City of Springfield Mass V Kibbe

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City of Springfield, Mass. v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987)
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107 S.Ct. 1114, 94 L.Ed.2d 293, 55 USLW 4239
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107 S.Ct. 1114
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Supreme Court of the United States
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CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS
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, Petitioner,
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v.
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Lois Thurston KIBBE, Administratrix of Estate of Clinton Thurston.
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Feb. 25, 1987.
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Rehearing Denied April 27, 1987.
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See
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481 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 1966
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Administratrix of police suspect who was fatally shot in motor vehicle pursuit
brought action against city and police officers under \u167\'3f 1983. The United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Frank H. Freedman, J.,
entered judgment against officer who fired fatal shot and against city and found
for the other officers. City appealed. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
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777 F.2d 801,
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affirmed. Following grant of certiorari,
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106 S.Ct. 1374,
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the Supreme Court held that discretion would not be exercised to decide issue as
to whether more than negligence was required to establish liability under \u167\'3f
1983 for inadequate training of city employees, an issue which was not preserved by
objection to jury instructions stating that gross negligence would suffice and was
not argued in Court of Appeals, where petition for certiorari did not explicitly
present negligence issue, and respondent strenuously objected to petitioner raising
the issue at the first point respondent was on notice that question was at issue,
i.e., in her response to petitioner\rquote s merits brief.
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Writ dismissed as improvidently granted.
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Ordinarily, Supreme Court will not decide questions not raised or litigated in the
lower courts, especially where party seeking to argue issue has failed to object to
a jury instruction.
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Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 51, 28 U.S.C.A
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33 Cases that cite this headnote
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Supreme Court, following grant of certiorari, did not exercise its discretion to
decide issue as to whether more than negligence was required to establish liability
under \u167\'3f 1983 for inadequate training of city employees, an issue which was
not preserved by objection to jury instructions stating that gross negligence would
suffice and was not argued in Court of Appeals, where petition for certiorari did
not explicitly present negligence issue, and respondent strenuously objected to
petitioner raising the issue at the first point respondent was on notice that
question was at issue, i.e., in her response to petitioner\rquote s merits brief.
\par
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148 Cases that cite this headnote
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{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Edward M. Pikula
}
}
argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Richard T. Egan
}
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and
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{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Harry P. Carroll.
\par
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*258
}
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Terry Scott Nagel
}
}
argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
J. Levonne Chambers
}
}
and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Eric Schnapper.
}
}
*
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Benna Ruth Solomon
}
}
and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
David O. Stewart
}
}
filed a brief for the U.S. Conference of Mayors as
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
amicus curiae
}
}
urging reversal.
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Briefs of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
amici curiae
}
}
urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Marjorie Heins, Jack D. Novik, Howard Friedman, Michael Avery,
}
}
and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Donald Rudovsky;
}
}
and for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People by
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Grover G. Hankins.
\par
}
}
}
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**1115
}
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PER CURIAM.
\par
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We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether consistently with our
decision in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
}
}
436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)
}}}
, a municipality can be held liable under
}
findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=42USCAS1983&originatingDoc=I650261f59c9711d9bc61beeb
b95be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=Do
cumentItem&contextData=(sc.DocLink)" }{\fldrslt
42 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 1983
}}}
for inadequate training of its employees.
