Professional Documents
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Tristan A. Reyes
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
EMILIO TUASON,
Petitioner,
- versus - G.R. No. 116607
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
decision of the Court of appeals denying petitioner’s appeal from an Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769 denying herein
petitioners petition for relief of judgment.
Herein respondent filed with the lower court a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage with the petitioner based on psychological incapacity.
Respondent prayed for the annulment of her marriage and powers for
administration to save the conjugal properties against petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner filed his Answer and the court a quo set the case for trial. Respondent
presented evidence and during this stage of the trial, petitioner filed his Opposition
to the former’s petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal
partnership of gains. Thereafter, private respondent rested her case and scheduled
the reception of petitioner’s evidence.
Two (2) days before the scheduled hearing on the reception of petitioner’s
evidence, a counsel moved for a postponement stating that the principal counsel
was out of the country. The lower court granted the motion and reset the hearing.
On the date of the re-setting, petitioner failed to appear. Respondent, upon oral
motion, moved that the court declare the petitioner to have waived his right to
present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidences presented. Thereafter, the trial Court rendered judgment on June 29,
Persons and Family Relationship
Tristan A. Reyes
Issue(s) :
Ruling :
No. A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Sec. 2 of the
Revised Rules of Court wherein “a final and executory judgment or order of the
Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he
has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action.” Petitioner
claims that he had been denied due process, whereas he failed to appeal during the
reglementary period and failed to appear during two (2) scheduled hearings which
his counsel failed to explain or inform the court the reason for his absence. When
the Decision was rendered by the trial Court, counsel for the petitioner was out of
the country and the same became final and executor since it was never assailed via
motion for reconsideration. “The failure of petitioner's Counsel to notify him on
time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence
which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client
and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment
resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face.”
Persons and Family Relationship
Tristan A. Reyes
SUPREME COURT
Manila
This case is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the Decision of
the Court of Appeals and its Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioner claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E.
Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract. During the proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, herein respondent sought to
intervene and claiming his share of the estate as an adopted son and sole surviving
heir. Respondent questioned the validity of the marriage between Petitioner and his
alleged adoptive father.
Petitioner claims that the marriage was solemnized by Msgr. Florencio C.
Yllana in 1975. She could not present the original copy of the Marriage Contract
stating that the same was lost. In lieu of the original, petitioner presented a
reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978 as secondary evidence. In addition,
Tomasa and Alfredo executed a Sworn Affidavit attesting that both of them lived
together as husband and wife for five (5) years, signed by both parties.
On the other hand, respondent presented an Order allegedly issued by Judge
Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared
respondent as the legally adopted son of Alfredo. Petitioner questioned the
Persons and Family Relationship
Tristan A. Reyes
genuineness and authenticity of the signature of the judge in said order. Likewise,
to disprove the same, petitioner took the deposition of Judge Moya on the matter.
A handwriting examination was conducted by two (2) expert witnesses. Where one
for the prosecution found that there were irregularities and the other witness for the
defense claimed that there were significant similarities that led him to conclude the
genuineness of the signature.
The trial court ruled in favor of Pilapil which was sustained by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue(s) :
1) Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and the deceased
Alfredo was valid; and
2) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo.
Ruling :
“The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when
they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio
Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the wedding
ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana
stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner,
informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the
Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the
marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop -- through his
vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino -- ordaining that the union
between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the
Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the
circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.” It was stressed that the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine
qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by
the very evidence presented by the petitioner.
As proofs of marriage, as early as Pugeda v. Trias, the Supreme Court held
that marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In that case,
it was said:
"Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by
one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be
admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify
as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
In both cases, testimonial evidence was allowed to prove the fact of marriage
reiterated in Trinidad v. CA, in which, because of the destruction of the marriage
contract, testimonial evidence was accepted in its place.