Ruthenia Classica

Aetatis Novae
A Collection of Works by Russian Scholars
in Ancient Greek and Roman History

Edited by Andréas Mehl / Alexander V. Makhlayuk /

Oleg Gabelko

Franz St einer Verlag

 1
i-'y^zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Evgeny V. Smykov ~
Kashcheyev, V. I. 1993: Ellinisticlieskijmir i Rim: vojna, mir i dlplomatija v 220-146godakh do n
(The Hellenistic World and Rome: War, peace and diplomacy 220-146 B. C ) , Moscow (in R ' ^'
sian).
Keaveney, A. 1982: Sulla: The Last Republican, London; Canberra.
Keaveney, A. 1982a: Sulla Augur: Coins and Curiate Law, AJAH, 7, 150-171.
Klebs, E 1897: Bruttius (10), in: REZ, 915.
Kovaliov, S.L 1986: Istoiija Rima (A Histoiy ofRome), Leningrad (in Russian).
Kovelman, A. B. 1988: Ritorika v tenipiramid (Rhetoric in the Shadow ofthe Pyramids), Mosc
(in Russian). ' (Journal "New and Modem History", Moscow)
Latte, K. 1960: Romische Religionsgeschichte, Munich.
Lewis, R, G. 1991: Sulla and Smyma, C 2 , N . S . 4 1 , 126-129.
Mackay, C. 2000: Damon of Chaeronea: The Loyalties of a Boeodan Town during the First Mith •
datic War, Klio 82,1, 91-106.
Magie, D. 1950: Roman Rule in Asia Minor, Vol. 1-2, Princeton,
McGing, B, G, 1986: The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eiipator, King of Pontus, Leiden,
Molev, E,A, 1996: VlastiteV Ponta (The Master of Pontus), Nizhny Novgorod (in Russian), '
Mommsen, T, 1937: Istorija Rima (AHistory ofRome), Vol. 2, Moscow; Leningrad (in Russian)
Miinzer, R 1918: Bruttius (10), in: RE Supp. 3, 218.
Ortega-y-Gasset, J. 1932 The Revolt ofthe Masses. Audiorized translation [by R. Carey], New York
Ramage, E.S. 1991: Sulla's Propaganda, Klio 73,1, 93-121.
Ranovich, A. B. 1949: Vostoclinye provinzii Rimskoj Imperii v I-III vv. (The Eastern Provinces of the
Roman Empke in the lst-3rd centuries A.D.), Moscow (in Russian).
Ranovich, A . B . 1950: Ellinizm i ego istoricheskaja roi (Hellenism and Its Historical Rôle), Mos-
cow; Leningrad (in Russian).
Reinach, Th. 1890: Mithridate Eupator, roi de Pont, Paris.
Rostovtzeff, M . , Ormerod, H.A. 1932: Pontus and its Neighbours: The Fkst Mithiidatic War in-
CAW', Vol. K , 211-262.
Santangelo, F. 2007: Sidla, the Elites and the Empire. A Study of Roman Policies in Italy and the
Greek East, Leiden; Boston.
Svencickaja, I.S. 1982: Mark Antonij i maloaziatskie polisy (Marc Antony and the Poleis of Asia
Minor), in: Sozialnaja struktura i poUticheskaja organizazja antichnogo obschestva (Social
Sttuoture and Political Organization of Ancient Society), Moscow, 119-134 (in Russian).
Sydenham, E.A. 1952: The Coinage oftlie Roman Republic, London.
Thompson, M . 1961: Tlie New Style Silver Coinage ofAthens, New York.
Trêves, R 1970: Balance of Power Politics in Classical Antiquity, Moscow,
Van Ooteghem, J. 1959: Lucius Licinius Lucullus, Namur.
Volkmann, H . 1958; Sullas Marsch aufRom. Der Verfall der rômischen Republik, Munich.
Zhebelev, S.A. 1898: Iz istoriiAfin. 229-31 gody do R. Khr. (From the History of Adiens. 229-31
B. C ) , St. Petersburg (in Russian).
MITHRIDATES AND SERTORIUS*
Anton V. Korolenkov
The story of tlie alliance between Mithridates VI Eupator, King of Pondis, and the
rebellious Marian proconsul Quintus Sertorius has already been Ûie subject of
scholaidy investigations, and the question has been thoroughly studied both in the
clii'onology of the events and tiie chcunistances in which tiie ti-eaty of alliance was
concluded. The conséquences oftiietteaty,too, have beentiioroughlyiiivestigated.
Many views have been expressed on tiiis matter, but not all the problems have been
fuUy resolved and there is much space for further work on the topic.
It is widely supposed that the first contacts between Mitlu-idates and Sertorius
took place in 79 B.C.* This conclusion is reached because Cicero mentions tiiat
Verres sold a myoparo to L. Magius and L. Fannius and hoc illi navigio ad omnis
populi Romani hostis usque ab Dianio adSinopam navigaverunt (Verr. II. 1. 87). It
is known that Dianium was tire naval base of Sertorius (Sti-abo. lïï. 4. 6), and Mag-
ius and Fannius were tiie begetters of tiie alliance between the Mai-ian proconsul
and the king of Pontus (App. Mithr. 68), whose capital was Sinope,
However, it cannot be concluded witii certainty from thèse words of Cicero that
Magius and Fannius were sent on tiie diplomatie mission from Mithridates to Ser-
torius as eai-ly as 79 B. C, The foreign policy situation in 79 B, C. suggests that such
contacts were not Irkely at that time. The war- witii Murena had been ended by Mitii-
ridates not long before, he sought a firm peace witii Rome and the written confii-ma-
tion of the heaty of Dardanus that had been concluded verbaUy in 85 B.C.^ The
contacts with Sertorius would have compromised liim in tiiis situation, so they can
hai-dly have taken place at tiiat time.^ Moreover, die rebellious Marian proconsul
was not a prominent figure in 79 B. C. and so he would not have interested Mitiiri-
dates at that point.4
In the mid-70s the situation changed. Mithridates was by tiien convinced tiiat
Rome would not ratify tiie treaty of Dardanus and that his kingdom would become
an object of Roman aggi-ession sooner or later. Consequentiy he began to prépare
for the new war. The alUance with Sertorius^ was of great importance in the context
of thèse préparations.
