Political Islam and Governance

in Bangladesh

The past decade has seen a marked policy focus upon Bangladesh, home to nearly
150 million Muslims; it has attracted the attention of the world due to weak
governance and the rising tide of Islamist violence. This book provides a broad-
ranging analysis of the growth and impact of “political Islam” in Bangladesh, and
reactions to it. Grounded in empirical data, experts on Bangladesh examine the
changing character of Bangladeshi politics since 1971, with a particular focus
on the convergence of governance, Islamism and militancy. They examine the
impacts of Islamist politics on education, popular culture and civil society, and
the regional and extraregional connections of the Bangladeshi Islamist groups.
Bringing together journalists and academics – all of whom have different profes-
sional and methodological backgrounds and field experiences which impact upon
these issues from different vantage points – the book assesses Bangladesh’s own
prospects for internal stability as well as its wider impact upon South Asian security.
It argues that the political environment of Bangladesh, the appeal of Islamist ideol-
ogy to the general masses and the dynamic adaptability of Islamist organizations
all demonstrate that Bangladesh will continue to focus the attention of policy
makers and analysts alike. This is a timely, incisive and original explanation of
the rise of political Islam and Islamic militancy in Bangladesh.

Ali Riaz is Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and Government,
at Illinois State University. Previously, he worked as Broadcast Journalist at the
BBC World Service in London. Recent publications include Islamist Militancy in
Bangladesh: A Complex Web, also published by Routledge.

C. Christine Fair is Assistant Professor in the Center for Peace and Security
Studies (CPASS) in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
University, USA. She was previously senior political scientist at the RAND Corpo-
ration. Her recent books include Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal
Security Assistance.
Routledge contemporary South Asia series

1 Pakistan 8 Regionalism in South Asia

Social and cultural transformations Negotiating cooperation,
in a Muslim nation institutional structures
Mohammad A. Qadeer Kishore C. Dash

2 Labor, Democratization 9 Federalism, Nationalism and

and Development in Development
India and Pakistan India and the Punjab economy
Christopher Candland Pritam Singh

3 China–India Relations 10 Human Development and

Contemporary dynamics
Amardeep Athwal
4 Madrasas in South Asia
Teaching terror?
Jamal Malik
5 Labor, Globalization and
the State
Workers, women and migrants
confront neoliberalism
Edited by Debdas Banerjee and
Michael Goldfield
6 Indian Literature and
Popular Cinema
Recasting classics
Edited by Heidi R.M. Pauwels
7 Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh
A complex web
Ali Riaz
Social Power
Perspectives from South Asia
Ananya Mukherjee Reed
11 The South Asian Diaspora
Transnational networks and
changing identities
Edited by Rajesh Rai and
Peter Reeves
12 Pakistan-Japan Relations
Continuity and change in
economic relations and
security interests
Ahmad Rashid Malik
13 Himalayan Frontiers
of India
Historical, geo-political and
strategic perspectives
K. Warikoo
14 India’s Open-Economy Policy
Globalism, rivalry, continuity
Jalal Alamgir
15 The Separatist Conflict
in Sri Lanka
Terrorism, ethnicity, political
economy
Asoka Bandarage
16 India’s Energy Security
Edited by Ligia Noronha and
Anant Sudarshan
17 Globalization and the
Middle Classes in India
The social and cultural impact
of neoliberal reforms
Ruchira Ganguly-Scrase and
Timothy J. Scrase
18 Water Policy Processes
in India
Discourses of power and
resistance
Vandana Asthana
19 Minority Governments
in India
The puzzle of elusive majorities
Csaba Nikolenyi
20 The Maoist Insurgency
in Nepal
Revolution in the twenty-first
century
Edited by Mahendra Lawoti
and Anup K. Pahari
21 Global Capital and
Peripheral Labour
The history and political
economy of plantation
workers in India
K. Ravi Raman
22 Maoism in India
Reincarnation of ultra-left wing
extremism in the 21st century
Bidyut Chakrabarty
and Rajat Kujur
23 Economic and Human
Development in
Contemporary India
Cronyism and fragility
Debdas Banerjee
24 Culture and the Environment in
the Himalaya
Arjun Guneratne
25 The Rise of Ethnic Politics
in Nepal
Democracy in the margins
Susan I. Hangen
26 The Multiplex in India
A cultural economy of
urban leisure
Adrian Athique and
Douglas Hill
27 Tsunami Recovery
in Sri Lanka
Ethnic and regional
dimensions
Dennis B. McGilvray and
Michele R. Gamburd
28 Development, Democracy
and the State
Critiquing the Kerala model of
development
K. Ravi Raman
29 Mohajir Militancy
in Pakistan
Violence and transformation
in the Karachi conflict
Nichola Khan
30 Nationbuilding, Gender and
War Crimes in South Asia
Bina D’Costa
31 The State in India after
Liberalization
Interdisciplinary perspectives
Edited by Akhil Gupta and
K. Sivaramakrishnan
32 National Identities in Pakistan
The 1971 war in contemporary
Pakistani fiction
Cara Cilano
33 Political Islam and Governance
in Bangladesh
Edited by Ali Riaz and
C. Christine Fair
Political Islam and
Governance in Bangladesh

Edited by
Ali Riaz and
C. Christine Fair
First published 2011
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010.
To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business
© 2011 Ali Riaz and C. Christine Fair for selection and editorial matter;
individual contributors their contribution
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Political Islam and governance in Bangladesh / edited by Ali Riaz and
C. Christine Fair.
p. cm. – (Routledge contemporary South Asia series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Islamic fundamentalism–Bangladesh. 2. Islam and
politics–Bangladesh. 3. Islam and culture–Bangladesh.
4. Bangladesh–Politics and government–1971-
I. Riaz, Ali. II. Fair, C. Christine.
BP63.B3P65 2010
320.55'7095492–dc22 2010006946

ISBN 0-203-84530-7 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 13: 978-0-415-57673-4 (hbk)

ISBN 10: 0-415-57673-3 (hbk)
ISBN 13: 978-0-203-84530-1 (ebk)
ISBN 10: 0-203-84530-7 (ebk)
Contents

List of tables ix
Notes on contributors x
Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction 1
A L I R I A Z A N D C. CHRI S T I NE F AI R

1 Political culture in contemporary Bangladesh:

histories, ruptures and contradictions 7
D I N A M A H N A Z S I DDI QI

2 Political violence in Bangladesh 27

M D . S H A M S U L I S L AM

3 Who are the Islamists? 46

A L I R I A Z A N D KH. AL I AR RAJI

4 Who are the militants? 71

Z A Y A D U L A H S AN AND P AVI T RA BANAVAR

5 Bangladeshi civil society and Islamist politics 91

E L O R A S H E H ABUDDI N

6 Islamist politics and education 115

ALI RIAZ

7 Islamist politics and popular culture 136

A L I R I A Z A N D MD. ABU NAS E R
viii Contents
8 Islamist militancy in Bangladesh: regional and
extra-regional dimensions 153
A L I R I A Z A ND JE S S I CA BAS T I AN

Bibliography 168
Index 173
List of tables

2.1 Bomb blasts in Bangladesh (1999–2008) 36

3.1 Taxonomy of Islamist political parties in Bangladesh 48
3.2 Academic background of the JI members of parliament (1986–2001) 61
3.3 Profession of JI members of parliament (1986–2001) 62
6.1 Schools and enrollments 2002 117
6.2 Aliya Madrassahs, student enrollment and teachers 124
6.3 Growth of secondary and post-secondary Madrassahs: 1972–2004 126
Notes on contributors

Zayadul Ahsan is the News Editor of a national Television Channel in Bangladesh.

Previously he was the Chief Reporter of the Daily Star, the most respected
English newspaper in Bangladesh. Mr. Ahsan began his career in journalism
as an undergraduate student. He earned his MA in Mass Communication and
Journalism from Dhaka University. He has been reporting on the militant
groups for more than a decade.
Kh. Ali Ar Raji is Associate Professor of Mass Communication at the University
of Chittagong in Bangladesh. He was previously a visiting faculty at Stamford
University in Dhaka. Mr. Ar Raji also worked a senior researcher at Bangladesh
Center for Development, Journalism and Communication at Dhaka. He regularly
contributes to Bengali newspapers.
Pavithra Banavar is an independent researcher. She was previously a research
assistant at the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention of the US Institute
of Peace. Ms. Banavar also worked as a Research Associate at the International
Peace Operations Association.
Jessica L. Bastian is an independent researcher. She earned her MA in Political
Science with emphasis on Global Politics and Culture from Illinois State
University, USA. Her research interests include South Asian and immigration
politics. She received her bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Western
Illinois University, USA.
C. Christine Fair is an Assistant Professor in the Center for Peace and Security
Studies (CPASS) within Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School
of Foreign Service. Previously she has served as a senior political scientist with
the RAND Corporation, a political officer to the United Nations Assistance
Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and as a senior research associate in USIP’s
Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. Her research focuses upon political
and military affairs in South Asia. She has authored, co-authored and co-edited
several books including Treading Softly on Sacred Ground: Counterinsurgency
Operations on Sacred Space (OUP, 2008); The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy
and Religious Education in Pakistan (USIP, 2008), Fortifying Pakistan: The
Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance (USIP, 2006); The Cuisines of the
 Notes on contributors xi
Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States (Globe Pequot, 2008) among others and
has written numerous peer-reviewed articles covering a range of security issues
in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. She is a member of
the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations,
serves on the editorial board of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and is the
Managing Editor of India Review. She is also a senior fellow with the Counter
Terrorism Center at West Point. She has a PhD from the University of Chicago,
Department of South Asian Languages and Civilization and an MA from the
Harris School of Public Policy also at the University of Chicago.

Md. Shamsul Islam was Associate Professor of Media Studies and Journalism
at the University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh. Previously he was Associate
Professor and Chair of the Department of Journalism and Media Studies at
Stamford University in Bangladesh. Prior to joining academe Mr. Islam worked
as a senior researcher at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic
Studies (BIIS) for more than 11 years. Professor Islam also taught at Dhaka
University as an Adjunct Faculty, He earned his MA from University of Leeds
in England.

Md. Abu Naser teaches journalism and communication courses at Southern Illinois
University Carbondale (SIUC) where he is a doctoral candidate in Mass Commu-
nication and Media Arts. Previously he worked as a Senior Lecturer in Media
and Communication at Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB). Prior to
joining the IUB in 2004, Naser worked as a reporter for the BSS – the national
news agency of Bangladesh, a freelance broadcaster for the BBC Bengali
Service, and the news editor of a community television station in London. He
earned his MA in Radio Broadcasting from the University of London in 2003. He
worked as an information specialist at the US Embassy in Bangladesh. Naser
has authored a book in Bengali, published several journal articles and presented
at various academic conferences.

Ali Riaz is Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and Government,
at Illinois State University. He previously taught at Claflin University in South
Carolina, Lincoln University in England, and Dhaka University in Bangladesh.
He also worked as a broadcast journalist at the BBC World Service in London.
Dr. Riaz has published extensively on South Asian politics. His recent books are
entitled Faithful Education: Madrassahs in South Asia (2008); Islamist Militancy
in Bangladesh: A Complex Web (2008); Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal
(co-authored with Subho Basu, 2007), Unfolding State: The Transformation of
Bangladesh (2005), and God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh
(2004). His edited volumes include Religion and Politics in South Asia (2010)
and (Re)Reading Taslima Nasrin: Contexts, Contents and Constructions (2009).
Professor Riaz has contributed numerous articles in peer-reviewed journals,
and has received a number of awards. He has ten books in Bengali to his
credit. Professor Riaz has worked with various international organizations as
a consultant.
xii Notes on contributors
Elora Shehabuddin is Associate Professor of Humanities and Political Science
at Rice University. She received her Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University
and A.B. in Social Studies from Harvard University. Her dissertation was awarded
the American Political Science Association’s award for best dissertation in reli-
gion and politics in 2002. Her publications include articles in several journals
and edited books, as well as two books, Reshaping the Holy: Democracy, Develop-
ment, and Muslim Women in Bangladesh (Columbia University Press, 2008)
and Empowering Rural Women: The Impact of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh
(Grameen Bank, 1992). She is an Associate Editor of the Encyclopedia of Women
and Islamic Cultures. She has held numerous fellowships; most recently, she
was selected as a Carnegie Scholar and received a US Institute of Peace grant
for a comparative study of gender and Islamist politics. She has also begun work
on a historical study of the intersection of feminism and Islam in the shadow of
empire.
Dina M. Siddiqi received her Ph.D. in Anthropology from the University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor and a BA from Wellesley College, Massachusetts. She
is currently a Visiting Professor at the Center for Gender, Sexuality and HIV/
AIDS at Brac University in Bangladesh where she is completing a study on
sexuality and rights in Dhaka city. Dr. Siddiqi’s recent publications include
“Do Bangladeshi Sweatshop Workers Need Saving? Sisterhood in the post-
Sweatshop Era?” in Feminist Review (2009) and “Communalizing the Criminal
or Criminalizing the Communal? Locating Minority Politics in Bangladesh” in
Violence and Democracy in India 2007 (Amrita Basu and Srirupa Roy eds.).
Her previous publications include “In the name of Islam? Gender, Politics and
Women’s Rights in Bangladesh” in Harvard Asia Quarterly (2006). Dr. Siddiqi
has worked for leading human rights organizations in Bangladesh and has
been a consultant for UNDP, UNICEF and NORAD. Dr. Siddiqi has taught at
Columbia University, the New School for Social Research, and the University
of Pennsylvania in the USA, and at Dhaka and Jahangirnagar University in
Bangladesh.
Acknowledgments

We are thankful to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) for supporting the
project between 2004 and 2008. Dr. Paul Stares, currently at the Council on Foreign
Relations, in particular merits special gratitude and USIP funding, without which
this volume would not have been possible. We also appreciate the patience of our
contributors. This project was lengthy and time consuming. Without their under-
standing and eagerness to make critical revisions when needed, this effort would
not have come to fruition. Over the long period of the project a number of research
assistants worked with us, we acknowledge their contribution with gratitude, among
them Pavitra Banavar and Jessica Bastian deserve special recognition. We are
also grateful to Dorothea Schaefter of Routledge for taking keen interest in the
project and publishing the volume with great care. Finally, we owe special thanks
to our patient and loving spouses, Shagufta Jabeen and Jeffrey D. Kelley. Our
spouses tolerate our long periods in the field and support us in our work, which
often keeps us in airports, offices and other far away places.

Ali Riaz
C. Christine Fair
Introduction
Ali Riaz and C. Christine Fair

This volume examines the historical and contemporary contexts and contours of
political Islam in Bangladesh. In the early years of the present decade, Bangladesh
attracted the attention of the world as a potential transit route for terrorists fleeing
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. A spate of high profile terrorist attacks,
including failed and successful assassination bids on high-level political leaders
as well as intellectuals, artists and secular-minded Muslims together with a series of
several hundred explosions throughout the country on a single day in 2005, further
discomfited western policy makers about the growing threats of intolerance, Islamist
militancy, and a permissive government that indirectly and directly benefited from
these developments. The overt alliance between the mainstream political parties,
particularly the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and declared Islamist parties
such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) – which ruled the
country for five years between October 2001 and October 2006 fueled these
concerns. In the same period, Bangladesh emerged as an important logistical hub
for Pakistan-based militant groups seeking to operate throughout India as well
as for the nascent Indian Mujahadeen looking to expand its presence throughout
the state.
Bangladesh is the world’s third most populous, and largely democratic, Muslim
state with more than 150 million people. Its location in terrorism-afflicted South
Asia and its important role in facilitating and hosting terrorist organizations in
the region continue to provoke concern in regional and western capitals alike.
However, unlike Pakistan and even India where there is considerable understanding
of political and militant Islam, these critical internal and trans-national issues in
Bangladesh remain poorly characterized.
This volume brings together a diverse set of empirically grounded essays to
address many of the empirical lacunae surrounding Bangladeshi politics and
governance as well as the rising influence of political and even militant Islam
upon Bangladesh’s cultural, social and political fabric. It brings together a diverse
set of authors, including both journalists and academics, all of whom have differ-
ent professional and methodological backgrounds and field experiences that
impact upon these issues from different vantage points. In this volume, the
authors mobilize the notion of political Islam provided by Graham Fuller which
posits that “Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how
2 Ali Riaz and C. Christine Fair
politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and
implemented in some fashion.”1
This volume is comprised of eight chapters, each of which addresses one or
more fundamental questions related to convergence of governance, Islamism and
militancy in Bangladesh in an effort to assess Bangladesh’s own prospects for
internal stability as well as its wider impact upon South Asian security.
The first two chapters of the volume, Political Culture in Contemporary
Bangladesh: Histories, Ruptures and Contradictions (by Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi)
and Political Violence: The Trends and Tendencies (by Shamsul Islam) provide
the contexts within which political and even militant Islam have flourished in
Bangladesh. Dina Siddiqi maps the structural continuities, historical contingen-
cies and contradictions in contemporary political culture. Her incisive analysis of
the political culture of Bangladesh demonstrates that the emergence of popular
political ideologies that fuse religion with politics is intrinsically linked to the
transformation of the Bangladeshi state. The Bangladeshi state inherited a colo-
nial structure which is alienated from community/popular politics and remained
so well after independence and the post-1990 ‘democratic’ era. She argues that
the most enduring sites of contestations are the questions of national identity and
the place of religion in defining Bengali/Bangladeshi nationalism. This contestation
between the two major political parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party, has been vengeful and unremitting, particularly since 1990 when
the military had to take a back seat after fifteen years of rule.
In Bangladesh, the struggle over history and memory has shaped the structure of
political rhetoric and practice; in so doing it pushed aside crucial issues like justice,
equality and the rule of law on the one hand and created space for the Islamists to
operate, on the other. The process, which Dina Siddiqi describes as “a progressive
hollowing out of political ideology and practice”, augmented the confrontation
between claimants of state power in public space and consequently eroded the
state’s capacity to govern.
These developments appear to have fostered a vicious cycle: violent confronta-
tion leads to erosion of state capacity which in turn is conducive to more violence.
As the state’s ability to govern by consent has declined, violent new actors have
emerged within the political landscape. Shamsul Islam argues in his analysis of
political violence in Bangladesh that the violence perpetrated by the Islamist
forces in recent years needs to be understood as one form of political violence
among many forms that the country has experienced since its independence.
Shamsul Islam contends that the recent upsurge of Islamist militancy cannot be
understood in isolation from the historical context of violence. Islam argues that
although political violence has been an integral part of the Bangladeshi political
scene since its inception, there has been a qualitative change in the nature and
pattern of violence in recent years. Not only has violence increased but new forms
of violence have emerged that threaten the social fabric of Bangladeshi society
and undermines the nation’s effort to establish a democratic system of governance.
Their chapter also draws attention to the fact that the extremist ideology-driven
violence committed by both the secular left and of Islamists has increased
 Introduction 3
significantly in the past decade. The adherents of a secular left extremist ideology
are divided into many organizations, are present in small rural pockets in western
and southwestern regions of the country, and are at odds with one another. The
militant Islamist organizations, on the other hand, seem to operate with greater
coordination. In 2005, militants exploded 450 bombs in 63 of the country’s
64 districts within less than an hour which bears testimony to this coordination.
In addition to these extremist groups both the ruling and the opposition parties,
and even the Bangladeshi state have employed violence at different times since
Bangladesh emerged as an independent state in 1971. The state-sponsored violence
such as extra-judicial, custodial deaths and indiscriminate killings of innocent
civilians by government forces such as the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini in 1974–5 and the
Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) since April 2004 have received wide press cover-
age but continue unabated. Over the past four years, RAB members have killed
more than 540 people. Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations
claim that extrajudicial executions are often preceded by torture. Most importantly
these forces and their members have enjoyed impunity. Thus Islam concludes that
“in a political environment where parties depend on violence for their perceived
success and media exposure, a respite in violence without making changes in the
political system is a faint hope.”
In the next chapter, Who Are the Islamists?, Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji,
provide a taxonomy of the Islamist political parties in Bangladesh. Their chapter
demonstrates that “the Islamists” of Bangladesh are not a monolithic and homog-
enous group of actors who adhere to a consistent set of objectives to be actualized
through political Islam. Rather, there is a wide array of groups and individuals
who seek to instrumentalize Islam in the pursuit of their specific organizational
and perhaps individual political objectives.
Unlike other countries in the region that have experienced sustained develop-
ments in political Islam, in Bangladesh it remains poorly understood. The authors
seek to provide clarity about the details of Bangladesh’s Islamist parties, dividing
them into five categories: Pragmatists/Opportunists; Idealist and Orthodox; Pir
(Preacher of Islam) centric and Mazar (Shrines) based; Urban-elite centric; and
Jihadists. The chapter also presents profiles of Islamist leaders and identifies
the salient features of Islamist politics. Notwithstanding the diverse landscape
of Islamist politics, three points stand out from this discussion. First, despite
a decline in electoral support for the extant mainstream high-profile Islamist
political parties, the number of parties with Islamist policies is increasingly
dramatically and their influence within mainstream politics has increased signi-
ficantly. Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, Islamist politics is not rural-
based neither are its supporters from the less-educated segments of the society.
Instead urban educated elites are being drawn to this political ideology (the emer-
gence and the growing popularity of new organizations like the Hizbut Tahrir and
the profile of the Jamaat-e-Islami leaders bear testimony to this phenomenon).
Third, the line between the mainstream and the militants has been blurred,
particularly since 2001 when mainstream Islamists became partners of the ruling
coalition.
4 Ali Riaz and C. Christine Fair
This latter point raises important questions about the effect of including
Islamist political parties in democratically elected governments. In Bangladesh,
this question has particular salience since one of the key Islamist parties, the
Jamaat-e-Islami, was banned for several years after independence because of the
role it played in Bangladesh’s war of independence, when it aided the west
Pakistan-led military in killing hundreds of thousands of Bengalis.
In Chapter 4 Zayadul Ahsan and Pavithra Banavar attempt to shed light on
the dark world of those Islamist actors that have embraced violence and who
describe themselves as “jihadists.” The security concerns of western countries,
particularly of the United States, have brought this strand of Islamism to light
in recent years. While pivotal events identified in the opening paragraphs of
this introduction diverted international interest towards Bangladesh, very little
is known about these groups, much less regarding their operational structure,
support base and sources of funding. Banavar and Ahsan do sterling work collect-
ing and mobilizing new data from a variety of Bangladesh-based sources including
government organizations, journalists and analysts interviewed during fieldwork
for this study. The authors analyze these data along with information gleaned
from secondary literature as well as statistical information from international
databases. The authors, synthesizing these myriad data sources, explore the origins,
characteristics, leadership, strengths and implications of militant groups operating
within Bangladesh.
Ahsan and Banavar identify the key groups in Bangladesh, describe their
composition and detail their recruitment mechanisms, training methods and
structures. This chapter also clarifies what is known about the groups’ sources
of financing and other sources of logistical support. Unfortunately, there is a
relatively large but unreliable body of sensationalist accounts of these groups and
their origins. The authors have scrupulously sought to rely upon independently
corroborated information in an effort to increase the reliability of their account.
Although the original research for this chapter was conducted in 2006 and 2007,
new information about the operations of these groups which became available
since then have been incorporated. These groups receive both ideational and mate-
rial external support and they are increasingly engaged in exporting militancy to
neighboring India. While the press coverage of these militant organizations has
diminished in recent years, these groups are thriving and have become threats to
the state and society of Bangladesh and pose serious risks to South Asian regional
security.
Elora Shehabuddin, in the fifth chapter entitled Bangladeshi Civil Society and
Islamist Politics, examines both how these militant groups have fostered intoler-
ance to religious plurality and how civil society organizations have organized to
firmly counter these groups and their efforts. Occasionally, these civil society
organizations have confronted each other in the streets.
Cognizant of the debate on the definition of civil society, particularly in the
Bangladeshi context where some analysts equate the presence of developmental
non-government organizations (NGOs) with the vibrancy of the civil society,
Shehabuddin underscores the point that the country has a rich tradition of
 Introduction 5
civil society which predates the arrival of the NGOs. She emphasizes two salient
features of Bangladeshi civil society: resistance to the establishment and entrenched
interests; and the use of cultural modes to spread the message of resistance.
Drawing on extensive field research in Bangladesh, the chapter examines the
messages and strategies of three civil society organizations’ campaigns against
Islamists before the 2001 parliamentary election in rural areas of Bangladesh.
The chapter also presents the response of the Jamaat-e Islami to their campaign-
ing. Her samples include the Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee, an organization
that explicitly seeks to root out Islamists from all spheres of society, particularly
members of the Jamaat; Nijera Kori, a NGO that operates nationally and was
particularly active in advocating secular politics in the run-up to the 1996 elec-
tions; and Rupantar, a small local NGO based in Khulna (a southwestern city)
that seeks to promote secular, progressive, and inclusivist education among the
rural poor of the area.
In this perceptive discussion, Shehabuddin demonstrates that the secularist
organizations’ exclusive focus on the role of the Islamists (particularly of the JI)
in 1971 “have not been successful in building a permanent support base among
the poor uneducated majority, though they can usually count on the support of the
small educated minority in most villages, such as the local elite and the village
schoolteachers.” An important finding of the chapter is the adaptability of the JI
in addressing these civil society organizations’ resistance to their messages. Since
1996 the Jamaat-e-Islami has been engaged in systematic efforts to reach out to
the rural women voters. The party makes use of audio cassettes of the party lead-
ers distributed through local organizers to spread the message and attract new
attendees to group meetings.
The use of the audio cassettes, a new medium, to reach a wider audience is
further explored in one of the two chapters which address the impact of political
Islam in Bangladesh. Chapter 6 entitled Islamist Politics and Education by Ali Riaz
focuses on the impact of the Islamists on the education scene of Bangladesh.
Usually discussions of Islamist politics and education are confined to the
madrassahs, particularly the radicalization of these institutions, for good reasons,
but Riaz argues that the influence of Islamists goes far beyond the madrassahs.
The chapter argues that the rise of Islamists as a formidable political force has
brought changes to the content of education. The country has witnessed a drift
of educational policies away from secular principles as propounded in the
Constitution of the country in 1972, incorporation of religious educational institu-
tions into mainstream education, and the proliferation of Islamic educational
institutions, namely madrassahs. Riaz insists that after having established influ-
ence over the primary and secondary sector, Islamists are now extending their
influence to the tertiary sector of education.
Chapter 7 explores the impact of Islamist politics on popular culture in
Bangladesh. Ali Riaz and Abu Naser Rajib analyze both the ways in which
Islamists have sought to mobilize Bangladeshi popular culture as well as how in
diverse forms it has facilitated the rise of Islamists. They argue in the chapter
entitled Islamist Politics and Popular Culture that in recent years, various
6 Ali Riaz and C. Christine Fair
cultural products are being employed by the Islamists to reach out to the general
populace, and propagate a certain political ideology. In so doing the Islamists are
using traditional cultural practices, and also introducing new ways and methods
to draw attention to their messages. In this chapter, two media of popular culture
which have witnessed changes in terms of content and their appeal to public are
examined. They are: popular Islamic literature, and the entertainment medium
(i.e. drama and music).
The Islamist novel, a new genre of fiction, has become popular in the past
couple of years. Audio cassettes of Islamist music and drama, relatively new
phenomena in Bangladesh, have carved out a niche in the popular culture over
the last few years. Cultural groups associated with Islamist organizations have
produced and sold hundreds of cassettes of so-called “jihadi music.” Most of
the lyrics focus on the changed world situation, wars and the resultant religious
feelings with a jihadi revolutionary undertone.
In the concluding chapter of the volume Ali Riaz and Jessica Bastian examine
these domestic developments within regional and extra-regional contexts. This
chapter grew out of a need to see how Islamist militancy in Bangladesh has been
shaped by regional forces and how it is affecting neighbouring states. The central
questions this chapter addresses are the following: what, if any, regional and
global events facilitated the rise of political Islam, particularly, militant groups,
in Bangladesh? How have these groups obtained weapons to maintain a viable
militant organization? Are these groups’ influences spilling over to neighbouring
India – an allegation Indian media and policy-makers have made over the years?
What can the international community do to help Bangladesh stem the rise of
militancy within its boundaries and its proliferation beyond national borders? The
authors argue that militant ideology arrived from outside the country, primarily
as a result of the Afghan War. Equally important is that these organizations,
particularly the Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB) continue to receive
support from outside the country including Pakistan. The authors further argue
that the operations of these organizations are no longer constrained by political
boundaries; instead they have spread their influence to India.
While the spectre of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh has receded from public
view in recent years given the commitment of the military regime (2006–8) and
the current Shekh-Hasina-led government to deal with militancy, this volume
reminds its readers that the political environment of Bangladesh, the appeal of
Islamist ideology to the general masses and the dynamic adaptability of Islamist
organizations demonstrate that Bangladesh should continue to focus the attention
of policy makers and analysts alike. These dynamics not only affect the internal
security of an important Muslim state but also potentially destabilize a region that
has long been characterized by domestic and international terrorism, insurgency
and other forms of sub-state conflict.

Note
1 Graham Fuller, The Future of Political Islam. (New York: Palgrave. 2003), xi.
1 Political culture in
contemporary Bangladesh
Histories, ruptures and
contradictions
Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi

This chapter offers a broad overview of Bangladeshi politics as it has evolved

since independence, when Bangladesh broke away from Pakistan in 1971.
Conventional accounts of the country’s politics tend to take regime histories
as their point of departure. Rather than provide a straightforward historical
narrative, in this chapter I map various institutional and cultural transforma-
tions that have shaped the polity over the years. Two questions broadly structure
the analysis. First, how do we understand contemporary political culture, in
which extreme partisanship, violent confrontation and unpredictability are the
norm, despite the formal trappings of democracy having been in place for over
a decade? Second, what socio-economic forces and/or political dynamics have
enabled the emergence of popular political ideologies that fuse religion with
politics? Keeping these two questions in mind, I identify key trends, themes and
sites of contention.
Historically, several interlocking themes characterize political culture in the
country. Reliance on authoritarianism in times of crisis and the resolution of politi-
cal differences through extra-parliamentary means are invariably accompanied
by appeals to contradictions in nationalist ideology and the portrayal of political
dissent as anti-patriotic. Notably, along with the extraordinary partisanship that
informs the politico-cultural landscape under all regimes, patronage politics tends
to predominate whether governments are elected or military.
Ironically, both ordinary citizens and opposition parties often find that the
only effective mode of political engagement open to them is mobilizing on the
streets.
The most enduring sites of contestation turn on questions of national identity
and the place of religion in defining Bengali/Bangladeshi nationalism, and the
historically constructed Bengali/Muslim dichotomy. As we shall see, struggles
over history and memory have intimately shaped the structure of political rhetoric
and practice. To put it differently, the problems of statecraft and of history writing
have been deeply intertwined. Highly charged ideological debates about national-
ism frequently eclipse conversations on other critical issues, such as distributive
justice. Moreover, persistent “culture wars” have allowed for a deepening polari-
zation of the political landscape; the overall effect, I argue, is a progressive
hollowing out of political ideology and practice.
8 Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi

From socialism to neo-liberalism: continuities and ruptures

in state practice
At first glance, the Bangladeshi state today appears radically different from its
precursor at independence. The original constitution of 1972, drawn up under the
new government of the Awami League (AL) invoked nationalism, democracy,
secularism and socialism as key principles of statecraft.1 Less than three years
later, the “father of the nation” and the country’s first Prime Minister, the Awami
League’s Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1972–5) pushed through the fourth Amendment
to the constitution, which instituted authoritarian one-party rule in place of parlia-
mentary democracy. In the years that followed, military dictatorships undercut
secular Bengali identity – the bedrock of the nationalist movement of the 1960s,
at the helm of which had been the Awami League. The military government of
General Ziaur Rahman (1975–81) dispensed with both socialist ideology and
secular principles. Zia lifted the ban on the use of religion in politics, thereby
rehabilitating political parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, which had opposed the
emergence of Bangladesh. The party he established in 1978 in order to burnish
his civilian credentials, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) embraced an
explicitly Muslim, Bangladeshi identity. Zia’s successor in the army, General
Ershad consolidated the non-secular face of the nation by declaring Islam the
state religion. Moreover, both Generals Zia and Ershad reversed the socialist
policies and rhetoric of the first AL government, dismantling state enterprises,
withdrawing state subsidies and promoting a regime of trade liberalization and
export promotion. Indeed, Bangladesh today has one of the most economically
liberalized economies in South Asia.2 This is a far cry from the socialist ideals
envisioned at independence.
Underlying such radical transformations, however, one can discern specific
continuities in state structures and practices of ruling. Some of these continuities
can be traced to concerns over political legitimacy that haunt all ruling parties in
Bangladesh. These concerns led both military and democratic governments to
secure political support through the use of patronage politics, as well as through
playing up the national identity question. As I show below, the tradition of
patronage initiated by the country’s first elected government – through which the
bureaucracy was consciously politicized and divided, favors handed out openly
in return for party loyalty, and personal rivals removed through invocations of
disloyalty to the nation – became a recurring theme in the rule of successive
governments, military and elected. It also laid the seeds for extreme partisanship.
With respect to state formation, it may well be that the most enduring legacy of
Awami League rule was not secular and socialist principles of statecraft but initi-
ating a “patrimonial”3 political process in which dissent was brutally squelched
and non-coercive democratic spaces squeezed out.4 In order to understand this
process more fully, here I briefly revisit the historical context and structural
factors that shaped state formation in its early years. I argue that the explicit
politicization of the bureaucracy, the invocation of a discourse of the Enemy
Other, and unabashed state patronage of party loyalists during the Mujib period
 Contemporary political culture 9
set the stage for later developments. Notably, these features show a remarkable
continuity with earlier developments in the state of East Pakistan as Bangladesh
was known until 1971.
It should be noted at the outset that the first government of Bangladesh, headed
by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, faced extremely difficult conditions and found itself
besieged at multiple levels. The movement against Pakistan had united diverse
interests under one cause. Once independence was achieved, the grounds for
national solidarity appeared much more slippery. The AL’s refusal after the war
to form a national government with representation from all parties, in favor of an
exclusively AL government, alienated many erstwhile allies. More important,
despite a landslide victory in parliamentary elections in 1973, challenges to the
legitimacy of Mujib’s government, especially from left-wing forces, continued
throughout his rule.5
Sovereignty was not assured on the international front either. Bangladesh’s
emergence was caught up in cold war politics; the US and the Soviet bloc, includ-
ing India, each had specific stakes in the outcome of the 1971 war. The new AL
government initially failed to secure recognition (and much needed assistance)
from powerful actors such as the US and China. Moreover, most Muslim coun-
tries viewed the split from Pakistan as a strike against Islam and also withheld
recognition and aid. Such international pressures exacerbated domestic problems
of legitimacy and of economic stability and security.

Patronage and the politics of state and society

The nation of Bangladesh inherited from Pakistan a non-democratic state struc-
ture dominated by the bureaucracy and the military, and alienated from popular
sentiments and politics.6 General Ayub Khan’s military coup in 1958 had arrested
meaningful democratic politics in Pakistan and ushered in an extended period of
rule by senior civil and military officials whose source of power and legitimacy
were “extra-democratic” and external. The structure of the state favored senior
military officers and bureaucrats, whose authority derived from external financial
and political support. As it happened, most East Pakistanis were excluded from
the military-bureaucratic nexus. Widespread socio-economic and linguistic discrim-
ination meant that only a miniscule elite of Bengali speakers occupied high mili-
tary and administrative positions.7 Nevertheless, as van Schendel notes, the Ayub
regime provided a crucial model for successive military rulers in Bangladesh
seeking non-democratic means of securing legitimacy. Indeed, a leading scholar
on Bangladesh argues that the 1958 coup was as critical an event as the 1952
Language Movement for understanding contemporary Bangladesh.8 Certainly all
regimes since independence have tried to both maintain the basically undemocratic
state structure inherited from Pakistan and simultaneously establish a viable popular
support base.9
The end of the war in 1971 brought about great expectations for change in
a society struggling to redefine the conditions of political participation. Mujib’s
government faced great odds in transforming the existing system into one
10 Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi
compatible with popular participatory politics while maintaining its hold on
power. Neither the military nor the bureaucracy constituted the Awami League’s
primary power base. Indeed, the petty bourgeoisie and the rural rich who
supported the Awami League had always resented the class privilege and sense
of entitlement of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy.10
Sensing a threat to its power, the new AL government was openly hostile
toward the established bureaucracy. It made explicit efforts to bring the function-
aries of the state under its control and took steps to marginalize the army. It was
at this moment of potential crisis that loyalty to the nation first came to be
conflated with loyalty to the ruling party. Within this framework, disagreement
with the policies of the Awami League were reduced to unpatriotic threats to
national integrity rather than being read as political dissent.
The AL purged the bureaucracy and the public sector of ideological opponents
and personal rivals. An indirect method of eliminating rivals involved making
accusations of collaboration with the Pakistani military government during the
nine-month long war in 1971 that did not need to be substantiated.11 The regime
launched a direct assault on its perceived enemies in the bureaucracy by pushing
through a Presidential Order, which removed constitutional protections for civil
service.12 As a result, bureaucrats could be removed at the will of the government,
without recourse to appeal or court review. Those non-AL officers who remained
harbored a growing sense of injustice, resentment and alienation.
Mujib sidelined the armed forces, creating his own paramilitary forces, the
Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (JRB). Vested with tremendous power and relatively free
from accountability, the JRB quickly became associated with arbitrary terrorizing
tactics, and an instrument to quash resistance to the regime. The military saw its
identity as protector of national interests undermined as well as its corporate
interests threatened by the creation of the JRB.
In order to quell other internal rivalries and external challenges, the govern-
ment generously patronized party loyalists, often with an extraordinary disregard
for the law.13 The AL appointed party functionaries to key positions in the
bureaucracy and in newly nationalized industries, regardless of aptitude or expe-
rience. The ad hoc commodification and plunder of nationalized resources that
followed led to rapid private accumulation. Political connections and proximity
to the seat of power determined access to resources. The best known example is
that of import licenses procured and resold at exorbitant prices by those with
close ties to the regime.14 Overnight a new class of extremely wealthy business-
men emerged, even though the economy remained stagnant. Rampant black
marketeering and smuggling led to spiraling inflation. One observer has charac-
terized this period as initiating a process of class formation through extortion, one
that has continued in various guises up to today.15
The state’s actions had the desired effect of producing a class of business
people and bureaucrats nominally loyal to the AL regime.16 It also naturalized a
culture of extortion, plunder and intimidation. Everyday politics became highly
personalized; at the same time, political and cultural dissent were interpreted
as always already seditious and therefore not to be tolerated. An increasingly
 Contemporary political culture 11
authoritarian and fearful regime dismissed dissenters of all shades as anti-patriotic,
anti-Awami League and anti-Mujib. It attributed armed resistance in the country-
side to the work of “miscreants” and “anti-social elements.” In the face of a serious
crisis of legitimacy, through a presidential ordinance, in December 1974 Mujib
declared a state of emergency and suspended all fundamental rights. The ordi-
nance empowered the government to pass any legislation it saw fit, without
consultation. The fourth amendment to the constitution, introduced on January
25, 1975 instituted one-party rule, installed Mujib as the President and gave him
unlimited power. Just months later, in August that year; Mujib and eighteen
members of his family were massacred in a military coup engineered by a group
of young army officers. A series of coups and counter-coups followed Mujib’s
assassination. Finally Major General Ziaur Rahman took over the reins of power
in late 1975. The events ushered in 15 years of military rule in Bangladesh, which
ended only after a popular uprising in 1990.

The ideology and politics of grievance

Public reaction to the coup and the brutal killings was remarkably muted.
Apparently the AL regime had generated enough disenchantment, frustration and
resentment among the general population to dampen serious resistance to the army
take-over. On the contrary, the arrogance and sense of entitlement of AL supporters
appeared to be matched by feelings of grave injustice and deprivation in those
excluded from the regime’s embrace. Aware of the need to generate support for his
rule, Zia skillfully tapped into feelings of resentment and exclusion, offering those
with grievances against the previous regime a place at the table, so to speak.
The new military government, which had usurped executive power, presented its
intervention as a reprieve from rampant corruption, mismanagement and civilian
autocracy. Zia initially vowed to hand over power to a civilian elected govern-
ment as soon as it was viable. However, he soon recast himself as a social
reformer and politician, recalling the rhetoric and actions of Ayub Khan in an
earlier period. Like Ayub, he subscribed to a progressivist vision of development
and modernization based on free market reforms. His openly pro-market stance
won him important friends and allies internationally.
Zia formalized the civilianizing process for his regime by launching the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in 1978. The BNP attracted a strikingly
heterogeneous crowd with no obvious ideology in common. Bureaucrats and
army officers, pro-China leftists, Islamists who had been banned until then from
participating in politics and even some disenchanted Awami League members
joined the party. If there was any ideological unity to the BNP at its inception, it
was in a shared – imagined or real – sense of victimization and deprivation under
the AL regime. At the level of membership then, the BNP was held together by
a combination of self-interest/opportunism and deep-rooted anti-AL sentiment,
which I call the politics of grievance.
Zia’s regime reproduced and refined patronage politics. Building up a new party
with little ideological coherence, and composed of politicians and political novices,
12 Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi
called for massive patronage, both to secure loyalty and to build constituencies.17
In the absence of any real ideological unity, his patronage of jobs, bank loans,
licenses and permits held together the BNP. Not surprisingly, corruption, cronyism
and malgovernance marked Zia’s tenure.
If under Mujib the state had been personalized, under Zia it was militarized.
Senior military officers were inducted at all levels of administration, in the public
sector and in diplomatic posts. Six out of 20 secretaries, 14 out of 30 superintend-
ents of police, 10 out of 20 top public sector corporate dictatorships and some
32 diplomatic posts were filled by officers drawn from the military.18
Despite such measures, Zia was not assured of support and legitimacy, espe-
cially from within the army corps. During his five year rule, at least 20 coup
attempts took place. Zia gained a reputation for ruthlessly eliminating mutinous
troops and potential rivals. He was killed by fellow officers in May 1981. After
several months during which a military-backed civilian government ran the coun-
try, the chief of staff lieutenant-general H.M. Ershad seized power (1982–90).
Ershad declared martial law and promised to return power to an elected civilian
government once he had reformed the polity and eliminated the various “evils”
of the BNP regime.
The “ideology deficit” was even more pronounced during Ershad’s dictatorship.
Like his predecessor, he attempted to build legitimacy through establishing his own
party, the Jatiya Party (JP) and had himself elected president through fraudulent
elections. The JP was held together even more precariously than the BNP, almost
exclusively through generous political patronage. Corruption was more or less
institutionalized into the structure of the state under Ershad, who was toppled
through a massive people’s movement in 1990. The military regime’s fall coincided
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spread of neo-liberal triumphalism
globally. It is likely that open dictatorships were no longer considered viable in the
“New World Order” so that Ershad lost much of his international support by late
1990. Ironically, the former sworn enemies, the BNP and AL, as well as the JI,
worked together to bring down the Ershad government. As it happened, the JI’s
participation in the pro-democracy movement provided the erstwhile stigmatized
party with unprecedented political credibility.
Thus, the two major political parties formed after 1975 came out of canton-
ments, with little obvious ideological coherence. Hostility toward the AL – the
politics of grievance – produced a partially unifying ideology. In the context of
this ideological vacuum however, both Ershad and Zia invoked religion to secure
political legitimacy.

Democracy since the 1990s: civil society and the partisan

practice of Citizenship
The immediate post-Ershad period was one of euphoria and great expectations
for a new beginning. It was followed by extreme disenchantment, especially with
the actions of the newly elected BNP government and the opposition AL. The
reinstatement of democratic politics opened up old ideological fissures between
 Contemporary political culture 13
the AL and the BNP, which soon became the two major actors in the political
arena. Although an estimated 170 political parties existed in 1996, Bangladeshi
politics operates – for all intents and purposes – as a two-party system with the
JI (and, on occasion the JP) playing an important side-role.19 The outcome of
parliamentary elections in 1991, 1996 and 2001 demonstrate this – the BNP and
the AL together secured almost 80 percent of the votes. Notably, the margin of
victory in each case has been very close. In 1991, the BNP obtained 31 percent
of the vote and the AL 28 percent. The AL won in 1996 with 38 percent of the
vote (BNP received 34 percent). Finally, in 2001 the BNP won through an even
narrower margin – 41 percent in contrast to the AL’s 40 percent. The narrow gap
suggests that the differences between the two parties are not necessarily sharply
defined at some level.
Understanding the nature of the intense rivalry between the two parties is
critical to understanding the political landscape. Sheikh Hasina, the leader of the
AL and daughter of Mujib and Khaleda Zia, the widow of Zia who had taken over
the BNP, successfully overcame their personal differences during the anti-Ershad
movement. However, once this common enemy had been removed from power,
thorny questions around national identity and the place of religion in politics (re)
emerged as significant sites of contention. Polarities constructed in earlier regimes
came back to haunt the polity. The Mujib regime had branded its opponents anti-
patriotic, anti-secular and pro-Pakistani. Its opponents in the BNP painted AL
supporters as pro-Hindu, pro-India, and anti-Islamic. The AL represented itself as
the keeper of secular Bengali cultural identity and values. The BNP under Zia
promoted Bangladeshi nationalism, one that explicitly acknowledged the role of
Islam in the making of identity. The AL heroized the role of Mujib in the
Liberation movement, while the BNP under Zia attempted to erase all mention of
Mujib and represented Zia (and the military) as saviors of the 1971 war. The
polemics around identity politics set the tone and framework for future political
debates.
In the years following Ershad’s fall, the AL-BNP, Bangladeshi-Bengali divide
deepened, becoming firmly entrenched in the social fabric of everyday life. The
extent to which polarization was naturalized and institutionalized can be gauged
from the fact that nearly all public and professional association openly declared
their political affiliation. Public universities and medical colleges, even Bar
Councils and Lawyers Associations came to be identified by their allegiance to one
side or the other. Those affiliated with the party in power gained maximum advan-
tage, not unexpectedly. In this situation, the framework for political debate – pro
or anti AL, pro or anti Liberation – remained essentially frozen.
At some level, such questions were reduced to ownership – of who owned the
War of Liberation and who could rightly claim to name the nation’s identity.
However, the bitter struggles that ensued polarized society at all levels. The
implications of this kind of polarization, which reached a high point during the
BNP’s second tenure, have been far-reaching. Political violence, undisguised
disregard for the law by state authorities, heightened street agitations by the
opposition, rising religious militancy and high public insecurity characterized the
14 Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi
coalition government led by the BNP.20 Parliament became increasingly dysfunc-
tional, in the absence of the opposition, the ruling party’s unwillingness to allow
debate on any topic it had not vetted and alleged partisanship by the Speaker.
Most disturbing perhaps, the government engaged in transparent manipulation of
the judicial process. Among other things, in 2004 the coalition government
appointed High Court judges under highly suspicious circumstances; allegedly
tampered with a high profile court case to exonerate the BNP members involved
and extended the retirement age for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, alleg-
edly to ensure that a pro-BNP person would preside as chief of the care taker
government over scheduled parliamentary elections in 2006. These and other
blatantly partisan measures produced deep skepticism among activists, opposi-
tion politicians and many ordinary citizens about the government’s intentions and
ability to ensure conditions for a neutral caretaker government.

Right by might? Symbolic violence as political practice

Curiously, political polarization rarely transgresses or threatens class boundaries.
That is, the Bengali/Bangladeshi divide provides a cross-class axis of polariza-
tion. Indeed, there is striking congruence in the economic and social ideologies
of rule of both parties, which have embraced without reservation the neo-liberal
logic of development through the “free” market. By extension, neither party
directly addresses questions of inequality or redistributive justice.
On one level then, the BNP/AL polarization after 1990 can be read as conflicts
over power sharing and access to resources rather than as ideological struggles.
Changes in the structure and direction of student politics in universities illustrate
this vividly. In the 1960s, universities functioned as critical sites of political
mobilization against the Ayub regime. Student groups were also active in the
anti-Ershad movement. By the end of the1990s, however, the student wings of
the major political parties the Chatra League (AL) and the Chatra Dal (BNP) had
morphed into quite different entities. Along with Islami Chatra Shibir (ICS), the
student wing of the JI, these groups operated as mini-armies, armed fronts of their
parties vying for dominance on campus. In the mid-1990s, it was not unusual to
find pitched battles unfolding on university campuses, which frequently led to
disruptions in the academic calendar.21 Some of the most violent confrontations
between the Chatra Dal and Chatra League (as well as factional feuding within
groups) have involved access to lucrative tenders and contracts or to the alloca-
tion of dormitory rooms. Student cadres fervently vie with one another to acquire
the rights to control and redistribute such resources through patronage or bidding.
In an evocative metaphor, Meghna Guhathakurta has likened this kind of
political maneuvering to the forcible and frequently violent occupation of the
sandbars that emerge regularly if unpredictably (through shifts in siltation
patterns) in much of rural Bangladesh.22 Highly sought after for their enriched
soil, these chars, as they are known locally, are technically public property.
Nevertheless, the physical possession over such “unclaimed” land becomes a site
of struggle at the moment of its (usually unpredictable) arrival. Popular literature
 Contemporary political culture 15
is replete with images of “char dokhol ” (the battle over chars); such narratives
invariably revolve around rival landlords, escorted by their private militia wielding
sticks as weapons, facing each other off in symbolic and literal battles as each
lays claim to the newly emerged land. A striking feature of c har dokholis that it
does not involve moral claims; symbolic and real displays of power determine
winners and losers.
The act of claiming char lands contains within it a double movement. The
significance goes beyond actual physical possession. It is part of the symbolic
enactment of power. That is, the act of physical possession constitutes and
reinforces other forms of power and hierarchy.
In this “feudal” landscape, the rest of the peasantry is forced to go with the
more powerful party if they wish to participate in and receive benefits from the
system. Force and patronage politics trump ideology and political predilections
in this instance. Crucially, winning implies a monopoly on power.
In the electoral system based on this logic, voters are compelled to support the
stronger candidate, to ensure access to resources as well as to gain symbolic and
real protection. The system enables and is enabled by patronage politics. If we
extend the dynamics of char occupation to the realm of electoral democracy, we
see that the promise of access and protection, rather than the content of election
manifestos, tends to determine voting patterns. The two significant contenders to
power, the BNP and the AL, engage in such politics in all spheres, from the
parliament and university campuses to remote rural areas. In their own interests,
voters are swayed by whichever party appears to have the most likelihood of
winning, and therefore of having a monopoly on power. It follows that voters are
reluctant to support independent candidates, no matter how appealing their ideol-
ogy, since they do not have party power to back them up. This makes it virtually
impossible for a viable “third” force to emerge in Bangladeshi politics.23
By implication, the politics of “might is right” does not require building up
constituencies in the long run. The circularity of the system entraps ordinary
citizens who may see through it but have no obvious means for escaping it. This
accounts for the ease with which opposition parties have been able to absent
themselves from parliament for prolonged periods. The system encourages the
resolution of political disputes through confrontation in public spaces. The façade
of parliamentary democracy is actually compatible with this kind of politics.
The problem, following Guhathakurta’s analysis, arises from a lack of trans-
formation in the structure and distribution of power. This has allowed for the
emergence of a winner take all attitude of the ruling party, which in turn has been
met by intransigence by the opposition party. Since 1990, the BNP and the AL
have boycotted parliament for long periods to protest harassment and unfair treat-
ment at the hands of the ruling party. An explicit disregard for the formal rules of
parliamentary democracy has normalized conflict resolution through violence
and extra-legal means. The opposition claims it is compelled to take to the streets
to have its voice and demands registered. The “truth” of such claims depends on
specific political conjunctures and moments. The point here is that such demon-
strations are always also symbolic productions, as well as displays, of power.
16 Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi
They represent a public flexing of political muscles – the equivalent of the lathials
(hired strongmen) used by powerful landlords to enforce possession of char lands.
Street politics itself has a heritage that goes much further back. Describing the
political style of the United Front coalition during the 1954 election in East
Pakistan, van Schendel writes, “This style is best described as mobilizing the
street: It depends heavily on drumming up public support by means of fiery
speeches delivered at enormous public rallies, organizing protest marches and
general strikes and issuing political manifestoes.” As he notes, this style has
dominated politics ever since. The movement for regional autonomy in the 1960s
engaged in much the same mode of protest politics. However, the wholesale
disruption of everyday life and livelihood caused by the strikes and shutdowns
of the 1990s and 2000 has taken street politics to an entirely different level of
intensity.
The structure of politics described above, in combination with the polarization
of civil society, results in the suppression of options and venues for citizens to
express grievances effectively through formal institutions. Civil society, argua-
bly, has lost much of its political edge in the process. The political scientist Neera
Chandhoke defines civil society as the site at which mediations and contestations
between society and state take place. She states:

States invariably seek to control and limit the political practices of societies
by constructing the boundaries of the political. The state attempts in other
words to constitute the political discourse. However, politics […] are not
only about controls and the laying down of boundaries. They are about trans-
gressions of these boundaries and about the reconstitution of the political.
The site at which these mediations and contestations take place, the site at
which society enters into a relationship with the state can be defined as
civil society. […] The institutions of civil society are associational and repre-
sentational forums, a free press and social associations.24

Paradoxically, the re-introduction of formal democratic politics after 1990 further

blurred the lines between civil society and the state, thereby undermining the
possibility of meaningful contestation or mediation.25 A combination of the
polarized political landscape, highly charged discursive struggles over national
identity and the resuscitation of patronage politics in a more democratic garb
enabled the process.
In the circumstances, the practice of citizenship has been intermittent, unpre-
dictable and mostly muted. The most effective way for citizens to be heard is
through spontaneous and often violent protest, even though historically the
Bangladeshi state, military and civil, has brutally repressed such protests.26
Two recent cases illustrate this vividly. In 2006, a group of citizens in
Kansat, northern Bangladesh, formed “The Action Committee for Rural Power
Development” to protest persistent shortages and blatant corruption in the
provision of electricity. An initially peaceful protest turned bloody after law
enforcement authorities opened fire, killing 17 people. Further intimidation and
 Contemporary political culture 17
harassment followed; police ransacked the houses of demonstrators, arrested people
indiscriminately and initially refused to file charges against those responsible for
the seventeen deaths.27
Similarly, in 2007, police fired on demonstrators demanding an end to acute
water and electricity shortages in Shanir Akhra outside Dhaka city, leaving at
least 100 people injured. In their fury, protesters had apparently damaged vehi-
cles, vandalized two petrol pumps and placed barricades on a major highway. The
protestors pelted the local Member of Parliament with stones since he had appar-
ently instigated the police action.28 Both these instances are reminiscent of an
earlier episode in 1995, when an acute fertilizer crisis led to violent protests
which resulted in the death of a dozen farmers by police fire.29 Bangladesh’s short
history is littered with examples of ordinary people pushed to the brink by the
unavailability of responsive and accountable institutions and procedures.

Sovereignty, law and disorder

Although the “state” is not a monolithic entity, it is clear that state agencies and
functionaries frequently find themselves unable – or are unwilling – to act against
dominant political and economic interests. If not always through explicit action,
through silence, inaction and passivity, state functionaries are complicit in viola-
tions of rights by state and non-state actors. By extension, the state apparatus
appears to have abdicated much of its authority in arenas such as law and order
and the administration of justice.
Notably, the neutrality of the state as well as of civil society has also been
undermined by asymmetrical economic growth that has concentrated resources
and power in fewer and fewer hands. Combined with an aggressively polarized
landscape, these concentrations of wealth have produced increasingly closed
networks of power and resources which can be accessed only through kinship,
party or other patronage ties. The ensuing culture of zero-sum politics has produced
an especially bleak scenario. Ordinary citizens are outside such networks of complic-
ity against which autonomous action or resistance is often difficult to sustain. If,
for instance, the owners of capital possess important political and or criminal
connections, or as is increasingly prevalent, they or their close relatives are Members
of Parliament, the democratic system set in place to provide checks and balances
may prove to be meaningless in practice.
The system in place offers protection to those who possess the requisite politi-
cal or social ties. It also allows for the systematic silencing and intimidation of
moderate voices and of those who refuse to submit to a partisan patronage
system. The mainstream political parties have little credibility with the general
populace.
Not surprisingly, Bangladeshis now live in an environment in which politics
has been criminalized while crime itself has been politicized. One commentator
has claimed the country is now caught in an economic trap of criminalization.30
In addition, the nature of party structure and leadership has promoted criminaliza-
tion of political processes. The centralization of power in top leaders and in the
18 Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi
capital encourages MPs to rely on local representatives (read goons – i.e. mercenary
vigilantes) to maintain political control. These local henchmen in turn exercise
control over local administration and the latter’s access to resources and authority.
Leaders often turn a blind eye to consequent processes of extortion that take place.
At the same time, violence has been routinized in everyday social transactions as
well, a reflection of the overall political and social disorder.
Difficulties in analyzing the course of political events are compounded by the
increasingly blurred lines between criminalization, communalism and religious
militancy.31 The overnight emergence of the vigilante group, the Jagrata Muslim
Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), and the rumors swirling around their origins is a case
in point. The JMJB terrorized communities in the areas under its control. Its
stated aim was to rid the northern districts of underground left wing extremists
known for their own terrorizing tactics and extortionary practices. It is common
knowledge that “godfathers” in the major political parties provide protection to
these smaller groups in exchange for favors.32 Presumably, the same held for the
JMJB. Among rumors circulating at the time of the JMJB’s rise were (1) this
was a turf war in which a new “gang” was trying to establish supremacy in the
locality; (2) the group was created and nurtured by some members of the ruling
coalition who were using it to eliminate political rivals by labeling the latter left
wing terrorists; (3) the JMJB was an “organic” organization with ties to interna-
tional Islamist groups, especially the Taliban; and (4) Islamist members of the
Coalition government were directly sheltering and patronizing a leader of an
Islamist militant Siddiqur Rahman (pseudonym Bangla Bhai) for ideological
reasons.33 The pertinent point here is that none of these is mutually exclusive as
an explanation – local, national and international factors are all entangled.

