Natural Law in Noahic Accent:

A Covenantal Conception of Natural Law

Drawn from Genesis 9

David VanDrunen

MUCH RECENT SCHOLARSHIP HAS CALLED FORTHE INTEGRATION OF NAT-

ural law theory with biblical revelation, yet few writers have pursued such a
project in detail.This essay presents the foundations of a constructive account
of natural law grounded in an overlooked biblical text and in Reformed
covenant theology, in conversation with contemporary biblical exegesis and re-
cent Protestant and Roman Catholic literature on natural law. It explores the
character of the Noahic covenant established with all creation (Gen. 8:20-9:17)
and argues that this covenant provides necessary theological foundation for
understanding nature and common human moral obligations.This account of
natural law provides a sound way to integrate natural law theory with the bib-
lical narrative and to conceive of natural law as a universal God-given stan-
dard mediated through a fallen world.

R
ecent research has uncovered extensive evidence that natural law was a
standard part of Reformed theology and ethics for most of the history
of the Reformed tradition.1 Yet natural law also fell out of favor in many
Reformed circles, both conservative and progressive, during the past century.
Several issues have troubled Reformed theologians about natural law. They have
perceived natural law ethics as an attempt to establish an autonomous moral
standard, as insufficiently attentive to the fallen character of nature generally
and humanity specifically, and as detached from the biblical narrative.
Such concerns about natural law are theologically legitimate and, given the
character of many natural law theories over the past couple of centuries, prac-
tically understandable. Recent contributions to the natural law literature seem
to be taking discussions in a promising direction, however. A number of
Christian ethicists, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, have attempted to
articulate theories of natural law that reject Enlightenment-inspired illusions
of human autonomy. Instead they have called for accounts of natural law that
are theologically grounded and integrated with biblical revelation.2 These
developments are promising, yet I fear that their promise in many respects

Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics, 30,2 (2010): 131-149

132 · David VanDrunen

remains unrealized. Attempts to integrate biblical revelation and natural law

theory have been sparse and piecemeal, particularly among ethicists. No one
has produced anything like a full-scale biblical theology of natural law.3 At-
tempts to provide a rich theological grounding for natural law have been
more impressive, yet from my Reformed perspective they too are unsatisfy-
ing. Roman Catholics regularly turn to Thomas Aquinas and the Thomistic
traditions to formulate a theological basis for natural law.4 The two most no-
table constructive Protestant accounts of natural law over the past years are
eclectic theologically but more indebted to Thomas than to anyone else.5
There is little distinctively Protestant in these books by Protestants. Thomas
is an important interlocutor for any Christian natural law theorist, yet natu-
ral law is unlikely to make any significant comeback in theologically serious
Protestant communities if it is unclear how it is related to their key doctri-
nal commitments.
I present this essay with great appreciation for many of the recent contri-
butions to the literature and considerable sympathies with many of their stated
intentions. Yet I am attempting to take some strides toward bringing to fruition
some of the promise that remains unrealized. I set forth some rudiments of a
Christian account of natural law that is founded in significant measure upon
the covenant with Noah as recorded in Genesis 8:20-9:17. This text speaks
about the created order and the stability of nature, the propagation and main-
tenance of human society through procreation and the enforcement of justice,
and even the image of God . . .for as long as the world endures. The Noahic
covenant is therefore a prime—but almost entirely overlooked—resource for
understanding natural law from a Christian perspective.6
I hope that this work will resonate with the intentions of many contem-
porary Christian natural law theorists. By examining natural law through the
lens of the Noahic covenant, I seek to integrate natural law within the bib-
lical story, to deal with natural law as a divinely established rather than an
autonomous moral standard, and to provide natural law with a rich theolog-
ical grounding. At the same time, I develop this account of natural law with
some distinctively Protestant, particularly Reformed, concerns in mind. For
example, by grounding natural law in the Noahic covenant, I am dealing with
nature specifically as fallen; additionally, I make significant use of a biblical
concept of covenant that has been a key organizing category in historic Re-
formed theology.7 Because notions of fall and covenant are undeniably im-
portant biblical themes, however, and all Christian theological traditions
must account for them in some way, I hope to make a contribution to
broader discussions about natural law.
Given its character, the Noahic covenant provides a way to view natural law
that is at once theologically grounded as well as universally applicable—two re-
quirements, it would seem, for a Christian theology of natural law. I present
 A Covenantal Conception of Natural Law Drawn from Genesis 9 · 133

natural law as an ethic than can be theological without being specifically Chris-
tian. It is not an ethic grounded in a Christian account of salvation or in the
hope of a new creation. Instead it is an ethic for this present world that must
be conceived distinctly from a particularly Christian moral theology grounded
in the work of Christ.
To explain and defend this account of natural law, I first describe the prin-
cipal features of the Noahic covenant through a concise exegetical study. Then
I identify the human responsibilities set forth in the Noahic covenant. Finally,
I defend the specific conclusion that the Noahic covenant is a covenant of na-
ture and that, as such, it establishes and regulates a natural law that continues
to be morally obligatory for the entire human race until the end of the world.

The Characteristics of the Noahic Covenant

Identifying the features of the Noahic covenant will enable us to consider more
specifically the human responsibilities entailed in this covenant and what it im-
plies about natural law. In this section I identify the parameters, duration,
scope, purpose, and distinctiveness of the Noahic covenant.

