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Kashmir, 1947 – the First Modern Hybrid War

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Peter A. Kiss
Kashmir, 1947 – the First Modern Hybrid War

This is a work in progress. I will present it at a conference later in 2021. I shall publish
the final version when the conference proceedings are published. Until then I request that
you do not cite it. Meanwhile, I welcome all comments and criticism.

Abstract
Modern technology has made hybrid warfare vastly more effective today than it was in the past.
Nevertheless, some hybrid operations launched when technology was much more primitive than
it is today also achieved remarkable success. Pakistan’s attempt to seize Kashmir in 1947 is one
example.
As Great Britain was withdrawing from its empire, India was partitioned into Pakistan, and
India. Geography and demographics largely determined that a particular state or province would
accede to one or the other. One exception was Kashmir, whose ruler preferred independence.
Pakistan was determined to force Kashmir’s accession, but could not afford the risk of Indian
intervention. In order to create a fait accompli, it launched a campaign that bore all the hallmark
of hybrid warfare. Pakistan achieved some success, although its ambitions were frustrated at
the last minute by the very Indian intervention it wanted to avoid.
This paper summarizes the actions and events that took place during the hybrid war phase,
compares Pakistan’s operation in Kashmir with Russia’s operation in the Crimea, and explain
the different outcomes.

1. By Way of Introduction – Hybrid War

Hybrid war became part of common discourse in 2014, following Russia’s seizure of the
Crimean peninsula. Surprisingly, even many security professionals are still not entirely certain
what the term covers – and what it does not cover. According to some specialists it is an entirely
new way of waging war; others argue that it is just a new buzzword, yet others contend that all
wars are hybrid wars.
NATO defines hybrid threats as “... wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary
and civilian measures … employed in a highly integrated design. The adversary tries to
influence ... policy-makers and key decision makers by combining kinetic operations with
subversive effort [and] ... resorts to clandestine actions, to avoid attribution or retribution.”1
The European Union’s definition is more detailed: “… mixture of coercive and subversive
activity, conventional and unconventional methods ..., which can be used in a coordinated
manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the
threshold of formally declared warfare. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the

1
Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Wales, 05 September 2014.
<https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm>

1
vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity to hinder decision-making processes.
Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to
radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats.”2
There is a good reason for seeking a precise definition: modern nations make a clear
distinction between war and peace, and grant greater freedom of action to their military only in
wartime. However, creating a precise definition can be self-limiting. The hybrid operator adapts
to the political, strategic and operational environment and executes his attacks in unexpected
ways, thereby frustrating the desire for clarity. Describing and analyzing hybrid war is far more
useful than trying to define it.3 Two concepts in NATO doctrine help describe and analyze – and
thereby understand – hybrid warfare. Since their origin is the US armed forces, they are
represented by acronyms: DIME and PMESII.
DIME stands for the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of
national power. These are the tools and resources a state deploys to protect and advance its
interests in the international environment, influence the world, coerce or incentivize other
nations. Whatever the state does can be squeezed into one of these four categories. Sometimes
the fit is not very comfortable, sometimes it requires a little effort, but it can be done.4
PMESII stands for the political, military, economic, societal, infrastructure, and
information subsystems that make up a state.5 The hybrid actor seeks the vulnerabilities in these
subsystems and targets them with his instruments of national power. Even the best governed
societies with a robust economy, and the best justice system have vulnerabilities in some of
these sectors. The PMESII concept helps identify key strengths and weaknesses, and helps
estimate the effects various actions will have in these areas.
A basic attribute of hybrid warfare is that the attacker seeks to achieve warlike objectives
without the risk of war. He achieves this by synchronizing and coordinating his actions: several
parallel operations, using various DIME instruments, targeting various PMESII vulnerabilities
are timed and sequenced to support and reinforce each other and achieve synergistic effects. By
these means the hybrid actor remains below the threshold of war, yet he creates conditions that
compel the targeted state to accept a disadvantageous settlement, and the international
community to consent to it.6
It is modern technology that makes hybrid operations so effective today: cyber-attacks
reach across state borders anonymously; disinformation influences millions and sows distrust
in government; quick, reliable and secure communications allow real time situational awareness

2
Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Joint Framework on countering hybrid
threats – a European Union response. Brussels, 6 April 2016. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016JC0018>
3
Frier, Nathan (2009). “Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe… Don’t Define.” in Small Wars Journal,
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/343-freier.pdf>
4
Carr, Edward H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations
(London: The MacMillan Press, 1939) p. 102–169.; AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine. NATO Standardization
Office, 2017, 1-3, 1-4.
5
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE), 2021, 1-13-1-14.
6
Cullen, Patrick J. and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud. Understanding Hybrid Warfare (Norfolk: MCDC Countering
Hybrid Warfare Project, 2017); Rácz, András. Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to
Resist. (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute for International Affairs, 2015).

