G.R. No.

L-4963             January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR
NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.

Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.

Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in
the Labrador, Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four minor children
before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of decedent Faustino Nebreda who died in 1945 and left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario
took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense, Maria Uson and her husband, the late
Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband
and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by
way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may
be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).

The court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and
possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants
interposed the present appeal.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of
her husband.
2. W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife have
successional rights.

HELD:

1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present
case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a
common-law wife with whom she had four illegitimate children with the
deceased. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much
prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is
evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land
he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his
only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art 777 NCC).As this Court aptly said,
 “The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death”. From that moment, therefore,
the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested.
2. The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right
over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any
future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in
the deed of separation, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that
future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced.
3. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though
the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior
legislation only if no vested rights are impaired. Hence, since the right
of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in
1945 upon the death of her late husband, the new right recognized by the
new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot,
therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson
over the lands in dispute.

G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE

BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de
Borja, appellant. .

G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,

special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.

G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972

TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-
appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:p

CASE DIGEST: DE BORJA V. VDA. DE BORJA (G.R.

NO. L-28040, AUGUST 18, 1972)
FACTS: Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa, fi led for
the probate of her will. When the will was probated, Francisco was
appointed as executor and administrator and herein appellee, Jose de
Borja, their son was appointed as coadministrator. Subsequently,
Francisco took upon himself, a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco (Vda. De
Borja). Even before the estate of Josefa was settled, Francisco died.
Tasiana instituted testate proceedings wherein she was appointed special
Administratrix.

The relationship between the children of the first marriage and the
second wife, Tasiana had been plagued with numerous suits and
counter-suits and in order to put an end to all these litigation, a
compromise agreement was entered into between Jose, in his personal
capacity and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa, and by
Tasiana, as the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco. Pursuant to the
compromise agreement, Jose agreed and obligated himself to pay
Tasiana the amount of Php800,000.00 as ‘”full and complete payment
and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco
de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa, and to any properties bequeathed
or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and
Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly
conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.”

When Jose submitted the compromise agreement for Court approval

with the CFI of Rizal (probate of will of fi rst wife) and the CFI of Nueva
Ecija (probate of will of Francisco), Tasiana opposed in both instances.
She claims among others, that the heirs cannot enter into such kind of
agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja.

ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement is valid?

HELD: In assailing the validity of the agreement, Tasiana relies on this

Court’s decision in Guevara v. Guevara wherein the Court held the view
that presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when
the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. However, the
doctrine in said case is not applicable to the case at bar. There was here
no attempt to settle or to distribute the estate of Francisco among the
heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the
contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of
Francisco and Josefa. Since a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is
transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such
predecessor in interest, there is no legal bar to a successor
disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after
such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of
such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately
adjudicated to the vendor heir.

G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976

ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their
father) who represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA,
AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court
of First Instance of Abra, respondents.

Federico Paredes for petitioners.

Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.

MARTIN, J:

On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and
wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title
over certain parcels of land located in Abra.

the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena
is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14,
1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked
for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the
hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in
interest and has no legal personality to sue.

On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the complaint
and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16
and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff
for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation
praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased
mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the
deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint
claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the
same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether the deceased Fortunata can be substituted by

her heirs in the instant case?

HELD: While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, he

can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case until completion. The
records show that Fortunata died on July 9, 1975 while the complaint
was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was
filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata was still alive, and therefore, the court
had acquired jurisdiction over her person. Under Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, whenever a party to a pending case dies, it shall be the
duty of his counsel to inform the court promptly of such death and to
give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or
legal representatives. This duty was complied with by the plaintiff’s
counsel.

Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.” Hence, from
the moment of death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute
owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by
the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the
determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance whether such right is pure or contingent. The right of the
heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before any
judicial declaration of heirship in the testate or intestate
proceedings. When Fortunata died, her claim or right to the
parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished by her
death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have
thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties
in interest in the case. Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
“after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be
substituted for the deceased." The question as to whether an action
survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. The causes of action which survive affect
primarily and principally property and property rights, the
injuries to the person being merely incidental, while causes of action
which do not survive are those where the injury complained of is to the
person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.
This case being an action to quiet title affects property and property
rights primarily and therefore is one that survives death. Hence,
substitution is proper.
G.R. No. 173292               September 1, 2010

MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
OSWALDO Z. CRUZ, Respondent.