Policing the borders of nationalism

The lack of ideological content with respect to political economy and distributive
justice in the AL/BNP struggles referred to earlier does not exclude the reality of
cultural disputes in society. In this section, I take a closer look at the fractures in
national identity and the corresponding rise of “Islamist” politics in Bangladesh.
Like elsewhere, Islamist parties cover the spectrum from legal groups such as the
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) to various shadowy under-
ground groups such as the aforementioned JMJB. Their agendas, tactics and
support bases vary as well. Some commentators attribute the popularity of
Islamist ideology to a lack of viable alternatives, especially in the face of glaring
inequality and dispossession.34 While this line of thought may have some merits,
I argue that inherent contradictions in the articulation of secularism in relation to
Bengali nationalism, and unresolved questions about the place of religion in
identity greatly enabled this process, as has the preoccupation of the BNP and AL
with self-interested partisan politics.
Bangladesh is especially “sovereignty challenged” as a territorial entity.35 The
war in 1971 was formally articulated in terms of a struggle for a secular state
based on the existence of a unified Bengali cultural identity that superseded
 Contemporary political culture 19
religious identity. Yet, Bengali nationalism as articulated in 1971 was limited to
the inhabitants of the territory of East Pakistan; it could not be extended to the
Bengalis of India without undermining the essence of the new nation. Territorial
anxieties are frequently generated by the unspoken need to justify the nation-
state’s existence in relation to West Bengal’s cultural and geographical borders. At
particular political conjunctures, this has generated particular kinds of cartographic
anxiety.36
The implicit “privatization” of religion following independence set aside rather
than resolved simmering tensions between Bengali and Muslim identities. The
Bengali/Muslim opposition, as putatively competing identities, was reversed
rather than interrogated. From its inception, the BNP espoused Bangladeshi (as
opposed to Bengali) nationalism which is explicitly Islamic in character and
which distinguishes between the Bengali speaking populations of India and
Bangladesh. The BNP’s ideology is also implicitly anti-Indian. In contrast, the
AL has for long been projected in the public imagination as pro-Indian and to a
great extent pro-Hindu/anti-Islamic, attributes that have come to be collapsed
with the party’s version of secularism. In the circumstances, especially before
parliamentary elections in 1996, the AL party leadership was unwilling to take
the political risk of being labeled anti-Muslim by sticking to a purely “secular”
agenda. The BNP used the shadow of India, the ostensibly threatening Hindu
neighbor and regional bully, to promote its parochial religio-nationalist agenda.
The AL did not resist.37
Between 1975 and 1990, successive military regimes took full advantage of the
Bengali/Muslim question, and invoked versions of Islamic nationalism in a bid to
secure their power bases. The deletion of the principles of secularism and social-
ism from the Bangladeshi constitution, the promotion of Islam to official state
religion, and the removal of a ban on political activity based on religion, marked
key moments in state attempts to recast national identity. Fifteen years of military
rule laid the groundwork for the Islamization of everyday political culture. The
restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1990/91 consolidated the process. By
the mid-1990s, Islamic symbols and idioms had become part of everyday politi-
cal vocabulary. Especially since 1975, the rituals and cultural practices of the
state have progressively taken on a more pronounced “Islamic” tone. From Zia’s
insertion of Bismillah (the Muslim invocation of god) into what was a secular
Constitution to Ershad’s characterization of Bangladesh as a mosque-based
society, Islamization processes have tended to be state-centric. Yet some inter-
ventions reached deep into popular culture. For instance, at one point, Ershad
announced that commemorations of Language Movement martyrs at the Shaheed
Minar could no longer include alpona (traditional line drawings made with rice
powder) because they were “unIslamic.” This parsing of long-standing cultural
practices into Islamic and non-Islamic was informed, among other things, by
the newfound influence of Middle Eastern states on Bangladeshi politics and
economy.
Toward the end of General Ershad’s regime, the two major political parties, the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and the Awami League (AL), began to draw
20 Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi
strategically on Islamic ideology in their bid to challenge the dictator. Ironically,
the main Islamist party, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) – notorious for its collaboration
with the Pakistani army in 1971, was opposed to Ershad’s regime. Thus, the JI
also took part in the struggle to reinstate a democratic political system. At differ-
ent moments both the BNP and the AL sought out potential electoral alliances
with the JI, thereby conferring on the party the political respectability it had
lacked earlier.
It is too easy to posit a linear historical progression from secularism to reli-
gious fundamentalism in Bangladesh, with the JI as the central actor, which is
how conventional narratives would have it. The presence of JI and other Islamists
in national politics in the 1980s and 1990s undoubtedly contributed to the broader
process of mainstreaming religion in public culture, as scholars have pointed out.
However, it is overstating the case that Jamaat’s presence in the political arena
was the fundamental factor in reshaping public discourse along these lines. The
JI’s presence was helpful; it enabled the “transition” to be smoother than would
otherwise have been possible. Nevertheless, total focus on the JI overlooks a
critical factor and major driving force behind the mainstreaming of Islamic
discourse in Bangladesh. This was the consolidation of an “alternative” national
identity constructed by the BNP that had slowly been taking place since 1975.
No surprise, then, that the AL, which had spearheaded the movement for a
secular state, began to position itself as a party that valued Islam as an integral
part of national cultural identity. Shortly before parliamentary elections in 1996,
the AL leader, Sheikh Hasina performed the Muslim pilgrimage or Hajj with
much fanfare. Eager to exhibit her personal piety, she emerged in public fully
covered in black headdress, long black-sleeved blouse and prayer beads in her
hand.38 As things stand today, political leaders now compete to “out-Islamicize”
one another, often in an astonishingly transparent manner. Just before she
resigned as prime minister in 2006, Khaleda Zia announced that she would accept
a long-standing demand by radical Islamist groups to extend state recognition
to private madrassahs. The announcement was widely interpreted as a way of
securing Islamist support prior to the elections of December 2006.
Not to be outdone, three months later, the supposedly secular AL announced
an electoral alliance with an obscure Islamist group, the Bangladesh Khilafat
Majlish (BKM). The BKM’s conditions for support included declaring the
followers of a minority Sunni sect non-Muslim, state recognition of private
madrassash education without corresponding state supervision, and lifting a High
Court ban on declaring fatwas or religious edicts. Civil society membership and
rights activists were baffled and outraged since they had fought bitterly against
the BNP and its allies on these very issues.
In short, the compulsion on the part of political parties to exhibit Islamic piety
was driven as much by latent contradictions in nationalist ideology as by the
institutionalization of Islamist politics in the public sphere. The success of the
BNP’s “Bangladeshi nationalism” was enabled by its ability to “fill” the cracks in
Bengali nationalist ideology. Rather than contend with the Bengali/Muslim dichot-
omy Bangladeshi nationalism attempted to cover over the potential contradictions
 Contemporary political culture 21
of secular Bengali nationalism. Not the JI but the ambivalent place of Islam in
nationalist ideology, which had previously been a specter, returned to haunt the
polity with a vengeance. As I have said elsewhere, by acquiescing to rather than
challenging ever narrowing battles over national identity based on the religious/
secular dichotomy – especially in the context of the long-term suppression of Left
political alternatives – mainstream political parties closed off other available
terms of debate.
Competing understandings of secularism compound the problem. A fundamen-
tal dividing line in this respect concerns the relationship between Islam and
nationalism. One unfortunate legacy of the War of Liberation – which the occu-
pying Pakistani army represented as a struggle to save Islam – is the construction
of an implicit opposition between Islam and Bengali nationalism. For some in the
intelligentsia, the public face of the sovereign democratic nation must be wholly
shorn of religion for the state to be fully secular. Others embrace the more
conventional postcolonial South Asian understanding of secularism as neutrality
in/of religion. Neither version addresses the problematic relationship of Islam to
Bengali nationalism.39 The hollowing out of political ideology has also involved
a hollowing out of the meaning of secularism. The dichotomous discourse on
nationalism has reduced secularism to the opposite of religion, specifically Islam,
a situation that Islamists and others have been able to exploit.

Conclusion: rescuing the nation from nationalism?

In this chapter, I have tried to map the structural continuities, historical contin-
gencies and contradictions in contemporary political culture. It is worth recalling
here that the political history of Bangladesh does not begin with the nation’s
independence in 1971. Despite the many ruptures of war, one finds striking
continuities in both state structure and culturally acceptable modes of political
engagement between the pre and post war periods. Bangladesh inherited from
Pakistan a state structure molded by a military-bureaucratic elite accustomed
to non-democratic means of ruling since it derived power from external sources
and sponsors. The state was effectively alienated from the community/popular
politics. This model of governance has been emulated by military regimes in
independent Bangladesh to secure political legitimacy. The challenge for civilian
governments has been to establish viable bases for political support without
relinquishing the power offered by the existing state structure.
Within this authoritarian mode of ruling, patronage and the use of identity
politics have been major interlocking modes of securing legitimacy. That is,
patronage sharpens ideological divides. Successive regimes have embraced and
refined their own versions of patrimonialism. In significant ways, the distinction
between the interests of the state and that of the ruling party became blurred.40
Moreover, state sovereignty was always in danger of compromise, both by
external dependencies and by internal dissension. The process left deep imprints
on political culture, eventually resulting in a “hollowing” out of the ideological
bases of struggles. By the time formal democratic politics was restored in 1990,
22 Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi
the hyper-visible polarization of politics – the AL/BNP divide – barely masked a
more basic struggle over control and ownership of resources.
Beginning with the Mujib regime, dissent has been consistently conflated with
disloyalty, thereby laying the foundations for vicious bipartisan bickering. In
addition to the discourse of the Enemy Other, the politics of grievance has
provided a unifying ideology at times.
Rancorous disputes over national identity and heightened political polarization
have narrowed discursive spaces. Other issues of equal national interest – whether
it is the provision of basic services or the terms on which to engage multinational
corporations are either politicized or marginalized. The BNP-AL divide, not class
or other interests, shapes most political and social dialogue. Political commentary
and social critique are now inevitably filtered through the lens of a parochial
nationalism so that the grounds for actual debate have eroded considerably.
Historically, Islamist politics and military rule (as well as economic libera-
lization) have gone hand in hand in Bangladesh. However, latent tensions in
Bengali nationalism also created the conditions for the formation and hardening
of identities through a religious idiom. Secular Bengali nationalism carried within
it the potential for ambivalence and fracture. Islamist politics flourish when encour-
aged and enabled by the state and recedes from view at other times. However,
actual tensions around questions of identity are always discernible under the
surface.

Postscript
Bangladesh’s history has been marked by periods of intense political expectations
after a protracted struggle, followed by disillusionment and frustration (1971 and
1990). In early 2007, after a descent into violent political anarchy caused by the
inability of the two main parties to come to agreement on the preconditions for
parliamentary elections, a military backed caretaker government took power. The
low profile military intervention banned all political activity and suspended
fundamental rights assured in the constitution. Nevertheless, it was met with
relief by the majority of Bangladeshis who were fed up with the violence of parti-
san politics. The non-elected, extra-constitutional interim government was openly
and fully supported by the UN and western powers. The hope was that the interim
government would be able to institute long term changes in political culture,
including rooting out corruption and partisanship. Curiously, for reasons known
only to itself, during its tenure, the interim government provided cover to several
efforts by a motley coalition of Islamists to gain national attention. Despite a
prohibition on demonstrations during Emergency Rule, for instance, Islamists of
various guises were permitted to protest publicly, and violently, against the
attempted reinstatement of a progressive version of the National Policy for the
Advancement of Women (originally formulated under the AL government in
1997). In response to the outcry, the interim government set up a religious
committee, led by the Khatib of the National Mosque, to assess whether or
not the policy went against the Sharia. By doing so, the state for the first time
 Contemporary political culture 23
institutionalized the role of the National Mosque and of religion, in policy making
around women’s issues. This was a dangerous precedent indeed. Other events of
concern included an attack on a government commissioned sculpture project in
Dhaka city on the grounds of being “unIslamic” and pressure on the high profile
editor of the leading Bengali daily newspaper to apologize publicly – to the head
of the National Mosque – for publishing a cartoon that allegedly hurt the sentiments
of Muslims.41
The long anticipated elections in late December 2008 returned the Awami
League to power in a sweeping victory. For a brief moment, the national mood
was celebratory, especially since the Islamists and the deeply unpopular BNP
were demolished in the elections. Yet, little had changed structurally, despite the
interim government’s efforts to purge the political system of graft, cronyism and
partisan politics. The same two parties with the same two leaders were back in
power, after two year’s hiatus. Since then, the BNP appears to be slowly disinte-
grating through inner squabbling, while Islamist parties have chosen to remain
out of the limelight. The AL government with its new left-leaning partners is
trying, among other things, to complete the trials of the killers of Mujib and his
family, and to set up a much-needed War Crimes Tribunal to try the war time
collaborators of 1971 who are still at large. If these could be carried through
transparently, a substantial change in political culture would emerge.
The tenure of the AL government thus far has been marred by a noted increase
in death by “crossfire.” The assertion that these are accidental or unavoidable
deaths that occur in the course of preventing criminal activities has been chal-
lenged by both human rights organizations and opposition parties. Two thousand
and nine has also been marked by a notable increase in reports of extra-judicial
punishments, often justified through fatwas, of women in informal village tribu-
nals. Neither phenomenon is particular to the AL regime. Indeed, both crossfires
and “fatwa” sanctioned violence against women represent substantive continui-
ties with the past. The argument that we are in a different political moment is
belied by the fact that both community and state continue to take recourse in the
extra-legal realm in order to contain dissent and maintain social domination.

Notes
1 The Awami League government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1972–5) greatly expanded
the role of the state: among other things, it nationalized all major industries and intro-
duced ceilings on land holdings and private investment. Policymakers who drew up the
First Five Year Plan along a Soviet model envisioned a process of radical redistribution
and transformation that Ali Riaz characterizes as “debourgeoisiefication.” Expectations
for a radical social revolution were high, see Ali Riaz, State, Class and Military Rule:
Political Economy of Martial Law in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Nadi New Press, 1994),
116–63.
2 This shift in trajectory resulted from external pressures and lack of economic and
political sovereignty as well as internal imperatives.
3 Weber’s notion of patrimonialism has often been used to illustrate the nature of politics
in Bangladesh. For him, this refers to situations in which the administrative apparatus
is appointed by and responsible to the top leader. They constitute an informal world
24 Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi
of politics, in which deputies with delegated authority possess considerable power and
leeway. Personal connections and an unspoken hierarchy dominate. Kochanek (Stanley
A. Kochanek, Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh (New Delhi: Sage
Publications, 1993)) argues that the traditional practice of tadbir or lobbying through
personal contacts for individual favors renders all government policy potentially
riddled with exemptions and exceptions. However, it is important to understand the
relationship between normative cultural expectations of helping one’s kin and the
consolidation of patronage politics. Expectations to assist family and kin networks
often blurred the line between nepotism and normative social obligations.
4 For instance, in September 1973, the Parliament passed the Second Amendment Bill,
which amended Article 33 of the Constitution of Bangladesh and authorized
Parliament to pass preventive detention laws. The amendment opened the way for
wide-scale arbitrary detentions. The following year, the Bill was passed as the Special
Powers Act 1974. The Act was purportedly designed to crush “black marketeers.”
However, it was immediately used to neutralize political opponents, including
suspected members and sympathizers of the radical left as well as activists in the
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHTs). The Act remains in force in Bangladesh today.
Toward the end of his rule, Mujib instituted one party rule by announcing the forma-
tion of the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL) in June 1975.
Members of all professions including journalists, bureaucrats and intellectuals were
under tremendous pressure to join BAKSAL or face the wrath of the regime.
See Human Rights Feature, Dealing with Dissent: The “Black Laws” of Bangladesh
(New Delhi: South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre. 11 October 1999).
5 For details, in an account sympathetic to Mujib, see Muntasir Mamoon and Jayanta
Kumar Ray, Civil Society in Bangladesh: Resilience and Retreat (Dhaka: Subarna
Press, 1998), Chapter 3.
6 During the British period, East Bengal (later renamed East Pakistan, then Bangladesh)
was a relatively isolated and neglected hinterland. For its mostly agricultural popula-
tion, the state remained a remote entity with which relations were mediated by
zamindars (large landlords and tax-collectors). The situation did not change noticeably
at independence in 1947. Other than at the administrative level, little meaningful
contact existed between representatives of the state and political forces in rural
society. Indeed, conditions were doubly alienating because of marked anti-Bengali
sentiments among West Pakistanis.
7 East Pakistanis constituted only 3 percent of the higher ranks of the armed forces and
7 percent of the central administrative apparatus.
8 In his words, “Rather than relying on links with the structure of economic and social
control within the country, senior civil and military officials came to rely increasingly
on their connections with international guarantors. This constellation gave rise to
intense misgivings about the legitimacy of their power. Bangladesh was to inherit this
state structure designed to favor the bureaucratic and military top brass and in perpet-
ual need of external financial and political support against popular forces within the
country.” See Willem van Schendel, A History of Bangladesh (Cambridge: Cambridge:
University Press, 2009), 128–9.
9 Ahmed Kamal makes a similar argument in Ahmed Kamal, State Against the Nation:
The Decline of the Muslim League in Pre-independence Bangladesh, 1947–54.
(Dhaka: UPL, 2009).
10 Those East Pakistanis who succeeded in securing high office in the government devel-
oped a reputation for high-handedness and superiority.
11 The labeling of dissent as anti-patriotic began early. For instance, Nure Alam Siddiqui,
a leader of the AL’s student front, declared before the 1973 elections that those who
voted against the AL were Razakars (war time collaborators) and enemies of independ-
ence. See Mamoon and Ray, Civil Society in Bangladesh, 106. This kind of rhetoric
invariably produced disenchantment and resentment among non-AL individuals.
 Contemporary political culture 25
12 By Presidential Order Number 9, any official could be dismissed from service without
being given a reason for the dismissal.
13 See Mamoon and Ray, Civil Society in Bangladesh, 95. For the AL there appeared to
be no distinction between the interests of the state and the interests of the party.
14 As part of its socialist project, the AL government embarked on a large-scale nation-
alization of industries. However, the import and distribution of products remained in
private hands. Non-AL business people had to pay exorbitant prices to procure legiti-
mate licenses from those favored by the AL regime. The smuggling of imported goods
to India constituted another source of illegal earnings.
15 Meghan Guhathakurta, “Assault on Minorities in Bangladesh: An Analysis,” Meghbarta
(January 2002) http://www.meghbarta.net/220/january/minority.html (accessed 22
December 2007).
16 Many of these people defected to the BNP – the party established by Ziaur Rahman in
1978 – as soon as it was opportune.
17 As Rehman Sobhan notes, Zia embraced a large number “discarded politicians” and a
clutch of politically ambitious professionals making their first entry into politics.
These political aspirants had low electability and therefore had to be propped up
through election rigging and generous patronage to establish constituencies. See
Sobhan, “Exit Strategies: Some Lessons from History,” Forum 2 (2007).
18 Guhathakurta, “Assault on Minorities in Bangladesh,” http://www.meghbarta.net/220/
january/minority.html (accessed 22 December 2007).
19 S.I. Khan, et al., Political Culture, Political Parties and Democratic Transition in
Bangladesh (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1996), 1–18.
20 See Ali Riaz, “Bangladesh in 2004: The Politics of Vengeance and the Erosion of
Democracy,” Asian Survey 45 (2005).
21 At the height of campus violence, in one year alone, in 1995, 25 students were killed
on campuses, several thousand injured and hundreds rounded up by the police. Four
universities closed indefinitely following armed clashes between rival student
bodies. Golam Hossain, “Bangladesh in 1995: Politics of Instransigence,” Asian
Survey (1996): 199.
22 Meghna Guhathakurta, “The Nature of the Bangladeshi State,” in Hameeda Hossain
(eds.), Human Rights in Bangladesh 2001 (Dhaka: ASK, 2002), 22.
23 For a fascinating example of the politics of mobilization in practice, see Shapan
Adnan, “Departure from ‘Everyday Forms of Resistance’ among the Poor Peasantry
of Bangladesh” Journal of Agrarian Change, 7 (2), 183–224.
24 Quoted in M.R. Khan and M.H. Kabir (eds.), Civil Society and Democracy in
Bangladesh (Dhaka: BIISS, 2002), 18.
25 As Timothy Mitchell argues, state formation is a continuous process, in which the
boundaries of the state are never clearly demarcated. Mitchell shows persuasively that
distinctions between state and society (or state and economy) have to be actively
produced and maintained. I am interested here in the specific ways in which the border
between state and society has been negotiated by successive military and non-military
governments. In the Bangladeshi case, patronage politics and kinship obligations
appear to be fundamental in connecting state and society. See Timothy Mitchell,
“Society, Economy and the State Effect,” in George Steinmetz (ed.), State/Culture:
State-formation After the Cultural Turn (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1999).
26 My argument here converges with Stanley Kochanek’s assessment that most social
forces and demand groups find direct action and violence to be the only effective
devices available for calling attention to their demands, redressing grievances, or forc-
ing some degree of accountability. However, my reasoning for this state of affairs
differs from his. See Stanley Kochanek, “The Rise of Interest Politics in Bangladesh,”
Asian Survey36 (1996): 704.
27 “Kansat – The Untold Story” //kansat.wordpress.com/.
28 The New Age, Dhaka, 6 May 2006.
26 Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi
29 See Hossain, “Bangladesh in 1995,” 201.
30 Abul Barkat, “Political and Economic Scenario of Bangladesh: Where to Go, Where
are we Going?” (paper presented at National Seminar on Economic, Social and
Political Situation in Bangladesh organized the Bangladesh Federation of Chambers
of Commerce and Industry, Dhaka, 2003).
31 I use the term communalism in the widely understood South Asian sense of religious
sectarianism, in this case, Hindu-Muslim antagonism.
32 Apparently there are godmothers as well. At the time of sending this article to press,
reports emerged of an AL MP from Kushtia who had been arrested for her long-term
ties to the “left” underground.
33 For a comprehensive report on the JMJB and other militant groups in Bangladesh, see
The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today (Islamabad/Brussels: ICG, 2006).
34 For an influential and sophisticated version of this argument, see Abul Barkat,
“Economics of Fundamentalism in Bangladesh,” (paper presented at Cornell
University October 2005).
35 See Dina M. Siddiqi, “Communalizing the Criminal or Criminalizing the Communal?
Locating Minority Politics in Bangladesh,” in Amrita Basu and Srirupa Roy (eds.),
Violence and Democracy in India(London: Seagull Press, 2006).
36 See Sankaran Krishna, “Cartographic Anxiety: Mapping the Body Politic in India,” in
Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.), Challenging Boundaries: Global
Flows, Territorial Identities (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996),
193–214.
37 For an insightful elaboration of this argument, see Ali Riaz, God Willing: The Politics
of Islamism in Bangladesh (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004) 17–47.
38 See Dina M. Siddiqi, “The Festival of Democracy: Media and the 1996 elections in
Bangladesh,” Asian Journal of Communication, Special Issue on Media and Elections
6 (20) (1996): 30–42.
39 While lively and sometimes acrimonious debates on secularism take place regularly in
newspapers and on television, the articulation of non-Muslim or non-Bengali voices
in the making of national identity is marginal.
40 The nexus between business and politics established during Zia’s rule thrived and was
built upon by those who followed. In the 1991 parliament, one third of JP and AL
members were from business and industrial backgrounds. Ninety-four of the BNP’s
candidates were from the business world.
41 For details see Dina M. Siddiqi, “Introduction” in Sara Hossain and Dina M. Siddiqi
(eds.), Human Rights in Bangladesh 2007 (Dhaka: Ain O Salish Kendra, 2008).
2 Political violence
in Bangladesh
Md. Shamsul Islam

Introduction
In recent years, Bangladesh has been portrayed by the international media as a
hotbed of political and religious violence.1 The country-wide bomb blasts orches-
trated by extremist Islamist groups in August 2005,2 the killings of internationally
known figures like SAMS Kibria,3 elected representatives4 and journalists,5 and
continued attacks on members of minority religious groups6 have lent credence
to this allegation. According to the Bangladesh Institute of Human Rights, about
1,100 persons, including leaders and activists of different political parties, were
killed in 997 incidents of organized violence by political parties between October
2001 and February 2005.7 On 21 August 2004, a multiple grenade attack killed
22 people including one of the most senior members of the Awami League –
Ivy Rahman – and injured hundreds during a public meeting in Dhaka. Many
observers have asserted that violence has become an important part of the
Bangladeshi political landscape. Rising violence, or the perception of rising
violence, poses a serious threat to nascent democracy in Bangladesh, and calls for
a probing investigation into the causes of and conditions for political violence.
The country experienced a significant surge in political violence between
October 2006 and 11 January 2007. The political impasse between the then-ruling
four party regime and the opposition alliance led by the Awami League led to
violence on the street becoming a regular occurrence. In the last week of October
at least 50 activists were killed either by political opponents or the police while
participating in demonstrations.8 The most gruesome of these incidents was the
killing of six political activists in broad daylight at a demonstration in Dhaka
on 28 October. Two political activists were lynched when supporters of the
then-ruling Jamaat-e-Islami and opposition Awami League clashed at downtown
Dhaka. The total death toll from the incidents in the city was seven. The presence
of a television crew did not deter the activists although these violent acts were
being recorded.9
During the caretaker regime (12 January 2007–6 January 2009) the number of
incidents of political violence decreased remarkably as the country was under
emergency rule and political activities were banned for most of this period.
Elected political government, since its installation, has intensified the crack down
28 Md. Shamsul Islam
on different militant (including Islamist militant and clandestine) groups. It has
brought back a semblance of a stable political order, at least in the short term.
However, the government faced a serious challenge within two months of coming
to the office; the border guards (the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR)) mutinied and
killed over 70 people including 57 army officers who were deputed to the BDR.
As of December 2009, the government is still reeling from the effects of the
mutiny. The trials of the mutineers began in November 2009. The two-day
mutiny attracted significant attention from the international media.
Despite the heightened media coverage of the past five years, political violence
is not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh. For instance, anti-colonial movements
against the British in India throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
used violence as a means to draw attention to their causes.10 The movement for
autonomy of the then East Pakistan after 1947 which led to the war of liberation
in 1971 also gave rise to violence. The genocide committed by the Pakistani
Army and the targeted killings of intellectuals by supporters of the Pakistani
forces in 1971 are perhaps the most glaring examples of political violence in the
recent history of the country. During the war incidents of persecution of minority
members of the Urdu-speaking “Bihari” community by Bengalis also occurred.
The reliance upon violence to achieve political objectives continued even after
the country gained its independence in 1971. Notable examples include the rise
of the Sarbahara Party (Proletariat Party) in 1972, the Gono Bahini (The Peoples’
Army) as a military wing of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD, National Socialist
Party) in 1973–4, and the existence of various radical factions known as Maoist
throughout the 1970s.11 Similarly, the state has used or encouraged the use of
violence against political opponents. The Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (JRB), founded
during the regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1972–5), various private vigilante
groups under the protection of the ruling party (e.g. the Lal Bahini during
1972–5), tolerance and encouragement of violence by government-supported
youth groups during President Ziaur Rahman’s regime and the corruption and
criminalization of politics during the Ershad regime are cases in point.
Among the many forms of contemporary political violence in Bangladesh, the
most common are clashes between political rivals, and between the police and
activists during hartals (general strikes),12 violence against women, and minori-
ties such as the Ahmediyyas and Hindus, and violence perpetrated by extremist
groups. The state has also perpetrated violence through extra-judicial killings.
Political violence is carried out through assassination of political opponents,
attacks on minorities, and vandalism of government properties and the creation
of a climate of fear and panic among the common people. Increasingly, the perpe-
trators of violence are employing such tactics in the name of religion, as evinced
by the various attacks perpetrated by Islamist militants. The frequent incidents
of violence in all guises have impeded the consolidation of democracy in
Bangladesh.
Against this background this chapter examines the pattern and trends of politi-
cal violence in Bangladesh. It seeks to understand how recent events and trends
of political violence differ from past incidents and practices. It explores the extent
 Political violence 29
to which the political parties in power have used the state apparatus to instigate and
nurture political violence. This chapter also attempts to highlight the nature and
scope of state-sponsored violence such as extra-judicial and indiscriminate kill-
ings of innocent people by a government force like the Rapid Action Battalion
(RAB).13 The relationships between criminalization of society, mastans (thugs
and vigilantes supported by political parties and mafia-like criminal gangs) and
the conduct of political violence are also discussed.
This chapter argues that not only has violence increased but new forms of
violence have emerged that threaten the social fabric of Bangladeshi society and
undermines the nation’s effort to establish a democratic system of governance.
These new forms of violence have serious socio-economic and political implica-
tions for the country. It is also our contention that the phenomenon of political
violence in Bangladesh is complex and multifaceted. Therefore, the recent upsurge
of Islamist militancy cannot be comprehended in isolation from the historical
context of violence within which this phenomenon has developed.

Political violence defined

Political violence is one means by which people and governments seek to achieve
political goals. Political violence has been defined in various ways. According to
Sreeradha Datta, political violence constitutes “acts carried out by individuals or
groups with an explicit desire of accomplishing a particular political objective or
directed at the party in power to secure political concessions or compromises that
are otherwise not possible.”14 Political violence is also defined as “unconven-
tional collective action taken by people making claims on each other or the state
that leads to physical damage inflicted on persons and/or objects.”15 Many groups
and individuals believe their political systems consistently fail to respond to their
political demands. As a result, they believe violence is not only justified but
also necessary in order to achieve their political objectives. By the same token,
many governments around the world believe they need to use violence in order
to intimidate their citizens into acquiescence. At other times, governments use
force in order to defend their country from outside invasion or other threats of
force. In effect, citizens, groups or governments in different contexts use political
violence.

Historical background (1972–91)

Until the emergence of Bangladesh, political violence, in large measure, had
been directed to the greater cause of establishing justice, equality, and freedom.
But since independence political violence has followed a different trajectory
in Bangladesh. Immediately after independence violence was perpetrated to
realize the narrow and parochial interests of a ruling party that was intolerant to
any opposition to the regime. Often opposition to the regime was viewed as
unpatriotic. Some of the opposition political parties also resorted to violent
means. A number of clandestine radical groups, claiming to be leftist, emerged.
30 Md. Shamsul Islam
Law enforcement agencies, particularly the newly founded Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini
(JRB), were given a free rein. Thus the nation experienced a high incidence of
political violence between 1972 and 1975. In April 1973, the then Home Minister
informed the parliament that 2,035 secret killings of a political nature had taken
place over the previous 16 months.16 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, then Prime
Minister, in a televised speech on December 16, 1974, revealed that four members
of the parliament and 3,000 supporters of the ruling Awami League (AL) were
killed in three years.17 Opposition parties alleged that 60,000 activists were
killed. While it is impossible to evaluate the charges and counter-charges, they
provide revealing testimony of growing political violence.
The nature and scope of political violence between 1972 and 1975 can be
understood from two accounts presented by Muhammad Yunus, the founder
of the Grameen Bank, and the barrister Moudud Ahmed, a member of several
cabinets formed during military regimes after 1975. Describing a scene at Tangail
district in 1974 Muhammad Yunus in his autobiography writes, “Tangail district
was in the throes of [a] warlike situation. Armed gangs in an underground
Marxist dissident movement called Gono Bahini (The People’s Army) terrorized
the countryside. These guerillas killed with little compunction. … There was
neither law nor order.”18 Moudud Ahmed’s account, presented in an analytical
study of the Mujib regime, reveals that the actions of the government were no
different from such clandestine opponents of the regime. Ahmed writes:

It [the JRB] acted like a storm-trooper, a crack-force for a lightening strike.

It would surround a whole village combing for arms, miscreants and political
opponents and at times to recover ‘fake ration cards.’ In the process they
would kill, loot and even rape – there was no regulation to control their
conduct or make them accountable. Soon it assumed the name of a private
Bahini working outside legal norms. They could enter any house, arrest
anyone, detain any number of people including women and children in their
camps all over the rural areas.19

General strikes, and attacks on party offices, government buildings, newspaper

offices became common features of mainstream politics. As political instability
mounted and the government’s ability to maintain public order declined, Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman increasingly resorted to authoritarian measures.20 He declared
a state of emergency in 1975, dispensed with the parliamentary form of govern-
ment, instituted a one-party state, and became the president of Bangladesh.21 This
was followed by a brutal and violent episode of Bangladesh history: the killings
of Mujib, members of his family22 and a number of his political associates.
A small group of army officers staged a successful military coup on 15 August
1975. Later, four national leaders namely Syed Nazrul Islam, Tajuddin Ahmed,
M. Mansur Ali and A.H.M. Kamruzzaman were killed in November 1975 inside
Dhaka jail where they were incarcerated after the coup. Bangladesh experienced
several coups and counter-coups between 15 August and 7 November, which cost
many lives, particularly of members of the defense forces.
 Political violence 31
Over the subsequent 15 years of military rule, coercion and political violence
became institutionalized. During the regime of Zia-ur Rahman (1975–80), political
opponents, particularly those who tried to organize military coups, were dealt with
by brutal force. Colonel Abu Taher, a war hero and a member of the military
wing of the JSD was hanged in a show trial in July 1976. Key leaders of the party
were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.23 After an abortive coup on
1 October 1977, according to government accounts, 92 persons were sentenced
to death, 34 persons received life imprisonment and 18 others were given various
terms of rigorous imprisonment.24 Zia-ur Rahman confided to a reporter of the
New York Timesin October 1977 that 460 officers and privates of the army were
tried for their involvement in abortive coups and only 63 were acquitted.25 In
order to gain political legitimacy after 1978 the regime organized elections and
allowed political activities, but politicians faced intimidation on an unprecedented
scale. The landslide victory of the newly formed BNP was ensured through
manipulation and intimidation of opposition activists. The youth and the student
wings of the party were allowed to unleash a reign of terror.
The era of H.M. Ershad (1982–90) was marked with clashes between pro-
democracy activists on the one hand, and law enforcement agencies and the
newly founded Jatiya party on the other. As the opposition political parties
formed two alliances – one under the leadership of the AL and the other with the
BNP at the helm – the state machinery was used to silence them in various ways.
Popular uprisings in 1983, 1986, 1987 and 1990 were suppressed with lethal
force and innumerable political activists were killed. Dissident voices were
muzzled, and, killings of opponents were allowed where deemed necessary.26
The most disturbing trend under the Ershad regime was the emergence of a nexus
between criminal gangs and the government-supported political party with the
connivance of state agencies. Members of criminal gangs were openly recruited,
financed and sometimes armed by public and party officials. Comprised prima-
rily of unemployed young men, these gangs were mobilized under the party
umbrella to attack political opponents and rig elections. Unfortunately, the oppo-
sition parties soon adopted the same tactics and began recruiting rival gangs. This
gave rise to the “mastan culture” in Bangladesh politics. The criminalization of
Bangladesh politics came full circle.
The Islamist political parties, who began to operate during the Zia regime and
became part of the anti-Ershad regime, took full advantage of the situation. The
Islami Chattra Shibir (ICS), the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, flexed their
muscles in many campuses against other student organizations, particularly
against student activists of the AL and the BNP. The attacks on members of rival
student groups by the ICS began in the 1980s during the Zia regime, but acceler-
ated after 1982. As the Ershad regime was trying to prove its Islamic credentials
and hoped to sway the JI in their favor, the violence perpetrated by the ICS was
tolerated.
During the Ershad regime law enforcing agencies, particularly the police and
the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) were used to break opposition demonstrations.
There were many occasions when the police fired upon peaceful demonstrations.
32 Md. Shamsul Islam
For example, on 13 February 1983 a student demonstration demanding the
withdrawal of newly formulated education policy was fired upon by the police
costing many lives; on 24 January 1987 a convoy carrying Sheikh Hasina to a
public meeting in the port city of Chittagong came under attack by the police and
paramilitary forces. Indiscriminate firing led to the death of at least 50 people.27
The political parties and their supporters resorted to violent means including
bomb blasts, strikes, widespread mass agitation, clashes with the police forces,
etc. to achieve their objective. Eventually, violence became widespread all over
the country during the last leg of Ershad’s regime, and an urban popular uprising
in December 1990 forced Ershad out of power.
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that political violence in Bangladesh
is not a new phenomenon. The history of Bangladesh, both before and after inde-
pendence, is replete with uprisings, rebellion, resistance and insurrection, and in
all such episodes political actors have resorted to violence in one form or another.
However, despite its linearity in terms of occurrence, violence has varied over
time in its nature and intensity.

Political violence in democratic Bangladesh: 1991–2009

The respite in political violence that the country enjoyed after 1990 began to fade
by 1993 as the acrimonious relationship between the two main political parties
deteriorated further.
Since then, these two parties have routinely resorted to extra-parliamentary
tactics, such as demonstrations, strikes and political chicanery to undermine the
ability of the other to govern.28 The country has experienced a steady rise in the
incidence of political violence perpetrated not only by various political forces
within mainstream politics but also by clandestine groups. The most significant
development is the rise of Islamist militant groups with possible domestic and
international connections which has attracted attention of the international
community.
Courting the support of the Islamist parties in order to achieve state power
became a new political game. Both of the main political parties (Awami League
and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party) attempted to form alliances with the
Islamist parties whenever they lacked an absolute majority in the parliament. In
the equation, acquisition of power was obviously an important factor. Meanwhile,
the Islamist parties gained a fresh foothold in the country’s politics. With direct
and indirect linkages between Islamist political parties and the secular parties,
radical Islamism slowly began to emerge in the country’s polity.
In the process, violence became inevitable as radical Islamist ideology contrasted
with the secular components of the society, and the former tried to gain an upper
hand through exerting pressure on the latter.
This is not to say that Islamist militancy is the only source of political violence
in post-1991 Bangladesh politics. Evidently, the issue of political violence in
Bangladesh is very complex and the incidence of violence is varied as the facts
presented in the introduction of the chapter demonstrate. But it is also necessary
 Political violence 33
to underscore the fact that the democratic era (1991–2006) has been marked
with a new variety of political violence along with those the country had been
experiencing since independence in 1971.
Among the most common forms of political violence present in Bangladesh are
the acts of violence perpetrated by the political activists and the government during
hartals, violence against minorities and women, violence by extremist groups, and
violence committed by the state through various law enforcing agencies.
While hartal has been used as a tactic by political parties since the 1960s, and
were frequently called during the pro-democracy movement in the 1980s, the
nature of hartal has changed quite significantly since the beginning of the new
democratic era in 1991. The number of hartals has steadily increased since 1990
with some 332 hartals taking place from 1999–2002.29 During 1991–6, the
Awami League called 173 days of hartals and the BNP retorted with 85 days
of hartals during 1996–2001.30 They have also become more violent and many
political activists and innocent members of the public have died in these clashes.31
Additionally, these hartals have been damaging to the economy. The United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) report states that during the period 1990–2000,
the average cost of hartals to the economy was 3–4 percent of GDP. It goes on
to claim “these costs include foregone earnings and lost employment and output,
as well as long-term impacts due to reduced savings, indebtedness, capital losses
and reduced profitability for businesses.”32
Attacks against minorities particularly against Hindus, Buddhists and ethnic
minorities such as the Chakmas with political objectives have become part of
Bangladeshi political culture. The Buddhist Chakmas, have seen the steady
erosion of their rights since the inception of the Bangladeshi state.33 They have
been subjected to state-sponsored violence for decades. They retaliated with
violence through formation of a military force called Shanti Bahini which waged
a war not only against the state but against the Bengali settlers. The organized and
persistent violence against religious minorities is, however, a comparatively new
phenomenon. More recently, especially following the general elections of 2001,
attacks on Hindus have increased alarmingly.34 The organized violence against
the Hindus began immediately before the October 2001 parliamentary elections.
In most instances, as press reports have suggested, the perpetrators were members
of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its allies, particularly the Jamaat-
e-Islami (JI). In some instances, Awami League supporters had also been behind
attacks, alleging that the local Hindus did not vote for them as had been expected.
In some instances, local criminal gangs took advantage of the situation and
indulged in extortion and looting.
The electoral violence in 2001 started 15 days prior to the 1 October elections
and continued until about 27 October, which ruined the Durga Puja, the most impor-
tant religious festival of the Hindu community in Bengal. Between 15 September
and 27 October 2001, about 330 incidents of violence against the Hindu community
were reported in various leading newspapers in Bangladesh. The violence included
rape, killing, physical torture, plunder, damage of property, bomb throwing, arson,
extortion etc.35
34 Md. Shamsul Islam
Violence against the Ahmediyya, a minority Muslim group36 (also called
Ahmedi) has become commonplace since 2001. While there were some sporadic
incidents of violence against the Ahmediyyas in the 1990s, no group had claimed
responsibility. On the contrary, since 2001, “groups of anti-Ahmediyya believers
have periodically attacked Ahmadiyya places of worship and more often than not,
little or no action was taken by the government forces to curb their attacks.”37 The
Human Rights Watch (HRW) report describes these incidents as part of a larger
trend within the society: “the recent upsurge in the persecution of the Ahmadis
can be understood as part of a gradual trend in Bangladesh from the country’s
secular roots toward more blending of religion and politics.”38
Despite the fact that the country has been governed by two women prime
ministers for more than 15 years (1991–2006) and is still being governed by a
woman prime minister (from 2009), women have been subjected to politically
motivated violence in addition to the high incidence of domestic violence.
Amnesty International reports that violence against women includes “physical
assault, rape, dowry related burning and killing of women, and acid attacks.”39
Furthermore, “Bangladesh has the dubious distinction of having the highest
number of battered women in the world.”40 The most significant development
since 1991 is the use of traditional institutions as political tools by the Islamists
against women. Throughout the 1990s, there have been hundreds of incidents where
rural women were flogged publicly for alleged sexual or other “transgressions.”41
There are also reports “about the recurrence of fatwa (religious edicts) related to
flogging in the country after a relative lull in recent years.”42 The Amnesty Inter-
national report also reveals, “social stigma, police refusal to act on more reports
of violence against women, and a lack of legal and community support for the
victims prevents many of them from seeking justice.”43 Women face discrimina-
tion on a dramatic scale. Their plight has worsened in recent years with the rise
of Islamic zealotry.44
Political violence associated with extremist political ideology began soon after
the war of liberation in 1971. The rise of the JSD within mainstream politics
heralded a new era of radicalism. Sreeradha Datta claims “disillusioned with
‘abandoning’ of its Leftist ideologies, soon after the liberation of Bangladesh, a
large group of young cadres broke from the Awami League to take up a more
radical stance.”45 Other radical groups emerged outside the realm of mainstream
politics. Some radical groups came into existence as a result of the split within
the left political parties and called for “an armed struggle” against the state.46 As
mentioned previously, the Sarobohara Party was founded under the leadership of
Siraj Sikdar. The party waged a war against the government describing it as a
“puppet of the Indian expansionist.” It also attacked local landowners and
supporters of the government. “In the mid-1970s, Maoist splinter groups such as
the Bangladesh Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist carried on a rural-based
insurrection. Acting under the direction of two renowned freedom fighters,
Mohammed Toaha and retired Colonel M. Ziauddin, guerrilla bands executed
landlords and moneylenders and staged hit-and-run raids on police stations and
government armories. By the late 1970s, however, Maoism had lost much of its
 Political violence 35
appeal in the countryside, and most guerrilla factions sought to become legal
organizations.”47 However, to date, some smaller factions continue to operate.48
Many of these groups have essentially become extortionists; but they are not only
reminiscent of the early days of extremist political activism in Bangladesh, but
clearly present a threat to society.
These so-called leftist militant groups have succeeded to establish their control
over various pockets of the western and southwestern districts of the country.
While the exact numbers of these groups are not known, press reports have
enumerated them in the dozens. It is important to note that the extent of violence
attributed to and/or claimed by the Leftist militant groups has been on the rise in
recent years. Jhenidah, a district located in the southwestern part of Bangladesh,
where at least 500 armed cadres grouped in 17 gangs operate, is a case in point.
Political murders have risen progressively in Jhenidah between 2001 and 2005.
In 2001, the number was 59, in 2002, it rose to 73, in 2003 the number rose to 75,
and in 2004 the number reached 101.49 Extremist groups have claimed responsi-
bility for most of these killings. Of the 101 killings in 2004, 50 were committed
by outlaws. The Janajuddho faction of Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP),
an outlawed militant group, claimed responsibility for 28 killings out of the 50
committed by outlaws.50 The overall trend in this regard is significant. According
to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, “177 deaths were reported in 2005 in LWE
[Left-Wing Extremism]-related violence, compared to just 35 killed in connec-
tion with Islamist militancy. The data assumes an even more sinister dimension
on closer scrutiny. As many as 163 of the 177 LWE fatalities (92 per cent) were
categorized as “outlaws.” 11 civilians and three security force personnel were
killed in LWE-related violence in 2005.51 During 2007–9 fatalities caused by
Islamist militant groups included seven militants and one civilian (total 8 eight)
in 2007, one civilian (total one) in 2008, zero in 2009 (until 20 November
2009).52 Fatalities caused by Left-wing extremism included 72 militants, eight
civilians (total 80) in 2007, 54 militants, three civilians, one member of security
forces (total 58) in 2008, 69 militants, three civilians (total 72) in 2009 (until
20 November 2009).53
Extremist-ideology driven violence has taken a new turn in recent years as
Islamist militant groups have emerged onto the political arena. Many experts
believe the elected governments since 1991 have allowed these groups to flourish
under their rule – either for narrow political gains, or from negligence. The
Islamist groups have formed close alliances with the major political parties in
Bangladesh. The International Crisis Group (ICG) report asserts “the BNP needs
its Islamist partners in government in order to be seen as more truly Islamic, not
least because Zia herself is a modern, secular woman.”54
Many others, however, argue that the entente cordiale between the BNP and
the Islamist parties is far more than a marriage of convenience; instead it is a
legacy of the BNP founded by Ziaur Rahman who used Islam to legitimize his
military rule in the late 1970s. Whatever may be the cause there is no denying
that as a result of this entente, during BNP rule in the early 1990s, religious intol-
erance and Islamic fundamentalism began to creep into Bangladesh politics
36 Md. Shamsul Islam
sometimes openly and sometimes surreptitiously. This was reflected vividly in
1994 when author Taslima Nasrin had to flee the country after receiving death
threats from several Islamist extremists for being critical about certain aspects of
Islam in her writings55 and the BNP led government sided with the Islamists.
Indeed, the rise of the Islamist militant groups is also connected to the larger
role played by religion in mainstream politics and society: “the notion of being
Islamic has gained increasing acceptance, legitimacy and popularity.”56 In so
doing, it has created an environment for further radicalization. It is well to bear
in mind that changes in the socio-economic dynamics and power structure also
played a part in the rise of Islamist political violence.57 The ethos and ideology of
the movement for autonomy and independence is less appealing to the common
masses in contemporary Bangladeshi politics; making it possible for the religious
groups to fill in the vacuum. It is well reflected in the JI’s line of argument that
“Only Islamic values, Islamic consciousness and character could help [maintain]
independence and sovereignty.”58
There were other considerations behind the rise of Islamist militant groups. For
example, the International Crisis Group (ICG) explains, “Islamist militant outfits
were quite openly cultivated in certain quarters as a counterbalance to leftist
groups, especially the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), whose main
focus was initially to eradicate left-wing extremists, particularly cadres of the
outlawed Maoist Purba Banglar Communist Party (PBCP).”59
As these groups were allowed to operate with impunity, the violence perpe-
trated by them increased exponentially. During the period from early 1999 to
February 2005, at least 34 bomb blasts killing 164 people and 1,735 people
sustained injuries.60

Table 2.1 Bomb blasts in Bangladesh (1999–2008)

Date Place Killed Injured

1999
March 6 Pro-left cultural rally, Jessore 10 100
October 8 Ahmediyya Mosque, Khulna 8 30
2001
January 20 Communist rally in Paltan Maidan near 7 50
AL headquarters, Dhaka
April 14 A cultural function at Ramna Batmul, Dhaka 10 50
June 3 A church at Baniarchang in Gopalganj 10 30
June 15 Awami League (AL) office at Narayanganj 22 0
September 23 Awami League Rally, Mollarhat, 8 100
Bagerhat district
September 26 Shullah, Sunamganj district 4 0
September 26 Sylhet town 2 0
October 14 Sirajganj 0 2
Table 2.1 (continued)

Date Place Killed Injured

2002
January Barisal 0 2
February 04 Chittagong Press Club 1 3
February 27 Dhandoba , Barisal district 1 1
April 10 Kushtia 0 0
April 25 Dhaka 0 2
May 1 Gurdaspur sub-district, Natore 1 25
September 28 Satkhira town 3 125
October 11 Rangmati town 3 2
October 13 Khulna 0 1
December 6 Mymensingh 18 300
2003
January 17 Dariapur village, Tangail district 8 8
March 1 International Trade Fair, Khulna 1 10
2004
January 12 Hazrat Shahjalal shrine, Sylhet 5 50
January 28 Poush Mela (winter fair), Golakandail, 2 20
Rupgonj, Narayangonj
May 21 Hazrat Shahjalal shrine, Sylhet 3 100
August 21 Bangabandhu Avenue in front of the 19 200
AL head office, Dhaka
2005
January 27 Awami League meeting, Boidder Bazaar, 5 150
Habiganj
August 17 459 explosions in 63 districts 3 100
October 2 Pabna, Daulatpur, Khulna 0 0
October 3 5 explosions in Laxmipur, Chandpur and 2 38
Chittagong districts
October 18 Sylhet 0 1
November 12 Naruamala, Gabtoli, Bogra 0 0
November 14 Jhalakathi 2 3
November 22 Taragunia, Daulatpur, Kushtia 0 5
November 23 Choulerborder and Harishankarpur, 0 0
Kushtia
November 27 Alamdanga, Chuadanga 1 5
November 29 Chittagong and Gazipur 9 78
November 30 KD Ghose Road, Khulna 0 0
December 1 Gazipur 1 30
December 2 Sylhet 0 0
December 8 Netrakona 8 46
December 25 Mirpur Road, Dhaka 0 4
(Continued on next page)
Table 2.1 (continued)

Date Place Killed Injured

2006
January 3 Khulna 0 0
January 6 Kachua, Kathalia, Jhalakathi 0 0
January 24 Shamaspur, Munshiganj 0 3
January 25 Gangni, Meherpur 1 20
February 25 Komorpur, Meherpur 0 2
March 3 Sher-e-Bangla road, Jhenidah 0 5
March 13 Bhomordah village, Meherpur 0 3
March 27 Maricha, Kushtia 0 3
April 7 Daulatdia village, Chuadanga 0 0
April 12 Paka village, Chuadanga 2 4
April 21 Sonadanga Bus Terminal, Khulna 0 3
May 5 Gobra Bazaar, Sadar sub-district, Narail 0 4
June 23 Omar Shahpara, Bander police station, 0 3
Chittagong
June 26 Shiromoni, Khan Jahan Ali police station, 0 3
Khulna city
August 1 Mirzapur town, Atrai sub-district, 0 15
Naogaon
2007
March 14 Meghna village, Bheramara sub-district, 0 2
Kushtia
May 1 Three explosions at the main railway stations 0 1
in Dhaka, Chittagong and Sylhet
May 4 Chawk Ramakantapur village, Manda 0 1
sub-district, Naogaon
May 15 Joypur Mastarpara village, Sapahar 0 1
sub-district, Naogaon
May 31 Kamalapur Railway Station, Dhaka 0 0

2008
March 14 Abhoynagar sub-district, Jessore 0 2
March 15 Naopara rail station, Abhoynagar sub-district, 0 7
Jessore
May 14 Kanchon Nagar in the Jhenidah town 0 1
June 26 Krishna Nagar under Tala sub-district in 0 4
Satkhira
July 5 Hajapur graveyard in the Awaliapur union of 0 2
Dinajpur sub-district
September 17 Faridpur Medical College Hospital 0 0

Sources: South Asia Terrorism Portal; Imtiaz Ahmed, Keynote paper “On the Brink of Precipice:
Contemporary Terrorism and the Limits of the State,” presented at a seminar organized by Bangladesh
Foundation for Development Research, Dhaka on November 30, 2005; The Daily Star and other
newspaper/website reports.
 Political violence 39
The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism
Knowledge Base makes a clear distinction between domestic versus international
acts of terrorism and insists that in Bangladesh there has been an increase in
attacks on domestic targets. According to the Terrorism Knowledge Base, in
the period between 1998 and 2007 there were only two international incidents
that have been attributed to Bangladeshi extremists. However in this same time
period 144 domestic incidents occurred. The National Counterterrorism Center’s
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) on the other hand claims that
between 1998 and 2007 there were 246 incidents in Bangladesh. However the
WITS does not differentiate between domestic and international incidents. The
majority of these incidents are aimed at the government and private citizens,
which exemplifies the use of extremist violence in order to effect political
change.
These Islamist militant groups have been relentlessly working to convert
Bangladesh into their brand of a Shari’a based Islamic state. Consequently, reli-
gious intolerance and fundamentalism have spread in Bangladesh. Many experts
are of the opinion that Islamic extremists have established their wider political and
social base in the society during this period. It is in this context that an analysis
in Jane’s Intelligence Review has described Bangladesh as “on the brink of being
a failed state,” and warned of its vulnerability to “al-Qaeda and its ever-expanding
network of Islamic extremist organizations.”61
The democratic prospects that emerged in the 1990s raised hopes that arbitrary
use of force against political opponents by the law enforcement agencies would
be reduced, if not completely eliminated. But the experience of the last 15 years
demonstrates that on the contrary the state has used extra judicial measures to
silence political opponents of the regime. Although state power alternated
between two rival political parties, the tendency to perpetrate violence, custodial
deaths and extra judicial killings has increased substantially. Often these measures
have been given immunity through executive power. “Operation Clean Heart,” the
85-day military operation against “criminal elements” between October 2002 and
January 2003 is a case in point. During the operation at least 50 people died in
custody. After the military was withdrawn on 9 January 2003, the government
issued an indemnity order exonerating members of the army of all wrongdoing.62
While many of those who were killed in custody were allegedly members of
criminal gangs, some targeted political killings also took place. More impor-
tantly, these custodial deaths were not investigated and the families of the victims
were barred from seeking justice in the courts.
The most glaring example of the state’s sanction of torture and extra judicial
killings is the establishment and operation of the RAB. Between March 2004,
when it was founded by the BNP regime, and December 2006, when the country
was under a caretaker administration, the force was implicated in 350 deaths.63
Press reports often identified those who were killed by the RAB as “outlaws” –
a euphemism for members of extremist left organizations. In 2004, in one
district, 15 leaders of different outlawed parties were killed in “crossfire” with
police and the RAB over a 56-day period from 1 November to 26 December.64
40 Md. Shamsul Islam
According to the human rights group Odhikar, 322 people were killed in “crossfire/
encounter/shootout” incidents during the two years (2007–8) of the caretaker
government.65 Despite election promises of the Awami League, the situation
has not changed since it came to power. In the first nine months of AL rule
(January–June 2009), a total of 97 people died in “shootouts” and in the custody
of law-enforcing agencies. According to the Odhikar, 28 people were killed by
the elite force Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), 41 killed by the police, while
another 21 were killed in joint operations by RAB and police.66 The report
further states that the military, Ansar (a paramilitary force), jail police and forest
guards were behind the deaths of seven people. Another 20 people died in “safe
custody.”
The organization’s comprehensive report notes that until 30 September 2009,
at least 185 people have reportedly died in political violence while 10,468 have
been injured. Thirty-six have been killed in intra-party conflicts of the ruling
party while others have died in clashes between the ruling party activists and the
main opposition the BNP.
One of the disturbing developments since the mutiny of the BDR is the death
of some of its members arrested for their alleged involvement in the mutiny.
About 3,500 members of the BDR were arrested before 30 November 2009.
While in custody 48 members of the BDR died between 9 March and 10 October
2009. Some observers allege that the arrested members of the BDR were tortured.
The aforementioned report of the Odhikar claimed that at least 14 members were
among 55 people who were allegedly tortured by the law enforcement agencies.
Among them, 25 were tortured the by police, 20 by the RAB, five by the coast
guard, three by the BDR and two by the members of a joint task force of various
agencies.

Implications
The multifaceted violence that proliferated during the various phases of the
political life of Bangladesh has multifarious implications for the country. Most
importantly, it has affected the society politically in so far as establishing true and
meaningful democracy is concerned. As Monirul Islam Khan quite rightly
observed in 1993,

Political violence is largely detrimental to the essence of democracy …

Political violence rejects the space of others in the domain of politics. Perfect
democratic polity grows out of the existence of self and other. Political
violence does not allow the customs and conventions of a democratic polity
to flourish and thus the issue of democratic transition remains a theoretical
project. At present, in our country we are heading to the crisis of democratic
norms where the political parties have shown very little respect [for] each
other’s opinions. And if our economic transformation is disturbed by contin-
ued political violence that will be used by the hated authoritarian forces to
appropriate the political power again.67
 Political violence 41
As the nation embarked on a new democratic era in the early 1990s, it was
expected that democratic practices would entrench themselves deeper into society
over time. But, more than a decade and a half later it became obvious that the ever-
increasing political violence has weakened the institutional base of good governance
in Bangladesh. To date, democratic institutions have not grown effectively in the
country. The failure to hold the scheduled election in 2007 was testimony to this
effect, which resulted in the taking over of the military-backed caretaker government.
The mindset which leads to the settling of political goals through street agitations and
violence has made the parliament dysfunctional; and further vitiated politics.
Political violence has affected the society economically from individual to
national level. Victims of political violence have been pauperized with no state
assistance and no means to rehabilitate them. Bangladesh’s national economy has
been most hard hit by the continuing political violence. The country has lost
millions of dollars owing to hartals that have become a part of the political
culture of Bangladesh and the nexus between politics and criminal gangs that
have fueled corruption. These have made the international business community
over-cautious in considering any investment plan in the country.
Political violence has affronted the country psychologically by denigrating its
image on the international scene. In this respect, the rise of Islamic violence is
an important contributory factor. But the mainstream political parties and their
leaders must bear their fair share of responsibility too. As one leading interna-
tional weekly once commented, “Extremism is a worry in Bangladesh; but it’s the
mainstream that is polluted.”68

Conclusion
The historical narrative and the recent developments pertaining to political
violence discussed in this chapter lead to the following tentative conclusions:

• that political violence is a not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh society,

evidently it has a history of its own;
• that political violence in the post-independence period has moved along the
narrow confines of party politics, politics of vengeance, narrow political
interests, parochial outlook of political leadership, corruption and greed;
• that lack of political legitimacy of the ruling elites, particularly the military
regimes, has institutionalized political violence as norms;
• that the Bangladeshi state has sanctioned violence and thus law enforcement
agencies have helped perpetuate a vicious pattern of killings;
• that perpetrators of violence have enjoyed impunity because of their connec-
tions with the regime and political parties;
• that criminalization of politics, reflected in the nexus between gangs and
established political parties, has added fuel to political violence;
• that the conflict in perpetuity between the two main parties – AL and BNP – has
created a convenient space for political violence, in particular the violence
committed by the Islamist extremists, to thrive;
42 Md. Shamsul Islam
• that the Islamist parties operating within mainstream politics have exploited
their connections with other political parties and the government, and enjoyed
impunity;
• that there is no strong evidence that Islamist extremists have joined their
hands in other criminal activities with mastans; though they pose a high level
security threat for the state. On the contrary, the Left Wing Extremist (LWE)
movement in Bangladesh is “a highly dispersed, low-scale and criminalised
movement, consisting of a multiplicity of minor groups, no combination of
which constitutes any significant threat to the country’s security.”69

Understanding and addressing the issue of political violence in Bangladesh,

therefore, is inherently connected to the political culture of the country. In a
political environment where parties depend on violence for their perceived
success and media exposure, a respite in violence without making changes in the
political system is a faint hope.

