XBRA3103

TAKE HOME EXAMINATION

SEMESTER MAY 2023

XBRA 3103

OSH RISK MANAGEMENT

MATRICULATION NO : 831018045109001
IDENTITY CARD NO. : 831018-04-5109
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Table of Contents

PART A ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Question 1 .............................................................................................................................. 3
Question 2 .............................................................................................................................. 8
PART B ................................................................................................................................... 10
Question 1 ............................................................................................................................ 10
Question 2 ............................................................................................................................ 13
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PART A

Question 1
a) It is important to manage hazards efficiently and effectively since it can cause injuries and
property damage at the workplace. Workplace hazards can be divided into five categories:
physical, chemical, biological, ergonomic and psychosocial.

Figure 1

Benefits of Understanding Categories of Workplace Hazards:

i.) Ensures safety of employees: Identifying potential hazards can help employees to avoid
accidents. Additionally, they're more likely to use their protective equipment with
regular training, promoting their overall safety.
ii.) Prevents operational problems: Hazard assessment helps avoid accidents that slow or
stop production or business processes. This helps businesses meet deadlines and
maintain profits.
iii.) Protects property: Accidents arising from workplace hazards can damage or destroy
property. Hazard assessment helps pre-empt and avoid such accidents.
iv.) Save cost: It's cheaper to conduct hazard assessment than deal with an accident. For
instance, organizations can save money by being pre-emptive and repairing a piece of
equipment rather than buying a new one or responding to accidents.
v.) Continuous Improvement: An understanding of hazard categories allows for ongoing
assessment and improvement of safety protocols. Organizations can gather data, track
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incident trends, and make informed decisions about refining safety measures and
policies.

b) HAZOP is a systematic group approach to identify process hazards and inefficiencies in a

system. Example a complex process will be simplified and made easy to understand,
where it will be broken down into NODE. NODE is defined as point or position such on
piping and instrumentation diagram, P & ID. Refer the process and illustration.

Figure Four Phase of HAZOP Methodology

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Figure process flow for piping and instrumentation diagram

The Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) methodology using a simple process as an
illustration: a chemical mixing tank process.

Process Description: Chemical Mixing Tank

Imagine a chemical plant where two different chemicals are mixed in a tank to produce a
chemical reaction. The process involves controlling temperature, pressure, and flow rates
to ensure a successful reaction.

1: Define the Study Scope

Identify the scope of the HAZOP study, which in this case is the chemical mixing tank
process.
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2: Assemble the HAZOP Team

Form a team consisting of process engineers, safety professionals, operators, and relevant
stakeholders.

3: Identify Process Parameters (Nodes)

Break down the process into individual nodes, which represent specific process
parameters that can be systematically examined. For the chemical mixing tank process,
nodes could include:
- Inlet Flow Rate of Chemical A
- Inlet Flow Rate of Chemical B
- Temperature
- Pressure
- Agitator Speed
4: Define Deviations
For each node, brainstorm potential deviations from the normal operating conditions that
could lead to hazards or operability problems.

5: Determine Causes and Consequences

For each deviation, discuss potential causes and consequences. What could lead to the
deviation, and what effects could it have on the process and safety?

Example:
- Deviation: Low Inlet Flow Rate of Chemical A
- Cause: Valve malfunction or clogging
- Consequence: Insufficient reaction rate, incomplete mixing, potential for unreacted
chemicals leading to an unstable reaction mixture.
- Step 6: Evaluate Safeguards and Controls
- Discuss existing safeguards and controls that are in place to prevent or mitigate the
consequences of the deviations.

Example:
- Existing Control: Flow rate alarms and interlocks to shut down the process if flow
rates deviate significantly.
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- Safeguard: Emergency shutdown system to isolate the tank in case of critical
deviations.
- Step 7: Identify Recommendations
- For deviations with inadequate safeguards, develop recommendations to enhance
safety measures and prevent potential hazards.

Example Recommendations:
- Install redundant flow sensors with cross-validation to ensure accurate flow
measurements.
- Implement regular maintenance and inspection of valves to prevent clogging.
- Step 8: Documentation and Reporting
- Compile the findings, recommendations, and discussions into a comprehensive report.
Include the identified deviations, their causes and consequences, safeguards, and
recommendations for further action.