The Parameters of the Noahic Covenant

I begin with a few comments on my identification of the Noahic covenant as
stretching from Genesis 8:20 to 9:17. Many biblical scholars believe that this
covenant consists only of the material found in Genesis 9:8-17. Standard crit-
ical scholarship assigns 8:20-22 to the J/Yahwist author and 9:1-17 to P/Priestly,
with some scholars seeing the latter as consisting of two distinct sections. What-
ever one's views on the sources underlying the text, the text itself presents plau-
sible reasons for dividing 8:20-9:17 into three distinct sections and identifying
only the last with the covenant.8
I believe, nevertheless, that there are weighty counterconsiderations that
commend taking the entirety of 8:20-9:17 as delineating this covenant. First,
significant substantive similarity exists between 8:20-22 and 9:8—17.9 Second,
important linguistic markers unite 9:1-7 with 9:8-17.10 These thematic and lin-
guistic features link the three allegedly separate sections of 8:20-9:17 and com-
mend the conclusion that it should be read in its entirety as a canonically uni-
fied presentation of the Noahic covenant. Genesis 8:20-22 records God's
subjectively expressed commitments, 9:1-7 records God's blessing upon human-
ity and its obligations, and 9:8-17 records God's commitments publicly and in
explicitly covenantal terms. Understanding this covenant, therefore, requires
drawing evidence from 8:20-9:17 in full.
134 · David VanDrunen

The Duration of the Noahic Covenant

Genesis 8:22 identifies the duration of the postdiluvian Noahic covenant
straightforwardly: "While the earth remains, seedtime and harvest, cold and
heat, summer and winter, day and night, shall not cease." In short, this covenant
will last for a very long time, but not forever. The terse statement in 8:22 im-
plies that a time will come when the earth will cease to exist.
Could this covenant possibly be terminated earlier than the end of the pres-
ent world? Stephen Mason has argued that the presence of imperatives in 9:1-7
make the Noahic covenant bilateral and hence breakable.11 While Mason is cor-
rect to identify human responsibilities in this covenant, this responsibility does
not necessarily make the covenant strictly bilateral. Genesis 8:20-9:17 contains
no conditional statements that threaten punishment for disobedience (as are
found repeatedly in Deuteronomy, for example, which provides a clear illus-
tration of a bilateral covenant).12 The Noahic covenant factors human wicked-
ness into the equation: "I will never again curse the ground because of man,
for the intention of man's heart is evil from his youth" (Gen. 8:21). God makes
the covenant precisely because of human rebellion. From the outset God sets
the termination of this covenant at the end of this world (8:22), and nothing
in the text indicates that this term might change.

The Scope of the Noahic Covenant

Several features of the text indicate that the scope of the Noahic covenant is
universal. First, the Noahic covenant encompasses all human beings from that
time forward. God speaks to "Noah and [to] his sons" (9:1, 8) and establishes
the covenant "with you and with your offspring after you" (9:9), even "for all
generations to come" (9:12). Second, the Noahic covenant also includes
"every living creature" (9:9-13, 15-17). The sweep of 9:10 in particular leaves
no doubt that this covenant is all-inclusive: "the birds, the livestock, and
every beast of the earth with you, as many as came out of the ark; it is for
every beast of the earth." Third, God explicitly states that this covenant is
with "the earth" itself (9:13). Finally, the Noahic covenant envelops the very
forces and functioning of the natural order. Never again will a flood of ex-
traordinary proportions destroy the earth and all life on it (8:21; 9:11), but
regularity in nature will prevail instead: "seedtime and harvest, cold and heat,
summer and winter, day and night, shall not cease" (8:22). Unlike the later
Old Testament covenants, such as the Abrahamic, Sinaitic, or Davidic, God
does not set apart a particular people in distinction from the rest of the world.
The Noahic covenant explicitly embraces all human beings, and the whole of
creation, within its scope.
 A Covenantal Conception of Natural Law Drawn from Genesis 9 · 135

The Purpose of the Noahic Covenant

Identifying the purpose of the Noahic covenant is difficult, requiring investi-
gation not only of the explicit purposes mentioned in Genesis 8:20-9:17 but
also of linguistic matters and the place of this covenant in canonical context. I
argue that the purpose of this covenant is specifically preservative. It holds out
no provision for attaining a state of eschatological consummation, either by hu-
man obedience or by a gift of grace. While this covenant is certainly related to
the other biblical covenants in God's inscrutable purposes for accomplishing
the divine plans in history, it is not organically united with them but is of a fun-
damentally different nature.
That the preservation of the natural and social order is at least one impor-
tant purpose of this covenant is hardly disputable. It promises to withhold the
destruction of the broader created order (8:21; 9:11, 15) and to uphold the un-
interrupted alternation of seasons and cycles of nature (8:22). The covenant also
promises to maintain a delicate balance between animal and human existence
(9:2-4). Its explicit commands, furthermore, provide for a continuing human
social order, through reproduction (9:1, 7) and the administration of a legal sys-
tem (9:5-6). These acts of preservation serve to maintain the original creation,
though not in its original form but as re-formed after the flood. A number of
textual features indicate that Genesis 8 should be read as a reenactment and
reestablishment of God's creating work in Genesis l:l-2:3. 13
But comparing Genesis 8-9 to the original creation account also reveals
some significant differences, many of which indicate that the Noahic covenant
promises to preserve this re-formed creation but does not promise to bring it
to consummation.14 The original creation account sets the stage for a dynamic
history to follow, with the goal of consummation for the work of both God and
God's human image-bearers.15 Genesis 8:20-9:17, in contrast, presents the
Noahic covenant not as designed to bring human work and the world as a whole
to a glorious consummation but as designed to keep human work and the pres-
ent world in a holding pattern for an extended period of time.
Genesis 8-9 thus describes the Noahic covenant as a covenant without re-
demption or salvation from sin and evil. It presumes the presence of sin and
evil but promises only to manage sin and mitigate its effects, not to eliminate
it or to forgive its perpetrators. God addresses the potential conflict between
human beings and animals by instilling in animals the fear and dread of hu-
mans (9:2). Intrahuman conflict is to be resolved by people enforcing justice
against one another (9:6). The covenant presumes tension within the human
community and within animal-human relationships, and, though it sets bound-
aries upon the scope of natural disasters, it does not rule out natural disasters
altogether. The nature of the covenant sign is instructive. At least one funda-
mental difference sets apart the rainbow from typical covenant signs later in
136 · David VanDrunen

