there is no complex crime of arson with h o m i cide because the crime
of arson absorbs the resultant death .
If death resulted as a consequence of arson, the crime can be
described as arson (People v. Dolendo, G.R. No. 223098, June 8,
2019) resulting to death. (People v. Abayon, supra)
C rimi na l O b j ect i n B u r n i n g th e P r o p e r t y
Burning the building or property where a person is killed is not
always arson result in g t o d e ath or s p ecial complex cr im e of ar son
with h o m i cide. The m ot ive of th e accused should be considered to
d etermine the crime commit t e d .
I f th e m a i n o b j e ctive o f t h e o f f e nder i s t h e b u r n i n g o f t h e
building, and a person died in th e course of the bur n in g t h ereof, he
is liable for arson with result ing death. In such a case, arson absorbs
homicide since the l a t ter i s j u s t a c i r c u m st ance that u p g r a des the
penalty for the former. (People v. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27,
1994)
X to collect fire insur ance sets fire to his insured house. B died
as a result o f t h e fi r e . T h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s d e st r u ct ive a r son
qualified by the circumstance of resulting death. (1971 Bar Exam)
If the main objective is to kill th e v i ct im , th e offender is liable
f or murder qu al i fied by th e circum st ance of by means of fire, wh i l e
arson is absorbed. (People v. Cedenio, supra) I f single act of burnin g
crime o f d o u bl e m u r d e r s. (P e ople v. Ga f f u d , G . R N o . 168 0 5 0 ,
September 19, 2008)
I f th e o bjective i s t o c o ver u p t h e k i l l i n g , o f f ender i s l i a b l e
for two separate crimes of homicide (or murder), and arson. If the
building is bu r ned to conceal mu r der an d an other v i c ti m d ied as a
 658 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
consequence of the bu r n i ng , th e offender is l i a ble for tw o separate
c rimes of mur der an d a r son result in g t o death .
(People v. Cedenio,
supra)
If the main objective is to commit robbery, the offender is liable
f or robbery wit h h o m i cide wh il e ar son shall be in t egrated into t h i s
special complex crime. (People v. Jugueta, G.R N o . 20 2124, A pril 5 ,
2 016) However, by means of fire shall be considered as an ordin ar y
aggravating circumstance. (U.S. v. Bulfa, G.R. No. 8463, August 20,
1913)
Diego, in afitof anger, unsheathed his bolo and hacked Pablo
to death. To conceal the kil l in g of Pablo, Diego brought Pablo's body
inside the house and burned it. M a r io, who was hiding in the house,
w as also bu r ne d t o d e a th . D i eg o i s l i a bl e fo r s e p ar at e c r i me s of
homicide, and arson with r e s ult i ng death. (1989 Bar Exam)
As a rule, burning the building to conceal a crime (e.g., murder)
constitutes separate crime ofarson and the crime being concealed.
H owever, burn ing th e bu i l d in g to conceal of robbery wit h h o m i ci d e
will not constitute a separate crime of arson. In this case
arso
s all be i n t e gr ated i nt o th e special complex cr im e of r obbery w i t h
homicide.
T error i sm, destr u c t io n an d a r s o n
Crimes involving destruction of property was punishable under
A rticle 324 of th e Revised Penal Code. However, Section 9 of P .D .
No. 1618 expressly repealed Ar t i cle 824 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, under RA No. 11479, terrorism is commi t ted by a person,
w ho engages i n i n a c t s i n t e n de d t o c a u s e e x t ensive d a m age or
destruction to a government or public facility, public place or privat e
p roperty or e x t ensive i n t e r f erence wi th , d a m age or d estru ction t o
c ritical in f r a st r u ct ur e w hen t h e p u r p ose of such act, by it s n a t u r e
and context, is to inti m i d ate the general public or a segment thereof,
create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear, toprovoke or
influence b y i n t i m i d a t io n t h e g o v e r n m en t o r a n y i n t e r n a t i o n al
o rganization, or s e r i ously d e stabilize or d e s t roy t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
political, economic, or social str u c t u r es of t he c ountr y, or c r e a te a
public emergency or seriously under m ine public safet .
y.
C ritical I n f r a s t r u c t u r e s hall r e f e r t o
a n asset o r
whether p h y s ical o r v i r t u a l , s o e s sentia l t o t h e m a i n t e nsystem,
a nce of
vital societal functions or to the delivery of essential public services
t hat t h e i n c a p acity o r d e s t r u c t io n o f s u c h s y s t em s a n d a s s e t s
J9JC9B0M
X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 659
would have a debilit a t in g i m p act on n a t i onal defense and security ,
n ational economy, p u b li c h e a lt h o r s a f e ty , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t ion o f
justice, and other f u n c t i ons analogous thereto. It m a y i n c l u de, but
is not li m i t ed to, an asset or system affecting t elecommunications,
w ater an d e n ergy s u p p ly , e m er gency services, food security , f u el
supply, bank in g an d f i n a n ce, tr a n sportati on, r a di o an d t e l evision,
information systems and technology, chemical and nu clear sectors.
(Section 3 of R.A. No. 11479)
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
Malicious mischief is committed by any person who deliberately
c auses damage to the property of another, which is not constitu t i v e
of arson. (Articles 827 and 329)
Killing a do g ow ned by a n o t her p e r son is m a l i cious mi schief
s ince a dog is a personal pr operty w i t h i n t h e contemplation of A r -
ticle 827 of the Revised Penal Code on malicious mischief (1976 and
1969 Bar E x a m s) and v i o l a t i on of R . A. N o. 8 4 85 ( An i m al W e l fare
Latv). Before killi ng a cow owned by another was constitut i ve of the
crime of malicious mischief. (People v. Valiente, CA-G.R. No. 9442-R,
December 2 9, 1958) However, ki l l i n g a c ow w i t h o ut c onsent of t h e
owner is now cattle-rustl ing un der P.D. No. 538.
T here ar e s p e cial c a ses o f m a l i c i ou s m i s c hief s uc h a s : ( 1 )
causing damage to obstruct the perform ance of public functions; (2)
using a poisonous or corrosive substance; (8) spreading infection or
c ontagion among cattle; (4) causing dam age to th e p r operty of t h e
National M u s eu m o r N a t i o na l L i b r a r y , o r t o a r c h i v e or r e g i s tr y ,
waterworks, road, promenade, or any ot her t h i n g u sed in common
by the public. (Artic le 327)
Damages a n d o b s t r u c tio n t o me a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t ion i s
committed by any person who damages a railway, telegraph or
telephone lines. The crime is qualified if t he d a ma ge results in a ny
derailment of cars, collision or other accident. Electric wires, traction
cables, signal system and other t h i n g s pert ai n in g to r a i l w ays shall
be deemed to constitute anintegral part of a railway system. (Article
880)
Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings
is committed by any person who destroys ordamages statues or any
other useful or ornamental public monument or useful or ornamental
painting of a public nat u re. (Artic le 881)
 660 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Republic Act No . 8550 as amended by R.A. No. 10654
The Philip p i n e I ' i s h e r ies Code of 1998
A s a r u l e , t h e j u r i s d i ction o f t h e c o a stal s t at e o ve r c r i m e s
c ommitted wi t hi n t h e 200 mi les exclusive economic zone is lim i t e d .
However, under th e Convention of th e L a w o f t h e Sea, the coastal
state in the exclusive economic zone has juri sdiction wit h r e gard t o
the protection and pr eservation of th e m a r in e envir onment. U n d er
Section 8 o f R . A . N o . 8 5 50 , t h e p r o v i sion o f t h e C o d e o n i l l e g al
fishing shall be enforced in all Phi l i p p ine waters, with respect to the
country's 200-mile exclusive economic zone.
F'ishing
h' Th r o u gh Ex p l o s i v es, Noxi o us or P o i s o nous
S ubstance or E l e c t r i c i t y
C atching fish i n t h e P h i l i p p in e fi s h er y a r e a w i t h t h e u s e o f
e xplosives, electricity or n o x i ous or poisonous substance is a cri m e
punishable under Section 88 of R.A. No. 8550. However, one, who
used explosive in comm i t t i n g i l l e gal fi sh i ng, can be pr osecuted for
illegal possession of explosives under Section 8 of P.D. No. 1866 in
r elation to Section 3-C thereof. If a person died or suffered inj u r i e s
as a consequence of illegal 6 sh i ng, th e offender can be pr osecuted
for illegal fishing and homi cide, mur der or ph y s ical inju r i e s. Under
R.A. No. 8550, the penalty for illegal fishing is without prejudice to
the filing of separate crimi nal cases when the use of the same would
r esult to physical inj ur y or loss of human l i f e .
Use of poisonous or noxious substances to eradicate predators
in fishponds i n a c cordance w it h a c cepted scientific p r a ct ices an d
w ithout c a u s in g a d v e r s e e nvironmenta l i m p a c t i n
neighboring
w aters and grounds shall not be construed as illegal fishin g .
Possession, dealing, selling or disposing 6sh caught though th e
use of explosives, electricity o r n o x i ou s or p o i sonous substance is
also a crime.
The disc overy of dynamite or other explosives, noxious or
p oisonous substances, or device for electrofishing or fish caught wi t h
t he use of ex pl o s ' ive, noxious or poisonous substances or electric t
s all c onsti t ute pr i m a f a c ie ev i d e nce of i l l e g al f is h i n g . H o wrici
sh y
e ver,
mere possession of ex plosive, noxious or p o i sonous substances or
e ectrofishing devices for illegal fishing is also a crime.
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X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 661
Poaching
The use and exploitation of the fishery and aquatic resources in
Philippine waters shall be reserved exclusively to Fili p i nos. (Section
5 ofRA. No. 8550) Any foreign person, who to fish or operate any
fishing vessel in Philippine waters, is liable for the crime of poaching.
The entry of any foreign fishing vessel in Philippine waters shall
constitut e a pr i m a f a c i e e v i d e nce t h at t h e v e s s el is e n g a g ed i n
6shing in Philippine waters. (Section 87)
Violation of R .A. No. 8550
The following acts constitute il l egal fishing or violation of R.A.
No. 8550:
1. F i sh i n g w i t h ou t p e r m i t o r l i c e nse. The di scovery of an y
person in possession of a fi sh in g gear or operat in g a fi s h in g vessel
i n a fishing area wh ere he has no license or permit sh all constit u t e
prima facie presumption that the person is engaged in unautho ri zed
fishing; however, fishing for daily food sustenance or for leisure
which is not for commercial, occupation or livelihood purposes may
be allowed;
Employing unlicensed fisherfolk or fishworker in a commercial
fishing vessel; engaging i n fi s h i n g a c t i v i t ie s such a s construction
of fishpond, fish pen o r fi s h t r a p w i t h o u t p e r m i t , l i c ense or l ease;
constructing or import ing fishing vessels or gears or to convert other
vessels into fishing vessels without permit; using a fishing gear or
method for commercial fishing wit h o ut l i c ense;
2. F i s h i ng with the use of a Philippine fiagged 6shing vessel
in thehigh seas, or in the territorial seas, archipelagic waters, and
exclusive economic zones of ot h er s t a t es w i t h o ut f ir s t s e c u r i ng a
fishing permit an d au t h o r i z ation from the coastal state.
8. E n ga g i n g i n u n r e g u l a ted fi s h in g i n w a t e r s w i t h i n a n d
beyond national j u r i s diction. Un r e gulated I i s h i n g r e f e rs to fis hi n g
activities conducted by: (a) Vessels without na t i onality but operated
b y F i l i p i n o a n d / o r F i l i p i n o c o r p o r a t i on ; ( b ) P h i l i p p i n e fi a g g e d
f ishing vessels operating in ar eas managed by RFMOs to which th e
Philippines is not a party to; or (c) Philippine flagged fishing vessels
operating in areas or fish stocks where there are no applicable
conservation and management measures;
4 Fish i n g with t he use of mesh net smaller than what is
required; fish in g w i t h t h e u s e o f a c t iv e gear i n m u n i c i pal w a t er s
 662 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER X. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY 663
VOLUME II

and in allbays as well as other fishery management areas; or with Acts of cutting mangrove trees, constructing a dike, installing an
the use of superlight in m u n i c i pal w a t ers, or li ght a t t r a ctor beyond outlet, and excavating in th e m a n grove forest constitute conversion
the required standards or use of superlight or fi sh ing li ght at t r a ctor because it alt ered the n a t u r a l s t r u c t ur e an d f or m of th e m a n grove
outside m u n i c i pal w a t e r s i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e r u l e s p r o m u l g a t ed f crest. Even if accused inherited the m a n grove forest area from hi s
outside municipal wat ers; grandfather it was already fishpond, such does not absolve him from
liability. His continued int r oduction of improvements and continued
5. F i sh i n g i n a r eas declared as over-exploited or in m a r i n e use of the mangrove forest area as a fishpond, despite knowledge of
p rotected a r eas, fi s h er y r e s e rves, r e f u ge, o r fi s h s a n c t u a r ie s o r the same being a mangrove forest area, impose upon him criminal
fishing during closed season; liability. (Leynes v. People, G.R No. 224804, September 21, 2018)
6. G at h e r i n g , possessing, selling or exporti ng, commercially
transporting corals except for scientific or research purposes; or
committing any activity that damage coral reefs; or fishing with gear
method that destroys coral reefs, seagrass beds, and other fishery
marine life habitat and similar gear and methods that require
diving, other physical or mechanical acts to pound the coral reefs
and other habitat to entrap, gather or catch fish and other fishery
species;
7. Cat c h i n g , g a t h e r i n g , c apturin g o r p os s e ssin g r a r e ,
t hreatened or e n d a ngered species; Im p or t in g o r e x p o r t in g fi s h o r
fisheries species in violation of the Code; taking, selling, transfer, or
p ossession shell fish which is sexually mat ure or below the mini m u m
s ize or above the maximu m q u a n t i t i e s ;

C atching, gathering, captur in g or p ossessing mat ur e m i lk fi s h

or sa b a l o" a nd s u ch o t h er b r e e ders or s p a w n e rs of o t h er f is h e r y
species except forlocal breeding purposes or scientific or research
purposes; or exporting breeders, spawners, eggs or fry;

8. Sh i p p i n g , c o m m er cially t r a n s p or t i ng , o f f er in g f o r s a l e ,
selling, import i ng, exporti ng, or h a v in g custody, control, or posses-
sion of, or dealing in or in an y m a n ner d i sposing of any fish or spe-
cies caught, taken or retained in vi olation of the Code.

T he discovery of an y fi s h o r s p e cies caught w i t h t h e u s e o f

e xplosives or n o x i ous o r p o i s onous su bstances shall c on st i t ut e a
prima f a cie p r e s u m p t i on t h a t t h e p o s s essor, s eller, f is h d e a l e r ,
t ransporter, i m p or t er, or e x porter t h e r eof has k n o w l edge that t h e
fish or species was caught or taken in v i ol ation of the Code.

9. Ob s t r u c t i o n t o n avigation o r flo w
or ebb of tide in
any stream, r i v e r, l a ke or b a y . O b s t r u c t i on of m i g r a t i on p a t h s o f
m igratory species; converting m a n gr oves into fi shponds or for a n y
other purposes.

