(Routledge Library Editions - Philosophy of Mind Volume 3) Sayre, Kenneth M. - Cybernetics and The Philosophy of Mind-Routledge (2015)

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
Volume 3
CYBERNETICS AND THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
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CYBERNETICS AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
KENNETH M. SAYRE
First published in 1976
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© 1976 Kenneth M. Sayre
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Cybernetics and
tbe Pbilosoph) of Mind
Kenneth M. Sayre
Professor of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame, Indiana
London and Henley
ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL

Atlantic Highlands Humanities Press
First published in I976
by ROlltledge & Kegan Palll Ltd
}9 Store Street,
London WCIE TDD and
Broadwtry House,
Newtown Road,
Henley-on-Thames,
Oxon RG.9 IEN
Set in Monotype Garamond
and printed in Great Britain by
Butler & Tanner Ltd
Frome and London
Copyright © Kenneth M. Stryre I.976
No part of this book mtry be reproduced in
any form without permission from the
publisher, except for the qllotation of brief
passages in criticism
ISBN 0 JIoo 8}68 8
To Gregory, Christopher and Jeffrey
CONTENTS
Preface xi
Part One The Mind-Body Problem
I Introduction 3
1 The Scientific Side of the Mind-Bo4J Problem 3
2 Protoscience 6
3 Traditional Approaches to the Mind-Bo4J Problem 8
4 The Cybernetic Approach 14
5 Relative Advantages of the Cybernetic Approach 16
Notes 17
Part Two Fundamentals
II Information 21
I Historical Background 21
2 'Information' Defined 22
3 Entropy and Mutual Information 26
4 Information Storage and Processing 30
Notes 34
III Entropy 36
I Communication Theory and Thermo4Jnamics 36
2 Thermo4Jnamic Entropy Defined 37
3 The Two Entropies Related 40
4 Maxwell's Demon 44
Notes 45
vii
Contents
IV Feedback 48
I The Priority of Information over Feedback 48
2 Positive and Negative Feedback 49
3 Homeostatic Feedback 52
4 Heterotelic Feedback 54
5 Sentient and Anticipatory Feedback 56
6 Feedback as Information Processing 59
Notes 6I
V Causation 65
I The Need for a Cybernetic Model of Causation 65
2 Criteria for an Adeqtlate Model 67
3 Reichenbach's Model 69
4 The Cybernetic Model 73
5 The Causal Model in Biological Explanation 76
Notes 81
Part Three Organism and Environment
VI Life 87
I Distinguishing Life from the Nonliving 87
2 Characteristics of Life 89
3 Life's Molecular Basis 93
4 Teleonomic Development 99
Notes 10 3
VII Evolution 10 5
I Evolution, Conditioning and ConIciousness as Feedback
Processes 10 5
2 Evolution and Natural Selection 106
3 Conjectured Life Origins III
4 Evolutionary Progress 115
Notes 1I9
VIII Learning 122

I Learning as Adaptation of the Individual Organism 122
2 A Cybernetic Model of Learning 12 5
3 Empirical Evidence for the Learning Postulates 13°
4 Respondent and Operant Conditioning Reconciled 133
Notes 13 6
viii
Contents
IX Consciousness 139
I Consciousness as a Form of Adaptation 139
2. Informational Characteristics of Basic Detector
Mechanisms 140
; The Postulate of Perceptual Efficiency 145
4 Illformational Realism 153
5 Establishing the Thesis 15 6
Notes 159
Part Four Mentality
X Society 16 5
I Society and OrganisnJ 16 5
2. Negentropic Advantages of Social Grouping 168
; Intention as a Basis for Social Adaptation 17 2
4 Moral and Prudential Values 177
5 Social Adaptation 182
Notes 18 3
XI Language 18 7
I The Problem of Origins 18 7
2. Limitations of Innate Symbolic Structures 18 9
3 Conjectured Development of Human Language 19 2
4 The Origin and Nature of the Meaning Relation 196
5 The Role of Syntax 2.01
Notes 2.06
XII Reason 2.08

I What in Reason Requires Explaining 2.08
2. Linguistic Developments Portending Reason 2.10
3 Concepts as Meanings Freed from Stimulus Control 2. 15
4 Reason in the Guidance of Human Activity 2.2.0
5 Formal Reasoning 2.2.3
Notes 226
XIII Subjectivity 2.;1

I Subjectivity Related to Previous Topics 2.3 1
2. Color Properties and Color Appearances 232-
; Pleasure and Pain 2.39
4 Intentionality 2.43
ix
Contents
5 Self-awareness 246
6 Immaterial Existence 24 8
Notes 25 0
Bibliography 253
Index 261
x
PREFACE
A star at midlife is balanced thermally by negative feedback

between forces of gravity and of radiation. On earth, life is an
energy exchange between environment and organism, regulated
by similar processes of negative feedback. With respect to repro-
ductive groups, these processes are known as natural selection.
In the individual organism they are known as learning, and in the
organism's nervous system perception and consciousness.
Feedback is basic to all life processes. But feedback is a form
of information exchange. The fundamental category of life is
information, in the technical sense of communication theory.
The task of this book is to exhibit man in his organic and mental
functions as a natural outcome of these informational processes.
The term 'information' plays a prominent role in recent con-
tributions to the philosophy of mind. Notable instances are D. M.
Armstrong's A Materialist Theory of the Mind (1968), and D. C.
Dennett's Content and Consciousness (1969), from both of which I
have benefited more than is immediately apparent. Instructive as
these treatises have been, however, their usefulness is diminished
by laxity in use of the term 'information'.
In Armstrong's treatment, for example, will (hence desire and
purpose, pp. 142, 154) is 'an information-sensitive mental cause'
(p. 150, author's emphasis), while information is identical with
belief (p. 210). Knowledge is 'information about our environ-
ment' (p. 3°°), and perception is a 'flow of information ... that
goes on the whole time that we are not completely unconscious'
(p. 226). Information, moreover, is acquired by bringing 'objects,
xi
Preface
events, etc., under concepts' (p. 141), is capable of being arranged
in 'very complex and idiosyncratic patterns' (p. 212), can be passed
on to another person (p. 343) and fed into a computer (p. 344), is
able to react back upon mental causes (pp. 162, 170), and yet for
all this can be true or false (p. 224). Armstrong's insights are often
blurred by these considerable disparities, and by his failure to
relate his use of this ambiguous term to the technical sense of
communication theory.
Dennett, on the other hand, expressly introduces 'information'
in its technical sense of diminished uncertainty (p. 186), but
immediately thereafter speaks of information that such and such is
the case, of information 011 particular topics, and of the informa-
tion content of English sentences (p. 187). Elsewhere he mentions
information that is relevant (p. 170), that is on experience 'in
general' (p. 150, author's emphasis), and that might be either true
or false (p. 157). None of these further senses is provided by
communication theory, and most have semantic overtones which
expositors of this theory often explicitly disavow. Since'informa-
tion' figures prominently in the development of key themes in
Dennett's book (for example, that of intentional behavior, p. 45),
a more strict use of the term might have yielded a more definitive
analysis.
In the text below, the concept of information 1S explicated in
formal mathematics before being deployed in the analysis of
other concepts, and the term 'information' is used only in senses
that have been explicitly defined. Since information can be
defined in this fashion, although fundamental it is not a primitive
concept. The primitive concept in this treatment is that of prob-
ability, needed to interpret the formal definition of information.
Although various analyses of probability are available from other
contexts, none lends itself to this interpretation more readily than
otbers. To accept probability as a primitive concept is to decline
further attempts at clarification.
The present approach is Platonic in its acceptance of mathe-
matical concepts as ontologically basic, and Aristotelian in its
treatment of inanimate nature as implicated in the nature of
human beings. Labels such as 'mechanism' and 'materialism',
however, I hope to avoid. In my opinion, no philosophic practice
is more stultifying than the facile bandying of general 'isms'
purloined from the careful thoughts of individual men. If a
xii
Preface
label for the present approach is needed, however, let it be one
free from prior indebtedness. Perhaps 'informational realism'
would be as appropriate as any.
My only request to the reader is that he bear in mind that the
argument is cumulative, and that the exposition of the later
chapters begins in the earlier. Although of course anyone is free
to sample here and there to sense the book's flavor, someone
intent upon comprehension must start at the beginning. For this
I apologize, but have no remedy.
My debts in this work have been diverse and extensive, and
there are many persons to thank whom I cannot mention by
name. The contributions of some, however, have been of para-
mount importance. I want particularly to thank James Massey,
Frank M. Freimann Professor of Electrical Engineering at the
University of Notre Dame, for his early instruction in com-
munication theory and for his exhaustive criticism of chapters
II and III. Substantial assistance was provided also by Gary
Gutting in his suggestions for improvement of chapter V, by
Robert Mcintosh in his helpful comments on chapters VI and
VII, by Chris Anderson in his incisive criticism of chapter VIII,
and by Vaughn McKim in his judicious reactions to chapters X
through XIII. It is not an empty gesture to emphasize that any
mistakes left in the text are mine alone, and in no way the fault
of these careful scholars.
Thanks are due my students Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Vern
Walker, James Heffernan, and Gary Monnard for their support
and constructive criticism, and to Sandra Garvick for her help
in preparing the manuscript. To my family lowe a particular
debt of gratitude for their patience during the four years I have
been laboring with this work. From a family's point of view,
four years of preoccupation may seem a bit excessive.
K. M. S.
xiii
PART ONE
THE MIND-BODY
PROBLEM
I
INTRODUCTION
I THE SCIENTIFIC SIDE OF THE MIND-BODY

PROBLEM
The purpose of inquiry is understanding. In general (more may be

involved in particular contexts), to understand a phenomenon is
to be able to trace its relationship to the conditions and conse-
quences of its occurrence.
This inquiry is directed toward an understanding of man. Of
course there is much about man we understand already, but our
understanding of the mental has remained deficient. We under-
stand relatively little about perception and language, and almost
nothing about the reasoning process. More basically, we conceive
ourselves as possessing both bodily and mental features, but are
unable to conceive how the two are related. This difficulty is the
core of the mind-body problem.
Being unable to conceive how mind and body are related is not
to be unaware that such relationships exist. We learn as part of
common sense when to attribute a person's behavior to his
thoughts and intentions, and how his feelings are affected by his
bodily states. The difficulty is our inability to trace the connections
between the mental and the physical by which these interactions
are brought about. Worse yet, we are unable to conceive how
these interactions are possible, how events of the two sorts are
capable of mutual influence.
It is important to keep these two aspects of the problem sep-
arate. On one hand is our puzzlement due to lack of explanatory
3
The Mind-Boc!J Problem
principles relating physical and mental events, parallel for example
to the puzzlement during the early modern period about the
relationship between electricity and magnetism. On the other
hand is our puzzlement due to lack of a conceptual framework
for bringing events of the two sorts into mutual relevance. Just
as the concepts of force and motion (typical of the physical)
admit no intelligible application to mental processes, so the
concepts of thought and intention (typical of the mental) have no
literal application to physical events.
Although distinct, these two sides of the problem are clearly
related. If we had principles providing causal links between the
mental and the physical, we already would have a conceptual
framework in which they could be intelligibly related. Solution
of the first part of the problem would include a solution to the
second as a necessary condition. The reverse, however, is not the
case, since we might possess a conceptual framework embracing
both types of phenomenon without any account of their causal
relationship. The first side of the problem is scientific, the second
what philosophers call ontological. Since solution of the first
would require solution of the second, the ontological is the more
basic side of the problem.
In our preoccupation with the ontology of the mind-body
relationship, however, we tend to forget that this is only part of
the problem, and that to understand how interaction is possible
is not to understand how it actually occurs. The mind-body
problem will not be resolved merely by providing a conceptual
framework in which these two sides of man can be intelligibly
related; it will be necessary to account for their mutual influence
as well. An alleged ontological solution by itself is idle if it does
not lead to understanding of the actual processes of interaction.
In brief, one mark of an adequate answer to the ontological
question is its fruitfulness as a prelude to scientific understanding.
By reverse token, our lack of an adequate ontological solution
is shown by our persistent inability to account for interaction on
a scientific basis. Our clearest indication that the mind-body
problem sti1llacks an adequate ontological solution is the isola-
tion of the physical sciences from the sciences of man. The con-
ceptual gap that blocks our understanding of mind-body inter-
action is reflected in the cleavage between chemistry and physics
and such man-oriented sciences as linguistics and psychology.
4
Introduction
Lacking a common conceptual framework in which these diverse
sciences can be interrelated, of course we do not understand
the interaction between mental and physical events.
This is not to suggest that nothing important has been accom-
plished toward linking various sciences pertaining to human
behavior. Much has been learned, for example, about the physio-
logical mechanisms controlling phenomena of perception and
speech; and the discovery of various 'pleasure centers' in the
brain must be reckoned as a breakthrough for empirical psy-
chology. Yet the fact remains that there is little systematic inter-
change of data or explanatory insights between sciences dealing
with the physical organism and those pertaining to mental activity.
This is the case even where there is overlap of specialized interests.
For instance, sociology shares with the theory of evolution an
interest in group influence upon individual members. Yet, apart
from isolated exploration by social scientists of the evolutionary
model,l neither field has been much influenced by the other's
theoretical work. A more basic rift exists between linguistics
and communication theory. Despite the fact that linguistics today
seems bent on an autonomous course, it remains a sheer anomaly
that the particular study of human communication remains
isolated from the study of communication in genera1. 2
Even more remarkable is the conceptual distance between the
social sciences and thermodynamics, the science of energy trans-
formations. All activities of the human organism itself, mental
and physical, as well as all interactions between members of
human groups, involve highly structured forms of energy ex-
change. Indeed, man is unique in the variety of living conditions
under which he can extract energy from his environment, a fact
(we shall see) intimately bound up with his mental capacities. At
face value, thermodynamics might be expected to be as basic to
psychology and sociology as chemistry is to neurophysiology.
From the ideal viewpoint of an integrated science of man, the
isolation of the social sciences from thermodynamics indicates a
fundamental conceptual deficiency.
The mind-body problem thus is no mere occasion for specula-
tive exercise, unrelated to empirical approaches to the under-
standing of man. If I have read the signs correctly, the conceptual
deficiency behind our inability to relate the mental and the
physical is implicated also in the theoretical cleavage between the
to
The Mind-Body Problem
natural sciences and the sciences of man. An adequate solution
to the mind-body problem should lead to an integrated science of
human nature. At very least it should bring these various ap-
proaches into mutual relevance.
2. PROTO SCIENCE
Science disengaged from philosophy only recently in human

inquiry, and their relationship since has remained ambiguous.
Today they appear to be independent disciplines, each locked
within the jurisdiction of its own university compartment. But
this appearance is surely misleading, for neither could remain vital
without the other's influence. The mind-body problem provides
an appropriate context for examining a few aspects of their
interrelationship.
Philosophic inquiry is general in several senses, each serving to
distinguish philosophy from the empirical sciences. For one,
philosophy is not identified with a particular methodology. Al-
though many philosophers (I among them) think of philosophy as
conceptual analysis, in application their methods vary from 'logical
reconstruction' (Russell) and 'descriptive metaphysics' (Strawson)
to what Austin has called 'linguistic phenomenology'. Moreover,
there are many other techniques (textual exegesis, demonstration,
provisional doubt) practiced by successful philosophers which we
should not deem irrelevant to philosophic inquiry. To be engaged
in science, on the other hand, is to be committed to a particular
methodology, although methods of course differ from field to field.
Further, philosophy is not restricted to particular areas of
human concern. Whereas physics, for example, has no bearing on
social behavior, nor sociology on interactions among inanimate
systems, both are recognized as subjects of philosophic inquiry,
along with problems ranging from cosmology to art and religion.
This restriction in subject matter on the part of science is related
to its specialization of methodology, both traceable to the manner
of its origin in the philosophic enterprise.
In presocratic thought philosophy was indistinguishable from
biology (Empedocles), psychology (Anaxagoras) and mathe-
matical physics (the Pythagoreans), being based on common
observation and speculative reason. As particular approaches
6
Introduction
began to prove fruitful in particular problem areas, however,
inquiry in these areas came to be dominated by concepts and
observational techniques which could not be extended appro-
priately to other fields. Thus biology emerged as a distinctive
discipline on the basis of methods which (despite Aristotle)
proved ineffective for physics, while physics gained autonomy
through conceptual resources which (despite Locke) proved
inadequate for the study of mind. More recently psychology
itself achieved status as a specialized discipline with methods
inapplicable, for example, within sociology and linguistics. In
each case limitation to a particular subject matter is a consequence
of methodological specialization.
Perhaps the most important point of comparison between
philosophy and science for our purposes, however, has to do with
a third sense in which philosophy is the more general inquiry.
Since science is generated through specialization, it splits off from
philosophy in relatively isolated segments. Problems particularly
amenable to one approach usually are excluded by other method-
ologies. The result is a circumscription of the several sciences by
boundaries of responsibility and of permissible neglect. The
accomplished physicist is not expected to be informed in soci-
ology, nor the psychologist in the mechanisms of genetic inheri-
tance. In sum, it follows from the very nature of scientific inquiry
that scientists are segregated into diverse competencies, none of
which is capable of synthesiZing a comprehensive conception of
man. The task of integration is left to philosophy, where it lay
originally with the presocratics. But whereas the presocratics
lacked the benefit of specialized science, we have accumulated
massive bodies of relevant scientific data. One of philosophy's
main responsibilities today is to weld these masses of scientific
data into a coherent account of human nature.
At least three stages are involved in this integrative process.
First is the stage of clarification, where the conceptual structures
of a given science are analyzed for consistency and logical order
(for example, with respect to primitive terms, explanatory
principles and rules of inference). This task generally belongs to
philosophy of science, although there is no reason why the
scientist (like Einstein) should not be his own philosopher.
The second stage is that of interpretation, where the basic terms
and principles of mutually relevant sciences are worked into a form
7
showing structural similarities. An illustration from psychology
is the recent conception of learning as a form of the evolutionary
process (see chapter VIn below). Although such interpretation
does not consolidate the disciplines in question, it indicates facets
that can be drawn together and enables an interchange of expla-
natory insight. In the third stage conceptual ties are extended
between analogous facets of the several disciplines in the form of
shared categories and explanatory principles. One example of
synthesis on this level is the development of the concepts of
charge and electric current by which the previously separate
studies of electrical and magnetic phenomena became integrated
into the science of electromagnetism.3
These latter two stages of interpretation and synthesis extend
the conceptual resources of the disciplines in question, and might
appropriately be labeled 'protoscience'. Although protoscience
is directed toward an increase in scientific understanding, its
integrative aspects make it a paradigm of philosophic inquiry.
In arguing above that the mind-body problem would be re-
solved only by bringing the natural sciences into harmony with
the sciences of man, I was arguing that the problem has proto-
scientific as well as ontological dimensions. For its resolution,
not only must we (a) provide a general conceptual framework
accommodating both mental and physical phenomena (the onto-
logical problem), but also we must (b) interpret the categories of
the several relevant sciences to fit within this general framework,
and (c) formulate generic explanatory principles to merge the
results of these diverse studies into a fruitful and coherent account
of the human organism.
The central thesis of this book is that all three of these require-
ments can be met with the resources of cybernetics, the study of
communication and contro1.4 In order to appreciate more fully
the significance of this point of departure, let us review some more
familiar approaches to the mind-body problem.
3 TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO THE

MIND-BODY PROBLEM
If one thinks of mind, with Descartes, as characterized essentially

by thought but as lacking extension, and thinks of the physical
8
Introduction
as thoughtless but essentially extended, then the two domains
are rendered conceptually incommensurable with no common
ground for explaining their mutual influence. Any resolution of
the mind-body problem must provide a set of categories appro-
priate to both fields of activity, in terms of which they can be
conceptually related.
Attempts to provide such categories generally have followed
one of two quite different stratagems. One stratagem has been to
accept the descriptive and explanatory concepts that have been
found adequate to one field of activity, and in terms of these to
'reduce' (define or eliminate) the basic concepts of the other field.
The other has been to devise a third set of categories in terms of
which the concepts of both fields can be explicated, and through
which accordingly they can be interrelated.
Two typical instances of the first approach are Berkeley's
mentalism and the materialism of the contemporary scientific
realists. Both these positions are reductionistic, but one accepts
as basic what the other rejects.
Assuming as unproblematic the concepts of idea, applying to all
objects of mental awareness, and of volition, applying to the men-
tal activity by which ideas are initiated, Berkeley attempted to
dispense with the concept of matter and to define the basic
categories of physics in terms solely of relationships among ideas.
In this respect, Berkeley attempted a reduction of physical to
mental categories, with more technical success than I believe is
commonly realized.
Yet Berkeley's reduction was fated to remain unconvincing.
One reason undoubtedly was the highly theological cast of the
ontology with which he replaced the ontology of physical things.
More significant in the long run, however, is that no well estab-
lished theory of mental activity exists in which either physical
or mental events can be satisfactorily explained. A person con-
cerned to increase his understanding of the human organism is
not going to find much help in the suggestion that physical events,
of which we already possess a considerable degree of systematic
understanding, on a more basic level really are mental happenings,
of which we possess very little understanding at all. From the
systematic point of view, Berkeley recommends a move from
strength to weakness.
Perhaps the most basic reason for failure of Berkeley's view-
9
point, however, is that it has led to no new insights into physical
nature, or into the relationship between physical and mental
phenomena. It was an insight of sorts, to be sure, to realize that
there is nothing conceptually necessary in our ordinary way of
thinking about the physical world. But it seems to be a matter of
practical necessity that we do not think of the world as Berkeley
recommended if we wish to increase our understanding of physical
nature. This is not as things should be if the physical were basi-
cally a form of mental activity.
This impasse reflects the attitude toward empirical science
implicated in Berkeley's methodology. Although his concern
(in Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas
and Philonous) was to analyze the basic concepts of the material
world with which science deals, science itself was treated not as a
source of insight but as the source of an ontology to be overcome.
And quite independently of science's ontological status, at very
least it helps us identify physical processes (reflection, radiation,
excitation) that are relevant to an understanding of mind-body
interaction. No analytic method unreceptive to this type
of input will make much headway against the mind-body
problem.
Materialism is better situated in several respects. In its most
interesting contemporary form, materialism represents the guid-
ing principle that all explanatory categories and laws necessary
for a comprehensive understanding of human behavior can be
provided within the context of the physical sciences. The sciences
in question are physics, chemistry and biology specifically, with
perhaps physics alone remaining in the final accounting. 5 Since
these sciences are systematic and highly developed, materialism's
move is in the direction of weakness to strength.
Moreover, our knowledge of the physical basis of mental
activity has been steadily increasing, which lends initial plausi-
bility to the materialist's thesis that such knowledge ultimately
will yield a physical explanation of mental events. Other advan-
tages of this variety of materialism are avoidance of so-called
'nomological danglers',6 and its vigorous application of Occam's
Razor.
Despite its initial plausibility, however, I believe the material-
ist's claim is almost surely unwarranted. As a response to the
mind-body problem, I understand this claim to be that mental
10
Introduction
events are really physical in nature, which entails that all inter-
actions between the mental and the physical can be understood
as interactions among overtly physical events. But there are many
mental causes of physical events that the physical sciences show
no signs of being able to elucidate. For example, there is no physi-
calistic interpretation of the reasoning processes that helps explain
how reason is effective in governing our bodily behavior, and in
adjusting it to future states of affairs. In brief, physical categories
provide no more insight into the effects of mental phenomena
than mental categories into the effects of physical events.
But the doctrinaire materialist will find this complaint obtuse,
for he has never claimed that mental causes could be explained by
the physical sciences. His claim, rather, is that there is nothing
uniquely mental about human behavior that requires explanation.
Our common notion that there is a causal influence between
mental and physical events is simply misleading if it leads to the
conviction that physical events might have nonphysical causes.
Although indeed it often appears that our behavior is influenced
by such subjective states as thoughts and intentions, the
materialist continues, these mental phenomena are not distinct
from the physical occurrences by which our behavior is shaped.
What we take to be uniquely subjective plays no part in any causal
process, and will lose even its appearance of relevance in our
final understanding of human behavior.7
In short, the materialist's position is represented more accurately
by the claim that the subjective plays no role in human behavior
that cannot be accounted for on a physical basis. But this is to say,
in turn, that all human behavior ultimately can be explained with-
out reference to any subject of mental events. If, to the contrary,
the subjective is somehow instrumental in human behavior, then
an adequate understanding of the human person must take this
factor into account.
Thus we have to choose between the materialist's thesis that
subjective states are inessential to our understanding of human
behavior, and the opposing thesis that subjectivity properly
understood is essential to any adequate account of human
activity. Our evidence for the latter is surely more impressive.
Arguments for the materialist's position are generally limited to
rebuttals of opposing viewpoints, for the position enjoys little
evidence of an empirical nature. 8 In favor of the claim that
II
The Mind-B~4Y Problem
subjective awareness plays a major role in guiding human behav-
ior, on the other hand, we have not only the emphatic testimony
of common sense, but also evidence in the biological origins of
human consciousness. If subjective awareness plays no part in
the guidance of human behavior, it would secure no advantages
for organisms possessing it and hence find no favor in natural
selection. To the contrary, however, the emergence of sub-
jective awareness, in the form of perception and thought espe-
cially, surely was a major juncture in the development of the
human species and a major factor in its achievement of biological
dominance. Hence it is a reasonable supposition that factors are
present in the guidance of human behavior which we can under-
stand only with reference to subjective states.
The basic error of materialism, as I have characterized it
(others may view it differently), is to have taken sides prematurely
on a speculative issue before the alternatives are clearly defined.
The materialist rejects dualism, according to which mind and
body cannot be understood within a common conceptual frame-
work, in favor of the thesis that both mind and body are ultimately
accountable in a framework based upon the categories of physics.
Another alternative, however, is that both can be understood
within a framework accommodating physics but in which
physics is not basic to all other science. Since the current isola-
tion of physics from other sciences in fact is part of the mind-body
problem, it is reasonable to pursue this latter alternative in search
of another set of basic categories not dependent upon physics.
To provide the foundations for such an alternative is the primary
goal of this present study.
In this respect, the present approach is like the second
traditional form of attack on the mind-body problem, that of
creating a set of 'neutral' categories in terms of which concepts
in either field can be defined, and through which accordingly they
can be interrelated. A classic example is Russell's theory of sensi-
bilia, or 'neutral monism.'9
A sensibile for Russell is like a sense-datum, save that it might
exist without being actually sensed. Once it enters into a rela-
tionship of awareness, the sensibile presents an appearance
characterized with respect to both the place from which and the
place at which the resulting sense-datum appears. The place from
which a sense-datum appears is private to the subject to which it is
12.
Introduction
given, but shares the place at which it appears with other sense
data. Any place from which data either do or might appear is
termed a 'perspective', and perspectives can be correlated accord-
ing to the structures in which their constituent data cohere.
The resulting correlation provides Russell with a 'perspective
space,' in terms of which he attempts to define space, time, and
other physical categories.
In this framework, the 'thing of common sense' is identified
with the class of its actual and possible appearances (Russell,
1917, p. 154). As a class of appearances, any object in physical
space retains its characteristics of appearing both from and at
specific places, those of the first sort ('subjective' or mental)
being of prime interest to the psychologist and those of the second
('external') to the student of physics. Since both the physical and
the mental are defined in terms of the same categories, there is no
problem in principle of understanding how the two domains are
related.
The basic weakness of the Russellian program, which renders
it useless for any practical purposes, is that the concept of sen-
sibilia is devoid of explanatory power. Despite their alleged
theoretical applicability to both the physical and the mental, the
concepts of sensibilia and of perspective space do nothing to
increase our understanding of phenomena in either domain.
No phenomena are explainable in this framework that are not
explainable otherwise, and this is true in particular of modes of
interaction between body and mind.
A consequence is that any explanation of either mental or
physical phenomena that came to be couched in the neutral
framework would have to be translated out of a nonneutral
context in which it had been independently achieved. Despite the
ontological and methodological priority that might be claimed for
the neutral framework, it is sterile for the explanation of actual
phenomena and hence parasitical upon existing theoretical
structures. It is no cause for wonder that physicists and psycho-
logists, among others, have not taken neutral monism seriously,
despite its express purpose of clarifying the foundations of the
sciences in question.
Like reductionism in its various forms, this approach to the
mind-body problem through ontologically neutral categories is
an option of some abstract interest. But neither approach seems
14
capable of removing the conceptual barriers that block an inte-
grated understanding of the human organism.
4 THE CYBERNETIC APPROACH
My purpose in this book is to recommend an approach to the

mind-body problem that avoids the difficulties mentioned above.
This approach begins with the concept of information, as tech-
nically defined in communication theory. This concept, as we shall
see, already has found extensive application beyond its original
context. Yet it can be shown applicable to an even wider range
of phenomena than is commonly realized, and some of these
applications are of considerable philosophic interest.
The direction of argument in the following chapters is that these
concepts are appropriate for the explanation of both physical
and mental events, and that they provide the basis for a conceptual
framework in which activities of both sorts can be coherently
related. This framework in turn enables the sciences of man to be
integrated conceptually with the physical sciences, and makes
possible the fruitful extension of certain principles from biology
and physics to the study of conscious mental phenomena.
This task dictates a method at once conceptual and empirical,
which may strike the reader as both familiar and strange. For
example, the physicist should find congenial ground in my treat-
ment of thermodynamic entropy, and the biologist in my use of
evolution theory; but the credulity of those specialists may well
be tested by the extension of their concepts to the study of mental
phenomena. The sociologist and linguist, on the other hand, will
find familiar issues in my treatment of man's interpersonal be-
havior, but may be vexed by an approach that gives precedence
to novel problems over others usually thought central to these two
disciplines. In yet other areas (consciousness, reason, and sub-
jectivity) that have not yielded to scientific study, the current
approach will appear almost entirely innovative. Despite risks of
misunderstanding, it could be no different. For if the studies per-
taining to man are to be brought into mutual relevance, only the
most firmly based will avoid the pressures of conceptual restruc-
turing. Our task is one of integration on the proto scientific
level, not one of accommodating particular orthodoxies in dis-
14
Introduction
puted areas. For our purposes, to paraphrase a maxim of Go,
facts are golden, firm theories silver, but disputed theories no
better than copper.
Finally, although protoscience (I have argued) is a philosophic
enterprise, philosophers themselves may be particularly prone to
disorientation by the conceptual approach of the following
chapters. Although the procedures of conceptual reconstruction
should be familiar, the primitives of communication theory will
be novel to most. Moreover, the data serving this analysis may
appear unusually empirical. The analysis will proceed on two
levels, first with respect to certain principles of empirical science
which require interpretation in terms of information and feed-
back, and second with respect to such phenomena as reason and
consciousness that have yet to be made intelligible in a scientific
framework. The first task requires discussions of certain scientific
principles in more detail than is usual for philosophic work.
Analysis of the second sort, on the other hand, relies largely on
description of the various phenomena in question, for conceptual
elucidation is not enough when our concepts are faulty. In either
case the procedure will be analytic, but with the aim of emendation
as well as clarification.
At the same time the approach is explicitly synthetic, in a way
suggesting a 'derivation' of mentality from other capacities of the
living organism. To understand mentality in this context is to
conceive it as a result of evolution, so that 'derivation' on the
organic level is a biological process. On the conceptual level,
however, it is necessary to exhibit such mental capacities as sub-
jectivity and reason in terms establishing the possibility of their
biological development. The major steps in this conceptual
'derivation' are as follows, beginning with the concept of infor-
mation in communication theory. Negative feedback is analyzed
as an informational process, in terms of which evolution itself
can be defined. Behavioral conditioning then is analyzed as a
form of the evolutionary process, and perceptual consciousness
in turn as a form of conditioning. Language is treated as an ex-
tension of man's perceptual capacities, and reason as language
freed from stimulus control. Finally, subjectivity is shown to be
a dimension of language and reason against which man conceives
other objects as distinct from himself. It follows from this
conceptual 'derivation' that mentality is a set of information-
16
processing capacities, but capacities nonetheless which are best
understood in terms of intermediate stages in their development.
(Analogously, all other operators in propositional logic are
definable in terms of a single operator, but no logical derivation
of more than minimal complexity can be made intelligible by use
of this operator alone.)
Finally, philosophers may be concerned with the ontological
significance of the cybernetic framework, in which the concept
of information plays the basic role. If the project of this book is
successful, it will have been shown not only that the concept of
information provides a primitive for the analysis of both the
physical and the mental, but also that states of information (yet
to be explicated) existed previously to states of mind. Since
information in this sense is prior to mentality, but also is impli-
cated in all mental states, it follows that information is prior also
in the ontological sense. For if instances of A are prior to all
instances of B, then A can exist without B but not vice versa.
And this presumably is what is meant by 'ontological priority'.
Success of the present project thus will show that an ontology of
informational states is adequate for an explanation of the pheno-
mena of mind, as distinct from an ontology of physical events.
It is a reasonable conjecture, indeed, on the basis of the material
in chapter III, that an ontology of information is similarly basic
to the physical sciences, but to test this would require a detailed
analysis of quantum physics.
5 RELATIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE

CYBERNETIC APPROACH
This approach to the mind-body problem shares the advantages

of both reductionism and monism, without being penalized by
the attendant weaknesses.
The main virtue of Russell's neutral monism is that the concept
of sensibilia is applicable to both the physical and the mental,
suggesting a theoretical rapprochement between the two domains.
A similar neutrality is enjoyed by the concept of information.
The concomitant disadvantage for Russell, however, is that
there is no independent theory of sensibilia by which to increase
our understanding of either type of phenomenon. The concept
16
Introduction
of information, by contrast, is part of a firmly established formal
theory, with proven applicability to a wide variety of other
disciplines.
An advantage of both mentalism and materialism in general is
that they enable us to avoid the problems of mind-body inter-
action. But both forms of reductionism have been notoriously
lacking in helpful things to say about their opposite domains.
The cybernetic approach, by contrast, is tailored to explicate
modes of mind-body interaction, and in the process to increase
our understanding of both types of phenomenon.
Materialism enjoys the additional advantage of being closely
aligned with the rigorous sciences, which have been notably
fruitful in their explanatory endeavors. But communication
theory is a branch of mathematics, hence even more rigorous
than physics or chemistry, with fruitfulness dramatically manifest
in the information-processing technology of recent decades.
The most disappointing aspect of both reductionism and neu-
tral monism as approaches to the mind-body problem, however,
quite apart from technical features that make them debatable from
various ontological viewpoints, is that they have not advanced in
the slightest measure our genuine understanding of the human
organism. Thus it may count as the most important advantage
of the cybernetic viewpoint that it already has yielded fresh
insights into many facets of human behavior. Unlike alternative
programs in the philosopher's repertoire, this one is not fated to
remain at a merely programmatic stage.
NOTES
I For example, see Skinner (1969), ch. 7; Russell (1958, 1959, 1961, 1962);
14
and Dunn (1971).
2 This anomaly may be traceable in part to the relative neglect of this theory
by professional linguists themselves. Chomsky, for example, after a
rather routine exploration (Miller and Chomsky, 1963) of some of
Shannon's early insights into the communication theoretic properties of
language, gives up communication theory as unprofitable for the study
of language (Chomsky, 1968). This regrettable attitude is typical of con-
temporary linguists.
3 For a historical account, see Roller and Roller (1954).
4 The term 'cybernetics' stems from the Greek kybernetu, meaning 'steers-
man' in the sense of one who guides or controls. It was coined by Norbert
14
Wiener as a name for the common interests of a rather disparate group of
mathematicians, engineers and physiologists who had joined forces to
study various problems of communication and control systems. The
nature of this original collaboration is described by Wiener in the Intro-
duction of his Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and
the Machine. Despite the extensive public notice the name has received
since Wiener's book was published in 1947, its reference remains vague.
There is no unified body of theory mastery of which would qualify one
for the title 'cybernetician', and no group of specialists who would prefer
to be known by that title in preference to 'biologist', 'computer specialist'
or 'electrical engineer'. Nor are all specialized studies of communication
and control systems of a sort likely to be classified as cybernetic (consider
the radio and push-button switching). In public fancy, at least, 'cyber-
netics' suggests the simulation of human data-processing and regulative
functions, in a digital computer or other suitable machine. In the present
context, the term is used to designate the study of communication and
control functions of living organisms, particularly human beings, in
view of their possible simulation in mechanical systems. For a definition
of 'simulation' in this use, see Sayre (1965), ch. I.
5 For the latter claim, see Smart (1963), ch. ;; and Armstrong (1968), ch. 4.
6 The term comes from FeigI (1958), p. 456.
7 For a forceful argument to this effect, see Rorty (1965).
8 The negative character of typical arguments for materialism is evident
in Smart (196;), ch. 5, and in Armstrong (I968), p. 85. The scientific
implausibility of materialism is argued in Sayre (1969), ch. 8, and Sayre
(197 2 ).
9 The standard view in Russellian scholarship is that Russell did not
become a neutral monist until after his 'The Relation of Sense-Data to
Physics' in 19I4. This view is supported by his distinction there between
sense-data and sensations, the latter but not the former including sub-
jective awareness. As Russell himself points out (1917, p. I 5I), however,
his position in this paper is compatible with monism and might have
been reached from such a viewpoint. Since Russell's theory of sensibilia
is easier to expound in relevant respects than the later expressly monistic
position, I have taken the liberty of representing this theory as a version
of neutral monism.
18
PART TWO
FUNDAMENTALS
CP~I-B
II
INFORM A TION
1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Cybernetics is based upon the concepts of information and

feedback. The concept of information is definable in precise
formal notation. The concept of feedback, on the other hand, has
been formalized only within particular engineering contexts, and
is applicable to biological systems only on an intuitive basis.
This disparity in formal status is reflected in the common uni-
versity procedure of presenting communication theory and con-
trol theory as independent disciplines. The present approach
departs from this procedure in treating feedback as a special form
of information processing. Our first task, however, is to explicate
the concept of information and other technical concepts employed
in the following discussion. Although this task requires a few
mathematical expressions, all formulae are accompanied by
explanatory prose.
Communication theory was first formulated systematically by
Claude Shannon in a paper entitled 'A Mathematical Theory of
Communication' (Shannon, 1948). The conceptual basis of the
theory, however, is due to Nyquist and Hartley, who studied
efficiency in the transmission of messages over electrical channels.
Nyquist proposed a logarithmic measure of speed in the 'trans-
mission of intelligence,' and showed that this quantity depends
both upon the speed of the signal and upon the number of dif-
ferent signal elements employed (Nyquist, 1924). Hartley used
the same expression subsequently as a quantitative measure of
21
Fundamentals
information, and related this measure to the frequency range of
the information carrier (Hartley, 1928). Shannon's important
contribution was to extend the theory to include such factors as
the effects of noise, the statistical structure of the message, and
the reliability of the channel through which it is transmitted.
Shannon's treatment is sufficiently formal to enable the explicit
deduction of a number of theorems, including some of basic
importance in communication system design. Our present pur-
pose, however, does not require detailed examination of com-
munication theory in its technological applications. What is
important is the definition of 'information' this theory provides.
The term 'information' is used in common language with a
wide variety of meanings, ranging from instruction and data to
knowledge itself. Despite repeated warnings by specialists,l these
other meanings tend to impede our understanding of 'informa-
tion' in the technical sense. The incidence of ambiguity has
increased with the term's adoption into various biological and
behavioral sciences, where often it takes on meanings peculiar
to these particular disciplines. 2 With these various meanings in
the background, it is often difficult to retain a sharp focus on the
sense of 'information' in communication theory. Yet this tech-
nical sense is essential to the discussion that follows.
Rather than pursue clarity by rehearsing the differences between
'information' in the technical sense and such ordinary terms as
'data' and 'knowledge', I propose to introduce the term into
technical use as a formalization of what is common in its more
familiar senses. 'Information' first will be defined as 'reduced
uncertainty,' and then will be given a mathematical formulation.
2 'INFORMATION' DEFINED
Imagine an investor who needs information (advice) about the

status of certain securities, and who consults a broker with special
information (knowledge) in that area. The broker informs (tells) him
that, by coincidence, a federal investigator had come by just that
morning seeking information about (evidence of) possible fraud
by the corporation issuing that particular stock. In response to
this information (data), the investor decides to sell, and so injorJJJS
(notifies) the broker who is to act as his agent.
12
Information
That is, being uncertain how to evaluate a portion of his port-
folio, the client consults someone more certain than he about this
side of the market. The broker relieves his client's uncertainty
about relevant happenings by recounting the visit of the federal
investigator, who himself had uncertainties to resolve of a pro
fessional nature. As an upshot of his increased certainty about the
state of his securities, the client removes any uncertainty in the
mind of the broker about his intention to sell.
Although 'information' may signify such different matters as
notification, knowledge, or simply data, in any case the imparting
of information is the reduction of uncertainty. 'Information'
thus signifies the positive difference between two uncertainty
levels.
The psychological cast of the term 'uncertainty' is not totally
irrelevant. If the broker had some inkling of malfeasance with that
particular stock, he would have been less surprised than his client
by the visit of the investigator. The client then would gain more
information than the broker from the events in question. What is
likely to be misleading about use of such terms as 'uncertainty'
and 'surprise', however, is the sense of mental attitude they often
convey. Although 'information' is accurately dt":1'lled as a de-
crease in uncertainty, the client's turn of mind has little to do with
the information he gains from the investigator's visit. To avoid
connotations of this psychological character, we will use the term
'uncertain' in the sense of 'undetermined' or 'unpredictable'
suggesting low probability.
In this more specific terminology, we may define information
simply as increased probability. This definition makes possible
the direct application of probability theory in the development of
other concepts with related technical meanings.
An interesting problem was raised (and solved) by Hartley
regarding the quantity in which information is most appro-
priately measured. 3 One initially plausible measure is the recip-
rocal of the probability of the event in question, properly
reflecting more information in the occurrence of less probable
events. An event initially 25 per cent probable, for example,
conveys more information by its occurrence than one with initial
probability of 50 per cent, and this is reflected in the different
values 1j.25 (= 4) and 1/'50 (= 2). The difficulty with I/P(e)
as a general measure of the information in event (e) arises with
2J
Fundamentals
consideration of the joint information in the occurrence of
associated events.
Consider an event el that is 50 per cent probable, such as the
result of flipping an unbiased coin. This event is one of two
equally probable events, and z is the value of the quantity
I/P(el). In general, if e is one of n equally likely events, the value
I /P(e) is equal to n. If our measure of information is I/P(e), then
the information value of el is z, and we would expect the value
of other coin tosses under similar circumstances to be the same.
Let e2 be the result of a second toss of the coin, ea the third result,
and so forth. We now ask what is the informational value of the
pair ele2, and of the triplet ele2ea, seeking in either case to isolate
the amount of information contributed by the additional tosses.
Since ele2 is one of four equiprobable occurrences, the informa-
tional value of the pair must be 4; similarly, the informational
value of the triplet must be 8, and so forth as the number of
additional tosses increases. Thus e2 will be reckoned to add two
units of information to the two of el, which is acceptable since
the two tosses then will have the same value. However, ea will
have to be considered as adding four units to ele2, which is not
acceptable since ea then will have twice the informational value of
either el or e2. A fourth toss, moreover, would have four times
the information value of el, a fifth eight times, and so on in expo-
nential sequence.
A similar difficulty arises in consideration of two or more inde-
pendent variables specified by the occurrence of a single event.
If a sound source emits four different frequencies at two different
intensities, the intensity of a single signal yields two units of infor-
mation by the measure I/P(e), and the frequency four units by the
same measure. Emission of a single signal thus, by addition,
would be reckoned to yield six units of information. Yet the
emission of such a signal, with two possible intensities and four
possible frequencies, is one of a set of eight equally likely events,
and hence ought to yield eight units of information by this
particular measure.
It is clear that some measure of information is required that
will preserve equality of information in the individual occurrences
of associated sequential events, and will assure that the informa-
tion acquired from the simultaneous occurrence of two indepen-
dent factors will equal the sum acquired from the two considered
14
Information
as separate occurrences. The measure proposed by Hartley in
solution to the first difficulty handles the second as well. Instead
of IjP(e) as the quantification of the information present in the
occurrence of e, the logarithm of that quantity turns out to be the
most appropriate measure.
The quantity by which information is measured in communica-
tion theory is thus established as log IjP(e). What is measured by
this quantity is an increase in probability of the event in question.
It is important to note that the quantity log IjP(e) is not iden-
tical with the information itself. That quantity rather is the mea-
sure of the information, much as meter is a measure of length and
degree a measure of heat. The information measured by this
quantity is a feature of the world at large, insofar as this world is
comprised by events that occur with distinct prior probabilities.
The quantity log I fP( e) admits further specification, since
logarithms may be based on any positive number. Three different
bases have been used in the literature. When the base chosen is
ten, the quantity log 10 I fP( e) is the unit of information, named
'Hartley' in honor of the originator of the logarithmic measure.
Natural logarithms also are occasionally used, with a unit called
the 'nat', for 'natural unit'. Most commonly, however, logarithms
to the base two are employed, with a unit called the 'bit' (for
'binary unit' as suggested by Shannon (1949, p. 4». One advan-
tage of logarithms to the base two is their convenient application
to problems in the design of digital computers. Another is the
intuitive understanding they provide of information content: the
number of bits of information represented in the occurrence of a
given event is the number of times its initial probability must be
doubled to equal unity.4 Base two logarithms will be assumed in
the remainder of this discussion.
The probability of an event that has occurred is equal to unity.
But information content is not restricted to past and present
occurrences. Like physics, chemistry, astronomy, and any other
predictive discipline, communication theory is concerned with
events that are possible as well as those that actually occur. And
events that are merely possible may have information content as
well, for they may be characterized under different circumstances
by different probabilities of occurrence. An example is the change
in probability that the first ball drawn from an urn will be white,
resulting from doubling the number of white balls in the urn. By
Z5
Fllndamentals
altering the ratio of white to black balls, the probabilities attach-
ing to each member of a possible series of draws will be altered
before the series actually begins. Another example reflects the
statistical interactions among letters in the written English alpha-
bet, according to which U is more likely to follow Q than any
other letter. The probability of U being written next in a series
of letters increases greatly if Q has just been written. Thus the
information content of the next number in the sequence is
altered before its occurrence, independently of whether it actually
occurs at all.
Like other mathematical characteristics, information content
may be an attribute of possible as well as of actual events. Thus
the description of the information content of an event as the
number of times its initial probability must be doubled to equal
unity, offered above, should not be understood to imply that the
event must actually occur in order to possess a determinate
information content.
3 ENTROPY AND MUTUAL INFORMATION
Given the concept of information, we may now define other