* Translated from Russian by Ye. A. Semyonova.
1 See literature in: Ballesteros Pastor, L. 1996, 204, n. 58.
2 Geyer,R 1932,2179.
3 McGing, B. 1986, 138.
4 Spann,Ph.O. 1987,100.
5 Not for nothing, as M . Gelzer writes, do Livy (per. 93) and Appian (Mithr. 68) tell diat Mittai-
dates began the war only after the conclusion of the alliance with Sertorius (Gelzer, M . 1963,
144). After all, we should remember that it was the king who took the initiative in die agree-
ment.
"160' Anton V. Korolenkov
Diodorus relates that as far back as the Social War the Italians had offered Mith-
ridates an alliance. They wanted him to land on the Italian peninsula, but tlie King
replied tirât he first wanted to conquer Asia ( X X X V I I . 2. 11). As G . De Sanctis
wrote: "Certo egli non prevedeva che i Romani impegnati in cosï tenibile guerra
nella [Apennine] penisola, sarebbero stati in grado di contendergli nello stesso
tempo i l possesso dell'Asia."^ In Ms turn B. McGing supposes that the offer by tire
Italians was none too promising because the Social War was almost over by then.''
Of course one may doubt such a sceptical assessment because we do not know
how things would have tumed out if the ICing had responded positively to the insur-
gents' call.^ Fmther, Diodorus' report is dubious in itself. Taking into considération
that ItaUans also suffered in the slaughter committed by Mitlnidates in Asia, it is not
likely that they would appeal to him. Also, it is doubtful whether the King wanted
to attack Italy even after the conquest of Asia: after the Ephesian massacre he could
scarcely count on any suppoit in the Apennine peninsula. That is why his landing in
Italy would have had no prospect of success (the probable help of tire Greek com-
munities, whether they wanted to assist him or not, would have been insufficient for
him). Finally there is the question of the sources of Diodorus' account. Only a few
persons could have known about this mission and tliey would hardly have told the
Romans about it, but everything clicks into place if we suppose that the Romans
fabricated tliis story for propaganda purposes.^ From their point of view the agi'ee-
ment between their worst enemies seemed enthely natural, and such an 'insignifi-
cant' fact as the massacre of Italians in Asia was important only in the eyes of Ital-
ians but not of Romans. The problem of Mitlnidates' supposed attack on Italy after
Iris victory in Asia thus also becomes clear: it too was a Roman propaganda move.
Note that this propaganda ascribed the same plans to the King even at tire end of the
Thkd Mithiidatic War,'° no matter how absurd such plans would have been at that
time.ii
6 De Sanctis, G. 1976, 98.
7 McGing, B. 1986,137.
8 This is the opinion that K. L . Goulenkov and I expressed eaiiier (Goulenkov, K. L., Korolenkov,
A.V. 2001, 64,n. 4).
9 The same may be supposed about another of Diodorus' taies related to Social war. According
to him, 10,000 Italians wanted to maroh on Rome but Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus "dis-
suaded" them from doing so (XXXVÏÏ. 1. 3; see: Korolenkov, A. V., Smykov, Ye. V. 2007,385,
n. 45). This taie was possibly created by Domitius Ahenobarbus himself or by one of his paiti-
sans, for it was his réputation that gained by it.
10 Plut.Pomp.41;F]or. I1I.5. 25;App.MV/ir 101-102; 109-110; Dio Cass. X X X V I I . 11- 1-
11 Nevertheless historians regard this plan as certain, no matter how fantastic it is. See Molev,
Ye. A. 1995, 134; Reinach, Th. 1895, 402-403; Geyer, F. 1932, 2196; Ballesteros Pastor, L.
1996, 273-274. It should be noted that many Wstorians have caUed this plan inexécutable, an
adventure and even a manifestation of the king's madness (for a séries of opinions see: Hav^'
L . 1968, 13; Havas [1968,14-25] is quite serious in defending the King's plan as feasible): ^
McGing is more cautions (1986, 165). It should be noted tliat we flnd this taie in rather la
ously
sources; the earliest of tliem relate to the beginning of the second century A . D . O''^'^" ^
Mithridates could not have had any support in Italy. If he said anything about such a P'^"'^g
would only be for propaganda purposes - he wanted to encourage his partisans and U"
those who were hesitating.
Mithridates and Sertorius 161
It is true that some historians think that the insurgent Italians coined money
from tire gold sent to them by Mitliridates,^^ but that is only spéculation. Besides,
finaircial support and a military alhance (and moreover a plan to attack Italy) are not
the same thing.
E. Gabba maintains that Sertorius' alliance with IVIitliridates emerged due to the
influence of Italians who openly took part in the Sertorian movement or supported
it in secret, especially from the south of the Apennine peninsula (because the mer-
chants in thèse lands had especially good trade links witli the East).'^ Taking into
considération ail that has been said above, this idea seems very doubtful. Of coiu'se,
the businessmen from the south of Italy maintained contacts with anyone who was
ready to pay them for goods and information (and also witlr both Mitlnidates and
Sertorius). But that does not necessaiily mean that they were the ones who per-
suaded Sertorius to unité witih Mitlnidates (especially as we know tirât the rebel-
lions proconsul had his own reasons for this alliance). The originators of the idea of
this alliance (as Appian and Orosius record) were the Fimbriaii officers L . Magius
and L . Fannius, who deseited from tlie Romans to Mitlnidates. The king was con-
vinced by them tirât such an alliance offered him good prospects (App.zyxwvutsrqponm
Mithr. 68;
Oros. VI. 2. 12), as they told him of tire sttength of Sertorius' army and his military
success,
Mitlnidates had once already missed an opportunity to conclude air advanta-
geous ti-eaty wiûi the enemies of Rome, i . e. the rebeUious Italians (Diod. X X X V I I .