J9JC9B0M

XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
ADULTERY
Adultery i s commit t ed by any m a r r i e d wo man w ho shall ha v e
sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man wh o
has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be marr i ed, even if th e
marriage be subsequently declared void.(Article883; 1948 and 1960
Bar Exams)
Sexual I n t e r c o u r s e
A dultery i s a c r i m e o f r e s ul t a n d n o t o f t e n d e n cy. I t i s a n
i nstantaneous c r i m e w hich i s con s u m m a t e d a nd ex h a u s t e d
o r completed a t t h e m o m e n t o f t h e c a r n a l u n i o n . E a c h s e x u a l
intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. Prosecuting the accused
for two crimes of adultery comm i t ted on different occasions will not
o ffend the r u l e o n d o u bl e j e opardy. A d u l t er y i s n o t a c o n t i n u o u s
crime (delito conti n u ado) s i n ce t he t w o a d u l t e r o us a cts w e re n o t
committed un der a si n gle cri m i na l i m p u l se. (see: People v. Zapata,
G.R. No. L-8047, May 16, 1961)
G ender E l e m en t of A d u l t e r y
A dultery i s a g e n d e r c r i m e s i n c e t h e p r i n c i pa l o f f e nder i n
adultery m us t b e a m a r r i e d w o ma n w h i l e t h e s econdary offender
must be a man. A man, who underwent sex reassignment, cannot be
a principal offender in adult ery since he is not a woman. In sum, the
g ender element of a d u l t er y i s w a n t i n g . F u r t h e r m o re, th e m a r r i e d
s tatus of th e p r i n c i pal o f f ender, w h ic h i s a l s o a n e l e m ent o f t h i s
crime, is not p r esent si nce th e m a r r i age between th e t r a n sgender
and the offended party isinvalid. (2016 Bar Exam)
The secondary offender in a d u l t er y m ust be a man ot h er t h a n
the husband of the married woman. A married woman, for having
664
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 665
h omosexual i n t e r course w i t h a n o t h e r w o m a n , i s n o t l i a b l e f o r
adultery since the secondary offender is not a man. (2016 Bar Exam)
Independent Responsibility of Secondary Offender
A man, who had no k n o w l edge that th e w o man wa s m a r r i e d,
i s not l i a bl e fo r a d u l t e ry . H o w ev er, th e m a r r i e d w o ma n i s l i a b l e
f or adult ery for h a v i n g sexual i n t e r course wit h a m a n o t h e r t h a n
h er husband w i t h ou t r e g ard t o th e g u il t o f t h e m an . A l t h o ugh t h e
o ffended husband cannot i n s t i t u t e a p r o secution for t h e c r i m e o f
adultery wit h out in cluding therein both of the guilty par t i es, but the
statute does not require that both of them must necessarily be tried
or convicted together. After th e h u sband in st i t u t es the prosecution
a gainst b ot h i n h i s c o m p l a i nt , t h e p r o s ecution m a y m o v e f o r a
dismissal of the complaint as to the paramour if his guilty kn owledge
cannot be established. (U.S. v. Topino, G.B. No. 11895, December 20,
1916) In a pr osecution for adu l t e ry, th e ar g u m ent t ha t a cqui t tal of
the paramour can prevent the conviction of the wife of the offended
party on the ground of the indivi sibil it y of that cr im e is not tenable.
(1948 and 2002 Bar Exams)
S ubsequent D e c l a r a t i o n of N u l l i t y
Adultery is committe'd even though the marriage is subsequently
declared void. Lawmakers intended to declare a dulterous t h e
infidelity of a m a r r i e d w o man t o he r m a r i t a l v o ws, even th ough it
.
s hould be made to appear that she is enti t led to have her ma r r i a g e
contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures
a formal judicial declaration to that effect.
H owever t h e o f f e n ded s p ouse m u s t i n s t i t u t e t h e c r i m i n a l
action for adultery before the marriage is declared null and void.
Under Ar t i cle 344 of the Revised Penal Code, only offended spouse
t hrough a s w o r n w r i t t e n c o m p l a in t c a n p r o s ecute t h e c r i m e o f
adultery. Thi s pr ovi sion pr esupposes that th e m a r i t a l r e l a t i onship
is st 11 subsisting at the time of the insti t u t ion of the crim i nal action
for adultery. Th e p r i v at e complainant w i l l c ease to be an offended
spouse once the mar r i age is declared null an d v oid (or divorce was
obtained by th e f or eign spouse abroad). Hence, crimi nal a ction for
a dultery i n s t i t u t e d af ter th e declaration of n u l l i t y o f t h e m a r r i a ge
w ill b e d i s m i ssed s i nce compli ance w i t h t h e r u l e r e g a r d in g t h e
institut ion of criminal action by the offended spouse is jurisdictional.
(Pilcpil v. Ibay-Somera, G.B. No. 80116, June 80, 1989)
 666 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
CONCUBINAGE
C oncubinage is commi t te d b y a h u s b a nd: (1) wh o sh al l k e e p
a mistress in th e conjugal dwelling; (2) who shall have sexual
intercourse w it h a w o m a n w h o i s n o t h i s w i f e u n d e r s c andalous
circumstances; or (3) who shall cohabit wi th h er in a ny o th er pla ce.
(Article 334; 1 946, 1 948, 1 9 5 1, and 19 6 9 Ba r E x a m s ) Co n c ubine
i s liable for concubinage if sh e i s a w a r e t h a t t h e h u s b an d of t h e
offended party ismarried.
K eeping a M i s t r e s s
A married man wh o k eeps a mi st r ess in his conjugal dwelli n g
is guilty of t h e c r i m e o f c oncubinage. "Scandalous circumstances"
are not necessary t o make him g u i l ty of s aid crim e. It is o nly w h e n
the mi s t r ess i s k e p t e l s e w h er e t h a t "s c a n d a l o us c i r c u m s tances"
become an el ement o f t h e c r i m e . (U . S. v. M a c a b abbag, G.R. ¹ .
10564, August 6, 1915)
C ohabita t i o n
I n c oncubinage, t o "cohabit" m eans d w e l l in g t o g e t h er as
husband and wife, or in sexual int ercourse. This crime is not a single
a ct of infidelity. The period of cohabitin g may be a w eek, a mon t h ,
a year, or l o n ger, bu t s t i l l , i t i s o n e concubinage only. W h er e t h e
sexual intercourses are occasional or the dur a t ion of having them is
transient, there is no cohabitati on . (People v. Pitoc, G.R. ¹ . 18 5 1 3 ,
September 18, 1 922; Ocampo v. Pe ople, G.R. No . 47 7 56, Ju n e 1 0 ,
1941)
A is m a r r i ed. H e h a s a p a r a m ou r w i t h w h o m h e h a s s exual
relations on a m or e or l ess regular b a sis. They m eet at l e ast once
a week in hotels, motels and other pl aces where they can be alone.
A is not l i a bl e fo r c oncubinage. H a v in g s exual i n t e r course per s e
with a woman, who is not hi s w i fe, even on a re gular b a sis will n o t
make the marr ied man li a ble for concubinage. In addition to sexual
i ntercourse, cohabitati on , m a i n t a i n i n g a m i s t r e s s i n a c o n j u g a l
d welling or scandalous circumstance is indispensable to commit t h e
crime of concubinage. Meeting at least once a week in a place where
they can be alone together is not enough to satisfy the requir ement
of cohabitation, maint ai n ing a mistress, or scandalous circumstance.
(2002 Bar Exam)
S uspecting tha t h e r h u s b an d of t w e nt y y e ar s wa s h a v in g a n
a ffair, th e w i f e h i r e d a p r i v a t e i n v e sti gator t o sp y o n h i m . A f t e r
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 667
two weeks, tl e pr i v at e i n v estigator showed the w if e a v i deo of her
husband having sexual i n t e rcourse with a n o t her w o man i n a r o om
o f a five-star h ot el. B ased on w ha t sh e saw on t h e v i d eo, the w i f e
accused her hu sband of concubinage. The case of concubinage will
not prosper because the element of cchabitati on, keeping a mistress
or scandalous cir cum stance i s n o t p r e s ent. M o r e over, th e s exual
video wa s t a k i n g i n v i o l a t i o n o f R . A . N o . 9 9 9 5 ( t h e A n t i - V i d eo
Voyeurism L a w), and t h us, the same is not adm i ssible in evidence.
(2010 Bar Exa m) If t he v i d eo also includes private communication,
such commur i c a t ion i s not a lso admissible in ev i d ence for being a
v iolation of tl e An t i - w i r e -tapping law .
Sexual video of husband and his mistress taken through a C CTV
camera deliberately in st alled by th e w if e in th e m a ster bedroom of
their h ouse to cover sexual m a r i t a l i n fi d e l it y i s n o t a d m i s sible in
e vidence for t ein g a violation of the An t i - V i deo Voyeurism L a w .
L etters o b t a i ned i n v i o l a t io n o f h u s b a n d's r i gh t o f p r i v a c y
is not adm issible in e v i d ence in a c oncubinage case. In Zu l u e ta v .
CA, G.R. No. 107383, Febru ar y 20 , 1 9 96, th e i n t i m a cies between
h usband and w i f e d o not j u s t if y an y on e of t h e m i n b r e a k in g t h e
d rawers and cabinets of th e other an d i n r a n s acking t hem for a n y
t elltale e v i d ence o f m a r i t a l i n fi d e l ' t y . A p e r s on , b y c o n t r a c t i n g
marriage, does not shed hi's/her int egrity or h i s r i gh t t o pr i v a cy a s
an individual an d th e constit u t i o nal pr otection is ever available to
him or to her.
Scandalous
The scandal produced by the concubinage of a married man
o ccurs not only when he and. his mistress appear together in publi c,
a nd perfor m a ct s i n s i g h t o f t h e c o m m u n i t y w h i c h g i v e r i s e t o
criticism and general pr otest am ong th e n eighbors. (Revised Penal
Code by Luis Reyes)
C oncubin age an d A d u l t e r y
A and B ar e h u s b a nd a nd w i f e ; X a n d Y , a r e a l s o h u s band
and wife. A and Y ha d sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances. B an d X l i k ew i s e h a d s e x u al i n t e r c ourse u n d e r
scandalous circumstances. What ar e t h e c r i m es commi t t ed? (1982
Bar Exam)
A, a married man, is guilty of concubinage for having
sexual i n t ercourse w it h Y , w h o i s r o t h i s w i f e , u n der scandalous
 668 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
c ircumstance. Y is also guilt y of concubinage if she is aw are of t h e
marital status of A. No te: B b e ing wife of A can file a complaint f o r
c oncubinage against A and Y.
Y; a mar r ie d w o m an , i s g u i l t y o f a d u l t er y fo r h a v i n g s exual
i ntercourse w it h A , w h o i s n o t h e r h u s b a nd . A i s a l s o g u i l t y o f
adultery if he is aware of the m a r i ta l st a tu s of Y. No te: X being the
husband of Yean file complaint for adu l t ery against Y and A.
X a m ar r i e d m a n , i s gu i l t y o f co n c u b i n ag e f o r h a v i n g
sexual in t ercourse with B, wh o i s n o t h i s w i f e , u n d er s c andalous
circumstance. B i s also guilty of concubinage if she is awa re of the
marital status of X. ¹t e: Yb e i n g t he w i fe of X can file a complaint
for concubinage against X and B.
B, a ma r r i e d w o m a n, is g u i l t y o f a d u l t e ry f or h a v i n g s e xual
i ntercourse w it h X w h o i s n o t h e r h u s b a nd . X i s a l s o g u i l t y o f
adultery if he is aware of the ma r i t a l st a tu s of B. Note: A being the
husband of B can file complaint for adul t e ry against B and X.
Adultery and concubinage are distinguished as follows:
1 . A d u l t e r y i s c o m m i t t e d b y a w i f e o f t h e o f f ended p a r t y ;
however, her paramour is also liable for adult ery if he is aware that
s he is ma r r i ed. Concubinage is comm i t t e d b y t h e h u s b an d of t h e
offended party; however, his concubine is also liable for concubinage
i f she is aware that he is mar r i e d .
2. T h e p r o h i b i t e d act i n a d u l t er y i s t h e sexual i n t e r course
between a married woman and a man, who is not her husband.
S exual i n t e r course i s a n el em en t o f c o n c u b i n age. B u t s e x u a l
i ntercourse between the m a r r i ed ma n an d a w o man other t ha n h i s
wife is not per se constituti ve of the crime of concubinage. To commit
concubinage, the element of cohabit at i on, m a i n t a i n in g a m i s t r ess,
or scandalous circumstance must also be present. (1960 Bar Exam)
3. Th e r e a r e a s m any c r i m e s o f a d u l t er y a s t h e r e are
sexual int ercourses between the w if e an d p a r a m our because every
intercourse poses a risk of introducing spurious heirs into the family .
(see: People v. Zapata, G.R. No. L-3047, May 16, 1951) On the other
hand, cohabiting or scandalously mai n t a i n in g a mi st r ess regardless
of the nu m ber of sexual i n t e r courses constit u tes a si n gle cr im e of
concubinage. (See: People v. Pitoc, supra)
4. T h e gist of the crime of adultery is the danger ofintroducing
spurious heirs into the family, where the rights of the real heirs may
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 669
be impaired and a man may be charged with the maintenance of a
family not, his own. (U.S. v. Mata, G.R. No. 1-6300, March 2, 191 1)
Every sexual int ercourse by the mar r ied woman wit h her par amour
w ill pose a r i s k o f a f o r e ign i n t r o d u ction. T ha t i s t h e r e a son wh y
every sexual intercourse constitutes a crime. On the other hand, the
commission of concubinage does pose such risk. The essence of this
crime other than violation of mar i tal vow, is the scandal that affects
the family. Regardless of the number sexual intercourses during the
cohabitation, concubinage will produce a single family scandal. That
is the reason why r egardless of the nu m ber of sexual i n t ercourses,
there is only one crime of concubinage.
C oncubin age an d B i g a m y
Abe, married to Liza, contracted another mar r i age with Connie
in Singapore. Thereafter, Abe and Connie returned to the Philippines
and lived as husband and w if e in L a g u na. Abe commi t ted bi gamy .
However, he cannot be p r osecuted in t h e P h i : i p p i nes because the
c rime of bigamy wa s comm i t ted i n S i n g apore. Abe also committ ed
c oncubinage for c o h abi t in g w i t h C o n n i e , w h o i s n o t h i s w i f e i n
Laguna. Connie is also liable for concubinage if she is aware of th e
marital condition of Abe. (1 994 Bar Exam)
V iolence aga inst w o m a n a n d b i g a m y
I f th e w i f e s u f f e re d e m o t i o na l d i s t r es s d u e t o t h e a c t o f
infidelity by th e h u sband, the l a t ter can be prosecuted for violence
against ~ oman under R.A. No. 9262 inaddition to concubinage. The
differences between the two are as follows:
1. U n l i k e co n cubinage, co h a bitation, m ai n t a ining a
mistress, or scandalous circumstance is not an el ement of vi olence
against woman. Un l i ke vio lence against wo ma n, emotional distress
is not an element of concubinage;
2. ' he court has no terr i t o r ial j u r i s diction over concubinage
c ommitted o u t s i d e t h e Ph i l i p p i n es . T h e c o u r t h a s t er r i t o r i a l
jurisdictior over psychological violence against woman if the act
of infi delit y c o m m i t t e d i n a f o r e i g n c o u n tr y p r o d u ces emotional
distress to the ~ o man and her ch i l d r en in t he P h i l i p p i n e s. (AAA v.
BBB, G.B. ¹ . 21 2 448,January 11, 2018)
3. Con c u b i n a ge, w h i c h i s a pr i v a t e c r i m e , c a n o n l y b e
prosecuted under two conditions: (1) complaint is filed by the offended
wife against both the husband and his mistress, and (2) the offended
wife have not consented or p a r d oned th e offenders. (Article 334 of
 670 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
the Revised Penal Code) Violence against women and the ir child r e n
shall be considered a public offense which may be prosecuted upon
the filing of a complaint b y an y c i t i zen h av in g personal kn owledge
of the circumstances involving the commission of the crime. (Section
25 of R.A. No. 9262)
RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE OR SEXUAL ASSAULT
There are two kinds of rape: (1) rape through sexual intercourse;
and (2) rape through sexual assault. However, the Supreme Court in
People v. Tulugan, G.R, No. 227363, March 12, 2019 said that rape
through sexual intercourse should be called as "rape" while rape
through sexual assault should be called as "sexual assault."
RAPE
Rape is committed by a man w ho shall ha ve carnal kn o wle dg
of a woman: (1) through force, threat, or in t i m i d a t i on; (2) when th
offended party i s d e p r i ved of r e ason or o t h er w ise unconscious; (3)
by means of fraudulent m a chin a t ion or gr ave abuse of authori ty ; or
(4) when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
(Article 226-A; 1951 Bar Ex a m )
Carnal Knowledge
Carnal knowledge isdefined as the act of a man having sexual
intercourse or sexual bodily connections wit h a w o m a n . (People v.
Parej a, G.R. No. 188979, September 5, 2012)
Lack of Consent
C arnal knowledge of the woman w it h h e r consent is not r a p e,
provided she isabove the age of consent or is capable in the eyes o:
t he law of giv in g consent. Th us, m ere copulation, wit h t h e w o m a r
p assively acquiescent, does not c onsti t ut e r a pe. Th e f e m ale m u s t
n ot at an y t i m e c o nsent; he r c o nsent, g i ven a t a n y t i m e p r i o r t c
p enetration, h o w ever r e l u c t a n tl y g i v e n , o r if a c c ompanied v ri t h
mere verbal protests and refusals, prevents the act from being rape.
provided the consent is wil l in g and free of init ial coercion. (People v.
Butiong, G.R. No. 168982, October 19, 2011
) not give he r c o n sent t o a s e x u a l i n t e r course w i t h ou t a c o n d om,
1. Con s e n t B e f o r e P e n e t r a t i o n — W h e re a m a n t a k e s
hold of a w o m a n a g a i nst h e r w i l l , a n d s h e a f t e r w ard co n sents to
intercourse before penetration, his act is not rape.
(People v. Butiong,
supra)
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 671
In People v. Lama r r o za, G.R. No. 126121, November 24, 1998,
a ccording t o t h e v i c t i m , t h e a c c used en t ered h e r h o u se, car r i e d
her, laid her down in a ba m boo bed; she struggled but failed to free
herself; accused told her t hat i f she could not satisfy him , he would
kill h er; but t h er e wa s no deadly w eapon used in t h r e a t ening her ;
she enjoyed what th e accused did to her. According to the Supreme
Court, in t h e c r im e of r a pe, it i s i m p e r a t iv e for th e p r osecution to
e stablish t h a t t h e e l e m ent o f v o l u n t a r i n ess is ab solutely l a ck i n g .
One cannot be for ed to have sex and at the same time enjoy it. This is
simple unnatural and not in accord with ordin ary hu man experience.
2. W it hd r a w a l o f C o n s ent —Where the woman consents,
but then wi t h d r a w s h er " o n sent before penetration, a nd t he a ct i s
accomplished by f orce, it i s r a pe. (People v. Bu t i o ng, supra) B u t i f
t he woman t a c i tl y c o n sents t o h a v e s e x ual i n t e r course w it h t h e
accused, but t h en wi t h d r a w s h e r c o n sent in t h e c o u r se of sexual
intercoursebecause she felt pain, and the act is not rape. It would
be unfair toconv:ct a man of rape committed against a woman who,
after givin g hi m t h e i m p r e ssion t hr u h e r u n e x p l a i n able silence of
h er tacit consent and allowing hi m t o h ave sexual contact w th h e r ,
changed her mind in the mi d dle and charged him w it h r a pe. (People
v. Tionloc, G.R. No. 212198, February 15, 201 7 )
3. C on d i t i o n a l C o n s ent —Where a woman offers to allow
a man t o h av e i n t e r course w it h h e r o n c e r t ai n c o n di t i ons an d h e
r efuses to c omp y w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o ns, bu t a c c omplishes th e a c t
without her consent, he is guilty of rape. (PeopLev. Butiong, supra)
4. St e a l t h i n g — S t e alth i ng i s t h e r e m o v al o f c o n d om b y
the man dur in g sex wi t h out consent of the wom an. Th ere is no law
e xpressly penalizing stealth i ng. I n f a ct , t h er e is a 2 019 bil l w h i c h
sought to amend the Revised Penal Code by including stealthing in
the definition of rape thr ough sexual assault.
It is submi t ted t ha t s t e alt h in g i s not equiv alent t o r ape since
lack of consent as an element of t hi s cr im e pert a ins to sex and not
to the removal of the condom. NulLum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.
However, if the woman expressly and categorically required the use
of condom as a condition t o sex, and m ade it c l ear t h a t sh e w ould
stealthing may constit ut e fr au d u l ent m a chin a t i on, which is a mode
of committ in g r a pe. But absolute lack of consent must be shown to
make the ma n l i a bl e for r a p e t h r o ugh f r a u d u l ent m a c h i n ation. If
the woman f a i led t o r e sist th e cont i n ued sex, or r e gister a st r ong
objection upon kn ow in g t ha t t h e ma n a l r e ady r emoved the condom
 672 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
f rom hi s p e n is, r ap e m u s t b e r u l e d o u t . R a p e i s a s e r i ous cr i m e
punishable by reclusion perpetua. H ence, the acts committed by the
accused must be clearly w i t h i n t h e contempl at ion of the stat ut e on
rape; otherwise, he must be acquit ted of r ape based on the pro re o
principle.
5. C on s e n t a f t e r th e C o n s u m m a t i o n of the C r i m e —The
accused, taking advant age of th e f act t h a t v i c ti m w a s a sleep, had
carnal knowledge of her. Assuming that th e victim consented to the
sexual act when she woke up, the accused is still li able for rape. The
crime of rape had already been consummated, and thus, consent
given after the consummation of the act is not of the character to be
excluded from the concept of the crime of rape. Such consent will be
considered as a mere. resignation in t h e f ace of an ou t r age already
perpetrated. (People v. Dayo, G.R. No. L-27859, December 1, 1927
) 2018) Resistance is not an element of rape. (People v. Ramos, G.R.
I ntim i d a t i o n
There is intim i d a t ion if the acts of the accused produce fea" that
if the victim d oes not y i eld t o t h e b estial d e m a nds of th e accused,
s omething w o ul d h a p pen t o h e r a t t h e m o m en t o r t h e r e a ft er, a s
w hen she i s t h r e a t ened w i t h d e a t h i f s h e r e p o rt s t h e i n c i d e n t .
ntimidation would also explain why t h er e are no traces of struggle
which would indicate that the victim fought off her attacker. (People
v. Leonardo, G.R No . 1 81086; July 6, 2010)
1. T e na c i o u s R e sistance — In People v. Lago, C .A., 45 0.0.
1356, at fir st, th e offended woman shouted for he lp, stru g gled and
i cked the accused, but t h e l a t t e r p r e ssed a h u n t i n g k n i f e a t h e r
throat, overcame her resistance, fondled her and after removing her
d rawers, succeeded in h a v in g s exual i n t e r cours e 't h h . I t
ru e t a t a v e r bal r efusal alone will not do. There must be physical
s truggle, t a x in g h e r p o w e r s t o t h e u t m o s t . T h u s ,
m ere i n i t i a l
resistance of the offended party in rape cases is not the manifest
and tenacious resistance that th e la w r e q u i r es. (The Revised Penal
Code by Justice Luis Reyes)
The Lago case, which is an absurd doctrine is not an
c ontrollin
ro i ng. .A m ong th e am en dments of th e law on r ap e i n t r o d iiced
un er .A. No. 8353 is Section 266-D, which provides that any
p ysical overt act m a n i f esting resistance against th e act of r ape in
any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is
so situated as to r ender her/hi m i n c apable of giv ing v a li d con~
cons en,t,
y e accepted as evidence in the prosecution of rape.
(People
v. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012) The legislators
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 676
agreed that A r t i cl e 2 6 6-D i s i n t e n ded t o s often th e j u r i s p r u dence
on tenacious resistance or the Lago principle. (People v. Dulay, G.R.
1Vos. 144-44-68, July 28, 2002) Failure to shout should not be taken
against the victim. (People v. Rivera, G.R. 1Vo. 200508, September 4,
2018; see. People v. Rubio, G.R. No,195289, Mar ch 7, 20 12; People
v. Penilla, G.R. ¹. 189 3 2 4 ,Ma r ch 20, 2018) It is n ot n ecessary for
t he victim of r a p e t o su st ain p h y s ical i n j u r i es. She need not k i c k ,
b ite, hit o r s cr atch th e offender w it h h e r fi n g e r n a il s to p r ove t h a t
she had been defensive. (People v. Torres, G.R. No. 134766, January
16, 2004)
P hysical r e si stance n eed n o t b e e s t a b l i shed i n r a p e w h e n
i ntimi d ation is brought to fear on the victim an d th e la t ter subm i t s
herself out of fear. (People v. Salaver, G.R. No. 223681, August 20,
No. 210485, 4ugust 15, 2018)
Force as an element of rape need not be irresistible. Inti m i d a t i on
is addressed to the mind of the vict im . It m u s t be viewed in li ght of
the woman's perception and judgment at the time of the commission
o f the cr i me . I t i s t h e r e f ore en ough t h a t i t p r o d u ces fear t h a t i f
the victi m d oes no t y i el d t o t h e b e s t ia l d e m a nd s of t h e a c cused,
s omething w o ul d h a p pen t o h e r . I n t i m i d a t io n i n c l u des th e m o r a l
kind as the fear caused by threatening the girl w it h a k n ife or pistol.
(People v. Bayanat, G.R. No. 215749, March 14, 2018)
Lack of r e si stance ma y s o m et i mes i m pl y c o n sent. H o w ever,
that is not al w ays th e case. While it m a y i m p l y c onsent, th ere ar e
circumstances t ha t m a y r e n d e r a p e r s o n u n a bl e t o e x p r ess h e r
resistance to another's sexual advances. Thus, when a p e r son ha s
c arnal k n o w l edge w i t h a n o t h e r p e r son w h o d o e s n o t s h o w a n y
resistanc:e, it does not always mean that the person consented to such
act. Lack ofresistance does not negate rape. Resistance, therefore,
i s not n ecessary t o e s t ablish r a pe , especially w h e n t h e v i c t i m i s
unconscious, deprived of reason, manipu l at ed, demented, or young
either in c h r onological age or m e n tal a ge. (People v. Quin t os, G.R.
No. 199402, November 12, 2014)
2. C on s t r u c t i v e F o r c e or In t i m i d a t i o n —In i n c estuous
r ape of a m i n o r , a c t u a l f o r c e o r i n t i m i d a t io n n e e d n o t e v e n b e
employed where the overpowering m oral in fl u e nce of accused, who
is victi m' s f a t h er , w o u l d s u f f i ce. (P eople v. S a m a n d r e, G . R. ¹ .
181497, February 22, 2012) In rape committed by a father, his moral
ascendancy and influence over the victim substitute for the requisite
f orce, tl : r e at , a n d i n t i m i d a t i on , a n d s t r e n g t he n t h e f e a r w h i c h
 674 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
compels the victim t o conceal her di shonor. (People v. Ortega, G.R.
No. 186285, Ja n u a ry 25 , 2 0 1 2; People v. Br o ca, G.R No . 20 1 4 4 7 ,
January 9, 2 0 18; People v. Candellada, G. R. No. 18 9298, Ju ly 1 0 ,
2018; People v. Osma, G.R No . 18 7 7 84, August 29, 2012; People v.
CCC, G.R. No. 220492, July 11, 2018)
In People v. Abanil l a, G. R. Nos. 148673-75, October 17, 2003,
being the fa t h er, accused's force or t h r ea t w a s suffi cient t o c r eat
ear i n the mind of the complainant compelling her to submit to h is
sexual abuse.
M oreover, t h e accused, who took advantage of his
moral
ascendency in having sexual int ercourse with his daughter, can also
b e convicted of rape through grave abuse of authori t y .
I f the information alleged force, threat, or int i m i d a t ion wi t h ou t
a verment of an y m e n t a l d i s a b i l it y o n t h e p a r t o f t h e v i c t i m , t h e
accused can stillbe convicted provided that sexual congress and
mental incapacity, i.e. the incapacity to give consent, are proven by
clear and convincing evidence. (People v. Quintos, G.R. No. 199402,
November 12, 20 14; People v. Gi l l e s, G.R. No . 22 9 8 60 M
h 21
201)8) Force or in t i m i d a t ion ma y b e actual or constru ctive. Hav i n g
sexual intercourse with a m e n t a lly r e t a r ded person is equivalent to
having sexual intercourse with a person through in t i m i d a t i on. If th e
information alleged inti m i d a t ion as a mode of raping the victim, but
the evidence merely proves her mental r et a r d ati on, the accused can
be convicted of rape thr ough i n t i m i d a t i on. (People v. Balatazo, G.R.
No. 118027, January 29, 2004)
3. L o n e t e s t i m o n y — Co nsidering t h a t o n l y t w o p e r s o ns
are usually i n v o l ved i n r a p e c ases, even th e l on e u n c orroborated
testimony of th e v i c ti m i s e n o ugh t o p r ov e t h e c r i m e a s c h a r ged,
as long as the testim ony i s cl ear, positive and p r obable. (People v.
Clemento, G.R. No. 215202, March 14, 2018)
4. Maria C l a r a r u l e —The Ma r ia C l a ra or wo m e n's honor
d octrine is a standard used by the court in a ssessing the credibili t y
o f a r ap e v i c t im . U n d e r t h i s p r i n c i p le, w o me n o f d e cent r e p u t e ,
e specially F i l i p i n os, w o ul d n o t p u b l i cl y a d m i t t h a t s h e h a s b e en
sexually abused, unless that is the tru th , for it is her natural in st i n ct
t o protect her honor. However, the factual setting in 1960 when th e
" women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our j u r i s p r u d ence is that it i s
natural for a w o man t o be reluctant i n d i s closing a sexual assault .
H owever, the w o men t o day h av e over t h e y e ar s t r a n sformed i n t o
a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 675
t o fight for h e r r i g h t s . T h us, i n a s sessing th e cr edibilit y o f a r a p e
victim, the Maria Cl ara standard should not be used. The testimony
of the victim must be evaluated without gender bias or cultural
misconception. It is i m p o r t ant t o w eed out th e M a r i a C l ar a noti ons
because an accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of th e
victim. (People v. Amarela, G.R. Nos. 225642-43, January 17, 2018)
However, in People v. Cabilida, G.R. No. 222964, July 11, 2018,
the Supreme Court said that a w oman w il l not expose herself to the
h umiliat ion of a t r i a l , w i t h i t s a t t e n d ant p u b l i cit y an d th e m o r b i d
curiosity i t w o u l d a r o u se, unless she has been t r u l y w r o n ged and.
seeks atonement for her a b u se. The Cab il i da d o ctrine is accordant
with the Ma r ia C l a ra pr i n c ip le .
This wr i t e r a g r ees with Ca b i l i d a c a s e. A F i l i p i n a w o u ld n o t
'ust let the doctor to examine her pudendum to support her charge of
"ape, and allow counsel to ask questions on how she was undressed,
h er position w h e n t h e p e ni s of t h e a ccused was i n serted i nt o h e r
v agina, and other u n comfortable topics if she is not r e ally a v i ct i m
of rape.
Child U n d e r 1 2 Y e ar s of Age
In statut ory r a pe, what th e law p u n i shes is carnal k n ow l edge
o f a woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquir y
is the age of the woman and w h e t her carnal k n o w l edge took place.
(People v. Do l l a n o, J r . , G . R. N o. 18 8 8 51, Oc tober 19, 2 0 11) Proof
of force, in t i m i d a t i on i s u n n e c essary as t h e y a r e n o t e l e m e nts o f
statutory rape.(People v.Blas Gaa, G.R. No. 212984, June 7, 2017)
Lack of phy sical evidence of inj ur y i s n o t r e l e v ant considerations.
(People v. Ta lap-talap, G .R. No. 20 9 844, Ju ne 2 7, 2016; 19 95 B a r
Exam) The child 's consent in s ta t u t o ry r a pe is i m m a t e r i al b ecause
the law presumes that her young age makes her incapable of
discerning g ood f r o m e v i l . (P e ople v. Fr a n c i a, G. R . No . 20 8 6 25,
September 6, 2017)
A llegation of th e a ccused that t h e v i c t i m , a c h i l d p r o st i t u t e ,
enticed him to have sex with her in ad v a n ce celebration of her 12th
b irthday is not a defense. This is stat u t ory r ape since the victim i s
under 12 years of a ge. (1995 Bar E x a m ) If t h e s e x ual i n t e r c ourse
is made in ce lebration o f h er 1 2 th b i r t h d a y, s ta t u t o ry r a p e is n o t
committed since the girl is exactly 12 years of age, and not under 12
years of age.
The word "age" in the provision on statutory rape includes
chronological age and m e n ta l a ge. In Pe o ple v. Da n i e ga, G.R. No.
 676 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
212201, June 28, 2017, aperson's capacity to decide whether to give
c onsent or to express resistance to an a d ul t a c t i v it y i s d et er m i n ed
not by his or her chronological age but by her mental age. Therefore,
i n determ i n in g w h e t he r a p e r so n i s " u n d e r t w e l v e ( 12) y e ar s o f
a ge," the i n t e r p r et at ion s h o ul d b e i n a c c ordance w it h e i t h e r t h e
chronological age of t h e c h i l d i f h e or s h e i s n o t s u f f e r i ng f r o m
i ntellectual d i sabili ty , o r t h e m e n t a l a g e i f i n t e l l ectual d i s abil i t y
is established. (People v. Qu i n t o s, G.R,. ¹. 199 4 0 2,No v ember 12,
2014; People v. L abordo, G.R ¹ . 28 90 8 8 , February 18, 2019)
M ental R e t a r d a t i o n
Mental retardation includes: (1) idiot, whose mental age is tmo-
year old b e cause his IQ i s 0 - 1 9; (2) im b ecile, whose mental a ge is
seven-year-old because his IQ is 2 0 - 49; (3) moron or f e ebleminded,
whose mental age is 12-year old be cause his IQ is 5 0 -69; and (4) a
person with borderline in t e l l i gence because his IQ is 70-89. (People
v. Butiong, G.B. No. 16 8982, October 19, 2011; People v. Bayran te,
G.A. No. 188978, June 18, 2012; People v. Gilles, G.R. No. 229860,
March 21, 2018)
l. E x e m pt i n g C i r c u m s t a n c e of I m b e c i l it y o r M i n o ' t
— In inori y
n exempting ci r c u m st ance of m i n o r it y u n d e r S e ction 6 o f R . A .
N o.
o. 9344, what
h is import ant is the chronological or actual age of the
accused, and not his mental age. (People v. Boxas, G.B. No. 200798,
June 4 2 0 1 4 ) On
0 t hhe o t h e r h a n d , i n e x e m p t in g c i r c u m st ance of
i mbecility u n d e r A r t i c l e 1 2 o f t h e R e v i sed P e na l C o de, w h a t i s
important is the mental age of the accused, and not his chronological
age.
An imbecile is exempt f rom c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i ty . H o w ever, since
t e mental age of an idiot is lower t han an i m b ecile, the exemptin g
circumstance of imbecility can be appreciated in favor of the
ormer. Bu t b e c ause th e m e n t a l a g e o f f e ebleminded an d p e r son
suffering from b o r d er l in e i n t e l l i g ence is h i g her t h a n a n i m b e cile,
t e exempting cir cum stance of imbecility cannot be appreciated in
favor of the former. (see: People v. Nunez, G.R N o s. 112429-80, Jul
os. , u y
-
28, 1997)
2. S ex u a l A b u s e A g a i n s t a M e n t a l R e t a r d e d — Un d e r
S ection 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, when the child exploited in prostitu t i o n
or s e x ual a b use is u n de r 1 2 y e ar s of a ge, th e p e r p etr at ors sh al l
be prosecuted for rape or acts of lasciviousness under the Revised
Penal Code. For purpose of Section 5(b), there is no d ifference
b etween actual age and m e n ta l a ge. T h us, an i d io t i m b e c il e a n d
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 677
feebleminded is covered by this provision. (People v. Pusing, G.R. No.
208009, July 1 1, 2016) However, a person suffering from borderline
intelligence is not wi t hi n t h e contemplation of Section 5(b) because
his mental age isabove 12 years.
3. R a p i ng a M e n t a l l y R et a r d e d — H a vi n g sex u a l
i ntercourse w it h a n i d i o t , i m b e cile, or f e ebleminded i s r a p e o f a
person deprived of reason (People v.Dalan, G.R. ¹. 208086, June
11, 2014); orstatutory rape of a child under 12 years of mental age.
(People v. Daniega, supra)
H aving s e x u a l i n t e r c o u rs e w i t h p er s o n s ufferin g f r o m
borderline intelligence is rape of a person deprived of reason. (People
v.Butiong, supra; People v. Bayrante, supra) The mental age of a
person suffering from borderline in t el l i gence is more than 12 years
old because hi s I Q i s h i g h e r t h a n t h a t o f f e e b l em i n ded. H e n ce,
h aving sexual i n t e rcourse wit h a p e r son suffering f rom b o r derli n e
intelligence is not statutory rape because his mental age is above
12 years.
T he complainant , a n 1 8 - y ear ol d m e n t a l r e t a r d at e w i t h a n
i ntellectual c a pacity b e t w een t h e a g e s o f 9 a n d 1 2 y e a r s , w h e n
a sked dur in g t h e t r i a l h o w s h e f el t w h e n s h e w a s r a p e d b y t h e
accused, replied "M a s a rap, it g a v e me m u c h p l e asure." According
to the accused, the complain ant c onsented for a f e e t o t h e s exual
intercourse. Accused is stillliable for rape of a person deprived of
r eason or statut ory r a pe. The complainant being a feebleminded i s
i ncapable of giv in g consent. Th e consent of th e c ompl ain ant s h a l l
not be recognized by law. (1 996 Bar Exam)
AJ, a medical student, was a boarder in the house of Mr. and
Mrs. M who had a good looking 25-year old retarded daughter with
t he mental ag e of a n 1 1 - year ol d g i r l . O n e d a y w h e n t h e c o u pl e
was out, Perl i ta , th e r e t a r ded d au ght er, ent ered A J's r o om, came
n ear him an d s t a r te d k i s sing h i m . H e t r i e d t o a v oid h er . Bu t s h e
persisted. They had sexual int ercourse. (1987 Bar Exam) The crime
committed is statut ory r a pe. Consent of the victim is not a defense.
Carnal knowledge of a woman, who is a mental retardate, isrape.
What needs to be pr oven ar e th e f a cts of sexual congress between
the accused and the victim, and the mental ret ar d ation of the latter .
(People v. Dela Rosa, G.P. No. 206419, June 1, 2016)
D emented P e r s o n
The term "d e m e nted" re f e rs to a p e r s on w h o h a s d e m e ntia
(schizophrenia) or insanity. (People v. Ventura, Sr., G.R. No. 206280,
 678 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
March 12, 2014) Having sexual int e rcourse with a p e rson suffering
from insanity constit u tes rape of a person deprived of reason under
Article 266-A(1)(b) or rape of a demented person under A r t i cle 266-
A(1)(d)
Deprived of r e a son
S exual i n t e r course w i t h o n e w h o i s i n t e l l e ctuall y w e a k t o
the extent t ha t she is in capable of giving consent to th e carnal act
constitutes rape. Proving the presence of force or inti m i d a t ion would
be
e fof no legal consequence because a person of weak in t el lect is not
expected to give effective resistance to an act the implications of
which she does not f u l l y c o m p r eh end. (People v. Ab e ndano, G.R.
Nos. 105586'-87, March 21, 1995)
The concept of the terms "deprived of reason" is comprehensive
since it i n c l u des demented person an d m e n t a ll y r e t a r ded p erson.
(People v. D a n i e ga, G.R. ¹ . 212 2 0 1 , tu n e 28 , 2 0 1 7) H o w e ver, a
deaf-mute is not necessarily deprived of reason. These circumstances
must be proven. Intercourse with a deaf-mute is not rape of a woman
deprived of reason, inthe absence of proof that she is an imbecile.
(People v. Caoile, G.R. No. 208041, J'une 5, 2018)
I f the victim is demented, the inform a t ion may all ege that t h e
victim is demented, insane, or deprived of reason. On the other hand,
if the victim is ment ally r et a r d ed, the Inf or m a t ion may allege that :
1. Th a t t h e v i c ti m i s i d i ot, imbecile, moron or feebleminded,
or a person wit h b o r d er l in e i n t e l l i g ence (People v. Bu t i o ng, supra;
People v. Bayrante, supra ); or
2. T h a t t h e v i c ti m i s deprived of reason (People v. Eleuterio,
G.R No. 219957,April 4, 2018); or
3. Th a t t h e vi ctim is a "mentally defective woman"
(People v.
Martinez, G.R No. 226'894, March 7, 2018); or
4. T h a t t h e v i c ti m i s u n der 12 years of (mental) age (People
v. Daniega, supra); or
5 . T hat (constructive) force, threat, or int i m i d a t ion was used
against the victim. (People v. Quintos, supra; People v. Gilles, supra;
People v. Balatazo, supra)
T he concept o f d e m e n te d p e r son i s d i f f e r en t f r o m t h a t o f
m entally r e t a r de d p e r son. T h u s , d e scribin g a m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d
person in the information for rape as demented person is improper.
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 679
I f the I n f o r m a t ion a l l eged the vi cti m of r a p e i s d emented, but t h e
evidence merely proves her mental r e t a r d a t i on, the accused cannot
be convicted of rape of a mentally retar ded person unless the accused
failed to raise the mistake in the Inform a t ion as an objection. (People
v. Ventura, Sr., G.R. No. 205280, March 12, 2014; People v. Eleuterio,
G.R. No. 219957, April 4, 2018)
However, even t h o ugh t h e I n f o r m a t io n fo r r a p e e r r o neously
d escribed a m e n t a ll y r e t a r ded v i c ti m a s a d e m e n ted p e r son, t h e
accused can stillbe convicted of rape ifher mental retardation is also
alleged in the inform a t i on. Describing the victim in th e i n f or m a t i on
as "a demented person whose mental age is below 7 years old" is
s ufficient c o m p l i a nce w i t h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o na l m a n d a t e t h a t a n
a ccused must be informed of the n a t ur e of th e charge against h i m .
(People v. Caoile, G.R. No. 208041, tu n e 5, 2018)
Unconsciousness
In Pe ople v. Ab i n o , G . R . N o . 1 3 7 2 8 8, D e c ember 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 ,
accused cannot be convicted of rape committed thr ough int i m i d a t i on
as a result of hi s m o ra l a scendancy. He was cha rged and t r i e d o n
an Information alleging rape of a woman who was "asleep and
u nconscious." Convicting hi m o f r a p e d one by i n t i m i d a t ion w o u l d
violate his constitu t i onal ri ght to be informed of nature and cause of
t he accusation against hi m .
In People v. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 2 9, 2002, since
complainant was dr u gged, she was effectively deprived of reason if
not effectively r endered unconscious when th e accused had sexual
i ntercourse with h er . Accused cannot t ak e comfort i n t h e f act t h a t
complainant failed to undergo a drug test.
In People v. Vill a n os, G .R. No. 126648, August 1, 2000, it wa s
? eld that true, there was no test conducted to determine the presence
o f any sedative or d r u g i n t h e d r i n k s g i ven t o t h e v i c t i m s w h i c h
caused them to lose momentary control of their faculti es. But this is
of little consequence as the same is not an in di spensable element in
a prosecution for rape. Under the circumstances, it suffices that th e
victim was found to have been unconscious at the tim e the offender
had carnal knowledge of her.
F raud u l en t M a c h i n a t i o n
When a p erson is a v i c ti m o f f r a u dulent machination or
manipulation,such as when she is induced to have carnal knowledge
 680 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
to treat a person's disease that he or she does not really h a ve, she
is not in f ul l control of hi s or her d ecisions. He or she acts wi t h out
full or w it h f a lse knowledge of the circum st ances from wh ich he or
she bases his or her actions. Therefore, any consent he or she gives
is either false or not his or her own. Any l ack of resistance may not
be interpreted as voluntar i n ess. (People v. Quintos, G.R. No. 199402,
November 12, 2014)
In the movie "Scorpion Night, "a college student was able to have
sexual intercourse with the wife of a security guard by pretending to
be her husband. This isa good example of rape through fraudulent
machination.
A ccording to P r osecutor N e l son Salva, an e x pert i n c r i m i n a l
l aw, having sexual int ercourse with a pr ostit ut e w i t h out paying th e
agreed amount, which is the consideration for sex, constitutes rape
t hrough fraudulent machin at i on .
Grave Abuse of Authority
Having sexual int ercourse with a m i nor and v i r gin w it h ab u s e
of authority i s q u a l if ied seduction. Ha v i ng s exual i n t e r c ourse with
grave abuse of authority is r a p e. A t e a c her h as sexual i n t e r c ourse
w ith hi s g i r l f r i e nd, wh o i s hi s s t u d ent , a m i n o r an d a v i r g i n . T h e
c rime commit ted is qualified seduction t h r o ugh abuse of author i t y .
A teacher has sexual i n t er course wit h h i s m i n o r s t u d ent, wh o w a s
forced to agree with his sexual demand because of threat of receiving
a failing grade in her subject. The crime commi t ted is rape thr ough
grave abuse ofauthority.
U ntenable D e f e nse in R a p e
The following defenses in rape are unt enable:
1. L a ck o f M e d i c a l E x a m i n a t i o n — In r a p e, the m e d ical
examination of th e v i c ti m i s n o t a n i n d i s p ensable element for t h e
s uccessful p r o secution t h e r eof b e cause i t a l l d e p e nd s u p o n t h e
evidence offered and as long as such evidence convinces the court, a
conviction by the crime of rape is proper. (People v. Belandres, G.R.
No. L-2801, March 81, 1950) In f a c t, testimony of the victim a l o ne,
if credible, is s uf fi cient t o c o n v ict t h e a c cused t h er eof. (People v .
Ortega, G.R. No. 186'285, January 25, 2012) even though she refused
to submit herself to medical examin a t i on. (1978 Bar Exam)
2. La c k o f S p e rm —Absence of sperm in victim's vagina
a lso does not f oreclose the p ossibilit y t h a t s h e w a s r a p e d b y t h e
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
a ccused. The absence of sperm i n h e r v a g in a d u r i n g t h e t i m e s h e
was examined could have been caused by a number of reasons none
of which, however, would have any bearing on whether she was in
fact raped or n ot. Rape is deemed consummated from th e m o m ent
the offender's penis "t o uches" the la b ia m aj ora or la b ia m i n o ra o f
the victi m's genit al s r e g ar dless of w h e t her t h e f o r m e r e j a culates
o r not. Thus, lik e how a n e wl y r u p t u r e d h y me n on th e p ar t o f t h e
victim is not an element of r ape, so too is ejaculation on the part of
the perpetrator not an essential i n g r e dient of th e cr i me. (People v.
Roco, G.R. No. 205200, September 21, 2016; 1995 Bar Exam)
3. I m m or a l C h a r a c t e r —T he vic ti m 's m o ral c ha r a cter in
rape is i m m a t e r ial w h er e i t i s s h ow n t h a t i n t i m i d a t ion w a s u s ed
for the vi cti m t o h av e sex w it h t h e a ccused. (Sison v. People, G.R.
No.187229, February 22, 20 12) Even if t h e v i c t im w a s no l o n ger a
virgin, thi s does not necessarily m ean t ha t t h e c r im e of r ape could
n ot have been commit t ed. Vi r gi n it y of th e offended party i s not an
essential element i n t h e c r im e of r a pe. (People v. Santos, G.R. No.
L-38512, November 1 6, 1979) The fact that t he o ffended party m a y
h ave been of an unchaste character such as a pokpok girl constitu t es
n o defense in a c h a r g e of r a pe, pr ovi ded t ha t t h e s e xual act w a s
committed w i t h f o r c e an d v i o l ence. (People v. C a b ie rte, G.R. N o .
170477,August 7, 2007; 1949 Bar Exam) Even a prostitute can be
the victim of r ape for she can still r e f use a man's lustful a dv ances.
(People v. Javier, G.R. No. 126096, July 26, 1999; 1995 Bar Exam)
4. P l a c e a n d T i me — R a p i s ts a r e n o t d e t e r r e d b y t h e
p resence of people nearby, such as the members of their own fam i l y
inside the same room, with th e l i k e l i h ood of being discovered, since
lust respects no t i me, locale, or cir cum st ance. (People v. Colorado,
G.R. No. 200792, November 14, 2012)
5. I m pr eg n a t i o n —I t is not absurd nor contra ry to h u m a n
e xperience tha t t h e v i c t i m g a v e b i r t h a f t e r 1 0 m o n t h s f r o m t h e
sexual assault since there are cases that the gestations are long.
I n any event, im p r egnation is not an el ement of r a pe. Whether t h e
child w h ich t h e ra p e vi c t im b o re w a s f a t h e red by t h e a c cused, or
b y some unk n own i n d i v i d u al , is of no m o m ent. W ha t i s i m p o r t a n t
and decisive is that th e accused had carnal k n ow l edge of the victim
against the latt er's will or wi t h out her consent. (People v. Gahi, G.R
No. 202976; February 19, 2014)
6. S w e e t h eart T h e ory — The s weetheart theory, as a
defense, necessarily a d m it s car nal k n o w l edge, the fi rst element of
 682 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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r ape. This admission makes the sweetheart t h eory more difficult t o
defend, for it is not only an affirm a t ive defense that needs convincing
proof; after t h e p r o secution h a s s u ccessfully e stablished a p r i m a
facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who has
to adduce evidence t'hat the i n t e r course was consensual. (People v.
Deli gero, G.R. No. 189280, April 1 7, 2013)
In rape, the "sweetheart" defense must be proven by compelling
evidence: first, t h at t h e a c c used and t h e v i c t im w e r e l o v e rs; a nd ,
second, t h at s h e c o n s ented t o t h e a l l e g ed s e xual r e l a t i o n s. T h e
second is as important as th e fi r st , because love is not a li cense for
lust. (People v. Victoria, G.R. No. 201110, July 6, 2015)
S weetheart d efense wil l n o t e x c u l p ate accused from l ii a a biiilyi t
for rape against ment a lly r e t a r ded person. In th e r ape of a wom an
deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will. The absence
o f will deter m i nes the existence of the r a pe. Such lack of w il l m a y
e xist not o nl y w h e n t h e v i c ti m i s u n c o nscious or t o t a ll y d e p r i v ed
of reason, but a l s o w h e n sh e i s s u f f e r in g s ome m e n ta l de fi ciency
impairing her r eason or free-will. Carnal k n o w l edge of a woman so
weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitu tes rape.
(People v. Caoile, G.R. No. 208041, tu n e 6, 2018)
A child was not capable of fully u n d er standing or kn ow ing t h e
import of her a c t i ons and i n c o nsequence, remained vu l n er able t o
the cajolery and deception of adults. Unl ik e r ape, therefore, consent
is immat erial i n c a ses i n v olv in g sexual a b use u n der S ectio
5 f
.A. No. 7610. For purposes of sexual abuse, the sweetheart defense
i s unacceptable. A c h il d e x p l oited i n p r o s t i t u t io n o r s e x ual a b u s e
c annot v a l i dl y g i v e c o n sent t o s e x u a l i n t e r c ourse w i t h a n o t h e r
person. (Caballo v. People, G.R. No. 198782, tune 10, 2018)
S EXUAL ASSAULT
Rape through sexual assault is n o w c a l l ed as sexual assault.
(People v. Tulugan, supra) It i s commi t t ed by a person, who inserts
his penis into the mouth or anal orifi ce, or instr u m ent or object int o
the genital or anal orifice of another person: (1) through force, threat,
or intim i d a t i on; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; (3) by m e ans of f r a u d u l ent m a c h i n a t ion or
g rave abuse of au t h or i ty ; or (4 ) w h e n t h e o f f ended part y i s u n d e r
twelve years of age or is demented. (Artic le 266-A; 2002 Bar Exam)
Upon the effectivity of R .A . No. 8353, specific forms of acts of
l asciviousness (e.g., sodomy) were no longer puni shed under Ar t i c l e
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 688
336 of the Revised Penal Code, but w er e t r a n sferred as a separate
crime of "sexual assault" under Article 266-A. "Sexual assault" has
also been called "gender-free rape" or "object rape." However, the
term "rape by sexual assault" isa misnomer, as it goes against the
traditional concept of rape, which is carnal k n o w l edge of a woman
without her consent or against her wi ll . In contrast to sexual assault
w h ch i s a b r o a de r t e r m t h a t i n c l u d e s a ct s t h a t g r a t i f y s e x u a l
desire (such as cunnil i n gus, fellatio, or sodomy), the classic rape is
particular and its commission involves only the reproductive organs
of a woman and a man. (People v. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227368, March
12, 2019)
A, a male, takes B, another male, to a motel and there, through
t hreat an d i n t i m i d a t i on , succeeds in i n s e r t in g h i s p e ni s i n t o t h e
anus of B. The crime committ ed is sexual assault. (2002 Bar Exam)
S wallowing t h e p e ni s o f a 1 2 - y ear ol d v i c t i m i s n o t s e x u a l
a ssault. I n s e x ua l a s s ault , o f f ender s h o ul d i n s er t h i s p e n i s i n t o
t he mouth o f t h e v i c t i m , a n d n o t t h e o t h e r w a y a r o u n d . N e i t h er
i s statut or y ac t o f l a s civiousness commi t te d s i nce th e ag e of t h e
victim i s not be low 12 years of age. However, the a ccused is lia ble
for acts of lasciviousness if he commit ted the lascivious act thr ough
violence or int i m i d a t i on; or, sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 if he coerced or infiuenced the child. If th ere is no violence,
intimi d a t i on, coercion or i n f l u ence, t he c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s c h i l d
abuse under Section 10(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
Rape and Se x ua l A ssault
Rape, which is commonly denominated as "organ rape" or
"penile rape," is commi t ted by a m a n b y h a v i n g c a r nal k n o w l edge
with a w om an. This is a gender crime since the offender must be a
man while the victim m ust be a woman .
On the other h a nd, th ere are t h ree ki nds of sexual assault, t o
wit,: (1) instrum e nt or object sexual assault, whi ch is commit t ed by
inserting an i n s t r u m en t or object i nt o th e genital or a nal ori fice of
another person; (2) sexual assault th r ough oral int ercourse, which is
committed by i n sert in g hi s penis int o an other person's mouth; and
(3'! sexual assault th r ough sodomy, which is commit ted by inserting
h is penis int o a n other p er son's anal or i f ice. In sexual assault, th e
g ender of the offender and th e v i c ti m i s no t m a t e r i al . T hat i s w h y
this crime is called "gender-free sexual assault." (see: People v. Soria,
G.R. No. 1 79081, November 14, 2012)
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VOLUME II
H owever, t h e modes (e.g., i n t i m i d a t i on ) o r c i r c u m s t a nces
( e.g., demented victim) i n com m i t t i n g th e cr im e an d th e qu al i f y i n g
circumstances are the same whether it is r ape or sexual assault.
Marital Rape
G avino boxed his wife Alma for r efusing to sleep with h im . H e
then violently t h rew her on th e fl oor and f orced her to h ave sexual
intercourse wit h h i m . A s a r e s u lt , A l m a s u f f ered serious physical
i njuries. Th e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s m a r i t a l r a p e a n d n o t s e r i o u s
physical injur i es. (1995 Bar Exam)
Husband can b e h e l d l i a bl e fo r m a r i t a l r a p e . A r t i cl e 2 6 6 -A
of the Revised Penal C ode u ses th e t er m "m a n " i n d e f in i n g r a p e
w ithout r e g ar d t o t h e r a p i s t's l e gal r e l a t i on ship w i t h h i s v i c t i m .
Under Article 266-C of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
R.A. No. 8353, in case it i s t h e l e gal h u sband wh o i s th e offender,
t he subsequent forgiveness by the w if e as th e offended party sh al l
extinguish th e cr i m i na l l i a b i l it y of th e offender. R.A. No. 8353 has
eradicated the archaic notion that m a r i tal r ape cannot exist because
a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife'sbody and
t hus her consent to every act of sexual in t i m acy wit h hi m i s a l w a y s
obligatory o r a t l e a st , p r e s u m ed. (P eople v. J u m a t v an, G . B. N o .
187495, April 21, 2014)
QUALIFIED RAPE
R ape or s exual a s sault i s q u a l i f ied b y a n y o f t h e f o l l o w i n g
circumstances:
1. W h e n t h e v i c ti m i s a child below seven years old;
2. Wh en th e v i c t im is below 18 years of age (but seven years
or above) and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affi n it y w i t h i n t h e t h ir d civi l
d egree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim ;
3. Wh e n t h e v i c t i m i s u n d e r t h e c u s t ody o f t h e p o l ice or
m ilitary aut h or i t ies or any law enforcement or penal in st i t u t i o n ;
4. Wh e n t h e r a p e i s c o m m i t t e d i n f u l l v i e w o f t h e s p ouse,
p arent, any of th e chil dren or o t her r e l a t i ves wi t hi n t h e t h i r d c i v i l
d egree of consanguinit y ;
5. W h e n t h e v i c t i m i s a r e l i g i ou s e n g aged i n l e g i t i.mate
re igious vocation or callin g an d i s personally k n ow n t o be such by
the offender before or at the tim e of the commission of the crim e
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 685
6. W h en t h e of f e n de r k n o w s t h a t h e i s a ff l i c t e d w i t h
the H u m a n I m m u n o - Deficiency Vi r u s ( HI V ) / A c q uired I m m u n e
Deficiency Syn dr ome ( A I D S) o r a n y o t h e r s e x u all y t r a n s m i ssible
d isease and the virus or disease is transmi t ted to the victi m ;
7. W h e n c o m m i t t e d b y a n y m e m b e r o f t h e A r m e d F o r ces
o f the Ph i l i p p i nes or p a r a m i l i t ar y u n i t s t h e r eof or t h e P h i l i p p i n e
National Police or any law enforcement agency or p enal instit u t i o n ,
w hen the offender t ook a d v an t age of hi s p o sition t o f a cil i t at e t h e
commission of the crime;
8. W h e n t h e offender kr ew of the pregnancy of the offended
party at the t im e of the commission of the crim e;
9 W h en t h e of f e n d e r k n e w of t h e m en t a l di s a b i l i t y ,
emotional disorder an d/or ph y sical h a n d icap of th e offended party
at the time of the commission of the crim e;
10. W h e n by r eason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim
h as suffered permanent physical mu t i l a t ion or disabili t y ;
11. W h e n by r eason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim
has become insane; and
12. W h e n e ver the rape is commit ted wit h th e use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons. (Article 266-B)
M inor i t y
The Pruna guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element
of the crime or as aqualifying circumstance, are as follows:
1. T h e best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is
an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.
2. I n t h e absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authenti c
documents such as bapt i smal cer ti fi cate an d school records which
show the date of birth of the victim w o uld suffice to prove age.
3. I f th e c e r t i fi c at e of l i v e b i r t h o r a u t h e n ti c d ocument i s
shown to have been lost or destroyed or other w ise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible. of the victi m's mother or a member
of the f a m il y e i t h e r b y a f fi n i t y o r c o n s anguin it y w h o i s q u a li fi ed
to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended pa"ty p u r su ant to Section 40, Rule 130
of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
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VOLUME II
a. I f t h e v i c ti m i s alleged to be below three years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than seven
y ears old (e.g., the prosecution sought t o p r ove the qu ali f i n
a i ying
circumstance in r ap e t h a t t h e v i c ti m i s b e low seven years of
age);
b. If the victim isalleged to be below seven years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
o ld (e.g., the prosecution sought to prove statut ory r a p e
);
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age
a nd what i s s o u ght t o b e p r o ved i s t h a t s h e i s l ess t ha n 1 8
years old (e.g., the prosecution sought to pr ove min or it y as an
element of a crime such as sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610).
4. I n th e a b s e nce of a c e r t i fi c at e o f l i v e b i r t h , a u t h e n t i c
d ocument, o r t h e t e s t i m on y o f t h e v i c t i m ' s m o t h e r o r r e l a t i v e s
concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice
provided that itis expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. I t i s t h e p r o secution t ha t h a s t h e b u r den of p r ov ing t h e
age of theoffended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
t estimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against hi m .
6. Th e t r i a l c o ur t s h ould al w ays m ake a categorical fin d i n g
as to th e a g e o f t h e v i c t i m . (P e ople v. Iu p a c , G. A . No . 18 2 2 8 0,
September 19, 2012; People v. Gozo, G.R No . 225605, July 23, 2018)
To prove the qualify in g circum st ance that th e vi ctim i s u n d er
s even years of age in rape case, the mother testified that th e victi m
was only six years and 10 months old, which her aunt corroborated
on the witness stand. (2004 Bar Exam ) Since there is no certificate of
live birth or au t h en tic document, the mother and aunt of the victim
can testify on he r a ge. U n der t h e Pr u n a ru l e s, the r e la t i v es mus t
testifythat the age of the victim is below three years of age because
w hat is sought to be proved is the quali fy ing circumstance that t h e
victim is less than seven years old. However, the w i t n esses merely
testified that the age of the victim was six years and 10 months old.
Thus, the qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated.
R elationship an d M i n o r i t y
I f t }h
1 e vi cti m i s b e l o w s even y e ar s o f a g e mino 't
qua
ualif
i ying
' cir cum stance. If t h e m i n o r i s s even years old or a b ove,
minority alone is not a qualify ing circumstance. To qualify rape, the
circumstance of minority must be combined with the circumstance
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687
X I. CRIMES AGAINST : I I A STI Y
of relationship. In sum, offender must oe a parent, ascendant, step-
p arent, relative by consanguinit y o r a f fi n i t y w i t h i n t h e t h i r d c i v i l
degree of the m inor victim .
A sister-brother r e l a t i onship i s o b v i ously i n t h e s econd civil
degree. Consequently, it is not necessary that the Inform at ion should
s pecifically s t at e t h a t t h e a c cused i s a r e l a t i v e b y c o n sanguinit y
within th e t h ir d ci vil degree of the minor v ct :m . If th e r elati onship
between the accused and th e m i n o r v i c t ir r i s u n cl e an d n i ece, the
information fo r r a p e m u s t a l l eg e t h a t t h e o f f e nder i s " a r e l a t i v e
by consanguinity o r a f fi n i ty wi t h i n t h e th i r d ci v i l de g r ee" because
there are niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the th ir d civil
degree. (See: People v. Ceredon, G.R. ¹. 1 6 7 1 79,January 28, 2008,.
2004 Bar E x a m) F o r e x a m p l e, if t h e a c cused is the b ro t h er of t h e
victim's moth r , t h e n i ece-uncle relationship is thi rd d egree; on the
other hand, if th e accused is the first cousin of the victi m's mother ,
the niece-uncle relationship is fifth degree
T o appreciate t h e q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t ance of m i n o r i t y a n d
third-degree relationship i n r a p e , th e p r o secution m u s t e s t ablish
t he precise nature of th e r el at i onship of th e m i nor v i c ti m w i t h t h e
a ccused, who is alleged in th e i n f o r m a t io r a s h e r u n cl e by affi n i t y
(uncle in law). Absent proof of the degree of the relationship between
them, accused should only be convicted of simple rape. (People v.
Laguerta, G.A. No. 288542, July 9, 2018)
G uardi a n ship an d M i n o r i t y
In q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m s t ances of mi n o r it y a n d g u a r d i a n shi p
i n r ap e a n d s p e cial a g g r a v at in g c i r c u m s t ance i n s e x u a l a b u s e
under R.A. Ko. 7610, the guardian m ust be a pe rson who has legal
r elationship w i t h h i s w a r d . H e m u s t b e I g a i l y a p p o i n te d f i r s t .
(People v. Flores, G.A. No. 188815, August 25, 20 10) The common-
law husband of the mother of the m i n or-v ct im is not her guar dian .
I f the I n f o r m a t ion a l l eged that t h e a ccus d i s t h e g u a r d ian of t h e
victim an d no t t h e c ommon la w s p ouse of lier mother, r ape is not
qualified.. (People v. Ga r c ia, G. R. No . 12 0 0 98, No v ember 6; 1 9 97)
However, in People v. Pusing, G. R. No. 238009, July 1 1, 2016, the
Supreme Court appreciated the qualify ing circumstance of minority
a nd gu a r d i an shi p i n s e x u a l a s s a ul t a l t h c u g h t h e o f f e n der, t h e
common }aw h u s b an d o f t h e m o t h e r o f t h e v i c t i m , i s n o t l e g ally
appointed as her guardian.
 688 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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C ommon-law R e l a t i o n s hip or St ep - r e l a t i o n ship and M i n o r i t y
R ape is q u a l i fie d w h e n t h e o f f e n der i s s t e p - parent o r t h e
c ommon-law spouse of the parent of the mi nor vi ct i m .
To be held liable for qu alified r a pe, a qualify ing circum stance
should be alleged inthe Information and proven by evidence beyond
r easonable doubt. If m i n o r it y an d st ep-relationship as a qualif y i n g
circumstance are alleged in th e I n f o r m a t ion for r a pe, but evidence
p rove m i n o r it y a n d c o m m o n - la w r e l a t i o n shi p w i t h t he m c t h e r
o f victim, t h e a ccused cannot b e c onvicted of q u a li fied r a pe. T h e
concept of st ep-relationship i s d i f f er ent f r o m t h a t o f c o m m o n -law
r elationship because in t h e f o r m e r t h e m o t h e r o f t h e v i c t i m a n d
the offender are legally m a r r ied w h il e in th e l a t ter t hey are no.. To
a ppreciate thi s q u a l i f y in g c i r c u m st ance of m i n o r it y a n d c o m m o n -
law relationship w il l o f f end th e constit u t i o nal r i gh t o f t h e ac cused
to be informed of the nature of the crime charged against him. (2015
Bar Exam)
M ental D i s a b i l i t y
Revised Penal Code punishes the r ape of a m e n t a ll y d i sabled
person regardless of the perpetrator's awareness of his victim's
m ental c o n d i t i on . H o w e v er , t h e p e r p e t r a t or' s k n o w l e dge o f t h e
victim's mental disability, at the time he committed the rape, qualifies
the crime. (People v. Caoile, G.R. No. 208041, Ju ne 5, 2018; People
v.Martinez, G.R. ¹. 226894, March 7, 2018 ) Since knowledge is an
element of this qualifying circumstance, it must be formally alleged
in the I n f o r m a t ion an d d u l y p r o ved by t h e p r o secution. (Peop'e v.
Obogne, G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014) In People v. Lascano,
G.R. No. 192180, M arch 21 , 2 0 12, th e I n f o r m a t ion i n t h e p r e sent
case merely stated that th e v i c ti m w a s b l i nd ; it di d not specifically
a llege that t h e a c cused knew o f h e r b l i n d n ess at t h e t i m e o f t h e
commission of the rape. Hence, the crime commit ted is simple rape.
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
A special complex crime is produced when by reason or on th e
occasion of consummated or attempted rape (or sexual assault),
homicide is committ ed. (Article 266-B)
A liswan pr odded hi s g i r l f r i en d t o r e m ove her cl ot h in g i n s i d e
h er bedroom l a te. F a i l in g t o ge t a p o s i t iv e r e sponse from h er , h e
forcibly un d r essed her. H e t h e n u n d r e ssed hi m self w h i l e b l ockin g
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 689
the door. Seeing her sobbing, he recovered his senses, and left her
room. Out side th e h o u se, A l i s wa n s p ot ted hi s g i r l f r i e n d's former
suitor. He fatally stabbed her suit or. (2017 Bar Exam)
U ndressing th e v i c ti m w i t h l e w d d e s ign c onsti t u te s a ct s of
lasciviousness (People v. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469, August 18, 2014)
a nd not a t t e m p ted r ap e si nce t h er e i s n o s h o w in g t h a t t h e p e n i s
o f Aliswan i s a l r e ady er ectil e an d i s i n t h e p o s i t ion t o p e n et r a t e
(Cruz v. People, G.R. ¹. ~66 4 4 1 , October 8 , 2014) or that A l i s w a n
actually c o m m e nced t o f o r c e h i s p e n i s i n t o t h e v i c t i m ' s s e x u al
organ. (People v. Ba n z uelz, G . R. N o. 20 2 0 60, December I I , 2 0 1 8 ;
2017 Bar Exa m) Mo r e ove:, att e m p t ed ra pe is not commi t t ed since
the Aliswan sp onta neously d esisted from c omm i t t i n g f u r t h e r a c t s
s uch as sexual penetr a t i o n .
Acts of la s c iviousness c a nnot b e m e r g e d w i t h h o m i c i de t o
form a s p e cial c omplex c=ime. The re is n o s p e cial c omplex c ri m e
of acts of lasciviousness with h o m i cide un der th e book of st at u t es.
Moreover, to be held l i a ble of a special complex cri me, th ere m u st
be a direct connection betw en th e components thereof. In this case,
the homicide is not directly connected with the acts of lasciviousness
s ince th e k i l l i n g w a s m o t i v a te d b y p e r s onal g r u d g e b y A l i s w a n
against the suit or. In su m, he kil l ed the victim f or personal reason,
which is unrelated and foreign to acts of lasciviousness.
A CTS GF LASCM O U S N E S S
Acts of lasc.'viousness is committed by any person who commits
an act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex: (1) through
force or t h r e at ; (2) w hen t h e o f fended part y i s d e p r i ved of re a son
or otherwise unconscious; or ( 8) when th e offended part y i s u n d er
12 years of a g e. (A r t i c le 8 8 6) T h e m o d es o f, or c i r c u m s tance in,
committing acts of lasciviousness are the same as those in rape under
the old version. (see: People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 20 0529, September
19, 2012; People v. Rellota, G.R. ¹. 16 8 108,August 3, 2010) This is
a gender-free crime.
E ffects of R .A . N o . 8 85 8 on A r t i c l e 88 6 o f t h e R e v i se d P e n a l
Code
U nder A r t i c l e 8 8 6 o f th e Rev i s e d P e n a l C o d e , acts of
lasciviousness i s c o m m i-.ted b y a n y p e r s o n u p o n o t h e r p e r s ons
o f either s ex , u n de r a n y o f t h e c i r c u m s t ances m en t i oned i n t h e
preceding a r t i c le . T h e w o r d s "p r e c eding a r t i c l e" i n A r t i c l e 8 8 6
pertainsto Article 885 on old version of rape.
 690 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

A ccording to J u s t ice Leonen, Section 4 of R .A . No . 8 353 (t h e

Anti-Rape Law) expressly repealed Ar t i cle 385 of the Revised Code
on rape. Since the circumstances under which acts of lasciviousness
is committed, are sourced from a repealed Article 885 ofthe Code,
Article 836 of the Code on acts of lasciviousness has been rendered
incomplete and ineffective by R.A. No. 8353.
Article 8-'6 of the Code is still a good law despite the enactment of
R.A. No. 8858 for t h er e i s n o i r r e concilable inconsistency between
their provisions. When the lascivious act does not constitute rape or
sexual assaulr, under R.A. No. 8858, then Ar t i cle 386 of the Code on
acts of lasciviousness is applicable.