scripture, such as circumcision, the Passover, baptism, and the Lord's Supper:
the rainbow does not signify the shedding of blood, the symbol throughout
scripture of the forgiveness of sins (see Hebrews 9:22).16 Furthermore, this
covenant says nothing of eternalfife.In this covenant God speaks of how things
will operate in this world "while the earth remains" but is silent about what
happens next. The Noahic covenant, therefore, preserves the world through
keeping sin and evil within boundaries but gives no final relief from them.
Some writers nevertheless claim that the Noahic covenant, considered in
relation to other biblical covenants, has a redemptive aspect that transcends
the merely preservative. According to this line of thought, this covenant is or-
ganically connected to earlier and later biblical covenants that promise re-
demption and must be interpreted in this light.17 I agree that the Noahic
covenant is connected to the other biblical covenants insofar as God has a uni-
fied plan for history and all of God's covenants serve that plan. Yet the
covenant in Genesis 8:20-9:17 is unique and cannot be situated in an organic
line of continuity with the preceding and subsequent biblical covenants. Let
me respond briefly to two chief arguments that the Noahic covenant has a re-
demptive element.
First, some scholars have pointed to the only use of the word "covenant"
prior to Genesis 9, in God's speech to Noah before the flood (6:18). They
argue that this prediluvian covenant with Noah, which promised to save
him from the coming flood, is one and the same as the postdiluvian
covenant of 8:20-9:17, and thus that the redemptive aspect of the former
must also be perceived in the latter.18 Comparing the content of the two
covenants, however, provides decisive evidence against this claim.19 The
parties and the purposes of the two covenants are different. With respect to
the parties, the covenant in 6:18 is thoroughly particularlistic while the
covenant of 8:20-9:17 is emphatically universalistic. In 6:18 God enters into
covenant with "you," that is, Noah (and his immediate family). The whole
point is to separate and distinguish a tiny part of humanity and the animal
kingdom from the rest. In sharp contrast, 8:20-9:17 repeatedly highlights
that there is nothing in creation that is excluded from the postdiluvian
covenant. The purposes of the covenants in 6:18 and 8:20-9:17 are also sig-
nificantly different, again suggesting two distinct covenants rather than one
organically unified covenant. To put it simply, while 8:20-9:17 promises
preservation of the world as judgment is kept at bay, 6:18 provides for sal-
vation for a small remnant in the midst of a devastating and universal judg-
ment.20 The purposes of the 6:18 covenant have been fulfilled by the time
that the narrative reaches 8:20 and introduces the postdiluvian covenant.21
The covenant of 6:18 makes the covenant of 8:20-9:17 possible, but this pro-
gression does not mean that these covenants are organically one.22
 A Covenantal Conception of Natural Law Drawn from Genesis 9 · 137

A second line of argument in support of seeing redemptive elements in the

Noahic covenant looks to subsequent biblical covenants and later biblical in-
terpretation of the Noahic covenant. Several scholars, for example, have iden-
tified thematic similarity between the Noahic covenant and God's later prom-
ises to Israel, particularly with regard to life on earth and cosmic harmony.23
This thematic similarity is undeniable, but it does not reflect an underlying or-
ganic unity between the Noahic covenant and the later Old Testament covenant
promises. God's covenant with all of creation through Noah creates a stage for
the unfolding drama of the later eschatological promises of salvation and thus
a broad harmonious relationship exists among them in this sense. Examination
of the thematic similarities, however, reveals a big difference in the way they
are developed. As noted, the Noahic covenant promises only the preservation
of the earth from a flood and the maintenance of the ordinary cycles of nature.
It presumes the presence of sin and evil in the human, animal, and cosmic or-
ders and pledges to manage and constrain this evil but not to expunge it. The
later biblical covenant promises, insofar as they take up Noahic themes of so-
cial and cosmic order, look forward to a time in which sin and evil are entirely
banished from all orders of creation. Preservation in the midst of evil is radi-
cally different from salvation from evil. Preventing undue violence between hu-
mans and animals through a fear instilled in the latter (Gen. 9:2) is categori-
cally different from establishing a perfect peace and harmony among lion and
lamb and cobra and child in the Messianic age (Isa. 11:1-9).

Human Moral Obligation in the Noahic Covenant

Having examined the characteristics of the Noahic covenant, I now turn to the
moral obligations that this covenant places upon human beings, as recorded in
Genesis 9:1-7. Here we take a step closer to drawing specific conclusions about
natural law within the Noahic covenant.
I note initially that the moral content of 9:1-7 is generally the same as that
of the original creation mandate in Genesis 1:26-28 although it comes in mod-
ified terms. In 9:1 and 9:7, God repeats, more or less verbatim, the command
to Adam and Eve in 1:28: "be fruitful and multiply." This twice-stated com-
mand, therefore, brackets 9:1-7 as a whole. No verbatim repetition of the orig-
inal dominion mandate lies in between this twofold statement of the command
to be fruitful and multiply, but there are good reasons to see a modified form
of the dominion mandate in 9:2-6, refracted through the lens of the Noahic
covenant as it regulates life in a fallen and much different world.
A first reason to see 9:2-6 as a modified form of the dominion mandate is
its thematic similarity to certain matters in 1:26-29. One similar theme is the
138 · David VanDrunen

relationship between humanity and the animal kingdom. In 1:26 God com-
mands human beings to have dominion "over the fish of the sea and over the
birds of the heavens and over the livestock and over all the earth and over
every creeping thing that creeps on the earth," and repeats a somewhat
shorter list in 1:28. In comparison, in 9:2 God instills the fear and dread of
humanity upon "every beast of the earth and upon every bird of the heavens,
upon everything that creeps on the ground and all the fish of the sea." Into
Noah's hand "they are delivered." A second common theme is food. At Cre-
ation, God gives "every plant yielding seed" and "every tree with seed in its
fruit" for eating (1:29). After the flood the list includes "every moving thing
that lives" and "the green plants," in other words, "everything" (9:3), except
"flesh with its life, that is, its blood" (9:4). 24 A third common theme is the
image of God. God creates human beings in the divine image and likeness in
1:26-27 and then after the flood reaffirms that "God made man in his own
image" (9:6). Because Genesis 8 is meant to be read as a re-forming of the
original creation of Genesis 1, and because the original command to be fruit-
ful and multiply is repeated in 9:1 and 9:7, these thematic similarities between
1:26-29 and 9:2-6 provide compelling reasons to read the latter as a restate-
ment of the dominion mandate.
In addition, the specific function of the image of God in 9:6 emphasizes the
idea of dominion. In 9:6 God states: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man
shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image." T h e popular in-
terpretation of this verse is that God appeals to the image of God to explain
why murder is such a terrible crime. 25 In other words, murderers will be exe-
cuted because they have extinguished the life of one who bears God's image.
This interpretation rests upon an unobjectionable theological idea: the image
of God imparts an inviolable human dignity. But there are good reasons to think
that Genesis 9:6 speaks more about human duties than human rights. God ap-
peals to the image of God not to explain why murder deserves a severe penalty
but to explain why the penalty will be administered "by man." 26 Weighty con-
siderations support this interpretation.
It is helpful to note that in Genesis 1 -26-21 the image of God does not con-
cern vague notions of human dignity or a human right to life but the concrete
exercise of dominion over the world. 27 That image-bearers should not kill each
other is true enough, but the negative prohibition of killing is not the main point
of the image. T h e main point is the positive royal-judicial commission to exer-
cise dominion and to subdue the earth. Without any intervening biblical mate-
rial that suggests a change in focus, the appeal to the image in Genesis 9:6 ought
to be read as an appeal to the reality of this royal-judicial commission. Thus,
when someone sheds the blood of man, "by man shall his blood be shed." When
justice is violated, human beings should exercise their judicial authority to rem-
edy the situation. In fact, taking 9:6 as an appeal to human rights creates an odd
 A Covenantal Conception of Natural Law Drawn from Genesis 9 · 139