2. 11).^'' This time he was more cautious and accepted the plan proposed by the
deserters. As is reported by Plutarch, certain ambassadors of the King went to Spain
"caiTying a letter and with verbal proposais to Sertorius" (Plut. Sert. 23. 4). Surely
thèse ambassadors were Fannius and Magius themselves, because Cicero says that
they sailed from Dianium to Sinope; Appian also writes that, after the conclusion of
the alhance, Sertorius sent them to the K i n g as war counsellors (Mithr. 68), which
means they must have visited Spain. Sertorius called a meeting of the emigrant
'senate' to discuss Mithridates' proposai.
Contrary to the view of M . Gelzer.^^ the rebels' position was far from idéal.
Duiing the campaign of 75 B . C . they lost large territoiies on the MediteiTanean
coast of Spain, Celtiberia Citerior and the teiritory of the Vaccaei.^'^ That was why
the idea of alliance with the hreconcilable enemy of Rome did not meet opposition
from the ' senators '. Insurgents from Rome were also not worried by the fact that the
inhabitants of Rome and Italy would dislike theh alliance with the K i n g of Pon-
12zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Let2ner,W.2000, 126,n. 85.
13 Gabba, E. 1954,316-317.
14 B. McGing believes that the proposai of alliance made by the Italians (as mentioned by Dio-
dorus) did not really have any prospect of success, because the Social war was akeady near its
end (McGing, B. 1986, 137). But we do not know what the resuit would have been if the king
had been more responsive to die Italians' call.
1^ Gelzer, M . 1949, 54-55. W.H. Betlnett went even further He thought that even in 73 B . C . the
positions of the insurgents were firm and that they even wanted to maroh on Rome (!) (Bennett,
W.H. 1961,468, n. 78).
^° Gurin.LG. 2001,202-216.
162 Anton V. Korolenkov
tus." As is stated by Plutarch, discussion was begun only about some terms of the
treaty. Mithiidates claimed Bitiiynia, Cappadocia and also the Roman province of
Asia. The 'senators' were prepared to agrée to diis demand, but Sertorius positively
refused to cède Asia to Mithridates because he regai'ded it as an inaliénable part of
die Roman state (Plut.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Sert. 23. 4-7).'^
The alliance of Midiridates and Sertorius has been investigated thoroughly, but
as fai- as I know no-one before now has asked the foUowing question: why did the
King of Pontus décide to conclude the treaty at ail i f the insurgents in Spain would
have continued their struggle anyway? He did not need to persuade the rebels to
keep fighting the Senate and he could help them financially wiûiout any formai
agreement.
The reasons for his initiative seem to be die foUowing. First and foremost, by
the fact of the treaty of alliance itself he annihilated any possibility of reconciliation
between the Sertorians and the Senate. Now diis idea may seem strange, but at that
moment nothing was clear. The SuUans had restored grain distribution, the tribunes
were pemiitted to hold other positions simultaneously and no-one was sure diat, on
the biink of war with Pontus, there would be no plan in Rome of coming to tems
with die insurgents in Spain. Also, the king's informants may have attached too
much value to the words of senators in private talks. Eventually, by concluding the
treaty with Sertorius the king did not suffer any loss, because tire war was already
decided. He may have seiiously believed in Sertorius' success; otherwise the ques-
tion about Asian territory would not have been raised at ail, He had an example in
SuUa, who used Pontus' money and was able to snatch a victory from the Marians'^
even though their political régime was supported by most of Italy. The SuUans
(Mithridates may have thought) were not finding support and this fact might com-
pensate for the military weakness of the Sertorians. A n d one more circumstance
should be mentioned: the peace of Dardanus had been concluded verbaUy, but now
the wiitten ù-eaty was in doubt.
B . Scai-digU supposes that the negotiations lasted a long time (beginning in 79
B . C . - vide supra) and that that was Sertorius' fault; he agi-eed to conclude the
treaty only once he knew that Pompey had set off against him.'^° However, it was
noted above that such an early dating of the start of serions conflict between Mith-
ridates and Sertorius can hardly be correct. It is most probable that Mithiidates of-
fered Sertorius an alliance only once he knew of tiie grave illness of Niconiedes
IV,^^ which made the bequest of Bithynia a practical issue. Sertorius in tum had no
17 Soullard,H.H. 1964,91.
18 I. Kônig writes (perhaps overstating the case somewhat) that he sees here a conflict between
Sertorius and Peipema's group, which was prédominant in tlie émigré 'senate' (Kônig, I- 2000.
455).
19 This may be the reason why the terms of the peace of Dardanus and the treaty between Mithri-
dates and Sertorius are strikingly similar. Thèse consisted of payments and the delivery of pa^
of tlie fleet (Gulenkov, K . L . 1998, 60), and the sums in both cases are the same, i.e. 3000 tal-
ents if we believe Memnon's report about the terms of the peace of Dardanus (35. 2). Plut^
reports 2000zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
(SuUa. 22. 9).
20 Scardigli, B. 1971, 253 and n. 102.
21 The idea that Mithridates' activity was provoked by news of Nicomedes' bad health was pi
Mithridates and Sertorius 163
reason to décline the help of Ponms in the difficult conditions of his struggle with
Metellus and Pompey (Plutarch reports only the debates on tiie terms of die agree-
ment in die emigrant 'senate').
As a resuit the treaty was concluded on the foUowing terms: Mitinidates re-
ceived Bithynia, Cappadocia (Plut. Sert. 24. 3) and (as Appian reports) Galatia,
Paphlagonia and Asia {Mithr. 68. 288). In addition, the Roman officers with a de-
tachment of soldiers led by M . Maiius^^ were sent to him from Spain. The latter (as
Plutarch reports) became the governor of the province of Asia. In retum, Mithii-
dates promised to send 300 talents^^ and 40 ships to Sertorius (Plut. Sert. 24. 3).
The vaiiation between Plutarch and Appian on the realms in Asia Minor ceded
to the king (Plutarch reports two, Appian four) may be inteipreted in différent ways.
We could suppose that the king claimed ail four realms and the Roman province,
but later renounced Asia. But it may be tiiought in gênerai Ûiat he v/anted to get two
realms and the province, and that he renounced the latter in exchange for Galatia
and Paphlagonia. However, that combination looks risky, and it would be more ef-
fective to ask for more to get more. Some scholai-s in fact believe that Asia, too, was
reserved for the King of Pontus.