}
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475 U.S. 1064, 106 S.Ct. 1374, 89 L.Ed.2d 600 (1986)
}}}
. In addressing that issue, we anticipated that we would be able to reach the \
u8220\'3ffairly included\u8221\'3f related question, see this Court\rquote s Rule
21.1(a), whether more than
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
negligence
}
}
in training is required in order to establish such liability.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The case having now been fully briefed and orally argued, we conclude that we
cannot reach the negligence question. Although petitioner city of Springfield
argues here that a heightened negligence standard does not suffice under
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Monell
}
}
\lquote s requirement of a municipal policy, it appears that in the District Court
petitioner did not object to the jury instruction stating that gross negligence
would suffice, App. 234\u8211\'3f235, and indeed proposed its own instruction to
the same effect.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Id.,
}
}
at 28. Nor did it argue for a higher standard than gross negligence in the Court
of Appeals. Brief for Defendant-Appellant and Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant
in No. 85\u8211\'3f1078 (CA1). It has informed us of no
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*259
}
}
special circumstances explaining its failure to preserve this question.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
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We ordinarily will not decide questions not raised or litigated in the lower
courts. See
}
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&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.DocLink)#co_pp_sp_708_1039" }{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
California v. Taylor,
}
}
353 U.S. 553, 556, n. 2, 77 S.Ct. 1037, 1039, n. 2, 1 L.Ed.2d 1034 (1957)
}}}
. That rule has special force where the party seeking to argue the issue has failed
to object to a jury instruction, since
}
Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
}}}
provides that \u8220\'3f[n]o party may assign as error the giving ... [of] an
instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict.\u8221\'3f Here, our inability to reach the negligence issue makes this
case an inappropriate vehicle for resolving the inadequate training question,
because of the close interrelationship between the two matters, and the other
questions presented are not of sufficient importance to warrant our review
independently.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The dissent argues that we need not concern ourselves about Springfield\rquote s
failure to preserve this issue, because it was passed on by the Court of Appeals
below.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Post,
}
}
at 1118\u8211\'3f1119. There is doubtless no jurisdictional bar to our reaching
it, whether or not the Court of Appeals did so. See
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Carlson v. Green,
}
}
446 U.S. 14, 17, n. 2, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1470, n. 2, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980)
}}}
. We think, however, that there would be considerable prudential objection to
reversing a judgment because of instructions that petitioner accepted, and indeed
itself requested. That the Court of Appeals was fortunate enough to entertain the
issue without reaching that outcome would not justify our running the same risk. In
any event, we disagree with the dissent\rquote s reading of the Court of Appeals\
rquote opinion, and do not believe that it pursued the extraordinary course of
considering this issue\u8212\'3fwhich petitioner had not even
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
raised
}
}
in its arguments to that court\u8212\'3fany more than we are inclined to do so.
See
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transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.DocLink)#co_pp_sp_350_804" }{\fldrslt
777 F.2d 801, 804, 809\u8211\'3f810 (CA1 1985)
}}}
. (We refrain from elaborating upon the latter point, since it is of no general
application.)
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
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{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*260
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{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i0
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Unlike
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
}
}
471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)
}}}
, this case does not present a proper
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**1116
}
}
occasion for us to exercise our discretion to decide an issue despite petitioner\
rquote s failure to preserve it. In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tuttle,
}
}
the issue in question was explicitly set forth in the petition for certiorari,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
id.,
}
}
at 814, n. 2, 105 S.Ct. at 2432, n. 2,
}}}
and was not objected to in respondent\rquote s brief in opposition to certiorari
or in respondent\rquote s merits brief.
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
at 815, 105 S.Ct., at 2432.
}}}
In addition, the issue had been fully briefed and argued in the Court of Appeals.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Ibid.
}
}
Here, by contrast, respondent\rquote s failure to object at the petition stage is
unsurprising, because the petition did not explicitly present the negligence
question, and it had not been addressed below. It would be unreasonable to require
a respondent on pain of waiver to object at the certiorari stage not only to the
petitioner\rquote s failure to preserve the questions actually presented, but also
to his failure to preserve any questions fairly included within the questions
presented but uncontested earlier. Respondent strenuously objected to petitioner\
rquote s raising this question at the first point that she was on notice that it
was at issue in this case\u8212\'3fin her response to petitioner\rquote s brief on
the merits in No. 85\u8211\'3f1078.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
For these reasons, we have concluded that the writ should be dismissed as
improvidently granted. See
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Belcher v. Stengel,
}
}
429 U.S. 118, 97 S.Ct. 514, 50 L.Ed.2d 269 (1976)
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
(per curiam).
\par
}
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
It is so ordered.
\par
}
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Justice O\rquote CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice WHITE, and Justice
POWELL join, dissenting.
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
We granted certiorari in this case to resolve whether a city can be held liable
under
}
42 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 1983
}}}
for providing inadequate police training, and, if so, what standard should govern
the imposition of such liability.