basic concepts of communication theory that play important roles
in the following chapters. 5
An information channel consists of two ensembles of statistically
related events. One is the input ensemble, consisting of events
emanating from the source, or input. The other set is the output
ensemble, consisting of events at the terminus, or output, that are
to some extent indicative of occurrences within the input set. We
may represent these two ensembles respectively as A, comprising
n symbols aI, a2 ... an, and B, comprising m symbols b I, b 2 ... bm.
The relationship between input and output then may be des-
cribed by a set of conditional probabilities, specifying for each
output event b j the probability of its occurring in association
with each input event ai. 6 Both A and B are assumed to consist of
mutually exclusive events, with total probability equal to unity.
A typical physical realization of an information channel is a
telegraph circuit, with events at the key and at the sounder
respectively constituting A and B, and their association through a
physical medium represented by an appropriate conditional
26
Information
probability matrix. Further characterization of the circuit, of
course, might mention such features as the length of the trans-
mission line, the voltage across it, and the temporal lag between
events at either end. Such features, however, are not essential to
an information channel, and may be replaced by others in a dif-
ferent physical system. The only requirement for an information
channel is the existence of a relationship between input and
output by which the latter ensemble of events provides some
indication of what occurs in the former. In its most general form,
an information channel exists between any two ensembles related
by conditional probabilities.
The quantity of information represented by the occurrence of
an event a with initial probability Pea) is log I/P(a). Unless all
input events are equiprobable, this quantity will vary for dif-
ferent members of the input ensemble. The average amount of
information represented by occurrences within the input en-
semble is the sum of the information contents of all individual
events in A each multiplied by the probability of its occurrence.
If the members of the input ensemble A are statistically inde-
pendent (a 'zero-memory' source), this average value is given by
the formula:
H(A) = ~ Pea) log I/P(a)
A
The quantity H(A) is called the entropy of A, in this case the ef.l-
tropy of the source or input ensemble. A corresponding quantity
H(B) can be calculated for the ensemble of output events. In
general, the closer the individual events within an ensemble
approach equiprobability, the closer the entropy of that ensemble
approaches maximum value.
The value H(A) does not reflect the statistical interaction be-
tween A and B in a communication channel. Because of this inter-
action, however, the probability of a given event occurring in A
may be affected by the occurrence of an event in B, and vice
versa. H(A) thus is sometimes called the a priori entropy of A, in
distinction to the a posteriori entropy of A conditional upon events
in B. The a posteriori entropy of A given b J is the average infor-
mation represented by an occurrence of an event in A when b j has
occurred in B:
H(A/b j ) = ~ P(a/bJ) log I/P(a/bj )
A
14
Fundamentals
Summing H(A/b j ) for all j, we then have the average a posteriori
entropy of A:
H(A/B) = ~ PCb) H(Ajb)
B
= ~ PCb) ~ Pea/b) log I/P(a/b)
B A
= ~ P(a,b) log I/P(a/b)
A,B
H(AjB) is called the equivocation of A with respect to B. An intui-
tive basis for this label appears with the reflection that the identity
of events in A is more fully disclosed with the occurrence of
events in B proportionally to a greater degree of reliability of the
latter as indications of the former. The amount of uncertainty left
in A given the occurrence of an event in B is a measure of the
ambiguity of A with respect to that event, and the average ambi-
guity of A with respect to such events is the equivocation of A
wita respect to B. The 'information about' A yielded by B thus
is inversely proportionate to H(A/B).
We may reflect, in the same manner, that in an information
channel with low equivocation from input to output about the
same information is represented by events at both ends. Con-
versely, the higher the equivocation of A with respect to B, the
less reliable the output as an indicator of events at the input. The
capacity of the channel to convey information thus varies in-
versely with the equivocation of input to output. It also varies
directly with the amount of information that can be represented
at the input. The difference between the entropy of the input and
the equivocation of the input with respect to the output thus
measures the capacity of the channel as a reliable conveyor of
information. This quantity
I(A;B) = H(A) - H(A/B)
is called the mutual information of the information channel.
An interesting and fundamentally important property of mutual
information is that it is independent of the order between input
and output across an information channel. That is, I(A;B) =
I(B;A).7 Mutual information, along with other basic properties
of the information channel, thus is independent of the temporal
ordering between input and output events .
.18
Information
Barring limiting cases, an information channel is characterized
by equivocation in either direction, which is to say that both
H(AjB) and H(BjA) possess positive values. One limiting case
is the noiseless channel, in which each event at the output indicates
with perfect reliability a specific input event. A noiseless channel
is one with H(AjB) = 0, for all assignments of probabilities to A.
A deterministic channel, by contrast, is one in which each input event
indicates uniquely a single event at the output, and in which
°
accordingly H(B j A) = for all assignments of probabilities to
B. A channel that is noiseless from input to output thus is deter-
ministic in the opposite direction, and of course vice versa. 8
These concepts can be extended to cover a cascade of informa-
tion channels, in which the output of the first is the input of the
second, the output of the second the input of the third, and so
forth. A cascade of deterministic channels itself is deterministic,
since each input-event of the first is associated with a unique
output-event of the final channel. In like fashion, a cascade of
noiseless channels itself is noiseless. A characteristic of cascades
that are neither noiseless nor deterministic is that their mutual
information generally is less than the mutual information of one
of their constituent channels. Put metaphorically, a cascade of
channels tends to 'leak' information, being no stronger in its
information-bearing capacity than its weakest link.
Communication theory also provides resources for dealing with
channels whose input and output, as it were, are collapsed into
one. To conceive of an information channel whose input and out-
put are drawn from the same alphabet, with every output-event
related to each input-event by a specific conditional probability of
occurrence, is to conceive of a first-order Markov source. An
mth-order Markov source is an alphabet of events in which the
probability of occurrence of a given member of the alphabet is a
function of the m preceding occurrences. A first-order Markov
source thus is one in which the identity of each successive event
(each output-event) is a probablistic function of the event imme-
diately preceding (a specific input-event). In similar fashion, a
second-order Markov source can be conceived as a cascade of two
information channels with all inputs and outputs comprising the
same alphabet, and so forth. The mutual convertibility of a
single-alphabet information channel (or cascade of channels)
with its corresponding Markov source is guaranteed by the fact
29
Fundamentals
that both can be completely characterized by a conditional
probability matrix of the same basic form. The generalized
channel matrix in footnote 6 of this chapter, for example, can be
converted into a matrix for the corresponding first-order source
by stipulating the following equalities: al = bbl,l , a2 = b 2 .
. .. ..
an == bm, with n == m.
4 INFORMATION STORAGE AND

PROCESSING
With this conception of information as a decrease in uncertainty,

or more directly as an increase in probability, what sense is to be
made of such common expressions as 'information transmission',
'information storage', and (that vaguest of locutions) 'information
processing'? Since an increase in probability is not a commodity
that can be moved about in space and time, information cannot
be transmitted like electrical power, and cannot be stored like
grain or whiskey. Neither can it be processed like meat or petro-
leum. For that matter, we may well ask, what literal sense does it
make to speak of an information source or terminal? Does infor-
mation originate from a source like a brook from a spring, or
terminate like a flight at the airport runway?
To question the meaning of such expressions, of course, is not
to suggest that they have no clear use in ordinary contexts. We
understand reasonably well (and electrical engineers understand
better) what it is to transmit information across a video channel.
And we have no cause to be critical of the computer specialist's
commodious understanding of 'information processing'. Our
question rather is whether, given the specific definition of'infor-
mation' above reflecting its common use in most nontechnical
contexts, we are able to provide specific definitions for these
other expressions as well which likewise remain faithful to their
common meanings.
Let us conceive as an instance of information transmission any
process in which the probability of one or more members of an
ensemble of events or states is changed as the result of a change in
probability of an event or state outside the ensemble. Thus con-
ceived, information transmission occurs with every physical
process (and with interactions among nonphyskal states, if such
30
Informatioll
exist). An information source is an ensemble of possible events or
states the members of which are so related that the sum of their
probabilities of occurrence is unity, and each of which by its
occurrence results in a change in probability of at least one other
event or state. An information terminus is an ensemble of possible
events or states with members so related that the sum of their
probabilities of occurrence is unity, and a change in probability
of occurrence of anyone of which is the result of a change in
probability of an event or state outside the ensemble. An infor-
mation source and its associated terminus, of course, constitute
an information channel. Information transmission thus may be
conceived also as simply a change in state of the output of an
information channel resulting from a change in input state.
What we recognize explicitly as an information source or
terminus will vary with our practical and theoretical interests.
Since radio transmitters and receivers are manufactured speci-
fically for the communication of information of a specific charac-
ter, we count these devices as typical of information sources and
termini. There are information channels not of human manufacture,
such as that between a star and an observing eye, that also offer
familiar paradigms. It should be held clearly in mind, however,
that any two ensembles of events constitute an information chan-
nel if their members are related by conditional probabilities of
occurrence; hence any event is a possible member of a source or
terminus.
Explication of the notion of information storage calls for dis-
cussion of how events may be related in an information source.
Since events at a source are mutually exclusive, only one event
occurs at any given stage of the source's activity. This requires an
ordering among event-occurrences, conceived most easily per-
haps as a temporal sequence. An example is the sequence of dots
and dashes entered into a telegraph line by operation of the key,
or the uttering of sounds into a telephone receiver. But there is no
requirement that the ordering among event-occurrences at an
information source be tempora1. A spatial ordering could do as
well. Consider a computer generating a list of numbers selected
randomly between one and fifty, issued simultaneously on a high
speed line-printer. In this case the ordering relation of the source
is spatial, instead of temporal as with display seriatim on a cathode-
ray tube. Apart from problems of physical representation, there
31
Fundamentals
may exist yet other orderings that are neither spatial nor temporal,
as illustrated in the sequence of natural numbers.
The term 'storage' commonly suggests inactivity over a period
of time. The notion of information in storage thus suggests
information characterized without change in the temporal
dimension. If time were the only dimension in which the state of a
source could change, this notion would be paradoxical, since
information has been defined as a change of probability. As the
illustrations above indicate, however, events at a source also can
be characterized with respect to differences along a spatial con-
tinuum. A more common example of change of probability
along a spatial dimension is the sequence of letters along a line of
printed English. Before the first member of the sequence is
specified, the probability that a given letter will be specified as the
second member of the series is roughly equal to its frequency of
occurrence generally in the written language. With specification
of the first letter, however, probabilities of occurrence in the
second place will alter. Since this sequence of specification is
in the spatial (as with a printing press or line-printer) rather
than in the temporal dimension, the change in probability con-
stituting the information along the printed line occurs in a spatial
ordering.
Information storage thus may be conceived as transferral of
probabilities of occurrence from a temporal to a spatial domain.
The form of spatial storage generally will be such as to make the
information recoverable in temporal form. Paradigm examples
are the storage of computer operating instructions on magnetic
tape, the storage of verbal information in the written line, and
the storage of structural information in the genes of a living
organism.
The concept of a cascade of information channels is useful in a
general characterization of information processing. A cascade,
we may recall, is simply a series of two or more information
channels such that the output of the first is the input of the second,
the output of the second the input of the third (if present) and so
forth. Unless all channels in a cascade are noiseless, information
will be diminished in quantity as it passes through the cascade.
This property of cascaded channels sometimes is a source of
technical problems, as with the attenuation of signals across
transoceanic cable. Properly controlled, though, it is an impor-
32
Information
tant asset. One result of reducing information through a cascade
might be to eliminate redundant signals, or details that are irre-
levant for a particular purpose. Another is to render repeating
signal patterns in more general form. Yet other such operations
are reduction of information patterns to numerical form, and
subsequent arithmetical transformations made possible by this
formulation. Such filtering and computational operations, of
course, are typical of information processing as understood by the
computer specialist.
Let us then conceive information processing quite generally as the
passing of information through cascades of information channels,
for the purpose of paring down the quantity of information
involved and of rendering it in a form suitable for a particular
application. The mode of application depends upon the activities
of the system which is served by the informational process. Our
concern in the chapters following will be largely with informa-
tional processes in the service of living organisms.
NOTES
1 Caution was first issued by Hartley himself, in the very article in which
the term 'information' was first given technical employment (Hartley,
1928, p. 538). See also Shannon and Weaver (1949, p. 3) and Bar-Hillel
and Carnap (1953).
2 Within a decade after the publication of Shannon's article in book form
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949) possible applications of communication
theory to an impressive variety of other disciplines were explored. Notable
illustrations are Attneave (1959), Quastler (ed.) (1953), Bar-Hillel and
Carnap (1953) and Hiller and Isaacson (1959). A sense of the diversity of
these early approaches may be gathered from the bibliographies of the
later works, Garner (1962), Luce (ed.) (1960), and Luce, Bush and
Galanter (eds) (1963).
B
FIJndafllcnta/s
3 Hartley (1928), pp. 538-4°. My development of the problem is not in-
tended as a faithful reproduction of Hartley's discussion.
4 See Sayre (1965), p. 232, for a discussion of this feature.
5 Many treatments of communication theory are available, for the tech-
nical and for the general reader. A clear and comprehensive technical
treatment is Abramson (1963). Less technical discussions may be found in
Weaver's contribution to Shannon and Weaver (1949), and in Bar-Hillel
(1964), ch. 16. Readers favoring something in between may wish to
refer to Sayre (1965), ch. II, or Sayre (1969), ch. 7.
6 A perspicuous representation of an information channel thus is afforded
by the following matrix, where P(bj/ai) is the probability of bJ given ai
at the input:
Outputs
b1 b2 bm
al P(b1/al) P(b2/al) ... P(bm/al)
a2 P(bl/a2) P(b2/a2) ... P(bm/a2)
Inputs
an P(bl/an) P(b 2/an) ••. P(bm/an)

7 A derivation of this property follows:
I(A;B) = H(A) - H(A/B)
(1) = EP(a) log I/P(a) - EP(a,b) log I/P(a/b)
A A,B
(2) = EP(a,b) log I/P(a) - EP(a,b) log I/P(a/b)
A,B A,B
(3) = EP(a,b) log P(a/b)/P(a)
A,B
Equality (1) follows by definition of H(A) and H(A/B); (2) follows since
the joint occurrence of a1 and bJ for all j equals the occurrence of a1 un-
conditionally; (3) follows by the relation between the division of quanti-
ties and the subtraction of their logarithms.
Since the joint probabilities P(a,b) and P(b,a) are equal, and since
Pea/b) P(b) = P(a,b), we derive further:
P(a/b)/P(a) = P(a,b)/P(b)P(a)
= P(b,a)/P(b)P(a)
= P(b/a)/P(b)
Hence, by substitution in (3), I(A;B) = I(B;A).

8 This is apparent in an inspection of the two simple channel schematics
on p. 35 (i) noiseless and (ii) deterministic:
34
Inforll1ation
InjortJlation
a1 ";2 1
b, 8f bl
~ 1
~ 8:t
% b:J '3
1
3/,0 1
32 b4 84 b2
1',0 1
b6 85
1 1
33 bee
b 8& b3
ii
(i) ii
(ii)
35
35
III
ENTROPY
I COMMUNICATION THEORY AND

THERMODYNAMICS
Information transmission has been defined as the change in

probability of an event in one ensemble resulting from the
occurrence of an event in another. Interactions of this sort typically
involve a transformation of energy. Any transformation of
energy, conversely, is accompanied by changes in probability
among associated events. Thus thermodynamics, the study of
energy transformations, might be expected to bear a close rela-
tionship to communication theory.
Even a summary discussion of this relationship would involve
more mathematical resources than presently at our disposal. The
upshot of such a discussion, however, would be that communica-
tion theory provides a basis upon which thermodynamics can be
systematically developed.! Relying upon earlier work by Maxwell
and Boltzmann, on how to compute the properties of gases by
statistical methods, and upon subsequent work by Gibbs and
Planck showing how the results of classical thermodynamics
can be got from quantum theory through these statistical methods,
Jaynes was able to show in the late 1950S how these same results
could be got more perspicuously on the basis of communication
theory. Given Shannon's formulae it is now possible, as Tribus
puts it (I96Ib, p. xx), 'to begin by considering the properties of
the smallest particles and by simple mathematical methods to
deduce the properties' of macroscopic systems.
36
Entropy
A clue to the relationship between thermodynamics and com-
munication theory is that both employ 'entropy' as a technical
term, with definitions that bear a close formal resemblance.
Although we do not need to explore all affinities between the two
formalisms, it is important to understand generally how these
two entropies are related.
2 THERMODYNAMIC ENTROPY DEFINED
The term 'entropy' was coined by Clausius a century ago to mean

'transformation' (from the Greek trope), and was defined as the
increment of heat energy received by a body divided by the
absolute temperature at which the exchange takes place (Clausius,
1879, p. 107). If the heat exchange produces no change in overall
temperature, the process ideally can be reversed and the system
remains constant in its capacity for work. A reversible change in a
closed system thus leaves its total entropy unaltered, for the
entropy gained by one part of the system is taken away from
another. When significant temperature changes are involved,
however, the system will lose some of its capacity for useful work
and will undergo an overall increase in entropy. Consider, for
example, the transformation of energy when a piece of hot metal
is immersed in cooler water. Although the heat energy lost ideally
is equal to that gained by the water, the absolute temperature of
the water is lower; hence the entropy gained by the water is
greater than that lost by the metal, and the total system increases
in entropy and decreases its capacity for useful work. 2 Whereas
the Second Law of Thermodynamics originally had been for-
mulated as the statement that energy available for work never
increases within a closed system, this definition of entropy
permits a concise restatement: the entropy of a closed system
never diminishes. As a system tends toward thermodynamic
equilibrium, moreover, its entropy increases, and in the final
state no energy remains in a form convertible to work. 3
The concept of thermal equilibrium suggests other ways of
conceiving entropy that are helpful for our purposes. Energy,
conceived thermodynamically, is molecular motion, and thermal
equilibrium is a condition in which all molecular motion is
randomly distributed. A system in thermal equilibrium can
37
Fundamentals
accomplish no work because no energy differences exist between
different parts. Such a system is in maximum disorder; random
molecular activity amounts to complete absence of structure. A
system contains energy for work, on the other hand, in propor-
tion to the departure from randomness of its molecular states. In
general, the greater the number of distinguishably different struc-
tural states within a system, and the greater their departure from
a random arrangement, the lower the entropy of the system, and
the greater its capacity for discharging energy in the form of work.
The formal statistical treatment of these intuitive relationships
was due to Planck and Boltzmann. Any system consists of atomic
elements which might exist in many different configurations,
depending upon their positions, velocities and quantum states.
In Planck's terminology, each possible configuration of micro-
states is referred to as a 'complexion' of the system at large
(Brillouin, 1962, p. 120). Individual complexions, however, are
not empirically distinguishable, for many different complexions
will correspond to any given macrostate. That is, for every
empirically distinguishable state (macrostate) of the system,
there are many possible complexions (microstates) that would
result in the empirical characteristics by which that macrostate
is identified. The a priori probability of the system's existing in a
given macros tate is equal to the proportion of all complexions
correlated with that particular macros tate to all possible com-
plexions of the system overall. 4 The relationship between the
entropy of a system and the probability distribution of its pos-
sible complexions is given by the well known equation attributed
to Boltzmann.
If P is the proportion of all complexions of a system corres-
ponding to a given macros tate, and k is Boltzmann's constant,S
then the equation S = k logn P gives the entropy S of the system
in that macrostate. In general, the higher the proportion of com-
plexions corresponding to a given macrostate, the more disorder
among its elements, and the less structure exhibited by a system
in that particular state. The most probable state in which a system
could exist, accordingly, is one of maximum disorder, depending
least upon any particular arrangement of its atomic constituents.
The more random the arrangement of its constituents, moreover,
the greater its content of thermal energy and the less energy it has
available for useful (mechanical and chemical) work. 6 A system
38
Entropy
existing in its most probable state is in thermal equilibrium, and
thus contains no energy convertible into other forms.
These relationships provide various additional ways of charac-
terizing thermodynamic entropy. An increase in entropy of a
closed system is not only a decrease in energy available for useful
work, but also a decrease in structure among its constituents (a
decrease in order, an increase in randomness) and an increase in
the a priori probability of its macros tate (an increase in the number
of complexions to which that state corresponds). An alternative
formulation of the Second Law thus is that a closed system tends
to change in its spontaneous action into more and more probable
macrostates. What this means in practical terms is nothing strange
to the housewife or gardener, nor other persons occupied in a
constant struggle against wear and decay.
Yet another conception of entropy emerges when we consider
the viewpoint of the experimenter seeking to specify the micro-
structure of an isolated system. Since many possible microstates
of a system correspond to any observable macrostate, more
knowledge about the system would be required to specify its
microstate at a given time than is available in observation of its
present characteristics. Moreover, as the system becomes less
highly organized (more probable in its macrostate), more possible
microstates correspond to its observable characteristics and more
knowledge would be needed to specify its microstructure. In
short, as the system becomes more random in structure, more
detailed knowledge is required for its complete specification.
Admitting relevant limitations in the amount of knowledge
available about a complex system, we may also conceive entropy
as directly proportional to the amount of knowledge that would
be required (if available) for a detailed description of the system's
microstate. As Tribus puts it (I96Ib, p. 146), 'entropy only
measures the extent of our ignorance about the detailed be-
havior of a system... .' Even more picturesque is the paraphrase
of the Second Law attributed to Gibbs (ibid.) that the 'mixed-
upped-ness' of a closed system always increases.
A simple analogy will illustrate the relationship between these
various characterizations of physical entropy and the Second
Law of Thermodynamics. 7 Imagine a large number of Mexican
jumping beans, one-third each red, blue and green, the agitation
(energy level) of which varies according to color. The beans are
39
Fundamentals
placed in a container divided into three equal compartments by
partitions low enough for any bean to jump over, but each com-
partment originally contains beans of a single color only. The
entropy of the system at this stage is minimal, for the beans are
arranged in maximum order. Potential for work (difference in
energy level between compartments) also is maximum; a light
object balanced on a partition would be pushed in one direction
by the superior force of the beans striking it from the other.
Moreover, a minimal amount of knowledge is necessary for a
description of the location of all the beans in the container, for
nothing more need be known than the color of each bean and the
arrangement of colors in the several compartments. As the beans
begin to change compartments, however, their arrangement
becomes less orderly, their potential for work decreases, and m0re
knowledge is required for a complete specification of their
individual locations. A state of maximum disorder is reached
when the beans are dispersed randomly throughout the container,
accompanied by an incapacity of the system for useful work and a
maximum uncertainty in location of the individual beans.
The beans in this analogy, of course, correspond to the parti-
cles whose agitation constitutes useful energy within a physical
system. In terms of this model, entropy may be characterized
alternatively as randomness in distribution of beans throughout
the container, as degree of parity in energy level between com-
partments, and as amount of knowledge required for a complete
system description. Thermal equilibrium is reached when the
distribution of elements becomes wholly random, and the system
has lost all capacity to change in statistical characteristics.
Let us now consider how information and associated concepts
can be fit into the picture. Our particular problem is to relate
thermodynamic entropy to the entropy of communication theory.
3 THE TWO ENTROPIES RELATED
The entropy of an ensemble of events (A) is defined in communi-

cation theory as the average information of its individual mem-
bers, represented formally by the equation:
H(A) = - ~ P(a) log P(a)
A
40
Entropy
Boltzmann's formulation of thermodynamic entropy is
S = klog n P
Both Hand S are functions of the quantity log P. In both cases,
moreover, P measures the probability of occurrence of a given
system state. Hence more than a common name suggests that H
and S are related. And their difference in sign suggests an inverse
relationship.
Yet it would seem paradoxical to conclude that H is simply the
negative of S, since both quantities increase directly with an in-
crease in randomness. (For set A with a given number of members,
H(A) reaches maximum with equiprobable members, and (inde-
pendent) equiprobable events occur in random order. Similarly, S
increases with increasing disorder of the system it characterizes,
and increasing disorder is increasing randomness.) How could H
and S take inversely varying values if both serve as measures of
system disorder?
Of course, the difference in sign could be avoided by relying
on the equivalent formulation
H(A) = ~ P(a) log I/P(a)
A
But in this form H still appears to be opposed to S in value, since
H now appears as a function of log I /p. which decreases with an
increase of log P in S.
Thus there are prima facie reasons both for the opinion that H
is the negative of S and for the opinion that Hand S are positively
proportional functions. Our sense of bewilderment is only in-
creased by observing that both views have been defended by
prominent authorities. 8 Indeed, we seem to have encountered a
case of severe conceptual rupture, not unusual at the juncture of
two conflating sciences. Might we find a resolution that is ade-
quate for our own particular purposes, without presuming to
instruct the experts in either domain?
We recall that P in the equation for thermodynamic entropy has
been defined as the proportion of possible complexions (micro-
states) corresponding to the macrostate characterized by S. Let us
now conceive all macro states of the system in question as ar-
ranged in the order of increasing entropy.9 This ordering will be
indicated as a series of macro states Ai, Ai+1 ... AJ ... An, with
entropy S increasing with j.
41
Fundamentals
Our problem is to determine the relationship between thermo-
dynamic entropy (S) and the entropy (H) of communication
theory. Now since the order of increasing j is the order of in-
creasing entropy, it is also the order of increasing proportion of
total microstates; and with appropriately quantized arguments,
these proportions are convertible into determinate fractions. The
order of increasing j thus may be considered an order of increasing
number of microstates associated with macro states Ai through An.
Although different macrostates will be assigned different numbers
of associated microstates, all microstates assigned to a given
macrostate may be assumed equiprobable within that set.
Consider the set of microstates assigned to macros tate A j • As
we have seen, the entropy H of an ensemble increases with an
increasing number of (equiprobable) members. Hence H(A j )
increases with increasing j. When macrostate AJ is conceived as an
ensemble of possible microstates, the entropy of Aj as an infor-
mation source thus varies directly with its thermodynamic
entropy. This relationship between Sand H(A J) is in harmony
with the position of those who claim a positive proportional
relationship between the two entropies.
The microstates assigned to Aj, however, by definition are not
observationally distinguishable. Since an information source is
conceived as a set of mutually exclusive (hence discriminable)
events, meaning can be assigned H(A J) only on a theoretical
basis. Hence there is reason to seek an interpretation of H, in
connection with the series Ai ... An, according to which it is pos-
sible to assign values to H on the basis of observation. The en-
semble of observationally discriminable states of the system in
question is the set of macrostates themselves, which we may
designate as the information source A. The question we have now
to answer is how H(A) varies with thermodynamic entropy S.
Factors relevant to answering this question are (I) the Second
Law of Thermodynamics, which entails that the system tends
increasingly to exist in more probable states; and (2) the defin-
ition of H(A) as average information yielded by members of A,
which entails that H(A) decreases as these members depart pro-
gressively from equiprobability. According to (1), the members
of ensemble A characterized by low entropy (Iowa priori proba-
bility of occurrence) occur less and less frequently, while those
characterized by high entropy occur increasingly more often.
42.
Entropy
Thus, as the system progresses toward maximum thermodynamic
entropy, its possible macrostates diverge increasingly from equi-
probability. By (2), accordingly, H(A) decreases with increasing j,
and hence decreases with increasing S. At its final stage An, when
S is maximum, the system is in its most probable state, and H(A)
takes on its minimum value.
The answer indicated by these considerations is that the com-
munication theoretic entropy H(A) of the system construed as an
ensemble of discriminable macrostates decreases with an increase
in thermodynamic entropy S. This construction is favorable to
those who understand H as negatively proportional to S.
Both lines of resolution are in accord with our definition of
information as the removal of uncertainty.lO When the system is
in its state of lowest thermodynamic entropy, it is in the least
likely of all possible macrostates, hence a maximum of informa-
tion is provided by that state's occurrence; but its microstate is
least uncertain, since fewer microstates are associated with that
particular macrostate. Thus H(A) is maximum and H(Aj ) mini-
mum when the system is in its state of lowest thermodynamic
entropy. Conversely, when its thermodynamic entropy is maxi-
mum, its macrostate is most likely, yielding the least information,
while its microstate is least probable, with maximum information
in its occurrence. In this state, accordingly, H(Aj) is maximum
and H(A) minimum.
The results of this analysis are as follows. As the thermody-
namic entropy (S) of a system (A) increases, there is an a priori
increase in the probability of its being in the macrostate (Aj) it is
actually in, hence an increase in the proportion of possible micro-
states associated with that macrostate, and an increase in the
communication theoretic entropy H(Aj ) of that state as an en-
semble of possible microstates. This justifies Tribus's characteriza-
tion (196Ib, p. 145) of thermodynamic entropy as equivalent to
uncertainty, for the uncertainty removed by the occurrence of a
system microstate varies with S. By reverse token, with an in-
crease in S there is also a decrease in the communication theoretic
entropy H(A) of the system as an ensemble of possible macro-
states, and accordingly a decrease in the structure of the system
on the macrolevel and a decrease in its ability to do useful work.
Of particular importance for our purposes is the fact that,
because of decreasing H(A), the information yielded by the
43
Fundamentals
occurrence of a particular macros tate Aj tends to decrease as the
system increases in thermodynamic entropy. In short, information
represented by macrostates of the system decreases with increas-
ing entropy. This renders intelligible Brillouin's characterization
of information as 'negentropy', where the entropy 'negated' is
that of thermodynamics. l l
4 MAXWELL'S DEMON
A thought-experiment known as 'Maxwell's Demon' has become

a standard representation of the subtle consequences of this rela-
tionship between information and physical entropy. Maxwell
proposed the conception of a channel connecting two containers
of gas, access through which was controlled by a nonphysical
demon. By manipulating a frictionless trapdoor across the chan-
nel, the demon would admit only fast moving molecules in one
direction and only slow in the other. After a while the molecules
would be mostly segregated with respect to velocity, and a tem-
perature difference would exist between the two containers. The
apparent result would be a thermal potential achieved without
expenditure of energy, the thermodynamic equivalent of a per-
petual motion machine.
Maxwell's Demon thus appeared to violate the Second Law of
Thermodynamics, and physicists were concerned to detect what
was wrong with this conceptual experiment (besides the demon
himself, whose nonphysical nature at least appeared not to
violate the Second Law). Some concentrated upon the effects of
Brownian motion upon the operation of the trapdoor. Others
debated whether the uncertainty principle would impose a limita-
tion on the acuity of the demon's vision (Brillouin, 1962, pp.
162-3). The most fruitful approach, however, came with Szilard's
observation that the demon must rely upon information re-
garding the state of the moving molecules, and that this informa-
tion could be conveyed only with an expenditure of energy. If, on
the one hand, the demon is to 'see' the individual molecules by
external illumination, this illumination itself introduces additional
energy into the system. If the demon were to detect an individual
molecule by its own radiation, on the other hand, this would
amount to a dispersal of energy within the system which thus
44
Entropy
would become unavailable for further work. In either case, the
decrease of entropy resulting from the nonrandom arrangement
of molecules within the two chambers would be purchased by an
increase in entropy elsewhere within the functioning system.
The outcome of this experiment has been a proof that the
increase in structure (negentropy) represented by the molecules'
nonrandom distribution must be less on the average than the
amount of energy (negentropy) necessary to convey information
discriminating their individual motions (Brillouin, 1962, pp.
164-8). The hypothetical introduction of a being who can move
frictionless doors with no expenditure of energy does not sus-
pend the principle that information can be conveyed between
physical locations only by processes that involve entropy in-
creases at least as great as the resulting decrease of uncertainty.12
It will be enough if we remember this one lesson from Max-
well's fanciful thought-experiment: where there is a transaction
converting negentropy from either information or energy to the
other form, entropy tends to increase as a result of the process.
NOTES
I This result is shown in M. Tribus (I96Ib). A more succinct discussion

is in Tribus (1961a).
2 Note that entropy represents a loss of heat energy available within the
system for doing work. A contemporary of Clausius's, recognizing the
importance of this concept, nonetheless complained that 'Unfortunately
the excellent word Entropy, which Clausius has introduced in this con-
nection, is applied by him to the negative of the idea [availability of heat
for work] we most naturally wish to express' (P. G. Tait, as quoted in
Brillouin, 1962, p. II6, author's emphasis).
3 A common way of conceptualizing the Second Law of Thermodynamics
is to think of the universe as originally in a state of thermodynamic dis-
equilibrium, but as progressing constantly toward a state of equilibrium
at which all energy differentials are cancelled out. At that conjectured
stage entropy would be at a maximum, and no potential would remain
for further change. The 'heat death' of the universe would then have
45
Fundamentals
occurred. Apart from the obvious metaphor in this expression, however,
application of the Second Law to 'the universe as a whole' remains hope-
lessly obscure. The universe cannot coherently be conceived as a closed
system, since there is no coherent concept of what it could be closed to.
4 A basic assumption of statistical mechanics is that the individual micro-
states of a system have equal a priori probability. See Bent (1965), p. 147.
6 Boltzmann's constant is the gas constant divided by Avogadro's number,
evaluated k = I.38 X 10-16 ergs per degree centigrade. Planck claimed
in his Scientific Autobiography, however, that Boltzmann did not introduce
this constant himself, and probably did not investigate its numerical
value (as quoted in H. A. Bent, 1965, p. 14z). This may account for the
fact that some authors refer to the equation above as the 'Boltzmann-
Planck formula,' e.g. Brillouin (196z), p. lZ0.
6 The First and Second Laws of Thermodynamics together imply that
some forms of energy are not spontaneously convertible into other forms;
only so, given the constancy of energy in a closed physical system, could
the system tend to lose its capacity for useful work. Mechanical or
electrical energy can spontaneously degrade into chemical or thermal
energy, and chemical into thermal, but transformations in the opposite
direction are very unlikely to occur. The statement that removal of
thermal energy constitutes a decrease in entropy is sometimes referred to
as the Third Law of Thermodynamics (see Bent, 1965, p. 39).
7 This analogy was suggested by one used by Tribus (1961b, p. 145) for
similar purposes, which derives in turn from H. Blum (1955, pp. 17-19).
8 (1 96z, p. 161)
Brillouin (196z, 16 I) criticizes Shannon for treating the two quantities
as equivalent, citing other authors in support of his own view of the
matter. But Tribus (1961b, pp. 141-Z) maintains the same attitude as
Shannon, expressing entropy in both contexts by the same formulation.
9 Alternatively, we might begin by conceiving the range of all possible
energy levels (macrostates) of the system, and setting each in corres-
pondence with the proportion of different quantum configurations
(microstates) that would yield that energy level according to theory.
These configurations will be appropriately quantized to assure that the
proportions take the form of fractions with determinate arguments (the
same stipulation also applies to the approach in the text above). An
arrangement of these levels in order of decreasing energy available for
work then will be equivalent to the order of increasing entropy.
10 The relationship among these two forms of communication theoretic
entropy and the other various quantities related to entropy discussed in
the preceding section can be depicted against the background of the bar
graph below, in which macrostates are ordered according to the num-
ber of associated microstates. Given this ordering of macrostates, the
temporal direction of a system's processes can be represented as the
direction of greater probability in the state flow diagram following, where
Pj > (1 - Pj). The tendency of the various quantities in question then
can be represented as vectors indicating increase in value. As H(Aj) and
S increase in value, for example, H(A) and energy for work decrease.
46
Entropy
~
.g
0
~
...
II>
>
II>
c:
~
i;i
t>::::J
::::J
~
S
:I:
SallllS0JOIW JO Jaqwnu
g
Co
>
c
II>
Cl
c
Q)
-0
......
II>
E
c:
gj
c:
0
.~
~
c:
II>
::::J
c:
~ (J)d:I (.)
:I:
Ii
.
...
.a
...'"
c
os
... .§~
co E
;
...
a::
C.
::0
Co
~
~
0
CII
I
...5
II>
II>
II See Brillouin (1962, p. 153) for this use of 'negentropy'. Note, however, M
that there is no justification in the discussion above for conceiving the

negentropy of H(A) as literally the negative of thermodynamic entropy S.
Our discussion has shown only that H(A) tends to decrease as S increases,
and vice versa.
12 In Brillouin's terms (1962, p. 168), 'every physical measurement requires
a corresponding entropy increase'; in Gabor's, 'We cannot get anything
for nothing, not even an observation.' Brillouin expresses surprise (ibid.)
'that such a general result escaped attention until very recently.' The
interchangeability of information and energy as forms of negentropy pro-
vides the basis for solution of a problem that had troubled renal physio-
logists for half a century. The kidneys are among the hardest working
tissues in the body, second only to the heart in rate of oxygen consump-
tion per weight. Yet the only thermodynamically measurable work the
kidneys do in their immediate environment is to concentrate urine and
hence to conserve body water, a task consuming less than I per cent of
their energy input. The problem was to understand why such an elegant
device performs with such apparent inefficiency. The solution came with
realizing that the main function of the kidneys is not merely to conserve
but rather to control the composition of the body's extracellular fluid, a
task involving continuous surveillance of ions and molecules passing
through the kidney tissues and the sorting out of unwanted particles.
This latter task requires the generation of a large amount of information,
the energy costs of which establish the efficiency of the kidney at about
30 per cent and make this organ even more efficient than the heart as an
energy-handling device. This result is due to H. A. Johnson and K. D.
Knudsen, and is summarized in Johnson (1970). With regard to the topic
of the following chapter, it should be noted that this process of surveil-
lance is typical of feedback processes involved in metabolism.
47
IV
FEEDBACK
I THE PRIORITY OF INFORMATION OVER

