1. National Federation of Labor vs. Eisma, G.R. No.

L-61236, January 31, 1984

FACTS:

The National Federation of Labor, filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor
Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for a direct certification as the sole exclusive
collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent
Zamboanga Wood Products Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumayao, Zamboanga City.
They also charged the firm on April 17, 1982 before the same office of the Ministry of Labor
for the reason of. underpayment of monthly living allowances.

On May 3, 1982, the illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union
for the reasons of unfair labor practice, nonpayment of living allowances, and employment
of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit led to a strike against the
respondent. The respondent then filed a complaint with the respondent Judge against the
officers and members of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with
prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order” on July 9,1982, alleged that the
defendants and now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus
preventing customers and suppliers and free ingress to or egress from such premises. It was
then argued and contended that the acts complained of were incidents of picketing (Strike) by
defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive
jurisdiction of the complaint belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227,
not to a court of first, for instance. The right to peace (The motion was denied. Hence, the
petition for certiorari.) picketing, according to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, Section 6 thereof,
amending Article 265 of the Labor Code, which now reads: (e) No person... engaged in
picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to
or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.

ISSUES:

The issue is whether or not the construction of the law is required to determine the
jurisdiction. (if it belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a
court of first) And which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an
employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and
damages--the court of general, jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor
Relations Commission [NLRC]?"

RULING:

Applying the law is the first and fundamental duty of courts. Construction and interpretation
comes only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them.
It is ruled that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (Article 217),
returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus enabling them to decide all
money claims: of workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of
wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or
appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security,
medicare and maternity benefits; All other claims arising from employer-employee relations
unless expressly excluded by this Code.

Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial
proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given
only by law. Jurisdiction should never be presumed; it must be conferred by law in words
that do not admit of doubt.

2. Abad vs. Goldloop Properties, G.R. No. 168108, April 13, 2007

FACTS:

13 parcels of titled agricultural land covering a total of 53,562 square meters were owned by
Enrique C. Abad and others, situated in the S.C. Malabon Estate in Tanza, Cavite. On August
29, 1997, respondent Goldloop Properties Inc., through its President, Emmanuel R. Zapanta,
entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale with the petitioners at the price of P650.00 per square
meter, or a total of P34, 815,300.00 for the entire land area. The parties, agreed on the following
terms of payment: An earnest money of Php1, 000,000 on June 30, 1997; first payment of
PHP6, 765,660.00 on August 17, 1997, upon signing of this DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE;
The remaining balance, representing full and final payment of the total contract price, in the
amount of PHP27, 049,640.00 shall be paid on or before 31 December 1997 and upon the
fulfillment of the following conditions. The Deed (paragraph 8), also provided for the
consequence of respondents failure to fulfill its obligation to pay the balance of the total
consideration agreed upon:

8. xxx In the event that the BUYER fails to comply [with] his part of the obligation within the
specified extension period, the earnest money of PHP1, 000,000.00, given by the BUYER to the
SELLER by way of a Check dated July 02, 1997, shall be forfeited in favor of the SELLER but
the first payment check of PHP6, 765,660.00 shall be returned to the BUYER without any
additional charges to the SELLER.

Zapanta informed Henry Abad that he would not object to the planned sale of the properties
to other parties, provided that the 50% of the forfeitable amount of P1,000,000.00 would be
returned in addition to the P6,765,660.00 as provided in paragraph 8 of the Deed of
Conditional Sale. He also directly expressed that the intended date of purchase had been
adversely affected by economic conditions during that time which were never foreseen as a
possible eventuality.

In another letter dated October 8, 1998, Zapanta then consequently informed Enrique C.
Abad that the negotiation and coordination with the banks had failed due to "the continuing
economic downturn" and thus, the transaction would not be completed. He then requested
that the first payment be returned within five days, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the
deed. The respondent then reiterated its demand towards the petitioners in a Letter and
filed a complaint for Collection with Prayer for Writ of Attachment against petitioners
directing the defendants to jointly and severally stop from executing any deed or instrument
intended to convey the ownership of the properties and pay plaintiff the following sums:

(a) P6,765,660.00: the principal amount due to plaintiff plus interest of 24% per annum, the
computation of which to start from the date of filing of the instant case until the said amount
is fully paid;

(b) Twenty-five (25%) Attorney’s fees of the principal amount sought to be collected;

(c) P50,000.00 representing the premium of the attachment and/or injunction bond;

(d) P50,000.00 litigation expenses;

(e) Cost of suit.