tension in the text: the very thing that makes killing so wrong (human dignity
as the image of God) demands that another killing take place. Both in the larger
context of creation in Genesis and in the immediate context of Genesis 9:6, the
royal-judicial interpretation of the image makes more sense. As in Genesis 1,
God is the ultimate judge and enforcer of justice (9:5) but has delegated this task
in part to human underlords (9:6).
This interpretation of Genesis 9:6 means that the statement "Whoever
sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed" is prescriptive rather
than simply descriptive. The image of God, particularly in the context of the
dominion mandate, is an inherently ethical concept. The image of God entails
an obligation to act in a certain way. Genesis 9:6 is therefore a normative state-
ment of human justice: the so-called lex talionis. What the Mosaic law (and many
other human legal systems) would later express as "eye for eye, tooth for tooth"
(Ex. 21:23-25; Lev. 24:18-21; and Deut. 19:21) is here expressed as, we might
say, "blood for blood." The lex talionis, regardless of whether it is applied lit-
erally, expresses the ideal of perfect and proportionate justice.28 The adminis-
tration of proportionate justice by those who bear God's image is thus to be
central for life under the Noahic covenant.29
Before we turn specifically to the question of natural law, what provisional
conclusions can be drawn about the human obligations imposed by the
Noahic covenant? Put simply, the Noahic covenant republishes the original
dominion mandate of Genesis 1:26-28 but in modified form.30 The commis-
sion to be fruitful and multiply apparently needs no modification, for it ap-
pears in virtually identical form in 9:1 and 7. The same cannot be said for
the dominion mandate. The language of Genesis 1:26 and 28—to "have do-
minion" and to "subdue"—does not recur in 9:2-6, but the idea of domin-
ion is unmistakably present in these verses. The dominion mandate will take
different form in a fallen world. First, the dominion mandate, as refracted
through the Noahic covenant, is to be pursued in the context of ongoing con-
flict within the world. Under the Noahic covenant, in contrast to the orig-
inal creation, conflict and hostility form part of the fabric of the natural and
social orders. There will be "cold and heat" (8:22), tension between animals
and humans (9:2), and murder (9:5-6). Second, the Noahic covenant envi-
sions no completion of the task of the dominion mandate. The covenant of
creation held out the prospect that, like God, human beings would finish
their work of dominion and would attain a state of eschatological consum-
mation.31 The Noahic covenant envisions only the ongoing performance of
the task in order to sustain human existence and to maintain an uneasy and
partial peace in society; animal-human tension is kept in check and
human-human conflict is mitigated, but the conflict itself is not expunged.
The dominion that Noah's descendents can achieve is but a shadow of the
dominion that Adam and Eve were to achieve.
140 · David VanDrunen

Natural Law in the Noahic Covenant

These considerations lay the foundation for a theology of natural law grounded
in the Noahic covenant. This covenant deals generally with the natural order
and specifically with human beings according to their nature. Its obligations
are not arbitrary but in accord with the nature of human beings as they image
God in a fallen but preserved world. To elucidate this link between natural law
and the Noahic covenant, I conclude by addressing three topics: natural moral
obligation as natural law, natural law and the divine nature, and natural law and
the image of God.

Natural Moral Obligation, Natural Law

The character of Genesis 8:20-9:17 as a natural covenant is most immediately
evident with respect to the created order broadly. God's opening words prom-
ise forbearance toward the ground and every living creature (8:21) and reestab-
lish the regular cycles of days and seasons (8:22). Later verses describe the
character of the animal kingdom (9:2-4) and restate God's commitment to sus-
taining the regular cycles of nature (9:11-17). God promulgates human obli-
gation in the very same covenantal action by which he ordains the existence,
continuation, and functions of the natural order. This is markedly different from
later biblical covenants that promise eschatological renewal but have no im-
mediate effect upon the present order of creation.
The Noahic covenant is a covenant of nature not only with respect to the
created order generally but also with respect to the obligations that it places
upon human beings. Its obligations are not arbitrary but fully consonant with
human nature. Among the considerations that lend credence to this claim, the
most decisive, I believe, is the motive clause that appears in Genesis 9:6: "Who-
ever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made
man in his own image." Motive clauses "are the grammatically subordinate sen-
tences in which the motivation for the commandment is given."32 In the Old
Testament motive clauses most commonly begin with the conjunction ki ("for"),
as is the case in Genesis 9:6. Murder should be punished justly because God
made human beings in the divine image, not because of God's arbitrary good
pleasure or a pragmatic desire to deter crime. The fall into sin and God's curse
upon the world have not altered the basic connection between human nature
and the fundamental human tasks of multiplying and exercising dominion. The
Noahic covenant deals with human beings in accord with the kind of creatures
that they are.
Confirming this conclusion is the form in which Genesis 9:6 is presented.
This verse has both legal and proverbial overtones.33 Appreciating both the le-
 A Covenantal Conception of Natural Law Drawn from Genesis 9 · 141

