S Pearson & Son Ltd v Dublin Corp.

In S Pearson & Son Ltd v Dublin Corp, the material fact was that Dublin Corporation had
passed a by-law prohibiting street trading, which included the sale of newspapers. S Pearson
& Son Ltd, a newspaper vendor, challenged the by-law as being ultra vires (beyond the
power) of Dublin Corporation.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that Dublin Corporation did have the
power to pass such a by-law under the relevant legislation, as long as it was reasonable and
did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve the legitimate objective of regulating street
trading. The court held that the by-law was valid, as it was reasonable and did not go beyond
what was necessary to achieve the objective of regulating street trading in the city.

Derry v Peek.

In Derry v Peek, the material fact was that the directors of a company had made a statement
in the prospectus which turned out to be false. A shareholder, Derry, sued one of the
directors, Peek, for fraudulent misrepresentation.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that in order for a statement to be
considered fraudulent, there must be knowledge of its falsity, or recklessness as to whether it
is true or false. The court held that for a statement to be fraudulent, the maker of the
statement must have had knowledge of its falsity or been reckless as to whether it was true or
false, and must have intended for it to be relied upon. In this case, Peek had not made the
statement with fraudulent intent, and was not liable for fraudulent misrepresentation.

Redgrave v Hurd

In Redgrave v Hurd, the material fact was that the defendant, Hurd, had entered into a
contract to purchase a partnership share from the claimant, Redgrave. However, Hurd later
repudiated the contract, claiming that he had been misled by a misrepresentation made by
Redgrave's clerk regarding the value of the partnership's assets.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that a misrepresentation made by an
agent within the scope of their authority is imputed to the principal, and the principal is liable
for any resulting damages. The court held that the misrepresentation made by Redgrave's
clerk was within the scope of their authority, and therefore Redgrave was liable for Hurd's
resulting losses. The court also held that the fact that Hurd had not relied on the
misrepresentation was not relevant, as the misrepresentation had induced the formation of the
contract.

Edgington v Fitzmaurice

In Edgington v Fitzmaurice, the material fact was that the defendant, Fitzmaurice, had issued
a prospectus inviting subscriptions for shares in a company. The prospectus contained a false
statement that the funds raised would be used for a particular purpose, when in fact they were
to be used for a different purpose. The claimant, Edgington, subscribed for shares in reliance
on the false statement, and later sought to recover his subscription.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that a person who makes a false
statement with the intention that it be acted upon, and which is in fact relied upon, is liable
for any resulting damages. The court held that Fitzmaurice had made the false statement with
the intention that it be acted upon, and that Edgington had relied on it in subscribing for the
shares. Therefore, Fitzmaurice was liable for the damages suffered by Edgington as a result
of the false statement. The court also held that the fact that other investors may have
subscribed for shares without relying on the false statement was not relevant to the claimant's
right to recover his subscription.

Attwood v Small

In Attwood v Small, the material fact was that the defendant, Small, had purchased land from
the claimant, Attwood, after making fraudulent misrepresentations about the value of
adjacent mines. The value of the land was greatly inflated as a result of the
misrepresentations. When Attwood discovered the fraud, he sought to rescind the contract
and recover the land.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that a contract can be rescinded for
fraudulent misrepresentation where the misrepresentation induced the contract, and the
innocent party has suffered loss as a result. The court held that Small's fraudulent
misrepresentations had induced Attwood to enter into the contract, and that Attwood had
suffered loss as a result of the misrepresentations. Therefore, Attwood was entitled to rescind
the contract and recover the land. The court also held that it was not necessary for Attwood to
prove that he had relied on the misrepresentations in order to establish that they had induced
the contract.

JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks Bloom & Co

In JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks Bloom & Co, the material fact was that the claimant, JEB
Fasteners, had been the victim of fraud by one of its directors, who had forged JEB Fasteners'
signature on cheques which were paid into the director's personal account with the defendant,
Marks Bloom & Co. JEB Fasteners sought to recover the funds from Marks Bloom & Co,
alleging that they were liable for the director's fraud.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that a third party is not liable for the
fraud of another unless they have dishonestly assisted in the fraud. The court held that Marks
Bloom & Co had not dishonestly assisted the director's fraud, as they had not known or
suspected that the cheques were being paid into the director's personal account. Therefore,
Marks Bloom & Co was not liable for the director's fraud, and JEB Fasteners could not
recover the funds from them. The court also held that the fact that JEB Fasteners had been
negligent in allowing the director to forge its signature did not relieve the director of liability
for his fraud.
With v O'Flanagan

In With v O'Flanagan, the material fact was that the defendant, O'Flanagan, had been
negligent in the treatment of the claimant, With, who had suffered injury as a result of a
botched operation. O'Flanagan had referred With to another doctor, who had also been
negligent in his treatment. With sought to recover damages from both O'Flanagan and the
other doctor.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that a defendant is only liable for the
damage caused by their own negligence, and not for the damage caused by the negligence of
another person. The court held that O'Flanagan was only liable for the damage caused by her
own negligence in the treatment of With, and not for the damage caused by the other doctor's
negligence. Therefore, O'Flanagan was only liable to pay damages for the part of the injury
caused by her own negligence. The court also held that the other doctor was liable for the
damage caused by his own negligence, and that he should also pay damages to With.