2
and close control and coordination of operations. However, as the example of Pakistan’s attempt
to seize Kashmir shows, hybrid operations had been attempted long before technology made
them so effective.
2. Kashmir, 1947 – the historical background
Maintaining a colonial empire became a huge burden for Great Britain after World War II, and
in 1945 the Labour government set about transforming it into a Commonwealth of independent,
but closely associated states. The first colony to become independent was India.
Since India’s Muslims were not willing to live as a permanent minority under Hindu
domination, their major mass organization, the All-India Muslim League demanded dividing
the subcontinent, and creating a separate, independent Muslims state.7 The British government
and the Indian National Congress (the major non-Muslim Indian political organization) objected
to dividing India. However, the Muslims were adamant, and emphasized their determination
through rallies and demonstrations that degenerated into extremely bloody riots.8 Britain and
the Indian National Congress finally agreed to the creation of two independent states
(dominions) within the British Empire: secular India in the center, and Pakistan to the east and
west.
Even before the boundaries between the dominions were drawn, Muslims had already
begun to migrate to the future Pakistan, while Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Christians, Buddhists and
other non-Muslims were moving to India. Sectarian hatred soon boiled to the surface, law and
order broke down, and unbridled violence engulfed not only the border regions, but the interior
of the two states as well. Fifteen million people were displaced, and the death toll (never reliably
established) was somewhere between 200,000 and two million.9
Dividing British India (the provinces directly governed by the Crown) was a relatively
straightforward matter, but there were also 565 semi-independent states bound to the British
Crown by treaty (the princely states), whose accession to India or Pakistan was more
problematic. (See Fig. 1.) The Indian Independence Act assigned to the rulers the sole authority
to decide whether to join one or the other, or remain independent. 10 Geography and
demographics determined accession for most rulers, but the case of Kashmir was more
complicated.11

7
Resolution of the Lahore Session of the Muslim League, 26th March 1940.
<https://www.punjnud.com/ViewPage.aspx?BookID=13811&BookPageID=318761&BookPageTitle=Lahore%2
0Session%20of%20the%20Muslim%20League%201940>
8
Mahajan, Mehr Chand. Looking Back: The Autobiography of Mehr Chand Mahajan Former Chief Justice of
India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963) pp. 112-113.; Khan, Abdul Wali (1988) Facts Are Facts: The
Untold Story of India's Partition (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1988) p. 114.
9
Talbot, Ian. “Partition of India: The Human Dimension.” Cultural and Social History, 2009, 6(4), pp. 403–410.
10
Khanam, Attiya. “An Historical Overview of the Accession of Princely States,” Journal of Historical Studies
Vol. II, No.I (January-June 2016), pp. 84-103.
11
The official name of the state since the time of its creation in the 19th century has been “Jammu and Kashmir,”
but the colloquial term has always been simply “Kashmir.” Even some official British India documents (e.g. the
Census of India) refer to the state as simply “Kashmir.”

3
Figure 1. India in 1947, before Partition (drawn by the author)

Kashmir’s location, where the borders of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia and China
met, made it a strategically important place. Both India and Pakistan courted – and sometimes
pressured – the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, to secure his realm’s accession. The logical choice
was Pakistan: the Maharaja was Hindu, but 77 percent of his subjects were Muslims, and the
state’s economy and infrastructure depended on Pakistan. However, even many Muslims
rejected accession to Pakistan. The Maharajah preferred independence, or, failing that,
accession to India.
The Pakistani government was ready to settle the matter by force, but that would have
risked Indian intervention and the Pakistani armed forces were nowhere near strong enough to
withstand an Indian offensive. Another constraint was the large number of British officers
serving in the Pakistani armed forces – even the commander in chief was a British General. A
way had to be found to achieve the desired result without the knowledge of the British officers,
and without provoking India into decisive action, at least until a fait accompli could be created.