The question of Asia has provoked much debate among historians. A t the same
time, it was of more symboUc dian practical importance. Certainly, Asia was not in
die hands of Sertorius or Mithiidates; it was, so to speak, pie in the sky. Most Msto-
lians foUow Plutarch's account of the refusai to give the province to Miflnidates,^''
diough some have had their doubts.^^ However, H . Berve absolutely rejected Plu-
tai'ch's report, prefemng the information of Appian. For him it was Sertorius who
would have had to concède, because he badly needed ships and money and could
give only some officers and a detachment of soldiers in exchange. The king in tum
posed by D. Glew (1981, 129). F. Callatay believes, citing Livy (per. 93: eius in provinciae
formam redactum est, Mitliridates foedere cum Sertorio icto bellum populo R[omano] inttdit)
tliat at that point the Bithynian king was akeady dead (Callatay, F. 1997, 343 and n. 15). But
the text of the Periochi is too short and not spécifie enough to base a scrupulous chronology on
it. Plutarch clearly reports Sertorius' refusai to give Asia to Mithridates (because it was a Ro-
man dominion), not to mention Bitliynia: consequently, it must have formally retained its inde-
pendence and so its king was stUl alive {pace Glew; see McGing, B. 1986,138, n. 25).
22 F. Hinard proposes to change the Marins confîrmed by Livy {Per. 91), Plutarch {Sert. 24.4) and
Orosius (VI. 2. 12) into the Varlus given by Appian {Mithr. 68). Hinard supposes that this man
is related to the tribunusplebis Q. Varius Sucronensis, because Maiius/Varius recruited fighting
men in Celtiberia (Liv. Per. 91) and it would have been necessary to know the local situation
for this; Q. Varius, as a person witli family connections to the hispanienses, would have known
it well enough (Hinard, F. 1985, 405). However the tiibune Varius came from Sucro and was
active on the Eastem coast, while Marius operated in Celtiberia as a praetor in 102 (?) B. C. A
M . Marius is mentioned by Appian {Mithr. 100); perhaps the Sertorian Marius was a relative of
tliis person, especially as both of them had the praenomen Marcus, which was not in use in the
gens Varia (Reinach, Th. 1895, 312, n. 1).
23 Undoubtedly in silver (Konrad, C F . 1994,198).
24 See the bibliography in: Magie, D. 1950, ïï, 1203, n. 1.
25 Ihne, W. 1886, 31-32, n. 2; Magie, D. 1950, H, 1203.
164 Anton V. Korolenkov Midiridates and Sertorius 165

would not have abandoned Ms clami to Asia, wMch was the goal of the wai- for give Asia to the King. However, the adhérents of tMs point of view have oveiiooked
Mni.26 the fact diat tiie question of temtoiies had less importance in the negotiations than
However we may suppose diat MitMidates did not pay much attention to the was given to it - intentionally or not - by Plutarch. A s for Appian he evidentiy used
concession of Asia:27 it is not likely that he really hoped to receive the province the anti-Sertorian tradition^^ that ascribed to Sertorius the abandonment of Asia to
even from Sertorius?^ However, his demand had its own logic. If the insurgents Mitinidates to discrédit the rebel even more.^^
were victorious, adveitising the fact that they had handed over to him some national However, the teeaty concemed other, less scholastic questions. MitMidates re-
propeity of die Roman people could be a h-ump-cai-d in the political sùuggle. Be- ceived the detachment of die soldiers and officers led by M . Maiius (Plut. Luc. 8.
sides, it is probable tiiat the K m g and Ms ambassadors were simply raising the price. 5);^^* he needed them to reorganize his anny on die Roman niodel.^^ Marius fought
It is obvions that Sertorius might refuse to grant Mithridates tiie odier régions in valiaiitiy against the Romans and became one of the audiors of tiie victory at Chal-
Asia Minor as well, because that would have been a serions déviation from ù-adi- cedon (Oros. V I . 2. 13). This detaclmient may also have been needed for other
tional Roman policy on die East.^^ Thèse tenitories, we should note, were of great purposes. The poleis of the province of Asia, which had learned from the bitter ex-
importance to Midiridates. Holding Bidiynia he would be able to contirol the périence of die Fkst MitMidatic War, were not inclined to take the part of the King
Bosporus sù-aits, and there was a 'Syrian' ttade route tMough Cappadocia that was of Pontus as readily as they had done before. But i f diey did not want to suixender
also of prime importance to Mm, tiie reason why he sti-uggled so hard to obtain this to MitMidates they might submit to Marius, who was the représentative of 'legiti-
poor region.^° (No wonder that Plutarch reports tliese tenitories and omits Galatia mate' Roman power invested with imperium.^^ It should be mentioned tiiat duiing
and Paphlagonia,) die war which began in 73 B . C . the towns were not inclined to recognize either
One of the reasons for Ûie excessive attention paid by Mstorians to tMs problem MitMidates or Matins, even though tiiey promised the abolition of debts and other
is die character of Plutarch's naiTative. In tiying to emphasize die greatness of Ser- privilèges (see Plut. Sert. 24. 5).^'' But did the King know that when he concluded
torius, he desciibes tMs épisode in détail usmg dramatic effects. He consù*ucts two die ù-eaty?
oppositions: 1. Sertorius versus the rebel 'senate': tiie rebellious proconsul rejects In gênerai MitMidates made a "wise militaiy investment" by subsidizing Serto-
MitMidates' pretensions to Asia in spite of die opimon of the 'senate': "He must not rius.^^ The rebels drew off some 14 légions in all;^^ the King had an interest in this
exercise power at the expense of die state. For to a man of noble spirit victory is to and he wanted it to continue as long as possible.'*"
be desired i f it comes witii honour, butzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
with shanie not even life itself. 2. Sertorius What did the other side, i . e. die Sertorians, gain by the ù-eaty? And did die King
versus Midiridates: tiie king, who knows the inexorability of the Romans, exclaims: in fact deliver anytiihig to diem? Some scholars answer this question positively,'**
"What terms, pray, will Sertorius impose when he is seated on the Palatine, i f now, odiers negatively.'*2 Some argue that MitMidates sent tiie fleet to Spain but it arrived
after he has been driven fortii to die Atiantic sea, lie sets bounds to our kingdom and too late, because the rebellions proconsul had already peiished. Memnon in Ms
tMeatens us with war i f we ti-y to get Asia"? (translations by B . PeiTin). However,
the King accepts the conditions proposed by tiie Roman {Sert. 23. 4-24. 3).