Dimmock v Hallett

In Dimmock v Hallett, the material fact was that the defendant, Hallett, was the executor of
the estate of a deceased person, and had received money from the estate that was meant to be
distributed to the claimants, Dimmock and others. Hallett had not yet distributed the money
to the claimants, but had instead invested it in a bank account, which had earned interest. The
claimants sought to recover the money from Hallett, along with the interest earned.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that a trustee or executor is entitled to
earn interest on money held on trust or in the course of administration, unless there is an
express or implied agreement to the contrary. The court held that Hallett had not acted
improperly in investing the money in a bank account, and that he was entitled to the interest
earned on the account. However, the court also held that Hallett was holding the money on
trust for the claimants, and that he had a duty to distribute it to them as soon as possible.
Therefore, the claimants were entitled to the money, along with the interest earned up until
the time that Hallett should have distributed it to them.

Gross v Lewis Hillman Ltd

In Gross v Lewis Hillman Ltd, the material fact was that the claimant, Gross, had been
dismissed from his employment without notice, following a breach of company policy. Gross
had a contractual entitlement to receive one month's notice of termination. Gross sought to
recover damages for breach of contract, arguing that he should have been given notice.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that a contract of employment can only
be terminated without notice in cases of "gross misconduct". The court held that the breach of
company policy that led to Gross's dismissal did not constitute gross misconduct, and
therefore he should have been given notice. As a result, the court awarded Gross damages for
breach of contract, equivalent to one month's notice. The court also held that the employer's
argument that Gross had waived his right to notice by his conduct was not valid, as there was
no clear evidence that Gross had agreed to waive his contractual right to notice.

Barclays Bank v O'brien

In Barclays Bank v O'Brien, the material fact was that the defendant, Mrs. O'Brien, had
signed a guarantee in relation to her husband's business debts, after being advised to do so by
the bank. The husband had misrepresented the state of the business to the bank in order to
obtain further credit, and had then defaulted on the loans. The bank sought to enforce the
guarantee against Mrs. O'Brien.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that a bank must take reasonable steps
to ensure that a person signing a guarantee understands the implications of what they are
signing. The court held that the bank had failed to meet this duty of care in the case of Mrs.
O'Brien. She had not received independent legal advice before signing the guarantee, and the
bank had not explained to her the nature and effect of the guarantee or the risks involved.
Therefore, the court held that the guarantee was unenforceable against Mrs. O'Brien, and that
she was not liable to pay the husband's business debts. This case established the principle of
the "O'Brien duty", which requires banks to take reasonable steps to ensure that a guarantor
fully understands the nature and effect of the guarantee.

Garnac Grain Co Inc v H.M. Faure & Fairclough Ltd

In Garnac Grain Co Inc v H.M. Faure & Fairclough Ltd, the material fact was that the
claimant, Garnac Grain Co Inc, had entered into a contract with the defendants, H.M. Faure
& Fairclough Ltd, for the shipment of a cargo of wheat. The contract contained a clause
excluding liability for any loss or damage arising from "latent defects" in the cargo. When the
cargo arrived at its destination, it was found to be infested with weevils, which had not been
visible on inspection prior to shipment.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that the exclusion clause in the contract
did not apply to the loss suffered by the claimant. The court held that the term "latent defects"
in the clause did not cover the infestation of weevils, as this was not a defect that was
inherent in the cargo itself. The infestation was a result of the conditions in which the cargo
had been stored, which was the responsibility of the defendants. Therefore, the court held that
the defendants were liable for the loss suffered by the claimant, despite the presence of the
exclusion clause in the contract. This case established the principle that exclusion clauses in
contracts are subject to the interpretation of the court, and will not be enforced if they are
found to be unfair or unreasonable.

Hasan v Wilson

In Hasan v Wilson, the material fact was that the claimant, Mr. Hasan, had purchased a car
from the defendant, Mr. Wilson, on the understanding that it had been previously owned by a
famous footballer. The defendant had provided documentation to support this claim, but it
later transpired that the documentation had been forged. When the claimant discovered the
forgery, he sought to rescind the contract and recover his money.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that the claimant was entitled to rescind
the contract and recover his money. The court held that the defendant had made a fraudulent
misrepresentation to the claimant by providing him with forged documentation to support his
claim about the car's ownership. The misrepresentation was material to the contract, as it had
induced the claimant to enter into the contract and pay the purchase price. Therefore, the
court held that the claimant was entitled to rescind the contract and recover his money, as he
had been induced to enter into the contract by the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation.
This case established the principle that a fraudulent misrepresentation will render a contract
voidable, and entitle the innocent party to rescind the contract and recover any losses
suffered.