FEEDBACK
Feedback processes existed in nature before life's first stirrings, and

have figured in technology from its very beginning. Yet only
within the current century have such processes been conceptually
isolated and provided with a general name. Not unexpectedly,
these processes which so long eluded naming also prove difficult
to define.
But my concern in this chapter is not merely to define various
forms of the feedback process. I wish also to characterize feed-
back as a form of information processing. One reason has to do
with a leading theme of this study, that human consciousness
involves adaptive procedures of basically the same sort as those
involved in species evolution and in the conditioning of behavior.
Since the analysis of consciousness below relies more upon the
categories of communication theory, while those of evolution and
conditioning depend more upon the concept of negative feedback,
it is important to understand the relationship between informa-
tion and the feedback process.
A more basic reason has to do with the systematic priority of
the concept of information in the following account of human
mentality. The concept of information dearly is more primitive
than that of feedback in the sense that it is definable simply as a
change in probability, while feedback can be defined only as an
interaction among several events. But the former is more primi-
16
Feedback
tive also in the sense that feedback can be defined as an informa-
tion process, but not vice versa. My defense of the claim that
evolution and conditioning (like consciousness and reasoning) are
forms of information processing will rest on the analysis of these
phenomena as feedback processes, conjoined with the argument
in the present chapter that feedback itself is a form of information
exchange.
2 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FEEDBACK
Feedback is a process by which the behavior of an operating

system is influenced in turn by the effects of this behavior with
respect to the system's operating environment. But the expres-
sions 'operating system' and 'operating environment' themselves
require clarification.
By 'system' let us mean any set of interacting variables, and by
'operating system' any system whose variables change in value
with time. A set of (constant coefficient) differential equations is a
system that is not operational. Examples of operating systems
include living organisms and functioning machines.
Our sun and its planets also constitute an operating system, but
one we normally (and perhaps corrigibly) understand to operate
independently of an external environment. Any living organism,
by contrast, exerts an influence upon some environment, and
depends upon its environment for life support. The external pro-
cesses that either influence or are influenced by an operating
system comprise what we shall call its 'operating environment'.
A system thus interacts with its operating environment in
much the way its variables interact among themselves. Indeed,
the boundaries between system and environment are intrinsically
vague. The grounds for distinction in any particular case are that
an operating system usually can change environments without loss
of integrity, and that an environment usually can sustain a variety
of operating systems. A geranium, for example, can be trans-
planted from pot to pot, and more than one plant can be nourished
by a pot of soil.
Mutual influence between a system and its operating environ-
ment does not by itself distinguish feedback processes from chance
interactions, as when a boy is startled by a quail he had just
49
F tlJldatJlentals
flushed from a bush. In feedback, the environment in some way
controls the continuing behavior of the operating system. As a
step toward making the nature of this control apparent, let us
distinguish negative from positive feedback.
Positive feedback is a source of instability, leading if unchecked
to the destruction of the system itself. Gunpowder explodes
because the chemical combination of its components produces
heat, which increases the rate of combination with resultant
increase of heat, and so forth, issuing in the (only apparently)
instantaneous destruction of the combining elements. View~d
cybernetically, the firing of gunpowder is an increasingly more
rapid process of oxidation, leading momentarily to self-extinction.
Other examples of positive feedback are provided by the way in
which a throat irritation induces coughing, which produces
progressively more irritation in turn, and the way in which an
insect bite becomes more itchy the more it is scratched. A more
poignant illustration is that of the insecure child who incites
abuse and teasing from his playmates because of his vulnerability,
leading only to an increase in his feeling of inadequacy and in the
adverse attention he consequently attracts.
The common feature in these examples is an increase in rate or
intensity of a pattern of activity resulting from performance of
the activity itself. The activity reinforces its own performance
through its environmental effect. Such a process results in self-
administered positive reinforcement of the activity in question,
hence the label 'positive feedback'.
Negative feedback, by contrast, is a source of stability and
control. As the etymology of the term 'cybernetics' itself suggests
(see chapter I), it is feedback of this sort with which the cyber-
neticist is primarily concerned. The characteristic feature of
negative feedback is that it acts to prevent ('negate') excessive
deviation of the system from a standard operating condition.
A clear illustration of negative feedback is the process by which
the level of illumination is regulated on the retina. When retinal
excitation increases beyond a certain optimal level, the pupil of the
eye contracts to decrease the amount of incoming light energy;
conversely, the pupil dilates to admit more light when the excita-
tion level decreases. In this circuit of interactions, the rods and
cones of the retina serve the visual system as sensors for detecting
current levels of illumination in the environment, the neural
50
Feedback
mechanisms that summate retinal stimulation serve as informa-
tion-processors, and the pupillary muscles that shape the aper-
ture serve as effectors maintaining the system in a constant
operating state. This combination of sensors, information-proces-
sors and effectors constitutes what we will call a 'feedback loop'.
Another physiological control system exhibiting negative
feedback is that regulating the temperature of the brain, and of
other vital organs, by regulating the temperature of their blood
supply. Heat is dissipated from this system through radiation
from blood vessels near the surface of the skin, and by evapora-
tion of perspiration from the surface itself. The mechanisms
responsible for capillary dilation and sweat gland activity thus
are the effectors of this regulatory network. The sensors are the
neurons exposed to the flow of blood through the hypothalamus
that vary their electrical activity with change in temperature. And
the information-processing component is the neural connection
between these neurons and the effector mechanisms.! Note that
the skin surface from which heat is dissipated is part of the en-
vironment of the physiological control system, which need not
coincide with the environment of the organism itself.
The first of these two systems regulates light energy admitted
to the optic nerves; the second regulates heat energy dispersed
from the body interior. Each system has the role of maintaining
the variable it regulates in a constant state that is physiologically
optimal, a process known technically as 'homeostasis'. As Cannon
noted (1932, pp. 24, 261) when he introduced the term into our
vocabulary, homeostatic processes serve the internal economy of
the functioning organism, and are typical of processes biologists
term 'involuntary' or 'autonomic'. This is not to say, of course,
that homeostasis is limited to biological systems. An even more
common paradigm of homeostasis is the thermostatic heating
system, which maintains a constant room temperature through
thermal variations in the outside air.
Nor is negative feedback limited to macroscopic systems. In-
deed, there is probably no aspect of the development, metabolism
and group behavior of living organisms in which negative feed-
back is not in some way involved. Consider this example from
molecular biochemistry.
Research recently published by French biologists Frans;ois
Jacob and Jacques Monod has shown that the metabolism,
CPV-C 51
Fundamentals
growth and division of bacteria cells are regulated by feedback
mechanisms similar to those studied by physiologists and con-
trol engineers. 2 Typical of these cells, and among the simplest
organisms presently known, is the common Escherichia coli. The
action of enzymes within this cell contributes to the production
of proteins which figure essentially in the cell's metabolism,
primarily in the accumulation and hydrolyzation of lactose and
other sugar substances (Monod, 1971, p. 73). One stage in the
production of these proteins is the synthesis of the amino acid
L-isoleucine. By employing L-isoleucine marked with radioactive
atoms, these researchers found that the amount of amino acid
within the cell acts as a signal controlling its own synthesis. That
is, accumulation of the amino acid above a certain level cuts off
further production of additional amino acid. Since L-isoleucine
is an ingredient of the proteins in question, the level of the amino
acid in the cell regulates protein production, and hence contri-
butes to the cell's metabolism. The mechanisms by which this is
effected involve a repressor molecule that attaches itself struc-
turally to the genes in the chromosomes involved in the produc-
tion of the contributing enzymes (Changeux, 19 65, pp. 38, 39).
In brief, repression and stimulation of protein production
within the cell is accomplished through the operation of specialized
receptor mechanisms, each capable of responding selectively to a
specific signal, and each controlling the synthesis of contributing
enzymes by acting upon genes by which that process is directed.
The effectiveness of this regulatory mechanism (on our time
scale) is quite dramatic. Within two or three minutes after a sud-
den increase in concentration of amino acid, the cell increases
its rate of protein production a thousand times over. It then falls
back to its previous 'dormant' rate within a similar period after
the concentration drops back to its previous level. The character
of this control process leads Monod to liken it to mechanisms em-
ployed in electronic automation circuitry, and he himself analyzes
the process in terms of feedback interactions (1971, pp. 64-8).
3 HOMEOSTATIC FEEDBACK
A homeostatic process can be described as a series of interactions

with three distinguishable stages: (i) the interaction between
52
Feedback
system and environment in which the system is disrupted from a
normal operating state, (ii) the interaction by which the system's
sensors indicate this disruption to its effectors and (iii) the inter-
action between the effectors and other internal variables by which
the system is returned to a normal state.
Conceive the operating environment as a set of events 0,
comprising all distinguishable environmental states and rela-
tionships capable of influencing the system parameter that is
homeostatically protected. In similar fashion, conceive S as the
set of all values of this system parameter, and E as the set of all
effector conditions by which this parameter can be adjusted after
environmental disruption. The series of interactions distinguished
°
above thus can be conceived as a cascade of information channels,
(i) to S, (ii) S to E, and (iii) E to S, respectively.3 Homeostasis
thus may be conceived in terms of communication theory. But let
us attempt to devise a less perfunctory characterization.
The cascade of channels S to E to S can be collapsed concep-
tually into the reflexive channel S to S, appropriately conceived
as a first-order Markov source (see chapter II). And first-order
Markov sources can be formulated with homeostatic character-
istics. 4 Such sources, however, do not constitute feedback systems
of the sort we have been considering, since they contain no
representation of the operating environment 0.
The set 0, by definition, comprises all and only environmental
states capable of influencing S. We assume, however, that not all
changes in S occur consequently to changes in 0; otherwise the
°
system would lack recovery powers and not be homeostatic.
We assume also that is not influenced by S in turn; otherwise
the system would not be merely homeostatic, but would exhibit
feedback of a sort we have yet to discuss. The system thus
characterized may be conceived as a Markov source with homeo-
static capacities, driven into disequilibrium intermittently by
an input signal of environmental origin. All these features can
be represented as probabilistic functions. 5 Hence this system
can be characterized formally in terms of communication
theory.
Since a homeostatic system of this sort maintains its structure
through change, its physical realization would exhibit a continu-
ing low level of thermodynamic entropy. This structural negen-
tropy would be purchased at the expense of information arriving
53
Fundamentals
through the system's sensors, and of energy channeled through
the effectors that maintain homeostasis.
4 HETEROTELIC FEEDBACK
Negative feedback of a different sort occurs when a system's

effectors operate to maintain a certain relation between system
and environment, rather than to maintain certain conditions
within the system itself. A common example is provided by the
target-seeking missile which changes direction in response to
changes in its target's position to maintain a constant relative
heading. In similar fashion, the daylily directs its blossom toward
the light of the sun, and the young oak escapes the shadow of its
towering neighbors.
In such cases, feedback works to maintain the organism in a
certain relationship with its operating environment, rather than
to sustain a certain internal state. The outcome, moreover, is
often the achievement of certain environmental relationships
which lead to a suspension of the feedback process. For example,
the control operations of the missile terminate when it collides
with the target. Systems under the control of this variety of feed-
back thus may exhibit a rudimentary form of 'goal-directed'
behavior. If a classical neologism is desired to contrast with
'homeostasis', perhaps such systems could be labeled 'hetero-
telic'.6
telic' .6
Heterotelic feedback differs from homeostasis in directing the
response of the environmentally stimulated system back to the
environment rather than containing it within the system itself. 7
Yet it may not always be clear which form of feedback is operating
in a given system. A case in point is the visual startle reaction of
the human organism. When the eye picks up stimulation from a
startling object at the periphery of its sensory field, the position
of the eyes, the head, and often the whole body will change to
bring the intruding object sharply into focus at the foveae of the
retinas. After the initial startle reaction, the object may remain in
retinal focus until it disappears, or is comfortably integrated with
other objects in the perceptual field. This process is homeostatic,
maintaining a constant pattern of excitation within the fovea.
But there is a heterotelic dimension to the process as well, for the
54
Feedback
organism is maintained in a constant (head-on) relationship with
a prominent part of its operating environment.
One reasonable way to remove the ambiguity is to think of the
retina, the effector muscles, and the incoming stimulation as con-
stituting a homeostatic system, and to think of this in turn as part
of a larger heterotelic system which is the organism itself as a
perceptual and motor unit. In like fashion, the overall heterotelic
activity of a homing missile is maintained by homeostatic control
of incoming signals (acoustic, thermal, or electromagnetic) within
a fixed area of its receptive field. Other cases of ambiguity, of
course, may be less easily resolvable; and there is no general
reason why such ambiguity should disturb us.
Yet the distinction between these two types of feedback is
worth preserving, for there are reasons for considering homeo-
stasis a more rudimentary process. One reason involves a modest
evolutionary conjecture. Since a homeostatic system can be
destroyed by severe disequilibrium, an organism capable of
moderating environmental stress before disequilibrium occurs
stands a better chance of surviving wide fluctuations in living
conditions. A shift in effector orientation from interior (homeo-
static) to exterior (heterotelic) adjustments thus amounts to a
major advance in the development of biological control mech-
anisms. The conjecture that homeostatic feedback preceded
heterotelic in evolutionary development is reinforced by the
observation that sensors capable of discriminating only among
internal states (like a thermostat) are generally less complex than
sensors that discriminate external configurations (like a radar set).
On the premiss that more complex mechanisms are developed
more slowly (whether by evolution or technology), it follows
again that heterotelic feedback appeared later in the development
of organisms.
Further, homeostasis is essential for the operation of a hetero-
telic system, while no similar dependency exists in the opposite
direction. Whereas interruption of heterotelic activity (fly-catch-
ing by a frog, a homing missile in flight) typically marks success
of the system's performance, an interruption of homeostasis
(maintenance of chemical balance in the animal's blood, disrup-
tion of the missile's power supply) is detrimental to a system's
operating condition. Thus any system is dependent on homeo-
stasis for continued operation, which no parallel requirement
55
Fundamentals
exists in general for heterotelic feedback. Homeostasis thus
appears to be both precursor and ingredient of heterotelic
activity.
16 SENTIENT AND ANTICIP A TORY

FEEDBACK
The following account of the territorial behavior of brightly

colored coral fish, taken from Konrad Lorenz's On Aggression,
illustrates feedback processes essentially different from either
form discussed above. Impressed by the solitary living habits of
these creatures, and by the correlation between the brightness of
their hue and their aggression toward others of their species,
Lorenz conjectured that hue plays the role of inciting intra-
specific fighting, and set about to find an evolutionary explana-
tion. His answer came with the realization that such fish live
within well defined territories just large enough to provide food
for a single fish (or for a pair if the species is given to permanent
mating). The function of the fish's bright coloration, Lorenz
concluded, is to serve as a warning to possible intruders that the
territory is occupied, much as a dog marks his domain by trees
and bushes scented during his daily round.
Lorenz's most remarkable discovery in this regard, however, is
that the readiness of such a fish to fight with one of his fellows
decreases geometrically with the distance from the center of his
territory (Lorenz, 1963, p. 36). When, for example, two angel fish
with neighboring territories encounter one another, the one
nearest its own center likely will put the other to flight, only to
be repulsed in turn when encroaching some distance into the
other's area. With possible adjustments for greater prowess on
the part of one contestant, this pursuit and retreat activity will
oscillate around a line roughly equidistant between the two
centers of maximum hostility. This line will be the boundary
between the two territories. The beneficial effect of this interac-
tion, from the evolutionary viewpoint, is that the stronger mem-
bers of the species are provided food enough to support their
more vigorous metabolisms, while the weaker are deprived of
territory and hence of nourishment.
The feedback mechanisms governing this behavior differ from
56
Feedback
any discussed above in that they rely upon states of the organism
which can vary widely without endangering its vital functions
(sensory response to coloration), but serve as precursors of others
(organic damage from a fight) of which this is not the case. Visual
response to the bright coloration of a potential aggressor obviously
is less harmful than a bite in the head. Let us refer to processes
of this sort as 'sentient feedback'. A system exhibits sentient feed-
back if its behavior is governed in part by changes in variables
that can withstand wide fluctuation without system impairment,
but which would be followed by states detrimental to the system
if corrective activity were not quickly forthcoming. Let us see
how sentient feedback might be added to our basic model.
We have conceived S as a set of system states that must be
maintained within a certain range for its continued viability, and
o as the set of states of the operating environment capable of
disturbing S from its optimal states. Certain of these environ-
mental states may upset the system so radically that destruction
follows, and any mechanism forestalling such disruptions would
tend to increase the system's survival value. The fish capable of
sensing and subsequently avoiding an approaching opponent
has obvious advantages over another whose first indication of
danger is a nip in the head.
Conceive now a second set of system states S', related to S as
follows: for each member of S there is a member of S' that (i) is
temporally prior to that member of S, (ii) is stimulated by the
same states of 0, and (iii) is not essential for the system's continued
operation and hence does not require homeostatic protection.
Sentient feedback can develop in a system thus provided by the
further provision that (iv) the set S yields to S' as sensor in the
heterotelic control of the system in 0. 8
In operational systems, conditions (i), (ll), and (iii) might be
met by the development of specialized receptors that respond
more quickly to 0 than do the variables of S that the system
protects. Condition (iv) might come about by the development of
increased interdependence (for example, through physiological
proximity) between Sand S', and by the emerging dominance of
S' (for example, due to its temporal precedence) in the production
of E. 9 Impetus for development of these features would be pro-
vided by the increased survival value they afford, for it is apparent
(by inspection of the diagrams in the two footnotes immediately
S8
Fundamentals
preceding) that the vital variables of a system are more fully
protected by sentient than by simple heterotelic feedback in
being removed from the primary feedback loop.
Yet a further cushioning of S would be achieved if the system
were able to respond to threatening states 0 before they occurred,
and to take action to prevent their actual occurring. Paradoxical
as this may seem from an abstract description, such an ability
is made possible for some biological organisms by the regularity
of nature combined with the development of information-storage
capacities. To put it in anthropomorphic terms, some organisms
are able to remember the antecedents of environmental events
that are particularly noteworthy, and to avoid (or to pursue) the
latter by appropriate responses to the former. To put it cyber-
netically, some biological systems are capable of sentient feed-
back in which the organism's behavior is governed by sensory
response to the antecedents of environmental states that would
influence the system unfavorably (or favorably), rather than by
response to these states as actually present. I shall refer to regu-
latory processes of this sort as 'anticipatory feedback'.
Characterization of anticipatory feedback requires reference to
another set of events 0', the members of which are paired with
members of 0 so that the former closely precede the latter in
their regular occurrence. The set 0, we recall, comprises states
of the operating environment the persistence of which would
disrupt the system's protected states S, and which trigger sensory
states S' in basic sentient feedback. Basic sentient feedback is
replaced by anticipatory feedback when members of S' come to be
triggered by members of 0' instead. By this expedient the system
is enabled to detect precursors of disruptive environmental
events before the latter occur and to employ its effectors in
avoidance procedures.1 0 The advantage of this capacity to its
possessor is immediately apparent, and provides an impetus for its
development (discussed in chapter IX) through the evolutionary
process.
Anticipatory feedback is illustrated in the territorial behavior
of Lorenz's coral .fish by their learning to stay within visually or
olfactorily defined bounds beyond which a fight is generally
forthcoming. A mechanical illustration would be an airborne
missile programmed to anticipate the evasive activity of a moving
target. Countless other examples could be found in the daily
S8
Feedback
lives of animals whose continued livelihood depends upon pre-
dicting the behavior of others.
6 FEEDBACK AS INFORMATION
PROCESSING
We have traced in outline a course of possible development of

anticipatory feedback from the simpler homeostatic variety. Let
us add to the sketch by considering these more complex feedback
procedures in view of their informational characteristics.
In any biological system there are variables, such as chemical
balance and structural integrity, that must be held within narrow
ranges of values for its continued operation. Any viable system
has feedback mechanisms to protect it from excessive variation in
these essential respects. One component of any such mechanism
is an effector capable of counteracting the influences that produce
yariation. Another is a sensor to indicate when excessive varia-
tion threatens or has actually occurred. This much is true even
in the case of simple homeostasis.
The salient feature of anticipatory feedback mechanisms is
that their sensors are capable of responding to potentially dis-
rupting environmental factors before their protected variables
are extensively influenced, and hence capable of guiding their
effectors in preventive (instead of merely remedial) reaction. The
role of the sensors in anticipatory feedback thus is to sustain
yariation themselves in order to prevent variation in the system's
protected states.
An intriguing aspect of these more complex feedback mech-
anisms is that they are better able to prevent fluctuation in the
yariables they protect the more their sensory components are
susceptible to variation themselves. Stability thus is the product
of variability. For variability in a sensor amounts to sensitivity,
and the importance of sensitivity in a regulatory mechanism is
easily appreciated.
Related to this is the anomaly that more highly evolved
organisms often appear less fully protected than lower forms. A
turtle's shell is a paradigm of protective covering, while man's
tender skin is subject to countless disturbances. The appropriate
response to such musings, of course, is that man's sensory sur-
S9
Fundamentals
faces are vulnerable just because they are sensitive, and that this
sensitivity serves protective mechanisms far superior to the
turtle's. The source of pain in man is also his source of strength.
As Ashby puts it, the paramount feature of a good feedback
mechanism is that it blocks the flow of variety from the environ-
ment to the system's essential variables (Ashby, 1956, p. HO).
And this requires that variety flow freely to sensory components
not requiring the same degree of protection.
These relatively straightforward observations provide the
background for a biological application of an important theorem
of communication theory. We have seen how a system's ability
to maintain operating effectiveness in a threatening environ-
ment depends upon its ability to receive information in a form
appropriate for effector control. An environment rich in terms of
possible states is correspondingly rich as an information source;
and for an organism to maintain its integrity in such an environ-
ment it must be capable of using this information in the control
of its effector components. Restrictions in an organism's capacity
to receive and to process environmental information, on the
other hand, result in corresponding restrictions in the range
of environmental circumstances to which it can effectively
respond.
In analogy to the adage about the chain being no stronger than
its weakest link, we may say that a feedback loop can exercise
control over no more variety than can be processed as information
within its sensory channels. This limitation on the effectiveness of
feedback mechanisms was treated formally by Shannon in his
Theorem 10, to the effect that the amount of divergence from a
norm that can be removed by an error-correction channel is no
greater than the amount of information at the channel's input
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949, p. 37). Paraphrased in terms of
feedback, this is the thesis that the variety that can be removed by
a feedback control system is limited by the amount of information
the system can communicate to its effector mechanisms.
The biological application is that the range of different environ-
mental circumstances in which an organism can protect its essen-
tial operating variables can be characterized by no greater entropy
(average information) than that of the environmental states dis-
criminated by its sensory receptors. It seems apparent, as a con-
sequence, that organisms excelling in sensory capacities will be
60
Feedback
treated preferentially by the forces of natural selection. This topic
is developed in subsequent chapters.
Let us summarize our discussion of negative feedback as a form
of information processing. According to the Second Law of
Thermodynamics, the entropy of a closed system tends generally
to increase, and the system accordingly tends to diminish in
structure. This process is manifest in the tendency of systems to
lose their operating effectiveness unless their structure is con-
stantly replenished. One means of structural replenishment is by
the ministration of corrective procedures initiated outside the
system itself, illustrated (in society) by the repair of machines
and (in nature) by symbiosis between members of different species.
The method of structural replenishment most often employed in
biological systems, however, is that of negative feedback, in
which destructuralizing influences are counteracted by procedures
initiated by the system itself. These countermeasures require the
operation of effectors capable of exerting energy to correct system
deviation from normal operating conditions, and the operation of
sensors providing information for the control of the effector
mechanisms.
Negative feedback thus may be conceived as a process through
which structure lost (entropy gained) as a result of normal opera-
tion is compensated by negentropy derived from the operating
environment. This negentropy comes both in the form of energy
channeled through the system's effectors, and in the form of
information by which these effectors are guided in response to
environmental contingencies.
Negative feedback is a mode of interaction by which a system
gains structure at the expense of energy extracted from its opera-
ting environment. This interchange of energy is a causal trans-
action. How are we to conceive the causal relationships involved?
NOTES
1 This process is described in nontechnical detail by Wooldridge (1963,

pp. 58-60), a valuable source of illustrations upon which I frequently
rely.
2 A general discussion may be found in Monod (1971). A more detailed
discussion is in Changeux (1965).
61
Fundamentals
; This series may be depicted schematically as follows:
E E
4 The following conditional probability matrix provides an example:
a b c d
a Y'5 % 0 0
b 15 % Y5 0
C 0 % 15 Ys
d 0 0 '% Ys
As specified in this matrix,

Pea) = l/5P(a) + l/5P(b),
Pcb) = 4/5P(a) + 3/5 P(b) + 3/5P(C),
P(c) = l/5P(b) + l/5P(C) + 4/5P(d),
and P(d) = l/5P(c) + l/5P(d),
from which can be deduced that b occurs three times more frequently
thanc, four times more frequently than a, and twelve times more frequently
than d. No matter what the system state at a given moment, it is approxi-
mately 50 per cent probable that it will return to b as one of the two
succeeding states.
E Conceive 0 and S to be related in the feedback loop
E E EE
In this depiction the delay-functor (<5) represents the shift in S from state
st, at time tt to the successive state at t1+1. The node between 0 and S is
occupied by a mechanism imposing the conditions that 0 will provide dis-
62
Feedback
ruptive input to S only intermittently and that S operates homeostatically
when there is no input from o. These conditions may be expressed form-
ally as P(S~'/Ot,) + P(S!'/Stt-l) = 1, and P(S;'/StH) > 0, where Sd
E
is a state of S representing disruption from homeostatically protected
E
conditions (state a, c and d if S is characterized by the matrix in the foot-
note above), and Se a state that is homeostatically protected (b in the
matrix above). It may be noted that the homeostatic powers of the system
will be overcome if P(Sd/O) increases beyond a certain cutoff value.
6 Heterotelic feedback, which clearly is not restricted to living organisms,
is typical of that type of goal-directed behavior proposed by Rosen-
bleuth and Wiener (1950) as models of purposiveness. This proposal
has been effectively rebutted by several authors. My own views are ex-
plained in Sayre (1969), ch. 3, where I suggest that negative feedback of
the sorts we have been discussing here may be considered examples of
activity 'for a purpose', but certainly not as models of behavior per-
formed 'on purpose' by human beings. It is much too early in our ex-
position of the cybernetic framework to start looking for analogues of
human purposiveness.
7 The simplest schematic depiction of heterotelic feedback is
62 62
62
8 These provisions may be depicted
62 62 62 62
62
where (i) is indicated by the delay-function (0), (ii) by the arrow directed
from 0 to the hyphenated complex at the upper right of the schema,
(iv) by the place of S' in the feedback loop between 0 and E, with the
understanding (iii) that S (which by definition contains all system vari-
ables requiring homeostatic protection) is not directly affected by the
condition of S'. Thus understood, the schema above represents the basic
operations of sentient feedback.
9 Experimental evidence of such development in certain organisms is cited
in chapter VIII.
E
62
Fundamentals
10 Anticipatory feedback may be schematized
62
62
62 62 62 62
62
wherein the delay-functor in the upper left sector represents the temporal
lag between 0' and O. The double remove of S from 0 is apparent in the
diagram.
62
v
CAUSATION
I THE NEED FOR A CYBERNETIC MODEL

OF CAUSATION
According to the Humean account of causation, two events c and

e are related as cause and effect if and only if they are members
respectively of classes C and E of observable events such that (i)
each member of E regularly follows and is contiguous with a
particular member of C and (li) an observer upon experiencing the
latter will be led to expect the former as well. This account was
maintained by Hume himse1f(A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I,
Section XIV), and (with variations) still has a strong hold upon
scientists and philosophers of science.
Another prominent conception of the causal relationship is
what we may call the 'entailment model', according to which one
event is the effect of another if and only if it follows from the
other as a logical consequence. This model (with variations) has
been held by Spinoza (The Ethics, Axiom III), and by more recent
philosophers of rationalist persuasion (e.g., Brand Blanshard,
1940, and A. C. Ewing, 1933).
Neither model is suitable for causal interaction between
mind and body. Since mental events generally are conceived
as nonspatial in character, they cannot meet the contiguity
requirement of the Humean model. As for the entailment model,
on the other hand, there is no intelligible sense in which mind
and body could exist in a logical relationship. If a study of
mental phenomena is to be integrated with the physical sciences,
65
Ftmdamellfals
it must be on the basis of a more adequate model of the causal
relation.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a model of causation
suitable for interactions not only between physical and mental
events, but also between events exclusively in either domain.
One approach would be to examine critically other available
models of the causal relation, in the slim hope of finding one that
would prove sufficient in the final analysis. A more direct ap-
proach would be to establish criteria of adequacy for the type of
model in question, and to formulate a model that meets these
criteria. By nature of the task, these criteria would pertain to the
role of causal models in science as distinct from the many uses of
common discourse. We shall follow this latter approach in the
present context, relying on the resources of the cybernetic
framework.
There are additional reasons for undertaking a cybernetic
analysis of the causal relationship. Cybernetics is a study of the
regulative and communication functions of organized systems,
including the functions of living beings. Many of these functions
submit readily to explanation within the standard formats of
physics and chemistry, in which each state of the system is con-
ceived as an effect of previous states. There are other life processes
such as tropisms and goal-seeking activities, on the other hand,
that invite explanation of a form in which present activities are
functionally related to subsequent states. Although our discus-
sion of negative feedback should have disarmed any prejudicial
distrust of the suggestion that present (goal-seeking) activity can
be a function of future (goal) configurations, it is clear that the
standard models of causation do not lend themselves easily to this
form of explanation. An advantage of the model developed in this
chapter is that it imparts equal status to causal explanation of both
forward and backward temporality, with no suggestion of mys-
terious causal influences in either case.
A corollary of the cybernetic considerations that contribute to
this model is that the possibility of a deterministic explanation
of all life processes is in principle discredited. This result is
elaborated toward the end of the chapter.
66
Causation
z CRITERIA FOR AN ADEQUATE MODEL
I refer to these various conceptions of causation as models to

emphasize their conceptual origin. They are not the result of
observation or of scientific theory.
If causal models were descriptive of nexus observable among
natural events, competition among them would be settled by
expert observers, with conceptual analysis playing at best an
auxiliary role. But characterization of the causal relation cannot
be an empirical matter, for the terms of the relation cannot even
be identified independently of a prior conception of how they are
related.
Nor are causal models developed as a result of scientific
inquiry. Although scientists obviously are concerned with events
that are causally related, it is no part of science to investigate
the causal relation itself. As has been remarked time and again by
philosophers of science, the term 'cause' seldom appears in
scientific writing;1 it would be otherwise if the development of
causal models were part of scientific theory.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to conclude with Russell
(1917, p. 180) that causality is a relic of bygone ages. Although the
concept plays no role in the formulation of scientific theories, it
has important applications in the scientific enterprise.
For one, although science begins with the observation of
regularities in nature, not all observed regularities are plausible
candidates for scientific explanation. For instance, rainclouds are
always followed by clearing skies, but we do not think of clouds
as providing a potential explanation of their eventual dispersal.
Exceptions of another type result from the deliberate introduction
of measuring instruments into a sequence of natural events.
Although a barometer yields readings regularly correlated with
approaching storms, we do not think of this contrived correlation
as the basis for an explanation of inclement weather. The role of a
causal model in this connection is to demarcate potential candi-
dates for explanation within the broader class of regularly
associated events.
Another application of an adequate causal model may be illus-
trated with reference to the time-symmetrical character of the
equations of classical physics. Time-symmetry here means that if
:It function f(t) in positive time is a solution of the equations in
67
Fundamentals
question then the corresponding function f(-t) in negative time
is a solution also, and vice versa. Although Newton's laws of
motion, for example, are generally conceded to be deterministic,
in the sense that they uniquely determine a system's subsequent
states once its initial state is given, there is nothing in these laws
themselves that specifies determination in the forward temporal
direction. Our interpretation of these equations as representing
processes with a particular temporal direction thus relies upon a
conceptual resource beyond the theory itself, namely our con-
ception of the causal relation. In so far as relativity theory
(Reichenbach, 1956, p. 42.) and quantum mechanics (Ford, 1963,
p. 2.01) also are time-symmetrical, it does not constitute a causal
explanation of any physical process merely to refer it to the
equations of one of these theories. To conceive one process or
event as occurring because of another it is necessary to con-
ceive them as temporally ordered in a functional relationship, and
to establish that relationship is a role of our causal model. In
brief, although values of functionally related variables are deter-
mined by equations of the relevant explanatory theory, the func-
tional order among the processes to be explained is established
with reference to a model of the causal relation.
An adequate model of the caul>al relation must meet these two
criteria. First, it must enable us to distinguish sequences of events
that show promise of yielding to scientific explanation within the
broader class of uniformly associated events. And second, it must
establish a functional order by which events may be conceived
as causally related when conforming to the equations of scientific
theory. The first has to do with the genesis of an explanation of a
particular type of occurrence, the second with the interpretation
of the theoretical equations in terms of which the explanation is
finally accomplished.
Quite apart from the inadequacy of both the Humean and the
entailment models in application to the mind-body problem, we
may note that each displays a more general deficiency with respect
to one of the criteria above. The Humean model is unable to
explicate the difference between the mere regular association
between the storm and the falling barometer and the causal
relatedness of the storm to changing atmospheric conditions.
Since both the falling barometer and the change in air pressure
are proximate to (in any relevant sense) and precede the storm,
68
Causation
the difference is not a matter of contiguity or of temporal order.
Nor can the difference lie merely in our anticipating the effect
upon observing its antecedents, since a falling barometer turns
our thoughts to an impending storm as readily as other signs of
atmospheric disturbance. Both falling barometer and changing
air pressure must be considered causes under the Humean model,
which accordingly fails by the first criterion. The entailment
model fails by the second criterion. For entailment, in any intel-
ligible conception, is an atemporal relation, and hence unable to
establish the temporal ordering by which events in nature are
functionally related. 2
Although the Humean model itself is inadequate, we should
follow Hume's lead in attempting to provide a model of the
causal relation which relies only on concepts that can be clearly
explicated. There is no room in an adequate model of causation
for mysterious forces or productive influences. Adhering at least
to the spirit of the entailment model, we should be content with a
model expressed in purely mathematical terms.
3 REICHENBACH'S MODEL
Causation and explanation obviously are closely related. To

identify a cause of a given event is to provide at least a partial
explanation, and to provide an event with an explanation is to
identify at least a partial cause. Our conception of scientific
explanation might be expected to be an instructive resource in our
search for an adequate model of the causal relation.
A recent account of scientific explanation by Wesley Salmon
(1970) is based upon the concept of statistical relevance, and
appears superior in several respects to accounts based upon
inductive and deductive inference. According to Salmon (ibid.,
pp. 181,2°9), an explanation of why an object or event is charac-
terized by a specific feature is not an argument purporting to
establish an inferential relation between propositions expressing
the states of affairs in question. An explanation rather is 'an attempt
to assemble the factors that are relevant to the occurrence of an
event' (ibid., p. 209). For example, to explain why an individual
contracted a certain disease is not to appeal to a general proposi-
tion about all persons in his circumstances being similarly
69
Fltndamentals
afflicted (to cite one of Salmon's examples, although roughly only
three out of ten persons with untreated syphilis develop the
symptoms of paresis, to refer to the presence of the former none-
theless is to explain the presence of the latter malady). It is in-
stead to isolate the factors in the individual's circumstances most
directly relevant to his contracting the disease. The paradigm
explanatory question for Salmon is 'Why is this x which is A
(the reference class) also B (the character to be explained)?' The
answer takes the form 'Because x is also C,' where C is relevant
to B within the reference class.
Property C is statisticallY relevant to B within the reference class
A if and only if (by definition) the probability of B given A and C
is different from the probability of B given A alone: formally,
P(B/AC) :f: P(B/A). Here C effects a partition of A into AC and
AC. A further partition of AC relevant to B might be provided
by D, such that P(B/ACD) :f: P(B/AC). A class is called homo-
geneolls with respect to a given property if there are no further
partitions of that class statistically relevant to that property. If A
is homogeneous with respect to B, then B cannot be further
explained as a property of A.
The essential feature of an explanation in Salmon's account is
that it consists of a partitioning of the reference class A into a
number of subclasses, each of which is statistically relevant to the
explicandum B and the intersection of which is homogeneous
with respect to B. The probability of B within A is termed its
prior probability, or prior weight, and its probability within the
resulting homogeneous subclass its posterior probability or
weight. Generally, the posterior weight of the explicandum will
be greater than its prior weight, although Salmon argues (ibid.,
pp. 206-9) that this is not universally the case.
This account enables Salmon to distinguish effectively between
symptoms and causes. Barometer readings, for instance, are
statistically relevant to the occurrence of storms, and may provide
a reference class more homogeneous in that respect than the un-
partitioned class of days in a certain locale. Why, we may ask,
should not barometer readings contribute to the explanation of
storms no less appropriately than do atmospheric conditions?
The answer is that although barometer readings are statistically
relevant to approaching storms, a class of days partitioned with
respect to falling atmospheric pressure is more fully homogeneous
62
Causation
with respect to storms than a class partitioned with respect to
barometer readings alone. In Salmon's terminology, widespread
drops in atmospheric conditions (C), which are the actual causes
of storms (E), screen off drops in barometer reading (D) within
the reference class (A) of days in a certain locale.
By definition, C screens off D from E within the reference class A
if and only ifD is statistically irrelevant to E within AC. Although
D may be statistically relevant to E within A alone, and hence
partition A with respect to E, the further partition of A with
respect to C achieves the same effect and more besides. Put for-
mally, although P(E/AD) is greater than P(E/A), it is less than
P(E/AC), for P(E/ACD) = P(E/AC). This treatment is entirely
plausible intuitively, for it provides a precise interpretation of the
claim that not all happenings regularly conjoined with a giYen
event are effective in bringing about the event's occurrence.
As Salmon observes (ibid., p. 198), 'Causal proximity increases
homogeneity.' This suggests that the causal relation itself might
be defined in terms of the screening-off relation. According to
the model I have in mind, we would say that an event of class C
causes a subsequent event 'of class E if and only if C is statisti-
cally relevant to E, and there is no other class of events that
screens off C from E. The first provision would assure that the
probability of an E-event given a C-event is higher than the
probability of an E-event alone, which seems an intuitive re-
quirement of a causal consequence. The second provision would
assure that for every effect there can be identified an event or
set of events which is its proximate cause, distinct from other
events that are merely statistically relevant. For example, the
atmospheric conditions would be identified as the cause of the
stormy weather if there were no other set of circumstances that
screens off the former from the latter.
This particular model of causation, in fact, is identical ttl
Reichenbach's definition of causal relevance in chapter 23 of The
Direction of Time. According to Reichenbach's definition, a
C-event is causally relevant to a later E-event if the probability of
the latter given the former is greater than the probability of latter
alone, and if there is no class of events earlier than or simultaneous
with events in C which screens off C from relevance to E. Reich-
enbach's reference to the temporal relation of C and E makes
explicit what was assumed in connection with the model above.
71
Fundamentals
Intuitively plausible as this model appears, there is a problem
which disqualifies it from application within science generally.
This problem concerns the necessary reference within the screen-
ing-off model to the temporal precedence of cause to effect.
In line with the second criterion delineated above, an adequate
causal model must establish a functional order by which causally
associated events may be distinguished as cause and effect. The
requirement, precisely understood, is not merely to establish a
temporal order among causally associated events. The expedient
of the Humean model, however, is to accomplish functional order
in terms of temporal directionality, by the stipulation that the
cause is always prior to the effect in time. The same expedient
is part of the screening-off model, as illustrated by Reichenbach's
requirement that there be no earlier or simultaneous events that
screen off a cause from its proper effect.
This means of establishing temporal order is unobjectionable,
it seems to me, as long as two conditions are met: (I) that tem-
poral order can be determined without theoretical difficulty among
all events that are candidates for causal relatedness, and (2) that
there are no serious reasons for questioning the stipulation that
the causal relation always is ordered from before to after. But
both conditions are violated by contemporary particle physics.
Regarding (I), not only is there no direct way of measuring, for
instance, the temporal parameters of the processes involved in the
annihilation of an electron and a positron in the production of an
X-ray (as Reichenbach himself points out, 1956, p. 264), but
moreover interpretation of the associated traces in a cloud
chamber relies upon theory which leaves temporal direction inde-
terminate. Regarding (2), it remains an acceptable interpretation
of the equations covering such occurrences that the positron is
actually an electron moving in the reverse temporal direction (see
the lucid discussion of Ford, 1963, pp. 204-5), in which case it
cannot be ruled out a priori that the causal sequence proceeds
backwards in time.
I am not sure that all readers attracted by the possibility of a
precise mathematical model of the causal relation will find this
shortcoming as serious as I do. Moreover, if no better model
were available I would endorse the screening-off model as
plausible for a wide range at least of physical processes. In point
of fact, however, another mathematical model is available which
62
73
Causation
is no less plausible than the screening-off model while avoiding
the difficulties surveyed above. This model is based on com-
munication theory, particularly the concepts of equivocation and
entropy.
4 THE CYBERNETIC MODEL
In discussing the communication-theoretic model we will con-

sider an event to be the occurrence of a determinate state of an
operating system, whether on the macroscopic or the micro-
scopic level. The system whose states constitute a causal sequence
includes all factors proximately relevant to the series of effects in
question. Isolated events (such as the rain that caused the flooding,
but only with saturated earth, poor drainage, etc.) and discrete
objects (such as the moving billiard ball that caused other balls to
rr(ove, but only on a smooth flat surface, with balls free to roll,
e'c.) that we think of as members of causal sequences, should be
Cbnsidered as particular aspects of the relevant systems singled
out for attention due to particular interests. An effect at one
stage in the sequence, of course, may stand as a cause at another.
The set of possible states of a system can be conceived as a
Markov source (see chapter II), emitting determinate signals in an
order characterized by a conditional probability matrix. As we
have seen, however, a Markov source can be conceived alterna-
tively as an information channel in which input and output are
drawn from the same alphabet. Our discussion will be in terms of
information channels.
The equivocation H(A/B) of the channel with input set A and
output set B, as defined in chapter II, is the average ambiguity
regarding the state of A when the state ofB is given. H(A/B) thus
decreases with an increase in the reliability of B as an indicator of
A. In a literal sense, the amount of information about A yielded
by B is inversely proportional to H(A/B). The following model
of causation is based upon the principle that no other event pro-
vides more information about the occurrence of a given event
than the event to which it is related as effect to cause. In brief, a
cause provides maximum information about its effect.
In formulating this model, we will use the concept of what may
be called the masking relation. Consider the set F, associated with
73
Fundamentals
A and B through the information channels A-F and B-F. Set B
masks set A with respect to F if and only if (definition) (i) the
equivocation of F with respect to B is less than the equivocation
of F with respect to A, formally H(F jB) < H(F j A), and (ii) no
further decrease in equivocation on the part of F would be
achieved by combining A and B as input alphabet, formally
H(FjB) = H(FjAB).
A definition of causal relatedness follows directly from that of
the masking relation. Set C is causalty related to set E if and only
if (definition) (i) for every event El there is at least one event Cj
such that the probability of the former given the latter is greater
than the probability of the former alone, formally P(EdCj ) >
P(Ei ), and (ii) there is no other set D such that D masks C with
respect to E. For example, to conceive states of unsettled atmo-
spheric conditions (C) as causally related to states of stormy
weather (E) in terms of this model is to conceive it the case that
the probability of stormy weather is increased by the occurrence
of unsettled atmospheric conditions, and that there is no other set
of events (D) (for example, barometer readings) such that D
masks C with respect to E.
In isolating the set of events C causally related to E in this
fashion, we have isolated the events with which occurrences of
events in E are to be explained. Since causal relatedness thus
defined is not symmetrical, we have also established that E is a
function of C rather than vice versa. It should be noted carefully
that the order of explanation between two causally related
events thereby is established independently of any specification of
temporal direction. Nonetheless, identifying the temporal rela-
tionship between C and E is important in light of the customary
conception that causation proceeds in the forward temporal
direction.
Specification of the temporal order between C and E in this
model is accomplished with reference to the Second Law of
Thermodynamics. On the basis of this law, which states that the
entropy of a closed system tends always to increase, positive
temporal direction for the universe at large can be defined as the
direction in which a majority of processes show an entropy
increase (Griinbaum, 1963, p. 259). This method cannot be used
to identify the temporal directionality of individual processes,
since there will always be a minority of processes in which en-
74
CatfSati011
tropy decreases with advancing time (Reichenbach, 1956, sec·

15). Our concern, however, is not to determine the temporal
direction of individual processes, since the communication-
theoretic model identifies the direction of causal relatedness
independently of temporal direction. Our concern rather is to
devise a means for representing temporal directionality within
the context of this formal model, whereby temporal order may
be represented among causally related events.
For this purpose we will assume the definition of temporal
directionality mentioned above, in which increasing thermo-
dynamic entropy is a mark of advancing time. Any formal repre-
sentation of increasing thermodynamic entropy thus will serve
also as a formal representation of the forward temporal direction.
Such a representation is provided by the result in chapter III,
that the communication-theoretic entropy (average information)
of a closed system on the macrolevel (the level on which different
individual states are detectable) decreases with an increase in
thermodynamic entropy. In effect, a decrease in communication-
theoretic entropy may serve to indicate the direction of advancing
time.
Consider a series of event sets with the succession . . . A, B,
C, E ... ordered according either to increasing or to decreasing
communication-theoretic entropy. If the series is such that
P(E/c) > peE), and that C masks B and all other prior members
with respect to E, then C is causally related to E. This is the case
without respect to the order of entropy change. If events in the
sequence decrease in entropy from A to E, however, then the
order approaching C is one of forward temporality. Otherwise,
the order is of reverse temporal directionality. In either case, E is
conceived as a function of C for explanatory purposes. In a par-
ticular case where C is of higher communication-theoretic
entropy than the E with which it is causally related, events in E
are to be explained as dependent upon temporally prior events.
In cases where C is lower in communication-theoretic entropy
than E, on the other hand, events in E are to be understood as
functions of temporally later events. An illustration of the latter
may be found in the case of particle physics, noted earlier, where
X-rays are conceived to be generated by electron processes of re-
verse temporality. Other illustrations may be available from
biological theory.
75
Ftmdamentals
Although causal explanation according to this model is not
restricted to event-sequences with forward temporality, we should
note that the model provides a fully plausible interpretation of
causal determinism. This is the thesis that every event in the
universe is caused by a set of prior conditions wholly sufficient
to bring it about. But if this is the case, then for every set of events
E, however constituted, there is a set of events C which masks
all other sets with respect to E. Further, if for each state of E
there is a state of C sufficient to bring it about, then the occurrence
of the latter leaves no uncertainty about the occurrence of the
former; hence the equivocation of E with respect to C is zero. In
communication theory this condition is met by only one possible
relationship between C and E, namely their being related as input
and output respectively of a deterministic channel (see chapter
II). A further mathematical consequence, however, is that in a
deterministic channel the entropy of the output is always less than
that of the input.3 Hence according to this model, cause and
effect in a deterministic context are always ordered in the forward
temporal direction.
The communication-theoretic model of causation thus avoids
the two difficulties noted above of the screening-off mode1. 4
Since the present model establishes causal relatedness among
events in a fashion independent of the temporal directionality of
the processes involved, it is not subject to difficulties of chrono-
metric measurement in domains such as microphysics. Further, it
leaves open the possibility that causal relatedness, and hence
causal explanation, might sometimes be ordered in the reverse
temporal direction, as seemingly required by biology and by
quantum physics.
5 THE CAUSAL MODEL IN BIOLOGICAL