Notes
1 See inter alia Eliza Griswald, “The Next Islamist Revolution?” The New York Times
Magazine (23 January 2005). Alex Perry, “Bangladesh: Deadly Cargo,” Time Magazine,
Asia Edition (14 October 2002). Bertil Lintner, “Bangladesh: Breeding Ground for
Muslim Terror,” Asia Times (21 September 2002).
2 On 17 August 2005 within the space of 45 minutes around 450 bombs exploded in
63 out of the country’s 64 districts. See for details, Ali Riaz, “Bangladesh in 2005:
Standing at a Crossroad,” Asian Survey 46(1) (2006): 107–13.
3 Prominent Awami League leader SAMS Kibria was a former finance minister of
Bangladesh and executive director of ESCAP. He was killed with four others in a
grenade attack on 27 January 2005 in Habiganj.
4 Ahsanullah Master, an Awami League MP was killed with another person in May 2004
at a public rally by his opponents.
5 In 2005, two journalists were murdered, 180 received death threats, 43 faced attacks,
cases were filed against another 81 journalists, while 50 were injured as a result of
torture, and five were arrested. In 2004 four journalists were killed in Bangladesh.
During a 2004 fact-finding mission, the New York based Committee for the Protection
of Journalists (CPJ) stated that “it takes real courage to be a journalist in Bangladesh.”
Bangladesh was the worst country in Asia in terms of violence against the press accord-
ing to the CPJ 2004 list. See Bangladesh Centre for Development Journalism and
Communication (BCDJC), State of Press Freedom in Bangladesh 2005 (Dhaka, 2005).
6 Hindus, the largest religious minority in Bangladesh and Ahamadiyyas, a Muslim sect
in Sunni-dominated Bangladesh face occasional torture and repression by different
political and religious groups.
7 “Political violence: 1096 killed in 52 months,” New Nation, 2005. Dhaka, 17 March
2005, 1.
8 The number is a conservative estimate of the killings which took place between 27 and
31 October 2006. The extent of these incidents can be understood from the following
four press reports published on 29 October, 30 October and 1 November: “12 killed,
2,000 hurt as violence hits country,” Daily Star, 2006. 29 October 2006, 1; “More
violence, more deaths – Toll rises to 24, section 144 imposed in many places,” Daily
Star, 2006. 30 October 2006, 1; “5 more killed, 50 hurt in political clashes,” Daily Star,
2006. 1 November 2006, 1.
 Political violence 43
9 “Downtown Dhaka turns into battlefield,” Daily Star, 2006. 29 October 2006, 1.
10 Examples are too many to be listed individually. The rebellion under the leadership of
Titu Mir in rural Bengal in the 1830s, the uprising in Chittagong under the leadership
of Surya Sen in April 1930, and the peasants’ uprising known as the Tebhagha move-
ment in various rural areas in Bengal in the late 1940s demonstrate that violence has
always been a part of the colonial political landscape.
11 Some of these splinter groups still exist in various parts of the country, particularly in
the western and southwestern regions.
12 Hartals are “the temporary suspension of work in business premises, offices and
educational institutions and movement of vehicular traffic nationally, regionally or
locally as a mark of protest against actual or perceived grievances called by a political
party or parties or other demand groups. S. Aminul Islam, “The History of Hartals,”
Beyond Hartals: Towards Democratic Dialogue in Bangladesh (United Nations
Development Programme, 2005), 15. Hartal is not inherently a violent political tactic.
Instead, this is one of the means to express legitimate grievances on a small scale or
on a large-scale and is a way of expressing non-confidence in the government. But in
recent years, particularly beginning in the 1980s, this mode of political activism has
become synonymous with political violence. This is due to two reasons: first, the
opposition parties have tried to impose their will instead of spontaneous public
support; second, the government and the ruling party resort to violence to stop the
activists from engaging in street demonstrations.
13 RAB is a permanent special force under the direct supervision of the Ministry of
Home Affairs, for details see <www.rab.gov.bd> (accessed 16 August 2006).
14 Sreeradha Datta, “Political Violence in Bangladesh: Trends and Causes,” Strategic
Analysis 29 (3) (July–September 2005): 427.
15 Lawrence Markowitz, “Political Violence,” www.oberlin.edu/politics/Markowitz/
217%20syllabus%20F06.pdf (September 12, 2006).
16 Quoted in Ali Riaz, Unfolding State: The Transformation of Bangladesh (Ontario:
de Sitters Publications, 2006), 147.
17 Riaz, Unfolding State, 147.
18 Muhammad Yunus, Banker to the Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against
Poverty (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 97.
19 Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Wiesbaden: Franz
Steiner Verlag, 1984), 56.
20 See for details: Ahmed, Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and Riaz, Unfolding State,
particularly 137–93.
21 Tazeen M. Murshid, “Democracy in Bangladesh: Illusion or Reality,” Contemporary
South Asia 4(2) (1995).
22 Except two of his daughters, Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana, who were outside
Bangladesh.
23 For details of the events, see Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished
Revolution (London: Zed Books, 1979).
24 These numbers are drawn from news reports published in Bangladesh between 19–27
October 1977.
25 Riaz, Unfolding State, 224.
26 For example, on 1 March 1984, in the wake of a general strike called by the
combined opposition prominent labor leader Tajul Islam was assassinated in broad
daylight.
27 There are too many instances to be mentioned individually. The period of the
Ershad regime was replete with incidents of the police, BDR and other para-
military forces unleashed on civilian demonstrators causing deaths and injuries to
hundreds.
28 M. Rashiduzzaman, “Political Unrest and Democracy in Bangladesh,” Asian Survey
27(3) (March 1997): 254–68.
44 Md. Shamsul Islam
29 Islam, “The History of Hartals,” 15–25. Nasreen Khundker, Beyond Hartals: Toward
Democratic Dialogue in Bangladesh (United Nations Development Programme.
2005), 19.
30 Elora Shehabuddin, “Bangladesh in 1998,” Asian Survey 39(1) (January–February
1999): 151. Mozaffar Islam, “Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh,” The Sentinel,
2001. 26 August 2001.
31 Elora Shehabuddin, “Bangladesh in 1999: Desperately Seeking a Responsible
Opposition,” Asian Survey 40(1) (2000): 181–8.
32 Khundker, Beyond Hartals, 38.
33 See for details Amena Mohsin, “Bangladesh,” in Michael E. Brown and Sumit
Ganguly (eds.), Fighting Words: Language Policies and Conflict in Asia (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2003). Amena Mohsin, “The Chittagong Hill Tracts,” International
Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Bangladesh: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
2003).
34 Sreeradha Datta, “Post-election communal violence in Bangladesh,” Strategic
Analysis 26(2) (April–June 2002); Sreeradha Datta, Bangladesh: A Fragile Democracy
(New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2004). Ali Riaz, God Willing: The Politics of
Islamism in Bangladesh (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 89–131.
35 Amena A. Mohsin, “Religion, Politics and Security: The Case of Bangladesh” in Satu
Limaye, Robert Wirsing and Mohan Malik (eds.), Religious Radicalism and Security
in South Asia (Honolulu, Hawaii, Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies. Spring
2004).
36 A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report states “members of the Ahmadiya community
(“Ahmadis”) profess to be Muslims. They contend that Ahmad meant to revive the
true spirit and message of Islam that the Prophet Mohammed introduced and
preached.” Human Rights Watch, “Breach of Faith: Persecution of the Ahmadiyya
Community in Bangladesh,” Human Rights Watch 17(6C) (June 2005): 7.
37 Sreeradha Datta, “Political Violence in Bangladesh: Trends and Causes,” Strategic
Analysis 29(3) (July–September 2005): 437.
38 Human Rights Watch, “Breach of Faith,” 8.
39 Amnesty International, “Bangladesh: Briefing to political parties for a human rights
agenda,” Amnesty International (October 2006): 9.
40 Sreeradha Datta, “Political Violence in Bangladesh,” 428.
41 Ali Riaz, “Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in Bangladesh,” Journal
of Asian and African Studies 40(3) (2005): 171–96.
42 Amnesty International, “Bangladesh: Briefing to political parties for a human rights
agenda,” Amnesty International (October 2006): 9.
43 Ibid.
44 Elora Shehabudin, “Beware the Bed of Fire: Gender, Democracy, and the Jama’at-
I-Islami in Bangladesh,” Journal of Women’s History 10(4) (Winter 1999).
45 Sreeradha Datta, “Political Violence in Bangladesh,” 433.
46 For details of radicalism in the 1970s, see: Talukdar Maniruzzman, “Radical Politics
and the Emergence of Bangladesh,” in Paul R. Brass and Marcus F. Franda (eds.),
Radical Politics in South Asia (Cambridge, Mass., London: The MIT Press, 1973):
223–80; for government responses see: Syed Badrul Ahsan, “Bangladesh Since 1971:
How Far Has It Come?” Asian Affairs 36(2) (July 2005): 153.
47 Bangladesh – National Security Index, <www.photius.com/countries/bangladesh/
national_security/index.html> (accessed 21 October 2007). For an informative and
interesting narrative of the left radicalism in the 1970s and its relevance in current
Bangladeshi politics see, Naeem Mohaiemen, “Terrorists and Guerrillas in the Mist,”
Sarai Reader: 2006, Turbulence, 296–311. <www.sarai.net/publications/readers/
06-turbulence/05_naeem_mohaiemen.pdf> (accessed 15 March 2007).
48 Afsan Chowdhury, “The nearly secret Maobadi War,” Himal Southasia, July 2005
<www.himalmag.com/2005/july/analysis_2.html> (accessed 11 June 2006).
 Political violence 45
49 “101 in 2004 against 75 in 2003: 50 murders by outlaws,” Daily Star, 2005. 4 January
2005, 12.
50 Ibid.
51 South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), “Bangladesh Assessment 2006,” South Asia
Terrorism Portal (SATP), <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/
assesment2006.htm> (accessed 9 July 2007).
52 South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Bangladesh Assessment 2010,” <http://www.satp.org/
satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/index.htm> (accessed 24 November 2009).
53 Ibid.
54 The International Crisis Group, “Bangladesh Today,” International Crisis Group Asia
Report 121 (2006), 19.
55 Sanjay Bhardwaj, “The Rites of the Passage: Rise of Religious Politics in Bangladesh,”
Journal of International Affairs8(1 and 2) (June and December 2004).
56 Sreeradha Datta, “Political Violence in Bangladesh,” 434.
57 J.N. Dixit, “Indo-Bangladesh Relations-Need For Better Handling,” in India’s Foreign
Policy and its Neighbours (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2001), 204–5.
58 Suchita Ghosh, China-Bangladesh-India Tangle Today (New Delhi: Sterling
Publishers, 1995), 54.
59 The International Crisis Group, “Bangladesh Today,” 18.
60 “Growing Fanaticism and Extremism in Bangladesh: Shades of the Taliban,” Official
Website of the Awami League, <www.albd.org/aldoc/growing/growing.fanaticism.
pdf> (10 July 2007).
61 “Terrorism in Bangladesh,” Jane’s Intelligence Report, 27 January 2005, <www.janes.
com/security/ international_security/news/fr/fr050127_1_n.shtml> (6 June 2007).
62 Human Rights Watch, “Judge, Jury and Executioner: Torture and Extra Judicial
Killings by Bangladesh’s Elite Security Force,” Human Rights Watch, 18 (6c)
(December 2006).
63 Human Rights Watch, “Judge, Jury and Executioner,” 3.
64 “101 in 2004 against 75 in 2003: 50 murders by outlaws,” Daily Star, 2005. 4 January
2005, 12.
65 “No crossfire has taken place: Sahara,” Daily Independent, 27 November 2009,
Dhaka, 1.
66 “Odhikar’s 9-Month Human Rights Monitoring Report 01January–30 September 2009,”
< http://www.odhikar.org/documents/odhikar_9_month_report09.pdf > (23 November
2009).
67 Monirul Islam Khan, “Violence in Bangladesh Society: Fallout on Democratic
Transition,” in Iftekharuzzaman and A.K.M. Abdus Sabur (eds.), Bangladesh Society,
Polity and Economy (Dhaka: Progoti Prokashani, 1993), 13–14.
68 “Extremism is a worry in Bangladesh; but it’s the mainstream that is polluted,”
Economist, 16 June 2005.
69 South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Bangladesh Assessment 2010.”
3 Who are the Islamists?
Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji

Introduction
The primary objective of this chapter is to identify the Islamists within Bangla-
deshi politics, discuss their backgrounds and try to understand the trajectories of
these political entities. For the purpose of this study we identify individuals, politi-
cal parties and alliances that profess to adhere to an Islamic legal system and an
Islamic style of governance in their publications and/or in public pronouncements as
Islamists. Based on constitutions, manifestos and public pronouncements, a number
of political parties in Bangladesh can be labeled as Islamist; but we will focus on
those who are active in the political realm, and have a significant following among
the masses.
In the last two decades, Bangladesh has seen a phenomenal rise of political
parties and organizations with an Islamist agenda. According to one account, in 1970
the number of Islamist parties was 11, while the number stood at 100 in 2006.1 The
exact number of Islamist parties is difficult to discern; but Election Commission
records and intelligence reports provide some estimates. Islamist parties partici-
pating in the elections show a steady growth since 1979, the year when Islamists
were first allowed to participate in elections in Bangladesh. This came after the
constitutional provision prohibiting religion-based parties was rescinded by the
then military ruler Ziaur Rahman. In 1979, only two Islamist political parties
contested the election, the number stayed the same in 1986 election, but increased
to 17 in 1991 and to 18 in 1996. The number declined slightly in 2001, to 11.2
Election commission records show that at least 35 political parties bearing
names suggestive of an Islamist agenda participated in elections between 1979
and 2001.3
Generally speaking, similarities in terms of ideology, fundamental beliefs,
aims and objectives, and practices, make it difficult to differentiate between the
Islamist political parties. Mindful of this limitation, we will categorize them into
five groups. This taxonomy is based on their origins and policies. The second
section of the chapter presents the defining features of each category and provides
examples of parties for each.
The third section of the chapter discusses the origin, ideologies and structure
of 12 parties representing these five categories. These parties have been selected
on the basis of their active roles in politics. In the fourth section we examine the
 Who are the Islamists? 47
profiles of the Islamists. Using available data on educational backgrounds and
professions of members of Islamist parties in the eighth parliament (2001–6) we
will try to understand the profile of the Islamist leaders in Bangladesh. This data
will be compared with the data of three previous parliaments (1996, 1991 and
1986) and survey data of 1981 and 1987 to ascertain changes in the background
of the leadership. In the concluding section of the chapter we summarize our
findings, discuss the main trends within Islamist politics and consider their
implications for understanding Islamist politics in Bangladesh.

Taxonomy of the Islamists in Bangladesh

As a key to understanding the Islamist political parties (IPPs) of Bangladesh, we
propose a five-category taxonomy. The Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JI, often
referred to as Jamaat, previously Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh), the largest and
the strongest IPP of the country, occupies the first category. We characterize
its policy as pragmatist, because of the party’s success in ascending to power from
political oblivion within two decades. Some of the Islamist parties describe this
phenomenal rise to power as an opportunistic tendency. In the second category
is placed the IPPs led by orthodox Ulema (plural of A’lim) whose support base
lies primarily with Qwami madrassahs. In the third category are Pir (renowned
religious figures) and Mazaar- (Shrine) based IPPs, and in the fourth category
resides a newly formed IPP whose aims and objectives are not only distinctly
different, but also international in nature. In the fifth category we place the mili-
tant organizations, which have attracted significant media attention in recent
days. These categories are further detailed in Table 3.1.

Islamists of various shades

In this section, we will discuss the emergence, ideology and organizational struc-
tures of some representative Islamist parties. Following the proposed taxonomy
we examine Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) as a pragmatic or opportunist IPP. We will
spend considerable space discussing the JI, because the party has emerged as
the largest platform of the Islamists and has had representation in parliament
since 1986.
Among the idealist IPPs we will focus on Bangladesh Khilafat Andolon
(BKA) (Bangladesh Khilafat Movement), Ahle Hadith, Jamaat-i-Ulema-e-Islami,
Bangladesh Nizam-e-Islami Party and Islami Morcha Bangladesh (Islamic
Alliance of Bangladesh). It is worth noting that these organizations generally
have a very limited support base. Among the shrine-based and/or pir-centric
IPPs, we will discuss the Bangladesh Islamic Movement (previously known as
Islamic Shashontontro Andolon – Islamic Constitution Movement) the Zaker
Party, and the Bangladesh Tariqat Federation. Hizb Ut Tahrir Bangladesh can
be described as unique among the Islamist parties on many counts but most
importantly because of its elite-centric nature. The main goal of the clandestine
militant organizations is to wage what they describe as “jihad,” therefore, we call
48 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
Table 3.1 Taxonomy of Islamist political parties in Bangladesh

Distinguishable traits Name of Islamic political party

Pragmatist/opportunist Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)

Want to establish Islamic social order in
society through the state, believe in
“Islamic revolution,” participate in
elections; support-base is wide-ranging
Idealist and orthodox Jamaat-i-Ulema-e-Islam, Khilafat Andolon,
Want a pure Islamic state; support base is Ahle Hadith, Islami Morcha,
largely within qwami madrassahs Khilafat Majlish, Nizam-e-Islam
Pir (preacher of Islam) centric and Mazar Zaker Party, Bangladesh Islamic
(Shrines) Based Movement, Bangladesh Tariqat
Aim to establish a state based on traditional Federation
Islam and sharia; party organized around
individuals; weak support-base
Urban elite-centric Hizb Ut Tahrir Bangladesh
Want to establish Khilafat; internationally
connected, highly educated middle class
leadership, yet to take part in elections
Jihadists Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh
Militant Islamists who aim to establish (HuJIB), Jamaat-ul Mujahideen
an Islamic state in Bangladesh Bangladesh (JMB), Hijbut Tawheed,
through “jihad.” Shahadat-e-al Hikma

them jihadists. Our discussion of the clandestine militant groups such as the
Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB) and the Jaamat-ul Mujahideen
Bangladesh (JMB) will be limited to an outline here, as they are discussed at
length in Chapter 4.

Pragmatist IPPs

Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami
The Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JI, previously Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh)
had emerged as the fourth largest political party4 in the general elections of 2001
and had two cabinet positions as coalition partner in the government between
2001 and 2006. These two cabinet positions were offered, presumably, as a result
of the party’s role in the landslide victory of the four-party alliance. Whether the
JI is the mastermind behind the alliance’s historical victory,5 as believed by some,
is debatable but it is beyond any doubt that since the end of military rule in 1990
the JI has become the “kingmaker” of Bangladeshi politics.
Established in the 1940s in northern India under the leadership of Sayyid Abul
A’la Maududi, the ideologue of the party, the JI has come a long way since then.
Although Maududi vehemently opposed the idea of a separate state for the
Muslims (i.e. of Pakistan), he migrated to Pakistan and continued organizing
the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan to transform that nation into an Islamic State.6
 Who are the Islamists? 49
When the manifestation of Bengali nationalism began to take shape in East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), the JI waged an ideological and cultural war against
it. Opposed to the ideology of nationalism and secularism, Jamaat campaigned
against the Bengali nationalist movement throughout the 1960s. Subsequently, it
actively opposed the Bangladesh war of independence in 1971, and collaborated
with the Pakistani Army during the genocidal war against the Bengalis, while
JI-supported armed groups provided logistical and intelligence support to the
Pakistani army. It is widely known that JI’s armed cadres, notably the Al-Badr,
the Al-Shams and the Razakars brutally murdered a number of distinguished
Bengali intellectuals on the eve of the surrender of the Pakistani army on
December 16, 1971.7
Soon after the independence of Bangladesh was announced, some of the top
leaders and cadres of JI were imprisoned on charges of collaboration with the
Pakistani military, the JI – along with other religion-based political parties – was
banned, and the citizenship of Golam Azam, the chief of East Pakistan Jamaat,
was annulled. Azam left the former East Pakistan in November 1971 and was
residing in (West) Pakistan when Bangladeshi authorities deprived him of his
citizenship. By the end of 1973, most of the imprisoned Jamaat leaders had been
released under a general amnesty.8 After the military coup of 1975, Jamaat-e-Islami
became active in Bangladeshi politics. The JI formally started its activities in 1979
when Ziaur Rahman introduced multiparty democracy and rescinded the ban on
religion-based parties.9
Golam Azam returned to Bangladesh in 1978 as a Pakistani citizen. Upon his
return, Azam assumed the leadership of the party, although this was not made
public until 1991.10 It is widely believed that to create an aura of political legiti-
macy for his rule and to win the approval of the Middle Eastern Islamic countries
General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) allowed the JI to work without any hindrance.11
During the Zia regime, the JI reportedly began receiving significant financial
assistance from Saudi Arabia and Iran. It also derived significant financial bene-
fit by controlling a number of Saudi-sponsored organizations in Bangladesh, such
as the Ibn Sina Trust, Rabitat-i-Alam Islami, and other similar philanthropic and
financial institutions. The JI failed, however, to restore the citizenship of its
leader Golam Azam during Zia’s military regime.
The JI enjoyed a favorable environment at the beginning of the military regime
of General Ershad, who usurped power through a military coup in 1982. Ershad
also began to make use of Islamic symbols and to court the JI, but the Ershad-JI
relationship came to an end in 1983, when the major opposition political parties
allied in a movement to restore democracy and the JI joined hands with the
alliance. The JI also participated in a controversial election held under military
rule in 1986. Following Ershad’s resignation on 6 December 1990, elections to
parliament were held in February 1991 and the new era of democracy began. The
elections created a political environment which allowed the JI to play a major role
in constitutional politics.
In the election of 1991, the JI won 18 seats; later the number was increased to 20
when two reserved seats for women were gained by the party as a quid pro quo
50 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
for its crucial support to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) – which needed
the JI’s support to form the government. By providing support to the BNP, the
Jamaat emerged as a key to power politics. This was further cemented when the
Awami League nominee Badrul Haider Chowdhury formally sought the support
of the JI in 1991 in his failed bid for the ceremonial office of president.12 The
legitimization process of Jamaat was now complete.
These political achievements notwithstanding, Jamaat secured its most stun-
ning accomplishment when Golam Azam’s citizenship was restored in April
1993, thanks to the Supreme Court of Bangladesh.13 With Azam’s citizenship in
hand the JI made a prudent move to gain acceptability by the progressive forces:
it broke off its relations with the BNP and joined with the Awami League and its
allies demanding the resignation of the BNP government.
In the general election of 1996, the JI, for the first time, filed candidates for all
300 parliamentary seats. But it won only three. Five years earlier, the JI had
gained 18 seats from 167 contested and received 12.13 per cent of the total votes.
In 1996 popular support for the party also dropped to 8.71 per cent. It was against
this backdrop that the JI decided to form an alliance with the BNP to fight the
election of 2001. They secured 17 seats, and received 4.28 per cent of popular
votes.14 While one explanation for the decline could be that the number of JI
candidates was fewer in the 2001 elections as part of an internal arrangement of
the four-party alliance, nevertheless the electoral support for the JI appeared to be
more or less inert.15
Jamaat advocates a greater role for Islam in public life and insists that it is a
movement rather than a religious or political party. Golam Azam, the supreme
leader of the Jamaat states,

The Jamaat is neither a political party nor a religious organization. It has

embraced Islam without any reservation and considers Islam to be [a] complete
and balanced code of conduct. So the Jamaat is both political and religious.
It is political to the extent Islam is political; it is neither more nor less political
than what Islam wanted to be.16

This view is emphasized in the election manifesto of Jamaat in 2001: “Jamaat-

e-Islami Bangladesh is not a merely political party with the aim of ruling the
country or ascending power.”17 According to the party leaders, the main objective
of Jamaat is the establishment of Deen or Islamic social order through “ethical,
peaceful, constructive, democratic and constitutional” means. Matiur Rahman
Nizami, the head of the party claims that, “the Jamaat-e-Islami is a constructive
and responsible Islamic organization that holds and preserves constitutional poli-
tics in a democratic process through a systematic and peaceful way. All of its
activities are based on democratic values. Jamaat-e-Islami represents [a] consti-
tutional and democratic system of political culture. We firmly believe that Islamic
principles should be established through the democratic process.”18
The purpose of the party, as stated in various party documents, is two-fold:
“to give a clear exposition of the Islamic system and to organize a party whose
 Who are the Islamists? 51
indoctrinated leadership and cadres would work to bring about an Islamic
revolution.”19 The Jamaat’s final aim is, as stated in the election manifesto
in 2001, to establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh: “Bangladesh shall be
declared an Islamic Republic on the basis of Sovereignty of Almighty Allah. The
Holy Quran and Sunnah will be the only source of all laws in the Republic.”20
Jaamat further states, “Each and every Muslim citizen shall be orientated in
unquestioned faith in Islamic fundamentals, injunctions and moral values so
that Muslim men and women could acquire knowledge about the fundamental
teachings of Islam easily. All possible steps shall be taken to establish “Salat”
(prayers).”21
The organization of JI in Bangladesh is similar to its Pakistani counterpart and
follows a pattern characterized by many as “cadre-based.”22 According to Banu,
“the Jamaat [is] built upon the pattern of revolutionary totalitarian parties work-
ing through concentric circles of spreading out their influences.”23 The organiza-
tion is hierarchically organized, but “well disciplined and cohesive.”24 The
central body is led by the Ameer-e-Jamaat (President), and the highest policy
making body is called the Majlish-e-Shura (Central Executive Committee) which
meets twice a year. The day-to-day functioning of the party is supervised by the
Central Working Committee while the Member Conference plays a key role in
electing the central leadership including the Majlish-e-Shura. The conference
takes place every three years. The Ameer or president has the supreme authority
within the party. According to party sources, the central and local leaderships are
elected through secret ballots.
Active members of the party are called Rukun. They are recruited through
a selective process and strict rules dictate the responsibilities of the members.
“A member [has] to remain as an associate member for some time and take
lessons in the ideology of the party before he is entitled to full membership.”25
Associate member, active associate member, worker and advance-worker are
steps to becoming a full member. If an advance worker is able to follow elaborate
guidelines only then may s/he be awarded membership of JI. Further, the party
usually imposes a variety of restrictions on the lifestyle of members. Party sources
claimed in 2006 that there were 22,000 Rukun and 30,000 advance-workers.26
Every member of JI is required to contribute one-fifth of his/her monthly
income or one-twelfth of his/her yearly income; alternatively, s/he will consider
JI as his/her family and will pay the average expenses of a family-member to the
party fund. Additionally, each member of JI is assigned by the party authority to
certain tasks with a specified target to achieve within a stipulated time. These
tasks include selling or distributing books, conveying party messages to targeted
persons, reaching out to a number of people, to name but a few. These obligations
often seem difficult to fulfill, particularly by those who do not intend to be engaged
full time in politics; thus they remain sympathizers or “associate” members, and
fulfill considerably less strict requirements. But these rules enable Jamaat to maintain
a dedicated support-base unlike other political parties. Observations and communica-
tions with many sympathizers reveal that the JI members remain in close contact
with the sympathizers.
52 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
The student wing of the Jamaat, the Islami Chatra Shibir (ICS), has been at the
forefront of the organizational expansion of the party and the main channel of
recruitment.27 Shibir claims to be “one of the largest student organizations of
Bangladesh” with about 130 thousand regular workers and millions of supporters.
Shibir has two types of branches (1) Institutional and (2) Residential. There are
103 branches and 14,000 units all over the country.28 Press reports and analysts
have suggested that members of the organization are reportedly engaged in
violence including killing and maiming their rivals, amputating limbs, severing
vital veins and crippling them for life.29 Hossain and Siddiquee state, “the ICS
has already earned [a] bad name for its brutality and violent acts against students,
teachers, and other opponents in many universities.”30
The annual budget of the party is close to 300 million taka (US$4.3 million).
The main sources of JI’s funds are various businesses like Islamic banking,
educational institutions (including university), clinics, hospitals, and pharmaceu-
tical industries across the country as well as contributions from certain favorable
foreign countries and migrant workers.31 Jamaat leaders, however, insist that
members may be engaged in businesses but the party has no connection to these
businesses. They insist that the party fund is generated from the contributions of
the workers and the supporters. It also has a Zakat fund which receives annually
an estimated 2 million taka (US$30,000).32
Since its re-emergence in the mid-1970s, Jamaat has been facing an onslaught
from two circles: the secularists of the country, and the orthodox ulema. The
secular forces oppose Jamaat as it uses Islam as a political ideology to further its
goal of capturing state power. Another source of contention is the role of the JI
during the independence war of Bangladesh. A section of the ulema strongly
disagrees with the interpretations of Islam furnished by JI’s ideologue Maulana
Maududi and thus opposes the JI. The orthodox ulema also do not support the
“politicization” of religion to extend the party base, and consider this approach as
a violation of the core concept of Islam.

Idealist IPPs

Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan

The Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan (BKA), established in 1981 under the leader-
ship of Moulana Mohammadullah, popularly known as Hafezzi Huzur, aims to
contribute to the “global movement for establishing Khilafa” and to establish
“Khilafat in Bangladesh.” Hafezzi Huzur, a pir, was known only to a small circle
of his followers until he formed the party to support his candidature in the
Presidential election in 1981. In a surprising result he bagged 1.79 percent of
votes cast and made the presence of his party felt in the political landscape. The
party can be credited with being the first Islamist political party in Bangladesh to
be led by a pir and to put up a candidate for the highest public office.
The head of the party is called “Ameer-e-Shariat.” The party has three
decision-making bodies: Majlish-e-Shura (Consultative Council), Majlish-e-Amela
 Who are the Islamists? 53
(Working Committee) and Majlish-e-Umushi (General Council). The Ameer
appoints the Secretary General in consultation with the members of the Majlish-
e-Shura. All members of the organization have to take two oaths before the head
of the organization: an oath of allegiance and an oath of jihad.33
Since its inception, the support of the party has remained confined within the
conservative sectors of the Ulema. A large number of workers of the party come
from the madrassahs, particularly qwami madrassahs, while a significant number
of the Islamist leaders including Shaikhul Hadith Azizul Huq, Mufti Fazlul Huq
Aminee and Syed Fazlul Karim – the pir of Charmonai, who now lead various
small parties, had been in leading positions in the BKA at one point or another.
This indicates that the party has experienced several splits over the last two
decades most of which can be attributed to personality clashes rather than ideo-
logical differences. The party is currently divided into two factions both of which
claim to represent the work of the founder of the party. Interestingly, both
factions are led by the sons of the founder. Comparatively speaking, the faction
led by Maulana Shah Ahmadullah Asrafi, the elder son of Hafezzi Huzoor, has a
greater following than the other faction. However, the results of the election of
2001 demonstrate that the support-base of the party has dwindled remarkably.
None of the 30 candidates of the party managed to secure 2 percent of votes cast
in their respective constituencies.
The program of Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan includes the introduction of the
principles of the Qur’an and Sunnah in the construction of the state, reorientation
of the judicial system towards Sharia law, Islamization of the educational system,
reorganization of Zakat and Waqfs, etc. The party is also opposed to the
Ahmediyya community, demanding that they be declared non-Muslims.
While the party is seldom criticized as an “anti-liberation force,” an expression
commonly used to denote those who opposed the war of independence, a number
of leaders of the party are known to have actively collaborated with the Pakistani
military during 1971.

Ahle Hadith movement

Until the official declaration in early September 2006 of the intent to form a
political party named Insaf (Justice), the members of the Ahle Hadith Andolon
Bangladesh (AHAB, Ahle Hadith Movement Bangladesh) denied having any
political ambitions.34 However, they have been working as a political platform to
transform Bangladesh into an Islamic state since the mid-1980s. The leaders of the
organization claim to have 25 million followers with strongholds in 40 districts of
the country, particularly in Rajshahi, Satkhira, Tangail, Jamalpur and Mymensingh
districts. Although the head of organization Dr. Asadullah Ghalib was arrested in
February 2005 for his alleged involvement in militant activities,35 the organiza-
tion has remained active and has been allowed to hold its conference in Rajshahi
in October 200536 and a grand rally in the capital in late August 2006.37
The AHAB grew out of a youth organization called the Ahle Hadith Jubo Sangha
(AHJS) established in 1978 under the leadership of Ghalib. Ghalib established the
54 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
AHJS after he left the Jaamat-i-Ahle Hadith, an organization of the adherents of
Ahle Hadith sect. The AHJS spent the following decade establishing madrassahs
in northern and western Bangladesh with the support of foreign funds. In 1994,
Ghalib formally launched the AHAB. Although it faced several minor splits, the
AHAB remained strong. The organization came into close contact with the
Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) in the late 1990s and the two worked
together with the political agenda of establishing an Islamic state.
The organization was led by Dr. Muslehuddin during the absence of Asadullah
Ghalib. The members of the AHAB supported the JI in previous elections but
according to their leaders, feel betrayed because “an Islamic state has not yet been
established.” 38 The AHAB leaders allege that the JI is behind the arrest and trial
of its leader Ghalib.

Jamaat-i-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)
The Jamaat-i-Ulema-e-Islam, perhaps the oldest Islamist party of the country,
was established in 1909. During British rule in India, the party operated as a
clandestine organization and attempted to organize an insurrection. The failure of
the clandestine operations brought the party to the open political arena in 1931.
While the party favored an undivided India and commanded significant support
prior to the establishment of Pakistan, it gradually lost ground between 1947
and 1959 in the former East Pakistan. After the independence of Bangladesh,
the party was forced to cease its activities. The political changes beginning in
1978 allowed the party to reorganize.
Two factions of the party are now active in the country. One faction is led by
Moulana Muhiuddin Khan, the editor of the monthly Madina – an Islamist maga-
zine, while the other faction is led by Moulana Fariduddin Masud, a former
Director of the government controlled Islamic Foundation. Indian press reports
suggest that the organization is connected to militant activities especially inside
the Indian state of Assam. For example, in 2004, the Assam Tribune reported that
Border Security Forces had arrested a Bangladeshi citizen named Farooq Ahmed
Talukdar in the village of Hailakandi who claimed to be a member of the JUI and
was engaged in subversive acts.

Police said that he [Talukdar] is a resident of Surikandi village of

Maulavibazar in Bangladesh and came to Hailakandi in December last year
for studying a graduate course in a madrassa here and simultaneously started
jehadi activities. Police also recovered some incriminating documents and
books and papers of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. He also revealed before the BSF
that he has already sent some unemployed youths of the State to Bangladesh
for Jehadi training.39

The connection between the militant groups, particularly between the HuJIB and
the JUI, came to light when the leader of the HuJIB, Mufti Abdul Hannan
confided to the press after being arrested in October 2005 that the former Home
 Who are the Islamists? 55
Minister later commerce minister, assured him he should have “no fear” to live
in the country. Hannan insisted that the head of one faction of the JUI, Maulana
Muhiuddin, mediated his contact with the minister. Both the minister and the
JUI leader denied any connections.40 The leader of the other faction of JUI,
Maulana Masud was arrested five days after the serial bomb blasts in Bangladesh
on 17 August 2005. The government alleged that Masud’s charity helped finance
the militants.41 However, Masud was later released. He claimed innocence and
pointed a finger at the JI whom he accused of patronizing the militants.42
The leaders of the JUI not only deny any linkages with militancy but also insist
that they are in favor of a moderate and peaceful voice of Islam in politics. For
example, the party organized an Islamic conference on 4 April 2005 which called
for tolerance and moderation. The conference was addressed by Maulana Asad
Madani, the head of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Hind of India and Maulna Fazulr
Rehman of JUI Pakistan.43 This demonstrates that the party maintains close
contacts with their Indian and Pakistani counterparts. The JUI in Bangladesh, like
its counterpart in Pakistan, considers the Ahmediyya community as heretic and is
at the forefront of a movement demanding an official declaration of Ahmediyyas
non-Muslim.

Bangladesh Nizam-e-Islam Party

The roots of the Bangladesh Nizam-e-Islam Party can be traced back to the
Jamaat-i-Ulema-e-Islam. In 1954, the Jamaat-i-Ulema-e-Islam of Pakistan decided
to name its parliamentary party the Nizam-e-Islam Party. Since then the party
has been known by that name. Almost a decade later the party reorganized
itself under the name of “Jamiaati Ulema-e-Islam and Nizam-e-Islam Party.” The
party did badly in the general elections of 1970 when all 49 candidates lost and
the total vote was negligible.44 Like all other Islamist parties, the Nizam-
e-Islami was reorganized after 1978. In 1979, it put up one candidate in the
Parliamentary election and secured only 1,500 votes.45 Nizam-e-Islam’s program
has five elements: (1) Conferring Dawat (Invitation) to join the revolution
according to the Quran and Sunnah, (2) Organization and training, (3) Building
personal character and public services, (4) Continuing publicity of and expanding
Islamic education and (5) Revolution.46 The party has a seven-tier organization
from local to national level with the national executive committee (NEC) at the
helm. The 46-member NEC is the highest policy-making body. The committee
is elected every three years. Mufti Izharul Islam Chowdhury is the current
president of Nizam-e-Islam. It is a member of the six-party coalition Islami Oikya
Jote (IOJ).

Islami Morcha Bangladesh

The Islami Morcha Bangladesh (Islamic Alliance of Bangladesh) drew public
attention in June 1994 when it launched an agitation against the Bangladeshi
author Taslima Nasrin for her allegedly blasphemous comments.47 The party was
56 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
only a month old then and was yet to take a definite shape. Working under the
banner of the “Alliance to Resist Anti-Islamic and Seditious Activities,” the
organization was led by Maulana Muhiuddin, of the JUI, and Mufti Fazlul Huq
Aminee, then a leader of the Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan. Over succeeding
years the organization took the shape of a political party although the name
reflects the origin of the party as an alliance.
The leaders of the party were instrumental in bringing various Islamist groups
into the IOJ in 1990 and have been at the forefront of the IOJ leadership.
For example, Aminee, who heads the Islami Morcha, is also the convener of the
IOJ. Aminee was elected a Member of Parliament in 2001 as a nominee of
the four-party alliance under the leadership of the BNP.
Four councils guide the organizational activities. They are: the Majlish-e-Shura
(Consultative Council); Majlish-e-Amela (Executive Council); Majlis-e-Ammah
(General Council) and Majlish-e-Khas (Advisory Council). The consultative
council is the highest policy-making body of the party. One of the primary objec-
tives of the party is to propagate the teachings of Prophet Muhammad and the
doctrine of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat.48 The supporters and activists of the party
largely come from the qwami madrassahs.

Shrine-based and/or Pir-centric IPPs

Bangladesh Islami Andolon (Bangladesh Islamic Movement)

The Bangladesh Islamic Movement (known as Islami Shashontantra Andolan,
ISA, until 2008) was founded by Syed Fazlul Karim, a pir of Chormonai, in
March 1987 with the goals of “formulating an Islamic constitution” and trans-
forming Bangladesh into a “total Islamic state in light of the experience of
Khilafat.”49 As one of the nationally known pir, Fazlul Karim had a large follow-
ing of devotees all around the country for quite some time which gave the party
a support base to begin with. However, it is well to bear in mind that the follow-
ers of pirs usually belong to various political parties and therefore, the support of
muridan (followers of pir) is not guaranteed for pirs when it comes to political
issues. But observations suggest that Fazlul Karim has succeeded in presenting
himself to his muridan as a political leader as much as a spiritual authority.
The party is led by the Ameer who has enormous authority and power over
decision making processes. There are three councils to steer organizational
activities; they are: Majlish-e-Sadrat (Presidium Council), Majlish-e-Shura
(Consultative Council), and Majlish-e-Amela (Executive Council). The members
of the Presidium Council are appointed by the Ameer. The Consultative Council
members are nominated by the local units. In addition to the head of the district
unit, each unit can nominate up to three members for the Consultative council.
The members of the executive council are appointed by the Ameer in consultation
with the members of the Presidium Council.50
In the election of 2001 the Islami Shashontontro Andolon formed an alliance
with a faction of the Jatiya Party (JP) under the leadership of the former military
 Who are the Islamists? 57
ruler General Ershad and two other small parties. The alliance, named the Islami
Jatiya Oikya Front (IJOF, Islamic National United Front) nominated 281 candi-
dates and secured 7.25 percent of the votes. These votes, however, do not reflect
support for the ISA; rather they represent support for the JP. As an election
platform the pir of Charmonai, Syed Fazlul Karim, declared that the IJOF
would establish an Islamic government in the country if voted to power. The
religious conservatism of the party can be understood from its stance on women.
The pir is not only opposed to female leadership, but also ordered that Ershad’s
wife, Raushan Ershad, a former member of Parliament and a senior leader of
the Jatiya Party, should wear a veil if she attended any of the alliance’s
meetings.51 This alliance collapsed after the election, because all of the 17 seats
won by the alliance were JP candidates who preferred their party affiliation in
the parliament. The leaders of the ISA seem to be on constant lookout for a possi-
ble ally, but not necessarily on the basis of an ideological affinity.52 The ISA
is always at loggerheads with the JI. This has much to do with the JI’s position
in regard to shrines and pirs. The latter is opposed to the shrines and the culture
of pirs.

Zaker party
The Zaker party is perhaps the best example of how a party with a small support
base located in one district can attract significant attention when it is linked to a
pir who has access to powerful politicians. The party was launched in 1989 by a
pir of Faridpur district known to his followers as Faridpuri or pir of Atarashi. Pir
Faridpuri came to prominence during the reign of General Ershad, who claimed
to be a follower of the pir. During the Ershad era, the military ruler and his close
associates used to visit the pir regularly providing the impression that the latter
wielded enormous power. Like other pirs, Faridpuri had devotees all around the
country, but they came from different shades of politics. Therefore, from the onset
the political base of the party was shaky to say the least.
Yet, when the party nominated 247 candidates in the parliamentary elections
in 1991 it caused some concern within political circles because it was not known
whether the appeal of a well-connected pir would translate into votes and which
of the mainstream parties would thereby stand to lose most. The results were
dismal as none of the candidates came close to victory and the party secured only
1.22 percent of votes. The party faced a severe blow when pir Faridpuri died of
old age. His son Pirzada Mustafa Amir Faisal, a businessman by profession, has
since assumed the leadership.
While the leaders of Zaker party criticized the JI for its role in 1971 and
occasionally accused it of not being an Islamic party, they did not discount the
possibility of an alliance.53 In the run-up to the election of 2007, the party leaders
remained in close contact with the Awami League and were attempted to join the
electoral alliance led by the AL. The party leaders claim to have 30 million
followers and party committees in 12 thousand villages (out of 66,000 villages of
Bangladesh).54
58 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
Bangladesh Tariqat Federation
The Bangladesh Tariqat Federation (BTF) is one of the new parties. It came into
being in 2005 after the BNP’s international affairs secretary, Najibul Bashar
Maizbhandari resigned from the party, accusing Jamaat-e-Islami of being linked
to bombings at shrines in the country. Maizbhandari told reporters that “I do not
want to be in a party which is influenced by Jamaat. Jamaat might have links with
the recent serial blasts.”55 Maizbhandari who also led the Jatiotabadi Ulema Dal,
an affiliate of the BNP, decided to form a new party which depends on the
Bangladesh Dargah-Mazar [shrine] Federation. The latter had been led by
Maizbhandari for some time. Najibul was elected MP with Awami League nomi-
nation in 1991 and joined the BNP in 1995. He was elected a member of parlia-
ment in the 15 February 1996 elections but was denied a party nomination for the
12 June election, also in 1996. Since establishing the party, Maizbhandari has
worked closely with a number of secularist parties and joined the alliance with
Gono Forum, led by Kamal Hossain, Bikalpa Dhara and former President Badruddoza
Chowdhury.

Urban elite-centric IPPs

Hizb-ut-Tahrir
The Hizb Ut Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB) is the country chapter of the HT, a leading
political movement in Central Asia currently headquartered in London. The HT
describes itself as “a global Islamic political organization (sic).”56 It launched its
Bangladesh chapter on November 17, 2001. The HTB envisions a Shari’ah-based
Khilafah state. The central office of the HT insists on the political nature of the
organization:

Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam. Its objective is to

resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic State that executes
the systems of Islam and carries its call to the world. … Hizb-ut-Tahrir is not
a spiritual bloc, nor is it a moralistic or a scientific bloc, but rather a political
bloc that works towards the management of the Ummah’s affairs as a whole
according to Islam.57

The HT is the only Islamist organization in Bangladesh to speak of Khilafat,

and to acknowledge its international connections. The HTB, as part of a global
movement, defined its method of work as divided into three stages; they are:

The First Stage: The stage of culturing (sic) to produce people who believe
in the idea and the method of the Party, so that they form the Party group;
The Second Stage: The stage of interaction with the Ummah, to let the Ummah
embrace and carry Islam, so that the Ummah takes it up as its issue, and
thus works to establish it in the affairs of life; The Third Stage: The stage of
 Who are the Islamists? 59
establishing government, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively,
and carrying it as a message to the world.58

The head of the HTB claims to have 5,000 members and a presence in 17
districts.59 According to a press report, the HT “has been gaining most momen-
tum through its activities at the country’s universities.”60 What makes the HT
distinctly different from other Islamist political organizations, including the clan-
destine ones, is that its political agenda is not confined to Bangladesh, but is a
global one.
Syed Golam Mowla, a university professor initiated the HT chapter in
Bangladesh after he became involved with HT in England. The HTB is currently
led by Mohiuddin Ahmed, a university professor, referred to as the chief coordi-
nator and spokesperson of the Hizb Ut Tahrir Bangladesh chapter.
Hizb Ut Tahrir Bangladesh claims in its publications that the party has never
resorted to violence as a means to achieve its objectives as this is not the way of
the Prophet (peace be upon him) to bring change in society and state. This claim
is similar to the HT central organization which insists:

Hizb-ut-Tahrir is convinced that the change we seek must start in the minds
of people and we do not accept for people or societies to be forced to change
by violence and terror. Consequently, Hizb ut-Tahrir does not advocate or
engage in violence. The party strictly adheres to Islamic law in all aspects of
its work. It is an Islamic intellectual and political entity that seeks to change
people’s thoughts through intelligent discussion and debate. We consider
that Islamic law forbids violence or armed struggle against the regime as a
method to re-establish the Islamic State.61

The organization maintains a high profile and organizes various activities including
demonstrations, seminars, round tables, etc. on a regular basis. The Government of
Bangladesh proscribed it on 22 October 2009.

The jihadists
It is almost impossible to calculate the precise number of clandestine militant
Islamist groups operating within Bangladesh. The estimated number varies
between 29 and 53. Some press reports have put the number at 95,62 which
appears to be exaggerated. However, intelligence reports have indicated that
these organizations are likely to be part of one single network and work closely
with each other. To date, the government of Bangladesh has banned four of these
clandestine organizations; they are: the Sahadat-i-Al-Hiqma (banned in February
2003), the JMB and the JMJB (banned in February 2005), and the Harkat-ul
Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB, banned in October 2005).
Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh, which began its activities in 1992,
appears to be the fountainhead of the Islamist militant organizations in
Bangladesh. It is widely reported in the press that Abdur Rahman Faruqi was the
60 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
first to lead the Bangladesh chapter of HuJI, but he died while removing a mine
in Afghanistan in 1989. Shawkat Osman alias Sheikh Farid now leads HuJI with
Imtiaz Quddus as its general secretary. Until 1996 HuJIB’s activities were largely
restricted to the southeastern hills close to the border with Myanmar. On 18
January 1996, 41 members of HuJIB were arrested in a village in the southeastern
Cox’s Bazaar district with a huge arms cache. Soon the organization moved its
operation to the northwestern region. The most audacious operation of the HuJIB
was its attempt to kill the then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on 20 July 2000.
The operation was planned and executed under the leadership of Mufti Abdul
Hannan, a leading member of the HuJIB.
Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) was formed in 1998 by Abdur
Rahman, with the support of Asadullah Ghalib. JMB’s armed activities began in
2000. The strength of the military wing of the JMB was demonstrated in a clash
with police in the Khetlal village of Joypurhat on 14 August 2003. At least seven
policemen including a higher-ranking police officer were seriously injured in the
clash. The militants snatched three shot guns, 40 bullets, magazines and a radio
from the police. It was later known that some 300 “commanders” gathered at the
house for a regional conference.
The membership of the organization is divided into three categories: leadership,
Ehsar, and Gayeri Ehsar. The leadership tier includes the regional leadership,
Ehsars are the full-time activists and operate according to the directives of
the higher echelons; and Gayeri Ehsar level members are part-time activists.
Additionally, another tier involves those who provide help and support to the
JMB and its front organization Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB).
Activists claim that the organization has training centers in 57 districts of the
country. The number of JMB members has been estimated as between 10,000 and
100,000. The number cannot be verified.
In 2005, the JMB carried out the spectacular bombing campaign on 17 August,
attacked court houses in Chandpur, Laxmipur and Chittagong districts on 3 October,
and orchestrated three suicide bomb attacks respectively on 29 November,
1 December and 8 December. Security analysts in Bangladesh believe that the JMB
has received support from the Pakistani militant organization Lasker-e-Tayeba
(LeT). As for financial support, a number of charities from the Middle East and
Persian Gulf countries, particularly the Revival of Islamic Heritage (RIHS), are
suspected of providing funds.
The primary goal of the militant organizations is to establish an Islamic state
in Bangladesh through violent means. It considers the secular system and secular
political forces “evil” and underscores the need for a united effort to deal with the
secular forces. JMB documents have never criticized any of the Islamic parties of
Bangladesh.

Profiles of the Islamists

To comprehend the profiles of the Islamists we examined the academic
backgrounds and professions of the Islamist members of parliament. The eighth
 Who are the Islamists? 61
parliament of Bangladesh (2001–6) had 20 elected members from the Islamist
parties. Seventeen of them belonged to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and three
belonged to the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ). JI leaders had been elected to previous
parliaments in 1986, 1991 and 1996. For a comparative perspective we have
looked at their backgrounds as well.
According to official records available at the parliamentary secretariat,
of the 20 Islamist MPs of the eighth parliament 12 have had a madrassah
education.63 Nine of them were members of the JI and the remaining three
were IOJ representatives. It is worth noting here that the JI members with a
madrassah education have come from the Aliya madrassah tradition, while
IOJ members have been schooled in Qwami madrassahs. Of the remainder of
JI members, seven have a bachelor’s degree and one has a degree in medicine.
One member had earned a BA degree from a university after completing a
madrassah education. Close examination of the educational backgrounds of the JI
members of parliament since 1986 reveal that the number of madrassah educated
leaders is on the rise. In 1986, only two of 10 JI members were madrassah
educated, the number rose to eight out of 18 in 1991, and one out of three in 1996
(Table 3.2).
These statistics are interesting because in the 1980s the JI leadership had
undergone a major shift towards western-educated individuals. Banu’s study of
the JI revealed that “in 1987, 71 percent of the top leadership had college or
university education, as against 67 percent in 1981.” Consequently, there was a
decline of leaders with orthodox, religious education from 21 percent in 1981 to
18 percent in 1987.64 It is well to bear in mind that the student wing of the party
has expanded in recent decades and thus should have brought more western-
educated individuals to the party. The educational profile of the MPs of the last
four parliaments seems to show a different trend. One explanation for this trend
could be that while the JI leadership has been tilted towards western-educated
individuals, the party has nominated those who appeal to the common people.

Table 3.2 Academic background of the JI members of parliament (1986–2001)

Degree 2001 1996 1991 1986

Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

Master’s 1 33 5 26 4 40
Bachelor’s 8 44 1 33 5 26 2 20
Medicine, 1 5 1 33 1 5 1 10
Engineering,
Law
Madrassah 9 50 8 42 2 20
Not Available 1 10

Note: One of the MPs of the 2001 cohort graduated from a madrassah and earned a bachelor’s degree
from a general university, thus he is counted twice. Of the 1991 cohort, one MP had a law degree in
addition to his master’s degree. He is also counted twice.
62 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
It will make more sense if we take into account that all the JI seats, except one,
have come from rural areas. Nevertheless, observations suggest that members of
the higher echelons of the JI leadership are indeed western educated.65 However,
there could be a shift in the leadership demography reflected in the profiles of the
MPs. We cannot conclude either way due to lack of data at hand, but this calls for
further study of JI leadership profiles.
As for the professional background of the 20 Islamist MPs, 11 are businessmen
and six are engaged in teaching. Of those who declared teaching as their profes-
sion, five are madrassah teachers and one is a college professor. Ten JI MPs are
involved in business, one is a college professor and three teach in madrassahs.
One of the madrassah teachers listed farming as his primary occupation. Two
central leaders of JI didn’t declare their profession: they are party chief Matiur
Rahman Nizami and member of the central committee Delwar Hossain Saidee.
Nizami was also a member of the cabinet. Saidee is reportedly engaged in various
businesses. Of the three MPs from the IOJ, two teach at madrassahs and the other
is a businessman.
Since 1991, a growing number of JI members had experience in business. In
1986, no JI members claimed business as his primary profession, but in 1991,
seven out of 18 MPs were businessmen; in 1996 the numbers were two out
of three (Table 3.3). The high proportion of businessmen members of the JI
cohort is consistent with the general pattern of Bangladeshi politics. According
to a Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) Report published in early
2006, at least 58 members of parliament directly own or operate a business.66

Table 3.3 Professions of JI members of parliament (1986–2001)

Profession 2001 1996 1991 1986

Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

Business 10 58 2 66 7 36
University 1 5 2 20
teaching
College 1 6 2 20
teaching
School 1 34 2 11 2 20
teaching
Madrassah 3 18 6 32 1 10
teaching
Politics 1 5 1 10
Legal 1 5 1 10
Medicine 1 5
Other 1 6
Unknown 2 12 1 10

Note: One of the MPs of the 1991 cohort declared business as his primary profession while he was a
part-time madrassah teacher which he controlled. He has been counted twice.
 Who are the Islamists? 63
Concerns have been expressed by many about the business-politics nexus in
Bangladesh:

In Bangladesh today, barring only a few, all major business groups are repre-
sented in the parliament and many of these representatives hold ministerial
appointments. Our businessmen have also realised that the shortest route to
big business is through a government office or at the very least the parlia-
ment. Only political power can give easy access to big bank loans and help
not having to repay (sic) it.67

It is noteworthy that the JI leadership has embraced more professionals in their

ranks in the 1980s according to Razia Banu’s survey. Banu states that in 1981,
42 percent of the JI leadership owned and operated small businesses; in 1987,
the number was reported at 21 percent. Additionally, the share of college profes-
sors and school teachers rose from 17 percent in 1981 to 35 percent in 1987.68
JI nominees for the parliament do not reflect that composition.

Conclusion: trends in Islamist politics in Bangladesh69

Islamist politics in Bangladesh has experienced a dramatic uplift in the last two
decades. Once consigned to political oblivion, Islamists have not only returned to
the political arena but also now occupy the center stage. This dramatic rise has
also brought significant changes in the contents and contours of Islamist politics.
We can identify at least five broad trends within Islamist politics. Although, at
times, these trends contradict one another; they are integral parts of the political
landscape and electoral politics.

Increase in numbers
The number of Islamist parties, both open and clandestine, has dramatically
increased. At least 35 Islamist parties operate within mainstream politics and had
participated in elections at one or another point. Similarly, clandestine organiza-
tions have proliferated over the last decade. While it is impossible to provide an
exact number, it is evident that there are more than four well-organized militant
groups that have spread their tentacles throughout the country.

In power, but electoral support decreasing

The most significant success of the Islamists over the last two decades is their
ascendance to power. As we have demonstrated in the second section of this
chapter, the JI – which opposed the establishment of independent Bangladesh and
had remained proscribed until 1976 – emerged as the kingmaker in 1991 and
assumed power as a coalition partner in 2001. Similarly the IOJ – the alliance of
small political parties – has become a member of the ruling coalition, though they
have not been part of the cabinet. The rise of other parties may be less spectacular
64 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
but definitely no less significant. These developments, however, mask the fact
that electoral support for the Islamists has progressively dwindled over time.
The support for Jamaat-e-Islami, we have shown, has declined from 12 percent
in 1991 to 4 percent in 2001. Interestingly, the share is less than what it received
in 1970, the last election held before independence. Islami Oikya Jote won one
seat in 1991 and 1996, but the percentage of votes it received were 0.79 percent
and 1.09 percent – negligible rise of 0.33 percent. This is consistent with the
overall trend in regard to support for Islamist parties. The statistics compiled
from the documents of the Election Commission reveal that the total number of
votes won by the Islamic parties declined by over 4 percent in the June 1996
parliamentary election compared to the 1991 election. In the 1991 election 17
Islamist parties secured 14.87 percent of votes while the share declined to about
10 percent in June 1996. This took place despite a 20 percent rise in voter turn-
out.70 The IOJ secured 0.68 percent of the votes in 2001; which means that IOJ’s
share has declined, though there was a wide-margin victory in one constituency,
thanks to the four-party alliance, particularly the BNP, which sacrificed a seat
won by its candidates in four previous elections. In the 2008 elections, the JI
secured 4.48 percent of total votes cast. Among the other Islamist parties, Islamic
Movement received 1. 05 percent, and IOJ secured 0.16 percent of popular votes.
Islamist parties together secured 6.27 percent of total cast votes.

The line between the mainstream and the militants blurred

The increased influence of the Islamists, particularly their access to state power
is matched by a very disturbing trend – the blurring of the state and the under-
ground. The clandestine groups have been treated softly by the administration
during the BNP-led alliance government (2001–6). It is often alleged that this is
due to the presence of the JI in power.71 Furthermore, it is now well documented
that the leaders of the main militant group, JMB, had been members of the JI.72
The connection between other Islamist parties and the militants has also surfaced.
Prominent HuJIB leader Mufti Hannan’s claim of having a relationship with
Islamist leaders is a case in point.

Inclination towards alliance-building

Since 1991, the Islamists, particularly the JI, have maintained close contacts with
the two main political parties (the AL and the BNP), and switched sides more
than once until they entered into an electoral alliance with the BNP in 1999.
Evidently, this approach has brought positive results to the party. Although the JI
has reaped the most benefit out of the alliance building, it is not the only party to
have adopted this strategy. The rise of the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) is a case in
point. The IOJ was established in 1990, and comprised seven parties: the Khilafat
Majlis, Nezam-e-Islam, Faraizi Jamaat, Islami Morcha, Ulema Committee, a
splinter group of NAP (Bhasani), and the Islami Shashantantra Andolon (Islamic
Constitution Movement).
 Who are the Islamists? 65
The members of the alliance have changed since then and the alliance currently
has six members: Jamiaat-i Ulema-e-Islam (led by Maulana Muhiuddin Khan);
Bangladesh Nizam-e-Islam Party (led by Mufti Izharul Islam Chowdhury); Bangla-
desh Farayazi Jamaat (led by Maulana Mohammad Mohiuddin); Ulema Committee
Bangladesh (led by Muhammad Shamsul Alam) Islami Morcha Bangladesh
(led by Mufti Fazlul Huq Amenee); Khilafat Majlish (led by Saikhul Hadith
Azizul Huq).
The Islami Shashontontro Andolon (ISA, Islamic Constitution Movement),
one time member of the IOJ, left the alliance in 2001 and tried its luck with
another alliance. The ISA joined hands with the Jatiya Party (JP led by General
Ershad) in forming the IJOF (Islamic Jatiya Oikya Front) during the 2001 election.
After the election the JP left the alliance but it did not deter the ISA from trying
once more to create an alliance. It has brought 11 smaller parties in 2006 to form
another platform.
Within months of the emergence of Bangladesh Tariqat Federation (BTF), it
also began looking for an alliance to join, and soon linked up with the Jatiya
Oikyo Front (JOF, National United Front) – a combination of the three parties
(Bikalpa Dhara Bangladesh and Oikya Manch).73

Disintegration ad nauseam
While the IOJ is an example of the Islamists’ eagerness to join like-minded
parties to influence mainstream politics and reap the benefits, it is also an exam-
ple of the disintegration of Islamists ad nauseam. The alliance has undergone
several rifts since its establishment and is currently divided into four groups with
the same name.
The first split occurred in 2002, soon after the election which made the alliance
a partner of the ruling coalition.74 In 2003, the Aminee faction faced a split when
Mufti Izharul Islam Chowdhury (Chair of the Nizam-e-Islam) claimed the leader-
ship of IOJ and formed his own faction. The leadership conflict brought about
another division within Shaikhul Hadith’s Bangladesh Khilafat Majlish and a
resultant split in the IOJ.75 Leaders of the breakaway faction Maulana Mohammed
Ishaq and Professor Ahmed Abdul Kader claim to be the third part of IOJ.
Maulana Mohammed Ishaq floated a new party called Bangladesh Khilafat
Majlish and declared himself as chief his faction of the IOJ. The latest division
came in May 2006.76 Three components of the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) left the
ruling coalition and floated a new political party named “Bangladesh Islami
Oikya Jote” (BIOJ) under the leadership of Misbahur Rahman Chowdhury. The
new Islamic party, formed with the merger of Nizame Islam, Jamaatul Ulema
Islam and Islami Sangram Parishad, has declared a wish to join the alliance led
by the Awami League.
Beside this continuous disintegration and consequent reorganization of the
alliance these smaller parties have also put pressure on the four-party coalition
with various demands and threatened to quit the alliance many times. For example,
in July 2004 Fazlul Huq Aminee threatened to resign from parliament to embarrass
66 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
the coalition.77 Maulana Shahidul Islam, lone MP from the Khilafat Majlish made
a similar threat in 2006.78
Apparently the reasons for these divisions are many, but closer observations
and discussions with the IOJ leaders reveal that personality clashes, a desire for
greater power, and the JI’s growing influence with the four-party coalition and
uncertainty over allocations of parliamentary nominations in the next election
were the primary reasons for internal squabbling. When asked about the causes
of the incessant rifts, Muhiuddin Ahmed, a leader of the IOJ, described these as
“unfortunate” but acknowledged:

It’s the same reason – power. There are some people who are extremely
power hungry. They have entered Islami Oikya Jote in the hope of gaining
power. They thought that if they were part of the Oikya Jote, they would
become ministers, be powerful. Now that they didn’t get that, they are squab-
bling among themselves. Trouble arises when their interests are not met.79

From the above discussion it is clear that the doctrinal tapestry of different
Islamist parties and groups overlaps in many cases and these parties, whether
anti-West, anti-secularist or plain religious purists are in many instances divided
by divergent theological orientations, by personality clashes and by political
ideology and strategies. To date, no single Islamist group or religious leader
has succeeded in appealing to the Bangladeshi people at large in a fashion
comparable to the late Ayatullah Khomeini of Iran, or Mollah Omar of
Afghanistan. But it is well to bear in mind that, thus far, Islamists have scored a
victory on many fronts: making Islam a political ideology in a nation which came
into existence on a basis of secularist principles; emerging as a formidable force
in Bangladeshi politics; making Islam an integral part of the political discourse,
and creating an environment within which a menacing militancy can flourish, to
name but a few.