}
475 U.S. 1064, 106 S.Ct. 1374, 89 L.Ed.2d 600 (1986)
}}}
. In my view, the question is properly before the Court, and I would decide it on
the merits.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
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{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
I
\par
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{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
On the evening of September 28, 1981, the Springfield Police Department received a
telephone call reporting that
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*261
}
}
someone had called an apartment\rquote s occupants and threatened to come after
them with a knife. Later calls reported that an individual identified as Clinton
Thurston had broken the apartment door and assaulted a woman staying at the
apartment. When officers arrived at the scene, they discovered that Thurston had
abducted the woman and driven away in his car. A short while later, Thurston\rquote
s vehicle was spotted by an officer driving an unmarked police car. When Thurston
stopped at an intersection, the officer walked up to Thurston\rquote s vehicle and
identified himself as a police officer, but Thurston drove away.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The officer gave chase, and soon was joined by other members of the Springfield
Police Department. Two officers set up a roadblock to stop Thurston, but he drove
past the obstacle without stopping. As he did so, one of the officers fired at the
tires of Thurston\rquote s vehicle; later a nick was found in the left rear wheel.
At a second roadblock, Officer Kenneth Schaub placed his vehicle across one lane of
traffic, while he stood in the middle of the other lanes and attempted to flag down
Thurston\rquote s automobile. Thurston again failed to stop. As Thurston passed the
roadblock, Schaub fired in the direction of the car.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Officer Theodore Perry, who had been waiting near the second roadblock on his
motorcycle, heard Schaub\rquote s shot and joined the chase. Accelerating past
several police cars, Perry pulled abreast of the rear window on the driver\rquote s
side of Thurston\rquote s car. As he did so, Thurston swerved to the left, and
Perry dropped back. Rather than remain behind the vehicle, Perry twice more moved
up even with the car\rquote s rear window; on both occasions, when Thurston swerved
towards him, Perry fired his gun. Apparently Perry hit Thurston in the head with
the second shot; the car rolled to a stop and Thurston was taken, unconscious, to
the hospital, where he died a short time later.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Respondent, the administratrix of Thurston\rquote s estate, brought suit in the
Federal
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**1117
}
}
District Court for the District of
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*262
}
}
Massachusetts under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
, alleging that the city and several of its police officers had deprived Thurston
of his civil rights. After trial, the jury returned verdicts against the city and
Officer Perry, but found in favor of the other officers. The jury awarded $1 in
compensatory damages and $500 in punitive damages against Perry and $50,000 in
compensatory damages against the city. The District Court denied the city\rquote s
motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The city
appealed the District Court\rquote s refusal to grant either a directed verdict or
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and also claimed error in the jury charge.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
}
777 F.2d 801 (1985)
}}}
. In showing that Thurston\rquote s injuries were inflicted pursuant to
government \u8220\'3fpolicy or custom\u8221\'3f under
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)
}}}
, respondent \u8220\'3fargued primarily that the City should be found liable here
because it had a policy or custom of inadequately training its officers.\u8221\'3f
}
777 F.2d, at 803.
}}}
The Court of Appeals observed that while the plurality opinion in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)
}}}
, may \u8220\'3fhave raised doubts as to whether a harm allegedly caused by a
policy of gross negligence in police training could meet
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
\rquote s standard of causation,\u8221\'3f the Court of Appeals \
u8220\'3fcontinue[d] to believe [that] this is a viable theory of municipal
liability.\u8221\'3f
}
777 F.2d, at 804.
}}}
The Court of Appeals found that while the evidence in the record regarding the
Springfield Police Department\rquote s training policy admittedly was \
u8220\'3fsparse,\u8221\'3f the jury could have concluded from the testimony of two
police officers that the city\rquote s training in the apprehension of fleeing
vehicles was grossly inadequate. The jury also could infer, from the fact that both
Schaub and Perry had used deadly force, that the city\rquote s failure to train its
officers in alternative methods of stopping a fleeing vehicle played a substantial
part in bringing about Thurston\rquote s death.
}
findType=Y&serNum=1985157953&originatingDoc=I650261f59c9711d9bc61beebb95be672&refTy
pe=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&con
textData=(sc.DocLink)" }{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
at 808
}}}
. The Court of Appeals identified a number of additional \u8220\'3fpolicies\
u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*263
}
}
or \u8220\'3fcustoms\u8221\'3f that the jury might have inferred from the evidence
in this case. As the court noted, however, \u8220\'3fthese other policies were not
proven sufficiently or linked sufficiently with the harm to impose municipal
liability.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
at 809
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Turning to the city\rquote s challenge to the jury instructions given in the case,
the Court of Appeals noted that the city\rquote s argument was that its liability \
u8220\'3fcould not be predicated upon an isolated incident of negligent training,
but must instead be based on \u8216\'3fa pattern of deliberate supervisory inaction
and indifference.\u8217\'3f \u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Ibid.
