THE ROLE OF IGAD MISSION IN RESOLVING CONFLICT IN THE

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN (2013-2018)

BY
AWAK HUSSEIN AJOUNG
INDEX: 20-PDSM-018

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO INSTITUTE OF PEACE

DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF JUBA

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE WARD OF MASTERS DEGREE IN
DIPLOMATIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

SUPERVISED BY
MR. ABONGO SIMON ALISON

JULY, 2023
 DECLARATION

I Awak Hussein Ajoung declaring that this thesis is my own work it has never been
submitted to any University for academic degree.

Signed: ………………………………..……. Date…………………………………..

Awak Hussein Ajoung

Index: 20-PDSM-018

i
 APPROVAL

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

Signed: …………………………………… Date……………………………..…

Mr. Abongo Simon Alison

Lecturer IPDSS, University of Juba

ii
 DEDICATION

I dedicated this thesis to my mam, the person who believed in me and has always see me big
and bigger,
To my husband, who supported me and pushed me even when I give up…

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First of all, I would like to thank the Almighty God for helping me in accomplishment of the
study.
This thesis was made possible through contribution of many people in particular my brothers,
sisters and my parents.
I would like also to thank my Supervisor Mr. Abongo Simon Alison for his continuous
direction and guidance throughout this research. Without him this research work would have
not been completed.

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 TABLE OF CONTENT

Declaration .................................................................................................................................. i

Approval ....................................................................................................................................ii

Dedication .................................................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgement .................................................................................................................... iv

Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................................................viii

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... x

CHAPTER ONE ...................................................................................................................... 1

General Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1

1.1. Background to Study........................................................................................................... 1

1.4. Objectives of the Study ....................................................................................................... 3

1.4.1. General Objective ............................................................................................................ 3

1.4.2. Specific Objectives .......................................................................................................... 3

1.5. The Study Questions ........................................................................................................... 3

1.6. The Scope of the Study ....................................................................................................... 4

1. 7. Significant of the Study ..................................................................................................... 4

1.8. Operational Definition ........................................................................................................ 5

1.9. Organization of the Study ................................................................................................... 5

CHAPTER TWO ..................................................................................................................... 6

Literature Review ...................................................................................................................... 6

2.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 6

2.2. The Formation and purpose of IGAD ................................................................................. 7

2.3. The Role of IGAD to Resolve Conflict in the Region ........................................................ 9

2.4 The Role of IGAD to Resolve Interstate and Intra state Conflict in the Region ............... 10

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2.5 Intervention of IGAD in South Sudan Conflict ................................................................. 13

CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................................... 15

Research Methodology .......................................................................................................... 15

3.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 15

3.3. Location of the Study ........................................................................................................ 15

3.4. Sampling Design ............................................................................................................... 15

3.5. Data Collection Instrument ............................................................................................... 15

3.6. Data Analysis procedures ................................................................................................. 16

3.7. Ethical Considerations ...................................................................................................... 16

CHAPTER FOUR.................................................................................................................. 17

Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussion of the Findings ............................................. 17

4.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 17

4.2. The Formation of the Republic of South Sudan. .............................................................. 17

4.2. The Causes of South Sudan Conflicts 2013/2016 ............................................................ 17

4.3. The Role of IGAD Mission in the Republic of South Sudan ........................................... 19

4.4. IGAD’s Achievements in the Resolution of Conflicts in South Sudan ............................ 24

4.5. The Challenges Encountered by IGAD in the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan .... 25

CHAPTER FIVE ................................................................................................................... 29

Discussion of the Results ....................................................................................................... 29

CHAPTER SIX ...................................................................................................................... 34

Summary Conclusion and Recommendations ......................................................................... 34

6.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 34

6.2. Summary to the Study Findings ........................................................................................ 34

6.3. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 35

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6.4. Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 37

References ................................................................................................................................ 40

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 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEC : African Economic Community

ARCSS : Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South
Sudan.
APSA : African Peace and Security Architecture
ARCSS : Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
AU : African Union
AU : Africa Union
AUMISOM : Africa Union Mission in Somalia
CCM : Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CEWARN : Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CoHA : Cessation of Hostility Agreement
CPA : Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR : Disarmament Demobilization and Integration
EASBRIG : Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
EU : European Union
FGD : Focus Group Discussion
GNI : Gross National Income
GONU : Government of National Unity
GORSS : Government of the Republic of South Sudan
GOSS : Government of South Sudan
HLRF : High Level Revitalization Forum
IGAD : Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGADD : Intergovernmental Authority on Development and Draught
IMF : The International Monetary Fund
IPDSS : Institute of Peace Development and Security Studies
IPSS : International Peace and Security Strategy
JIUs : Joint Integrated Units
JMEC : Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
LRA : Lord’s Resistance Army
MVM : Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms
OAU : Organization of African Unity
PDF : Protection and Deterrence Force

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R-ARCSS : Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan
RCI-LRA : Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s
Resistance.
REC : Regional Economic Community
RTGoNU : The revitalized transitional government of National unity
SAF : Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA : Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM : Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM – IO : Sudan People's Liberation Movement in opposition
SPLM/A-IG : Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army in Government
SSP : South Sudanese Pound
UN : United Nations
UNAMID : United Nations and the AU Hybrid Peacekeeping Missions in Darfur
UNAMIS : United Nations Advanced Mission in Sudan
UNDP : United Nation Development Programmer
UNMISS : United Nation Mission in South Sudan
UPDF : The Uganda People’s Defense Force

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 ABSTRACT

The major objective of this thesis is to provide an explanation of the role of IGAD in
resolving conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. The study aimed to answer the questions;
what are the causes of South Sudan Conflicts? What role did IGAD played in resolving the
conflict in South Sudan? What are the achievements made by IGAD in resolving conflict in
South Sudan? And what are the challenges encountered by IGAD in resolving conflict in
South Sudan. The study relied on qualitative method where both primary and secondary data
were collected by reviewing scholarly articles, journals, conference memo and agreements
facilitated by IGAD. Face to face interviews and Focus group discussion were conducted.
The study found out that the causes of 2013 conflicts in South Sudan includes; Lack of access
to shared resources, the problem of economic marginalization and political exclusion. The
role played by IGAD in conflict resolution in South Sudan as a regional body includes;
taking time to meet with the parties individually and explaining to them the importance of the
R-ARCSS, explaining to the parties to the R-ARCSS how the process works so that everyone
has the same understanding of what will happen when all the parties are together, assist the
parties to R-ARCSS to listen to one another and to make sure that everyone feels that he/she
is being heard, assists the parties to the R-ARCSS to exchange their opinions without
needless conflict and helps them to solve one problem at a time. The achievements made by
IGAD in managing the revitalized agreement for South Sudan peace agreement includes; the
agreement facilitated by IGAD laying a foundation for a united, peaceful and prosperous
South Sudan, the R-ARCSS represents a solid pact as it contains the requisite procedural,
substantive and institutional components expected of any sustainable peace agreement. The
challenges encounter by IGAD in conflict resolutionin South Sudan includes; the problem of
creation and maintenance of institutions that reflect broad societal ownership by the South
Sudanese people, lack of effective long-term problem solving at multiple mechanisms, lack of
Strong and active citizenry to design programmer of lasting peace, lack of Commitment to
dialogue, participation, competition, and compromise from the local to national level.

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 CHAPTER ONE
General Introduction

1.1. Background to Study

The main objective of this research is to examine role of IGAD in resolving conflict in the
Republic of South Sudan. South Sudan is a landlocked country located in East-Central
Africa; It is bordered by Ethiopia to the east, Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to the south, the
Democratic Republic of Congo to the southwest, Central African Republic to the west, and
Sudan to the north. The country becomes independent from Sudan on 9th July, 2011 (Country
Profile, 2015).
Two years after its independence in December 2013 a civil war broke out between the
governments the revel group called Sudan People Liberation Movement in Opposition
(SPLM-IO) as a result of misunderstanding between the two parties. This civil war attracted
the interest of Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) to get involved in the
management of the conflict leading to the signing of the peace agreement
After decades of struggle by the Sudanese people liberation front/army within Sudan due to
human right violation, exploitation, corruption and marginalization by the Albeshir’s
government, the newest nation in the world, South Sudan was born on July 9, 2011(Country
Profile, 2015). The people of South Sudan had suffered a lot in search of peace, stability and
development.
Meanwhile, the referendum of South Sudan did not save the country from entering into
another form of chaos and instabilities. Within two years of independence the country had got
into a civil war. This has been triggered by the political division that has been erupted
between President Salva Kiir and the former Vice President Riek Machar (Madak, 2019).
Though the beginning of the conflict was because of the power competition between the two
presidents, later it has changed into an ethnic conflict (Irit Back, 2014).
IGAD, the East African regional organization is established, among others, to promote peace
and stability in the Eastern Africa sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region
for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts. IGAD has
better experience in resolution of the North and South Sudan conflict. It has played
significant diplomatic effort in resolving the civil war of north and South Sudan which was
held from 1955 to 2005. After the failure of the effort of OAU, Abuja peace talks which was
aimed at finding solutions for the civil war of Sudan held in 1992-1993, the Sudanese
government approached the regional body of the Inter-Government Authority on Drought and
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Development (IGADD) during its 1993 summit, asking its leaders to mediate in the Sudanese
conflict (Ibid:23).
In response, an IGAD sub-committee on conflict resolution was established and included the
presidents of Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. It was IGAD’s first political mediation
effort (Irit Back, 2014). The Sudanese government had agreed to IGAD's diplomatic
initiative. Despite its concerns about IGAD's disposition toward the Sudanese government,
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A; the movement that led the
Southern rebellion during the second phase of the civil war) participated in the mediation
process.
According to Irit Back (2014), IGAD's active mediation, combined with the unanimous
support of the AU was translated into the 2005 Comprehensive Peace agreement (CPA)
between the South and the North that eventually resulted in South Sudan’s declaration of
independence on July 9, 2011. South Sudan's independence was an historic development, one
that challenged the sacred African post-colonial principle of the sanctity of colonial borders.
It would not have been achieved (and certainly not with the same speed and efficiency)
without the active mediation efforts of IGAD and many AU members, which largely
supported the South Sudanese claim against the Northern ruling elite.
As an organization having experience from the conflict resolution of Sudan IGAD didn’t take
long time to involve in mediation after the broke out of the conflict in South Sudan (Irit Back,
2014). IGAD was the first regional organization to react for peaceful resolution of the
conflict. Mediation efforts under the auspices of IGAD resulted in several ceasefire
agreements between the warring parties of South Sudan.
According to Koos and Gutschke (2014), IGAD involved in resolution of the conflict in the
Republic of South Sudan at the earliest stage of the conflict it was the first International
Organization to react to the conflict of South Sudan. IGAD has prepared many mediations
rounds to solve the conflict between the group supporting the government of Salva Kiir and
the opposing group led by Riek Machar.
Despite its continuous mediations, it has taken long time for IGAD to bring peace in South
Sudan. It was common to hear violation of agreements immediately after the conclusion of
agreements. The groups blame each other for the failure of respecting the agreements. The
conflict continued for the past five years and it resulted in the death of many innocent
individuals, soldiers involved in the conflict, destruction of the infrastructures, refuge of
many citizens to the neighboring countries, and internal displacement of many citizens.