gal and proverbial character of 9:6 further justifies the use of the term "natu-
ral law" to describe the moral obligations inherent in the Noahic covenant.
First, the statement in Genesis 9:6 suggests the presence oí law. In the bib-
lical context, the motive clause has overt legal overtones. Motive clauses are a
distinctive feature, a "peculiarity" of Old Testament law. While motive clauses
are virtually unknown in other ancient Near Eastern codes, motive clauses are
appended to well over half of the laws in Leviticus and Deuteronomy (though
far fewer than half in Exodus).34 To Hebrew readers, Genesis 9:6 must have
sounded like the statement of a law. In addition, the very principle asserted, the
lex talionis, is overtly legal. The lex talionis appears three times explicitly in the
Mosaic law (Ex. 21:23-25; Lev. 24:18-21 ; and Deut. 19:21) and is arguably one
of the fundamental principles of its jurisprudence. It is compelling to read
Genesis 9:6 as a statement of law.
It is also compelling to see a proverbial element of Genesis 9:6 and some-
thing that is genuinely natural. Though we should read Genesis 9:6 prescrip-
tively, it is stated descriptively. Genesis 8:20-9:17 isfilledwith statements about
how things will operate under the Noahic covenant, and in this context 9:6
states: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed." Like
so many biblical proverbs, Genesis 9:6 describes the way things work in the
course of human affairs, with strong moral force underlying the descriptive
statement. Of course, the fact that a principle is proverbial does not necessar-
ily mean that it is natural. Although the naturalistic fallacy is not a crime of
which all natural law theories are guilty, the claim that every customary prac-
tice with proverbial force is a natural moral obligation would invite the accu-
sation.35 History abounds with examples of evil social customs. But resolving
judicial disputes through the talionic principle is no ordinary social custom. The
lex talionis has been expressed not only in extrabiblical ancient Near Eastern
legal codes (predating Moses) but also in the Mosaic law, the Roman law, and
in the legal practice of many other societies.36 Proverbial statements and so-
cial customs certainly tell us something about human nature. The lex talionis
has served much good in constraining feuds and de-escalating cycles of
vengeance through seeking that delicate balance between too little payback and
too much. Arguably, it manifests the human conception of and drive toward
impartial justice and thereby shows the way that we must conduct ourselves if
we are to maintain orderly societies that redress wrongdoing without spiraling
into chaos. It tells us about natural moral obligation within the confines of a
fallen and evil world. This suggestion, which the semiproverbial form of the
opening of Genesis 9:6 makes reasonable but inconclusive, is confirmed by the
motive clause at the end of the verse. By administering justice through the lex
talionis the human race acts according to nature in the best sense: according to
its identity as those who bear the image and likeness of God.
142 · David VanDrunen

Based upon such considerations, I conclude that the obligations placed

upon the human race in Genesis 9:1-7 are natural moral obligations grounded
in the original creation of human beings in the image of God and continuing
in the present fallen world. T h e obligations are legal and in accord with na-
ture. Hence we may accurately describe the obligations of the Noahic
covenant as natural law and we have good reason to assert that the Noahic
covenant is the foundation for the ongoing presence and force of natural law
in the world today.

Natural Law and the Divine Nature

Insofar as the Noahic covenant points to the image of God as the ground of
human obligations, it suggests that the character of God's own actions some-
how defines natural human moral obligations. I now examine how God is re-
vealed in the Noahic covenant and then consider how this revelation determines
the moral conduct expected of God's image-bearers in that covenant. I con-
clude that God is revealed as a creative, fruitful, and generous God and as a
God of justice tempered by forbearance. This creative fruitfulness, combined
with a forbearing justice, defines the substance of the Noahic natural law.
In scripture, God and human beings do not meet as strangers; they meet
according to a covenant relationship defined by God. As often emphasized in
classic Reformed theology, in whatever circumstance human beings may find
themselves, whether in an Unfällen, fallen, or redeemed condition, they relate
to God not in the abstract but according to the concrete terms of God's
covenantal revelation. Human beings can only relate to the God whom they
know, and the God they know is revealed in a particular covenant relationship.
How, then, is God revealed in the Noahic covenant? First, God displays a
creative fruitfulness that looks much like the creative fruitfulness at creation.
Although the story of the flood in Genesis 6:9-7:24 is one of destruction, its
aftermath in Genesis 8:1-20 is a story of re-forming and repopulating the earth
that echoes the original creation account. T h e waters abate so that dry ground
appears, vegetation springs forth from the ground, and the various creatures
are to "swarm" and fill the earth once again. As in Genesis 1-2, therefore, God
speaks the covenantal words in Genesis 8-9 after ordaining all manner of life
to exist and abound in the world. Also similar to the creation account is the
display of God's generosity. God does not make the earth abound in order to
horde its riches but calls the creation to share in the work and to participate in
the divine fruitfulness. T h e ground brings forth vegetation (8:11), the animals
are to "swarm" and to "be fruitful and multiply" (8:17), and human beings are
to be fruitful and multiply, to exercise dominion under God, and even to ap-
propriate and enjoy the bounty of creation for their own well-being through
eating both plants and animals (9:1-7).
 A Covenantal Conception of Natural Law Drawn from Genesis 9 · 143

The revelation of God's justice in the Noahic covenant is more difficult to

analyze, yet crucial for a theology of natural law. The story of the flood in Gen-
esis 6-7 portrays a very strict divine justice. When God pronounced a guilty
verdict upon the serpent, Eve, and Adam in Genesis 3:14-19, God also an-
nounced a plan of salvation; God did not immediately bring down the full
weight of judgment but preserved humanity and the broader world from de-
struction. Genesis 6:5-7, in contrast, declares God's intention to terminate the
preservation of creation. God promises to blot out humans and animals alike
from the face of the earth because of the utter depravity of humanity. The fol-
lowing story then relates how God kept this promise by means of the flood.
Genesis 6:11-7:24 looks something like the strict judgment that we would have
expected to come in Genesis 3, in light of the threat in Genesis 2:17. Noah
aside, there is no forgiveness or mercy for the world in Genesis 6-7. The New
Testament confirms this observation by looking back to the flood as an anal-
ogy for the final and decisive judgment of the last day (Matt. 24:36-44; 2 Pet.
3:5-7). The Noahic covenant emerges against the background of a drastic and
dramatic reminder that God is a God of strict justice.
Precisely at this point, however, the story becomes more complicated. Af-
ter Noah and his companions disembark (8:18-20), God repeats the indictment
of the utter wickedness of humanity (8:21). Strikingly, this indictment does not
trigger a destructive judgment, as in 6:5-7, but serves as a rationale for God
not cursing the ground again. If human wickedness prompts a commitment
from God to withhold radical judgment, then the operative principle here is
obviously not strict justice. As the following verses (8:21-9:17) make clear, the
operative principle is also not mercy or forgiveness. The Noahic covenant
promises not salvation but only temporary preservation. In my judgment, the
operative principle is therefore best described as forbearance, toleration, or
longsuffering. In the flood God is a God of strict justice, but after the flood
God publicly resolves to withhold that strict justice for a time. The Noahic
covenant, therefore, reveals a God of justice tempered by forbearance.