}
}
The Court of Appeals concluded that while the jury instructions \u8220\'3fcould
have emphasized the distinction between negligence and reckless or grossly
negligent conduct,\u8221\'3f the instructions were not deficient because they did
inform the jury \u8220\'3fthat it must find a failure to train which amounted to
gross negligence.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
at 810
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
II
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The central question presented in this case is whether a city can be held liable
under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
for the inadequate training of its employees. As the Court notes, fairly included
is the related question whether more than simple or heightened negligence in
training is required in order to establish such liability. See
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
ante,
}
}
at 1117.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_B00211987024292_ID0}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_B00211987024292_ID0}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnote_B00211987024292_1" }{\fldrslt
1
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The Court of Appeals clearly reached and decided the negligence question, both in
its consideration of the appeal from the jury charge, and in its review of the
denial of the city\rquote s motions for directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. First, in addressing the city\rquote s challenge to
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**1118
}
}
the jury instructions, the Court of Appeals specifically considered whether the
jury charge should have required a
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*264
}
}
showing of \u8220\'3fdeliberate supervisory inaction and indifference.\u8221\'3f
See
}
777 F.2d, at 809.
}}}
The Court of Appeals rejected the city\rquote s argument, concluding that the jury
instructions were adequate because they \u8220\'3finstructed the jury that it must
find a failure to train which amounted to gross negligence.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
at 810
}}}
. Today this Court holds that the city\rquote s challenge to the jury charge was
not properly preserved on appeal because the city failed to make a timely objection
to the instructions as required by
}
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51
}}}
.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Ante,
}
}
at 1115. The Court of Appeals, however, did not treat the question as barred by
}
Rule 51
}}}
, perhaps because that argument was not pressed before it. See Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellee in No. 85\u8211\'3f1078 (CA1), pp. 21\u8211\'3f24. In my view, this Court
should not now decline, on that basis, to review the Court of Appeals\rquote
affirmance of the jury charge.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Moreover, even if the Court treats the city as having waived its challenge to the
jury charge, the failure to object to an instruction does not render the
instruction the \u8220\'3flaw of the case\u8221\'3f for purposes of appellate
review of the denial of a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
See
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ebker v. Tan Jay International, Ltd.,
}
}
739 F.2d 812, 825, n. 17 (CA2 1984)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hanson v. Ford Motor Co.,
}
}
278 F.2d 586, 592\u8211\'3f593 (CA8 1960)
}}}
;
}
findType=Y&serNum=0104890360&pubNum=0102228&originatingDoc=I650261f59c9711d9bc61bee
bb95be672&refType=TS&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D
ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.DocLink)" }{\fldrslt
9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure \u167\'3f 2558 (1971)
}}}
. The city raised the negligence question in its motions for directed verdict and
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that it should not be held liable
\u8220\'3feven for its grossly negligent failure to train single police officers.\
u8221\'3f App. 26, 41. In arguing that a \u8220\'3fpattern\u8221\'3f of police
misconduct is necessary to establish municipal liability under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
, the city relied on
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Wellington v. Daniels,
}
}
717 F.2d 932 (CA4 1983)
}}}
, and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Languirand v. Hayden,
}
}
717 F.2d 220 (CA5 1983)
}}}
. In those cases, the courts required proof of a pattern of police misconduct on
the ground that municipal liability under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
could not be imposed absent proof of the city\rquote s \u8220\'3f \u8216\'3ftacit
authorization\u8217\'3f of or \u8216\'3fdeliberate indifference\u8217\'3f to
constitutional injuries.\u8221\'3f See
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*265
}
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Wellington v. Daniels, supra,
}
}
at 936
}}}
; see also
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Languirand v. Hayden, supra,
}
}
at 226, n. 7,
}}}
and 227\u8211\'3f228.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The Court of Appeals must have viewed the city\rquote s motions as raising the
negligence question, because the court directly ruled on the issue. The Court of
Appeals began by stating that it previously had recognized \u8220\'3fgrossly
inadequate training\u8221\'3f as a basis for imposing municipal liability. See
}
777 F.2d, at 803.
}}}
The court acknowledged, however, that the decision in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1984)
}}}
, had \u8220\'3fraised doubts as to whether a harm allegedly caused by a policy of
gross negligence in police training could meet
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
\rquote s standard of causation.\u8221\'3f
}
777 F.2d, at 804.
}}}
The Court of Appeals then cited a footnote in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tuttle
}
}
which states: \u8220\'3f[I]t is open to question whether a policymaker\rquote s \
u8216\'3fgross negligence\u8217\'3f in establishing police training practices could
establish a \u8216\'3fpolicy\u8217\'3f that constitutes a \u8216\'3fmoving force\
u8217\'3f behind subsequent unconstitutional conduct,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
or whether a more conscious decision on the part of the policymaker would be
required.