4
3. DIME and PMESII analysis
Although the DIME and PMESII concepts did not exist at the time, for the purposes of this
paper they will have to serve for analysis, since there are no official documents showing what
analytical tools the Pakistani leadership relied on to formulate its plans. (Actually, there is some
evidence that assumptions, wishful thinking, and self-interest informed Pakistani planning as
much as thorough and realistic analysis.12)
3.1. Pakistani DIME
Diplomacy. As a newly independent state Pakistan had the goodwill of the rest of the world.
Although Great Britain wanted to prevent open conflict between its erstwhile colonies, it
covertly supported Pakistan’s ambition to acquire Kashmir, because it considered Pakistan as
an important future strategic partner.13
Information. Pakistan had the means to reach international public opinion, as well as the
population in the target area. It had a strong influence over the Kashmiri Muslims through the
state’s Muslim organizations and through clandestine operatives. It could even exert some
influence on Indian policies through the sizeable Muslim minority remaining in India. The
Muslim refugees flowing in from other parts of India had suffered unspeakable atrocities on the
way, and their stories could be exploited as a particularly powerful source of propaganda.
Pakistan also had a nearly complete stranglehold on Kashmir’s communications and could
choke off any reports that were detrimental to Pakistan.
Military. Pakistan inherited one third of the personnel and materiel resources of the British
Indian Army, Air Force and Navy. The armed forces were still in the process of reorganization,
but were far stronger than those of Kashmir (although much weaker than India’s). The flow of
Pakistan’s share of military stores from India was uncertain, but alternative sources of supply
were available. Due to the morphology of the region, Pakistani forces had relatively unimpeded
access to Kashmiri territory throughout the year, while the lack of adequate roads, as well as
heavy snows in winter restricted access from India.
Economy. Pakistan’s economy was none too robust, and the Muslim refugees flooding into the
state were crushing burden. It could not offer Kashmir economic inducements, but it could apply
serious coercion: it sat astride all practicable commercial routes into Kashmir, and controlled
all its communications with the outside world. It could delay or stop entirely the flow of
Kashmir’s external trade and could render all but the simplest financial transactions impossible.
3.2. Kashmiri PMESII
Political. With the withdrawal of Great Britain the guarantor of the Maharajah’s power
suddenly disappeared, and in the new, unstable external and internal conditions he had to
maneuver among several actors. The Muslims in Jammu province were ardently pro-Pakistan,
and made it clear that nothing less than accession to Pakistan would be acceptable. The majority
of Muslims in Kashmir province rejected accession to Pakistan and preferred independence or

12
Khan, Muhammad Akbar. Raiders in Kashmir (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992) pp. 14, 17-36.
13
Bajwa, Kuldip Singh. Jammu and Kashmir War, 1947-1948: Political and Military Perspective, (New Delhi:
Har-Anand Publication Pvt Ltd, 2003) pp. 73-74, 77; Jha, Prem Shankar. Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of
History (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 83-91.