Natural Law and the Image of God

If natural law directs human beings to exhibit the divine image, as defined by
God's self-revelation in a particular covenant relationship, then Noahic natural
law must require a God-like creative fruitfulness and generosity as well as the
practice of justice tempered by forbearance. Genesis 9:1-7 confirms this logical
conclusion. As God fruitfully refashioned the world and exercised benevolent
dominion over it in Genesis 8:1-19, so human beings were to be fruitful and mul-
tiply and to take up tasks of dominion. The various endeavors of human culture
that flow from the abilities and capacities of the human person were to continue
in the postlapsarian world. The issue of justice is less straightforward. The
144 · David VanDrunen

Noahic covenant, through its statement of the talionic principle in Genesis 9:6,
obviously highlights the importance of justice. The lex talionis expresses justice
in a perfect and proportionate form, and thus Genesis 9:6 seems to impose an
obligation to pursue strict justice akin to that of God in bringing the flood. What
seems to be lacking in Genesis 9:6 is any room for forbearance akin to God's for-
bearance in temporarily preserving the world from destruction after the flood.
Nevertheless, we should interpret the call to justice in Genesis 9:6, in the
context of the Noahic covenant, as a proportionate justice tempered by forbear-
ance. First, 9:6 itself points us to the image of God. If human justice is to re-
flect the likeness of God insofar as God relates to the world through the Noahic
covenant, then it cannot be an unmitigated strict justice, for strict justice is not
God's way with the world after the flood. Second, Genesis 9:6 commends jus-
tice for human society, but the biblical text has already told us that postlapsar-
ian and postdiluvian human society is composed of people whose hearts' inten-
tions are "evil from his youth" (8:21). Would the imposition of strict justice,
untempered by forbearance, even be possible in such a society? If I was obliged
to seek strict justice against every person who did me the least wrong, and vice
versa, society would be quickly overwhelmed with lawsuits and productive cul-
tural pursuits would grind to a halt. Strict enforcement of the lex talionis is fun-
damentally incompatible with God's will to preserve a creatively fruitful human
society in a pervasively sinful world. It is interesting that Genesis 9:6 states the
talionic principle only with regard to redressing the most heinous intrahuman
crime, murder, perhaps subtly indicating that we must be selective in pursuing
strict justice. The Noahic covenant leaves us with the general obligation to seek
justice even while we forbear many wrongs, without telling us exactly how to
strike the balance between them.
The Noahic covenant imparts a natural law (seek justice, tempered by for-
bearance) that is imprecise. But as such it reflects the postlapsarian context of
nature and God's dealings with it. The course of nature brings "rains from
heaven and fruitful seasons, satisfying your hearts with food and gladness"
(Acts 14:17), tokens of God's goodness and longsuffering. But the course of na-
ture also brings hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, floods, droughts, tsunamis,
and wildfires, no doubt reminders of the judgment to come. The postlapsar-
ian natural order itself, in other words, reveals God's justice and his forbear-
ance, but who can perceive the precise relationship they bear to each other?
Thus I suggest that the natural law obligating image-bearers under the Noahic
covenant directs us to pursue justice tempered with forbearance but does not
define the exact contours of what that must mean in practice. The Noahic nat-
ural law demands the formation of a justice system but leaves much room for
flexibility and adaptation in putting that demand into concrete application, as
required by the need to foster social order and productive cultural activity in
ever-changing contexts.37
 A Covenantal Conception of Natural Law Drawn from Genesis 9 · 145

Finally, God preserved a culturally productive human society and ordained

the practice of human justice as a covenant-making God. Does this suggest that
God's image-bearers are to be covenant-making people, particularly in regard
to establishing social arrangements that promote cultural productivity and the
enforcement of justice? It is an intriguing question since many human social
arrangements have been formed through covenants and treaties of various
sorts, and since the biblical story presents Abraham making such covenants
shortly after the account of the Noahic covenant (see Gen. 21:22—34).38

Conclusion

I have outlined some rudiments of a theology of natural law grounded in the

biblical covenant with Noah. It has, I hope, resonated with important concerns
of much recent Christian natural law literature. By basing natural law in God's
own act of covenant making in Genesis 8-9, I propose an account of natural
law that is theologically grounded, integrated into the biblical story, and at odds
with any notion of natural law as an autonomous moral standard. It is also dis-
tinctively Protestant as it seeks to place natural law in the context of a specifi-
cally fallen created order and utilizes the prominent Reformed theme of
covenant to provide its foundational structure.
What, in summary, is distinctive about a theology of natural law as outlined
here? I believe that the biblical covenants may provide a better framework for
understanding natural law from a Christian perspective than an ontological par-
ticipatoryframework,as is common among some Thomistically orientied schol-
ars.39 The covenantal approach is not only explicitly biblical but it also better
respects the distinction between the Creator and the creature, the distinction
between God's relationship with human beings before and after the fall into
sin, and the concrete, historically dynamic character of God's dealings with the
human race.
I also believe that my account presents natural law in a different perspec-
tive from accounts that use a Thomistic grace-perfects-nature model.40 If nat-
ural law is grounded in the Noahic covenant, then it is not a law for earthly
happiness waiting to be perfected by supernatural grace and the order of love,
nor is it a means through which God bestows salvation upon those who never
hear the Christian gospel. It is crucial to see the Noahic covenant as depicting
God's dealings with the world neither according to its originally pristine cre-
ated form nor in a saving and redemptive fashion. The Noahic covenant prom-
ises God's temporary preservation of a natural order that is fallen but in itself
offers no promise to remove evil from it or to bring it to eschatological con-
summation. Emerging out of such a covenant, natural law can and must be seen
in theological perspective but not as an expression of Christian ethics.41 Natural
146 · David VanDrunen