Notes
1 Shakhawat Liton, “Islamic parties boom after 1976 ban lifting,” Daily Star, 29 August
2006, 1. The parties that existed in 1970 were: Nizam-e-Islam, Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim
Affairs, Jamiaat-a-Ulama-e-Islam, Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith, Islami Darodi Sangha, United
Islamic Front, Islami Sangram Parishad, Islami Durmuz Party, Jatiya Mujaheed Sangha
and Jamaat-e-Tabligue-e-Deen.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 In the general election of 2001, JI secured 17 of 300 seats in the Bangladesh Parliament.
It secured 4.29 percent of total votes (Bangladesh Election Commission, http://www.
ecs.gov.bd/election.php3?sum=1 (3 October 2005). Three parties ahead of it were the
BNP, The Awami League, and The Jatiya Party (Ershad).
5 The 4-party alliance secured a two-thirds majority in the parliament in the general
election of 2001.
6 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at-i Islami
of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
 Who are the Islamists? 67
7 The role of the JI during 1971 has been discussed in most of the published histories of
Bangladesh. See U.A.B. Razia Akter Banu, “Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh: Challenges
and Prospect,” in Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi (eds.), Islam, Muslims and
the Modern State (St. New York: Martin’s Press, 1994), 80–99.
8 After the promulgation of the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order
1972, widely known as the collaborators order, on 24 January 1972, the government
set up 73 special tribunals, to try Razakar, Al-Badr and Al-Shams forces, defined as
collaborators in the order. However, these trials came to a halt after the government
granted a general amnesty on 30 November 1973. Under the general amnesty, about
26,000 out of the 35,000 people held or convicted under the act were released. While
the amnesty did not apply to those charged with murder, rape or arson, most of the
collaboration cases, especially those of the bigwigs, involved abduction and other
general collaboration charges. A large number of persons charged with murder, rape
or arson, including prominent collaborators, were also released. See Shahiduzzman,
“Cases buried, laws revoked,” New Age. Special Supplement, 15 December 2005.
<www.newagebd.com/2005/dec/15/murdered/murdered03.html> (3 March 2007).
9 Ali Riaz, God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2004), 36–7.
10 Banu, “Jammat-i-Islami,” 81.
11 Riaz, God Willing, 34–7.
12 See Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, “Islam in Bangladesh Politics” in Hussin Mutalib and Taj
ul-Islam Hashmi (eds.), Islam, Muslims and the Modern State (St. New York: Martin’s
Press, 1994), 128.
13 See Riaz, God Willing, 96–106.
14 Statistics related to the election results are gathered from the Bangladesh Election
Commission.
15 This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that in the election of 1970, the JI received
only 6.07 per cent of the votes and did not win any seat in former East Pakistan.
JI won four seats in then-West Pakistan.
16 Golam Azam, A Guide to the Islamic Movement (Dhaka: Azam Publications,
1968), 62–3.
17 JI, “Preamble,” Election Manifesto, 2001,” Available at: <www.bangla2000.com/
Election_2001/Manifesto_Jamaat-e-Islami.shtm> (6 September 2006).
18 See Interview with Matiur Rahman Nizami “Where does Jamaat Stand?” Executive
Times, September 2006 <www.exectimes.com/diplay_news.asp?conid=544&edid=60>
(19 September 2007).
19 Banu, “Jammat-i-Islami,” 83.
20 JI, “Preamble” Election Manifesto, 2001. For an exposition of the Jamaat’s idea of an
Islamic state see: Ishtiaq Hossain and Noore Alam Siddiquee, “Islam in Bangladesh
Politics: The Role of Ghulam Azam of Jamaat-i-Islami,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies
(2004): 388–9.
21 JI, “Social Reforms and Religious Life,” Election Manifesto, 2001.
22 Husain Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” in Current Trends
in Islamist Ideology 1 (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005). <http://www.
futureofmuslimworld.com/research/pubID.30/pub_detail.asp> (23 October 2006).
23 Banu, “Jamaat-i-Islami,” 84.
24 Ishtiaq Hossain and Noore Alam Siddiquee, “Islam in Bangladesh Politics: The Role
of Ghulam Azam of Jamaat-i-Islami,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 5 (2004): 395.
25 Banu, “Jamaat-i-Islami,” 84.
26 Selim Jahid, “Total Earnings of Jamaat 30 Crore Taka: Expenses are the Almost Equal
amount,” Shamokal, 19 September 2006, 1.
27 Banu, “Jamaat-i-Islami,” 89. B.M. Monoar Kabir, “The Politics of Religion: The
Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh,” in Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed.), Religion, Nationalism and
Politics in Bangladesh (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1990): 129.
68 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
28 BICS, “At a Glance,” <www.shibir.com/ataglance/glance.html> (2 September 2006).
29 Daily Sangbad, 25–26 December 1990; Weekly Swandeep, 6–12 January 1992, 15.
Quoted in Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, “Islam in Bangladesh Politics,” in Hussin Mutalib
and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi (eds.), Islam, Muslims and the Modern State (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 121. Taj I Hashmi, Women and Islam in Bangladesh
(New York: St. Martins Press, 2000), 189.
30 Hossain and Siddiquee, “Islam in Bangladesh Politics,” 396.
31 Abul Barkat, “Bangladeshe Mowlabader Arthoniti (The Economic of Fundamentalism
in Bangladesh),” Sikhha Barta 18 (2005): 31–9.
32 Jahid, “Total Earnings of Jamaat 30 Crore Taka,” 1.
33 Abdul Latif, “Islamic Parties in Bangladesh,” Weekly Purnima 18(42) (29 June
2005).
34 “Ahab to float ‘Insaf’, contest next election,” Daily Star, 2 September 2006, 1.
35 “Govt finally cracks down on militants; Galib arrested,” Daily Star, 24 February 2005, 1.
Ten cases filed against him, but four were later withdrawn and he was released on bail
in August 2008.
36 S. M. Humayun Kabir, “Govt allows Ahle Hadith to hold gathering in Rajshahi,”
New Age, 13 October 2005, 1.
37 “Ahab to float ‘Insaf’, contest next election,” Daily Star, 2 September 2006, 1.
38 “Welcome Insaf,” News Notes, Daily Star Weekend Magazine, 5(111), 8 September
2006 <www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2006/09/02/news.htm> (10 September 2006).
39 Satananda Bhattacharjee, “Bangla ultras’ plot to train NE youths unearthed,” Assam
Tribune, 22 July 2004 <www.assamtribune.com/jul2204/main.html> (19 September
2006).
40 “Mufti Hannan captured, Militant kingpin tells of Altaf’s assurance of ‘no fear,’ ”
Daily Star, 2 October 2005, 1.
41 Waliur Rahman, “Bangladesh bombs suspect arrested,” BBC News, 22 August 2005
<news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4174416.stm> (24 August 2006).
42 “Maulana Farid had direct role in blasts: police; Nizami responsible, alleges
ex-Islamic Foundation director,” New Age, 24 August 2005, 1.
43 “Bangladesh Islamic Conference Portrays Soft Islam,” Yahoo News, <in.news.yahoo.
com/050404/139/2kjse.html> (25 August 2006).
44 A.S.M. Shamsul Arefin, The Elections in Bangladesh (Bengali), (Dhaka: Bangladesh
Research and Publications, 2003), 23.
45 Arefin, The Elections in Bangladesh, 31.
46 Abdul Latif, “Islamic Parties in Bangladesh,” Weekly Purnima, 29 June 2005.
47 For details of the controversy and agitation regarding Taslima Nasrin, see Riaz,
God Willing, 106–21.
48 Abdul Latif, “Islamic Parties in Bangladesh,” 18.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Haroon Habib, “On Neutral Ground,” Frontline 18(16) (4 August 2001) <www.flonnet.
com/fl1816/18160570.htm> (4 September 2006). See Riaz, God Willing, 44–5.
52 In early 2006, a weekly newspaper in Dhaka reported that the head of the ISA met the
BNP leaders with a view to negotiate their entry to the BNP-led alliance while party
representatives were also maintaining close contacts with the Awami League, and
other parties (PROBE News Magazine, 28 April and 4 May 2006).
53 “News Notes: Jamaat Under Fire,” Daily Star Weekend Magazine, 16 April 2005
<www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2005/04/03/news.htm> (6 September 2007).
54 Probe News: <www.probenewsmagazine.com/index.php?index=2&contentId=883&
PHPSESSID=daa39c3a652565cab2277b4468f86a91#Top> (7 October 2006).
55 “Najibul resigns from BNP in protest against Jamaat,” New Age, 27 September 2005, 1.
56 “FAQ About Hizb ut-Tahrir,” Kalifah, <www.khilafah.com/home/category.php?
DocumentID=11691&TagID=1> (19 September 2006).
 Who are the Islamists? 69
57 “About Hizb-ut Tahrir,” Hizbuttahrir, <www.hizbuttahrir.org.uk/postnuke/pn/
modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=6&
page=1> (19 September 2006).
58 “The Method of Hizb ut-Tahrir” Khilafat, <www.khilafat.org/newPages/Hizb/htahrir.
php#The_Method> (19 September 2006).
59 Shafiq Rahman, “Call for Khilafah: A look into Hizb-ut-Tahrir Bangladesh,” Weekly
Probe, 24 February–2 March 2006, 21. Muhiuddin Ahmed stated to the reporter in
an interview: “now we have some 10,000 members and 50 percent of them are
activists.”
60 Mahfuz Sadiq, “Islam’s New Face?” New Age, Eid Special Issue, 4 November
2005, Dhaka <www.newagebd.com/2005/nov/04/eidspecial05/non-fiction03.html>
(20 September 2006).
61 “Our Method” <www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/who-is-ht/our-method/our-method.html>
(26 October 2006)
62 “Totpor 95 Jongi Sangathan” (95 Militant Organizations are Active), Bhorer Kagoj,
23 August 2006, 1.
63 Although these are self-reported data, the reliability is high because providing inac-
curate information is a misdemeanor and can cost the parliamentary seat of the indi-
vidual. The statistics are derived from, Pramanaya Sangsad 2001 (Dhaka: Tathya
Sheba Information Service, 2002), 119–213.
64 Banu, “Jamaat-i-Islami,” 89.
65 This observation is based on the academic background of the following leaders of the
JI: Maulana Abul Kalam Muhammad Yusuf; Maqbul Ahmad; Professor A.K.M. Nazir
Ahmad; Abu Ahsan Mohammad Mojaheed; Maulana Abdus Sobhan; Muhammad
Kamaruzzaman; Abdul Quader Molla; ATM Azharul Islam; Badre Alam; Mir Abul
Kasem and Barrister Abdur Razzak. All of these central leaders are known to be
“western-educated.”
66 Enayet Rasul, “Nation let down by a non-performing parliament,” Financial Express
(Dhaka) 5 July 2006 <www.financialexpress-bd.com/index3.asp?cnd=7/5/2006&
section_id=16&newsid=29605&spcl=yes> (8 October 2006). The TIB report accounted
for big business houses; the number will be far higher if owners of small and medium
businesses are added to the list.
67 M.I. Ali, “The dangers of politics-business nexus,” Weekly Holiday, 1 November
2002, 8.
68 Banu, “Jamaat-i-Islami,” 87–9.
69 Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web (London Routledge,
2008) 40–3.
70 Shakhawat Liton, “Islamic parties losing votes, forging alliance,” Daily Star,
31 August 2006.
71 Riaz, “Crippled Caretaker,” Himal Southasia, August 2006, 29–32.
72 Shamim Ashraf, “All 7 JMB Shura men had links with Jamaat, Shibir,” Daily Star,
28 April 2006.
73 “Bikalpa Dhara, Jatiya Oikya Manch and Tarikat Federation Form New Alliance,”
VOA News: Bangla, 31 August 2006 <www.voanews.com/bangla/2006-08-31-voa5.
cfm> (3 September 2006).
74 Iraz Ahmed with Nurul Kabir, “Whither alliance allies?” Weekly Holiday, 1 February
2002, 1. The IOJ split into two factions under the leadership of Obaidul Huq and
Fazlul Huq Aminee.
75 “IOJ splits as Mufti Izharul forms faction,” News Network, 11 April 2005 <www.
newsnetwork-bd.com/UI/Public/NewsDetail.php?LogID=2901> (12 September
2006).
76 “Three components of bifurcated IOJ break away,” Bangladesh Observer,
7 May 2006. <www.bangladeshobserveronline.com/new/2006/05/07/national.htm>
(12 September 2006).
70 Ali Riaz and Kh. Ali Ar Raji
77 Ekram Kabir, “Factionalism Bedevils Ruling Alliance,” Asian Affairs (August
2004).
78 “Khelafat MP threatens to resign from JS,” News Today, 15 August 2006.
79 Interview with Maulana Muhiuddin, Weekly Probe 4(25) (16 December 2005)
<www.probe newsmagazine.com/index.php?index=2&contentId=552> (12 September
2006).
4 Who are the militants?
Zayadul Ahsan and Pavitra Banavar

Introduction
Since Bangladesh gained its independence from Pakistan in 1971, it has steadily
made progress towards being a moderate and democratic country. In the late
1990s and early 2000s this progress stagnated due to “a combination of political
violence, weak governance, poverty, corruption, and rising Islamist militancy.”1
These issues remained the key impediments on the path towards democratization
and political stability in Bangladesh. The emergence of Islamist parties such as
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) as important political actors and
their participation in the coalition government headed by the Bangladesh National
Party (BNP) (2001–6) have allowed the Islamist militant groups to operate more
freely.
This chapter explores the emergence and proliferation of the Islamist
militant groups operating within Bangladesh. The following seven sections
analyze the origins, characteristics and implications of militant groups in
Bangladesh. The chapter begins with an examination of the origins, leadership
and existing connections between the various groups. This section will also
explore the objectives and tactics employed by each group in an effort to
spread their message. The second section analyzes the numerical strength of each
group and addresses the discrepancies among the different sources within
Bangladesh and in the international community. The third section addresses the
composition of the groups, specifically the recruitment mechanisms, training
methods and structures, and the sources of financing for the various groups. The
fourth section focuses on the areas of operation for each group. The fifth and sixth
sections analyze the connections between the various political parties and the
militant groups as well as the government’s steps to eradicate terrorism in
Bangladesh. The final section attempts to assess the future of Islamist militancy
in Bangladesh and how this will subsequently affect its role in the international
community. The information for this chapter has been gathered from various
sources, including government, think tanks and personal communications with
experts in the field.
72 Zaydul Ahsan and Pavitra Banavar
Genesis
Militant groups in Bangladesh began to appear on the political scene in the early
1990s. In the past decade, they have increasingly relied upon violence to spread
their message throughout the country. The main militant groups within Bangladesh
are the Harkat ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB), Jagrata Muslim Janata
Bangladesh (JMJB) and the Jamaatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB). However,
members of these organizations have also operated under the names of various
other organizations; for example, after being banned in October 2005 the HuJIB
reportedly renamed itself Islami Dawaat el Kafela.2 In the years since the forma-
tion of these groups numerous theories have been posed in order to explain their
formation, activities and connections. The origins and linkages of each group and
reactions from the government are outlined below.

Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh

The Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB, Movement of Islamic Holy
War) was formed in 1980 after some of its members returned from fighting
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. On 30 April 1992 senior figures in the HuJIB held
a press conference at the National Press Club in Dhaka to announce their inten-
tion of establishing an Islamic state in Bangladesh. Among the many connections
HuJIB shares with other militant organizations, is the signing of the Islamic
Front’s 1998 declaration of war on the U.S. along with Osama bin Laden.3 Since
2000 HuJIB militants have been connected to the stabbing of a Bangladeshi
journalist, the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the
attack on the U.S. Center in Kolkata and numerous rallies against Indian security
forces in Kashmir.4 On 17 October 2005, the BNP government banned HuJIB
as an extremist organization. The U.S. State Department included HuJIB on their
list of Other Terrorist Groups in their 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism report.5

Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh

The Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB, Party of the Mujahideen), has been
working to “establish Islamic law in Bangladesh through armed struggle and is
opposed to democracy, NGOs, many cultural outlets such as music and the
cinema and imposes strict Islamic codes on the behavior of women.”6 There is
conflicting information regarding the formation of JMB, with sources suggesting
that the group was created sometime between the mid- to late 1990s. The ICG
report suggests the group was created in 1998 and only came to the public’s
attention in 2002 when several of their militants were arrested.7 According to
the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism
Knowledge Base, JMB came into being in 1998 but was not recognized by the
public until 2004. The International Crisis Group claims that JMJB was formed
much later in 2003.8 When JMB launched its operation in the northern region
of Bangladesh, it was under the banner of Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh
 Who are the militants? 73
(JMJB, Awakened Muslim Masses of Bangladesh). Since their appearance in
2004, the JMJB has been linked to the murder of an alleged member of the Purbo
Banglar Communist Party (PBCP), “a left-wing extremist group in direct opposi-
tion to the JMJB agenda to “Talibanize” Bangladesh.”9 In 2005 the group was
connected to the 17 August bombings in which 450–500 bombs were simultane-
ously detonated in 63 out of the 64 districts of Bangladesh. The JMB was also
involved in the assassinations of two judges in a southern district in November
2005 and killings of several others in two districts; suicide bombers carried out
these attacks, which was a tactic never used by the JMB before 17 August that
year. The BNP government placed a ban on the JMB and the JMJB, separately
naming it, on 23 February 2005. Sources suggest that following the arrests of
Abdur Rahman and Siddiqul Islam in March 2006 the group has scattered.

Additional Islamist groups

In addition to the three main Islamist militant groups there are also lesser-known
groups such as Shahdat-e Al-Hiqma, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Jadid al Qaeda.
There is little reliable data about the other groups, including Shahdat-e Al Hiqma,
and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Of them, Jadid al Qaeda came under scrutiny when it
detonated several bombs at three railway stations – Kamalapur Railway Station
at Dhaka, Chittagong and Sylhet in May 2007. Since then, no other activities have
been attributed to this organization.10
The profiles of the militants arrested since the beginning of 2005 indicate that
former participants of the Afghan war and disaffected youth are at the helm of
these organizations. Their attacks seem to demonstrate similar patterns which
may suggest a single central directive guiding their operations. They frequently
target specific kinds of organization and personalities such as locally prominent
NGOs and NGO-run schools, members of the judiciary, cultural activists, etc.11

Connections among Islamist and militant groups

There are multiple theories about the connections between these various militant
groups, particularly the JMB and the JMJB driven in part by several shared
characteristics. The ICG report claims, “JMJB is an offshoot of the JMB, renamed
only after a clash with police.”12 The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base claims
that JMB is a military front for JMJB. The Terrorism Knowledge Base further
asserts that despite the claims that JMJB and JMB are actually one operational
group, “JMB operates more widely than JMJB, which is generally confined to
the country’s northwestern districts.”13 A number of the arrested JMB operatives
disclosed to interrogators that the JMJB was a temporary banner for operations
in the northern region. This claim is substantiated by the fact that the JMJB
banner has not been used after the militants were forced to wrap up their
operation in the northern districts. Sources in Bangladesh claim that arrested
HuJIB militants joined the JMB in 2003 to avoid detection by law enforcement
officials.
74 Zaydul Ahsan and Pavitra Banavar
There are also allegations that the student organization, Islami Chatra Shibir
(ICS) has been linked with several militant organizations within Bangladesh. The
ICS is the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) Bangladesh, which is the largest
Islamic political party in Bangladesh. The ICS is “dedicated to the establishment
of an Islamic system of education in Bangladesh, and the foundation of an Islamic
state in greater Bangladesh.”14 ICS is a member of international Islamic student
organizations such as the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations
(IIFSO) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. ICS was founded in 1941
along with its parent organization, Jamaat-e-Islami. Their main centers of opera-
tions are in Bangladeshi universities along with visible presence and influence in
the madrassas (religious schools) throughout Bangladesh.
There are essentially two kinds of violent activities that the ICS undertakes. The
first is characterized by confrontations between the ICS and other student organiza-
tions, mainly the Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL) which is the student wing of
the Awami League and a political opponent of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JI).
The second involves violent activities conducted outside educational institutions.
The ICS is also seen as a training ground for Islamist politicians throughout
Bangladesh. “Many officials and news sources allege that the group is nothing
more than a recruiting ground for Bangladeshi terrorist groups such as Harakat
ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJIB) and Jamaatul Mujahideen (JMB), while others simply
view the ICS as a front for Jamaat-e-Islami’s (JI) terrorist operations.”15 Another
connection between ICS and the militant groups is that all seven members of the
Majlish-e-Shura, the highest body of the proscribed JMB, had been involved with
the JI or its student wing, the Islami Chatra Shibir (ICS).16

Leadership
Reliable information on the leadership of the militant groups is hard to find. The
South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the ICG and Ali Riaz have laid out what is
known about the leaders of each Islamist and militant group. This section also
reveals further connections between the militant groups through their shared
leadership. Each individual’s journey towards gaining leadership over these
militant groups is also explained in this section.

HuJIB
Like other clandestine organization, the leadership of the HuJIB has changed
over time. In late-2005 the organization was led by Shauqat Osman alias Sheikh
Farid and Imtiaz Quddus, the secretary general. In 2006, sources close to the
militants claimed that Obaidur Rahman Nadvi and Manzur Hasan had taken over
the leadership. Until his arrest in late 2005, Mufti Hannan was one of the key
leaders of the organization. Mufti Abdul Hannan Munshi, alias Kalam alias
Jaman, claimed to be the “operations commander.” Mufti Hannan joined the
Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul- Islami (HuJIB) in the early 1990s when the former Afghan
Mujahideen established the organization. He began his HuJIB career as a local
 Who are the militants? 75
leader, but soon rose to the policy-making level. Hannan is currently serving a
jail term for weapons charges and there are two other charges that are pending.17
In early June 2007 Mufti Hannan was charged with the grenade attacks on British
envoy Anwar Chowdhury in Sylhet in 2004. He later made judicial confessions
regarding his involvement in the grenade attack on Awami League chief Sheikh
Hasina during a party rally in the capital on 21 August 2004 that left 23 persons
dead and over 200 injured, and a bomb attack on a new year celebration in Dhaka
in 2001.

JMB
The two main leaders of the JMB were Shaekh Abdur Rahman and Siddiqul
Islam, better known as Bangla Bhai. The JMJB, being the offshoot of the JMB,
was also led by the duo. Abdur Rahman was the Ameer (‘chief’) and spiritual
leader of the JMB while Bangla Bhai was the commander of the group’s militant
activities until they were both hanged in March 2007. Abdur Rahman, before
the independence of Bangladesh, joined the Islami Chatra Sangha, the then
student wing of the Jaamat-e-Islami and later the JI. Rahman established the
JMB in 1998, after befriending Asadullah Ghalib, a young radical within the
Ahle Hadith community. Ghalib left the Ahle Hadith Jamaat and established
the AHAB (Ahle Hadith Andolon of Bangladesh, Ahle Hadith Movement of
Bangladesh) in 1994.
Siddiqul Islam was also known to Abdur Rahman before the formation of JMB.
Siddiqul Islam’s political career began with Islami Chatra Shibir (ICS) and it was
through his ICS background that he came to know Abdur Rahman, the chief of
the JMB. Similarly, Ataur Rahman Sunny, the youngest brother of the JMB chief
Abdur Rahman, also known as Hasan alias Abdus Samad, joined the Islami
Chatra Shibir (ICS) and rose to prominence as a leader in that organization.
Mohammad Sohel alias Saleheen alias Salahuddin was also a member of ICS
until he met Abdur Rahman and joined JMB. Mohammad Sohel is a member
of the majlish-e-shura of the JMB, and joined Bangla Bhai in his operation in
Bagmara, a small area in northern district Rajshahi where people suffered due to
the outlawed activities of the PBCP, a point the JMJB banked on in the course
of spreading its wing in the region, in April 2004.
Mohammad Faruk Hossain alias Khaled Saifullah was a member of the ICS
and after completing his education at the Madrassah-e-Aliyah joined Ayesha
Siddique Salafiya Islamia Women’s Madrassah at Chhoto Gurgola in Dinajpur
as an administrative officer. Saifullah joined the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami
Bangladesh (HuJIB) in the early 1990s and became a close associate of Mufti
Hannan in 1999. Hannan introduced him to JMB chief Abdur Rahman resulting
in Saifullah’s joining the JMB shortly afterwards. This exemplifies the close ties
between ICS members and those who join the larger militant groups once they
complete their education.18
The close ties between militants and the ruling parties are also demonstrated by
the presence of a number of individuals in the close circles of the ruling coalition.
76 Zaydul Ahsan and Pavitra Banavar
For example, one of the alleged organizers of the HuJIB in Bangladesh, Ataur
Rahman Khan, was elected to the Parliament in 1991 as a BNP nominee; and a
former “Afghan Mujahideen” – a volunteer who fought in Afghanistan. Mufti
Shahidul Islam was also an MP elected in 2001 representing the Islamic Oikya Jote
(IOJ, a constituent of the four-party coalition government that ruled Bangladesh
from 2001 to 2006). Muhammad Habibur Rahman, one of the senior leaders of
the Bangladesh Khilafat Majlish, a component of the IOJ, claimed in an interview
in 1998 that he was one of the 10-member delegation team from Bangladesh
which visited Afghanistan in 1988 at the invitation of the HuJI Pakistan. Other
members of the Bangladeshi delegation included Shaikhul Hadith Azizul Haq,
the chief of a faction of the IOJ. The connections between the ruling parties and
the militants are not limited to the national level but are also established at the
local level. For example, the first rally of the JMJB in Bagmara was addressed by
the Joint Secretary General of the local chapter of the BNP.19
After the arrest (2006) and execution (2007) of the five leading members of the
Shura, the highest policymaking body, followed by a countrywide crackdown to
dismantle their network the JMB grappled with a leadership crisis. Several senior
leaders, however, constituted a new shura in August 2006. Maulana Saidur Rahman
alias Abu Zafar, a former amir of Habiganj district of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI),
replaced Shaekh Rahman as amir of the JMB. Saidur was allegedly expelled from
Jamaat in 1989 for his radical views and had forged close links with other militant
organizations in Bangladesh and the large Sylheti diaspora in Britain. However,
many take the Jamaat’s claim of expelling Saidur as an attempt to divert people’s
attention from its militant connection to enable Saidur to continue with his mili-
tant mission. This is further substantiated by Jamaat’s disowning of its members
whenever they were caught carrying out militant activities or criminal acts.20
While Shaekh Abdur Rahman was alive Saidur became one of his most trusted
advisers and patrons. He was entrusted with the Shaekh’s safety during the crack-
down. Shaekh was eventually arrested in March 2006 in a house rented by Saidur
in Sylhet.
In November 2008, the Shura was reconstituted with a mix of veterans who
were close to Shaekh Rahman. According to the confessional statement of
Jahidur Rahman, alias “Boma Mizan” the chief explosive expert of the JMB the
new shura members are: Maulana Saidur Rahman, Mohammad Mahfuz alias
Sohel Mahfuz, Najmul Shahid alias Bhaigna Shahid, Mehedi Hasan Abir, Sayem,
Osman alias Shahed.21 Jahidur Rahman was arrested with a huge amount of
explosives in May 2009.22
After the 2006 crackdown, the group divided itself into seven divisions. The
entire northern region is now commanded by the powerful shura member Najmul
alias Bhaigna Shahid who also took charge of explosives training, bomb-making
and caches after Boma Mizan’s arrest.
The other key leader in the new Shura is Sohel Mahfuz, who is in charge of
military operations and the merged division of Dhaka. The lesser-known Abir is
in charge of the southwest, while Osman alias Shahed has been placed in command
of Chittagong. Sayem, the only shura member who is reportedly hiding in India,
 Who are the militants? 77
was part of Shaekh Rahman’s inner circle and developed the group’s IT section
with Saidur’s son Shamim, who was arrested with large amounts of IT equipment
in 2005.The new structure prevents direct communication between district cells,
between the da’wa and military groups and the leaders. Bashar, another son of
Saidur, is the point man for all communication between Saidur, division heads,
financiers and shura members.

Numerical strength

HuJIB
The Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI- Bangladesh), reportedly established with
assistance from Osama bin Laden, has around 15,000 members in Bangladesh,
including local residents and foreigners. Rohingya refugees from Mynamar resid-
ing in different camps in Cox’s Bazar constitute a significant portion of the
HuJIB cadres. The organization also recruits cadres from students of various
madrassas, most of which are financed by Arab charities.23
The ICG report claims that HuJIB has an estimated 2,000 members and a
majority of them have been recruited from various madrassas throughout
Bangladesh. The SATP puts the estimate closer to 15,000 members.24 Members
of HuJIB revealed during police interrogation that there were 25,000 trained
activists in the group. However, intelligence reports claim there are only 15,000
members with many of the cadres joining different Islamic parties after the
proscription of the group. The intricate links and splits between the groups makes
it more difficult to gauge the exact number of members in each. But even a
conservative estimate puts the figure at thousands.

JMB
In his interviews to the press in May 2004, Shaekh Rahman claimed the JMB had
10,000 Ehsars, hundred thousand Gayeri Ehsars and a million Sudhis.25 The
number most quoted by several witnesses, former JMB members and intelligence
officials is close to 2,000 Ehsars and around 5,000 Gayeri Ehsars at the group’s
peak. Journalists who followed the events estimate the number to be close to
5,000 Ehsars and 10,000 Gayeri Ehsars, but their calculations are based on the
number of people who frequented the JMB camps at that time.
The JMB operates under a three-tier system that accounts for members based
on whether they are recruited on a full-time or part-time basis. In the first tier,
activists are recruited on a full-time basis, Ehsar. The second tier is the Gayeri
Ehsar, or part-time recruits, and the third tier is composed of individuals who
indirectly cooperate with JMJB or their sympathizers. In 2006, it was reported
that the JMJB was in the process of creating a fourth tier that would consist of
their younger supporters called sathis or sudhis.26
Many government officials agree that around 1,500 militants were arrested in
late 2005 crackdown. But it is yet unknown how many were released and returned
78 Zaydul Ahsan and Pavitra Banavar
to the organization. News reports suggest at least 500–800 were released due to
insufficient evidence or lobbying from the erstwhile BNP-led government.

Operational capabilities

Recruitment
There is no single source of recruitment for the militant groups in Bangladesh.
The profiles of the arrested militants, particularly the leading figures arrested
since August 2005, show that they have come from various backgrounds and
have been recruited from both urban and rural areas. The educational back-
grounds of the key militants, however, show that a large number of them have
been students of Qwami madrassah. Qwami madrassah are Islamic seminaries in
which religion is taught in a more orthodox fashion and which are not subject to
government regulation. Unfortunately, despite the recurring connection between
madrassahs and Islamist groups in Bangladesh, there is a lack of empirical research
about the links between madrassahs and Islamist groups. Madrassah education in
Bangladesh is often viewed as a “cheaper, more accessible and more Islamic
alternative to education.”27 But these institutions are also described as the means
of “education of the holy warrior.”28 (For discussions on the connection between
education and Islamists, see Chapter 7 of this volume.) The importance of educa-
tional institutions as the recruiting ground should not be overemphasized;
because, “a variety of factors, including a lack of equitable development, poverty,
weak law and order, and erosion of credibility of successive governments, have
contributed to the growing appeal of radical elements in Bangladesh.”29 It is
worth recalling that many militants have an ICS background.30

HuJIB
The Harkat-ul Jihad-al- Islami-Bangladesh has recruited members from many
different sources throughout the years. Many of its recruits have been involved in
conflicts throughout the region and therefore bring unique backgrounds to the
group. At the beginning the HuJIB recruited many ex-soldiers who had trained in
Afghanistan with the Taliban. These individuals now occupy leadership and
trainer positions of the organizations. The second wave of the HuJIB cadres came
from those who worked closely with the Rohingya community who are refugees
from Myanmar who fled to escape religious persecution.31 Charu Lata Hogg
claims there have been “charges that Quomi madrassas have served as recruit-
ing grounds for various Islamic groups such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
(HuJIB).”32
The HuJIB has two sections. The activists of the jihad section are those who
train HuJIB activists to prepare them for the jihad and assist Muslims fighting
anywhere in the world. The dawat and irshad sections publish and distribute books,
booklets and leaflets, organize seminars and conferences to motivate people. HuJIB
recruits members from both local residents and foreigners. Rohingya refugees
 Who are the militants? 79
from Mynamar residing in different camps in Cox’s Bazar constitute a significant
portion of the HuJIB cadres. The organization also recruits cadres from students
of various madrassahs, most of which are financed by Pakistan and Middle Eastern
countries.
Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami (HuJIB) leaders from India and Pakistan, who fought
on the frontline in Afghanistan, visit Bangladesh and some of them stay for a long
time to train local operatives as well as those from other countries in remote
hideouts and training camps. Mufti Obaidullah, a Lasker-e-Tayeba leader who
was arrested in Dhaka in July 2009, confessed to law enforcement officers that
he had contact with HuJIB leader Mufti Abdul Hannan and that he came to
Bangladesh to take shelter as the Indian government had declared him a “most
wanted” criminal for his involvement in different terrorist attacks in India.

JMB
JMB’s recruitment has diversified over the years and does not always conform to
popular perceptions. Although JMB maintains a solid madrassa foundation, its
Da’wa program has changed significantly since the crackdowns, with extensive
and open da’wa networks in the first six years replaced by tight da’wa cells since
November 2008. A former counter-terrorism chief said that in 2006, 53 percent
of arrested JMB operatives were educated in secular schools and only 39 percent
had a madrassah background, while the remainder were illiterate.33
The JMB’s off-campus recruitment was not limited to ICS members as some
of JMB’s most powerful operatives were recruited while at university, but
through intermediaries off-campus. With strong linkages to Ahl-e-Hadith hub
madrassahs, JMB heavily recruited madrassah teachers and mosque staff such
as imams and muazzins. In turn, these men acted as recruiters in the mosques,
targeting men who were already politically engaged. Recruitment of madrassah
students has always played and continues to play a crucial part in JMB recruit-
ment. JMB’s original shura were picked out of a madrassah’s study group in
Jatrabari in Dhaka and the method is maintained. This information was gleaned
during interrogations and interviews by journalists of the JMB operatives who
were arrested and are in hideouts.
The ICG report claims JMJB “cadres are recruited from madrassas and
mosques such as the Jamalpur-based Al-Madina Islamic Cadet Madrassahs run
by Maulana Abdur Rahman.”34 Press reports have indicated that a number of
madrasshas have been used for this purpose. The leaders of many of these organ-
izations claim they “have used about 700 establishments identified as madrassahs
and mosques” for recruiting new members. 35 The JMJB has also set up commit-
tees within individual villages which citizens are coerced to join.36 The JMJB has
used children between the ages of 12 and 15 to act as “couriers but also carrying
and setting off bombs.”37 Field work conducted by one of the authors of this
chapter revealed that young madrassah students tend to join militant groups due
to a perceived lack of opportunities and the believe that they have more to gain
from joining a militant group because they are told they will be rewarded by
80 Zaydul Ahsan and Pavitra Banavar
reaching Heaven and paradise for performing acts of Jihad. However, the fact
remains that there was no separate mode of recruitment for the JMJB since it was
just a façade of the JMB used in Rajshahi region for a specific time in the first
half of the decade.

Training
Despite counter-terrorism efforts launched in early 2005, which resulted in the
arrests of the key leaders of the JMB in the first half of 2006, the training infra-
structures of the militant groups have not been unearthed by the law enforcement
agencies in Bangladesh. However, there is an agreement among various sources
that these groups have established efficient training facilities in various parts of
the country.

HuJIB
The ICG report, quoting a U.S. State Department source asserts that the HuJIB
has at least six militant training camps in Bangladesh.38 The SATP report insists
on the existence of similar numbers of camps in “the hilly areas of Chittagong,
where its cadres are trained in the use of weapons.” Six more training camps exist
in the Cox’s Bazar area, according to the SATP.39 Ali Riaz notes that arrested
militants revealed the existence of training camps in Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar,
established through foreign funds that are centered on qwami madrassah.40 Most
of these camps were established during the 1990s as part of the support network
to the Rohingya militants. Bertil Lintner, a freelance reporter who follows rebel
groups in South and Southeast Asia, quoted an internal HuJIB document in 2002
suggesting the organization has at least 19 “training establishments” all over
Bangladesh. But Lintner commented, “It is uncertain how many of them actually
offer military training.”41
Since 1996, HuJIB training camps in Ukhia in Cox’s Bazar and remote places
in Chittagong Hill Tracts have been run with the help of Arakan rebels and
Rohingyas. It set up more training camps in the Islamic University in Kushtia and
in Sylhet and Habiganj districts in north-eastern Bangladesh. The Indian insurgent
group ULFA is also believed to have training camps in these areas. Operatives of
Lasker-e-Tayeba and Asif Reza Commando Force, an Indian terrorist group that
claimed responsibility for the 2002 attack on the American Center in Kolkata,
entered Bangladesh clandestinely to hide out in these areas used to train the local
HuJIB operatives. Captured Lasker-e-Tayeba leader Obaidullah said in his state-
ment to police that arrested the HuJIB leader Mufti Hannan had told him that
HuJIB had training camps in remote Mangrove thickets of the Sundarbans.

JMB
The JMB reportedly received funds for a number of madrassahs that came from
Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami. Abdur Rahman used his own madrassahs, particularly the
 Who are the militants? 81
Medina Cadet Madrassah to preach violence, and it was allegedly used as a train-
ing camp. The ICG report claims “it has a network of mosques, madrassas and
militant training camps in 57 districts; some senior cadres have reportedly trained
in Afghanistan.”42 JMB also receives funding from the Al-Haramain Islamic
Foundation (AHF), which presents itself as a private, charitable, and educational
organization dedicated to promoting Islamic teaching throughout the world.43
Ali Riaz has noted that following the 17 August bombings intelligence reports
claimed that an orphanage funded by the AHF had provided training to about 500
militants of the JMB on how to manufacture and use bombs.44 The members of the
JMJB, during their open activities in the northern region of Natore and Rajshahi in
early 2004 admitted providing training. But, as reported by the ICG, “JMJB admits
to giving recruits self-defense training, and denies it has any militant camps.”45
Some captured JMB operatives disclosed to police that physical training took
place in different madrassahs, chars (shoals) and river banks, and arms training
in hideouts.
According to information gleaned from the arrested JMB operatives, the training
had two parts – motivational lectures and readings and physical training with arms
and explosives. The lecture was based on the theme that losing one’s life for a
holy purpose will bring everlasting happiness. The trainers also used motivational
books, videos and audio in the training and main theme of these propaganda
materials is the call for Jihad by sacrificing one’s life. In 2003, decoded diaries of
the militants stunned the investigators with information that the outfit had training
stations in 57 districts with bases at the Ahle Hadith mosques and madrassahs.
On 19 July 2005, police arrested 11 JMB men at their training camp at a newly
constructed house at Puthiapara in Paba upazila in Rajshahi. Police seized diaries
from their possession that detailed training methods, descriptions of sophisticated
arms including AK-47 rifles. The diaries also described different types of detona-
tors, their construction and operation and where bomb-making materials could be
found. A training manual “Proshikkhon Guide” with techniques to dodge law
enforcers was recovered from militants arrested in Dhaka on 16 September 2005.
“They have well-equipped training stations in all the 16 northern and some south-
ern districts and small stations in other districts where they operate,” the then
inspector of Joypurhat unit of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of
police told this author quoting from an intelligence report.

Financing
Financial contributions to these groups come from different sources such as inter-
national donors, local level donations, especially alms, and personal contributions
given to various madrassas. Funds have also been generated from involuntary
sources such as through extortion and looting local businesses and NGOs in
remote parts of the country. HuJIB’s funding comes primarily from madrassas in
Bangladesh, and some of their funds are transferred from Pakistani extremists.
Their initial funding was allegedly received from Osama bin Laden’s network.46
The SATP also claims HuJIB “reportedly receives financial assistance from Pakistan,
82 Zaydul Ahsan and Pavitra Banavar
Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan through Muslim Non-Governmental Organizations
in Bangladesh, including the Adarsa Kutir, Al Faruk Islamic Foundation and
Hataddin.”47 The Terrorism Knowledge Base claims JMB is funded by

Private citizens from countries throughout the Middle East allegedly contrib-
ute to JMB, while international NGOs based in the Persian Gulf also provide
a significant source of funding. JMB reportedly invests in numerous shrimp
farms in south-west Bangladesh, in addition to money laundering activities.
Madrassas connected to JMB also are a source of support.48

Rohan Gunaratne, head of the International Center for Political Violence and
Terrorism Research, at Singapore’s Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at
Nanyang Technological University, insists that the “JMB received significant
al-Qaida assistance in training and finance.”49 The ICG report claims JMB spends
approximately $1,250 per full-time cadre each month.50 JMJB, in similar vein,
received funding from a variety of sources, and “the organization collects
membership dues and receives donations from private citizens.”51
It is alleged that JMB received funding from the proscribed British group
Al Muhajiroun. In June 2005, two British-Bangladeshi men named Sajjad and
Habibur Rahman, who claimed to be from Al Muhajiroun, paid JMB £10,000
through connections with the large Bangladeshi diaspora, mostly from the Sylhet
region, in Britain. After their arrest, JMB Shura members Ataur Rahman Sunny
and Abdul Awal made judicial statements on this on 8 February 2006.52
AHAB chief Dr Asadullah al-Galib informed security officials that he received
Tk 27 crore each year from the Kuwait-based Ahle Hadith organization, Revival
for Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), until the organization was banned in
Bangladesh. The NGO continued to fund their operations through multiple
methods, including Hundi (Hawala), and several front organizations.
According to the statement of arrested JMB explosive expert Boma Mizan
made to police, he received a monthly stipend of around $450 a month. Ehsars
who were under Mizan’s explosives training program, were paid $20 a month for
their expenses. Most startlingly, however, he revealed that in 2008 alone, he
received $10,000 to buy bomb-making materials. These, of course, are just figures
for operations under Mizan and calculating the total number of Ehsars at 200,
JMB are raising enough funds to pay $3,500 to all of its Ehsars every month.
Obaidullah claimed that Mufti Hannan had told him that ISI, Pakistan’s intel-
ligence agency, is a regular supplier of funds and other assistance to the HuJIB.

Areas of operation

HuJIB and JMB

The SATP report claims HuJIB operates in “the coastal area stretching from the port
city of Chittagong south through Cox’s Bazar to the Myanmarese border. …”53
ICG also states “its stronghold is in the south east, along the border with Myanmar.”54
 Who are the militants? 83
JMJB’s headquarters are in Dhaka but “it operates mainly out of Jamalpur with
regional offices throughout the country.”55 The Terrorism Knowledge Base asserts
“it has divided Bangladesh into nine organizational divisions with a divisional office
in each. The highest decision-making body is the seven-member Majlish-e-Shura
(Islamic law council).”56 The SATP report states “the JMJB is reported to have
created strong bases mostly in northwest Bangladesh, in the districts of Rajshahi,
Satkhira, Naogaon, Bagerhat, Jessore, Chittagong, Joypurhat, Natore, Rangpur,
Bogra, Chittagong, and Khulna.” The report goes on to claim, “The outfit has also
established at least ten camps at Atrai and Raninagar in the Naogaon district,
Bagmara in Rajshahi district, and Naldanga and Singra in Natore district.”57

Connection to political parties

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) which was in power from 1991–6 and
2001–6 and the Awami League which held power from 1996–2001 and since 2009
has dominated the Bangladeshi political scene.58 In addition to the mainstream
political parties, Islamic parties such as Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the
Islamic Oikya Jote (IOJ) are also involved in the decision-making process. Riaz
explains that, in spite of the role of major Islamist parties within the constitutional
framework this does not alleviate the threat posed to the political system by
opposition parties that reject the idea of pluralism and the notion of democracy.59
The ICG report claims “the BNP’s conservatism has meant it has been mostly
comfortable in alliances with religious parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, though
the relationship is not always easy.”60 The ICG report goes on to state “BNP lead-
ers maintain that JI is firmly under their control but critics believe the Jamaat is
hollowing out the BNP and making it more religiously based.”61 Since members
of JI and IOJ joined the government, militant groups have operated with impunity
due to the blurred lines between the underground and the state.62
During its 2001–6 rule, the BNP not only overlooked the alarming rise of militancy
but also assisted it fearing it might lose the votes of the Islamic minded people.

HuJIB
HuJIB has been linked to many of the political parties in Bangladesh including
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), and Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ).
The Congressional Research Service report claims

the radical Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJIB) is thought to have ties to both

Al Qaeda and the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), which is a coalition partner of the
BNP. Some view the BNP’s coalition with hardline Islamist coalition
members as promoting the spread of violence.63

After his arrest on 1 October 2005 in Dhaka, Mufti Hannan told newsmen that
he had been staying in the country after getting assurance of “no fear” by the
BNP’s minister for home affairs, Altaf Hossain Choudhury.64 He was wanted for
84 Zaydul Ahsan and Pavitra Banavar
his involvement in a plot to kill the then prime minister Sheikh Hasina in July
2000, an accusation he admitted in the court later, like his confessional statements
about assassination attempts on Hasina in 2000 and later on in 2004.
In a dramatic turn of events, the media in Bangladesh recently revealed that a
man accused of an assassination attempt on Hasina received assistance from a
serving senior army officer who was appointed military secretary to the president
of Bangladesh a few months ago.
There are also reports that “two senior members of IOJ have reportedly been
connected with the recent reemergence of Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami (HuJIB)
under the name “Conscious Islamic People.” As the banner failed to hide the
faces of the Afghan returnees, they attempted to launch a political party, Islamic
Democratic Party (IDP) in 2008. The then Caretaker Government did not allow
them to register with the election office but fell short of taking any action against
them. After the Awami League formed a government with a historic win in the
2008 parliamentary elections, it also prevented them from registering. Since then,
the IDP leaders have been in hiding. It has also been reported that the political
wing of HuJIB will seek to enter politics under the name “Islami Gono Andolon.”65
The SATP report claims “In Bangladesh, the HuJI is also known to have enjoyed
the patronage of mainstream political parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami.”66 The ICG report claims “IOJ chairman,
Azizul Haq, is reportedly on the advisory council of the radical HuJIB.”67

JMB and JMJB

JMB and JMJB have also formed links to the mainstream and Islamist political
parties and “many prominent Bangladeshis and members of the secular opposi-
tion Awami League party accuse the government of collaboration, or at least tacit
tolerance, of Islamic extremists.”68 The SATP claims:

Many members of the JMB and JMJB have invariably been found to be cadres
of the Islami Chatra Shibir (ICS), student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, a partner
in the ruling coalition. Such unbroken linkages with the Jamaat-i-Islami have
helped the outfit immensely not just in terms of unhindered growth but also in
terms providing relief in the event of intermittent official action.69

Bangla Bhai, the erstwhile leader of JMB and JMJB was suspected of having
ties with political parties in Bangladesh. The CRS report claims Bangla Bhai
“is suspected of having ties to Jamaat-e-Islam (JI), and is thought to advocate a
Taliban-style government for Bangladesh.”70 The ICG report states “JMB activ-
ists are sometimes connected to the Jamaat, and arrested members have told this
to the police and to [Rapid Action Battalions] RAB.”71 The SATP asserts:

Reports indicate that the JMJB is supported by certain members of the

ruling Bangladesh National(ist) Party (BNP). The Deputy Minister for Land,
Ruhul Kuddus Talukder Dulu, has been allegedly linked to the outfit.
 Who are the militants? 85
Bagmara’s BNP Joint Secretary, Besharat Ullah, indicating the degree of
support that the vigilante outfit enjoys within the ruling coalition, reportedly
addressed the first rally of the JMJB.72

Many of the activists established ties with the political parties through their
involvement with student groups such as ICS.
When the JMB was operating under the banner of JMJB in northern
Bangladesh, it enjoyed the support of some local MPs and ministers which led to
the release of militant operatives, if any were arrested, thanks to the prompt inter-
vention of the influential political leaders in power. The government, in coalition
with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and IOJ, disregarded several intelligence reports
that recommended immediate government moves to arrest the alarming rise of
militancy, and instead announced that the reports on militant activities were just
a creation of the media. However, the international community, civil society
organizations and the media finally pressured the government to ban the JMB and
its offshoot JMJB in February 2005.

ICS
The ICS, since its creation has had strong ties with political groups such as JI
which has allowed it to flourish and produce militants who go on to join HuJI-B,
JMB and JMJB. The SATP report claims,

The ICS is also part of a larger Islamist extremist network of the HuJIB,
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), and Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ). This network has assisted
the terrorist outfits in developing an effectual infrastructure for training as
also a network of clandestine camps and shelters for stockpiling weapons
and supplies in Bangladesh.73

Along with the assistance ICS receives from the various political groups
within Bangladesh, some “view ICS as a front for Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) terrorist
operations.”74 The ICG report asserts “many terrorist suspects arrested since
August 2005 have been associated with Shibir.”75 The ICS is the only group
which has not been banned in Bangladesh and is the group with the strongest ties
to both political parties and the larger militant groups.
JMB’s history is inextricably linked with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). As the larg-
est Islamic party, Jamaat has an important political presence in the country’s
educational institutions through its student wing, ICS. Starting from Shaekh
Rahman and current JMB chief Saidur Rahman, the JMB leadership is replete
with former ICS and Jamaat workers and leaders.76

Government inaction to action

Since the United States began its invasion of Afghanistan following 11 September
2001, there has been mounting pressure on the Bangladeshi government to crack
86 Zaydul Ahsan and Pavitra Banavar
down on militant groups. The United States policy towards Bangladesh has
always been to bolster “political stability and democratization; continuation of
economic reform and market-opening policies; social and economic develop-
ment; environmental issues; counterterrorism; and improvement of the human
rights situation.”77 Alan Kronstadt claims in his CRS report “there is concern
among analysts that Bangladesh might serve as a base from which both South and
Southeast Asian terrorists could regroup.”78 Ali Riaz asserts that the international
community should remind the Bangladeshi state and political forces of its respon-
sibility to tolerate pluralism, ensure individual freedom, uphold democratic
values, and to be an active participant within the international community.79
In an effort to show the international community that Bangladesh was eager to
become a democratic country, it proscribed its militant groups in 2005. Due to the
ties between militant groups and political groups there has been some speculation
about the extent to which the government bans affect the operations of these
groups. Well before the August 2005 bombings, the political environment in
Bangladesh had tolerated political radicalism and social intolerance.80 The HuJIB
and IOJ connections have led some analysts to “suggest this may be why HuJI
was not banned in February 2005 along with other militant organizations but
allowed to continue operating freely for a further eight months.”81
In December 2005 the U.S. produced a list of criteria for Bangladesh to
complete in order to become a “full partner” with the U.S. in its war on terror;
included in the list was the capture and prosecution of JMB’s leader Abdur
Rahman and JMJB’s leader Bangla Bhai. They were finally captured in March
2006 with much skepticism from the public, but the government used this as an
opportunity to show the international community that they are not just a “basket
case.”82 The ICG report claims “the BNP has also sought to turn the belated
crackdown to its advantage, rebranding the administration as triumphing over
terrorism.”83 The United States Department of States claims there is ongoing
progress being made in Bangladesh to crackdown on terrorist activities.
In January 2007 the caretaker government, led by Iajuddin Ahmed, declared a
state of emergency after a faceless coup occurred in Bangladesh and postponed
the elections, which had been scheduled for 22 January. Since the declaration of
a state of emergency there has been an increase in the number of extra constitu-
tional hangings. The caretaker government (2007–8) led a stronger crackdown on
militant groups than the previous BNP government. In March 2007 “six top mili-
tant leaders including Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) supremo Abdur
Rahman and his deputy Bangla Bhai were hanged for killing two Jhalakathi
judges.”84 Following the March 2007 hanging of six militant leaders, “at least 22
Islamists were arrested in overnight raids as Bangladesh strengthened security
nationwide. …”85 The military police and Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) forces
continue to arrest suspected militants even as the country continues to slide
toward military rule and away from democratic governance.
Since 1991, the governments led by the BNP and Awami League paid little
attention to the rise of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh till early 2005. The
Awami League government, which was in power from 1996 to 2001, took no
 Who are the militants? 87
action throughout its tenure against those that were responsible for major bomb
attacks at cultural functions. After the BNP-led four-party coalition came to
power in 2001, some of its leaders actively patronized the militants to spread their
network countrywide. The state mechanism indirectly assisted their growth by
failing to take action against them. With the return of democracy and the
December 2008 election, the Awami league again came to power having made a
redoubled effort to fight militancy a key feature of its election manifesto.
Throughout 2009, the law enforcement agencies appear to be serious about
dismantling the militants’ network and fulfilling this important pledge.

Conclusion
Islamist militancy in Bangladesh must be addressed as part of an overall progres-
sion towards political stability and democracy. Riaz asserts that militancy cannot
be isolated from the overall political climate of the country.86 These two factors
are linked and as the government begins to make political changes towards
greater democratization in Bangladesh, there must also be greater emphasis on
counterterrorism. Although Bangladesh has been viewed as the “moderate voice
in the Islamic world”87 the nation must continue to make strides in the political
and economic arenas so Bangladeshi citizens can develop confidence in the
government rather than turning to militant groups. The government must examine
whether the citizens of Bangladesh seek political stability and secularization or if
they want to see the Islamic groups gain control. In the elections held in 2008 an
overwhelming majority of Bangladeshis rejected the idea of a state based on
Islamic law and a union of religious and political authority. But until steps
towards economic progress are made and political parties bury their hatchet to
institutionalize the democratic gains, the menace of militancy will continue to
plague the country.

Notes
1 Bruce Vaughn, Bangladesh: Background and U.S. Relations (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 2006).
2 “Captures fail to halt Bangladesh militants,” Jane’s Information Group, 12 April 2006,
<www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jtsm/jtsm060412_1_n.shtml>
(28 April 2008).
3 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today (Islamabad/Brussels: ICG, 2006),
17. Many analysts believe this is a matter of mistaken identity because a Pakistani
militant leader bears the same name (Fazlur Rahman) and that no organization with the
name “the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh” ever existed.
4 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 17.
5 U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001,” Office of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001).
6 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 16.
7 “Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base; The International
Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 16. “Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB),” South
Asia Terrorism Portal, <www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/
JMB.htm> (5 May 2006).
88 Zaydul Ahsan and Pavitra Banavar
8 Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base; “The
International Crisis Group,” Bangladesh Today, 16.
9 “Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.
10 “Bomb blasts at Dhaka, Ctg, Sylhet rail stations, 1 injured,” Daily Star, 2007. 2 May
2007, 1. For more on Jadid al Qaeda, see, Pinaki Dasgupta, “In the name of Jadid Al
Qaeda: Militants are apparently reorganising themselves under a new banner,” Probe
News <http://www.probenewsmagazine.com/index.php?index=2&contentId=2614>
(12 October 2009).
11 Ali Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh – A Complex Web (London: Routledge,
2008).
12 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 17.
13 “Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base <www.tkb.org/
Group.jsp?groupID=4497> (20 December 2006).
14 “Islami Chhatra Shibir,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base <www.tkb.org/Group.
jsp?groupID=4065> (20 December 2006).
15 “Islami Chhatra Shibir,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base <www.tkb.org/Group.
jsp?groupID=4065> (access date).
16 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 18. “All 7 JMB Shura men had
links to Jamaat, Shibir,” Daily Star, 28 April 2006.
17 See profile of Hannan, in Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh, 124–5.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Shamim Ashraf, “All 7 JMB Shura men had links to Jamaat, Shibir,” Daily Star,
28 April 2006, 1.
21 Two members of the shura, Mehedi Hasan alias Abeer, who was in charge of JMB’s
Khulna division, and Zahirul Islam alias Zahid alias Badal, who was in charge of
Dhaka division (north), were arrested from a house at Borpa, Rupganj in Narayanganj
on 26 October 2009.
22 “JMB’s mini bomb-making factory busted in city,” Daily Star, 16 May 2009, 1.
23 Zayadul Ahsan, “Profiles show them interlinked,” Daily Star, 28 August 2005, 1.
24 “Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI),” South Asia Terrorism Portal <www.satp.org/
satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/HuJI.htm> (21 June 2007)
25 Julfikar Ali Manik, “Bangla Bhai active for 6 yrs,” Daily Star, 13 May 2004, 1.
26 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 17.
27 Charu Lata Hogg, Child Recruitment in South Asian Conflicts: A Comparative
Analysis of Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh (Chatham House: The Royal Institute
of International Affairs, 2006) <www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/asia/
R1106childrecruitment.pdf> (19 June 2007).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Shamim Ashraf, “All 7 JMB Shura men had links to Jamaat, Shibir,” Daily Star,
26 April 2006, 1 <www.thedailystar.net/2006/04/28/d6042801085.htm> (5 May
2006).
31 “Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI),” South Asia Terrorism Portal <www.satp.org/
satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/HuJI.htm> (access date).
32 Charu Lata Hogg, Child Recruitment in South Asian Conflicts.
33 ATM Amin, “Developing a Counter Terrorism Strategy for Bangladesh,” in Farooq
Sobhan (ed.), Countering Terrorism in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Bangladesh Enterprise
Institute. 2008).
34 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 17.
35 Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh, 96.
36 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 17.
37 Charu Lata Hogg, Child Recruitment in South Asian Conflicts, 25.
38 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 17.
 Who are the militants? 89
39 “Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI),” South Asia Terrorism Portal <www.satp.org/
satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/HuJI.htm> (10 June 2007).
40 Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh.
41 Bertil Lintner, “Bangladesh: Breeding ground for Muslim terror,” Asia Times Online,
2002. 21 September 2002 <www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DI21Df06.html>
(7 June 2007).
42 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 16.
43 “Key Issues: Protecting Charitable Organizations,” U.S. Treasury Office of Terrorism
and Financial Intelligence (TFI) <www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/
protecting/charities_execorder_13224-a.shtml> (5 June 2007).
44 Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh, 86.
45 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 17.
46 “Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base <www.
tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4404> (5 June 2007).
47 Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI),” South Asia Terrorism Portal <www.satp.org/
satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/HuJI.htm> (5 June 2007).
48 “Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base <www.tkb.org/
Group.jsp?groupID=4497> (5 June 2007).
49 “ISN Security Watch – Bangladesh militants shift strategy,” International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), 3 December 2005.
50 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 16.
51 “Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base <www.tkb.
org/Group.jsp?groupID=4587> (5 June 2007).
52 Chaitanya Chandra Halder, Shamim Ashraf, “2 Britons funded JMB to carry out bomb
attacks,” Daily Star, 9 February 2006, 1.
53 Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), South Asia Terrorism Portal.
54 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 17.
55 Ibid.
56 “Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base <www.tkb.
org/Group.jsp?groupID=4587> (5 June 2007).
57 “Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB),” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
58 Bruce Vaughn, Bangladesh: Background and U.S. Relations (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service RL33646, 2006), 3.
59 Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh, 29–44.
60 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 4.
61 Ibid.
62 Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh, 44–7.
63 Bruce Vaughn, Islamist Extremism in Bangladesh (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service RS22591, 2007), 3.
64 “Mufti Hannan captured,” Daily Star, 2 October 2005, 1.
65 Vaughn, Bangladesh: Background and U.S. Relations, 8.
66 “Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), South Asia Terrorism Portal.”
67 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 18.
68 “Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.
69 “Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB),” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
70 Vaughn, Bangladesh: Background and U.S. Relations, 7–8.
71 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 18.
72 “Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB),” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
73 “Islami Chhatra Shibir,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, <www.satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/ics.htm> (5 June 2007).
74 Ibid.
75 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 18.
76 Halder, “2 Britons funded JMB.”
77 Vaughn, Bangladesh: Background and U.S. Relations, 1.
90 Zaydul Ahsan and Pavitra Banavar
78 Alan K Kronstadt, Terrorism in South Asia (Congressional Research Service, CRS
(RL32259). 31 August 2005), 46.
79 Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh, 107–9.
80 Ibid.
81 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 18.
82 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 20.
83 The International Crisis Group, Bangladesh Today, 19.
84 “Bangladesh: Six ‘top’ Militant Leaders Executed,” BBC Monitoring South Asia,
31 March 2007.
85 Shafiq Alam, “Bangladesh Arrests 22 after Militants Executed,” Agence France
Presse, 31 March 2007.
86 Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh, 44–61.
87 Vaughn, Bangladesh: Background and U.S. Relations, 1.
5 Bangladeshi civil society
and Islamist politics
Elora Shehabuddin

There has been a much-heralded revival of academic and popular interest in

the term “civil society” following the transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe,
the Philippines, and elsewhere in the final decades of the twentieth century,
during what Samuel Huntington has called the “third wave of democratization.”1
In its latest incarnation, the term has come to be associated closely with non-
governmental organizations or NGOs; thus, the proliferation of NGOs in Bangladesh
in particular has often led automatically to assumptions regarding the richness of
civil society in the country and often-unrealistic expectations regarding the advances
in economic and political development that should follow.
Bangladesh indeed possesses a rich and diverse civil society but not only
because of the dense NGO presence. International donors eager to promote civil
society in Bangladesh have targeted NGOs as recipients of their funds, with
consequences, as elsewhere, such as the over-dependence of NGOs on donor
funds, the selective identification of only certain kinds of NGOs as “civil society”
at the expense of other organizations, and of course the dramatic reduction in
financial aid to the state.2 As Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace warns, “it is a mistake to equate civil society with NGOs”
or to assume that “civil society consists only of noble causes” and, pointing
specifically to Bangladesh, that “a wealth of NGOs” translates into “wealth for
the people.”3 A more accurate understanding of the term would include a wider
range of associations, organizations, and political parties than merely formal
NGOs concerned with economic development or human and women’s rights, and
encompass ethnic associations, religious organizations, and bird-watching clubs.
As David Rieff points out, the National Rifle Association in the United States no
less merits the designation of civil society than the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines.4 In the context of Bangladesh then, Islamists groups such as the
Jamaat-e-Islami, which also operates as a political party, and theater and singing
groups should also be counted as a part of civil society. What has also been
obscured by the exclusive focus on the famous NGOs and their activities is
Bangladesh’s long history of civil society presence and activism that predates the
fall of communism and, in particular, the country’s rich tradition of the use of
cultural modes of resistance. Used in the recent past against the West Pakistani
regime, these tools are now being used to fight the might of globalization and the
Islamist brand of Islam.
92 Elora Shehabuddin
In this chapter, I explore the attempts of three distinct organizations in
Bangladesh to campaign against Islamists before recent parliamentary elections,
with particular attention to the strategies they used, and the response of the
Jamaat-e-Islami itself to such campaigning. Specifically, I examine the role of
secularist civil society organizations in Bangladesh in recent years in combating
the Islamist presence in society and politics, with particular focus on their efforts
in rural areas and against the Jamaat. I discuss the activities of three groups that
I believe represent a diverse sample of the variety of organizations operating in
the country today in terms of the audience they target and the methods they use
to convey their message: the Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee, a citizen-initiated
organization that explicitly seeks to root out Islamists from all spheres of society,
particularly members of the Jamaat; Nijera Kori, a well-funded NGO that oper-
ates nationally yet defines itself as quite different from most major NGOs and has
been a vocal advocate of secular politics; and Rupantar, a small local NGO based
in Khulna that seeks to promote secular, progressive, and inclusivist education
and thinking among the rural poor of the area in which they operate.
I begin with a brief background to secular and Islamist politics in Bangladesh.
I then discuss the three organizations mentioned above: their activities in recent
years, the groups they have targeted, and the strategies they have employed.
I follow this with a look at the efforts of Islamists to reach out to similar groups,
often in an attempt to directly counter the negative campaigning against them.
I argue that the impoverished rural majority of the population has been most
receptive to anti-Islamist rhetoric when it has appealed to their self-interest rather
than been dressed in abstract ideals about secularism and 1971. In addition,
I show that the anti-Islamist campaigning has been particularly effective when it
has drawn on Bangladesh’s rich cultural traditions of folk songs and folk-theater.
Finally, I contend that the success of the anti-Islamist campaigning has led the
Jamaat, founded in 1941 as a community of pious educated men, to rethink its
own program and strategies and to make important changes in its own public
rhetoric in order to court the support and votes of the rural poor; today, the Jamaat
is trying to appeal to a broader base – the poor, uneducated, and women –
and using tools of oral pedagogy not unlike those long used by more secular
organizations, including development NGOs.
This chapter draws on extensive fieldwork that I conducted in Bangladesh in
1995–7, 2001, and 2003.5 During these visits, I interacted in informal as well
more formal interview settings with large numbers of impoverished rural women
and men, members of different political parties, NGO workers, local profes-
sionals such as teachers and journalists, and government officials. I also collected
and analyzed newspaper articles, government documents, political party and
NGO literature, and recordings of Islamist lectures and relevant television
programs. In addition to my own fieldwork and primary research, I also draw on
the results of three large surveys that I supervised (in 1996)6 or co-organized
(in 1996 and 2001).7 In all three cases, I worked with several research assistants
and as a team we were able to cover much greater ground than I could have
done alone. Except when indicated otherwise, all information and quotations in
 Civil society and Islamist politics 93
this chapter draw on these surveys and my own notes or those of the research
assistants.