FACTS: 1. On October 18, 1993, Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila a
Complaint against her son, defendant-appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for "Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance
and Damages." 2. Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased)
Architect Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of land located at Tabora corner Limay Streets, Bo.
Obrero, Tondo Manila;  that the said lot was registered in her name under TCT No. 63467 at the
Register of Deeds of Manila;  that sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the title to the said
property was transferred by appellee and the latter’s wife in their names in August 1991 by virtue of a
Deed of Sale dated February 12, 1973;  that the said deed was executed through fraud, forgery,
misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void;  that she, with the help of her husband’s
relatives, asked appellee to settle the problem; that despite repeated pleas and demands, appellee refused
to reconvey to her the said property 3. For his part, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that
(1) the plaintiff’s reconveyance action is a personal action which does not survive a party’s death,
pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, and (2) to allow the case to continue would
result in legal absurdity whereby one heir is representing the defendant [and is a] co-plaintiff in this case.
ISSUE: 1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Memoracion Z. Cruz’s Petition for
Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a purely personal action which did not
survive her death;

HELD: We find the appeal meritorious. The Petition for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages
survived the death of petitioner

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage
sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the
causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental. If the case affects primarily and principally property and property
rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or petitioner. In Sumaljag v. Literato, we held that a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to property and
property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant case for
annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.

We rule that it was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned earlier, the petition for annulment
of deed of sale involves property and property rights, and hence, survives the death of petitioner
Memoracion. The RTC was informed, albeit belatedly,13 of the death of Memoracion, and was supplied
with the name and address of her legal representative, Edgardo Cruz. What the RTC could have done was
to require Edgardo Cruz to appear in court and substitute Memoracion as party to the pending case,
pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and established
jurisprudence.

BOUGH VS MODESTO 47 OG 97 9 3013

Facts: On March 4, 1936 Bruno Modesto, Bough and Restituto Anapol executed a private
document whereby Modesto agreed that he would share with Restituto Anapol and Bough
whatever property he might inherit from his deceased wife. It was provided in such document
that the properties were to be divided and proportioned 1/8 each provided that Restituto pay the
expense to be incurred in connection with the litigation that Modesto was facing. Bough and
Restituto instituted the present action to secure judgment ordering Modesto to divide the
properties left by his wife, in the manner and form provided in the private document. Modesto, in
his defense said contract was not contrary to law, morals and public policy.
Issue: whether the contract, the object of which is Modesto’s inheritance is valid and binding
between the parties?
Held: The contract is valid. It is well settled that rights by inheritance are acquired and
transmitted upon the death of the decedent. If this is so, it must necessarily follow that it is
perfectly legal for an heir to enter into a contract of the nature of the document in this case, the
understanding to be, of course, that the contract would be effective only if and when he is really
declared an heir and only as regards any property that might be adjudicated to him as such. It
cannot be said that the disputed contract deals and interferes with properties in Custodia legis
because the reasonable interpretation that must be given to it that contemplates and provides
for the partition only of such property as may be adjudicated to Modesto if when he is declared
to be an heir of his deceased wife, the claims of the partition to be made in due course, that is through the
probate court.
It is the present action that should not be considered strictly as one for partition but only as an
action intended to determine the right of the parties under the terms of the contract.
BORROMEO-HERRERA VS BORROMEO 152 SCRA 171

G.R. No. L-41171               July 23, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-

HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.