law ethics is universally applicable for the cultures and societies that presently
exist in this world by God's preserving grace, prescribing a creatively fruitful
way of life that seeks justice tempered by forbearance. But natural law does not
provide an ethic for the new creation, nor is it teleologically oriented toward
the new creation. The kingdom of God proclaimed by Jesus represented a new
work of God, grounded not in a covenantal act of preservation but in the new
covenant in Jesus's blood, which promised not the maintenance of the present
created order but the manifestation of a new created order of eschatological
peace. The Christian gospel promises not the perfection of our life under the
natural law but ultimately our liberation from life under the natural law in that
it promises release from the confines of this present age.42 The ethic of the new
covenant, in distinction from the Noahic covenant, is founded in an act of
mercy and forgiveness, the love of God in giving the Son, which evokes an anal-
ogous merciful love in God's servants (1 John 4:9-11). Moral theologians face
an ongoing challenge in seeking to define precisely the relation between nat-
ural law and a merciful, Christ-centered Christian ethic.

Notes

1. See David VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms A Study in the Development of
Reformed Social Thought (Grand Rapids, MI· Eerdmans, 2010); and Stephen Grabill, Re-
covering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2006).
2. See Russell Hittinger, The First Grace Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World
(Wilmington, DE. ISI Books, 2003), Jean Porter, Nature as Reason A Thomistic Theory of
the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI· Eerdmans, 2005); Matthew Levering, Biblical Nat-
ural Law A Theocentric and Teleological Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008);
Craig A. Boyd, A Shared Morality A Narrative Defense ofNatural Law Ethics (Grand Rapids,
MI. Brazos, 2007), and J. Daiyl Charles, Retrieving the Natural Law A Return to Moral First
Things (Grand Rapids, MI Eerdmans, 2008).
3. Levering has made the most extensive attempt to date in Biblical Natural Law, but it is far
from comprehensive, and some of the biblical data he deals with should be handled dif-
ferently. Also see James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Oxford Clarendon,
1993); Markus Bockmuehl, Jewish Law in Gentile Churches Halakhah and the Beginning of
Christian Public Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI· Baker Academic, 2000), ch. 5 and 6, and John
Barton, Understanding Old Testament Ethics Approaches and Explorations (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox, 2003), 32-44.
4. This is true of the works by Hittinger, Porter, and Levermg cited previously, although they
appropriate Thomas in different ways. See also Douglas Kries, The Problem ofNatural Law
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), and John Finnis, Aquinas. Moral, Political, and Le-
gal Theory (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1998).
5. See Charles, Retrieving the Natural Law; and Boyd, A Shared Morality.
6. See L. Dequeker, "Noah and Israel. The Everlasting Divine Covenant with Mankind,"
in Questions disputes d'Ancien Testament Méthode et Théologie, ed. C. Brekelmans (Leuven,
 A Covenantal Conception of Natural Law Drawn from Genesis 9 · 147

Belgium: Leuven University Press, 1972), 115; James Barr, "Reflections on the Covenant
with Noah," in Covenant as Context: Essays in Honour ofE. W. Nicholson, ed., A. D. H.
Mayes and R. B. Salters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 11; and Katharine J.
Dell, "Covenant and Creation in Relationship," in Covenant as Context: Essays in Honour
ofE. W. Nicholson, ed., A. D. H. Mayes and R. B. Salters (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), 111.
7. See Geerhardus Vos, "The Doctrine of the Covenant in Reformed Theology," in Redemp­
tive History and Biblical Interpretation: The Shorter Writings of Geerhardus Vos, ed. Richard
Β. Gaffin Jr. (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980), 234-67. On the differ­
ent views of the Noahic covenant among Reformed theologians, see VanDrunen, Natural
Law and the Two Kingdoms, 413n94.
8. The arguments for this case and citations of scholarly proponents have been summarized
recently in Steven D. Mason, "Another Flood? Genesis 9 and Isaiah's Broken Eternal
Covenant," Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 32, no. 2 (2007): 180-83; and Steven
D. Mason, "Eternal Covenant" in the Pentateuch: The Contours of an Elusive Phrase (New York:
Τ & Τ Clark, 2008), 66-87.
9. For example, although some different Hebrew vocabulary is used in 8:21-22 and 9:8-17,
the substance of what God says in the former and in the latter is obviously similar.
10. For example, see Mason, "Another Flood?" 184-94.
11. See generally Mason, "Eternal Covenant" in the Pentateuch.
12. See Meredith G. Kline, Kingdom Prologue: Genesis Foundations for a Covenantal Worldview
(Overland Park, KS: Two Age Press, 2000), 246; W.J. Dumbrell, Covenant & Creation: A
Theology of the Old Testament Covenants (Carlisle, U.K.: Paternoster, 1984), 28-31; Claus
Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion, SJ (Minneapolis, M N :
Augsburg, 1984), 473; and Bruce K. Waltke, Genesis: A Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 2001), 146, 154.
13. See Nahum M. Sarna, Genesis (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 49-50;
Waltke, Genesis, 127-29; Kline, Kingdom Prologue, 220-24; and Warren Austin Gage, The
Gospel of Genesis: Studies in Protology and Eschatology (Winona Lake, IN: Carpenter, 1984),
ch. 2.
14. Four differences between Genesis 8-9 and the original creation account seem especially
relevant. First, Genesis 8-9 does not describe God looking upon creation and declaring
it (very) good. Second, the description of God's rest in 8:21 (smelling an "aroma of rest")
is quite muted and does not have the feel of a grand coronation scene as in 2:1-3. Third,
as mentioned, the language of dominion and subduing is intentionally omitted in 9:1-7
(even while it uses the language of being fruitful and multiplying). Finally, 8:20-9:17 con­
tains no conditional statements and gives no probationary command to Noah.
15. For defense of this classic contention of traditional Reformed covenant theology see David
VanDrunen, Living in Gods Two Kingdoms: A Biblical Vision for Christianity and Culture
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway, in press), ch. 2.
16. Geerhardus Vos writes, "that the berith is a berith of nature appears from the berith-sign;
the rainbow is a phenomenon of nature, and absolutely universal in its reference. All the
signs connected with redemption are bloody, sacramentally dividing signs." See Vos, Bib­
lical Theology: Old and New Testaments (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1948), 62-63.
17. See Dumbrell, Covenant & Creation, 33, 39; O. Palmer Robertson, The Christ of the
Covenants (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980), 109-11; and Mark D. Van-
der Hart, "Creation and Covenant: Part One," Mid-America Journal of Theology 6, no. 1
(1990): 10-13.
148 · David VanDrunen

