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Phil 102: Introduction

to Philosophy:
“Knowledge & Reality”
A sampler of questions and issues

Professor Amy M. Schmitter, Department of Philosophy

 Where we are . . .
2
´ Last time, we were looking mainly at the structure of Anselm’s
argument.
´ A deductive argument that takes the form of a reductio ad
absurdum.
´ We also looked at several criticisms that concerned that structure.
´ Gave you some technical vocabulary (validity, soundness) to help in
isolating different features of arguments
´ Today, I want us to get a bit more into analyzing the concept that
Anselm uses: ’that than which nothing greater can be thought.’
´ From this concept, Anselm pulls out a number of different
attributes that NGCT (“God”) must have.
´ This combination of attributes illustrates a classic “theistic”
conception of God.
´ J.L. Mackie explains a problem for this kind of concept of God.
´ It’s a different kind of problem from those that Gaunilon raises, but
Mackie thinks it does show a deep logical difficulty with
maintaining the existence of a God of this kind.
3 How Anselm Conceives of God
´ “That than which nothing greater can be thought”
´ This is a relative notion -- not a definition, but a
way to think our way into the nature of God
´ “The divine nature,” embodies everything that can be
thought, absolutely speaking, better for something
to be than not to be”.
´ Analyzing what is more metaphysically “perfect”
than its alternative gives a number of attributes that
NGCT must have.
´ What are those attributes?
 God’s attributes
4
´ Everything that can be thought, absolutely speaking, better
for something to be than not to be”
o Self-existent (chap. 5),
o Creator ex nihilo (chap. 5),
o Supremely good, just, truthful, etc. (omnibenevolent)
(chap. 5),
o Omnipotent (chap. 6),
How do o Understood in whatever way is positive (so cannot be How
these much
corrupted, lie, etc.) (chap. 7),
attributes of this
follow from
o Not in time or space (chap. 13, 19, reply), is like
the o No beginning or end, Plato’s
concept? Good?
o Indivisible, without parts, “simple” (chap. 18),
o Transcendent (chap. 20),
o Greater than what can be thought (chap. 15).
o What most is, the “one necessary thing,” complete, total
and only good (chap. 22-23).
v Classic theistic notion of God
 Classic “Theistic” concept of
God
´ Highest being
´ Metaphysically perfect (complete)
´ Full of being (plenitude) with no gaps, or holes (not-being)
´ Has all positive properties
´ To the greatest degree
v That is, all the omni-properties
Ø Omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient
´ And has them all in a tight unified whole.
Ø The One.
o Transcendent, creator, and moral agent (judge, guide, actor)
ü Note: there are other, non-theistic concepts of God, which don’t
attribute these features to God.
q Mackie’s problem for the theist – is the theistic conception of God
compatible with the way the world is?
J.L. Mackie and the Problem of
Evil
´ What is “the problem of evil?”
´ If there is a God with all the omni-properties, how can
evil exist?
´ What does Mackie want to argue using the problem of evil?
´ “. . . not [merely] that religious beliefs lack rational
support, but that they are positively irrational, that the
several parts of the essential theological doctrine are
inconsistent with one another.”
´ Mackie’s version is supposed to show a “logical” problem.
´ We can understand this as an attack on the theistic
conception.
´ By going exhaustively through the possible “solutions”
to the logical problem,
´ Mackie aims to show that the concept cannot be saved.
 THE LOGICAL PROBLEM
´ Inconsistent triad: “some contradiction between these three
propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third
would be false.”
´ God is omnipotent;
´ God is wholly good ;
´ Evil exists.
´ [Does Mackie need to add in “omniscience” to get the
inconsistency?]
´ Mackie adds some additional premises:
´ “ . . . good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good
thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there
are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.
´ From these it follows that a good omnipotent thing
eliminates evil completely, and . . .
´ then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists,
and that evil exists, are incompatible.”
´ The problem: the theistic concept cannot apply to any existing
thing if evil exists.
 Possible responses?

´ “Adequate Solutions” (that is, logically adequate):

´ Put restrictions on the omni-properties;
´ Such as, restrictions on God’s power.
´ Note: Mackie raises some interesting points about
what thoroughgoing “omnipotence” would be.
´ Or deny that (true) evil exists:
´ It is an illusion, or merely a privation of good.
´ These dissolve the logical problem.
´ How?
´ But they may seem deeply unsatisfactory in other
ways.

How might they seem

unsatisfactory?
 Possible responses 2?
´ “Fallacious Solutions”
1) "Good cannot exist without evil" or " Evil is necessary as a
counterpart to good.” (p. 203)
2) " Evil is necessary as a means to good.” (p. 205)
3) " The universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if
there were no evil.” (p. 206)
´ Analyzed as promoting a 2nd-order (higher) good by letting
a lower-level evil (e.g., pain) exist.
´ Mackie thinks that none of these work to dissolve the logical problem
of inconsistency.
´ Why not?
1) Seems to get the “grammar” wrong (“good” and “bad” are not
correlative terms like “bigger” and “smaller”).
2) This seems like a causal claim, which an omnipotent God could
easily change.
3) Or if there is a logical precondition that there must be some evil
(e.g., pain) to allow a 2nd-order good (e.g., sympathy, care), then
it seems to just push the issue back further, since 2nd-order evils
exist (e.g., sadism).
´ There is a variation on 3 that is worth considering in its own right . . .
10 Possible response 3?
(also ”fallacious”)
´ “Evil is due to human freewill.” (p. 208)
´ How is this supposed to be a solution?
´ Shifts the cause of evil to something other than God
(human willing),
´ Which God allows because free will is so intrinsically
valuable that it outweighs the evil that humans do.
´ Why does Mackie think this is only a fallacious solution?
´ Freedom of the will does not mean that humans will
sometimes do evil,
´ Freedom is consistent with always doing the right thing.
´ So, God could make it such that humans freely choose
to always do the right thing.
v Does this claim make sense? Why would somebody think
that the existence of free will explains evil?
11 The Paradox of Omnipotence?
´ If free will did entail that some people will do evil, Mackie
thinks that this raises another problem.
´ What is the “paradox of omnipotence”?
´ “Can an omnipotent being make things which he cannot
subsequently control ? Or, what is practically equivalent to
this, can an omnipotent being make rules which then bind
himself ?” (p. 210)
´ Why does Mackie bring this up?
´ To show that there is something problematic in the very
concepts used by the theist:
´ “what the paradox shows is that we cannot consistently
ascribe to any continuing being omnipotence in an
inclusive sense” (p. 212).
v Can you think of any other ways to reconcile the inconsistent
triad?
v Is Mackie right that we really cannot wrap our heads around
something unqualified omnipotence – and perhaps the other
attributes that it is “better for something to be than not to be”?
Next time:
• Knowledge
• (How) is it more than just belief?

Read: tiny section from Plato’s “Meno,”

then some selections from Zagzebski
and Gettier.