EXPLANATION
There are three general ways in which the output may be related
to the input of an information channel. One is that of the deter-
ministic channel, noted above, in which the equivocation of the
output with respect to the input is zero for all assignments of
probabilities to the input. In such a channel, since H(B / A) = 0,
I(A;B) = H(B). Another is the noiseless channel, in which
76
Causation
I(A;B) = H(A) under the same conditions. In such a channel,
since the equivocation of the input with respect to the output
is zero, the output provides a perfectly reliable indicator of
all input events. The third way, of course, is that of a channel
that is neither noiseless nor deterministic, representing a
mode of association more common by far among natural
occurrences.
What makes the noiseless channel particularly interesting in
the present context is that, in every theoretical respect, it consti-
tutes a deterministic channel in reverse. Inasmuch as the deter-
ministic channel models the deterministic causal sequence in the
manner discussed above, the question arises whether the noise-
less channel in like manner models processes actually found in
nature. The question may be sharpened in terms of the concept of
necessary conditionality. In the deterministic channel, every
occurrence of an input event is associated with the occurrence of
a unique output event, which consequently is a necessary condi-
tion of its occurring. A natural causal process represented by a
deterministic channel, accordingly, is one in which temporally
later events are necessary for the occurrence of prior events; the
earlier would not occur unless the later occurred also. A process
represented by a noiseless channel, correspondingly, would be
one in which prior events are necessary for the occurrence of later
events. The question is whether there exist in nature processes
in which certain states of affairs could not occur without certain
other states occurring previously.
Put in these terms, our question admits a ready answer. The
growth and development of living organisms are processes in
which earlier states are necessary for the occurrence of later
states: for no oak has grown that was not first a sapling, and no
hen ever lived that was not first a chick. Moreover, whereas
deterministic processes like explosions generally lead to states of
increased thermodynamic entropy, processes of growth and
development generally result in locally decreased entropy. In
exactly the same respects considered above in which the deter-
ministic channel corresponds to deterministic processes in nature,
the noiseless channel corresponds to processes typical of living
organisms. These facts are incontrovertible. The problem is how
to interpret them.
One interpretation not open to us is that time 'runs backwards'
77
Fundamentals
in biological contexts. Although the increase in communication-
theoretic entropy characteristic of a noiseless channel has been
taken as a formal representation of reverse temporality for pur-
poses of introducing a time dimension into our model of causal
relatedness, there is no suggestion that processes corresponding to
the model in this particular form actually occur in 'backward
time.'
Another proscribed interpretation is that there are causal influ-
ences in biological systems that somehow operate in a reverse
temporal direction. The notion of causal influences, whether
backward or forward, has no place whatever in the communica-
tion-theoretic model. There is no room here for the confused
conception that posterior causes somehow operate before their
time to bring about anterior effects.
The proper interpretation of the correspondence between the
model of the noiseless channel and certain processes in living
systems is indicated by the role of causal models generally in
establishing functional relationships among variables in scientific
theory. To establish C as causally related to E, in the context of
the communication-theoretic model, is to establish C as the class
of variables with respect to which states of E are to be explained
according to relevant scientific principles. To establish in addition
that C is lower than E in communication-theoretic entropy is to
establish that C is subsequent to E in positive time. The noiseless
channel thus is a model of natural processes in which earlier are
explained as functions of later events.
In short, conceived as a causal model the noiseless channel
represents an order of explanatory relevance and not a temporal
order in nature between cause and effect. The question remains
how reference to certain states of living organisms can help us
understand other states that precede them in time. A general
answer to this question has already been indicated in our earlier
discussion of negative feedback mechanisms, by which current
processes are regulated according to subsequent goal states. This
answer is further elaborated in the following chapter, when we
turn to consider specific feedback procedures in biological
systems.
At this point, however, someone wise in the ways of entropy
may pose a fundamental problem regarding the nature of scien-
tific explanation. The noiseless channel has been recommended as
78
Cat/sation
a model of 'temporally backward' explanation, he will remind us,
at least partly on the basis of a characteristic decrease in thermo-
dynamic entropy in certain life processes, in contrast with the
increase in entropy typical of most physical systems. But it is
generally recognized that the growth and development of living
organisms provides no exception to the Second Law of Thermo-
dynamics, for the entropy dispersed as part of the life process is
matched by entropy increases within the supporting environ-
ment. If life forms are conceived as only parts of more complex
physical systems, comprising the living environment as well as
the organism itself, then life processes still may be understood in
light of the deterministic model with no need arising for models
of different temporal cast.
Furthermore, the objector may continue, complete physical
knowledge about the circumstances of life processes might even
eliminate the need for explanatory principles of a special biologi-
cal sort. To be sure, there are stages in the development of an oak
tree, for example, such as the acorn sprouting and the shoot
growing leaves, that are not currently explainable by other than
biological principles. But if we knew everything there is to know
about how the acorn germinates in fertile soil, how the sapling
responds to favorable conditions of light and moisture, and how
the plant will be protected from disease and predators during its
tender years, then we would be able to understand its growth in
the same fashion as we understand the explosion of gunpowder.
Full reliance on the deterministic model, he may insist in short,
depends only upon full knowledge of contributing conditions.
The objection is that laws might exist that are entirely deter-
ministic in application, and yet that cover all details of behavior
in organic systems.
The response to this variant of the Laplacean ideal5 is that it is
based on a supposition ruled out by the plight of Maxwell's
demon. An important lesson to be learned from this fanciful
thought experiment (see chapter III) is that energy cannot be
converted into information without a resulting gain in entropy.
In this particular context, the information available to the demon
for his operation upon the individual molecules is always less
than the energy expended in making that information available. 6
A corollary is that the amount of energy needed to provide com-
plete information regarding the details of a closed system's
79
Fundamentals
operation is greater than can be supplied within the system itself.
Thus, far from favoring a completely deterministic conception
of the behavior of organisms, the Second Law of Thermody-
namics actually rules out the possibility of deterministic expla-
nation to the extent that such would rely on complete knowledge
of microstates. To suppose that we elm know the state of every
component in a complete operating system at a given time is to
suppose that there is more energy in the system than is provided
by the states of its constituent elements. This type of determinism
is as incoherent in itself as the request for a complete audit of one's
financial resources at the cost of a cent-and-one-half per penny.
The significance of this result should be carefully construed.
There is nothing in these considerations to rule out the logical
possibility that all events in nature are completely determined in
their occurrence. What is ruled out by these considerations is the
possibility that all events in nature can be provided a completely
deterministic explanation. This follows from the character of
energy exchanges in nature itself, rather than from the character
of human knowledge or from the limitations of scientific meas-
uring techniques. Given that deterministic explanation is not
available for all natural events, however, it is unclear what
interest might remain in the bare possibility that all events
nonetheless are completely determined.
In the present context, the major significance of this result is to
discredit what seems to me to be the only prima facie plausible
argument for the thesis that all mental events are subject to
deterministic explanation. Since this thesis is supported neither
by common sense nor by scientific accomplishment, the only
credible way to establish it would be to establish the general
premise that all events whatever are subject to deterministic
explanation, and then to reach the claim about mental events by
inference from universal to particular. What has been shown is
that the general premise, for physical reasons, is necessarily
untrue.
This chapter has provided a model of the causal relation that is
applicable to all sequences of interacting events, without respect
to their physical or mental character. It has shown also that
scientific discussion about the causal interaction between physical
and mental events as such cannot be ruled out on the basis that a
full scientific explanation of mental events would show them all
80
Causation
to be completely determined and hence without features requiring
special accounting, But very little has been said about the features
of mental events that enable them to participate in causal relations.
To pursue this topic requires an examination of the life process
itself, and a consideration of how the various forms of human
mentality might have evolved from inanimate nature.
NOTES
I Although Newton employed the term 'cause' in his Principia, for instance
in the Definitions, none of his discussion there depends upon a specific
conception of the causal nexus. If it were otherwise philosophers such as
Hume during the modern period could not have pursued their own
puzzlement about the causal relation without challenging the authority
of Newtonian mechanics.
2 An attempt might be made to defend the entailment model by distinguish-
ing physical processes, which obviously are not logically related, from
propositions describing them, which might be related by logical entail-
ment, and by building appropriate temporal reference into propositions
representing causally associated events. For example, given the premise
'When, but only when, dry tinder is exposed to open flame in the presence
of oxygen, the tinder burns immediately thereafter,' and the stipulation
'Time tl immediately follows time to,' the proposition (C) 'Dry tinder is
exposed to open flame in the presence of oxygen at to' entails the pro-
position (E) 'The tinder burns at tI.' However, I do not believe this tactic
will remove the difficulty, for the relation of entailment between (C) and
(E) remains atemporal despite temporal references in the propositions
themselves. The significance of this may be seen in the following con-
sideration. Exactly the same entailment relation holds between the
propositions (C') 'Dry tinder is burning at tI' and (E/) 'Oxygen was
present at to.' That is, although the temporal relation between (C /) and
(E/) is exactly the opposite as that between (C) and (E), the same relation
of entailment holds in either case. Indeed, this attempt to impart tempor-
ality to the entailment relation is as misguided as attempting to render it
spatial by citing (E") 'Moline is west of Chicago' as entailed by (C")
'Chicago is east of Moline.'
3 In a deterministic channel, I(A;B) = H(B). Since
I(A;B) = H(A) - H(A/B),
for the deterministic channel
H(A/B) = H(A) - H(B).
But in a deterministic channel that is not also noiseless, H(AjB) > o.
Hence in such a channel, H(B) < H(A).
4 The screening-off model and the communication-theoretic model are
not equivalent formulations of the causal relation. One difference is that
the former model is defined in terms of temporal relations, while the
81
Fllnda'JlClIta/s
latter enables a definition of temporal order within its own resources. A
more subtle difference has to do with an important distinction between the
screening-off relation and the masking relation on which the models are
respectively based. The classes of events in terms of which the screening-
off relation is defined are composed each of different occurrences of the
'same' event. The class C of low atmospheric pressure conditions em-
ployed as illustration in the discussion above has as members only occur-
rences of such conditions, to the exclusion of moderate, average or high
pressure states. Thus the relationship between high atmospheric pressure
and clear days must be represented as a causal interaction distinct from
that between low pressure and stormy weather. In the context of the
masking relation, on the other hand, the statistical relationship in ques-
tion is between (to continue the example) atmospheric conditions and
states of the weather in general. Equivocation, by which the masking
relation is defined, is a feature of communication channels in which both
input and output are capable of issuing repeated occurrences of several
distinguishably different states. This emphasis upon classes of causally
associated events with diverse membership is entirely natural, since we
would not consider a drop in atmospheric pressure of a given degree the
cause of a storm unless changes in atmospheric pressure were correlated
generally with changes in weather. We should note that in one special
case there is a direct relationship between the screening-off and the
masking relations. In a deterministic channel, in which the input masks
all other events with respect to the output, the input also screens off all
other events in the same respect.
6 In Laplace's words: 'We must consider the present state of the universe
as the effect of its former state and as the cause of the state which will
follow it. An intelligence which for a given moment knew all the forces
controlling nature, and in addition, the relative situations of all the
entities of which nature is composed-if it were great enough to carry
out the mathematical analysis of these data-would hold, in the same
formula, the motions of the largest bodies of the universe and those of
the lightest atom: nothing would be uncertain for this intelligence, and
the future as well as the past would be present to its eyes.' This is the
translation from Laplace's Essai philosophique sur les probabilites cited by
Reichenbach (1956, p. 10).
6 An informal proof follows. Consider M the energy (negentropy) of the
radiation source in that thought experiment, N the information (negen-
tropy) on which the (by assumption, perfectly efficient) demon bases his
selective activity, and M' the energy (negentropy) resulting from his
activity. The demon thus is the agency of selection by which N is con-
verted to M', after originating in M, and the conversion is conceived to
be maximumly efficient. Since the system is closed, M'.;;; M by the
Second Law of Thermodynamics. The proof proceeds by assuming
M <: N, from which reductio ad absurdum results. Since the demon is per-
fectlyefficient, N = M'. Thus M.;;; M'. ButifM = M', then the demon's
operations are reversible, contrary to the hypothesis of selective activity
in one direction only. And M < M' is contrary to the Second Law.
82
Causation
Hence it is false that M <: M', and false accordingly that M < N. A
formal derivation of this result is in Brillouin, 196z, pp. 168-76. In
Brillouin's terms, this shows that 'every physical measurement requires
a corresponding entropy increase' (ibid., p. 168).
OPII_ 83
PART THREE
ORGANISM AND
ENVIRONMENT
VI
LIFE
I DISTINGUISHING LIFE FROM THE

NONLIVING
The statistician Fisher, Julian Huxley informs us, once described

natural selection as 'a mechanism for generating an exceedingly
high degree of improbability' (Young, 1965, p. 5ZI). With match-
ing whimsy, we might describe life as the process of maintaining
improbability at an exceedingly high level once evolution gets it
there. More seriously, but in the same vein, Konrad Lorenz
speaks of life as 'a steady state of enormous general improbability'
(Lorenz, 1965, p. 3Z), and Michael Ovenden characterized
living things as having the ability to maintain their structure and
to resist decay (Young, 1965, pp. 540-1).
Norbert Wiener speaks of living organisms that 'tend for a
time to maintain and often even to increase the level of their
organization, as a local enclave in the general stream of increasing
entropy.. .' (Wiener, 1954, p. 95), and more picturesquely refers
to life as comprising 'phenomena which locally swim upstream
against the current of increasing entropy' (ibid., p. 3Z). This
imagery is reminiscent of Robert Frost's 'West-running Brook,'
where we are given to imagine
The black stream, catching on a sunken rock,

Flung backward on itself in one white wave,
in which the brook runs counter to itself.

87
Organism and Environment
It is from that in water we were from
Long, long before we were from any creature.
The sense of all these characterizations is that life is a process by

which a system maintains its structure against a disruptive
environment. But resistance to destructuralization provides at
best a partial characterization of the life process, for it is shared
by many nonliving systems as well. The question arises whether it
is possible to find a characterization in terms of features that mark
off living from all other systems in nature.
Now this question might be asked with anyone of several
different problems in mind. One is that of distinguishing the
living from the nonliving among known molecular forms.
Biologists sometimes speak of any molecular system as alive
that can pass along alterations of structure to succeeding genera-
tions (Beadle and Beadle, 1966, p. 10). Since this characterization
would accommodate the nucleic acids, others attribute life only
to protein structures capable of reproducing by cell division
(including viruses), and yet others draw the line at organisms
capable of sustaining their own metabolisms (Steiner and Edel-
hoch, 1965, p. 43). Although the issue appears inessential for
molecular biology (Beadle and Beadle, 1966, p. 216), reports of
'artificially created life' in the popular press (eg. Asimov in
Young, 1965, p. 320) should be evaluated with these alternatives
in mind.
A different problem concerns the first appearance of life in
evolutionary development, and the criteria by which it is to be
differentiated from its nonliving origins. Since the earliest life
forms probably are no longer existent, this issue is even more
speculative than the one above and may well remain forever un-
resolved without serious impairment to biological research. Yet
another problem with more practical ramifications is the question
when individual life begins in the development of organisms that
are generated by the fusion of two separate cells. Important as this
problem has become in the area of morality and medical policy, it
cannot be settled by more knowledge about evolution or about
molecular chemistry. It is a problem calling for more insight into
the life process itself, apart from matters of origin and of molecular
structure.
Having distinguished these specific problems, I want to dismiss
88
Life
them from concern in the ensuing discussion. Our problem in this
chapter is not to decide where life emerges on a given continuum
(whether evolutionary, molecular, or ontogenetic). Our problem
rather is to reach a general characterization of the relationship
between an organism and its supportive environment that will
help us understand how life differs from non-vital processes, and
how it is possible for life to have risen from lifeless surroundings.
Our resources in this undertaking are the concepts of information
and feedback, and associated concepts from thermodynamics and
communication theory.
2 CHARACTERISTICS OF LIFE
As Schrodinger puts it in his stimulating little book What is Ufo?,

<the device by which an organism maintains itself stationary at a
fairly high level of orderliness (= fairly low level of entropy)
really consists in continually sucking orderliness from its environ-
ment' (Schrodinger, 1967, p. 79)' Again, 'What an organism feeds
upon is negative entropy. Or, to put it less paradoxically, the
essential thing in metabolism is that the organism succeeds in
freeing itself from all the entropy it cannot help producing while
alive' (ibid., p. 76). Each of these remarks draws our attention to
some important aspects of the distribution of entropy between
organism and environment.
For one, there is the rather remarkable fact that living organisms
alone among small-scale natural systems are able to receive energy
from other systems existing thermodynamically at lower energy
levels. Carrots and lettuce are structurally less complex, and con-
tain less energy for work, than the rabbit or human they serve as
food. The specific processes by which the vegetable yields up its
energy, of course, are basically chemical in nature, and hence in
accord with the Second Law of Thermodynamics. This means
that the combined system of organism and immediate environ-
ment is in a higher state of entropy after digestion than it was
before. Yet as a result of this very process, the entropy of the
organism itself generally decreases. In some way the living
organism is able to slough off the entropy resulting from inter-
action with its environment.
A related characteristic is that the nutrient material of the
73
OrganiStJJ and El1llironment
organism, although at a higher entropy level initially than the
organism itself, is lower in entropy than the resulting waste
products. In other words, the material the organism takes into its
system from the environment is richer in energy (structure.
negentropy) than what it expels back into the stream of inanimate
nature. This is the meaning of the two remarks of Schrodinger
quoted above: the organism 'sucks up' negentropy from its sur-
roundings, and 'frees itself' from the entropy resulting from the
disposal of that resource in its metabolic processes.
A third characteristic following from these two is the familiar
feature of life celebrated by Frost in the poem quoted above. Life
is an ongoing process as part of which the organism tends to
decrease entropy within its own structure, or at least to maintain
its entropy at a constant level. This process, moreover, is irre-
versible, whether with respect to evolutionary origins (as in the
poem) or to the growth activities of the individual organism.
While life is present, these processes cannot recede to previous
states. We can no more conceive of an oak regressing to an
acorn in the real world of nature, than myriad bits of matter
whooshing backward to compose a keg of gunpowder with a
wick expanding as it unburns.
It was through reflection upon the differences between such
processes as growth and explosion, of course, that we were led to
explore the differences between teleonomy and inanimate physical
causation. Perhaps similar considerations can be made to yield a
characterization of what is central to the life process itself.
Life is a process in the course of which entropy is held at an
appreciably lower level than in its surrounding environment.
This characteristic by itself, however, is not sufficient. The entropy
of a whirlpool or a tornado is lower than that of the surrounding
medium; yet such forces of nature generally are not numbered
among living things. Again, the living system extracts energy
from surroundings with lower capacity for useful work (lower
state of thermodynamic energy), which is roughly comparable
to one's toast being warmed by a cold piece of butter. But this
characteristic is not sufficient either, for the sun produces energy
from particles randomly gathered in its gravitational field. Nor
can life's characteristic feature be merely the production of material
in a more advanced state of entropy than that upon which it
feeds, for this is characteristic also of ordinary combustion.
90
Life
Now although air, fire and water all have been considered
animate at other stages in the history of culture, we view life as
clearly different from these other processes. Life, in contrast with
even the most persistent whirlpool, tornado, or nuclear explosion,
is a process of a highly organized and stable system. This means
that life depends for its unusual entropic characteristics upon the
interaction of many parts of an operating system, maintained in
adjustment by negative feedback mechanisms. The typifying
mark of a living
Hving system thus appears to be its persistent state of
low entropy, sustained by metabolic processes for accumulating
energy, and maintained in equilibrium with its environment by
homeostatic feedback processes.
This characterization might be challenged by phenomena in
nonliving nature in which structure is maintained by negative
feedback through the expenditure of energy gained from en-
vironmental resources.
An instructive counterexample would be a machine capable of
repairing itself by automatic replacement of wornout parts.
Assume a machine powered directly by solar cells so as not to be
dependent upon human industry for its source of energy. These
cells will be positioned by negative feedback, along with various
effectors by which its work is accomplished and various regulators
to maintain its operating readiness. Assume further that the work
of this machine is to fabricate other machines with identical
capacities,! and that the materials for both regenerative and repro-
ductive functions are supplied through a large stock of prefab-
ricated parts. This machine thus is maintained in a stable arrange-
ment by negative feedback, derives its operating energy by a
self-sustaining process (has a 'metabolism'), and achieves as a
result of its operating process a local reduction of entropy. Would
we thereby consider it a living
Hving system?
I think we would not, for two reasons. One is that this system
depends for both reproduction and replenishment upon compo-
nents expressly fabricated by (presumably) human contrivance.
It is not merely parasitic upon human activity, in the sense of
existing on by-products issuing incidentally from human routines.
Rather, it is completely dependent on the ministration of delib-
erate human industry. But let us alter our fanciful mechanism to
meet this objection. Imagine that the machine is able to obtain
both energy and materials from natural sources, and to fashion
9I
these resources itself into replacement parts. The machine now
can exist indefinitely in a natural environment without ministra-
tion from other sources, and moreover can reproduce in other
systems of identical kind. Suppose explorers were to land upon a
planet occupied by tribes of these mechanical creatures, but totally
devoid of any sign of biological organisms. Would they say the
planet was occupied by a form of life? Oparin proposed a thought-
experiment of this variety, drawing the conclusion that no
strictly mechanical (non-protein-based) system could be under-
stood save 'as offshoots of human (or similar) society' (Oparin,
1961, p. 34), and that even though every last sign of organic life
had vanished from the planet we would still consider such
machines as lifeless artifacts of prior living forms.
This thought experiment reveals the second respect in which
our self-replicating machines fall short of the mark of living
systems. Contrary to Oparin's intimation, construction of protein
molecules does not appear an essential factor. We may accept as
both true and relevant his observation (ibid., p. 2.2. 1) that
the form and structure of living bodies are flowing in
nature. For this reason organisms can only exist for any
length of time as a result of the continuous accomplishment
of chemical transformations, which constitute the essence
of living, and the cessation of which would lead to the
disruption of the living system and the death of the
organism.
But there appears no a priori reason why protein is the only
possible molecular structure by which these transformations could
be accomplished, nor hence why living systems could not be
based on other molecular forms)! Again, it does not seem accurate
to suggest that we cannot understand the nature of a system
without tracing its origins, for there surely are living systems we
understand better today than we understand their origin in non-
living matter. The problem with our fantasy of the living machines
is not their constitution or their uncertain origin, but rather their
lack of mutability under environmental change. No matter how
variable the circumstances of their operating environment, these
machines reconstitute themselves without the slightest variation
in pattern, and fabricate their offspring as exact replicas of them-
selves. It is not that we lack knowledge of how these systems
92.
Life
evolved; it is rather that we know that they could not have
evolved at all, and could not survive a radical change in en-
vironment.
If we allow one more alteration in the make-up of our imag-
ined machine, and conceive it as adaptable to changing environ-
mental circumstances by appropriate structural changes in forth-
coming progeny, we might be ready to classify it as a living
system. 3 The descriptive term 'machine' at this point might even
appear gratuitous. Indeed, if we substitute 'organism' for
'machine' throughout the discussion above, we would find that
instead of some mysterious artifact we have described something
no more exotic than a flower or tree.
Accepting the lesson of this example, let us conceive any sys-
tem to be a living organism that (I) tends by its operation to
resist an increase in entropy, (2) maintains its structure by negative
feedback, (3) is independent of continued ministrations by other
systems (apart from symbiosis and parasitism), and (4) is a member
of a reproductive group reflecting adaption to environmental
change. Without solemnizing these features into an 'essential
definition of living organism,' we may rely upon them to define
the conception of life with which we shall deal in the following
chapters.
At the same time, we must not lose sight of the fact that life is
a process in which there is a very intimate interaction between
organism and environment,4 and that this process can be des-
cribed from the environmental side as well. From this point of
view, life may be described as a process by which a local decrease
in entropy is purchased through accelerated entropy increases in
the surrounding locale. Although the entropy level of a relatively
isolated locale tends to increase under any conditions, the in-
crease is more rapid when life is present. Life thus is a catalyst
working to increase disorder within its host environment, acting
more effectively in life forms that are more complex.
3 LIFE'S MOLECULAR BASIS
Thus characterized, life is possible without protein molecules.

Yet protein is essential to all known life forms.
Proteins are polymeric molecules composed of amino acids,
93
which in turn are composed mainly of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon,
nitrogen and sulfur. Despite their basically similar composition,
however, thousands of different proteins occur in living cells, and
each plays a different role according to its molecular construction. 5
Collagen, for example, plays a structural function, concerned with
the maintenance of form essential to living beings. Myosin and
actin are contractile substances, occurring in effector organs
which enable the organism to act upon its surrounding environ-
ment. And hemoglobin conveys oxygen throughout the blood
stream, providing general support for other organic functions.
Another important class of proteins consists of the enzymes, which
catalyze many chemical reactions essential for the organism's
metabolism.
A second type of polymeric molecule occurring in all known
living systems is that of the nucleic acids. The subunits of these
molecules are called nucleotides, which in turn are composed of
sugars, phosphoric acids, and so-called nucleotide bases. One of
the two major forms of nucleic acid is ribonucleic acid (RNA),
including adenine, uracil, cytosine or guanine as nucleotide bases.
The other major form is deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), differing
from RNA in having deoxyribose instead of ribose as its sugar
grouping, and by replacement in its set of four bases of uracil by
the derivative thymine. The role of DNA is to store structural
information in a form transmittable from parent to progeny and,
in a given organism, to control the synthesis of protein molecules.
The role of RNA is to convey this information in a form directly
translatable into specific molecular structures. DNA, of course,
has been identified as the hereditary gene.
Genetically controlled construction of a living organism by
matter and energy from its host environment is one of the most
complex processes man has ever set about to study. It is a rela-
tively new field of inquiry, and despite spectacular progress
within the last few decades a field scientists have only begun to
explore. Mendel's laws of hereditary transmission were published
little more than a century ago, and gained general acceptance only
several decades later. Chromosomes, which are now recognized
as the vehicles of genetic instructions, were isolated micro-
scopically in the late 1890s, but were not clearly linked with
hereditary characteristics until the work of Morgan and others in
the early 1900S (Dobzhansky, 19550 p. 53). Mutational effects of
94
Life
genetic subunits of the chromosome were studied extensively
during subsequent decades, and the gene was established as
DNA in the early 1950s. In 1953, Watson and Crick identified
the double helical structure of the DNA molecule, explaining how
DNA copies itself, and enabling in turn discovery of how genetic
instructions are encoded, how translated into directions that
cells obey, and how modified by mutation of the DNA molecule.
Genetics thus was brought within the domain of molecular theory.
What is of particular significance for the present study is that
genes appear to operate by familiar cybernetic mechanisms,
exercising important functions of communication and control.
The communication functions presently are better understood.
Genes constitute messages from parent organisms to subse-
quent generations. The bearers of these messages, of course, are
the chromosomes, comprising long strands of DNA molecules.
The method by which the message of the DNA molecule is
transmitted has become increasingly intelligible since discovery of
their double helical structure. In each of these paired helixes, the
constituent nucleotides are arranged with phosphates and sugars
on the outer edges, and bases (adenine, thymine, cytosine and
guanine) oriented in the direction of the common axis.
Now the structure of adenine and thymine molecules (with
'exposed' nitrogen and oxygen atoms) permits their being
coupled by two hydrogen bonds, while three such bonds can
join cytosine and guanine. 6 It is by these couplings that the two
strands are held in their double helical arrangement. The process
of intercellular information transmission begins with the rupture
of these relatively weak couplings, and the subsequent parting
of the strands in zipper-like fashion. This leaves the exposed
nucleotide bases on each strand free to form new pairings with
other molecules of appropriate structure floating free in the
nucleus. These new molecules become associated along the length
of the single stranded helix, and form an exact duplication of the
original double helix from which it had split. Each strand of the
original thus is provided a new partner, and two double helixes
exist where one was before.
In this fashion, information-bearing molecules are duplicated
for passage into new cellular structure, either by (asexual)
mitosis or by mingling with other chromosomes subsequent to
(sexual) meiosis.
95
A second phase in the communication function of DNA occurs
when it is established in a protein-producing cell. Its information
here must be translated into specific protein materials. Although
there are approximately 200,000 nucleotide bases in each chromo-
some, the information they contain is coded in a four element
alphabet. The thousands of different proteins constructed under
their instructions, however, are composed of twenty different
amino acids in specific combinations. Thus at least twenty units
of information are required for the construction of each protein
molecule; and since only four can be provided by a given nucleo-
tide base, it appears that no less than three bases are required to
specify a given amino acid (42 < 20 < 43). Recent experimenta-
tion has shown that indeed the genetic code is read off in triplets,
with each different amino acid indicated by several different
combinations. 7
Transmissions of information from DNA to protein begins as
before, with the zipper-like rupture of the hydrogen bonds
holding the two strands of the helix together. In the course of this
process, however, the freed individual strand forms a companion
in which uracil appears in the place of thymine (coupling with
adenine), resulting in a large RNA molecule which then leaves its
DNA template and joins with a ribosome particle (another form
of RNA) outside the nucleus. These larger RNA molecules are
called 'messenger RNA', since their role is to carry genetic
instructions to the site in the cell where protein is formed. Smaller
molecules of similar structure, called 'transfer RNA', float
freely through the cytoplasm outside the nucleus collecting
molecules of amino acids. In the presence of messenger RNA,
these transfer molecules maneuver their amino acid loads into
positions specified by the ordering of bases along the messenger
strand. The amino acids then are synthesized into specific pro-
tein molecules, and the transfer molecules disengage to collect
another load. By such processes, part of the genetic message is
translated into protein structures needed for cellular growth of the
developing organism.
Less well understood are the processes by which the genes of
an organism control its morphological development, and estab-
lish the neurological structures responsible for its characteristic
behavior patterns. As forcibly put by G. W. Beadle, the Nobel
prize-winning geneticist,
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Life
The nuclei in our body cells-a total that runs into billions-
contain duplicate sets of the same chromosomes. And yet,
out of all the information coded in the DNA of those
chromosomes, each cell uses only the part that pertains to
its specialized role in the body. What causes this specializa-
tion is one of the major unanswered questions of biology
(Beadle and Beadle, 1966, p. 208).
Beadle, however, cites some provocative clues.

All available indications point to control functions in which
both genes and environment play essential roles. More informa-
tion is needed for differential cellular development than can be
provided within the genes themselves. 8 Some of this additional
information may be carried elsewhere within the cell, as illus-
trated by the production of amino acid within Escherichia coli
(discussed in chapter IV above). But there is no doubt that
conditions external to the cell itself also may cooperate in the
control of genetically specified processes. A striking illustration
of the latter is provided by a certain seaweed which, at the two-
cell stage of development, grows 'roots' on the bottom and
'leaves' on top. The difference between top and bottom for this
cell, however, is determined by differences in illumination, warmth
and acidity of solution, having nothing to do with the structure's
physical orientation. Thus, although genetic factors provide for
both 'leaf' and 'root' budclings, the option between the two is
settled by environmental features.
Insight into possible mechanisms by which control over cell
development might be shared by both gene and environment is
provided by another Nobel laureate, Jacques Monod. This
account (Monod, 1971, ch. IV) is based upon the properties of
allosteric enzymes. Like other enzymes, these amino acids as-
sociate themselves with certain substances and catalyze their
conversion into derivative products. But an allosteric enzyme has
the further property of responding selectively to other com-
pounds which have the effect of either stimulating or inhibiting
its catalytic activity. Consider a given allosteric enzyme E, capable
of existing in two configurational states Rand T, in which it
binds respectively the additional compounds a and b. If a and b
are bound at the same site on the enzyme, they will be mutually
exclusive, and T will be inhibited by a as R is by b. If there is
97
another compound c, however, that can be bound by E while in
state T, then both c and b will tend to maintain E in this state and
to stimulate the associated catalytic activity. This function may
be shared by band c in the total absence of any chemical inter-
change between the two compounds themselves. This shared but
indirect mode of feedback control results in what Monod calls
'gratuity,' the 'independence, chemically speaking, between the
function itself and the nature of the chemical signals controlling
it,' and has the result of allowing the subordination of a chemical
reaction 'to the intervention of compounds that are chemically
foreign and indifferent' to the reaction itself. 9 Monod's sum-
marization of the consequences is worth quoting in full:
The way in which allosteric interactions work hence permits
a complete freedom in the 'choice' of controls. And these
controls, having no chemical requirements to answer to, will
be the more responsive to physiological requirements, and
will accordingly be selected for the extent to which they
confer heightened coherence and efficiency upon the cell or
organism. In a word, the very gratuitousness of these
systems, giving molecular evolution a practically limitless
field for exploration and experiment, enabled it to elaborate
the huge network of cybernetic interconnections which
makes each organism an autonomous functional unit ...
(Monod, 1971, pp. 77-8, my emphasis).
The general picture emerging from these diverse observations
is as follows. During the very earliest stages of an organism's
development, its cells are grouped within an environment with
differing features which interact with its gene structures in
different ways. An immediate result is the constitution of cells
with differing cytoplastic characteristics. Further interaction
between genes and environment, both 'natural' and constituted,
results in feedback processes in which appropriate genetic con-
trols are activated, resulting in yet further differentiation of cell
environments. The gross result is the fabrication of distinctive
organs and other morphological features, in a sequence by which
each stage is sustained by previous stages.
The key concepts in this picture of morphological development
are (I) that such development is controlled by gene and environ-
ment together, and (2) that each stage of development (short of
98
Life
final maturity) is essential to subsequent stages. Although mech-
anisms by which such control processes might be exercised have
only recently been studied, it seems most likely they will yield
their secrets to conceptualization in terms of negative feedback. lO
In this section we have examined briefly some of the processes
by which genes govern the formation of additional structures
through the expenditure of energy and material gained outside
the organism. By these processes, negentropy in the form of
energy is translated into negentropy in the form of structure
under the control of negentropy in the form of genetic informa-
tion. This explains, in a general way, how an organism is able to
achieve and to maintain a lower state of entropy than its sur-
rounding environment. It also suggests an answer to the riddle
of teleonomic development.
4 TELEONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Living organisms resist increasing entropy by preserving their

structure while interchanging materials with their host environ-
ment. Living organisms further are capable of growth and repro-
duction, in which activities they not only resist the general
tendency toward increasing entropy but actually achieve a de-
crease of entropy within their structural bounds.
The processes of regeneration and development, moreover,
involve orderly transitions, in which prior stages form a basis for
subsequent stages. Structural states of an organism thus are
rendered possible by preceding states, in the sense that they could
not occur without appropriate antecedents. The role of prior
stages of organic processes thus often is best understood in
relationship to subsequent stages. This is the reason the noiseless
channel recommends itself as a model for interaction among
stages of certain organic processes, for it enables prior states to be
conceived as functions of subsequent states.
It was emphasized in our discussion of the causal relation that
adoption of the cybernetic model provides no occasion for the
introduction of a vitalistic terminology. We shall have no call to
speak of agencies transcending the principles of inorganic nature,
or of final causes exerting an influence backwards in time.
Accordingly, the term 'teleonomy' will be used without speculative
99
adornment to refer to biological processes directed toward
states that are only subsequently realized. l l With due qualification
along the lines indicated above, we may speak of such a state as
the 'end' of its associated process.
Now it has been claimed by some, with an air of the obvious,
that the end of any living organism is reproduction.12 This
surely is incorrect. If there is any teleonomic end shared by all
living organisms it is a continuing state of homeostasis, main-
tained without expansion of behavioral capacities. Consider first
the importance of homeostasis.
An organism passing through any given stage of morphological
development must relate to its environment with sufficient
stability to procure the materials and energy required for its
growth at that particular stage. These requirements may vary
from stage to stage, and so consequently might the modes of
procurement (consider the nutritional intake of the embryo, the
tadpole, and then the frog). Thus there may be successive changes
in the organism's means of maintaining stability. At any given
stage, however, the means of stability will be homeostatic in
character, such that deviations from an optimal relationship
between organism and environment will result in changes
(behavioral, metabolic, or simply chemical) by which the deviation
may be corrected. One basic role of homeostasis in the develop-
ment of an organism thus is to maintain a stable coupling with its
environment by which the organism is enabled to acquire the
material and energy needed to support its vital processes in their
current form.
The acorn, for example, sprouts a shoot and begins its root
system before extending leaves to seek the light. Each of these
stages is essential for the oak to come. At none of these early
stages, however, is the organism capable of maintaining itself
in the face of an indifferent environment without further develop-
ment of a structural nature. An acorn that does not sprout rots
away or is eaten, the shoot without the growing root soon fails
to receive nourishment, and the root without the leaf receives no
energy by which to maintain continuing growth. Only when the
system develops into a sapling is it capable of holding its own
without further morphological changes, and competition for
light generally requires further growth in some particular direc-
tion for the sapling to preserve its vitality in a crowded forest.
100
Life
The final stage in the series of developmental transitions will be
one in which the organism can maintain its vital processes in a
condition of homeostasis without further growth in structural
complexity. Organisms unable to reach this stage within a
given environment either change their locale (if mobile), or
falter in their vital processes and promptly disintegrate. The
mature state of a living organism, hence the end of its teleonomic
development, thus is relative to the resources of its living
environment.13
Only those organisms fortunate enough to reach this stage of
maturity become eligible for an active role in procreation. But
it does not follow from this that procreation itself is the end of
teleonomic development. Not every oak must seed another to
reach its full maturity, nor must an animal beget offspring to ful-
fill its developmental processes. I see no merit in Samuel Butler's
remark that a hen is only an egg's way of making another egg.
The hen rather is the egg's teleonomic fulfilment. Which came
first we should not aspire to know, but the end of the chicken is
not merely to lay an egg.
We have seen that the series of stages through which an
organism develops are ordered such that the earlier is a necessary
condition for the later stage. Either that stage precisely, or
one structurally similar, is requisite for further ontogenetic
development. No organism reaches full structural maturity
without passing through several structurally less complex
forms.
Given this relationship of necessary conditionality of later upon
earlier forms, several features of biological development that
once seemed mysterious begin to take on the appearance of rela-
tive lucidity. The sense in which growth of an organism repre-
sents a sort of 'reverse' functional relationship may be under-
stood simply in terms of its successive states of teleononllc
development. When we think of event E as the functional
precursor of another event C, this amounts to the conception of
E as a necessary condition without which C itself would not
occur. In connection with nonliving systems the necessary
condition is typically conceived as the later event (the effect later
than the cause). In connection with biological growth, how-
ever, it is often the preceding that is necessary for subsequent
stages.
101
Organism and Ewironmmt
Equally important is the perspicuous conception we may now
formulate of teleonomic development itself. Just as each major
stage in an organism's development is a necessary condition of
every major stage following, so each major stage in turn is
necessary for the final stage of ontogenetic maturity. Each
earlier stage provides a basis without which further organic
development could not occur, and the structures emerging at
these earlier stages cannot be fully understood independently of
their roles in this further development.14 Thus there is a clear
sense in which earlier structures in the growth of a living system
are ordered towards its final (end) state. Organic development is
a continuing process, the stages of which can be comprehended
(literally, 'grasped together') only in the context of its overall
result.
Most striking, however, is the sense we are now provided in
which the organism's growth may be perspicuously conceived
as actually impelled toward this final state. This sense is pre-
dicated upon the assumption that the organism in question is of a
form that has been naturally selected for vitality in its particular
living environment.
As has been pointed out, the final stage of a developmental
process is the one in which the organism requires no further
structural complexity for lasting homeostatic stability in its given
environment. It follows that any stage prior to this end is one in
which the organism cannot long remain and retain the capacity
for successful environmental adjustment. Thus if the organism
is to remain alive it cannot tarry long at any preliminary stage
of development. Teleonomic growth involves a requirement for
passing through successive ontogenetic phases which does not
abate until the organism is fully mature. The organism literally
cannot stop growing, if it is to have a chance of survival, until it
has reached its final state. Hence the organism that survives the
process of natural selection must possess a 'built-in' compulsion
to reach maturity.
In this sense, any viable organism is impelled in its growth
toward its final state, although not by forces of nonnatural sort.
The impulsion results from the continuing requirement for a
stable coupling with its living environment, under penalty of
disruption of its energy sources. It is the role of natural selection
to assure that this requirement is met.
102
Life
NOTES
I The possibility of self-replicating machines of this sort has been demon-

strated by von Neumann; see Gardner (1971) and Moore (1956) for
helpful discussions.
2 I know of no way to be convinced of this save by thought-experiments of
the sort in the text above. Independent support for this opinion, how-
ever, may be found in Beadle and Beadle (1966, p. 3I), and Wooldridge
(19 66 , p. 55)·
3 An interesting experiment with evolving mechanisms, albeit in an highly
artificial environment of number sequences, is reported in Fogel, Owens
and Walsh (1965).
4 As Mead (1934, p. 130) puts it, 'since organism and environment deter-
mine each other ... , it follows that the life-process, to be adequately
understood, must be considered in terms of their interrelations.'
6 A discussion of protein structure accessible to laymen may be found in
Steiner and Edelhoch (1965, ch. 5).
6 The hydrogen bond is a non-covalent (without shared electron) con-
nection forming typically under certain conditions between two oxygen
molecules, two nitrogen molecules, or one oxygen and one nitrogen
molecule. Hydrogen bonds are much weaker than ordinary covalent
bonds, and may be broken and reestablished easily by changes in temper-
ature. The importance of this bond for life extends beyond its role in
structuring the double helix of DNA. It is also the basis of that unique
property of water whereby it freezes from the top downwards, thereby
making possible the existence (and evolution) of aquatic life. (In this
latter connection see Blum, 1955, p. 76.) Of particular interest in the
present context is that the hydrogen bond itself is formed by the 'balance'
of a proton in the attractive fields between two adjacent atoms, a state
suggesting analysis in terms of negative feedback. Further, hydrogen
bonding makes possible, with its low energy requirements, an 'experi-
mental' procedure by which a molecule can seek out its most stable
state. It is on the basis of this capacity, itself a feedback operation, that
DNA assumes its helical form. (For this, see Monod, 1971, p. 106, and
Steiner and Edelhoch, 1965, p. 90.)
7 A clear account of how the genetic code was 'broken' can be found in
Beadle and Beadle (1966), chs 21 and 22.
8 This is in accord with genetic determination of developing structures.
The point is that the genetic messages require interpretation, and that
the interpretation which yields one rather than another structural result
is provided by the 'initial' environmental conditions. See Monod (1971),
p. 95, where there is mention of genetic information being 'screened' by
initial conditions.
9 Monod, 1971, p. 77. This process as Monod describes it bears striking
similarity to the general process of sentient feedback discussed in chapter
IV.
10 Monod says as much (ibid., pp. 89,95) in expressing his opinion that these
10 3
processes may yield to hypotheses similar to those (involving negative
feedback) by which he explains allosteric interaction.
I I The term was suggested as a replacement of 'teleology' by Pitten-
drigh (1958, p. 394). It is interesting to note that Monod (1971, p. 69) uses
'teleonomic' as synonymous with 'cybernetic', a usage not to be recom-
mended for general purposes.
12 For example, see de Laguna (1962), p. 119.
13 Rosenbleuth (1970, p. 16) alludes to fish that die, barring accident or
disease, because of size requiring more food than the animal can obtain
in its present environment. These animals presumably are mature, but
maladapted. Competition for food within environmental limits is a
common natural 'technique' for population control.
14 Readers familiar with Nagel's analysis (1961, pp. 413-18) of goal-directed-
ness in physical systems may be interested to note that his notion of
'G-state' illustrates this point. 'G-state' is short for 'causally effective
state with respect to G', where 'G' represents the terminus of a goal-
directed process. A G-state thus is conceived as such with respect to its
role in understanding a state of the system prior to the G-state itself. I
agree with the consequence Nagel traces from his discussion of teleo-
logical explanation, that such an explanation 'in biology indicates the
consequences for a given biological system of a constituent part or pro-
cess'; while 'the equivalent non teleological formulation of this explana-
tion ... states some of the conditions • .. under which the system persists
in its characteristic organization and activities' (ibid., p. 405, author's
emphasis). I agree also that biological explanations are always possible
that do not require the 'adoption of teleology as a fundamental or un-
analyzable category' (p. 417) or 'the postulation of purposes or goals as
dynamic agents' (p. 411), and that these explanations are concerned with
the effects of given states upon subsequent system operation. I would
not, however, analyze feedback of the sort required in biological develop-
ment according to the pattern Nagel offers (pp. 411-18). It appears to me
unrealistic, for reasons discussed in chapter V, to base one's analysis of
life processes upon the assumption of determinism (contra ibid., p. 412).
Further, I reject the assumption that 'environmental factors vary quite
independently of the internal parts .. .' (ibid., p. 417) of the operating
system. Although there are forms of homeostatic feedback (e.g. blood-
temperature regulating mechanisms) of which this is the case, it pointedly
is not the case for feedback systems generally. The natural environment
of human society is constantly undergoing change in compensation for
the increasing stress placed upon it by human encroachment; and the
very business of animal nutrition is to make the state of environmental
structures (food/waste) dependent upon factors internal to the organic
system.
104
VII
EVOLUTION
1 EVOLUTION, CONDITIONING AND