5
accession to India. Most Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists favored joining India. 14 The future
leaders of India and Pakistan also pressed him to accede to their dominion. There seemed to be
no best-case scenario, only a least bad one.
Military. The Kashmir Army (about 12,000 men) consisted of eight infantry battalions (some
with WW II combat experience15) deployed throughout the state, six garrison police companies
(in effect a gendarmerie) and a cavalry regiment deployed in in Kashmir and Jammu, as well as
a constabulary battalion in Gilgit. The Army had some serious weaknesses: it had no artillery,
armor, or aircraft, since under the Crown’s protection these had been unnecessary; about a
quarter of the personnel were Muslims, whose loyalty was divided between their oath to the
Maharaja and the idea of Pakistan,16 and it depended on arsenals in Pakistan for all military
supplies.
Economy. Kashmir’s economy was hostage to Pakistani goodwill. All commercial traffic had
to go through Pakistani territory, and financial transactions had to go through Pakistani
institutions. By closing its border, Pakistan could cause severe shortages and hardship within a
few weeks.
Societal. Mountain ranges compartmented the state into clear-cut geographical regions: Jammu
(south and west), Kashmir (center and west), and the high mountain region of Gilgit, Baltistan
and Ladakh (north and east). (See Figure 2.) There were extreme differences in environment,
economy, social organization, language, culture and religion among the regions,17 but one trait
was common: the religious divide between Muslims and non-Muslims. In the Kashmir valley
this division was not very sharp, but in the other provinces, particularly in Jammu, the inter-
communal relationship was less ideal.18 Nevertheless, until early October 1947 Kashmir was
spared the violent upheaval of Partition.
Infrastructure. The only all-weather road ran along the Kashmir valley from Rawalpindi to
Srinagar (the summer capital). A seasonal road (closed during the winter) connected Srinagar
to Jammu city (the winter capital). The rest of the road network consisted of fair-weather roads,
dirt tracks and caravan trails. There was only a single railroad line, from Sialkot to Jammu. All
motorable roads, the major rivers, and the single rail line led through Pakistani territory. The
only road link to India was a fair-weather road between Pathankot and Jammu. There was one
fully equipped airfield at Srinagar. All telephone and telegraph traffic went through Pakistani
facilities, and the mail service was operated by Pakistan.
Information. The government controlled all media, but its reach was limited, due to the
undeveloped state of communications within the state. Through its control of all communication
channels between Kashmir and the outside world, Pakistan controlled all information coming
out of the state, could disseminate Pakistani propaganda, and could interfere with dissemination
of government information.

14
Snedden, Christopher. The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, (London, Hurst & Company, 2012)
pp. 17-32.
15
Singh, K. Brahma (1989). History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles (1820-1956): The State Force Background,
(New Delhi: Lancer International, 1989) pp. 170-203.
16
Singh. K.B. History of Jammu and Kashmir rifles, p. 220.
17
Prasad, S. N. and Dharm Pal (1987), History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947-48) (Delhi: Controller
of Publications, Government of India, 1987) p. 3.
18
Snedden. The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 18

6
Figure 2. Kashmir in 1947 (drawn by the author)

4. The Pakistani Hybrid Operation

As mentioned earlier, official documents are not available on how the Pakistani leadership
formulated its plans to force Kashmir’s accession. Pakistani sources generally claim that there
was no such plan. The Pakistani political figures, military officers and civilians who got
involved were either rouge elements or idealists motivated by a desire to assist oppressed
Muslims. They were acting without the approval, or even knowledge, of the Pakistani
government.
Indian sources, on the contrary, insist that Pakistan executed a thoroughly developed plan that
had been approved at the highest government levels. The accounts of key participants, and such
official documents as are available in various archives, tend to support the Indian version. An
overview of the sequence and timing of the key events also suggests that a sound plan did exist,
and the Pakistani government was indeed involved at the highest levels. The operation rested
on four pillars: a strategic information operation, economic blockade, subversion, and armed
force.
4.1. Strategic information operation
The target audiences were the Kashmiri Muslims, the Pakistani population, the government of
Great Britain, and world public opinion. The narrative was based on the trope of the injustice,

7
exploitation and oppression that Muslims had to endure all over the world, wherever they were
in a minority. The main themes were adapted to the Kashmiri situation: 19
₋ Kashmir had a significant Muslim majority that would suffer under Hindu oppression if the
state acceded to India. Only Pakistan could guarantee their security and prosperity.
₋ The Kashmiri Muslims had been oppressed, treated as inferior subjects, excluded from the
administration, taxed unfairly, drafted for corvée, and suffered many other indignities.
₋ The Maharaja deployed his Army along the Pakistan border, armed Hindu and Sikh militias,
and incited sectarian hatreds in order to execute a secret plan to kill or expel his Muslim
subjects and accede to India.
₋ The plan was already being executed: the Army and the militias were committing atrocities
against the Muslims, who now had to defend themselves.
₋ Muslims elsewhere had an obligation to assist the Kashmiri Muslims.
As the operation progressed further themes were added:
₋ The Kashmiri Army was conducting cross-border raids, looting and burning Pakistani
villages, and killing their inhabitants.20
₋ Pakistan had no role in the disturbances in Kashmir, but could not prevent its citizens taking
the initiative to defend fellow Muslims.
₋ Pakistani soldiers who fought to protect fellow Muslims were on furlough and did not have
the blessing of the Pakistani state.
4.2. Economic blockade
In early September 1947 Pakistan closed the border to all commercial traffic and brought all
Kashmiri external trade to a halt. The truck fleets that provided intra-state transport services
were soon immobilized due to a shortage of gasoline, so commercial activities within Kashmir
were also paralyzed. The postal service (operated by Pakistan) refused to cash postal money
orders, accept checks, or operate the postal savings accounts. Inter-bank money transfers were
stopped, and the Lahore Mint refused to supply banknotes and coins to Kashmiri banks. The
economic blockade exacerbated the food shortages and high prices caused by the unusually
harsh winter of 1946-47.21
4.3. Subversion and rebellion
Even before Partition, Muslim League operatives had been active throughout Kashmir. They
advised the local Muslim organizations, spread pro-Pakistan propaganda, subverted Muslims in