By following the HAZOP methodology in this example, the chemical plant can
systematically identify potential hazards and operability issues in the chemical mixing
tank process. The analysis helps the plant improve its safety measures, prevent accidents,
and ensure the process operates within safe boundaries.
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Question 3
a) The figure given represent Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), two benefits of these analysis are:
i.) FTA can help identify design, procedural & external conditions which can cause
problems under normal operations.
ii.) FTA is excellent for ensuring interfaces are analyzed as to their contribution to the
top undesired events.

b)

The measures might not entirely eliminate bad odor, but they significantly contribute to
reducing the likelihood of such complaints.
i.) Cleaning Routine:
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Regular and thorough cleaning prevents the buildup of dirt and dust, reducing the
chances of odors originating from these sources. Cost might increase hiring additional
cleaning staff, investing in cleaning equipment, and cleaning products.
ii.) Improved Ventilation System for proper air circulation helps in preventing stagnant
air and removing odors. Such as upgrading ventilation systems, installing air purifiers
or air fresheners.
iii.) Effective Waste Management to prevents odor from trash and discourages pests that
contribute to bad odor. By implementing proper waste management practices,
providing adequate waste bins, and waste disposal services.

Limitations of FTA in This Analysis:

i.) The actual factors contributing to bad odors might have complex interactions that
cannot be fully captured in this basic FTA.

ii.) Assigning probabilities to events might be challenging without access to historical

data or expert opinions.

iii.) The analysis here focuses on internal factors within the hotel rooms. External factors,
such as nearby industries or environmental conditions, are not considered in this basic
analysis.

iv.) human behavior and perception, which can also contribute to the issue are hard to
identify.
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PART B

Question 1
a) Review meetings should be arranged to monitor completion of agreed actions that have
been recorded. The review meeting should involve the whole HAZOP team. A summary
of actions should be noted and classified as:
i.) Action is complete
ii.) Action is in progress
iii.) Action is incomplete, awaiting further information

chemical plant that deals with the loading and unloading of a flammable liquid, such as
gasoline or ethanol. We'll examine the potential hazards associated with the deviations
mentioned:

a) No Flow of Liquid into the Tank:

In this scenario, if there is no flow of liquid into the tank during loading, several hazards
could emerge:

Overheating: If the liquid is supposed to flow into the tank to keep it cool, the lack of
flow could result in overheating. Flammable liquids can have low flash points, meaning
they can ignite at relatively low temperatures. Overheating could lead to vapor
generation and increased pressure, which might cause the tank to rupture or explode.
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Formation of Vapor Clouds: Without the liquid to contain and dissipate heat, the
flammable liquid could vaporize and form a vapor cloud around the tank. This cloud
could spread and find an ignition source, leading to a potential explosion or fire hazard.

Static Electricity Buildup: Stagnant flammable liquid can accumulate static charges,
and these charges can potentially discharge as sparks, igniting the vaporized liquid or
any surrounding flammable atmosphere.

b) No Flow of Liquid out of the Tank:

If there's no flow of liquid out of the tank during unloading, the following hazards might
arise:

Overfilling: Without proper flow out of the tank, overfilling could occur. This could
lead to spillage or leakage, increasing the risk of fire and environmental contamination.

Increased Pressure: If the tank is not being relieved of the liquid being loaded, pressure
could build up inside the tank. Elevated pressure can cause the tank to rupture or fail
catastrophically, potentially causing an explosion.

c) No Pressure in the Tank:

If there's no pressure in the tank, it can lead to the following hazards:

Collapse: Flammable liquids can be stored under pressure to keep them in liquid form.
Without pressure, the liquid might vaporize rapidly, causing a significant drop in
volume and potentially leading to the tank collapsing inwards.