The RTC then ruled in favor of respondent, whether the contract was extended or not, the
first payment in the amount of Php6,765,660.00 shall be returned to the plaintiff.

Abad and the other petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the trial court
erroneously interpreted paragraph 8 of the contract. The RTC then issued an Omnibus
Order denying both motions. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA, but the CA dismissed
it and affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

Petitioners again filed a motion for reconsideration. In the Resolution[19] dated May 4,
2005, the CA partly granted the motion and declared that the liability of petitioners is only
joint and not in solidum.

ISSUE:

In the instant petition for review on the certiorari, petitioners presented the following issues
to be resolved by the Court:

6.1.a. Whether the obligation of petitioners to return the first payment of P6,765,660.00 is
an unconditional obligation or not;

6.1.b. Whether the obligation to return the first payment of P6,765,660.00, assuming it as
unconditional, is a pure obligation or an obligation with a period; and

6.1.c. Whether or not the duration of the period within which petitioners have to comply with
their obligation must be fixed first by the court before the respondent can demand from
petitioners the fulfillment of said obligation.

HELD:
The petition filed is denied as the Court cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their
obligation to return the first payment should be deemed one with a period, and that the Court
should fix the period within which they should comply with the obligation.

Paragraph 8 of the contract is clear and unambiguous as the trial and appellate courts ruled,
unlike the P1,000,000.00 earnest money which would be forfeited in favor of the petitioners in
case the respondent failed to deliver the balance of the total consideration, the first payment
should be returned to respondent.

In the first paragraph of Article 1370 of the Civil Code, the cardinal rule in the interpretation of
contracts is embodied: "if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations... shall control." This
provision assumes that the intent of the parties to an instrument is "embodied in the writing
itself, and when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered...only from
the express language of the agreement."

3. Accenture vs. CIR, G.R. No. 190102, July 11, 2012

Facts:

Accenture, Inc. (Accenture) is a corporation engaged in the business of providing

management consulting, business strategies development, and selling and/or licensing of
software. The corporation is duly registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a
Value Added Tax (VAT) taxpayer or enterprise in accordance with Section 236 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code).

Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this is a petition aiming for the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA En Banc) dated last 22
September 2009 and its subsequent Resolution dated 23 October 2009.

In resolving the sole issue of whether or not Accenture was entitled to a refund or an
issuance of a TCC (tax clearance certificate) amounting P35,178,844.21, it is ruled that
Accenture had failed to present evidence to prove that the foreign clients to which the
former rendered services did business outside the Philippines. Ruling that Accenture's
services would qualify for zero-rating under the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code of the
Philippines (Tax Code) only if the recipient of the services was executing business outside
of the Philippines, the Division quoted Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Burmeister and
Wain Scandinavian Contractor Mindanao, Inc. (Burmeister) as a basis of the notion.

Issues:

The main issue is represented as follows: Should the recipient of the services be "doing
business outside the Philippines" for the transaction to be zero-rated under Section 108(B)
(2) of the 1997 Tax Code?

Ruling:
The CTA en banc takes stand in their opinion that Accenture cannot invoke the non-
retroactivity of the rulings of the Supreme Court, whose interpretation of the law is part of
that law as of the date of its enactment.

This Court further finds that Accenture's reliance on Amex is misplaced.

In Section 102 of the 1977 Tax Code, the Court ruled in Amex that it does not require that
the services be consumed abroad to be zero-rated. However, nowhere in that case
discussed the necessary qualification of the recipient of the service, as this matter was
never put in question. In fact, the recipient of the service in Amex is a nonresident foreign
client, and ruled that the place of performance and/or consumption of the service is
irrelevant.

The court denied Accenture's Petition for a tax refund as the evidence presented by
Accenture may have established that its clients are foreign but does not automatically
mean, however, that these clients were doing business outside the Philippines. After all, the
Tax Code itself has provisions for a foreign corporation engaged in business within the
Philippines and vice versa, to wit:

SEC. 22. Definitions - When used in this Title:

(H) The term "resident foreign corporation" applies to a foreign corporation that is engaged
in trade or business within the Philippines.

