Professional Documents
Culture Documents
L STONE Revival of Narrative History
L STONE Revival of Narrative History
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Oxford University Press and The Past and Present Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Past &Present.
http://www.jstor.org
III
The firstcause of thecurrentrevivalof narrativeis a widespread
disillusionment with the economicdeterminist model of historical
explanationand thisthree-tiered hierarchicalarrangement towhichit
gave rise.The splitbetweensocial historyon the one hand and in-
tellectualhistoryon the otherhas had the mostunfortunate conse-
quences.Bothhave becomeisolated,inward-looking, and narrow.In
Americaintellectualhistory, whichhad oncebeentheflagshipof the
fell
profession, upon hard times and fora whilelost confidencein
itself;8socialhistoryhas flourished as neverbefore,butitspridein its
isolatedachievements was buttheharbinger ofan eventualdeclinein
vitality,when faithin purely economic and socialexplanationsbegan
toebb.The historicalrecordhas nowobligedmanyofus to admitthat
thereis an extraordinarily complextwo-wayflowof interactions
betweenfactsof population,food supply,climate,bullion supply,
prices,on theone hand,and values,ideas and customson theother.
Alongwithsocial relationships of statusor class, theyforma single
webofmeaning.
7 E. Le Roy Ladurie, "L'histoireimmobile",in his Le territoire
de l'historien,2
vols. (Paris, 1973-8),ii; the articlewas writtenin 1973.
8 R. Darnton,"Intellectualand CulturalHistory",inM. Kammen(ed.), Historyin
Our Time (forthcoming Ithaca, N.Y., 1980).
giganticamountofeffort is currently
beingspentin manycountries,
onlysomeofwhichis likelyto produceworthwhile results.
Despite its unquestionableachievements it cannotbe deniedthat
quantification has not fulfilled
the highhopesof twentyyearsago.
Mostofthegreatproblemsofhistory remainas insolubleas ever,ifnot
moreso. Consensuson thecausesoftheEnglish,Frenchor American
revolutionsare as faraway as ever,despitetheenormouseffort put
intoelucidatingtheirsocial and economicorigins.Thirtyyearsofin-
tensiveresearchon demographic historyhas leftus moreratherthan
lessbewildered. We do notknowwhythepopulationceasedto growin
most areas of Europe between 1640 and 1740; we do not know why it
began to growagain in i740; or evenwhetherthecause was rising
fertility or decliningmortality. has toldus a lot about
Quantification
thewhatquestionsofhistorical but
demography, relatively littleso far
about thewhy.The majorquestionsaboutAmericanslaveryremain
as elusiveas ever,despitetheapplicationto themof one of themost
massiveand sophisticated studiesevermounted.The publicationofits
findings,far fromsolvingmost problems,merelyraised the tem-
peratureofthedebate.12It had thebeneficial effect offocusingatten-
tionon important issuessuch as thediet,hygiene,healthand family
structureof AmericanNegroesunder slavery,but it also diverted
attentionfromthe equally or even more importantpsychological
effects ofslaveryupon bothmastersand slaves,simplybecausethese
matterscould not be measuredby a computer.Urban historiesare
clutteredwith statistics,but mobilitytrendsstill remainobscure.
Todayno oneis quitesurewhether Englishsocietywasmoreopenand
mobilethantheFrenchin theseventeenth and eighteenthcenturies,
or even whetherthe gentryor aristocracywas risingor fallingin
England beforethe Civil War. We are no betteroffnow in these
respectsthan wereJamesHarringtonin the seventeenth centuryor
Tocquevillein thenineteenth.
It is justthoseprojectsthathavebeenthemostlavishlyfunded,the
mostambitiousin theassemblyofvastquantitiesofdata byarmiesof
paid researchers, processedbytheverylatestin
themostscientifically
computertechnology, the mostmathematically sophisticatedin pre-
sentation,whichhave so farturnedout to be themostdisappointing.
Today, twodecadesand millionsofdollars,poundsand francslater,
thereare onlyrathermodestresultsto showfortheexpenditure ofso
muchtime,effort and money.Thereare hugepilesofgreenishprint-
out gatheringdust in scholars'offices;thereare many turgidand
excruciatingly dull tomesfullof tablesof figures,abstrusealgebraic
equationsand percentages givento twodecimalplaces.Thereare also
12R. W. Fogel and S. Engerman,Time on the Cross(Boston,Mass., 1974); P. A.
David etal., ReckoningwithSlavery(New York,1976); H. Gutman,Slaveryand the
NumbersGame (Urbana, Ill., 1975).
V
If I am rightin mydiagnosis,the movementto narrativeby the
"new historians"markstheend of an era: theend of theattemptto
produce a coherentscientificexplanationof change in the past.
Economicand demographicdeterminism has collapsedin thefaceof
theevidence,butno full-blown deterministic modelbased on politics,
psychology or culturehas emergedto takeitsplace.Structuralism and
functionalism havenotturnedoutmuchbetter.Quantitativemethod-
ologyhas proveda fairlyweakreedwhichcan onlyanswera limited
set of problems.Forced into a choice betweena priori statistical
modelsofhumanbehaviour,andunderstanding basedon observation,
experience, judgement and intuition,someofthe"newhistorians"are
nowtendingto driftback towardsthelattermodeofinterpreting the
past.
Althoughtherevivalbythe"newhistorians"ofthenarrativemode
is a veryrecentphenomenon, it is merelya thintricklein comparison
withtheconstant,largeand equallydistinguished outputofdescrip-
tive political narrativeby more traditionalhistorians.A recent
examplewhichhas metwithconsiderablescholarlyacclaimis Simon