Leakage and Vaporization: If pressure is required to keep the liquid contained within
the tank, the absence of pressure might cause leakage. The leaked liquid could vaporize
and form flammable vapor clouds.

d) No Temperature in the Tank:

If there's no temperature control in the tank, hazards can include:
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Ignition and Fire: Flammable liquids can have specific temperature ranges within which
they can ignite. If the temperature drops too low, the liquid might become difficult to
ignite. On the other hand, if the temperature rises too high, it could lead to spontaneous
ignition or increase the risk of leaks and vaporization.

Viscosity Changes: Fluctuations in temperature can cause changes in the viscosity of

the liquid, affecting its flow characteristics. This might impact the loading and
unloading processes, potentially leading to spillage or overfilling.

In all of these scenarios, it's important to consider not only the immediate consequences
of the deviations but also their potential cascading effects and interactions with other
process variables. Conducting a thorough HAZOP study helps identify these risks and
allows the team to implement appropriate safeguards and mitigation measures to ensure
the safe operation of the chemical plant.
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Question 2
Top Event: Workers Struck by Falling Objects

Intermediate Events:
Lack of Hard Hats: Workers not wearing hard hats.
Inadequate Barricades: Lack of proper barricades to prevent workers from entering
hazardous areas.
Poor Material Storage: Improper storage of materials leading to instability and falling.
Insufficient Inspection: Lack of regular inspection of overhead structures and
equipment.
Lack of Training: Workers not adequately trained on safety protocols regarding falling
objects.
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Measures to Reduce Risk:

Mandatory Hard Hat Policy:
Effectiveness: Enforcing a strict policy requiring workers to wear hard hats at all times
in designated areas reduces the risk of head injuries due to falling objects. Hard hats
provide a physical barrier against impact.
Cost: The cost involves initial investment in hard hats, ongoing enforcement efforts,
and potential training. While it might not be a significant financial burden, the real
challenge lies in consistent enforcement.
Enhanced Barricade Implementation:

Effectiveness: Installing effective barricades that prevent unauthorized access to

hazardous areas reduces the likelihood of workers being in the path of falling objects.
This measure creates a physical barrier between workers and potential hazards.
Cost: Costs include materials for barricades, installation, and ongoing maintenance.
The effectiveness heavily depends on proper design and placement of barricades.
Regular Inspection and Maintenance:

Effectiveness: Implementing a routine inspection schedule for overhead structures

and equipment ensures early identification of potential hazards. Timely maintenance
reduces the risk of falling objects caused by deteriorating equipment or structures.
Cost: The cost involves hiring skilled personnel for inspections, maintenance work,
and potential downtime for repairs. While this measure may have moderate upfront
costs, it prevents costly incidents in the long run.
Limitations of FTA in Assessing Risks of Workers Being Struck by Falling Objects:

Complexity: FTA requires a deep understanding of the system, its components, and
their interactions. In the case of falling objects, factors like external forces, material
properties, and human behavior contribute to complexity, making the analysis
challenging.

Assumption Dependency: FTA relies on assumptions and historical data. However,

the variety of possible falling objects and scenarios can lead to incomplete or biased
assumptions, impacting the accuracy of the analysis.
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Quantification Difficulties: Assigning probabilities and failure rates to events in FTA

can be difficult, especially when dealing with human behavior or dynamic factors like
wind and vibrations affecting falling objects. This can hinder accurate risk assessment.

Limited Scenario Coverage: FTA considers predetermined scenarios, but it might miss
newly emerging risks or combinations of events that lead to the top event. It might not
capture all possible contributing factors.

Human Factors: FTA might not fully account for human factors, such as workers'
decision-making processes or reactions in high-stress situations. Human error and
behavior can significantly impact the likelihood of the top event.

Resource Intensive: Developing a comprehensive FTA demands significant time,

expertise, and resources. Smaller companies might find it challenging to allocate these
resources effectively.

Static Nature: FTA provides a snapshot of the system at a specific point in time. It
might not capture evolving risks, changes in the work environment, or long-term
effects.

In summary, while Fault Tree Analysis is a valuable tool for identifying and
assessing risks, it has limitations when applied to complex scenarios like
workers being struck by falling objects. It's crucial to complement FTA with other
methods, such as job hazard analysis and human factors assessments, to
achieve a more holistic understanding of the risks and effective mitigation
strategies.