Secularism and Islamism in Bangladesh

According to a 2005 study, there are 7,643 NGOs in Bangladesh, comprising all
NGOs registered with the NGO Affairs Bureau as well as the registered field
offices of Grameen Bank, BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee),
ASA, Proshika and Caritas.8 It is estimated that NGOs have received about
$300 million a year in foreign funding in recent years.9 While NGOs are gener-
ally seen as working for positive goals and are clearly part of “civil society,”
Islamic NGOs such Muslim Aid, Ibn Sina, and Islami Samaj Kalyan Samity
(Islamic Social Welfare Association) have not been considered part of this group.
As Ainoon Naher remarks, “general discussions of NGOs in Bangladesh (within
the discourse of development) implicitly tend to exclude ‘Islamic NGOs.’ For
example, while ‘Islamic NGOs’ may be mentioned as a separate category in
the development literature, it may be noted that it is rare for other NGOs to be
categorized as ‘secular’ or ‘Christian’.”10 This stems largely from a general
acceptance of a dichotomy between Islam and development and of a neat congru-
ence between development and westernization. In his study of the relationship
between donors, NGOs and what he calls the “intermestic” development circle in
Bangladesh, Kendall Stiles is careful to recognize the “non-NGO dimension” of
civil society in the country: “journalist associations, labor (as organized in trade
union federations), the private sector (as organized in chambers of commerce),
and academic and theater groups.”11 He also applauds the efforts of community
organizations at the level of villages and thanas (literally, ‘police station’, but in
this instance, sub-district levels of local administration, officially called upazilas)
that function without guidance or funds from NGOs or foreign donors and
have been effective in providing relief to the poorest villagers following devastat-
ing floods or protesting the World Bank’s ill-conceived Flood Action Plan.12
However, Stiles too locates Islamic groups outside civil society and points out
that the mutual animosity between NGOs and Islamic groups reflects suspicion
and mistrust of Islamists among the radical and liberal elite and intelligentsia.13
Relations between secularists and Islamists have been acrimonious throughout
the country’s brief history. Islamist parties such as the Jamaat were bitterly
opposed to the movement for an independent Bangladesh in 1971; for them,
Bengali nationalist grievances about the economic and political exploitation of
East Pakistan over the preceding 24 years did not justify severing the bonds of
Islam that held together the two wings of Pakistan that were culturally and linguis-
tically so disparate.14 Leaders and members of the Jamaat actively collaborated
with the West Pakistani army in targeted killings and rapes during the nine-month
war of liberation and earned the bitter enmity of Bengali secularists and national-
ists. Party members organized “peace committees” that were committed to a
united Pakistan and created militias called Razakars, al-Badr, and al-Shams.15
Following independence, the country’s new constitution enshrined secularism as
94 Elora Shehabuddin
one of its four directive principles (the others were nationalism, democracy and
socialism) and banned Islam-based political parties. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who
led the historically secularist Awami League (AL) and the nationalist movement
and is widely regarded as the “Father of the Nation,” was assassinated along with
several of his family members in 1975 and for the following 15 years, the country
would remain in the hands of army generals happy to use Islam to legitimate their
claim to power. While it was not until 1977 that the constitution was amended to
replace secularism with “Absolute faith in Allah,” it is important to note that
Mujib himself had begun to make overtures to oil-rich Muslim countries, increased
funding for madrassas, and established the Islamic Foundation.16
The Jamaat has been a legitimate actor on the political scene, even if reviled
by many, since May 1979, and today is the largest and most articulate of the
Islamist political parties. In early 1980, it demanded that the state restore the
citizenship of Ghulam Azam. As amir (head) of the Jamaat in Easy Pakistan
during the 1971 war, Azam had been at the forefront of collaboration with the
West Pakistani army and government in opposing the movement for Bangladesh.
As a result, he was denied Bangladeshi citizenship upon the country’s independ-
ence and remained in exile in London until 1978. After his return, the Jamaat
established Committees for the Restoration of Citizenship all over the country in
order to press their demands upon the government of military ruler Ziaur Rahman
but the movement had little strength or credibility, given its unwillingness to
address questions about its role in 1971. To the contrary, secularists, nationalists
and freedom fighters realized the urgent need to counter “anti-liberation forces”
such as the Jamaat and came together under the umbrella of the Freedom Fighters’
Association. Ziaur Rahman, a recognized freedom fighter himself, naturally
found himself under pressure to oppose the Jamaat.17
In the 1980s, the Jamaat joined forces with other political parties, including
secularist ones, to oppose military ruler Hussain M. Ershad.18 Ershad’s attempts
to use Islam to gain political support (in the vein of Anwar Sadat in Egypt and
Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan, among others), including declaring Islam the state reli-
gion in April 1988, simply infuriated the Jamaat further; after all, the Jamaat’s
true objective was an Islamic republic based on Islamic law. Ershad was eventu-
ally overthrown in 1990 by a mass movement and Bangladesh has had four
parliamentary elections since then, in 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2008, that are widely
regarded as having been generally free and fair. In 1991, the Jamaat contested
221 of the 300 seats open to direct election, won 18 seats and 6 percent of the
votes; following a tactical alliance with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP),
it gained two additional seats from the 30 indirectly elected women’s seats.
Surprised by even this limited success on the part of the Jamaat, secularists
resolved to work to turn voters against the Jamaat in future elections.

Ghatak Dalal Nirmul committee

Although Ghulam Azam had been functioning as head of the Jamaat in
Bangladesh even while in exile, his position as Amir was officially announced on
 Civil society and Islamist politics 95
29 December 1991. Ostensibly “pro-liberation” political parties did not react to
this announcement, but citizen activists were quick to organize and point out that,
as a non-citizen, Azam could not head a political party.19 On 19 January 1992,
101 activists comprising university professors, artists, retired Supreme Court
judges, journalists, and others, came together to found the Ekatturer Ghatak Dalal
Nirmul Committee (Committee for Resisting the Killers and Collaborators of
the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971), popularly referred to as the Nirmul
Committee. Educationist and writer Jahanara Imam was named convener of the
committee. Imam had been thrust into the limelight in 1986 by the publication of
her book Ekattorer Dinguli (Those Days of 1971), the first personal account of
the 1971 War of Liberation to be published. Imam, who lost both her son and her
husband during that war, faithfully kept a diary throughout the period of the war.
The book was an immediate success and four editions were rapidly published,
followed by an English translation in 1990.20 Imam’s book and other narrative
accounts that quickly followed thus played an important role in reminding the
older population of the country, and teaching a new generation, about the horrors
of the 1971 war as well as the original ideals that had led to it. With her personal
history of loss and social activism and her renown following the publication of
her book, Jahanara Imam was a natural choice to be the leader of the Nirmul
Committee.
The organization’s primary objectives were to bring the war criminals of the
1971 war to justice and to fight against communal politics in the country. In
February 1992, the support base of the committee expanded dramatically with the
founding of the National Coordinating Committee for the Implementation of the
Values of the Bangladesh Liberation War and the Elimination of the Killers and
Collaborators of 1971. Seventy-two organizations, including the AL, left-wing
parties and socio-cultural groups joined the cause.21 The Nirmul Committee’s
most significant public activity in its earliest days was the “public tribunal” of
Ghulam Azam on Independence Day (26 March) 1992 by a People’s Court,
an event Ali Riaz describes as “a watershed in the history of the movements
spearheaded by civil society.”22 On the third anniversary of its founding, in
January 1995, the committee held a national conference at which the newly
elected leaders announced a plan to set up branches of the committee at the
lowest administrative levels in the country in order to fight the “evil forces” of
fundamentalism and communalism at the grassroots level.23
On the Nirmul Committee’s website, www.secularvoiceofbangladesh.org,
Kazi Mukul, the General Secretary of the organization invites and responds to
questions about the committee’s activities from visitors to the site. Of course, in
a country with an adult literacy rate of 41 percent and where 80 percent of inter-
net providers operate in Dhaka while 80 percent of the country’s population is
poor and in rural areas, the website which is primarily in English is accessible to
a very small proportion of the population.24 Nonetheless, it provides an interest-
ing window onto the Nirmul Committee’s position on Islamist organizations.
Among the questions Mukul has answered, one queried the appropriateness of
demanding a ban on the Jamaat when it has been accepted by the authorities as a
96 Elora Shehabuddin
regular political party that contests democratic elections. I reproduce the exchange
below:

Question: Jamaat-e-Islami takes part in every general election and secures a

number of parliamentary seats. If you believe in democracy, why [do] you
demand [a] ban on their politics?
Answer: Crime is crime. One cannot rectify his crimes by winning any
election. The demand for trial of the crime continues to prevail for years after
years. The criminal cannot be spared unless he is punished. It is true that
Jamaat-e-Islami wins a number of seats in parliamentary election. But we’ll
have to realize in what condition they win elections. They were able to win
people’s support and acceptance in some areas of the country during the
21-year period since 1975 as a result of direct patronage from government
parties. Besides, wrong judgment about them by some pro-liberation parties
and in some cases their sympathetic attitude or underestimation towards the
anti-liberation forces also strengthened them. On the other hand, a major
portion of the voters were born after the war of liberation and this generation
does not know about the heinous role of Jamaat leaders and their party’s
activities during the 1971 war. Some people voted for Jamaat after being
misled by the propaganda of the anti-liberation forces while some were influ-
enced by money. It does not prove popularity of Jamaat as a political party.
The political ideology of Jamaat is a fascist one – there is no difference with the
ideology of Hitler. In the name of protecting Islam, they unleash terrorism, kill
people, cut off their tendons, torture women, create conflicts among people, take
a stand against democratic norms and term democracy as a “Kufri” ideology. So
we’ll have to ban this fascist, fundamentalist force for the sake of protecting
democracy. People have started knowing their real character through our
movement and that’s why Jamaat suffered a debacle in the municipal election
in ’93, mayoral election of ’94, and general election in ’96.25

The parliamentary elections of 1996 provided anti-Islamist organizations like the

Nirmul Committee with a valuable opportunity to mobilize secular sentiments at
both national and grassroots levels. The year marked the 25th anniversary of the
War of Liberation and secularists repeatedly invoked the “spirit and ideals of
1971” – secularism, socialism, democracy and nationalism. In the weeks leading
up to the 12 June elections, local branches of the Nirmul Committee targeted
those areas where the Jamaat had won parliamentary seats in the 1991 elections.
The southwestern district of Satkhira, a longtime Jamaat stronghold, was the site
of much Jamaat as well as anti-Jamaat campaigning in 1996 and a good example
of the campaign wars being fought elsewhere. Out of five parliamentary constitu-
encies in the district, four had gone to the Jamaat in 1991 and one to the AL.
Professor Kabir Chowdhury, one of the founders of the Nirmul Committee, had
come from Dhaka a few months before the June 1996 elections for a meeting of
the Muktijoddha (Freedom Fighter) Library, itself also an anti-Islamist resource;26
he had urged local Nirmul members to engage in a systematic anti-Jamaat
 Civil society and Islamist politics 97
campaign before the elections. As the elections approached, local Nirmul workers
traveled around the area giving speeches and putting up posters supplied by the
central office and other supportive organizations. One of the posters, published
by the Quran-Sunnah Research Institute based in Jessore, juxtaposed verses from
the Quran with quotations from the writings of Syed Abul Ala Maududi, the
founder and main ideologue of the Jamaat, in order to show that Maududi had
willfully distorted the Quran. Another poster included a famous black and white
photograph of the bodies of the intellectuals murdered in December 1971 lying in
a brick field against a bright red background. Below the photograph were listed,
in large letters, the names of seven prominent Jamaat leaders. The poster warned
voters against voting for these men – whom it referred to as war criminals – or
anyone who supported their corruption or tyranny. The poster reminded readers
that the vote was a “sacred trust” and that it would directly affect their children’s
future; it urged readers to realize the dream of the 300,000 martyrs from the
Liberation War for a Bangladesh that was free of oppression and communalism,
that was democratic and concerned with the welfare of the people. The poster
ended with a plea for a vote in favor of the ideals of the Liberation War.
With little funding available to them from the national level, the members of
the Satkhira branch of the Nirmul Committee pooled their own resources, rented
a “scooter-tempo” and loudspeaker and set off towards distant villages close to
the Indian border to warn the local people against supporting the “killers of
1971.” They put up posters and, using the loudspeaker, gave speeches and played
a cassette of jarigaan (folk songs) directly charging Ghulam Azam with criminal
acts; they did not have time to go door-to-door with their message. A Satkhira
Nirmul member (a journalist by profession) whom I interviewed insisted that the
Nirmul Committee was not necessarily committed to the AL; it simply wanted to
persuade people to vote for any party other than the Jamaat: “We told them they
can vote for anyone they want – just not the Jamaat or razakars.” In fact, some
of the activists I spoke with were disappointed in the local AL. “After all,” one man
pointed out, “our anti-Jamaat campaigning, our constant invocation of the ideals
of 1971, were ultimately benefiting none other than the local Awami League
candidate.” Yet, he lamented, when they sought help from the AL following
threats from local Jamaat supporters, they received no support, not even a public
statement of protest against the Jamaat’s harassment of Nirmul workers.27 It is
not clear why the local AL workers did not automatically support the Nirmul
Committee in its endeavors to fight the Islamists. One possible explanation is
that the AL had itself made a deliberate effort in the 1996 campaign to highlight
its own Islamic credentials. Moreover, the party had joined forces with the
Jamaat in recent months to demand both the resignation of the previous BNP
regime and a constitutional amendment requiring an interim neutral caretaker
government prior to future parliamentary elections. The Thirteenth Amendment,
which guaranteed this arrangement, was passed in March 1996.28
On 10 June 1996, just two days before Election Day, Ghulam Azam himself
came down to Satkhira for the final phase of the campaign. This was in sharp
contrast to Sheikh Hasina (AL) and Khaleda Zia (BNP), who returned to Dhaka
98 Elora Shehabuddin
for their final campaign speeches. Eager to retain the four seats the Jamaat had won
in Satkhira in 1991, Ghulam Azam made a point of visiting every single thana in
Satkhira and warned huge crowds against the massive anti-Jamaat propaganda
campaign in the villages. The local Nirmul workers I spoke with after the elec-
tions were confident that their work in the weeks before the elections had helped
to sway many who would otherwise have voted for the Jamaat. Of course, it had
also helped, they conceded, that the other parties had nominated better candidates
this time. One local Nirmul activist opined that, given the large number of
minorities in the area, the AL should have won soundly even in 1991. The prob-
lem was, he believed, that the AL had not nominated the best candidates then. In
1996, the Jamaat won only one of the five seats in Satkhira, with three going to
the AL and one to the Jatiya Party (JP).29
Five years later, as the 2001 elections approached, research assistant Sharif
Mohammad Bari in the study that Zakir Hossain of Nagorik Uddyog and I coor-
dinated found that there was still some support for the Jamaat in Satkhira
district.30 There was consensus among the voters interviewed that this was the
source of much consternation for the new AL candidate M. Nazrul Islam who had
gone out of his way to help the survivors of the devastating 1998 floods, along
with NGOS like BRAC, Proshika, Grameen Bank and ASA, while the Jamaat
MP had made no special effort. In his 2001 campaign speeches, Islam reminded
his listeners of the AL’s accomplishments over the previous five years, notably
that “nobody had starved to death” during the 1998 floods thanks to the AL
government’s relief efforts. He tried to tarnish his Jamaat opponent’s image by
calling him a razakar. Moreover, in an effort to discredit his opponent’s Islamic
credentials, he distributed flyers revealing that Maulana Abdul Malek Mandol’s
father was called Lal Chand Mandol, clearly a Hindu name.31
In the border areas of Satkhira district, freedom fighters distributed 15,000 leaf-
lets and 7,000 posters publicizing the activities of the Jamaat generally and the local
Jamaat candidate in particular during the 1971 war. This campaign had some effect
on voters who had been unsure of how to vote though less impact on voters who
were already committed to the Jamaat. When Jamaat leaders eventually ordered
their workers to tear down the posters and hinder the distribution of leaflets, some
conflict ensued in those areas. The anti-Islamist campaign also received help from
an unexpected quarter, former military ruler Hussain M. Ershad. A few weeks
before the 2001 elections, Ershad came down to Satkhira district to campaign for
his Jatiya Party’s local candidates. At a public speech on 19 September 2001 that
Bari attended, Ershad accused the Jamaat of engaging in the abuse of religion,
insisted that the party’s deeds did not match its words, claimed that it hurt people’s
religious sensibilities purely for its own profit, and protested that it had turned the
mosque into its political headquarters. As an example of the Jamaat’s hypocrisy, he
reminded his listeners that, on the one hand, the Jamaat claimed that female leader-
ship is haram yet, on the other, it had come to an agreement with a female leader in
1991 and again prior to the 2001 elections. He expressed his objection to the BNP’s
decision to form an alliance with the “anti-Liberation” Jamaat and a breakaway
section of his own party and called the BNP the “comrade of razakars.”
 Civil society and Islamist politics 99
At the national level, the Nirmul Committee has remained active in publicizing
crimes committed by Islamists and its work has been complemented by that of
other organizations. With the Jamaat and Islami Oikyo Jote part of the BNP-led
alliance that came to power following the 2001 elections, there was a fair degree
of overlap between anti-Islamist activism and criticism of the government. Various
groups charged the government with failing to apprehend in time the extreme
and violent Islamist groups that had emerged in recent years and established
a reign of terror in different parts of the country. On 19 August 2004, Professor
Kabir Chowdhury, a founding member of the Nirmul Committee and president of
the South Asian People’s Union Against Fundamentalism and Communalism
(SAPUFC), sent a letter to “pro-liberation political parties” urging them to stand
against fanaticism and fundamentalism, and specifically the Islamist repression
of the Ahmadiyya community; for several decades, groups like the Jamaat have been
calling on the Pakistani and Bangladeshi governments to declare the Ahmadiyyas
non-Muslims. The letter stated, “the defeated forces of 1971 are now trying to turn
a progressive and democratic Bangladesh into an extreme fundamentalist state
in Taliban style.”32 On 20 August, the Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists
(BFUJ), eight other journalists’ unions, and the Workers’ Party of Bangladesh
condemned Islamist attacks (led by madrassa teachers and students) on the Bengali
daily newspaper Prothom Alo; “the BFUJ also expressed deep concern over
the government’s … [indifference] to such destructive activities by the Islamic
zealots” and added that this lack of action “raises the question whether the
government itself is conspiring to strangle the free press by allowing free rein to
the religious bigots.”33 The government received further criticisms following a
grenade attack on an AL rally in Dhaka on 21 August 2004 that killed 19 people
(including veteran AL leader Ivy Rahman) and injured over 200. On 1 September
2004, the leaders of 32 women’s organizations protested the government’s inability
to apprehend anyone in connection with the incident. They called on “democratic,
progressive and pro-liberation forces to unite against the government to drive
out the fanatics.” In their speeches, Matia Chowdhury, a high-ranking leader of
the AL, and Khushi Kabir, convener of Nijera Kori, both drew a link between
the government’s blind eye to Islamist attacks on progressive forces and the
government’s own repression of women.34
In October 2005, the Nirmul Committee published a White Paper discussing
the incidence of “communal torture” over the preceding 1,500 days (or four
years). The report described just under 3,000 incidents as recorded in newspapers
but calculated that over ten thousand incidents had occurred in that period; the
bulk had simply not been reported for fear of further attacks and harassment.35 In
his introduction to the White Paper, Shahriar Kabir, Acting President of the
Nirmul Committee and General Secretary of the South Asian People’s Union
Against Fundamentalism and Communalism, insisted that communal harmony
depended on the existence of a secular state and government:

The coalition government that came to power through [the] October 2001
election is pro-Islamist. Although the BNP doesn’t like to introduce itself as
100 Elora Shehabuddin
an Islamist party like Jamaat-e-Islam and Islami Oikya Jote, its political
philosophy is Islamic nationalism, like that of [the] Muslim League. The two
other main partners of the alliance Jamaat-e-Islami and IOJ came to power
after declaring to establish (sic) Islamic rule. The JP too believes in Political
Islam, like the BNP. There is no room of democracy (sic) and progressive-
ness in political Islam. Jamaat’s founder Moulana Abul Ala Moududi termed
democracy as a “kufri” (infidel) doctrine. Jamaat and its associates do not
approve any constitution written by [a] human being. It is very likely, when
such communal and fundamentalist parties form an alliance and go to power,
they will concentrate and do whatever is necessary to establish a society of
religion-based communal politics and society instead of secular democracy.

He further lamented, “The minority people who fled the country in 1971 for life
came back after the war was over. Many of the victims of communal repression
who left the country during this coalition rule told me and the media correspond-
ents that they would never come back.” The report emphasizes the importance
of encouraging “strong mass awareness” as a long-term strategy if there is to be
an end to communal violence and minority persecution.36
The Awami League-led alliance won a landslide victory in the December 2008
parliamentary elections. During her campaign, Sheikh Hasina had promised
that war criminals would be brought to justice – finally, after 37 years. After the
elections, she reaffirmed her commitment: “People have already ‘tried’ the war
criminals and the anti-Liberation forces through ballots, but our government
would obviously take legal steps to try them.”37 Despite continuous pressure from
the Nirmul Committee on the government to keep its promise, little progress has
been made on that front as this chapter goes to press. As a veteran journalist
quipped, “the trial may have reached its equinox, because the chance of holding
it appears equally likely as the chance of being postponed again.”38

Nijera Kori
The earliest version of Nijera Kori (We Do It Ourselves) was founded in the
mid-1970s by a Norwegian woman Elijabet Helsing, who was in Bangladesh
working with the World Food Programme. She set up a program in her own home
in order to assist the rural women who had arrived in Dhaka during the 1974
famine. The organization’s main objectives were to provide food, shelter and
income-generating skills (particularly ericulture, an alternative to sericulture or
silk production using silkworms) to such women. Nijera Kori was registered with
the Department of Social Welfare in 1980. The organization set up field projects
in August 1979 when female workers who had been at the Canadian University
Services Organization (CUSO) came on board. The most dramatic change in
Nijera Kori’s staff and objectives came in 1980 when several organizers defected
to Nijera Kori from BRAC, which had been founded in 1972 to deal with the
devastation of the Liberation War and is today the largest NGO in Bangladesh
with coverage that BRAC estimates at 100 million people and a staff of just
 Civil society and Islamist politics 101
over 97,000.39 These men and women left because they were “dissatisfied” with
the growing emphasis on “service delivery functions” throughout the NGO sector
and wanted to focus instead “on raising awareness and building organizations of
the poor.” According to Naila Kabeer, these new Nijera Kori leaders “brought
with them a very different understanding of developmental problems of Bangladesh,
one [of] which has since shaped the history and evolution of Nijera Kori.” As
Nurul Islam Khan, chairperson of the organization’s Governing Body, put it in a
Foreword to a 2002 study of the NGO, “Nijera Kori is quite unique within the
Bangladesh NGO community as an NGO that has consistently kept its focus on
social mobilization and building capacities of the poor, of course, with a major
focus on organizing and empowerment of women.”40 Nijera Kori describes as its
vision and goals the establishment of “an exploitation-free society by changing
the present system of social exploitation with the aim of emancipation of working
class people.”41 Indeed, several studies have found that Nijera Kori’s emphasis
on mobilization and collective action for change (as opposed to a focus on indi-
viduals) has paid off with greater awareness and capabilities among the more
underprivileged groups in rural society.42 Although women and the poor have
suffered disproportionately from the decisions of the traditional village tribunal or
salish, this appears to be changing in areas where Nijera Kori groups are strong.
In some villages, Nijera Kori members have even established their own salishes in
order to settle local disputes.43 This is significant because traditional salishes have
increasingly invoked religion to justify decisions that have been overwhelmingly
in favor of males and the rich.44
Nijera Kori members have also engaged in a great deal of collective action
for more equitable gender rights. Of all incidents of collective action and
social movements undertaken by Nijera Kori members between 1998 and 2000,
gender issues were the second most important rallying issue, following land
rights.45 They have protested against verbal divorces (the three talaqs), polygamy,
child marriage, dowry and violence against women. Nijera Kori’s position on
gender issues and its members’ willingness to demand redress whenever they
perceived injustice and wrongdoing “has brought its group members into direct
conflict with local mullahs who seek to use fatwas to give their pronouncements
the sanction of religion, often in the context of village salish proceedings.” An
evaluation team from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs found that
local religious leaders had responded to Nijera Kori activism and awareness by
taking greater care with their interpretations of Islamic law. Nijera Kori workers
found that there had been a decrease in fatwas and attacks on NGO workers
and group members in areas where organizations like Nijera Kori have been
working.46
In May 1996, just a few weeks before the elections, I traveled to Roumari in
Kurigram district near the northernmost tip of Bangladesh with some prominent
NGO and feminist activists to attend a 25th anniversary celebration of the war
of independence.47 Organizers hoped that the event would also serve to warn
local voters against voting for Jamaat candidates. As a high-ranking Nijera Kori
leader put it on the drive up, “Freedom fighters are getting together to oppose
102 Elora Shehabuddin
the Jamaat-e-Islami in areas where they have won before or have a candidate.
In Roumari, it is a case of the latter – and the Jamaat candidate is known to be a
good person.”48
By the time we arrived at our destination, several hundred people had gathered
on a field for the outdoor celebrations. The evening’s performances were an
excellent example of the use of traditional cultural tools by secularist orga-
nizations to convey their message to the poor and uneducated majority of the
population. The evening began with very moving speeches by local freedom
fighters, including the recently re-discovered and celebrated woman freedom
fighter Taramon Bibi. They spoke of their activities in 1971 and their disillusion-
ment with the nation that they had helped to found. One male freedom fighter
spoke of his troops’ efforts to drive the razakars out of the neighboring area of
Gaibandha, and described the crimes the razakars had committed there:

The 58 people they had killed have become shaheed (martyrs) … what they did
is enough to make your hair stand on end … [t]hey had also raped 12–13 ma-bon
(mothers and sisters). In addition, they had raped 30 lakh (300,000) ma-bon
throughout Bangladesh. The dreadful scene we stumbled onto in what used to
be Helalpark, now the Stadium, in Gaibandha. Someone who has not seen it with
their own eyes cannot imagine the atrocities committed, … cannot imagine how
our mothers and sisters were attacked, assaulted and killed.49

The speeches were followed by a series of short skits by landless men trained
by Nijera Kori. That evening, the skits revolved around the recent history of
East Pakistan/Bangladesh, especially events of and since 1971. One skit satirized
the different political parties currently competing for state power. The character
representing a Jamaat member was particularly colorful as were his statements.
Bearded of course and dressed in a panjabi (local long shirt) and prayer cap, he
began by “confessing” his opposition to the independence movement in 1971:

I was not wrong to oppose independence in 1971. This country will become
Pakistan once again. The moon and star flag [of Pakistan and a few other
Muslim countries] will once again be unfurled in these skies. Have you not
seen how much better organized we have become in the last 25 years? … Do
you not hear? We can now shout “Pakistan Zindabad ” (Long live Pakistan!)
in our rallies. That is how far we have come along in the last 25 years! The war
criminals of the Second World War are still being pursued, yet at my leader’s
command, hundreds of thousands of people were killed and thousands of
women raped [in 1971] but have your people and your leaders been able to do
anything to my leader [Ghulam Azam]? … That day is not far when the
slogan “Joi Bangla” (“Victory to Bengal!,” the slogan of the independence
movement) will be declared illegal.50

By billing the evening’s performance as entertainment and a celebration, the

organizers were able to attract a large audience of men, women and children.
 Civil society and Islamist politics 103
The Jamaat character and his speech, specifically, were clearly intended as a
warning to the audience of the dangers of supporting the Islamists in the upcoming
elections and, also, to remind the older generation and teach the new generation
about Jamaat activities in 1971.

Rupantar
Founded in 1978 in the southwestern districts of Khulna and Bagerhat, Rupantar
(literally, transformation or metamorphosis) was registered as an NGO in 1992
and has relied primarily on “cultural activism,” the use of theatre, folk music
and publications to create awareness about various social issues. Veteran British
journalist Jeremy Seabrook describes Rupantar as “a cultural organization
committed to democracy, anti-corruption and social justice.”51 The organization
operates on the basic assumption that “culture and sustainable development are
closely connected,” while recognizing also that society and culture are constantly
changing and that there are elements of “culture” and “tradition” that need to be
rethought. It describes its vision as one of “a gender equitable democratic society
with cultural values, free from injustice and superstitions.” In the weeks and
months before the parliamentary elections of 1996 and union parishad elections
of 1997, Rupantar undertook a voter education campaign specifically targeting
rural women.52
Unlike most NGOs currently operating in Bangladesh – but like Nijera Kori –
Rupantar does not provide microcredit. Consequently, it has avoided the ire of
Islamists who object to the interest charged by microcredit providers. It also does
not engage in any kind of formal education activities. Almost 15 years after its
establishment as an NGO, the organization confines its activities to Khulna,
Bagerhat and other districts in the Sundarban region. What it has not gained in
terms of geographic breadth of coverage, it has accomplished with depth of
coverage and activity within this small area. Rupantar has taken a leadership role
in its focus on specifically local issues, such as the sustainable conservation of
the mangrove forests of the Sundarbans and the training and empowerment of
local women in the legal and political arenas. The Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation, which has been working with Rupantar since 1998, has been a
primary supporter of its “Grassroots Women’s Leadership” project. The objective
of this project is to promote the greater involvement of women in the political
sphere, in other words, not simply encourage them to vote but also prepare them
to run for elected office. It has helped and trained women to establish women’s
committees at various levels of local government, such as the Union Parishad and
Ward levels. With USAID funding, Rupantar has been working since 2002 to
train public representatives at the union level. According to a press release by the
organization, the project had emerged as a “model” for such training.53 Rupantar’s
success over the years has earned it American attention and funding from USAID
and the Asia Foundation.54
Rupantar’s greatest innovation lies perhaps in its development and use of
effective modes of communicating with the illiterate and poorly educated rural
104 Elora Shehabuddin
population of the area. It currently relies on three methods: Alternative Living
Theatre, which draws on folk drama traditions; pot-gaan or patua gaan, elaborate
painted images accompanied by spoken and sung narratives; and “popular” publi-
cations. Rupantar’s folk plays are “for education and communication and usually
issue-based and the desired messages are conveyed in [an] attractive style and
rhythmic form that allows everyone to understand the theme.” Rupantar has devel-
oped and performed plays on issues such as women’s and human rights, voter
education, the environment, and human trafficking. For instance, their plays on
women’s issues and lives include: “Ahollya” (female character in a well-known
epic), about women “trapped in religious fundamentalism and prejudice”; “Janoni
Amar” (My mother), about mothers and the “killing of offspring”; “Jhara Bokul”
(Fallen Flower) and “Lojja,” both about the status of women in Bangladesh, and
“Ashohar Alo” (Lights of Hope), about women’s opportunities for education.55
According to Syed Jamil Ahmed, professor in the Department of Theatre and
Music, Dhaka University, there was a long history of traveling performers in
Mymensingh, Sylhet, Comilla, Dhaka and Jessore who would go door to door in
rural areas performing their patua gaan. Today however, there are few such
performers left; Ahmed identifies only three.56 Folk music has also enjoyed a rich
and respected presence in Bengal and there are several varieties within the genre,
depending on who wrote the songs, where they are sung, when they are sung, and
by whom (some songs, for example, were traditionally sung only by boatmen or
only at harvest time). The Rupantar staff has kept these traditions alive by incorpo-
rating them into their work of raising social consciousness. Rupantar workers have,
for example, set new words to traditional and familiar folk tunes and combined these
songs with pot, or large painted canvases that visually represent the issues covered
in the songs. The organization has performed these songs in front of live rural audi-
ences, but also on various television channels in Bangladesh and at international
venues (e.g. Stockholm in March 2004), teaching new audiences about this old
Bengali tradition. The potgaans have covered issues ranging from water resource
management, arsenic contamination, the conservation of the Sundarbans, the rights
of the disabled, to women’s rights and relations between men and women. In March
2005, a reporter for the Bangladesh-based online weekly newspaper New Age,
described a Rupantar potgaan’s celebration of democracy at a festival in Khulna:

As the potgaan (literally meaning “picture-song”) describes the importance

of “voting in a democratic society” with the soulful singing of a seasoned
voice, and the rhythmic dancing of the accompanying troupe, you could be
forgiven if your feet started tapping to the beat. Having seen the classic tools
of the trade in the battle to tickle the masses to awareness – seminars, focus
group discussions, motivational classes – such a “no-nonsense” approach
seemed like just what the doctor recommended.57

The third mode of communication that Rupantar has used with great success has
been publications meant for mass consumption. The organization has published
numerous inexpensive pamphlets (usually costing between Tk. 1 and Tk. 20),
 Civil society and Islamist politics 105
written in a simple style accessible to even semi-literate readers, on topics such
as mosquitoes and malaria, local government, village women and quack doctors,
and the environment.
While based in Satkhira prior to the 2001 elections, our research assistant
Bari58 heard that a mobile team from Rupantar had traveled around Satkhira and
Khulna recently to provide voter education through public gatherings and plays.
Local inhabitants spoke to him about the open hostility and clashes between
Jamaat supporters and workers from NGOs like BRAC, Proshika and Uttaran,
which were perceived as openly supporting the AL. Jamaat workers had smashed
the motorbike of an Uttaran worker who had been campaigning for the AL. Some
accused Proshika of having promised money and new homes to anyone who
voted for the boat symbol, i.e. the AL. Bari himself suffered from this suspicion
of NGO workers when he first visited a village in Agardari Union a couple of
weeks before the elections and was subjected to lengthy interrogations. That
Rupantar enjoys an impartial reputation has no doubt helped it build up credibil-
ity in the area. While it does not define itself or its mission as anti-Islamist or
anti-fundamentalist as such, yet, in highlighting the importance of women’s and
human rights, in encouraging the rural populace to demand more of local leaders
and police and to question certain aspects of tradition, it prompts a questioning of
the status quo as well as of claims of religious exclusivity. For example, one
pamphlet published by Rupantar in 2001 drew attention to the common beliefs
and myths shared by the different religious communities that inhabit the
Sundarban region. Such an approach runs contrary to Islamist claims of Muslim
exclusivity, even superiority, and reaffirms the long history of coexistence between
religious communities in the area. Islamists throughout the Muslim world have
spent much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries trying to extricate what they
believe to be a pure, authentic Islam from the local cultural accretions that have
inevitably attached themselves to the beliefs and practices of Muslims over the
centuries. Thus, any efforts to cast those accretions in a positive light, to value local
culture, to value tolerance and inclusivity over an Islam shorn of its local roots
should be read as important anti-Islamist gestures.

The Islamist response to secularist campaigning59

Following the Jamaat’s ignominious performance in the 1996 elections, when it
won only three seats in parliament, down from 18 in 1991, the party’s leadership
took a conscious decision to work to improve its support base at the grassroots
level. Secularists and Islamists alike were confident that the anti-Islamist
campaign among impoverished men and women, and especially the women
beneficiaries of NGOs, had successfully prevented the rural majority from voting
for the Jamaat. Just a few months after the June 1996 elections, one elderly rural
Jamaat supporter put it thus:

There was a conspiracy here by an NGO called Proshika. They went around
telling people not to vote for us, saying, “How is daripalla [scales, ballot
106 Elora Shehabuddin
symbol of the Jamaat] going to help you? You should all vote for dhaner
shish [sheaf of rice, ballot symbol of the BNP. If you vote for rice, you will
never again go without rice.” Also, the BNP distributed a great deal of money
among the villagers. And, of course, who won? The BNP! … [The local
Jamaat candidate], on the other hand, did not have a single penny to give the
villagers.60

The anti-Islamist campaigning in 1996 and electoral outcome that year prompted
the Jamaat to rethink both the content of the message it delivers to the illiterate
poor and its modes of outreach. The Jamaat has traditionally reached out to
prospective supporters through written literature, direct personal contact and
large public lectures (waaz mahfil ). Founded as an elite organization, the Jamaat
always sought out well-educated men and later, women. In recent years, the
specific demands of electoral competition in present-day Bangladesh, a setting
that is democratic, yet overwhelmingly impoverished and illiterate, I have argued,
has led the Jamaat to begin rethinking its traditional strategies in an effort to woo
this vast majority, as electoral supporters if not necessarily as formal members.
My point is not that the Jamaat had completely ignored the poor and illiterate
prior to June 1996, but that the party’s efforts have become much more system-
atic since then. About a month before the elections, a senior Jamaat woman
explained how Jamaat workers had been spreading the party’s message among
the predominantly illiterate population in rural areas: “We target those who read
a little, tell them about the Quran and hadith and tell them to take the message to
others, to explain our goals.” When I asked if this could be done orally, she did
not hesitate to remind me, “Yes, just the way Islam was originally preached!”61
Ever since the Jamaat’s central command had declared gonoshikkha (mass
education) a top priority, dedicated senior Jamaat women had been venturing into
slums and remote villages with their messages. One woman I met, the wife of a
high-ranking government official in the city of Chittagong, explained her
commitment to working with the poor: after all, both the Prophet and his daugh-
ter Fatima were poor, thus “it is through the poor that I must fulfill my religious
obligations. It is my faraj (obligation). I must love them.”62
Another Jamaat worker described to me the nature and content of the typical
meeting: “We start with a reading of the Quran. We then talk to the women about
heaven and hell, about praying, about the fear of the afterlife, about covering their
head … we explain everything in easy language.” The Jamaat workers regularly
reminded the women who lived in the slum that the Prophet himself had been
poor and that Islam had first spread among the poor. As one worker told us,
“I tell them, my poor sisters, if Islam must spread again, then I say, it will spread
through you. Rich people have never been here and will never come. It will
spread through you, if you can live in accordance with your faith. Only then will
Islam thrive in this country.”
While educated recruits were expected to read the Quran and Maududi’s inter-
pretations of it with utmost diligence and then meet to discuss what they had read,
the unlettered women who are increasingly being targeted had to work with
 Civil society and Islamist politics 107
cassettes of speeches and Quranic discussions sold to them by the Jamaat workers.
A female Jamaat leader elaborated:

Just as you can understand a song when you listen to it, you can listen to and
understand a speech. Then [the workers] announce there will be a program
where iman (faith) will be discussed. At the meeting, iman is discussed and
explained orally with quotations from the Quran and hadith. We then turn to
talk about how this life on earth is not our real life, that we have eternity
ahead of us, that death lies ahead. There are many deaths all around us now.
So they come to believe in death, that life does not end with death. If it were
such, if it said in the Quran-hadith that there was nothing after death, then
that would be the end, and we could do as we wished. But there is a God and
we will have to account for everything. All this is described in various
verses.

According to the senior and elite Jamaat women, regular attendance at such
meetings granted the impoverished women a new understanding of Islam, which
in turn led to greater honesty, as well as dramatic changes in speech and dress.
Similar work was of course being done among the illiterate men in the community
by Jamaat men.
In addition to direct contact with prospective supporters, the Jamaat has long
used the forum of the public lecture or waaz mahfil. Thousands of men and
women attend the waazes of the most charismatic speakers, the most famous
among them being Delwar Hossain Saidi, currently a Jamaat member of parlia-
ment; millions more hear his lectures through widely available audio-cassettes.
These religious lectures that often last several days and nights are neither new nor
unique to the Jamaat. In the months preceding the 2001 elections, several
cassettes of recent lectures by Saidi were again released on the market. While he
did address strictly religious topics in these lectures, such as the importance of
praying and fasting, he devoted much more time to attacks on the incumbent AL.
Whenever possible, Saidi connected religion and politics, for instance, by repeat-
edly stressing that Islam could not thrive in Bangladesh while the AL was in
charge of the country. He warned listeners that if the AL – “enemies of Islam” he
called them – were allowed to return to power, Bangladesh would “face the fate
of Turkey.” In Turkey, he revealed, clearly horrified, men were not permitted to
grow beards and women to observe purdah. He repeatedly called on his audience
to ensure that the AL did not win a majority in the upcoming elections.63
Turning to the five years of AL rule between 1996 and 2001, Saidi claimed
that over 40,000 women had been raped in that period. Not only had the AL
government failed to protect the “honor” of the women of the country, he pointed
out, but in fact AL workers were very often the perpetrators. Far from being
“a government of the awami [people],” in the previous five years in power, the AL,
he charged, had become “a government of dharshan [rape]. He supported this
charge by referring to a particularly appalling incident when a university student,
a member of the youth wing of the AL, had held a party to celebrate his hundredth
108 Elora Shehabuddin
rape or as the student is alleged to have bragged, “a century of rapes.”64 The
student was expelled from the university but no criminal charges were brought
against him. Saidi assured his listeners that under a government with which the
Jamaat was affiliated, a government that was more favorably inclined towards
Islamic principles and values, such criminals would be dealt with severely;
moreover, strict observance of purdah by all women would prevent such acts
from occurring in the first place. It is quite likely that the Jamaat has focused on
AL workers’ alleged involvement in these rapes as a way to counter, even invert,
allegations of its own involvement in mass rapes during the war in 1971, a charge
that secularists and feminists have kept alive for the last three decades through
demands for a war crimes tribunal and a formal apology from the government of
Pakistan.65
It may be useful here to return to the district of Satkhira for a glimpse of
local-level Islamist activism. As mentioned earlier, Satkhira has long had a sound
Jamaat presence and that of course is precisely what drew the Nirmul Committee
to undertake grassroots-level anti-Islamist organizing prior to the elections of
1996 and again 2001. Eager to recapture the seats it lost in 1996, the Jamaat
engaged in systematic campaigning among the poor and women. In an interview,
one local Jamaat leader spoke of the importance of courting women voters, who
constituted about half the voting population. He said it was essential that women
workers be engaged in efforts to explain the party’s philosophy to women voters
and win their support; as long as they dressed properly, he saw no problem in
women’s engaging in such campaign work on behalf of the party. The Jamaat
workers urged the women they visited to vote for the candidate who was honest,
“qualified,” and for a party that would stand firm against the “nakedness” and
“shamelessness” that NGOs were currently propagating and ensure that women
enjoyed the rights that Islam had granted them.
Local women described how burqa-clad Jamaat workers had visited them in
their homes before the elections and pleaded with them to vote for the Jamaat.66
Apparently, the Jamaat women had clutched the hands of the women they were
visiting to their own chests and had made them promise to vote for the Jamaat’s
symbol, daripalla (a scale). On their way out, the Jamaat women had informed
the women that they had a small Quran under their burqas and that, therefore, the
women had actually – and unknowingly – sworn on the Quran. This had the
effect, the local women complained, of compelling many of them to vote for
the Jamaat out of fear of the torment of hell for breaking an oath taken on the
Quran. In any case, several people with different political affinities admitted
that the other parties (BNP, AL, and JP) had made no special effort at all to reach
out to women voters in this area, certainly nothing as systematic and organized
as the Jamaat.
Local Jamaat candidate Maulana Mandol expended much time and effort
vehemently denying all charges the AL candidate had leveled against him
(discussed earlier), including that of being of fairly recent Hindu stock. He
retorted by calling the AL Prime Minister “Killer Hasina” and describing the five
years of AL rule as characterized by disorder, corruption, and rapes. He pointed
 Civil society and Islamist politics 109
out that Sheikh Hasina had worn shindoor (vermilion) during her visit to India
and permitted the Venezuelan president to kiss her hand – acts he expected his
listeners to recognize immediately as being completely contrary to the teachings
of Islam. Just days before the elections, on 25 September 2001, Matiur Rahman
Nizami, the Jamaat’s secretary-general arrived to campaign for the local Jamaat
candidate. Speaking to a large gathering in the playing field of the local govern-
ment secondary school, Nizami promised that if the Jamaat were to come to
power, the country’s name would be changed to the Islamic Republic of
Bangladesh and that Bangladesh would be transformed into an Islamic state in
which the entire legal system would be in line with the shariah. He expressed
profound concern that, if the AL were permitted to return to power, Bangladesh
would be turned into a colony of India’s, and urged his listeners to keep that party
out of office by all means possible. During this campaign speech, he also made a
point of emphasizing the importance of women observing purdah. In addition, he
called the local AL candidate a kafir (non-believer), on the grounds that he was
known not to say his daily prayers. In doing so, Nizami was simply drawing
further attention to what many in the local population had already noticed and
discussed among themselves. M. Nazrul Islam’s decision not to join prayer gath-
erings or engage in any public displays of religiosity made him an unfit candidate
in the eyes of many local voters.
In the 2001 elections, given its pre-election alliance with the BNP and others,
the Jamaat contested only three seats in Satkhira, leaving its alliance partner BNP
to nominate its own candidates for the other two constituencies in the district. The
Jamaat won all three of those seats in 2001, soundly beating the AL candidates
in all three instances. Mondal, for example, received 124,206 votes, as compared
to M. Nazrul Islam’s 69,861.67

Conclusion
As this brief and selective overview demonstrates, numerous anti-Islamist groups
operate in Bangladesh today and while their methods and objectives differ, they
share a concern with fighting the particular brand of Islam being propagated by
Islamist groups like the Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Oikya Jote, or Jagrata Muslim
Janata Bangladesh. While secularists and anti-Islamists clearly disagree about the
precise nature of the role of Islam in the public sphere, it is important to keep in
mind that there are also important differences among the different Islamist enti-
ties present in Bangladesh today, a topic beyond the scope of this chapter. For
instance, the twin pressures of operating in a democratic context and the presence
of millions of uneducated, impoverished women trained and mobilized by NGOs
have led the Jamaat to rethink not only how it courts poor rural women but also
the content of its message to them. Naturally, Islamist movements who are not
concerned with getting votes are not subject to such pressures to modify their
tactics.
On the secularist side, movements that have focused exclusively on the
Islamists’ 1971 crimes have not been successful in building a permanent support
110 Elora Shehabuddin
base among the poor uneducated majority, though they can usually count on the
support of the small educated minority in most villages, such as the local elite and
the village schoolteachers. A large part of the rural population was born after
1971 or is simply too young to remember the war, while most are far more
concerned about daily survival. Hence, the relative success of those anti-Islamists
who campaigned that a Jamaat victory would lead to NGOs being shut down and
the loss of livelihood for millions of rural women. Strident declarations about the
need to relegate all religion and religious behavior to the private domain make
little sense to much of the population who see no real harm in the public use of
“Bismillah” before undertaking any tasks, or in male politicians attending public
prayer gatherings, or in female politicians covering their head with a scarf or the
end of their saree.
The current era, of course, does not mark the first time Bengalis have been told
that their brand of Islam is not “correct” or “good enough.” During the Pakistan
era (1947–71), it was routine practice among West Pakistani authorities and civil-
ians, as well as some members of the East Pakistani elite to dismiss the Islam
practiced in East Pakistan as too tainted by local un-Islamic influences. For a
variety of historical, geographical and social reasons, there were indeed differ-
ences in the Islam of the two wings of Pakistan, but Bengalis took pride in these
differences.68 The West Pakistan-based central government’s decision to declare
Urdu (and not Bengali, the language of the majority of the population of united
Pakistan) as the official language of Pakistan in 1948 was met with the Bhasha
Andolon (Language Movement) led by students. On 21 February 1952, six
student protestors were shot and killed and the date is commemorated to this day
in Bangladesh as Ekushey February (21 February) and celebrated with music and
drama; in 1999, UNESCO declared the date International Mother Language Day.
Bengali was finally recognized as an official language alongside Urdu in the 1956
constitution of Pakistan. But the conflict was far from resolved. The Ayub Khan
regime established a Bureau for National Reconstruction to replace Sanskrit and
Hindu elements in the Bengali language with Arabic, Urdu and Persian words.
The songs of Rabindranath Tagore, revered and beloved Bengali poet, playwright
and Nobel Laureate of the early twentieth century, were banned from radio and
TV on the grounds that he was a Hindu.69 As Rahnuma Ahmed points out,
Bengali women took the lead in the

Bengalis’ resistance to Pakistani state ideology on the cultural front – in defi-

ance they sang Tagore songs, put on tip (decorative spots on the forehead
traditionally worn by Hindu women), wore flowers in their hair, sent their
daughters to music and dance schools, allowed them to perform on stage …
[A]ctivities which seem so commonplace now, in the 50s and 60s were
acts of dissent given the Pakistani government’s branding of these as Hindu
aberrations.70

Similarly, today, the population of Bangladesh finds itself confronted with the
narrow exclusivist Islam of the Islamists, which shows little tolerance for those
 Civil society and Islamist politics 111
who think and practice otherwise, an Islam alien to local history, culture and
society, one that many would argue has crept into the country along with indi-
vidual remittances and national aid packages from the Arabian Gulf countries.
Those who seek to fight this strand of Islam are finding that the most effective
strategy is perhaps not so much to undermine religion as such, but to highlight
the differences between the Islamist brand of Islam and the broad, inclusive Islam
long practiced in rural Bangladesh, generally accepting of different beliefs, prac-
tices, and dress both within and outside the Muslim community. Folk music and
folk theatre, which historically developed around stories and characters whose
traditional appeal cut across the different communities, can not only serve as a
bridge across communities but are also particularly useful in a population that
remains largely illiterate.

Notes
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
2 Syed Hashemi and Mirza Hassan. n.p., “State, Politics, and Civil Society in the
Context of Donor Hegemony” (paper presented at Conference on Bangladesh at 25,
Columbia University, December 1996). David Rieff, “Civil Society and the Future of
the Nation-State: The False Dawn of Civil Society,” The Nation (1999): 11–16.
Thomas Carothers, “Civil Society,” Foreign Policy 117 (1999): 18–29. Peter R. Davis
and J. Allister McGregor, “Civil Society, International Donors and Poverty in
Bangladesh,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 38 (2000): 47–64. Claire
Mercer, “NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: A Critical Review of the
Literature,” Progress in Development Studies 2 (2002): 5–22.
3 Carothers, “Civil Society,” 19–20, 24.
4 David Rieff, “Civil Society and the Future of the Nation–State: The False Dawn of
Civil Society.” The Nation (22 February 1999): 11–16. See Carothers, “Civil Society.”
5 Funding for these trips was provided by the Council for Regional Studies and the
Center for International Studies at Princeton University, the Social Science Research
Council (1995–7), and faculty research grants from the University of California, Irvine
(2001), and Rice University (2001, 2003).
6 Under the auspices of Ain-o-Salish Kendro and the Asia Foundation.
7 In 1996, with Mirza M. Hassan under the auspices of the Programme for Research on
Poverty Alleviation, Grameen Trust, and Nagorik Uddyog; in 2001, in collaboration
with Zakir Hossain and Nagorik Uddyog with funding from the Social Science
Research Council.
8 Anna Fruttero and Varuc Gauri, “The Strategic Choices of NGOs: Location Decisions
in Rural Bangladesh,” Journal of Development Studies 41(5) (July 2005): 759–87.
9 Kendall W Stiles, Civil Society by Design: Donors, NGOs, and the Intermestic
Development Circle in Bangladesh (Praeger, 2002).
10 Ainoon Naher, “Gender, Development and Rural Development in Bangladesh,”
M.A. Thesis. (University of Sussex, 1996).
11 Stiles, Civil Society by Design, 112.
12 Ibid.
13 Stiles, Civil Society by Design, 118–19.
14 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (Dhaka: University Press
Limited, 1994 [1972]). B. M. Manoar Kabir, “The Politics of Religion: The Jamaat-i-
Islami in Bangladesh,” in Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed.), Religion, Identity and Politics: Essays
on Bangladesh (International Academic Publishers Ltd, 2001); Talukder Maniruzzaman,
112 Elora Shehabuddin
“Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends.” in Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed.), Religion,
Identity & Politics: Essays on Bangladesh (International Academic Publishers Ltd,
2001).
15 Rafiuddin Ahmed, “Redefining Muslim Identity in South Asia: The Transformation of
the Jamaat-i-Islami,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Accounting for
Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements. (University of Chicago,
1994), 682. Kabir, “The Politics of Religion,”122. Ishtiaq Hossain and Noore Alam
Siddiquee, “Islam in Bangladesh Politics: The Role of Ghulam Azam of Jamaat-i-
Islami,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 5 (2004): 384–99, 387.
16 Kabir, “The Politics of Religion,” 124.
17 Ibid., 128–9.
18 Maniruzzaman, “Bangladesh Politics,” 89–90.
19 Ali Riaz, God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 99; Hossain and Siddiquee, “Islam in Bangladesh
Politics,” 387.
20 Jahanara Imam, Of Blood and Fire: The Untold Story of Bangladesh’s War of
Independence, trans. Mustafizur Rahman (Dhaka: University Press Ltd, 1990).
21 Nirmul Committee, 2005. White Paper. Available at <www.secularvoiceofbangladesh.
org/The%20White%20Paper.htm> (accessed 19 April 2006).
22 Nirmul Committee, “White Paper,” 20; Riaz, God Willing, 100.
23 Nirmul Committee, 1995, 7.
24 Akber Hossain, “Access to Internet: Bangladesh Perspective.” (paper presented at
Global indicators workshop on community access to ICTs (Information and
Communications Technologies) Mexico City, 16–19 November 2004).
25 Kazi Mukul, “Some Q/A about Nirmul Committee!,” Secular Voice of Bangladesh,
<www.secularvoiceofbangladesh.org/all_about_nirmul_committee.htm#Question_15>
(accessed 28 May 2006).
26 See Jeremy Seabrook, Freedom Unfinished: Fundamentalism and Popular Resistance
in Bangladesh Today (London and New York: Zed Books, 2001), 82.
27 Interviews, Satkhira, 14 June 1996.
28 Nizam Ahmed, The Parliament of Bangladesh (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). Nizam
Ahmed, “From Monopoly to Competition: Party Politics in the Bangladesh Parliament
(1973–2001),” Pacific Affairs 76 (2003): 55–77.
29 Personal interview, Satkhira, 14 June 1996. The Jamaat came in second in two of
the five constituencies, in both cases to Awami League victors. In Satkhira-2, the
Jamaat candidate Kazi Shamsur Rahman beat a woman, Syeda Razia Fayez, who had
run on a Jatiya Party ticket, by an extremely narrow margin of 309 votes following
a recount.
30 Unless indicated otherwise, information about the 2001 campaign in Satkhira is taken
from the notes of research assistant Sharif Mohammad Bari in the 2001 study coordi-
nated by Zakir Hossain of Nagorik Uddyog and myself (see note 3).
31 Bari noted that the Jamaat candidate had not used his last name “Mandol” in any of
the campaign posters, though it did appear in the official ballots. While, in theory,
given the Quran’s insistence on social equality, it should not matter if Mandol’s family
had only recently converted to Islam, Nazrul Islam was clearly trying to suggest that
Mandol could not be a very good and authentic Muslim precisely because he did not
come from old Muslim stock. This notion of hierarchy among Muslims has echoes of
the older stratification that persisted for centuries among Muslims in South Asia,
whereby foreign-born Muslims considered themselves ashraf (noble, elite, respecta-
ble) and superior to local converts ajlaf (inferior, lowly). And indeed, for a long time,
the two groups were indeed distinct in terms of race, class, and occupation. See
Richard M. Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204–1760 (University
of California Press, 1993).
32 Daily Star, 20 August 2004.
 Civil society and Islamist politics 113
33 Daily Star, 21 August 2004.
34 Daily Star, 2 September 2004.
35 Daily Star, 11 October 2005.
36 Nirmul Committee, “White Paper.”
37 Julfikar Ali Manik, “The Trial We are Waiting For,” Daily Star Magazine, 9 January
2009.
38 Mohammad Badrul Ahsan, “Toying with the War Crimes Trial,” Daily Star, 11
September 2009.
39 Martha Chen, A Quiet Revolution: Women In Transition In Rural Bangladesh
(Cambridge: Schenkman, 1983). Aditee Nag Chowdury, Let Grassroots Speak:
People’s Participation, Self-Help Groups and NGOs in Bangladesh (University Press
Limited, 1996), 175–6.
40 Naila Kabeer, “We Don’t Do Credit”: Nijera Kori, Social Mobilization, and the
Collective Capabilities of the Poor in Rural Bangladesh (Dhaka: Nijera Kori,
2002), vi, 2.
41 Naila Kabeer, “Making Rights Work for the Poor: Nijera Kori and the Construction of
‘Collective Capabilities,’ ” in Rural Bangladesh. (Institute of Development Studies
Working Paper 200, 2003), 9.
42 Aditee Nag Chowdury, Let Grassroots Speak. David J. Lewis, “NGOs, Donors, and the
State in Bangladesh,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
554 (1997): 33–45. Kirsten Westergaard, “Decentralization in Bangladesh: Local
Government and NGOs” (paper presented at Colloquium on Decentralization and
Development, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 7 April 2000). Deborah
Thomas, et al., “Citizen Participation and Voice in the Health Sector in Bangladesh,”
report commissioned by Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Bangladesh, and
financed by the UK. Department for International Development (DFID), 2003.
43 Kabeer, “Making Rights Work for the Poor,” 25–6.
44 Elora Shehabuddin, “Contesting the Illicit: Gender and the Politics of Fatwas in
Bangladesh,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 24 (4) (Summer 1999):
1011–1044; Dina M. Siddiqi, Paving the Way to Justice: The Experience of Nagorik
Uddyog (One World Action, 2003).
45 See Bina Agarwal, “Gender and Land Rights Revisited: Exploring New Prospects via
the State, Family and Market,” Journal of Agrarian Change 3 (2003): 184–224 for her
important discussion of women’s desire for land rights.
46 Kabeer, “Making Rights Work for the Poor,” 26–8, 47.
47 This description of the trip to Roumari elaborates on a more condensed discussion that
appears in Elora Shehabuddin, Reshaping the Holy: Democracy, Development and
Muslim Women in Bangladesh (Columbia University Press, 2008), 174–176.
48 Personal interview, Roumari, 23 May 1996.
49 Public speech, Roumari, 23 May 1996.
50 Public performance, Roumari, 23 May 1996.
51 Seabrook, Freedom Unfinished, 78.
52 Rupantar. n.d., Rupantar Means Social Transformation, Chapters 1–2.
53 “Strengthen local govt to institutionalise democracy,” Daily Star, 23 April 2006, 10.
54 Seabrook, Freedom Unfinished, 78.
55 “Method of Development Communication,” Rupantar, <http://www.rupantar.org/
rupantar-method.php> (4 July 2007).
56 Syed Jamil Ahmed, In Praise of Niranjan: Islam, Theatre and Bangladesh (Dhaka:
Pathak Samabesh. year), 329; see also Syed Jamil Ahmed, Acinpakhi Infinity:
Indigenous Theatre of Bangladesh (University Press Limited, 2000).
57 Seabrook, Freedom Unfinished. Siddiqi, Paving the Way to Justice. Mahfuz Sadique,
“Democracy is Fun,” New Age, 2005. 18–25 March. See, Seabrook, Freedom Unfinished,
79–80.
58 See, Seabrook, Freedom Unfinished, 3.
114 Elora Shehabuddin
59 Much of the following section has previously appeared as part of Chapter 6 in
Shehabuddin, Reshaping the Holy.
60 Personal interviews, Satkania, Chittagong, 16 January 1997.
61 Personal interview, Dhaka, 12 May 1996.
62 Personal interview, Chittagong, 3 August 2001.
63 “Allama Delawar Hussain Saidi: Views on the Elections,” Audiocassette recording,
Spandon Audio-Visual Centre, Dhaka; he repeated many of these charges at a massive
gathering in his home constituency of Pirojpur during the 2001 election campaign
that was attended by research assistants Raqibul Hassan Rana and Jessmin Nahar (see
note 3).
64 Subsequent events indicate that the student, Jasimuddin Manik of Jahangirnagar
University (JU), perpetrated multiple rapes in the campus. The fact finding committee
appointed by the University authority recommended Jasimuddin Manik’s expulsion.
The committee also identified five other students, also Awami League student leaders,
as perpetrators of sexual assaults and rapes. Two were suspended for two years, two
more for three years, while a fifth was given a suspended one-year expulsion (i.e. he
would face expulsion if found guilty of misconduct within that year). A JU professor
described these punishments as “a license to rape.” The large number of rapes and
sexual assaults in the late 1990s on the JU campus – and the weak response of
the university administration to them – galvanized the student body and supportive
professors to demand a formal Policy on Sexual Harassment. Similar movements have
since emerged on other campuses too following allegations of assaults by fellow
students as well as professors. Although the JU movement presented a draft policy to
the administration in 1999, there has been no response, and it has become a ritual for
the movement to restate the demand on International Women’s Day every year. Such
a code would be the first of its kind on any campus in Bangladesh and would govern
the behavior not just of students but also professors (for details of the event and subse-
quent developments, see: Mohammad Omar Farooq, “In Search of the Bottom: Focus
on the Top,” Daily Star, 25 August 2002. Hana Shams Ahmed, “Violating a Sacred
Relationship,” Star Weekend Magazine, 1 August 2007.
65 Yasmin Saikia, “Beyond the Archive of Silence: Narratives of Violence of the 1971
Liberation War of Bangladesh,” History Workshop Journal 58(2004): 47. See Nayanika
Mookherjee, “Gendered Embodiments: Mapping the Body-Politic of the Raped Woman
and the Nation in Bangladesh,” in Nirmal Puwar and Parvati Raghuram (eds.), South
Asian Women in the Diaspora (Berg, 2003). “Case Study: Genocide in Bangladesh,
1971.” Gendercide.org, <www.gendercide.org/case_bangladesh.html> (15 November
2009). “Women of 1971: Drishtipat Campaign to Assist Seven War-Affected Women,”
Drishtipat.Org, <www.drishtipat.org/1971/index.htm> (15 November 2009). “Women
of Pakistan Apologize for War Crimes in 1971,” adhunika.org, <www.adhunika.org/
issues/wpawc71.html> (15 November 2009).
66 The burqa is a very common sight in this area so the Jamaat women’s burqas are
worthy of comment only to the extent that they covered more of the female form than
the traditional local burqa.
67 Bangladesh Election Commission, <www.ecs.gov.bd/report.php3> (21 May 2006).
68 Naila Kabeer, “The Quest for National Identity: Women, Islam and the State of
Bangladesh.” in Deniz Kandiyoti (ed.), Women, Islam and the State. (London:
Macmillan, 1991), 117. See Richard M. Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal
Frontier, 1204–1760 (University of California Press, 1993).
69 Naila Kabeer, “The Quest for National Identity.” Zillur Rahman Khan, “Islam and
Bengali Nationalism,” in Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed.), Religion, Identity and Politics:
Essays on Bangladesh (International Academic Publishers Ltd, 2001).
70 Saikia, “Beyond the Archive of Silence,” 47.
6 Islamist politics
and education
Ali Riaz

Since Bangladesh became an independent nation in 1971, education and especially

the curriculum, has been a site of contestation between Bangladesh’s various
social groups and classes. Education policy has been on the agenda of almost all
governments since 1971 and political parties and civil society groups alike have
battled to make their mark on education in as many ways. The secular Bengali
nationalist movement that culminated in the founding of Bangladesh promised
a universal and uniform system of education. Consequently, the constitution
formulated in 1972 stipulated that the state would provide free compulsory
education to all children between the ages of six and ten years.1 While this goal
remained enshrined in the constitution, after 35 years of independence more than
half of the population remain illiterate. Successive governments have failed to
deliver a high-quality, uniform education for all of its citizens. Instead, the educa-
tion sector is fragmented along social class lines with few opportunities for the
socially and economically disadvantaged to obtain a decent education.
Of equal importance is the drift of educational policies away from secular
principles as propounded in the Constitution of the country in 1972, the increas-
ing incorporation of religious educational institutions into mainstream education,
and the proliferation of Islamic educational institutions, namely madrassahs.
These developments have taken place in the context of the rising influence of the
Islamists in mainstream politics. In this chapter, I investigate the impact of the
rise of Islamist politics upon the education sector in Bangladesh. The main
contention of this chapter is that the rise of Islamists as a formidable political
force has brought changes to the contours and content of general education in
public and private educational institutions alike. The most obvious evidence of
this gradual Islamization of education has been the inclusion of religious educa-
tion in the curriculum, and the proliferation of madrassahs. The chapter will also
demonstrate that infrastructures founded under the name of madrassahs have
been used by Islamist militant groups as centers for recruitment and training.
These arguments are elaborated in eight sections. The second section provides
an overview of the education sector in Bangladesh; the third section briefly points
to recent successes and failures of the Bangladeshi education system, particularly
in the primary education sector; the fourth section examines changes in educa-
tional policies over the last three decades; the fifth section explores changes in
116 Ali Riaz
curriculum and content, particularly in regard to religious studies in primary and
secondary schooling; the sixth section examines madrassah education, with
special emphasis on its relationship with Islamist parties and militant groups; and
the seventh section deals with the higher education sector where the Islamists
are trying to increase their influence. The eighth and final section presents the
conclusions.