}
}
\u8221\'3f
}
471 U.S., at 824, n. 7, 105 S.Ct., at 2436, n. 7
}}}
(emphasis added). Notwithstanding the reservations expressed in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tuttle,
}
}
the Court of Appeals \u8220\'3fcontinue[d] to believe\u8221\'3f that gross
negligence in police training was \u8220\'3fa viable theory of municipal liability\
u8221\'3f under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
.
}
777 F.2d, at 804
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The Court does not contend that the Court of Appeals failed to pass upon the
negligence question. Instead, the Court finds, from its own review of the briefs
filed in the court below, that the city did not
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
argue
}
}
for a higher standard in the Court of Appeals.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Ante,
}
}
at 1116. Certainly it is fair to conclude from the city\rquote s briefs in the
Court of Appeals that its position on the question of culpability was unclear: it
argued at different points that the standard should be deliberate indifference, see
Brief for Defendant-Appellant in No. 85\u8211\'3f1078 (CA1), p. 15; recklessness or
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**1119
}
}
\u8220\'3fgross, palpable, and culpable\u8221\'3f negligence,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
id.,
}
}
at 8; or deliberate indifference or gross negligence,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
id.,
}
}
at 13. Perhaps the Court of Appeals might have been able to conclude from this
that it did not have before it the question whether municipal liability
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*266
}
}
can be based on a finding of negligence. The court did not read the briefs in that
fashion, however; instead it viewed the question as before it and proceeded to
consider whether gross negligence or some \u8220\'3fmore conscious decision on the
part of the policymaker,\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, supra,
}
}
471 U.S., at 824, n. 7, 105 S.Ct., at 2436, n. 7,
}}}
would be required to establish
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
liability. Having done so, it is clear that there are no jurisdictional or
prudential reasons why this Court should not review the Court of Appeals\rquote
decision. The standard we previously have employed is that we will not review a
question not pressed
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
or
}
}
passed on by the courts below. See,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
e.g.,
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
}
}
398 U.S. 144, 147, n. 2, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1602, n. 2, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Husty v. United States,
}
}
282 U.S. 694, 702, 51 S.Ct. 240, 242, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1931)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Duignan v. United States,
}
}
274 U.S. 195, 200, 47 S.Ct. 566, 568, 71 L.Ed. 996 (1927)
}}}
. Here, the Court of Appeals expressly ruled on the question, in an appropriate
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; it is therefore entirely proper in light of
our precedents for the Court to reach the question on which it granted certiorari,
and I would do so.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_I659f621a9b5b11e38578f7ccc38dc}{\*\bkmkend
co_anchor_I659f621a9b5b11e38578f7ccc38dc}
\par
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
III
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)
}}}
, the Court held that municipal liability under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
can be imposed only where the municipality itself \u8220\'3fcauses\u8221\'3f the
constitutional violation. The
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Monell
}
}
Court reasoned that
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
, as originally enacted, imposed liability if a person \u8220\'3fsubjected, or
caused to be subjected,\u8221\'3f another person to the deprivation of federally
protected rights. By specifically imposing liability for the torts of another
person if one \u8220\'3fcaused\u8221\'3f the tort to be committed, the statutory
language suggested that Congress \u8220\'3fdid not intend
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
liability to attach where such causation was absent.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
at 692, 98 S.Ct. at 2036
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Monell
}
}
Court found support for this conclusion in the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, the precursor to
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
. The legislative history showed that Congress had rejected the \u8220\'3fSherman
amendment,\u8221\'3f which would have imposed vicarious liability on municipalities
for damage
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*267
}
}
caused by the \u8220\'3friotou[s] and tumultuou[s] assembl[y]\u8221\'3f of private
individuals within their borders, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 749 (1871), on
the ground that the amendment was of questionable constitutional validity.
}
The Court determined that while the legislative history did not specifically
address whether Congress intended to permit vicarious liability for the torts of
municipal agents and employees, the same constitutional difficulties that Congress
perceived when it rejected the Sherman amendment would apply to liability based on
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
respondeat superior.