H owever, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t t h r o u g h J u s t i c e V e l a sco i n A cts of Lascivi ou sness, Sexual Assault an d R a p e

quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017 disagreed. Section
o R.A. No. 8358 did not expr essly repeal A r t i cle 836 of the RP C The differences and simil a r i t ies between acts of lasciviousness
or if it w er e th e i n t en t o f C on gress, it w o ul d h av e expressly done and rape are as follows:
so. The phrase "deemed amended, modified, or repealed accordingly"
1. R a p e a n d sexual assault is a crime against person, which
in e c t i on 4 of R.A. No. 8358 qualifies "Art ic le 335 of Act No. 3815." can be prosecuted de officio. Acts of lasciviousness is a crime against
With due r espect to J u s t ice Leonen, and J u s t ice Velasco, the chastity, a priv ate crime, which cannot be prosecuted de officio.
subject matter of th e r e pealing clause under S t'
2. R a pe can only be committed by a man against a woman.
i not Article 385 of the Revised Penal Code but Ar4t i cle
8353 is f R.A.
836.NTo. This is a gender crime. On th e other h a nd, sexual assault and acts
quote Section 4 of R.A. No. 8353 as follows: of lasciviousness can be committed regardless ofthe gender of the
cc
S EC 4 . Re p e aling C l a u s e.— Article 336' of Act N o. 38 1 5, as offender and victim. Both of them are gender-free crimes.
amended an d a l l ? ?awe, acts, presidential d e crees, executive orders, 8. R a pe is committed by having carnal knowledge ofa woman.
administra tive or dders,
er ru les an d r e g u l a t i ons i n c onsistent wi t h o r
Sexual assault i s c o m m i t t e d b y i n s e r t in g h i s p e n i s i n t o a n o t h er
contrary to the provisions of this Act are deemed amended, modified
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any in st r u m ent or object, into th e
or repealed accordingly."
genital o a n a l o r i fi c e of a n o t her p e r son. Acts of l a sciviousness is
A textual r e a d in g o f S e ction 4 o f R . A . N . 8 8 5 3 h committed by having lascivious conduct upon other persons of either
t hee p hr ar a h y"
ses e " d e emed ame nded, m o d ifie d, or r e p e aled a ccordingl sex, which does not constitute sexual intercou "se or sexual assault.
therein qualifies A r t i cl e 386 of th e R e v i sed Penal Code on acts of
4. Ra p e , s e x ua l a s sault a n d a ct s o f l a s civiousness can be
lasciviousness, and not Ar t i cle 885 thereof on rape.
committed t h r o ug h f o r ce, or in t i m i d a t i on o r w h e n t h e o f f e n d ed
H owever, although th e subject ma t ter of S t' party is deprived of reason (e.g.,retarded or demented person) or
4 the
8858 is Article 886 of the Code on acts of lasciviousness, f R.A. N .
former otherwise unconscious; and w hen th e w o ma n i s u n de r 1 2 y e ars of
as no repealing effect on the latter. In other words, R.A. No. 8853 d'd age. However, unlike acts of lasciviousness, rape and sexual assault
n ot d ecriminalize acts of lasciviousness. According to th e o.Su pr em1e can also be committed by means of fraudu l e nt machina t ion or grave
ourt in Pe o ple v. Tu l u g a n, G. R. N o. 2 2 7 3 63, Ma r ch 1 2, 2 0 1 9, i abuse of authority.
i s erroneous to claim t h a t a c t s of l a sciviousness can no l o nger b e
5. U n l i k e a ct s of lasciviousness, the provisions on rape and
prosecuted un der t h e R e v i sed Penal C d . T h d
o e. e e c r i m i n a l i z ati on sexual assault h av e r u l es on qu a l i f y in g ci r cu m st ances and special
ofacts
o actsofflasciviousness,
I as per Ju st ice Leon
e n ' s t h e o r y ,w o ul d n o t complex crime.
sufficie
su cientlybe supplanted by R.A. No.7610 and R.A. N . 9262. S
o . . No. 8853 did not expressly repeal Art i cle 886o.of the .Code; ection it H aving s e x ua l i n t e r c ourse t h r o ug h f o r c e w i t h a ga y , w h o
only states that Ar t i cle 836 of the Code inconsistent underwent gender reassignment, is not r ape since the victim is not
'th t
o e p r o v i sions thereof are deemed amended, modified or repealed, a woman. Rape isa gender crime. It is committed by a man having
a ccordingly. Th ere i s n o t h in g i n c on s t c arnal kn ow ledge of a w o man t h r o ugh f or ce. Neither i s t hi s crim e
is en e we en th h e p r o v i sions
o f Article 836 of th e Code, and R .A. N . 8t 3b5t8 , instrument or object sexual assault since the offender used his penis,
o. , except some acts of
lasciviousness
asciviousness (e.g.,
e. . sodomy)
s are now pu n i sh able as sexual assault. and not an instr u m ent or object, in commit t in g the crime. Nor is this
crime sexual assault t h r o ugh oral i n t e r course or sodomy since the

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 692 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 693
VOLUME II

artificial vagina of the victim i s not a m o ut h or a nal ori fi ce. Hence,

the crime committed is acts of lasciviousness. (2016 Bar Exam)
Acts of I ascivi ousriess and Sex ual Assault
Prior to R.A. No. 8353, sexual assault wa s considered as acts
of lasciviousness. However, upon the passage of R.A. No. 8353, some
acts, which were constitut ive of acts of lasciviousness before, are now
treated as sexual assault. H o w ever, th e concept of sexual a ssault
has not acquired some of the characteristic of acts of lasciviousness.
case, the accused will be convicted of ac=s of lasciviousness, which
is necessarily included in the charge o:"rape. (People v. Parej a, G.R.
No. 202122, January 15, 2014; People v. Cuaycong, G.R. ¹. 19 6051,
October 2, 2018; People v. CA, G.R. ¹. 188 6 '52,February 25, 2015)
If t he c r i me c h a r ged is a c ts of l a s c iv iousness, but t he c r i m e
proven is sexual assault, the accused will be convicted of the lesser
c rime of a ct s o f l a s civiousness, wh ich i s n e c essarily i n c l u ded i n
sexual assault.(People v.Adaj ar, G.R. ¹. 281806, June 17, 2019)

1. D oct r i n e of Ab sor p t io n in R a p e —R ape willn o t b If the c ri me c ha r ged is s exual a s sault, b ut t h e c r i m e p r o v en

acts o asor b is acts of lasciviousness, the accused will be convicted of the lesser
a c s of
o I as c i v i o u sness if t h e t w o w e r e r e s pectively c om m i t t e d b y
two conspirators. (People v. Dy, G .R. No s. 11 5286-87, Janu ar 29 c rime of acts of lasciviousness, which is necessarily in cluded in t h e
charge ofsexual assault. (Lutap v.People, G.R. No. 204061, February
) i s kissing and l i ck in g th e b r east of th e v i cti m w h i l e Z, h i s
co-conspirator, is having sex wit h h er . R ape wil l no t a bsorb acts of 5, 2018)
a sciviousness. Z i s l i a bl e fo r r a p e t h a t h e p e r s onally c o m m i t t e d Accused touched AAA's vagina by using his middle finger,
a nd acts of l a sciviousness commit ted b y X . X i s l i a b l e fo r a ct s of which was then fullycovered by a panty and short pants. He ceased
lasciviousness that he personally commi t ted and rape committed by therefrom when AAA swayed off his hand. Accused was charged with
sexual assault. Th ere being no actu.al insertion of accused's finger
Rape absorbs acts oflasciviousness if both are committed by into AAA's vagina, he cannot be he d. liable for consummated sexual
one person. (People v. Dy, supra ) Kissing, licking t he b re ast of and assault. Neither i s he l i a ble for at t e m p ted sexual assault si nce his
having sex by a single offender with th e victim constit ute ra a cts "annot be i n t e r p r eted as demonstr at in g a n i n t en t t o a c t u a l l y
r ape.. A
ct s insert h i s fi n g e r i n s i d e h e r s e x ua l o r g an . H o w ev er, t h e a c cused
o lasciviousness consisting of th e k i s sing of th e vi t
c im a n d Ii ck ' i n g can only be held gui lt y of th e l esser crime of acts of lasciviousness
ofh
o e r b r e ast is in cidental to th e commission of rape, and t h us, th e
latter absorbs theformer. punishable under R.A. No. 7610 folowing the variance rule. (Lutap
v. Peopie, supra)
B ut th e d o c t r in e o f a b s o r p t io n i s n o t a p p l i c able t o s e x u a l
a ssault. I n s u m , r a p e d oes no t a b s or b s e x ua l a s sault . I n s e r t i n g
lighted cigarette into the genital orifice and anal orifice of the victim TOUC H ING THE BODY OF THE VICTIM
and having sex with her by m eans of force constitu tes two cour ts of
Touching the body of the victim may constitute rape, attempted
sexual assault, an d r a pe. (People v. Cr i s ostomo, G.R. No. 19 6'485, rape. acts of lasciviousness, unjust vexation, slander by deed, direct
January 2 9, 2014) Inserting t he penis into t he m o uth of t he v ic tim
assault or sexual abuse.
a n i n t o h e r g e n i t a l o r i fi c e c onsti t u te s s exual a s sault a n d r a p e .
(People v. Espera, G.R. No. 20286'8, October 2, 2018)
C orisununated R a p e
2. V ariance R u l e i n R a p e —If the crime charged is rape,
Touchingof either labia majora or labia minorao f t h e p u d e ndum
but
u thee cri
cr i m e p r o ven is ac ts of l a s civiousness, t he accused will b e
of the victim by an erect penis of the accused capable of penetration
convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness, which is
consummates the crime. Touching vrhen applied to rape cases does
necessarily included in t h e charge of rape. (Peo le v. Da sa G . R . N .
n ot simpl y m e a n m e r e e p i d er ma ' c o n t a ct, s t r o k in g o r g r a z in g of
2198899, January 29, 2018) If the crime charged is rape, but the crime
organ.s,a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer
proven is sexual assault, the accused cannot be convicted of sexual
of the victim's vagina, or the mo ns pub;s. There must be sufficient
assault. Th e v a r ia nce rul e i s n o t a p p l i c able si nce sexual a ssault
and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid
is not necessarily i n c l u ded in t h e c h a rge of r a pe. Th e elements of
into the female organ, and not m er ely st r oked the external surface
t ese two crimes are materially and substantially different. In such thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. (People

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 694 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129438, March 30, 2000; People v. Butiong,
G.R. No. 16'8982, October 19, 2011)
1. P e n e t r a t i n g t h e v a g i n a l o r i fi c e i s no t a n e l e m e n t -
Touching the labia of the pudendum of the victim consumma tes the
crime of r a pe. Penetrat in g th e v a g i nal o ri fice i s no t n e cessai.y for
purpose of consummation of rape.
In People v.Baguion, G.R. No. 223553, July 4, 2018, accused
undressed himself, and AAA (10 years old) through force. Thereafter
he performed the pu sh-and-pull m o t ion on h er , bu t h i s er ect penis
f ailed to f u l l y p e n e t r at e A A A ' s g e n i t a l ia . D e spite t h e l a c k o f f u l l
p enetration, AA A s t i l l f e l t s e v er e p a in . D u r i n g h e r e x a m i n a t i o n
of AAA, the doctor found r e dness on the vi ct i m's la bia maj ora a nd
o pined that such in j ur y w a s possibly caused by consistent r u b b i n g
through sexual abuse. With t h i s m e dical fin d in g and th e testimony
of AAA on how the penis of the accused had only slightly penetrat ed
her vagina, the latter was convicted of consummated rape.
In Peop/e v. Matutina, G.R. No. 227311, September 26, 2018,
a ccused forced hi s p e ni s i n t o h e r v a g i n a . H o w ever, a l t h o ugh h i s
penis was able to touch her priv ate part (labia), but he was unable to
penetrate inside due to her resistance and the unexpected arrival of
the barangay tanods. Accused was convicted of consummated rape.
2. Ci r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e nce —
In People v. Nuyok G. R. N .
195424, June 15, 2015, the commission of r ape can be established
b y cir cum stan t ia l e v i d e nce e ve n i f t he vi c t i m , b e i n g t h e s o l e
witness, was rendered unconscious durin g it s commission. Accused
slapped victim and punched her in the stomach. She was rendered
unconscious. When she regained consciousness, she found blood in
her panties, and felt p ai n i n h e r v a g i na. Accused was convicted of
rape.
In People v. Belgar, G. R. No. 182794, September 8, 2014, the
a ccused had injected an unk n own substance into her belly that h a d
t hen rendered her u n c onscious. U pon w a k i n g p
h h d f d Lutap v. People, G.R. No. 204061, February 5, 2 0 1 8, the S up re me
erse lying naked on the ground; she had feltpain in her vagina,
which held a red and white substance in it; and he had been the only
person last seen by her before she had passed out. The lack of direct
evidence against him notw i t h s t a n d i ng, these circumstances sufficed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because they formed an
unbroken chain that unerringly showed the accused, and no other,
had committed the rape against her .
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 695
3. E r e ct penis capable of penetration — As a rule, the
touching of the labia of the victim's pudendum that will consummate
rape must be made in the context of the presence or existence of an
erect penis capable ofpenetration. However, there is an exception.
W here th e a c cused f a i led t o a c h i eve a n e r e c ti on, h a d a l i m p o r
f iaccid penis, or a n o v e r s i zed p e ni s w h i c h c o ul d n o t f i t i n t o t h e
victim's vagina, the Supreme Court n onetheless held that r ape was
consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused
repeatedly tr i ed, but in v a in, to insert his penis into her vagina and
in all likelihood reached the labia of the pudendum as the victim felt
his organ on th e l ip s of her v u l va , or t ha t t h e p e nis of th e accused
touched the m i d dle part of her v a g i na. (People v. Campuha n, G. R
No. 129488, Mar ch 80, 2000 citing People v. Dela Pena, 233 SCRA
573)
4. I n se r t i n g i n s t r u m e n t or obj ect into the labia —
Labia,
maj ora and minora, and vaginal orifice are two different parts of the
internal pudendum of a female. The labia are the first l a y ers of the
pudendum, while the vaginal orifice is a layer next to labia. The size
of the opening of the vaginal orifice is smaller than t hat of the labia.
Touching the labia of the pudendum by th e penis consummates the
crime of rape. (People v. Campuhan, supra) I n s um, penetrati ng the
vaginal orifice, the next layer, is not necessary to consummate rape.
(People v. Matuti n a, supra)
In People v. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011, the
Supreme Court ru led that in the crime of rape whereby the slightest
p enetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact wit h t h e
outer li p o r t h e l a b i a ma j ora of t h e v a g i na a l r e a dy c onsumma te s
the crime, in l i k e m a n n er , i f t h e t o n g ue, in a n ac t o f c u n n i l i n g u s,
touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered
a s already consummat ing the crime of sexual assault, not the crim e
of acts oflasciviousness.
In Ricalde v. People, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015 and
Court affir med the Bonaagua pri n c iple .
With due respect to the Supreme Court, it is the submission of
this writer t hat th e Bo naagua pri n c iple should be reexamined.
I n th e c r i m e o f i n s t r u m en t o r o b j ect s exual a s sault, A r t i c l e
266-A of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 8353 uses
the phrase "inserting any instr u m ent or obj ect into the genital orifice
of another person." It s e e ms th at t h e w o r d s " genital o rifice" under
 696 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
R.A. No . 8 8 5 8 a n d "v a g i n a l o r i f i c e" un d e r m e d i c al t e r m i n o l o gy
are synonymous. Hence, the i n s er t in g of t h e i n s t r u m en t o r o b j ect
i nto the genital o r v a g i na l o r i fice of t h e v i c ti m c o n su m m a tes t h e
c rime of sexual assault. Touching the labia of the pudendum by t h e
instrument or object is not enough to consummate the crim e.
However, fo r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e b a r e x a m t h e B o n a a g u a
principle s h o ul d b e fo l l o w ed . T h e t o u c h i n g t h e la bi a by an
instrument or object consummates the crime of sexual assault. Wit h
this principle, the term "genital orif ice" under R.A. No. 8858 should
be treated as a comprehensive concept since it in cl u des "labia" and
"vaginal ori jice" o f the victim.
A ttempted R a p e
If the offender touches the body of the victim t h r o ugh force, the
crime commit ted is at t e mpted ra pe pr o vided th a t: ( 1) t he a ct d o es
not constitute consummated rape, and (2) there is clear int en tion to
have sexual intercourse.
I ntent to have sexual in t ercourse is present if it i s shown t h a t
the erectile penis of the accused is in the position to penetrate (Cruz
v. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014) or the accused actually
commenced to force his penis into the victi m's sexual organ. (People
v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013; 2017 B ar Ex a m )
However, there is no at t e m p ted r ape if t h e accused spontaneously
d esisted from having sexual int ercourse with th e victi m .
F or th er e t o b e a n a t t e m p t e d r a p e , t h e a c cused m us t h a v e
c ommenced the act of p e n etr a t in g h i s s exual o r gan t o t h e v a g i n a
o f the vi cti m b u t f o r s o m e c a use or a c cident o t he r t h a n h i s o w n
s pontaneous desistance, th e p e n e t r a t i on , h o w ever, s l i g ht , i s n o t
completed. (People v. Bandril, G.R. No. 212205, July 6, 2015)
A, a suitor of girl B, s aw t he l a t t er at a b o ut m i d n i g ht w a l k i n g
along a dark and deserted alley near her house. A sneaked up to her,
grabbed her breasts from behind, kissed her, and at the same time
r aised her d r ess. At t h a t m o m e nt , a n o i se wa s h e ar d f r i g h t e n i n g
A , who i m m e d i ately r a n a w a y . A t t e m p te d r ap e i s n o t c o m m i t t e d
since intent to have sex is not clearly established because there is no
showing that hi s penis is erectile, and in th e position to penetrat e;
or that h e actu ally comm enced to force his penis i nt o th e v i c t im' s
sexual organ. Hence, the crime commi t ted is acts of lasciviousness.
(1 982 Bar Exam)
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 697
Acts of Lascivi ou sness
If the offender touches the body of the victim t h r o ugh force, he
is liable for acts of lasciviousness provided that there is lewd design
but there is no intention to have sexual int ercourse.
In the absence of showing that the erectile penis of the accused
is in the position to penetrate (Cruz v. People, supra) or the accused
actually c o m m enced t o f o r c e h i s p e n i s i n t o t h e v i c t i m ' s s e x u al
organ (People v. Banzuela, supra), the accused cannot be convicted
of attempted r ap e b ecause of l ac k o f c l ea r i n t en t t o h a v e s exual
intercourse. H ence, ki ssing an d u n d r e ssing th e v i c ti m (P e ople v .
Sanico, G.R. No. 20 8469, August 1 3, 2014) or to uching her v a g ina
by the h an d of th e a ccused (People v. Ba n z uela, G.R. No. 20 2060,
December 1 1, 2013), touching t he b r e ast a nd t h i g hs of v i c t im a n d
kissing her (P eople v. Vic tor, G.R. ¹ . 12 79 0 4 , De cember 5, 2002);
or rubbing hi s p e ni s on t h e mo n s p u b is of t h e p u d e nd um (P eople
v. Abanilla, G .R. ¹s . 14 8 6 7 3 -75,October 17, 2003) is merely acts
of lasciviousness because int ent t o h a v e sexual i n t e r course is n ot
clearly shown, but lewd design is established.
D brought h i s m a i d E to h i s r o o m. A f t e r r a i s i ng h is c a ne D
compelled her t o t a k e o ff h e r c l o t h es a nd d a n ce before hi m. T h e
crime commi t ted i s a ct s of l a sciviousness since it a p p ears t hat D
was motivated by lewd design in compelling E to d.ance naked. (1959
Bar Exam)
In People v. Dadu l l a, G. R. No. 172821, February 9, 2 011, the
a ccused's act of o p ening th e z i p per a n d b u t t on s of A A A ' s s h or t s ,
touching her, and tr y in g to pull her f ro m u n der th e bed manifested
lewd designs, not intent to lie with h er. Wi t h out clear int ent to have
sex, he is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness.
U njust V e x a t i o n
I f th e o f f ender t o u ches th e b od y o f t h e v i c t i m w i t h o u t h e r
consent, h e i s l i a b l e f o r un j u s t v e x a t ion p r o v i d ed t h a t t h e r e i s
n either i n t e n t io n t o h a v e s e xual i n t e r course nor l ew d d e sign. I n
s um, if th e t o u ch in g of th e b ody of t h e v i c ti m d oes not constitut e
rape, attempted rape, or acts of lasciviousness, the crime committed
is unjust vexation.
The act of pressing a cloth soaked in chemical in the mouth of
the victim, which would induce her to sleep, is not constitutive of
attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness since neither intent to have
 698 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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sexual intercourse nor lewd design is not present. Hence, the crime
committed is only u n j ust v exation. (Baleros, Jr. v. People, G.R. No.
188088, February 22, 2006 and Jan u a ry 80, 2007
) 2. Wi t h o ut Force or Threat —Even though the offender
T he i n f o r m a t io n f o r a t t e m p t e d r a p e alleged t h a t a c c u sed
covers the face of the victim w it h a pi ece of cloth soaked in chemical
with in t ent t o h ave sex. The evidence established unj ust v exati on .
Applying the variance rule, the accused can be convicted of the lesser
crime of unjust v exation al t h ough th e i n f o r m a t ion ha s not a l l eged
i ntent t o v ex , a n noy or i r r i t a t e , th e ac t o f c overing he r f ace w i t h
c loth soaked in ch emical, w h ich i s a l l e ged in t h e i n f o r m a t ion w i l l
definitely annoy or vex th e offended par ty. (B a l e ros, Jr. v. People,
supra)
The d i f f erence b e t w een acts of l a s c i v i ousness a nd u n j u s t
vexation are as f o ll ows: (1) i n a ct s of l a s civiousness, the offender
c ommitted th e act w i t h l e w d d e sign, w h il e i n u n j u s t v e x a t ion t h e
a nnoying, i r r i t a t i n g o r v e x a t i ou s ac t i s c o m m i t t e d w i t h ou t l e w d
design; (2) acts of l a sciviousness must b e com m i t t e d b y m e an s of
force or t h r e at , or a g a i nst a p e r s on, wh o i s d e p r i ved of r e ason or
otherwise unconscious or u n d e r 1 2 y e ar s o f a ge; u n j us t v e x a t i on
m ust be committed wi t h out vi olence or int i m i d a t i o n .
1. W it h o u t L e w d D e s ign —The presence or absence of lewd
d esigns is inferred from th e n a t ur e of th e acts th emselves and th e
environmental circum stances. (People v. B albar, G.A. Nos. I- 2 0 2 1 6
and I; 2 021 7, November 29, 1967)
While going up the escalator, a 75-year-old retiree stayed a step
b ehind a mi n i - ski r ted one, and in a m o m ent of excitement, put h i s
hand on her buttock and massaged it. He was apprehended. (2006,
2010 and 2019 Bar Exams) Since the offender merely massaged the
buttock of the victim in a pu b l ic place, lewd design can be ruled out.
Without lewd design, he is only l i a ble for u n j ust v exation, and n ot
acts of lasciviousness.
A t a disco club, Leoncio and E v e lyn w er e i n t i m a t ely d a n cin g
a very seductive dance num b er. W h i l e gy r a t in g w i t h t h e e iirr b
o o di'e s ,
L e oncio dipped hi s p r i v a t e p a r t s i n E v e l y n ' s b u t t o cks. Inncensece
d,
Evel
ve yn
n p r o t ested, bu t L e o n ci o c o n t i n ue d a n d t i g h t l y e m b r a c ed
h er. The c r i m e c o m m i t t e d i s u n j u s t v e x a t io n s i n c e t h er e i s n o
clear showing t ha t L e oncio is m o t i v a ted by l ew d d esign. H ow ever,
it would h ave been different if , even a f ter t h e m u si c ha d st opped
s oppe
L eoncio continued t o d a n c e d i r t y , r u b b i n g h i s p r i v a t e p a r t s o n
Evelyn's buttocks. In t h i s s i t u a t i on , l ew d d esign i s established by
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 699
the continued rubbing of his penis on her buttock. Hence, he is liable
for acts of lasciviousness. (2009 Bar Exam)
committed act with l ew d design upon the victim , if t h ere is no force
or threat,the offended party is not deprived of reason or otherwise
u nconscious or u n der 1 2 y e ar s of age, th e cr im e comm i t te d i s n o t
acts of lasciviousness, but u n j ust v e x at i on. In Pe ople v. Contreras,
G.R. Nos. 137128-84, August 28 , 2 000, it w a s f o un d t h a t a c cused
c ommitted l ascivious acts against th e v i c t im . H o w ever, th e v i ct i m
was not presented as witness to testify on the element of force or
threat. Hence, the accused was merely convicted of unjust vexation.
A was peeping through a small hole in the bathroom door whil e
a young 16-year old lady was taking a bath. Acts of lasciviousness is
n ot committed since he did not commi t ted acts upon the child w i t h
lev-d design by means of violence or int i m i d a t i on. Hence, the crim e
committed is unjust vexation. (2014 Bar Exam)
U sing his ch a rm s because of hi s m o vi e star l o oks, Ph il , i n a
movie date with L yn , a 19-year old college student, kissed her on the
cheek and stroked her pubic hair.Lyn shouted for help and Phil was
arrested. (2018 Bar Exam) Even though stroking the pubic hair may
be treated as act of lewdness, acts of lasciviousness is not committ ed
s ince there i s n o s h o w in g t h a t P h i l u s e d f o rce or i n t i m i d a t ion i n
committing the act, and that Ly n is deprived of reason, unconscious
o r under 12 years of age, or demented. Hence, the crime commit t e d
is unjust vexation. This crime is broad enough to include any human
conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material
harm, would unju stly annoy or ir r i t at e an i n n ocent person.
S lander by D e e d
I f th e o f f ender t o u ches th e b od y o f t h e v i c t i m w i t h o u t h e r
consent, he is liable for slander by deed provided that there is neither
intention to have sexual int ercourse nor lewd design, but element of
publicity i s p r e sent. In s u m, if t h e t o u c hing t he body of the v ic ti m
does not constitute rape, attempted rape, or acts oflasciviousness,
the crime commi t ted i s u n j u st ve xation if t h e re is n o p u b l i c ity; or
slander by d eed if there is publicity.
The common denomin ator pr esent in u n j ust v exation, slander
by deed, a n d a c t o f l a s c i v i ousness i s i r r i t a t i o n o r a n n o y a nce.
Without lewd design and publicity, the offense would be merely
u njust vexation because this cr im e i s e qu ated w it h a n y t h in g t h a t
 700 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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annoys or irri t a tes another wit h out ju sti fi cati on. If in addition to the
irritation or annoyance, there was attendant pu blicity and dishonor
or contempt, the offense would be slander by deed. However, if, in
addition to the annoyance or irr i t a t i on, there was present the use of
force or int i m i d a t i on, depriva t ion of r eason or oth er w ise renderin g
the offended party u n conscious, or if th e offended party wa s u n d er
12 years of age, together wit h l ew d designs, the crime would be act
of lasciviousness. (see: People v. Mo t i t a, CA 5 9 O . G. 30 20; Revised
Penal Code by CA Justice Luis Reyes)
K issing a girl i n p u b l i c an d t ou ching her b r east w i t h ou t l e w d
designs, committed by a rejected suitor tocast dishonor on the girl
was held to be slander by deed and not acts of lasciviousness. (People
v. Valencia, CA, G.R. ¹. 4 1 3 6 '-R, May 29, 1950;Revised Penal Code
by CA Ju s t ice Luis Reyes) If t he a ct w a s n ot d o ne in t h e p r e s ence
of a third p erson, or it w a s perpetuated surr ept i t i ously, slander by
deed is not commit ted since the element of publicity is not pr esent.
Hence, the crime commit ted is unjust vexation .
In People v. Su m i n g w a, G. R. N o. 1 8 3 619, October 1 3, 2 0 0 9,
e mbracing, dragging an d k i s s in g i n f r o n t o f h e r f r i e n d c onstit u t e
unjust vexation. No te: It is s ubm i t t e d t h at t h e a ccused can be held
liable of slander by deed in this case if the elements of publicity an d
d ishonor are alleged in the infor m a t i on .
Pro Reo — In case of doubt on whether the penis of the accused
touched the la b ia of t h e pu d e n d um o f t h e v i c t i m , t h e s a me m u s t
b e resolved in f a vor o f a m i l d e r c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y . H e n ce, he w i l l
b e convicted of a t t e m p ted r ap e i n s t ead of c onsum m ated r a pe. I n
People v. To lentino, G. R. N o. 1 3 0 514, June 1 7, 1 999, the v i c t i m' s
statements that th e accused was "tryi ng to force his sex o rgan in t o
mine" and "binundol-bundol ang kanyang a~ i" d id not prove that the
accused's penis reached the la b ia of t h e pu d e n dum of t h e v i c t i m' s
vagina. Hence, accused was convicted of attempted rape.
In case of doubt on whether the touching of the victim is m a de
w ith i n t en t t o h a v e s exual i n t e r course or n ot , t h e s am e m u s t b e
resolved in favor of a m i l der cr i m i n a l l i a b i l i ty . H e nce, accused will
be convicted ofacts of lasciviousness instead of attempted rape (or
attempted seduction). In Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 8,
2014, touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts
are "susceptible of double interpr et at i on." These circumstances may
show that th e i n t e n t ion of th e accused is either t o commi t r a p e or
s imple seduction (or a ct s o f l a s civiousness). Since i n t en t t o h a v e
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 701
sexual int ercourse is not clear, accused could not be held li able for
attempted rape. Hence, he is only liable for acts of lasciviousness.
I n case of doubt o n w h e t he r o r n o t t h e a c cused touched t h e
v ictim v it h l e w d d e sign, th e sa rr e m u s t b e r e solved in f a vor of a
m ilder c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y . H e n ce, h e m u s t b e c o n v i cted of u n j u s t
vexation or slander by deed instead ofacts of lasciviousness.
Direct Assault
In People v. Balbar, G.R. Nos. L-20216 and L-20217, November
2 9, 1967, accused k i ssed an d e m b r a ced hi s c o -teacher w h i l e t h e
latter wa s conducting he r c l a ss. The f a ctual s et t i ng, i. e., a school
r oom in the presence of complainant's students and w i t hi n h e ar i n g
distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion that th e accused
was actuated by lewd design. The crime of acts of lasciviousness is
not commit t ed. H ow ever, th e accused can be pr osecuted for d i r ect
assault.
S exual Abu se
Lascivious conduct is defined as the intentional touching, either
directly or t h r o u g h c l ot h i ng , of t h e g e n i t a l ia , a n us, gr oin, b r east,
i nner th i gh , or b u t t o cks, or th e i n t r o d u ction of an y object i nt o t h e
g enitalia, anu s o r m o u t h , o f a n y p e r s on, w h e t her o f t h e s am e or
opposite sex, wit h a n i n t e n t t o a b u se, hu m i l i a te, h a r ass, degrade,
o r arouse or g r a t i f y t h e s e x ua l d e s ir e o f a n y p e r s on, b estiali t y ,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person. (Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of
Child Abuse Cases)
1. G r a tification of Sexual Desire — In People v. Ladra,
G.R. No. 221443, July 17 , 2017, when th e v i c t im , 12 y e ars of age,
w ent t o t h e i r ki t c h en , s h e e n c ou nt ered a c cused, w h o , without
warning, just squeezed her vagina. Accused was convicted of sexual
abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610. Mere fact of "squeezing" the
private part of a child could not have signified any other intention
but one having lewd or indecent design. It could not have been done
merely to annoy or vex her. That the victim was fully clothed at that
time, which led th e courts a qu o to b e lieve that a c cused could not
h ave int ended t o li e w i t h h e r , i s i n c onsequential. N o te: I n t ent t o
have sex is not an element of sexual abuse.
2. I nt e n t t o A b use, Humiliate, Harass, or Degrade -
The concept of lascivious conduct for purp ose of sexual abuse under
 702 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 is broader than acts of lasciviousness. In
acts of lasciviousness, the intent of the accused is to satisfy his lust.
On the other hand, the intent of the offender in sexual abuse is not
only to arouse or gratify sexual desire but it includes intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass or degrade the child.
Embracing, kissing and touching breast of the victim shall only
be considered unjust vexation instead of acts of lasciviousness if the
intention of the accused is only to annoy, or vex the victim. (1994
Bar Exam) However, if the victim is a minor, the crime committed
is sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 since lasciviousness includes
touching the breast of the child with i n t ent to degrade, debase, or
humiliate her.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
R.A. NO. 7877
The elements of the crime of sexual harassment are: (1) that the
offender has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over victim;
( 2) the authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a work,
training, or education environment; and (3) the offender demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the victim.
Authority or Ascendency
The offender in sexual h arassment has authority, influence
or moral ascendancy over victim in a w ork, tr aining, or education
environment.
Sexual h a r assment c a n b e c o m m i t te d b y a n emp l o y er,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainer or any other .person, who has
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over victim.
I t can a l s o b e c o m mi t ted a g ainst on e w h o i s u n d e r t h e
care, custody or supervision ofthe offender or against one whose
education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the
offender. (Section 8 of R.A. No. 7877)
M oral ascendancy as a n e l ement o f s e xual h a r assment i s
present if the respondent recommended complainant to her present
position. (Alegria v. Duque, A.M No. RTJ-06-2019, April 4, 2007)
The gravamen of sexual harassment is not the violation of the
victim employee's (or student's) sexuality but the abuse of power by
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 703
the offender. (Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corp. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 12461 7,April 28, 2000)
Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking
advantage of awoman by reason of sexual desire; it is about power
being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That
p ower emanates from th e f act t ha t h e can r emove them i f t h e y
refuse his amorous advances. (Alegria v. Duque, A.M N o. RTJ-06-
2019, April 4, 2007)
In La msis v. Sa les, A.M. N o. P-17-8772, January 1 0, 2018,
complainant is a janitress of a priva-.e company assigned in the Hall
of Justice. While working, respondent, a court process server, showed
his private organ to her. Respondent did not commit the crime of
sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877 since he as a process server
has no moral ascendancy over complainant, who is an employee of
independent contractor. However, respondent is administratively
liable for committing an immoral act.
If an employee sexually harasses another employee, but the
former has no authority, influence or ascendency over the latter, this
is not sexual harassment under RA No. 7877. But the harassment
constitutes gender-based public spaces or online sexual harassment
under R.A. No. 11313 (Safe Spaces Act) or any other crime. Under
R.A. No. 11818, the crime of gender-based sexual harassment may
also becommitted between peers and those committed to a superior
officerby a subordinate, or to a teacher by a student, or to a trainer
by a trainee.
Work or Training, or Education Environment
Sexual harassment can only be committed in a work, training,
or education e n v i r onment. I f an off e n d er sexually h a r a ssed
his neighbor, th e c r im e c ommitted i s u n j us t v e xation, acts of
lasciviousness, sexual abuse or any other crime.
Dem a nd, Request or Require Sexual Favor
In sexual h a r assment, th e c f f ender d emands, requests or
otherwise r equires an y s e x ual f a vo r f r o m t h e v i c t i m . S e xual
harassment is committed regardless of whether or not the demand,
request or requirement for sexual submission is accepted by the
victim. Hence, sweetheart defense cannot be u pheld i n f a vor of
offender in sexual harassment case.
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In Aquino v. Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1, April 2, 2 002, the
c ase against th e r espondent Ju dge was di smissed for f a il ur e t o
show that he demanded, requested or required any sexual favor
from complainant in exchange for favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotion or privileges.
In Ja c u tin v. Pe o ple, G . R. N o . 1 4 0 6 04, M a r ch 6 , 2 0 0 2 ,
complainant wa s s eeking em ployment i n t h e c i t y h e a lth of f ic e
h eaded by t h e a ccused. Whil e t h e a p p ointing a u t h orit y i s t h e
mayor, the r ecommendation of t h e a ccused has a g ood w eight.
Accused demanded from complainant t hat she should expose her
body and allow her private parts to be mashed and stimulated by
him as a condition for her employment. He was convicted of sexual
harassment.
1. I m p l i e d De m a n d —R.A. No. 7877 calls for a "demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that
the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated
in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with
equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. (Bacsin v. Wahiman,
G.B. 1Vo. 1460$3, April 30, 2008)
In Bacsin v. Wahiman, supra, even without an express demand
from respondent, a school teacher, his act of mashing the breast of
his student was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment.
In Domingo v. Rayala, supra, demand for sexual favor may
be discerned, with e qual certit ude, from t h e a cts of r e spondent
Atty. Rogelio Rayala, chairman of N L RC, against complainant, a
NLRC stenographic reporter. Holding and squeezing her shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and t i ckling her ear, having
inappropriate conversations with h er, giving her money allegedly
for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making
statements with unmistakable sexual overtones — all these acts of
responded resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for
a sexual favor.
If the offender has moral ascendency over the victim and the
former committed sexual advances on the latter, implied request or
demand for sexual favor is present. Hence, sexual harassment is
committed.
In Narvasa v.Sanchez, G.R. No. 169449, March 26, 2010, during
a field trip, respondent, a municipal assessor, pulled complainant, a
bookkeeper, towards him and attempted to kiss her. Complainant
resisted and was able to escape the clutches of respondent. Hi s
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 705
act of grabbing complainant and a t t empting to k iss her w i t h out
her consent was an unmistakable manifestation of his intention to
violate R.A. No. 7877 that specifically prohibited sexual harassment
in the work environment.
In Gonzales v. Serrano, G .R. No. 1 75433, March 11 2 0 1 5
A tty. Jacinto Gonzales, direct superior of the complainant, forcibly
kissed her lips in the restaurant in front of her officemates and other
customers. She tried to ward off Atty. Gonzales by pulling her head
a way from him, but he persisted on kissing her against her wi l l .
After releasing her, Atty. Gonzales said: "Ang sarap pala ng labi ni
Maila." Atty. Gonzales violated R.A. No. 7877.
In Aquino v. Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1, April 2, 2 002, the
case for sexual harassment against a judge was dismissed f
failure
' or
to show that he demanded, requested or required any sexual
favor from complainant in e x c hange for fa vorable compensation
terms, conditions, promotion or p r i v ileges. Thus, it a ppears that
sexual demand, request or requirement is an essential element of
sexual harassment. However, Domingo v. Bayala, G.R. No. 155831,
February 18, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that it is not essential
that the demand„request or requ'rement be made as a condition for
c ontinued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It i s
enough that the respondent's acts result in creating an intimidating
hostil o r o ffensive environment:"or the employee. In this case, the
intim'dating and h ostile environment for complainant i s clearly
shown by the fact that she reported the matter to an officemate and,
after the lastinc.dent, filed for a leave of absence and requested
transfer to another unit . R e spondent is found to have committed
sexual harassment.
2. Fr i e n d l y Ki s s — In Aquino v. Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-
1, April 2, 2002, Atty. Susan M. Aquino, personnel of Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), charged CTA Judge Ernesto Acosta with sexual
harassment under R.A. 7877. In one occasion, respondent kissed
her or. her cheek after greeting her. In another occasion, respondent
shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas" and then, he
embraced her and. kissed her. When the Senate approved the bill
on expanded jurisdiction of the CTA and while complainant and her
companions were congratulating and kissing each other, respondent
suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and k i ssed her.
According to th e Su preme Court, th e conducts of r espondent in
k issing th e c omplainant ar e c a sual gestures of f r i e ndship a n d
camaraderie, nothing more, nothing less. There is no indication that
respor dent was motivated by malice or lewd design. Evidently, she
 706 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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misunderstood his actuations and construed them as work-related
sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877.
A mere casual buss on the cheek of the complainant dur i n g
festiveor special occasions in front of several persons is not a
sexual advance within t h e p u r v iew of sexual h a rassment under
R.A. No. 7877. (Aquino v. Acosta, supra) But a k i ss on her li ps of
the complainants (Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino v. Judge Armando
De Asa, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-98-1144, July 22, 1998; Narvasa v.
Sanchez, supra)even in a public place (Gonzales v.Serrano, supra);
o r holding an d s queezing complainant's shoulders, ru n ning h i s
fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the inappropriate
comments made in privacy (Domingo v. Rayala, supra) constitute
sexual harassment within the contemplation of R.A. No. 7877.
The case of Aquino is different from Domingo. While in Aquino,
the Court interpreted the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of
friendshipand camaraderie,done during festiveor specialoccasions
and with other people present, in th e case of Domingo, Rayala's
a cts of holding and squeezing Domingo's shoulders, running hi s
fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the inappropriate
comments, were all made in the confines of Rayala's office when no
other members of his staff were around. More importantly, and a
circumstance absent in Aq u i n o, Rayala's acts produced a hostile
work environment for Domingo, as shown by her having reported
the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a
leave of absence and requesting transfer to another unit.
Additional Element of Sexual Ha r assment
Additional element for sexual harassment in a w o r k -related
or employment environment is that: (1) the sexual favor is made as
a condition in the employment or continued employment of victim
or in granting her favorable terms or privileges; (2) the refusal to
grant the sexual favor results in her discrimination or impairment
of her rights or privileges; or (8) the demand for sexual favor would
result in an inti midating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.
Transferring a s u b or dinate t o a p l a c e w i t h ou t t e l ephone
for refusal to submit herself to the sexual desire of her superior,
which impaired her p r i v i lege as an employee, constitutes sexual
harassment. (Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corp. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 1246'1 7,April 28, 2000)
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 707
It is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be
made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to
a higher position. It is enough that the respondent's acts result in
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee. (Domingo v. Rayala, supra)
In D o m i ngo v . R a y a l a , supra, i n t i m i d a ting a n d h o s t i l e
environment fcr complainant is clearly shown by the fact —.hat she
reported the matter to an officemate and, afterthe last incident,
filedfor a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.
Addition~i element for sexual harassment in an education or
training envi'onment is that (1) when the sexual favor is made a
condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the granting privileges;
or (2) when tl:e sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or
offensive emmonment for the student, trainee or apprentice.
In Bacsin v. 1Vahiman, supra,,complainant testified that she
felt fear at the time respondent touched her. The act of respondent
of fondling onc of his students is against R.A. No. 7877 since such
sexual advances result i n a n i n t i m i d ating, hostile or o f f ensive
environment to her.
Performing Sexual Acts
Mere demand or r equest for sexual favor consummates the
crime of sexual harassment. Actual commission of sexual advances
is not required for the consummation of this crime. However, if the
offender, who has ascendancy over the victim, already pe"formed
sexual acts «pon h er , h e s h al l b e e x posed to cr i m inal l i a bility
for a grave crime such sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610, acts of
lasciviousness, or rape by means of grave abuse of authority.
In Peopie v, La r i n , G. R. N o . 1 2 8 777, October, 7 1 9 9 8 , a
swimming instructor was convicted for sexual abuse under R.A. No.
7610 for perforniing cunnilingus on her, licking her breast, touching
her genitalia, and fcrcing her to hold his sexual organ.
GENDER-BASED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11313 (SAFE SPACES ACT)
The crimes punishable under the R.A. No. 11313 (Space Spaces
Act) are called. gender-based sexual harassment. There are f our
kinds of gender-based sexual harassment, to wit:
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1. G ender-based streetand public spaces sexual harassment;
2. Ge n d e r-based online sexual harassment;
3. Ge n d er-based sexual harassment in the work place; a n d
4. Ge n d e r -based sexual h a r a ssment i n e d u c ational a n d
training institution.
GENDER-BASED STREETS AND PUBLIC SPACES
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The crime of gender-based streets and pub lic spaces sexual
harassment is committed by a ny p e r son th r o ugh a ny u n w a n ted
and uninvited sexual actions or remarks against any person in a
public space, regardless of the motive for committing such action or
remarks.
Public spaces
Acts constitutive of ge nder-based streets and p u b l ic spaces
sexual h a r assment ar e t h o s e p e r f ormed i n b u i l d i n g s, s chools,
churches, restaurants, m a i ls, p u b li c w a shrooms, bars, i n t ernet
s hops, public markets, tr ansportation t er minals or p u blic u t i l i t y
vehicles. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 11812)
Public spaces refer to streets and alleys, public parks, schools,
buildings, mails, bars, restaurants, transportation terminals, public
markets, spaces used as evacuation centers, government offices,
public utility vehicles as well as private vehicles covered by app-
based transport network services (e.g., Grab transportation services)
and other recreational spaces such as, but not l i m i ted to, cinema
halls, theaters and spas. (Section 8 of RA. No. 11812)
Sexual harassment in a private place is not punishable under
the Safe Spaces Act. For example, Pedro inside his house uttered
to Maria, his cousin, "Palaki ng palaki wetpu mo, papisil naman."
Since a private house is not within th e contemplation of the word
"public spaces" under R.A. No. 11313, the crime committed is unjust
vexation, and not ge nder-based streets and pu b lic spaces sexual
harassment.
Specific criminal acts
Under Section 4 r e l ation t o S ection 1 1 of R .A . No . 1 1818,
gender-based streets and public spaces sexual harassment includes
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 709
the following acts made i n p u b li c spaces such as alleys, roads,
sidewalks and parks:
1. Ca t c a l l ing, w o l f -whistling, misogynistic, t r a n sphobic,
homophobic, sexist slurs and leering and intrusive gazing;
Note: Catcalling refers to unwanted remarks directed towards
a person, commonly d on e i n t h e f o r m o f w o l f - w histling a n d
misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic, and sexist slurs. (Section 8
of R.A. No. 11313) The following are examples of catcalling "wow
legs," "ang puti puti mo naman," "hi sexy" and "putangina malas.
may baklelong."
2. U n w a n t ed invitations (e.g., group of men stating to group
of ladies in a music bar "join us girls, please; will paint the town red,
we will make you happy, promise");
8. Pe r s i stent uninvited comments or gestures on a person' s
appearance o" the use of words, gestures or actions that ridicule
on the basis ofsex, gender or sexual orientation, identity and/or
expression (e.g., a student stating to his female classmate, who is
wearing corduroy pants "baduy mo, tabatshing ka, kadiri k a, yuk
yuk yuk.r');
4. Re l e n t l ess requests for personal details such as name,
contact and social media details or destination; or stalking;
Note: Under R.A. No. 11818, stalking refers to conduct directed
at a person involvir g the repeated visual or physical proximity, non-
consensual communication, or a combination thereof that cause or
will likely cause a person to fear for one's own safety or the safety of
others, orto suffer emotional distress. However, stalking against a
child constitutes child abuse under Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610
(Araneta v. People, G.R. No. 174205, June 27, 2008), while stalking
against a woman w'th whom the offender has/had marital, sexual or
dating relationship, or her child constitutes psychological violence
against woman under Section 5 (h) of R.A. No. 9262.
5. St a t e m ent o f s e xual c omments an d s u ggestions (e.g.,
asking a lady passenger inside the bus "Mali bog ka ba? Can you be
my fubu? One time lang, please");
6. Pe r s i stent telling of sexual jokes, use of sexual names,
c omments and demands, and an y s t atement t ha t h a s m ade an
invasion on a p e rson's personal space or t h r eatens the person' s
sense ofpersonal safety;