The education system in Bangladesh: an overview

There are generally three levels of education in Bangladesh, namely: primary,
secondary and higher education. Primary education is provided by primary level
institutions, and the total length is five years (grades one to five). The general
non-formal education is part of this stage. Secondary education is imparted by
junior secondary/secondary and higher secondary education institutions and is
completed in seven years. Higher education is imparted by degree colleges,
universities and other specialized and professional educational institutions.

Primary education
Primary education (the first five grades for children aged six to ten) and junior
secondary education (grades six through seven for children aged eleven to thirteen)
are delivered through two systems: formal and non-formal. There are now eleven
types of primary school in Bangladesh. Six of these are considered mainstream
schools because they implement the curriculum and use textbooks books pres-
cribed by the National Curriculum and Textbook Board (NCTB). The mainstream
schools are: government primary schools (GPS), registered non-government pri-
mary schools (RNGPS), non-government primary schools (NGPS), attached experi-
mental schools (EXP), high school attached primary schools (HSAPS), community
schools, and satellite schools. Non-formal system schools include the Ibtedayee
madrassah (EM), high madrassah attached to primary schools (HMAPS), and
non-formal schools run by Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
NGO provision of education is an important innovation of Bangladeshi devel-
opment activists and thus merits brief elaboration. The concept of non-formal
schooling initiated by the leading Bangladeshi NGO- the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) – has received significant international atten-
tion as a model for children who are otherwise not served by the public school
system. Initially the schools were one-room-one-teacher centers. Each center
admitted a cohort of about 35 children who were eight years or older. These chil-
dren are too old to enter the regular primary school. Students attending these
BRAC schools study for three years, enabling them to catch up with their peers
in the fourth or fifth grade of primary school at regular schools, enabling them to
join and continue their formal education. Gradually, this model developed into a
full primary education program, offering the equivalent of five-year formal
primary education in four years. Almost 700 NGOs have adopted this model and
are involved in providing educational services in Bangladesh.2
 Islamist politics and education 117
In 2002, primary education was delivered through 78,363 schools serving
about 17.6 million children. Of these, 48 percent were Government Primary
Schools (GPS), while the remaining schools were registered non-governmental
schools partly funded by the government. A significant proportion of students (39
percent) – were enrolled in non-government schools (Table 6.1). Primary level
madrassahs, which constitute more than 9 percent of the educational institutions,
comprised less than a 5 percent share of the total enrolled students aged between
five and seventeen. Interestingly, in 2002, the share of the non-formal schools
operated by NGOs was far smaller than generally perceived: about 4 percent of
total primary educational institutions were operated by NGOs and these schools
had about 2 percent of total enrolled students. The Campaign for Popular
Education (CAMPE) reported the share of non-formal institutions at 1.1 percent
in the ten upazillas (sub-districts) they surveyed in 2004.3

Post-primary/secondary education
The post-primary level in education is divided into four streams in terms of curric-
ulum: general education, madrassah education, technical-vocational education and
professional education. The situation at the secondary level is remarkably different
from primary education. Secondary education in Bangladesh covers five academic
years, from grade six through ten. It concludes with a public examination – the
Secondary School Certificate (SSC). Secondary schooling is not compulsory.
Local communities run a large proportion of the existing secondary schools. The
government provides 90 percent salary support for the teachers of non-government
schools and a bridge grant for maintenance and construction. In madrassah educa-
tion, the equivalent stage is the Dakhil. At the secondary level there are special-
ized educational institutions called Cadet Colleges which offer secondary and
higher secondary education (from grade six through twelve). At the secondary level,

Table 6.1 Schools and enrollments 2002

Type Schools Enrolments

Number % Number %

Government Primary Schools (GPS) 37,671 48 10,832 61

Registered Non-Government Primary Schools (RNGPS) 19,428 25 4,170 24
Community 3,225 4 454 3
High School Attached Primary Schools (HSAPS) 1,576 2 499 3
Non-Government Primary Schools (NGPS) 1,792 2 307 2
Eb. Madrassahs 3,443 4 417 2
High Madrassah Attached to Primary Schools (HMAPS) 3,574 5 403 2
Satellite 4,823 6 209 1
NGOs and Others 2,831 4 376 2
Total 78,363 100 17,677 100

Source: Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, 2004.

118 Ali Riaz
students can also pursue two other curricula: a trade certificate, and artisanal
courses (i.e. ceramics). Additionally, children from affluent families have the
option to go to English medium schools and complete English GCSE and A-level
courses.4
Available government statistics show that in 2003, the secondary school-age
population in Bangladesh was 17.98 million and a total of 18,500 institutions
were offering junior secondary and secondary level general education to 8.12
million students, while 5,995 Dakhil madrassahs educated 2.19 million students.
By this account the share of madrassahs in secondary level general education is
close to 25 percent. However, it is well to bear in mind that parents have other
options for secondary school age children. The availability of these options
makes it difficult to ascertain the exact share of the Dakhil students in total
secondary level enrollment figures (I will return to the enrollment in madrassahs
later in the chapter). One aspect of the available statistics should be highlighted
here: the gross enrollment rate at secondary level is about 45 percent, meaning
close to 8 million school-age children remain without any formal schooling.
After successful completion of the Secondary School Certificate students may
study for an additional two years and obtain a Higher Secondary Certificate
(HSC). Within the madrassah system the equivalent degree is called A’lim. A
standardized public examination is held annually and those who succeed are eligible
to undertake bachelor’s degrees offered by degree colleges and universities – either
for general education or for specialized courses such as engineering or medical.
Both the SSC and the HSC examinations are conducted by seven regional
educational boards. The Dakhil and A’lim examinations are conducted by the
Madrassah Board, and a Technical Education Board supervises the terminal
examination of the vocational educational institutions. The medium of instruction
of the government schools, government-supported schools and schools run by the
NGOs is Bengali where English is taught as a second language.

Tertiary/higher education
The tertiary education sector in Bangladesh has experienced dramatic growth
in recent years. Until 1992, higher education was dominated by the 10 state-
supported public universities, which included specialized technical universities
like the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET). The
Private University Act of 1992, amended in 1998, has allowed the establishment
of universities in the private sector, and since then a significant number of private
universities have been founded. In early 2007, it is estimated that more than 100
institutions representing the conventional higher education institution were func-
tioning. There are 21 public universities, 54 private universities, one international
university, five regional engineering universities, 31 specialized colleges includ-
ing 12 government and 14 private medical colleges which offer bachelor’s and
higher degrees. There are two universities exclusively for female students. The
total enrolment at public universities was 92,152, out of which more than a quarter
were female students.5
 Islamist politics and education 119
The state-supported and private colleges which offer baccalaureate and post-
baccalaureate degrees are required to be affiliated to the National University
(NU). The NU was established in 1992 to provide curricular guidance to colleges,
monitor their academic standards, and harmonize the higher education sector.
According to the NU authorities, in mid-2007 about 1 million students were
studying at more than 1,600 colleges or institutions affiliated to this university.6

Successes and failures of the education system

In recent years Bangladesh has been applauded for its success in “expanding
access to primary and to some degree secondary, education for the poor and for
the girls.”7 Indeed, in South Asia, Bangladesh has been a pioneer in increasing
girls’ secondary school enrollment. The gross primary enrollment rates, which
were only 61 percent in 1980, increased to 72 percent in 1990 and to 96 percent
by 2000. In 2002, national gross enrollment rate was 106.34. In terms of absolute
numbers, between 1991 and 2003, enrollment increased from 12.36 million to
17.46 million. It is argued that “by the end of the 1990s gross enrolment rates
were over 100 percent and the gender gap at the primary level was eliminated. In
theory, at least there were enough school places for every school-aged child in
the country.”8 These impressive statistics demonstrate that the country has come
a long way from the early days of its existence when the promise of mass educa-
tion was more symbolic than a commitment. While the focus of education
programs was on higher education in the 1970s and the 1980s, the 1990s saw a
shift towards mass and primary education. There was a growing consensus
among the political elite that education, particularly mass education, was impor-
tant for economic development, making this transformation possible. The success
may also be attributed to the involvement of the private sector in education;
the most important actor in this regard has been the NGOs. However, the priva-
tization of education and the franchising of education to non-state actors has
created more opportunities for the urban richer segments of the society than the
rural poor.
Ironically, despite this enormous success, at least 3.5 million children aged six
to ten years remain unenrolled.9 The number of unenrolled students is estimated
at 4.47 million by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) in the official report
of the census of 2001.10 The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) suggests that almost 30 percent of children in the country do not have
a primary education.11 Geographically a large number of them are in the econom-
ically backward northern region. According to a press report of 2005, over 300,000
children do not attend schools “because of abject poverty and absence of educa-
tional institutions.”12 The trend is more striking among the socio-economically
disadvantaged groups irrespective of their geographical locations. Equally impor-
tant is the rate of drop-outs, particularly at the primary level. According to the
USAID, the rate is as high as 25 percent.13 Additionally, the issue of quality has
been a major concern of analysts and policy-makers. The overall picture of the
education sector, therefore, shows progress in recent years but the system is still
120 Ali Riaz
failing major segments of the society. The inaccessible and insufficient facilities
combined with the lack of quality and the direct and opportunity costs of primary
education can be identified as the salient features of the education sector.
These issues assume greater significance due to the growing number of youths
in the country. Despite a reduction in the population growth rate, from 3 percent
to 1.6 percent, the Bangladeshi population is expected to reach or exceed 170
million by 2020. Currently, adolescents and youths (ten to twenty-four years)
form the biggest segment of the population of Bangladesh. According to the 2001
census, nearly one-third (32 percent) of the country’s population (total 132 million)
is in this age group, and 45 percent is below fifteen years of age. The number is
expected to grow to more than 35 million in 2020.14
Problems such as the absence of public education have already created oppor-
tunities for privatized educational institutions throughout the country. The urban
and affluent classes of the society are now turning to these private institutions
while costs and non-availability of such institutions are forcing the poorer
segments to rely on free or inexpensive religious educational institutions operated
outside the purview of any state supervision. This factor, among others, has
helped the proliferation of madrassahs in recent years.

Education policies: the drift toward Islamization

Until the 1990s, the state remained the central actor in the education sector and
the education policies of successive governments had a far reaching impact. The
state’s direct intervention into the education sector began with the nationalization
of 36,000 largely community-based primary schools in 1973–4. This move was
rationalized as an effort to realize the constitutional mandate of providing mass
education, although higher education to replace the departing bureaucrats and
teachers was prioritized over primary or mass education.15
The education policy formulated in 1974 viewed education as a means to instill
nationalist ideas, particularly secular Bengali nationalism. The prescribed books
of the then School Text Book Board, in charge of writing text books, particularly
the history books demonstrate this focus.16 It was expected that the policy would
chart a course for and develop modus operandi for inculcating the Bengali
national identity. The secular ideals which served as the raison d’être of the
nationalist movement and were enshrined in the constitution were to be the guid-
ing principle. The education policy was formulated in 1974 at the recommenda-
tion of a commission headed by Professor Kudrat-e-Khuda. While the commission
was intended to set a direction for realizing the goal of a uniform education
system in line with the constitutional provision, the commission report did not
recommend abolishing religious educational institutions neither did it suggest
the abolition of privately operated English-language kindergartens. This reflected
the tensions faced by the regime in fulfilling its promise of uniform education
and the demands of the elites, both secular and religious.
The religious educational institutions, namely madrassahs, were kept to
appease the religio-political forces who were consigned to oblivion through the
 Islamist politics and education 121
ban imposed on all religious parties in 1972. Importantly, the commission recom-
mended blending religious education with state-supported general education,
primarily because the educated elites of the country favored this amalgamation.
In their responses to the questionnaire sent by the commission, the elites of the
society (vice-chancellors and professors of the universities and degree colleges,
principals and professors of the medical colleges, principals of the higher second-
ary colleges, headteachers of the high schools, members of the associations of
school and college teachers, and superintendents of madrassahs, educationists,
essayists, poets, novelists, playwrights, newspaper editors, top-level civil serv-
ants and Members of Parliament) overwhelmingly (74.69 per cent of total
respondents) suggested that “religious education should be an integral part of
general education.”17
This resulted in the continuation of religious education (i.e. Islamic education
for Muslim students and Hindu religious texts for Hindu students) at both primary
and secondary level. Additionally the government increased funding for the
madrassahs. The nationalization of primary education in 1974 left the kindergar-
tens and the madrassahs outside its purview. Consequently, particularly in the
rural areas, madrassahs – with their limited resources and poor facilities – became
the only option for many parents. The neglect of primary education in the 1970s
and the 1980s is well documented in the fact that the number of children in
primary education rose to 45,783 in 1990 from 39,914 in 1975, at a time when
the population was growing at least 2.41 percent.18
In the 1970s and 1980s, as the country experienced military regimes, there
were overt attempts to Islamize the education sector. For example, in 1977, the
military regime of Zia ur-Rahman (Zia) appointed a Committee on Curricula and
Syllabi which declared that

Islam is a code of life, not just the sum of rituals. A Muslim has to live his
personal, social, economic and international (sic) life in accordance with
Islam from childhood to death. So the acquiring of knowledge of Islam is
compulsory for all Muslims – men and women.19

Madrassah education received a serious boost in the following year, and the
government established a separate directorate within the education ministry and
set up the “Madrassah Education Board” to oversee madrassah education. The
Board’s responsibilities included standardization of madrassah curricula and
tests. The Board was entrusted with the task of making madrassah education
equivalent to secular general education. This entailed creating opportunities for
madrassah educated students to enter university.
During the rule of General Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1982–90), Islam was
declared the state religion, and emphasis on Islamic education was stepped up at
various levels. In 1982, it was proposed to introduce the Arabic language as a
mandatory subject at primary level to increase religious awareness. The policy
was discarded after massive student protests. The growing involvement of the
NGOs in education during the Ershad Era partly lessened the impact of the
122 Ali Riaz
Islamizing of mainstream education, but evidently the state policies favored more
Islamic content in the curriculum.
The education policies formulated during the democratic era (1991–6) by the
regimes of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP, 1991–6; 2001–6) and the
Awami League (AL, 1996–2001) failed to make a break with past practices. For
example, the education commission in 1997, headed by Professor Shamsul
Haque, insisted that madrassahs should be further integrated within general
education, although one stream of madrassahs (Aliya madrassash) had already
been integrated into the general education system in the 1980s. The policy for
primary education adopted in 2000 under the BNP regime delineated 22 objec-
tives, the first of which was: “indoctrination of students in the loyalty to and
belief in the Almighty Allah, so that the belief inspires the students in their
thought and work, and helps shape their spiritual, moral, social and human
values.”20
The most notable victory of the Islamists in regard to education policy came in
2006 when they secured the recognition of the Daurah Hadith – highest degree
of qwami madrassah – as equivalent to the master’s degree in Islamic Studies
and/or Arabic. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia in a politically expedient move21
announced the decision to recognize the degree on 22 August 2006. The decision
was made without any consultation with the University Grants Commission
(UGC), the national accreditation body for higher education, a rigorous examina-
tion of the curriculum, and above all, even before formulating any policy guide-
lines in regard to the implementation mechanism.22 That the government had
decided to recognize this degree without considering the other degrees conferred
by the same institution demonstrated an inconsistency and the absence of a
planned measure to reform the qwami madrassah sector. Islamist politicians, who
had been pressing the government for the recognition, and a section of the ulama,
were euphoric about the recognition, but also stated unequivocally that they
would not allow any government “interference” in these madrassahs even if
public funds were provided to them.23
As a result of the growing strength of the Islamist parties within the political
arena and Islamization of the society, the education policies of successive regimes
have moved further away from secular principles and ideals and have embraced
Islamist content. This drift is evident in changes in the mainstream school
curriculum, as described below.

Changes in curriculum and content

The most significant change in the school curriculum over recent decades is the
inclusion of religious education, particularly Islamiat (Islamic studies) at various
levels of primary and secondary education. The process began in earnest in 1978,
when the military regime of Ziaur Rahman introduced this as an optional subject
in the higher secondary certificate examinations. This move came as the military
regime was co-opting the Islamists. Under the new political arrangements, the
religio-political parties were allowed to operate and the Islamists extended their
 Islamist politics and education 123
support to the regime of the Ziaur Rahman. The Ershad regime took this policy
further in 1984: Islamiat became a mandatory subject for students of grades three
through ten. Text books for all these grades were written and produced by the
National Curriculum and Textbook Board (NCTB). The books not only teach
the fundamentals of religion such as Iman and Akaid (belief), akhlaq (good
manners), and the biographies of the four caliphs, but also deal with the status of
women in Islam, and sources of Islamic laws. In 1991, the BNP government
extended religious education to grades one and two. The AL regime made no
change to this during their five year term in office.
In the primary and secondary curriculum, the Islamic studies course is often
described as “religious education”; therefore, theoretically adherents of other reli-
gions may receive education about their own religions. Four streams of religious
education are supposed to be offered at the primary and secondary level. But often
due to lack of resources, schools only offer Islamic studies. Non-availability of
teachers of religions others than Islam, is a very common occurrence.24
The influence of the Islamists over the content of education is most dramatically
demonstrated in the textbooks produced by the NCTB. The historical narrative
of the independence struggle has become a contentious issue since the BNP
regime came to power in 1991. Since 1975, the official narrative has deliberately
remained silent about the role of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the Bengali national-
ist struggle, the role of India during the nine-month long war, and the enemies of
the war of liberation.25 In the early post-independence period history textbooks
recorded that the Islamists, namely the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), opposed the war of
independence, collaborated with the Pakistani Army in their genocidal operation,
and founded three paramilitary forces called Razakars, Al Badr and Al Shams.
These paramilitary forces led by current JI leaders were engaged in abductions,
torture and killings, including the planned murders of Bengali intellectuals in the
wake of the surrender of the Pakistani Army in December 1971. But these facts
had been purged from history textbooks by 1978. Between 1991 and 1996, the
BNP regime deliberately obliterated discussion of various aspects of the Bengali
nationalist struggle and its leaders and textbook descriptions of the identity of the
opponents of the war of independence became vague. In 1996, when the AL came
to power, they “corrected” these deliberate omissions. But with the return of BNP
to power in 2001, with JI as its partner,

a descriptive and controversial paragraph added by the Awami League in

1996, blaming the razakars and specifically naming the Jamaat-e-Islami as
responsible for the deaths of the intellectuals on December 14, 1971 was duly
removed from the textbooks after October 2001. … [T]he BNP’s efforts to
vindicate the perpetrators of genocide have gone considerably further than
even the former textbooks of Zia and Ershad’s periods where the word
‘razakars’ still appeared in reference to the murderers of intellectuals on
December 14, 1971. … After October 2001, eliminating references to razakars
and certainly the Jamaat-e-Islami was an imperative since former razakars and
members of the Jamaat-e-Islami are now part of the ruling coalition.26
124 Ali Riaz
The above examples show how the Islamists have changed the curriculum and
content of mainstream public education. But, perhaps, the most significant
changes have taken place on the margin of the mainstream education sector; that
is in madrassah education with the phenomenal rise in terms of numbers and
transformation in terms of the role of these institutions.

Madrassah education: the citadels of Islamists

Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of madrassahs in Bangladesh: Aliya
Madrassahs and Qwami Madrassahs. The former are state-supervised and state-
supported madrassahs modeled after the Calcutta Madrassah (and later the Dhaka
Aliya Madrassah),27 while the latter category comprise privately managed madrassahs
modeled after the Deoband madrassah.28 Variations within the qwami madrassahs
are found, but in popular discourse madrassahs which do not follow the Aliya nisab
(curriculum) are identified as qwami madrassahs. There are at least three kinds of
pre-primary religious institutions that often serve as feeders for madrassahs of both
kinds; they are: maktabs – which offer religious education as well as basic literacy,
Furkania/Hafizia madrassah – which offer basic Islamic education for about four
years exclusively meant for memorizing the Holy Qu’ran, and Nurani Madrassah –
similar to maktabs but which emphasize basic knowledge of Islam.
Aliya madrassahs were integrated into mainstream education in the 1980s, and
are supervised by a state-appointed Madrassah Board. The curriculum is equiva-
lent to general education, and the students can move laterally from the madrassahs
to general education, particular after either of the two terminal degrees (Dakhil –
equivalent to SSC examination, and Al’im – equivalent to HSC examination).
Two higher degrees offered by the Aliya madrassahs are not yet recognized (Fazil
is equivalent to a bachelor’s degree course and is a two-year program, and Kamil
is equivalent to a master’s and takes two years to complete.) The qwami
madrassahs, on the other hand, have remained outside any centralized supervision
and their degrees have no equivalent. Usually it takes 16 years to complete the
curriculum with Daurah Hadith as the highest degree.29
In the last three decades (1977–2007), there has been a phenomenal increase
of both types of madrassahs. Official statistics in regard to Aliya madrassahs bear
testimony to the fact. Between 1977 and 2004, the number of Aliya madrassahs
has increased 692 percent and student enrollment by 653 percent (Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 Aliya Madrassahs, student enrollment and teachers

1977/78 1978/79 1981/82 1990/91 1991/92 2002/03

Madrassah 1,976 2,329 2,466 5,248 5,959 15,661

Student 375,000 423,000 388,000 1,028,000 1,278,240 2,824,672
Teachers 21,579 22,643 22,969 85,636 83,761 133,445

Sources: Various government publications and personal communication with BANBEIS, December
2005.
Note: 1978/79 data does not include kamil madrassahs and students enrolled at kamil level.
 Islamist politics and education 125
These figures do not include the number of institutions offering Ibtidayee (primary)
level courses.
The growth in secondary-level madrassahs has been the most remarkable. Over
a period of 32 years (1972–2004), post-primary madrassahs have grown about
732 percent. Madrassahs have grown at an average annual rate of 6.8 percent.
Over the decade between 1983 and 1993 the growth was almost 100 percent; in
the following 11 years (1993–2004) the overall increase was about 111 percent.
The most significant growth has taken place at Dakhil (secondary) level. In the
first decade after the founding of Bangladesh (1972–83) the annual rate of growth
was 7.2 percent; in the second decade (1983–93) the rate was 8.8 percent; and in
the third decade (1993–2004) the rate was 8.3 percent. Over the 32-year period
(1972–2004), the growth of Dakhil madrassahs has been astounding: 1,103
percent. Annual rate of growth has been 8.1 percent.30
Official statistics provided by the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education in
regard to the enrollment in primary level of Aliya madrassah is low, and constitutes
a small proportion of total school enrollment.
As mentioned before, in 2002 the share was about 10 percent. A survey
conducted in ten upazillas (the lowest administrative unit) covering 3.2 million
people with a primary school age population of 512,000 shows a higher level of
madrassah enrollment. According to the survey, out of 2,452 educational institutions,
400 were madrassahs accounting for 9 percent of students.31
However, there has been a significant development in the 1990s which merits
attention: the growth of “Islamic Kindergartens.” There is no reliable figure for
this kind of kindergarten. In metropolitan cities, district headquarters and in sub-
district levels there exist a significant number of such kindergartens mostly
managed by local leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. Professor Siddiqur
Rahman of the Institute of Education and Research of Dhaka University believes
the number of this kind of schools to be close to 5,000.32 These schools do not
follow the national curriculum designed by the NCTB, nor the curriculum of the
Bangladesh Kindergartens’ Association. The previous government took an initia-
tive to bring these schools under control by asking them to register with the
Education Ministry. This move has apparently failed. These Islamic Kindergartens
provide students with a combination of religious and general education. There
are also some English-medium Islamic Kindergartens and English-medium
Madrassahs in the country. Affluent families, who are mostly associated with
Jamaat and other Islamist political parties, send their children to these kinds of
Islamic Kindergartens. The parents think that their children will gain a good
command of the English language while receiving an Islamic education if they
attend these schools.33
There are no official figures regarding the Qwami Madrassahs. A report
published by the Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics
(BANBEIS) in 1992 maintained that the number was 3,000 and boasted that
“some of them are functioning as [the] highest seat of Islamic learnings (sic)
attracting foreign students to pursue Islamic studies and research.”34 In 1998,
government sources claimed that the number was 2,043.35 A study, in 2004,
Table 6.3 Growth of secondary and post-secondary Madrassahs: 1972–2004

Types of No of institutions Growth rate in percentage

Madrassah
1972 1983 1993 1999 2004 1972–1983 1983–1993 1993–1999 1993–2004 1972–2004

Over Annual Over Annual Over Annual Over Annual Over Annual
11 years 10 years 6 years 11 years 32 Years

Dakhil 765 1645 3825 4865 9206 115.0 7.2 132 8.8 27.2 4.1 140.7 8.3 1103.4 8.1
Alim 302 508 806 1090 1180 68.2 4.8 58.6 4.7 35.2 5.2 46.4 3.5 290.7 4.4
Fazil 300 591 831 1000 1180 97.0 6.4 40.6 3.5 20.3 3.1 42.0 3.2 293.3 4.4
Kamil 54 61 97 141 180 12.9 1.1 59.0 4.8 45.4 6.4 85.6 5.8 233.3 3.8
Total 1421 2805 5559 7096 11,746 98.6 6.1 98.3 7.1 27.6 4.2 111.2 7.0 731.9 6.8

Sources: Statistics for 1972 is from the Education Commission Report, 1974, p. 81 published by the Government of Bangladesh; Statistics for 1983, 1993 and 1999
are gathered from the BANBEIS (Bangladesh Bureau of Education, Information and Statistics) through communication in 2005. Statistics for 2004 are derived from the
Education Commission 2003 Report published in 2004 by the Government of Bangladesh, p. 271. The growth rate was compiled by the author.
 Islamist politics and education 127
however, estimates the number to be around 4,000.36 The non-availability of
reliable figures is due to the fact that these institutions do not have to register
with any government agencies or local administration. They remain outside the
purview of the government as they do not receive any financial aid. In early 2006,
at least 12 groups claimed to have established separate Qwami Madrassah Boards
and have provided varying numbers of students enrolled in these institutions.
Abdul Jabbar who leads one of these Boards claimed that about 1.8 million
students are currently enrolled. Fazlul Huq Aminee, a former Member of
Parliament (2001–6) and leader of an Islamist political party Islami Oikya Jote,37
stated on many occasions, including in an interview with the author, that there are
at least 20,000 institutions and 2 million students. Since 1992, the semi-government
Islamic Foundation has offered three cycles of one-year Maktab or Mosque-based
Islamic education to 2.41 million students.38
The number of Furkania and Nurani Madrassahs is staggering and there is
no way to reach a reliable figure. In 1965–6, the education department enumer-
ated a total of 2,929 Furkania and 188 Nurani madrassahs. In 1972, soon after
independence, a government report put the combined figure at 6,601.39 About
20 years later, a survey of the Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information
and Statistics (BANBEIS) estimated that there were at least 130,000 madrassahs
attached to the mosques and 60,000 independent maktabs.40 Abdalla et al.
quoted an official of the Madrassah Education Board as saying that there were
58,124 maktabs/nurani madrassahs.41 This number does not include the Furkania
madrassahs. According to a UNESCO report, government sources quoted the
number of Maktabs/Hafezia/Furkania madrassahs as 78,821.42
Statistics related to education in general and particularly madrassah education
demonstrate two important points: that the gross enrollment rate at secondary
level is about 45 percent, meaning close to 8 million school-age children remain
without any formal schooling; and that of the enrolled students, about 20 percent
attend madrassahs. The share of secondary level madrassahs is significantly
higher compared to madrassahs at the primary level, but is consistent with the
growth of Dakhil level institutions over recent decades. A sample taken in 2005
supports these general observations. A survey of 24,000 households and 600
secondary level educational institutions throughout the country conducted by
Education Watch in 2005 reveals that about 14 percent of students attend
madrassahs – close to 11 percent at Dakhil madrassahs and the remainder at
higher madrassahs. There are an additional 2 percent of students who attend non-
graded madrassahs. The survey also found that there is a variation between rural
and urban areas. In the rural areas, the share of the madrassahs is slightly higher
at 16 percent of total enrollment.43
Overall, the combined figure for the students enrolled at various levels of
madrassah education – from pre-primary to master’s level – is estimated to be at
least 6 million. Two conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion: firstly,
the increasing strength and influence of the Islamists is allowing Islamization of
education in Bangladesh; and second, with increasing numbers of students taught
at various Islamic educational institutions the likelihood of Islamists gaining
128 Ali Riaz
further strength in the future is greater. The future projection is based on two
elements of the education system: the changes in curriculum discussed earlier and
the influence of the Islamist parties within these institutions.
The connection between the madrassah and political activism is not new in
South Asia – the involvement of the Deoband madrassah with the anti-colonial
movement in late nineteenth century is a case in point. But post-independence
Bangladesh did not inherit the tradition, largely because the mainstream
madrassahs came out of the Calcutta Madrassah tradition. Additionally, not only
had the ulema no role in the Bengali nationalist movement, but many opposed the
movement until the establishment of Bangladesh. The situation began to change
in the late 1970s. The JI was the first to organize its supporters within the Aliya
madrassahs even when the party remained banned. The removal of the constitu-
tional provision banning religion-based political parties helped the Islamists in
two ways. The JI supporters began emerging as an organized force within the
Aliya madrassahs. The Political Parties Regulation (PPR) ordinance promulgated
by the Zia regime in 1978 made it mandatory for all political parties to have a
students’ wing and thus legitimated the Islami Chatra Shibir (ICS). The ICS was
not only limited to the madrassahs. Instead the organization endeavored to estab-
lish control over all kinds of educational institutions. On the other hand, the
ulema began to enter into the political realm, and qwami madrassahs began to
become their home turf.
The first direct connections between an organized political entity and
madrassahs came to the fore in 1981 when the Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan
(BKA) was established under the leadership of Moulana Mohammadullah, popu-
larly known as Hafezzi Huzur, with an aim to contribute to the “global movement
for establishing Khilafa” and to establish “Khilafat in Bangladesh.”44 Moulana
Mohammdaullah’s support came from his disciples (murids), but a large number
of activists of his party came from the madrassah he established and headed.
When he ran for the Presidency in 1981, it was obvious that the support base was
overwhelmingly qwami madrassahs. This was a watershed in the recent history
of the Islamist movement in Bangladesh. In many ways the BKA is the fountain-
head of an Islamist movement that is distinctly different from the Jaamat-e-Islami
(JI). A significant number of the Islamist leaders including Shaikhul Hadith Azizul
Huq, Mufti Fazlul Huq Aminee and Syed Fazlul Karim(the pir of Charmonai),
who now lead various small Islamist parties, had been in leading positions in the
BKA at one point or another. These leaders have established a madrassah, or a
network of madrassahs, which serve as their bases.
Mufti Fazlul Huq Aminee, who heads a faction of the IOJ, is perhaps the
best illustration of the politicization of the qwami madrassah and its impact on
politics. According to the official biography,45 Aminee started his career as a
teacher at Jamia-e-Nuria, near Dhaka in 1970. After marrying a daughter of
Maulana Mohammadullah (Hafezi Huzzur), Aminee established a madrassah in
Dhaka in 1972. Three years later he joined the Jamia Qurania Arabia Lalbagh
Madrassah as a teacher and an Assistant Mufti. He was promoted to Vice
Principal and Chief Mufti in 1984. He became the Principal and Shaikhul Hadith
 Islamist politics and education 129
of this madrassah after the death of Hafezzi Huzur in 1987. Aminee entered into
politics in 1981 when his father-in-law formed the BKA and appointed him
Secretary General of the party. After the death of Hafezzi Huzur, the party split
and Aminee became the Chairman of one faction of it. The other faction of the
party was headed by Maulana Ahmadullah, son of Hafezzi Huzur. Later, Aminee
formed the Islami Morcha Bangladesh and became its Chairman. The Islami
Morcha Bangladesh is a partner of Islami Oikyo Jote (IOJ) which was a member
of the four-party alliance. In 2002, when Islami Oikya Jote split again, he
assumed the Chairmanship of one faction. It is not a coincidence that his rise
within the Jamia Qurania Arabia Lalbagh Madrassah (Lalbagh Madrassah) paral-
leled his growing influence in politics. He also directs a number of madrassahs in
Brahmanbaria, a town southeast of the capital Dhaka from where he was elected
to the parliament in 2001. The city was a site of periodic violence between the
secularists, particularly NGOs and the Islamists, throughout the 1990s.46
In spite of the banning of political activities inside madrassahs under the code
of conduct for teachers and staff published by the Qwami Madrassah Education
Board in 2003, many Islamist parties have their party headquarters within
madrassahs. This practice continued even during the “state of emergency”
declared in January 2007 when political activities were suspended. Aminee
continued to use the Lalbagh madrassah as the head quarters of his party. The
Organizing Secretary of the party, Mufti Mohammad Foyzullah claimed that an
office was rented from the madrassah. Aminee, however, questioned: “If we
don’t do Islamic politics in madrassahs then where else we will do it?” The head-
quarters of the Bangladesh Khilafat Majlish (BKM) led by Shaikhul Hadith
Azizul Huq is located in Jamia Rahmania Madrassah at Mohammadpur in Dhaka.
The Babus Salam Madrassah situated near the airport in the capital Dhaka has
been used as one of the bases by the Khatme Nabuat movement, which continues
to agitate against the Ahmediyya community, demanding that they be declared
non-Muslims.47
The Jamiat-ul-Uloom Qwami Madrassah located in Chittagong is the divi-
sional headquarters of another faction of the IOJ led by Mufti Mohammad Izharul
Islam Chwodhury, the principal founder of the madrassah. The Islami Chatra
Majlish, the student front of another faction of the IOJ led by Moulana Mohammad
Ishaq, is politically active in different madrassahs. A good number of madrassahs
controlled by the Islami Shashantanta Andolon (Islamic Constitution Movement)
led by Moulana Syed Rezaul Karim and the Bangladesh Khilafat Andolon led by
Moulana Ahmadullah Ashraf are also used as their local offices and help mobi-
lize the madrassah students in support of the respective parties.48
The second recent wave of politicization of madrassahs took place during the
1980s, under the aegis of the Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB) headed
by Asadullah Khan Ghalib. The organization emerged following a rift within the
Jamaat-i-Ahle Hadith in the 1978, and the formation of the Ahle Hadith Jubo
Sangha (AHJS). The AHAB leaders, particularly Ghalib, secured funding from
various Islamic charities in the Gulf countries; most notably the Kuwait based
Restoration of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS, Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turah al-Islami).
130 Ali Riaz
Throughout the 1980s, the Towhid Foundation – a front for the AHJS and AHAB –
established hundreds of qwami madrassahs throughout the country. They prima-
rily focused on the northern region, which is economically underdeveloped and
where schools are very few and far between. These madrassahs were established
with a political goal: to engage the students in “jihad” against Islamic “fallacies”
including the culture of treating shrines with respect. Significantly, the political
ideology of these madrassahs legitimated violence and often provided training in
arms to the students. This was indisputably a major and qualitative transformation
of the madrassah.49
This trend strengthened further, when the Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh
(HuJIB) and its front Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) leaders forged a
close relationship with the AHAB.50 Both the clandestine organizations and IOJ
leaders have used the charities for establishing madrassahs with political goals.
Mufti Shahidul Islam, a member of parliament (2001–6) from the IOJ, founded
Al-Markazul Islam and established 13 madrassahs in his constituency from the
funds he received from various international charities. Students of these madrassahs
have worked as the foot soldiers of the party.51
The nexus between militancy and the madrassahs has not been limited to any
specific geographical area. Since the mid-1990s, in various parts of the country,
the HuJIB and the JMB either began using the established qwami madrassahs or
founded infrastructures in the name of qwami madrassahs to recruit militant
activists. Between 2000 and 2004, militants arrested by the police revealed that
many madrassahs were being used as training centers. In Gopalgonj, 38 qwami
madrassahs under the control of the Tungipara Gohardanga Madrassah were
reported to have been used by this outfit in 2000. On 13 February, 2003 in
Dinajpur, a northern city, a high-powered bomb went off inside the staff resi-
dence of a local girls’ madrassah. Soon afterward, police recovered revolvers,
explosives, bomb-making equipment, maps, training manuals and documents
related to the Jamaatul JMB. On 20 September, the same year, 18 extremists were
arrested at Boalmari in western Faridpur. Audiocassettes, mobile phone sets and
literature in Arabic promoting militancy were also recovered. The arrested persons
confessed that they came to Faridpur from the Jamia Islamia Nurul Ulum Qwami
Madrassah of Bhaluka in Mymensingh district to raise funds for an armed revolu-
tion against the “enemies of Islam.” “Maulana Abdur Rashid, the leader of the
group, confessed that he had received arms training in Pakistan and fought for
four years in Afghanistan against the Soviet forces.”52 Rashid also claimed that
he had been educated in a Deoband madrassah. After the spectacular blasts of
450 bombs by the JMB on 17 August 2005, the intelligence agencies, in their
initial assessment, identified 233 madrassahs where military training took place.53
Indications of connections between madrassah and militancy were also obvi-
ous from the comments of the Islamist leaders belonging to the ruling coalition
between 2001 and 2006. For example, Fazlul Huq Aminee declared on 1 March
2005, that “the students of madrassahs are strong enough to stage an Islamic
revolution in Bangladesh,”54 His warning came within weeks of the govern-
ment’s decision to ban the JMB and the JMJB, and the arrest of Asadullah Ghalib
 Islamist politics and education 131
and a number of his followers. He reiterated the same threat in December 2005
after the government was forced to hunt the militants following the blasts in
August of the same year.55

Tertiary education: the new frontier?

The Islamists have established considerable influence over the education sector
of Bangladesh through changes in the curriculum and education polices over
recent decades. This influence had been limited to the primary, secondary and
post-secondary level. However, it appears that they are now extending their influ-
ence to the tertiary sector. This is not to say that the Islamists do not already have
some influence over universities in Bangladesh. Instead, by the early 1980s, they
had already established their formidable presence in the universities through their
student activists,56 and the Islami Chatra Shibir (ICS) earned notoriety for its
brutality against opponents in the campuses. During that period, ICS members
succeeded in creating strong footholds in at least two state universities. Islamists,
particularly the JI, have also garnered support from the university faculty. The
latter became obvious in 1992 when hundreds of state university teachers signed
a press statement demanding the release of Golam Azam, the leader of the JI, and
restoration of his citizenship. Since 1991 there have been concerted efforts on the
part of the JI to ensure their activists secure faculty positions in state universities.
Many faculty members have alleged that the appointment process in state univer-
sities was manipulated between 2001 and 2006 to ensure that former ICS members
were recruited as faculty.57
Since allowing the establishment of private universities, the leaders, supporters
and sympathizers of the JI have founded a number of private universities. It was
reported in the press in 2006 that of 54 private universities in the country, 15 were
either directly or indirectly under the control of the JI. The report revealed that
“a top leader of Jamaat, the head of [a] Jamaat-controlled financial establishment,
a Jamaat policy-making level leader and a former secretary directly controls at
least 10 private universities.” In 2006, the government approved the founding
of the Bangladesh Islamic University, which has Delwar Hossain Saidee as one
of the founding members.58
Taking advantage of the sloppy supervision mechanism of the UGC and the
government’s desire to see more universities of Islamic hue, Islamists have secured
permission to establish these universities during the last decade, particularly
between 2001 and 2006. Although the quality of some of these institutions is poor,
to say the least, thousands of young people are enrolling in these universities due
to lack of adequate higher educational facilities.

Conclusion
Often discussions of Islamist politics and education are confined to the
madrassahs, particularly the radicalization of these institutions. The foregoing
discussion demonstrates that the influence of the Islamists over the education
132 Ali Riaz
sector goes far beyond the madrassahs. In the last three decades Islamists have
influenced education policies and the curriculum of mainstream general education.
Despite the success of the government in expanding educational opportunities,
the available resources remain inadequate, creating a pool of potential students
for the madrassahs. The proliferation of madrassahs bears testimony to this fact.
The Islamists have also adapted to appeal to the growing affluent sections of
the society through new models of primary level educational institutions such
as Islamic kindergartens. Our discussion has also shown that the connections
between Islamist parties and madrassahs are conspicuous, and many of the
madrassah-based Islamist parties are using students as foot soldiers of the parties.
It is also important to note that a nexus between the militants and madrassahs has
been established, and that these institutions have received financial support from
outside the country via Islamic charities. With recent moves to establish Islamic
universities, the Islamists are expanding their reach and influence and may soon
be able to develop a complete alternative system of education that provides
primary to tertiary education.

Notes
1 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary
Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, 2000, Article 17.
2 For history of BRAC’s non-formal primary school model, see: Catherine H. Lovell
and Fatima Kaniz, Assignment Children. The BRAC Non-Formal Primary Education
Programme in Bangladesh (New York: UNICEF, 1989). For a critical appreciation of
NFE and BRAC’s education program, see Alan Rogers, Non-Formal Education
Constitution on: Flexible Schooling or Participatory Education? (New York:
Springer, 2005).
3 Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE), The State of Secondary Education
Progress and Challenges – Education Watch 2005 (Dhaka: Bangladesh. 2005).
4 Information regarding the structure of the education system in Bangladesh is derived
from the author’s experience and observations over many years, and discussions with
the members of local management committees of various schools and government
officials during several field trips including between 23 December 2005 and 4 January
2006.
5 Sajeda Amin, “Schooling in Bangladesh,” in Amita Gupta (ed.), Going to School in
South Asia (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2007), 37–52, 48.
6 National University, “National University,” <www.nu.edu.bd/> (7 August 2007).
7 Naomi Hossain, Access to Education for the Poor and Girls: Educational Achievements
in Bangladesh (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2004), 1 <www.worldbank.org/wbi/
reducingpoverty/docs/FullCases/PDFs%2011-13-04/Bangladesh%20girls%20education.
pdf> (25 August 2005).
8 Ibid.
9 Jakir Hossian, “Bangladesh Report: Status of Education MDG Implementation,”
(paper presented at the Workshop on ICTs on Universalizing Education, One World
South Asia, Agra (India), 23–24 January 2006), 3.
10 Quoted in World Bank, “Bangladesh: Second Primary Education Development
Program (PEDR II), Annex 4: Economic and Fiscal Analysis,” World Bank, 2004.
11 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Bangladesh:
Education. Current Condition,” United States Agency for International Development,
2007 <www.usaid.gov/bd/education.html> (4 August 2008).
 Islamist politics and education 133
12 “Over three lakh children do not get primary education,” New Age, 8 June 2005, 1.
13 USAID, “Bangladesh: Education.”
14 Abul Barkat and Murtaza Majid, “Adolescent and Youth Reproductive Health in
Bangladesh: Status, Policies, Programs, and Issues,” Policy (2003): 1.
15 Naomi Hossain, Ramya Subrahmanian, and Naila Kabeer, “The Politics of Educational
Expansion in Bangladesh,” IDS working paper 167. (Brighton, UK: Institute of
Development Studies, 2002): 8–9.
16 For further discussion, see Yvette Claire Rosser, Indoctrinating Minds, A Case Study
of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 2004).
17 Nurul Kabir, “De-secularising Bangladesh: Will the Whimper of the Minority Sink
into the Thunder of the Majority?” Holiday, 11 November 2004, 1.
18 Bangladesh’s population growth rate for 1975–80 was 2.46, 1980–5 was 2.57; 1985–90
was 2.48 and 1990–5 was 2.41. See “Demographic Profile at Different Perspectives,”
Sustainable Development Networking Program (SDNP) Bangladesh, <www.sdnpbd.
org/sdi/international_days/population/2004/data/pop10.htm> (8 August 2007).
19 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Education, “Bangladesh National Syllabi and
Curriculum Committee Report, Part II,” April 1978, 149.
20 Kabir, “De-secularising Bangladesh.”
21 The timing of the announcement clearly indicates that political, especially electoral,
considerations prompted the decision. The announcement was made on 22 August
2006, exactly two months before the end of the tenure of the government. Many
analysts believe that the announcement was made to placate various Islamist parties
and factions and to help them garner support in the election scheduled within the
following six months. The gathering, where the announcement was made, lends
credence to this assertion. The meeting was attended by all factions of the Islamist
parties (See “Qawami madrasa degree gets master’s status,” Daily Star, 22 August
2006, 1; for discussions on the decision see: “Playing Politics with education,” Daily
Star, 22 August 2006, 1; “Hasty recognition of quomi madrassah is electoral give-
and-take,” (in Bengali) New Age, 23 August 2006, 6; “How Long the Politics with the
Madrassah Education?” Prothom Alo, 23 August 2006, 1.
22 The-then Prime Minister later instructed the Education Ministry to form a twenty-one-
member committee to implement the decision. The fundamental problem faced by the
committee was recognizing one board to oversee the examinations. Four regional
boards insisted that all of them should be recognized while the “national” board
opposed the idea. Finally, the President decided to establish a new Board instead of
recognizing any of the existing ones “President Approves New Qwami Madrassah
Board,” (in Bengali) Jugantor, 21 December 2006, 1. The interim government suspended
the decision in 2007.
23 “Govt won’t be allowed to exert control,” Daily Star, 23 August 2006, 1.
24 Discussions with a number of school teachers, December 2005, Dhaka.
25 The debate is long and too complex to be incorporated in this chapter. Discussions on
this issue abound in Bengali. For a powerful cogent exploration, see: Yvette Claire
Rosser, Indoctrinating Minds (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2004).
26 Yvette Claire Rosser, Indoctrinating Minds, 22–3.
27 The Calcutta Madrassah, established in 1780, underwent a major change in 1915 when
the government made English a mandatory subject replacing Persian, and introduced
Mathematics, Geography, History and physical education in the curriculum.
Madrassahs which adopted the reformed curriculum were called the Reformed (or
New Scheme) Madrassah. This change created two separate trends within the institu-
tions following the Calcutta Madrassah curriculum: the old scheme madrassahs and
the new scheme madrassahs.
28 Dar-ul Ulum, commonly known as the Deoband Madrassah, established in 1867 in the
present day state of Uttar Pradesh of India, is known for its orthodox and puritanical
stand on social and religious issues. It is also known for its political activism.
134 Ali Riaz
29 The length of the courses in Qwami Madrassahs vary. However, a number of Alim
associated with Qwami madrassahs provided this number (discussions with madrassah
teachers and ulema, December 2005).
30 For sources of data see notes of Table 6.3, the trend is computed by the author.
31 CAMPE, Quality with Equity: The Primary Education Agenda (Dhaka: CAMPE,
2005).
32 Personal Interview, 1 August 2006, by Abu Naser Rajib on behalf of the author.
33 Based on author’s observations and discussions with parents of madrassah students
during field research in December 2005 and January 2006.
34 Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics (BENBEIS), “Education
System of Bangladesh: A Descriptive Detail.” (Publication no.169. Dhaka: BENBEIS,
1992), 27.
35 A.K.M. Yakub Hossain and Balal Muhammad. “Madrasah” in Banglapedia: the
national encyclopedia of Bangladesh <//banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/M_0032.
htm> (5 June 2005).
36 Amr Abdalla, ANM Raisuddin and Suleiman Hussein, Bangladesh Educational
Assessment: Pre-primary and Primary Madrasah Education in Bangladesh
(Washington D.C: USAID. 2004), 7. In 2003, the Befakul Madarisil Arabia Bangladesh,
an umbrella organization which claims to represent the Qwami madrassahs, computed
the total figure at 43,000 (Shariar Khan, “Bangladesh Launches Refresher Course for
Islamic Schools,” One World Report, 2003 <www.oneworld.net/article/view/66855/1/1>
(3 June 2005). These numbers perhaps include all madrassahs outside the Aliya
madrassah system.
37 See Chapter 3 for details on Islamist political parties including the IOJ.
38 Muhammad Shahrul Hoda Sarkar, Assistant Director, Islamic Foundation, Personal
Interview, 30 December 2005.
39 Abdul Huq Faridi, Madrassah Education: Bangladesh (in Bengali) (Dhaka: Bangla
Academy, 1982), 79.
40 Mujib Mehdi, Madrassah Education: A Review (in Bengali) (Dhaka: Bangladesh Nari
Progoti Sangha, 2001), 35.
41 Abdall et al., Bangladesh Educational Assessment, 8.
42 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
Education for All (EFA) 2000 Assessment Country Reports Bangladesh, 2000 <www2.
unesco.org/wef/countryreports/bangladesh/rapport_1.html> (12 June 2005).
43 CAMPE, “Education Watch Report 2005,” 9.
44 See Chapter 3 for details on the Bangladesh Khilafat Andolon (BKA).
45 This official biography is drawn from an Islamist website called Islam in Bangladesh,
see: <www.islam-bd.org/Personalities/Amini/Amini.html> (14 March 2008).
46 See Ali Riaz, God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh (Lanham: Rowman
and Littlefield, 2004), 89–131.
47 “Political activities continue in qwami madrasahs violating rules,” Prothom Alo,
3 June 2007, 20.
48 Ibid.
49 Ali Riaz, Faithful Education, Madrassahs in South Asia (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 2008).
50 For details of the emergence and operations of the HuJIB and JMB, see chapter 4 of
this volume.
51 “100 crore taka gathered in the name of orphans used for militants,” Manav Jamin,
26 June 2007, 1.
52 Haroon Habib, “The Menace of Militancy,” Frontline 20(12) (11 October 2003)
<www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2021/stories/20031024000605900.htm> (29 June 2004).
53 “Qoumi madrassahs under vigil,” New Age, 1. “Militant training continues in 250
madrassahs” (in Bengali), Jonokantha, 29 August 2005, 1.
 Islamist politics and education 135
54 “Islamic revolution will take place through the Qwami madrassahs,” Prothom Alo,
2 March 2005, 1.
55 “Jihad will start if attempts are made to control qwami madrassahs” Amenee says to
Prothom Alo, Interview with Prothom Alo, 2 December 2005, 1.
56 For example, in the early 1980s, members of the ICS were elected to a number of
Students’ Unions of various universities and colleges. Between 1979 and 1990, the
ICS have filed candidates in all elections of the Dhaka University Central Students’
Union (DUCSU), the most influential students’ union of the country.
57 Personal interview with Dhaka university teachers during field research in December
2005– January 2006, and January 2007. These faculty members include leaders of the
Dhaka University Teachers Union (DUTA).
58 “Fifteen Private Universities Under Jamaat Control,” Daily Inquilab (Dhaka), 27 May
2006, 1.
7 Islamist politics and
popular culture1
Ali Riaz and Md. Abu Naser

Bangladesh’s Islamists have garnered attention inside and outside Bangladesh at

least in part because they have emerged as a formidable force within mainstream
politics since the 1980s. The modalities of their rise have received considerably
less attention. This chapter takes as its subject one such means by which they
have developed influence: popular culture. Specifically, this chapter analyzes
both the ways in which Islamists have sought to mobilize Bangladesh’s popular
culture as well as how its various forms have facilitated the rise of Islamists.
This set of queries is crucial for understanding the growing Islamist appeal to
Bangladeshi society and comprehending the future of the Islamist movement
within the country.
To date, there has been minimal scholarly investigation of the relationship
between Islamist politics and various popular cultural products in Bangladesh.
The general understanding is that the Islamists view popular culture as decadent
and incompatible with their political objectives. This leads to the facile conclu-
sion that Islamists are opposed to and have no role in popular culture. Discussions
of political Islam rarely consider popular culture, especially traditional cultural
practices, and entertainment media such as music and drama, as sources of moti-
vation for committed activists and the youth, the potential pool of activists.
Proponents of this view frequently reference the Taliban to bolster their argument
noting that the Taliban not only banned music, but destroyed televisions, tapes,
CDs and musical instruments (as well as other forms of entertainment). The
Taliban also claimed that that there is a hadith warning people not to listen to
music lest molten lead be poured into their ears on Judgment Day.2 Similarly, in
Sudan, musicians are barred from performing after dark, and in a Nigerian state
where Islamic law is followed musicians have been imprisoned for singing.3
A wide array of Islamist militant groups and political parties in Pakistan have
imposed Taliban-like bans upon listening to or playing music and have closed
down video shops in places where they have established control.4
Less well known are the growing examples of Islamists utilizing popular
cultural products to shape the popular imagination and to influence public
discourse, particularly in the Muslim majority countries.5 The contours and
content of these Islamist cultural products widely vary – ranging from moderation
to radical overtones.6 But these cultural products, once unimaginable, are now
 Islamist politics and popular culture 137
part of a larger political strategy of the Islamists in Bangladesh and elsewhere.
Despite the growing importance of such cultural products in Bangladesh, they
remain understudied. Thus, this chapter examines the interplay of Islamist poli-
tics and popular culture in Bangladesh, focusing upon the impact of Islamists on
popular culture.
In this chapter, we demonstrate how in recent years Islamists have employed
various cultural products to reach out to the general populace and propagate their
political ideology. Notably, the Islamists are using traditional cultural practices
while also introducing new ways and means to draw attention to their message.
We examine three kinds of popular media, which have evolved over time in terms
of their content and their appeal to the public. While these three media do not
cover the wide spectrum of popular culture in Bangladesh, we have chosen them
to demonstrate the ways in which Islamists have mobilized specific forms of
popular culture. These three forms include print and non-print media both of
which have appeal to the growing middle class and beyond. The three media
to be examined in this chapter include: popular Islamic literature, waz mahfil
(a traditional practice of public performances of scriptural commentaries) and
entertainment media (i.e. drama and music).

Popular culture and politics: a brief overview

The relationship between popular culture and politics is intricate and intimate,
particularly in a democratic society. John Street, in his seminal work on politics
and popular culture, insisted that, “Political actions and thoughts cannot be
treated as somehow separate or discrete from popular culture.”7 Neither Street
nor we suggest a causal relationship between these two; but it needs to be under-
scored that they are interconnected in many ways. Street argues that “if we fail to
take popular culture seriously, we impoverish our understanding of the conflict-
ing currents and aspirations which fuel politics.”8 Street contends that this holds
for any society where political space is open to competing social and political
forces. To determine whether or not it is equally true for understanding Islamist
politics in Bangladesh depends not only upon the specificities of Islamist politics
there but also upon our understanding of what functions popular culture play
within the country.
One of the most important functions of popular culture is to appeal to sensa-
tion. These sensations are meant to connect the audience to a wider world. While
these feelings and sensations may appear ephemeral, their impact is not transient.
“Popular culture’s ability to produce and articulate feelings can become the basis
of identity, and that identity can be the source of political thought and actions.”9
Understandably, it is not only popular culture which defines identity; culture
of any kind performs the same function. Additionally, identity formation is a
multi-layered process. But by reaching beyond the realm of dominant culture and
by providing a sense of authenticity, popular culture offers a sense of belonging.
Over time, popular culture influences the practices, rituals and public
discourses, and shapes public culture. That is why authoritarian rulers/states on
138 Ali Riaz and Md. Abu Naser
the one hand attempt to control popular culture, while utilizing it as a tool of
propaganda on the other.
New identities (i.e. who we are and what roles we play in our society), whether
created by the state or political parties or political forces under the guise of cultural
movements, are then articulated and mobilized within democratic politics. The
articulations not only transform already existing identities but also provide a
“way of making sense of the social world,”10 or in other words, provide a world
view. Within this frame of mind, if the social world looks chaotic, it implicitly
and/or explicitly calls for “creating a certain order.”11
Equally important in understanding the significance of popular culture is that
it can be a form of resistance – that is an instrument to oppose “power.” The
power in this context is not only limited to structured power (such as the state),
but the power of language and imagination. Popular culture can be an alter-
native to the dominant ideology and therefore can serve as a potent source of
opposition to the latter and to the existing social order. Such defiance can take
many shapes – direct messages incorporated in cultural products or subtle ways
of reconstructing history or offering a different worldview, to name but a few.
This can be described as the creation of new political imaginaries. These imagi-
naries do not have their moorings in the dominant discourses.12 Popular culture
deconstructs the dominant paradigms and constructs new ones by reinventing the
history and analysis of current political realities.
It is well to bear in mind that the nature and scope of links between politics and
popular culture is not predetermined: “the connection depends on the conditions
and the contexts.”13 In any given society at a given moment, the state and the
dominant political forces play crucial roles in shaping that context; because,
among other things, they provide the material basis to popular culture. Therefore,
despite the apparent distance between popular culture and the state, there is a
latent but significant relationship that exists between them. But we must also take
note that popular culture and the institutions that create and transmit the ideas
embedded in cultural products assume a life of their own. Once these messages
become part of the public discourse they are no longer determined by the intersection
of forces that brought them about.
Thus our argument is that in democratic politics, popular culture plays an
important role; and engages in creating and disseminating imaginaries, and
constructing identities which serve as the point of departure for political activism.
In comprehending the role of popular culture in politics we must then ask what
identities are being produced; how these identities are being naturalized; and
how they challenge dominant worldviews. These questions are applicable to any
emerging counter-hegemonic political ideologies. In the case of Bangladesh,
Islamism is an emerging political ideology which merits attention.
As discussed elsewhere in this volume, Bangladeshi politics experienced a
dramatic shift after 1975 and Islamist ideology made its way to the center stage
of the country’s politics in the 1980s. The Islamist ideology, although it received
overt support from the state, is at the same time a counter-hegemonic ideology
which exists in opposition to the secularism that has dominated Bangladeshi
 Islamist politics and popular culture 139
politics without contest until quite recently. Indeed, secularism is professed and
practiced by a larger segment of the society including the elites. The hegemony
of the secular culture is evident in Bangladesh’s traditional cultural practices
(for example, the celebration of Bengali new year) as well as popular cultural
artifacts (for example, folk music). The political agenda of the Islamists, there-
fore, involves changing the tenor of traditional cultural practices while creating
new means to reach out to the public at large.