2
This multidimensional intra-state conflict calls the sub-regional, regional and the
international community to play a role in resolving the conflict. The fighting between the
warring parties never ceased utterly following the signing of the Cessation of Hostility
Agreement (CoHA). Despite the numerous warnings from the mediation team, the fighting
went on unabated (Koos and Gutschke, 2014).
In this study, the research did not discuss anything concerning the other activities of IGAD in
the region but, it based its concerned on the role of IGAD in the resolution of the conflict in
the Republic of South Sudan,
The main reason of choosing this topic is because there is few academic research being
conducted in this field of study that is why the research filled the gap by documenting the
causes of South Sudan civil war, the role played IGAD mission in resolving the conflict, the
achievements made by IGAD mission in the management of South Sudan conflict and the
challenges encountered by IGAD in resolving the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.

1.4. Objectives of the Study

1.4.1. General Objective
The main goal of this study is to investigate the role of IGAD mission in resolving conflict in
the Republic of South Sudan.

1.4.2. Specific Objectives

1. To analysis the causes of South Sudan civil war/conflicts that attracted the attention of
IGAD?
2. To explore role did IGAD played in resolution of South Sudan conflicts?
3. To examine the achievements made by IGAD in the resolution of South Sudan
conflict?
4. To find out the challenges encountered by IGAD in the resolution of conflicts in the
Republic of South Sudan.

1.5. The Study Questions

This study answered the following questions;
1. What are the causes of South Sudan civil war/conflicts that attracted the attention of
IGAD?
2. What role did IGAD played in resolution of South Sudan conflicts?
3. What are the achievements made by IGAD in the resolution of South Sudan conflict?

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 4. What are the challenges encountered by IGAD in the resolution of conflicts in the
Republic of South Sudan.

1.6. The Scope of the Study

The main objective of this research is to explain the role of IGAD mission in conflict
resolution in the Republic of South Sudan. South Sudan is a landlocked country located in
East-Central Africa; It is bordered by Ethiopia to the east, Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to
the South, the Democratic Republic of Congo to the South West, Central African Republic to
the West, and Sudan to the North (South Sudan Country Profile, 2015).
This study based its analysis entirely on the role of IGAD mission in the resolution of
conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan. The study echoed on the root causes of conflicts in
South Sudan, the roles of IGAD in resolution of conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan and
the achievement made by IGAD in resolving the conflicts in South Sudan and the Challenges
encounter by IGAD in the resolving the conflicts in South Sudan.
The study was conducted in Juba the capital city of South Sudan targeting the diplomats
entrusted with the ongoing activity of the peace process in the region in particularly the office
of the IGAD and officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international cooperation.
The information collected covered a period from 2013 to 2023 where the Peace Agreement
mediated by IGAD was signed and its implementation was ongoing.

1. 7. Significant of the Study

This study will contribute to the available literature by filling the gap of past studies that was
left by the scholars.
The study findings contributed to the availability of the literature in the area of the role of
IGAD mission in the resolution of conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. More specifically,
to bridge the gap that exists as a starting point for further research.
The findings provided by this research can be used by other countries to improve on their
facilities and to identify those factors that can contribute to either the failure or success of
regional organization’s activities this could be further used for decision-making.
To academia, the research would serve as a source of academic reference for further studies.
On the other hand, the research is recommended for reading by students of conflict
management, scholars and government policy makers to understand how regional
organizations would be effectively utilized as vehicles for managing conflicts that are
numerous and recurrent in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

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1.8. Operational Definition
Peace: Peace refers to a control or an agreement to end war or any dispute and conflict
between two people, two nations or two antagonistic groups of people (Ven, 1995).
According to the American military history, the word peace essentially means the absence of
war.
Security: the state of being or feeling secure; freedom from fear, anxiety, danger, doubt, etc.;
state or sense of safety or certainty
Conflict: conflict a clashing or sharp disagreement (as between ideas, interests, or purposes):
mental struggle resulting from needs, drives, wishes, or demands that are in opposition or are
not compatible.
Conflict Resolution: Conflict resolution is a way for two or more parties to find a peaceful
solution to a disagreement among them. The disagreement may be personal, financial,
political, or emotional. When a dispute arises, often the best course of action is negotiation to
resolve the disagreement.
IGAD: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was
created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
(IGADD) which was founded in 1986.

1.9. Organization of the Study

This study was organized in six chapters as explain below; Chapter one presented the
background to the study, the statements of problem and the main arguments, the objectives
and the research questions, the scope and significant of the study, and the definitions of the
key variables. Chapter two review the literature related to the study. Chapter three explain the
methodology used for the study, Chapter four presented, analyzed and interpreted the data.
Chapter five discussed the finding of the study while Chapter six provided summary,
conclusion and recommendations to the study.

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 CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review

2.1. Introduction
Following the broke out of conflict in South Sudan in December 2013, IGAD took the lead to
respond to the conflict. It dispatched a Ministerial Delegation to Juba on 19 December
2013(Mehari Taddele, 2015). Starting from this very early day IGAD served as a forum for
different cease fire and peace agreements of the conflicting parties of South Sudan.
Power struggle, ethnicity, natural resources and corruption are among the factors that caused
the conflict of South Sudan (Kulang, 2018). The struggle for political power between
President Salva Kiir and his former vice, Riek Machar is at the root cause of the violent
conflict of South Sudan. After the death of John Garang, the leader of SPLM in 1983, Salva
Kiir became the leader of SPLM, who then led South Sudan to achieve independence in
2011(Ibid:86).
After gaining independence, Salva Kiir became the president, while Riek Machar became his
vice. Riek Machar viewed the leadership of Salva Kiir as reckless and autocratic (Koos &
Gutschke, 2014). Ethnicity has been the simplistic explanation of the conflict in South Sudan.
Kiir who belongs to the ethnic group of Dinka and Machar who belongs to the ethnic group
of Nuer has manipulated their political interest and differences and present them in favor of
ethnic nationalism, mobilizing their kinsmen into participating in a violent conflict. As many
African countries, natural resources in South Sudan resulted in high level of corruption
among government officials.
In South Sudan, the oil revenue constitutes 98 percent of the national budget and practically
all foreign currency earning (Wel, 2013). Thus, South Sudan has the most oil-dependent
budget in the world.
Following his removal from the position of Vice President by the Salva Kiir, Riek Machar
organized his supporters to fight with the government. Then the conflict turned in to ethnic
conflict between the ethnics of Dinka and Nuer (Muhabie Mekonnen, 2018). Within short
time after the conflict started IGAD involved to seek solution for the conflict. IGAD has
arranged different forums so that the leaders of the two conflicting groups discuss to seek
solution for the conflict.
At the end of the meetings the two parties agree to cease fire and continue peaceful
negotiations to bring peace within the nation. But within short time after conclusion of the
agreements the parties found themselves involved in the conflict. One group accuses the other
6
group for the violation of the agreements (Knopf, 2016). It was found difficult task for IGAD
to bring peace within the land of South Sudan.

2.2. The Formation and purpose of IGAD

Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was founded by the
then drought affected Eastern African countries Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan
and Uganda in 1986 with its head quarter in Djibouti. The aim of IGADD was to engage in
coordinated efforts managing drought and development across the Eastern Africa sub-region
with a focus on food security (Eastern Africa Preamble and art 7, 1986). IGADD was
superseded by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996 as one of
Africa's sub-regional organizations. IGAD has an expanded mandate that included conflict
resolution (Ibid: 26). After its independence, the State of Eritrea was admitted as the seventh
member of IGADD at the fourth Summit of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa,
in September 1993. South Sudan also admitted as a new member of the authority in 2011.
IGAD's aim was to provide coordinated efforts of managing drought and development across
the Eastern Africa sub-region with a focus on ensuring food security. After ten years, in 1996,
IGADD evolved into IGAD, which produced a much broader mandate that embrace
cooperation in almost all socio-economic, political and environmental fields (Weldesellassie,
2011). The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) in June 1991
(Abuja Treaty) that foresaw the formation of a common economic community for the whole
of Africa had played its role in the development of IGAD.
The Abuja Treaty accorded special recognition to the role of the existing regional economic
communities (RECs) and also highlighted political stability as an important component for
development in the post-Cold War era. The 1992 Rio UN Summit which led to the UN
Convention to Combat Desertification also contributed its role in the development of IGAD
(Ibid: 42). In promoting and implementing both the AEC and the convention, the sub-
regional groupings were given special impetus and high priority. However, IGADD's
structure and capacity was not adequate in that it was not capable of implementing its
proposed five-year program (1992-96) and its secretariat had only 12 professionals without
any significant operational potential (Weldesellassie, 2011). At the beginning of 1995 it clear
that the original IGADD mandate required revisiting to enable the organization to deal with
emerging sub-regional challenges.