}
}
The
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Monell
}
}
Court concluded that Congress did not intend, in enacting
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
, that municipalities be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of their
employees. It is only when the \u8220\'3fexecution of [the] government\rquote s
policy or custom ... inflicts the injury\u8221\'3f that the municipality may be
held liable under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
.
}
436 U.S., at 694, 98 S.Ct., at 2037
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Given the importance, under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
, of distinguishing between direct and vicarious liability, the Court repeatedly
has stressed the need to find a direct causal connection between municipal conduct
and the constitutional deprivation. See,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
e.g.,
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
471 U.S., at 824\u8211\'3f825, n. 8, 105 S.Ct., at 2436, n. 8
}}}
(requiring \u8220\'3faffirmative link\u8221\'3f between municipal policy and
constitutional violation);
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Polk County v. Dodson,
}
}
454 U.S. 312, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981)
}}}
(municipal policy must be \u8220\'3fmoving force\u8221\'3f behind constitutional
deprivation). In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Monell
}
}
itself, the policy at issue commanded the deprivation of constitutional rights.
The causal link between the municipal policy and the constitutional
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**1120
}
}
violation therefore was readily apparent: no \u8220\'3fevidence was needed other
than a statement of the policy by the municipal corporation, and its exercise.\
u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
471 U.S., at 822\u8211\'3f823, 105 S.Ct., at 2435\u8211\'3f2436
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
When the execution of municipal policy does not compel a constitutional violation,
however, the causal connection between municipal policy and the deprivation of
constitutional rights becomes more difficult to discern. In some sense, of course,
almost any injury inflicted by a municipal agent or
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*268
}
}
employee ultimately can be traced to some municipal policy. Finding
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
\rquote s causation requirement satisfied by such a remote connection, however,
would eviscerate
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Monell
}
}
\lquote s distinction, based on the language and history of
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
, between vicarious liability and liability predicated on the municipality\rquote s
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
own
}
}
constitutional violations. The limits on municipal liability imposed by
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
require more careful analysis, in each instance, of the municipal policy alleged
in the case, and whether a jury reasonably could conclude that the city\rquote s
conduct was the moving force in bringing about the constitutional violation.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In this case, the causal connection between the municipal policy and the
constitutional violation is an inherently tenuous one. Respondent does not contend
that the city\rquote s police training program
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
authorizes
}
}
the use of deadly force in the apprehension of fleeing vehicles; rather, her
argument is that the methods taught in the city\rquote s training program were \
u8220\'3finadequate,\u8221\'3f and that if individual officers had received more
complete training, they would have resorted to those alternative methods without
engaging in the unconstitutional conduct. The difficulty with respondent\rquote s
argument is that at the time of the officers\rquote alleged misconduct, any number
of other factors were also in operation that were equally likely to contribute or
play a predominant part in bringing about the constitutional injury: the
disposition of the individual officers, the extent of their experience with similar
incidents, the actions of the other officers involved, and so forth.
}
To conclude, in a particular instance, that omissions in a municipal training
program constituted the \u8220\'3fmoving force\u8221\'3f in bringing about the
officer\rquote s unconstitutional conduct, notwithstanding the large number of
intervening causes also at work up to the time of the constitutional harm, appears
to be largely a matter of speculation and conjecture.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Because of the remote causal connection between omissions in a police training
program and affirmative misconduct by individual officers in a particular instance,
in my view the
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*269
}
}
\u8220\'3finadequacy\u8221\'3f of police training may serve as the basis for
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
liability only where the failure to train amounts to a reckless disregard for or
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons within the city\rquote s domain.
The \u8220\'3fcausation\u8221\'3f requirement of
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
is a matter of statutory interpretation rather than of common tort law. Cf.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Martinez v. California,
}
}
444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S.Ct. 553, 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980)
}}}
(injury \u8220\'3ftoo remote a consequence\u8221\'3f of official conduct to impose
liability under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
, even if conduct \u8220\'3fproximately caused\u8221\'3f injury under state tort
law). Analogy to traditional tort principles, however, shows that the law has been
willing to trace more distant causation when there is a cognitive component to the
defendant\rquote s fault than when the defendant\rquote s conduct results from
simple or heightened negligence. See,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
e.g.,
}
}
}
findType=Y&serNum=0294806422&pubNum=0101577&originatingDoc=I650261f59c9711d9bc61bee
bb95be672&refType=TS&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D
ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.DocLink)" }{\fldrslt
Restatement (Second) of Torts \u167\'3f 501
}}}
, Comment
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
a,
}
}
p. 591 (1965) (\u8220\'3f[A] jury may be permitted to find that a defendant\rquote
s reckless misconduct bears a sufficient causal relation to a plaintiff\rquote s
harm to make him liable, although were the defendant\rquote s conduct merely
negligent, no such finding would be permissible\u8221\'3f). See generally W.