CONSCIOUSNESS AS FEEDBACK PROCESSES
Feedback in life processes is not confined to protein production,

or to the maintenance of couplings with energy sources. Feedback
operations are involved also in the phylogenetic processes by
which organisms become capable of these activities. The first
task of this chapter is to delineate the feedback aspects of the
evolutionary process, and thereby to lay the basis for comparing
evolution with other forms of adaptation.
A major thesis of this study is that there is continuity both in
development and in manner of operation among (I) mechanisms
of evolution and natural selection within the reproductive group,
(2) mechanisms of conditioning within the individual organism,
and (3) mechanisms of consciousness within the central nervous
system. The first step in developing this thesis is to exhibit all
three forms of interaction between organism and environment-
natural selection, conditioning and consciousness alike-as
closely related forms of negative feedback. In so far as this pro-
ject is successful, we shall be able to speak without metaphor
of conditioning as the evolution of behavioral patterns, and
of consciousness as the (very rapid) evolution of sentient
structures.! These topics are the concern of the two chapters
following.
The second task of this chapter is to treat the origin of living
forms in terms of processes known to exist in inorganic systems.
10 5
In the final section we will consider the question of so-called
'evolutionary progress'.
2 EVOLUTION AND NATURAL SELECTION
Homeostatic feedback (see chapter IV) occurs whenever a system's

behavior is modified in response to environmental changes to
maintain some feature of the system in a standard condition.
There is no requirement that the system be a living organism. A
homeostatic system might be wholly inorganic, or might be com-
posed of other organisms that in turn are homeostatic in their
individual behavior.
Natural selection itself is a homeostatic process. Its long-term
effect is to preserve life in changing environments. Among its
more transitory effects are the groups of individuals with shared
characteristics that we identify by phylum, genus and kind.
In order to describe the feedback processes of a given homeo-
static system, we need to identify the normal features protected
by its homeostatic operations, the manner of indicating deviation
from its normal state, and the resources of the system by which
deviation is remedied. And of course we need to identify the
system itself. For present purposes this later requirement is
crucial, for not everyone will be prepared to think of evolution
and natural selection in terms of a system governed by homeo-
static feedback.
The biological system that undergoes natural selection is a
group of reproductive individuals, with characteristics pro-
pagated genetically through successive generations2 and with
membership depending numerically upon environmental condi-
tions. Such a group will be conceived to persist as long as there
exist individuals capable of propagating the genes of the parent
group. The context in which natural selection occurs is a biota, or
set of reproductive groups in a shared environment.
The normal state of a homeostatic system is the state toward
which it tends to return through fluctuation stemming from
environmental change. In a reproductive group, the normal state
is a population density that is relatively fixed within a specific
geographic locale. Deviation from this normal state may take the
form of either a sharp increase or a sharp decrease in population.
106
Evolution
Sharp increases in population of a given group within a given
environmental niche may result from an increase in food or from
a decrease in predators. In either case the group may expand
until it reaches stability at a higher population level. When a
sharp increase in population is not accompanied by adequate
food and protection within its niche, however, various regulative
mechanisms may take over to bring it back to a lower level. One
such mechanism, of course, is an increase in predator population,
spurred by an increase in its food supply. Other mechanisms of
population control may arise within the affected group itself.
Guppies, for example, manifest a tendency towards cannibalism
that increases with population density. Female mice seem to un-
dergo a decrease in ovulation rate with an increase in population
beyond optimal levels. Among species sophisticated enough to
permit ranking of individual members in a 'pecking order,' this
ordering serves not only to channel abuse but more importantly
also controls access to food and mating privileges. Since less
vigorous members are deprived both of food and of progeny,
this mechanism not only regulates population density but also
maintains a high level of vitality within the group.
Population decreases also may be countered in various ways. If
the decrease does not result from food shortage or increased
predation, increased reproductive activity may return the group
to a previous level. More interesting from the evolutionary point
of view, however, are regulative mechanisms responding to
increased competition or predation from other species. Such
pressures may result in the evolution of new genetic structures
within the affected group.
One general response to such pressures is diversification, either
by adapting as a group to different living conditions (terrestrial,
arboreal, aerial, aquatic, amphibious) or by taking advantage of
different food sources (mammals, insects, seeds, herbs) (see
Simpson, 1965, pp. 80-91
80-91 for a discussion of this process of
'adaptive radiation'). An opposite response is specialization, by
which the organism is enabled to sustain itself by more efficient
use of particular food sources. Another response is to develop
more effective weaponry for interspecific conflict, enabling the
group to ward off its predators and to increase its dominance
within its niche.
Yet another means of escaping pressures leading to population
101
10
decrease is for the group to migrate to a different locale. Although
food there may be plentiful in its accustomed form, new environ-
mental contingencies will arise to which the group must respond,
resulting in the development of new specific traits. 3
The emergence of new specific traits within a reproductive
group thus may be viewed in general as the result of homeo-
static mechanisms by which the group tends to recover equili-
brium under environmental stress. Since stress of the sort in
question typically is exerted by other groups inhabiting the same
locale, adaptive evolution can occur without major geophysical
upheaval, although of course it can occur for this reason as well
(Simpson, 1965, pp. 37-8). The net effect of such adaptive pro-
cesses throughout the biosphere is a proliferation of living forms.
As Simpson (1965, pp. 77-8) puts it, in the form of a general
principle, 'throughout its history life has tended to expand, to
include increasingly greater numbers of kinds of living things.'
The generation of different kinds is a result of homeostatic feed-
back, working to maintain equilibrium in population density of
the reproductive group.
But not all mutant groups persist within the evolutionary
procession. Each must compete for a place within its environ-
mental niche, and the success of one competitor entails the
failure of others.4 Whereas the generation of potentially stable
mutations is part of a feedback process operating on the level of
the individual group, natural selection results from feedback
on the level of the local biota itself. Natural selection is homeo-
stasis on the part of a system of interacting life forms in a shared
environment. In the words of Margalef (1968, p. 93), 'selection is
controlled by the cybernetic mechanism at the level of eco-
system.'
The normal state of a local biota is to include as many different
individuals of as many different species as can obtain shelter and
nutrition within their shared environment. Species sustained by
the same varieties of breeding and living space (caves, trees,
burrows, etc.) and the same varieties of nutrition (leaves, seeds,
insects, etc.) may be said to occupy the same roles in a given
biota (Simpson, 1965, pp. 79, 82). Another general principle
cited by Simpson (ibid., p. 82) is the tendency 'to fill and to keep
filled all the roles of a biota, to keep the community full and in
balance.' The state of being 'full and in balance' thus is normal for
108
Evolution
a local biota, in the sense of being the state to which the system
returns through fluctuation.
Depletion of membership within a particular role is countered
by immigration of groups from neighboring locales, by adaptive
radiation within the biota, or by accelerated reproduction within
present groups. This process thus operates by positive feedback.
Excessive population within a particular role, on the other hand,
may be remedied either by deceleration of reproduction or by the
emigration or extinction of a competing group. When population
pressures arise because of competition among recently emerging
groups, the long range result is the natural selection of those few
groups best able to maintain their own stability within the role,
and the extinction of other competitors within that particular
niche (Simpson, I965, pp. 82-3). Natural selection is the outcome
of a biota adjusting its membership to maintain a dynamic
balance (Simpson, I965, p. 83; Dobzhansky, 1955, p. 132), based
on the fact that two groups competing within the same role
generally will not long exist together (Simpson, 1965, p. 79).
Natural selection thus is a process of negative feedback operating
on the level of the biota.
Whereas adaptation and the emergence of new genotypes is a
feedback process within a reproductive group, natural selection
is homeostasis within a relatively isolated biotic system. The
result of these two processes operating together is the evolution
of established species (Dobzhansky, I95 5, p. I3 I).
This account of evolution through mutation and natural
selection is simplified to the extreme, but it serves the purpose of
delineating two of the more important feedback processes
operating in the generation of different kinds of living organism.
An even more basic level of feedback process must come into
account when we conjecture about the origin of the evolutionary
process itself.
Like other adaptative processes, evolution requires both the
persistence of stable structures and variability in the procedure
by which these structures are propagated. To appreciate this, let
us distinguish three possible modes of genetic transmission. One
is a procedure by which genetic structures of each new individual
are strictly determined by those of a single parent (an example is
cloning). A population propagated by this procedure exclusively
would be entirely inflexible, with no chance of survival in a world
109
of competition and change. Another possibility is a general inde-
pendence of genetic structures between successive reproductive
stages. In this case, the traits of the parent would be lost to the
offspring, and no group would emerge with a stable set of fea-
tures adapted to its living environment.
The third possible procedure is the one that provides for groups
that are stable throughout successive generations, yet capable of
adapting to changing living conditions. In this procedure, the one
we conceive actually to operate in species evolution, genetic
structures of offspring generally copy those of the parents with
variations according to the statistics of the genetic pool. These
(and occasionally more radical) variations might be produced
entirely at random,S by nongenetic causes such as radiation, or by
strategies of variation such as those inherent in sexual repro-
duction. With this combination of novelty and repetition, suc-
cessful genetic structures can be passed through successive
generations, with occasional changes representing adaption to
environmental stress. Rough calculations suggest that about one
change out of 1014 comes to be included in the genotype of an
established species.6
An intriguing conjecture in this regard is that this particular
combination of chance and regularity itself probably has evolved
as the mode of genetic inheritance best capable of sustaining life
through continuous fluctuation of living conditions. If a group
should ever have emerged with an appreciably lower probability
of genetic mutation, its career on earth would have been short
for its complete lack of adaptive characteristics. Individuals with
appreciably higher probabilities of mutation, on the other hand,
generally would not generate viable offspring. By suppression of
groups and individuals featuring these two extreme modes of
genetic transmission, the feedback mechanisms between organism
and environment must have fostered the present balance between
regulation and novelty.
In view of these three levels of feedback operating within the
evolutionary process, as well as the countless feedback mech-
anisms working to preserve the metabolism and structure of the
individual organism, the very organization of life itself appears
as an instantiation of the feedback process. One may be excused
for wondering how it all began.
IIO
Evolution
3 CONJECTURED LIFE ORIGINS
The question how it all began is not one for scientific discussion:
in science the story begins at a less ultimate stage. Nor does
science at the present offer more than tenuous hypotheses about
the origin of stellar bodies from hydrogen gas, or about the
generation of elements when these stars exploded. For our pur-
poses there is no reason to examine such hypotheses in detail. But
it is pertinent to conjecture about the early appearance of certain
feedback mechanisms which may have sponsored the develop-
ment of elementary life forms.
Recent calculations by astrophysicists indicate that hydrogen
is by far the most abundant element in the known universe,
roughly 70 per cent of its total by weight, with helium next at 28
per cent. Within the remaining 2 per cent, oxygen, carbon and
nitrogen are most common, and the heavier elements increasingly
rare (see Greenstein, 1961, pp. 450-2). Matter is collected largely
in stars like our sun, with 10 per cent or less in the form of
interstellar gas.
But stars themselves undergo evolution, beginning with the
collection of hydrogen masses by gravitational forces. As the
gravitational mass builds up, the protostar contracts and becomes
increasingly hot, beginning to generate nuclear energy at core
temperatures approaching about a million degrees. The internal
heat then increases more rapidly until the energy released is
balanced by radiation into space from the surface, the surface
held constant in turn as radiation pressure from the center
balances gravitational force (ibid., p. 454). The star exists in this
stable configuration for most of its life, controlled by negative
feedback interactions between thermal, radiational and gravita-
tional energy. When the internal supply of hydrogen becomes
insufficient to maintain the mass in this stable condition, the star
enters its stage of final destruction, perhaps by gradual decay into
a 'red giant' (approximately 5 X 108 degrees) and into very high-
density 'white dwarfs' (ibid., p. 461). A more spectacular end
occurs in some larger stars where loss of energy by radiation from
the surface is exceedingly rapid, as a result of which the exhaus-
tion of further hydrogen fuel leads to a correspondingly rapid
loss of internal radiation pressure, and the collapse of the star
due to sheer gravitational weight.
III
Although lighter elements such as helium and perhaps oxygen
form in the star's center before this final collapse, the sub-
sequent explosion (a supernova) generates temperatures of several
billion degrees, producing all other elements capable of existing
under such extreme conditions (ibid., p. 461). In some fashion
such as this, oxygen, carbon, nitrogen, sulfur, and other
elements appearing in basic life forms, were introduced
into space to find their way eventually into separate solar
systems. 7
In its lifeless beginning, the major part of the earth's surface
was covered by water, with an atmosphere of ammonia, methane
and lots of free hydrogen. The water was hot and frequently
turbulent from volcanic activity, while the atmosphere was
energized by electrical discharges and by intense ultraviolet
radiation from the unshielded sun.
It was demonstrated under laboratory conditions scarcely
twenty years ago that a mixture of water vapor, hydrogen,
ammonia and methane circulated in the presence of an electrical
discharge will produce several amino acids similar to those essen-
tial for life. A similar mixture exposed to high-energy electron
bombardment a few years later yielded not only amino acids, but
also sugars, fatty acids, urea, and several nucleic acid bases. 8 In
the primeval atmosphere, including such elements as sulfur,
phosphorus and sodium, yet other molecules typical of life could
eventually form. Since these new substances were heavier than
atmospheric gases, they settled on the seas and lakes below.
After some billion years had passed, the lakes and ponds became
hot dilute 'broths,' containing most of the organic substances
from which life would form.
Energy is required to link amino acids into protein-like com-
pounds. This could be provided by lightning flashes and con-
tinuing volcanic activity. The process would be abetted by con-
centration of the materials due to evaporation, and to the pre-
sence of clay-like substances for which proteins have a known
affinity. At this early stage organic substances could persevere in
the 'broth' indefinitely, with no bacteria to reduce them back to
their basic elements.
As yet no living form has entered the picture. There are no
stable structures to preserve themselves while interchanging
matter with their environment. And there is no reproduction. In
lIZ
Evolution
short, there is no negative feedback by which matter can be
maintained under stress in a state of high improbability.
Imagine these organic materials to be in the process of genera-
tion for another billion years, shifted from place to place by
evaporation and surface upheaval, but collecting time and again
in rivers and lakes. Volcanic gases contribute hydrogen sulfide
and carbon dioxide. Energy-rich molecules develop that are
capable of supplying energy for protein synthesis in the absence
of volcanic activity. Metallic catalysts in various combinations
become concentrated in the ponds and lakes. Autocatalytic pro-
cesses occur that cause one locale to specialize in one sort of
reaction, others in another, until each separate pond develops its
own unique type of chemical activity. Chemical products now
can be formed in days that before required millions of years in
production.
At this point, some two billion years into the story, collections
of molecules called coacervates begin to play a dominant role.
Coacervates can be obtained under laboratory conditions by
mixing certain substances of high molecular weight into a solu-
tion at ordinary temperatures. 9 Whereas the molecules are ini-
tially dispersed equally throughout the liquid, they come soon
to unite with each other in dumps or droplets that separate
themselves out of solution and grow until they reach a certain
size. At the end of this process, the coacervate globules contain
practically all the molecules of the substance in question that
originally had been mixed within the liquid. Proteins are among
several substances that share this property of coacervate formation.
Coacervates, moreover, can form out of several different sub-
stances together, and may contain enzymes which continue their
catalytic activities within the droplet.
The shape, size, and stability of a given coacervate globule will
depend upon its surface tension, which in turn depends upon the
materials with which the globule is surrounded. In protein
coacervates there may be a migration of substances to the sur-
face that endow the droplet with specific mechanical properties.
The surface thus becomes a membrane that can absorb particular
substances from the surrounding solution, or can pass certain
molecules in one direction but not the other.
Assume a coacervate droplet in the 'primeval broth,' with a
surface membrane capable of passing small molecules, but not
113
large, in either direction. The droplet thus may absorb molecules
of amino adds, nucleic acid bases, carbohydrates, hydrogen
sulfide, and carbon dioxide, which in the presence of catalysts may
be transformed into larger molecules of protein and carbohy-
drate that hence will be retained within the globule. As new
'supplies' are passed through the surface, the droplet grows, and
may even 'excrete' smaller by-products through its selective
membrane. The coacervate as we now conceive it has the be-
ginnings of a simple metabolism.
Continued growth, however, is dependent also upon the pro-
duction of more membrane substance by the internal chemical
reactions. If not enough membrane material is produced, the
droplet will become glutted and perhaps explode. If too much is
produced, its surface may become too thick and shut off the
droplet from further supplies. A 'successfully growing' coacer-
vate will be one that admits less new material when its membrane
tends to become too thick, thus cutting back on the production
of new membrane material, and that admits greater amounts as the
membrane becomes excessively thin. By whatever chemical pro-
cesses this stability is achieved, such a droplet will continue to
grow, continuing to exchange materials with its host environ-
ment. The coacervate has achieved a basic homeostasis, by which
it maintains and increases its special structure at the expense of
material and energy from its surrounding medium. The form of
negative feedback typical of life has finally entered the picture.
Reproduction is accomplished for the first time as a particularly
large (hence particularly 'successful') globule breaks up under
extreme agitation, to reform in smaller globules with the same
basic chemical makeup.
A coacervate is a pond contained within itself, hence free to
migrate without chemical change into the open ocean. Here the
supply of fresh materials will be more sparse, and those systems
unable to find the molecules their metabolism now requires, or
unable to adjust otherwise to the new environment, will even-
tually disperse and release their materials for others to feed on.
Those capable of sustaining their growth in the more rigorous
environment, on the other hand, will multiply at the expense of
their less hearty cohabitants.
Conceive now that several hundred millions of years have
passed since coacervate structures began to develop, and mi-
114
Evolution
grated in many forms into the seas of the earth. Those relatively
few forms that have developed capacities for self-preservation
and for reproduction of their kind will have had these capacities
'tuned' by the exigencies of an unsympathetic environment.
Whereas at the beginning of their ocean existence these self-
sustaining 'bags of chemicals' had only the barren oceans to
contend with, the time arrives when the more prolific forms in
isolated locales begin to vie among themselves. Those that win
out over their competitors in one place will tend to spread out in
increasing numbers to contest the dominance of those that have
learned to flourish in neighboring locales. Strains will begin to
develop that specialize in sustaining themselves upon varying
diets, sometimes including the contents of smaller globules. The
struggle for dominance spreads throughout increasingly larger
locales.
Early products of this evolution among organic forms are
structures capable of preserving themselves effectively under
changing environmental conditions. A particularly effective
technique would be that of maintaining a self-contained environ-
ment in which material could be stored for later use by a central
metabolism. Another would be a symbiotic association between
systems that could protect each other against hostile influences in
a shared environment. Either arrangement could evolve into a
cell-like structure, with a 'nucleus' specializing in regenerative
activities and a 'cytoplasm' specializing in the gathering of raw
materials. 10
At some stage in this process, occurring between two and three
billion years ago, these remarkable 'bags of chemicals' evolved
into what we would consider a primitive organism. Life as we
know it had begun on earth.
The feedback processes by which young stars were held in
balance between gravitation and radiation are mirrored more than
symbolically in the feedback processes by which living cells
impose their structure upon an indifferent environment.
4 EVOLUTIONARY PROGRESS
In comparison with the two to three billion years required for the
evolution of basic life forms, and the additional approximately
CP1i-B 115
two billion years for the appearance of animals capable of leaving
a fossil record, mammals emerged less than one hundred million
years ago, and man only within the last hundred thousand years. l l
Viewed from this perspective, nature seems to be in a rush to
develop organisms of increasing complexity. Even from view-
points less dramatically staged, there appears to be a marked
directionality in evolutionary development. What significance
might this have for our understanding of man?
A question often debated by students of biological science is
whether any sense can be attached to the notion of evolutionary
progress. An answer is available within the cybernetic context.
The mark of success of an organic form in the evolutionary
experiment is the ability of its members to achieve stability within
their environment which they can maintain until reproduction
occurs.12 This amounts, in the picturesque terminology of
Schrodinger (1967, p. 76), to persisting ability on the part of the
organism to feed upon the negentropy of its immediate environ-
ment. The more capable it becomes of exploiting the energy and
structure of its environment for its growth and stability, the
higher its chances of populating the environment with more of its
kind. The overall tendency of natural selection is to single out
life forms that excel in maintaining a favorable balance of negen-
tropic exchange.
Both structure and energy are forms of negentropy (chapter
III). Hence it is possible to formulate a meaningful ratio of an
organism's degree of structural complexity divided by the average
energy input (nutrition and sensory information) required to
maintain this structure through normal variations of its living
environment.l3 This ratio may appear at first to provide a quanti-
tative measure of evolutionary success. A given species might be
reckoned more successful than another if its typical mature
members were characterized by a higher ratio of structure to
energy. Evolutionary progress would be marked by increasingly
higher ratios.
However, the mistake in this approach is easy to recognize.
The evolutionary parameter measured by the ratio of structure to
energy is not progress but specialization. And species that become
highly specialized are not well seeded in the competition for group
survival. Thus the herbivorous brontosaurus maintained its
considerable bulk at the expense of nutrients relatively low in
II6
Evolution
energy and structure, but was limited thereby to lush and solid
ground. The negentropic superiority we want to characterize
is exemplified better by men and roaches, both of proven ability
to exist within wide ranges of environmental contingencies.
The parameter we want to measure is flexibility.
Aristotle drew a basic biological distinction between organisms
capable of absorbing nutrients only in a fixed location and those
able to move about in search of food. This distinction is basic to
the cybernetic account also, for mobility is an important factor in
the development of organisms with flexibility in the assimilation
of negentropy. In speaking of flexibility in the assimilation of
negentropy I refer to the capacity of an organism to establish
efficient couplings with its environment, under a range of dif-
ferent conditions, through which negentropy can be obtained
to support its growth and metabolism and to control its response
to environmental contingencies. Among such couplings are
channels of nutrition in all living organisms, mechanisms of
heliotropism in many flora, and perceptual channels in mobile
animals. Let us name this capacity 'negentropic flexibility'.
Mobility supports the development of negentropic flexibility
in at least two respects. For one, an organism threatened in a given
location often can save itself and hence its progeny simply by
moving to a more hospitable locale. Individuals with superior
mobility thus will tend to replace others within their reproductive
group, thereby strengthening the genetic factors that make
mobility possible. Among such factors, however, is perceptual
sensitivity (argued in chapter IX), which contributes directly to
the organism's capacity to acquire negentropy in the form of
information. Second, species whose members move in a variety of
habitats will tend to develop genetic characteristics that support
successful negentropic couplings in each domain. The mechanism
which accomplishes this most directly is sexual reproduction,
which enables genetic structures successful within different
locales to merge within the genes of derivative organisms. By this
means also, individuals able to relate successfully to different
habitats will tend to mate more widely within a group that is dis-
persed geographically and hence to produce more progeny than
their less flexible fellows.
Groups with greater negentropic flexibility, in turn, are more
likely than others to survive the hazards of natural selection. A
II7
basic lesson of evolution theory is that groups specially adapted
to particular living conditions are likely to decrease in number
when these conditions are altered, perhaps to be replaced by
others more adaptable to the new environment. But groups with
a higher degree of negentropic flexibility are more likely to per-
sist through environmental change.
Survival through major environmental change, moreover, often
results in the development of further capacities for efficient
negentropic coupling, perhaps new modes of sensitivity or more
nutritional diets.1 4 And these new capacities in turn provide
greater mobility.
This positive feedback interaction between mobility and negen-
tropic flexibility portends the development of a successful new
species, with members more adept than those before them in the
acquisition of energy and information. In matters of evolu-
tionary development, nothing fosters success more than success
itself; no species show more promise of survival through new
environmental crises than those with negentropic flexibility
gained by coping with past contingencies.
It is with regard to flexibility of this sort, I suggest, that we
are justified in speaking of evolutionary progress. A group is
more or less advanced on the evolutionary scale according to its
members' ability to maintain a stable relationship with a variety
of environmental circumstances, and thereby to assimilate suffi-
cient negentropy for their growth to maturity and eventual
propagation.l5
Negentropic flexibility recommends itself as a mark of evolu-
tionary progress not because it places man in the vanguard of the
process, nor because of intuitions we may have about natural
excellence. Indeed, it is not clear prima facie that man deserves
that singular honor, for there exist other life forms (cockroach,
opossum, ginko tree) whose proof of flexibility reaches back to
periods far more ancient than man ever remembered. Negen-
tropic flexibility is a mark of evolutionary progress simply be-
cause it indicates the direction in which evolution by its very
nature is bound to develop. It is simply a fact that life forms
capable of assimilating structure and energy under a wide variety
of circumstances tend to surpass others with less diversification.
And when successful innovations occur in these particular capa-
cities they generally tend to encourage more of the same. The
!I8
Evolution
organism showing more extensive effects of evolution and natural
selection thus is the one capable of maintaining stability in a wider
variety of environmental circumstances, whereby it assimilates
negentropy essential for its eventual reproduction. In short, the
organism that is more advanced in the order of evolutionary
progress is that with the higher degree of negentropic flexibility.
But what of man's status in comparison with the omnivorous
cockroach? We must recall that food is not the only form of
negentropy yielded by the supporting environment. In addition
there is structure, including patterns of individual adaptive
behavior, and information received through perceptual channels.
To complete the case for man we must turn to these other
capacities, the topics respectively of the following two chapters.
NOTES
1 Similarities between evolution and conditioning have been noted by

Wiener (1961, p. 170), and by Skinner (1969, pp. 175, 197, 203). For
early attempts to apply cybernetic concepts in the analysis of these two
processes, see Pringle (1951), and Russell (1958, 1959, 1961, 1962).
2 Within the genetic pool causally correlated with the characteristics identi-
fying a given group, there is likely to be no combination occurring in-
variably in every member, and perhaps no combination occurring
unaltered in parent and offspring alike (see Simpson, 1947, p. 72).
3 After a period of adaptive radiation, animals of common origin in
isolated geographic locales may become incapable of interbreeding, even
though they continue to develop in comparable fashion. This is known
technically as 'parallelism' (Simpson, 1965, p. 8).
4 In a general account such as this there is the constant danger of important
details slipping from view. Competition between particular species for a
particular role does not necessarily result in extinction of the less favored
competitor. As MacArthur points out (1972, p. 92), 'unless one species
is uniformly superior to another in every habitat, it wilI not exterminate
the other completely. That is, the usual effect of introducing a com-
petitor is to restrict but not eliminate the previous species.' Nonetheless,
competition plays a major role in the eventual extinction of species, along
with predation (ibid.) and environmental upheaval.
5 Chance mutations occur when hydrogen bonds form between two mole-
cules at the wrong juncture during the process of gene replication. If
thymine pairs with guanine instead of adenine, for example, one of the
second generation replicas will have cytosine (paired subsequently with
the guanine component) in place of adenine in the 'grandparent' gene.
See Beadle and Beadle (1966), pp. 20-1.
6 By Beadle's estimate (Beadle and Beadle, 1966, p. 9), mutations occur
II9
only about once out of a million replications. Lorenz (1965, p. 103) esti-
mates that the chances of a successful mutation are of the order of one
to 10 8•
7 According to some versions of the favored 'big-bang' hypothesis, all
elements were formed within minutes of the 'beginning' of the universe.
At worst this consequence would deprive us of a few primordial ex-
amples of negative feedback. That the schematic account above is also
compatible with the 'big-bang' hypothesis may be seen in Schramm
(1974), pp. 69-7 2.
8 A lucid discussion of these experiments may be found in Wooldridge
(1966), ch. 5. I am indebted to this book for much of the material in this
section. Other important sources are Oparin (1961 and 1964).
9 This brief discussion of coacervates depends heavily upon Oparin (1961),
pp. 69-71. I must take responsibility, however, for all speculative remarks
about early forms of negative feedback.
10 As Oparin sees it (1961, p. 71), from a physico-chemical point of view,
protoplasm is a very complex form of coacervate.
II These estimates come from Dobzhansky (1955), ch. I. If we think of the
time from the beginning of the earth to the present as a twenty-four-hour
period, we should think of man as present only during the final second.
It is noteworthy that the acceleration in energy use by life forms so
apparent in our current 'population explosion' actually began with the
first appearance of life on earth and has held roughly constant ever since.
In light of estimates that mankind will consume as much energy and
other natural resources within the next ten to twenty years as consumed
between now and the beginning of human life, it appears that we might
be in the final stages of that accelerative process.
12 It is compatible with this remark that certain species, such as dandelion
and ragweed among the plants, are adapted to 'colonize' disturbed
ecosystems and accordingly are poor competitors within stable environ-
ments. Because of their short life cycles and generally high reproduction
rates, groups of such organisms are able to maintain the environmental
adjustment necessary for species propagation, even though their en-
vironment itself is in process of change. Stability of an organism to the
point of reproduction does not necessarily require a stable environment.
13 A rough characterization of structural complexity in communication-
theoretic terms is the following: the arrangement of a set of elements is
structurally complex in proportion to the number of elements in the set
and the degree of average mutual information between subsets randomly
selected in mutually exclusive and exhaustive pairs. This measure of
structural complexity over average energy intake is similar to the cri-
terion of ecosystem maturity suggested by Margalef(1968, p. 44), namely
'the ratio of information preserved per unit energy flow.' Odum (1971,
p. 39) remarks, apropos of Margalef's criterion, that one 'of the theoreti-
cal questions now under debate is whether nature maximizes the ratio of
structure to maintenance metabolism . . . or whether it is energy flow
itself that is maximized.' I propose in the text following that the factor
maximized is the ability of organisms to exploit the energy resources of
120
Evolution
their environment, from which it follows as an unfortunate consequence
that energy expended in the maintenance of life forms also will be
maximized.
14 A critically important phase in the development of man as a tool-making
creature occurred when his ancient precursors learned to rely upon meat
instead of vegetation for their primary food source, hence to find leisure
time between feedings to develop weapons and tools. With weapons, in
tum, acquiring food became increasingly easy, allowing progressively
more time for the perfection of art and industry. This and other break-
throughs in means of energy acquisition are discussed in Beadle and
Beadle (1966), ch. 6.
1 S It is not clear that negentropic flexibility provides a scale along which all
organic forms, living and dead, can be related in order of evolutionary
progress. Moreover, it should be emphasized that superior negentropic
flexibility does not assure superior longevity, for which specialization is
more auspicious in persistently stable environments. The respect in which
increasing negentropic flexibility is associated with evolutionary progress
is indicated in the following quotation from Herrick (1946): 'Progressive
organic evolution may be defined as change in the direction of increase
in the range and variety of adjustments of the organism to its environ-
ment. This involves increase in the complexity of structure, ensuring
sensitivity to greater variety of environing energies and more refined
sensory analysis .•• .' I am indebted to Gary Monnard for helpful criti-
cism in regard to the conception of negentropic flexibility, and in other
matters also.
121
VIII
LEARNING
I LEARNING AS ADAPTATION OF THE

INDIVIDUAL ORGANISM
The natural course of evolution, we have seen, gives preference to

organisms capable of acquiring energy (for metabolism), structure
(for growth) and information (for guidance) under a wide variety
of environmental conditions. Since energy, structure and infor-
mation are forms of negentropy (chapter III), this capacity has
been entitled 'negentropic flexibility'. When expediencies arise
in the course of species evolution that increase the negentropic
flexibility of prevalent genotypes in a reproductive group, that
group tends towards increased dominance over competitors
within its environmental niche.
A major expedient of this nature appeared with the ability of
animals to adapt their mode of behavior to changing circumstances
within their immediate environment. Whereas species evolution
is adaptation over periods of many generations to pervasive
change in general living conditions, adaptation of individual
behavior to immediate contingencies may occur repeatedly in the
lifetime of a single organism. Individuals endowed with such
adaptive capacities tend to prevail within their reproductive
groups.
Adaptive modification of behavior occurs primarily in the
association between an organism's receptor and effector mech-
anisms. Let us consider certain nonadaptive modes of association
by way of contrast.
122
Learning
In so-called reflex or involuntary behavior there is a direct
pairing of sensory and motor activity which is not subject to
modification in the course of experience. For example, in the
association between sharply increased retinal firings and pupillary
contraction there is little or no room for adaptation by the
individual organism. Although such associations obviously
are important in the formation of animal behavior, they do not
contribute to the organism's ability to shape its behavior to
environmental contingencies.
Another class of receptor-effector pairings which appear
similarly inflexible includes the web-building of the spider
and the dance of the bee, accomplished under appropriate
stimulus conditions. In such cases, although the response
of the effectors shows a high degree of species adaptation, its
pairing with certain patterns of receptor stimulation is estab-
lished on a genetic basis without adaptation through repeated
occurrence.
A borderline class includes the receptor-effector association
apparently involved in the phenomenon called 'imprinting',
studied by Lorenz and other ethologists.l On the basis of exten-
sive work with the graylag goose, Lorenz reported that a newly
hatched gosling which after issuing its 'lost piping' signals
observes a retreating object emitting sounds of variable pitch but
regular rhythm will follow that object regardless of its identity.
In nature, of course, such an object is most likely to be the gos-
ling's mother. But the same 'following response' reportedly
can be elicited by other objects rigged to emit the appro-
priate stimuli, including in one case the experimenter himself
(Hess, 1958, p. 81). Here the association between the receptor
activity by which the gosling fixes upon the mother surrogate
and the effector activity of its 'following response' clearly
is not established by genetic inheritance. Yet, once formed
by the imprinting process the association appears to be ir-
reversible (Lorenz, 1965, p. 56) and hence incapable offurther
adaptation.
In adaptive behavior, by contrast, the association between
afferent and efferent activity remains subject to modification,
allowing the organism to alter its behavior patterns to accom-
modate changes in its living environment. When a new feeder is
established in a neighborhood, birds encounter it first only by
12-3
happenstance, but subsequently come to visit on a regular basis.
If the feeder goes unreplenished for several days, however, the
visitors stop coming and turn to more rewarding sources in their
search for food. During the period of regular visits the visual
activity signalling the immediate vicinity of the feeding station is
coupled with the efferent component of the bird's flight behavior
to direct its movement to that particular location. Subsequently
these efferent events come under the control of different visual
activities in support of the bird's movement to new food sources.
A similar example is that of the young squirrel who often is
rewarded by a cookie after tapping on a certain window, but
only when the curtains are partially open. In this case the animal's
efferent activity is under the control of a discriminative stimulus
(see below) through the mediation of distinctive processes in its
afferent channels. When tl10se afferent processes are active it
engages in tapping behavior, but otherwise bypasses that par-
ticular window.
It is likely that no group of organisms will ever evolve whose
members tap on particular windows on a species-wide basis. Yet
there is considerable advantage to be gained by individual
creatures who enact that behavior in just the right circumstances.
This advantage is achieved by genetic structures that enable
individual members of the favored species to adjust the relation-
ship between their afferent and their efferent mechanisms in
response to regularities in their immediate environment.
This ability to adapt behavior to contingencies of the organism's
local surroundings is known in psychological literature by various
titles, 'learning' and 'conditioning' being perhaps the most com-
mon. In the following discussion, I shall use 'learning' as the
more general term, with specific use of 'conditioning' when the
context warrants.
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a cybernetic model
of the learning process on the basis of a few basic postulates, and
then to argue that these postulates are plausible on physiological
grounds. In the final section I attempt to show that both
operant and respondent conditioning as commonly conceived are
special cases in the operation of this general model. The cyber-
netic account of learning thus appears to enjoy the explanatory
potential of these more standard frameworks, and in addition to
illuminate their interrelation.
124
Learning
2 A CYBERNETIC MODEL OF LEARNING
This approach to the study of learning is focused upon the rela-

tionship between afferent and efferent states. An efferent state of
an operating system is one in which the system acts upon its
environment. If the system is a living organism, an efferent state
comprises the disposition both of its effectors and of its efferent
nervous system. The efferent state is distinct from any effect it may
accomplish within the operating environment. In this discussion
the term 'behavior' will be avoided in technical use because of the
bias it suggests toward an inquiring observer. There is no pre-
supposition that an efferent state is open to observation, or that
an observer would be competent to assess its significance.
An afferent state of an operating system is one capable of acti-
vating an efferent state. In a biological system, an afferent state is a
state of its afferent nervous system, including but not confined
to its sense receptors. An afferent state is distinct from the object
or set of environmental circumstances by which it is elicited.
Given the example of a graylag goose reacting to a whitetailed
eagle silhouetted against the sky (Lorenz, 1965, p. 50), we may
distinguish the predator itself, its silhouette, and the afferent
response in the goose which the object stimulates. Only the latter
constitutes an afferent state. The term 'stimulus' will be reserved
for the object or circumstance by which the receptor activity is
elicited.
A fundamental concept in this model is that of an afferent state
capable of increasing the probability of future occurrence of
immediately preceding efferent states. Biological examples include
the taste of food, erotic sensations, and such experiences in the
human as aesthetic pleasures. Afferent states of this sort will be
entitled 'reinforcers' and symbolized 'Ar'. It should be noted that
in this usage reinforcers are afferent states (the experience of
food), and not the objects or circumstances by which such states
are activated (the food itself). In biological systems, reinforcers
generally are associated with behavior beneficial for the species,
and usually (not always) beneficial to the organism itself. The
mechanisms of natural selection assure that most members of a
viable group are reinforced by what is good for the species; hence
what its members find reinforcing can change as the group
evolves.
12 5
Contrary in operation to reinforcers are afferent states which
have the ability to decrease the future probability of efferent states
occurring previously. Examples of such afferent states, which we
shall entitle 'punishers' and symbolize 'Ap', are pain and other
forms of sensory disruption.
An efferent state is more or less probable according to its fre-
quency of occurrence when not precluded by other conditions.
Any state, of course, might be precluded at times by the system's
environment, or by other states of the system itself. On the other
hand, given any condition of the system and the environment
together, there is a class of efferent states anyone of which might
possibly occur. A state is probable under a given combination of
system and environmental circumstances to the extent that it
occurs in place of possible alternatives. A state is probable
within the class of all such combinations permitting its occurrence
in proportion to its average frequency of occurrence under these
several circumstances, each being assigned an appropriate relative
weight. 2 In the following discussion, where reference is made to
changes in probability of a given state under conditions of re-
inforcement or punishment, it will be assumed that this prob-
ability is determined relative to conditions permitting that
state's occurrence.
The model is based upon two general postulates. One is the
postulate (I) that efferent states followed proximately by a
reinforcer Ar increase in probability of further occurrence up to a
point of steady high probability, and that this probability sub-
sequently decreases if the association with Ar discontinues.
Although this association is not intended to be a precise functional
relationship, we will assume that the probability level of the
efferent states in question varies generally with the regularity of
their correlation with Ar. Since we will be concerned with the
reinforcement of efferent states both individually and pairwise, it
will be convenient to express (I) in the form of two more specific
postulates: (1') that if Ec (an efferent state to be conditioned) is
followed more or less regularly by Ar, then P(Ec) increases to a
steady high value, but decreases if the association with Ar is
broken; and (I") that if Ec and Ed occur jointly and are followed
more or less regularly by Ar, then P(Ec,Ed) (the probability of
their joint occurrence) increases to a steady high value, but
decreases if the association with Ar is broken.
12.6
Learning
With this postulate the model becomes capable of positive
feedback. If the system is so coupled with its environment that the
occurrence of Ec energizes motor behavior leading shortly to the
excitation of Ar (as biting an apple may lead to pleasant taste
experiences), then by (1') the probability of Ec increases. But an
increase in P(E c) leads to more frequent occurrences of that
particular state, and subsequently to further increases in P(Ec). If
this association between Ec and Ar continues, P(E c) will rise to its
maximum level. In similar fashion, if Ed happens to occur
simultaneously with E c, then the subsequent excitation of Ar will
lead by (I") to increasingly frequent joint occurrences, so that in
effect peEd) is carried to a maximum level with P(E c). If the
regular association of Ec and Ar is disrupted, however, P(Ec,Ed)
will regress with P(E c) to a previous level.
Negative feedback is introduced into the model with the second
general postulate (II) that efferent states followed by a punisher
Ap decrease in probability of occurrence, more rapidly as their
association with Ap is repeated. This postulate provides for the
progressive extinction of efferent states down to a level of prob-
ability approaching zero when they are followed regularly with
punishing experiences. More specifically, this postulate provides
(II') that if Ec is followed by A p , P(Ec) decreases, approaching
zero as the association between Ec and Ap continues; and (II")
that if the joint occurrence of Ec and Ed is followed by A p , then
P(Ec,Ed) decreases in the same general fashion. I shall refer to
(I) and (II) together as the 'learning postulates'.
If the coupling between a system and its environment is so
arranged that the motor activity energized by Ec leads regularly
to the punishing experience Ap (as reaching for a hot coal leads to
the pain of burns), then with each occurrence Ec becomes
progressively less likely to be repeated. In similar fashion, if Ed
and Ec happen to occur conjointly, the probability of one given
the other would similarly decrease. 3 In particular, the occurrence
of Ed would become an occasion upon which Ec would seldom
occur. Extinction of Ec in this fashion proceeds by positive
feedback, as with the process of reinforcement discussed above. 4
Negative feedback enters when these two processes become
interactive, in a system undergoing adaptive change to a changing
environment.
Let us assume a relationship between system and environment
IZ7
such that the states Ar accompany or lead directly to circumstances
that are conducive to the system's proper activity (in a biological
system, the provision of nourishment, shelter, protection, etc.),
and that the states Ap similarly are associated with disruptive
circumstances (imminent physical danger, chemical imbalance,
etc.). In organisms, this is assured by natural selection, since indi-
viduals punished by what is beneficial or rewarded by disruption
tend not to survive in competition. We will assume further that
the environment is disposed to respond to certain operations with
stimuli exciting A r, and to other operations with the stimulation of
Ap. These dispositions, however, are subject to change; and the
system is not instructed when it begins operation regarding the
dispositions of its operating environment.
In short, the relationship between system and environment is
adjusted initially to benefit the system in some operations and to
harm it in others. But the system is not instructed regarding these
arrangements, which moreover are subject to change.
When the uninstructed system first becomes active, its opera-
tions are emitted on a random basis, and the responses it educes
from its operating environment generally are not conducive to its
continued activity. If it happens to fall into an efferent state Ee
that energizes an operation leading to the excitation of Ar , how-
ever, its probability of being in that efferent state increases, and
the positive feedback process that ensues in this situation soon
establishes that operation as a regular part of its behavioral
repertoire. Similarly, a chance occurrence of an efferent state
energizing an operation leading to Ap will lead soon to the regular
avoidance of that form of behavior.
Let us assume finally that the environment is so structured that
the likelihood of a given efferent state Ee leading to Ar is greater
when the operation energized by Ee occurs in conjunction with
another operation energized by Ed. A flicker's pecking, for in-
stance, is much more likely to be rewarded if accompanied by
regular movement around the trunk of a grub-infested tree. In
like fashion, the environment will produce punishing experiences
more regularly in response to certain operations when accom-
panied by others, as a dog is more likely to encounter painful
stimuli in the vicinity of a porcupine when approaching the
latter with an inquisitive sniff.
Although the system is uninstructed regarding these regu-
128
Learning
larities during its initial activity, the provisions of postulates
(I") and (II") enable appropriate accommodations in its subsequent
behavior. Thus, once Ed and Ec happen to occur together and are
followed by a rewarding Ar, then the two states occur jointly
with increasing frequency and bring with them the advantages
of that rewarding experience. Similarly, if a punishing experience
follows two efferent states that happen to occur conjointly, then
future occurrences of one would provide occasions upon which
the other is avoided, thus decreasing the incidence of that par-
ticular experience. By successive alterations of this nature, the
system will adjust its behavior to the contingencies of its oper-
ating environment, taking advantage of available benefits and
avoiding punishment.
Whereas the system's behavioral repertoire initially was un-
structured and unmatched to its surroundings, the structure of its
behavior now matches the structure of its operating environment.
The system's behavior has evolved to fit its immediate surround-
ings much as a biological species evolves to fit its environmental
niche.
Suppose now that the environment of our simple system
changes in such a fashion that operations initially leading to
reinforcing experiences no longer have that beneficial effect, and
perhaps even lead to punishment instead. Further, advantages
now lie in operations that were once detrimental. Unless the
system is able to adapt to its altered environment, it will cease
activity and perhaps be destroyed.
Adaptation is provided by the learning postulates. If Ec
energizes an operation that previously led to Ar, but now is
associated with neither Ar nor Ap, Ec will occur with decreasing
frequency (postulate (1'» and the operation it energizes will lose
its distinctive place in the system's behavioral repertoire. If Ec
now leads directly to Ap, however, that operation will be promptly
extinguished (postulate (II'». Conversely, an efferent state ener-
gizing an operation that no longer leads as before to Ap now is
available for reinforcement, and if followed regularly by Ar
becomes established in the system's emerging repertoire.
Similarly, if the paired operations energized by Ec and Ed no
longer lead as before to Ar, then P(Ed,Ec) will decrease in value,
either gradually (postulate (I"» or abruptly (postulate (II")
according to their association with Ap. And if the joint occurrence
129
of Ec and Ed no longer eventuates as before in A p , then that
pairing is available for reinforcement.
If we assume that maintaining a close fit between behavior
and environment is essential for the well-being of the system, as is
the case generally with living organisms, then it is reasonable to
assume that many operations (for example, ingestion) lead to
consequences that are either harmful or beneficial but not in-
different. From this it follows that mismatches between behavioral
repertoire and changing environment are often corrected by
extinction through punishment according to postulate (II) rather
than by the less rapid processes of postulate (I). The negative
feedback provisions of postulate (II) must be assumed to playa
basic role in our model of adaptive behavior insofar as it resembles
behavioral adaptation in biological systems.
Adaptation of behavior under the stresses of indifferent and
inconstant surroundings, as portrayed in the present model,
involves negative feedback procedures basically similar to those
by which reproductive groups adapt themselves to changing
environments in the presence of competing groups. We noted
previously that the formation of behavioral repertoires to match
environmental structures is analogous to the evolution of life
forms to fit their environmental niches. In parallel fashion,
adaptation of a system's behavior to changing environmental
contingencies is analogous to the biological process of natural
selection. 5
3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE

LEARNING POSTULATES
The abstract model of the preceding section has been developed

without biological presupposition, and as it stands has no par-
ticular biological significance. Nevertheless, the model has been
liberally illustrated with biological examples, and obviously was
constructed with animal behavior in view. Two possible obsta-
cles must be removed before we can consider the model a plausible
framework for the study of learning in animals. One concerns the
empirical plausibility of the postulates upon which it is based.
The other stems from the fact that the most profitable approach to
the study oflearning has been on the basis of observable behavior,
13 0
Learning
while the model has been developed in terms of physiological
states. My concern in the final section of this chapter will be to
show that despite this difference, the model accommodates the
paradigms of learning upon which the approach through be-
havior generally relies. In the present section I wish to review
briefly certain findings reported in recent neurophysiological
literature that lend empirical plausibility to the learning postulates.
The postulates are (I) that efferent states followed by re-
inforcers increase in probability of further occurrence, to a point
of steady high probability, but that this probability subsequently
decreases if reinforcement ceases; and (II) that the probability
of efferent states followed by punishers decreases, more rapidly
as punishment is repeated.
As part of his work with the snail Ap(ysis, Kandel has investi-
gated the hypothesis that activity in one neural pathway might
produce reversible changes in the synaptic activity of other
pathways. Although his work has dealt with relatively uncom-
plex neuronal associations in this particular organism, he be-
lieves that his results can be applied to more complex learning
processes (Kandel, 1970, p. 70). Among his results was the finding
that the potentiality for discharge (not a threshold change)
caused by the stimulation of a given pathway could be greatly
increased by activity in another pathway, a process he calls
'heterosynaptic facilitation' (ibid., p. 61). In his words, 'the
stimulus sequence used in these experiments begins to resemble
the sequences used in learning experiments,' offering a neural
analogue of 'the process whereby a strong stimulus enhances
other responses' (ibid., p. 61).
Kandel goes on to compare his results with earlier reports by
Dudel and Kuffier of having discovered a mechanism by which
activity in one pathway depresses synaptic transmission in
another (ibid., pp. 61-2). The same results are also attributed to
Eccles and to Wall in a discussion by Wilson, who summarized by
remarking 'it has been shown that impulses in some nerves can
depolarize the presynaptic terminals of other nerves' (Wilson,
1966, p. 109). Although the process of presynaptic inhibition dis-
covered by Dudel and Kuffier occurs within milliseconds, the
resulting synaptic changes may last for hours (Kandel, 1970,
p. 62); and in the case of facilitation, Kandel finds that synaptic
changes of this sort act 'as a governor regulating the long-term
13 1
release of the chemical transmitter substance in the facilitated
pathway' (ibid., p. 61).
Although these results as they stand fall short of providing
clear evidence for postulates (I) and (II), they at least show the
existence of physiological processes similar to those that would
have to be demonstrated as a physiological basis for the postu-
lates in question. These specific results suggest mechanisms
which would support Galambos's conclusion a few years earlier
that the role of reinforcement is to generalize and to increase the
amplitude of responses in the central nervous system to afferent
signals (Galambos, 1961), a result Magoun cited as 'an outstand-
ing achievement of recent electrophysiological investigation of
the processes of learning in the brain' (ibid., p. 2;9).
The probable existence of these reinforcing mechanisms indi-
cates an important role that might be played in the learning pro-
cess by the so-called 'pleasure centers' in the brain discovered by
Olds (1956, 1958). Stimulation of these areas in the neighborhood
of the hypothalmus was claimed by Olds himself to constitute
reinforcement even stronger than the ingestion of food (Olds and
Olds, 1961, p. 168), and to promote the repetition of preceding
responses (ibid., pp. 154, I82.). This suggests the hypothesis that
I54, 182.).
the 'positive' character of reinforcement somehow involves
excitation of these 'pleasure centers' in the presence of the
efferent state that is reinforced, by which the latter is somehow
facilitated.
Specific postulates (I") and (II") refer to efferent states that
occur simultaneously, and are reinforced or punished on a joint
basis. Several recent findings hint at a physiologically based pro-
pensity of states that once occur together to occur conjointly on
subsequent occasions. In this respect, postulates (I") and (II") are
congruent with Hebb's neurophysiological postulate (1949, p. 62)
that when a pair ofaxons involved in perception or memory are
simultaneously active and in contact, an increased dependence of
one upon the other results (see also Osgood, 1968, p. 188).
Catania draws attention to a related tendency in his remark that
for several decades there have been indications in the literature
that 'the elicitation of responses makes these responses more
probable even in the absence of the eliciting stimulus' (Catania,
1971, p. 207). If efferent states energizing such responses become
more probable for having already occurred, then states that occur
1;2.
Learning
together will become jointly more probable, and hence more
likely to be joined in subsequent occurrences. Experimental
evidence that this indeed is the case is reported by Kandel (1970,
p. 70), and physiological hypotheses that might account for this
tendency are surveyed by Thorpe. 6 Each of these researchers
emphasizes that much remains to be learned on the topic. Again,
however, there appears reason to believe that our learning postu-
lates are at least consonant with current physiological evidence
as they pertain to the conditioning of efferent states on a conjoint
basis.
4 RESPONDENT AND OPERANT

CONDITIONING RECONCILED
According to this model of the learning process, the result of

learning is a series of changing neuronal associations, primarily
in the efferent portions of the nervous system, that enable the
organism to cope with a changing environment. As a consequence
of these changing neuronal associations the organism manifests
adaptively different behavioral responses in the presence of
different stimulus configurations. The stimulus, however, is only
part of the input coupling between organism and environment,
and itself does not undergo alteration in the learning process.
Similarly, the organism's behavioral response is merely part of its
output coupling. Although behavior is altered as a result of
learning, the locus of the learning process is the nervous system
itself. Consequently, a study of the organism'S efferent processes
must be an important part of the study of its learning activity.
This approach to learning thus does not sit squarely within the
behaviorist tradition, where the study of learning is basically a
study of observable behavior. Yet it must be admitted that the
study of behavior under controlled conditions has disclosed most
of what we know about the learning process, and that relatively
little has been discovered about its physiological underpinnings.
If this cybernetic approach is to be recommended to the learning
theorist, its compatibility must be established with the behaviorist
approach. At very least, the theorist must be convinced that the
explanatory power of his more traditional models is not lost
within the present approach to the learning process.
133
This task is complicated by the fact that learning theory is
laboring with different conceptual models it has not been able to
integrate, most notably the concepts of operant and of respondent
conditioning. 7 My aim in the remainder of this discussion is to
show how both operant and respondent conditioning can be fit
into this cybernetic account of learning, and hence to show how
they may be conceptually related. More specifically, I shall at-
tempt to show that if learning in a natural organism proceeds
according to the provisions of the cybernetic model, then it must
be possible to condition organisms by both operant and respon-
dent procedures. If this is shown, a consequence is that any empiri-
cal findings regarding the application of these basic procedures
can be accommodated within the cybernetic account. A bonus
is that the cybernetic framework becomes available as a more
comprehensive context in which both forms of conditioning can
be conceived as intimately related. 8
In a simple paradigm of operant conditioning, the operant
to be conditioned (for example, a motion of the pigeon's neck) is
followed by a reinforcing stimulus (accessible food), whereupon
the response occurs more frequently. In the context of the learn-
ing model, Ee (the efferent state energizing the response to be
conditioned) is followed by Ar (the reinforcing afferent state
excited by stimulus Sr and activating efferent state E r). Operant
conditioning involves essentially only Ee and Ar.9 By postulate
(1'), P(E e) increases when Ee is followed by Ar.
Stimulus discrimination occurs when an animal is reinforced in
a given operant only when a certain stimulus is present, where-
upon it emits the operant frequently when that stimulus is present
but abstains from such behavior under other conditions. As
Skinner puts it (1953, p. 108), 'when a discrimination has been
established, we may alter the probability of a response instantly
by presenting or removing the discriminative stimulus.' For
example, a pigeon can be trained to peck a disk exclusively when
the disk is red. In the context of the cybernetic model, Ee (the
efferent state energizing the pecking of the disk) is followed by Ar
(the reinforcing experience excited by available food) only in the
presence of Sd (the discriminative stimulus, which leads with
high probability to some efferent state Ed). The consequence is
that Ee (manifest in the pecking of the disk) occurs more fre-
quently in the presence of Sd. In this process, the essential
134
Learning
factors are Sd, Ed, Ec and Ar.1° Ed follows Sd with high prob-
ability. Hence when Ec occurs in the presence of Sd, it occurs
roughly simultaneously with Ed (which may be a continuing
state of 'behavioral readiness'). But when Ed and Ec are re-
inforced by the subsequent occurrence of Ar , P(Ec,E d) increases,
and with it P(EclEd) (see footnote 3 above). Since P(Ed/S d) is
high initially, the result is a high value of P(Ec/S d).
Respondent conditioning bears a close resemblance to stimulus
discrimination. A paradigm instance of respondent ('Pavlovian')
conditioning occurs when the stimulus to be conditioned (the
sound of a bell) is followed by an unconditioned stimulus (food)
which produces a characteristic response (salivation), whereupon
the conditioned stimulus comes to produce this also or a similar
response. Considerations of time sequencing are crucial for inter-
preting this process. Although the unconditioned stimulus is
presented after the stimulus to be conditioned, the latter may
linger past its initial occurrence (as with the sound of the bell;
see Spence, 1956, p. 49). Moreover, the efferent state normally
following the conditioned stimulus may be one of alertness or
'action readiness' (the animal listens to the bell), and not one dis-
charged immediately in motor behavior. In either case, we may
assume that the efferent state energizing the characteristic re-
sponse of the unconditioned stimulus occurs roughly simul-
taneously with the efferent state elicited by the stimulus to be
conditioned. Another assumption necessary for this interpreta-
tion is that the conditioning stimulus is followed in the normal
course of events by reinforcement (or punishment in the case of
defense conditioning; see Spence, ibid., pp. 46-7). As Spence puts
it (ibid., p. 48), in discussing the salivation paradigm, the re-
sponse 'in this instance is elicited by the reinforcing object, food,
which serves a dual function, that of eliciting the unconditioned
reflex and providing the reinforcing event.'
In terms of the cybernetic model, Sc (the stimulus to be condi-
tioned) elicits afferent state A c, activating the briefly enduring
efferent state Ec. Immediately after Sc, unconditioned stimulus Su
is presented, which not only elicits Au activating E u, but also
leads to the reinforcing experience Ar • The essential factors in this
process are Sc, E c, Eu, and Ar .ll Since Ec and Eu occur con-
jointly (at some point during the persistence of E c), and are
followed by Ar , P(Eu,Ec) increases and with it P(Eu/E c) (see
135
footnote 3 above). But since Ec normally follows Sc, P(EclSe) is
high. Hence P(Eu/Sc) also increases.
Catania, who has conducted an insightful study of the relation-
ship between operant and respondent conditioning, concludes
that the only difference between them that 'has maintained a
prominent status' is the 'ineffectiveness of partial reinforcement
in respondent procedures and its powerful control in operant
procedures .. .' (Catania, 1971, p. 197). This difference can be
accommodated in principle within the cybernetic model. Operant
conditioning involves a direct reinforcement of Ec by Ar, without
mediation of other physiological states. In respondent condi-
tioning, on the other hand, Ec and Eu are reinforced conjointly,
and the dependency of Eu upon Sc is established only through the
mediation of a pair of conditional relationships, P(Ec/S c) and
P(Eu/Ec). Because of the larger number of neuronal associations
that must be influenced to bring this dependency about, the
reinforcing effect of Ar upon P(Eu/Sc) is less direct than that
upon P(E c). It is reasonable to assume, accordingly, that sporadic
reinforcement would be less effective in the former than in the
latter case. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that the re-
inforcement provided under postulates (I") and (II") would be
generally less effective than that provided under (I') and (II').
As with other aspects of the cybernetic model, this assumption in
principle should be empirically testable.
NOTES
I Among classic references for imprinting are various works of Lorenz,

ego 1965. See also Hess (1958 and 1972). These studies deal primarily
with wild birds. Thorpe (1963) mentions phenomena suggesting im-
printing also in fish, anthropods and certain mammals.
2 This sense of probability is close to that of the standard frequency in-
terpretation (Salmon, 1966), with the explicit understanding that proba-
bilities are calculated relative to circumstances in which the events
concerned might possibly occur. The formidable practical problem of
identifying distinct occurrences of a given efferent state for a frequency
count is deflected, if not resolved, by the assumption that in any experi-
mental context dealing with such events there are operational criteria of
identity and reidentification. To the incipient paradox that there might be
events with high probability of occurrence which nonetheless occur very
infrequently because the conditions of their possible occurrence almost
1;6
Learning
never arise, we may respond that there is no ground for assigning relative
probabilities to members of a class no member of which more than rarely
occurs.
3 In circumstances of extinction when Ee Ec is followed by a punishing
experience leading to a decrease in P(Ee), P(Ec), P(Ed/Ee)
P(Ed/Ec) decreases with
P(Ed,E ec), since P(Ed,E ec) = P(Ed/Ee)/P(Ee).
P(Ed/Ec)/P(Ec). For parallel reasons,
P(Ed/Ee)
P(Ed/Ec) increases with P(Ed,Ee)
P(Ed,Ec) in circumstances where Ee
Ec is followed
by a reinforcing experience. Assuming that P(Ed) remains at a relatively
steady value, we see that P(Ee/Ed)
P(Ec/Ed) both increases and decreases with
P(Ed,E ec), since P(Ed,Eec) = P(Ee,E
P(Ec,E d) = P(Ee/Ed)/P(E
P(Ec/Ed)/P(Ed).
4 The 'negative' effects of punishment may come about by positive feed-
back no less directly than the 'positive' effects of reinforcement. On the
other hand, both punishment and reinforcement could contribute, in
appropriately arranged systems, to processes of negative feedback. There
is no necessary relationship between the 'positive' and the 'negative'
effects of reinforcement and punishment respectively and the positive
and negative features of the two feedback processes.
5 As Skinner points out (1969, p. 194), both phylogenetic and ontogenetic
processes of adaptation 'change the organism 50 that it adjusts to its
environment in the sense of behaving in it more effectively. With respect
to phylogenic contingencies, this is what is meant by natural selection.
With respect to ontogeny, it is what is meant by operant conditioning:
6 Thorpe, 1963, pp. 161-77. Thorpe here presents a good summary of
earlier speculations by Pringle (195 1) regarding the relationship between
evolution and learning, the weakest aspect of which seems to be its re-
liance upon a 'reverberation' theory of neural patterns. For the opinion
that this now seems unpromising, see Kandel (1970, p. 58).
7 Considerations bolstering the distinction between respondent and oper-
ant conditioning are reviewed by Catania (1971, p. 197). In the opinion of
the physiologist OIds (Olds and Olds, 1961, p. 154), whether there is
only one mechanism between these two modes of conditioning, or two
basic mechanisms, is a matter to be decided by further experimentation.
The following discussion suggests that one mechanism might do the job.
8 Catania suggests that the best way to deal adequately with the relation-
ship between these procedures 'may be to place them both within the
context of a more exhaustive account of behavioral relationships' (Catania,
1971, p. 200). The cybernetic account developed in this chapter may
serve this purpose.
9 In the following diagram, consider the relevant factors to be ordered by
time of occurrence from left to right:
Sr -+ Ar-+Er
Ee
Ec
Since Ar follows E Eo, P(Ec) increases by postulate (I').
e , P(Ee)
10 Consider the relevant factors in order of occurrence:
Sd-+Ad-+Ed
Ee
Ec
Sr-+Ar-+Er
137
Since Ar follows the joint occurrence of Ed and E c, P(Ed,E c) increases by
P(Ed,Ec)
postulate (I"). P(Ec/Ed) increases accordingly (see footnote 3 above).
But P(Ed/S d) is high initially. Hence P(EcIS d ) assumes a high value.
1I In order of occurrence, the relevant factors are:
Sc ~Ac-~Ec - Ec-Ec-Ec
Su~Au~Eu
Ar
The (momentarily) simultaneous occurrence of Eu and Eo is followed by
A r, whereupon P(Eu,Ec) increases, and with it P(Eu/Ec} (see footnote 3
above). By the normal relationship between So and Eo, P(Eo/S o} is high
initially. It follows that P(Eu/S c) correspondingly increases.
13 8
IX
CONSCIOUSNESS
1I CONSCIOUSNESS AS A FORM OF
ADAPTATION
Human consciousness, like learning, is a product of the evolu-

tionary bias toward life forms with superior negentropic£lexibility;
for conscious organisms excel in their ability to receive informa-
tion and to apply it under a wide variety of living conditions.
Like learning also, consciousness is a form of adaptation parallel
to the evolutionary process in its feedback characteristics. Whereas
evolution is adaptation of the reproductive group, and learning
adaptation of the organism's behavioral patterns, consciousness
is adaptation of the organism's afferent information-processing
system, each with respect to environmental contingencies.
There is a sense, accordingly, in which consciousness may be
conceived as the (very rapid) evolution of afferent neuronal
structures. Alternatively, consciousness may be conceived as
(very short-term) learning of the sensory system.
In this chapter we consider several probable stages in the
development of perceptual consciousness, relying upon both
phenomenological and experimental evidence. The fundamental
expository framework, however, is that of communication theory.
This is in accord with the reasonable expectation that the general
theory of communication should be applicable in a discussion of
the particular sensory channels through which the individual
communicates with his living environment.
Our concern for the most part will be limited to vision, which
139
among sense modalities traditionally has proved most challeng-
ing to philosophic theory of perception.
A further caveat requires particular notice. In this chapter we
do not discuss the modes of consciousness ingredient in social,
linguistic and rational activities, and do not consider self-aware-
ness. These topics are reserved for the chapters following.
2 INFORMATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
BASIC DETECTOR MECHANISMS
Among the simpler feedback mechanisms in living systems are

those governing the production of protein in Escherichia coli, a
common and much studied bacterium cell (see chapter IV).
Regulation is based upon the level within the cell of amino acid
required for protein synthesis, detected by chemical changes in
regulatory genes. Such feedback mechanisms play roles that are
entirely inflexible, and the chemical detectors are too directly
involved in the feedback process to warrant consideration as
sense receptors. The same may be said of the light-sensitive
patches occurring in the one-celled Pouchetia cornuta (Walls, 1942,
pp. 2-3). All this is consonant with the very limited range of
environmental contingencies with which such organisms must
cope during their normal life cycles.
A mode of excitation more closely akin to vision appears with
the rudimentary receptors of some simple invertebrates. The
earthworm possesses cells with photosensitive capacities, inter-
spersed with other cells in the organism's skin (Walls, ibid.).
These photosensitive cells register differences in illumination
level, and enable the animal to escape the light of the sun. The
earthworm also possesses tactual receptors by which it avoids
the rough and the dry and which cooperate with its photo-
receptors in guiding it to safety in the damp undergound. A par-
ticularly interesting feature of these discriminative facilities is that
they render the worm subject to operant conditioning. When
placed repeatedly on a pathway leading either to dry sandpaper
or to agreeable mud, the animal eventually learns to avoid the
former branch and to follow the latter (Yerkes, 1912; see Woold-
ridge, 1963, pp. 204-6 for a summary). This elementary capacity
for learning indicates flexibility in behavior that enables the worm
140
Consciousness
to cope with a variety of environmental threats. Corresponding
flexibility is present in its information-processing mechanisms.
Not only is the animal served by complementary detection mech-
anisms, but moreover each exhibits a form of sentient feedback. l
Being exposed to light, for example, is not so much a threat
itself to the animal's metabolism as a warning of impending
desiccation from ultraviolet radiation. Its photoreceptors main-
tain control over its wriggling behavior, eliminating this damaging
state from the feedback loop.
The capacity of a photosensitive detector system can be en-
hanced by increasing the number of receptors involved. Its
capacity can be increased also by arranging the receptors to per-
mit direct interaction. This can be shown on the basis of a formal
inequality of communication theory, pertaining to the merger of
two previously independent information channels. In general,
when two channels with independent capacities each less than
unity are merged by combining their input alphabets, the capa-
city of the resulting integrated channel is greater than the sum of
the capacities of the two channels operating separately.2 Under
the assumption that neurophysiological channels constituted by
single receptors are not noiseless, and hence that they are charac-
terized by less than one bit capacity, it is apparent that the neuronal
bulk committed to such channels in the design of nature is em-
ployed more efficiently if the channels operate together rather
than independently. The conjecture that nature in effect 'dis-
covered' this source of efficiency in the grouping of sense re-
ceptors by evolutionary experimentation is supported by a
theorem of communication theory that has far-reaching ramifica-
tions for the study of sensory systems.
Shannon's Tenth Theorem states roughly that the capacity of a
regulating system to correct deviations from an optimal state or
norm cannot exceed the information present at the system's
input. 3 This entails, for one thing, that the development of in-
creasingly more versatile forms of behavioral adaptation must be
accompanied by the development of sensory mechanisms with
increasingly greater capacity. A corollary is that organisms under
selective pressure to increase their range of adaptive behavior
will be under pressure also to increase the efficiency of their input
channels. Since input channels are more efficient when employed
jointly than individually, retinas replace isolated photoreceptors
141
on higher levels of the evolutionary process. The superior
capacities of integrated retinal receptors are illustrated in studies
of the frog's visual network undertaken about 15 years ago at
MIT (Lettvin et a/., 1959).
The frog relies upon its visual capacities not only for guidance
around the edge of the pond, but also to warn it of approaching
predators and to signal the presence of insect food. Not sur-
prisingly, the MIT experiments disclosed forms of visual sen-
sitivity specifically suited for each requirement. One, the so-called
'sustained contrast' detector, discriminates edges with a sharp
brightness gradient. This mechanism, differing from the photo-
receptors of the earthworm in responding to a line (hence to a
structured configuration) rather than to a mere brightness
difference, may help the frog maintain orientation with respect
to dominant shapes along its skyline. Another, the 'net dimming'
detector, responds only to sudden reductions in illumination
level, enabling the frog to take quick evasive action when its
light is blocked out by a larger animal. This discrimination also is
more complex than the earthworm's, for it involves brightness
differences with respect to time. The 'moving edge' detector
seems to be an elaboration of the 'sustained contrast' facility,
firing only when the line of contrast is moving. Its role may be
to enhance the animal's evasive activity as it jumps out of the
path of an approaching predator. The frog's most selective
sensory response, however, is that of the 'net convexity' detector,
which fires only in the presence of a small moving object, and
fires more strongly when the object is fly-sized and tongue-
length away. This pattern also is based on contrasts in illumina-
tion level, but is adapted specifically to the frog'S appetite for
small flying insects.
Stimulation of the 'net convexity' detectors can instigate a
complex set of responses which best can be studied on the
behavioral level. 4 If an insect appears to the frog more than tongue-
flick away, the appearance elicits a series of reactions consisting
of a general alerting, turning directly toward the object, hopping
closer if necessary, and finally a rapid tongue extrusion. The frog
thus responds initially to environmental circumstances that only
promise (rather than provide) gratification, and thereby exhibits
anticipatory feedback (defined in chapter IV as occurring when a
system's behavior is governed to some extent by sentient feed-
142
Consciousness
back in response to antecedents of environmental states especially
significant for system operation, rather than in response to these
states directly). This more complex form of feedback control is
correlated with a higher degree of negentropic flexibility: the
frog, unlike the earthworm, can sense nutriment at a distance
from its body surface, and hence can sustain itself under a wider
variety of environmental conditions.
Of these several types of neuronal response, perhaps that of the
'net dimming' detectors is simplest with respect to the informa-
tion processing involved. Although retinal receptors may fire
spontaneously in the absence of direct stimulation, such activity
is infrequent and on a random basis (Weiss, 1941; Hebb, 1949,
pp. 124, 184). Receptors under external stimulation, on the other
hand, fire regularly and (within limits) more frequently as stimu-
lation increases. A retina affected by higher levels of illumination
thus will be characterized by a higher percentage of receptors
firing more regularly at more frequent intervals than a retina
responding to lower illumination levels. Because of this regu-
larity, firings within the more highly stimulated areas of the retina
on the average will convey lower amounts of information (remove
less uncertainty). But since more firings occur within the more
highly stimulated areas, more information overall is conveyed
into the upper visual tract. Any mechanism for distinguishing
with respect to either of these conditions thus could perform the
role of the frog's 'net-dimming' detectors. Accordingly, this role
can be described in communication-theoretic terms.
The 'sustained contrast' detector discriminates lines of light-
dark contrast cast upon the retina, and hence responds to sharp
edges of differential receptor activity. One side of such an edge
is characterized by relatively infrequent firings, hence by events
with a relatively high level of average information. A series of
random samplings of receptor events within this area would dis-
close roughly constant average information from sector to sector.
Similarly, a series of random samplings on the more highly stim-
ulated side of the line would disclose measures of average infor-
mation that are also roughly constant, but at a lower level
because of more frequent firings. Detection of this line of de-
marcation could be accomplished by a mechanism for registering
different levels of average information within a local area, the
senes of contiguous samples with
line being indicated by a series
143
Organism and EnvironJJtent
information levels differing markedly from those of other
neighboring areas.
The role of the 'moving edge' detector could be performed
by a similar mechanism that responds positively only when
the line of demarcation moves in time from sector to proxi-
mate retinal sector. The operation of this detector thus is
an elaboration of that of the 'sustained contrast' detector, much
as the latter extends the operation of the simple 'net dimming'
mechanism.
Given the capacity to discriminate moving lines of light-dark
contrast, few additional resources are required for development
of a 'net convexity' detector. One possible addition for this pur-
pose would be a mechanism capable of tracing the edge of a line
of contrast around an arc of high curvature, and of responding
when the trace comes back on itself.5 The 'net convexity' detec-
tor of the frog, we recall, responds most vigorously when the
configuration of excitation is moving, and when its size suggests
a fly about a tongue-length away. An excitation configuration
somewhat smaller than this optimal size leads the animal to move
in its eyeward direction, while the optimal size releases its tongue-
flicking reaction. This distinction could be accomplished by a
mechanism for distinguishing degrees of curvature, which re-
leases either the hopping or the tongue-flicking response depend-
ing upon the curvature of the retinal arc.
It would be gratuitous to suggest that the information-proces-
sing operations described above are directly identifiable in the
activities of the frog's visual system. Nonetheless, it is a reason-
able conjecture that processes like these might actually occur in
the sensory tracts of relatively complex biological systems, and
the frog illustrates their likely manner of operation. More sig-
nificant for our purpose is that receptor configurations like that
in the frog'S retina are superior (in respects other than number)
to physiologically dissociated receptors (as in the earthworm) for
the processing of sensory information, and that both the nature
of the retina's superiority and the likely nature of its basic opera-
tion can be described in terms of communication theory. This is
the case also, I believe, with the operations of perceptual con-
sciousness, which represent yet a higher level of efficiency in the
processing of sensory information.
144
Consciousness
3 THE POSTULATE OF PERCEPTUAL
EFFICIENCY
The frog's visual system operates according to an organizational

format assigning distinct and exclusive communication channels
to each type of message. Messages deriving from the 'moving
edge' detectors, for example, pass through specific predetermined
fibers that are not available for communications from other
sources. With this restriction to a direct correspondence between
message type and neuronal channel, any increase in the number of
different configurations to which an organism's nervous system
could respond would involve an increase as well in the system's
bulk. Constraints with regard to size thus would limit the range
of distinct environmental stimulus configurations to which a given
organism could respond, and hence limit its growth in negen-
tropic flexibility.
This principle of direct correspondence dearly does not apply
to the sensory system of the human being. Not only is the human
brain comparable in size to that of other organisms with con-
siderably less flexibility in stimulus input and behavioral response,
but moreover the acquisition of new forms of afferent sensitivity
from infancy onward involves little increase in bulk on the part of
supporting neuronal channels.
The expedient adopted by nature in the evolution of nervous
systems supporting conscious behavior, as it were, was to aban-
don the format reserving a specific channel for each message
type, and to develop instead a procedure of information proces-
sing by which different stimulus configurations at different times
could be ushered through an integrated network of afferent
channels. In effect, the efficiency gained by gathering receptors
together in a retinal grouping is compounded by an integration
of the afferent channels through which information is passed into
the upper nervous system. The enormous increase in efficiency of
a control system based upon this flexible procedure, and the
resulting advantages in natural selection, may be presumed to lie
at the origin of perceptual consciousness. Let us consider why
this is the case.
A corollary to Shannon's Tenth Theorem mentioned above is
that organisms under selective pressure to increase their range of
adaptive behavior will also be under pressure to increase the
145
efficiency of their afferent information channels. A consequence
is that a highly evolved organism, and in particular the human
organism, will tend to expend as little of its information-proces-
sing capacity on a given perceptual task as is compatible with its
successful execution.6 We may refer to this consequence as the
'postulate of perceptual efficiency'. The upshot of this postulate
is that a successful organism possesses the afferent information-
processing capacity needed to cope with its normal range of
efferent control tasks, but generally commits no more of this
capacity to a given perceptual enterprise than is required to
maintain equilibrium within its immediate environment.
The import of this postulate may be clarified with the help of
the following equation of communication theory (from chapter II)
I(A;B) := H(A) - H(A/B)
which defines the mutual information of a channel as the differ-
ence between the entropy (informational capacity) of the input and
the equivocation of the input with respect to the output. In this
context, I(A;B) is to be conceived as a measure of the reliability
with which a message is passed through the organism's afferent
channels for application in behavioral control, H(A/B) as the
amount of noise or disruption its nervous system encounters in
this regulative function, and H(A) as the amount of afferent
capacity committed to the regulative task in question. The
quantity I(A;B) must be maintained within certain limits for
adequate afferent control of the organism's behavior. Within these
limits, however, the value of H(A) is constrained inits lower values
only by the value of H(A/B). When the organism is functioning
routinely in a familiar environment, the value of H(A/B) gen-
erally remains at a relatively low level and H(A) will be free to
assume a low value. The postulate of perceptual efficiency states
simply that H(A) normally remains at its lowest possible value
compatible with the organism's regulative requirements I(A;B)
under constraints set by H(A/B).
To discuss the interactions of these variables under different
perceptual conditions is to discuss the basic dynamics of per-
ceptual consciousness. Let us consider possible means for re-
ducing H(A), and also certain stresses reflected in H(A/B).
One technique available to communications engineers for
reducing the load on an artificial information channel is to
146
Consciotlsness
eliminate redundancy,beyond the level necessary to assure accurate
message transmission through a noisy channel. The biological
equivalent in a conscious organism is to filter out redundant7
information at the peripheral level, leaving resources available
in the higher nervous system for the pursuit simultaneously of
other perceptual ventures and for immediate response to oppor-
tunities and emergencies.
A four-leaf clover is distinguished from the three-leaf variety
by angle of leaf structures around the axis of the stem, by the
depth of lateral cleavage between lobes in each leaf, and by various
other aspects consequential upon the closer proximity among
leaves in the four leaf arrangement. But there is a difference also
with respect simply to the number of protrusions around the
center. This feature by itself is adequate to serve the child looking
for four-leaf clovers, the others being redundant and probably
never entering his ken. By restricting his attention merely to the
number of projections, the child may glean adequate information
for his perceptual venture, without surrendering awareness of
other features of his visual scene. However, since 'smokebombs'
are often manufactured to look like firecrackers both in shape and
in details of marking, the child (or parent) concerned with safety
on the Fourth of July must exercise his whole range of visual
discriminatory powers to distinguish the smoldering from the
explosive firework.
Another load-reducing technique is the elimination of noise,
which in an artificial system amounts to filtering out information
entering the channel independently of its primary input. In a
biological system, noise takes the form also of information from
the stimulation of its sense receptors which is irrelevant to the
guidance of its current behavior. One means for eliminating such
noise is what engineers call 'smoothing'.
Coins of a given denomination, for example, display minor
differences in shape upon close examination, with respect to
nicks and blemishes and uneven serration. When one is looking
for a dime to feed a parking meter, however, such differences are
irrelevant and constitute noise usually filtered out in that particu-
lar enterprise. In other circumstances noise of this sort might
actually impede a given perceptual venture. A familiar color-
blindness test is based upon a mosaic of small colored shapes
arranged to exhibit various letters and numbers when viewed by
CPII-P
147
a subject with normal color vision. Although the subject is able
to distinguish these smaller shapes by additional expenditure of
his visual information processing capacities, success in the test
requires viewing the configurations holistically and hence sur-
pressing the bulk of this additional information.
The amount of information relevant and necessary in given
circumstances depends upon the nature of the perceptual task.
Consider my present awareness of a familiar picture of Witt-
genstein, in which he appears clad in a striped flannel jacket and
posed against an outbuilding door. His cheeks and throat are
deeply shadowed, and his broad forehead bordered by dark wavy
hair. The eyes are recessed to the point of being scarcely visible
beneath the brows, and the mouth is slightly arched into an upper-
lip smile. Although I have viewed this picture many times before,
under essentially the same conditions of distance and lighting,
during this most recent viewing I became aware of details that
previously had escaped my notice. An unbuttoned shirt, for
example, is visible above the collar of the jacket, and although the
material of the jacket is obviously pieced around the shoulders
its horizontal striping continues evenly across chest and arms.
The difference between my noticing these details presently and
not before, with respect to processes in the nervous system, is not
a difference in stimulus configuration at the retinal level. It is a
difference rather in the extent of information-processing activity
occurring in the upper reaches of the visual system. What con-
stitutes awareness of additional details on the part of the viewer
amounts, on the part of his nervous system, to passing additional
information beyond the retinal level and preparing for its use in
more demanding ventures.
Perhaps the simplest response I might make to Wittgenstein's
picture is to the presence of an object in a particular place on the
wall, if I were simply checking to make sure it had not been re-
moved. In this case the information communicated in my aware-
ness of the object would amount only to the few bits necessary to
distinguish the occupied section generally from the rest of the
wall. If I were concerned instead to find space for a new calendar,
my awareness would be more specific with respect to dimensions
and would include information distinguishing the picture's
relative size. To view the picture as that of a man requires dis-
tinguishing among alternatives of a much greater variety, and
148
Consciollsnes s
hence a greater expenditure of information-processing capacities.
Progressively more demanding upon my information-processing
resources are observing a human form clad in rough clothing,
viewing a sensitive face against a sun-blotched background, and
perceiving a person I recognize and know by name.
Yet another noise-reducing technique is illustrated by the pro-
cedure of tracking, for instance in a computer-based aircraft
detection or control system, in which data indicative of change in
position of a moving object is averaged into a stable trajectory.
By this procedure the noise of momentary aberration in posi-
tional data is eliminated in vector summaries corresponding to
movement over extended periods of time. A similar expedient
apparent in the dynamics of conscious experience allows an
observer to maintain a stable fix upon a perceptual object without
responding to minor variations in response at the receptor level.
We may label this procedure 'stabilization'.
Russell, in his discussion of the constitution of objects in per-
spective space, speaks of the arrangement of the perspectives of a
penny according to their divergence from regular circularity
(Russell, 1917, p. 161). The sense one gets from this description
is that a penny viewed obliquely presents a form increasingly
elliptical as the angle of vision decreases. Psychologists have
objected to such descriptions by pointing out that a penny
appears no less circular when viewed at a slant than it does from
the privileged angle of ninety degrees (eg. Krech and Crutchfield,
1959, pp. 18-19). A viewer with no interest in taking sides could
find support for either contention in his ordinary experience. One
indeed can view a penny on a slant (less than roughly forty-five
degrees) as an ellipse somewhat wider than it appears to be high.
But considerable attention is involved in this 'two-dimensional'
viewing, including perhaps a momentary squinting to block out
details suggestive of the coin's identity. It is easier, and more
typical of such viewings, to see the coin simply as circular, in
effect stabilizing its shape around the norm appearing from
approximately a right angle of vision. Further illustrations of this
effect are available in one's perception of any familiar object in
which transitory deviations of shape and position fail to engage
one's attention. 8
These expedients for reduction of load upon the conscious
information-processing system can be characterized in terms of
149
OrganiS!J1 and Environment
communication theory. There is a literal sense in which the human
visual system is a cascade of information channels, extending from
the retina to the visual cortex and articulated at several junctures
in between. For simplicity, letus consider a highly simplified model,
consisting of set A of neuronal events (at the retinal level) feeding
into B (a level proximate to the optic chiasma), events in which
finally are stabilized at C (the level of the visual cortex). Assume
that A receives information from a fixed source of reflected radia-
tion (the retina is stimulated by an object, for instance a penny).
If stimulation of the receptors at A is short in duration, relatively
low in energy level, and corresponds to a sector of the visual field
subject to a minimal degree of the subject's attention, information
from the stimulation may not reach the cortex, and if it does will
be overshadowed by other cortical activities. If stimulation by the
object is more sustained, however, the initial sequence of events
at A (corresponding to the configuration of retinal firings in
response to the penny) will be succeeded by sequences with
approximately the same structure. Somewhere in the channel
between A and B, on the basis of this repeated configuration of
retinal firings, salient contours will be generated by edge-tracing
and smoothing procedures, and coded for passage into level C.
Channel A-B thus serves as a locus for informational processes
corresponding roughly to those of the frog's visual system des-
cribed in the section above.
After repeated stimulation from level B, certain neurons at
level C will fire with increasing frequency. In accord with the
findings discussed in chapter VIII (Catania, 1971; Kandel, 1970;
et al.), we will assume in general that any given neuron is associ-
ated with others in its immediate vicinity in such a fashion that its
m0mentary states of excitation will affect the states of neigh-
boring neurons, by way of either enhancing or inhibiting their
likelihood of firing. The repeated firing of a particular set of
neurons within a specific region of level C thus will have a joint
effect upon other neurons in their general area which is different
from the effect of some different set. Although most of the
neurons in this matrix of interacting influences may be involved
in responses to other perceptual objects, the particular group
associated with this particular penny from this particular point of
view will be distinguishable by its interactions with other neurons
in its immediate vicinity. Moreover, the more often this particular
15 0
Consciotlsnes s
set fires together, the more likely that its members will fire
jointly in subsequent moments, until the point is reached where
joint firing does not require stimulation of the entire original
group. By this process of positive feedback, a stable configuration
of interacting events develops on level C which can be sustained
by less frequent stimulation from B.
Because of the summating and smoothing operations in the
channel A-B, events in set B are characterized by lower average
information (H(B)) than events that trigger them on level A
(H(A)). Further, since events on level C tend to occur in regular
and hence predictable configurations, they tend thus to be lower
in average information (H(C)) than their more sporadic counter-
parts on level B. In accord with the postulate of perceptual
efficiency, we assume that the measure of average information
committed to a perceptual enterprise on level C generally assumes
the lowest value compatible with its successful pursuit.
The criterion of success at a particular stage of a perceptual
venture lies in the relationship between Band C. The channel
B-C is characterized by a high degree of mutual information
(I(B; C)) as long as the regular configurations at level C accurately
mirror the more dominant among the changing contours at level
B. That is to say, the configuration of neuronal associations at C
will remain relatively constant as long as C retains high mutual
information with respect to B. When appreciably different con-
figurations of activity become dominant on level B, however,
normally as the result of major changes in stimulation groupings
on level A, mutual information between Band C will fall below
its critical value and new configurations will be established on
level C. When, for example, retinal information that has fed one's
perception of a circular penny undergoes a major shift in group-
ing because of a major change in viewing angle, a new configura-
tion will become stabilized on level C and the penny will assume
a more elliptical appearance. However, as long as the viewing
angle remains roughly the same the penny will maintain its
original appearance of circularity.
Just as a positive feedback process is responsible for building
up each successive stable configuration on the cortical level, these
configurations are preserved in adjustment with structures of
incoming information by familiar processes of negative feedback.
The norm around which the state of the system is maintained is a
15 1
high degree of mutual information (I(B;C)) between events on
the cortical and on the feeder levels. Deviation from the norm is
indicated by a decreasing correspondence between structures on
these two general levels, constituting equivocation (H(BjC)) that
must be removed for continued success in the present perceptual
venture. The response of the system is to commit more of its
resources (H(C)) to the reestablishment of correspondence be-
tween the two levels, marked by return of an adequate measure
of mutual information. Relying upon a physical metaphor, we
may think of neuronal configurations on the cortical level as
characterized by greater 'inertia' than those on lower levels of the
afferent cascade. The advantage of these relatively stable con-
figurations is a lower expenditure of information-processing
capacity, available while they serve the current perceptual task.
The cost of maintaining stability under changing perceptual
circumstances is the frequent readjustment of these 'inertial'
configurations.
Configurations of this sort within the cortex of a conscious
organism are what elsewhere I have termed a 'patterned visual
response' (Sayre, 1969, chapters 6 and 7 passim). A pattern may be
defined in general as an ordering among elements of a set such
that when the arrangement of a subset is given the arrangement
of the remainder is indicated at a probability greater than chance
occurrence in proportion to the size of the given subset (Sayre,
1965, p. 153). Any arrangement of elements has a probability of
occurrence on a random basis. When an arrangement is part of a
pattern, its occurrence is made more probable by the occurrence
of other arrangements within the shared pattern, and the infor-
mation conveyed by its occurrence accordingly diminished. The
expedient adapted by nature in the evolution of conscious infor-
mation-processing systems, as it were, takes advantage of this
basic lesson of communication theory.
In particular, a pattern of neuronal activity in the cortex is a
set of events so ordered that the occurrence of a subset increases
the probability that the remainder will occur in proportion to the
size of the given subset. When a pattern of activity has been
established in the cortex by repeated configurations on the retinal
level, the occurrence of only part of this pattern during subse-
quent moments may stimulate the remainder into an active state.
Accordingly, the occurrence of these activities together in patterned
15 2
Consciousness
formation involves less information than the sum of their
independent occurrences. Processing visual information in the
form of such cortical patterns thus requires less expenditure of
the organism's afferent capacities than less flexible modes of
information processing.
4 INFORMATIONAL REALISM
Perception occurs within the cascade of information channels