Edington v Fitzmaurice

In Edgington v Fitzmaurice, the material fact was that the directors of a company, the
defendant Fitzmaurice and others, had issued a prospectus inviting the public to subscribe for
shares in the company. The prospectus contained statements about the company's financial
position, which were misleading and untrue. The claimant, Mrs. Edgington, subscribed for
shares in reliance on these statements, but later discovered the true financial position of the
company and suffered a loss.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that the claimant was entitled to recover
her losses from the defendant directors. The court held that the directors had made fraudulent
misrepresentations to the claimant, which had induced her to enter into the contract and
subscribe for shares in the company. The misrepresentations were made with the intention of
deceiving the claimant and inducing her to invest in the company. Therefore, the court held
that the claimant was entitled to recover her losses from the defendants, as she had been
induced to enter into the contract by their fraudulent misrepresentations. This case established
the principle that a fraudulent misrepresentation will render a contract voidable, and entitle
the innocent party to rescind the contract and recover any losses suffered.

The Seaflower

In The Seaflower case, the material fact was that the claimant, The Seaflower, was a British
ship that had been captured by a French privateer during the Napoleonic Wars. The ship was
then taken to the French port of Brest and sold, along with its cargo, by the French prize court
to the defendant, the purchaser, who was a French national. The claimant subsequently
sought to recover the ship and its cargo, on the basis that the sale was invalid under
international law.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that the sale of the ship and cargo was
invalid, as it had taken place after the cessation of hostilities between Britain and France. The
court held that the sale was in breach of the principle of postliminy, which holds that captured
property must be restored to its original owner once hostilities have ceased. As the sale had
taken place after the cessation of hostilities, it was invalid and the claimant was entitled to
recover its ship and cargo. This case established the principle that the principle of postliminy
applies to captured property, and that any sale or transfer of such property after the cessation
of hostilities is invalid.

Esso Petroleum v Mardon

In Esso Petroleum v Mardon, the material fact was that the defendant, Mr. Mardon, was a
tenant of a petrol station owned by the claimant, Esso Petroleum. Esso provided Mardon with
sales forecasts for the petrol station, but these were inaccurate and overstated. Relying on the
sales forecasts, Mardon entered into a long-term lease agreement with Esso, but the petrol
station did not perform as expected, and Mardon suffered significant losses.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that the claimant was liable for the
losses suffered by the defendant, as the inaccurate sales forecasts constituted negligent
misrepresentations. The court held that Esso had a duty of care to provide accurate sales
forecasts to Mardon, and that it had breached this duty by providing inaccurate information.
As a result, the court found Esso liable for the losses suffered by Mardon as a result of its
negligent misrepresentations. This case established the principle that a party can be liable for
negligent misrepresentations, even where there is no contract between the parties.

Smith v Land & House Property Corp

In Smith v Land & House Property Corp, the material fact was that the claimant, Mrs. Smith,
was injured when a piece of ornamental ironwork fell from a building owned by the
defendant, Land & House Property Corporation. The ironwork was located on a balcony on
the defendant's building, and it fell onto the pavement below, striking the claimant.

The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that the defendant was liable for the
claimant's injuries, as it had breached its duty of care to maintain the balcony in a safe
condition. The court held that the defendant had a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that
the balcony was safe, and that it had breached this duty by failing to properly maintain the
ironwork. As a result, the court found the defendant liable for the claimant's injuries. This
case established the principle that property owners have a duty of care to maintain their
property in a safe condition, and that they can be liable for injuries caused by their failure to
do so.

Bisset v Wilkinson

In Bisset v Wilkinson, the material fact was that the claimant, Mr. Bisset, purchased a piece
of land from the defendant, Mr. Wilkinson, for the purpose of sheep farming. The defendant
represented that the land could support 2,000 sheep, but in reality, it could only support a
much smaller number.
The ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) of the case was that the defendant was not liable for the
claimant's losses, as the representation was a statement of opinion rather than a statement of
fact. The court held that where a representation is a matter of opinion rather than a statement
of fact, the representee cannot rely on it as a basis for a claim for misrepresentation unless the
representor has special knowledge or expertise in the area. As the defendant was not an
expert in sheep farming, the court found that the representation was a statement of opinion
rather than a statement of fact. Therefore, the defendant was not liable for the claimant's
losses. This case established the principle that a representation must be a statement of fact,
rather than a statement of opinion, in order to give rise to a claim for misrepresentation.