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts \
u167\'3f 34, p. 213 (5th ed. 1984). Similarly, a jury should be permitted to find
that the municipality\rquote s inadequate training \u8220\'3fcaused\u8221\'3f the
plaintiff\rquote s injury only if the inadequacy of the training amounts to
deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for the consequences. Negligence
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**1121
}
}
in training alone is not sufficient to satisfy the causation requirement of
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
A number of lower courts have recognized the need to show more than negligence
before a deficient training policy can form the basis for municipal liability under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
, phrasing the requisite degree of fault variously as \u8220\'3fdeliberate
indifference\u8221\'3f or gross negligence \u8220\'3famounting to deliberate
indifference.\u8221\'3f See,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
e.g.,
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Fiacco v. Rensselaer,
}
}
783 F.2d 319, 326 (CA2 1986)
}}}
(\u8220\'3fdeliberate indifference\u8221\'3f);
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Languirand v. Hayden,
}
}
717 F.2d, at 227
}}}
(so grossly negligent as to constitute \u8220\'3fdeliberate indifference\
u8221\'3f);
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*270
}
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Patzner v. Burkett,
}
}
779 F.2d 1363, 1367 (CA8 1985)
}}}
(\u8220\'3fdeliberate indifference\u8221\'3f where training so grossly negligent \
u8220\'3fthat police misconduct inevitably occurs\u8221\'3f);
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Wellington v. Daniels,
}
}
717 F.2d, at 937, n. 6
}}}
(no showing that municipality \u8220\'3fremain[ed] indifferent to\u8221\'3f
unwarranted injury). Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit previously
had adopted such a standard, requiring proof of gross negligence \
u8220\'3famounting to deliberate indifference\u8221\'3f before finding
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Monell
}
}
liability. See
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Voutour v. Vitale,
}
}
761 F.2d 812, 820 (CA1 1985)
}}}
. In my view, these decisions properly reflect the need to show more than \
u8220\'3fnegligence\u8221\'3f in police training procedures before a jury should be
permitted to find that the city\rquote s policy was a material element and
substantial factor in bringing about the alleged deprivation of protected federal
rights.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In this case, there clearly was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the
city\rquote s training policy was conducted with reckless disregard for the
consequences or deliberate indifference to its citizens\rquote constitutional
rights.
}
Because such a showing is necessary, in my view, to make out a claim that the city
\u8220\'3fsubjected, or caused [Thurston] to be subjected,\u8221\'3f to a
deprivation of his constitutional rights under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit should have reversed the decision of
the District Court and remanded for the entry of judgment on behalf of the city of
Springfield.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The plurality opinion in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tuttle
}
}
made clear that to establish municipal liability for a policy that is not itself
unconstitutional, the plaintiff must introduce evidence sufficient to establish the
existence of the policy; evidence showing that the city was at fault for
establishing the policy; and evidence establishing that the policy was the moving
force in causing the constitutional harm. A plaintiff does not carry the burden of
proving these elements merely by introducing evidence concerning the particular
incident at issue: \u8220\'3fwhere the policy relied upon is not itself
unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single incident will be
necessary in every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*271
}
}
municipality, and the causal connection between the \u8216\'3fpolicy\u8217\'3f and
the constitutional deprivation.\u8221\'3f
}
471 U.S., at 824, 105 S.Ct., at 2436
}}}
(footnotes omitted). A different result would have been directly at odds with the
need under
}
\u167\'3f 1983
}}}
to \u8220\'3fprevent the imposition of municipal liability under circumstances
where no wrong could be ascribed to municipal decisionmakers.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
at 821, 105 S.Ct., at 2435
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The Court of Appeals\rquote analysis of \u8220\'3ffault\u8221\'3f in this case
relies upon the kind of inference specifically rejected in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tuttle.