32 Schulten, A . 1926,106-107.
The melodramatic character of Sertorius' and MitMidates' speeches, by which 33 Tsirkin, Ju. B. 1989,152.
a dialogical effect is created, is évident and makes an impression. TMs feature of die 34 It is possible that the senator Attidius, later executed by Mithridates on a charge of the con-
text has raised doubts about flie passage,^^ especially about Sertorius' refusai to spiracy (App.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCB
Mithr. 90), also depm-ted witli Mai-ius. G . Kelly identifies him with Atilius Bul-
bus (Kelly, O.P. 2006, 188), but that seems doubtful, because Atilius was only an exile, and
escaping to Mithi-idates could have put Mm in mortal danger. Obviously he had nothing to lose,
26 Berve, H . 1929, 201-204, 207-212; Haeliling, R. von, 1993, 150, n. 16; 160. See also Car- because he took pai-t in civil dissensions, most probably in the rebellions of Lepidus and Serto-
copino, J. 1968, 29-30. Von Haeliling doubts the version of Plutarch, and one of the reasons is rius.
that the Greek writer makes the centre of Roman power not the Capitol but the Palatine. This is 35 Geyer, F. 1932, 2181; Gurin, L G. 1996, 11.
typical of the Empire, not the Republic, so Plutarch's source was not Sallust, but an author of 36 Bemhardt, R. 1985, 64, n. 339. He obviously was a praetor, because the word aTQaxr|Y6s
the impérial period. The objections of M . Gelzer against this are not persuasive (see Gelzer, M. which Plutarch uses when speaking about M . Marius {Sert. 24.4) simply means praetor in this
1963,140). However, the fact that Plutarch used an imperial-period source does not mean that author (Gabba, E, 1973, 429),
we should not believe him at ail (see Gurin, I. G. 2001, 219). 37 Gurin, I. G. 2001, 221; Bernhardt, R. 1985, 136. In essence, as I. G. Gurin points out, the Ser-
27 Nevertheless R. Etienne, foUowmg H . Berve, wrote in his récent work that if Sertorius would torians continued in Asia the policy on provinces that they had foUowed in Spain.
not cède Asia to the King, the latter would hardly have helped the Roman in his struggle with 38 Bennett, W . H . 1961, 468, n. 78.
the Senate in Rome (Etienne, R. 1997, 23). 39 Brunt,RA. 1987,449,471.
28 It will be enough to recall the fate of the gifts to Cleopatra made by Antonius: the real power m 40 Gurin, L G . 2001,219; McGing, B. 1986,137.
Roman provinces remained in the hands of Roman magisti-ates (Smykov, Ye. V. 2002, 102)- 41 Reinach, Th. 1895, 312; Scardigh, B. 1971, 252-258; Leach, J. 1978, 48; Haeliling, R. von,
29 Gelzer, M . 1963, 144; Kônig, I. 2000, 454. 1993, 16; Kelly, G. R 2006, 188.
30 This is brilliantly demonstrated in: Gulenkov, K . L . 2001, 91-93. 42 Gurin,LG. 1996,11 ; Molev, Ye. A . 1995, 92;Pareti,L. 1953, 679; Havas,L. 1968,14; Spann,
31 Ihne, W. 1886,31-32, 2; Berve, H . 1929, 209-213. Ph. O. 1987,130, 209, n. 40; Ballesteros Pastor, L . 1996, 209-210.
 record of thiszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
(fi: 43. 1) mentions that the legate of Lucullus, named Valerius Tri-
aiius, intercepted tire Pontic sliips that were on dreir way back from Spain in 72
B. C.'*^ However, it is évident that tliis voyage of the King's sliips (or ships of pkates
friendly to the King) cannot have been the first. It is uncertain whedier contacts
between Mithridates and Sertorius were broken off once tiie clauses of tiie treaty
had been executed.'''* It is also difficult to explain why Mitliridates "was not able to
help his allies", as I. G. Gurin writes.*^ The pirates who dominated the sea were
friendly to M m (Plut. Pomp. 19. 6), and he had enough nioney.'*'^ There are also
other reasons. It is known that at the end of 75 B. C. Sertorius did not pay his army's
salary (Sali. Hist. E . 98. 7). Appian tells of the Roman ù'oops' discontent with Ser-
torius in the spring and suraiiier of 74 B . C., but he does not say diat die reason was
lack of pay. He also notes that they nonetheless did not leave M m ( S C I . 112). It is
obvions diat i f the Roman detacMiieiits had not subsequentiy received any money,
diey would simply have dispersed. The loyalty of the Spamards would also be
weakening. O f course, many Spaniards did not need pay because diey were fighting
less for Sertorius tiian for their own freedom, but would diey have provided for the
Roman insurgents in such a situation? During tiiis period the insurgent army re-
mamed united and continued its sù-uggle vigorously for not less than a year. Evi-
dentiy Perpema, who took over tiie leadersMp after Sertorius' death, had money
too, because i f he had not been able to pay the soldiers he could not have made the
army obey Mm (App. BCI. 114). It seems diat there is oMy one possible source of
money, naiiiely the tireasury of Pontus. Thus although die king's help, wMch came
no later than the middle of 74 B. C. did not change die resuit of the war,'*^ it none-
theless made it much longer and we should take that into account.
So when did MitMidates and Sertorius make their alliance? It is usually be-
lieved that it was concluded in 75 B. G.,''^ and, to be précise, at the beginning of the
year.^° B . M c G i n g proposes anodier date, the summer of 74 B . C . , because Appian
writes that the rest of summer and winter was over before the wai- began (in 73
B . C ) , after he has related the épisode of die conclusion of theti-eaty.^*The account
43 D. Magie was the first scholar (as far as I Icnow) to point out tliis fact (Magie, D. 1950,1, 326).
44 To ail appearances thèse sliips were not tlie ones that Mithridates provided to Sertorius. 40 ships
were mentioned in the treaty, but Memnon mentions 80 (Sherwin-White, A . N . 1984, 170, n.