18. See U. Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis, Part II, From Noah to Abraham
(Jerusalem· Magnes, 1964), 68,130; Dumbrell, Covenant & Creation, 28, 33,42^6, Robert­
son, The Christ of the Covenants, 109-10n2, and J. V. Fesko, Last Things First Unlocking
Genesis 1-3 with the Christ of Eschatology (Fearn, U.K.: Mentor, 2007), 87-88, 112-13.
19. Among proponents of seemg two different covenants m Genesis 6 and 9, see, for exam­
ple, Mason, "Eternal Covenant" in the Pentateuch, 48-66, Stephen G. Dempster, Dominion
and Dynasty A Theology of the Hebrew Bible (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2003), 73n33,
and Kline, Kingdom Prologue, 230-62.
20. See especially Kline, Kingdom Prologue, 230-31, and Westermann, Genesis 1-11, 422.
21. See Kline's comments on God's "remembering" m Genesis 8:1 m Kingdom Prologue, 231.
22. See also Mason, "Eternal Covenant" in the Pentateuch, 55-66.
23. See ibid., 227-29, Dell, "Covenant and Creation m Relationship," 111-33, Robertson, The
Christof the Covenants, 121-23, and Dequeker, "Noah and Israel," 115-29.
24. Here I would express reservation about Kline's interpretation, curious in context, that the
prohibition of blood is a cultic matter pertaining to sacrifice. See Kline, Kingdom Prologue,
253-62.
25. See Charles H. H. Scobie, The Ways of Our God An Approach to Biblical Theology (Grand
Rapids, MI Eerdmans, 2003), 159, Francis Watson, Text and Truth Redefining Biblical
Theology (Grand Rapids, MI Eerdmans, 1997), 280, 291-92,299, Dempster, Dominion and
Dynasty, 59, 73, Cassuto, Commentary on the Book of Genesis, Part Π, 127, Gordon J. Wen-
ham, Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 1, Genesis 1-15 (Waco, TX, Word, 1987), 193-94;
and Sarna, Genesis, 62.
26. See Mason, "Another Flood ? " 192-93, W. Randall Garr, In His Own Image and Likeness
Humanity, Divinity, and Monotheism (Leiden, Netherlands· Brill, 2003), 163, and Kline,
Kingdom Prologue, 252-53.
27. Recent scholarship on Genesis 1 26-27 has expressed a broad consensus that the image
of God refers to the exercise of royal dominion as God's representative on earth. One writer
noted the emergence of this consensus already in the late 1980s, see Gunnlaugur A. Jóns-
son, The Image of God Genesis 1 26-28 in a Century of Old Testament Research (Stockholm
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1988), 219-23.
28. The best exploration of this theme of which I am aware is William Ian Miller, Eye for an
Eye (Cambridge· Cambridge University Press, 2006).
29. "The tight chiasöc formulation [of Genesis 9-6] (shed, blood, man, man, blood, shed) re-
peating each word of the first clause m reverse order in the second emphasizes the strict
correspondence of punishment to offence." Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 193.
30. Similarly, see Kline, Kingdom Prologue, 251 "there is both continuity and discontinuity be-
tween the creational kingdom program and the common grace cultural order."
31. For defense of this classic contention of traditional Reformed covenant theology see Van-
Drunen, Living in Gods Two Kingdoms, ch. 2.
32. See B. Gemser, "The Importance of the Motive Clause in Old Testament Law," in Sup-
plements to Vetus Testamentum, vol. 1, Congress Volume (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1953),
50, 53. For broader discussion of ki, in purpose clauses and elsewhere, see A. Schoors, "The
Particle yod, kaph," in Remembering All the Way A Collection of Old Testament Stud-
ies Published on the Occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Oudtestamentisch Werkgezelschap
in Nederland (Leiden, Netherlands Brill, 1981), 240-76.
33. Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 193.
34. See Gemser, "Importance of the Motive Clause," 51-52.
 A Covenantal Conception of Natural Law Drawn from Genesis 9 · 149

35. See, for example, Porter, Nature as Reason, 123, 232.

36. See several of the laws of Hammurabi, in G. R. Driver and John C. Miles, The Babylonian
Laws, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), §§ 196, 197, 200, which read that "if a man has
put out the eye of a free man, they shall put out his eye"; "if he breaks the bone of a (free)
man, they shall break his bone"; and "if a man knocks out the tooth of a (free) man equal
(in rank) to him(self), they shall knock out his tooth." For examination of how the lex tal-
ionis has been expressed and applied in a variety of cultures, see especially Miller, Eye for
an Eye.
37. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I.II.97; and John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian
Religion, 4.20.16, ed., John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westmin-
ster, 1960).
38. On this matter see the suggestive comments of David Novak, The Jewish Social Contract:
An Essay in Political Theology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 45-46.
39. For example, Hittinger in The First Grace and Levering in Biblical Natural Law.
40. For example, see Porter, Nature as Reason, ch. 5; Levering, Biblical Natural Law, ch. 4; and
Boyd, A Shared Morality, ch. 7.
41.1 put it in these terms in part as a point of interaction with Porter, Nature as Reason
(325-26), where she seems to associate a "theological" approach to natural law with an at-
tempt to articulate natural law as a "Christian" ethic.
42. See my preliminary thoughts on this Pauline theme in David VanDrunen, "Natural Law
and the Works Principle under Adam and Moses," in The Law Is Not of Faith: Essays on
Works and Grace in the Mosaic Covenant, ed. Bryan D. Estelle, J. V. Fesko, and David Van-
Drunen (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 309-13.
 ^ s
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