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The IGADD heads of state and governments opened an extraordinary summit on 18 April
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and signed a declaration to revitalize and expand IGADD's mandate,
taking into account both political stability and development issues. On 21 March 1996, at the
extraordinary summit held in Nairobi, Kenya, the Assembly of the State and Government
finalized the process and a new Agreement Establishing the IGAD was adopted with a new
structure and an expanded mandate. The Agreement significantly upgraded IGADD's old
legal status, governance structure and mandate. IGAD was established for achieving peace,
prosperity and sub-regional integration. Beginning from its inception, IGAD has assumed
strong institutional frameworks so as to address inter- and intra-state conflicts in the region.
In its 2003 summit, the heads of states and governments had reached a consensus to launch
the Peace and Security Strategy, which aimed at resolving conflicts, maintaining peace and
security and synchronizing the peace-building processes.
The IGAD’s peace and security framework is based on the Peace and Security Council of the
UN and the AU as well as IGAD-specific agreements and mechanisms such as the Protocol
on the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN, 2002), the policy
framework for the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG, 2005) and IGAD Capacity
Building Against Terrorism (ICPAT) (Adar, 2000). By adopting all these protocols and
agreements, the Peace and Security Strategy of IGAD entails to promote collaboration in
peace and security threats, strengthening the potential of member states in early warning
conflicts, if not resolving them. IGAD consists of different bodies in its institutional makeups
(IGAD,1992). The first one is IGAD heads of state and government or IGAD summit which
is the highest policy making body. IGAD summit held at least once a year to pass significant
political and economic decisions.
The second body is Council of Ministers, which is composed of the ministers of the foreign
affairs of and one other focal minister designated by each member state. This body is
responsible for making recommendations to the Assembly on matters of policy aimed at the
efficient functioning and development of the Authority (IGAD, 1986).
The third body is the Committee of Ambassadors, which is composed of IGAD member
states ‘ambassadors accredited to the IGAD headquarters in Djibouti. It is a body in which
advice the Executive Secretary on the promotion of his efforts in realizing the work plan
approved by the Council of Ministers (Adar, 2000). Indeed, the Committee of Ambassadors
is the only standing policy making body that oversees policy-relevant initiatives that the
IGAD secretariat undertakes and ensures implementation by the secretariat of the decisions of
IGAD’s main policy bodies.
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The final standing body of IGAD is the secretariat, which is responsible for assisting member
states in formulating regional projects in the priority areas, facilitating the coordination and
harmonization of development policies, mobilizing resources to implement regional projects
and programs approved by the council, and reinforcing national infrastructures necessary for
their implementation (Ibid). Headed by an executive secretary, the secretariat is organized
into three substantive divisions: Peace and Security, Economic Cooperation and Social
Development, and Agriculture and Environment. As it will be discussed in the following
section, much of IGAD’s visible work has been in the areas of peace and security.

2.3. The Role of IGAD to Resolve Conflict in the Region

The main purpose of establishment of UN is to maintain international peace and security, and
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace (Adar, 2000). As
the purpose of UN is protection of peace and security of the globe it encourages the efforts
made by regional organizations to maintain peace and security in their respective region. That
is why the Charter Agreement Establishing Inter-Governmental Authority on Development,
Art 9, 1996 clearly stipulates that regional arrangements or agencies can deal with matters
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action.24 UN Charter doesn’t preclude the action of regional organizations made for the
purpose of protection of peace and security of the region.
IGAD, as East African regional mechanism established for, among others, promotion and
protection of peace and security in the region have lawful mandate to intervene in when
peace and security of its member states is under threat. At the AU continental system, the
legal basis and instruments that define the relationship between the AU and its RECs include
the Constitutive Act, the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the AU Peace and Security
Council and Protocol on Relations between the African Union and the Regional Economic
Communities. The Protocol on Relations between the African Union and the Regional
Economic Communities set out the objectives as to: formalize, consolidate and promote close
cooperation among the RECs and between them and the Union through the coordination and
the harmonization of their policies, measures, programs and activities in all fields and sectors
and to establish a framework for coordination of the activities of the Regional Economic
Communities (African Union commission, 2015).

9
Article 16 of the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the AU Peace and Security
Council provides for the relationship with regional mechanisms for conflict prevention,
management and resolution. It states that the Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall
security architecture of the Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace,
security and stability in Africa. From this provision of the protocol one can understand that
the AU continental system empowered the IGAD, the East African regional economic
community to respond on violations of peace and security in the region.

2.4 The Role of IGAD to Resolve Interstate and Intra state Conflict in the Region
History of the Eastern African region shows that the region is highly exposed to conflict. The
causes of conflicts and insecurity in the region are external and internal factors. They include
the legacies of colonial rule and the cold war, the International Monetary Fund structural
adjustment policies, and continuing superpower interference in the region including the war
on terror) to structural factors such as socio-economic deprivation and inequalities, lack of
democratic governance and rule of law, and the non-inclusive organization and control of
state power heavily reliant on force.
According to the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (IPSS), all major conflicts in the region
emanate from factors associated with gaps in democratic governance, poverty and low levels
of development, a political culture of intolerance and lack of respect for the rule of law. Other
factors it identified are the colonial and cold war legacies including lack of trust and peace
needed among countries of the region, low penetration of state institutions in peripheral areas,
and communal struggle over access to resources such as land and water (African Union
commission, 2015).
As the problem of peace and security is prevalent in the IGAD region, the main reason for
transforming IGADD to IGAD was the need for addressing conflict within regional
cooperative frame work. IGAD member states at the extra ordinary summit held in April
1995 at Addis Ababa decided to invest the regional body with peace and security mandate.
The 1996 IGAD Agreement gave significant space to peace and security (IGAD, 2002).
The agreement has the principles of peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-state conflicts
through dialogue and maintenance of regional peace and security. Among the objectives of
the regional body was to promote peace and security in the region and create mechanisms
within the sub-region for the prevention, management, and resolution of inter and intra-state
conflicts through dialogue.

10
Conflict resolution was given an important place under article 18 of the agreement providing
that member states shall take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-
operation, peace and security; establish an effective collective mechanism for consultation
and co-operation for the pacific settlement of differences and disputes; and deal with disputes
between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other
regional or international organizations. IGAD is one of the eight regional bodies recognized
by the African Union (AU) as building blocks for continental integration, including in the
areas of peace and security (IGAD, 2018).
The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the AU as a comprehensive
mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution offers a useful lens for
assessing the peace and security mechanisms envisaged within the IGAD Agreement. APSA
is the policy and institutional framework that the AU established as an operational structure
for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention,
peacemaking, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-
conflict reconstruction. The APSA as elaborated in the protocol establishing the Peace and
Security Council (PSC) consists of mechanisms that are designed for conflict prevention,
management, and resolution (International Crisis Group, 2015).
In practice, this responsibility is undertaken by the principal policy body of IGAD, namely
the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government (with the support of the Council of
Ministers). In terms of early warning and response, similar to the AU, IGAD has developed
an early warning system known as the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
(CEWARN). CEWARN was established in 2002 by a protocol signed and later on ratified by
the IGAD member states (Ayele, 2014).
According to the protocol establishing CEWARN, the mandate of IGAD includes providing
credible, evidence-based early warning information and analysis in a fashion that would
inform timely action to prevent or mitigate violent conflict. IGAD does not have a body or
mechanism that is dedicated to mediation and peacemaking roles. However, it has been
engaged in peacemaking and mediation efforts throughout its existence (African Union,
2002).
This is perhaps the area that IGAD is considered to have made its most notable achievements;
36although initiatives in this area have been dependent on the political and diplomatic role of
individual member states and the support or push of external partners. The lack of an
institutional framework and the ad hoc nature that characterizes IGAD’s work in this area