40).
45 Gurin, L G . 1996, 11.
46 Even at the end of the Thhrd Mifhridatic war there were not less than 45,000 talents in the
King's treasury (see Gulenkov, K . L . 2000,161-166).
47 B. Scardigli believes that the King delayed executing his promises to Sertorius, while he waited
for azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
casus belli, and finally gave him aid not before the later pait of 74 B. C. when he gained
confrol over tlie Hellespont (Scai-digli, B, 1971, 256-258). But it is more likely that the Third
Mithridatic war began only in 73 B . C . (see Gabelko, O . L . 2005, 400 and n. 346-350 with
further literature); that is why money could be delivered to Sertorius by a completely légal way,
not to mention that the services of pirates were also available.
48 Trêves,?. 1932, 141.
49 See the literature in: Magie, D. 1950, n, 1203, n. 1.
50 Schulten, A . 1926, 106-107; Leach, L 1978, 48; Spann, Ph. O. 1987, 99-104; Molev, Ye. A.
1995, 92.
51 A<lithi: 68-69; McGing, B. 1986, 138-139. A. Mastrocmque offers the same date but without
of the Ù-eaty is foliowed by Appian's ai-gunients about how MitM'idates' hopes of
victoiy were not realized because Sertorius perished and the Romans sent Lucullus
and Pompey against die King. Later (in Mithr. 69) Appian returns to tiie naiTative of
tlie war and writes that tiie King was sure it would be very difficult; he also tells of
his prepai-ations, and it is only after this that he notes that die summer and winter
were over. For that reason we may suppose tiiat Appian's dating relates both to the
conclusion of tiie treaty and to the prepai-ations of tiie King. It is obvions diat in
Mithr. 69 die Alexandrian historian is nsing another source that is not coordinated
with die previous story, sometiiing diat is not rare in Appian's works.^^
C.F. Kom-ad supposes tiiat tiie ùeaty was signed between snituiier of 76 B. C.
and spring of 75 B . C . He believes that the negotiations took place on tiie eastern
coast of Spain and that we cannot see anyti-acesof Sertorius' présence from the end
of die 75 B . C.^^ We should bear in iiiind tiiat Konrad adhères to die chronology of
R. Grispo^'' and nioves the events of the Sertorian War one yeai- earlier, dating the
battle of Lauro to 77 B . C , not 76 B . C , and the battle of Sucro to 76, not 75 B . C.^^
In otiier words, according. to die ùaditional cMonology that is used also by me,^'^
C.F. Komad supposes that die alliance between Midiridates and Sertorius was con-
cluded by 7 5 - 7 4 B . C .
The ai-guraentation of C. F. Kom-ad looks questionable. There is no évidence
that die negotiations were conducted on the coast^'^ except the idea that it would be
die most secure option for the ambassadors of tiie king, who would otherwise be in
danger of being taken prisoner. This ch-cumstance should not be ignored (see be-
low). A t die same time, Sertorius would not want to gather his 'senate' in a place as
dangerous as the Spanish Levant was for the insurgents at diat moment. Besides,
Sùabo reports that the last batties of Sertorius took place by Dianium and Tarraco
(III. 4. 10, p. 161), wMch ai-e siùiated precisely on the Mediten-anean coast. In ad-
dition, it was not easy to take Dianium because, as the same author writes (III. 4. 6,
p. 159), this settiement is strongly fortified by nature itself.
Neverdieless, it seems to me that the date proposed by C. F. Konrad is coiTect,-^^
though for différent reasons. A t die end of 75 B . C. Sertorius, as was said above, did
not pay his troops and dimng the discussion of the ùeaty conditions the 'senators'
pointed out that the King was offering them the dùng they most requii-ed, [lakiaxa
ôsô(j£Voi (Plut. Sej-t. 23. 5) - and of course that meant money above ail. The coïn-
cidence is very précise from the point of view of cMonology, and it allows us to date
the conclusion of the alliance to 75 B . C . The money of Midu-idates would have
detailed argument (Mastrocinque, A. 1999, 109, 113).
52 See, for example, Hahn, L 1982,257-258.
53 Konrad, C.F. 1994,197.
54 Grispo,R. 1952, 199-210.
55 Konrad, C E 1995, 157-187.
56 L G. Gurin gives a critical analysis of C. F. Konrad's chronology and persuasively demonstrates
its inconsistency (see Gurin, L G . 2001,223-231).
57 Nevertheless R. Etienne v/rites with confidence that the negotiations took place in Dianium
(1997, 23).
58 J. Carcopino (1968, 29) dates the negotiations to tiie autumn of 75 B . C . (which is generally
correct), but he does not provide any arguments.
 been acquired by die Sertorians (taking into account die conditions of navigation
diat time) not eaidier dian the end of spring. It is interesting diat in 74 B . C. Sertori
conducted only die opérations near Calagunis and Pallantia, and we do not Icnow ^'f
opposition by hhn to Metellus' offensive, which took place before this: he obvi
ously could not begin major opérations before he got money for the soldiers' na^~
Of course, we nùght ascribe tiiis to Appian's ignorance, but it is equally possibf'
that he had nothing to tell.
F. Gai-cia Morâ is even more concrète. He dates die first embassy to Sertorius to
the summer/autumn of 75 B . C. In the winter of 74-75 B. C. die Roman refugees
would have thought over the offers of the Pontic king and in the spring of 75 B c
sent ambassadors to Mithridates to sign the treaty.^^ Thèse dates do not conflict with
the calculations made by C.F. Konrad. They seem highly plausible except for the
date of die first embassy, wliich could have taken place earlier
Thèse events are connected with an épisode mentioned by Cicero. He says that
die legates of Mithridates came to Pompey in SpainzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
(De imp. Cn. Pomp. 46). H
Berve supposes that they reconnoiù-ed die military situation in tiie Iberian peninsu-
la.'5° M . Gelzer believed that they tiied to discover tiie mood of Pompey and 'the
war party ' tiiat stood behind hhn.^i But, despite tiie many interprétations proposed,^^
it seems that the fact die legates were sent precisely to Pompey has never been
called into question before now. It is in fact difficult to imagine this happening,
because Pompey was not the most influential person in Roman policy-making at
that moment and the décisions were taken in Rome.