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7. Pu b l i c m asturbation or Hashing of private parts for th e
sexual gratification of the perpetrator with the effect of demeaning,
h arassing, th reatening o r i n t i m i d at in g t h e o f f ended part y a n d
similar lewd sexual actions;
Note: Thecrime ofgender-based streets and public spaces sexual
harassment is committed regardless of the motive for committing
such action or remarks. (Section 4 of R.A. No. 11313) However, acts
that are legitimate expressions of indigenous culture and tradition,
as well as breastfeeding in public shall not be penalized. (Section
31) For example, an Igorot, who is wearing bahag while dancing in
a public park in front of several women, is not committing gender-
based sexual harassment.
8. G r o ping (e.g. during a political rally, some par:icipants
hug, touch the breast and kiss a female bystander); and
9 . A ny ad v a n ces, w h e ther v e r ba l o r p h y s i cal, t h a t i s
unwanted and has t h r eatened one's sense of personal space and
p hysical safety (e.g. touching, pinching, or b r u shing against t h e
genitalia, f ace, ar ms, a n us , g r oin , b r easts, i n ner t h i g hs, f ace,
buttocks or any part of the victim's body).
Note: If the touching of the body of the victims constit ates ac-.s
of lasciviousness,sexual assault, rape, or sexual abuse, the accused
should be prosecuted under th e Revised Penal Code or R.A. No.
7610, where the penalty is higher than that prescribed under R.A.
No. 11313.
H arassment must be gender-based and sexual in natur e
The streets and public spaces harassment under Saf S p aces
Act must be gender-based and sexual i n n a t u re; otherwise, the
h arasser is l i a ble fo r u n j us t v e x ation, oral d e famation. or a n y
other crime. For example, Pedro uttered to Jose, who farted while
walking in Jupiter Street, "Putang ina mo, utotero ka, sukdulan ang
kapangitan mo." This harassment is not sexual and gender-based.
Hence, the crime committed is unjust vexation, and not violation of
the Safe Spaces Act.
GENDER-BASED ONLINE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Gender-based online sexual har assment r e fers to an o n l i n e
c onduct targeted at a p a r t i cular p erson that causes or l i k ely t o
cause another mental,emotional or psychological distress, and fear
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 711
of personal safety, sexual harassment acts. (Section 8 of R.A. No.
11818)
Gender-based online sexual harassment under Section 12 of
R.A. No. 11313 includes the follovring acts committed with the use
of information. and om m u n i cations technology in te rrorizing and
intimidating victims:
1. P l y s i c al, psychological, and emotional threats;
Note: T h reat t o k i l l th r o u gh t h e u s e o f information a n d
c ommunications technology constitutes gr ave t h r eat u n der t h e
Revised Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance of using
information or communication technology under Section 6 of R.A.
No. 10175;
2. U nw a n t ed sexual misog1mistic, transphobic, homophobic
a nd sexist r e m ark s an d c o mmert s o n l in e w h e ther p u b licly o r
through direct and private messages;
3. In v a s ion of v i ctim's privacy through cyberstalking and
incessant messaging, uploading and sharing without the consent of
the victim, any form of media that contains photos, voice, or video
with sexual content:
4. I n v a s ion of v i ctim's privacy through any u n authorized
recording and sharing of any of the victim's photos, videos, or any
information online, and
5. I nv a s io n o f v i c t i m' s p r i v acy t h r o ug h i m p ersonating
identities of victirrs online (online identity theft) or posting lies
about victims to ha "m their reputation, or filing, false abuse reports
to online platforms to silence victims.
Online identity .heft or impersonating the identity of the victim
online also constitutes the cybercrime of identity theft under Section
4 of R.A. No. 10175
Exemption
Exemption to acts constitutive and penalized as gender-based
online sexual harassment are authorized written orders of the court
for any peace officerto use online records or any copy thereof as
evidence in any civil, criminal i nvestigation or t r ial of th e crime:
Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted
upon w r i t te n a p p l ication a nd th e e x amination u n der o at h o r
affirmation oi" the applicant and the wi t nesses may produce, and
 712 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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upon showing that t h ere ar e r easonable grounds to believe that
gender-based online sexual h a r assment ha s b een committed or
is about to becommitted, and that the evidence to be obtained is
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution or
prevention of such crime. (Section 14 of R.A; No. 11818)
Inadmissible evidence
Any record,photo or video, or copy thereof of any person that
is in violation of the preceding sections shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation. (Section 14 of R.A. No. 11818)
O nline h a r a ssment m u s t b e g e n d e r -based an d s e x ua l i n
nature
The online harassment under R.A. No. 11313 must be gender-
based and sexual in n a t u re; otherwise, the harasser is liable for
cyber unjust vexation,cyber threat, cyber libel or any other crime.
For example, Pedro to annoy hi s arch enemy, Juan, incessantly
sent nonsense text messages through cell phone to him. Since this
harassment is not gender-based and sexual in nature, Pedro should
be prosecuted for unjust vexation under the Revised Penal Code with
qualifying circumstance of use of i n f ormation or c ommunication
technology under Section 6 of R.A. No. 10175 (Cyber Crime Law).
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
The crime committed is qu a l ified gender-based streets and
public spaces sexual harassment or qu alified online gender-based
sexual harassment if any of the following qualifying circumstances
attended the commission of the crime:
1. T h e h a r assment takes place in a common carrier or PUV,
including, but not limited to, jeepneys, taxis, tricycles, or app-based
t ransport network vehicle services, where the perpetrator is t h e
driver of the vehicle and the offended party is a passenger;
2. Th e o ffended party is a minor, a senior citizen, or a person
with disability (PWD), a breastfeeding mother nursing her child, or
diagnosed with a mental problem tending to impair consent;
3. T he p e r petrator is a member of the uniformed services,
such as the PNP and AFP, and the act was perpetrated while the
perpetrator was in uniform; and
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 713
4 Th e a c t t a k e s place 1n the p r emises of a g overnment
agency offeringfrontline services to the public and the perpetrator
is a government employee.
GENDER-BASED SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
OR EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING INSTITUTIONS
The crime of g e nder-based sexual har assment in t h e w o r k
place under Sections 16, 17 and 19 of R.A. No. 11313 is committed
by the employer or other persons of authority, influence or moral
ascendancy in a workplace, who failed to prevent, deter, or punish the
performance of gender-based sexual harassment in the workplace,
or failedto take action on the reported harassment.
The crime of gender-based sexual harassment in educational
and training institution under Sections 22 and 23 of R.A. No. 11318
is committed b y p r i n cipals, school heads, teachers, instructors,
professors, coaches, trainers, or any other person who has authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a n educational or
training institution, who shall f ai l t o : (1) disseminate or post a
copy of R.A. No. 11313 in a conspicuous place in the educational
institution; (2 ) p r o vi de measures t o p r e vent t h i s h a r a ssment,
like information campaigns; (3) create an i n d ependent i n t ernal
mechanism to investigate and address complaints for harassment;
(4) provide and disseminate, in consultation with all persons in the
educational institution, a code of conduct or school policy; or (5) to
act on reported harassment.
On the other hand, the person, who committed act of gender-
based sexual harassment in th e w orkplace or in educational and
training institution, is l i able for ge nder-based streetsand public
spaces sexual harassment under Sections 4 and 11 thereof; or gender-
basedonline sexual harassment under Sections 12 and 14 thereof.
ANTI-PHOTO AND VIDEO VOYEURISM ACT OF 2009
R.A. NO. 9995
Photo/video voyeurism under Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9995 is
committed byany person, who shalltake photo or video coverage of
a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any similar
activity or capturing an image of the private area of a person without
the consent of the person involved and under circumstances in which
the personhas a reasonable expectation of privacy.
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Private area of a person means the naked or undergarment
clad genitals,pubic area, buttocks or female breast of an individual.
Reasonable expectation of privacy
Secretly capturing the image of the private part of a woman
urinating in a public comfort room with the use of a hidden camera
constitutes the crime of photo/video voyeurism. The woman has a
reasonable expectation of privacy since she believed that she could
disrobe in private inside the comfort room, without being concerned
that herprivate area was being captured. (Section 8 ofR .A.N o.9995)
Clandestinely taking a photo of a woman's breast exposed due
to wardrobe malfunction while she was dancing in a public beach
during a town fiesta constitutes the crime of photo/video voyeurism.
Even though she was dancing in a public place, she had a reasonable
expectation of privacy since she believed that her breast would not
be visible to the public. (Section 8 of R.A. No. 9995)
Taking a videocoverage of a drunken woman, who deliberately
removed her shir t a n d br a t o e x pose her breasts while dancing
in a disco pub, is not photo/video voyeurism because she had no
reasonable expectation ofprivacy.
Other crime
Photo/video voyeurism under Section 4 (b) to (d) of R.A. No.
9995 is committed by any person, who shallcopy or reproduce, or
to cause tobe copied or reproduced, sell or distribute, or cause to be
sold ordistributed, publish or broadcast, or cause to be published or
broadcast, such photo or video coverage or recordings of such sexual
act or any similar activity.
Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9995 covers photo or video of sexual
act orsimilar activity, and image of the private area of a person. On
the other hand, Section 4 (b), (c) and (d) merely covers photo or video
of sexual act or similar activity. Thus, publishing a picture, through
the internet, depicting a nude body of a woman without her written
consent is not a violation of Section 4 (d).
Consent torecord or take a photo or video coverage of sexual
act or private partsgiven by the person involved is a defense in
crime involving recording or taking photo or video under Section 4
(a) but not involving copying, selling, and publishing under Section
4 (b), (c) and (d). Consent as a defense in crime involving copying,
selling, and publishing must be a wr i t ten consent to copy, sell or
publish.
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
715
Taking a videocoverage of a nude woman hired to dance in a
stag party is not constitutive of the crime of voyeurism under Section
4 (a) because of the consent given by the woman. But publishing
the video coverage through the internet without the written consent
:"rom the said woman violates Section 4 (d).
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
Qualified seduction is committed by: (1) person in authority,
priest, house-servant, domestic, guardian, t eacher
r, or a p erson
entrusted in any capacity with her education or custody, who has
carnal knowledge of a virgin and a minor, who is not under 12 years
of age; or (2) a person who has carnal kn owledge of his sister or
descendant, who isnot under 12 years of age. (Article 887)
1. O f f e n d e r — In q u a l i f ied s eduction, the re is a b u se of
authority, confidence or relationship on th e p art of t h e offender.
(Gonzales v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108811, May 81,
1994) There are three classes of offenders in the crime of qualified
seduction, to wit: (1) those who abuse their authority in s educing
the woman such as a person in authority, guardian, teacher, or a
person entrusted in an y capacity wit h he r e ducation or custody;
(2) those who abuse the confidence reposed on them by the woman
seduced such as priest, house-servant, or domestic; and (3) those
who abuse their relationship with the woman seduced such as those,
who seduced their sister or descendant. (2007 Bar Exam)
a. T e a c h e r —A is a g i r l o f 1 7 y e a rs, single and a
high school student whose teacher is B. Teaching in the same
school is C. One afternoon, after class, A and C had sexual
intercourse in the storeroom of the school. A became pregnant.
(1981 Bar Exam) The crime committed is qualified seduction
t hrough abuse of authority. Consent of th e victim w h ich i s
obtained through seducement or abuse of authority i s not a
defense. The fact that A is not the teacher of the girl will not
negate the element of abuse of authority since both b e l ong
to the same school. Even if A i s no t th e teacher of the girl,
qualified seduction is still committed since both belongs to the
same school, and thus, A has moral infiuence as member of the
faculty over the girl. (Santos v. People, 40 O.G., Supp. 6, 28/
Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis Reyes
)
b. D om e s ti c —The tenn " d omestic" for pu r p oses of
qualified seduction refers to persons usually living under the
 716 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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same roof, pertaining t o t h e s ame house, and constituting,
in thi s sense, a p ar t t h e r eof. (People v. A l v a rez, G.R N o .
L-34644, January 17, 1974; People v. Subingsubing, G.R. Nos.
104942-43, November 25, 1993) By reason of the intimacy and
confidence existing among various members of a household,
opportunities for c ommit t in g s eduction ar e m or e f r equent.
(People v. Camatis, G.R. Nos. L-30635-6, January 29, 1976)
Where the accused carnally abused two orphan girls, relatives
of his wife, sheltered in his house, he was convicted of qualified
seduction. He was a domestic in relation to the girls. (U.S. v.
Arlante, G.R. ¹ . L - 3 8 59, January 15, 1908)
c. A s c e n d an t o r B r o t h e r — I f t h e o f f ender is t h e
brother or ascendant of the victim, elements of minority and
virginity are dispensed with. Parenthetically, the relationship
of the offender and the victim must be by consanguinity but
need not be legitimate. (Revised Penal Code by Luis Reyes) The
essence of seduction qualified by relationship is an incestuous
sexual intercourse between the offender and offended party.
However, one h aving sexual i n t ercourse wit h h i s a d opted
daughter i s l i a b l e f o r q u a l i fied s e duction b ecause under
Section 17 ofR.A. No. 8552, the adoptee shall be considered
the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes.
A, 75 years of age, had sexual intercourse with his sister,
80 years of age. A is liable for qualified seduction.
2. O ff e n d e d P a r t y — Th e v i c t im i n q u a l if ied s eduction
must be a minor, a v i r g in, and a w o man. However, in seduction
qualified by relationship, minority and virginity is not an element.
But the victim must not be under 12 years of age; otherwise, the
crime committed is statutory rape.
Virginity as a n e ssential i n gredient of th e c r im e of s i mple
abduction should no t b e u n d erstood i n i t s m a t e r ial s ense and
does not exclude the i dea of a b duction of a v i r t u ous woman of
good reputation. The prior sexual intercourse of the accused with
the offended party will not make the latter a non-virgin when th' e
former subsequently had sexual intercourse with her, which is the
subject matter of seduction. (U.S. v. Casten, G.R. No. 11488, August
19, 1916) The concept of virginity as an element of simple abduction
is the same as that of an element of qualified seduction. In sum,
virginity as an element of simple abduction and qualified seduction
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 717
pertains to legal virginity. As long as the girl is of good reputation,
he is a virgin in the eyes of the law. (1981 Bar Exam)
The word "seduce," as found in the statute, imports not only
illicit sexual intercourse, but it imports also a surrender of chastity;
a surrender of the woman's personal virtue. The statute is for the
protection of the chastity of unmarried women, and the existence of
the virtue at the time of the intercourse is a necessary ingredient of
the offense; for, as has been often said, the woman who has lost her
c hastity, the prostitute, may be the victim of rape, but is not th e
subject of seduction. The fact that th e man may have considered
her a virgin does not seem to change the rule. His ignorance of her
previous immoral and unchaste practices cannot make her a virgin
in the eyes of the law. (U.S. v. Suan, G.R. No. 9201, March 3, 1914)
3. Se x u a l I n t e r c ourse —Sexual intercourse between the
seducer and seduced is an element of qualified seduction. Consent
of the woman seduced to the sexual intercourse with the offender
i s not a d e f ense i n q u a li fied seduction. Qualified seduction i s
committed even though no deceit int ervenes or even when such
carnal knowledge was voluntary on the part of the virgin. (People v.
Fontanilla,supra; 1981 Bar Exam)
SIMPLE SEDUCTION
Simple seduction is committed by any person, who has carnal
k nowledge of a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation,
and a minor, who is not under 12 years of age by means of deceit.
(Article 338; 1965 Bar Exam)
l. O ff e n d e d Pa r ty —The offended party in simple seduction
must be a woman, single or a widow of good reputation and minor,
who is not under 12 years ofage. If she is under 12 years of age,
having sexual intercourse with her is statutory rape.
In simple seduction, unlike that in a qualified case, the matter
of virginity of the offended party is not essential; it is only necessary
that the complainant be an unmarried woman and of chaste life and
good reputation. Under the law, simple seduction is not synonymous
with loss of virginity. (People v. Yap, G.R. No. L-251 76, February 27,
1968)
To be considered as a victim of simple seduction, a widow must
be a minor or under 18 years of age. Since the marrying age und
er
tthe
e Family Code is at least 18 years of age, a minor, who has no
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capacity to marry, cannot be a widow. Thus, as a general rule, a
widow cannot be a victim of simple seduction simply because she is
not a minor. However, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, the
marrying age is at least 15 years of age. In this sense, a minor, who
is married in accordance with the Muslim Law, can become a widow,
and a victim of simple seduction.
A t h r ough p r o mise of m a r r i age wa s a bl e t o h a v e c a r n al
knowledge of B, a girl of 16. A had believed all the time that B wa s
a chaste person but l ater found out t ha t she had i l l i cit r elations
with other men. He refused to marry her and she filed charges of
seduction against him. A is not guilty of the crime of seduction since
the element of good reputation of the woman seduced is not present.
The word "seduce," as found in the statute, imports not only illicit
sexual intercourse, but it imports also a surrender of chastity. The
statute is for the protection of the chastity of un married woman,
and the existence of the virtue at th e t ime of the intercourse is a
necessary ingredient of the offense. The fact that the man may have
considered her aperson of good reputation does not seem to change
the rule. Hi s i g n orance of he r p r e vious i m m oral an d u n c haste
practices cannot make her reputation good in the eyes of the law.
(1971 Bar Exam)
2. S e x u a l I n t e r c o u r s e — The Information alleged that on
the same occasion,accused by means of deceit and false promise of
marriage seduced and had sexual intercourse several times with a
minor of good reputation. The fact that t h ere should be different
acts of intercourse, consented by the woman in r eliance upon the
same promise of mar r i age would not m ean separate offenses of
seduction. Nowhere in th e I n f ormation does it appear that every
act ofintercourse was the result of a separate act of deceit. (People
v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25176, February 27, 196'8) In sum, despite the
allegationsof several of sexual intercourses, the Information charged
the accused of a single crime of simple seduction.
Lewd design is an indispensable element of rape and. crimes
against chastity. (People v. Gilo, G.R. No. L-18202, April 80, 196'4)
The Information for acts of lasciviousness alleged that accused
while being drunk touches the breast and face of the complainant
by means of violence or intimidation. Since the Information failed
to allege lewd design, which is an indispensable element of acts of
lasciviousness, the acts committed by the accused are converted into
another crime, which in this case is unjust vexation. (People v. Gilo,
supra)
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 719
In Information for rape,it is not necessary to allege lewd design,
for to require such averment is to demand a patent superfluity. Lewd
desigr, which is inherent in rape, is manifest in the very act itself-
the sexual intercourse with a woman through force or intimidation.
(People v. Obsania, G.R. No. L-24447, tune 29, 1968) By the same
token, lewd design is inherent in the very act itself of having sexual
intercourse with a chaste woman over 12 and under 18 years of age
under a false promise of marriage, which act constitutes the crime of
simple seduction. (Luansing v. People, G.R. No. L-28289, February
28, 1969)
3. De ce i t —The Information does not allege deceit which
is essential in simple seduction. It is thus clear that the trial court
erred in convicting the accused of simple seduction upon the basis
of the four Information charging rape committed by means of force
and intimidation. (Berba v. People, G.R. Nos. L-82267-70, March 26',
1979)
I, a suitorof M aria who is single and 17 years of age, succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of the latter. After the sexual intercourse
in order to assuage her ruffled feelings K made repeated promises to
marry her. However, E failed to keep his promises. Simple seduction
is not committed since the promise to marry was made after the
sexual intercourse. To commit si mple seduction, the deceit such
as a false promise to marry must be employed by the offender to
seduce the woman in having sexual intercourse with him. In sum,
there must be a causal connection between the deceit or promise to
marry and the sexual intercourse. This cause and effect relationship
canno-. be considered as present if the promise to. marry was made
after the sexual intercourse. (1965 Bar Exam)
Deceit is an essential element of simple seduction. However,
deceit does not need to be proved or established in a charge of
qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence, authority,
or relationship. When the offender is apublic officer, a priest or
minister, a servant, domestic, tutor, teacher, or under any ti tle is
in charge of the education or keeping of the offended woman, the
act is punishable although fraud or deceit may not have been used
or, if employed, has not been proved. The law takes into account the
a buse of confidence (authority or r elationship) on the part of t h e
offender, which implies deceit or fraud. (People v. Fontanilla, G.R.
No. L-25854, Jun,e 28, 1968)
In simple seduction, proof of specific acts constituting deceit
c omm tted by the accused to seduce the woman to give in t o h i s
lustfu desire is required. Usually, the deceit is consisting of promise
 720 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
to marry, which the accused fails to fulfill. If th e accused fulfilled
his promise to marry, the accused is not liable for simple seduction
since thepromise appears not to be deceitful. Moreover, marriage is
a mode of extinguishing criminal liability for seduction.
I n qualified seduction, proof of s p ecific acts committed or
words uttered by the accused to seduce the woman to give in to his
lustful desire is not required. The fact that the accused is a person
in authority or p r i est is a seducing circumstance that causes the
woman to give consent to a sexual intercourse with th e offender.
Abuse of authority, confidence, or r el ationship i m p lies d.eceit or
fraud.
Deceit may constitute seducement or fraudulent machination.
If the accused seduced his girlfriend, who is a mi nor and of good
reputation, to have sex with him by deceitfully making a promise to
marry her, the crime committed is simple seduction. If the accused
pretended to be the husband of the victim, and by reason of this
pretense, he was able to have sex with h er, the crime committed
is rape t h rough f r a udulent m a chination. Th e essence of simple
seduction is having sexual intercourse by means of seducement in
the form of deceit. On the other hand, the essence of rape through
fraudulent m a c hination i s h a v i n g s e x ua l i n t e r course without
consent. In sum, without fraudulent machination there is no way for
the accused to obtain from the rape victim her consent to have sex.
CONSENTED ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
Acts of lasciviousness uith th e consent of the offended party
is committed by t h e s ame persons and th e s ame circumstances
as those in qualified seduction and simple seduction. (Article 889)
Seduction and consented acts of lasciviousness are the same except
in the latter the criminal act is sexual intercourse with the offended
party; while in former, the criminal act is having lascivious conduct
with her.
Seduction, Rape and Sexual Abuse
The gravamen of r ape and acts of l asciviousness is having
sexual intercourse or acts of lasciviousness without consent of the
offended party.Consent of a person under 12 years of age, demented
or mentally retarded is not recognized by law. The essence of sexual
abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 is having sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct w it h a c h i l d u n d e r c oercion or i n fl u ence.
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 721
Consent of a child under coercion or influence is not recognized by
law. The gravamen of seduction and consented acts of lasciviousness
is having sexual intercourse or acts of lasciviousness with consent of
the offended party obtained through seducement.
1. M in o r i t y —In s ta tutory r a pe or acts of lasciviousness
under Articles 266-A and 336, the victim must be under 12 years of
age. In seduction or consented acts of lasciviousness under Articles
337 and 338, the seduced woman must be over 12 years and under
18 years of age.
If the offended party was seduced by the offender on her 12th
birthday, there is an issue on whether the provision on statutory
rape or that on seduction is applicable since the victim is neither
above nor under 12 years of age. Because there is doubt as to
which of the penal provisions applies, it must be resolved in favor
of the accused. Since the provision on seduction is favorable to the
accused, the words "over 12 years of age" mentioned in Articles 337
and 338 should beinterpreted as "12 years of age or over." Hence,
the provision of seduction is applicable.
In qualified seduction o r c o nsented acts o f l a sciviousness
involving relationship between the seducer and seduced, minority
is not an element. However, the victim must not be under 12 years
of age;otherwise, the crime committed is statutory rape or acts of
lasciviousness.
In sexual abuse, the victim must be a minor. But if the victim is
under 12 years ofage, the accused shall be prosecuted for statutory
rape oracts of lasciviousness.
2. V i rg i n i t y —In q ualified seduction, the victim must be
a virgin wh ile in s i m ple seduction she must be a person of good
reputation. However, a virgin is equivalent to a person of good
reputation since virginity i n q u a lified seduction pertains to legal
virginity. But in seduction qualified by relationship, rape or sexual
abuse, virginity is not an element.
A minor, who is not a virgin, or a person of good reputation,
may have given her consent to sexual intercourse with the accused
voluntarily, and not by reason that the latter seduced her. Since she
had already experienced sexual intercourse, the accused could have
sex with her without the need of seducing her.
If a professor had sexual intercourse with hi s m i nor female
student, who is not a virgin, qualified seduction is not committed.
 722 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
However, he i s l i a bl e fo r s e xual a b use i f h e u s e d i n f luence or
psychological coercion on her to consent to have sexual intercourse
with him.
3. T ea c h e r — A t e a cher courted h is s t u d ent, a 1 4 - year-
old virgin, invited her to a motel and had sexual intercourse with
her. The crime committed is qualified seduction through abuse of
authority. Consent of the victim obtained through seducement is not
a defense in qualified seduction. Because of his authority, he was
able to seduce her student in having sexual intercourse with him.
A teacher t h r eatened t o f l u n k h i s s t u d ent, a 1 4 -year o l d
virgin, in her English subject if she will not agree to have sexual
intercourse with him. Because of fear of being flunked, she agreed
to have sexual intercourse with him. While the teacher was having
sexual intercourse with his student, the latter was crying. The crime
committed is rape through grave abuse of authority. Consent by the
student obtained through grave abuse of authority is not recognized
by law.
The essence of qualified seduction through abuse of authority
is having sexual intercourse by means of seducement by abusing
offender's authority. On the other hand, the essence of rape through
grave abuse of a u t h ority is h a v i n g s e x ual i n t e r course wit h out
consent. In sum, without the grave abuse of authority th ere is no
way for the accused to obtain from the rape victim her consent to
have sex.
In People v. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998, at the
shower room o f t h e u n i v ersity, a ccused, swimming i n s t r uctor,
o rdered his student (14 years of age) to undress to allow him t o
shave her pubic hair since it is visible. His student complied. But
instead of shaving her p u bic h air , accused performed the act of
cunnilingus. She backed away saying "Nandidiri a ho" but accused
kept on saying "H u uiag mong lagyan ng m a l i sya." Accused then
asked her to stand up and told her to simply pretend that he was
her boyfriend and thereupon accused removed the right cap of her
brassiere and licked her right breast while touching her vagina at
the same time. Then accused performed again the act of cunnilingus
on her, and forced her to hold and squeeze his penis. Accused was
convicted ofsexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 because he employed
moral and psychological coercion on his minor student.
In Ma l to v. Pe ople, G.R. No. 1 64733, September 21, 2 007,
accused, a philosophy professor, invited his student (17 years
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHAS ITY 723
old! and her gr oup t o w atch pornographic films in a m o t el, and
then suggested to t h e m t o l i e w i t h h i m i n b e d . T h e y r e sisted
until he relented. Accused courted her. Socn, they had a "m u tual
understanding' and became sweethearts. When she protested her
grade of "3," he changed it to "1.5." He brought her to a motel, but
she:efused to have sexual intercourse vrith him. He brought her
again in a mote'. She again refused to have sexual intercourse with
him. He threatened to end the relationship. Pressured, she agreed
to have sexual intercourse with him. The accused was convicted of
sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 committed against
his 17-year old student. It was proven that the accused who was the
minor's professor obtained the minor's consent by taking advantage
of his relationship and moral ascendarey to exert influence on her.
4. F at h e r —F ather, who had sexual intercourse with h is
daughter with consent of the latter, is liable for seduction qualified
by relationship regardless ofthe virgini-. y and age of the victim.
But if t h e v i ct''m is a m i nor an d t h e accused took advantage of
his ascendancy as a father (or stepfather). the crime constitutes
sexual abuse against a child under ir fl u enee and psychological or
physical coercion (People v. Optana, G.R. ¹. 18 8 9 22,February 12,
2001) and rape through grave abuse ofauthority and psychological
intimidation. (People v. Mendoza, G.R No. 224295, March 22, 201 7)
In such a case, he shall be prosecuted for the graver crime of rape
insi,ead of sexual abuse. (People v. Pushing,GA. No. 208009,July 11,
2016)
In People v. Optana, supra, the accused committed sexual abuse
on his stepdaughter, using his moral ascendancy in intimidating the
victim to engage in sexual intercourse with him. He was convicted of
sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
In People v. Mendoza, supra, the accused stripped his five-year
old daughter naked and asked her to lie facing downwards. He then
inserted his penis into her vagina and anus. The harrowing incident
was interrupted by the arrival of her grandfather, after which she
dressed up, went out of the house anc played with her dog, while
he stayed inside the house. He was "onvicted of rape. According
to tl e Supreme Court, in incestuous "ape of a minor, actual force
or int i mid.ation need no t b e p r e sent. Th e m o ra l a n d p h y sical
dom'nation of the father is sufficient to int midate the victim int o
submission to his carnal desires. The rapist by hi s overpowering
and overbearing moral influence, can easily consummate his bestial
lust with i m p u n i ty. Consequently, proof of force and violence is
 724 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
unnecessary, unlike when the accused is not an ascendant or a blood
relative of the victim.
5. P r o m i s e to Ma rr y —Having sexual intercourse through
deceit(promise to marry or entering into a fake marriage) constitutes
simple seduction or sexual abuse. In Caballo v. People, G.R. No.
198732, June 10, 2013, the Supreme Court considered the assurance
o f love, guarantee that she would not get pr egnant by u sing th e
withdrawal method and the promise of marriage as "psychological
coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5 of R.A. No.
7610. Hence,accused is guilty of sexual abuse.
If th e a ct s committed b y t h e a c cused constitute q u alified
s eduction or s i m pl e s e duction an d s e x ual a b u se, h e s h al l b e
prosecuted for the graver crime of sexual abuse instead of seduction.
(People v. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016)
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
Forcible abduction is committed by any person, who abducts
with lewd designs (1) a woman against her w i ll , or (2) a w oman
below 12years of age. (Article342; 1951 Bar Exam)
Abduction
Where the accused abducted and transported the victim to a
place where he will be killed, and thereafter, the victim was killed,
the crime committed is murder. Kidnapping is not committed since
the deprivation of liberty is just incidental to the crime of murder.
(People v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009)
W here the accused abducted and t r a nsported the victim t o
a place where she will b e r a ped, and t h ereafter, the victim w a s
raped, the crime committed is r ape. Forcible abduction for being
an indispensable means to commit r a p e i s a b sorbed. (People v.
Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916, July 11, 2002)
Where the accused abducted and transported the victim to a
safe house for the purpose of killing him, and detained him therein
f or an appreciable period of ti me, and th ereafter, the victim w a s
killed, the cr ime committed i s k i d n apping w it h h o m i cide. Since
there is intent to deprive liberty for the victim was detained in a safe
house, and he was killed in the course of detention, kidnapping with
homicide is committed even the original design is to kill the victim.
(People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 116289, November 29, 2000)
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 725
W here th e a ccused for t h e p u r p ose of r a p in g t h e v i c t i m
transported her to a house or motel, or a place at an appreciable
distance, ordetained her for an appreciable period and thereafter,
the victim was raped, the crime committed is rape through forcible
abduction. (People v. Jo se, G.R. No. L- 2 8282, February 6; 1 9 71;
People v. Caraang, G.R. Nos. 148424-27, December 11, 2008)
W here the accused kidnapped and detained the vi ctim n o t
for purpose of ki l l in g hi m o r r a p in g h er , an d subsequently, th e
victim was kill d or raped as an afterthought, the crime committed
is kidnapping with h o micide or k i dnapping with r a pe. (People v.
Mercado, supra)
Lewd Design
Lewd design is an element of forcible abduction and consented
abduction. Lewd design must be present at the precise moment that
the accused abducted the victim.
K issing th e v i c ti m s everal t i m e s w i t h i n t e n tion t o m a r r y
her after abducting her may not establish lewd design; (People v.
Crisostomo, G.R ¹ . L - 1 9 0 84, February17, 1928) but kissing the
victim, touching her thighs, and lifting her skirt i m mediately after
abduction (Peovle v. Jose, G.R. No, L-28282, February 6, 1971); or
forcibly embracing her, kissing her, and handling her against her
will (People v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-125, July 26, 1946) is an evidence
of lewd design.
Aurora, single, 29 years old, on her way back to her house in
Polo, Bulacan,accompanied by her sister, was forcibly abducted by
Ernesto, one of her suitors. Ernesto kissed her several times while
he was holding her in his arms to prevent her from running away.
The abductor took his victim away to another town where they were
o vertaken by A u r c r a's brother. E r nesto released his victim a n d
disappeared. Ernesto was Aurora's suitor for several years. To his
proposals of marriage Aurora has always answered in the negative.
So, he decided to abduct her with no other intention but to marry her.
(1956Bar Exam) Since there is no showing that Ernesto and Aurora
have legal impediments to marry each other, the intention of the
former to marry the latter is not an evidence of lewd design, which is
an element of forcible abduction. Several kissing without commission
of other acts are not sufficient to establish lewd design. Without lewd
design, abducting the victim constitutes illegal detention. (People v.
Crisostomo, G.R No. L-19084, February 17, 1928) Since the victim is
 726 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
a woman, which is a qualifying circumstance, the crime committed
is kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
In People v. De Lara, G.R. No. 124703, June 27, 2000, Rolando
with co-accused carried his ex-girlfriend, who refused reconciliation,
to force her to marry h i m . T h ereafter, Rolando raped the victim.
To constitute abduction, the taking away of a woman against her
will must be proven to have been made with lewd designs. Hence, it
was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the three accused
were actuated bylewd design. The prosecution failed to do so, except
with respect to Rolando. While it is enough that at least one of the
accused entertained lewd design in order to convict all of the three
of forcible abduction, such lewd intent, however, must be known to
all accused who cooperated in the commission of the felony. In the
case bar, it was not proven that other accused had knowledge of the
lewd designs entertained by Rolando. Rolando was convicted of rape
through forcible abduction while his co-accused were convicted of
grave coercion.
Against the Will or Un der 12 Years of Age
The element of against the will is present where the abduction
was committed by means of violence or intimidation.
A is charged with t h e f o rcible abduction with l e wd d esigns
of X, agirl, 16 years old and Y, a 20-year old female friend of X.
The evidence shows that the abduction was with consent. Forcible
abduction is not committed because the abduction with lewd design
was not committed against the will of the victims, who are not under
12 years of age. (1961 Bar Exam)
Forcible Abduction absorbs attempted rape
In, case the offender attempted to rape the abducted victim,
forcible abduction absorbs attempted rape (or acts of lasciviousness).
The attempted rape was itself the external manifestation of lewd
design, which is an element of forcible abduction. Hence, the crime
committed isforcible abduction and not complex crime of attempted
rape through forcible abduction. (People v. Egan, G.R. No. 189888,
May 28, 2002)
Forcible abduction could not be committed without lascivious
conduct such as kissing the sensitive part of the victim's body; thus,
forcibleabduction absorbs attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness
because the latter is inherent in former. (U.S. v. Ramirez, G.R. No.
L-18997, March 8, 1919)
J9JC9B0M
. I. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
727
Forcible Abduction cannot absorb Rape
Sexual intercourse is not a n e l ement of f o r cible abduction
( .S. v. Ramirez, supra); hence, it follows that rape is not inherent
in forcible abduction. Forcible abduction can be committed without
raping the victim. Thus, forcible abduction cannot absorb rape.
Rape absorbs Forcible Abduct ion
Settled is the rule that if the main objective of the accused is
to rape thevictim, the crime committed is rape. Forcible abduction
is absorbed. The doctrine ofabsorption rather than Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code is applicable since forcible abduction is an
indispensable means to commit rape. (People v. Mej oraday, G.R. No.
102705, July 80, 1998; People v. Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916; July
11, 2002; People v. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 1 75924, March 14, 2012)
Complex crime of rape through forcible abduction
Iff orcibleabduction is a necessary means to commit rape, this
is a complex crime proper under Ar t i cle 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. (People v. Jose, G.R. ¹. L - 2 8 2 32, February6, 1971; People
v. Buhos, G.R. No. L-40995, June 25, 1980; People v. Tami, G.R.
Nos. 101801-08, May 2, 1995) Where the victim was abducted with
lewd design and brought t o a h o use (People v. Magdaraog, G.R.
No. L-40988, April ' 5 , 19 8 8;People v. Buhos, G.R. No. L-40995,
June 25, 1980, En Banc; People v. Velasquez, G.R. Nos. 187888-84,
November 28, 2000) in a desolated place (e.g.,uninhabited grassy
upland) (People v. Caraang, G.R. Nos. 14842-27, December 11, 2008)
or forest (People v. De Lara, G.R. No. 124708, June 27, 2000) where
she was raped,forcikle abduction should be treated as a necessary
means to commit rape, and thus, the crime committed is a complex
crime of rape through forcible abduction.
Maita was the object of Solito's avid sexual desires. Solito had
a ttempted many times to entice Maita to a date in bed with h i m
but Maita had consistently refused. Fed up with all her rejections,
Solito abducted Maita an d br ought her t o a h o use situated '
desolated part of the town. There, Solito succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of Maita against her will. (2017 Bar Exam) Solito is liable
for complex crime ofrape through forcible abduction.
CONSENTED ABDUCTION
Consented abduction is committed by any person, who abducts
with lewd designs a virgin and a minor, who is not under 12 years
 728 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
with her consent. (Article 848) The taking away of th e offended
party must be with her consent,after solicitation or cajolery from
the offender. (Perez v. CA, G.R. No. 80888, November 29, 1988)
Virginity
T here are only tw o c r i mes where vir ginity of t h e v i cti m i s
a n element, and t h ese are, qualified seduction except when t h e
qualifying circumstance is relationship, and consented abduction.
Virginity is presumed if victim is unmarried and of good reputation,
or a virtuous woman of good reputation. (People v. L ee, G.R N o .
189070, May 29, 2002) In simple seduction, good reputation of the
victim is an element.
Virginity as an essential ingredient of the crime of consented
abduction should no t b e u n d er stood i n i t s m a t e r ial s ense and
does not exclude the i dea of a b duction of a v i r t u ous woman of
good reputation (U.S. v. Casten, G.R. No. 11488, August 19, 191 6)
b ecause the essence of the offense is not th e w r ong done to t h e
woman, but the outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it
by the disappearance of one of its members. (Valdepenas v. People,
G.R. No. L-20687, April 80, 1966)
In Valdepenas v. People, supra, the information alleged that
the victim is a minor and accused took her by taking advantage of
the absence of her mother from their dwelling and carried her to a
secluded spot to gain carnal intercourse with her with lewd designs.
This allegation implies that the victim is a minor living under patria
protestas, and hence, single, thus leading to the presumption that she
is a virgin apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation.
The presumption of innocence includes also, that of morality and
decency, and as a consequence, of chastity.
Minority
In forcible abduction under second paragraph of Article 342,
the victim must be under 12 years of age. In consented abduction
under Article 343, the victim must be a minor, who is above 12 years
of age.
If a v i r gi n i s a b ducted wit h l e w d d esign by he r b o yfriend
with her consent on her 12th birthday, there is doubt whether the
crime committed is forcible abduction or consented abduction. The
consenting victim in f orcible abduction must be under 12 years of
age. On the other hand, the victim in consented abduction must be
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 729
above 12 years of age. Since the woman is exactly 12 years of age
when the abduction was committed, she is neither under nor above
12 years of age. Settiedis the rule in caseof doubt the accusedsho ld
P s u
bee convicted of the lesser crime. Since the penalty for c cnsented
! abduction is lighter t han t hat for f orcible abduction, the accused
should be held liable for consented abduction. The phrase "above 12
years of age" in A "ticle 343 on consented abduction should be read as
"12 years of age and above."
Lewd Design
In forcible abduction or c onsented abduction, th e erin inal
act must be committed with l ewd design. If the victim regardless
o f age is abduc-.ed without lewd design, but against her wi ll , t h e
crime committed is kidnapping and serious illegal detention since
the victim is a woman. (Article 267) If the victim, who is a minor,
is abducted withcut lewd design but with consent obtained ihrough
solicitation, the "rime committed is inducing a minor to abandon her
parents' home. (Article 271)
Despite the offender knows the she cannot legally consent tc the
marriage because of her minor age and yet he elopes with her, his
intention to marry gives rise to the presumption that the abduction
is committed with l ewd design. Hence, accused is liable for comented
abduction. (People v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-19084, February 17 ,
1928)
The accused believes that he can marry a m i nor. because o
such belief, he takes a girl 14 years of age with her consent to a
judge for the purpose of marrying her. He is not liable for ccnsented
abduction unless he performed acts showing lewd design. Intent to
marry accomparied with the belief that he is capable of marrying
the abducted minor does not constitute lewd design. (see: U.S'. v.
Galves, 5 Off. Gaz., 98 cited in U.S. v. Santiago, G.R. ¹. T9898,
~
January 29, 191.5)
If the offender and the woman forcibly abducted are both of
legal age and do not l.ave any impediment in contracting marriage,
intention to mar y d oes not constitute unchaste design. V/ithout
lewd design,the accused cannot be held liable for forcible abduct'on.
(People v. Cr i s ostomo, supra) H e n ce, t he c r i m e c o m m i-.ted is
kidnapping an d s e r ' ous i l l egal d e t ention with t h e q u a l i f ying
circumstance that the victim is a female.
 730 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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Solicitation
In forcible abduction, the criminal act i s committed against
the will of the victim. However, the consent of a woman under 12
years of age is not recognized by law. Hence, abduction of a woman
under 12 yearsof age is considered as having been made against her
will. In consented abduction, the criminal act is committed with the
consent of the victim obtained through solicitation or cajolery.
Juan and Petra(girlof 17 years of age) were found by the latter's
parents in a compromising situation. Sometime later, the parents
severely scolded their daughter for having brought dishonor to the
family because they discovered that Juan had filed an application for
marriage with another woman. Immediately after such upbraiding,
Petra left her house, and, together with Juan who was waiting tor
her outside the house, went to and stayed in the latter's house, the
two having sexual intercourse occasionally thereat. (1966 Bar Exam)
Juan is not l i able for consented abduction since there is no
showing that the consent of Petra to stay in his house was obtained
through his solicitation or cajolery. (People v. Palisoc, 6 CA. Rep.
65) Nor is Juan liable for simple seduction since there is no showing
that he employed deceit such as promise to marry to have sexual
intercourse with P etra. N either i s J u a n l i a ble for sexual abuse.
Sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child per se is not
a crime. What is punishable under R.A. No. 7610 is sexual abuse
with a child. Sexual abuse is more than a mere sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child. (see: People v. Hon. Court of Appeals,
G.Il. No. 171868,August 20, 2008)
A with lewd designs, took a 18-year old girl to a nipa hut i n
his farm and there had sexual intercourse with her. The girl did not
offer any resistance because she was infatuated with the man, v.ho
was good-looking and belonged to a rich and prominent family in the
town. (2002 Bar Exam)
A is notliable for forcible or consented abduction since there is
no showing that abduction was committed against the will of the girl
or her consent to the abduction was obtained through his solicitation
or cajolery. Nor is A l i a ble for simple seduction since there is no
showing that he employed deceit such as promise to marry to have
sexual intercourse with the girl. Neither is A liable for sexua' abuse.
Sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child per se is not
a crime. What is punishable under R.A. No. 7610 is sexual abuse
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
731
with a child. Sexual abuse is more than a mere sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child.
C onsented Abduction with Ra p e
After committing consented abduction, the accused forcibly
ad sexual intercourse with 15-year old girl. Accused is liable for
complex crime of r a p e t h r ough consented abduction. (People v.
Amante, G.B. No. 25604, December 6, 1926)
PROSEC UTION OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Crimes against chastity, except corruption of minor and white
slavery, are private crimes, which cannot be prosecuted de officio.
T here ar e t h r e e rules under Article 844 of the R
e e vise d
Penal
ena C o d e ,to wi t: (1) prosecution of adultery or concubinage; (2)
prosecution of seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness; and
(8) mode of extinguishing criminal liability arising from seduction,
abduction, or acts of lasciviousness.
PROSEC UTION OF ADULTERY OR CONC USINAGE
Under Article844, there are three pre-conditions to prosecute
an offender for adultery or concubinage, to wit: (1) the offended spouse
must file a complaint for adultery or concubinage; (2) the offended
spouse cannot i n s t i t ut e c r i m i nal p r osecution w i t h out i n c luding
the guilty parties; and (8) the offended spouse must neither have
consented, expressly or impliedly, to the adultery or concubinage
nor pardoned, expresslyor impliedly, the offenders.
Complaint
Adultery or concubinage, which is a private crime, cannot be
prosecuted unless the offended party filed a complaint against the
offender. The action for crimes against chastity cannot be prosecuted
upon the I nformation of th e fi scal. (People v. Zurbano, G.B. No.
L-82678, February 22, 1971)
1. E f f ect of non-compliance with the rule on filing of
complaint — Non-compliance with Article 844 is not jurisdictional.
The complaint r e quired i n t h i s p r o vision i s m e r ely a co n dition
precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to
prosecute the guilty parties. (Valdepenas v. People, G.R. No. L-20687,
April 80, 1966)
 732 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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2. E f f e c t of divorce Wendy,
- a Filipino citizen, and Hecky,
a German citizen, were married in Cebu City. Hecky obtained in
Germany a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage.
Upon return to the Philippines, Hecky after learning the cohabitation
of Wendy and Pedro filed complaint for adultery against them. (1991
Bar Exam) The complaint for adultery shall be dismissed since an
alien divorcee is not an "offended spouse" within the contemplation
of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code for the purpose of filing
a complaint for a dultery. (Dacasin v. Da casin, G.R. No. 16 8785,
February 5 , 2010) The foreign divorce shall be recognized in t h e
Philippines insofar as Hecky is concerned. Applying the nationality
principle, the law of Germany, of which Hecky is a citizen, shall be
considered on the matter of his status as a divorcee. (Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera, G.R. ¹. 80116,tune 80, 1989)
Wendy, a Filipino citizen, and Hecky, a German citizen, were
married in Cebu City. Hecky obtained in Germany a decree of divorce
on the ground of failure of marriage. Upon return to the Philippines,
Hecky cohabited with Cathy. Wendy filed a complaint for concubinage
against Hecky and Cathy. The complaint for concubinage shall not
b e dismissed. The foreign divorce shall not b e r ecognized in t h e
Philippines in so far as Wendy is concerned. Applying the nationality
principle, the law of the Philippines, of which Wendy is a citizen, shall
be considered on the matter of her status as a married woman. Since
Philippine law does not recognize divorce, Wendy shall be considered
as a married person, and not as a divorcee; hence, despite the foreign
divorce, Wendy is still an "offended spouse" within the contemplation
of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code for the purpose of filing a
complaint for concubinage.
Charging both guilty part y
In adultery, the offended husband must include his wife and
her paramour. In concubinage, the offended wife must include her
husband and his concubine in the institution of criminal prosecution.
Wendy and Hecky were newly married. While Hecky was away
in a foreign land, Wendy had sexual intercourse with Pedro. In a
preliminary investigationfor adultery, the investigating prosecutor
finds Pedro didnot know that Wendy was a married woman. Hence,
the fiscal filed an adultery charge against Wendy only. (1982 Bar
Exam) T he fiscal committed a mistake. The law requires that the
inclusion of both the wife and her paramour in th e complaint for
adultery, which must be filed by the offended husband in court. The
J9JC9B0M
XI, CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 733
determination of the guilt or innocence of the paramour of the crime
of adultery must be left to the court (and not the fiscal or husband).
After the institution of criminal action in court, the trial prosecutor
may move for a dismissal of the complaint as to the paramour if his
guilty knowledge cannot be established. (U.S. v. Asuncion, G.R. No.
L-7124, March 25, 1912) However, the court shall ultimately decide
the fate of the paramour.
Bigamy is not a crime against chastity. It i s a crime against
civil status of a person. Hence, it is a public offense. Thus, the rule
on the inclusion of guilty parties in the complaint for adultery or
concubinage is not applicable to bigamy. The first w ife can file a
criminal case for bigamy against her h u sband who contracted a
second bigamous marriage without including the second wife. (1981
Bar Exam) In fact, both the first and the second spouses may be the
offended parties in bigamy depending on the circumstances. (Garcia
v. CA, G.R No. 119068, tanuary 27, 1997)
Either spouse or a third person (People v. Belen, CA., 45 O.G.,
Supp. 5, 88) can file a complaint for bigamy. A neighbor of the
offended spouse can file a complaint for preliminary investigation
a gainst the offender for bi gamy an d th e f i scal can i n stitute t h e
criminal action through the filing of Information in court. (1964 Bar
Exam) However, while third person can file a complaint for public
crime, they are not allowed to intervene in the proceeding through
counsel. Under Section 16, R ul e 11 0 o f t h e R u l es of C r i m i nal
Procedure, only the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense.
Express or implied pardon in adultery and concubinage
In case of adultery and concubinage, pardon must be given by
the offended spouse to both offenders to beeffective. (Concepcion
v. Savellano, tr., G.R. No. 131728 March 9, 1998) Pardon as a bar
to criminal action for adultery or concubinage is either express or
implied. (Ligtas v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47498, May 7,
1987)
When the offended husband in writing or in an affidavit asserts
that he is pardoning his wife and her paramour for adultery is a
case of express pardon. Th ere is implied pardon when the offended
husband continued to live with his wife even after the commission
of adultery. However, such consent or p ardon cannot be implied
when the offended husband allows his wife to continue living in the
 734 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
conjugal home afterher arrest for adultery only in order to take care
of their children. (Ligtas v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47498,
May 7, 1987)
In Ligtas v. Hon. Court of Appeals, supra, after the complainant
reported the crime of adultery topolice authorities, he asked the
Chief of Police to hold in abeyance the filing of the case as he had in
mind of giving his wife apology as he took pity on his young children
a nd his w i fe. H owever, he executed an af fi davit w h er e I e w a s
granting forgiveness to his wife and paramour subject to a condition
that she lives separately from her paramour. However, complainant
relented in his plan to grant pardon to his wife and her paramour is
demonstrated bythe fact that after two days he executed a complaint
for adultery. There is neither such express nor implied pardon. It
is obvious that the affidavit t hat th e complainant executed was a
mere declaration of intention to pardon his wife and her paramour.
Subsequent acts of the complainant show that he changed his mind
and decided to continue with the prosecution of the case.
Express or implied Consent in Adultery or Concubinage
Consent as a bar to criminal action for adultery or concubinage
is either express or implied. (People v. Sensano, G.R. ¹. L - 8 7 7 20,
March 27, 1988)
A notarized document wh ere th e h u sband allowed his w i f e
to get anew partner is void. However, it is a competent evidence
t hat the husband. gave consent to the adultery committed by hi s
wife. (People v. Gu in ucud, G.R. No. L - 8 8672, October 27, 1983)
This prior consent of the husband to the infidelity of his wife shall
be a bar to the institution of criminal action for adultery, (People
v. Schneckenburger, G.R, No. L - 4 8188, November 10, 1941) and
disqualify him from the benefit of death or physical injuries under
exceptional circumstance under Article 247. (2018 Bar Exam)
Failure to take any action against the accused for seven years
despite knowledge of her adulterous relations with another person
warrant the inference that he consented to the crime of adultery.
(People v. Sensano, G,R. No. L-87720, March 27, 1988)
Hecky and Wendy are married. Hecky cohabits with Cathy, the
wife of Hector despite the fact that they know of each other's marital
status. Wendy cohabits with Pedro, who knows her marital status.
Cohabitation has been going on for five years with the knowledge
of Hecky and Wendy of each other's infidelity. What are the crimes
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 735
committed, and can they be prosecuted for these crimes? (1961 Bar
Exam)
Suggested answer:
Cathy, a married woman, committed as many counts of adultery
as there are sexual intercourses with Hecky, a man other than her
husband, in the course of their cohabitation. Hecky also committed
such crimes of adultery since he is aware of the marital condition of
Cathy. The offended party in t hi s adultery is Hector. They can be
prosecuted for these crimes since Hector did neither pardon Cathy
nor give consent to this crime.
Hecky, a married man, committed concubinage for cohabiting
with Cathy, who is not his wife. Cathy is also liable for concubinage
since she is aware of the marital status of Hecky. The offended party
in concubinage is Wendy. However, they cannot be prosecuted for
this crime since the circumstance that Wendy knows the infidelity of
Hecky for five years is an indication of implied consent to the crime
of concubinage.
Wendy committed as many counts of adultery as t h ere are
s exual intercourses with Pedro, who i s not he r h u sband, in t h e
course of their cohabitation. Pedro also committed such crimes of
adultery since he is aware of the marital condition of Wendy. The
offended party in t his adultery is Hecky. However, they cannot be
prosecuted for this crime since the circumstance that Hecky knows
the infidelity of Wendy for five years is an i n dication of implied
consent to the crime of adultery.
P ROSECUTION O F S E D U C T ION, ABDU CTION O R A C T S O F
LASCIVIOUSNESS
Under Article344, there are two pre-conditions to prosecute
the offenders inseduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness, to
wit: (I)offended party or her parents, grandparents, guardian,
or state must file a complaint for seduction, abduction, or acts of
lasciviousness;and (2) offended party or her parents, grandparents,
or guardian must not have expressly pardoned the offender.
Complaint
Adultery, c o ncubinage, s eduction, a b duction, o r acts of
lasciviousness, which is public crime, cannot be prosecuted unless the
offended party filed a complaint against the offender. The action for
 736 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
crimes against chastity cannot be prosecuted upon the Information of
the fiscal. (People v. Zurbano, G.R No. L-82678, February 22, 1971)
When it is said that the requirement in Ar t i cle 344 regarding
the filing of complaint b y t h e o f fended party or h e r r e l atives is
jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts
the prosecution proceeding. It i s not th e complaint which confers
jurisdiction on th e court t o t r y t h e c ase. The court's jurisdiction
is vested in it b y t h e J u diciary L aw. (People v. Babasa, G.R. No.
L-88072, May 17, 1980; People v. Villaruel, G.R. Nos. 188741-42,
October 26, 2001)
N on-compliance with A r t i cl e 34 4 i s n o t j u r i s dictional. Th e
complaint required in this provision is merely a condition precedent
to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the
guilty parties. (Valdepenas v. People, G.R. No. L-20687, ApriL 80,
1966) And such condition has been imposed out of consideration
for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a
public trial. (People v. Castel, G.R. No. 171164, November 28, 2008)
Right to file complaint
The rules pertaining to th e r i ght of th e victim i n seduction,
abduction,or acts of lasciviousness, her relatives and State to fi le a
complaint against the offender are as follows:
1. V ic t i m is an adult — If the victim of seduction, abduction,
or acts of lasciviousness is an adult, she has the exclusive right to file
a complaint against the offender.
The parents of an adult v i ctim cannot file a complaint for a
private crime against the offender. If the victim is already of age
and is in complete possession of her mental and physical faculties
no one would dispute her paramount right to avenge the wrong done
to the exclusion of her parents and other relatives. (Benga-Oras v.
Evangelista, G.R. No. L-8558, September 28, 1955)
2. Vi ct i m i s a m i n o r —A minor has the right to i n i t i a te
the prosecution of the offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of
lasciviousness independently of her parents. (Section 5, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure)
However, the minor, who is a victim of seduction, abduction,
or acts of lasciviousness, cannot file a criminal complaint against
the offender ifshe is incompetent or incapable of doing so.(Section
5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal P rocedure) But, an i m becile
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 737
with a mental age of 8 was not considered as incompetent. In People
v. Dela Cruz, G R. No. 135022, July 11, 2002, if a minor under the
Rules of Court can fil e a c omplaint for a c r i m e against chastity
independently of her parents, complainant, then 20 years of age who
was found to have the mentality of an 8-year old girl, could likewise
fil e the complaint independently of her relatives. Her complaint can
be rightfully considered f iled by a minor.
3. P a r e n t s of the minor victim —Where the minor, who is
a victim of seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness, fails to file
the complaint, her parents may file the same. (Section 5, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure)
The parents of the minor vi ctim i n s eduction, abduction, or
acts of lasciviousness can validly initiate the filing of the complaint
against the offender. (People v. Excija, G.R. No. 119069, July 5 ,
1996) If the minor victim does not want to file the complaint against
her offender, her parents may do so being under obligation to render
protection to t h ose under t h ei r p o wer an d l a w fu l g u a r dianship
and to represent them in the exercise of all the actions which may
redound to their benefit. (Benga-Oras v. Evangelista, supra)
The mother or th e f a ther of th e m i nor v i ctim i n s eduction,
abduction, or acts of lasciviousness alone can validly in i t i ate the
filing of the complaint against the offender. In People v. De la Cruz,
G.R. No. L-28810, March 27, 1974, the father of the offended girl
in crime against chastity did not restrain or prevent his wife from
filing the complaint for crimes against chastity. It is highly probable
that he tacitly approved it. He did not pardon the offender. Being
occupied in the daily task of earning a living for his family, he had no
time to spare for a criminal investigation. Under the circumstances,
the complaint filed by the mother was a sufficient compliance with
the law. The father's passivity should not preclude the mother from
securing redress for the outrage committed against her daughter.
4. G r an d p a r e nts and guar d ian —Under Section 5, Rule
110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, where the offended party,
who is a minor, fails to file the complaint (for seduction, abduction
and acts of lasciviousness), her parents, grandparents, or guardian
may file the same. The right to file the action granted to parents,
grandparents,or guardian shall be exclusive ofallother persons and
shall beexercised successively in the order herein provided.
The word "e xclusive" i n t h e r u l e s m e ans t he r i g ht o f t h e
parents of the minor to file complaint for seduction, abduction and
 738 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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acts of lasciviousness is exclusive. Hence, the grandparents and
guardian are "excluded" from the entitlement under the rules to file
such complaint. The word "successive" in the rules means that if the
parents of the minor are dead or incompetent, the grandparents will
"succeed "the exclusive right to file such complaint; if the parents and
grandparents of the minor are dead or incompetent, the guardian
will succeed the exclusive right to file such complaint.
The word guardian appearing in Article 344 refers to a guardian
legally appointed by the court. I n t h i s p r ovision, the inclusion of
the guardian is only to invest him wit h th e power to sign a sworn
written complaint to initiate the prosecution of three crimes against
chastity. (People v. Flores, G.R. No. 188815, August 25, 2010)
The so-called exclusive an d s u ccessive r ul e i n s e d u ction,
abduction and acts of lasciviousness do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. Only the offended spouse in adultery or concubinage,
and no other, is authorized by law to i n i t i ate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse
to institute the action for adultery and concubinage, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of
legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. A
foreigner, who obtained a divorce in a country, cannot file a complaint
for adultery against his former wife and her paramour since he is
not an offended spouse anymore. (Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No.
80116, June 80, 1989)
5. State — If the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated
before she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents,
grandparents or g u ar dian, th e S t at e shall i n i t i at e th e c r i m i n al
action in her behalf. (Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure)
E xpress P a r d o n in se d u c t i on , a b d u c t i on , o r
lasciviousness
If the victim of seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness
is an ad u lt, she has the exclusive right to e xpressly pardon the
offender. The parents of the adult victim cannot pardon the offender.
As the pr i v ate crime essentially an d d i r ectly affects the i nj ur ed
party, she alone can pardon the offender. (U.S. v. Luna, G.R. No.
892, September 11, 1902)
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 739
If the victim of seduction, abauction, or acts of lasciviousness is
a minor, pardon as a bar to criminal prosecution must be given by
both the minor and her parents.
Pardon given b y t h e p a r e nt s w i t h out t h e c o ncurrence of
the minor will not effectively bar th e criminal prosecution of the
offender for seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness (U.S. v.
Luna, supra) unless the minor is dead or incapacitated. (People v.
Arguelles, C.A., G.R. No. 612, March 81, 1987; Revised PenaL Code
by Justice Luis Reyes)
Pardon given by the minor victim without the concurrence of her
parents or guardian will not effectively bar the criminal prosecution
of the offender forseduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness
(People v. Lacson, Jr., C.A., 56 O.G. 9460) unless the minor has no
parent or guardian, orthey are dead or incapacitated. (People v.
Inciong, C.A., 1 O.G. 904, October 26, 1942) The concurrence of the
parents of the minor is required because the latter in her tender age
and lack of sufficient knowledge would hardly know the full impact
and consequences of her acts. In her indifference and inexperience,
the parents are given th e r i gh t a n d p ower t o p r otect her. (T h e
Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis Reyes; 1970 Bar Exam )
Either th e m i nor v i ctim o r p a r ent can fil e a c o mplaint f or
seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness. But pardoning the
offender in this crime must be given by both the minor victim and
parents to bar the criminal prosecution.
Express pardon
Pardon as a bar t o criminal action for seduction, abduction,
and acts of l a sciviousness must b e ex pressly gi ven. (People v.
Dollano, Jr., G.R. No. 188851, October 19, 2011; Perez v. Court of
AppeaLs, G.R. No. 80888, November 29, 1988) Under Article 344, the
offenses ofseduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness, shall not
be prosecuted x x xifthe offender has been expressly pardoned by
a ct s of
the above-named persons.
The delay of more than nine years in filing the case for qualified
seduction against the accused is not tantamount to pardon by the
offended party. Pardon as a b ar to c r i m i nal a ction for seduction
must be expressly made. Moreover, the length of time it took her to
file the case is of no moment considering that she filed it within the
10-year prescriptive period for qualified seduction. (Perez v. Court of
Appeals, supra)
 740 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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Implied pardon will not bar criminal prosecution of seduction,
abduction, or acts of lasciviousness. But implied pardon or consent
can bar criminal prosecution of adultery or concubinage.
Seven years of acquiescence on the part of the husband in the
adultery of hi s w if e w a r r ants an i n f erence that h e consented to
the adulterous relations existing between the accused. Because of
this implied consent, husband is not authorized by law to institute
criminal proceeding for adultery. (People v. Sensano, supra)
Consent in seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness
Consent is no t a b a r t o c r i m i na l p r osecution of se duction,
abduction, o r a c t s o f l a s ci viousness.H o wever, c onsent of t h e
offended party may negate "force or intimidation" as an element of
acts of lasciviousness or "against the will" as an element of forcible
abduction. But consent is not a defense in other cases such as consent
given by theoffended party under 12 years of age or by a demented
or mentally retarded victim in acts of lasciviousness.
Rape is a public crime
Rape was a private crime before for being a crime against
chastity. However, R.A. No. 8353 has reclassified rape from crime
against chastity to crime against person. Hence, rape is not a private
crime anymore. In sum, rape is a public crime, the prosecution of
which can be made de officio (People v. Mariano, G.R. Nos. 135511-
18, November 17, 2000); or it c an b e p r o secuted even without a
complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Pardon by the offended party
of the offender in the crime of rape will not bar criminal prosecution.
(see: People v. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6; 2011) The parents
of the victim (or any other person) can file the complaint for rape
since this is a public crime. (1987 Bar Exam)
Mode of ba r r in g C r i m i na l P r o secution for C r i m e s Against
Chastity
Crimes against chastity are private crimes; hence, there are
procedural conditionsfor the prosecution of these crimes.
In adultery or concubinage, it i s r e quired that th e offended
party must fi l e a c o mplaint. I n s e duction, abduction, or a cts of
lasciviousness,that offended party or her parents, grandparents,
guardian or State may file a complaint.
In adultery o r c o ncubinage, offended spouse must i n c lude
both guilty parties in the complaint. This rule is not applicable in
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 741
seduction,abduction, or acts of lasciv ousness because there is as a
general rule only one guilty party.
I n adult r y o r c o ncubinage, the consent or p a r don by t h e
offended party as abar to criminal prosecution is either express or
implied. In seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness, pardon
by offended party or her parents,grandparents, or guardian as a
bar to criminal prosecution must be express; consent in this crime
may or may not be a defense; but it is not a mode of barring criminal
prosecution.
The term "pardon" in Article 344 pertains to that given after the
commission of crime against chastit; w h ile "consent" refers to that
given before (People v. Schneckenourger, G.R. No. L-48188, November
10, 1941) or afTer the commission thereof. (People v. Guinucud, G.R.
No. L-88672, October 27, 1988) A notarized document where the
husband allowed his wife to maintain her affair with her paramour
given after the commission of adultery is an e vidence of consent,
which shall bar the institution of criminal action. This is not pardon
since the document does not show that the husband forgave his wife.
Consent tVera-Neri v. People, G.R. No. 96'715 November 19,
1991), or pardon in the form of affidavitof desistance (People v.
Alcante, G.R. ¹s . 1 27026-27 May 81, 2000) or recantation (People v.
Dollano, Jr., G R. ¹ . 18 8 851,October 19, 2011) as a bar to institution
of criminal action for crimes agair st chastity must be given prior to
the institution thereof. Pardon or consent given after the institution
of criminal action for pr i v ate crime does not extinguish criminal
liability (Peoplev. Miranda, G.R. ¹. 88 1 71,October 6; 1982; People
v. Infante, G.R. No. L-86270, Avgus! 31, 1932). Neither is pardon
nor consent a g.ound for the dismissal of the criminal case once the
action has been instituted. The prosecution of the case continues
even ifthe off nded party pardons the offender after the case has
been instituted. (People v. Alcante, supra) The reason for this rule is
that the true aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution is the People
of the Philippines. Once filed, control of the prosecution for a crime
against chastity is removed from rhe offended party's hands. (People
v. Manhuyod, G.R. No. 124676, Ma", 20, 1998) and any change of
heart by the victim will not affect the state's right to vindicate the
atrocity comm tted against itself. t People v. Dollano, Jr., supra
)
Private Pardon and Executive Pardon
Pardon given by offended part; infavor of the offender is a
b ar to c r i m i nal p " osecution of s eduction, abduction, or a ct s o f
 742 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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lasciviousness; but i t i s n o t a m o d e o f e x t i n guishing cr i m i n al
liability. (People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 88171, October 6', 1982)
Pardon mentioned in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which is
a mode of extinguishing criminal liability, pertains to that given by
the President in the exercise of pardoning power under Section 19,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Private pardon as a bar to criminal prosecution applies to
seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness. Executive pardon as
a mode of criminal extinction applies to any crime.
Private pardon as a bar to criminal prosecution of seduction,
a bduction, or a cts of l a sciviousness must b e m ade p r ior t o t h e
i nstitution o f c r i m i na l a c t i on. E x ecutive p ardon a s a m o d e o f
extinguishing criminal liability must be given by the President after
the finality of judgment of conviction.
MODES OF C RIMINAL EXTINCTION IN C R IMES AGAINST
CHASTITY
Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability
is totally extinguished by th e m a r r i age of th e offended woman,
as provided i n A r t i c l e 3 4 4 o f t h i s C o de . G i ven p u b li c p o l i cy
c onsiderations of r e spect for t h e s a n ctity o f m a r r i age an d t h e
highest regard for the solidarity of the family, the court must accord
accused, who married the offended party, the full benefits of Article
89. (People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185848, March 8, 2010)
Marriage in Seduction, Abduction, or Acts of Lasciviousness
Under Article344, in cases of seduction, abduction, or acts of
lasciviousness, the marriage of the offender with the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or r emit th e penalty already
imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the co-principals, accomplices, and accessories after
the fact of the abovementioned crimes.
Marriage in Rape
B efore, rape as a c r i m e a g ainst c h astity w a s i n c l uded i n
Article 344 on marriage as a mode of criminal extinction. Since rape
is now a crime against person, it is deemed deleted in Arti cle 344
according to JusticeRegalado. In case of rape, the applicable rule
is now Article 266-C of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHAST Ty 743
No. 8353. Under this provision, subsequent marriage between the
offender and offended party shall extinguish the criminal action
or penalty. (2002 Bar Exam) Ho wever, there is no rule in A r t i c le
266-C that such marriage will also extinguish the criminal liability
arising from rape of the co-principal, accomplice, or accessory. It is
the submission of this writer that marriage will not extinguish the
criminal liability arising from rape of the co-principal, accomplice,
or accessory.
The extinguishment of criminal action or penalty under Article
266-C and Article 344 is tantamount to extinguishment of criminal
liability.
Marriage made after the finality of :he conviction for rape will
extinguish the criminal liability of the accused and remit the penalty
imposed by the court upon him. In Peop!e v. De Guzman, G.R. No.
185843, March 8, 2010, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of
the accused and affirmed his conviction for rape on March 27, 2008."
Accused filed a motion to absolve him from criminal liability because
he and the pri~ ate complainant contracted marriage on "August 19,
2009." The Supreme Court said marriage to-.ally extinguishes the
criminal liability of accused arising from rape and the corresponding
penalty that may have been imposed upon those found guilty of the
felony.
Valid Marriage
T o extinguish c r i m i na l l i a b i l it y a r i s in g f r o m seduction,
abduction, or acts of lasciviousness in accordance with Article 89 in
relation to Article 344, the marriage must be valid. (U.S. v. Santiago,
G.R. No. L-27972, October 3I, 1927) Under Article 266-C, the crime
of rape shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated
if the marriage is void ab initio.
Marriage in Bad Faith
T he m a r r i age o f t h e o ffender w i t h t h e o f f e nded p a r t y
e xtinguishes th e c r i m i na l a c t ion f o r r a p e u n l ess t h er e i s an
indication that the marriage was entered in-.o in bad faith. (People
v. Velasco, G.R. No. L-28081, January 21, 1974) Where the marriage
was entered into by the offender and the victim for the former to
escape from the criminal consequences of rape without bona fide
intention of making her his wife, such marriage will not extinguish
his criminal liability. (U.S. v. Santiago, G.R. No. L-27972, October
81, 1927)
 744 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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A seduced B a woman and was subsequently convicted While
serving sentence, A married B but immediately after the ceremony,
he abandoned her. Marriage, which is entered into in bad faith for
the sole purpose of escaping the penal consequence of seduction, will
not extinguish the criminal liability of A. (1975 Bar Exam)
M odes o f B a r r i n g C r i m i n a l P r o s e cution a n d M o d e s o f
Criminal Extinction
T he modes of b a r r in g c r i m i nal p r osecution should no t b e
c onfused with th e m odes of extinguishing criminal l i ability. T h e
first rule is procedural while the second is substantive.
A mode of barring criminal prosecution (e.g.,pardon) must be
present before the institution of criminal case while the modes of
extinguishing criminal liability (marriage) may arise even though
the offender is already serving sentence by final judgment.
In adultery or c oncubinage, pardon or c onsent, express or
implied, by the offended spouse is a bar t o cr i m inal prosecution;
but Article 344 has no provision on mode of extinguishing criminal
liability in this crime.
In seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness, (1) express
pardon by the victim, or by minor victim and her relative is a bar
to criminal prosecution, and (2) marriage between the offender and
o ffended party is a mode of extinguishing criminal liability of th e
offender, his co-principal, accomplice, or accessory.
In rape, marriage is a mode of extinguishing criminal liability
of the offender. However, pardon is not a mode of barring criminal
prosecution ofrape. But in marital rape, forgiveness (pardon) is a
mode of extinguishing criminal liability.
X seduced 1, a minor. He was prosecuted for seduction. After
pleading for fo rgiveness, Y without e ven consulting her p a rents,
pardoned X. Pardon will not extinguish the pending criminal action
against X. Marriage between X and Y and not a mere pardon can
extinguish the criminal liability of X. (1976' Bar Exam) Pardon as
a bar to criminal prosecution must be made prior to the institution
of the criminal action for seduction. Moreover, such pardon without
the concurrence of the parents of the minor is not a bar to criminal
prosecution.
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 745
Death of the offended party
Death of the offended party i n a c ase for adultery is not a
mode of extinguishing criminal l i ability w h ether t otal or p a r t i al .
The participation of the offended party is essential not for the
maintenance of th e c r i m inal a ction bu t s olely for t h e i n i t i a tion
thereof. It is true, the institution of the action in private crimes is at
the option of the aggrieved party. But it is equally true that once the
choice is made manifest, the law will be applied in full force beyond
the control of the offended party, and in spite of his death. (Donio-
Teves v. Vamenta, G.R. No. L-38308, December 26; 1984)
Pari delicto
Pari delicto is not mentioned in Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code
o e as a circumstance that will bar criminal prosecution for crimes
against chastity. In Vera-Neri v. People, G.R. No. 96715, November
19, 1991, the accused in an adultery case argued that her husband,
the complainant, i s p r e sently c ohabiting w i t h a n o t her w o m an
(which constitutes concubinage). In sum, the accused is invoking
the principle of pari delicto as a defense. The defense was rejected.
According to the Supreme Court, the concept of pari delicto is not
found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in Article 1411 of the Civil
Code, which relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The
case for adultery does not involve any illegal contract which either of
the contracting parties is seeking to enforce. (2018 Bar Exam'
CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Person guilty ofrape, seduction or abduction, shall also be
sentenced: (1) to indemnify the offended woman; (2) to acknowledge
the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing (1948
Bar Exam); and (3) in every case to support the offspring. (Article
345)
~, B an d C t cok t u rns in r a ping a woman, X. If all of t h em
were finally convicted, it would not be correct for the judge to order
e ach of them to acknowledge and support the offspring of X T h e
court should make a determination as to who is the father of the
offspring of X such as through DNA test, and then, order the father
to acknowledge and support him.(1982 Bar Exam)
 746 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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LIABILITY BY ASCENDANTS AND OTHERS
The ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers and any person
who, by a b use o f a u t h o r it y o r c o n f idential r e l a tionship, sh all
cooperate asaccomplices in the perpetration of the crimes against
chastity except adultery an d c oncubinage shall b e p u n i shed as
principals. (Article 846')
CHILD PROSTITUTION AND SEXUAL ABUSE UNDER
R.A. NO. 7610
H aving sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a chil d
constitutes child prostitution if it i s c o mmitted for money, profit,
or any other consideration (People v. Jalosj os, G.R. Nos. 182875-76;
November 16', 2001); or sexual abuse if it is committed under coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. In child prostitution,
the victim is called child exploited in prostitution while in sexual
abuse the victim is called child exploited in sexual abuse. (Section 5
of R.A. No. 76'10)
1. Ch i l d —"Children" r e f e rs t o p e r s ons b e low e i g h teen
(18) years ofage or those over but are unable to fully take care
of themselves or protectthemselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
e xploitation or d i s crimination b ecause of a p h y sical o r m e n t a l
disability or condition. (Section 8 of R.A. No. 76'10)
2. La sc i v i o us C o nduct —The term " l e wd" is c ommonly
defined as s omething i n d ecent o r o b scene; i t i s c h a r a cterized.
by or intended to excitecrude sexual desire. That an accused is
e ntertaining a l ew d o r u n c haste design is n ecessarily a m e n t al
processthe existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying
out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as
lewd orlascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs isinferred
from the n at ure of t h e a ct s t h emselves and th e e n vironmental
circumstances. What is or w h a t i s n o t l ew d conduct, by it s v ery
nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition. (People v.
Tulugan, G.R. No. 227868, March 12, 2019)
Lascivious conduct means th e i n t e n tional t o uching, either
directly or t h r ough clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of th e same or
opposite sex, with an i nt ent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratifythe sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
747
a person. (Rules and Regulations of the Reporting and Investigation
of Child Abuse Cases)
In Amployo v. People, G.R. No. 157718, April 26, 2005, accused
approached the eight-year-old victim, who was walking to school,
touched her head, placed his hand on her shoulder where it t h er
moved down to touch her breast several times. Accused thereafter
told her not to report to anybody what he did to her. This was not the
first time that the incident happened. The court found that there is
I ewd design on the part of the accused. He was convicted of sexual
abuse.
3. I nt e r v e n t i o n of t h i r d pe r s o n —The i n t e r vention
by a third person isnot necessary to convict an accused for child
prostitution under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. A child exploited in
prostitution may engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
regardless of whether or not a "bugaw "is present. Child prostitution
is committed even if a child voluntarily submitted himself or herself
to lewd design of the accused for a consideration of monetary or
otherwise, without a third person intervention. (Quimvel v. People,
G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 201 7)
4. Coe r c i o n o r I n fl u e nce —In sexual abuse, coercion is
either physicalor psychological. Taking advantage of ascendency as
a swimming instructor over student is psychological coercion. (People
v. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October, 71 998) The assurance of love,
guarantee that she would not get pregnant by using the withdrawal
method and the promise of marriage were classified as psychological
coercion and influence within the purview of Section 5 of R.A. No.
7610 used by the accused to convince his minor girlfriend to have
sex with him. Hence, accused is guilty of sexual abuse. (Caballo v.
People, G.R. No. 198782, June 10, 2018)
With a promise of reward, Robert asked Romy to bring him a
young girl that he can have carnal knowledge with. Romy enticed a
15-year-old lass through cunning and deceit of Romy to voluntarily
go to the house of Robert whe "e the latter subsequently had carnal
knowledge with her. Robert, and Romy on the basis of conspiracy
can be held liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 for having sexual intercourse with a child under influence of an
adult or group. (2018 Bar Exa n)
5. C o ercion or Influence employed by the offender-
Coercion or influence of a child to indulge in sexual intercourse in
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6710 on sexual abuse is clearly exerted NOT
 748 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
by the offender who is liable for sexual abuse or child prostituticn
under this provision. Rather, the "coercion or influence" is exerted
upon the child by " adult" (syndicate, or group), who is l i able for
promoting, facilitating or inducing child prostitution under Secticn
5 (a) thereof. In sum, coercion or influence of any adult (e.g., pimp) is
employed againstthe child to become a prostitute. The "coercion or
influence" is not the reason why the child submitted herself to sexual
intercourse,but it was utilized in order for the child to become a
prostitute. (People v. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227868, March 12, 2019)
With due respect to the Supreme Court in the Tu l u gan case,
this writer has a different position on the matter. Since the advent
of R.A. No. 7610, the Supreme Court i n s e veral cases affirmed
the convictions for sexual abuses of the accused, who themselves
e mployed coercion or influence in order for th e m i nor v i ctims t o
submit themselves to lascivious conduct.
In Qu i m v el v. Pe o ple, G . R. N o . 2 1 4 4 97, A p r il 1 8 , 2 0 1 7 ,
participation of a th ir d person is not essential in sexual abuse. It
is immaterial wh ether or no t t h e a ccused himself employed the
coercion or influence to subdue the will of th e child for tne latter
to submit to his sexual advances for him to be convicted of sexual
abuse. Sexual abuse can be committed by "any adult, syndicate or
group" without qualification.
In Rarang v. People, G.R. No. 226760, August 14, 2019, Satur
v. People, G.R. No. 245875, June 19, 2019, People v. Veron, G.R. No.
239028, April 10, 2019; People v. LCU, G.R. No. 284819, April 10,
2019, and De Joan v. People, G.R. No. 282957, September 25, 2019,
the accused were convicted of lascivious conduct (sexual abuse) under
Section 5 (b) although the coercion or influence is not employed by
adults, who promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution, in order
for the child tobecome a prostitute. In these cases, the accused
themselves employed coercion or influence in order for the victims,
who are minors, to submit themselves to lascivious conduct.
6. Co n s ent of the victim — In Ma l t o v. People, G.R. No.
164738, September 21, 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any
lascivious conduct or sexual intercourse. Hence, consent of the child
is immaterial in criminal cases involving child prostitution or sexual
abuse.
However, in People v. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227868, Ivlarch:2,
2019, the Supreme Court, En Banc, abandoned this principle. It was
J9JC9B0M
XL CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 749
held that Malto is correct that consent is immaterial in cases under
R.A. No.7610 where the offended party is below 12 years of age.
However, consent of the child is material and may even be a defense
in child prcstitution or sexual abuse where the child is 12 years of
age or above. Consent of the child to sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct may be imp ied if the prosecution failed to prove the element
of money, profit or any other consideration, or coercion or influence.
The essence of child prostitution and sexual abuse is having
s exual i n t ercourse of l a scivious conduct w i t h a child w i t h out
consent. If th e prosecution failed to prove the element of money,
profit or any other consideration, or coercion or influence, consent
o f the child t o s exual i n t ercourse or l ascivious conduct may b e
implied. Sexual intercourse "with consent" of the child is not child
prostitutior or sexual abuse. (People v. Tulugan, supra) Conversely,
if the prosecution p"oved the element of money, profit or any other
consideration, or coercion or influence, lack of consent of the child
to sexual irt ercourse or lascivious conduct may be implied. Hence,
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct "w ithout consent" o f the
child is child prostitution or sexual abuse.
7. Al l e g a t i ons —
The elements of child prostitution or sexual
abuse must. be alleged in the I nformation. Without allegations of
the specific elements of t h i s c r im e (e.g., coercion or in f lu e nce),
the accused cannot be convicted thereof even if the caption of the
Information charged hi m w i t h s e x ual a b use (People v. Ra yon,
G.R. No. 194286, January 80, 2018) or the body thereof alleged
commission of acts of lasciviousness upon a child exploited in sexual
abuse, which is a conclusion of law. (People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No.
188090, November 14, 2011) However, the accused may be convicted
of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code (Pielago v.
People, G.R. No. 202020, March 18, 2 018) if the allegation in th e
Informatior contains the elements of this crime.
The Penalty for Child Prostitution and Sexual Abuse
Under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious
conduct wit h a c h i l d e x ploited i n p r o stitution or s e xual a buse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age,
the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code,
for rape orlascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years o:"age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
 750 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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Section 5 (b) contains a provision with two qualifying provisos.
The "provision" prescribes reclusion temporal in it s me dium
period to reclusion perpetua for child prostitution and sexual abuse.
The "first proviso"requires the prosecution of child prostitution
and sexual abuse against an under-12-year-old child for statutory
rape oracts of lasciviousness.
The "second pr oviso" pr e scribes re clusion t e mporal i n i ts
medium period for lascivious conduct against an under-12-years-old
child.
In People v. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227868, March 12, 2019, the
"second proviso" q u a lifies t h e "first p r o viso" th a t i m m e d iately
preceded it, and not the "provision." With t h is i n te rpretation, the
following rules should be observed.
U nder the pr ovision, the penalty for c h il d a buse and chil d
prostitutionis reclusion temporal in it s medium period to reclusion
perpetua.
Under the first proviso, the penalty for rape committed against
an under-12-year-oldvictim is that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code.
Under the second proviso, the penalty for lascivious conduct
committed against an under-12-year-old victim is reclusion temporal
in its medium period. (second proviso)
SEXUAL ABUSE AND RAPE OR ACTS OF LASCIVIOUNESS
The poorly written provision in Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610
has created the most complicated rules in criminal law.
Non-application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
If the acts constitute sexual abuse (or child prostitution), and
rape or actsof lasciviousness, the offender cannot be prosecuted for
a complex crime. Sexual abuse for being an offense under special
law cannot be made a component of a complex crime because Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code speaks of a single act constituting
"grave or less grave felonies." An offense under special law is not a
felony. (People v. Abay, G.R. No. 177752, February 24, 2009; People
v. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227868, March 12, 2019)
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XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 751
Prosecution for single crime
If the acts constitute sexual abuse (or child prostitution), and
rape or acts of lasciviousness, the offender cannot be prosecuted for
both crimes because ofthe rule on double jeopardy.
The essence ofsexual abuse and rape or acts of lasciviousness
i s having sexual int ercourse or lascivious conduct wit h a v i c t i m
without her consent, or capacity to give consent. Since these crimes
are identical, the Supreme Court in People v. Abay, G.R. No. 177752,
February 24, 2009 ruled that the offender cannot be accused of both
crimes because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced.
Other view: In Pe ople v. Ud ang, G.R. No. 210161, January
10, 2018, the Supreme Court, Third D i vision, ruled that offender
can be liablefor rape and sexual abuse because they are separate
crimes with distinct elements. It seems that Udang case is a stray
decision. The Abay principle is controlling since it was affirmed by
the Supreme Court in several cases such as People v. Dahilig, G.R.
No. 187088, tune 18, 2011; People v. Matias, G.R. No. 186469, June
18, 2012; Alberto v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130, J'une
19, 2018; People v. Ej ercito, G.R No. 229861, July 02, 2018; People
v. Jaime, G.R. No. 225832, July 28, 2018; People v. Mabalo, G.R No.
288889, February 27, 2019 and People v. Tulugan, supra.
Prosecution for the graver crime
If the acts constitute sexual abuse (or child prostitution), and
rape or acts of lasciviousness, the offender shall be prosecuted
either under the Revised Penal Code or R.A. No. 7610 (People v.
Abay, supra),whichever prescribes a graver penalty. (Dimakuta
v. People, G.R. No. 206518, October 20, 2015; People v. Tulugan,
supra) The higher penalty under either law must be applied for the
minor victim's benefit. Imposing a lower penalty for the offender is
undeniably unfair to the child victim. (People v. Pusing, G.R. No.
208009, July 11, 2016).
1 . Se x u a l a b u s e , a n d se x u a l a s s a ul t o r a cts o f
lasciviousness — If the acts constitute sexual abuse, and sexual
assault or acts of lasciviousness, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted
under R.A. No. 7610. The penalty under R.A. No. 7610 is graver than
that under the Revised Penal Code. In line with the Tulugan case,
the proper nomenclature of the offense is "lascivious conduct" under
R.A. No. 7610. (People v. Molej on, G.R. No. 208091, April 28, 2018;
ZZZ v. People, G.R. No. 243467, April 08, 2019; De Joan v, People,
 752 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
G.R. No. 232957, September 25, 2019; People v. V ergara, G.R N o .
242477, September 2, 2019)
The accused is charged of acts of lasciviousness. The information
alleged "force and in t i m i d a t ion," which is a n e l e ment of a c ts o f
lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code but it does not aver
"coercion or influence," which is an e lement of lascivious conduct
under R.A. No. 7610. The accused may be convicted of the graver
crime of lascivious conduct. (See: People v. Molejon, supra) The
term "coercion and influence" is broad enough to cover "force and
intimidation," which are alleged in the information. In fact, as these
terms are almost used synonymously, it is then of no moment that
the terminologies employed by R.A. No. 7610 and by the Information
are different. (Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017;
People v. Ej ercito, G.R. ¹. 22 9 8 61,tu ly 2, 201 8;People v. Tulugan,
G.R. No. 227868, March 12, 2019)
2. Se x u a l a b use and r ape —If the acts constitute sexual
abuse,and rape (or sexual assault with homicide), the perpetrator
shall be prosecuted under th e Revised Penal Code. The penalty
for rape under the Code is graver than that prescribes by R.A. No.
7610. Rape is severely penalized because it may lead to unwanted
procreation; or to paraphrase the words of the legislators, it will put
an outsider into the woman who would bear a child, or to the family,
if she is married. (People v. Tulugan, supra) Where a minor is raped,
the Revised Penal Code ought to prevail over R.A. No. 7610. (People
v. Ej ercito, supra)
T he information c h a rged t h e a c cused o f r a p e . "Force or
intimidation," which is an element of rape is alleged in the information
and proven by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is
convicted of rape, and not sexual abuse. The term "c oercion and
influence" is broad enough to cover "force and intimidation." (Quimvel
v. People, supra) Ho wever, the p r o secution evidence specifically
pertains to "force and intimidation as an element of rape," and it did
not referto the broader scope of "influence or coercion as an element
of sexual abuse." (People v. Abay, supra; People v. Pangilinan, G.R.
No. 188090, November 14, 2011; People v. Tubillo, G.R. No. 220718,
tune 21, 2017)
The prosecution sufficiently established that accused chanced
upon AAA, poked her neck with a bladed weapon, covered her eyes
and nose, and thereafter had sexual intercourse with her against her
will. Applying Abay, Pangilinan, and Tubillo, accused is convicted
J9JC9B0M
XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 753
of rape,and not sexual abuse. (People v.Laguerta, G.R Nd. 288542,
t'uly 09, 2018)
SPECIAL RULES IF THE VICTIM OF SEXUAL ABUSE AND RAPE
OR ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS IS UNDER 12 YEARS OF AGE
There are special rules under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 if
the child exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse is under 12 years
of age. A demented person (idiot, imbecile, and feebleminded), whose
metal age isunder 12 years, is covered by these rules. .(People v.
Pusing, supra; People v. Tulugan, supra)
Raping a child exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse, who
is under 12 years of age.
If the perpetrator had sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse, who is under
12 yearsold (or demented), the former shallbe prosecuted forrape.
(First proviso of Section 5 (bj of R .A. No. 67 10) The word "rape"
includes qualified sexual assault.
1. Ra pe —Sexual abuse or child prostitution under R.A. No.
7610 isseparate and distinct from statutory rape under the Revised
Penal Code. Aside from being dissimilar in the sense that the former
is an offense under special law, while the latter is a felony under
the Code, they also have different elements. Nevertheless, sexual
intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years of age or is demented
is always statutory rape, as Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 expressly
states that the perpetrator will be prosecuted under Code. (People v.
Tulugan, supra)
E ven if t h e g i r l w h o i s b e low t w e lve (12) years old o r i s
demented consents to the sexual intercourse, it is always a crime
of statutory rape under the Revised Penal Code, and the offender
should no longer be held liable under R.A. No. 7610. For example,
a nine (9)-year-old girl was sold by a pimp to a customer, the crime
committed by the latter if he commits sexual intercourse with the
girl is still statutory rape (and not child prostitution), because even
if the girl consented or is demented, the law presumes that she is
incapable of giving a rational consent. (People v. Tulugan, supra)
2. Qualified sexual assault — Accused inserted his penis
into the mouth of hi s foster child, whose actual age is above 12
years old, but her mental age is 9 years old. The crime committed is
statutory sexual assault. The qualifying circumstances of minority
 754 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
and guar'dianship, and m e ntal d i sability ar e p r esent. Since th e
mental age of the victim i s u n der 12 years, first pr o viso Section
5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 is applicable. Under t hi s provision, if t h e
perpetrator had lascivious conduct with a child exploited in sexual
abuse, who isunder 12 years old,the former shall be prosecuted for
rape under the Revised Penal Code, which includes qualifi e sexual
assault. (People v. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016)
Committing lascivious conduct against a ch ild exploited. in
prostitution or sexual abuse, who is under 12 years of age
If the perpetrator committed lascivious conduct w ith a c hild
exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse, who is under 12 years old
or demented, the former shall be prosecuted for lascivious conduct
u nder Revised Penal Code: Provided, That t h e p enalty shall b e
reclusion temporal in its medium period. (secondproviso of Section
5 rb] of R.A. No. 6710) The word "lascivious conduct" covers acts of
lasciviousness and simple sexual assault.
1. Act s of l a s civiousness — If the accused committed acts
of lasciviousness against a child exploited in prostitution or sexual
abuse, who is under 12 years of age or demented, the former shall
be prosecuted for acts oflasciviousness under the Revised Penal
Code with the penalty of reclusion temporal in i ts m edium period
under R.A. No. 7610. In l i n e w i t h t h e Tu l u g an case, the proper
nomenclature of this crime is acts of lasciviousness under Revised
Penal Code in relation to R.A. No. 7610. (People v. Molej on, G.R. Vo.
208091, April 28, 2018; Granton v. People, G.R. No. 226'045, October
10, 2018; Francisco v. People, G.R. No. 241452, March 25, 2019;
1998 and 2016 Bar Fxams)
To apply the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
pursuant to the second proviso of Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610, the
requisites of acts of lasciviousness must be met in addition to the
requisitesfor sexual abuse or child prostitution. (Quimvel v. People,
supra; Ramilo v. People, G.R. No. 284841, June 8, 2019; People v.
Basa, G.R. No. 287849, February 27, 2019)
T he accused is c h a rged o f a c t s of lasciviousness against
an under-12-year-old child. Th e i n f o rmation a l l eged "f orce end
intimidation," which is an element of acts of lasciviousness under
the Revised Penal Code but it does not aver "coercion or influence,"
which is an element of sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610. But it was
ruled that the term "coercion and influence" is broad enough to cover
J9JC9B0M
XI CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 755
"force and intimidation" as alleged in the information. Committing
lascivious conduct against an under-12-year-old child is statutory
acts of l ascivi.ousness. Committing l ascivious conduct against a
child under coercion or influence is sexual abuse. Since the elements
of acts of lasciviousness and those of sexual abuse are proven, the
accused is convicted of acts of l asciviousness under the Revised
Penal Code in relation to R.A. No. 7610. (Quimvel v. People, supra)
3. Si m p l e sexual assault —
If the accused committed simple
sexual assault against a child exploited in prostitution or sexual
abuse, who is under 12 years of age or demented, the former shall
be prosecuted for sexual assault under the Revised Penal Code with
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period under R.A.
No. 7610. In line with the Tulugan case, the proper nomenclature of
the crime is "sexual assault" under Revised Penal Code in relation
to R.A. No. 7610. (People v. Tulugan, supra; Ramilo v. People, G.R.
No. 284841, June 8, 2019)
The accused forcibly inserted his finger into the genital orifice
of a child, who is 10 years old. The victim is a child exploited in
sexual abuse since the element of coercion is present. Since the
victim is under 12 years ofage, the crime committed is statutory
sexual assault. The penalty for sexual assault under the Revised
Penal Code is prision mayor. On t he other hand, the penalty for
lascivious conduct under the second proviso of Section 5 (b), R.A.
N o.
. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period. To impose the
lighter penalty under the Revised Penal Code is unfair to the victim.
To prevent u n f airness, the Supreme Court i m p osed the gr aver
penalty under R.A. No. 7610. In sum, the accused is convicted of
simple sexual assault under the Revised Penal Code in relation of
R.A. No. 7610. (People v. Chingh, G.R. No. 1 78828,March 16, 201 1)
If hthe courts would not opt to impose the higher penalty under
R.A. No. 7610 in cases of sexual assault, wherein the victims are
under 12 years of age, an accused who commits acts of lasciviousness
under Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. No. 7610, suffers the
more severe penalty of re clusion temporal in i t s m e d ium p eriod,
than the one who commits sexual assault which is punishable by
vrision mayor. (People v. Talibog, G.R. No. 288112, December 05,
2018) Moreover, R.A. No. 7610 is a special law which should clearly
prevail over R.A. No. 8353, which is a mere general law amending
the Revised Penal Code. (G ranton v. Pe ople, G.R. No. 22 6'045,
October 10, 2018; Aicalde v. People, G.A. No. 211002, January 21,
2015, and People v. Adaj ar, G.R No. 281806, June 17, 2019)
 756 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER XI. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 757
VOLUME II