}
}
The evidence introduced at trial showed that the city\rquote s officers were
instructed in two techniques for apprehending fleeing suspects: they were told to
stand in the street and put up their hands in a stopping motion; and to move up
behind the vehicle while using lights and siren to signify that the suspect should
pull over and stop.
}
777 F.2d, at 807.
}}}
They were taught not to set up obstacles that completely block the road.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Ibid.
}
}
The Court of Appeals did not point to any evidence which would support the
conclusion that these instructions deviated from accepted police practice. Instead,
the court concluded that the jury could have inferred, from the chase itself,
that \u8220\'3fpartial roadblocks were not an effective method of slowing down a
suspect who
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**1122
}
}
was unwilling to stop,\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
ibid.;
}
}
that additional methods might have been successful in apprehending the fleeing
vehicle;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_B00321987024292_ID0}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_B00321987024292_ID0}
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}
and that the failure to instruct
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*272
}
}
in these additional methods constituted gross negligence on the part of the city.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Ibid.
\par
}
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The chain of inferences drawn by the Court of Appeals directly conflicts with
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tuttle
}
}
\lquote s instruction that \u8220\'3fconsiderably more proof than the single
incident will be necessary in every case to establish ... the requisite fault on
the part of the municipality.\u8221\'3f
}
471 U.S., at 824, 105 S.Ct., at 2436.
}}}
There was no evidence in the record, apart from the speculative inferences
suggested by the Court of Appeals, from which jurors reasonably could conclude that
the city\rquote s training in the apprehension of fleeing vehicles manifested
recklessness or deliberate indifference. Respondent therefore failed to prove an
essential element of her claim, and a directed verdict should have been entered in
favor of the city. Accordingly I would reverse the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit and would remand for the entry of judgment in favor of petitioner in this
case. I respectfully dissent from the Court\rquote s judgment dismissing this case
as improvidently granted.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf19 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_parallelCitations_1}{\*\bkmkend co_parallelCitations_1}
Parallel Citations
\par
}
}
107 S.Ct. 1114, 94 L.Ed.2d 293, 55 USLW 4239
\par
}
}
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Footnotes
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{\li0 \ri0
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We also granted certiorari on two other questions: whether the \u8220\'3fsingle
incident\u8221\'3f rule of
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
}
}
471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)
, is limited in application to one act by one officer, and whether a policy of
inadequate training may be inferred from the conduct of several police officers
during a single incident absent evidence of prior misconduct in the department or a
conscious decision by policymakers.
\par
}
}
}
}
}\f4 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \qj \sa0 \sb0 \fs18 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \row }
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\par
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}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
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{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
We also granted certiorari to consider whether the \u8220\'3fsingle incident\
u8221\'3f rule of
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
}
}
471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)
was satisfied in this case. Because, in my view, the decision below is
inconsistent with
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i1
Tuttle
}
}
\lquote s requirement of proof of fault, see
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i1
infra,
}
}
at 1121, I do not reach the question whether other aspects of
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i1
Tuttle
}
}
were satisfied in this case.
\par
}
}
}
}
}\f4 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \qj \sa0 \sb0 \fs18 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \row }
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{\li0 \ri0
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{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
The Court of Appeals speculated that the jury might have found three alternatives
to be successful in stopping fleeing vehicles: \u8220\'3fdeploying several police
cars to crowd or surround Thurston\rquote s car\u8221\'3f; \u8220\'3fcalling in
reinforcements\u8221\'3f; or using \u8220\'3fsheer persistence\u8221\'3f in the
hope that it \u8220\'3fmight have worn
}
Thurston down.\u8221\'3f 777 F.2d, at 807.
The first method would not have been an accepted alternative to the use of deadly
force. See International Association of Chiefs of Police, A Manual of Model Police
Traffic Services, Policies and Procedures, Procedure 1.20, p. 91 (1986) ( \
u8220\'3f[B]oxing in, heading off, ramming, or driving alongside the pursued
vehicle ... may be approved only when the use of deadly force would be authorized\
u8221\'3f). The second alternative, the use of reinforcements, in fact had been
implemented by the city\rquote s police officers during the chase\u8212\'3f10
officers ultimately were involved in trying to stop Thurston\rquote s vehicle. The
third suggestion does not appear to be different from the city\rquote s policy of
following the vehicle while using lights and siren.
\par
}
}
}
}
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par
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End of Document
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\u169\'3f 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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}\sect }

City of Springfield Mass V Kibbe

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