It may be suggested that tiie only probable explanation is flie foUowing. The
diplomats that Mitinidates sent to Sertorius were detained by the soldiers of Pom-
pey en route. The Pontic envoys obviously kept Ûieirhead. To avoid problems they
announced that the goal of their joumey was the headquarters of Pompey, The same
type of épisode took place during the Second Punie War when Xenophanes (Philip
V of Macedon's ambassador to Hannibal) was imprisoned by Roman soldiers and
announced that he had made his way to Italy with die pui-pose of concluding a û-eaty
between Rome and Macedonia: the first time tiie hick worked well enough; die
crafty Greek was unmasked only the second time (Liv, XXIII. 33. 4-9; 34. 1-9).
The ambassadors of Mithridates were obviously believed too. Perhaps they man-
aged to vanish before they reached Pompey's camp and the latter hushed up the
business (the most dangerous enemies had been let sUp!), representing it in the
same way as flie ambassadors themselves did, Incidentally it bunùshed his image:
who else among the Roman commanders was deigned worthy of an embassy from
such a mighty monarch?
D i d a ù-eaty between the King of Ponùis and the Marian proconsul become an
excuse for the Third Mithridatic War, as is sometimes supposed?^^ This question is
difficult to answer because of the condition of the contemporary som-ces. It may
59 Garcia Morâ, F. 1991,295-301.
60 Berve, H . 1929, 202.
61 Gelzer, M . 1963, 143.
62 See the survey of opinions in: Ballesteros Pastor, L . 1996, 210-213.
63 See, e. g., McGing, B. 1986, 144-145; Mastrocinque, A . 1999, 101.
equally be supposed diat Mithridates did not wait for the déclaration of war by the
•jiomans and invaded Bithynia before they had time to occupy it witii lai-ge forces.
And a final considération. In the com-se of assessing the pact between the K i n g
of Pontus and the rebeUious proconsul, H . Berve has exclaimed; "Wenn Mommsen
in den prachtvoUen Satzen, die seine Dai-stellung des Sertorius schlie|3en, an C o i i -
olanus erinnert, so ist es, glaube ich, notwendig zu betonen, dap tatsachlich seit
^ ienem sagenhaften Hochveirater der Fiiihzeit Sertorius der erste Rômer wai", von
deni ein offenes Kampfbiindnis mit dem Feinde seiner Vaterstadt berichtet wird,
und da(3 eine solche Handlung auch im letzten lahrhundert der Republik etwas
Unerhôrtes dai-stellte, als ungelieuerUcher Frevel am Staate empfunden worden sein
rm^-"^ ^^^^ really perceived in such a way? Cicero mentions fliis alUance a
few times in his speeches and says that Sertorius was more dangerous flian Mithri-
dates (De imp. Cn. Pomp. 9-10,62; Pro Mur. 32),^^ but he never criticizes Sertorius
himself and does not place him on the same footing as such figures (antipatlietic for
Cicero) as Saùiminus, tiie Gracclii or Catiline. Also, the fact tiiat the opponents of
die rebeUious commander decided to ascribe to him tiie cession of Asia to M i t i n i -
dates shows fliat he was not discredited sufficientiy by tiie mere fact of alliance with
die enemy of Rome. Moreover, die public réaction to tliis alUance was obviously
not sttong, because Cicero says noûiing about it. This is not surpiismg because,
when in 47 B . C. Caesai- tiimed over Cyprus to Ai-sinoe, a territory which had been
a Roman province for 10 yeai-s by dien (Dio Cass. X L H , 35, 5), it did not provoke
any négative reactions in Rome,*^'^ Metellus Scipio is known to have transferred tiie
province of Aftica to Juba tiie Numidian (Dio Cass. XLIII. 4. 6). The sUence of ail
die other sources on this subject also means Ûiat the propaganda effect of this fact
(or fiction)^'^ cannot have been strong. The situation witii tiie gifts for Cleopaû-a
made by Antonius is différent, but in that case the propaganda of Octavian (who
was skilled in such business) had a sù'ong effect.
64 Bei-ve, H . 1929,213. F. Frôhlich also corapared Suite with Coriolanus, which was rather more
agreeable to Berve: tlie comparison was not in favour of SuUa (Frôhlich, F. 1901, 1535-1536).
65 Evidentiy, the alliance of Mithi'idates and Sertorius temfied the Romans - Cicero mentioned a
concerted plan of attack on Italy from east and westzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVU
(uno consilio a binis hostiiim copiis bellum
terra mariqiie gereretur - De imp. Cn. Pomp. 9) and also pointed out tliat the Pontic fleet (de-
feated by Lucullus) aiming for the Italian coast was led by Sertorian commanders {classem
magnam et ornatam quae ducibus Sertorianis ad Italiam studio atque odio inflammata rapere-
tur-De imp. Cn. Pomp. 21), W. Ihne (1886, 33), foUowed by V. Bhrenberg (1935,196), even
supposed that it was just after concluding the treaty with the king that Metellus announced a
price for the head of Sertorius, as mentioned by Plutarch {Sert. 22. 1). But this is spéculative;
other dates are also possible for this act (see Korolenkov, A. V. 2003, 286-287).
66 Smykov, Ye.V. 2002, 102.
67 L Carcopino (1968,448, n. 5) believes that it is true because Cassius Dio used the 'pompeianus'
Livy as a source, but die silence of the author of the Bellum Àfricanum on this subject is suspi-
cions: he would never omit a fact that was so unpleasant for the supporters of Pompey. Ftuther-
more Cassius Dio was unfavourable to the partisans of the Republic (Hose, M . 1994,278-282,
302-328 u. a.), which is why a version that is so disadvantageous for them should be ap-
proached quite oautiously. Finally, it is not certain diat Livy was the source of Dio in this case
(and not e. g. Asinius PoUio).