Pankhania v London Borough of Hackney

In Pankhania v London Borough of Hackney, the material fact was that the claimant, Mr.
Pankhania, was a tenant of a council property that suffered from dampness and other defects.
The claimant sued the defendant, London Borough of Hackney, for breach of its repairing
obligations under the tenancy agreement.

The ratio decidendi of the case was that a local authority has a duty to keep its council
properties in a reasonable state of repair and to take reasonable steps to prevent dampness and
other defects. The court held that the defendant had breached its repairing obligations by
failing to take reasonable steps to prevent dampness and other defects, and that the claimant
was entitled to damages for the loss suffered as a result of the defendant's breach. This case
established the principle that local authorities have a statutory duty to maintain their council
properties in a reasonable state of repair and to prevent defects, and tenants can bring a claim
against them for breach of this duty.

Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council

In Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council, the material fact was that the claimant,
Kleinwort Benson Ltd, had entered into a number of interest rate swap agreements with the
defendant, Lincoln City Council. Following the House of Lords decision in Hazell v
Hammersmith and Fulham LBC, which held that local authorities had acted ultra vires in
entering into certain types of swaps, the claimant sought to recover the losses it had suffered
as a result of the swap agreements.

The ratio decidendi of the case was that a local authority acts ultra vires if it enters into a
contract that is beyond the scope of its statutory powers. The House of Lords held that the
swaps in question were not ultra vires and therefore the local authority was liable for the
losses incurred by the claimant. This case established the principle that local authorities can
be held liable for losses arising from contracts that are beyond the scope of their statutory
powers.

Bilbie v Lumley
In Bilbie v Lumley, the material fact was that the defendant, Lumley, had induced the
plaintiff's apprentice to break his contract of apprenticeship and work for him instead. The
plaintiff, Bilbie, sued Lumley for the loss of his apprentice's services.

The ratio decidendi of the case was that an action lies for the wrongful inducement of a third
party to break a contract. The court held that Lumley's actions were unlawful, as he had
induced the apprentice to break his contract without justification or excuse. The court
awarded damages to Bilbie for the loss of his apprentice's services. This case established the
principle that a third party who induces a breach of contract can be held liable for the
resulting damages.

Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilia World Service BV

In Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilia World Service BV, the Spice Girls entered into an agreement
with Aprilia World Service to sponsor their European tour. As part of the agreement, Aprilia
agreed to provide motorcycles for the Spice Girls to use during the tour. However, the
motorcycles were not delivered on time, and the Spice Girls were forced to make alternative
arrangements. The Spice Girls sued Aprilia for breach of contract.

The ratio decidendi of the case was that Aprilia was in breach of contract for failing to
provide the motorcycles on time, and the Spice Girls were entitled to damages for the loss
they suffered as a result. The court held that the motorcycles were a key part of the
sponsorship agreement, and Aprilia's failure to provide them on time had a significant impact
on the Spice Girls' ability to carry out the tour. Therefore, Aprilia was ordered to pay
damages to the Spice Girls to compensate them for the loss they suffered.

Walters v Morgan

In Walters v Morgan, the claimant, Walters, sold his car to Morgan. During the sale, Morgan
asked Walters if the car had ever been involved in an accident, to which Walters replied that
it had not. However, the car had previously been in an accident and had been repaired. After
discovering this, Morgan sued Walters for misrepresentation.

The ratio decidendi of the case was that Walters was liable for misrepresentation. The court
held that Walters' statement that the car had not been involved in an accident was a false
statement of fact and amounted to a misrepresentation. As a result, Morgan was entitled to
rescind the contract and claim damages for any losses suffered as a result of the
misrepresentation.

Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders

In Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders, Borders, a solicitor, acted as a

solicitor for the Third Equitable Benefit Building Society in a mortgage transaction.
However, Borders was also acting as a director and shareholder of the borrowing company in
the same transaction. The Building Society sought to set aside the mortgage, alleging that
Borders had breached his fiduciary duty by acting for both parties in the transaction.
The ratio decidendi of the case was that Borders had breached his fiduciary duty by acting for
both the Building Society and the borrowing company in the same transaction. The court held
that a solicitor acting for two parties in the same transaction was a conflict of interest and was
a breach of fiduciary duty. As a result, the Building Society was entitled to set aside the
mortgage and claim any losses suffered as a result of Borders' breach of duty.

Keates v Cadogan

Material facts: Keates was a tenant of Cadogan Estates Ltd, and he sublet the flat to another
person. The lease required that the flat must be used as a private residence, and not for any
business or trade.

Ratio decedendi: A landlord cannot unreasonably withhold consent for a tenant to sublet their
flat. However, a landlord is entitled to refuse consent if there are good reasons to do so, such
as if the proposed subletting would result in a breach of a term in the lease. In this case,
Keates had breached the term in the lease that required the flat to be used as a private
residence, by subletting it to a business. Therefore, the landlord was entitled to refuse consent
for the subletting.