19
Pakistani authors continue to repeat these themes. See for example Khan, Sardar M. Ibrahim. Kashmir Saga
(Lahore: Ripon Printing Press Ltd, 1965) pp. 41-48; Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf. Kashmiris Fight for Freedom vol.
2. (Mirpur: National Institute Kashmir Studies, 2019) pp. 78-135.
20
“Kashmir Exposes Pakistan's Propaganda: Border Clashes Already Reported,” Indian Daily Mail, October 18
1947, p. 1.; “Kashmir's Warning To Pakistan.” Indian Daily Mail, October 22 1947 p. 1.; “Kashmir Ruler's
Rebuff to Pakistan's Allegations,” Indian Daily Mail, October 18 1947, p. 4.
<https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed Aug 15 2021.
21
Jha, Kashmir 1947, p 2, p. 16; Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad. Flames of the Chinar: An Autobiography, (New
Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1993) p. 87. Prasad and Pal, History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, p. 14-15.;
„Kashmir’s warning to Pakistan,” Indian Daily Mail, October 22, 1947, p. 1; „Kashmir Exposes Pakistan's
Propaganda: Border Clashes Already Reported,” Indian Daily Mail, October 18 1947 p. 1.
<https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed Aug 15 2021.

8
the civil service and army, and generally incited communal tensions between Muslims and non-
Muslims.22
The western districts of Jammu province was particularly fertile ground for subversion.
The Muslim population had been restive for some time, because its genuine grievances had not
been addressed. Pakistani agents, as well as local politicians, had been active among the
population for some time, inciting fear of the Maharajah’s intentions, fear of the Army, and
hatred towards non-Muslims. The incitement made the population even more restive, and the
state’s response – increasing the size of the local army garrisons, heavy-handed suppression of
even lawful and peaceful protest, abuse of detainees, imprisonment of opposition politicians –
only added to the fear of the population.23 Fear soon bred action: in late August small rebellions
broke out all over Jammu.24
By mid-October the small, scattered rebellions developed into full-scale armed revolt,
whose center was in the Jammu-Poonch-Mirpur area, where many of the residents were veterans
of the British Indian Army. The rebels liberated several districts along the Pakistani border. The
civil administration all but collapsed, taxes were not collected, the work of the courts come to
a standstill, and the Army had to withdraw its garrisons from several towns. Non-Muslims were
abandoning their homes for shelter in the larger towns that still had Army garrisons. The rebels
begun to organize themselves into a state: the Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) government was
declared on October 24. Its armed force developed into a small, but fairly effective army.25
In the far north, in Gilgit there was no need for Pakistani operatives – their work was done
for them by British officers in the Maharajah’s service, who organized a coup d’etat.26 The
military force in the province (about 1,200 men) consisted of the Gilgit Scouts (a locally raised
all-Muslim constabulary battalion), and an infantry battalion that consisted of three companies,
one Muslim, one Sikh, and one Hindu.27 On October 31 the Scouts, led by their British officers,
cut off all communications with the outside world, locked down the town of Gilgit, and arrested
the governor and the commander of the infantry battalion. Next the infantry battalion’s Muslim
company and a Scout contingent attacked the Sikh and Hindu companies, killed many and
captured the rest.
The Pakistani flag was raised over the Scouts’ cantonment, and Gilgit was soon integrated
into Pakistan: a governor was installed, regular air service was established, military personnel