An emerging new genre: Islamist fiction14

Among the emerging Islamic popular cultural products, the most prominent is
fiction, particularly the genres of the romance novel and the thriller. In the last
decade, a significant number of fictional works have been published in Bangladesh
which can be described as Islamist fiction.15
The term “Islamist fiction” is used here for want of a better term. Maimuna
Huq described them as Islam-oriented texts. She states that “the producers and
readers of these novels consider them ‘Islamic works’.”16 Similarly, authors and
sellers of these books, in conversations with us, preferred the characterization –
“Islamic novel.”
There is no clearly articulated definition of Islamist fiction, globally and/or in
Bangladesh.17 However, one vendor of such fictional works primarily in English,
Islamic Fiction Books, defines Islamic fiction as,

creative, imaginative fiction books written by Muslims and marketed prima-

rily to Muslims. Islamic Fiction may be marketed to secular markets, too.
The content of these books incorporates some religious content and themes,
and may include non-fictionalized historical or factual Islamic content with
or without direct reference to the Qur’an or the Sunnah of the Prophet
(pbuh). The stories may also include modern, real life situations and moral
dilemmas.18

It is worth noting that the protagonists also insist on making a clear distinction
from “secular novels.” The website explains that:

All Muslim-authored Fiction books that do not meet the criteria of [the]
Islamic Fiction are categorized as Secular Fiction. These books have Muslim
characters but the focus of the story is not Islam and the actions of the char-
acters are not attributed to Islam. Secular Fiction books generally do not have
any Islamic religious content and are written primarily to appeal to secular
markets.

Similar sentiments are echoed by a number of sellers of Islamist literature includ-

ing fictional works in Bangladesh.
Due to an apparent neglect of “Islamist/Islamic fiction” within mainstream
literary criticism, there is no cogent scholarly definition of Islamist fiction.
140 Ali Riaz and Md. Abu Naser
However, the North America-based Islamic writers have come up with their own
definition. They describe “Islamic Fiction Books” as “creative, imaginative, non-
preachy fiction books written by Muslims and marketed primarily to Muslims.”19
Although some insist that there is no direct reference to the Qur’an or the Sunnah
of the Prophet (pbuh) in this literature, in most cases Islamist fiction is based on
some versions of Islamic factual content with direct reference to the Qur’an and
the Sunnah (teachings) of Prophet Muhammad. The stories mostly contain
modern, real life situations and moral dilemmas within the larger frame of
religious content and themes. The Islamic Writers Alliance observes that

While Islamic knowledge presented in Islamic Fiction may be taken directly

from the Holy Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be
upon him), as well as from Islamic history, not all of the Islamic contents in
these books will be considered factual or acceptable by all Muslim readers.
This is due to differences between a Muslim reader and the writers, editors,
and publishers with respect to personal practices, beliefs and knowledge, as
well as the influence of his mathab, culture, and tradition.20

There are debates within the circle of Islamic writers about the contour and
contents of Islamic fiction. Some writers prefer to term these books as “Muslim
fiction” while the other group of writers would call the genre “Islamic fiction.”
There are some writers with extreme views who think that fiction writing itself is
not halal as “fiction writing is writing lies and reading fiction is a useless waste
of time.”21 Some writers contradict this idea with the argument that “storytelling
is a traditional Islamic art and the novel brings this art right into the home.
Muslims of all ages need the contemporary Muslim story as a vehicle for inter-
preting the world in an Islamic light.”22 Marwa Elnaggar, Editor of IslamOnline,
also believes that for the Muslim community to progress, attention should be
paid to the creation of literature to offer alternative narratives for, by and about
Muslims.
Whether Islamic fiction should be considered as a pure form of literature is
an open question. Some authors of Islamist fiction, for example the Chinese
writer Zhang Chengzhi, consider their works as “a solemn narration of the
religio-political history of the much-victimized Muslim Community.”23 To them
Islamist fiction books are not normal literary works but “religious homework”
predestined to be done by them in order both to represent the Muslim people and
to save their own souls.24 These works also tend to exceed the generic boundaries
of fiction. “One dimension emerges from an Islamic religious avowal; the other
is founded on a politics of subaltern representation.”25 Zhang claims that his liter-
ary narrative cannot easily be equated with those of a referential realism. In that
sense Islamist fiction may be considered as a form of counter history. For exam-
ple, Zhang devotes himself to a history “in which his people (a sect of the Chinese
Muslim population) were severely oppressed.”26
Thus Islamist fiction blends history and literary imagination to convey a
message and represent a community. In Bangladesh, while such authors are few
 Islamist politics and popular culture 141
in number and while their popularity is not yet comparable to any secularist
author, these books have a growing following.27 Empirically grounded data on
the profiles of readers of this fiction are wanting, but Huq’s observation that these
readers are “from the prestigious circle of upwardly mobile professionals, the power-
ful communities of high school, college and university students, and the influential
associations of small and big businessmen”28 perhaps is correct.
The growth of this genre is in large measure a response to the popularity
of fictional works penned by secularist authors whom the Islamists consider
“decadent.” Huq has accurately noted that “Romance novels with their vividly
illustrated covers have been a stronghold of secular literature, one that Islamists
could not have imagined as appropriate, at least not for the purpose of Islamisation
(sic), even a decade ago.”29 However this view is changing slowly but steadily
and “some Islamic publishers see novels becoming the most popular form of
Islamic writing in the near future.”30 The expansion of titles which broadly falls
under this category undergirds this optimism.
The new genre developed in the 1990s as a new breed of Islamists gained
prominence in the socio-political arena. Contrary to their predecessors who
attempted to reach out to the older generation through propagandist literature and/
or lifestyle books, the new younger Islamists intend to reach out to their contem-
poraries and appeal to their imagination. The emotive significance of fiction is
well-known:

Fiction touches people’s hearts and emotions in a way that non-fiction and
even true-life stories cannot. It moves us, it captures our imaginations, and
affirms our understanding of the world and of ourselves. It allows us to work
through issues in our lives without actually having to experience the ramifi-
cations ourselves. It allows us to explore other cultures from the safety of our
homes. It makes us laugh, cry, quake in our shoes, or soar on the heights of
joy, providing an emotional outlet and relieving tension and stress. This is
why story-telling is a part of every culture.31

Arguably, the Islamist’s choice of novel – both romance and thriller – is a political
move intended to persuade readers to Islamically imagine various aspects of their
lives and the lives of others around them.32
Apparently the storylines of these novels are no different from their secular
counterparts – love, despair, hope – are central. Take, for example, the romance
novels of Qasem Abu Bakar, Abdus Salam Mitul, or Mosharraf Hossain Shagar.
Abu Bakar and Salam Mitul’s two most popular fictions – Prothiksha (Waiting,
1994) and Golaper Kanta (Rose Thorn, 1992) deal with the social lives of the
young but overtly discourages what is considered indecent mingling of charac-
ters. These novels are infused with moral lessons, overtly and covertly. The ills
of immoral acts are highlighted and these stories are intended to imbue a moral
standard consistent with the teachings of Islam. The characters are not political
activists and thus are not meant to be standard bearers; yet their lives are indica-
tive of the positive elements of leading an Islamic life. Conspicuously absent in
142 Ali Riaz and Md. Abu Naser
their novels are vulgar language, sexually explicit content, practices that are
identified as un-Islamic; and portrayal of Islam in a negative way. Among these
authors, as Huq has noted, political Islam is evident in Mosharraf Hossain
Shagar’s novels. “In Abujh Ridoy (Uncomprehending Heart),33 for instance,
Shagar describes how the main character becomes an Islamist activist and
advances from one cadre to the next in an Islamist group called Islami Mukti
Sangha (Islamic Liberation Association).”34
While the romance novels are gaining in popularity, the Islamic thrillers have
already created a large readership.35 The authors who enjoy popularity among
readers include Abul Asad, Asad Bin Hafiz, Tawhidul Islam Babu and Hashim
Roni, to name but a few. Distributed by various publishers, there are at least four
series of thrillers that have attracted readers’ attention. They are: Saimoom,
Crusade, Operation, and Spy. Among these Saimoom is the longest running
thriller series published by Bangla Shahitya Parishad (Bengali Literary Council)
and authored by Abul Asad. Up to the end of 2009, forty-eight novels have been
published in this series. The author, a member of the central working committee
of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and editor of the JI’s mouthpiece daily Sangram, is
also the President of the Bangla Shahitya Parishad. According to an Islamist
website “Abul Asad is better known and admired for his thriller series ‘Saimum’.”
Books of this series added a new dimension to our literature. It combines herit-
age, passion and ideology, and inspires the reader to devote his/her life, deeds and
love to Islam.”36
The protagonist of the series is Ahmed Musa, a central Asian Muslim who was
driven out by communists and has devoted his life for the cause of Islam since
then. As the leader of an international revolutionary group called Saimoom,
Ahmed Musa travels around the world to fight for the Muslims who are oppressed.
For example, in the first two volumes named Operation Tel-Aviv-1 and Operation
Tel Aviv-2 Musa travels to Israel to support the Palestinians. In the forty-third
volume of the series, Musa travels to Southern Thailand and comes to the aid of
the Shah family in the city called Sultan Gar. The book titled Pattanir Sabuj
Aronya (The Green Forest of Pattani) depicts the plight of the popular Muslim
royal family who are now under the twin attacks of non-Muslim rulers – who
have labeled the family as terrorist and Muslim revolutionaries. Musa finds that
the terrorists, operating under the guise of Muslims, are armed with weapons
inscribed in Hebrew.37
The second most popular series, Crusade, authored by Asad bin Hafiz had
30 books in its list as at August 2006. The series is published by Priti Prakashan,
a press known to be affiliated with the Jamaat-e-Islami. The series presents the
“history” of crusade blended with stories of the bravery of Saladin and love and
hatred. The Operation series is set against the “worldwide Islamic revival” and
“the conspiracy against the Muslims” but focuses on China where, the author
claims, Muslims are being persecuted and where “the freedom struggle of the
Muslims is underway.” Tawhidul Islam Babu’s narrative reminds readers that
the struggle is intrinsically connected to the international conspiracy to suppress
Muslims. At the end of 2006, eight books had been published in this series.38
 Islamist politics and popular culture 143
The success of these thrillers has encouraged new writers. Spy, the new series that
began to appear in late 2006 is a case in point. Hashem Roni’s first thriller in this
series, entitled Secret Zone, is dedicated to Abul Asad and Asad bin Hafiz.39 In
the preface of the book the author acknowledges that thriller series like Saimoom
and Crusade have attracted him to thrillers and inspired him to write. Interestingly,
he also acknowledged that he was an avid reader of secular thrillers, particularly
the most popular secular thriller series titled Masud Rana.40 Unlike Masud Rana
series, his thriller series deals with contemporaneous issues and attempt to depict
a global conspiracy against the Muslim community irrespective of their national
identity and geographical locations.
Despite the salience of contemporaneous issues these fictional works, romance
novels and thrillers alike, carry messages related to morality and roles of indi-
viduals in the society. The role of women demonstrates these messages quite
loudly. Josephine represents the women who are bearers and guardians of tradi-
tion, albeit differently. She has dedicated her husband to a greater cause, that of
alleviating injustices against the Muslims worldwide. Ahmed Musa, Josephine’s
husband, has responded to the call of duty. Her personal sacrifice is highlighted
through the fact that she lives alone while Ahmed Musa travels far and wide. But
as the Islamists insist, women are principal agents in the family – as wives and as
mothers socializing a new generation of activists who would shoulder the build-
ing of the Muslim umma (nation). Josephine does the same, by providing support
to Musa and raising their son Ahmed Abdullah. Within this framework women’s
public participation is, however, circumscribed by tradition and an interpretation
that is devoid of equality among men and women. Here the chief objective is
the creation of an “ideal woman citizen” responsible for the “purity” of an Islamic
culture.41
These fictional works are, therefore, not only the expressions of the creative
imagination of Islamist authors, but a means to spread the message of Islamist
politics. Pamela Taylor’s call for English language Islamic fiction has clearly
demonstrated this point: “Fiction can be a powerful tool for dawah (outreach). …
Even though the stories are not “real,” fiction deals with real issues, real emotions,
and the reader relates to the characters like friends or family members. As such,
it can have a much greater impact on a person’s feelings, thoughts, and beliefs
than non-fiction. It can inspire them to question their values and their habits,
leading to positive change, both for Muslims and non-Muslims. … Fiction has
the potential to alter lives.”42 Authors of Islamist novels have embarked on this
journey and perhaps are making good progress.

A traditional cultural practice takes new shape

Waz Mahfils (public performances of scriptural commentaries) have a long tradi-
tion in Bengal. They are organized in both urban and rural areas as a means of
preaching Islam among the believers. Although traditionally this has been an
expression of piety in eastern Bengal, particularly in the rural areas, it has taken
a different form since the 1980s. These gatherings have become a forum of
144 Ali Riaz and Md. Abu Naser
commentary on current affairs and thus more centered on ideology than on
theology. The people who attend these mahfils are stimulated by the cultural
construct of religion. Barring few exceptions, maulanas who conduct the mahfils
have very little knowledge of Islamic theology, and thus provide interpretations
based on a very narrow and often inaccurate understanding of religious texts. Yet,
for a large number of people, these mahfils have emerged as the most authorita-
tive sources of the interpretation of Islam and its relevance in daily lives. It has
also become the most effective and popular medium of communication with the
population who either lack literacy to access the original religious texts or are too
busy to read the texts or share the same worldview. The enormous influence of
the mahfils is due both to their oratory and the uniformity of their messages with
the popular culture. Hashmi noted this aspect, “they (speakers of these mahfils)
cast a magical spell on their audiences, mostly arousing a fear of hell, in conformity
with the popular culture which glorifies death and the hereafter.”
Delawar Hossain Saidee, a member of the central committee of the Jamaat-
e-Islami and a former parliamentarian, is the most well known speaker at mahfils.
In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that Delwar Hossain Saidee
almost singularly transformed the scope and nature of the waz mahfil over the last
two decades. He uses a distinctly different rhetoric and a belligerent style of
presentation, and loads his speeches with overt political content. His presentations
are meant to assail the secularists, and provide an ideology-driven, politically-
motivated interpretation of Islam.
The transformation of this traditional institution came to the attention of
many in the early 1990s when the Islamists began a campaign against the non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) alleging them to be spreading Christianity.
During this campaign Waz became the most convenient platform for the tirade
against the secularist, and vilification of the schools organized by the NGOs.
Often non-formal schools and NGO offices were attacked after mahfils. These
waz mahfils not only condoned violence but also, in many instances, provoked
the attendees.
Use of waz mahfils by militant Islamists and the salience of political messages
in them is borne out by the fact that Mufti Abdul Hannan, a leading figure of the
Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh – HuJIB convicted of planting a bomb to
kill – Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2000, used to give speeches in waz mahfils
in various madrassahs, according to his relatives. One of his close relatives said,
“several times I heard stories about Afghan war against Soviet soldiers during
speeches by Mufti Hannan in Waz Mahfils at different madrassahs. It was exciting
when Hannan described how he fought against the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan.”
Hannan’s elder brother Alimuzzaman Nannu, who also fought in the Afghan war,
also used to attend and speak in mahfils in Kotalipara, in Tungipara district.
As for Saidee, his speeches are available on audio and video tapes, both within
and outside Bangladesh, sending a clear signal to the audience that the messages are
sanctioned by a political party. These messages provide legitimacy to hatred,
anger and violence, and contribute to the militant attitude. It is not surprising
that on many occasions police found cassettes of Saidee’s speeches delivered in
 Islamist politics and popular culture 145
waz mahfilsin the militant hideouts, and some of the militants, for example Jabed
Iqbal alias Aman Ullah alias Mohammad alias Abu Hurrab, the chief of Jamaatul
Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) Chittagong region, confessed to the law enforc-
ing agencies that “he was imbued with the sprit of jihad to establish Islamic rule
in Bangladesh after listening [to] the speech of Maulana Delwar Hossain Sayedee
at Tafsir Mahafil held at the parade ground in Chittagong.”43

Motivational songs and drama: changes in tone and tune

Islamist music and drama, relatively new phenomena in Bangladesh, have carved
out a niche in the popular culture over the last few years. Cultural groups associ-
ated with Islamist organizations have produced and sold hundreds of cassettes of
so-called “jihadi music,” The serene tone of the Hamd and Naths (songs written
to eulogize the Prophet Muhammad) has been replaced by more motivational
and militant music. Most of the lyrics focus on the changed world situation, wars
and the resultant religious feelings with a jihadi revolutionary undertone. Even
though the madrassah students used to sing these songs in different Islamic
functions including mahfils, (public performances of scriptural commentaries)
the producers of Islamic songs have been successful in marketing their products
to a larger clientele of different ages and strata of the society. The trend began
in the mid-1980s, with the emergence of the Islami Chattra Shibir’s (JI’s students’
wing) cultural wing Spandan Shilpi Goshthi. The number of such groups has
increased many fold in the 1990s. Additionally, independent Islamist production
studios have also entered into the market.
The main theme of the songs is the call for jihad by sacrificing one’s life,
newspaper reports suggest. “The lyrics make no bones about bloodshed, swords
and arms. None of these songs are talking of jihad through knowledge or any other
form of jihad, such as the battle against poverty, etc. The message is direct.”44
According to available information, there are a large number of cassettes on the
market that quite explicitly call upon youth and adolescents to take part in jihad
and, in some cases, very implicitly, to become suicide bombers. One such album
titled Sahidi Tamanna has a song that goes: “Young, tender Shish Mohammad, how
fortunate his friends are/ Shish has sacrificed his life for the Quran.” Besides Jamaat,
Islamist parties like Khilafat Majlish (KM) and Islami Shashantantra Andolan (Islamic
Constitution Movement) have now opened their respective cultural wings to popu-
larize Islamist music and drama. Newspaper reports say that a total of 20 national level
Islamist cultural fronts have formed an united platform named Jatiya Sangskritik
Jote to promote Islamist music and culture. On 23 August 2005 the Jatiya Sangskritik
Jote organized the Islamic concert, which is something new in Bangladesh. The word
“concert” which is often referred to in Bangladesh as “Western” has found its way
into popular Islamist culture.
As of December 2004, 20 albums had been released by a group named Ronangon
Shilp Goshthi (Battlefield Artiste).45 The group’s objective is, according to their
own statement, to “spread the blood-soaked tradition of jihad in the field of culture.”
Their albums include “Taliban,” “Action,” “Commander-in-Chief ” (Shipahshalar),
146 Ali Riaz and Md. Abu Naser
“Campaign,” “Warning” and “The Calling.” The covers of these albums depict
rifles, mortars, and rocket launchers against the backdrop of deserts and mountains.
These albums extol Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar profusely, and the artists of
these albums introduce them as the “Taliban of Bangladesh.” Osama bin Laden is
described as “the guiding light in the struggle for freedom,” “valiant commander-
in-chief,” and “the greatest soldier of this era” in several albums. Similarly, Mullah
Omar is described as “the great hero,” and “the life of millions of Muslims.”
In some of these albums songs are punctuated with commentaries to motivate
“jihad.” The album titled Taliban begins with sounds of explosions and firing.
This would remind those who were familiar with the broadcasts of Afghan state-
run radio under the Taliban. As Gihr reported, Radio Shariat used to broadcast
patriotic chants such as “Taliban, O Taliban, you’re creating facilities, you’re
defeating enemies” which were “sometimes augmented with the sounds of rocket
launchers and Kalashnikov fire.”46 In the album titled Taliban, the sounds of
explosions are followed by an introduction,

Osama bin Laden is the valiant Mujahid of the 20th century. America
shudders hearing his name. Today, Osama bin Laden is the hero of the
Muslim world. Osama is needed today to shred America into pieces. Osama,
you’re the leader of the world Islamic jihad, you’re the most loved one of the
mujahideen worldwide, and you’re the leader of the jihad.

The song that follows not only expresses solidarity with Osama’s causes, but
declares that “we accept you as the commander and we want to join you in the march
to victory.” The album is filled with admiration for the Taliban. But another album
“The calling: Listen to call of Osama” goes further: “Azan (call for prayer) is over,
Mujahid let’s go, join the Jihad, say the name of Allah with weapons your hands and
courage in your heart.” The commentary inserted between the songs say,

Taliban are a wonder of this world. They established a complete Islamic

Hukumat (rule) at the end of the 20th century. But the “taguti” (un-Islamic)
forces could not tolerate this heavenly rule. They removed Taliban from the
power. But Taliban are still in the thrones of hearts of the Muslims all over
the world.

Lyrics of songs makes statements such as, “Mullah Omar has called, let us dedicate
our lives in the path of Allah,”

Wouldn’t you be Taliban with courage in your hearts and Koran in your hands?
Look, they are fighting in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Palestine; waging Jihad as
heroes in the path of the Prophet. Hey, you the young, come to the path of the
Prophet, to dedicate your life; not much time is left, take positions for jihad.

The lyrics of the albums of another group called “Taliban Shilpi Goshthi” (Taliban
Artiste) go beyond all limits. One of their albums is titled “Revolutionary Osama.”
 Islamist politics and popular culture 147
Lyrics of one of the songs go like this: “take the Kalashnikov in your hand, put
the bullets in the magazine, let us go to the mountains of Afghanistan where
oppressed are crying loud. We will kill the hyenas,47 free our lands.”
Beside the songs, albums of recitation and drama are also available offering
similar messages. The dialogue in one such drama is as follows:

“Sir, may I come in?”

“Please do. What’s up?”
“Sir, the work is complete.”
“What do you mean by complete? Tell me if the mission is successful?”
“Yes sir, successful. 7 killed and 20 injured.”
“Good, very good, well done. Now let’s celebrate our success.”48

The involvement of Islamist militants with these cultural groups is exemplified

by Jabed Iqbal, one of the regional chiefs of Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh
(JMB), who was a member of the Saimum Shilpi Goshthi. And as for the
impact of these albums as motivational tools, one incident is illustrative. When
Abdullah Al Mamun, a 17-year old student of Darul Quran Madrassah was
arrested on 17 December 2005 in Mymensing for his alleged involvement with
the JMB and the blasts on 17 August, police discovered a music cassette in his
possession calling for jihad.49 Maulana Abu Taher, one of the key patrons of
the Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB), arrested for orchestrating
and funding the attacks on Sheikh Hasina at the public rally of the Awami League
on 21 August 2005, acknowledged that the musical cassettes of the Ronangon
Shilp Goshthi (Battlefield Artiste) were used to motivate students of qwami
madrassahs.50

Beyond the three forms

The Islamists’ incursion into the three forms of popular culture discussed above
is neither sporadic nor isolated, and therefore cannot be appreciated only by look-
ing at these forms. Instead they should be understood within a broader context,
i.e. changes in forms of public culture and the other traditional means through
which Islamists try to influence personal and public lives.
The long tradition of the availability and popularity of Islamic lifestyles books,
often referred to as Mas’ala text, is important in this regard. These texts, prima-
rily Quranic exegesis and Hadith literature, are intended to suggest various
aspects of an ideal Muslim life and the practices that need to be strictly adhered
to. Maimuna Huq has aptly noted that mas’ala texts are “more like handbooks
than discursive formations.”51 Two of these texts, Neyamul Quran and Maksudul
Momeneen have been available for some time and often serve as primary sources
of Islamic knowledge to the semi-literate. These books have been in print since
the 1930s;52 yet they are reprinted without any modifications almost every year.
The regular reprints are testimony to their huge popularity. Bookstores which sell
Islamic texts have attested to the popularity of Neyamul Quran. The manager of
148 Ali Riaz and Md. Abu Naser
one such bookstore in Dhaka informed one of the authors in March 2007 that at
least 100 copies of the book are sold monthly.53
Another indication of the popularity of these books is that at least another
version of Moksedul Momeneen, written by Shaikhul Hadith Maulana Muhammad
Mustafizur Rahman, is available on the market.54 Another book has an almost
identical name: Mokesdul Mumeen. Written by Maulana Mufazzal Hossain Khan,
the book has been reprinted 15 times in five years since its first publication in
1992.55 Amal-i-Nazat – a book of this genre, by Maulana Muhammad Mahmudul
Ahsan, reached 8 editions between November 1998 and February 2007.56 Nek Amal
by Alhaj Bashiruddin Ahmed from Maulavibazar is in its tenth edition. This latest
edition was published in October 2005.
Criticisms against this genre of texts abound. Taslima Nasrin, a Bangladeshi
feminist author, was the first to bring the misogynistic nature of these books to
public discourse through her newspaper columns in the late 1980s and the early
1990s.57 Tajul Islam Hashmi noted that the books are full of unscientific and unre-
fined explanations for almost every natural phenomenon.58 In many ways these
texts represent the orthodox and narrow interpretation of Islamic practices, often
based on a very limited knowledge of Islam. Islamists, particularly those who
are represented by the Jamaat-e-Islami, also dislike these texts. “Mas’ala texts,
Islamists believe, limit Islam to rituals and hinder the growth of revolutionary or
reformist consciousness. To many secularists, they embody backwardness, rustic-
ity and superstition.”59 Islamists, on the other hand, prefer the exegesis of their own
ideologues. For example, the supporters and sympathizers of the JI are encouraged
to read Tafhimul Quran by Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi. Bookstores aligned to the
JI claim that this 19-volume set has become popular in recent times.60
While we are in agreement with Huq that “Mas’ala texts play a significant role
in shaping public consciousness”61 we depart from her analysis that they encour-
age ritual-based piety. Instead it is our contention that these texts cultivate a
culture within which Islamism can flourish and thrive; because, as Huq acknowl-
edged, these texts foreground Islam and the Quran in daily practice. It should be
noted that the limitations of this genre, particularly its inability to reach the
younger and educated population, have been the driving force in exploiting other
forms of texts including the novel and thrillers. There has been a change in topic
and presentation within the genre as well. Recent publications of such texts
include Dainandin Jibane Islam (Islam in Daily Life), published by the Islamic
Foundation Bangladesh. The 748-page book comprises various aspects of daily
life, Islamic political system, and Islamic economics. The fifth edition of the book
was published in 2006.
The foregrounding of Islam in daily lives has also enabled other changes
within the public culture. The growing number of programs on Islamic life-
styles in the media, particularly on television, and publishing dedicated sections
on Islam (and on Muslim World) in daily newspapers bear testimony to this.
It is now customary to broadcast Islamic programs almost everyday and to
dedicate more airtime on Fridays. The private television channels that came into
existence during the last decade, especially during the BNP-led four party
 Islamist politics and popular culture 149
alliance rule (2001–6), now have either sermon-like programs or a call-in show
on Fridays. These programs are meant to provide an “Islamic solution” to day-to-day
problems.
Most of the programs of NTV, RTV, Channel I, ATN, and Bangla Vision have
a format where one or a panel of Maulanas responds to questions from the audi-
ence. The problem-solvers appear to be all-knowing and provide solutions to
problems ranging from sexual issues affecting personal life to issues connected
to home management, lifestyles, investments, share markets, corruption etc.
These question-answer programs seem to be gaining ground as the time slots for
the programs have increased. The number of calls to these programs has also
increased, reflecting the interest of the people in these programs. This, in turn, is
impacting upon the lifestyles, not only of the viewers but also of the larger section
of the people. Additionally, in April 2006, the government approved a television
channel, Islamic Television (ITV), to broadcast exclusively religious and reli-
gion-oriented programs. The channel, owned by the then Prime Minister Khaleda
Zia’s brother, was approved while hundreds of other applications languished.62
It is not only that the newspapers owned by the Islamists, for example Inqilab,
Naya Diganta and Sangram, publish articles, columns and editorials on issues
related to various Islamic practices but also the so-called secular-leaning newspa-
pers do the same. The defining feature of these efforts is to show Islamic events
and practices as cultural representations of the Bangladeshi nation. Muslim
majoritarianism is the key in transposing Islam to nationalism.

Conclusion
The above discussion demonstrates that the process of Islamization since 1975
with the support of the state has not remained limited within the political arena.
It has influenced various forms of popular culture in Bangladesh. Islamists are
either changing the content of traditional forms of cultural practices, or utilizing
existing formats.
Often they receive support from the state, but they are not dependent on it
alone. Islamists are not shying away from forms of popular culture once consid-
ered the exclusive preserve of the secularists as the new genre of Islamist fiction
has exemplified. The growing popularity of these cultural products also indicates
the Islamists’ success in reaching out to a new clientele.
The discussion also underscores the importance of examining various strate-
gies employed by the Islamists in spreading their messages. The adoption of such
strategies is not surprising. Neither it is unique to the Islamists, as any political
force would have done the same. The flexibility and adaptability of the Islamists
seems to have eluded the Bangladeshi analysts.

Notes
1 Two sections of this chapter (Traditional Cultural Practice Takes New Shape, and
Motivational Songs and Drama: Changes in Tone and Tune) are reprinted from Ali Riaz,
150 Ali Riaz and Md. Abu Naser
Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web (London: Routledge, 2008) with
due permission from the publisher.
2 Although the authenticity of this Hadith is seriously in doubt, the Taliban nevertheless
used it.
3 Nadya Labi, “Rhythmless Nation: The Taliban believes music is wrong. Musicians are
paying the price,” Time, 2001 <www.time.com/time/musicgoesglobal/asia/mtaliban.
html> (5 June 2006).
4 Pazir Gul, “18 militants killed in Waziristan,” Dawn (Karachi), 17 May 2006 <www.
dawn.com/2006/05/17/top3.htm> (7 July 2006). The newspaper reported that in Hamuzai
area near Miramshah, Waziristan a leading cleric declared the ban. On 21 January
2006, suspected Islamic militants planted explosive material near a music shop in the
center of the bazaar in Tanak district of North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan,
Pakistani security officials reported to Kuwait News Agency.
5 An extended discussion on this point is beyond the scope of this chapter. However,
Malaysia is a case in point. Mawi, a young musician, attracted the attention of the
media in recent years due to his dissemination of Islamist messages through “rock”
concerts. A graduate of the Royal Academy of Music in London and a piano virtuoso,
Azerbaijani born British Islamic singer Sami Yousif’s songs broadly fall into this
category. They are called the Islamic “Inshaad.” Many believe that the cultural land-
scape of the Gulf region is rapidly changing, thanks to this new breed of musicians.
Ahmed Bukhatir is the most prominent among them. The content of these songs varies
widely, but generally speaking, they are “merely monologues seeking forgiveness and
closeness to Allah in self-flagellating piety.” “Pop-Inshaad: The Rise of Islamic
Singers,” 10 March 2006 <http://www.aqoul.com/archives/2006/03/popinshaad_the.php>
(9 July 2006).
6 For discussion of Islamist parties and groups see Chapter 4 of this volume. Islamists
of all shades have been engaged in producing various cultural products, for example,
songs.
7 John Street, Politics and Popular Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1997), 5.
8 Street, Politics and Popular Culture, 6.
9 Street, Politics and Popular Culture, 10.
10 Thomas Blom Hansen, Saffron Wave – Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern
India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 19.
11 Hansen, Saffron Wave, 19.
12 Corinne Kumar, “Towards A New Political Imaginary,” Speech delivered in Istanbul,
26 June 2005 <snellings.telenet.be/womeninblackleuven/new_political_imaginary.htm>
(10 July 2006).
13 Street, Politics and Popular Culture, 16.
14 The word fiction is used throughout the chapter to denote an imaginative creation or
a literary work whose content is produced by the imagination and is not necessarily
based on fact. The Merriam Webster dictionary defines fiction as “something invented
by the imagination or feigned; specifically: an invented story.”
15 The term “Islamist fiction” is used here for want of a better term. Maimuna Huq
described them as Islam-oriented texts. She states that “the producers and readers of these
novels consider them ‘Islamic works’.” Maimuna Huq, “From Piety to Romance: Islam-
Oriented Texts in Bangladesh,” in Dale Eickelman, J.W. Anderson and Mark Tessler
(eds.). New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2003), 129–57, 129. Similarly, authors and sellers of these
books, in conversations with us, preferred the characterization – “Islamic novel.”
16 Maimuna Huq, “From Piety to Romance,”129–57, 129.
17 As noted before, many tend to describe these works as Islamic, instead of Islamist.
18 Islamic Book Fiction, “Definitions,” <www.islamicfictionbooks.com/definitions.html>
(15 July 2006)
 Islamist politics and popular culture 151
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 <http://islamicfictionbooks.wordpress.com/2009/08/11/whats-in-a-name-islamic-
fiction-or-muslim-fiction/> (17 July 2006).
22 <http://www.islamicfictionbooks.com/whatreaderssay.html> (17 July 2006).
23 Jian Xu, “Radical Ethnicity and Apocryphal History: Reading the Sublime Object
of Humanism in Zhang Chengzhi’s Late Fictions,” Positions: East Asia Cultures
Critique 10(3) (2002); 526.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 H.Y.F. Choy, “To Construct an Unknown China: Ethnoreligious Historiography in
Zhang Chengzhi’s Islamic Fiction,” Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 14(3)
(2006): 688.
27 The sellers of these books in Dhaka confided to one of the authors of this chapter in
December 2005 that the buyers are often “repeat customers” (personal conversations,
Dhaka, December 2005 and Dhaka January 2008). Among the secularist fiction writ-
ers worth noting are Humayun Ahmed, Emdadul Huq Milon, Humayun Azad, Taslima
Nasrin, Anisul Huq. Novels written by these authors sell in thousands in each edition
and each novel is reprinted several times in a single year.
28 Huq, “From Piety to Romance,” 155.
29 Huq, “From Piety to Romance,” 141.
30 Huq, “From Piety to Romance,” 142.
31 Pamela Taylor, “Call for English Language Islamic Fiction,” Petitionspot.com,
21 July 2006 <www.petitionspot.com/petitions/islamicfiction> (10 March 2007).
32 Huq, “From Piety to Romance,” 141.
33 1st ed. August 1995; 2nd ed. January 1996.
34 Huq, “From Piety to Romance,” 147.
35 The number of thrillers published on a regular basis is one indication of their
popularity. Booksellers in Dhaka have enthusiastically spoken of high regular sales of
the thrillers (Discussions with staff of book stores in Dhaka, January 2008).
36 Islam-bd.org, “Abul Asad,” <www.islam-bd.org/Personalities/AbulAsad/AbulAsad.
htm> (11 July 2007).
37 Abul Asad, Pattanir Samuj Aronya, Saimum Series 43 (Dhaka: Bangla Shahittya
Parishad, 2006), 77.
38 Tawhidul Islam Babu, Operation Series (Dhaka: Priti Prokashan). It is worth noting
that the publisher of the books is Asad bin Hafiz.
39 Hashem Roni, Secret Zone (Dhaka: Kheya Prokashani, 2006).
40 Masud Rana is a fictional character created by Qazi Anwar Hossain. Originally
created in the 1960s modeled after James Bond, the character has matured and
changed significantly. The series, with more than 372 books until the end of 2007, is
perhaps the longest running spy thriller in Bengali literature and the most widely read.
With a new volume each month, the series is known as an “adult series” because it
comprises narratives of sex and violence. These series is most popular among younger
readers particularly those who have little access to English thrillers. Many Islamists
consider this as the epitome of decadent literature and allege that the series encourages
many vices including promiscuity (For an introductory discussion on the series, see:
Mahmud Rahman, “Masud Rana: Super Spy of Transplant Fiction,” Daily Star,
10 March 2007, 24.)
41 The above characterization is drawn from several episodes of the thriller series titled
Saimum by Abul Asad. These points are most vividly illustrated in Dubo Pahar, the
forty-second volume of the series, particularly in the telephone conversation between
Ahmed Musa and Josephine. Abul Asad, Dubo Pahar (Dhaka: Bangla Sahitya
Parishad, 2006), 6–9.
42 Pamela Taylor, “Call for English Language Islamic Fiction.”
152 Ali Riaz and Md. Abu Naser
43 Nazimuddin Shymal, “Modus operandi of JMB in Ctg: Law enforcers now more
knowledgeable about outfit militant,” Independent (Dhaka), 15 December 2005, 6.
44 Shafiq Rahman, “The New Trend in Islamic Music,” Probe Magazine, <www.
probenewsmagazine.com/index.php?index=2&contentId=678> (19 June 2006).
45 Data after 2004 are not available.
46 Richard Gehr, “Taliban Killed the Radio Stars,” Village Voice, 16 November 2001
<www.villagevoice.com/music/0147,gehr,30076,22.html> (12 May 2005).
47 In Bangladeshi public discourse, the hyena is a widely used symbol of an aggressor.
This became popular during the war in 1971 when Pakistani occupation forces were
referred to as hyenas to emphasize the bestiality of the occupiers.
48 Shafiq Rahman, “The New Trend in Islamic Music.”
49 “9 JMB men including 4 varsity students held,” Bangladesh Observer, 8 December
2005, 1.
50 “Housing Businessman Maulana Taher Provided Funds for the Grenade Attacks of
21 August,” Amader Shomoy, 21 November 2007, 1.
51 Huq, “From Piety to Romance,” 136.
52 Maksudul Momeneen by Maulana Gholam Rahman first published in 1935 and Maulvi
Muhammad Shamsul Huda’s Neyamul Quran, was first published in 1937.
53 Personal interview, Muhammad Rafiqul Islam Sarder, Manager of Kataban Corner,
March 2007.
54 The book entitled, Moksedul Momeneen or The Key to Paradise, has seven parts
compiled as one volume in 2000 (Dhaka/Chittagong: Solemania Book House, 2000).
55 Maulana Mufazzal Hossain Khan, Mokesdul Mumeen (Dhaka: Solemania Book
House, 1997).
56 Maulana Muhammad Mahmudul Ahsan, Amal-i-Nazat (Dhaka: Meena Book House,
2007).
57 Taslima Nasrin, Nirbachito column (Selected Columns) (Calcutta: Ananda Publisher’s
Private Limited, 1992).
58 Taj I Hashmi, Women and Islam in Bangladesh: beyond Subjection and Tyranny
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), 74.
59 Huq, “From Piety to Romance,” 134.
60 Abul Ala Maududi, Tafhimul Quran (Dhaka: Adhunik Prakashani, 1995).
61 Huq, “From Piety to Romance,” 134.
62 “Two more TV channels before polls,” Daily Star, 26 April 2006, 1.
8 Islamist militancy
in Bangladesh
Regional and extra-regional
dimensions
Ali Riaz and Jessica Bastian

The domestic socio-political environment, discussed in the previous chapters, has

encouraged the rise of political Islam, particularly its militant variant in Bangladesh;
however, regional and extra-regional factors have also contributed to this phenom-
enon. This chapter focuses specifically upon identifying those regional and extra
regional sources of influences that have facilitated the rise of Islamism and Islamist
militancy, including ideological and political connections as well as the supply of
war material into the country, such as weapons and explosives. By understanding
external factors, as well as internal dynamics, this chapter proposes a number of
ways that the international community can help Bangladesh stem the rise of
militancy within its boundaries and its proliferation beyond national borders.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines the inflow
of militant ideology and militant organizations into Bangladesh. Within an input-
output model, in some measure, this presents the input side of the process of
radicalization of Islamism in Bangladesh. The second section examines the
sources of weapons introduced into the country. Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh
does not have a domestic weapons production industry; suggesting that the weapons
are procured externally. Stemming the supply of weapons arguably is as impor-
tant as stemming the ideological movements that support militancy in Bangladesh.
The third section presents the output side of the process; that is, it examines
whether these militant groups have extended their reach beyond national borders.
In the concluding section the possible roles that regional neighbors and the inter-
national community can play to help Bangladesh confront the menace of militancy
are discussed.

Inflow of militant ideology and organizations

The Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB) can be easily identified as the
fountainhead of militant organizations in Bangladesh. Since its emergence in the
early 1990s, Bangladesh has witnessed a dramatic growth of various militant
organizations. Importantly, leaders of many of these organizations had been, at
one point or another, connected to this organization or inspired by it.
Equally important, the organization owes its birth to the Afghan War. Like other
militant groups (for example, the Jammiyah Islami) the war imparted organization
154 Ali Riaz and Jessica Bastian
and skills to Bangladeshi militant Islamists. The Afghan jihad provided critical
opportunities for Bangladeshi militants to meet and forge common ground. The
key organizers of HuJIB and many other militant activists came to know each other
through their participation in the Afghan War. This facilitated the development of
an eventual organizational structure for the emergent militant organizations. While
the process began when a small volunteer corps joined the war in 1984, Bangladeshi
militant groups began taking organizational shape much later, after 1992.
Another external resource that has been critical to militant operations in
Bangladesh is outside financial support. It is well documented in the Bangladeshi
press and in the reports of Bangladeshi intelligence agencies that a number of
charity organizations based in Persian Gulf countries and the Middle East have
financed these militant groups and their activities. The Al-Haramain Islamic
Foundation (AHF), the Jeddah-based International Islamic Relief Organization
(IIRO) and the Kuwait-based Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS,
Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turah al-Islami) are the three most prominent organizations
which are accused of providing funding to militant Islamist groups.1 Following
the 17 August bombing, intelligence agencies reported that an orphanage funded
by the AHF was being utilized to provide training to about 500 militants of the
Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) in the manufacture and use of bombs.2
Some of these external Islamic charity organizations come from other parts of the
world as well; for example, the Servants of Suffering Humanity (SOSH), based
in South Africa has been engaged in dubious activities. Two officials of the
SOSH, one from South Africa and another from Pakistan, were arrested in Dhaka
on 25 January 1999 for their alleged involvement with HuJIB, especially provid-
ing funds to the organization. In April 2009, the head of a Britain-based charity
called Green Crescent, was arrested in Bangladesh after police discovered a huge
cache of weapons at the Green Crescent madrassah and orphanage on the remote
southern island of Bhola. The raid was conducted in late March.3 The madrassah
was established by Faisal Mostafa and was financed by his charity. Police described
the premises as a “mini-ordnance factory” and said the whole compound was being
used for militant training.4 Mostafa was previously arrested twice in Britain on
terrorism charges.5

Sources of weapons
In the 1990s, small arms became dramatically more available in Bangladesh. The
Small Arms Survey, a yearbook of the Graduate Institute of International Studies
based in Geneva, Switzerland, reported in 2002 that between 1991 and 1998 the
country had evolved into a destination state from being a transit state for small
arms.6 For the observers of the security situation in Bangladesh this was not a
revelation but an affirmation of the changes the country had been undergoing.
The most important aspect of this change was that over the same period a number
of Islamist militant organizations proliferated throughout the country. Needless
to say, while militancy needs funds, support, recruits, and infrastructure to thrive,
weapons and munitions constitute a major requirement. The ability of any militant
 Regional and extra-regional dimensions 155
group to acquire and maintain a flow of weapons is essential to their efforts to
threaten the government and to challenge public order. The military strength of
a group also influences its ability to gain attention, public support, and new
recruits.
This development begs two questions: where do the weapons come from and
for whom are they intended?
As the Small Arms Report 2002 implied, the flow of weapons to the country
was not a 1990s phenomenon; the country being already a transit route. As a
matter of fact, some weapons were destined for Bangladesh as well. The tribal
insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts gained strength after 1975 opening the
door for importation of weapons for low intensity guerilla warfare against the
government. The Jana Sanghati Samiti (JSS) and its military wing the Shanti
Bahini, representing the tribal Jumma people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts
(CHT), had become a formidable force in the CHT by 1979.7 The material
support of the Indian authorities was provided via the refugees who crossed the
border. The topography of the hills allowed the tribal insurgents to establish
control over areas that then became inaccessible to the Bangladeshi forces. The
important point to note is that at that time weapons were not delivered to the rebels
within Bangladesh; instead the rebels had to procure them from outside and carry
them in on their own. Delivering weapons within the borders of the country began
later. Illicit weaponry began arriving at the southeastern region of the country
due to the insurgency of the Rohingyas in Myanmar in the 1980s. The bases
established by the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) in the early 1990s was the
precursor to the arrival of other rebel organizations in the region. With the
moral support of the policy-makers in Dhaka, the Rohingyas began importing
small weapons from outside the region, particularly from Southeast Asia. Two
sources of weapons were cultivated by these rebels: “black” market and “grey”
market.
With respect to the black market, Southeast Asia’s vibrant covert arms markets
have been the principal source of weapons for rebel groups and criminal gangs in
South and Southeast Asia. Available information suggests that since 1975, “an
unknown quantity of weapons flowed out of Indo-China … into surrounding
states, to guerrilla groups and pirates who plied the waters of Southeast Asia.”
Thailand became the point of exchange for this illicit trade. In the 1990s,
“Thailand became the primary source of arms for insurgents operating in north-
east India, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka in addition to criminal
groups operating in Southeast and East Asia.”8 Over time various insurgent
groups in South Asia began tapping into the same sources. The waterways
and islands off the coast of Southeast Asia became the main route, and “insurgent
groups in north[east] India, western Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the
Philippines use anything from commercial ocean freighters to fishing boats to
deliver small arms procurements. Speedboats are frequently used to unload cargo at
sea and ferry the shipments across coastguard patrol lines to bring them to
shore.”9 Defense officials of the region are well aware of this illicit trade and have
acknowledged the fact. For example, Colonel Si Thu of Burma’s defense ministry
156 Ali Riaz and Jessica Bastian
commented in 2000, “It is a well-known fact that the insurgents active on the
borders with Thailand, Bangladesh and India purchase arms and ammunitions
from smugglers in Thailand.”10
Based upon considerable circumstantial evidence, it is likely that the Southeast
Asian weapons bazaars (such as the Thai town of Aranyaprathet near Thailand’s
border with Cambodia, Tuk Thla in Phonm Penh which operated openly until
1999, or the tropical island of Phuket in southern Thailand) are the primary
source of illegal weapons for many South Asian rebel groups. Two widely
reported incidents in 1996 and 1997 in particular lend credence to this supposi-
tion and are of particular relevance to Bangladesh. In March 1996, Bangladeshi
authorities seized 600 assault rifles and a large quantity of explosives in the Bay
of Bengal near Cox’s Bazar from a trawler originating in Thailand.11 While the
intended recipients of these arms could not be identified with certainty, the proxim-
ity of Rohingya rebel camps provided some clues. In 1997, the Thai navy inter-
cepted a 16-meter boat after a chase off the Thai port of Ranong. They confiscated
two tons of weapons and ammunition, including two rocket-propelled-grenade
launchers, twenty assault rifles, M-79 grenade launchers and more than 10,000
rounds of ammunition. Of the ten people arrested on the boat four were reportedly
associated with the Manipur Revolutionary People’s Front (MRPF), an insurgent
group from northeastern India, and six were from the Arakan region of Myanmar.
The boat was heading toward Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh.12 Many in the intel-
ligence community believe that the weapons were procured in Thailand by rebel
Manipuri groups and the Rohingyas jointly.
These arms exchanges are not always the work of small groups of corrupt and
profit-seeking people, “but also secret and legally questionable transfers from states
to non-state actors in another country against the wishes of the importing govern-
ment,” according to David Capie. This is called the “grey market” of weapons.
Capie states that “often these transfers violate the law or export regulations in the
supplier state, but they are made possible through deals arranged by intelligence
services with the tacit or active approval of the state’s political leadership.”13 As
a matter of fact, the Small Arms Survey 2002 noted, “Government patronage
appears to be the leading source of arms, funds, and training for the vast majority
of non-state actors … Nearly every region of the world has experienced this
phenomenon.”14 An important point to note here is that the arms supplied through
grey channels have the likelihood of moving to groups who were not the intended
or primary recipients of the supply.15
In Bangladesh, weapons are provided through “grey channels,” that involve the
intelligence agencies of both Pakistan and India. Allegedly, in 1991 ten Naga
rebels surrendered to the Indian border security forces near the Indo-Bangladesh
border south of Parya. They reportedly detailed an elaborate plan of procuring
arms from Pakistan’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).
According to Indian accounts, a group of 250 NSCN rebels entered Bangladesh
through Mizoram in their journey towards Cox’s Bazar. Although ten members
of the group defected and surrendered to the BSF, the remainder went ahead
and received their consignment delivered at Cox’s Bazar by the ISI operatives.
 Regional and extra-regional dimensions 157
Two more consignments were received. The fourth group was intercepted by the
army and killed. This did not prevent the rebels from procuring weapons but
forced them to change their routes. Cox’s Bazar, it is alleged, remained the point
where the arms where transacted.16
Two incidents from 1988, widely cited by security analysts, indicate the
involvement of India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Intelligence
Wing (RAW) in providing weapons to rebels groups of Burma. On 10 February,
the Indian Navy intercepted four boats, two of which were loaded with sophisti-
cated weapons, near Narcondum Island in the Indian Ocean. Six leaders of the
group were killed and 38 rebels were arrested. But information that later surfaced
revealed that members of two Burmese rebel groups namely the Arakan Army
and the Karen National Army bought these weapons in Thailand and were
destined to deliver them to Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. From Cox’s Bazar the
arms were to be sent to the Arakan hills.17 The second incident came three months
later. The Indian navy intercepted two Thai trawlers near Narcondam Island and
seized 50 kilograms of heroin of Myanmarese origin along with a large shipment
of arms coming from Thailand to be delivered somewhere close to Cox’s Bazar
in Bangladesh.18 It was also alleged that the weapons were purchased in Cambodia
with the consent of the RAW to ship them to Wyakaung beach between Cox’s
Bazar and Arakan for Burmese insurgents in the Arakan and Chin provinces.
David Capie insists that, “They were part of a secret Indian operation to support
the rebels in an attempt to offset growing Chinese influence on the military
regime in Yangoon (sic).”19
The Indian Navy acted without any knowledge of this clandestine operation.
These incidents, described as Operation Leech in official documents, created a
serious rift between the Indian Navy and the RAW. The Navy Chief was
dismissed after open debate with the Defense Minister.20
The above descriptions reveal that Bangladesh, particularly the southeastern
part of the country, was being used as a weapons transit point by various rebel
groups from India and Myanmar. Over time, these weapons began to change
hands and stay within the country for usage – both in criminal activities and
militancy. For example, “after giving up their own struggle in 1998, some
members of the Shanti Bahini began selling arms on the black market.”21 In the
1990s, Islamist militants and other insurgents who have been using southeastern
Bangladesh as their base have benefited from both kinds of arms transfers.
The extent of the importation of illegal arms within the country can be under-
stood from three major arms hauls in 2003 and 2004. On 27 June 2003, in an
ordinary village in the northwestern Bogra district, about 100 kilometers from the
Indian border, the police recovered 100 thousand bullets and about 200 kilograms
of explosives from an abandoned truck.22 Over subsequent days, police recovered
more ammunition and explosives hidden in houses and ponds.23 On 30 November
2003 after a gun battle, police seized sophisticated weapons including AK-47
rifles, time bombs and explosives in the suburb of the capital Dhaka.24 On 2 April
2004, police discovered that a massive quantity of weapons and ammunition was
being offloaded from two trawlers onto the jetty of the Chittagong Urea Fertilizer
158 Ali Riaz and Jessica Bastian
Factory (CUFF). The amount and the variety of weapons stunned members of the
law enforcing agencies. Jane’s Intelligence Review (JIR), described this as “one
of South Asia’s largest ever seizures of illicit weaponry.”25
The discovery of these weapons from three different places, hundred of miles
apart, is a testimony to the proliferation of weapons throughout the country. Since
then seizures of large stockpiles of arms from various parts of the country have
become a regular occurrence. Similarly, the law enforcing agencies have discov-
ered explosives and raw materials for bomb making on many occasions.26
Bangladesh has also accused Indian militants of the movement of weapons into
Bangladesh.

Beyond the borders

The question as to whether there are connections between Islamist militants in
Bangladesh and transnational terrorist groups has occasionally surfaced in the
international media. Alex Perry, in his report in Time in 2002, insisted that not
only does a relationship exist, these groups work closely together.27 Zachary
Abuza had expressed similar views in 2003.28 The possibility of a close connec-
tion between the Bangladeshi groups and other militant organizations is not
far-fetched because cross border cooperation among militants in the vicinity of
Bangladesh is a fact of life. Interestingly, these relationships are not always based
on ideological affinity. Instead some grew out of the convenience, physical proxi-
mity and the need for weapons shipments. As these groups became part of a chain
of arms procurement from illegal sources, they became closer.
The presence of the Rohingya militants in southeastern Bangladesh where the
Shanti Bahini had significant influence in the 1980s was the precursor of future
relationships between various groups. In the 1990s, the Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islam
Bangladesh (HuJIB) developed a close relationship with the Rohingya insur-
gents, particularly with the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO).29 The scope
and nature of this relationship has been described by arrested militants as very
important and reciprocal. For example, Jahidur Rahman, alias “Boma Mizan”
divulged after being arrested in May 2009 that he and some other JMB operatives
received training from RSO arms experts in a camp near the Myanmar border in
2002. Furthermore, “In exchange for the firearms lessons, JMB trained Rohingyas
to improvise and set off bombs.”30 This relationship, tacitly encouraged by the then
Bangladesh government headed by Khaleda Zia, helped shape future relation-
ships between various militant groups who use the hill tracts as their bases. Besides,
as we have discussed in the previous section, the area, particularly Cox’s Bazar,
became the transit point of weapons shipments. This need alone was sufficient to
foster a relationship among the insurgents. Some of the Indian insurgent groups,
such as the NSCN, also became part of the network in order to have access to this
channel.
It is worth remembering that some other Indian insurgent groups, the United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura
(NLFT) have allegedly received material support from the government in Dhaka
 Regional and extra-regional dimensions 159
and their members have taken refuge in Bangladesh, perhaps with the knowledge
of the local intelligence agencies. Press reports in 2005 suggested that members
of the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), the United Liberation Front of Assam
(ULFA) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) had “intruded” into
the Bangladeshi side of the border areas.31
The important point is that a working relationship between the militant groups
in the region had developed even before Islamist groups had a wider presence
throughout the country. This provides the backdrop to the new relationships
forged between external Islamist militant groups and the Bangladeshi militants.
Notwithstanding the relationship established with the Rohingya insurgents since
the 1990s, there are indications that the connections between external militant
organizations and Bangladeshi groups have now become two-way. After the
emergence of the Taliban in the mid-1990s organizational and personal links
between the militant groups in Pakistan and Bangladesh strengthened. Pakistani
militant groups, particularly the Lasker-e-Tayeba (LeT), have been aggressive in
recruiting and training militants for their ongoing operations in Jammu and
Kashmir. As part of its effort to intensify pressure on Indian authorities, the LeT
leadership is trying to open a second front against India – either through expand-
ing their organization within the country, or through recruiting Bangladeshis to
act on their behalf, or using Bangladesh as the safe haven of Indian militants.
Arrests of six high-profile Indian militants connected to Lasker-e-Tayeba (LeT)
bear out these connections and substantiate the claim of the presence of a transna-
tional militant network operating in and through Bangladesh. The network uses
Bangladesh as both a transit route and source of shelter for militant activity.
On 27 May 2009 Indian nationals and wanted criminals, Abdul Rauf Daud
Merchant and Zahid Sheikh along with their Bangladeshi host, were arrested at a
tea stall in Brahamanbaria, a town southeast of the capital.32 According to inter-
rogation statements released by Bangladeshi police, Abdul Rauf Daud Merchant
is a close associate of Indian mobster Daud Ibrahim who is believed to have ties
with both the Pakistan based militant organization Laskar-e-Tayeba (LeT) and
the Bangladesh militant group Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB).33
This arrest marked the first in a series, with six Indian nationals eventually
rounded up in Bangladesh between May and October 2009. Subsequent arrests
have further connected the LeT and HuJIB organizations to the Indian militant
group Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF) believed to be operating in
Bangladesh. After the September arrest of Mufti Obiadullah, alleged leader of the
Indian-based Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF), Bangladeshi police learned
that militant groups attempting to cross the India-Pakistan border would instead
enter Bangladesh before proceeding to Pakistan to avoid border authorities.
Obiadullah’s statement released by the police read, “As it was tough to cross back
to Pakistan through the India-Pakistan border, the Mujahideen would cross to
Bangladesh and then left for their destination using fake passports and visas.”34
Obiadullah also confessed to building a safe house in Habiganj, Bangladesh under
the guise of a kindergarten, with the purpose of aiding militants in transit, and
sheltering fugitives, as well as recruiting and training sympathetic Bangladeshis.35
160 Ali Riaz and Jessica Bastian
However, the ARCF does not operate alone, Obidullah confessed to having
contact with several other militants in Bangladesh, including HuJIB operative
Mufti Adbur Rouf and fellow Indian LeT member Habibullah alias Mansur.36 It
is believed that these militant organizations worked in concert to provide training
and shelter to Pakistani and Indian militants.37
The presence of militant networks in Bangladesh has long been suspected but
not confirmed. This recent string of arrests illustrates the severity and depth of
militant infiltration into Bangladesh. The sixth Indian national arrested in the
Gabtali area of Bangladesh is Mohammad Emdadullah alias Mahbub alias Ripon
Miah. Bangladeshi police believed that Emdadullah is linked to the LeT and
connected to several bombings carried out by the HuJIB. It is believed that he was
trained in arms handling and explosives in Balochistan, Pakistan and then was
sheltered by militant groups in Bangladesh.38 Like Daud Merchant, Emdadullah
escaped into Bangladesh after being arrested by the Indian police in 2006. He
allegedly maintained contact with LeT leader Abdullah who is thought to be
located in Pakistan. In a statement released by the Bangladeshi policy Emdadullah
said, “I came to Bangladesh in April 2006 to take shelter here and Abdullah sent
me (Indian) Rs. 4,000 per month from Pakistan through Western Union Money
Transfer.”39 In this statement garnered as the result of Bangladeshi police inter-
rogation it is clear that militants are using Bangladesh for shelter as well as a base
of operations.
Evidence suggests that the militants had stronger ties to Bangladesh than
simply using it as a route between Indian-Pakistan and vice versa. Bangladeshi
police estimate a network of approximately 150 Indian militants in Bangladesh.40
Daud Merchant, Zahid, Obiadullah, and Emdadullah had possession of passports,
national identification cards, and Bangladeshi voting credentials, suggesting that
the men were posing as Bangladeshi citizens and casting votes in local elections.41
Obiadullah, under the name of Abu Zafar, was employed at several madrassahs
in Monirampur of Jessore, in Shrimangal of Moulvibazar, and at Tikipur Jamia
Mahmudia Madrassah in Nawabganj of Dhaka.42 He reported voting in several
elections as well as maintaining a network of supporters within the country.43
Bangladeshi police believe that Daud Merchant obtained passport and identifica-
tion documents through a local Bangladeshi municipality officer named Hafizur
Rahman Mollah.44 Merchant has denied all allegations while in police custody;
he insists that he moved his family to Bangladesh to start a business and evade
Indian police.
There are also reports that Bangladeshi militant groups have been engaged in
activities in India. Intelligence officials and the media claim that the HuJIB has
developed close connections with militants in Pakistan and India. The growing
close relationship between Bangladeshi Islamist militant groups, particularly the
HuJIB, and Indian militant groups, particularly the Student Islamic Group of
India (SIMI), has featured prominently in the Indian press. Claims have been
made by the Indian authorities that these two groups are working in concert as
a proxy of Pakistani militant groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and
Lasker-e-Tayeba (LeT).
 Regional and extra-regional dimensions 161
While some incidents give credence to these allegations, caution must be
exercised in accepting them at face value. The picture is far more complex than
the reports in the popular press and claims made by Indian political leaders
suggest. Particular attention should be given to the scale of cooperation between
local militants and the Bangladeshi militant groups. HuJIB operatives of Pakistani
and Kashmiri descent were apprehended in Guwahati, the northeastern state of
Assam, as early as August 1999 but no internal Indian link was suspected.45
However, the post-11 September 2001 global political and security environment
changed the tone and tenor of these allegations. The December 2001 attack on the
Indian Parliament in Delhi and the January 2002 bombing of the American
Centre in Kolkata intensified the rhetoric of the Indian government that external
hands were at play. The latter event brought forth the allegation that Bangladeshi
militant groups were partners in the attack, and that the HuJIB was operating
within India.46
Central to the Indian allegations is Bangladesh’s role as a transit route of
Islamist militancy into India’s northern region. Evidence to support this claim is
largely provided through weapons profiles and intelligence gathered through
integration or intercepted through communications surveillance. In 2008, 41 live
grenades were found in Dhaka and confiscated by Bangladeshi officials who also
arrested the top HuJIB operatives found in possession of the explosives. The
Daily Star newspaper quoting an unnamed source reported that a “nexus of
Bangladeshi and Pakistani militant organizations (sic) is supplying explosives to
Islamic militant outfits in India.”47 The investigation cited information based on
statements provided by HuJIB leaders who were arrested during the raid. These
statements led officials to believe that several shipments of grenades were sent
into Bangladesh by Pakistan-based militant groups with the intent to smuggle
them onward to India. This included the grenades and firearms seized in
Chittagong on 2 April 2004. Press and intelligence sources have insisted that
these weapons were intended not for Bangladesh but for neighboring India.
Jane’s Intelligence Review (JIR) reported that the April 2004 incident in
Chittagong involved two key insurgent movements within India – the United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the Isak-Muivah faction of the Nationalist
Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM).48 On the other hand, Bangladesh has
accused Indian militants of the movement of weapons over their border.
The Indian allegation of the involvement of Bangladeshi militants is also tied
up with Indian domestic political developments. In past decades, some Indian
political parties, especially the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has alleged that
illegal Muslim migration from Bangladesh is changing the demography of India.
Citing dubious statistics the BJP leaders argue that border states such as West
Bengal and Assam are bearing the brunt of it and that this is a well designed plan
to Islamize these states and establish a large Muslim state.49 The BJP has advo-
cated an uncompromising approach to “dealing” with the illegal immigration
problem. Consequently, India has identified illegal Bangladesh immigrants as a
security threat. In 2003 the then Deputy Indian Prime Minister Lal Krishna
Advani of the BJP issued a national directive to, take “immediate steps … to
162 Ali Riaz and Jessica Bastian
identify them, locate them, and throw them out.”50 Some Indian sources claim
that 20 million illegal Bangladeshis live in India.51
Bangladesh continues to deny a Bangladeshi presence within India. Instead
they argue that the “illegal” Bangladeshi migrants identified by Indian officials
are actually Bengali speaking Indian Muslims expelled from their homeland and
forced upon Bangladesh. As a result, Bangladesh has refused to accept undocu-
mented migrants.52 Additionally, some Bangladeshis feel that India is using the
immigration issue as a scapegoat and is shying away from its responsibilities of
addressing the root causes of the violence and militancy inside the country.
The Bangladeshi government, for example, has publicly declared that: “India
looks for a ‘scapegoat’ every time there was an attack.”53 Social and political
analysts insist that the indiscriminate labeling of ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’
as terrorists, most of whom can be identified as economic migrants, has engen-
dered a serious ‘social repercussion’ that is, breeding “fear and historical ethnic
tensions.” 54
The context described above is not intended to imply that militancy in
Bangladesh is not spilling over to India. Certainly, HuJIB operatives arrested in
India in 2006 and 2008 have confessed that they received training and funds from
the Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lasker-e-Tayeba of Pakistan.55 The organization has
also trained militants in Bangladesh to engage in subversive activities in India,
three operatives arrested there told Delhi police. The confessional statements
also indicate that militant leaders from Pakistan had traveled to Bangladesh to
recruit, organize training and disburse funds. One such case is the arrest of
alleged militant Mohammad Iqbal, active under the name Abdur Rehman, from
New Delhi Railway Station, on 22 May 2008.56 According to the police report
Rehman was sent to India by top commanders of HuJIB to bomb the capital. This
arrest occurred after Indian authorities gained information through the interroga-
tion of previously apprehended terrorists which revealed that the Pakistani based
terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lasker-e-Tayeba (LeT) were
working in league with HuJIB of Bangladesh. Specific information was received
by the Indian authorities that Rehman had entered India through the Indo-
Bangladeshi border and was expected to arrive in Delhi. This information led to
his arrest and subsequent confiscation of weapons. During follow up operations
the Indian authorities report the apprehension of large amounts of RDX, timers
and electronic detonators.57 Interrogation of the suspect further revealed that
Rehman had crossed the border into Bangladesh and Pakistan several times. In
Pakistan he received training in weapons and bomb detonation after which he
traveled to Bangladesh. According to the report filed, once in Bangladesh Rehman
was directed by the commander of HuJIB to travel to India for the purpose of
terrorist activity and the recruitment of militant youth.58
As indicated earlier, the HuJIB, originally created in Pakistan and currently
with a strong footing in Bangladesh, seems to be a key bridge between Indian,
Pakistani and Bangladesh militants. The information provided by the Indian
police and intelligence sources regarding the series of blasts in Jaipur in May
2008 shows that a local Indian group acted with the help of HuJIB.59 An Indian
 Regional and extra-regional dimensions 163
group called the “Indian Mujahideen” claimed responsibility but Indian autho-
rities believe the homegrown groups to be connected to HuJIB operatives.60
These allegations center around the notion that HuJIB operatives are training,
organizing and supplying Indian Muslims with the means to effectively carry out
violence in India. These operatives are thought to be seeking shelter in the
densely populated Bangladeshi slums located outside the walled city of Jaipur.61
The “Indian Mujahideen” is believed to be a faction of the Student Islamic Group
of India (SIMI) working in conjunction with the HuJIB under the direction of
Mohammed Amjad alias Khaja. Amjad has allegedly taken over the operation of
HuJIB within India and is believed to have been successful in recruiting members
from groups like SIMI.62 Authorities report that SIMI is strengthening its pres-
ence in southern and western India.63 Several high profile SIMI ansars have been
arrested for their involvement in past incidents of violence: the 28 July 2005
bombing of the Shramjeevi Express at Jaunpur, and the Varanasi serial bombs of
7 March 2006. Connection to HuJIB operatives is believed to have been crucial
in the execution of both those incidents. Citing Indian intelligence sources
The Hindu reports that links between SIMI and Bangladeshi militants were
forged through interaction with the Islami Chatra Shibir, the student wing of
Bangladesh’s Jamaat-e-Islami, but which has grown into an extension of the
HuJIB terrorist network in India.64 Indian law enforcement agencies believe it is
the extensive SIMI network coupled with the outflow of militancy from
Bangladesh that provides the capacity needed to coordinate such sophisticated
campaigns of violence.