11
continue to undermine the building of institutional memory and development of
institutionalized capacity and expertise by the regional body (Ayele, 2014).
As the IPSS itself admitted, IGAD’s efforts have been reactive [and] lack continuity and
institutional memory due to the ad hoc approach pursued so far. While it is clear that IGAD
has not achieved the same level of progress in its three areas of engagement, its role has
received increasing recognition both from member states and external actors. It is one of the
eight regional economic communities recognized by the AU as the building blocks for
continental integration (African Union, 2002).
Forming part of the APSA and establishing itself over the years as the platform for regional
action in dealing with peace and security challenges of its member countries, IGAD’s role in
peace and security is well established and continues to receive continental and international
support including from the AU and the UN. The AU’s peace and security architecture
provides the broader institutional setting within which IGAD and Africa’s other regional
organizations operate (Ayele, 2014)
The regional mechanisms are formally recognized as part of this architecture and the PSC is
required to harmonize its activities with them (African Union, 2002).
In practice the AU looks to the sub-regional organizations to lead on crisis management
within their own regions. This has certainly been the case in the Horn of Africa, where the
PSC has consistently endorsed all the initiatives emanating from IGAD (Healy, 2009).
The African Peace and Security Architecture are composed of various sub regional elements
and structures. The future potential for these African partners may get ground to act
effectively in peace and both geographically and functionally. Establishing EASBRIG one;
making EASBRIG operational and building the necessary capacity for it to achieve the final
scenario capacities, involving AU regional peacekeeping forces is another matter. In this
regard, one of the priorities for peace and security in the IGAD sub-region in particular, and
in Africa in general, is creating synergy between these existing organizations, enabling them
to complement and support one another. It has already been noted that the IGAD region is
primarily known for the short supply of peace and security within and among its member
states. There are different types of conflict in the region (Ibid). These are interstate conflicts,
intrastate conflicts involving armed insurgency and terrorism, the protracted violence and
insecurities affecting Somalia and its neighboring countries arising from years of state
collapse and intra-Somalia and regional violent rivalry, and Tran’s boundary inter communal
resource conflicts aggravated by food insecurity and environmental degradation (Ayele,
2014).
12
The security challenges of the countries of the region are deeply interconnected. There are no
major conflicts in these countries that are ordinarily confined to national borders. Instead,
such conflicts often both spills over into neighboring countries and tend to draw countries in
the region into the fray, particularly if they are not settled in a short period of time. The
conflict that erupted in South Sudan in December 2013 serves as the latest illustration of this
phenomenon (Melha and Ojok, 2018). Given that peace and security are generally in short
supply in the region, it was no surprise that peace and security came to take center stage in
IGAD’s integration agenda (Ayele, 2014).
The success that IGAD registered in the peace processes on Sudan and Somalia and the
opportunity it presented for member states to push for a regional effort for addressing
conflicts prevalent in the region were the major factors for the prominence that peace and
security received in IGAD. Indeed, as noted previously, one of the major factors behind the
transformation of IGADD into IGAD with an expanded mandate was the need for addressing
conflicts within a regional cooperative framework. It was at the extraordinary summit held in
Addis Ababa in April 1995 that the decision to invest the regional body with a peace and
security mandate was adopted (Melha and Ojok, 2018).
The 1996 IGAD Agreement gave significant space to peace and security. Two of the
principles of the agreement are the peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-state conflicts
through dialogue‖ and maintenance of regional peace and security (Tabares, 2009). One of
the objectives of the regional body was to promote peace and security in the region and create
mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management, and resolution of inter
and intra-state conflicts through dialogue (Taddele, 2015). Conflict resolution was given a
primary place with a dedicated article and agreement among member states to (a) take
effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace and security;
(b) establish an effective collective mechanism for consultation and co-operation for the
pacific settlement of differences and disputes; and (c) deal with disputes between member
states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or
international organizations (IGAD, 2014; Tabares, 2009; Taddele, 2015).

2.5 Intervention of IGAD in South Sudan Conflict

This section addresses the justifications for the intervention of IGAD in the intra state conflict
of South Sudan. Under this section what stage of conflict would warrant the intervention of
IGAD are discussed. The fighting initially caused by the power struggle between President

13
Salva Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar broke out on the evening of 15 December 2013 and soon
spread throughout Juba city over the next couple of days.
On 19 December 2013, the Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) rushed to Juba, South Sudan, for an emergency three-day
intervention to stop what has become ethnic cleansing‖ of Nuer by mainly Dinka armed
elements associated with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GOSS) (Journal of
African centered solutions in peace and security, 2016). IGAD’s intervention also confirmed
the structural integration with the characteristics of the conflict as well as demonstrating the
organization’s sub-regional mandate to maintain peace and security contained in the regional
founding documents and inherent mandate (IGAD, 2018; Kusztal, 2017). It is also true that
the intervention by IGAD member states was at each country’s expense including subsequent
support from the existing peace fund.
The priority for IGAD was, therefore, to restore the stability of the collapsing central
government while responding to humanitarian distress as it sought to curb the ethnic
massacre between the Dinkas and the Nuer that had the potential to engulf not only the
country but also the sub-region. Such interventions would be guided by the responsibility to
protect and prevent genocides. According to this doctrine, countries have a responsibility to
intervene in other countries when crimes against humanity or genocides are being
perpetrated. Therefore, the intervention of IGAD in the intra state conflict of South Sudan can
be justified by the above reasons (Koos and Gutschke, 2014).
The responsibility to protect civilians lies with the government of South Sudan, but if the
state fails to protect its civil population, it should seek assistance from the international
community, neighbors and the region to discharge its role of civilian protection. It is in this
context that the IGAD is assisting South Sudan to end the conflict and protect its citizens.
However, if a state is unwilling to protect its citizens and the state is complicit in committing
crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing, the international community has the
responsibility to protect civilians (Healy, 2008).

14
 CHAPTER THREE
Research Methodology

3.1. Introduction
This chapter explains the research design for the study, the study location, the sampling
technique, the data collection tools, data analysis and ethical considerations.

3.2. Research Design

This study purely employed a qualitative method because the information would not require
numerical data but, rather simply understanding the central phenomena under study. In that
regard, both primary and secondary data for this study was collected by key informant
interviews, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and Desk-top review.

3.3. Location of the Study

This study was conducted in Juba the capital city of South Sudan where most the ministries
were located including the headquarters of the most organizations. All the participants were
chosen within the study area.

3.4. Sampling Design

The Study utilized anon probability, snowball sampling technique, Snowball sampling
method was adopted in this study because the researcher does not know who is expert about
the role of IGAD mission in the resolution of conflict in South Sudan therefore, one
participant was able to tell about the experience person whom they had been working
together or sharing experiences by way of giving their contacts (telephone number and email
addresses) for the researcher to reach their offices or organization.

3.5. Data Collection Instrument

3.5.1. Key Informant Interviews
With a sample of 50 participants from IGAD’s office, Ministry of information, Ministry of
foreign affairs and international cooperation, SPLM/A secretariat and civil society activist
were given in-depth interviews in Juba the capital city of South Sudan.

3.5.2. A Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

Three FGD were conducted with the government officials, NGOs staff, CSOs
managers/directors, service providers from IGAD office. The criteria for selection of the
participants were based on consensus upon consultation by the researcher. Three (3) groups

15
of each with the total number of seven (7) participants were selected based on experience
about IGAD’s role conflict resolution. The discussion was conducted for two (2) hours each.

3.5.3. Desk-review
Apart from the interview and FGD, secondary data were collected by scanning information
from the existing literatures written by scholars in the form of journal articles, policy brief,
conference statements, and minutes of meetings, accords, and working papers. The data from
the situation analysis consultations with the target populations were used to corroborate the
secondary data.

3.6. Data Analysis procedures

Data and information obtained from interviews, Focus Group Discussion and examination of
secondary data was organized and grouped under appropriate categories and themes.
Processing data involved both manual tabulation and interpretive methods. Data collected
from the key informants and structured FGD guide was tabulated manually.
Secondary data sources involved a review of all the existing information on interventions for
resolution of conflict. The information generated from both source of data primary and
secondary sources was triangulated to test its validity. The results were used to generate
findings, conclusions and recommendations.

3.7. Ethical Considerations

First the researchers requested permission from the administration of the Institute of Peace,
Development and Security Study, University of Juba to conduct the data collection process.
Also, the researcher asked permission from the respondents to collect the information. After
the researcher have requested the permission and considered the protection of all
respondents’ data response.
Respondents were informed that their participation voluntarily and based on their will is
assured of complete anonymity. Furthermore, they were informed that they do not have to
answer any question they feel uncomfortable about it.

16
 CHAPTER FOUR
Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussion of the Findings

4.1. Introduction
The major Objectives of this paper is to investigate to the role of IGAD mission in resolving
Conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan.
However, this chapter examine the causes of South Sudan conflicts, it explores the
achievements made by IGAG mission in the resolution of conflicts in South Sudan and lastly
it explains the challenges encountered by IGAD in the resolution of conflicts in the Republic
of South Sudan as discussed below;
The data for this chapter was mostly drown from desk review with three focused group
discussion comprised of 7 participant each was conducted and 25 participants were being
interviewed on a specific issue critical to the study.

4.2. The Formation of the Republic of South Sudan.

In the experience of the researcher, the Republic of South Sudan became an independent state
from the Republic of Sudan on 9 July 2011 when it completed its secession. The creation of
the new nation followed a referendum held in January 2011 in which citizens of Southern
origin voted in favor of independence. Power sharing arrangement was made by the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
On Independence Day July 9 the president signed into law the transitional constitution, which
provides for an executive branch headed by a president, a bicameral national legislature, and
an independent judiciary. After independence the SPLA became the national defense force of
South Sudan and continued to be composed of various ethnic groups. Indeed, independence
was the only way to liberate the country from decades of human right violation, exploitation,
corruption and marginalization by the Albeshir’s government. Meanwhile, the referendum of
South Sudan did not save the country from entering into another form of chaos and
instabilities. Within two years of independence the country had got into a civil war (Healy,
2009).

4.2. The Causes of South Sudan Conflicts 2013/2016

Before understanding the roles of IGAD in the resolution of conflict in the Republic of South
Sudan, participants were asked in an in-depth interview as well as in three focus group
discussions about the causes of South Sudan conflicts of 2013 and 2016 and their results were
recorded as shown in table 3.1bellow;

17
Table 4.1: Causes of Conflict in South Sudan
1. Lack of access to shared resources for example the oil; it means the situation that
inequitable sharing of national resources leading to conflict
2. lack of representation in the structures of government leads to violence in the country
3. Large communities have experienced economic marginalization and political
exclusion, often mirroring ethnic and tribal or clan fault lines lie at the root of South
Sudan internal conflicts
4. Large communities have experienced economic marginalization and political
exclusion, often mirroring ethnic and tribal or clan fault lines lie at the root of South
Sudan internal conflicts
5. The external power intervention in the politics of South Sudan also exacerbated local
conflicts associated to the strategic location of the region
Source: Field Data 2023

In a critical analysis in comparison to the work done by Healy, the root causes of conflicts in
South Sudan can be generalized as a result of state fragility, poor and unaccountable
governance and the challenges of poverty, the colonial legacy, political and economic
problems, lack of access to shared resources and environmental degradation, mutual
intervention and political alliances, external powers interventions (Healy, 2009).