The Chingh p r i n c i ple i s no t a p p l i cable to q u a l i fied sexual 3. A c t s o f l asciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in
assault. relation to R.A. No. 7610 if the victim is a child, who is under 12
years old or demented. (People v. Tulugan, supra; People v. XXX)
The accused through force inserted his tongue in the genital
orifice of his 8-year-old daughter. The victim is a child exploited in Rape through sexual i n t ercourse should b e d e signated as
sexual abuse since the element of coercion is present. Since the victim "rape" regardless of the age of the victim.
is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is statutory sexual
Sum m a ry of sexual crimes
a ssault. Qualifying circumstance of relationship and m i n ority i s
present. The penalty for qualified sexual assault under the Revised DESIGNA-
Penal Code is reclusion temporal. On the other hand, the penalty TION OF PENALTY LEGAL JURISPRU-
for lascivious conduct under the second proviso of Section 5 (b) R.A. CRIME PROVISION DENCE
No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in i ts medium period. Accused was
c onvicted of qualified sexual assault w it h t h e p enalty u n der t h e Child not
exploited in
Revised Penal Code. Since rationale of unfairness to the child victim
prostitution
that Chingh case wanted to correct is absent because the Revised or sexual
Penal Code already prescribes the high penalty, there is no need to abuse (e.g.,
apply the penalty under R.A. No. 7610.(People v.Bonaagua, G.R. sleeping
No. 188897, June 6, 2011; People v. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July child) or
11, 2016) adult
Sexual Rape, sexual Penalty Articles 266-
Designation of crime ir tercourse, assault under RPC A and B, and
The proper nomenclature of the crime of sexual assault is as sexual assault or acts of 355 of RPC
follows: or acts lasciviousness
lasciviousness
1. S e x u al assault under the Revised Penal Code if the victim
Child who is
is neither a child nor demented; or
12 years old
2 L as c i v i ous conduct under R.A. No. 7610 if the victim is a or above
child,who is 12 years old or above; or Sexual Child Reclusion Section 5 (b) Tulugan
3. S e x u a l assault under the Revised Penal Code in relation intercourse prostitution temporal in of R.A. No.
to R.A. No. 7610 if the victim is a child, who is under 12 years old ar lascivious or sexual its medium 7610
conduct abuse period to
or demented. (People v. Tulugan, supra; People v. XXX, G.R. ¹ .
constituting reclusion
226467, October 17, 2018) child perpetua
4. Qualified sexual assault under the Revised Penal Code prostitution
if the victim is a child, who is under 12 years old or demented and or sexual
abuse only
qualifying circumstance is present.