22
Palit, D.K. (1972). Jammu and Kashmir Arms: History of the J&K Rifles, (Dehra Dun: Palit & Dutt,
Publishers, 1972) pp. 155, 160; Singh. K.B. History of Jammu and Kashmir rifles, p. 214.; Khan, S. M. I.
Kashmir Saga, pp. 60-61., Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, p. 85.
23
Khan, S. M. I. Kashmir Saga, pp. 52-53.
24
Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, pp. 151-152.
25
Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, pp. 152-174. Khan, S. M. I. Kashmir Saga, pp. 68-74.
26
Brown, William A. The Gilgit Rebellion 1947 (London: Ibex, 1998) pp. 104, 115-121, 145-218. Cheema, Amar.
The Crimson Chinar – The Kashmir Conflict: A Politico Military Perspective (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and
Distributors, 2014) pp. 42-43; Ahlawat, Dalbir and Kedar Thaakar. “Kashmir Imbroglio Resolved: Strategic
Options for Pakistan.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 2021. p. 137-151.; Bajwa, Jammu and
Kashmir War, pp. 76-100.
27
Brown, The Gilgit Rebellion 1947, p. 20. Other sources state that there were only two companies, one Muslim,
one Hindu.

9
arrived, arms and equipment was shipped in, and a recruitment drive yielded some 2,000 locals.
Gilgit soon became the springboard for the operation to take Baltistan and Ladakh.28
4.4. March on Srinagar and Jammu
The centerpiece of the operation was the use of military force. In order to conceal Pakistan’s
role, irregular forces were raised in the Northwest Frontier Province, where the Pathan
tribesmen responded to Pakistani propaganda.29 They fielded 1000-man lascars; the Pakistani
armed forces provided them with rations and transportation, and assigned regular officers, non-
commissioned officers and veterans of the Indian National Army30 to lead them and to operate
such equipment (e.g. mortars) as was unfamiliar to the tribesmen.
In early September heavily armed bands begun to raid Hindu and Sikh villages along the
border, and fled back to Pakistan when Kashmiri forces responded.31 The Pakistani government
feigned ignorance of the incidents, while its propaganda arm kept accusing the Kashmiri
government of atrocities against the Muslim population.32 Responding to the raids, securing the
most vulnerable locations, patrolling to prevent incursions, while at the same time trying to
suppress the rebellion in Jammu paralyzed the army: its forces became so widely dispersed as
to be incapable of concerted action.
On October 22, 1947 a two-pronged general offensive commenced. The main thrust was
delivered in the Kashmir valley, where five lascars attacked along the Rawalpindi-Srinagar
road, with Srinagar as their objective. The Army battalion deployed along the border to block
infiltration was destroyed by its own Muslim soldiers, who killed their non-Muslim officers and
comrades and joined the raiders. 33 An Army detachment was rushed up from Srinagar and
managed to destroy the bridge over the Uri river. For disciplined troops this would have been
only a temporary setback: the river was easy to cross on foot, and the distance to Srinagar was
about 100 km – with light equipment a matter of three days' march. But the lascars were tribal
militias, not disciplined regulars. Obedience to orders was not their strong point – strategic
sense even less so. They refused to give up their vehicles (that they needed to carry their
plunder), and thus they delayed the advance for nearly four days.34
They finally reached Baramula, the next large town, on October 26. Srinagar was only 30
km away, and the road was open and undefended. The situation required a fast, determined

28
Palit, Jammu and Kashmir Arms, pp. 224-244.
29
Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 93
30
“Ex-INA Officers Leading Kashmir Raiders?” Indian Daily Mail, October 31 1947 p. 1., “Former INA
Commander Kiani Leading Rebels Against Kashmir” Indian Daily Mail, November 1 1947 p. 4.
<https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed Aug 15 2021. The Indian National Army (INA – Hindi
name: Azad Hind Fauj – Free Indian Army) was a 40,000-man force the Japanese raised among the Indian
prisoners of war. The INA fought against the Allies in Burma.
31
“Tribesmen Massing on Kashmir Border: Sporadic Raids on Villages Reported, India Govt. Watching
Situation” Indian Daily Mail, October 8 1947, p. 1. <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed Aug
15 2021.
32
Prasad and Pal, History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, p. 13.; Bajwa, Jammu and Kashmir War, pp. 77.
33
Prasad and Pal, History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, p. 21.; Singh. K.B. History of Jammu and
Kashmir rifles, pp. 228-229; Palit, Jammu and Kashmir Armspp. 178-180.; “Explosive Situation in Kashmir.”
Indian Daily Mail, October 27 1947, p. 1.; “"Undeclared" War against Kashmir?” Indian Daily Mail, October 27
1947 p. 2. <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed Aug 15 2021.
34
Palit, Jammu and Kashmir Arms, pp. 192-193.; Sen, L.P. Slender was the Thread: Kashmir Confrontation,
1947-48, (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1969) pp. 37-38.