In the experience of the researcher, the 2013/2016 conflict in South Sudan is not driven by
ethnicity, but rather by a power struggle between two individuals, President Salva Kiir and
former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar, who are using ethnicity to sustain or gain power.
IGAD has been working to broker a power sharing agreement between the two sides, with
limited success.
The violence that was begun within a single military unit rapidly spread to other branches of
the armed forces in other states. Though the beginning of the conflict was because of the
power competition between the two presidents, later it has changed into an ethnic conflict. As
a response to the dispute, a number of peace talks and ceasefires were put into place to curb
the disputes. The conflict resulted in a killing of thousands of peoples and displacement of
millions of peoples and almost half of the population of the country let to rely on aid.

18
4.3. The Role of IGAD Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
Participants were asked in an interview and FGD about the roles of IGAD mission in
resolving conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and their responses were recorded and
summarized as below;
As an organization having experience from the conflict resolution of Sudan IGAD didn’t take
long time to involve in mediation after the broke out of the conflict in South Sudan. IGAD
was the first regional organization to react for peaceful resolution of the conflict. Mediation
efforts under the auspices of IGAD resulted in several ceasefire agreements between the
warring parties of South Sudan.
The participants argued that, the IGAD-led peace process for South Sudan took place in
Ethiopia from January 2014 to the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the
Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed in September 2018.
A team of three mediators from IGAD countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan) was selected
to lead the process. Most negotiating rounds took place in Ethiopia’s capital city, Addis
Ababa. The mediation process made in January 2014 focused on a cessation of hostilities
agreement and the release of a group of high-profile SPLM leaders who had been arrested
and remained in government custody.
The participating stakeholders were the two main warring parties: the government of
President Salva Kiir and the SPLM/A-IO led by Riek Machar. The agreements held from
February 2014 to August 2015 attempted to expand the peace process and its agenda, with the
goal of a comprehensive political settlement and structural reforms. In addition to the
government and opposition, other stakeholder groups including a group of high-profile SPLM
leaders known as ―the former detainees, other political parties, civil society, faith leaders,
and women’s organizations were involved at various stages.
The process took place for more than a year while fighting continued. Neither incentives nor
pressure were employed to stop the warring parties from their deadly conflict. After its failure
to bring peace by its efforts IGAD decided that international community must involve in the
process.
New mechanism of mediation employed and the IGAD mediation was officially reconfigured
as IGAD Plus‖ in 2015.The IGAD Plus‖—forum includes IGAD members as well as five
African Union member states, the United Nations, the Troika (US, UK, Norway), the
European Union, and China. But this attempt to expand the forum did little to mitigate the
problems at the core of IGAD’s mediation effort.

19
Regional heads of state convened six extraordinary IGAD summits during Phase II of the
peace process, and US President Barack Obama convened his own in July 2015. After
continuous deal of IGAD- plus with the stake holders of South Sudan, an agreement on the
resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan was signed at Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia in 17 August 2015.
A Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) were established in October 2015 to
oversee implementation of the agreement. The JMEC’s members included the South
Sudanese stakeholders, IGAD member states, the African Union (AU), the United Nations,
and the wider set of nations that had formed IGAD Plus. However, implementation of the
agreement was slow and become difficult for JMEC to enforce the deal or hold the parties
accountable as IGAD heads of state were reluctant to relinquish authority to the oversight
body.
The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), with 12,000 troops in South Sudan having
a mandate to support for implementation of the peace agreement was to be an important
implementing partner.
As per to the power-sharing terms of the agreement Machar returned to Juba in April 2016
but tensions started. Just three months later, the conflict resumed and the capital again
descended into violence. Machar was driven out of the country and the deal was suspended.
The fighting continued for more than a year until the next peace deal which as usual couldn’t
result in peace. IGAD and the wider international community would attempt to revitalize‖ the
peace process.
The revitalization initiative was endorsed by IGAD in June 2017, and a new team of special
envoys began consultations in August 2017. However, in the meantime, conflict evolved and
fighting spread to new parts of the country areas that had not been directly impacted by the
violence.
Under the auspices of IGAD the revitalized agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the
Republic of South Sudan was finally signed on 12 Sep 2018 in Addis Ababa.
The peace deal was signed by leaders of the different political groups and by representatives
of the IGAD region and the body’s secretariat.
The IGAD leader of the season Ethiopian Prime Minister, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, delivered a stern
warning to the parties to ensure that the deal would not fail. The main actors in the country’s
politics, incumbent President Salva Kiir and his main opponent former Vice-President Riek
Machar, were present at the ceremony. The revitalized transitional government of National
unity (RTGoNU) is to be based in the capital of South Sudan, Juba and will be expected to
20
steer affairs of Africa’s youngest nation for a period of thirty-six months. The transitional
period is expected to commence eight months after the signing of the agreement. The term
and mandate of the RTGoNU shall be for the duration of the transitional Period, until such
time that elections are held, except as provided for in this Agreement. The RTGoNU shall
hold elections sixty (60) days before the end of the Transitional Period in order to establish a
democratically elected government.

Table 4.2: The Responses of Participants about the Roles of IGAD Mission
▪ One of the Curial roles of IGAD to the R-ARCSS was usually taking time to meet
with the parties individually and explaining to them the importance of the R-ARCSS.
▪ IGAD play a role of explaining to the parties to the R-ARCSS how the process works
so that everyone has the same understanding of what will happen when all the parties
are together.
▪ IGAD’s role was to ensure that they are neutral participants in the meetings.
▪ IGAD’s members were trained to assist the parties to R-ARCSS to listen to one
another and to make sure that everyone feels that they are being heard.
▪ IGAD assists the parties to the R-ARCSS to exchange their opinions without needless
conflict and helps them to solve one problem at a time.
▪ IGAD with the agreement of the parties to R-ARCSS, give suggestions, if the
members feels that the discussions are slowed down.
▪ Unlike a lawyer in litigation, IGAD to the R-ARCSS does not represent one side or
the other. IGAD’s job does not involve giving legal advice.

The R-ARCSS is an agreement that seeks to revive the ARCSS of August 2015, which had
temporarily ended the first civil war of South Sudan that broke out on 13 December 2013.
Between August 2015 and June 2016, the ARCSS played a noticeable role in constraining the
key parties to the conflict from engaging in confrontations, until July 2016 when conflict
ensued.
Since the resurgence of civil war in South Sudan on 7 July 2016, there have been efforts to
ensure a return to peace in the country through various initiatives at national and regional
levels. The establishment of the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) by the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) a seven-member regional bloc comprising
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda – at its Extra-Ordinary
Summit of Heads of State and Government on South Sudan on 12 June 2017, was
21
instrumental in convening negotiating parties in South Sudan to revive the ARCSS (Clayton
2018).
The HLRF, after its launch in December 2017, managed to facilitate several negotiations for
15 months between President Salva Kiir Mayardit’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
and Army in Government (SPLM/A-IG), Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon’s Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement and Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and other opposition political
parties, which ultimately culminated in the R-ARCSS. The R-ARCSS was preceded by five
key agreements between the parties and stakeholders to the conflict in South Sudan:
• Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian
Access, signed on 21 December 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• Addendum to the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians
and Humanitarian Access, signed on 22 May 2018 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between Parties to the Conflict in South Sudan,
signed on 27 June 2018 in Khartoum, Sudan;
• Agreement on Outstanding Issues of Security Agreements, signed on 6 July 2018 in
Khartoum, Sudan; and
• Agreement on Outstanding Issues on Governance, signed on 5 August 2018 in
Khartoum, Sudan.
The Tools Applied by IGAD in the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan
In Focus group discussion held on 25th December, 2020, participants were asked to state the
tools used by IGAD in resolving the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Their responses
were recorded as shown in the table 3.3. Below;

Table 4.3: Tools Used by IGAD in Resolving the Conflicts in South Sudan
• Face to face talk: Individual meeting, IGAD talk to each party privately and share the idea
with the other party.
• Dialogue with the conflicting parties: IGAD facilitates the coming together of the parties to
R-ARCSS where ever they have agreed to meet
• Advocacy: IGAD advocated for the peace process by explaining to the parties to R-ARCSS
the importance of any protocol reached in the agreement.
• Consultation: IGAD conducted consultation about the contending issues to be discussed and
provide fatback to all the parties to the conflict and organized a dialogue in order to reach an
agreement.

22
By looking at the desk review, OECD defines peace building as a process involving wide
range of measures intended at a reduction of risk outbreak of conflict through capacity
building and enhancing the management of conflict thereby laying the foundation for
sustaining peace and development. The process of building peace is long term and it usually
focuses on transition from violence to peace and involves inclusivity in peace process to
bring an end to conflicts and creation of a platform for attaining political settlements and
conflict resolution without violence within the relevant institutions.
This process addresses the root cause of conflicts and its impact which if not well addressed
tends to recur over time. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan created a
road map which the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) and the Government of National
Unity (GONU) and other development partners embraced as a strategy to force Khartoum
and Juba to find a common ground on the resolution of the long-term conflict. Under this
arrangement Sudan was to have a six-year interim period of governance. As per the accord on
sharing of power and stability, created a unitary government as well as regional parliaments.,
stipulated that election would take place at all levels of government which happened in April
2010, recommended on the following; that 1956 border be delineated , that oil revenue be
shared on 50% basis after a 2% share to oil rich regions, a joint integrated military forces
units be deployed on border and a disarmament, demobilization and integration (DDR)
process begin with UN monitoring the process and popular consultations be made in Blue
Nile state and South Kordofan for purposes of settling concerns with the North. Generally,
CPA was seeking to redress the cause of conflict by laying a frame work to facilitate sharing
of power and resources as well as guarantying human rights.
Measures taken by IGAD so far to mitigate the security threats in South Sudan include;
sending its mission to Sudan to help mitigate the crisis/ offering reinforcement, employ Early
Warning Mechanisms to prevent conflict, approval of Protection and Deterrence Force (PDF)
to come to South Sudan, Special coordination with UNMISS peacekeepers battalion on
conflicts zones, deployment of monitors through the Monitoring and Verification
Mechanisms (MVM), built capacities of national security and Built capacity of South
Sudanese security organs. The successful diplomatic intervention by IGAD resulted in
achieving dialogue between the North and South in Sudan conflict (Adar 2000).