The proper nomenclature of the crime of acts of lasciviousness

is as follows:
1. A c t s of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code if the
victim is neither a child nor demented; or
2. L as c i v ious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 if the victim is a
child,who is 12 years old or above; or

J9JC9B0M
 758 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II XI CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
759

Sexual Rape Reclusion Articles 266-A Pusing, Lascivious

intercourse perpetua, and B of RPC Dimakuta & Qualified Reclusion First proviso Bonaagua
conduct sexual assault temporal
constituting reclusion Tulugan of Section 5
constituting under RPC prescribed
sexual abuse perpetua (b) of R.A. No.
sexual abuse by RPC
and rape to death 7610
or child
penalty, prostitution
or death
and sexual
penalty assault with
Lascivious Lascivious Reclusion Section 5 (b) P using, qualifying
conduct conduct under temporal in of R.A. No. Dimakuta & cs cumstance
constituting R.A. No. 7610 its medium 7610 Tulugan
sexual abuse period to
and sexual reclusion SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN UNDER R A NO 9262
assault perpetua zr
'«iolence against a woman is committed by a man, who shall
or acts of
lasciviousness cause or attempt to cause a woman, with whom he has/had marital,
sexual or dating relationship, or her child to engage in any sexual
Child, who activity which does notconstitute rape, by force or threat of force,
is under 12
physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman
years old, or
or her child or her/his immediate family. (Section 5 of R.A. No. 926'8)
demented
Sexual Statutory Prescribed First proviso Sexual activity, which the victim is compelled to engage in, may
intercourse rape under by RPC of Section 5 inc ude masturbation, having lascivious conducts with the offender,
constituting RPC (b) of R.A. or other person, or lewd exhibition of the genitals.
sexual abuse No. 7610 and
or child If the offender forced the woman or her ch il d t o engage in
Article 266-B
prostitution of RPC prostitution, he could be held liable for trafficking in person under
and rape R.A. No. 9208 or child prostitution under R.A. No. 7610. The offender,
w ho committed sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with t h e
Lascivious Acts of Reclusion Second Quimvel, child exploited in sexual abuse, may be held liable sexual abuse
conduct lasciviousness temporal in proviso of Chingh & under R.A. No. 7610. If the offender's act of compelling the victim
constituting or sexual its medium Section 5 (b) Tulugan
sexual abuse assault of R.A. No. to engage in sexual activity constitutes rape, he shall be prosecuted
period
or child under RPC prescribed 7610 under Article 266-A of Revised Penal Code.
prostitution in relation to by R.A. No.
and acts of R.A. No. 7610 7610
lasciviousness
or sexual
assault

J9JC9B0M

XII. CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
SIMULATION OF BIRTH
Simulation of b i rth is c o m mitted by a ny p e r son who s hall
simulate birth for another. (Article 847)
Simulation of birth is the tampering of the civil registry making
it appear in the birth records that a certain child was born to a person
who is not his/her biological mother, causing such child to lose his/
her true identity and status. (Section 8fj J of R.A. No. 8552 or th e
Domestic Adoption Law) Any person who shall cause the fictitious
registration of the birth of a child under the name of a person who
is not his/her biological parent shall be guilty of simulation of birth
under Section 21(b) of R.A, No. 8552 or under Ar t i cle 347 of the
Revised Penal Code. (2002 Bar Exam)
Simulation of birth under the Revised Penal Code is likewise
committed by a woman, who pretended to be pregnant when in fact
she is not, and on the day of the supposed delivery takes the child
of another as her own. (The Revised Penal Code by CA Justice Luis
Reyes)
Physician or surgeon or public officer who, in violation of the
duties of his profession or office, shall cooperate in th e execution
o f simulation of bi r th , substitution of one child for a n other an d
concealment or abandonment of a l e g it i m ate child i s a lso li able
under Article 347. (2002 Bar Exam)
A ttempted Ch il d T r a f fi ckin g o r A t t e m p ted T r af ficking i n
Person
I f the bi rt h o f t h e ch il d i s s i m u l ated by th e doctor for t h e
purpose of selling, trading, or dealing with the child, the crime
committed is attempted child trafficking or attempted trafficking in
person. Simulation of birth of a c hild by a d octor, nurse, hospital
or clinic employee or midwife for the purpose of child trafficking is
760
J9JC9B0M
XII. CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
761
constitutive of the crime of attempted child trafficking under Section
8 of R.A. No. 7610. Simulation of birth for the purpose of selling the
cnild constitutes attempted trafficking in verso
d S t 4A
ofR.A.N
. . o .. 9208.
Child Trafficking
If after the simulation of bir th, the child is delivered to the
buyer or child tr afficker, the crime committed is child t rafficking.
Engaging in trading and dealing with children such as buying and
selling or barter is constitutive of the crime of child trafficking under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7610.
A childless couple, A and B, wanted to have a child they could
calltheir own. C, an unwed mother, sold her newborn baby to them.
Thereaft r, A and B ca used their names to be stated in the birth
certificate of the child as his parents. This was done in connivance
with the doctor who assisted in the de ivery of C. (2002 Bar Exam)
, B, and C and the doctor are liable for —.he crime of child trafficking
under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610. They are also liable for simulation
of birth under Article 347 of the Revisec. Penal Code,
Qualified Trafficking in person
If the trafficker bought the child, who e birth was simulated,
for prostitution, pornography, slavery, force labor, or removal of
organ, the crime committed is qualified trajficking in person under
Section 4 in relation to Section 6(a) of RA. No. 9208.
SUBSTITUTION OF CHILD
Substitution of one child for another is committed by any perse
who shall substitute one child for another. (4rticle 847) For example,
X gave birth to a child, A, in the hospital. Y, a rich mother on the
same day likewise gave birth t o a child, B, in t he same hospital.
To give her child a better life, X exchanged 4 and B. X took care of
making it appear that he is her real biological child. The crime
committed by X is complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention through substitution of one ch ld for another.
USURPATION OF CIVILSTATUS
Usurpation of civil status is committed byany person who shall
usurp the civil status of another for tne purpose of defrauding the
offended party or his heirs. (Article 848)
 762 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
l
This crime is committed by one who impersonates himself to
be another person to enjoy the rights and privilege arising from the
civilstatus of the person impersonated as a doctor, lawyer, or a rich
businessman or to assume the filiation or the parental or conjugal
right of another.
BIGAMY
Bigamy is c o mmitted by a n y p e r s on w ho s h a ll c o ntract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved,or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. (Article 849)
The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent
marriage; (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it
not been for the existence of the first (Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R.
No. 188509, July 81, 2000); and (5) fraudulent intention. (People v.
Manuel, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005; 2018 Bar Exam)
Events Subsequent to the Consummation of Bigamy
During the pendency of the case for bigamy, the complainant,
the first w if e of t h e accused died. According to th e accused, he
should not be convicted of bigamy since there was no longer any
impediment to marry his second wife. The argument is untenable.
At the time the accused married his second wife, his marriage with
his first wife is still subsisting. Hence, the crime of bigamy is already
consummated. Death of the complainant after the consummation of
the crime of bigamy will not extinguish the criminal liability of the
accused for bigamy since that is not a mode mentioned in Article 89
o f the Revised Penal Code. Lack of legal impediment to marry hi s
second wife after the consummation of the crime of bigamy is not a
defense since what is important is his legal impediment at the time
that he married his second wife. (1981 Bar Exam)
Bigamy is consummated upon contracting the second marriage
d espite th e s u b sistence of t h e fi r s t m a r r i a ge. Once th e c r i m e
consummates, criminal liability will attach to the accused. After the
consummation of bigamy or celebration of the second marriage, the
criminal liability shall not be extinguished by subsequent events not
J9JC9B0M
XII. CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
763
mentioned in Ar t i cle 89 such as subsequent declaration of nullity
of first marriage and second marriage. (Jarillo v. P
164485, September 29, 2009) eople, G.R. No.
Declaration of Nullity of the Fi rst or Pr e vious Marri a ge
A man can be prosecuted and convicted for bigam
y even t ho u gh
thee first
r s t mm a r. iage is null and void ab i n i t io un less the nullity o f
the firstmarriage was declared by the court before the celebration
of the second marriage. (196'8 and 2018 Bar &a m s ) Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
or the same must b e s u bmitted t o t i e j u d g ment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can
it e h el d as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists. I'herefore, he who contracts
a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of t h e
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
( andichov.Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, February 28, 1968, Marbella-
Bobis v. Bobis, G.R No. 188509, July 8:, 2000; People v. Odtuhan,
G.R. No. 19156'6; July 1 7, 2013)
1. P s y c h o logical Incapacity —
Declaration of nullity of the
first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity subsequent
to the consumn ation of bigamy is not a defense because:
a. Th i s d e c laration of n u L'ity o f t h e f i r s t m a r r i age
subsequent to the consummation of the crime is not a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability.
b . T o av o i d c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y , the d eclaration
of
n ullity of th e f i rst m a r r i age must be m ade previous to th e
consummation of bigamy, which is required by Article 40 of
the Family Code, which provides: The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a finalju d g m ent declaring such, previous
marriage void. A declaration of the absolute nullity of the first
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense in bigamy. (People v. Teves, G.R. No.
188775, August 24, 2011; Mercado v. Tan., G.R. No. 187110,
August 1, 2000; Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, G.R. ¹. L - 5 8 7 08, August
19, 1986 Landicho v. Relova, G.R. Vo. L-22579, February 23,
1968; Domingo v. CA, G.R. No. 104818, Sep~wmber 17, 1998; Ty
v. CA, G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000
2. Bi ga m o u s M a r r i a g e —U nder S ection 29 of A c t N o .
3 613 th eeOl d MM arr iage Law, judicial decree is not necessary to
 764 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
establish the invalidity of a previous marriage, which is void from
its performance. In People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-5877, September
28, 1954 and People v. Ar agon, G.R. No. L - 10016, February 2 8,
1957, judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage is not
necessary toenter into another marriage because of the old Marriage
Law. Hence, the accused was acquitted of bigamy for entering into a
marriage despitethe subsistence of a previous bigamous marriage.
(Yap v. CA, G.R. No. L-40008, October 28, 1986)
However, in La s anas v. People, G.R. No. 1 59031, June 23,
2014, the Supreme Court said that the Me ndoza case and Aragon
case has already been abandoned by the case of Landico and case
of Sempio-Diy. The Y ap c ase which r e surrected the Ar a gon and
Mendoza doctrine, had been overtaken by Article 40 of the Family
Code and by Domingo case and Te case. Under Section 40 of the
Family Code, judicial declaration of nullity of the bigamous marriage
is indispensable to v alidly e n ter i n t o a n other m a r r i age wi thout
committing bigamy. I n s u m , j u d i c i al d e claration of n u l l i t y o f a
bigamous marriage is now necessary to enter into another marriage.
X contracted three marriages. His first w ife is already dead
when X contracted his third marriage. (1953 Bar Exam)
X is liable for bigamy involving the second marriage on the
basis of his first marriage because the first was still subsisting when
he contracted the second.
X is not l i a ble for b i gamy i n volving th e t h ir d m a r r i age on
the basis of th e f i rst m a r r i age since the fi rs t h a s a l r eady been
extinguished by reason of death of the first wife when he contracted
the third.
X is liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis
of the second marriage. Applying the Lasanas principle, X should
have first caused the declaration of nullity of the second marriage
for being bigamous before entering into a third marriage.
3. L ack of License or Affidavit of Cohabitation — The
marriage between accused and complainant was void because of the
absence of a marriage license or an affidavit of cohabitation. The
ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could not h ave validated
the void marriage because neither mar r i age license nor affidavit-
of cohabitation was presented tothe priest who presided over the
religious rites. But then accused should have first secured a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his first marr iage before contracting a
J9JC9B0M
XII. CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS 765
second marriage. Thus, he is liable for bigamy. (Lasanas v. People,
G.R. No. 159081,June 28, 2014)
4. I n c e s t u ous Mar r i age — Issa and Bobby, who were f irst
c ousins, were married in 1975. In 1993, Bobby was told that h i s
marriage to Issa was under the law then in force and therefore void
ab initio. He married Caring. Charged with bigamy, Bobby cannot
raise the defense that his first marriage is void ab initio. Although
the first m a r r i age is n ul l a n d v oi d fo r b e ing i n cestuous, Bobby
should have first caused the declaration of nullity of such marriage
for being incestuous before entering into a second marriage. (1994
Bar Exam)
5. A rt i c l e 4 0 i s P r o c e d u ra l — E v en t h o u gh t h e f ir s t
m arriage and th e second marriage were contracted prior t o t h e
Family Code, the rule is the same since Article 40, which is a rule
of procedure, should be applied retroactively. The reason is that
as a general rule,no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. (Jarillo v. People, G.R. No. 164435, J'une 29, 2010)
6. D ec l a r a t ion of N u l l ity B efore Cr i m i nal I n st itution
— Declaration of nullity ofthe first marriage obtained after the
consummation of bigamy but b efore the fi l in g of i n f ormation for
bigamy by the prosecutor is not a defense. To rule otherwise is to
make the crime'of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of
the prosecutor office to immediately act on complaints and eventually
file Informations in court. (I asanas v. People, G.R. No. 159081, June
28, 2014)
Declaration of nullity of the first marriage obtained after the
consummation of bigamy but before the filing of the complaint for
bigamy by the complainant is not a defense. To rule otherwise is
to allow a p erson who commits bigamy t o evade prosecution by
i mmediately filing a p eti tion for th e declaration of nullity of h i s
earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision isrendered
therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. (People v.
Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013)
Exceptions:
T he p r i n ciple t h a t " o n e w ho enters i n t o a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty
of bigamy"is not a pplicable where the parties merely signed th e
marriage contract without marriage ceremony performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. The m ere p r i v ate act o f s i gning
 766 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Hence, bigamy is not
committed. (Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226; February 6, 2004)
Judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage dissolved by reason
of death of spouse is not needed to validly enter a second marriage
without committing bigamy.
Declaration of Nul l i t y o f Second or Subsequent Mar r i a g e
A rticle 40 of t h e F a m il y C ode i s n o t a p p l icable in a c a s e
where the second marriage was declared as null and void after the
consummation of bigamy because this provision governs the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage and not the second marriage.
1. P s y c h o logical incapacity —
Declaration of nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not a
defense because:
a. Th i s d e claration of nu l l it y of th e second marriage
subsequent to the consummation of the crime is not a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability .
b. To m a k e t his declaration as a defense would render
the State's penal laws on bi gamy completely nugatory, and
a llow individuals t o d e l iberately ensure t ha t e ach m a r i t al
c ontract be flawed or defective in some manner, and to thu s
escape liability for bigamy. (Tenebro v. The Honorable Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004; Walter v. People,
G.R. No. 188805, JuLy 8, 2018; 2018 Bar Exam)
2. La c k o f M a r r i a g e L i c e nse —Declaration of nullity o f
the second marriage on the ground of lack of marriage licensewhere
the accused presented a falsifiedaffidavit of cohabitation is not a
defense because:
a. T h i s d e claration of nu l l it y of th e second marriage
subsequent to the consummation of the crime is not a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability.
b. To m a k e this declaration as a defense would render
the State's penal laws on bi gamy completely nugatory, and
a llow in dividuals t o d e liberately ensure t ha t e ach m a r i t al
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape liability
for bigamy.
c. Th e a c cused cannot use the n u l l it y of t h e second
marriage as a defense in bigamy because she herself is
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XII. CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
767
ponsible o r t h e d efect in t h e m a r r i age, e.g,fraudulentl
a certificate of m a r r i age, and t ha t i s p r esentin
falsified afpctavit of cohabitation instead of marriage license
(Santiago v. e opLe, G.R. No. 200288, July 15, 2015
) She who
comes to court must do so with clean hands.
Exception:
Th
he second marriage was celebrated one daybefore the issuance
of the marriage license. Accused can use the nullity of the second
marriage as adefense in bigamy. In this case, accused did not cause
the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second
marriage. He die. rot fraudulently secure a Certificate of Marriage,
and later used this criminal act as basis for seeking her exculpation.
The crime committed is not bigamy under Article 349 (Santiago v.
eople, ibid.; People v. De Lara, No. 12588-R, February 14, 1955, 51
O.G. 4079) but illegal marriage under Article 350. (People v. Peralta,
CA-G.R. No. 13180-R, June 80, 1955)
CBP is lega ly married to OEM. Without obtaining a marriage
license, CBP contracted a second marriage to RST. CBP is liable for
bigamy if he fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage such as
presenting a falsified affidavit of cohabitation instead of marriage
license. He is not allowed to use the nullity of the second marriage
as a defense. Hov ever, if he did not fraudulently secure a Certificate
of Marriage, and.later used this criminal act as basis for seeking
her exculpation, he is not liable for bigamy. He is allowed to use
the nullity of the second marriage as a defense in bigamy. But he is
liable for illegal marriage. (2004 Bar Exam)
Subsequent Annulment of Second Marriage
If the second marriage was annulled in a civil action due to
force or intimidation committed against the accused in bigamy t o
obtain his consent in entering such marriage, he should be acquitted.
A subsequent mar riage contracted by t h e a ccusedinvoluntarily
cannot be the basis f' or conviction for the crime of bigamy. (Landicho
v. Relova, G.R ¹. L -2 2 5 79,February 28, 1968) On the other hand,
i th e second marriage was annulled in civil action due to force or
intimidation committed by the accused in a bigamy case to obtain
the consent of the other party in m a r r y ing him, he should not be
acquitted on this ground. Since the accused was the one who used
the force or intin idation, he may not use his oivn malfeasanceto
defeat the action for bigamy based on his criminal act. (People v,
Aragon, G.R. No. L-5980, February 17, 1954)
 768 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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Presumption of Death
I n bigamy, the second marriage must be entered into w i t h
fraudulent i n t ent (intencion fr a udulente) wh ich i s a n e s s ential
element of a felony by dolo. The element of fraudulent intention is
not stated in A r t i cle 349, because it is u n doubtedly incorporated
in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting cne of the
landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness
there is no crime. (People v. Manuel, G.R. No. 165842, November 29,
2005)
However, where anabsentee spouse isbelieved to be dead, there
must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death. Before such
declaration,the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even
if done in good faith. Article 41 of the Family Code, which requires
judicial declaration of presumptive death, is intended to protect the
p resent spouse from a cr i m i nal p r osecution for bi gamy w it h t i e
judicial declaration that the missing spouse is presumptively dead,
the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage
is already established. (People v. Manuel, supra)
If the absent spouse has been missing for four ccnsecutive
years, or two consecutive years, if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Arti -
cle 391 of the Civil Code, and the present spouse has a well-found d
belief that the absentee is dead, the latter may file a summary pro-
ceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
(Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94058, March 17, 1998; Article 41 of
the Family Code) If there is a jud icial declaration of presumptive
death, the present spouse can remarry without violating the law on
bigamy. The first marr iage having been extinguished by the pre-
sumptive death of the first spouse cannot be considered as existing
when the second marriage was contracted.
Divorce Obtained by a Foreign Spouse
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a fcreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (par. 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code) The capacity of the Filipino spouse
to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree
capacitated the alien spouse to do so. (Corpuz v. Sto. Thomas, GN.
¹. 186571,August 11, 2010)
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XII. CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS 769
The rule under par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code includes
cases involving parties who, at. the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as aforeign citizen and obtairis a divorce decree. The
F ilipino spouse should li k ewise be allowed to r emarry a s i f t h e
other party we "e a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154880, October 5, 2005)
The Orbecido case will not apply if there is no competent evidence
concerning naturalization of the alien spouse and the divorce decree,
which capacitated the alien spouse to remarry. (Sarto v. People, G.R.
¹. 2 0 6284, February 28, 2018)
In a bigamy case, accused alleged that complainant, his wife,
acquired Canadian citizenship, obtained a divorce, and thereafter,
remarried. By "aising divorce, it is incumbent upon the accused to
show that it was validly obtained in accordance with complainant's
n ational law (e.g., Canadian law) p r ior t o t h e celebration of t h e
second marriage. In thiscase, accused presented a certificate of
divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of
British Columbia. Th e d efense was r ejected. Fi r s t, th e d i v o rce
decree required toprove the fact of divorce is the judgment itself as
rendered by the foreign court and not a mere certification. Second,
assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce
decree, it was not accompanied by a certification issued by the proper
Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Canada, as
required under Section 24of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged
Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be
reasonably determined whether the subject divorce decree was in
accord with complainant's national law. Accused was convicted of
bigamy. (Sarto v. People, supra)
In the recent case of Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April
24, 2018,the Supreme Court, En Banc, extended the application of
Article 26(2) of the Family Code to further cover mixed marriages
where it was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign spouse.
Thus, pursuant to Ma n a lo case, foreign divorce decrees obtained
to nullify marr ages between a Filipino and an alien citizen may
already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between
the spouses initiatedthe divorce: provided, of course, that the party
petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree must
prove the divorce as afact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. (Dela Cruz v. Morisono, July 2, 2018, G.R.
No. 226013; Juego-Sakai v. Republic)
 770 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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The Filipino spouse, who remarries in accordance with par. 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code, is not liable for bigamy since the first
marriage with the alien spouse is considered dissolved.
Adultery, Concubinage, and Bigamy
If A, a married man, cohabited with B, a married woman, the
offended wife of A can file a complaint against A and B for concubinage
and the offended husband of B can file a complaint against B and A
for adultery.It is a criminal act partaking of the nature of a double
crime. (Del Prado v. De la F uente, G.R N o . 92 7 4, September 14,
1914) If A married B, they are also liable for two counts of bigamy in
addition to concubinage (see: Revised Penal Code, Book Ttvo by Luis
Reyes) and adultery. These crimes are distinctive from each other.
A m ar ried p erson can c ohabit w i t h h i s m i s t r ess w i t h out
marrying her; or he can marry his mistress without cohabiting with
her. Hence, bigamy and concubinage are not m u t u ally exclusive
crimes.
B igamy, a d ultery, a n d c o n cubinage ar e d i s t i n guished a s
follows:
1. Co n c e p t —The e ssence of a dultery is h a v i ng s exual
i ntercourse by a m a r r i e d w o ma n w i t h a m a n o t h e r t h a n h e r
husband with the risk of introducing spurious heirs into the family.
The gist of concubinage is cohabiting or maintaining a mistress by a
married man in violation of his marital vow to the humiliation of his
own wife. Bigamy is committed by the celebration of a subsequent
marriage despitethe subsistence of a valid marriage; this crime is
being punished to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.
2. N um b e r of crimes —There are as many crimes of adultery
as there are sexual intercourses between the wife and paramour
because every intercourse poses a risk of introducing spurious heirs
into the family. (see: People v. Zapata, G.R. No. L-8047, May 16 ,
1951) On the other hand, cohabiting or scandalously maintaining a
mistress regardless of the number of sexual intercourses constitutes
a single c r im e o f c o ncubinage. Bi gamy ca n b e c o m m i t ted b y
cohabiting for a period of time, which may involve several sexual
i ntercourses. Hence, the number of th e cr ime of bigamy wil l n o t
d epend on th e n u mber of sexual i n t ercourses committed i n t h e
course ofcohabitation.
J9JC9B0M
XII. CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
771
3. Cr i m i n a l P r o s ecution — B i g amy i s a pu b l i c c r i m e
against status, while adultery and concubinage are private crimes
against chastity. I n a d u l t er y a n d c o ncubinag
d b h
off
o ended party will bar the prosecution of the case, which is not so in
bigamy. (People v. Nepomoceno, G.R. No, L-40624, June 27, 1975)
4. O ff e n d e d P a rty —In adultery, the offended party is the
husband of the offender while in concubinage, the offended party
is the wife of the offender. In th e crime of bigamy, both the first
spouse and second spouse may bethe offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused
without being aware of his previous marriage.
5. Se c o n d ary Of f e n d er — In t h e c r i me of b i g a
b th
t he first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending
on the circumstances; but the second spouse can be held liable as
an accomplice to bigamy if h e/she had knowledge of the previous
marriage of principal offender. (Santiago v. People, G.R No. 200288,
July 15, 2015) In adultery, the paramour is also liable as principal
for this crime if he is aware that the woman is already married at the
time of sexual intercourse. (Article 888 of RPC) In concubinage, the
concubine is also liable as principal for concubinage if she is aware
that her man is already married at the time of cohabitation. However
the penalty for the concubine is only destierro and not imprisonment.
(Article 384)
ILLEGAL MARRIAGE
Illegal marriage is committed by any person who shall contract
m arriage knowing t h a t t h e r e q u irements of t h e l a w h a v e n o t
been complied with orthat the marriage is in disregard of a legal
impediment provided that the act is not constitutive of bigamy. The
crime is qualified if either of the contracting parties shall obtain the
consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation, or fraud.
(Article 850; 1958 Bar Exam)
Bigamy is committed by any person who contracted a second
or subsequent m a r r i age before th e f o r mer m a r r i' age
ge h a s ebe n
ega y dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.Illegal marriage is committed by a person who entered
into a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not
been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal
impediment provided the act does not constitute the crime of bigamy.
 772 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Article 350 on illegal marriage is a catch-all provision, which covers
all illegal marriage except bigamous marriage. (1969Bar Exam)
Tong and Teresa got married before ajudge. Teresa is below
18 years old.Their marriage was contracted because Teresa and
her mother, Petra, at the instigation of Tong, assured the judge who
solemnized the marriage ceremony that Teresa was 19 years old and
that her father was already dead. Upon Tong's prodding too, Petra
gave her consent. The crime committed is il legal marriage. (1993
Bar Exam)
In U.S. v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-9405, December 24, 1914,
accused who seduced a 15-year-old girl to live with him by procuring
the performance of a fictitious marriage ceremony with the help of
Bautista, who pretended to be a Protestant minister, was held liable
for the complex crime proper of simple seduction through usurpation
of official function. Usurping the function of a priest to solemnize
marriage isa necessary means to seduce a minor. (1955 and 1985
Bar Exams)
The case of Hernandez was decided prior to the effectivity of
the Revised Penal Code. At that t i me, a religious official such as a
bishop is a person in authority within the purview of the Old Penal
Code. (U.S. v. Smith, G.R, No. 14057, January 22, 1919) However,
the Revised Penal Code was passed during the American regime.
T hus, in crafting A r t i cle 152 of t h e R evised Penal Code on t h e
definition of person in a u t hority, th e Code committee considered
American principles such as the doctrine of separation of State and
church and the non-establishment rule. In v iew th ereof, religious
officials were not listed in Article 152 as persons in authority.
Since a priest is not a person in authority anymore, usurping
the function of a priest by solemnizing marriage does not constitute
usurpation of f u n ction u n der A r t i cl e 17 7 o f t h e R e vised Penal
C ode. The crime committed i s i l l egal m a r r i age qualified by t h e
c ircumstance of by m eans of f r a ud. A t p r esent, the facts in t h e
Hernandez case constitute c o mplex c r i me o f s i m p l e s e d uction
through illegal marriage. However, Hernandez principle pertaining
to the complex crime of simple seduction thr ough usurpation of
function is still applicable if the accused usurped the function of a
mayor in solemnizing marriage, which is necessary means for his
co-accused to commit simple seduction.
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XII. CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS 773
P ERFOR M A N C E OF ILLEGAL MARRIAGE CEREM O N Y
Performance of i l l egal m a r r i age ceremony is c ommitted by
priests or m i n i sters of a r e l i gious denomination or sect, or civil
authorities who shall p e rform o r a u t h orize an i l l egal m a r r i age
ceremony. (Article 352) The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of
an illegal marriage ceremony. (Ronulo v. People, G.R. No. 182438,
July 2, 2014)
A person who entered into an i l l egal marr iage is li able for
bigamy under Article 249 or illegal marriage under Article 250. On
the other hand, the priest, minister or civil authority who performed
such bigamous marriage (Sermonia v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 109454, J'une 14, 1994) or illegal marriage such as marriage
without license (Ronulo v. People, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014),
is liable for performance of illegal marriage ceremony under Article
252.
A priest who performed a marriage ceremony despite knowledge
that the couple had no marriage license isliable for performing
illegal marriage ceremony. The non-filing of a criminal complaint
for illegal marriage under Article 250 against the couple does not
negate criminal liability of the priest. Article 352 does not make this
an element of the crime. (Ronulo v. People, supra)
Considering that t his crime is an i nt entional felony, it must
be committed by means of dolo. Hence, good faith is a defense. A
clergyman, who is not aware that one of the contracting parties is
a minor, is not criminally liable for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony. (U.S. v. San Juan, G.R No. 8502, October 10, 1913)
T he la w s e t s t h e m i n i m u m r e q u i r ements constituting a
marriage ceremony, which is an element of performance of illegal
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of
the contractingparties before a solemnizing officer;and second, their
declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they
take each other as husband and wife. For purposes of determining if
a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is
not included in the requirements. (Ronulo v. People, supra)
Erwin and Bea approached Mayor Abral and requested him
to solemnize their marriage. Mayor Abral agreed. Erwin and Bea
went to Mayor Abral's office on the day of the ceremony, but Mayor
Abral was not there. When Erwin and Bea inquired where Mayor
Abral was, his chief of staff Donato informed them that the Mayor
 774 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
was campaigning for the coming elections. Donato told them —.hat
the Mayor a u thorized hi m t o s o lemnize th e m a r r i age and —.hat
Mayor Abral w o ul d j u s t s i g n t h e d o cuments when h e a r r i v ed.
Donato thereafter solemnized the marriage and later tu r ned over
the documents to Mayor Abral for hi s signature. In th e mar r iage
contract, it was stated that the marriage was solemnized by Mayor
Abral. (2015 Bar Exam)
Since the mayor is absent, his chief of staff solemnized the
marriage between two persons, and later turned over the docum nts
to Mayor Abral for his signature. The chief of staff, who performed
the act of solemnizing marr iage, which pertained to th e m a yor,
person in a u thority, w i t h out b eing l awfully en t i t led t o d o so, is
liable for usurpation of function under Ar t i cle 177. The crime of
performance ofillegal marriage ceremony under Article 352 is not
committed because this crime can only be committed by a person
who is authorized to solemnize marriage. (Ronulo v. People, G.R. No.
182488, July 2, 2014; 2019Bar Exam)
Mayor Abral is liable for falsification of public document by a
public officer under Ar t i cle 171. Making an u n t r u t h ful st atement
b y stating i n a m a r r i age contract, a p u b li c document, that t h e
marriage was solemnized by him, is an act of falsification. The crime
of performance of illegal marriage ceremony is not committed since
Mayor Abral di d not p erform th e m a r r i age ceremony. (Ronu!o v.
People, supra; 2019 Bar Exam)
DECRIMINALIZATION OF PREMATURE MARRIAGE
U nder Article 351 of th e R evised Penal Code, a woman i n
contracting m a r r i age w i t hi n 3 0 1 d a y s f r o m d e at h o f h u s band,
or dissolution or annulment of mar r i age is liable for the crime of
premature marriage. (1987 and 1950 Bar E x ams) However, R.A.
No. 10655 decriminalizes premature marriage by repealing Article
3 51. Premature m a r r i age wa s d ecriminalized since A r t i cle 3 5 1
discriminates women because this provision is not a p plicab e to
men. Moreover, Article 351 sought to prevent a possible confusion
as to whether the father of the child born after the dissolution of the
marriage is the first husband or the second. This preventive measure
is not anymore necessary since paternity and filiation could now be
easily determined through modern technology such as DNA test.
J9JC9B0M
XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
DEFAMATION
A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a
vice or defect, real or i m aginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead. (Article 858; 1947 and 1950 Bar Exams) The
Spanish text of Article 353 used the word "defamacion." Hence, the
word "libel" in the English text of this provision should be read as
"defamation."
If ddefamation is committed by m e ans of w r i t i ng, p r i i i t i i i g,
lithoograp"y, e n graving, radio, phonograph, p ainting, t h eatrical
exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, the
crime is libel. (Article 855; 1965 Bar Exam) If it i s c ommitted by
oral means, the crime is slander or oral defamation. (Article 858)
If it is committed by performance of an act not punished as libel
or slander, which shall cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon
another person, the crime is slander by deed. (Article 859; 1947and
1961 Bar Exams)
ELEMENTS OF DEFAMATION
To commit th e cr ime of d efamation (libel, oral defamation,
and slander by d eed), the f ollowing r equisites must concur: (a)
the writing, utterance or acts must be defamatory; (b) it must be
malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be
identifiable.
Defamatory Im p u t a t i on
A n allegation
is considered defamatory ifitascribes to a person
thhe commission ofa crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or
 776 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstances
which tends to dishonor or di scredit or pu t h i m i n c o ntempt, or
which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. (Vasquez v.
CA, G.R. No. 118971, September 1$, 1999)
In d.etermining whether a statement is defamatory, the words
used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in
their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they
were used and understood in another sense. Moreover, a charge is
sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose
and understand that the person or persons against whom they were
uttered were guiltyof certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach
the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons
up to public ri dicule. (Manila B u l l e tin P ub lishing Corporation v .
Domingo, G.R. No. 170841, July 6, 2017)
A publisher of the Baguio Daily was sued by Pedro Aguas for
libel for the public publication of his picture with th e notice that:
"This is to inform the public that M r. P edro Aguas whose picture
appears above has ceased to be connected with the Sincere Insurance
Company as underwriter as of December 81, 1987. Any transaction
entered into him af t er said d a te w ill n ot b e honored." (1988 Bar
Exam) The published notice is not defamatory. It merely informed
t he public that Pedro Aguas is not a n ymore connected with t h e
company. Moreover, the publication was not made with dolo since it
is thepractice of companies to make notice to the public regarding
the non-recognition of transaction with a person who is not anymore
connected with the company. This notice is for the protection of the
interest of the company and the public as well.
Malice
Malice is an element of libel or defamation. There is malice in
fact when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-
will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure
the reputation of th e p erson who claims to h ave been defamed.
(Alonzo v. CA, G.R. No. 110088, February 1, 1995)
In Yuchengco v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 184315, November 25, 2009,
in a span of one month, defendants wrote and published and caused
the publication o f s e ven l i b elous A r t i cles against c omplainant
attacking his honor and reputation as a distinguished businessman,
philanthropist, his political inclination, and as an employer in hi s
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
777
insurance company. The incessant publication of th e defamatory
A rticles attacking the honor and r eputation of complainant i s a
proof of defendant's malicious scheme to malign and defame the
name, honor and reputation of the complainant.
Th
here are two kinds of malice, malice in law and malice in fact.
1. M al i c e i n L aw — E ve r y d e f a matory i m p u t a t ion i s
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown. (Article 864 of the Revised
Penal Code) When the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution
n eed not prove malice on the part of t h e defendant, for th e l aw
already presumes that t h e d efendant's imputation i s m a l i cious.
Presumed malice is called malice in law. The burden is on the side
of tl e accused to show good intention and justifiable motive in order
to overcome the legalinference of malice.
2. M a l i ce in act
F —The following circumstances will negate
the presumption of malice in a defamatory statement: (1) if there is
a good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown; (2) if
the defamatory statement is a privileged communication.
I f th e d e f amatory i m p u t a tion i s covered by a qualified
priv leged communication, defamatory imputation is not presum d
me
t o be malicious. Hence, actual malice must be established beyond
reasonable doubt to prove the crime of libel or defamation. Actual
malice is also known as "malice in fact."
I f t hh e defamatory i m p u t ation i s covered by a n a b s olute
privileged communication, lack of malice in making a defamatory
imputation is conclusively presumed. Libel or d efamation is not
committed because "malice in law or in fact," which is an element
thereof, is lacking.
Publicity
Writing to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient
t o constitute pu blication, for t h e p e rson t o w h o m t h e l e t ter i s
addressed is a third person in relation to its writer and the person
defamed therein. The wife of the person defamed is, in context, a
third person to whom the publication was made. (Magno v. People,
G.R. No. 188896; January 27, 2006; 1969 Bar Exam)
There i s pu bl i c a t ion if th e d efa m a t o ry s tatement i s
communicated to a third person. It is not required that the person
d efamed has read or h e ard about th e l i b elous remark. What i s
 778 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONQR
VOLUME II 779

material isthat a third person has read or heard the libelous Identifiable Offended Party
statement, for a man's reputation is the estimate in which others
To satisfy th e element of id e n tifiability, it m u s t b e s h o wn
hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself. Simply put,
that atleast a third person or a stranger was able to identify the
in libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it
offended party as the object ofthe defamatory statement. It is
is written, known to someone other than the person against whom
e nough if by i n t r i n sic reference the allusion is apparent or if t h e
it has been written. The reason for this is t hat a communication
publication contains matters of description or reference to facts
of the defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot injure his
and cir"umstances from which others reading the article may know
reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A man's reputation
the person alluded to;or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous
is not the good opinion he has of h i mself, but th e estimation in
c ircumstances so that t h ose knowing such person could and di d
which others hold him. (Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v.
unders-.and that he was the person referred to. (Manila Bu lletin
Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017)
Publishing Corporation v. Domingo, supra)
Exposing a letter containing defamatory imputation to a third
ln Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 159787, May 25, 2007, a libelous
person constitutes publication. Thus, sending a defamatory letter
article defaming "Miss S" does not give a suff icient description or
enclosed in asealed envelope by special messenger to the plaintiff
other indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the article fails
by the defendant is not libel because the element of publication is
to show that "Miss S" and the complainant are one and the same
not present. On the other hand, sending a defamatory letter, which
person. Although the article is libelous, complainant could not have
is unsealed, or not shown to be sealed, through a messenger is libel
been the person defamed therein.
since the element of publicity is present. (People v. Silvela, G.R. No.
L-0610, May 26; 1958; 1969 Bar Exam) Because of a pendency of a labor dispute, two belligerent labor
un:ons had confrontation in a picket line during which the President
A defamatory lettercontained in a closed envelope addressed
and the Secretary of one union shouted to the members and officers
to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted
of the r val union composed of men and women, the following: "Mga
with its possession in such a way that it can be read by person other
supot, mga wa l ang b ayag, mga k a b it n g I n t s i k, m ga t u t a, m ga
than the offended party. If a s ender of a l i belous communication
segunda mano." The President and the Secretary of said union are
knows or has good reasons to believe that itwill be intercepted
not liable for oral defamation because the element of identifiability
before reaching the person defamed, there is sufficient publication.
of the prsons defamed is not present. (1998 Bar Exam)
The publication of a libel, however, should not be presumed from
the fact that th e i m mediate control thereof is parted with u n less In Ma n i l a B u l l e t in P u b l i s hing C o r poration v. Do mingo,
it appears that t h ere i s r e asonable probability t ha t i t i s h e r eby supra, the accused published an article where he stated that these
exposed to be read or seen by third persons. (Belen v. People, G.R. national employees should be commended for bringing into the open
No. 211120, February 18, 2017) this garbage that has piled up in their own backyard. To Joe Con's
successor, the chopping board is ready. All you need is a Muslim kris!
In Belen v. People, ibid. a r e solution was issued dismissing
Palakulin mo, Pare ko! This is not libelous. On the first statement,
a complaint for estafa filed by th e accused. He filed a motion for
accused is merely commending the DTI employees who brought into
reconsideration with th e prosecutor's office and copy furnished to
the open t heir complaints against the private complainant in t h i s
respondent in the estafa case and Office of the Secretary of Justice.
case, a DTI officer. This is a fair remark. The last three sentences
The motion for reconsideration contains irrelevant and defamatory
me"ely meant that heads should roll at the DTI office, which does
statement against the investigating prosecutor. Despite the fact that
not ascribe something deprecating against complainant. Moreover
the motion was contained in sealed envelopes, it is not unreasonable )
the statement does not refer to an ascertained or ascertainable
to expect that persons other than the one defamed would be able to
person
read the defamatory statements in it. Hence, the element of publicity
in libel is present. In People v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. L-8777-79, August 14, 1956,
Corazon Aquino uttered in public "You, Merrera lawyers, are stealers,