10
advance, before the state forces could react or receive reinforcements. However, instead of
making a dash for Srinagar, the Pathans halted again and spent two days looting Baramula.35
Due to their lack of discipline they failed to reach their objective in time: the delay allowed the
Maharaja to sign the instrument of accession to India (night, October 26-27).
The secondary attack was launched in Jammu province by the Azad Kashmir Army forces
and several lascars. They broke out of the areas already under their control, occupied the
undefended towns and surrounded those that had army garrisons. They cut the Poonch-Jammu
road, and tried, but failed, to take the towns of Poonch and Jammu. Both remained in the
government’s hands, and Jammu became a major Indian base throughout the rest of the war.
5. Indian Intervention
Once it received the instrument of accession, the Indian government reacted quickly. Within a
few hours it airlifted an infantry battalion to Srinagar, which held up the raiders’ advance long
enough to build up sufficient strength at the airfield. After several days of serious skirmishing
around the city and the airfield the Indian force routed the lascars with heavy losses on
November 7. The lascars quickly withdrew nearly all the way to the Pakistani border.36
The Azad Kashmir Army units and lascars in the Jammu area were somewhat more
successful. They not only held onto several towns that they had occupied in September and
early October, but also maintained the siege of Poonch and several other towns, and forced
some smaller Kashmir Army garrisons to surrender or withdraw. They even managed to repulse
several relief operations, in spite of superior Indian firepower and mobility.
India followed up the deployment of the first infantry battalion with more forces and
mountains of supplies by air to Srinagar and by road to Jammu. The Indian strength eventually
grew to two infantry divisions, supported by fighter-bomber and transport squadrons. With their
limited resources and military skills, neither the lascars, nor the Azad Kashmir forces could
stand against the Indian regular forces for long.37 The hybrid (“below the threshold of formally
declared warfare”) conflict gradually developed into limited – albeit undeclared – international
war, as the first large Pakistani units were deployed in late April or early May, 1948, and begun
to take the lead in combat operations.38 Combat operations ended in a ceasefire (January 1
1948). The ceasefire line (Line of Control) divides Kashmir to this day.
6. Kashmir 1947 – Crimea 2014
The Russian operation to seize the Crimea is sufficiently well known to require only a brief
summary. Russia prepared the ground by subverting politicians, public servants and major local
criminals. Its propaganda turned Crimea’s sizeable Russian population against Ukraine.
Political instability (the aftershocks of the Euromaidan Revolution) and Russian economic
pressure hindered government and legislature in Kyiv. In the Crimea Russian forces (deployed
there by treaty) bottled up Ukrainian forces in their bases, while local Russian militia and

35
Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 92-93.
36
Sen, Slender was the Thread, pp. 78-100.; Sinha, S.K. Operation Rescue: Military operations in Jammu &
Kashmir 1947-49. (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1977) pp. 11-30.
37
Khan, S. M. I. Kashmir Saga, pp. 117-118.; “Military Situation in Kashmir,” Indian Daily Mail, October 29
1947 p. 1. “Tribal Raids On Kashmir Halted.” Indian Daily Mail, October 29 1947 p. 3.
<https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed Aug 15 2021.
38
Khan, M.A. Raiders in Kashmir, pp. 82-84.