originating at the surface of the perceptual object and terminating
in the cortex of the perceiving organism. This characterization is
general enough to hold true independently of competing views
about the nature of the intermediate stages. It is true for someone
(like Aristotle) who holds that structures present in external
objects are conveyed directly to the sensorium of the perceiving
subject, as well as for someone (like Locke) who holds that there
are intermediate objects (such as sense-data) of which alone the
subject is directly aware. It is true for someone (like Berkeley) who
treats perceptual awareness as a passive response to external
influences, as well as for someone (like Kant) who emphasizes the
participation of the mind itself in the formation of the structures
of which we are aware. The present approach to perception
shares important features of each of these views.
According to the present account, normal perception of exter-
nal objects involves a discrete series of information channels, with
a distinct stage beginning at each articulation of the transmitting
medium. In vision (which provides the paradigm for this dis-
cussion), the series begins with the microstructure of an external
object, which by a process of absorption and reflection introduces
a configuration of signals into the electromagnetic field. If this
information-laden radiation is further reflected off the surface of a
mirror, the information is transferred into another channel,
and yet another if refracted through an optical instrument. Pass-
ing through the cornea and aqueous humor to the retinal re-
ceptors, the message configuration then is transferred into a series
of electrochemical channels leading through optic chiasma and
brain stem into the visual cortex.
In the course of its passage from retina to cortex, the message
configuration is subjected to various sorting, smoothing and
153
stabilizing operations. These tend both to lower its overall infor-
mation content and to facilitate passage of certain dominant
structures recurring persistently in the retinal field. In the final
stages, these intermediate configurations are transformed into
stable patterns of cortical activity, through which guidance is
channeled to the organism's efferent system. The result is a stable
field of perceptual structures, capable of being joined with re-
sources of reason and memory to guide the organism's behavior
in an environment of repeating occurrences.
Even when aware of an entirely common and unchanging per-
ceptual object, a person's afferent information-processing system
is busily engaged in the endless activity of balancing stable neur-
onal structures against the diversity of information from his
sense receptors. Remaining securely balanced over the fulcrum of
a seesaw requires constant adjustment of the body's muscular
tensions, as maintaining a true note on a double-reed instrument
requires constant adjustment of the player's embouchure. Simi-
larly, maintaining stable perceptual patterns within a field of
constantly changing sensory stimulation requires a dynamic
balance of the higher nervous system between behavioral re-
quirements and afferent information flow.
The central nervous system responds to information impressed
at its afferent periphery much as a radio receiver responds to
information impressed across its antenna. The information gets
through to the higher level only if the receiver is properly tuned.
One major difference is that the informational processes by which
balance is achieved in the organic system are responsive not only
to changes in afferent signal, but also to requirements of efferent
control. Another is that this balance is achieved in patterns
imposing minimal strain upon the organism's information-
processing capacity compatible with maintaining that control
at an acceptable level. This latter feature, I maintain, is found only
in conscious organisms, and accounts for the selective advantages
which consciousness developed.
In veridical perception, the cascade of information channels
is 'focused' or 'tuned' to correlate major changes at the output
(the subject's cortex) with major changes at the input (the per-
ceived object), rather than with influences entering at intermediate
levels. When by anomaly of signal or organic misfunction the
anterior point of correlation shifts to some intermediate stage, the
154
Consciousness
result is some form of distortion or perceptual illusion. In normal
perception, however, the 'focus' is maintained on the level
enabling the organism best to effect adaptation within its chang-
ing environment, and this generally is the level ofexternal objects. 9
While this account in no sense is eclectic within the field of
philosophic theories of perception, it incorporates important
features of major traditional views. It accords both with Berkeley's
mentalism and Locke's causal representationalism in depicting
the initial stage of the perceptual process as a passive response of
the sense faculties to external influences. Like Berkeley's theory,
further, it regards the mind (however construed) as playing an
active role in organizing these initial sensory responses. And like
Locke's theory, it provides a perspective in which the perceptual
process obviously involves a causal relationship between sense
faculty and object. As explicated in chapter V, the causal rela-
tionship is a certain form of information processing.
Yet not all information processing can be understood in terms
of causal processes. Thus it is possible to maintain with Kant that
the organism's mental faculties are also active in the perception of
objects, and that the structures of objective appearance reflect
constraints under which these faculties operate. At the same time,
it is possible to maintain with Aristotle that these objective
structures in the domain of the mind's activity are identical with
objective structures at the other end of the perceptual cascade. In
a literal sense, structures present in the organism's cortex are
identical with structures characterizing the object of perception.
The sense in which this is so can be made precise only in the
context of communication theory.
The reliability of the output of information channel A-B as an
indicator of events at the input increases with a decrease in equi-
vocation. That is, I(A;B) increases with a decrease in H(AjB). A
noiseless channel, by definition, is one in which H(AjB) is zero.
Thus in a noiseless channel events at the output indicate with per-
fect reliability identically the same events as indicated at the
channel's input. In this sense, identically the same information is
present at B as at A. In a less than noiseless channel (which is still
a channel of communication in that I(A;B) is greater than zero),
some indications at the output are identical with those at the
input. The presence of equivocation, however, precludes identi-
fying without error all those of which this is the case. Thus there
155
Organi.rm and Environment
is a literal sense in which the perceiving mind shares identical
information with the perceptual object, but under conditions in
which noise is invariably present as well. Since this shared infor-
mation is essential for perceptual control, this account might be
appropriately entitled 'informational realism'.
5 ESTABLISHING THE THESIS
Perceptual consciousness, I maintain, is a mode of information

processing in which information entering at the organism's sense
receptors is transformed into patterns of cortical states which
remain generally stable from moment to moment and change
with changing demands upon the perceptual system. In brief,
perceptual consciousness is a patterned response of the organism's
cortex to information arriving at its sense periphery. This thesis
to be credible requires defending. But what line of defense would
be appropriate?
The thesis cannot be established by conceptual analysis, since
there is no fixed concept of perceptual consciousness in common
use to be conceptually analyzed (Sayre, 1969, ch. 5). Nor can it
fruitfully be treated as reporting an empirical discovery (like 'the
Morning Star and the Evening Star are identical') or a consequence
ofscientific theory(like 'lightning is a form of electrical discharge').
The appropriate tactic, I believe, rather is to offer the thesis as an
explication of how perceptual consciousness ought to be under-
stood in the context of inquiry, and by way of support to show
that commonly recognized features of perception gain intelli-
gibility when conceived in terms of these informational pro-
cesses.1°
One such feature is the tendency of visual objects to maintain
constant shape appearances under varying conditions of retinal
stimulation. This phenomenon of shape constancy is illustrated
in our discussion of the penny which maintains its circular
appearance despite considerable variation in angle of vision. Un-
der the present account, shape constancy is a manifestation of the
tendency of the afferent channels to process visual information in
increasingly more economical and stable structures, preserving
adequate mutual information throughout the process to maintain
behavior under afferent control. The physiological function of
15 6
Consciousness
these stable patterns is to conserve the organism's capacity for
information processing. Psychologically, their function is to
structure the subject's perceptual field with respect to stable
perceptual objects, of which constancy of shape is a normal
concomitant.
A related phenomenon is figure closure, pertaining to the way
in which familiar objects partly hidden from vision present
shapes that appear continuous through the missing sectors. The
shape of a book partially blocked from view by a flowerpot, for
example, appears as a rectangle of a familiar variety, even though
the surface actually present to vision is bounded on one side by a
graceful curve. Similarly, the living-room wall preserves its
integrity as a continuously flat surface despite pictures obscuring
major portions of its total area.
The tendency of the brain to 'fill in gaps' associated with mis-
sing areas of retinal stimulation is dramatically illustrated in cer-
tain cases of injury within the occipital lobe. Victims of wounds in
the posterior section often complain (if conscious) of displace-
ment or distortion of objects within their entire visual field. Mter
a period of adjustment, however, these anomalies tend to dis-
appear, although the patient may be left with persisting gaps in his
field of vision (Teuber, 1966, pp. 186-90). Objects falling entirely
within the resulting scotoma never appear in conscious view, even
when the corresponding retinal field is normally active. If the
scotoma comes within a stable pattern sustained by unaffected
neighboring areas, however, the pattern may be completed with
no gap appearing. It is as if the brain surrounding the injury can
carry the 'load' of the pattern if no great stress is placed upon
information in the affected area, but no pattern can be sustained
by this area itself.ll
'Gap-filling' phenomena of similar character are also common in
auditory perception. Recent studies of 'phonemic restoration'
have disclosed an unusually compelling perceptual illusion in
which missing sounds can be heard as clearly as if they were
actually present, even though the subject has been warned in
advance that certain sounds were missing (Warren and Warren,
1970).12
Figure closure may be understood in the following fashion.
Just as the upper brain levels can sustain patterns with compo-
nents missing due to abnormal perceptual circumstances, ilIus-
157
trated by scotoma and by contrived illusion, so a pattern may
remain active under normal circumstances despite lapses of
stimulation at lower levels. By definition, a perceptual pattern is
an enduring configuration of neuronal interactions, within which
activity of a part renders activity of the remainder more likely.
If a pattern is particularly well established within the subject's
perceptual repertoire, stimulation of a subset of its operating
sequences may engage the entire set in information-processing
activity. In effect, the subject may govern his behavior with re-
spect to a field of familiar objective structures, portions of which
are not currently represented at his sense receptors. Since the
typical percipient in a literate culture is accustomed to dealing
with books as objects with predominantly rectangular contours,
his awareness of a book partially obscured by a flowerpot will
reveal a rectangular surface behind a curved volume rather than a
surface partially bounded by a curvilinear side.
An account is also available of figure-ground reversal. In the
well known vase-face illusion, for example, the observer at one
moment sees a vase against a bare background, and at another the
outlines of opposing faces. Emphasis thus far has been upon the
formation of patterns at the corticallevel in response to repeating
stimulus configurations. An experienced perceiver, however, has
available a repertoire of previously established perceptual pat-
terns in terms of which his awareness will be normally structured.
These established patterns have been formulated to accommodate
familiar perceptual contexts, and yield to one another as the
context changes. Only when an established pattern fails to serve
a specific perceptual endeavor will the cortex develop new patterns
for its information-processing task.1 3 In the display triggering
face-vase reversal, the stimulus configuration is carefully prepared
to be equally suggestive of these two particular objects and at the
same time not to suggest an alternate construal. In the context of
other figures representing vases in less equivocal fashion, the
vase-face would stabilize in the vase appearance, and mutatis
mutandis if the context were unambiguous with respect to faces.
In the ambiguous context, however, appearances oscillate between
the two standard patterns, with no practical consequences to
stabilize either rendition.
In this chapter we have considered how cortical patterns become
established in their role of stabilizing the subject's perceptual
15 8
Consciousness
field to provide adequate guidance for his behavioral projects.
But information-processing patterns can be established also
in one's intercourse with other persons, and in the course of
private thought. There is no reason in principle, moreover, why
such patterns should not be established by genetic procedures, as
the developing organism is equipped prenatally to cope with the
human social environment.
A second general class of consideration in support of this
explication of perceptual consciousness appears with its deploy-
ment as the basis of an account of higher levels of information-
processing functions, in which the concept of perceptual pattern
finds extensive employment. Without foreclosing further evidence
of a psychological nature, let us turn to consider society, language
and reason.
NOTES
I Distinctions among homeostatic, heterotelic, sentient and anticipatory

feedback are drawn and discussed in chapter IV. Sentient feedback
occurs when a system is under at least partial control of variable states
(1) which do not themselves require maintenance within a particular
range for continued system operation, but (2) which vary with environ-
mental circumstances affecting other variables that must, for this purpose,
be maintained within a particular range.
2 The capacity of the combined channel is loga of the sum 2 raised to the
power of the capacity of one independent channel and 2 raised to the
power of the capacity of the other. If we designate the capacities of the
independent channels 'Cl' and 'C2', and that of the combined channel
'Cs', this relation may be expressed: 2 C1 + 2 C2 = 2 Cs • Inspection of this
equation (recall that the sum of the logarithms of two numbers is the
logarithm of their product) shows that Cl + 0 < CO when Cl + 0 < 2.
For insight into the physiological importance of proximity and hence
interaction among visual receptors in pattern detection, see Ratcliff (1961).
3 More exactly, the theorem states that the capacity (maximum value of
mutual information under variation of input probabilities) of a system
capable of correcting all but an arbitrarily small fraction of errors can be
equal to (but not less than) its equivocation (Shannon and Weaver, 1949,
p. 37). An equivalent and (for our purposes) more straightforward
statement is Ashby's 'Law of Requisite Variety,' to the effect that a
device's capacity 'as a regulator cannot exceed [its] capacity as a channel
of communication' (Ashby, 1956, p. 2II, original italicized). But this
latter cannot exceed the entropy of the device's input alphabet. The
formulation above follows from these two considerations.
159
4 In the MIT studies cited above, subjects were immobilized and fitted
with electrodes. For observations on the full behavioral response of the
frog to a flying insect, see Barlow (1961), p. 220.
5 A mechanism capable of edge tracing and curvature differentiation has
been developed in the course of the pattern-recognition project under-
taken at Notre Dame, and is described in Sayre (1973). Conjectural
models pertaining to the accomplishment of such procedures in physio-
logical nerve nets are discussed in von Foerster (1968).
6 The capacity of an information channel is defined as its maximum value
of mutual information under variation of input probabilities. Calculation
of this quantity in actual systems is complicated save in rather special
circumstances (see Abramson, 1963, pp. 131-5), and is out of the question
when channel characteristics are not known. Crude estimations of the
total information in bits that can be managed by various segments of the
human afferent system have been attempted by several researchers (see
von Neumann, 1958, pp. 63-4, and Wooldridge, 1963, pp. 188-92). The
drift of such calculations with regard to the human visual system indicates
something in the neighborhood of 10 8 bits of information representable
at the input, with considerable attenuation in the amount present at the
output of the system. Note that the postulate expressed above is based
on the assumption that an organism's information-processing capacity is
not infinite. Although this is perhaps evident in itself, for concurrence
see Broadbent (1965), p. 458.
7 Sensory information is redundant for a given organism at a given time
if it is potentially relevant to the guidance of the organism's current
activity but is unnecessary for that purpose because of duplication and
hence could be eliminated without impairment of control. Thus what is
redundant within an organism's information structures cannot be deter-
mined independently of its current behavior. A consequence is that
processes for the elimination of redundancy can be studied neither by
techniques that require anaesthetizing (or otherwise restraining) the
organism, nor by observation solely of its motor behavior. The study of
procedures for the elimination of redundancy requires access to some
juncture in the processing of sensory information at which this pro-
cessing reflects the variations of environmental contingencies. The only
access we seem to have at present that meets this requirement is the quite
ordinary (although not unproblematic) awareness of changing structures
within the observer's own perceptual field. In discussing procedures for
the reduction of sensory information we must rely upon phenomena that
in an obvious sense are subjective in nature. Our present concern, how-
ever, is limited to what they reveal about the processes of consciousness;
examination of their subjective character is reserved for a later chapter.
S A striking demonstration of the effects of averaging out momentary ex-
tremes of motion is available in looking at a series of still photographs of
a runner in action, in which his legs will be seen to reach a higher position
in beginning a stride than one is likely to have anticipated. Similar
blanking out of extreme excursions of the legs takes place in viewing a
walking figure. A multiple exposure photograph of a walking man
160
Consciousness
displayed in the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry is accompanied
by the surprising commentary that before the development of this
photographic technique the leg motions involved in walking were never
known in detail.
9 The proper object of veridical perception is identified in much the same
way that Armstrong (1968, p. 139) recommends we identify the 'end' of
purposive activity. According to Armstrong, purposive activity is
'initiated and sustained by a mental state, and controlled from beginning
to end by perception acting as a feedback cause on the mental state'
(ibid.). The 'end' of such activity is 'the state of affairs such that percep-
tion that it has been reached feeds back to the sustaining causal state and
stops the causal state operating' (ibid.). Similarly, by the present account,
the object of perception is the source of the information upon which (or
with respect to which) the organism operates in maintaining its be-
havioral equilibrium (either in action or in readiness to act) under
perceptual control.
10 I have argued on a priori grounds (Sayre, 1969, pp. 146-7) that no evi-
dence is available contrary to the thesis that perceptual consciousness is
a form of patterned awareness. Briefly, such evidence would show that
one is sometimes present without the other, and it is inconceivable that
such evidence should be forthcoming. The presence of perceptual con-
sciousness cannot be evident without patterned awareness, since being
perceptually conscious at all is to be conscious of something, which in
turn is to be subject to patterned awareness. On the other hand, evidence
of patterned awareness in perception without perceptual consciousness
would come either in a person's self-awareness or in his experience of
another person. But such evidence cannot come in a person's experience
of himself, since to be aware of patterns in one's own experience is
necessarily to be perceptually conscious. And it cannot come in one's
experience of another, since to be aware of such patterned awareness in
another person would require knowledge of cortical activity which
could be identified as the type in question only on the basis of observ-
able behavior of a sort we would interpret as exhibiting perceptual
consciousness. This line of argument, if sound, shows that the thesis
above cannot be shown conclusively false. But to show that it is true
requires more positive evidence.
I I An amusing illustration is related by Lashley (Teuber, 1966, p. 193), in
connection with recurring scotoma associated with migraine headache.
While seated opposite a companion during lunch at the Harvard Faculty
Club, Lashley reported having 'cut off' this other man's head by bringing
it within his area of localized blindness. The resulting view across the
table, however, was not of a scene with an unoccupied gap. What Lashley
saw instead was a headless man against a normal expanse of patterned
wallpaper. The distinctive pattern of the wallpaper behind his dining
companion was completed without interruption across the area where
the head should have appeared.
12 The context was the taped sentence 'The state governors met with their
respective legislatures convening in the capital city.' The experiment was
161
prepared by cutting the first's' in 'legislatures' phonetically out of the
tape, and substituting a cough of the same duration. Contrary to expecta-
tion, the subjects uniformly reported hearing the cough at various
points throughout the sentence, but never as replacing the missing
phoneme. The missing's' instead was heard as clearly as any other sound
in the sentence.
13 So dependent is the human perceptual process upon preestablished pat-
terns that when stimulation is received in configurations that are totally
unfamiliar the subject may literally be unable to see the objects in ques-
tion. A classic case is Darwin's report of how the Fuegians watched his
rowboat in wonder when he first set ashore, but failed to notice the
Beagle anchored a short distance off. In light of the present account, it
seems likely that the Fuegians did not simply 'overlook' the larger ship,
but that the presence of such a large object in their harbor was so novel
that they had no perceptual patterns with which to accommodate it.
Since their attention would have been riveted upon the landing party, no
priority would be given the establishment of novel patterns.
162
PART FOUR
MENTALITY
x
SOCIETY
I SOCIETY AND ORGANISM
Grouping together for mutual benefit is an ancient expedient in

the evolution of organisms. In our discussion (chapter VII) of the
possible origins of life in coacervate structures, the survival
advantages of one globule encased within another as a buffering
environment led to the conjecture that the very organization of
the cell into nucleus and cytoplasm derives from some form of
symbiotic arrangement. Conjecture aside, it is clear that many life
forms themselves are complex organizations of interdependent
but separate living units.
Some relatively simple primitive organisms, from the phyla
Protozoa and Coelenterata for example, are actually colonies of
subordinate organisms. Individuals of the species Volvox, which
contribute to the green scum sometimes seen in fresh-water
ponds, are composed of unicellular flagellates, themselves among
the most primitive organisms living today. Among more complex
colonial organisms are jellyfish and corals, comprising several
specialized animals as constituent members. What makes these
colonies distinct organisms rather than mere aggregates of indi-
viduals is a general coordination of specialized activities. The
flagella of Volvox, for instance, cooperate to move the colony
always with a certain side forward, and the flagellates at the
front have larger eyespots than those at the rear. More radical
diversification is found in the familiar 'Portuguese man-of-
war,' which includes some members for feeding, some for
16 5
Mentaliry
reproduction, and others for catching wind to move the colony
about.
Analogous diversification of function is apparent in bee colo-
nies, with queen and drones specializing in reproduction and
workers attending to construction and provision of the hive.
The parallel between hive and organism extends further in the
process of reproduction. When a second queen begins to flourish
within the hive (analogous to nucleus division), workers are par-
titioned by divergent allegiances (analogous to cell mitosis) and
then regroup as independent hives. l
The distinction between colonized individual and social group
is even less apparent in the case of the army ants of the tropical
rain forest. Among the several roles played by various castes
within the nest, one has evolved to become literally structural.
Having no fixed abode as they forage within the forest, the army
ants' nest 'is a seething cylindrical cluster of themselves,ant hooked
to ant, with queen and brood sequestered in a labyrinth of corri-
dors and chambers within the ant mass' (Schneirla and Piel,
1948, p. 17). Just as individual flagellates are structural elements
within the organism Volvox, individual ants are the structural
elements of their own communal dwelling. And just as the member
organisms of the 'man-of-war' are dependent upon the proper
functioning of their fellow members, so the individual ant is
dependent upon the rest of his nest.
So complete is the interdependence among members of the ant
colony that the effects of natural selection seem to have been dis-
placed from the level of individual organisms to that of caste
structures within the social group. Regardless of stresses imposed
by environmental contingencies, the individual ant must conform
to predetermined patterns of group behavior. Since the results of
deviation are usually fatal (Herrick, 1956, p. 173), adaptation to
changing environmental circumstances can come only with
changing patterns of group interaction. Correlated with this are
the facts that ants seem particularly inept at learning new be-
havior (Schneirla and Piel, 1948), and that they have not changed
in basic appearance over millions of years (a picture of a fossil
specimen may be seen in Buchsbaum, 1948, p. 322). Although
there are an estimated 3,500 species of ant in the world, each
adapted to its own particular living environment, this adaptation
has taken place primarily with respect to roles played within the
166
Society
nest and not with respect to morphology or behavior of individual
insects (Herrick, 1956, p. 173).
Thus there are at least two respects in which social groups may
appear as extensions of individual organisms. Both structures are
composed of living members, exhibiting considerable diversity
and specialization of function, and dependent for their vitality
upon the activities of others. And both are capable of modification
by processes of natural selection.
Particularly important, however, is that there appear to be at
least two distinguishable processes by which species may adjust
to pervasive environmental change. One is the proliferation of
different capacities on the individual level, those being preserved
within the species that prove individually best suited to environ-
mental contingencies. The other is change in dominant patterns
of group interaction, those patterns being selected which main-
tain group stability. In the former case, the reproductive chances
of a given individual may depend upon its ability to respond to its
environment through novel behavior, and hence through
behavior divergent from the norms of its group. In the latter, the
fortunes of the individual depend exclusively upon its being a
compliant member of a successfully coping group.2 As illustrated
by the contrasting examples of the ant and the eagle (by nature
of food source a solitary bird: White, 1959, p. 61), dominance of
one mode of adaptation often is achieved at the expense of the
other.
In human phylogeny, however, these two modes of adaptation
have been mutually supportive. With the great increase in indi-
vidual learning capacity in perceptual consciousness, man gained
increased capacity for adaptive group activity. With increasingly
flexible modes of group activity, on the other hand, human
individuals have gained the vast resources of language and
reason.
Growth in adaptive capacity, we have seen (chapter VII), may
be measured by an increase in negentropic flexibility, with respect
to the acquisition both of structure and energy and of information
about the living environment. The mutual reinforcement between
these two modes of adaptatior.. has been so effective that man seems
to have surpassed many times over the negentropic flexibility of
other advanced species. To continue our examination of man's
adaptive superiority requires a discussion of human society.
167
Mentality
Whereas the preceding chapters have been concerned with
adaptation of the species and of the individual organism, we turn
now to adaptive procedures within the social group. This leads
to a discussion of shared intentions, and of the values by which
these intentions are regulated.
2 NEGENTROPIC ADVANTAGES OF SOCIAL

GROUPING
Some forms of interaction among individuals within a species are

established genetically, and hence are socially nonadaptive.
Examples are courtship behavior among fish (see the analysis of
the stickleback's nesting activity in Thorpe, 1963, p. 292) and
insects (see Lorenz, 1965, p. 25, on the salticid spider), and among
mammals various forms of maternal care. Although advantageous
in being available without learning experience, such forms of
interaction change only with alterations in genetic structure and
are unresponsive to changes in the immediate environment.
Other forms of interaction are genetically based, but subject
to change in the course of individual experience. In the relation-
ship of dominance, the relative position of each participant is
established on the basis of trial aggressions. When two strange
hens meet at a feeding dish, the usual result is a fight which one
hen clearly loses. In subsequent meetings the fighting behavior
will be repeated, but with progressively reduced intensity, until
finally it is enough that the dominant hen threaten and the other
exhibit avoidance activity. This dominance relationship provides
a high degree of group stability, in which the interaction among
individuals is generally predictable. In a group of sea lions
occupying a beach during breeding season, for example, there
will appear little disturbance as long as the group remains com-
posed of the same individuals. When a new member joins or an
old one disappears, however, there will be a great deal of fighting
and irregular behavior until new relations of dominance are
established (Scott, 1971, p. 14). Such relationships may change
frequently within an individual's lifetime, and thus provide
flexibility in the group's response to short-term contingencies.
Another class of interaction includes relationships rooted in
genetic inheritance, but extended for the benefit of the several
168
Society
participants.
partIcIpants. In Sahlins's estimation, the beginning of human
society came with the shift in control of sexuality from hormones
to the cerebral cortex (Sahlins, 1968, p. 110). That is, while sexual
behavior among other animals usually is confined to compara-
tively brief mating periods, among higher primates there is a
general readiness to mate on a more extended basis, and hence an
incentive to establish more permanent social groupings. Sexual
pairing thus leads to other social relationships. With inter mating,
for example, the primitive family can expand into a band or tribe;
and peaceful cooperation among tribes is often based on the kin-
ship relation. 3
Apart from their biological origins, however, the reason for the
persistence of such social groupings must be the advantages
resulting for most of the individuals involved. Individuals in a
band of hunters benefit from larger and more regular kills, and
hence are likely to survive the lone hunter when game is scarce.
(Title in a recent Harvard publication: 'The species that preys
together stays together.') Conversely, individuals in a group are
less open to attack by predators. In either respect, the advantages
of banding with others for mutual purposes dramatically affect
the survival probabilities of the average member. Individuals
acting in concert with other individuals are both more versatile
in acquiring negentropy in the form of nutrition and more capable
of preserving the negentropy of their organic structure.
No less significant is the advantage shared by members of an
organized group in the acquisition of negentropy in the form of
information. As in the hive a scout's sensors are at the service of
other bees, and as in a primate band when one senses danger all
may flee, so individuals in human society share the perceptual
faculties of others with whom they communicate. Society thus
extends the information-processing capacities of the individual
without increase in bulk of his nervous system.4
A radical increase in flexibility was achieved, in the phylo-
genetic development of the human information-processing sys-
tem, when the integrative procedures of perceptual consciousness
superseded the partitioning of neural channels by message type
(chapter IX). No a priori reason appears why further flexibility
in the processing of afferent information might not be achieved
by other radical changes in the organization of the individual
nervous system. The next major step in the evolution of human
169
Mentality
negentropic capabilities, however, appears to have led in an
entirely different direction. Instead of increased flexibility in the
isolated nervous system, it led to increased flexibility in inter-
personal communication. s
Discussions of human communication tend to converge around
the topic of inflected language. Use of such language in the
exchange of interpersonal messages, to be sure, is man's most
flexible form of social adjustment, the origins of which in due
course (chapter XI) we must subject to scrutiny. To move too
quickly in this direction, however, would be to overlook lan-
guage's role as an instrument of group stability and the social
institutions through which that role is exercised.
In its primary role, language is a repository of information by
which members of society coordinate their group activity. One
obvious respect in which this is so is the provision in language
for such social acts as promising and betrothing, convicting and
pardoning, insulting, apologizing, betting and swearing.6 In
providing such institutions, society in effect has selected from a
practically limitless range of possible symbolic interchanges the
forms by which its members shape their interpersonal relation-
ships. Since information is the limitation of possible alternatives,
such institutions contain information for the guidance of social
behavior.
Another respect in which language conveys information on the
communal level has to do with the conditions of its being learned
and understood. Although there are certain terms (in English, for
example, 'soft', 'sharp' and 'heavy') that we come to understand
directly on the basis of our own perceptions, there are others
(like 'corporation', 'monopoly' and 'prosecute') that require a
more extensive understanding of societal matters than one is
likely to acquire by personal experience. Such terms are more
typical of modern techno.logical societies, but also appear in
primitive cultures. To comprehend the incest taboos of an
aboriginal society, for example, requires a fuller awareness of
different forms of interpersonal relationship than is likely to arise
within the direct experience of an individual member.7 Since these
terms represent specific patterns of social interaction, their very
presence within language provides a fund of information for the
accomplished user. 8
Consider further the role of language in an oral tradition. In
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Society
Homeric Greek culture, for instance, formulae for social inter-
action are transmitted primarily in folklore and historical nar-
rative. Thus the Iliad provides instructions on matters ranging
from priestly prerogatives, ransom and divination, to the division
of spoils among victorious warriors and sanitary measures for
controlling plague. As Havelock puts it, the Homeric epics
'served as the tribal encyclopedia' (Havelock, 1963, p. 165),
preserving the body of tradition, manners and mores by which the
culture was identified. Since transmission of such accounts relied
entirely upon memory, and since exactness was essential for cul-
tural continuity, the mode of transmission had to be formulaic
and in accord with the requirements of poetic rhythm. The effect
on one hand was to facilitate learning, but on the other to limit
the range of possible word combinations that could be fit into
a recitation of the poetic narrative. 9 The oral formulation of the
narrative thus itself served as a vehicle of information, in the
strict sense pertaining to the removal of uncertainty regarding
possible alternatives. In a literate culture, of course, this function
is served by other expediencies, such as the elevation of certain
texts (the Bible, Capital, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung) to
canonical status.
With such resources for regulating interpersonal relationships,
a society gains the advantages of group solidarity in competition
with other communal forms. A necessary condition for the de-
velopment of these resources, however, is that individual mem-
bers share a repertoire of action patterns directed toward com-
mon goals and interests. Merely to recite the Iliad, to foreswear
incest, or to utter the formula of a binding commitment, are not
themselves to engage in significant social activity. To this end,
the individual must also be capable of undertaking the behavior
these verbalizations signify within the appropriate social con-
text. He must be capable of initiating a course of action in which
others will recognize the intent they associate with these ver-
balizations. In a word, he must be capable of the appropriate
intentional action.
Although intention typically is discussed in philosophic litera-
ture without respect to its social origin, it is at least recognized as
a phenomenon with social significance. Let us discuss the nature
of intentional action and its role in the regulation of social
behavior.
17 1
Mentality
3 INTENTION AS A BASIS FOR SOCIAL
ADAPTATION
By 'intentional action' I understand behavior directed by con-

scious purpose. The nature of conscious behavior has already been
treated (chapter IX). Purpose also can be explicated within the
cybernetic framework.
Purpose is a component of a regulative procedure which may
be understood in comparison with the feedback operations dis-
cussed in chapter IV. In homeostasis, the stability of a system
operating in a disruptive environment is maintained by adjust-
ments within the system itself. Heterotelic feedback, by contrast,
enables a system to maintain a stable relationship with external
factors by operations upon the immediate environment. Although
both procedures conserve the status of certain variables, with the
former what is conserved is a state of the system (for example, an
organism's body temperature), while with the latter it is a rela-
tionship between the system and an external constituent (such as
the difference between a missile's heading and the target's
location). In both procedures, however, the protected variable
is part of the feedback loop, in that corrective response is trig-
gered by deviation from its optimal value.
Sentient feedback also operates to protect an important system
variable, but in a way excluding that variable from the feedback
process. Control is exercised instead through an indicator vari-
able whose values are less critical for successful system operation.
The advantages of this arrangement to the system are obvious.
Although the earthworm may not be able to avoid occasional
stimulation by sunlight, for example, by responding to variation
in excitation of its photoreceptors it can avoid desiccation from
prolonged exposure. Further buffering is provided by anti-
cipatory feedback, in which sensory indicators respond to stimuli
preceding conditions that would disturb the protected variable,
allowing corrective response before disruption occurs. By such
procedures, the frog responds to the hawk's shadow instead of its
talons, and the heat-sensitive sprinkler counteracts further
spread of the flame.
These feedback procedures are basically similar in operation.
While each is a source of goal-directed activity, the goal is to
maintain an optimal state or relation and not directly to achieve
171.
Society
an absent state of affairs. This is the case even with the target-
seeking missile, which achieves impact only as a consequence of
maintaining minimal difference between its heading and changing
target location. From the designer's point of view, to be sure,
the missile's goal is impact upon the target; from the point of
view of the guidance system, however, impact is an incidental
albeit disastrous consequence of maintaining the missile on a
certain relative heading. Put otherwise, the role of these regula-
tive procedures is basically conservative. They function to cor-
rect deviation of the system from some optimal status, and not to
bring the system to novel status within its operating environ-
ment. Given this role of conservation, these feedback operations
are so much part of normal system performance that failure to
operate under relevant circumstances would indicate system
malfunction.
Purposeful human behavior differs in several respects. For one,
human purpose is not conservative, with the goal of maintaining
the organism in a stable condition, but is directed rather toward
establishing a novel condition of the organism with respect to its
operating environment. As a consequence, purposeful human
behavior is not bound to respond to existing circumstances, but
may be motivated by the absence of a desired state of affairs.
Thus, for example, while the homing missile is goal-directed only
when locked on an existing target, the human prospector may
search for gold that is not there to be found,lO Purposeful
behavior, moreover, is not compelled either by environmental
constraints or by normal operating requirements. As a conse-
quence, purposeful behavior often can be withheld without
indication of malfunction in the behaving organism. Strictly
conceived, human purpose is not even a feedback procedure.
Although based physiologically upon many levels of feedback
activity, purpose represents a new departure in regulative pro-
cedures. Let us consider these matters further.
Purpose is the guide of purposeful behavior. Since all behavior
is guided by neural activity, purpose is a variety of neuronal
structure. More particularly, purpose is an afferent neuronal
configuration capable of directing behavior in regular sequences
toward an end state in which it normally terminates. Such con-
figurations, I suggest, are closely akin to neuronal patterns of the
sort discussed in chapter IX.
173
Mentality
By definition, a perceptual pattern is a stable configuration of
neuronal events, so ordered that the occurrence of a subset
increases the probability of the remainder occurring in proportion
to the size of the given subset. The role of such patterns in the
processing of afferent information is to provide flexible control
of the organism'S efferent activity with minimal expenditure of its
information-processing capabilities. To characterize such pat-
terns as stable structures, however, is not to suggest that they are
changeless or static. Since we live in an environment in which
motion is no less prominent than fixity, we have developed a wide
range of perceptual patterns for accommodating stimulus
sequences showing repetitive change. A fly is distinguished from
a spot on the wall by its frequent change in position, and a satel-
lite from a star by its regular motion. In following a small moving
object against a variegated background our strongest visual cue
often is its very motion rather than any static feature of color or
form. Indeed, the patteDs by which familiar moving objects are
perceived may be so well established as to invite illusion, as when
a leaf darting downward at the edge of our vision is actually seen
as a swooping bird.
Perceptual patterns are manifest primarily in the structure of
the subject'S field of perceptual awareness, but not necessarily
in his behavioral sequences. In sudden view of a bear, for in-
stance, a person may undertake avoidance activity or may halt in
his tracks and remain perfectly still. By contrast, human purpose
is manifest primarily in the subject's behavioral sequences, but
not necessarily in his field of awareness. Let us consider further the
nature of these behavioral sequences, and the nature of the neural
structures by which they are regulated.
Animal behavior in large part is composed of sequences of
regular motions adapted to the circumstances of the living
environment. This is true no less of human behavior, much of
which is sequenced without conscious influence. By way of illus-
tration, consider the typical case of the person viewing himself
for the first time in a television image who is surprised by be-
havioral traits of which he was not previously aware. Other
sequences may originate in consciously regulated activity, but
sink into marginal awareness as they become habitual. Examples
abound in sports (one's golf swing), in musical performance
(fingering the piano keyboard) and in personal grooming (tying
174
Society
one's shoes) of behavior that may be either consciously or (often
better) unconsciously undertaken. There are other sequences of
behavior, however, that normally can be sequenced only by
conscious guidance. One type of example is the skilled use of
tools (the jeweler's screwdriver, the power saw), another highly
coordinated social activity (primitive hunting of large animals,
modern surgery).
Of these three varieties of sequenced behavior, the first is
controlled by neural activity that typically does not emerge in the
subject's consciousness. A person normally is conscious of such
behavior only when viewing himself as he would another person.
The third, on the other hand, is controlled by structures of neural
activity which not only mold the subject's behavior into repeat-
able sequences but also provide the flexibility of conscious
guidance. Such structures are perceptual patterns that participate
directly in sequencing the individual's behavior; viewed alterna-
tively, they are neuronal configurations active in behavior-
sequencing which exhibit the features of conscious patterns. The
remaining variety is controlled by neuronal structures which may
be evinced in perceptual consciousness, but may also operate on a
subconscious level.
In this context, the noun 'purpose' can be provided a relatively
specific referent. A purpose is a neuronal configuration capable
of shaping behavior in repeatable sequences, and capable on
occasion of bringing that behavior under conscious control. One
essential feature of such configurations is that they regulate
behavior through sequential stages, and hence that they operate
in a sequential manner. Another is that the behavior they regulate
is terminated when a certain stage is reached in the afferent
sequence. This final stage itself may be a perceptual pattern,
activation of which indicates that the organism has reached a
certain state with respect to its operating environment. In reach-
ing for a telephone, for example, a person's hand motions are
guided by a sequence of afferent configurations that terminate
with the pattern of the hand grasping the instrument. Since this
state is reached under the guidance of that particular purpose, it
constitutes the goal in which the purpose is realized.
Sometimes by 'purpose' we mean the goal of an act, in which
case the purpose is identified by the end toward which it guides
the subject's behavior. Otherwise we mean that by which the
175
Mentality
action is motivated. To be motivated by the purpose of finding a
misplaced pencil, for example, is to be guided in one's behavior
by a sequence of neuronal activities that terminates (without
frustration) in perceiving the missing object. To inquire about
the purposes of another person is to inquire into the action-
guiding patterns by which he is motivated, understood in terms of
his likely behavior. In general, to act on purpose is to be guided
in one's relevant behavior by such goal-directed neuronal
structures.
One advantage of purpose in the guidance of human behavior
is the flexibility it provides in matching the activity of the indi-
vidual organism to foreseeable events in the living environment.
Purposeful activity is ordered in expectation of future occurrences,
and (unlike autonomic and reflexive activity) not merely in
response to existing circumstances. Accordingly, to withhold
purposeful activity is not necessarily a malfunction in the or-
ganism's response to present circumstances; it may be merely to
decline pursuit of certain future contingencies. l l
No less consequential are the advantages of purpose in com-
munal activity when individual behavior is brought under inten-
tional control. Since purpose can operate on subconscious
afferent levels, not all purposeful activity is also intentional.12 A
person engrossed in other concerns while walking home is
engaged in purposeful behavior, yet his motions are uninten-
tional because performed inadvertently. Similarly, a piano player's
finger motions are largely unintentional, but are no less purposeful
for being subconsciously enacted. In such cases, the agent's
purpose apart from his actions is not communicated, and does not
engage the expectations of other persons. Conscious purpose, on
the other hand, can be linguistically communicated, and can
influence the behavior of other persons independently of the
agent's resultant activity. The social importance of intention lies
in the basis it provides for a mode of interpersonal behavior
whereby one person's activity can be coordinated with that of
another before either line of activity is completely enacted.
One role of intention is in the application of those social insti-
tutions by which an individual's expectations are geared specifi-
cally to the plans of other persons. By conveying one's intentions
to another in the formula of a warning or a promise, for example,
one invokes conventions under which the other is warranted in
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Society
guiding his own behavior in anticipation of certain responses from
oneself. We have already noted the sense in which such institu-
tions of performative utterance provide information for the
guidance of social behavior.
Another regulative function of basic importance emerges when
intentions are shared throughout the membership of a social
group, enabling an individual to expect certain behavior from
other members without respect to particular persons. 13 Shared
intentions are the means by which society regulates the inter-
actions of its membership generally, beyond restrictions of time
and distance. By prescribing certain intentions and proscribing
others, society marks off certain typical activities as right and
wrong, good or bad, and hence as worthy of the praise or blame
of other persons. To be sure, the term 'intention' often carries a
sense of moral solemnity, suggesting that a person's intentions
(apart from his incidental purposes) are a matter of particular
social significance. Intentions are the implements by which social
values are brought to bear in the regulation of interpersonal
behavior. Let us consider the role of values in this regulative
function.
4 MORAL AND PRUDENTIAL VALUES
The term 'value' has many senses, most of which are not germane
to the present discussion. Any commodity has value if it com-
mands a price, whether in time, labor or monetary exchange. In
another sense, value has to do with preference or taste, or more
generally with attitudes of a favorable nature. A third sense of
value pertains to the worth of an object, as distinct from its cost
and preference rating. Worth is a character by which we deem
something desirable, a feature by which an object warrants
positive appraisal.
It would be inaccurate to say that values of these various sorts
are irrelevant to the state of a given society. The worth of iron
and fossil fuel, for example, is dependent upon a society's stage
of industrialization, and the widespread preference for private
transportation has caused major problems in modern techno-
logical society.
More directly implicated in a society's character, however, are
177
Mentality
values in the sense of norms and priorities, guides for the comport-
ment of our personal lives. In this further sense of the term, we
may conceive values as principles for the ordering of personal
intentions, and for selection among alternatives when conflict
arises. 14 Thus one individual's behavior may be governed by
values of wealth and influence, while another's is guided by
principles of social justice. The disposition of such values within
a group of persons directly influences the character of their social
life.
A distinction may be made between types of ordering principle
according to types of behavior regulated. One pertains to an
individual's personal behavior, the other to his relationships with
other people. Although the distinction is significant for other
reasons in moral theory,15 our concern will be limited to the dif-
ferent roles values of these two types play in the adaptation of
social groups to changing living conditions.
Values of the first type generally are prudential in nature. Some
seem to be present in all societies, as for example self-preservation
and the husbanding of resources. Others, like fertility or the
ownership of property, change with living conditions across
geographical boundaries. Yet others may vary with individual
circumstances, frugality (for the poor) and self-reliance (for the
privileged) being notable examples. The distinctive mark of such
principles is that they are not universal. Thus, while self-preserva-
tion may be a personal value in all societies, it is commonly over-
ridden in the interests of patriotism. Again, while it may be impor-
tant in an agrarian society to encourage fertility, technological
change can reverse this value within a relatively short period.
By contrast, values of the sort governing interpersonal rela-
tionships normally are inviolable in a healthy society. Examples
are honesty, duty and the norms of conscience, which are the basis
for mutual trust in any group activity. Values of this second sort
generally are moral in character, comprising what we conceive
to be the moral virtues. Thus, whereas it may be prudent to pro-
tect oneself or care for one's property, we do not think of these
concerns as being morally excellent. On the other hand, although
honesty and duty are among the canons of virtue, following such
principles on occasion can be distinctly imprudent.
A major difference between moral and prudential values arises
with their function in the control of social behavior. Prudential
17 8
Society
values such as wealth and self-preservation provide goals to be
realized by any means available, and thus constitute purposes for
positive action. But values such as honesty influence behavior
in a negative fashion, imposing restrictions on actions by which
goals may be realized. Thus honesty does not motivate truth-
telling in any manner available (to tell a truth is not a goal in
itself), but rather confines the pursuit of positive goals to means
not involving deception and cheating. In sum, whereas prudential
values pertain to general purposes by which means are marshalled
toward particular goals, moral values restrict such goals to par-
ticular means of accomplishment insofar as their pursuit affects
the interests of others.
This difference has major consequences for the adaptation of
society. For a social system to adapt to changing living conditions
is for it to undergo numerous variations in interpersonal rela-
tionships, some of which prove mutually beneficial to various
groups of its members. Because of the advantages of these new
associations, the values they represent become reinforced in the
persons involved and come to replace other values in their
individual behavior. As these individuals become more successful
in their undertakings, they also become more prominent within
society and their values become more attractive to other members.
In this fashion the adaptation of a society to changing living
conditions, although perhaps involving changes in technology
and geographical location, occurs primarily as changes in the
social values by which members govern their personal and
cooperative activities.l6
The significance of the distinction between prudential and moral
values pertains to their degree of involvement in social change.
Prudential values change more easily, and hence more frequently,
and thus respond more readily to changing living conditions.
This readiness to change follows from the nature of prudential
values as purposes to be realized by available means. Since avail-
able means are limited both by moral and by material influences,
prudential goals generally are served by only a small set of
alternative actions. Thus a change in the prudential goals by
which a group is motivated may involve relatively minor changes
in group activity, and encounter relatively little resistance from
social tradition.
Changes in moral values, on the other hand, have more
CPM-O 179
Mentality
pervasive consequences with respect to group activity. Since the
value of honesty is primarily restrictive or negative in influence,
it rules out lying in the indefinitely numerous forms in which this
mode of deception might possibly be exercised. Hence a change
in force of the value of honesty might involve extensive changes in
interpersonal activity that are not readily made in a stable society.
When changes in moral values occur, moreover, they more
likely will be with respect to application than with respect to the
values themselves. Recent American cultural history, for example,
has shown a shift from a principle demanding honesty for all
members of society to a norm exempting political and industrial
leaders. In a parallel example, the process of extending social
justice from native whites to all members of the nation has been
accompanied by considerable social and political turmoil. Moral
values thus exert a conservative influence, and change usually
only in association with conditions of group instability.
In providing both moral and prudential values for directing
the behavior of its members, society thus makes available both
'broad' and 'fine tuning' controls by which the social group can
adapt to its changing environment. Changes in prudential or
'fine' controlling values occur with relative ease as society adjusts
to local conditions, and may cause only minor perturbations in
interpersonal relationships. Changes in moral values, on the
other hand, occur much less readily, and with their occurrence
bring major realignments in relationships among individual
members.
Such remarks regarding the variability of moral values will
elicit complaints of 'ethical relativism,' a notion many people find
intensely disturbing. This fact itself is noteworthy, for it suggests
that one condition for the effective guidance of social interactions
by moral values is that these values themselves be considered
invariable. To be sure, a soldier in combat cannot be allowed to
think of his enemy as a potential customer in post-war commerce.
In general, when a moral principle imposes unpleasant restric-
tions upon an individual, he cannot be expected to comply in an
exemplary fashion if he thinks the principle might be abrogated
under different social conditions. In light of such considerations,
the suggestion that moral values might change with social con-
tingencies might be taken as a pernicious consequence of the
cybernetic analysis.
180
Society
In my estimation, exactly the opposite response is warranted, as
may be seen in a review of the claims above. It has been claimed
that moral principles are subject to change in their range of
applicability from culture to culture. That this is so is a fact of
cultural history not open to refutation by ethical theory. As any
competent theorist will recognize, however, a change in the
applicability of a general principle is not equivalent to a change in
the principle itself. On the other hand, it has also been claimed
that there are certain conditions regarding the interaction among
individuals within a society that must be met if the society is even
to exist. The function of the several moral values discussed above
is to assure that these necessary conditions are realized. From the
cybernetic point of view, accordingly, values similar to those of
honesty and duty are essential to the maintenance of the social
fabric. Thus, rather than threaten the so-called 'objectivity' of
values, the cybernetic approach indicates a general explanation of
why such principles are necessary.
For example, one necessary condition of social well-being is
that individuals in roles of communication, including messengers
and scouts as well as leaders and teachers, must perform these
roles so as to keep the communication channels in which they
communicate relatively free of noise. Since deception is noise in
interpersonal communication, this requirement translates into the
virtue of honesty. There is an important lesson here for govern-
ment leaders who believe they can best serve the interests of
government by policies of falsehood and dissimulation.
Consider further that as society becomes more complex and
roles diversify, the individual becomes dependent upon an
increasing number of other persons. In such a context, ostracism
from the group is tantamount to execution, and social acceptance
becomes essential to individual survival. Moreover, faithful
performance of one's own role becomes increasingly important
for group approval. A chronically unsuccessful hunter, for ex-
ample, will lose the spear-makers' favor and will not receive
proper weapons for future opportunities, while the spear-makers
disfavored by the successful hunters will not be fed amply after
the kill. Subject to pressures of this sort, the average member of
society will learn to respond to the expectations of others and
soon will develop the virtue of duty.
An individual strongly motivated by the approval of others,
lSI
Mentality
however, would soon come to distinguish subtle signs of favor
and disfavor, and in the course of learning to control his behavior
by these indications would learn to distinguish what others
thought he did and what he had actually done. This added
dimension of sensitivity opens up a vast range for cheating, whe-
ther with respect to partners prohibited by sexual mores or pri-
vate kills hidden from one's hungry fellows. A group of people
with sufficient sophistication to fool each other frequently in
matters of shared interest would not long remain as a social
entity. Further social controls must come into play; and since the
danger is private conniving against common interests, the control
itself must be commensurately private. Perhaps it will first appear
as an unpleasant feeling, similar to the emotion of regret or shame.
Whatever its subjective character, however, this control must act
as a personal regulator, the precursor of modern man's sense of
conscience)7
73 SOCIAL ADAPTATION
Like other major forms of organization developed in the evolution