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 780 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
shameless, impolite." The accused was convicted of oral defamation.
The offended parties are identifiable. They are lawyers belonging to
the Merrera family.
Members of aparticular group can be offended parties in libel.
(People v. Aquino, supra) However, if the membership in the group
is so large, the element of identifiability of the offended parties is
not present. Thus, one, who published a st atement "l a h at n a n g
Americano eh maniac," is not liable for libel.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be
interpreted to advert to an i dentified or identifiable individual. A
lecture imputing corruption in Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of
Internal Revenue is not actionable absent circumstances specifically
pointing the defamation to particular persons. (2008 Bar Exam)
In MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 135308, January 28, 2003, the accused
wrote in a newspaper Bulgar "Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong
uri ng h a yop sa Mi n d a n ao ay hi n d i k i n a k a in n g m g a M u s l i m /
Para sakanila ang mgaito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nilait o
kai langang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam
sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba
pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa
araw na tinatawag nilang Ramadan." The accused was acquitted of
libel because the identifiability of the offended parties, which is an
element of libel, is not present. The Muslim community is too vast
as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly
defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as indeterminate
and generic as a similar attack on Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists
or Mormons would do.
In Eliseo Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 225010, November 21,
2018, theaccused Soriano, through a religious radio program, "Ang
Dating Daan," uttered and described the members of Jesus Miracle
Crusade as "isang dakot na gago" and "siraulo." The information does
not refer to any specific individual or pastor but merely mentions
"persons comprising th e Je s us M i r a c le C r u s ade, I n t e rnational
Ministry." The defamatory statements do not single out any specific
pastor and they are not sweeping enough as to injure the reputation
of all the members of JMCIM. The accused is acquitted of the charge
of libel.
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HQNQR 781
LIBEL OR WRITTEN DEFAMATION
Libel is committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, r adio, p h onograph, p a i n t i ng , t h e a t rical e x h i bition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means. (Article 855)
M eans to com mi t d e f a m a t i o n
Defamatory imputations, which are made not by publication
in the r ewspapers but by broadcast over the radio, constitute libel.
(2002 Bar Exam)
W iting, printing, radio etc., have a common characteristic, and
that is, their permanent nature as a means of publication, and this
explains the graver penaltyfor libel than that prescribed for oral
defamation. Hence, the phrase "anv similar means" in Art icle 355
should be understood in the light of the said common characteristic
of the means to commit libel. Thus, defamation through an amplifier
constitutes oral defamation under Article 358 and not libel under
Article 355 since its nature as means of publication is not permanent,
and thus, it i s not si m ilar t o r a dio or other means mentioned in
Article 355. i'People v. Santiago, G.R N o. L- 17668, May 80, 1962;
1965 Bar Exam)
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code did not include television
as a means to commit libel since in 1932 when this law took effect,
there were no televisions in the market. Members of the Philippines
Legislature were not be aware that there was a technology called
television. However, although television is not expressly mentioned
in Artie'e 355, it easily qualifies under the general provision "or any
similar means." (People v. Casten, CA-G.R. No. 07924-CR, December
18, 1974; 2005 Bar Exam) Since the nature of television as a means
of publication is permanent, it should be considered as a means to
commit libel.
L ibel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that t h e
government has an obligation to protect private individuals from
defamation. Indeed, cyber libel is actually not a n ew c rime since
Article 353, in relation to Ar t i cle 355 of the Revised Penal Code,
already punishes it. Online defamation constitutes "similar means"
for committing libel. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 208885,
February 18, 2014)
Persons Responsible for Libel
Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication
or exhibition of any d efamation in w r i t i n g or b y s i m i lar m eans,
 782 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
shall beresponsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or
pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
m agazine o r s e r i a l p u b l i cation, s h al l b e responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he was the
author thereof. (Article 860 of Revised Penal Code)
In Erwin Tul fo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008,
the claim of editors and president of Remate, the paper on which the
defamatory articlesappeared, that they had no participation does
not shield them from liability. Article 360 does not provide absence
of participation as a d efense, but r a t her p l ai nly an d specifically
statesthe responsibility of those involved in publishing newspapers
a nd other periodicals. It i s no t a m a t t e r o f w h ether or no t t h e y
conspired in preparing and publishing the subject articles, because
the law simply so states that they are liable as they were the author.
N either th e p u b lisher nor t h e e d i t ors can d i sclaim l i a bilit y f o r
libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they
had no participation in th e preparation of the same. They cannot
say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which
the subject articlesappeared, when they themselves clearly hold
p ositions of authority in th e newspaper or as the president in th e
publishing company. (2016 Bar Exam)
The criminal l i ability of t h e p r esident of th e company th at
published the libelous articles is the same as that of th e author.
T he crime of l ibel w ould not even be consummated without h i s
participation as publisher of the libelous articles. One who furnishes
the means for carrying on t h e p u b l ication of a n e w spaper and
entrusts its management to servants or employees whom he selects
and controls may be said to cause to be published what actually
appears, and should be held responsible therefor, whether he was
i ndividually concerned i n t h e p u b l i cation o r n o t . A l t h ough t h e
participation of each felon in the crime of libel differs in point in time
and in degree, both author and publisher reneged on the private
duties they owe their fellow men or society in a manner contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty,
or good morals. (Ty-Delgado v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 219608, January 26, 2016)
CYBER LIBEL
Under Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. No. 10175, cybercrime punishable
includes content-related offenses such as such cyber libel, which is
an unlawful or prohibited act of libel as defined in Article 355 of RPC
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 783
committed through a computer system or any otl.er similar means
which may be devised in the future.
The phrase"actsconstitute the offense of cybercrime punishable
under this Act" in Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. No. 10175 means that libel
defined under Revised Penal Code committed t hr ough computer
system (cyber libel) is punishable under R.A. No. 10175 and not
under the Revised Penal Code. Unfortunately, Section 8 of R .A.
No. 10175, tle penal provision of the law, fails to prov de a penalty
for cyber libel under Section 4(c)(4). Thus, the offender cannot be
prosecuted for.cyber libel under Section 4 in relation to Section 8 of
R.A. No. 10175. For committing libel through the internet, he should
b e prosecuted for cyberlibel under Revised Penal Code with t h e
qualifying circumstance of use of information and communications
technology under Section 6 of R.A. No. 10175. With this qualifying
circumstance, the penalty for l ibel under Ar t i cle 855 of the Code
shall be increased one degree higher. (2019 Bar Exam)
Angelina maintains a w ebsite where visitors can give their
c omments on th e p osted pictures of th e g oods she sells in h e r
exclusive boutique. Bettina posted a comment that the red Birkin bag
shown in Angelina's website is fake and that Angelina is known to
sell counterfeit items. Angelina wants to file a case against Bettina.
The crime committed i s cyber l i bel or l i bel w i t h t h e q u alifying
aggravating circumstance of using information or communication
technology ir committing a crime. (2010 Bar Exam)
MULTIPLE PUBLICATIONS RULE
Other jurisdictions have adopted the "single publication" rule,
under which any single integrated publication, such as one edition
of a newspaper,book, or magazine, or one brcadcast, is treated as a
unit, giving rise to only one cause of action, regardless of the number
of times itis exposed to different people.
It issettled however that a single defamatory statement, if
published severaltimes, gives rise to as man r offenses as there are
publications. Each and every publication of the same libel constitutes
a distinct offense. This is the "multiple publication rule" which is
followed in o u r j u r i s diction. (S oriano v. In t e rmediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 72888, November 9, 1988; Br i l l a n te v. CA, G .R.
Nos. 118757 and 121571, October 19, 2004) In sum, republication
of a defamatory statement constituteslibel,which is separate and
 784 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
distinct from the previous libel arising from the first publication of
the same defamatory statement.
Since l i bel a r i s in g f r o m fi r s t p u b l i c ation of defamatory
statement is different from the libel arising from the republication
thereof, libel is not a continuing crime. The concept of continuing
crime is not compatible with the multiple publications rule. Under
t he continuing cr im e r u le , t h er e i s o nl y o n e l i bel a r i sing f r o m
t wo publications of t h e s am e d efamatory s t atements since t h e
republication thereof is just a continuation of the first publication.
L ibel, Not a Continuing Crim e
There is a t h eory t hat l i bel published through the i n t ernet
is a continuing crime as long as th e defamatory statements are
accessible to the public t h r ough th e i n t ernet. The publication of
the libel in the internet is continuing, and thus, the commission of
libel is also continuing. Under this theory, the one-year prescriptive
period for libel shall not run as long as the libelous statements are
still accessible to the public through the internet.
It is submitted however that this continuing publication theory
will go against the essence of the rule on prescription, and that is,
to fix a r easonable period within w h ich a c r i m i nal action can be
instituted. This view will r ender the crime of libel imprescriptible
since it is of public knowledge that defamatory writings posted in the
internet will be accessible to the public even after several years have
elapsed. Moreover, defamatory articlespublished in a newspaper
such as Inquirer several years ago are still accessible to the public
in the National Li br ary or o t her l i b r aries; and yet, the Supreme
Court in People v. Hon. Gines, G.R. No. 88463, May 27, 1991 did not
consider theaccessibility of the defamation in the newspaper as a
factor in determining when the prescriptive period will commence to
run. In this case, it was held that the prescriptive period of one year
for libel shall commence to run f rom th e day the alleged libelous
article was published.
SLANDER OR ORAL DEFAMATION
Oral defamation i f i t i s o f a s e r i o us a nd i n s u lti ng n a t u r e
constitutes grave slander; otherwise, it is slight slander. (Article 85'8
of the Revised Penal Code)
Slander is a defamation committed by oral (spoken) means,
instead of in wr i t i ng. The term oral defamation or slander as now
J9JC9B0M
XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 785
understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory
words which t end t o p r ejudice another i n h i s r e p utation, office,
trade, business, or means of livelihood.
Grave or Simple Slander
There is grave slander when it i s of a serious and insulting
nature. The gravity of t h e oral d efamation depends not only ( 1)
upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations
of the accused and the offended party, and (8) the circumstances
surrounding thecase. Indeed, itis a doctrine of ancient respectability
that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending
not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted
ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and th e offender, which mi ght t en d t o p r ove th e
i ntention of th e offender at th e t i m e . (People v. Pader, G.R. ¹ .
189157, February 8, 2000)
Uttering w ords i m p ut in g i m m orality a g ainst a r e spectable
married lady and her young daughters, who are all prominent in the
social circles (U.S. v. Tolosa, G.R. No. L-12696, November 19, 191 7),
or imputing estafa to the offended party (People v. Balite, G.R. No.
L-21475, September 80, 1966) constitutesgrave slander.
T he social standing and position of th e offended party ar e
also taken into account and thus, it was held that the slander was
grave, because the offended party had held previously the Office of
Congressman, Governor, and Senator and was then a candidate for
Vice President, for which no amount of sophistry would take the
statement out of the compass of grave oral defamation. However,
uttering d e famatory w o rd s i n t h e h e a t o f a n g e r , w ith s o m e
provocation on the part of the offended party (Villanueva v. People,
G.R. No. 160851, April 10, 2006) or calling a Judge a hypocrite and
land grabber in the heat of anger (1988 Bar Exam) constitutes slight
slander.
In De Leon v. Peoplo, G.R. No. 212628, January 1 1, 2 616,
complainant, a policeman, pointed his gun at his jogging buddy, the
accused. During the hearing on administrative case, the accused
stated "walang h iy a, m a n gongotong na p u l i s, yabang m o." T h e
statement is defamatory since it imputes to complainant the crime
of robbery. However, since the statement was made a mere product
of an emotional outburst because of the gun-pointing incident, the
crime is only classified as simple slander.
 786 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
In the case of People v. Arcand, G.R. No. 46336, September
29, 1939, a priest, who called the offended party a gangster in the
middle of the sermon, is liable for slight slander as there was no
imputation of a crime, a vice, or immorality.
Lando and Marco are candidates in the local elections. In his
s peeches, Lando attacked his opponent Marco alleging that he i s
the son of Nanding, a robber and a thief who amassed his wealth
through shady deals. (1990 Bar Exam) As a rule, defamation in a
political meeting, when feelings are running high and people could
not think clearly, only amounts to simple slander. (People v. Laroga,
40 O.G. 128) However, imputing to the father of Marco the crime of
robbery and theft is seriously insulting. Hence, the crime should be
classified as serious oral defamation.
Putang Ina Pr i n ciple
The words "putang i n a m o" a re c ommon expression in t h e
dialect that isoften employed, not really to slander but rather
to express anger or displeasure. Itis seldom, if ever, taken in its
literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a
mother. (Reyesv. People, G.R. Nos. L-21 528 and L-21 529, March 28,
1969) Thus, the statement "Putang ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?"
made by the accused cannot be considered as slanderous. (Martinez
v. People, G.R. No. 198694, February 18, 2018) Uttering "putangina"
to minors in the heat of anger is not child abuse. (Escolano v. People,
G.R. No. 226991, December 10, 2018)
Same as words "fuck," "son of a bi t ch," or "m otherfucker" in
America, "hijo de puta" in Spain and, "bakero" in Japan, "putang ina"
is an expletive expression of Filipinos, which cannot be considered
as a sourceof criminality at alloccasions. It is not an exaggeration to
state that numerosity of Filipinos, including President Duterte, are
expressing the words 'putang ina" multiple times on a daily basis.
Obviously, the minds of these Filipinos, who are instinctively using
'putang ina" as part of their language, are not criminal.
The statement "yabang" (boastful or a r r o gant) li ke "p u t ang
ina" is a common expression by Filipinos; hence, it is not defamatory.
(Jamilano v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. L-26059, October 81, 1969)
But the words "malandi kang babae ka" is not a m er e profanity
like "Putang ina m o." It is d e famatory since it i m p u tes to a l ad y
immorality. (Revita v. Rimando, A.M No. 1489-MJ, July 22, 1980)
However, if the statement "putang i n a" is m a de not only t o
express hate ordispleasure but also to defame or insult a person in
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 787
front ofseveral persons, the crime of simple slander is committed.
For example, a n a c cused, who shouted " p u t ang i n a mo Atty.
Escolango. Napaka walanghiya mo!" at the compla'nant, a lawyer
and candidate for vice mayor, while the latter was conversing with
his political leaders, is liable for simple slander. (Pader v. People,
G.R. No. 189157, February 8, 2000) An accused, who pointed a dirty
finger at the vice-mayor in th e m u nicipal hall i n f r ont of several
persons, is liable for simple slander by deed. A dirty finger ordinarily
connote=- the phrase "fuck you," which is similar to th ex p r e ssion
"puta" o" "putang ina mo," in local parlance. Voile such act is an
expression ofanger and displeasure, itcasts dishonor, discredit, or
contempt upon complainant since she is a lady and a vice mayor,
and it was made in front of several persons. (People v. Villanueva,
G.R. No. 160851, April 10, 2006)
B ut i f t h e w o r d s "putang i n a " i s accompanied w i th t h e
statement "papatayin k i t a ," t h e c r i me c ommitted is t h r e at. T h e
utterance "putang in a," is n ot a s e parate crime of slander since
it is merely made to make the threat more emphatic. In sum, the
statement "putang in a" shall be considered as part of the th reat.
(Reyes v. People, supra)
In the course of an angry demonstration by a group of some 20
to 30 personsled by X who had been laid offallegedly by Y, several
threats were hurled against the latter. Among the h a r g es Y filed
against X isfor oral defamation because of Y's alleg d utterance of
the words: Y, putang ina mo. Xis not liable of oral defamation since
the statement "putang ina" is just part of the threat. (2976Bar Exam)
If the statement "putang in a, bu llshit" i:- accompanied with
banging a chair and choking complainant, who is a ady, the crime
c ommitted is serious slander by d eed. The cuss words shall b e
considered as partof the crime of serious sland r by deed. (Mari v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127694, May 81, 2000)
Stating "Putang ina mo ng bata ka n amumurc ka n asa akin
at susunugin ko yong pamilya mo" against a minor is child abuse.
(Jumaquio v. Villarosa, G.R. No. 165924, January 19, 2009).
P ublici t y
Publicity is an element of slander by deed since it s a specie of
the crime of defamation. Without publicity, the crime committed is
unjust vexation or slight physical injuries.
 788 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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Single Defamatory Statement Against Several Persons
In People v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. L-8777-79, August 14, 1956,
Corazon Aquino uttered a single defamatory statement addressed
to several persons. She said in public "You, Merrera lawyers, are
stealers, shameless, impolite." Even if t h e re a re s everal persons
defamed, there is one count of grave oral defamation. It was l.eld
that: At common law, a libel on two or more persons contained in
one writing and published by a single act constitutes but one o:"fer se
so as to warrant a single indictment therefor. (State v. Hoshins, 60
Minn. 168) The utterance of the defamatory statement, whicn was
made once and referred toa family of lawyers designated by their
common surname, should be regarded as only one offense.
X a n e w s paper o f g e neral c i r culation i n t h e P h i l i p pin=s,
published in its issue of August 1, 1962, a libelous article accusing
A, B, and C of having acted in confederation to smuggle, as they
did smuggle into th e P h i l i ppines, several i t ems of me r c handise
worth P1,000.00. A resides in Manila; B in Quezon City; and C in
Polo, Bulacan. Applying the Aqui no principle, since there is a single
defamatory statement directed against three persons, there isa
single crime of libel. The criminal liability of the author of this libel
cannot be divided into three distinct and separate offenses. They
should be prosecuted under a single Information and be convicted of
a single count of libel. (1 962 Bar Exam)
Two Distinct Defamatory Statements Against Two Persons
In People v. Del R osario, G.R. No. L - 2 254, April 2 0, 1 950,
accused wrote two d i f f erent and d i s t in ct s tatements again t t o
persons. The f ir s t d e f a m atory s t a t e ment a l l e ged t h at M o r e l o s
preferred Chinese in engaging business while the inhabitants of the
Cebu would suffer, he made money out of the copra ordinance and
he has a gang whose members are only serving for their own good.
The second defamatory statement alleged that Espina was merely
appointed as mayor, goafter and dismiss policemen and emp oyees
w ho are without gu i lt , h e i s t o b e t r a n sferred to th e Capitol i n
order to be made Berdugo of the employees whom they wan-. to
be executed, and he was nearly k i l led by hi s t enants because he
grabbed lands. Accused then pleaded to Cebuanos not to ele"t the
t wo. These published defamatory statements were written in t h e
same article entitled "My Plea to Cebuanos."
According to the trial court, this is a complex crime since there is
singlepublication of two different defamatory statements addressed
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 789
to two persons. However, the Supreme Court ruled that there are
two separate crimes oflibel. It was held that there are as many
offenses of libel as there are persons libeled, and the computation
of the number is not the publication but the writ ing or composing
of the libel. From this point of view, there are as many defamations
committed as there are persons defamed. The inclusion of several
persons in a libelous news article is not a product of a "single act"
contemplated in Article 48.
In People v. Gil, G.R. No. L-20398, October 31, 1968, slanderous
statements were uttered on the same date, and at the same place,
albeit against two different persons. The decision in People v. Del
Rosario, supra, for libel is controlling. There are as many offenses of
libel asthere were persons defamed.
The principle in Aquino case must not be confused from that
in Del Rosario. In t he case of Aquino, there is single defamatory
statement addressed to several persons. This constitutes a single
crime of o ra l d e f amation. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n De l R o s ario
case, there are two d if ferent and d i s t inct defamatory statements
respectively addressed to two persons. These two defamatory
statements published under one article constitute tw o counts of
libel and not a compound crime. In sum, although there is a single
p ublication, th e S u preme Court c onsidered th e a cts of w r i t i n g
two different defamatory statements as beyond the contemplation
of phrase "single act constituting two or m ore grave or less grave
felonies" in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Several defamatory statements Against a single person
In Gonzales v. Arcilla, G.R. No. L-27923, November 18, 1991,
accused uttered "Mang-aagaw ng asawang may asawa! Tib ihon!
Putang I n a M o . W a l an g H i y a ! P a t a y G u t o m!" Th e se s everal
defamatory statements areaddressed against a single person. This
is not a complex crime of multiple libels. Regardless of the number
of defamatory utterances,the accused can only be prosecuted for
a single offense. Note: Settled is the rule that t h e re are as many
crimes of libelor oral defamation as there are persons defamed.
Since there is only one person defamed, there is only one crime of
oral defamation.
Privileged Communication
There are t w o k i n d s o f p r i v i l eged communication, to w i t :
absolute p r i v i l eged c o m m u nication and q u a li fie d p r i v i l eged
communication. (1966 Bar Exam)
 790 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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1. Ab s o l ut e P r i v i l e ge d Co m m u n i c a t ion - I f t h e
defamatory s t atements ar e a b solute p r i v i l eged communication,
lack of malice is conclusively presumed. In absolutely privileged
communications, the ma la or b o n a f ides of th e a u t hor i s o f n o
moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar t o t h e a ction.
(GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos, G.A. No. 146848, October 17, 2006)
A bsolutely p r i v i leged communications ar e t h ose w h ich ar e n o t
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith such as speech
or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof (Philippine
Journalists, Inc. v. Tkoenen, G.R. No. 143872, December 13, 2005)
or words uttered orpublished in the course of judicial proceedings,
provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case (Malit
v. People, G.A. ¹. L- 5 8 6 81,May 81, 1982); or which is legitimately
relatedthereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that
it may become the subject of the inquiry in the course of the trial.
(People v. Sesbreno, G.B. No. L-62449, July 16, 1984)
Absolutely privileged communication includes allegations or
statements made by parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions
or during the hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings,
as well as a n swers given b y t h e w i t n ess i n r e pl y t o q u estions
propounded to them i n t h e c ourse of said proceedings, provided
that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and
the answers are responsive to th e questions propounded to said
witnesses. (Belen v. People, G.R. No. 211120, February 18, 2017)
Allegations in civil complaint for d amage of fraud for convincing
him to buy a defective vehicle are covered by the absolute privileged
communication r u l e . ( 2 0 11 Ba r Exa m ) Abs o l u tely p r i v i l e ged
communication extends to statements in preliminary investigations
or other proceedings preparatory totrial provided the statements
are pertinent orrelevant to the case. (Belen v. People, ibid.)
In Be l en v. Peo p l e, i b i d . , a c c u sed f il e d a m ot i o n fo r
reconsideration of resolution dismissing a complaint for estafa. The
accused alleged in the said motion that the public prosecutor who
dismissed the case is corrupt, stupid, imbecile, mentally dishonest,
and bereft of intellectual ability. This is not covered by the absolute
privileged communication rule since the defamatory allegations in
the motion are not relevant to the issue of whether or not the motion
for reconsideration should be granted because there is probable
cause to charge the respondent in the preliminary investigation for
estafa.
Statements in the answer to complaint that the counsel for the
defendant is "hobo, inutile, good for nothing, stupid, and a menace
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 791
to clients" are not protected by the privileged communication rule
(2018 Bar Exam)
2 Qualified P r i v i l e ged Communication
If the
defamatory st atement i s a q u a l i fied p r i v i leged communication,
there is no malice in law. Hence, to prove libel or defamation, malice
in fact must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The privileged
character of t h e c o m munication i s s u bject t o t h e q u a l i fication
that it i s m ade without malice. If th ere is proof of actual malice,
the defamatory communication is no t p r i v i l eged; hence, libel or
defamation is committed.
Private communication and fair and t r ue report are qualified
privileged communications mentioned in Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code. These privileged communications under A r t i cle 354
are qualified because of Article 362 of the Code which provides that
j(7 ' 7
libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged
under the provisions of Article 854, if m ade with m al ice (in fact),
shall not exempt the author thereof nor the editor or managing editor
of a newspaper from criminal liability."
However, th e e n u m eration u nder A r t i cl e 3 5 4 i s not an
exclusive list of qualified privileged communications since there are
other qualified privileged communications not mentioned in the said
provision such as "fair commentaries" on matters of public interest.
(Borj al v. CA, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999)
Qualified privileged communication in Article 354 is a defense
in a libel or defamation case for two r easons: (I) lack of malice;
and (2) element of publicity is not present because the person or
persons with whom the accused have the privilege to communicate
something defamatory is not a third person. That is the reason why
the title of Article 354 is "requirement for publicity."
Privileged Private Communication
A private communication made by any person to another in
the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty i s a q u alified
privileged communication. Defamatory imputation in this privileged
private communication is not presumed to be malicious. (Article 854)
To make a p r i v ate communication as a q u alif ied privileged
c ommunication, the following elements must be p r esent: (I ) t h e
person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social
duty to m a k e t h e c ommunication, or a t l e a st, ha d a n i n t e rest
to protect, which interest may either be his own or of th e one to
 792 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer
or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter,
and who has the power to fu r nish th e protection sougnt; and (3)
the statements in the communication are made in good faith and
without malice. (Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 and
121571, October 19, 2004)
1. Co m m u n i c a t ing Complaint to the Right Person — A
person has the privilege to communicate privately a complaint or
concern to another person, who has the authority or duty to address
or to act upon such complaint or concern.
X , a c o ur t e m p l oyee, wr ot e t h e p r e siding j u dge a l e t t e r ,
imputing to Y, also a court employee, the act of receiving an expensive
gift from one of the parties in a pending case. Because of this, Y
accused X of libel. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious. (Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code) However, despite
the defamatory character of the imputation, malice is not presumed
if the communication is privileged. A private communication made
by any person to another in th e performance of any legal, moral,
or social dut y i s a q u a l i fied p r i v i l eged communication. H ence,
defamatory imputation in i t i s n o t p r esumed. (Article 354) Since
the presiding judge has the duty to act on what the letter states,
malice is not presumed and must be proven by evidence. (2011 Bar
Exam)
In Syhunliong v. River, G.R. No. 200148, June 4, 2014. Rivera,
was informed by Lumapas of the delay or denial of the latter's claims
for payment of salaries, benefits, and i n centives by Syhunliong.
Rivera sent the following text m essage to the company's official
cellular phones held by Lumapas: "I am expecting that. Grabs talaga
sufferings kodyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay ko.I don't deserve
this because I did myjo h when I was still there. God bless ras fsicJ.
Sana yung pagsimba niya, a la m n i y a r ea l m eaning. K ai l angan
release niya lahat nang makukuha ko diyan including incentive up
to the last date na nandyan ako para di n a k a mi a b ot sa la bor."
Rivera merely expressed through th e s u bject t ext m e ssage her
grievances to Lumapas, who was the best person, who could help
expedite the release ofher claims. The text message falls within
the ambit of a q u alified privileged communication since she was
speaking in response to duty to protect her own interest and not out
of an intention to injure the reputation of Syhunliong.
Report submitted to the PMCC by its Field Operations Officer
after she had conducted the inspection of the two clinics of private
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
793
complainant p u r suant t o t h e d i r e ctive of P M C C i s a q u a l i fi ed
privileged communication. (Alonzo v. CA, G.R. No. 110088, February
1, 1995)
2. I n d i scriminately C o mmunicating Complaint
Qualified privileged communication in Article 354 is a defense in a
libel or defamation case for two reasons: (1) lack of malice; and (2)
element of publicity is not present because the person or persons
with whom the accused has the privilege to communicate something
d efamatory is not a th ir d person. That is the reason why the titl e
of Article 354 is "requirement for publicity." If t he communication
is made to a person, who has no duty to address the concern, the
elements of malice and publicity will be considered as present.
The accused wrote a complaint for robbery, and threat to his
life, to burn hi s property and t o accuse him of several concocted
c rimes. This is a p r i v i leged communication if th e complaint w a s
only communicated to proper investigating authorities (e.g., NBI).
However, the privileged character of th e l e tter i s l o st: (1) when
actual malice is proven; or (2) when several provincial and national
g overnment agencies which had no i nt erest, right or d ut y i n t h e
prosecution of said charges were furnished copies thereof. (Pastor v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48772, May 8, 1992)
A letter reporting corruption ofthe Mayor addressed to the
M unicipal Court, M u n i cipal C ouncil an d C h ief o f P o lice is n o t
privileged communication. None of the persons to whom the letter
was sent, was vested with the power of supervision over the mayor
or the authorityto investigate the charges made against the latter.
(Daez v. Court of AppeaLs, G.R. No. 47971, October 3I, 1990) A letter
involving corruption should have been addressed to the Office of the
Ombudsman or DILG.
An open letter involving a planned assassination of a person
addressed to the President and published in several newspapers of
g eneral circulation is not a privileged communication. Even if th e
interest sought to be protected belongs to the public ingeneral,
certainly, the general public does not have the power to remedy the
alleged dangers sought to be prevented by the accused in publishing
the open letter. His lack of selectivity is in dicative of malice and
is anathema to his claim of pr i v ileged communication. (Brillante
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 and 121571, October 19,
2004; Buatis v. PeopLe, G.R. No. 142509, March 24, 2006) A letter
involving aplan to commit a crime should be addressed to the police
authorities or NBI.
 794 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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Privileged Communication of a Fair and T ru e Report
A fair a n d t r u e r e p ort , m a d e i n g o o d f a i th , w i t h ou t a n y
comments or remarks, of any ju dicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report orspeech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions is a
qualified privileged communication. Defamatory imputation in this
privileged private communication is not presumed to be malicious.
(Article 854)
1. R ep o r t —A person, such as a journalist, has the privilege
to communicate to the public a fair and true report of non-confidential
official proceedings, statement or speech made therein or function-
related actsperformed by a public offi cer.
a. T ru e R e p or t —Defendant, a publishing company,
published in its paper, "Manila American," a complaint filed
against A l ejandro a n d J a m e s w i t h f r a u d , c o l lusion, and
r emoving money from t h e s afe of t h e company for p r i v at e
purposes was filed in court. However, the complaint contains
no incriminatory allegations against James. The charges are
limited toAlejandro. This is not a true and fair report covered
by th e p r i v i l eged communication. (M a c leod v. P h i l i p p i n e
Publishing Company, G.R. No. 4841, January 8, 1909)
b. E r r o n e ou s R e p or t —Z, a r e p o rter of a c e r t a in
daily newspaper known as "Bulalakaw," published an article
concerning an account of a successful raid by two P.C. officers
upon a gambling den and the arrest of several people. The article
also stated that a certain Madame 'X," the complainant; was
among the persons arrested and that her name was stricken
from the Information. It tu r ned out that the complainant was
not caught,arrested, or prosecuted. (1980 Bar Exam)
Criminal action for libel against Z will not prosper. A fair
and true report, made in good faith, wi thout any comments
or remarks, ofact performed by public officers in the exercise
of their f u n ctions i s a q u a li fied p r i v i leged communication.
(Article 854 of the Revised Penal Code) Defamatory imputation
in this privileged private communication is not presumed to be
malicious. However, error, misstatement or inaccuracy in news
report does not prove actual malice. Mistakes are inevitable in
the exercise of freedom of expression and press. (Borj al v. CA,
G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999)
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 795
2. N o R e m a r k s —The accused in this case published an
a dministrative complaint a g a inst G a nzon fo r m a u l in g a r a d i o
commentator. Th e f i scal, who was c ommissioned by p r e sident
Magsaysay to conduct investigation, found Ganzon guilty. However,
in addition to the report of the administrative case, accused made
r emarks that Ganzon is rejoicing the death of M agsaysay in t h e
same way the buzzards and coyotes rejoice over the same thing.
Even if the reported jubilation of Ganzon is true, the accused should
have stopped at reciting the facts only. By m a k ing r emarks and
comments, the report isplaced out of the coverage of privileged
communication. (People v. Rico, 8 C.A. Rep. 225)
A fair and t r u e r eport of a complaint fi led i n court w i t h out
remarks or comments even before an answer is filed or a decision
promulgated should be covered by th e p r i v ileged communication
rule. (Santos v. CA, G.R. No. L- 15081, October 21 1991) The reaso
P 1 e reason
for the rule that p l eadings in ju dicial proceedings are considered
privileged communication is not only because said pleadings have
become part ofpublic record open to the public to scrutinize, but
also due tothe undeniable fact that said pleadings are presumed
to contain allegations, which is legal in n at ure, and thus, it i s of
general public concern. (Cuenco v. Cuenco, No. L-29560, March 81,
1976) A filed complaint in court would by itself constitute a judicial
proceeding although the issues have not as yet been joined. Hence,
publication of such complaint w i t h out r emark an d comment is a
privileged communication under Article 354. (Manuel v. Pano, No.
L-46079, April 17, 1989)
Private Communication and Fair and T rue Re port
Privileged p r i v at e c ommunication p e r t ains t o complaint
t
g ievances, or concern (e.g., report of th e commission of a crime)
communicated to a person, who has the authority or duty to address
the same. It is a private communication; hence, publishing the same
in a newspaper or on TV w il l d i vest its character as a privileged
communication.
Privileged communication of a fair and true report pertains to
true report without remark of non-confidential official proceedings
or function-related act by public officers communicated to a person
or the public (usually by journalist or reporter). Publishing the same
in a newspaper or on TV will not divest its character as a privileged
communication.
 796 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
A letter to the NBI requesting for validation of report that the
offended party, Swiss national, was shooting pets in BH homes is a
privileged communication. However, this letter containing libelous
matter lost its character as a privileged communication when a story
regarding the shooting of pets was published in the newspaper and
circulated among the general population. (Phaippine Journalists,
Inc. v. Thoenen, G.R. No. 148872, December 18, 2005) However, a
journalist can publish a report that complaint for shooting pets was
filed against a Swiss national. As long as the publication is confined
to the fact of filing of complaint, the same shall be considered as a
privilegedcommunication of a fair and true report.
U pon r eport o f m a l v e rsation, t h e m a y o r o r d ered A , t h e
municipal attorney, to conduct investigation against X an employee
of the T r easurer's Office. A fter c onducting a n i n v es-.igation, A
submitted his report. Asked by news reporter, A stated that he has
found X had malversed public funds and that he has recommended
his prosecution, which is subject to evaluation by the Mayor. (1986
Bar Exam) X has the privilege to communicate this report to t h e
Mayor as directed. In submitting this report to the Mayor, X cannot
be held liable for libel because of the rule on qualified privileged
private communication. X has the privilege to report the same to a
media reporter. As long as the reporting is confined to his finding
with a statement that th e same is subject to the approval of th e
Mayor, X is not l i a ble for l i bel because of the r ule or p r i v i l eged
communication of a fair and true report. The media reporter has the
privilege to communicate this report to the public. If he will publish
this report in the newspaper without comment or remark, he is also
protected by rule on privileged communication of afair and true
report.
Fair Commentaries
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are qualified
privileged communications, although they are not listed in Ar t i cle
354. These constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that w h il e i n g eneral every
defamatory and public imputation is deemed false, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the defamatory
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity,
it is no t n e cessarily actionable. I n o r der t h a t s u c h d efamatory
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it mus-. either be a
falseallegation offact or a comment based on a false supposition. If
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 797
the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as
long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. (Borj al v. CA,
G.R No.126466, January 14, 1999)
l. E lem e n t s o f F a i r C o m m e n t a r ies —A p e rson, such
as a journalist, has th e p r i v i lege to communicate to th e p u blic
fair commentaries on matters of public interest. There are three
requisites to apply the fair commentaries doctrine, to wit: ( I) t h e
defamatory statement is directed against public officer, public figure
or aspirant of public position or matter of public interest; (2) the
defamatory statement pertains to act committed by public officer or
public figure in connection with their official function or work; and
(3) the accused does not know that the comment is false or has not
recklessly disregarded of knowing whether it is false or not.
The fair commentaries principle is based on th e l a n dmark
American case of Sulivan v. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254.
a. P ub l i c Of f ic er — Attacks against public officials
under the fair commentary doctrine do not constitute libel.
(1969 Bar Exam) The conduct, moral fitness, and ability of a
public official to discharge his duties are undoubtedly matters
o f public int erest. A n e wspaper, especially one national i n
reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and
developments in w h ich th e p u blic has a l egitimate interest
with minimum fear of being prosecuted in court by one group
or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the
newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality
and civility prevailing within the general community. (Manila
Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170841,
July 5, 2017)
In defamation, where th e i m p utation is based upon a
matter of r i ght p u blic int erest, the presumption of criminal
intent does not arise from the mere publication of defamatory
matter. A m a t ter o f p u b lic i n t erest is a c ommon pr operty,
and hence, anybody may express his opinion on it. The public
conduct of every public man is a matter of public concern. A
public official must not be too thin-skinned with reference
to comments upon his official acts. (U.S. v. Bustos, G.R. No.
I-12592, March 8, 1918)
b. F un c t i o n -related —Fair commentary principle is
not applicable to defamatory statement against public officer
 798 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
if the same does not pertain to his official function or is not
related to his work. In Br i l l a n te v. CA, G.R. Nos. 118757 and
121571, October 19,2004, Brillante implicated Mayor Jejomar
Binay and PUP President Prudente in a planned assassination
of Syjuco as well as election-related terrorism. The doctrine of
fair comment as a defense in libel is not applicable since the
utterances are unrelated to a public officer's performance of his
duties. Obviously, commission of murder and terrorism is not
related tothe performance of their duties as public offi cers.
The rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on
the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the
discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the
defendant proves the truth of the imputation. But any attack
upon the private character of the public officeron matters
which are not related to the discharge of their official functions
may constitute libel under Article 355. (Sazon v. Hon. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 12071 5;March 29, 1996)
A topicor story should not be considered a matter of public
interest by the mere fact that the person involved is a public
officer, unless it r elates to his functions. Assuming a public
office is not tantamount to completely abdicating one's right
to privacy. (Yeschengco v. Alfonso, G.R No. 194815, November
25, 2009)
Under Article 357 of the Revised Penal Code, a reporter,
editor or manager of a newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall
publish facts connected with th e p r i v ate life of another and
offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said person,
is liable for the crime of prohibited publication. This crime is
committed even if the offended party is a public officer.
c. R ec k l e ss Disregard —Comment is not fair if there
is reckless disregard of k n o w in g w h e ther t h e d e f amatory
i mputation i s f a lse or n ot . H e nce, defamatory comment i s
not a privileged communication if a journalist failed to make
research before making his allegations of corruption (Erwin
Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161082, September 16, 2009) or if he
failed toexercise efforts to talk to complainant to clarify the
issues and get his side. (Yuchengco v. Alfonso, supra; 2019 Bar
Exam)
X a t a b l oid columnist, wr ote an A r t i cle describing Y ,
a public official, as stupid, corrupt, and having amassed ill-
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 799
gotten wealth. X relied on a source from Y's own office who fed
him the information. X committed libel. In the problem given,
it appears that X acted with actual malice when he imputed
upon Y st u pidity a nd c orruption. X m a d e s uch defamatory
statenient with r eckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. Xas a columnist failed to verify the story before publishing
it pursuant to the standard stated in the case of Tul fo v. People,
supra. X is liable for libel since the Article was libelous and
inconsistent with good faith and r easonable care. (2011 Bar
Exam.)
In his column, Direct Hit, A, a journalist, wrote about X
the head examiner of the BIR-RDO Manila as follows: "Itong si
X ay ralagang BUWAYA kaya ang logo ng I acoste T shirt niya
ay napaka suwapang na buwaya. Ang nickname niya ay si Atty.
Buwoya. Ang PR niya ay 90% sa bayad ng taxpayer at ang para
sa RP ay 10% lang. Kaya ang baba ng collection ng RDO niya.
Masyadong magnanakaw si Xat dapat tanggalin itong bundat
na bundat na buwaya na it o at n a pakalaki na ng k u r a kot."
(2016 Bar Exam) The crime of libel is committed. Journalists
bear Le b u r den of writ ing responsibly when practicing their
profession, even when writing about public figures or matters
of public interest. The articles are wild accusations. He had
written a n d p u b l i shed t h e s u b ject a r t i cles with r e ckless
disregard of whether the same were false or not. (Erwin Tulfo
v. People, supra)
In Manila Bu l l etin Pu,blishing Corporation v. Domingo,
G.R. No. 170341, Jul y 5 , 2 0 17, th e a r t i cle wa s m erely a
factual report w h ich w'as based on the l etter of th e W ar ay
employees. The statements on the "l o usy performance" and
"mismanagement" of private complainant as a DTI officer are
matters of public interest as these relate to his moral conduct,
his capacity to lead the DTI em ployees, and to manage and
supervise the affairs. of the office. These statements undoubtedly
make it to the grade of qualified privileged communication and
thus, would require actual malice to be actionable. Failure of
the ieporter to counter-check the status of the complaints by
the Waray employees, which was already dismissed, cannot
be corsidered asenough reason to hold him liable. A reporter
may rely on i n formation given by a l one source although it
reflectsonly one side of the story provided the reporter does
not entertaina high degree ofawareness of its probable falsity.
 800 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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Complainant had the burden of proving actual malice or that
the reporter had entertained awareness as to the probable
falsehood of the complaints against him.
2. Pu b l i c F i g u r e —The doctrine in Su l i v an v. New York
Times covers statements concerning public f igures regardless of
whether or not t hey are government officials. (Lopez v. The Hon.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-26549, July 81, 1970) A public figure
has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame,
or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives
the public a legitimate interest in hi s doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a "public personage." He is, in other words, a
celebrity. (Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82880
and 82898, April 29, 1988) Public figures include those, who thrust
themselves to th e f orefront of p a r t i cular p u blic controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either
event, they invite attention and comment. (Yuchengco v. Alfonso,
supra)
Fair c omment p r i n c i ple i s n o t a p p l i cable t o d e f a matory
statement against public figure if the same is not related to his works
as a public figure. In Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28,
2008, Cristy F er min i m p u ted t o A n n abelle Rama Gu ti errez, an
actress,the crime of malversation and of vices or defects for being
fugitives from the law and of being a wastrel. The doctrine of fair
comment as a defense in libel is not applicable. It is un r elated to
public figure's work. The defamatory imputation has nothing to do
with the works of Annabelle as an actress.
I n her w e ekly g ossip column i n a t a b l o id, G igi w r ot e a n
unflattering article about Pablo, a f amous singer, and hi s b i t t er
separation from his wife. The article portrayed Pablo as an abusive
husband and caused him to lose lucrative endorsement contracts.
(2018 Bar E x am) Th e d efamatory p ublication is n ot c o vered by
privileged communication because Gigi was attacking the personal
life of Pablo as a husband and not his public life as a famous singer.
Other view: This is covered by privileged communication since the
column has something to do with circumstance that caused a famous
actor to lose lucrative endorsement.
In Eliseo Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 225010, November 21,
2018, the accused Soriano,through a religious radio program,
"Ang Da t in g D a a n," u t t e r ed t h e w o r d s "gago," "tarantadong
pastor," "pastor ng d emonyo iyan," "bulaang propeta," w h ich i s
directed against Wilde Almeda of the Jesus Miracle Crusade. Fair
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 801
commertary i s a q u a l i f ied p r i v i l eged communication. However,
though religion is arguably a mat:er or subject of public interest,
there is no standard by which it can be declared that the subject
defamatory statements are fair commentaries. On their own, the
words used by the accused do notappear to debunk the purported
falsities in th e preaching of JM CIM bu t a c tually t o degrade and
insult their pastor or founder, Almeda. Moreover, such defamatory
statements are not protected by the Constitution because plain and
simple insul-.s directed at another person cannot be elevated to the
status of religious speech.
3. P ub l i c A s p i r an t — F a ir c o m m entary o n c o n d uct o f
aspirant ofe ective or appointive ofhce, and upon his mental, moral,
and physical fitness for the same is a privileged communication. The
public has a. right to be informed as to the qualifications of those who
seek election or appointment, and thus, such comment may lawfully
be made by tnepublic press. In the absence of proof of actual malice,
such comment and criticism should be presumed to have been made
for justifiable motives. (U.S. v. Sedano, G.R. No. 4998, October 25,
1909)
Lando and Marco are candidates in the local elections. In his
speeches Lar.do attacked his opponent Marco stating therein that he
had charged ~ando of estafa through falsification in the Ombudsman
so much so that since his (Lando's] integrity is doubtful he should
not be elected.Marco is not liable for grave oral defamation. This is
a fair comment on the moral fitness of Marco as candidate, which
is based on the fact that a complaint for estafa for falsification was
filedagainst him. (1990 Bar Exam)
In Baguio Midland Courier v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 107566,
November 25, 2004, defendant published an article that plaintiff, a
candidate for mayor, has not also paid their medical services with
doctors and that since he is donating millions, he should settle his
small debts. Defendant's article constitutes a fair comment on a
matter of publicinterest as it dealt with the character of private
respondent vrho was running for th e top elective post in B a guio
City at the time. Considering that private respondent assured his
would-be constituents that he would be donating millions of his own
money, said column with respect to pl aintiffsindebtedness provided
the public with information as regards his financial status which, in
all probability, was still unknown tc them at that time.
Defama.ory comment or criticism on aspirant of public office
may constituce a criminal libel if it appears that it was actuated by
 802 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
actual orexpress malice. From the very nature of this privilege the
freedom of such criticism is necessarily limited to fair comment on
the matters under discussion, fair comment being comment which is
true, or which, if false, expresses the real opinion of the author, such
opinion having been formed with a reasonable degree of care and on
reasonable grounds. Moreover, such criticism cannot be permitted
to be used as acloak for malicious assaults on the private life and
character of the person criticized. (U.S. v. Sedano, G.R. No. 4998,
October 25, 1909)
The Sedano doctrine on fair commentary on aspirant of public
position is subject to the New York Times doctrine. (Baguio Midland
Courier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107566, November 25, 2004) In
sum, the commentary on aspirant of elective or appointive position
i s a privileged communication even if th e same is un t r u t h fu l a s
long as accused does not know that the comment is false or has not
recklessly disregarded knowing whether it is false or not.
A w a s n o m i n ated a s D e p a r t m en t S e cretary. W h i l e t h e
Commission on Appointments was considering the nomination, B
caused to be published in the newspapers a statement objecting to
A's appointment with allegation that A was a drug dependent, that
he had several mistresses, and that he was corrupt. As a result of the
publication, the nomination was not confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. Since A is being considered for confirmation of his
appointment, his moral, mental, and physical fitness for the public
trust is a public concern. Hence, B is not liable for libel unless his
imputation of immorality, corruption, and drug dependency is false
and he recklessly disregarded knowing whether it i s f alse or not.
(2002 Bar Exam)
In Villavicencio v. Nonato, G.R. No. 8768, January 26, 1915,
defendants, members of the municipal council, publish a resolution
stating that th e p l aintiff, wh o was seeking to be appointed to a
judicial position, is immoral and devoted himself the prosecution
of unjust suits. The libelous publication was inspired by express
malice. The defendants failed to establish the truth of these charges,
and they merely acted based on rumors and hearsay. They did not
exert genuine effort to verify them. They were held civilly liable for
damage.
In Vi l l a v icencio case, defendants r ecklessly dis regarded of
knowing whether the defamatory imputation is false or not.
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 803
Fair and True Report and Fair Commentary
The differences between fair and true report under Article 354
of Revised Penal Code, and fair comment under the Sulivan, v. New
York Times doctrine as privileged communications are as follows:
1. I n f a i r a n d t r u e r eport, the accused makes a report on
o fficial proceedings, which are not confidential i n n a t ur e or t h e
function-related acts p erformed b y p u b li c of ficers w i t h o ut a n y
comments or remarks. (People v. Rico, 8 C.A. Rep. 225,'~
In fair commentaries, the accused is making a comment on the
function-related acts performed by public officers, public figures or
public aspirants.
2. In fair and true report,the report of the proceeding or
function related acts invo ving defamatory statement must be true.
(Macleod v. Phili opine Publishing Company, G.R. No. 4841, January
8, 1909)
In f ai r c o m m entary, t h e d e f a m atory i m p u t a tion i n th e
commentary may' be false but the accused has no knowledge that
it is false and has not rccklessly disregarded to knew whether it
is false or not. Only false statements made with the high c.egree of
awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times
may b t h e s u bject of either civil or c r i m i nal sanctions. (Flor v .
People, G.R. No, 189987, March 81, 2005)
3. F a i r a n d t rue r p ort and fair commentaries are qualified
privileged communications. Hence, the accused can still b e h eld
liable for libel if actual malice is shown.
In fair a nc. true r eport, actual m a lice (Article 862) " an b e
established by showing tl at the report was not made in good faith.
(Article 854)
In fair c ommentaries, actual m a l ice can be established by
showing that the comment was not made in good faith or was made
with k n owledge that i t w a s f a lse or w i t h r e ckless disregard of
knowing whether it was false or not. (Guingguing v. Ho@,. Court of
Appe
ases, G.R. No. 128959. September 80, 2005)
Good Motive and Tru t h f u lness
Proof of good intention or motive and justifiable ends and/or
truthfulness of the imputation is a defense in defamation.
 804 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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1. G o o d M o t i v e —Publishing defamatory imputation with
good motives and j ustifiable ends is a defense in defamation. Under
Article 354, defamatory imputation is not presumed to be malicious
if it is shown that there is good intention and justifiable motive for
making it. Truthfulness of the imputation is not required to cause
the acquittal of the accused in the crime of defamation.
In People v. Ch avez, 5 3 O .G. 8886, imputation m a de by a
n urse upon complainant t hat h e ha s contaminated his wife wi t h
venereal disease as a precautionary measure to prevent further
contamination, is in the nature of privileged communication. Since
it was made with good intention and justifiable motive, the nurse
i s not liable for l i bel. I n t h i s case, there is no showing that t h e
complainant is suffering from venereal disease.
In Eliseo Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 225010, November 21,
2018, the accused Soriano, through a religious radio program, "Ang
Dating D a an," ut t e red t he w o r ds "g a go," "tarantadong pastor,"
"pastor ng d emonyo iyan," "bulaang propeta," wh ich is d i r e cted
against W i ld e A l m eda o f t h e J e su s M i r a cle C r u sade. Accused
claimed that his motive was harken to other religious leaders not
to use the institution of r eligion in a m a n ner t hat w ould subject
religion to public distrust and disdain. Such motive does not make
his statements justified. Moreover, the defamatory statement does
not reveal such alleged motive.
2. Go o d M o t i v e a nd T r u t h f u l n ess —
The defense of good
motive and justifiable in defamation will be further strengthened by
proof of truthfulness of the published defamatory imputation. Under
Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, in every criminal prosecution
for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it
appears thatthe matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover,
that it was published with good motives and forjustifiable ends, the
defendants shall be acquitted.
8. T ru t h f u l n ess —
Without good motives and for justifiable
ends in publishing defamatory statements, proof of truthfulness of
the same is not a defense. (Alonzo v. CA, G.R. No. 110088, February
1, 1995) Under Article 361, proof of the tr uth of an i m putation of
an act or omission shall not generally be admitted. Under Arti cle
354, even if a defamatory imputation is true, it is presumed to be
malicious, if there is no showing of good intention and justifiable
motive for making it.
Publishing that X is mentally retarded and making fun out of
his mental condition constitute the crime of libel. Offering evidence
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 805
that X is in fact mentally retarded shall not be admitted. Without
good motive for publishing his mental condition, the defamatory
imputation, even though it is true, is presumed to be malicious.
However, t h er e a r e e x c eptions. P r oof o f t r u t h f u l ness of
imputation.of a crime or a function-related defamatory act against
a public officer is a defense even though he does not prove that the
imputation was pu b l ished with g o od m otives and f or j u s t ifiable
ends. (Vasquez v. CA, G.R No. 118971, September 15, 1999) Under
Article 361, proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission
constituting a r i m e , or imputation against government employees
with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties
shall be admitted; and in such cases if the defendant proves the
truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
In the crime of libel, truth is not an absolute defense. But such
truthfulness of the defamatory statement can be considered as a
defense in the following circumstances: (1) the publication of the
defamatory but t r u t h ful st atements was made with good motives
and for justifiable ends; or (2) the publication of defamatory but
truthful statements pertains to a cr ime or a f u n ction-related act
made by a public officer. (2009 Bar Exam)
a. I m pu t a t i on of Crime —
Proof of the truthof an imputation
of an act or omission constituting a crime shall be admitted. In such
case if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by
him, he shall be acquitted. (Article 361) This is a defense regardless
of whether the person tc whom the crime was imputed is a public
officer or a private person. For example, A published in a newspaper
that B killed C. In a libel case, A will be allowed to present witnesses
and evidence that B in f act killed C I f t h e re is proof that B re ally
killed C, A v-il: be acquitted. Even if A. is an enemy of B, aiid thus,
the publicatiori was made out of hate, just the same A is not liable
for libel.
b. I m p u t a t i o n o f F u n c t i on-related Act — P roof of t h e
truth of an imputation made against government employees with
respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties shall
be admitted. In such case if the defendant proves the truth of the
imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted. (Article 361) This
is a defense "egardless o:" whether the function-related act imputed
upon the publi" officer constitutes a crime or not.(2019 Bar Exam)
A rule placing on tl e accused the burden of showing the truth
of allegations cf official misconduct and good motives and justifiable
 806 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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e nds for making such allegations would not only b e contrary t o
Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe
on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a
rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members
of a self-governing community. (Flor v. People, G.R. No. 18998'7,
March 81, 2005)
Sam wrote a letter to his friends stating that Judge Odon loves
obscene magazines and keeps these in his desk. Charged with libel,
Sam cannot present proof that J u dge Odon indeed loves obscene
magazines and keeps these in his desk because he does not impute a
crime toJudge Odon or a defamatory act related to the discharge of
his duties. (2011 Bar Exam)
D efamat ion A g a i nst P u b l i c O f f i cer an d P r i v a t e I n d i v i d u a l
Whether the person defamed is a p r i v ate individual, public
figure, public aspirant or a public officer, malice as an element of
libel is presumed if the statement published is defamatory. Under
Article 854 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true. The rule on presumption
on the existence of malice appliesregardless of the status of the
person defamed. Article 854 has not m ade a distinction between
defaming a private individual and defaming a public officer or public
figure. Hence, the court must not make a distinction.
However, the defense in libel where the person defamed is a
public officer or public figure is different from that where the one
defamed is a private individual.
Whether the person defamed is a p r i v ate individual, public
officer or public figure, the accused can avail the following defenses:
1 . P r o o f o f g o o d i n t e n t io n a n d j u s t i fi abl e m o t iv e f o r
publishing defamatory statement against the former (Article 854).
This proof will overcome the presumption of malice.
2. P r o o f of th e t r ut h of an i m p u t ation of a crime. (Article
861)
If the person defamed is public officer, the accused can avail
the following additional defenses:
1 . P r o o f t hat th e defamatory imputation is a fair and tr u e
report an act performed by publicofficers in the exercise of their
functions, which is made in good faith, and without any comments or
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 807
remarks. (Article 854) A fair and true report containing defamatory
i mputation i s a p r i v i l ege communication w h er e m a l ice i s n o t
presumed;
2. Pr c o f of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission by
government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge
of their duties. In such cases, if the defendant proves the truth of the
imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted; and (Article 861)
3. D e f e nse o f f a i r c o m m entaries, w h ich i s a p r i v i l e ge
communication, where malice is not presumed.
If the person defamed is a public aspirant or public figure, the
accused can avail ofthe additional defense of fair commentaries,
which is a privilege communication.
Where tne offended party is a public official (or a public figure),
the defense of absence of actual malice in m a k ing a d efamatory
c omment is available even when th e st atement t u n s ou t t o b e
f alse unless the offender makes the defamatory statement w i t h
the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of knowing
whether it was false or not. %'here the offended party is a private
individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice.
The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the
defamatory character ofthe assailed statement. For his defense,
t he accused must show t hat h e h a s a j u s t i fiable reason for t h e
defamatory statement even if it was in fact true. (Disini v. Secretary
of Jt stice, G.R. No. 208885, February 18, 2014)
In Philippine J'ournalists, Inc. v. Thoenen, G.R. No. 148372,
December 18,2005, a reporter published an articleregarding the acts
of a Swiss national in shooting pets in BF Homes and the complaint
against him by BF Homes residents for deportation through lawyer
Atty. Efren Angara. The report is based on the letter of a certain
Atty. Efren Angara. However, it was established by evidence that
the report is not true. Libel is not a protected speech. A newspaper or
broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual,
who is neither a public official nor a public figure, may not claim a
constitutional privilege against liability for injury infiicted, even if
the falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest.
Without verifying the information given by a complainant, a
commentator in his TV program urged the closure by the authorities
of RX Hospital for denying medical assistance to a dying child simply
because the mother could not give cash deposit. He added that the
said hospital even refused to accept a check. It turned out, however,
 808 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
that th e st ory wa s w r o ng. Th e sick ch il d w a s n ever i n c r i t i cal
condition, and th ere was no check involved in t h e i n cident. The
commentator is liable for libel. Report on matter of public interest
involving the conduct of private person (such a private corporation)
published by a j ournalist w i t h out v erifying first th e t r u t h f ulness
thereof islibel and not a protected speech ifthe same turned out to
be false maliceis presumed from the defamatory character of the
published report. (1984 Bar Exam)
Defensive Libel
In order to justify homicide on the ground of self-defense, it is
essential that the attack upon the defendant be simultaneous with
the killing, or succeeded the latter without appreciable interval of
time. (U.S. v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 60, November 8, 1901) But in defense
of honor, a person libeled may hit back with another libel even if
there is an appreciable interval of time between the aggressive libel
and defensive libel. Once the aspersion is cast upon the good name
of a person, its sting clings and the one defamed may avail himself
of all necessary means to shake it off. He may hit back with another
libel, which, if adequate, will be justified. (People v. Chua Hiong,
fC.A.J 51 O.G. 1982)
X a Senator, filed a f ormal complaint against A, a C abinet
official, with the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee in connection with
A's alleged anomalous acquisitions of p u b li c w o rk s e q uipment,
which complaint was played up in the press. Two days after, a press
release was issued by A , p u b l i shed i n t h e m e t r opolitan dailies,
depicting X as a "consistent li ar," as having prostituted his high
public office for pecuniary gains, and as having committed certain
serious offenses in violation of R.A. No. 3019. Upon complaint of X,
A was charged with libel. (1974 Bar Exam) The defamatory charge
against A regarding an anomalous transaction being investigated
by the Senate is protected by the privileged communication. Hence,
it does neither constitute l i bel no r u n l a wful l i b elous aggression
for purposes of defensive libel. Hence, A cannot invoke justifying
circumstance of defense of honor for making defamatory statement
against X since the element of unlawful libelous aggression is not
present. A's imputations against X were neither made privately nor
officially; hence, they are not qualified privileged communication
under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. (Antonino v. Valencia,
G.R. No. L-26526, May 27, 1974)
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 809
In defensive libel, the means employed by the accused must be
reasonably necessary to restore his ruined reputation or honor and
not just to retaliate by ruining also the reputation of the aggressor.
Example: A, after alighting from a rig, went in front of the home of
B, C, and D, the three defendants, and in the heat of anger, shouted
at them the following words: "You pimp, women of ill repute, thieves,
paramours of my husband."To which B answered back, saying: 'You
are a woman of the street, you smell bad, and your money was stolen
from the PCAU."The other defendant C retorted: "You are shameless,
blackmailer, murderer." And the t h i rd d efendant D re p lied: 'You
have a thick face, you are not legally married, you are the paramour
of Father Baluyut." It was held: The defendants let loose a barrage
of insults upon A, imputing immorality, unchastity, dishonesty and
criminality which were not fair answers to A's lambaste and were
absolutely unrelated to her imputations upon them. Retaliation or
vindictiveness can hardly be a basis of self-defense. The answering
of libel may be justified, if it is adequate; and it is inadequate when
the answer is unnecessarily scurrilous. (People v. Rayo, C.A., 58 O.G.
8618; 2011 Bar Exam) However, A is also liable for oral defamation.
In Chua Hi o ng supra, the private complainant caused to be
published in t h e M a n il a C h r onicle an a r t i cle entitled "Doubtful
Citizenship." In the said article, the private complainant made to
appear that accused in his petitionfor naturalization obtained a
decision on the basis of questionable pieces of evidence. Thereafter,
accused published a statement to the effect that private complainant
instigated investigations in different government agencies against
the accused because of his prosecution mania and in the spirit of
revenge and t ha t t h e p r i v ate complainant wa s th e m astermind
behind the threatening letter of B.S. sent to the accused. Accused
was acquitted because of the justifying circumstance of defense of
honor. Note: The libelous means employed by accused is reasonably
necessary to neutralizethe effect of the libelous article entitled
" Doubtful C i t i zenship." Th e s u bject st atement wa s i n t ended t o
counteract the impression left in the mind of the public by the article
"Doubtful Citizenship."
Venue for Written Defamation
Before Article 360 of Revised Penal Code was amended, the
rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any
jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where i t w a s w r i t ten or p r i n t ed. Experience had
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shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the
accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in
a remote or distant place. To forestall such harassment, R.A. No.
4368, which amended the Code, lays down specific rules as to the
venue of the criminal action so as to prevent harassment arising
from out-of-town libel suits. (People v. Macasaet, G.R No. 196094,
March 5, 2018)
Under Article 360 of th e R evised Penal Code, the criminal
action for "written defamation" may be filed in the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published. However,
t here is a second option. Criminal action may be instituted at th e
province or city where offended private individual actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense; or at the province, city
or at Manila where offended public officer held office at the time of
the commission of the offense. In all cases, the criminal action shall
be filed in the Regional Trial Court.
If theoffended party is a public officer, the place ofhis residence
shall not be considered as a venue for libel. (1966 Bar Exam)
The words "written defamation" in Art i c le 360 is not confined
to libel committed by written means but it includes libel by radio or
other similar means. To interpret otherwise is to defeat the purpose
of the law, and that is, to prevent inconvenience or harassment to
the accused if the complainant can choose a place where he was
defamed as a venue for a libel case anywhere in the Philippines in
case the publication is made nationwide. (Bocobo v. Estanislao, G.R.
No. L-30458, August 81, 1978)
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal
action for written defamation, the complaint or information should
contain allegations as t o w h e ther, a t t h e t i m e t h e o f fense was
c ommitted, the offended party w a s a p u b li c officer or a p r i v a t e
individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever
possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and
first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be
a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed
and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.
(Agbayaniv.Sayo, G.R. No. L-47880, April 80, 1979)
T he I n f ormation i s q u a s hable f o r i m p r o per v e n ue. T h e
allegations in the Information, that "Panay News, a daily publication
with a considerable circulation in th e City of I l oilo," only showed
that Iloilo was th e place where Panay News had a c onsiderable
J9JC9B0M
XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 811
c irculation bu t d i d n o t e s t ablish t ha t t h e s ai d p u b lication w a s
printed and first published in Iloilo City. The Information failed to
allege the residence of complainant. While the Information alleges
that complainant is a physician in Iloilo City, such allegation did not
clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo
City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that
the complainant was actually residing in another place. (Foz, Jr. v.
People, supra)
Information alleged that the publisher and writer of Malaya
with address at Port Area, Manila City defamed private complainant
by writing and publishing a defamatory article in the Malaya. The
Port Area, Manila is the editorial and business offices of Malaya.
T his is a c o m pliance wit h t h e r u l e r e q uir in g a l l egation i n t h e
information ofthe place where the alleged defamatory article was
p rinted and first published. The Information need not parrot th e
provisions of Article 860 of the RPC and expressly use the phrase
"printed and first published." If there is no dispute that the place
of publication indicated in the Information is the place where the
alleged defamatory article was "printed and first published," then
the law is substantially complied with. After all, the filing of the
Information before the Regional Trial C ourt w o uld f orestall any
inclination to h a r ass the accused. (People v. Macasaet, G.R. No.
196094, March 5, 201 8)
The place where libelous article was accessed by the offended
party in the Internet is not equivalent to the place where the libelous
article is printed and first published within th e contemplation of
the rule on venue under Article 860 of the Revised Penal Code. To
rule otherwise is to allow the evil sought to be prevented by th e
amendment to A r t i cl e 860, an d t h a t w a s t h e i n d iscriminate or
arbitrary laying of the venue in l ibel cases in distant, isolated or
far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or
intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation
becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of
sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or
the need for revenge. To equate the "first access to the defamatory
article on website" with "printing and first publication of the article"
would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 860 of the
Revised Penal Code sought to discourage and prevent. It h a r dly
requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in
situations where the website's author or writer, a blogger or anyone
who posts messages therein could be sued for l ibel anywhere in
 812 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
the Philippines that th e p r i v ate complainant may h ave allegedly
accessed the offending website. At any rate, Article 360 still allows
the offended party to file the civil or criminal complaint for Internet
libel in t h ei r r e spective places of r esidence. (Bonifacio v. R T C ,
Makati, Branch 149, G.R. No. 184800,May 5, 2010)
PRIVATE LIBEL
Under Ar t i cle 860 of t h e R evised Penal Code, no criminal
action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime
which cannot be prosecuted de officio shall be brought except at the
instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.
The statement "no criminal a ction for defamation" indicates
that it applies to all kinds of defamation including oral defamation.
(Campita v. Aquilino, G.R. No. L-20228, November 28, 1964)
Under Article 844, the crimes, which cannot be pr o secuted
de officio, are adultery, concubinage, seduc'tion, abduction, or acts
o f lasciviousness. In sum, l i bel or o ra l d efamation involving t h e
imputation of private crime such as adultery is also a private crime,
which cannot be prosecuted de officio. On the other hand, libel or
oral defamation involving imputation of public crime such as rape,
theft or prostitution is also a public crime, which can be prosecuted
de officio. (1958 and 1969 Bar Exams)
A lthough t h e i mp u t a t io n o f p r o s t i t u t io n i n c l u de s t h e
imputation of adultery since the offended party is a married woman,
the criminal action may still be instit uted without her complaint
b ecause public i n t erest, w h ich i s a l w ay s p a r amount t o p r i v a t e
interest, so requires. Oral defamation involving the imputation of
prostitution is a public crime; hence, it can be prosecuted de officio.
(People v. Orcullo, G.R. No. L-57108, January 80, 1982)
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 08-2008
Re: Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases
The Supreme Court imposed fine with subsidiary imprisonment
for libel because: (1) accused wrote the libelous article merely to
defend his honor (Sazon v. Court of Appeals, 825 Phil. 1058,~; (2)
the crime was committed in th e h eat of anger (Ma ri v. Co urt o f
Appeals, supra); (8) the crime was committed in the heat of passion
J9JC9B0M
XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 818
during the election period (Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
118757, 121571, November 11, 2005); and (4) the accused is a first
time offender and he merely believe that he was exercising a civic
or moral duty. (Buatis, Jr. v. People, G.R No. 142509,March 24,
2006)
On January 25, 2008, the Supreme Court issued Administrative
Circular No . 0 8-2008, entitled Gu i d elines in t h e O b servance of
a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases,
which expresses a preference for the imposition of a fine rather than
imprisonment, given the circumstances attendant in Sa zon case,
Mari case, Brillante case and Buatis case in which only a fine was
imposed by this Court on those convicted of libel. It also states that,
if the penalty imposed is merely a fine but the convict is unable to
pay the same, the Revised Penal Code's provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment should apply. However, the Circular likewise allows
the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, the option to impose
imprisonment as penalty, whenever the imposition of a fine alone
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice.
(Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157648, March 28, 2008)
In Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People, G.R. No. 194214, January
10, 2018, pursuant to th e policy in A .C. No. 08-08, the Supreme
Court finds that the imposition of a fine, instead of imprisonment,
is sufficient. It i s n oteworthy that accused is a first-time offender
with no other criminal record under her name. Further, the degree
of publication is not that wi despread considering that the libelous
letter was circulated only to a few individuals.
SLANDER BY DEED
Slander by deed is the performance of an act not punishable
as other crime against honor, which shall cast dishonor, discredit,
or contempt upon another person. (Article 859 of the Revised Penal
Code)
The elements are: (1) that the offender performs any act not
i ncluded in an y o t her c r im e against honor; (2) that s uch act i s
performed in the presence of other person or persons; and (8) that
such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended
party. (Valanueva v. People, G.R. No. 160851, April 10, 2006)
 814 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
Slanderous Actions
Slander by deed is libelcommitted by actions rather than
words. The most common examples are slapping someone or spitting
on his/her face in front of the public market, in full view of a crowd,
thus casting dishonor, discredit, and contempt u pon th e p erson
of another; pointing a di rt y fi n g er, which ordinarily connotes the
phrase "Fuck You," to a lady-mayor in front of several persons in the
municipal building. (Villanueva v. People, supra)
Publicity
Publicity is an element of slander by deed since it is a specie
of libel. Without p u blicity, th e cr ime committed is either u n j u st
vexation, maltreatment or slight physical injuries.
Serious or Simple Slander by Deed
If slander by deed is of serious nature, the penalty is higher.
Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a
serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended
party, the circumstances under which the act was committed, the
occasion, etc. (Villanueva v. People, supra )
P ushing an d s l a pping a w o m a n i n o r d e r t o r i d i c ule a n d
shame her before other people (People v. Delfin, 112 Phil. 807), or
slapping a woman during a meeting of corporate officers without
provocation constitutes serious slander by deed. (Teodoro v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 108174, July 11, 1996) Banging of a chair in
front of complainant and choking her i n t h e p r esence of several
persons is serious slander by deed. But in view of the fact that the
offense was done in the heat of anger and in reaction to a perceived
provocation, the Court opted to impose the penalty of fine instead
of imprisonment. (Mari v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 127694, May
81, 2000) However,"poking of the dirty-finger," triggered by refusal
to sign the application for monetization, constitutes simple slander
by deed even though the offended party is a vice mayor and a lady.
(Villanueva v. People, supra)
Maltreatment, Slander by Deed and Di r ect Assault
Ill-treating a n o t he r b y de e d w i t h o u t c a u s in g i n j u r y i s
maltreatment under Article 266(3) of the Revised Penal Code.
However, if the maltreatment casts dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon another person, the crime committed is slander by deed. (1994
Bar Exam)
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 815
If there is no showing that t h e m o t ive of th e defendant in
maltreating the teacher and the fact that th e act was committed
publicly, the crime committed is maltreatment and not slander by
deed. (People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-89275, December 20, 1988)
H owever, holding the h air o f a s chool teacher and shaking hi m
violently i n t h e p r e sence of school children an d o t her t eachers
constitute slander by deed and not m a l t reatment because of the
nature and effects of the maltreatment inflicted upon him and the
nature of his position. (People v. Velez, G.R. No. 42234, August 81,
1984)
If the maltreatment (such hitting her twice on the face with his
raincoat and violently pushing her to the window) is committed while
the teacher is engaged in the actual performance of professional
duty orby reason of past performance of professional duty, the crime
committed is direct assault qualified by the circumstance of laying
of hands. (Sarcepuedes v. People, G.R. No. L-8857, October 22, 1951)
Less Serious Injuries and Slander by Deed
I f two f elonies would otherwise have been covered by t h e
definition of a complex crime under Article 48, but the Code imposes
a single penalty for these crimes, it cannot be punished as a complex
crime ortwo separate crimes. Since there issingle penalty prescribed
by law for these two crimes, it shall be treated as one. Thus, even
where a single act results in less grave felonies of serious physical
injuries and serious slander by deed, the same shall not be punished
as a complex crime under Ar t i cle 48 but as less serious physical
injuries with ignominy under the second paragraph of Article 265.
Slander by deed shall be considered as ignominy, which is an element
of qualified less serious physical injuries. (People v. Malinao, G.R.
¹. 1 2 8 148,February 16, 2004)
Unjust Vexation and Slander by Deed
T he common denominator p r esent i n u n j ust v e xation a n d
slander by d eed i s i r r i t a t ion o r a n n oyance. Without an y o t h er
concurring factor, th e offense would b e m erely u n j ust v exation
because unjust vexation is equated with anything that annoys or
irritates another without justification. If in addition to the irritation
or annoyance, there w er e a t t endant p u b licity a n d d i s honor or
contempt, the offense would be slander by deed. (People v. Motita,
CA 59 O.G. 3020; Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis Reyes)
A disliked the long hair that his brother, B, was sporting. One
night, while B was asleep, A cut short his brother's hair. A is liable
 816 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
for unjust vexation. (1975 Bar Exam) A, a single man being jealous
of B, his fiancee, cuts her hair off, shaving her head entirely. Her
bald condition w il l s u r ely expose her t o h u m i l i a tion an d p u blic
ridicule. Hence, the crime committed is slander by deed 'Dec. Sup.
Ct. Spain, April 18, 1896;1947 Bar Exam) or psychological violence
against woman under R.A. No. 9262.
THREATENING TO PUBLISH LIBEL
Threatening t o p u b l is h l i b el is c o m m i t t ed b y t h r e a tening
another to publish a l ibel concerning him or th e parents, spouse,
child, or other members of his family.
Offer to prevent publication of libel is committed by offering to
prevent publication of libel concerning him or the parents, spouse,
child, or other members of his family for a compensation or money
consideration, (Article 86'5)
The crime of threatening to publish a libel is punished in the
United States by the law on blackmailing and extortion. Blackmail
may be defined asany unlawful extortion of money by an appeal to
the fears ofthe victim, especially extortion of money by threats of
accusation or exposure. (U.S. v. Eguia, G.R. No. L-18540, October
24, 1917)
PROHIBITED PUBLICATION
Prohibited publication is committed by a r e porter, editor, or
manager of a newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall publish facts
connected with the private life of another and offensive to the honor,
virtue, and r e putation of s ai d p erson. Thi s cr ime i s c ommitted
even though said publication be made in connection with or under
the pretextthat it is necessary in the narration of any judicial or
administrative proceedings. (Article 857 of the Revised Penal Code)
The provisions of Article357 constitute the so-called "Gag
Law." Newspaper reports on cases pertaining to adultery, divorce,
or issues about the legitimacy of children will necessarily be barred
from publication. (Revised Penal Code by Luis Reyes)
INCRIMINATING AN INNOCENT PERSON
Incriminating a n i n n ocent person i s committing an a ct n o t
constituting perjury, which directly incriminates or imputes to an
innocent person the commission of a crime. (Article 86'4)
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XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 817
Not Constituting Perjur y
The provision o n i n c r i m i n atin g a n i n n o cent p e rson d oes
not contemplate th e i dea of m a l i cious prosecution in t h e s ense
of someone prosecuting or instigating a criminal charge in court.
It refers to the acts of "planting evidence" and the like, which do
not in themselves constitute false prosecution but tend directly to
cause false prosecutions. (Campanano v. Datuin, G.R. No. 172142,
October 17, 2007) Filing of criminal complaint against the offended
party without justifiable cause or motive, causing the same to be
prosecuted, and testifying falsely as w i t ness for th e p r osecution
do not constitute incriminating an i n nocent person since the law
expressly excludes perjury as a means of committing incriminating
innocent person. (Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 80 ,
1971)
Planting Incrim i n atory Evidence
As a g eneral r u le, p l antin g o f e v i dence to i n criminate an
innocent person constitutes the crime of incriminating an innocent
person under Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code. However, if the
incriminatory evidence planted is dangerous drugs or unauthorized
explosives, loose firearm, the crime committed is planting of evidence
under Section 29 of R.A. No. 9165 for the dangerous drug, Section
4-A of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 9516 for the explosive
arid Section 38of R.A. No. 10591 forloose firearm.
Planting of evidence is the willful act by any person of maliciously
and surreptitiously inserting, placing, adding or attaching directly
or indirectly, th r ough any overt o r c overt act, dangerous drugs,
explosive, or loose firearm or its ammunition in the person, house,
effects or in the immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the
purpose of implicating, incriminating, or imputing the commission
of crime involving dangerous drugs, explosive, or loose firearm or
its ammunition. (Section 8 of R.A. No. 9165, Section 4-A of P.D. No.
1866, and Section 88 of R.A. ¹. 10 591)
Complex Crime
As a rule, illegally arresting a person, which is not based on
probable cause, by a public officer is arbitrary detention. However,
arbitrary detention can only be committed by a public officer in pursuit
of their duty to arrest. Hence, arbitrary detention is committed if
police officer arrested the victim without probable cause for purposes
of investigating him. (U.S. v. Hawchaiv, G.R. No. L-6909, February
 818 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
VOLUME II
20, 1912) or bringing him to the proper investigating authority (U.S.
v. Gellada, G.R. No. L-5151, January 31, 1910) If the police officer
arrested the victim without probable cause for purposes of planting
incriminatory evidence and to make a judicial delivery, the crime
committed is incriminating an i n nocent person through unlawful
arrest. (People v. Alagao, G.R No. L-20721, April 30, 1966) It is not
the duty ofthe police to arrest a person for purposes of planting
incriminatory evidence. He committed the crime of unlawful arrest
in his private capacity.
A surreptitiously placed a firearm in t h e p r e mises of B a n d
informed the police against B for illegal possession of firearm. The
crime committed is planting of evidence. (1950 Bar Exam)
If u n l a w fu l a r r es t i s c o m m i t t e d t o p l a n t i n c r i m i n atory
evidence, the crime committed is complex crime of incriminating
innocent person through unlawful ar r est. (People v. Alagao, G.R.
No. L-20721, April 30, 1966) If i n c riminatory evidence is planted
to justify an unlawful arrest, the crime committed is complex crime
of unlawful arrest through incriminating an i nnocent person. But
if the incriminatory evidence are dangerous drugs, explosive or
loose firearm, unlawful arrest and planting of evidence are separate
crimes. Complex crime is not committed since planting of evidence,
which is punishable under special law, cannot be made a component
of acomplex crime.
Stealing property and planting the stolen property to impute
t o the v i c ti m t h e c r i m e o f t h e f t c o n stitutes complex cr im e o f
incriminating an innocent person through theft.
Planting of live bullet by NAIA personnel to extort money from
a passenger ofan airline constitutes separate crimes of planting of
evidence and consummated or attempted robbery.
Malicious Prosecution and In cr i m i n a t ory M a ch in ation
M alicious prosecution an d i n c r i m i n atory m a chinations ar e
distinguished as follows (1972 Bar Exam):
1. M al i c i ous prosecution is embodied in Ar t i cle 326 of the
Spanish Penal Code of 1887. Article 326 of the Spanish Penal Code
"does not appear in t h e R evised Penal Code, which contains no
offense denominated 'acusacion o denuncia falsa'or its equivalent."
(Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971) Incriminatory
machination, which includes incriminating an innocent person and
J9JC9B0M
XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 819
intriguing against honor, is a felony under the Revised Penal Code.
(1969 Bar Exam)
2. Pe r s ons wh o c ommitted m a licious prosecution can b e
held liable for perjury, false testimony or offering false testimony. In
incriminating an innocent person, the act committed by the offender
to incriminate an innocent person must not constitute perjury.
3. U n d e r Ar t i cle 326 of the former Penal Code, the gravamen
of the malicious prosecutior is the imputation itself when made before
an administrative or judicial officer, whereas in Article 363 of the
Revised Penal Code, the gravamen of incriminatory machinations
is performing an act which tends directly to such an imputation.
Article 326 o f t h e o l d P e nal C ode p u ni shes false prosecutions
whereas Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any act
which may tend directly to cause a false prosecution. (Ventura v.
Bernabe, supra.)
Note: For purposes of a civil case, it is irrelevant that there is
no sucl crime of malicious prosecution in the Revised Penal Code.
A civil action need not be based on the existence of such a crime.
Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may
be recovered in acase involv'ng malicious prosecution. (Ventura v.
Bernab o, ibid.)
INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR
Incriminatory m a c h i n a tio n i n c l u de s i n c r i m i n ating an
innocent person and i n t r i guing against honor. (1969 Bar Exam)
Intriguing against honor is committed by intriguing a person, which
has for its pr incipal purpose to blemish his honor or reputation.
(Article 364)
Gossiping
Gossiping may constitute oral defamation or intriguing against
honor. If the gossiping directly imputes to the offended party a crime
or defamatory condition,the crime committed is oral defamation. If
the gossiping imputes to the offended party a crime or defamatory
condition without knowing the source thereof, the crime committed
is intriguing against honor. (1968 Bar Exam)
In People v. Padil l a, G. R. N o. L - 1 1575, January 2 4, 1 959,
the Information for intriguing against honor alleges that "with the
principal purpose of blemishing the honor and r eputation of one
 820 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 821
VOLUME II