11
unidentifiable riflemen established roadblocks and occupied the public administration facilities
and the local parliament. Russian military exercises along the borders prevented the deployment
of the Ukrainian armed forces to the Crimea. All communications between the Crimea and
Ukraine (especially the government) came under Russian control, and the Russian narrative
(Russia was exercising its right to protect the oppressed Russian minorities in the neighboring
countries) dominated the information space.
Hybrid operations are tailored to the operational environment, the targeted state’s
vulnerabilities, and the international situation. Nevertheless, some conditions are generally
applicable for success. 39 Comparing how Russia and Pakistan satisfied these conditions
provides at least a partial explanation to the different outcomes.
1. Possess strong political leadership that sets objectives, directs operations and deals with
reverses.
Russia did better in this area than Pakistan, for two reasons. One, the need to keep the
operation secret from the British officers hindered the leadership’s ability to control
operations. Two, the leadership was not unified, due to personal ambitions and the
Muslim League’s function as a parallel government.40
2. Possess and select instruments of national power that are suitable for hybrid operations,
and match the identified vulnerabilities in the target state.
Russia’s instruments and resources were perfectly tailored to the operational area, the
political and strategic situation in Ukraine and the Crimea, and to the international
situation. In Pakistan’s case the Pathans were an asset in the initial cross-border raids,
but turned into a liability on the march to Srinagar. Also, the armed forces were not
strong enough either to deter the Indian intervention, or to defeat it, once it took place.
3. Maintain tight control over all state and some private resources and instruments, to
achieve synchronization and coordination.
Control was weaker in Pakistan, as the indiscipline of the lascars shows. However, aside
from that synchronization and coordination appear to have been adequate, as the timing
of the major actions shows.
4. Possess robust intelligence capability to identify vulnerabilities and maintain real-time
situational awareness.
Russia had an advantage in this area, due to advances in technology. Pakistan had no
difficulty identifying the vulnerabilities of Kashmiri society: they were plain to see for
any observer. Muslims in the Kashmiri civil service, the Army, the political
organizations and the general population were ready sources of information. Once
operations started, the technology of the age, as well as superior Indian strength on the
ground and in the air limited Pakistan’s intelligence collection abilities, and the
generally underdeveloped communications systems of the region made timely
situational awareness more a future concept than a reality.

39
Cederberg, Aapo and Pasi Eronen. How can Societies be Defended against Hybrid Threats? (Geneva: Geneva
Centre for Security Policy, 2015); Rácz, Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine
40
Khan, M.A. Raiders in Kashmir, pp. 22-24., Jha, Kashmir 1947, pp. 25-26.

12
 5. Achieve surprise through orchestration of the instruments in unexpected ways and
diversion and deception tactics.
Both countries did equally well. Even though both the Maharjah and the Indian
government were aware of Pakistani intentions and preparations, the unfolding events
did cause surprise both in Delhi and in Srinagar.
6. Execute strong political follow-up to protect the achieved gains and end state.
Both countries achieved what was possible in the given international environment. They
have not obtained full international recognition for their territorial gains, but with the
passage of time the international community has moved on to other concerns.
7. Control the information environment to project the narrative to all key audiences.
Russia had an advantage in this area, due to advances in technology. Pakistan also did
quite well, at least initially, until the Indian intervention. Relying on the available means
at the time it managed to incite a sizeable portion of the Muslim population against
Hindu rule, and motivated many Pakistanis also to participate in the conflict.
8. Neutralize the armed forces of the targeted state.
Both countries did equally well in this category. The capabilities of their adversaries
were vastly different, nevertheless both found the most suitable means to paralyze the
targeted state’s military forces.
9. Maintain unimpeded access to the operational area to support operatives, local allies,
deployed forces.
For different reasons both countries did equally well, in entirely different condition.
Pakistan had no difficulty supporting the lascars, its local allies, and subsequently its
regular forces with all their logistics requirements, even when Indian forces entered the
conflict.
7. Conclusion
The thesis of this paper is that hybrid operations had a good chance of success long before
modern technology turned them into the instrument of choice for forcefully advancing national
interests without going to war. The Pakistani operation to seize Kashmir bears this out. Pakistan
failed to realize all its territorial ambitions, and could not prevent India’s intervention. The
failure was due to imperfect leadership, inadequate instruments of national power, and
underdeveloped technology. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s partial success was impressive: It retained
the Muslim-majority areas of the Kashmir and Jammu provinces, as well as Gilgit and Baltistan.
Pakistan has persisted with below-the-threshold operations against India in the past seven
decades. Although these were far less successful than the attempt to seize Kashmir (especially
because some of them led to major high intensity wars). Nevertheless, they did achieve results
that served Pakistan’s interests. In the first place, the Muslim population of the state is far more
restive, than it was in 1947: India must maintain a very large force there to keep an insurgency
within manageable limits. The insurgency has cast doubt on the legitimacy of India’s claim to
Kashmir and has prevented Kashmir’s full integration into the Union of India.

13
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