23
4.4. IGAD’s Achievements in the Resolution of Conflicts in South Sudan
A desk- review was conducted in approaching this question with result displayed as below;

1. According to IGAD (2018), in spite of the possible obstacles that frustrated the
implementation of the R-ARCSS, there are a considerable number of factors that
ensured that the agreement delivers its overarching objective of laying a foundation
for a united, peaceful and prosperous South Sudan.
2. In terms of content and substance, the R-ARCSS represents a solid pact as it contains
the requisite procedural, substantive and institutional components expected of any
sustainable peace agreement. This is an enabler. What will then be needed is political
will and commitment to implement the letter and spirit of the agreement (IGAD
2018).
3. The fact that the peace pact is politically inclusive and representative unlike its
predecessor, the ARCSS is a necessary condition for successful implementation at the
same time as there are still arguments that a few influential individuals and armed
groups such as splinter factions of some parties like the SSOA are opposed to the
agreement the extent of inclusivity of the agreement was a basis for continuous
engagement with non-signatory parties (Sudan Tribune 2018).
4. According to Sudan Tribune (2018), the legitimacy of the R-ARCSS is another
enabler. Generally, there is substantial local ownership of the agreement, and
regionally and internationally, there seems to be consensus that the peace pact is
acceptable.
5. One of the important achievements was that although the international community
appears skeptical at the beginning and yet after understandably so, given the historical
trend of peace agreement violations in South Sudan, they have pledged to support the
implementation of the peace process (Sudan Tribune 2018).
6. The Troika of the United Kingdom, United States of America and Norway expressed
its “concern about the parties’ level of commitment to the agreement” (US Embassy
in South Sudan, 2018), acknowledged that the agreement is key in addressing peace
and security in South Sudan, on the other hand the United Nations spokesman for the
Secretary-General on South Sudan welcomed the peace pact as “a positive and
significant development.” Legitimacy will be an enabler of success, as it often assists
to mobilize the necessary support for the durability and sustainability of peace
agreements.

24
 7. The effectiveness of IGAD determined the success of the R-ARCSS. It is necessary to
recognize and anticipate that there are parties and individuals that are ready to
undermine the R-ARCSS through covert and plain means in defenses of their
constituent interests, power and ideologies. The ability of IGAD to intervene
effectively to manage peace spoilers or resisters was critical in facilitating the smooth
implementation of the peace pact (IGAD, 2018).
8. Overall, building trust, cooperation and interparty collaboration in implementing the
R-ARCSS was the greatest facilitator of success, at the same time as it is conventional
wisdom that in protracted and intractable conflicts, distrustful parties often sign peace
agreements under political pressure to end human suffering, the peace implementation
process often presents an opportunity to reinforce and fortify not only overlooked or
imperfect provisions in the peace pact, but also to detoxify political relations,
transform political attitudes and re-establish unity of purpose. Thus, the commitment
of R-ARCSS parties to invest in attitudes, institutions and structures that strengthen
positive peace and build conflict resilience in South Sudan was key (Clayton 2018).
9. The leadership, in collaboration with all stakeholders, worked towards sustaining the
central pillars of positive peace that is, a well-functioning government, democracy
and rule of law, an environment conducive for business, equitable distribution of
resources, and human capital development (United Nations, 2018).
10. Most importantly, the ability to institute and capacitate peace building structures and
systems that was proactively prevent and peacefully manage and resolve future
conflicts was fundamental in the implementation of the R-ARCSS. Such tasks should
never be assumed to be facile and simplistic, considering the history of South Sudan’s
conflicts and its current ranking as the most fragile state in the world (Funds for
Peace, 2018).

All the above statements signify the achievements made by IGAD in managing the
revitalized peace agreement in South Sudan.

4.5. The Challenges Encountered by IGAD in the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan
In both FGD and an in-depth interview held, participants argued that there are several
challenges encounter by IGAD in the Resolution of conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.
Their arguments were listed down, analyzed and summarized as shown below;

25
 1. The problem of creation and maintenance of institutions that reflect broad societal
ownership by the South Sudanese people was a challenge to IGAD
2. The building of multi-institutional states that have multiple points of political access
to address and solve problems
3. Lack of effective long-term problem solving at multiple levels that focuses on
building political solutions from solid social and economic foundations by IDAG
4. Lack of Strong and active citizenry to design
5. local institutions and coproduce public goods and services
6. Lack of Commitment to dialogue, participation, competition, and compromise from
the local to national level.

The desk-review informed us that, IGAD took an active role aimed at building peace and
security, especially in both South Sudan and Somalia of particular interest is South Sudan,
whose case has an origin to state and institution failure. The collapse of state institutions
meant that representation and resource allocation difficult. It is worth to note also that lasting
and sustainable peace and security may not be possible without local stakeholders and
therefore, IGAD lacks partners in the region who are committed to the peace process. Again,
in South Sudan the fall of the central government resulted in a flood of arms and ammunition
overrunning the South Sudan space (Kidist, 2009).
The effectiveness of IGAD in preventing and minimizing the impact of armed conflict is
blocked by the following factors:

Rivalry amongst member states: important as mutual respect and collaboration is to

effective partnership within regional member states, the case of IGAD had always been of
rivalry and mutual suspicion among its members. The rivalry amongst member states had led
to a situation of difficulty in framing and achieving common positions on Somalia and Sudan.
For instance, Ethiopia and Eritrea had extended their own proxy wars to Somalia in their
support and arming different Somalia sides, thereby aggravating and extending this crisis
from 1998.

Regional Instability: IGAD is inundated with significant regional issues. Member states are
confronted by many intra and interstate conflicts. Sudan had gone from crisis to crisis;
Ethiopia had fought long, bitter wars and is still battling internal insurrections; generally, the
regional governments have a characteristic of “bad governance, poor human rights records
and weak democratic institutions and culture.” (Kidist, 2009).

26
Lack of regional power: IGAD region lacks a regional hegemony therefore no country can
take a lead role and assume unchallenged authority just like is the case with Nigeria and
South Africa in ECOWAS and SADC respectively. Ethiopia has the military and population
required but lacks a strong economic base at the same time as Kenya does not have the
military power to assume regional leadership. Sudan has oil wealth, but is weakened by
internal conflicts at the same time as South Sudan is engaged in multiple ethnic armed
conflicts.

Lack of trust among the Conflicting Parties: The deep suspicions and mistrust between the
warring parties, particularly between Kiir and Machar, constitute a serious obstacle to finding
a peaceful solution to the conflict. In addition to ethnicity, there is also history that goes back
to the liberation struggle. This suspicion and mistrust are colossally evident in the negotiation
strategies of the parties. It has become abundantly clear that Kiir is adamantly opposed to
reinstating Machar, whom he accuses of plotting a coup, as vice president.

Lack of Political Will: IGAD secretariat is limited in influencing decisions. It can only
implement the decision enacted by the assembly of head of states and governments as well as
the Council of Ministers. It is argued that there is no interest among member states to make
IGAD stronger but they rather prefer a weaker IGAD so that they can outmaneuver it to
champion their own agendas (Kuna 2005).

IGAD Secretariat’s Limited Capacity: The secretariat lacks enough capacity, financial
resources, and political authority to effectively execute its broad mandate. It is therefore weak
and has limited professional expertise and administrative staff (IGAD, 2018).

Financial Constraints: IGAD relied much on funding from donors especially IGAD
Partners Forum (IPF) i.e., donations from donor states and organizations in Peacekeeping
since 1960,” That means that IGAD’s successful enforcement of its policies lies on the
mercies of member states. Therefore, IGAD has only been issuing communiqués some of
which don’t get to be implemented and if implemented they are constrained financially.
There is also a tendency to enforce only matters of less sensitivity as well as politically in
nature for instance, environmental conservation.

27
Poor Policies on Peace and Security: IGAD’s inability to have a comprehensive policy on
the region’s peace and security in order to mitigate the main source of conflict in the region
was evident during its involvement in the Somalia conflict. This showed that IGAD lacked
robust policies and objectives to the region’s insecurity situation. Attempts have been made
by IGAD in order to find common ground to regional conflict, even though emphasize has
always been on revitalization rather than on a common strategy on security policy with short
term political gains. Undemocratic tendencies, poor human rights record, intolerance of many
diversities, and ailing economic climate are factors that limit the development of a common
policy (Healy 2008).