Tuniing back to Sertorius we should note diat many modem authors have n
perceived liis behaviour as a "teixible crime" at all.^^ " L a condaima... si originJ^ i
un vacuo ed ottocentistico pregiudizio nazionalista".^^ Concluding a treaty with th^
same Midiridates at Dar^danus, SuUa had already made not only peace, but also
alliance.''" The foUowing décades provide a lot of comparable examples, such as
Catiline and the AUobroges, Metellus Scipio and Juba, Antonius and Cleopatra Of
course none of the foreigners mentioned here was guilty of thousands of Roman
citizens' deaths as Mitlmdates was, but SuUa did not for that reason refuse to make
a ti-eaty widi liim in 85 B . C. V. Elirenberg remarked, not witiiout irony: "Die Ges
cluchte aller Zeiten kennt Beispiele dafiir, da(3 dieser Begriff [liighfa-eason.- A, K ]
durchaus relativ sein kann. Die Grenze zwischen Paileigesimiung und Verrat an
Land und Staat, zwischen Verbrechen und patriotischer Pflicht ist in revolutionâren
Epochen notwendig fliepend, und mit mindestens dem gleiclien Rechte hat man
wiederholt schon den grô(3ten Optimatenfuhrer als den ersten und eigentiichen
romfeindlichen Rômer Mngestellt".''* We should reniember that the cession of Ro-
man possessions to foreign leaders also took place dming the subséquent civil wars.
Thus Sertorius, suppoited by his associâtes, joined in aUiance with a king who
was beginning a war against Rome, and most of his conteniporaries and ail known
ancient authors did not condemn him for this. In the previous century it would have
been unthinkable, just as tiie capture of Rome by Roman ti'oops, proscriptions and
many other acts were undiinkable too. The consciousness of the Romans had
changed, and both the alliance between Mithridates and Sertorius and the reaction
of many contemporaiies to it became one more - very revealing - testiniony of this
fact.
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Sherwin-White, A . N . 1984: Roman Foreign Policy in the East 168 B. C. ~A.D. 1, London. AHISTORICALAND EPIGRAPHIC COMMENTARY
Smykov, Ye. V, 2002: Antonij i Dionis (o religioznoj politike triumvira M . Antoniya) (Antonius ON HYPSICRATEIA'S EPITAPH*
Dionysos [on theReligious Politics of Triumvir M . Antonius]), A A M U , 80-106 (in Russi
Spann, Ph. 0. 1987: Quintus Sertorius and the Legacy of Sulla, FayetteviUe.
Oleg L. Gabelko
Trêves, R 1932: Ssitoûo, Athenaeum 10, 127-147.
(Russian State University for the Humanities)
Tsirkin, Ju. B. 1989: Sertorianskoe dvizheniye (Sertorian Movement), in: Sozial'naya bor'ba i jg
liticheskaya ideologiya v antlchnom mire (Social Sti-uggle and Political Ideology in the Ancient
World), Leningrad, 144-162 (in Russian). A unique discovery was made during die underwater excavations of Plianagoreia in
2005: tlie epitaph from the mai-ble base of die monument to Hypsicrateia, wife of
Midnndates V I Eupator.' It is rightly considered to be one of the most substantial
finds in the classical archaeology and epigraphy of the northern Black Sea région
(and, probably, of die ancient oikoumeiie as a whole) of the last décades. The sig-
nificance of the monument goes beyond the fact that it pro vides a brilliant confirma-
tion of infonnation recorded by Plutarch (Pomp. 32. 8);^ it also gives us a rare
oppoitunity to see heroes of the past not just as 'historical characters', but as living
people widi human feelings. In addition, Hypsicrateia's epitaph conveys exception-
ally valuable information about both the final period of the IVIitliridatic wars in the
Bosporan area and some aspects of the history of Pontus itself. As was quite reason-
ably stated by the editor of tiie inscription, it is not difficult to restore its text;^

* I should like to extend my utmost gratitude to my coUeagues who assisted in my work on this
aiticle, looked tlu-ough this text prior to its publication and gave me a number of valuable com-
ments v/hich I have taken into considération (regardless of whether or not I agreed with them),
and, especially, who discussed my paper on this subject at the Ist International Conférence in
Epigraphy (Moscow, 30-31.01.2012): A . G. Avdeyev (Moscow), L . Ballesteros Pastor (Se-
villa), D. G. Bugrov (Kazan), A . Chaniotis (Princeton), P. A . Evdokimov (Moscow), H . Heinen
(Trier), G. M . Kantor (Oxford), L A . Levinskaya (St. Petersburg), L A . Makarov (Moscow),
N.I. Nikolayev (Nikolayev), S.Yu. Monakhov (Saratov), N . A . Pavlichenko (St. Petersburg),
R. V. Stoyanov (St. Petersburg - Çanakkale), L E . Surikov (Moscow), E.R, Ustaeva (Taman),
A . A . Zavoykin (Moscow). Despite flie large number of specialists mentioned above, ail inac-
curacies and mistakes, of course,, lie with the author alone.
1 In most detaU: Kuznetsov, V . D . 2007a, 238-243, with illustrations of the inscription; Kuznet-
sov, V . D . (ed.) 2008, 61-63; more briefly: Kuznetsov, V . D . 2007b, 5-15; see also the first
publication,. Bongai'd-Levine, G . , Kochelenko, G . , Kuznetsov V, 2006, 277-278. Unfortu-
nately, this last work contains a number of regrettable mistakes: the name Hypsicrates is given
tliere not in the vocative but in the nominative case, Mithridates' royaltitieis omitted altogether
(and, as a resuit, the inscription text is given in three Unes, not four), and the king's name is
written with iota in the second syllable, instead of alpha, v/hich was the typical form for the
Northern Black Sea région (277). Some very valuable observations in connection with this re-
port were made by the Academician P. Bernard: 280-288 (his name in the foUowing notes on
this work wiU therefore be cited especially). See also die brief mention of this subject in the
article of H . Heinen (Heinen, H . 2008,190-191) and his more detailed récent work (Heinen, H .
fordicoming).
2 It is impossible to accept the opinion of F. CanaU De Rossi, who believes (without serious ai'gu-
ments) that this fact could be understood as évidence of the spurious character of the inscription
(http;//bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2009/2009-05-22/html); cf. Heinen, H . forthcoming.
3 Kuznetsov, V. D. 2007a, 238.