Stemming the tide

As the rise of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh is not the exclusive product of
domestic developments; domestic policies alone cannot stem the tide. Both
regional and international forces will have to play important roles if the interna-
tional community seriously aims to help Bangladesh in its quest for a sustainable
democratic political system and stem the proliferation of further instability in
South Asia. The threat to global security from militant groups in the region
around Bangladesh, Islamists (such as the HuJIB, the ARNO) and non-Islamists
(such as the ULFA, the NSCN) may not seem direct or imminent, but the
November 2009 revelations about a HuJIB-LeT plot to attack the US Embassy in
Dhaka again focused attention on the Islamist militant threat in Bangladesh.65
The insurgency in northeastern India is a case in point. Political struggles within
India may leave her exposed and vulnerable to the inflow of militant ideology and
weapons. Some analysts have suggested that the instability of the northern region
is primarily the government’s making. Fractionalization of groups in the northern
region are the direct result of India’s policy to “split and rule,” in a deliberate
effort to avoid addressing the real political problems.66 Further, the delay within
which the Indian government addresses these concerns may provide a hospitable
environment for militant groups to find a receptive audience. Indian neglect of
concerns on the part of the Muslim population and the rise in Hindu nationalism
164 Ali Riaz and Jessica Bastian
in recent years has increased and spurred ethnic tensions between the majority
Hindu population and minority groups of Muslims, separatists, and immigrants.
India has been accused of placing the blame for attacks, actually attributable to
localized politics, on foreign terrorist groups; claims which subsequently have
been picked up by the international media.67 The erosion of secularist forces in
Indian politics, disregard for the ideals of democracy and equality in India and
the increasing violence in the northern region should be a cause for concern in the
international community. In similar vein, the non-state actors based in Pakistan
and their relationship with the Pakistani state cannot be seen as merely a domes-
tic issue. These forces have become sources of major concern for the entire region
and Bangladesh has not been spared.
The policies of the international community must be comprehensive and
two-pronged. A comprehensive policy cannot be merely a military one. Often the
sources of security threats are embedded in the socio-political-economic environ-
ment. It is crucial that the international community examines the causes of and
conditions for the popular appeal of radical forces. The most positive aspect to
date is that the appeal of radicalism is limited and these groups have very little
popular support. But this should not make any one complacent. If the issue
remains unaddressed, these groups, especially their ideology, may reach out to
a larger segment of the society. This is particularly of concern because of the
fractious nature of mainstream domestic politics and the connections between
mainstream parties and clandestine groups. The international community in their
bilateral and multilateral dealings with Bangladesh must take cognizance of the
complex nature of the phenomenon. The international community cannot be
oblivious to issues such as education, balanced social and economic develop-
ment, and human rights whilst demanding that radicalism and extremism be
addressed vigorously. Sustained economic growth and a reduction of economic
disparity are believed to be the best antidotes to radicalism. (However, there are
no robust sources that buttress these claims.) Often poverty and disparity serve as
the cause behind the appeals of the militants. The recruitment strategies being
used by these militant groups may provide a clue as to which segments of the
society are more vulnerable to their call. The international community should
extend their help to the Bangladeshi authorities in addressing these issues. It is a
welcome development that the international community does not view Bangladesh
through a 1970s prism which portrays the country as an aid-dependent nation; the
country has come of age and deserves to be treated accordingly. Considering it as
a partner, rather than a recipient of handouts is important.
As for the counter-terrorism strategy, the international community must take
into consideration the regional and extra-regional dynamics of Islamist militancy.
Therefore, it is necessary that the international community, particularly the
United States, influence the regional and extra-regional actors to be more
constructive in fighting militancy there. As a small country with few resources
and no clout in global politics, Bangladesh is not equipped to influence India and
Pakistan to cease and desist from using the country as a proxy battleground.
Without the help of these two countries, and a coordinated effort from the
 Regional and extra-regional dimensions 165
international community, there is little hope of making headway. As long as the
grey channels of the arms trade remain intact, the flow of weapons to the country
will continue.
Finally, in a globalized world where information flows instantaneously, global
politics is bound to have as much of an impact on Bangladesh as anywhere else.
The actions of the western nations, particularly the world’s only super power –
the United States, will influence Bangladeshi perceptions of the global political
system. US policies in general, and particularly towards Muslim communities, shape
the worldview of the Bangladeshis as much as local politics. This aspect should
not be ignored by US policy-makers.

Notes
1 “Top boss of Kuwait-based RIHS leaves,” Daily Star, 22 August 2005, 1. Anwar Ali,
“2 RIHS staff ejected from the country,” Daily Star, 20 May 2006.
2 “Al-Haramain trained militants on how to make, use bombs,” New Age, 15 September
2005, 1.
3 “Militants’ ‘ammo factory’ busted,” Daily Star, 25 March 2009, 1.
4 “Charity chief focus of arms probe” BBC News, 26 March <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/7965633.stm> (27 March 2009).
5 “British chemist Faisal Mostafa arrested after raid on orphanage in Bangladesh”
Guardian(London), 26 March 2009, p.1. He, however, was cleared on both occasions.
6 Graduate Institute of International Studies, Small Arms Survey 2002, 142–3.
7 Amena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts,
Bangladesh(Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1997).
8 Graduate Institute of International Studies, Small Arms Survey 2002.
9 Graduate Institute of International Studies, Small Arms Survey 2002, 142–3 (For a
graphical presentation of the flow of arms from Cambodia see, Box 3.8.)
10 Kanis Dursin, “Worried governments target small arms trade,” Asia Times, 12 May
2000 <www.atimes.com/se-asia/BE12Ae01.html> (3 September 2006).
11 Muhammad Shahedul Anam Khan, “Linkages Between Arms Trafficking and the
Drug Trade in South Asia,” in Jayanath Dhanpala (ed.), Small Arms Control Old
Weapons, New Issues (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1999), 266–7.
12 Ramtanu Maitra, “Trouble on India’s islands,” Asia Times, 11 February 2005 <www.
atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GB11Df05.html> (3 April 2005).
13 Capie, Sovereignty Under Fire, 59.
14 Graduate Institute of International Studies, Small Arms Survey 2002, 142–3. For a
graphical presentation of the flow of arms from Cambodia see, p.129. The study
provides a long list of countries that provided arms to various non-state actors
(NSAs).
15 For a graphical presentation of the arms chain possibility see Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Small Arms Survey 2002,110. Box 3.1.
16 E.N. Rammohan, “A Degenerated Insurgency,” ManipurOnline, 20 April 2006
<www.manipuronline.com/Features/April2006/degeneratedinsurgency20_1.htm>
(15 May 2006).
17 For details see Ali Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web (London/
New York: Routledge, 2008). Soumen Datta, Anish Gupta, and Sourbah Sen, “Blood
and Sand,” Sunday, 31 May–6 June 1998. A section of the report is available at
<www.rediff.com/news/1998/jul/14cbi1.htm> (4 September 2006). For other reports
see: Ajay Singh, “A Storm Over Security,” Asia Week, 2 April 1999. Sukumar
Muralidharan, “The Admiral Speaks Out,” Frontline 16(5) (27 February–12 March 1999).
166 Ali Riaz and Jessica Bastian
Subir Bhaumik, “Seized Weapons Vanish from Military Custody in Andamans,”
Times of India, 22 April 2001. Subir Bhaumik, “Guns, Drugs and Rebels,” Seminar
Web Edition 550 (June 2005).
18 There is a variation in the account of the events. According to one account once the
rebels realized the Indian Navy was tailing them, they sank their vessels, arms and the
consignment of narcotics. Twenty-two of them were rescued by divers, detained in
Port Blair for a few days and then released. Another account suggests that two trawlers
with arms were confiscated.
19 Capie, Sovereignty Under Fire, 68. Subir Bhaumik, “Guns, Drugs and Rebels.”
20 Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, the chief of Navy, was dismissed on 30 December 1998.
There were a number of issues of contention between the Defense Minister and the
Navy Chief, these operations were among them. Bhagwat told his side of the story in
a book entitled Betrayal of the Defense Forces (New Delhi: Manas Publications,
2001).
21 Graduate Institute of International Studies, Small Arms Survey 2002, 142–3.
22 Anwar Ali, “Big ammo haul from Bogra AL leader’s house, truck,” Daily Star,
29 June 2003, 1.
23 “Bogra-Haul Round-up,” Holiday, 12.
24 “Huge Arms Haul in City,” Daily Star, 1 December 2003, 1.
25 Anthony Davis, “New details emerge on Bangladesh arms haul,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, September 2004.
26 For example, on 16 November 2008, the Rapid Action Battalion seized 70kg of
explosives, 40kg of nitric acid, 150 cases of improvised grenades, a large quantity of
bomb-making materials and equipment during a raid at a militant hide-out.
27 Alex Perry, “Deadly Cargo,” Time, 2002.
28 Jonathan Curiel, “Downsized al Qaeda settles for smaller terror targets,” San
Francisco Chronicle, 15 May 2003 <www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2003/
05/15/MN45792.DTL&hw=qaida&sn=070&sc=313> (11 July 2009).
29 There are also a number of other armed groups, mostly based among the Buddhist
Rakhine population, which remain active in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border areas.
These include the National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA) and the Arakan Army.
30 “Rohingya rebels trained JMB men,” Daily Star, 10 May 2009, 1.
31 “Crackdown on cross-border gunrunners kills 6,” Daily Star, 28 May 2005, 1.
32 “Two Top Indian Criminals Held” Daily Star, 29 May 2009, 1.
33 “Laskar-e-Taiyeba active in Bangladesh for 14 years,” Daily Star, 17 July 2009
<http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/latest_news.php?nid=18129> (10 October
2009).
34 “Foreign militant used country as transit point,” Daily Star, 2 September 2009 <http://
www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=104051> (2 October 2009).
35 “Foreign militant,” Daily Star, 2 September 2009.
36 “Foreign militant,” Daily Star, 2 September 2009.
37 “Foreign militant,” Daily Star, 2 September 2009.
38 “Indian with Lashkar links arrested in Dhaka,” Uzbekistan News.Net., 2 October
2009.
39 Indian with Lashkar, Uzbekistan News.Net., 2 October 2009.
40 “150 Daud operatives already in Bangladesh,” Daily Star, 1 June 2009, 1.
41 “Laskar-e-Taiyeba active in Bangladesh for 14 years,” Daily Star, 17 July 2009, 1;
“Indian Militant Network in Bangladesh had collapsed,” bdnews24, 1 October 2009
<http://bdnews24.com/pdetails.php?id=143941> (2 October 2009); “Indian with
Lashkar links arrested in Dhaka,” Uzbekistan News.Net., 2 October 2009; “Over 150
Daud operatives already in Bangladesh,” Daily Star, 1 June 2009, 1.
42 “Laskar-e-Taiyeba active in Bangladesh for 14 years,” Daily Star, 17 July 2009.
43 Ibid.
44 “150 Daud operatives already in Bangladesh,” Daily Star, 1 June 2009.
 Regional and extra-regional dimensions 167
45 Wilson John, “Bangladesh’s Muslim Migrants: No Longer economic refugees but
merchants of terror,” East India Watch, 7 August 2008. <www.dailypioneer.com/
columnist1.asp?main_variable=Columnist&file_name=john> (accessed 28 March
2009).
46 Ibid.
47 “Pakistan-Bangladesh militant nexus smuggling grenades to India,” Thaindian News,
19 February 2008 <www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/pakistan-bangladesh-
militiant-nexus> (13 November 2008).
48 Anthony Davis, “New details emerge on Bangladesh arms haul,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, September 2004.
49 For an incisive discussion of these arguments see Patricia Jeffery and Roger Jeffery,
Confronting Saffron Demography: Religion, Fertility, and Women’s Status in India
(Haryana, India: Three Essays Collectives, 2006).
50 Sujata Ramachandran, “Global Migration Perspectives,” Global Commission on
International Migration (42) (September 2005) <www.gcim.org> (12 March 2009).
51 Philip Bowring, “India is causing trouble,” International Herald Online, 22 January
2003 <www.bowring.net/banglaind.htm> (28 January 2009).
52 Ramachandran, “Global Migration Perspectives.”
53 “Terror-hit India looks for scapegoats: Bangladesh,” Indo-Asian News Service,
5 August 2008.
54 Arpita Mukherjee, “Bangladeshi immigrants spreading terror in India” Asia Sentinel,
9 September 2009.
55 “HuJI Bangladesh has connections with Indian and Pakistani Militants, Mursalin and
Muttakin tell Delhi Police” (in Bengali), Prothom Alo (Dhaka), 16 May 2008, 1.
56 Press release of Deputy Commissioner of Police, East District, Delhi, 22 May 2008
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 “Six bombs in 15 minutes leave at least 80 dead in Jaipur,” Times (London), 14 May
2008 <www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3925840.ece> (31 January
2009).
60 Josy Joseph, “Blast investigators try to crack HuJI-SIMI network,” IndianInfo.com,
13 November 2008.
61 Arpita Mukherjee, “Bangladeshi immigrants spreading terror in India?,” Asia Sentinel,
9 September 2008. Indian Human Rights Groups have contested this allegation. The
People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), for example, insists that Bengali migrants
were unfairly targeted and made a “scapegoat.” For details see: “The Jaipur Terror
Scapegoat: The Poor Bengali Muslim Migrant/ PUCL Rajasthan’s Report” <www.
binayaksen.net/2008/05/the-jaipur-terror-scapegoat/> (13 Jume 2009).
62 Ibid.
63 Praveen Swami, “A tragedy foretold,” The Hindu, 12 July 2006 <www.hinduonnet.
com/thehindu/thecrip> (13 November 2008).
64 Ibid.
65 Anisur Rahman, “3 Arrested for Plotting to Attack US Embassy in Dhaka,”
Outlook India, 6 November 2009 <http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?669027>
(14 November 2009).
66 “Indian government policy is blamed for the HUJI-ULFA connection,” India Post, 19
January 2008 <//indiapost.com/article/perspective/5221> (28 January 2009).
67 Philip Bowring, “India is causing trouble,” International Herald Online, 22 January
2003 <www.bowring.net/banglaind.htm> (28 January 2009).
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Vaughn, Bruce. Bangladesh: Background and U.S. Relations. Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 2006.
Yunus, Muhammad. Banker to the Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against Poverty.
New York: Public Affairs, 2003.
Index
Abdalla, Amr et al. 127, 134n36
Abujh Ridoy (Shagar, M.H.) 142
Abuza, Zachary 158
Action Committee for Rural Power
Development in Kansat 16–17
Adarsa Kutir 82
Adnan, Shapan 25n23
Agardari Union 105
Agarwal, Bina 113n45
Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh
(AHAB) 47, 53, 54, 75, 82, 129, 130
Ahle Hadith Jubo Sangha (AHJS) 53–4,
129, 130
Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat 56
Ahmadullah, Maulana 129
Ahmed, Alhaj Bashiruddin 148
Ahmed, Iajuddin 86
Ahmed, Iraz 69n74
Ahmed, Moudoud 30, 43n19
Ahmed, Muhiuddin 66
Ahmed, Nizam 112n28
Ahmed, Rafiuddin, Ahmed 112n15
Ahmed, Rahnuma 110
Ahmed, Syed Jamil 104, 113n56
Ahmed, Tajuddin 30
Ahmediyya community 28, 34, 44, 55, 99
Ahsan, Maulana Muhammad Mahmudul
148, 152n56
Ahsan, Syed Badrul 44n46
Ahsan, Zayadul x, 4, 71–90, 88n23
Ain-o-Salish Kendro 111n6
al-Qaeda 39, 82
Alam, Shafiq 90n85
Ali, Anwar 166n22
Ali, M. Mansur 30
Aliya Madrassas 124–5
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 159
alliance-building 64–5
Amal-i-Nazat 148
Aminee, Fazlul Huq 53, 56, 127, 128–9, 130
Amin, Sajeda 132n5
Amir Faisal, Pirzada Mustafa 57
Amnesty International 34, 44n42
anti-colonial violence 28
Ar-Raji, Kh. Ali x, 2–3, 46–70
Arakan Army 157
Arefin, A.S.M. Shamsul 68n44
ASA Bangladesh 93, 98
Asad, Abul 142, 143, 151n37
Advani, Lal Krishna 161–2
Ashraf, Moulana Ahmadullah 129
Ashraf, Shamin 69n72, 88n20, 88n30
Asia Foundation 103, 111n6
Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF)
159–60
Asrafi, Maulana Shah Ahmadullah 53
Assam Tribune 54
ATN Bangla 149
authoritarian one-party rule 7, 8
Awal, Abdul 82
Awami League (AL) 2; AL-BNP 2,12,
19, 32, 80n4, 86, 122; AL-BNP
Bangladeshi-Bengali divide 13–14, 18,
22; alliance led by, election victory
(December, 2008) 23, 65, 87, 100;
civil society and Islamist politics 94, 96,
97, 98, 99, 107–8, 109; education
policies 122, 123–4; Islamists and 50,
57, 58; militancy and 84, 86–7;
nationalism and 8; political culture 8, 9,
10, 11, 12–13, 15, 19–20, 23, 25n14;
political violence and 27, 30, 31, 32–3,
34, 40, 41; power base 10; rapes and
sexual assaults by student members
114n64; Saidi’s criticism of Awami
rule (1996–2001) 107–8
174 Index
Azam, Golam 49, 50, 67n16, 94–5, 97–8,
131; ‘public tribunal’ for 95
Azizul Huq, Saikhul Hadith 53, 84
Babu, Tawhidul Islam 142, 151n38
Babus Salam Madrassah 129
al-Badr militia 93, 123
Bagerhat district 36, 83, 103
Bakar, Qasem Abu 141
Banavar, Pavithra x, 4, 71–90
Bangla Shahitya Parishad 142
Bangla Vision 149
Bangladesh: arms hauls of illegal weapons
157–8; authoritarianism in 7, 8;
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) 28, 31, 40,
43n27; Bengali/Bangladeshi nationalism
7; break with Pakistan 7, 8–9, 18–19;
Buddhist minority in 33; business-
politics nexus in 63; caretaker regime
(2007–2009), crackdown on political
violence 27–8; education as site of
contestation in 115; exclusivist Islam,
confrontation with 110–11; Hindu
minority in 28, 33; Indian allegations
of Islamists’ involvement 161–2;
Islamization since 1975, state support
for 149; location in terror-afflicted
South Asia 1; militant groups in,
working relationship between 159;
militant Islam, emergence and prolifera-
tion in 71; national identity 7; Operation
Clean Heart 39; parties with Islamist
agendas, phenomenal rise of 46–7;
political murders in 35; population
growth 120, 133n18; school types and
enrollments 116–17; transit route for
terrorism, potential as 1; traveling
performers in 104; weapons provision
in, “grey channels” for 156–7; see also
Islamist militancy; political culture;
political violence
Bangladesh Chattra League (BCL) 74
Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists
(BFUJ) 99
Bangladesh Islamic University 131
Bangladesh Khilafat Andolon (BKA) 47,
52, 53, 56, 58, 128, 129, 134
Bangladesh Khilafat Majlish (BKM) 20,
56, 58, 64, 65, 66, 76, 129, 145
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami
League (BAKSAL) 24n4
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 1;
AL-BNP 2,12, 19, 32, 80n4, 86, 122;
AL-BNP Bangladeshi-Bengali divide
13–14, 18, 22; civil society and Islamist
politics 94, 99, 100, 106, 109;
“comrades of razakars” 98; education
policies 122, 123–4; Islamists and 50,
56, 58; militancy and 71, 72, 76, 83, 84,
86–7; political culture 8, 11–12, 12–13,
13–14, 15, 19–21; political violence 31,
32–3, 35–6, 39, 40
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) 28, 31, 40, 43n27
Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee (BRAC) 93, 98, 100, 105,
116, 132n2; civil society and Islamist
politics 93, 98, 100, 105
Bangladesh Tariqat Federation (BTF) 47,
58, 65
banning of Islam-based parties 94
Banu, Razia Akter 61, 63, 67n7
Bari, Sharif Mohammad 98, 105, 112n31
Barkat, Abul 26n30, 26n34, 68n31
Barkat, Abul and Majid, Murtaza 133n14
Bastian, Jessica L. x, 6, 153–67
Bengali/Bangladeshi nationalism 7
Bengali identity and nationalism 18–19
Bengali Literary Council 142
Bhagwat, Admiral Vishnu 166n20
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 161–2
Bhardwaj, Sanjay 45n55
Bhattacharjee, Satanandra 68n39
Bibi, Taramon 102
bin Laden, Osama 72, 77, 81, 146
black market in weaponry 155–6
bomb blasts (1999–2008) 36–8
Bowring, Philip 167n51, 167n67
Buddhist minority in Bangladesh 33
Bureau for National Reconstruction 110
Bureau of Educational Information and
Statistics (BANBEIS) 125–7, 134n34
Bureau of Statistics (BBS) 119
bureaucracy, ideological purging of 10
business-politics nexus in Bangladesh 63
Cadet Colleges 117–18
Calcutta Madrassah 124, 128, 133n27
Campaign for Popular Education
(CAMPE) 117, 132n3, 134n31
Canadian University Services
Organization (CUSO) 100
Capie, David 156, 157
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace 91
Carothers, Thomas 91
Centre for Development Journalism and
Communication (BCDJC) 42n5
Chakma minority 33

Chandhoke, Neera 16
Channel I TV 149
char lands, claims on (“char dokhol”)
14–15
Chatra Dal (BNP student wing) 14
Chatra League (AL student wing) 14
Chittagong 60, 73, 77, 82, 83, 106, 114,
129, 145, 161; Area Fertilizer Factory
(CUFF) 157–8; Hill Tracts (CHTs)
24n4, 155; HuJIB training in hills
around 24n4, 80; police violence in 32;
uprising in (1930) 43n10
Choudhury, Altaf Hossain 83
Chowdhury, Afsan 44n48
Chowdhury, Anwar 75
Chowdhury, Badruddoza 58
Chowdhury, Badrul Haider 50
Chowdhury, Kabir 96, 99
Chowdhury, Matia 99
Chowdhury, Mufti Izharul Islam 55
Chowdhury, Aditee Nag 113n42
Choy, H.Y.F. 151n26
citizenship: intermittent practice of 16–17;
partisan practice of 13–14
civil society: definition of 16; polarization
of 16; political culture and 12–14, 16–17;
richness and diversity of 91; role of 92
civil society and Islamist politics 91–114;
Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee (BRAC) 93, 98, 100, 105;
banning of Islam-based parties 94;
campaigns against Islamists 92;
communal repression 99–100; crimes
committed by Islamists, publicization of
99; freedom fighters in Satkhira district
98; Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee 92,
94–100; Ibn Sina 93; Islamic Social
Welfare Association (Islami Samaj
Kalyan Samity) 92; Islamism 93–4,
110–11; Islamist-secular relations,
acrimonious nature of 93–4;
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) 92, 93, 94, 95;
Language Movement (1952) 110;
Muslim Aid 92; NGO Affairs Bureau 93;
Nijera Kori 92, 99, 100–103; opposition
to military rule 94; parliamentary
elections (1996) 96–8; rich and diverse
civil society 91; Rupantar 92, 103–5;
rural receptiveness to anti-Islamic rhetoric,
self-interest and 92; secularism 93–4,
96, 102, 105, 108, 109–10; secularist
campaigns, Islamist responses to 105–9;
village community organizations 93;
World Bank Flood Action Plan 93
Index 175
Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order
(1972) 67n8
Commission on Curricula and Syllabi
(1977) 121
Committee for the Protection of
Journalists (CPJ) 42n5
communal repression 99–100
communalism 18, 26n31, 95, 97;
South Asian People’s Union Against
Fundamentalism and Communalism
(SAPUFC) 99–100
Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist 34
corruption, institutionalization of 12
counter-terrorism strategies 164–5
Cox’s Bazar 60, 77, 79, 80, 82, 156,
157, 158
Criminal Investigation Department
(CID) 81
criminalization of politics 17–18
Curiel, Jonathan 166n28
curriculum 122–4
Daily Sangbad 68n29
Daily Star 42n8, 45n49, 88n10, 161
Daily Star Weekend Magazine 68n53
Dakhil madrassahs 117–18, 124–5, 127
Datta, Sreeradha 29, 34, 43n14, 44n34,
45n56
Daurah Hadith 122, 124
Davis, Anthony 166n25
Davis, Peter R. and McGregor, Allister J.
111n2
Deen (Islamic social order) 50
democracy: militants and 87; political
culture 12–14; political violence in
democratic Bangladesh (1991–2009)
32–40; popular culture, role in
democratic politics 138–9
Deoband Madrassah 124, 128, 130, 133n28
Dhara, Bikalpa 58
Dixit, J.N. 45n57
Dulu, Ruhul Kuddus Talukder 84
Durga Puja, electoral violence during 33
Dursin, Kanis 165n10
East Bengal 24n6
East Pakistan 9, 16, 19, 24, 28, 49, 54, 67,
93, 102, 110; United Front in 16
The Economist 45n68
education, Islamist politics and 115–35;
content, Islamist influence over 123–4;
curriculum 122–4; education as site of
contestation 115; failures of education
system 119–20; higher education 118–19;
176 Index
Madrassah education 61, 124–31;
overview of education system 116–19;
policy drift towards Islamization
120–22, 131–2; post-primary education
117–18; primary education 116–17;
secondary education 117–18; successes
of education system 119; tertiary
education 118–19; tertiary education,
new frontier in 131–4; unenrolled
students 119
Ekattorer Dinguli (Imam, Jahanara) 94
Election Commission 66n4, 67n14
electoral violence 33
Elnaggar, Marwa 140
Emdadullah, Mohammed (Mahbub, Ripon
Miah) 160
Emergency Rule 22–3
Ershad, General Hussain M. 8, 12, 19–20,
28, 31–2, 49, 57, 94, 98, 121–2, 123
Ershad, Raushan 57
extortion, class formation through 10
extra-judicial killings 28, 29
extremist political ideology 34–5
Fair, C. Christine x–xi, 1–6
Faridi, Abdul Huq 134n39
faridpuri (pir of Atarashi) 57
Al Faruk Islamic Foundation 82
Faruqi, Abdur Rahman 59–60
financing militants 81–2
Flood Action Plan (World Bank) 93
Foreign Policy 111n2
Foyzullah, Mufti Mohammad 129
Freedom Fighters Association 94
Fruttero, Anna and Gauri, Varuc 111n8
Fuller, Graham 1–2, 6n1
functions of popular culture 137–8
Furkania Madrassahs 124, 127
Gaibandha, Razakars in 102
Gehr, Richard 146, 152n46
general strikes (hartals) 28, 33, 41, 43n12
Ghalib, Asadullah Khan 53–4, 60, 82, 129
Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee 5, 108;
civil society and Islamist politics 92,
94–100
Ghosh, Suchita 45n57
Golaper Kanta (Mitul, A.S.) 141
Gono Bahini, rise of 28, 30
Gono Forum 58
government: attitude towards militants
85–7; personalization of state 12;
Sheikh-Hasina government 6;
support and encouragement for
political violence 28; see also Awami
League; BNP
Graduate Institute of International Studies,
Geneva 154, 165n6
Grameen Bank 98
Green Crescent 154
grievance, politics of 11–12
Griswald, Eliza 42n1
Guhathakutra, Megna 14, 15, 25n15,
25n18, 25n22
Gul, Pazir 150n4
Gunaratne, Rohan 82
Habib, Haroon 68n51, 134n52
Hafiz, Asad Bin 142, 143
Halder, Chaitanya Chandra 89n52
Hannan, Alimuzzaman Nannu 144
Hannan, Mufti Abdul 54–5, 64, 68n40,
74–5, 82, 83–4, 144
Hansen, Thomas Blom 150n10
ul-Haq, General Zia 94
Haqqani, Husain 67n22
Haque, Professor Shamsul 122
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHF)
81, 154, 165n2
Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh
(HuJIB) 6, 59; areas of operation 82–3;
education and 130; financing 81–2;
leadership of 74–5; militancy of 72,
74–5, 77, 78–9, 80, 81–2, 82–3, 83–4,
86; militants 59, 72, 74–5, 77, 78–9, 80,
81–2, 82–3, 83–4; numerical strength
77; operational capabilities 78–9; politi-
cal parties, connection to 83–4; popular
culture and 144, 147; recruitment 78–9;
regional and extra-regional dimensions
of Islamist militancy 153–4, 158,
159–60, 161, 162–3; training 80
Hasan, Manzur 74
Hashemi, Syed and Hassan, Mirza 111n2
Hashmi, Taj ul-Islam 67n12, 148,
152n58
Hasina, Sheikh 13, 20, 32, 43n22, 60, 72,
75, 84, 97–8, 100, 108–9, 144, 147
Hassan, Mizra M. 111n7
Hataddin 82
Helsing, Elijabet 100
higher education 118–19; Higher
Secondary Certificate (HSC) 118, 124
The Hindu 163
Hindu minority in Bangladesh 28, 33
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HTB) 3, 47, 58–9
Hogg, Charu Lata 88n27
Hossain, Akber 112n24

Hossain, A.K.M. Yakub and Muhammad,
Belal 134n35
Hossain, Golam 25n21, 26n29
Hossain, Ishtiaq 67n24, 68n30
Hossain, Jakir 132n9
Hossain, Kamal 58
Hossain, Mohammad Faruk (“Khaled
Saifullah”) 75
Hossain, Naomi 132n7, 133n15
Hossain, Qazi Anwar 151n40
Hossain, Zakir 98, 111n7
Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2, 34,
44n36, 45n62
Huntington, Samuel P. 91, 111n1
Huq, Maimuna 139, 141, 148, 150n15,
151n28
Huq, Saikhul Hadith Azizul 128, 129
Ibn Sina 93
Ibn Sina Trust 49
Ibrahim, Daud 159
idealist Islamic parties 52–6
identities, articulation of 138
“ideology deficit” in political
culture 12, 15
illegal weaponry 157–8
Imam, Jahanara 95, 112n19
India: allegations of Islamists involvement
161–2; insurgency in northeast of
163–4; Parliament of, attack on (2002)
161; Research and Intelligence Wing
(RAW) 157
information flows 165
Inqilab 149
instability, stemming tide of 163–5
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies,
Singapore 82
Institute of Education and Research 125
Institute of Human Rights 27
institutionalization of political violence 31
International Crisis Group (ICG) 35, 36,
45n54, 72, 73, 74, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86,
87n3
International Islamic Federation of Student
Organizations (IIFSO) 74
International Mother Language Day 110
Iqbal, Jabed 145
Iqbal, Mohammad (Abdur Rehman) 162
Islam, declaration as state religion 8
Islam, M. Nazrul 98, 109
Islam, Maulana Shahidul 66
Islam, Mohammad Shamsul xi, 2–3,
27–45
Islam, Mufti Shahidul 130
Index 177
Islam, S. Aminul 43n12
Islam, Siddiqul 73
Islam, Syed Nazrul 30
Islam, Tajul 43n26
Islam in Daily Life
(Islamic Foundation) 148
Islami Chatra Shibir (ICS) 14, 31, 52, 74,
75, 84, 85, 128, 131, 145
Islami Jatiya Oikya Front (IJOF) 57, 65
Islami Morcha Bangladesh 47, 55–6,
64, 129
Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) 1, 18, 55, 56, 61,
64–5, 66, 127, 129, 130; civil society
and Islamist politics 99, 100, 109;
militancy and 71, 76, 83, 84, 85, 86
Islami Shashontantra Andolon (ISA) 47,
56, 57, 65, 68n52
Islamiat (Islamic Studies) 122–3
Islamic Constitution Movement (Islami
Shashantanta Andolon) 129, 145
Islamic Democratic Party (IDP) 84
Islamic Foundation 54, 127; establishment
of 94
Islamic ideology, political embrace of
19–21, 35–6
Islamic Kindergartens, growth of 125
Islamic Liberation Association (Islami
Mukti Sangha) 142
Islamic lifestyle books (Mas’ala) 147–8
Islamic militancy: militant Islam,
emergence and proliferation in
Bangladesh 71
Islamic Relief Organization (IRO) 154
Islamic Social Welfare Association (Islami
Samaj Kalyan Samity) 92
Islamic TV 149
Islamic Writers Alliance 140
Islamism in civil society 93–4, 110–11
Islamist fiction 139–43
Islamist militancy: areas of operation
82–3; black market in weaponry 155–6;
counter-terrorism strategies 164–5;
India, insurgency in north-east of
163–4; instability, stemming tide of
163–5; international policies based on
causes and conditions, need for 164;
Islamic nationalism, military invocation
of 19; Islamist groups 72–3; militant
ideology and organizations, inflow of
153–4; political violence and 36, 39;
regional and extra-regional dimensions
153–65; transnational terrorism,
links with 158–63; weapons,
sources of 154–8
178 Index
Islamist-secular relations, acrimonious
nature of 93–4
Islamists: AHAB 47, 53–4; alliance-
building, inclination towards 64–5;
Bangladesh Khilafat Andolon (BKA)
47, 52–3; Bangladesh Tariqat
Federation (BTF) 47, 58, 65;
disintegration ad nauseum 65–6;
electoral support, decrease in 63–4;
Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh
(HuJIB) 48, 59–60; Hizb-ut-Tahrir
(HTB) 47, 58–9; idealist Islamic parties
52–6; Islami Morcha Bangladesh 47,
55–6; Islami Shashontantra Andolon
(ISA) 47, 56–7, 65, 68n52; Islamist
parties, categorization of 3; Jaamat-ul
Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) 48,
59–60; Jagrata Muslim Janata
Bangladesh (JMJB) 59, 60;
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) 47, 48–52;
Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) 47, 54–5;
jihadists 59–60; Lasker-e-Tayeba (LeT)
60; mainstream, blurred line between
militants and 64; Nizam-e-Islam Party
47, 55; numbers, increase in 63;
Pir-centric Islamic parties 47, 56–8;
pragmatist Islamic parties 48–52;
profiles of 60–63; Revival of Islamic
Heritage (RIHS) 60; shrine-based
Islamic parties 47, 56–8; taxonomy of
47; trends in Islamist politics 63–6;
urban elite-centric Islamic parties 58–9;
various shades of 47–8; Zaker party
47, 57
Islamization in education: policy drift
towards 120–22, 131–2
IslamOnline 140
Jaamat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
54, 59, 130–31, 145, 147, 154, 158;
areas of operation 82–3; financing 82;
Islamists 48, 59–60; leadership of 75–7;
militancy and 72–3, 75–7, 77–8, 79–80,
80–81, 82–3, 84–5, 86; militants 59,
72–3, 75–7, 77–8, 79–80, 80–81, 82–3,
84–5; numerical strength 77–8;
operational capabilities 79–80; political
parties, connection to 84–5; recruitment
79–80; training 80–81
Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB)
36, 72–3, 76, 86, 109, 130–31; Islamist
position of 59, 60; militant nature of
84–5; political culture 18, 26n33
Jahan, Rounaq 111n14
Jahid, Selim 67n26, 68n32
Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) 160, 162
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) 1, 3–4, 5, 31, 32, 57,
128, 131, 142, 163; academic back-
ground of MPs 61–2, 69n65; cassettes
of speeches and Quranic discussions
106–7; civil society and Islamist politics
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97–8, 99, 100, 109;
Committees for the Restoration of
Citizenship 94; freedom fighters
opposition to 101–2; hypocrisy of,
Ershad’s view 98; Islamist position of
47, 48–52; mass education, top priority
for 106; militancy and 71, 74, 76, 83,
84, 85; political culture 8, 18, 20–21;
post-independence period, facts of
activities purged from history books
123–4; professions of MPs 62;
public lectures, forum for 107; rural
conspiracies against 105–6; satirization
of 102–3; supreme aim of 51; women
voters, importance of courting 108
Jamaat-i Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) 47, 54–5
Jammiyah Islami 153–4
Jana Sanghati Samity (JSS) 155
Jane’s Intelligence Review (JIR) 39,
45n61, 158, 161
Jatiya Oikyo Front (JOF) 65
Jatiya Party (JP) 56–7, 65, 98; political
culture of 12, 13
Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (JRB) 2, 28, 30;
political culture of 10
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) 28, 31, 34
Jatiya Sangskritik Jote 145
Jian Xu 151n23
jihadists 59–60
Josy, Joseph 167n60
Kabeer, Naila 101, 113n41, 114n69
Kabir, B.M. Monoar 67n27, 111n14
Kabir, Ekram 70n77
Kabir, Khushi 99
Kabir, Nurul 69n74, 133n17
Kabir, Shahriar 99
Kabir, S.M. Humayun 68n36
Kamal, Ahmed 24n9
Kamruzzaman, A.H.M. 30
Karen National Army 157
Karim, Moulana Syed Rezaul 129
Karim, Syed Fazlul 53, 56–7, 128
Khan, General Ayub 9, 11, 110
Khan, Maulana Mufazzal Hossain
125n55, 148
Khan, Monirul Islam 40, 45n67

Khan, Moulana Muhiuddin 54, 55
Khan, M.R. and Kabir, M.H. 25n24
Khan, Muhammad Shahedul Anam
165n11
Khan, Nurul Islam 101
Khan, S.I. 25n19
Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah 66
Khulna district 103, 105
Khundker, Nasreen 44n29
Kochanek, Stanley A. 23–4n3, 25n26
Kolkata, US Culture Center in 72, 161
Krishna, Sankaran 26n36
Kronstadt, Alan K. 86, 90n78
Kudrat-e-Khuda Education Commission
(1974) 120–21
Kumar, Corinne 150n12
Labi, Nadya 150n3
Lal Bahini 28
Lalbagh Madrassah 128–9
Landmines, International Campaign to
Ban 91
Language Movement (Bhasha Andolon) 9,
19, 110
Lasker-e-Tayeba (LeT) 60, 159, 160,
162, 163
Latif, Abdul 68n33, 68n46
leadership of militant groups 74–7
leftist militancy 35
legitimacy, crisis of 11
Lifschultz, Lawrence 43n23
Lintner, Bertil 42n1, 80, 89n41
Liton, Shakhawat 66n1, 69n70
Madani, Maulana Asad 55
Madina 54
madrassah education: education, Islamist
politics and 61, 124–31; Madrassah
Education Board 118, 121, 124
Maitra, Ramtanu 165n12
Maizbhandari, Najibul Bashar 58
Mamoon, Muntasir and Ray, Jayanta
Kumar 24n5, 24n11, 25n13
Al Mamun, Abdullah 147
Mandol, Lal Chand 98
Mandol, Maulana Abdul Malek 98, 108–9
Manik, Jasimuddin 114n64
Manik, Julfikar Ali 88n25
Manipur Revolutionary People’s Front
(MRPF) 156
Maniruzzamam, Talukder 44n46,
111–12n14
Maoism 34–5; Maoist radicals, rise of 28
Al-Markazul Islam 130
Index 179
Markowitz, Lawrence 43n15
“mastan culture” 31
Masud, Moulana Fariduddin 54, 55
Maududi, Sayyid Abul A’la 48, 52, 97,
106, 148, 152n60
media presentations of Islamic lifestyle
148–9
Mehdi, Mujib 134n40
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of
Terrorism (MIPT) 39, 72; Terrorism
Knowledge Base 39, 72, 73, 82, 83,
87n7, 88n8, 89n46
Mercer, Claire 111n2
Merchant, Abdul Rauf Daud 159, 160
“might is right,” politics of 15
militants: areas of operation 82–3;
connections among Islamic and militant
groups 73–4; democracy and 87;
financing 81–2; government attitude
towards 85–7; Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami
Bangladesh (HuJIB) 59, 72, 74–5, 77,
78–9, 80, 81–2, 82–3, 83–4; Islami
Chatra Shibir (ICS) 85; Islamist groups
72–3; Jaamat-ul Mujahideen
Bangladesh (JMB) 59, 72–3, 75–7,
77–8, 79–80, 80–81, 82–3, 84–5;
Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh
(JMJB) 84–5; leadership of militant
groups 74–7; militant groups, working
relationship between 159; numerical
strength 77–8; operational capabilities
78–80; origins of militant groups 72;
political parties, connection to 83–5;
political stability and 87; recruitment
78–80; training 80–81
military dictatorship 8; opposition to
military rule 94
minorities, violence against 33–4
Mir, Titu 43n10
Mitchell, Timothy 25n25
Mitul, Abdus Salam 141
Mohaiemen, Naeem 44n47
Mohammadullah, Moulana (“Hafezzi
Huzur”) 52–3, 128, 129
Mohsin, Amena A. 44n33, 44n35, 165n7
Mokesdul Mumeen (Khan, M.M.H.) 148,
152n55
Moksedul Momeneen (Rahman,
S.H.M.M.M.) 148, 152n54
Mollah, Hafizur Rahman 160
Mostafa, Faisal 154, 165n5
motivational songs and drama 145–7
Moududi, Moulana Abul Ala 100
Mowla, Syed Golam 59
180 Index
Al Muhajiroun Group 82
Mukherjee, Arpita 167n54, 167n61
Muktijoddha (Freedom Fighter)
Library 96–7
Mukul, Kazi 95–6, 112n25
Murshid, Tazeen M. 43n21
Muslehuddin, Dr. Muhammad 54
Muslim Aid 92
Muslim League 24n9, 100
Nadvi, Oabidur Rahman 74
Naher, Ainoon 111n10
Naser, Md. Abu xi, 5–6, 136–52
Nasrin, Taslima 55–6, 68n47, 148, 152n57
The Nation 111n2
National Counterterrorism Center,
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System
(WITS) 39
National Curriculum and Textbook Board
(NCTB) 116, 123, 125
National Liberation Front of Tripura
(NLFT) 158–9
National Mosque, institutionalization of
role of 22–3
National Policy for the Advancement of
Women 22–3
National Press Club, Dhaka 72
National Security Index 44n47
National University (NU) 119
nationalism: national identity in
Bangladesh 7; policing borders of
18–21; rescue of nation from 21–2
Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland
(NSCN) 156, 158, 161, 163
Naya Diganta 149
Nek Amal (Ahmed, A.B.) 148
neo-liberalism 8–9
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 101
neutrality of state (and of civil society) 17
New Age 68n55, 104
New York Times 31
NGO Affairs Bureau 93
Nijera Kori 5, 92, 99, 100–103
Nizam-e-Islam Party 47, 55
Nizami, Matiur Rahman 50, 67n18, 109
NTV Bangladesh 149
Nurani Madrassahs 124, 127
Obiadullah, Mufti 159–60
Omar, Mullah 66, 146
Operation Clean Heart 39
operational capabilities of militants 78–80
Osman, Shawkat (“Sheikh Farid”) 60, 74
Pakistan: break with 7, 8–9, 18–19;
genocide by army of 28
parliament: elections (1996) 96–8;
parliamentary dysfunction 14; parties
with Islamist agendas, phenomenal
rise of 46–7
patronage politics: force and 15; political
culture and 8, 9–11, 11–12
Perry, Alex 42n1, 158
Pir-centric Islamic parties 47, 56–8
political culture vii, 2; AL-BNP
Bangladeshi-Bengali divide 13–14, 18,
22; analysis of 2; authoritarian on-party
rule 7, 8; of Bangladesh 33; Bengali
identity and nationalism 18–19;
bureaucracy, ideological purging of 10;
changes in 22–3; char lands, claims on
(“char dokhol”) 14–15; characteristics
of 7; citizenship, intermittent practice of
16–17; citizenship, partizan practice of
13–14; civil society 12–14, 16–17;
connected to violence 42; contradictions
in 2; corruption, institutionalization of
12; criminalization of politics 17–18;
democratic system of 12–14, 50;
Emergency Rule 22–3; extortion,
class formation through 10; force and
patronage politics 15; grievance, politics
of 11–12; hartals part of 50; “ideology
deficit” 12, 15; ideology of grievance
11–12; international recognition,
difficulties with 9; Islam, declaration
as state religion 8; Islamic ideology,
political embrace of 19–21, 35–6;
Islamic nationalism, military invocation
of 19; Islamization of 19; legitimacy,
crisis of 11; “might is right,” politics of
15; militants’ connection to political
parties 83–5; military dictatorship 8;
National Mosque, institutionalization
of role of 22–3; National Policy for
the Advancement of Women 22–3;
nationalism, policing borders of 18–21;
nationalism, rescue of nation from
21–2; neo-liberalism 8–9; neutrality of
state (and of civil society), underlining
of 17; parliamentary dysfunction 14;
patronage politics 8, 9–11, 11–12, 15;
personalization of state 12; polarization
of civil society 16; political anarchy 22;
political parties and 25n19, 170;
politicization of crime 17–18; power,
failures in structure and distribution
of 15–16; public culture, mainstreaming

of religion in 20; ruptures in state
practice 8–9; secular Bengali identity 8;
socialism 8–9; sovereignty 17–18;
state and society, politics of 9–11; state
formation, early years of 8–9; state
practice, continuities in 8–9; symbolic
violence as political practice 14–17
political murders in Bangladesh 35
Political Parties Regulation (PPR) 128
political violence: anti-colonial violence
28; bomb blasts (1999–2008) 36–8;
caretaker regime (2007–2009), crack-
down on 27–8; characteristics of 41–2;
clashes between political rivals 28;
complex nature of 32–3; definition
of 29; in democratic Bangladesh
(1991–2009) 32–40; electoral violence
33; extra-judicial killings 28, 29;
extremist political ideology and 34–5;
general strikes (hartals) 28, 33, 41,
43n12; genocide by Pakistan army 28;
Gono Bahini, rise of 28, 30; govern-
ment support and encouragement for
28; historical background (1972–91)
29–32; implications of 40–41; institu-
tionalization of 31; Islamist militancy
and 36, 39; leftist militancy and 35;
Maoist radicals, rise of 28; “mastan
culture” 31; Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) 39, 72;
minorities, violence against 33–4;
organized violence, deaths as a result of
27; pattern and trends of 28–9; popular
uprisings against Ershad, suppression of
31–2; Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) 2,
3, 29, 39–40, 43n13, 84, 86; rising
violence, perception of 27; Sarbahara
Party, rise of 28; state violence and
extra-judicial measures 39–40; surge in
(2006–2007) 27; Tangail district,
violence in 30
politicization of crime,olitical culture and
17–18
popular culture vii, 1, 5; Bangladeshi 5;
forms of 147, 149; functions of 138;
impact of Islamist policies 5, 136, 148;
Islamist politics and 137; Islamist view
of 13; media of 6; relationship with
politics 137, 158; significance of 139;
waz mahfilsand 144
popular culture, Islamist politics and:
functions of popular culture 137–8;
identities, articulation of 138; Islamic
lifestyle books (Mas’ala) 147–8;
Index 181
Islamist fiction 139–43; Islamization
since 1975, state support for 149; media
presentations of Islamic lifestyle 148–9;
motivational songs and drama 145–7;
politics and popular culture, overview
137–9; public performances of scrip-
tural commentaries (Waz Mahfils)
143–5; resistance through popular
culture 138; role in democratic politics
138–9; romances in Islamist fiction
141–2; socio-political Islamist fiction
141; thrillers in Islamist fiction 142–3
population growth 120, 133n18
post-primary education 117–18
power, failures in structure and
distribution of 15–16
pragmatist Islamic parties 48–52
Primary and Mass Education,
Ministry of 125
primary education 116–17
Private University Act (1972) 118
PROBE News Magazine 68n52, 68n54
Prophet Muhammad 44n36, 56, 59, 106,
139, 140, 145, 146
Proshika 93, 98, 105–6
Prothiksha (Bakar, Q.A.) 141
Prothom Alo 99
public performances of scriptural
commentaries (Waz Mahfils) 143–5
Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP)
35, 36, 73, 75
Quddus, Imtiaz 60
Quran-Sunnah Research Institute 97
Qwami Madrassas 124, 125, 127, 129,
130, 133n21, 133n22, 134n29
Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami 49, 80–81
Radio Shariat 146
Rahman, Abdur 60, 73
Rahman, Anisur 167n65
Rahman, General Zia-ur 8, 11–12, 13, 19,
25n16, 26n40, 28, 31, 35–6, 46, 49, 94,
121, 122–3
Rahman, Ivy 27, 99
Rahman, Jahidur (“Boma Mizan”) 76,
82, 158
Rahman, Maulana Abdur 79
Rahman, Maulana Saidur (“Abu Zafar”) 76
Rahman, Muhammad Habibur 76, 85
Rahman, Professor Siddiqur 125
Rahman, Sajjad and Habibur 82
Rahman, Shaekh Abdur 75, 76–7, 80–81,
85, 86
182 Index
Rahman, Shafiq 152n44
Rahman, Shaikhul Hadith Maulana
Muhammad Mustafizur 148
Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur 8, 9, 12, 23,
23n1, 28, 30, 94, 123; assassination
of 11
Rahman, Siddiqul Islam (“Bangla Bhai”)
18, 75, 84, 86
Rahman, Shafiq 69n59
Rahman, Waliur 68n41
Ramachandran, Sujata 167n50
Rammohan, E.N. 165n16
Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) 2, 3, 29,
39–40, 43n13, 84, 86
Rashid, Maulana Abdur 130
Rashiduzzaman, M. 43n28
Rasul, Enayet 69n66
Razakars militia 93, 97, 98, 102, 123
recruitment to militancy 78–80
Rehana, Sheikh 43n22
Rehman, Maulna Fazulr 55
Revival of Islamic Heritage (RIHS) 82,
129–30, 154, 165n1; Islamist
position of 60
Reza Nasr, Seyyed Vali 66n6
Riaz, Ali xi, 2–3, 5–6, 25n20, 42n2,
43n16, 46–70, 74, 80, 81, 83, 86, 87,
95, 112n19, 115–35, 134n49, 136–52,
153–67
Rieff, David 91, 111n2, 111n4
Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) 155, 158
Rohingya Solidarity Organization
(RSO) 158
romances in Islamist fiction 141–2
Ronangon Shilp Goshthi 145–6, 147
Roni, Hashim 142, 143, 151n39
Rosser, Yvette Claire 133n16
Rouf, Mufti Abdur 160
Roumari, Kurigram district 101–2
RTV (National TV), Bangladesh 149
Rupantar 5; civil society and Islamist
politics 92; communications with
illiterate rural people 103–5
Sadat, Anwar 94
Sadiq, Mahfuz 69n60
Sahidi Tamanna 145
Saidi, Delawar Hossain 107, 114n63,
131, 144–5
Saikia, Yasmin 114n65
Saimum Shilpi Goshthi 147
SAMS Kibria 27, 42n3
Sangram 142, 149
Sarbahara Party, rise of 28
Sarkar, Muhammad Shahrul Hoda 134n38
Sarobohara Party 34
Satkhira district 105, 108; freedom
fighters in 98
School Text Book Board 120
school types and enrollments 116–17
Seabrook, Jeremy 103, 112n26, 113n57
secondary education 117–18;
Secondary School Certificate
(SSC) 117, 118, 124
secularism: civil society and Islamist
politics 96, 102, 105, 108, 109–10;
enshrinement in independence
constitution 93–4; secular Bengali
identity 8; secularist campaigns,
Islamist responses to 105–9
Sen, Surya 43n10
Servants of Suffering Humanity
(SOSH) 154
Shagar, Mosharraf Hossain 141, 142
al-Shams militia 93, 123
Shanti Bahini 33, 157, 158
Shehabuddin, Elora xii, 4–5, 44n30,
91–114
Sheikh, Zahid 159
shrine-based Islamic parties 47, 56–8
Shymal, Nazimuddin 152n43
Siddiqi, Dina Mahnaz xii, 2, 7–26
Siddiquee, Noore Alam 67n24, 68n30
Siddiqui, Nure Alam 24n11
Sikdar, Siraj 34
Small Arms Survey (Graduate Institute of
International Studies, 2002) 154–5, 156,
165n6
Sobhan, Rehman 25n17
socialism 8–9, 19, 94, 96
socio-political Islamist fiction 141
Sohel, Mohammad (“Salahuddin”) 75
South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 35,
45n51, 74, 81–2, 83, 84–5
South Asian People’s Union Against
Fundamentalism and Communalism
(SAPUFC) 99–100
Southeast Asian weapons bazaars 156
sovereignty 17–18
Spandan Shilpi Goshthi 145
Special Powers Act (1974) 24n4
state: formation, early years of 8–9;
practice, continuities in 8–9; and
society, politics of 9–11; violence and
extra-judicial measures 39–40
Steinmetz, George 25n25
Stiles, Kendall W. 93, 111n9
Street, John 137

Student Islamic Group of India (SIMI)
160, 163
Sunderban region 103, 105
Sunny, Ataur Rahman (“Abdus Samad”
or “Hasan”) 75, 76, 82
Swami, Praveen 167n63
Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation 103
symbolic violence 14–17
Tafhimul Quran (Maududi, S.A.A’la) 148,
152n60
Tagore, Rabindranath 110
Taher, Colonel Abu 31
Taliban 18, 45, 78, 84, 99, 136, 145,
150n2, 159; Taliban Shilpi
Goshthi 146–7
Talukdar, Farooq Ahmed 54
Tangail district, violence in 30
Taylor, Pamela 143, 151n31
Tebhagha movement 43n10
Technical Education Board 118
tertiary education 118–19;
new frontier for 131–4
Thomas, Deborah et al. 113n42
thrillers in Islamist fiction 142–3
Thu, Colonel Si 155–6
Time magazine 158
Toaha, Mohammed 34
Towhid Foundation 130
transnational terrorism 158–63
Transparency International Bangladesh
(TIB) 62
traveling performers 104
Tungipara Gohardanga Madrassah 130
Uddyog, Nagorik 98, 111n7
Ukhia, HuJIB training camps in 80
Ullah, Besharat 85
United Front in East Pakistan 16
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
158–9, 161, 163
Index 183
United Nations (UN): Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) 132n2; Development
Program (UNDP) 33, 43n12;
Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) 110, 127,
134n42
United States 164; Congressional
Research Service (CRS) 83, 84, 86, 87,
89n63, 90n78; National Rifle
Association (NRA) 91; Patterns of
Global Terrorism Report (State Dept.,
2001) 72; USAID 103, 119, 132n11,
133n13
University Grants Commission
(UGC) 122
University of Engineering and Technology
(BUET) 118
urban elite-centric Islamic parties 58–9
Uttaran 105
van Schendel, Willem 9, 16, 24n8
Vaughn, Bruce 87n1, 89n63
village community organizations 93
War of Liberation (1971) 13, 21, 95,
96, 97
weapons: provision in Bangladesh, “grey
channels” for 156–7; sources of 154–8
Weber, Max 23–4n3
Westergaard, Kirsten 113n42
Wilson, John 167n45
World Assembly of Muslim Youth 74
World Bank 132n10; Flood Action
Plan 93
World Food Programme 100
Yunus, Muhammad 30, 43n18
Zaker party 47, 57
Zhang Chengzhi 140
Zia, Khaleda 13, 20, 97–8, 122, 149, 158
Ziauddin, Colonel M. 34