28
 CHAPTER FIVE
Discussion of the Results

The state of South Sudan has long been predicted to face challenges in its uncertain transition
from a state of protracted civil war to statehood and nation building. It is the world’s
youngest nation and one of the poorest members of the United Nations. The Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January 2005, partly concluded several decades of one of
the longest civil conflicts in Africa between the Sudanese people.
The CPA implementation culminated in a historic referendum that led to the declaration of an
independent state of South Sudan on 9 July 2011. In February 2009, the Wunlit Conference
gave expression to the role of traditional authorities in national confidence and trust building
related to post-conflict South Sudan. However, the deep and unresolved ethnocentric and
power disputes amongst the top political leadership of the Sudan People Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA), and especially between President Kiir and the opposition
leader, Riek Machar, continued to bedevil any opportunities for a sustainable peace
agreement and peacemaking after the outbreak of deadly violence on 15 December 2013. The
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) heads of states convened an
extraordinary summit in January 2014 to stop the escalation in the crisis of political
leadership. By August 2015, an Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
(ARCSS) had been mediated and signed between the warring parties, paving way for the
formation of the then-Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU). However, just a
few months before its implementation, the ARCSS collapsed due to violent clashes between
the forces of the president and his former vice president on 9 July 2016. IGAD intervened
further, managing to broker another cessation of hostilities agreement and initiate the
revitalization of ARCSS in Addis Ababa in March 2017.
On 12 September 12, 2018, in Addis Ababa, the government of South Sudan under President
Salva Kiir, various armed and unarmed opposition groups, and other parties, including the
SPLM/A-IO led by Dr. Riek Machar, signed a peace deal – the Revitalized Agreement on the
Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) aimed at ending the
civil war.
The R-ARCSS was mediated by IGAD and facilitated by the Government of Sudan. The R-
ARCSS provides for the establishment of a Revitalized Transitional Government of National
Unity (RTGoNU) whose term of office shall be 36 months, commencing eight months after
signing of the R-ARCSS (as of September 12) or on completion of redeployment of
29
“necessary unified forces.” The Agreement provides that Kiir shall continue as president of
South Sudan, with Dr. Machar assuming the position of the first vice president. According to
the R-ARCSS, the RTGoNU shall be comprised of five parties:
1. The Incumbent TGoNU, comprising of: the former GRSS; the former SPLM/A-IO
(led by Gen. Taban Deng Gai); and the Other Political Parties in TGo NU and
represented, as such, at the HLRF;
2. The SPLM/A-IO (led by Dr. Riek Machar);
3. The Former Detainees (FDs);
4. Other Political Parties (OPP) outside of the Incumbent TGoNU including Alliance,
Umbrella and political parties participating as such at the HLRF; and
5. The South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA).

According to Jean Arnault, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, a good

agreement will result in a durable peace, while a bad agreement will result in delays, setback,
or even the collapse of the peace agreement implementation process. This chapter will shed
light on the challenges and opportunities of both governance and security arrangements, and
their role in enabling a sustainable peace agreement and peacemaking in South Sudan, and
particularly the recently signed revitalization peace agreement. It is important to note that the
major cause of the crises was the fall-out within the SPLM/A top leadership, and the
consequent divide between the South Sudanese major ethnic groups.

Attention regionally and internationally has shifted to the implementation of the signed R-
ARCSS between the government and armed and unarmed opposition groups. Its
implementation is important because it will end the past two years of resumed violence after
the collapse of the ARCSS signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in August 2015. However, the
unresolved post-conflict issues limit the chances for a durable peace agreement. These issues
include, for example, weak institutional capacities (corrupt practices across different
government levels and the misuse of authority), problems regarding viable political space,
ethnically based politics, intertribal communal conflicts along borderlines regarding cattle
grazing pastures, possession of illegal arms by civil populations and a lack of socioeconomic
development. For South Sudan’s progress on the path to state and nation building to meet the
benchmarks set by UNMISS and to emerge from its fragile post-conflict position,
considerable work will be needed. The CPA and other subsequent peace agreements such as
R-ARCSS have barely begun to foster the required security, peace and stability.

30
In March 2018, at an extraordinary meeting of the IGAD heads of states in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, the South Sudanese parties were encouraged to cooperate in IGAD’s efforts to
revitalize the 26 August 2015 peace agreement. A ceasefire agreement was signed by the
parties, but its implementation remained shaky with several reports of continued violations,
with the United Nations observer group continuing to raise concerns over attacks on civilian
populations by the forces of the warring parties.

Overcoming these challenges requires serious measures from the regional and the
international community alike, in addition to those from the South Sudanese parties. The
governance power-sharing deal signed on 5 August 2018 (a subset of the R-ARCSS) is
believed to be flawed, including by the TROIKA countries (Norway, the USA and the UK)
involved in helping South Sudan to emerge from the decades of conflicts.

The leadership fallout within the SPLM has opened up issues surrounding weakened
leadership resulting in malfeasance, self-interest and disregard for citizen priorities.
Fortunately, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar have yielded to regional and international
community pressure to reconcile their differences and have both agreed to work together.
Similarly, the alliances of opposition inside and outside South Sudan, despite their
dissatisfaction, have joined in signing the R-ARCSS. Efforts to help the South Sudanese
leaders to reconcile and amend their working relationship remain problematic despite the
humanitarian crisis and grave human right violations. IGAD and other members of the
international community continue to exert pressure on the parties to ensure that the R-ARCSS
is fully implemented and refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) return back to their
homes.

According to Kate A. Knopf, stabilizing a nascent state such as South Sudan would require
transforming extractive or predatory political and economic norms into inclusive, accountable
institutions to manage political contests nonviolently and provide a good environment for
sustained economic growth.

Trust-building is the bedrock upon which the desired working relationships in an organization
are built among political leaders to attain their vision and mission. The role of traditional
authorities, such as shown through the Wunlit Conference that operated at a grassroots level,
are helpful in building trust and confidence amongst the neighboring communities. However,
the authority that they can exercise in such a role largely depends on the prevalence of
security and the political will amongst the main rival parties at the national level.

31
The Wunlit Conference was able to achieve some success because of the implementation of
the CPA. For example, today the three neighboring communities of Greater Lakes (Rumbek),
Warap and Western Upper Nile have been able to maintain community peace with the
exception of a recent flare up of military engagement due to the SPLM/A political power
rivalry. Similarly, the national dialogue established by the government can function only if a
peace agreement has been reached by the parties and implemented. Other civic society
organizations can foster programs of peace building to assist in building a sustained peace.

Governance and security arrangements are fundamental to any peace agreement and its
implementation. Drawing on experiences in other post-conflict states, three critical tasks are
important for building the momentum for peace: ensuring public safety and security,
strengthening the capacity of the government, and creating peace dividends. The failure of
most post-conflict peace agreements, including in South Sudan, are mainly the result of
flawed modalities for the implementation of the security arrangement.

The current R-ARCSS agreement between the South Sudanese parties faces challenges
related to the provision of public safety and security assurances. The implementation of the
security arrangement is viewed by many as an exact replica of the past failed security deal
that allowed for a recurrence of violence. The public are unsure whether the proposed role for
regional forces and the proposed joint integrated forces of the warring parties will provide the
necessary security and public safety during the pre-transitional arrangement or thereafter.
Ashraf Ghani (2004) the president of Afghanistan, says that people in failing states know that
it is the dysfunctional state that stands between them and a better life.

Ashraf Ghani, argues for decisive, legitimate governments that have a strong social contract
with their own citizens and the international community.

This has been recognized for a considerable time: To take one example, all representatives of
fragile states at the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, Ghana, September
2008, acknowledged the importance of legitimate government. Provision of just and equitable
employment opportunities to the diverse communities of South Sudan, and the provision of
basic services such as clean drinking water, health services, education and food security,
amongst others, in a transparent and accountable manner are important peace dividends for
poverty-ridden communities to recover from the state of abject poverty created by years of
relentless violence in the Ashraf Ghani, Afghan president, statement at Aid Effectiveness

32
Conference, Accra, Ghana, 2004 country. Often times, such unprecedented and complex
conflict situations are fraught with the problems of conflict definition, rules of engagement
and strategies.

All of these are separate but connected: Often seen on a peace process continuum, they
require different strategies to bring about holistic stability and transformational solutions.
Importantly, it is primarily the South Sudanese parties who must use this opportunity to build
confidence, trust and reconciliation amongst themselves to achieve a durable peace. They
should focus on creating conducive environment for ensuring public safety and security, and
thereby fairly disburse peace dividends amongst the population to restore hope and
tranquility.

The Khartoum-facilitated R-ARCSS revitalization no doubt carries over some unresolved

issues into its implementation, yet many consider it a miraculous opportunity after years of
IGAD mediation. Some of the described shortcomings would require a separate set of follow-
up strategies between the guarantors (IGAD, TROIKA and the UN) and the parties.
Primarily, the issues of executive and legislative power, the security and safety of opposition
leaders and supporters, federalism, must all be addressed.

It is a known fact that most agreements fail because of lack of balance in executive and
legislative power-sharing between the parties, the current R-ARCSS is a case in point and is a
replica of the collapsed peace agreement brokered by IGAD and signed on August 2015.

The revitalization of the ARCSS is not free from this dilemma, especially as no one is yet
sure whether the agreement will be implemented in its current form, give the technical
limitations that it faces. The IGAD Council of Ministers continues to facilitate the final steps
but there are doubts about the agreement comprehensiveness and whether it will herald the
needed transformation considering the plethora of irregularities that colored the process.

33
 CHAPTER SIX
Summary Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1. Introduction
This chapter provides a brief summary of the findings; it also provides the conclusion and the
recommendations to the study.

6.2. Summary to the Study Findings

This study set out in Chapter one to investigate the role of IGAD in the resolution of conflict
in the Republic of South Sudan. The existence of conflict in the state indicated that states
related in a specific pattern that protects their national interests. Conflict triggers insecurity
among neighboring states in sub-regions.
Therefore, the member states in a sub-region that are in proximity to the conflict usually seek
to resolve the conflict through a collective approach so as to avert the spillover of the
conflict. The collective approach of states in pursuing peace and security is identified as
achievable only through regional organizations such as IGAD.
The study point out that the cause of conflicts in South Sudan that includes; Lack of access to
shared resources, lack of representation, the problem of economic marginalization and
political exclusion and the problem related to external power intervention in the politics of
South Sudan.
The role played by IGAD in resolving conflict in the Republic of South Sudan as a regional
body includes; taking time to meet with the parties individually and explaining to them the
importance of the R-ARCSS, explaining to the parties to the R-ARCSS how the process
works so that everyone has the same understanding of what will happen when all the parties
are together. IGAD played a neutral role in managing the conflict,
IGAD assist the parties to R-ARCSS to listen to one another and to make sure that everyone
feels that they are being heard, assists the parties to the R-ARCSS to exchange their opinions
without needless conflict and helps them to solve one problem at a time, give suggestions, if
the members feels that the discussions are slowed down and the efforts to ensure a return to
peace in the country through various initiatives at national and regional levels. The
establishment of the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) that managed to facilitate
several negotiations

34
The tools apply by IGAD in management South Sudan revitalized peace agreement includes;
Face to face talk with the conflicting parties, Dialogue with the conflicting parties, for the
peace process by explaining to the parties to R-ARCSS the importance of any protocol
reached in the agreement and IGAD conducted consultation about the contending issues to be
discussed.