32
Facts: Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu died without heirs but leaving
properties in Cebu. Jose Junguera filed with the CFI Cebu a petition for the probate of a one-page
document as the last will and testament left by said deceased, but the same was found to be a
forged document.
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceeding as several parties filed their
claims alleging that they are the heirs of the intestate of Vito Borromeo. On April 10, 1969 the
trial court invoking Article 972 of the Civil Code issued an order declaring nine persons to the
exclusion of others as intestate heirs of Vito. The Court also ordered that the assets of Vito be
divided in 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed equally.
On April 25, 1969 Fortunato who had earlier claimed an heir under the forged will, filed a motion
praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased, alleging that he is an
illegitimate son and entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heir. In his motion for
reconsideration, Fortunato attached a waiver of hereditary rights of 5 of the deceased heirs and
the latter having agreed to designate their share to the former.

Issue: whether hereditary rights may be waived before there has been acceptance or repudiation
of an inheritance which the heir intends to transfer.

Held: The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that the properties included
in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the
heirs who by fiction of law continue the personality of t former. Nor does such properties have
the character of a future property because the heirs acquires a right to succeed from the
moment of death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property,
but the acceptance in any event acts form the moment of death in accordance with the provision
of the Civil Code. The right is vested although conditioned upon the adjudication of the
corresponding hereditary partition. The heirs therefore could waive their hereditary rights even if
the order to partition the estate was yet to be issued.

G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020

DR. NIXON L. TREYES, PETITIONER, V. ANTONIO L. LARLAR, REV. FR. EMILIO

L. LARLAR, HEDDY L. LARLAR, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of Dr. Nixon Treyes (Dr. Nixon), died without any children and
without a will. Rosie left behind seven siblings, Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne
(Larlar, et al.). At the time of her death, Rosie owned fourteen (14) real estate properties with Dr. Nixon
as conjugal properties. Subsequently, Dr. Nixon executed two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, transferring
the estate of Rosie unto himself, claiming that he was the sole heir. Hence, Larlar, et al. filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for annulment of the Affidavits, cancellation of TCTs,
reconveyance of ownership and possession, partition, and damages.

Dr. Nixon filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter and, corollarily, lack of real parties in interest. The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion, prompting
Treyes to file before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The CA, however,
denied the same. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE Is a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate special
proceeding a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession of
property?
RULING NO. That Larlar, et al. do not really seek in their Complaint the establishment of their rights as
intestate heirs but, rather, the enforcement of their rights already granted by law as intestate heirs finds
basis in Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that “the rights of succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent.”

The operation of Article 777 occurs at the very moment of the decedent's death — the transmission by
succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, the heir is legally deemed to have
acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance at that very moment, "and not at the time of
declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution."

Hence, the Court has held that the "title or rights to a deceased person's property are immediately
passed to his or her heirs upon death. The heirs' rights become vested without need for them to be
declared 'heirs.'" In fact, in partition cases, even before the property is judicially partitioned, the heirs
are already deemed co-owners of the property. Thus, the heirs are deemed real parties in interest
without a prior separate judicial determination of their heirship.

The Civil Code identifies certain relatives who are deemed compulsory heirs and intestate heirs. They
refer to relatives that become heirs by virtue of compulsory succession or intestate succession, as the
case may be, by operation of law. Here, subject to the required proof, without any need of prior judicial
determination, Larlar, et al., siblings of Rosie, by operation of law, are entitled to one-half of the
inheritance of the decedent. Thus, in filing their Complaint, they do not seek to have their right as
intestate heirs established, for the simple reason that it is the law that already establishes that right.
What they seek is the enforcement and protection of the right granted to them under Article 1001 in
relation to Article 777 of the Civil Code by asking for the nullification of the Affidavits of Self-
Adjudication that disregard and violate their right as intestate heirs.

To delay the enforcement of such rights until heirship is determined with finality in a separate special
proceeding would run counter to Article 777 of the Civil Code which recognizes the vesting of such rights
immediately — without a moment's interruption — upon the death of the decedent. Moreover,
jurisprudence supports the institution of an ordinary civil action by legal heirs arising out of a right based
on succession without the necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status as
such. Henceforth, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the
decedent’s estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may
commence an ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of
property, or any other action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of
succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.