(I) The term 'nonresident foreign corporation' applies to a foreign corporation not engaged in
trade or business within the Philippines.

4. RCBC vs. IAC, 320 SCRA 279, G.R. No. 74851, December 9, 1999

Facts:

On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a “Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of
Suspension of Payments” with the SEC.

RCBC, listed as one of the creditors in BF Homes’ inventory of creditors and liabilities, on
October 26, 1984, requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially expropriate its real
estate mortgage on some properties of BF Homes. BF Homes, on the other hand, opposed the
auction sale and the SEC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon
petitioners filing of a bond. Unaware presumably of the filing of the bond on the very day of the
auction sale, the sheriff then proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was
considered as the highest bidder for the properties auctioned. But because of the proceedings
that took place in the SEC, the sheriff then withheld the delivery to RCBC of the certificate of
sale covering the auctioned properties.

Despite the SEC case, on March 13, 1985, RCBC filed with RTC an action for mandamus
(judicial writ issued as a command to an inferior court) against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to urge
him to execute in its favor a certificate of sale of the auctioned properties. 5 days later, the SEC
appointed a Management Committee for BF Homes.

Consequently, the trial court granted RCBC’s “motion for judgment on the pleading” ordering the
respondents to execute and deliver directly to the petitioner the Certificate of Auction Sale.

On appeal, the SC affirmed CA’s decision ruling that “whenever a distressed corporation asks
the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert
such preference but stand on equal footing with other creditors.” Hence, leading to this Motion
for Reconsideration.

Issue:

BF Homes is challenging the validity of the auction and the actions of RCBC afterwards as
premature, asserting that BF Homes have already filed a petition for rehabilitation and as such
all claims of creditors must be suspended. Also, when should the suspension of actions for
claims against BF Homes take effect?

Ruling:

The issue of whether or not preferred creditors of distressed corporations stand on the same
level with all other creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the appointment of a
management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body.

Upon cursory reading of Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately clear that the
suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is figured up only upon the
appointment of a management committee or a rehabilitation that takes effect as soon as the
application or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC. To some, it is more logical and
wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the law. To insist on such
ruling, no matter how noble, would be to impinge upon the legislative right to define the wisdom
of the law --- plainly judicial legislation.

Once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is appointed in pursuant

to PD 902-A, all actions for the supposed claims against a distressed corporation pending
before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly, and shall not
prejudice or render ineffective the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally
unsecured creditor. This gives the receiver a chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there
should still be a possibility for doing so. Incase rehabilitation is no longer feasible and claims
against the distressed corporation would eventually have to be settled, the secured creditors
shall enjoy preference over the unsecured creditors to be subjected only to the provisions of the
Civil Code on Concurrence and Preferences of Credit.

5. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103882, November 25, 1998

FACTS:
The reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities constitutes and
authorized by the RA No. 1899 which was approved on June 22, 1957. Pasay City invoked this
Act, and passed Ordinance No. 121 for the reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore lands
along the seaside in Pasay City. It was amended authorizing Republic Real Estate Corporation
(RREC) to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.

Republic of the Philippines (RP) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages
questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC on the grounds that the subject-
matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and conditions are
violative of RA 1899 and the said Agreement was executed without any public bidding. It alleged
that what Pasay City has are submerged or offshore areas outside the commerce of man which
could not be a proper subject matter of the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in
question. As the area affected itself is within the National Park, known as Manila Bay Beach
Resort, that was established under the Proclamation No. 41, dated July 5, 1954, in pursuant to
Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in open, has been a continuous and peaceful
possession since time immemorial.

ISSUE:
The issue at hand projects whether or not the Ordinance passed by Pasay City in relation to
reclamation of foreshore lands is valid.

RULING:
The Court rules that the ordinance is invalid. Foreshore land does not include submerged areas
as it refers to the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The duty of the court is to interpret the
enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning, much less widen the
coverage thereof. If the original intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it
should have been provided expressly. The lack of provision could only signify the exclusion of
submerged areas from the term "foreshore lands". The subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance
No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement in question, have been found
to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore considered as ultra vires,
and null and void.