The achievements made by IGAD in managing the revitalizes agreement for South Susan
peace agreement includes; the agreement facilitated by IGAD laying a foundation for a
united, peaceful and prosperous South Sudan, the R-ARCSS represents a solid pact as it
contains the requisite procedural, substantive and institutional components expected of any
sustainable peace agreement. Agreement the extent of inclusivity of the agreement was a
basis for continuous engagement with non-signatory parties. There is substantial local
ownership of the agreement, and regionally and internationally, there seems to be consensus
that the peace pact is acceptable, the international community have pledged to support the
implementation of the peace process,

The ability of IGAD to intervene effectively to manage peace spoilers or resisters was critical
in facilitating the smooth implementation of the peace pact, the commitment of R-ARCSS
parties to invest in attitudes, institutions and structures that strengthen positive peace and
build conflict resilience in South Sudan was key, the ARCSS become the central pillars of
positive peace that is, a well-functioning government, democracy and rule of law, an
environment conducive for business, equitable distribution of resources, and human capital
development, the ability to institute and capacitate peace building structures and systems that
was proactively prevent and peacefully manage and resolve future conflicts was fundamental

In its facilitation of the peace process in South Sudan, IGAD encounter the following
challenges; problem of creation and maintenance of institutions that reflect broad societal
ownership by the South Sudanese people, lack of effective long-term problem solving at
multiple mechanisms, lack of Strong and active citizenry to design, lack of Commitment to
dialogue, participation, competition, and compromise from the local to national level.

6.3. Conclusion
The UN Charter under its Art 52 allows regional organizations to deal with maintenance of
international peace and security. Under this provision of UN Charter, the regional
organizations like IGAD are empowered to peacefully settle both inter and intra state
conflicts arising within its member states. IGAD is empowered with the mandate to peaceful

35
settlement of inter- and intra-State conflicts arising within its member states and maintenance
of regional peace, stability and security under Art 6 and 7 of agreement establishing IGAD.

The regional mechanisms operating in Africa are made part and parcel of the African Union
peace and security architecture under Art 16 of the Protocol Establishing African Peace and
Security Council. For peaceful settlement of inter and intra state conflicts arising in its
member states the AUPSC utilizes the sub regional mechanisms. IGAD, having legal
mandate under UN Charter, legal framework of AU and the constituent document of IGAD to
involved in resolution of the conflict of South Sudan within short time after the beginning of
the conflict.

The conflict of South Sudan started in December 2013 after President Salva Kiir fired the
then Vice President Reich Machar from his position. The conflict later converted in to ethnic
conflict between Dinka and Nuer ethnics. It resulted in death, displacement and hunger of
many those involved in the conflict and civilians. Through mediation of IGAD, Kiir and
Machar have signed several ceasefire agreements, including some lasting for just a few days.
Among the efforts of IGAD the most fruitful agreement by mitigating the war, though not
fully respected, was the revitalized agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic
of South Sudan signed in September 2018 in Addis Ababa.

The agreement provided for the establishment of revitalized transitional government of

National unity for a period of thirty-six months within eight months after the signing of the
agreement. After the signing of this agreement the conflict in South Sudan was mitigated
significantly but the expected unity government was not established yet. From the IGAD
mediation process in the conflict of South Sudan one can understand that IGAD played a
significant role for South Sudan arrive the current better stage.

Currently there is no active conflict in South Sudan but this doesn’t mean that the peace is
totally restored. IGAD accompanied with the support of international actors played
significant role in resolution process of the conflict of South Sudan. This doesn’t mean that
IGAD is successful in bringing peace within the reasonable period of time in South Sudan.
The limitations of IGAD in resolving the conflict of South Sudan can be explained by
different factors.

These factors include military involvement, various interests of IGAD member states and
lack of trust among the conflicting parties, risks of parallel mediation, Uganda’ Military
Deployment in South Sudan, the rivalry and internal division among the IGAD member

36
states, violation of the peace agreements by the warring parties and poor Institutionalization
of IGAD. These limitations can be categorized as limitations associated with the conflicting
parties’ lack of commitment of conflicting parties and deficiencies of IGAD.

6.4. Recommendations

Even though IGAD invested its human power and material resources it couldn’t bring full
peace in the land of South Sudan yet. But no one can deny that IGAD played significant role
in bringing the current better status of peace in South Sudan. This doesn’t mean that IGAD is
fully successful in its mediation process of the conflict of South Sudan. It is obvious that
bringing peace in South Sudan needs the contributions of the conflicting parties and other
international actors.

As discussed above, the failure of IGAD to bring sustainable peace in South Sudan can be
associated with lack of commitment on the part of the conflicting parties, lack of active
involvement of international community and deficiencies related with IGAD. Therefore, for
IGAD to become successful in bringing sustainable peace in South Sudan problems related
with these three organs must be solved. Hence here below some recommendations for the
three organs are forwarded.

6.5 Recommendations for IGAD

The conflicting parties signed different peace agreements under the auspices of IGAD but
none of the agreements were fully respected. One of the reasons for continuous violations of
the agreements is absence of sanctions on for violation of the agreements from the part of
IGAD. From the past experience of IGAD on its endeavor to resolve the conflict of South
Sudan we can learn that there shall be some sanction mechanisms for enforcement of the
agreements. So, IGAD should enhance its capacity to impose economic sanctions, embargo
and other punitive measures on individuals and groups that breach the peace agreement.
IGAD also is should convince its member states to have common stand on South Sudan's
peace and influence the African Union to prioritize South Sudan's conflict and play
meaningful role in the peace process.

IGAD negotiation process should involve non-armed stakeholders. This concept seeks to
address the issue of exclusion, whether competitively or systematically, of non-armed
stakeholders in mediation and negotiation peace processes. Current practice reveals that the
grassroots organizations and civil society organizations are not empowered to participate
meaningfully in peace processes.
37
The IGAD-PLUS-led mediation revealed this injustice, when the warring parties blocked the
participation of non-armed stakeholders. Some ended lobbying these parties because they
lacked the legitimacy to participate independently. This recommendation seeks to create
room at the regional level for the voice of the non-armed stakeholders to be heard without
being at the mercy of the belligerents, who at times choose not to invite grassroots
organizations to participate. Involving non armed stake holders embodies the values of
ownership, justice, and fair representation, and is a reliable way to promote the participation
of local communities in regional initiatives. Addis Ababa peace process showed that armed
parties can manipulate mediators into downplaying the importance of non-armed
stakeholders. Involving non armed parties gives the non-armed stakeholders a legitimate
character, this ensures that they are not manipulated or co-opted or pushed about by
belligerent parties; or limited to observer status in peace processes that have a great impact on
the well-being of local populations in any given conflict situation.

It would compel mediators and belligerent parties to accommodate non-armed stakeholders

as a requirement to establish peace talks; the warring parties would have no influence on
which actors are selected to participate; mechanisms would be employed to ensure
transparency and accountability.

This mechanism would provide a feasible framework that authorizes non-armed stakeholders
to demand for official participation in peace talks and monitoring the implementation of
peace agreements.

6.6 Recommendations for International Community

To achieve sustainable peace in South Sudan, there is need for active engagement by the
international community would be decisive. In particular, those who were the midwives of
the secession of South Sudan should reengage themselves.
The dispute between Sudan and South Sudan needs to be part of the long-term solution. The
border-region conflicts, unless addressed, have the potential to become intra-state and
interstate conflicts. Governments should target the leaders of South Sudan's warring factions
with painful financial measures and other actions to persuade them to change the behavior
that has plunged their country into a state of perpetual conflict and suffering.

38
6.7 Recommendations for Conflicting Parties of South Sudan
Truly achieving sustainable peace in South Sudan is a long-term endeavor. The short-term
emphasis should be on building trust and confidence-building and ensuring that any unity
government formed is inclusive. Involving communities ensures that indigenous resources
are strategically employed to find solutions for durable peace. These resources are not limited
to finances; they include indigenous knowledge of conflict resolution mechanisms and
cultural practices. Thus, it needs to promote multi-stakeholder approaches, and enhance the
capacity of local communities to work together with formal and informal institutions to
generate innovative solutions.
This calls for access to information about peace building processes. People have to be availed
with information in local languages and there should be media freedom to facilitate the flow
of information between government and society. Having access to information relating to
issues like transitional justice, and to resources like land can promote constructive
engagement with affected communities and ensure accountability of leaders.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for instance, depends on access to information on the
role played by different conflicting parties and their interpretation. In order to promote home-
grown peace initiatives that take into account local values, resources of South Sudan, the
ownership of ideas, processes, strategies and outcomes should be emphasized by external and
local actors. This is important for the sustainability of peace building efforts in communities
affected by the conflict. The capacity of civil society organizations should be enhanced to
engage the government during the national transitional phase. The civil society should be
well positioned to monitor the reforms, for instance, in the security sector and hold the
government accountable during the transition period.

39
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