Fausta Bravo, a m a r r ied w oman, the accused did c ir c ulate and crime committed is i n t r i guing against honor wit h t h e q u alifying
spread gossips, rumors or stories highly offensive and defamatory circumstance of using communication or i n f ormation technology.
to her honor, virtue and reputation, by then and there telling some This is not oral defamation since the offender is not directly imputing
people in the neighborhood that said Fausta Bravo was a paramour to the offended party the crime of adu te"y.
of one Sangalang, a man not her husband." While the accused is
The phrase "Si Maximina Banguis, aking nakuha" im plying
charged with i n t r i g u in g a gainst h onor, I n f ormation avers facts
that the offended party is not a virgin anymore because he had sexual
constituting wri tten defamation |libel). The defamatory statement
intercourse with her, constitutes intriguing against honor, and not
accused upon a married woman of having illicit relations with a man
oral defamation. (People v. Bao, G.R. ¹. L - 1 2 1 02, September29,
not her husband which in effect constitutes the crime of adultery.
Since the crime alleged in the Information is written defamation, it 1959)
cannot beprosecuted de officio.
Expression ofOpinion
Spreading gossips an d r u m o r s b y te l l i n g p e ople i n t h e
In Francisco v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45674, May
neighborhood "May b al i ta n a s i F a u s ta ay h a b it n i S a n g a lang,
30, 1983,Dr. Francisco said to Mr. Cruz, "Your wi fe should not have
kalat na kalat na" wi t h out knowing the source thereof, the crime
been operated.If I were the doctor, all 'hat I should have done was
committed is intriguing against honor and not oral defamation. (see:
to do a curet(tJage on her." The doctor is not lia ble for intr i g uing
People v. Pelayo, Jr., C.A., 64 O.G. 1998)
against honor or oral defamation. His statements are clearly not
libelous per s e. Complainant, Dr. A n g eles had admitted that h e
Scheme or Plot
committed a mistake in the management of the case of Mrs. Cruz.
Using scheme or plot by means of trickery to create an intrigue, The remarks made by Dr. Francisco were but a harmless expression
which is designed to blemish the reputation of a person, is intriguing of his opinion on what should have been done in t r eating her, if
against honor. Intriguing against honor is akin to slander by deed, in he were the doctor managing her. Hi s st atements were nothing
that the offender does not avail directly of written or spoken words, more than a comment that complainant committed a mistake in the
pictures or caricatures to ridicule his victim but of some ingenious, diagnosis and management of the patient.
crafty and secret plot,producing the same effect. (see: People v.
Fontanilla, C.A., 56 O.G. 1981) If the offender directly imputes to
the offended party by words a crime or defamatory condition, the
crime committed is defamation. (1968 Bar Exam)
Accused said to the companion of the offended party "Why are
you going uith her? Masamang tao iyan * and continued saying: 'All
her neighbors are her enemies. Maraming asunto siya, nagkahagulo-
gulo at nagkakapatong-patong ang mga asunto niya."The crime
committed is oral defamation since the accused directly imputes to
the offended party crimes and bad attitudes. This is not intriguing
against honor because the accused did notresort to scheme or plot
by means of trickery designed to blemish the reputation of a person.
(People v. Fontanilla, C.A., 5'6 O.G. 1981)
If the offender spreads pictures ofthe offended party in the
company of a married man with a statement "ang sweet naman nila,
smell something fishy" through the In te rnet to create an intr i g ue
that she is having an adulterous relation with th e said man, the

J9JC9B0M

XIV. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Imprudence is an act by r e ckless imprudence, which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, less grave felony,
or a light felony.
Negligence is an act by simple imprudence or negligence which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony or a less serious felony or
causing wrong by simple imprudence or negligence which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. (Article 865)
R eckless i m p r udence consists i n v o l u n t a ry , b u t wi t h o u t
malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage
results by reason ofinexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
t he person performing or failing to perform such act, taking in t o
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time,
and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed
in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifests. (1969 Bar Exam)
Failure to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help, as
may be in his hands to give, is a qualifying circumstance.
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Arson
One night when there was a Meralco brownout, A wanted to
pour gasoline from a container into the gas tank of his car. He got a
candle, lighted it and asked B to hold it but while A was pouring the
gasoline, the gas ignited and the flames immediately enveloped the
ground floor of A's house. The tenants occupying the premises suffered
firstdegree burns and their properties destroyed as a consequence
of the fire. A's mother-in-law, who was then on the upper floor of the
house upon seeing the flames, jumped to the ground and sustained
cranial fracture. The child of A was also caught by the flames and
822
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XIV. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 823
perished. The "rime
. committed is reckless imprudence resulting in
arson, homicide,serious physical injuries, and damage to property.
(Peoplev. Pacson, CA., 46 O.G. 21 65)
Simple Negligence Resulting in Alarm and Scandal
In a children's party, G left hi s loaded and cocked pistol on
a chair a m idst chil dren pl aying ar ound t o m eet v i sitors. All o f
a sudden, thc. chair was bumped by a ch ild being chased by his
playmates, causing the pistol to fall on the ground and fired. This
created considerate slock and fear among the persons present
thereat, especially the children, who scampered for safety. (1977
Bar Exam) Leaving a loaded firearm on a chair wit h in t he r each
of a child then playing in the place constitutes reckless negligence.
(Viada, Vol. III, p. 629> Since this negligent act created considerate
shock and fear among the persons present thereat, G i" l i able for
simple negligence resulting to alarm and scandal.
Discharging Firearm
Firing a gun at a person to scare him constitutes discharge of
firearm. If the bullet hit a wall and bounced back and nit another
person killing him as a consequence, he is responsible far homicide
because of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Since a single act
produces two crimes, I e is liable for complex crime of homicide and
discharge offi rearm.
Firing a gun in a public place causing people to scamper away
constitutes a arm and scandal. If, as a consequence o: alarm and
scandal, a person was hit by th e bu llet and diec., the offender is
liable for homicide because of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
During a concert of Gary V., and in order to prever t the crowd
from rushing to the stage, Rafael Padilla, a securi-.y guard, pointed
his gun at thc onrush of people. When the crowd still pushed forward,
Rafael fired. However. the bullet hit one of the metal roof supports,
ricocheted and then hi t on e of th e stage crew memb rs, causing
injuries which resulted in the latter's confinement in a hospital for
12 days. (2007 Bar Exam) Pointing a gun and firing it at the unruly
audience is beyond the performance of the duty of a security guard.
Common sense dictates that firing a gun at the audience will cause
them to scamper away and death may result as a coraequence. A
security guard is ought to know that firing at the audience is not a
solution to prevent them from being unruly. The act of the security
guard in this case constitutes at least alarm and scandal. Hence, he

824 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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is also liable for the less serious physical injuries because of Article 4
of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Abarca, G.R. No. L-74488, September 14, 1987, the
accused was absolved from criminal liability for killing the paramour
of his wife. It wa s held that accused did not commit a f elony for
the death of the paramour since "it is the proximate result of th e
outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse
in the act of infidelity." However, he was not exempted from criminal
liability w it h r e gard t o th e i n j ur y su stained by t h ir d p ersons. It
was held that: This does not mean, however, that th e accused is
totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was
not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he
cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that
before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("anwaray
labot kagawas,') that are not enough precaution to absolve him for
the injuries sustained by the victim's negligence that was found on
his part under Article 865.
In People v. Galacgac, C.A. 54 O.G. 1027, the accused has the
lawful right to defend himself against unlawful aggression. However,
he did not aim at his assailant but instead indiscriminately fired his
deadly weapon at the risk of the life and limbs of innocent persons.
His act of indiscriminately firing his gun without due care in a thickly
populated area of Metro Manila constitutes the crime of discharge
of firearm. Hence, he is liable for injury sustained by the victims
as a direct, natural and logical consequence of unlawful discharge
of firearm. Note: In Abarca case, the accused discriminately aimed
and fired the gun at the paramour of his wife.
For firing a warning shot without the least intention of causing
injury to anyone by the policeman in the performance of duty does
n ot constitute alarm an d scandal or d i scharge of firearm. I f t h e
bullet hit a bystander, who died as a consequence, he is not liable for
homicide since he is not committing a felony in firing his gun. Article
4 is not applicable. However, the policeman is liable for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide if he failed to take the necessary
precaution demanded by the circumstances as to time and place in
firing a warning shot. (People v. Cusi, CA., 68 O.G. 2777)
Firing a gun in the air and at the ground to stop two persons from
having a fistfight is not constitutive of alarm and scandal since there
is no evil intent to cause alarm. If the bullet, when it hit the ground,
ricocheted and hit another person, who died as a consequence, the
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XIV. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
accused, who fired the gun, is not liable for homicide. Article 4 is not
applicable since he is not committing a felony. However, he is liable
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide if he failed to take
precautions demanded by the circumstances such as the district
was populated, and the likelihood that his bullet would glance over
the hard pavement of the Manila thoroughfare. (People v. Nocum,
' G.R. 1Vo. L-482, February 25, 1947)
Murder
In the course of funeral procession, a young mourner, who was
h had
a
marching, mcmentarily stopped down to tie her shoelaces whic
become untied. The driver of the hearse, who was driving at five
miles an hour, was then looking at the stores by the roadside and
did not see her. He continued to drive on and ran over the girl. When
th e peopI e aro
ar ou n d s h outed and gestured, he backed up and ran over
e
the girl a second time, killing her. (1988 and 2001 Bar Exams)
normal reaction of any person who had accidentally ran over another
would be to immediately alight from the vehicle and render aid to
the victim. (People v. Castillo, Jr., G.R. No. 121768, July 21, 1997)
Backing up and running over the victim for the second time shows
deliberate intent to kill the victim. Hence, he should be charged with
murder.
No Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Frustrated Homicide
Accused cannot be charged with reckless imprudence resulting
in frustra-.ed homicide. (1973 and 1989 Bar E xams) In People v.
Castillo, 42 O.G. 1914, it was held that t h e re can be no reckless
negligence
ne i resulting in f r u str ated homicide inasmuch as reckless
o i
negI'igence imp
implies
i lack of intent to ki ll , and without inten
os.
uco G.R. 1Vos.
the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist. (Yapyuco,
120744-46, June 25, 2012) However, if the victim died, he can be
charged v-ith reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Doctor
Quack doctor or a person practicing medicine without license is
presumed to be reckless in treating a sick person, (People v. Carmen,
G.R. 1Vo. 137268, March 26, 2001) On the other hand, a licensed
physician is presumed. that he takes the necessary precaution and
e mploys the best of hi s k n owledge and skill i n a t t ending to h i s
clients. (Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 122445, November 18, 1997) Doctors
are not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result.

826 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences.
Furthermore, they are not liable for honest mistake of judgment.
(Dr. Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. ¹. 11 2 4 45,November 18, 1997)
However, a doctor could be held liable for culpable felony if
there is a cause-and-effect link between his recklessness in treating
his patient and the injury or death of latter. The Hippocratic Oath
mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the health
a nd welfare of th eir p a t ients. If a d o ctor fails t o l iv e u p t o t h i s
precept, he is made accountable for his acts. A mi stake, through
gross negligence or incompetence or plain human error, may spell
the difference between life and death. In this sense, the doctor plays
God on his patient's fate. (Ramosv. CA and Delos Santos, G.R. No.
124854, December 29, 1999)
Since death or i n j u r ies i nvolved in m a l p ractice actions are
determinable only in the li ght of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support
t he conclusion as t o c a u se-and-effect r elationship b etween t h e
malpractice committed by th e a t t ending doctor and th e death of
or injury sustained by, his patient. (Cruz v. CA, G.R. ¹. 122 4 4 5,
November 18, 1997) To make a doctor liable for reckless imprudence
r esulting in homicide, it must be shown that he did not t r eat hi s
patient in accordance with the standard of care and skill commonly
p ossessed and e x ercised b y s i m i l a r s p e cialists u n de r s i m i l a r
circumstances. Failure to pr esent specialist as w i t ness to testify
on this standard is fatal to the prosecution of the case. (Solidum v.
People, G.R. No. 192128, March 10, 2014)
In Cr uz v . C A, G . R. N o. 1 2 2445, November 18, 1 997, the
lower court b ewails th e f o l lowing cir cumstances: inadequacy of
the facilities and u n t i diness of the clinic; the lack of pr ovisions;
the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and th e
s ubsequent transfer of L y dia t o th e San Pablo Hospital and t h e
reoperation performed on her b y t h e a ccused. Expert t estimony
should have been offered to p r ove t ha t t h e c i r cumstances cited
by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the
standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing
when performing th e s ame operation. A p h y sician i s p r esumed
that he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his
knowledge and skill in attending to his clients. This presumption is
rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at
bench. Moreover, above-stated circumstances do not indicate that
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XIV. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
accused was re:klessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a
surgeor. Accused was acquitted.
In Ja r c ia v. Pe ople, G.R. N o. 1 8 7926. February 1 5, 2 0 12,
Roy, Jr., who was hit by a t axicab, was rushed to the hospital for
emerg ncy medical treatment. The X-ray of h;s ankle result showed
no fracture as read by Dr . J arcia, a ju nior r esident. Tne mother
of victim asked for X-ray of the leg of her son. Dr. Bastan, after
conducting her own examination of the victin , informed the mother
that since it was only the ankle that was hit, th ere was no need
to examine the upper leg.Eleven (11l days later, victim developed
fever, sweiling of the right leg and misalignment of the right foot. It
was later found through X-ray that the victim suffered fractures in
the shaft of the bone. Held: The Court is not convinced with moral
cert air
' yt th at t h e r esident doctors are guilty of reckless imprudence
or simple negligence. The elements thereof were not prove yt e
prose "ution beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of a specialist in
pediatric orthopedic, although pointing to some medical procedures
that could have been done by the two accused„as physicians on duty,
was riot clear as to whether the injuries suffered by patient Roy, Jr.
were indeed aggravated by the accused's judgment call and their
diagr osis or appreciation of the condition of tne victim at the time
they assessed him.
To be held liable for reckless impudence resulting in homici e,
t he accused must be an a ctive pl ayer i n t h e c ommission of t h e
reckless act, which is the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
(Nacino v. Ojh'ce of the Ombudsman, G.R, No. 284789-91, October
16, 2019) The doctor, who referred the case of a patient to another
doctor, cannot be considered as an active player in t h e r eckless
treatment of the patient, which is the proximate cause of his death.
(Dr, Ynzon v. People, G.R. No. 165805, July 80, 2014)
Pharma ci st
O limpio w en t t o a dru g s t or e t o b u y p a r a cetamol. T h e
pharmacist sold him t h r ee tablets. Upon arriving home, he took
a tablet. One hour later, he had a seizure and died. The autopsy
showed that the tablet he had taken was not paracetamol but a pill
to which he was allergic to. (2008 Bar Exam) Olimpio is not liable
for murder qualified by the circumstance of by means of poison since
there is no showing of intent to kill on his part. However, he is liable
le v. Castillo,
for eckless negligence resulting to homicide. In Peop
42 Q.G. 1914, it was held that the profession of pharmacy demands

828 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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f consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that
care and skill; and d r u ggists must exercise the highest demee o
care known to practical men, so that human life may not constantly
be exposed to the danger flowing from th e substitution of deadly
poisons for harmless medicines.
O vertaki n g
In People v, Dumayag, G.R. No. 172778, November 26, 2012,
Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136 mandates all motorists todrive and
operate vehicles on th e r i gh t s i d e of th e r oad or h i g h w ay. Wh en
o vertaking a n other, i t s h o ul d b e m a d e o nl y i f t h e h i g h w a y i s
c learly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking whil e
a pproaching a cu rv e i n t h e h i g h w ay, w h ere th e d r i v er's viev; i s
obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when
overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of care
and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see
to it that vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not taken
unaware by his presence on the side' of the road upon winch th ey
have the rightto pass.
Contributory N e gligence
'l
In a criminal case involving a motor vehicle accident, the tria
judge found the accused driver recklessly imprudent, but l i k ewise
concluded that the inj u red complainant was guilty of contributory
negligence. (1974 Bar Exam) The accused is liable:"or the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. The contributory
negligence of the victim does not exonerate the accused. The defense
of contributory negligence does not apply in crimina' cases involving
cannot
crime committed t h r ough r e ckless imprudence, since on
a llege the negligence of another t o e v ade th e effects of hi s o w n
. ¹ . L - 4 0 452
negligence. (Genobiangon v. Co urt of Appeals, G.R. ¹ .
October 12, 1 9 8 9) H o w e ver, s uch contributory n e g l igence w i l l
mitigate the amounts of civil l i a b i l it y i m p osed upon the a ccused.
(People v. Dumayag, G.R. No. 172778, November 26, 2012)
L ast Clear Ch ance Rul e
The doctrine of l ast c l ear ch ance provides that w h er e both
parrties
ies are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later
to
in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible
determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence
of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid
t he impending h ar m b u t f a i l e d t o d o so, i s ch argeable wit h t h e
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XIV. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 829
the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery
o f damages caused by th e s u p ervening negligence of th e l a t t er ,
w ho had th e l ast f ai r c h ance to pr event th e i m p ending harm b y
the exercise of due diligence. (Greenstar Express, Inc. v. Universal
Robina Corporation, G.R. No. 205090, October 17, 2016)
Emergency Rule
Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly finds himself in
a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence. if he fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless
t he emergency in w h ich he fl nds h i mself is br ought about by h i s
own negligence. (Orix Me tro Leasing and F i n a n ce Corporation v .
Mangalinao, G.R. No. 174089, January 25, 2012)
Marnasapano case
In Nacino v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 234789-91,
October 16, 2019, President Aquino and SAF Director Napenas were
charged for reckless imprudence resulting in multi p le homicides in
connection with the Mamasapano incident where 44 SAF members
were killed.
I t was h el d t h a t A q u i n o p a r t i cipated i n t h e p l a n n in g a n d
preparation for the Oplan Exodus to arrest two terrorists, Marwan
and Usman, by approving the suggested alternative date of execution
and ordering the increase in the number of troops and coordination
with th e A F P . H o w ever, th ese acts barely qualify A q u ino as an
active player in the entire scheme of the operations, more so point to
any criminal negligence on his part.
Without doubt, Napenas had been negligent in the exaction of
the operation to arrest two terror sts. Lack of prior coordination with
the AFP was the most fatal m i st ake made by N apenas. Napenas
explained that past law enforcement operations against high-value
targets failed because of apparent leak in i nformation. On the
belief that t h e A F P w a s c ompromised, he recommended a t i m e-
on-target coordination w it h i t . M o r eover, th ere are other factors
that contributed to the loss of lives in the implementation of Oplan
Exodus, e.g., the inferior quality of equipment and ammunition of
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our police force. It is not fair to make Napenas criminally responsible

for all factors that contributed to the death of the 44 SAF members
including those, which could not have foreseen during the planning
and execution of Oplan Exodus. There is no perfect law enforcement
operation. There is no guarantee of police officers' safety even in
developed countries possessed of sophisticated crime-fighting
technology.

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