of living organisms, human society was selected for characteris-
tics we should now find intelligible. These characteristics have to
do with the efficient reception of negentropy from the living
environment, and the effective use of information in control of the
individual organism.
In its primitive stages, quite independently of other social
developments, the banding of individual protohumans into
cooperative groups served to increase both the receptor and the
effector capacities of the organisms involved. By sending out
scouts, the primitive hunting party was enabled to share the sense
faculties of many individuals simultaneously, and by pooled
weaponry could achieve larger kills than the single hunter.
Among the advantages of this form of cooperative activity were
the relative assurance of food when easy game was not plentiful
and the protection afforded by the organized group. Similar
advantages, of course, are available in insect societies, where the
forms of individual interaction that make group cooperation
possible are provided by genetic endowment. In view of the
apparent dependence of early forms of social relationship among
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Society
vertebrates upon sexuality and maternal care, it appears likely
that protohuman society itself was genetically structured. Adap-
tation of human society in its early stages thus must have required
hundreds of generations.
Once evolved, however, social adaptation proved by far the
most flexible procedure. For one thing, society provides a matrix
in which modification in general forms of interpersonal behavior
can be effected within the course of a single generation. Moreover,
in contrast with the mechanisms of genetic adjustment, change in
a society's interpersonal structures can occur without sacrifice of
the individuals involved. The 'finishing touch' in the evolution of
society as we know it, however, was the development of a dual set
of shared intentions, serving the interests both of stability and
change. A society is stabilized around its moral principles, which
establish formats of interpersonal relationship within the group
that are generally resistant to change. Values of a primarily
prudential nature, on the other hand, change with relative fre-
quency, and enable the society to keep abreast of minor altera-
tions in material living conditions.
Both moral and prudential values, however, are dependent in
their social role upon interpersonal communication. It is time
to turn to the topic of language.
NOTES
1 This analogy is due to Rapoport, in his foreword to Buckley (1968). The

parallel is strengthened further by the experiment of von Frisch in which
young and old bees were isolated in separate sectors of a hive, so that one
group lacked brood nurses (young females with active salivary glands)
and the other foragers (older females with atrophied salivary glands).
After three days the latter group responded by producing young foragers
with glands prematurely atrophied, and the former by producing older
nurses with reactivated glands (von Frisch, 1955, pp. 40-2). In short,
not only the behavior patterns but also the physiological capacities of
the members adjusted quickly to the needs of the hive.
2 The distinction is between different levels of selected behavior, not
between different mechanisms of natural selection. All adaptation ulti-
mately pertains to changes in the genetic structure of individual organ-
isms. Effective therapy for other ways of viewing the matter is provided
in Williams (1966).
3 One conclusion Sahlins draws from such phenomena is that 'Thomas
Hobbes's famous fantasy of a war of "all against all" in the natural state
18 3
Mentality
could not be further from the truth' (Sahlins, 1968, p. IIZ). Sahlins's
view is supported by White (1959, pp. 64, 67, 78,84).
4 As pointed out by Dunn (1971, p. 78), 'Just as man learned to amplify
his biological effectors through joint action, he learned to amplify his
biological receptors. Through shared perception (e.g., the use of scouts
in a hunting or collecting party) he acquired the power to inspect or
encompass a broader range of experience.'
5 I argue in the chapters following that both language and reason consti-
tute extensions of perceptual consciousness, and hence represent further
increases in flexibility of neuronal organization. The remark above sug-
gests only that the growth of flexible social structures is a necessary
condition of these further developments. Yet this seems to be the case
with language only its more highly developed forms, since a rudimentary
language in turn is necessary for the development of human society.
Whether language or society is ultimately more basic is a fruitless ques-
tion, since neither could exist as we know it without the other. If such
considerations were the only pertinent factor, the order of this and the
following chapter could be reversed.
6 The classic and still most insightful analysis of performative discourse is
in Austin (19620). A more regimented analysis may be found in Searle
(1969).
7 Other examples from primitive cultures mentioned by Kuhn (1963, p. 2. I 6)
pertain to disease, growth, death, and the origins of the world.
8 As Kuhn sees it (196;, p. 152.), 'a language itself contains a tremendous
amount of information, and merely to learn it acquaints us with much
accumulated knowledge. To learn a language is to learn the meaning of
its words, and one cannot learn the meaning of such words as ship,
eclipse, lever, jury, Arctic, noun, price, or organization without learning
important things about his environment.'
9 In Havelock's terms (196;, p. 149), 'The requirements of memory are
met in a fundamental fashion through practising a strict economy of
possible combinations of reflexes. There are a million things you cannot
say at all in metrical speech and it will follow that you will not think
them either.'
10 In Consciousness, chapter ;, I argued against Rosenbleuth and Wiener's
(1950) use of the goal-seeking missile as a model of human purposive-
ness, on the grounds partially that such mechanisms are dependent for
their operation upon features of their immediate environment, while
human purposive behavior may be directed with respect to an absent
goal. Campbell and Rosenberg (197;, pp. 550-1) criticize this argument
on the basis that not all negative feedback requires a physically present
goal. The existence of anticipatory feedback corroborates this empirical
claim. Nonetheless the criticism misses the point, for I was arguing
against a specific feedback model in which a physically present goal is in
fact required.
I I Purposeful activity as characterized above meets the criteria of purpose
developed in Consciousness, chapter ;. (1) Such activity qualifies as action,
in the sense of something someone does rather than something happening
18 4
Society
to the person in question (we ask 'why?' rather than 'what happened?'
or 'how did that occur ?'). Further, (z) the absence of such activity, as
noted above, is not an indication of malfunction in the behaving organism.
Finally, (3) such activity occurs in sequences of predictable behavior,
integrated with the organism's other activity in its behavioral context.
1 z Campbell and Rosenberg criticize my characterization of action on
purpose in Consciousness, chapter 3, on the grounds that my criteria of
purposeful action 'do not guarantee the existence of any intentions on
the agent's part' (1973, p. 553). According to my analysis of purpose,
intention enters only when purpose becomes conscious. Thus I cannot
accept the opinion on which this criticism is based, namely that in 'com-
mon parlance a person does something on purpose when he acts inten-
tionally, with a purpose, and contrary to someone's expectations or
wishes' (ibid., p. 5F). This opinion is faulted for independent reasons,
for surely purposeful action (obeying a command, for instance) is not
always contrary to someone's wishes.
13 To share an intention clearly is not to share literally the same conscious
cortical pattern. Yet there remains a sense in which intentions are shared
by members of a linguistic group who use certain linguistic symbols to
convey the same meaning, and whose activities are coordinated in the
same plan of action. Although the cortical patterns involved are ob-
viously different, the activities they control may be sufficiently congruous
from person to person to warrant speaking of motives as in some sense
the same. We return to this topic in chapter XI. It should be noted that
an intention cannot be identified merely by observing its resulting be-
havior, since the same general sequence of personal activity may be
motivated by different intentions. One's intention in operating a water
pump, for example, may be simply to exercise, or to take a drink, or to
fulfill a commitment to one's employer. Evaluation of the social status
of the action requires determination (through language) of the particular
intention by which the agent was guided.
14 Rescher (1969, p. 109) characterizes values as 'invariable instrumentalities
for reasoning about alternatives' (author's emphasis). This is close to the
sense of values specified above, although the emphasis upon reasoning
should not suggest that such values operate only in the course of explicit
deliberation. What makes values important principles of social cohesion
is that they contribute so effectively to the formation of personal habits.
The emphasis upon reasoning is understandable, however, in that values
also play an important role in the public justification of problematic
courses of action, where the relationship between the action and the
value supporting it must be understood commonly by all parties involved.
15 This distinction is closely parallel to one the ramifications of which for
moral theory are discussed in Strawson (1961).
16 To the extent that social adaptation comprises technological change, this
is likely to be a consequence of changes in social values that motivated
attempts to bring such material changes about. In the course of an in-
sightful analysis of the similarities between biological and social evolu-
tion, Dunn argues (1971, pp. 83-4) that, whereas the basic goal in the
18 5
Mentality
former is survival, and takes the form of an instinctive drive toward self-
maintenance and self-reproduction, in 'the social realm human beings
develop goals that go beyond the instinctive drives associated with
survival. The behavioral amplification associated with human creativity
and social action makes it possible to attach value to such things as levels
of productivity and levels of living.'
17 The classic parable here is that of Gyges' ring, in Plato's Republic 359D-
;60B. Indeed, this stage in the development of conscience may have been
reached in Greek culture at the end of the Homeric era, when epic poetry
was the main vehicle of moral formation. According to Havelock (196;,
p. 1Z), Plato's animus against poetry was that it indoctrinates the young
with the view that 'what is vital is not so much morality as social prestige
and material reward which may flow from a moral reputation whether or
not this is deserved.' Havelock observes also (ibid., p. 158) that the 'pull
between the pleasureful inclination to act in one way and the unpleasant
duty to act in another way was relatively unknown' during the Homeric
period, but that all 'this begins to change by the time the fourth century
was under way.' As this illustration indicates, the claim above is not that
moral virtues are present in society from its primitive beginning, but
rather that part of a society's development beyond a certain rudimentary
level is the development of an active set of moral values.
186
XI
LANGUAGE
I THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINS
Philosophers often profess to find in language an essential dif-

ference between man and beast. Those who occupy themselves
with the search for essential differences, however, typically over-
look the question how such differences originate. Descartes, for
instance, conceived language to be the sign of thought, and
thought in turn to be the essence of spirit; but to the audacious
query how man became a spiritual being there is nothing to say
but that God made him so. We do not learn much from Descartes
about the origin of language.
Nor, curiously, do we learn much on this topic from contem-
porary linguistics. l According to Chomsky, for instance, the
core problem of human language is how, on the basis of limited
experiences with a language, 'one is able to understand an inde-
finite number of expressions that are new to one's experience'
(Chomsky, 1968, p. ICO), and to produce such expressions on
appropriate occasions, communicating with others who share the
same ability. In a rationalistic stance reminiscent of Descartes,
Chomsky maintains that competence in a language depends upon
a set of rules somehow 'internalized' in the mind of the speaker,
which provide the basis for the language's grammar. Since these
rules operate even in speakers who are unable to formulate them,
and seem to be present in all linguistic societies, Chomsky postu-
lates the existence of innate linguistic structures in the minds of all
potential language users (Chomsky, 1968, pp. 171-94). But no
18 7
Mentality
account is suggested of how such structures became part of man's
genetic endowment. In view of the question of origins, it is no
more informative to be told that linguistic structures are provided
innately than to be told that God created man with linguistic
capacities.
The question of origins is basic from the cybernetic viewpoint.
Language is a means of communication which apparently man
does not share with other species. At some stage in his phylo-
genetic development, man not only must have acquired the
capacity for linguistic behavior but also must have found such
behavior advantageous in the selective competition for group
survival. The apparent uniqueness of human language requires
explaining, and the explanation should be sought within the
context of natural selection.
Natural selection, as we have seen, works generally to foster
efficiency in the use of energy resources. In an organism confined
to relatively unchanging living conditions, efficiency lies in the
direction of specialization, compatible with relative fixity of
behavioral responses. With the higher vertebrates, however,
efficiency is the product of versatility and of the organism's
capacity to take advantage of changing environmental circum-
stances. This requires flexibility in the control of motor behavior,
to which the organism's information-processing faculties are a
primary contributor. The greatest flexibility in this regard is
apparent in man, who has developed in consciousness the capacity
for processing information in stable, yet constantly changing,
perceptual patterns.
It is dear, however, that man's consciousness is not limited to
processing information from his sense receptors, and that his
flexibility is extended by his linguistic capacities. To explain the
origin of language from the cybernetic viewpoint is to explain its
contribution to the control of the behaving organism, for which
it has been favored by natural selection.
Among linguists, the approach of Greenberg (1957) is con-
genial to this point of view. Accepting a notion of evolutionary
progress similar to the conception of chapter VII above, Green-
berg cites (ibid., p. 59) the capacity for more artful manipulation
as progress on the side of motor behavior, and the capacity for
finer stimulus discrimination as progress on the side of sensitivity.
Each of these abilities constitutes an increase in the flexibility and
188
Language
efficiency of the favored organism, and in each case efficiency is
determined with reference to a function to be performed. The
primary function of language, in turn, is communication, rang-
ing from the personal exchange of verbal messages to the dis-
semination of culture within society. 'The question of the evolu-
tion of language,' accordingly, is a question of the place of lan-
guage among other means of communication and the question
whether 'in this wider context, a line of evolutionary advance can
be discovered' (ibid., p. 62). These questions mark out the ap-
proach of the present chapter.
To emphasize the communicative role of language is not to
ignore the problems of grammar, syntax and meaning. Although
language surely did not originate replete with such structural
subtleties, grammar and syntax clearly are essential to verbal
language as we currently know it. We must presuppose that the
addition of semantic and syntactic structures enabled language
to function more efficiently than before they were added. Accord-
ingly, the structures of meaning and grammar must be account-
able in terms of communication efficiency.
In the sections following we shall attempt to recapture, on the
basis of communication theory, anthropology and likely conjec-
ture, the major stages in the development of man's linguistic
capacities. Then we turn to questions of grammar and meaning.
2 LIMITATIONS OF INNATE SYMBOLIC

STRUCTURES
Communication among individuals is a necessary condition of

group activity. Whenever a social group exists its members are
capable of exchanging information. In this manner the activities
of the individual are influenced by and influence in turn the activi-
ties of others within the group.
Each of the sense modalities, as we commonly classify them,
provides social communication channels in some animal species.
Ants, for example, communicate tactually by their highly motile
antennae, and also rely upon some sense of smell (Thorpe, 1963,
p. 235). And bees, returning to the hive from a newly discovered
food source, first incite interest among their fellows by supplying
tastes of nectar from their successful flight (Esch, 1967). Even
18 9
Mentality
among nonhuman animals, however, the most effective channels
of communication often are provided by sight and hearing. The
remarkable schooling behavior of fish seems to depend mostly on
visual cues, as indicated by the fact that in nonluminescent species
these schools break up in the dark of night (Thorpe, 1963, pp.
295-6). The more long-range and loosely structured social beha-
vior of whales and dolphins, on the other hand, appears to depend
primarily on the complex auditory signals that have fascinated
linguists and ethologists in recent years.
A particularly versatile and abstract form of nonhuman com-
munication is exhibited in the signalling behavior of honey bees,
which zoologists have studied intensively during the past three
decades.:! Both vision and hearing playa role in this information
exchange. When the returning food scout has gathered about it a
bunch of excited bees, it enters into an agitated dance routine
consisting of a short, straight run in a certain direction, followed
by a semicircular return to the starting position. During the
straight run the dancer engages in a waggling activity, and also
emits bursts of vibrations in the audible range. Whereas originally
it was thought that the repetition rate of the dance pattern was the
primary indicator of the distance of the food from the hive, Esch
showed that the duration of the sound signal is more regularly
and exactly correlated with the range of the insect's flight. Since
considerable variation is possible in the length of these bursts, a
considerable amount of information is packed into the audible
signal.
The most remarkable aspect of the bees' communication, how-
ever, is the manner in which information is conveyed about the
direction of the food from the hive. If the dance is performed in
view of the sun (or a surrogate light source), the straight run will
be headed toward the food source itself, exhibiting a fixed angle
between that line and the sun. If the run is enacted in a dark hive,
however, it will be performed on a vertical plane with difference
in gravitational pull indicating the upward direction. In this
context (requiring an upright hive), the vertical line represents the
sun's direction, and the heading of the dance relative to this re-
ference line indicates the direction of the food source with re-
spect to a line from the hive to the sun. As Esch points out, this
aspect of the bees' language is wholly symbolic (1967, p. 102).
Lacking the opportunity to show its fellows the direction of the
19°
Language
food by actually moving in that direction, the messenger can con-
vey that information with equal facility and accuracy by enacting
substitute movements its viewers are able to translate into appro-
priate flight.
Highly symbolic as the bees' language may be, there are
several respects in which it differs fundamentally from human
speech. Most importantly, both the behavior patterns by which
the dancer announces its discovery, and the flight behavior its
followers enact after experiencing the dance, are determined as
part of the insect's genetic endowment. One consequence is that
no learning is required to enable young bees to communicate
within the hive society. Under standard conditions, this feature
is advantageous for the group as a whole. Under extraordinary
conditions, however, a purely innate language can be dis-
advantageous, for it lacks flexibility of adjustment to changing
conditions. Not only are the members unable to communicate food
directions among themselves in the dark when the hive has been
disturbed from its upright position (Esch, 1967, p. 104), but more-
over there is no room for improvement in communication effi-
ciency which might enable the group to take advantage of special
features of their food-gathering environment. Another unfavor-
able consequence is that both the dance behavior of the informant
and the subsequent food-gathering response of the followers are
triggered by specific stimuli, in the absence of which this beha-
vior would not normally occur. The dance is elicited only by the
presence of nectar, just as the flight is elicited only by the dance of
the messenger; and under these circumstances the bee language
cannot be extended to serve other purposes.
The net result is that bee language cannot develop into a means
of deliberation, an instrument for learning from past experience,
or a vehicle for exploring future alternatives, all highly efficacious
forms of information processing. In short, an innate language
is incapable of serving even in a rudimentary manner those infor-
mation-processing functions that come to fruition in thought and
reason.
These are disabilities to be overcome in the development of
language capable of supporting not only literature and science but
also speculation about its own origins. The basic disability is
restriction to message structures that are innately determined and
cannot be modified in the course of experience.
19 1
Mentality
There is no presumption behind these observations that human
language relies upon capacities that are entirely different from any
manifest elsewhere in the animal kingdom. 3 Nonetheless, it is
clear that human language, whatever its origins, has developed
into a medium of communication that is radically different from
any other language system known today. The presumption in-
stead must be that those features of human language that mark it
off most distinctly from other language systems have developed
gradually through evolution and natural selection, and that there
have existed in the process forms of communication among
humans and other hominid organisms that exhibit these features
in various stages of development.
Moreover, in trying to relate language as we know it to signal
systems of prehominid forms, we cannot rely upon descriptive
categories that apply uniquely to the former. The transition from
prehominid signal systems to human language can be described
only in terms of features that can be present in any communica-
tion system, hence in terms of communication theory. We must
rely upon the combined resources of anthropology and cyber-
netics for reconstructing the major stages in the evolution of the
language of man.
3 CONJECTURED DEVELOPMENT OF
HUMAN LANGUAGE
Hockett postulates that the signal systems of prehominid or-

ganisms were similar to the call-system of the modern gibbon
(Hockett, 1960; also Hockett and Ascher, 1968, p. 218). A call
system consists of a relatively small number of vocal signals, each
a response to a recurrent and biologically important stimulus
situation. Among gibbons, one such situation is the discovery of
food, others the detection of danger and the desire for company.
The vocalization of these calls, as well as the responses to them by
other gibbons, are determined genetically; they enter the animal's
behavioral repertoire without learning experience. Although a call
signal can vary in duration, intensity, or number of repetitions, it
admits no variation in what we might call phonetic structure.
In particular, the signals of the call system are mutually exclu-
sive, in that there are no means by which two different signals can
19 2
Language
be uttered in the same stimulus situation. If the animal encounters
both food and danger, there are no provisions for mixing two
appropriate signals to alert its fellows to both situations at once.
When vocalization of one signal begins it will be repeated as long
as the stimulus continues. And there is no capacity for breaking
the signals down into smaller elements for hybridization. The
informational capacity of the call system thus is limited to a few
bits per vocalization, depending upon the number of discrete
calls it provides. Although one individual can alert another to the
presence of certain very important circumstances, only a rela-
tively small proportion of the animal's daily behavior can be
subject to vocal influence on the part of its fellows.
A call system differs from human language in several basic
respects. Not only (I) is it incapable of generating new signal
configurations, as noted before, but also (2) it exhibits no struc-
ture by which the individual signals might be analyzed and inter-
nally related; in effect, it lacks both phonetic and syntactical
structure. Moreover, (3) its signals depend for their utterance upon
the presence of appropriate stimulus conditions. This fact, in con-
junction with their innate status, assures that (4) its components
are incapable of being modified by tradition or experience.
Between the era of the prehominid call systems and that of
human language, man's ancient forebears moved from forest to
savannah, where pressures to carry food and weapons, and simply
the need to see over tall grass, led to posture that was increasingly
erect. With increasingly more effective hand-carried weapons,
groups were able to subdue larger prey and to rely more completely
upon the sustaining powers of a carnivorous diet. And with mouth
freed for longer periods from eating and carrying, the developing
prehominid could spend more time chattering at his impression-
able fellows and hence developing neural connections related to
vocalization. While more information-processing capacity thus is
distributed physiologically to vocal areas within the cortex, the
need arises concomitantly for greater versatility in communi-
cation. With larger and more dangerous animals as prey, the
foraging group develops role specialization and with it the need
for more specialized signals.
The brain may be presumed ready, and the need apparent. The
third element in the transition from call system to human lan-
guage is the increased flexibility in sound production resulting
19'
Mentality
from the upright posture of the emerging hominid. Whereas in
protohominoid forms the close proximity of glottis and velum
in the vocal mechanism limits the variety of sounds the animal
produces easily, the increased separation of these parts in the
extended throat of the erect prehuman makes him capable of the
wider sound range of human language (Hockett and Ascher,
1968, pp. 224-5)' The stage is set for a series of perceptual and
behavioral advances, probably fostered by minor genetic changes
selected with relative rapidity, in the course of which the call
system of our ancient ancestors evolves into a language with
structure and meaning.
Suppose, with Hockett, that some particularly loose-throated
individuals caught the knack of signalling food and danger
simultaneously by mixing parts of the two signals into one
vocalization. 4 If this happened regularly, in circumstances allow-
ing one group of listeners to acquire food while another handles
the danger, the advantages of this cooperative response would
encourage repetition of the hybrid utterance. Mixed signals thus
would become part of the group's vocal repertoire. If the (pre-
viously noncomposite) signal AB had signified food and CD
danger, for example, the (now composite) signal AD will come
to signify the presence of both. The sounds previously constitut-
ing a call system of perhaps a half-dozen signals now compose a
set potentially of more than a dozen, with corresponding in-
crease in the average information yielded by occurrence of an
individual signal.
Although the call system of a group may increase several fold in
capacity by such augmentations, it ret.nains a system of inarticu-
late signals. To our ears the utterances AD and AB would exhibit
a common phonetic element, but to the ears of the users they
would remain wholly distinct. The amount of information con-
veyed within such a system is limited by the capacity of its users
to discriminate numerous auditory gestalts, and this capacity is cur-
tailed by the innate origin of the signal system. As long as the
signals available to the group for communication are genetically
determined, vocalization of hybrid utterances will be restricted
to a few versatile individuals with no means of further dissemin-
ation throughout the species. While inheritance holds sway to the
exclusion of learning, extensions of the call system will not pro-
vide the additional communication resources needed to support
194
Language
an increasing number of different roles within prehominid
society.
The hold of the innate perhaps was broken by the element of
play. As lion cubs fight mock battles with their siblings and
mothers, and as monkeys learn sociability through sexual play,
so presumably our prehominid ancestors also learned essential
skills in their play activity. The chattering which stimulated
development of the vocal system itself was a form of verbal play,
and provided a context in which the individual could experiment
with vocalization without jeopardizing group welfare by unusual
and confusing utterances.
In the course of such relaxed play situations, opportunities
would arise for alert individuals to sense similarities between the
vocalization AD and AB, and to repeat the sounds with explora-
tory variations. Eventually they would learn to discriminate
shared components of the two verbal signals, and to encourage
this discrimination in others during play activity. Whereas pre-
viously discrimination was limited to gestalts on the composite
level, the elements A, Band D now become discriminable and
appear as gestalts themselves on the constituent level. Speaking
in terms pertaining to language proper, we may say that whereas
before AB and AD were perceived only as inarticulate signals
they now are perceivable as combinations of phonetic units.
Thus emerges what linguists call 'duality' (Hockett and Ascher,
1968, pp. 219, 225), the structuring of utterances both on the
morphemic and on the phonetic levels.
The inception of duality made possible a radical increase in
information content of the communication systems affected.
From the cybernetic point of view, this must be considered the
primary reason for duality having been favored by natural selec-
tion. The illustrative signal set previously comprising only AB
and CD as noncomposite messages, each (assuming equiprob-
ability) containing only one bit of information, now comprises
all combinations of the elements A, B, C, and D, so that AB and
CD each convey (2 X 10g24 =) 4 bits of information. Moreover,
whereas previously repetition of signals served merely as em-
phasis or the expression of excitement, it now becomes possible
with the introduction of composite messages to string elements
together repetitiously in new signal patterns. Thus the new signal
system may include not only AB and AD as distinct message
195
Mentality
configurations, but also AA, AAB, ABC, and so forth. With this
possibility the system becomes open to an indefinite number of
verbal messages, and early man is furnished the linguistic poten-
tial for the development of increasingly numerous social roles.
Breaking the hold of the innate through verbal play promotes
the emergence of yet other features of language as we currently
know it. For one, tradition takes the place of heredity as the major
source of communication resources. This means not only that
language is learned with the cooperation of others, which itself
increases the cohesion of the social group, but moreover that
language structures come to be adaptable to changing social
conditions. In effect, new verbal structures emerge for use in
novel situations of social importance, while locutions in disuse
gradually slip away.
No less important is the freeing of language from direct
stimulus control. Verbal signals uttered in play are not dependent
upon the presence of any particular stimulus situation, and are not
interpreted by chance hearers as having particular significance.
Speech thus acquires the characteristic of displacement (Hockett
and Ascher, 1968, p. 224), which is the ability to issue utterances
pertaining to situations that are not actually present. 5
These are the features as noted above, that distinguish human
language from the call system of the contemporary gibbon. When
our system of verbal communication acquired (I) the capacity to
generate new signal configurations, (2) duality, in the sense of
both morphemic and phonetic structuring, (3) independence of
signal utterances from stimulus condition, and (4) the capacity of
being modified by experience and tradition, then man emerged as
a language-using being.
4 THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE

MEANING RELATION
Some philosophers say the basic question of semantics is 'What is

meaning ?', and respond as if the question had a definite answer.
meaning?',
In candor, however, we realize that the term 'meaning' has many
uses, each of which establishes a separate meaning. The question
<What does "meaning" mean?' admits many answers.
A more fundamental question is 'How is it that words have any
196
Language
meaning at all?' In particular, we may ask how it comes to be
possible for a given word to be meaningfully associated with a
given object.
All sounds in nature are associated with specific objects through
causal conditions, as a tinkle is associated with a particular bell.
Spoken words are associated in this way with vocal organs, and
with conditions that stimulate the speaker's utterance. But some
spoken words are associated with objects in a quite different
fashion. These words are issued pursuant to the speaker's inten-
tion, and thereby associated with objects not contributing to their
causal production. Our task is to understand how words can be
intentionally associated with objects, and thus acquire meaning
independently of their causal origins.
In the call system described above, the appearance of food pro-
duces a fixed vocalization on the part of the perceiver, which in
turn stimulates food-directed activity among the hearers. The
vocalization is merely a phase in a causal sequence connecting
several individuals with an object of common interest. No more
than any other phase in the sequence does it assume the role of
meaning food.
The causal chain is loosened when the signal becomes assimi-
lated into idle chattering activity, for there it becomes indepen-
dent of particular stimulus conditions and no longer commands
response from the casual hearer. Thus displaced, the vocalization
is freed from determination of the sensory environment, and
becomes available for participation in a meaning relationship.
Meaning is not a special sort of causal relationship. Neither a
word nor the object it means explains the other. Indeed, words
can mean objects that do not even exist. This is indicative of their
intentional origin, for intentions are often directed toward states
of affairs that never actually occur (chapter X). To understand how
words can be meaningfully related to objects is to understand how
words are related to a person's intentions whereby his behavior
is directed toward objects whether absent or present.
In the explication above, an intention is a purpose operating
consciously in control of an organism's behavior. A purpose, in
turn, is an afferent neuronal configuration regulating behavior
through sequential stages, terminating in a particular goal with
respect to the organism's environment. The operation of the
afferent configuration itself is a stepwise procedure, with a final
197
Mentality
state consisting of a perceptual pattern the activation of which
indicates that the goal is present. As purpose operates in the pri-
vate projects of individual organisms, no need arises for any form
of vocalization.
In the cooperative pursuit of shared intentions, however,
communication through language is an essential element. For to
the extent that intentions can be shared at all by different agents,
the vocalizations of language provide the means of sharing. In a
word, language is the medium through which intentions are
communicated.
To what extent, and in what fashion, are there shared inten-
tions? Since intentions are neuronal configurations within the
individual cortex, the problem must be faced of how the same
intention can govern the behavior of different individuals. For
clearly the same neuronal configuration cannot be present in
different cortexes.
Intentions, being conscious purposes, possess the features of
perceptual patterns, the operation of which I have tried to estab-
lish (chapter IX) as constituting the presence of perceptual con-
sciousness. A perceptual pattern by definition is a stable con-
figuration of events, so related that the occurrence of the events
in a subset increases in proportion to the size of the subset the
probability of occurrence of the remaining events. Although we
have been speaking of such patterns as instantiated in an individual
cortex, it is clear that they could be instantiated in other forms as
well. Since the relationship among its elements that makes a
configuration a pattern can be expressed mathematically, a pattern
can be instantiated in any system the events within which can be
related in that mathematically designated fashion. 6 Let us refer to
those features that can be expressed mathematically as the formal
features of the pattern in question.
Thus we are led to distinguish between the material aspect of a
pattern in a particular instantiation and the formal aspect that can
be instantiated in different systems. Different configurations can
instantiate identically the same formal pattern insofar as charac-
terized by the same properties of sequence, order, dependency and
so forth.
Intentions are patterns of neuronal activity directing an or-
ganism's behavior stepwise to particular goals, in such manner as
to maintain behavior under adequate control with minimum
19 8
Language
expenditure of the organism's information-processing capacities.
Intentions can be shared among individuals in the sense of the
same (formal) intention motivating the activities of different
persons. In a fuller sense, intentions are shared when different
individuals cooperate in a shared plan of activity governed by a
single (formal) intention directed toward a goal which they real-
ize jointly. Shared intentions of this sort are the basis of communal
activity. Let us consider how such intentions might emerge in the
course of social development.
In our discussion of conjectured origins of the control mech-
anismsoperating in intentional behavior (chapterX),no reference to
language was essentially involved. The individual craftsman may
be guided by his intention to produce a spear, and the hunter by
his intention to fell an antelope, without reliance upon linguistic
resources. Similarly, although various signals may be necessary
to coordinate the efforts of a band of hunters, presumably a group
could join in search for quarry without vocalization of their com-
mon purpose. Presumably, that is, a group could become accus-
tomed to cooperating in a joint venture without means of ver-
balizing their shared plan of action. Individual (private) intentions
thus can be welded into communal enterprise before shared
intention surfaces in communal language. However, the advan-
tages of shared intentions find due favor in natural selection as the
group comes to share counsel on their projected activity. Sig-
nification of shared intentions in language provides a means of
pooling anticipations incorporating various insights of past
individual experience.
Signification of shared intentions becomes possible only waen a
language has reached the point of displacement where vocaliza-
tion is no longer controlled by the sensory environment. At this
point language has gained the facility to form 'free floating' verbal
signals that can be used to signify notable situations not provided
for by genetic endowment. Unlike predetermined signals in a call
system, vocalizations formed by combination of phonetic ele-
ments are free to be associated with a variety of perceptual cir-
cumstances, depending upon the experience of the language
users.
Such vocalizations may become joined with particular percep-
tual circumstances by procedures of reinforcement similar to
those examined in chapter VIII. When a certain vocalization
199
Mentality
happens to occur in connection with behavior that serves the
biological needs of the individual organism, it will occur in the
presence of neural states that are positively reinforcing. More
specifically, when the afferent neural structures governing a given
vocalization occur conjointly with the afferent structures govern-
ing an activity followed by positive reinforcement, the likelihood
of further joint occurrence of these two afferent structures is
increased. In this manner the vocalization becomes associated
with that particular activity, so that the probability of either one is
increased when the other occurs.
In like fashion, when an utterance is issued in the presence of a
sequence of cooperative behavior that turns out to the benefit of
all persons involved, that utterance will tend to become associated
with that activity in the cortex of the individual participant. As
the conditioned individual tends to repeat that utterance on fur-
ther occasions of that particular cooperative activity, other par-
ticipants may be led through imitation to form equivalent asso-
ciations in their own neuronal channels. A shared verbal structure
thus comes to be associated with the intentions of the cooperating
individuals, and further refinements in their interaction bring
their intentions more closely into equivalent form. The outcome
of this process of reinforcement and adjustment is a shared inten-
tion under the control of a shared vocalization. By this utterance
an individual can arouse that intention in the minds of his fellows,
and the behavior it controls comes within the shared repertoire
of the social community.
The basic elements of the meaning relationship are now in view.
This relationship involves (I) a vocalization (word) within the
competency of the linguistic: community, (2) a shared intention by
which individuals are guided in their group activity, and (3) the
socially recognized object or perceptual situation constituting the
goal by which the intention is realized.
One sense of 'meaning' is that of reference, as when we say that
a term means that thing to which it refers. The referent of a term
is the object or state of affairs which constitutes the goal of the
shared intention with which the word is associated in the lin-
guistic community.
Another sense of 'meaning' is that of sense, as when we say that
a term means what we intend in its normal utterance. The mean-
ing of a term in this sense is the shared intention with which the
200
Language
term is associated in its common use. Although there is a sense in
which the meaning of a term literally is present within the cortex
of the user, there is a sense also in which the meaning of a term
is shared throughout a linguistic group. On one hand, a meaning
is an intention, and hence a purpose, and hence a neural configura-
tion controlling an organism's goal-directed behavior. On the
other, a meaning is a formal structure that can be instantiated in
the cortexes of different individuals, and transmitted to others
within the group.
The sense in which the same meaning may be present in the
minds of different individuals is closely analogous to the sense
in which the same informational structures may be present in
the mind of the perceiver as are present in the object of veridical
perception (chapter IX). In both cases, what is identically present
at the two different junctures is a structure of interacting prob-
abilities, by which the same information is present in different
systems.
This parallel between perception and language is significant for
two particular reasons. One is that we have come to conceive
both language and perception without metaphor as information
channels respectively between persons in a linguistic community
and between individual persons and the external world. The other
is that we have finally arrived at an understanding of language
as a means of conveying information in the sense of meanings that
can be communicated linguistically. The gap has been closed
between 'information' of communication theory and 'information'
in the sense of what is semantically meaningful. Adhering strictly
to the meaning of 'information' as reduced uncertainty, we have
explicated how language can convey information in the sense of
meanings.
5 THE ROLE OF SYNTAX
The common preoccupation of linguists with questions of syntax

suggests that grammar is essential to human communication.
This suggestion is dubious, and I think misleading. It is an em-
pirical fact that most developed languages spoken in the world
today exhibit fairly determinate syntactic structures. But it is an
empirical fact also that much of what we express in language
201
Mentality
could be communicated by gestures and drawings, themselves
devoid of syntactic form. Even in the realm of speech itself,
considerable information is transmitted without benefit of
grammar, such as that regarding the speaker's identity and his
state of mind with respect to the hearer (see Hockett, 1953, p. 85).
From the genetic point of view, moreover, it appears almost
certain that language in emerging from the call system level did
not spring forth in full bloom of grammatical inflection.
The reasonable presumption is that syntactical structures
developed in the context of a language that was already function-
ing, and capable of performing its function without grammatical
subtlety. If grammar developed in this fashion, its selection over
nongrammatical verbal structures must have been due to its
enabling language to servf: more effectively in social roles lan-
guage was already performing.
With the replacement of innately determined call signals by
arbitrarily combinable phonetic units as elements of verbal com-
munication, language became a channel with informational
capacity limited only by the range of distinguishable sounds. 7 Thus,
although the overlay of grammatical distinctions on phonetic
structures may increase the capacity of language several fold,S
gain in channel capacity cannot be the only reason for the develop-
ment of grammar. What other factors contributed to grammar's
origin?
Consider the effects upon the user as additional phonetic ele-
ments become part of his language, and as more combinations of
phonemes are given meaningful use. If the increase in number of
meaningful combinations is achieved primarily by adding dif-
ferent sounds to the element set, constraints will begin to take
effect regarding phonemes (like fbi, /p/, and /t/, or /1//1/ and /r/)
that cannot easily be vocalized together. If, on the other hand, it
is achieved through increased length of phonetic sequence, con-
straints will arise with respect to the number of elements the user
can remember in unique combination. Although in principle a
very large number of different messages can be formulated by
lengthy combinations of a small number of elements, in practice
we seem normally able to discriminate and remember sequences
of only seven or eight randomly arranged members (this limita-
tion is discussed in terms of communication theory in Miller,
195 6).
2.02.
Language
Another major problem concerns ambiguity and noise. As
more sounds are added to the basic phonetic set, more precision
is required for their distinct articulation and more uncertainty
arises in their interpretation. The effect is a decrease in informa-
tion content. At the same time the communication channel
between speaker and hearer becomes increasingly subject to
disruption by noise (literally, in two senses), and the information-
bearing capacity of the channel is further diminished.
The only general solution to the problem of noise is to intro-
duce redundancy into the communication system. But redun-
dancy requires additional channel capacity; and as we have seen,
in a language consisting only of phonetic structures capacity is
limited by constraints of articulation and memory. As a result,
there arises a point at which the most effective way to achieve
redundancy is to introduce new information-bearing structures
into the linguistic system.
One expediency for imparting redundancy to a signal sequence
is what psychologists call 'grouping' or 'chunking' (Neisser, 1967,
p. 220). If long sequences are broken into smaller groups, and
each group in turn given a distinct identity, ambiguous or
missing elements in an occurrence of a particular group can be
identified by their place in the group itself. Words, of course, are
'chunks' with redundant structures. An illustration is the sequence
'th_ dog e_ts me_t', in which the three missing letters are easily
identified. Although some degree of redundancy would be pre-
sent already within the sound sequences themselves (as Idl, for
example, is likely to be followed by a liquid sound, but not by
Ibl or It/), the additional redundancy resulting from the forma-
tion of word-length 'chunks' would be effective in overcoming
noise in the linguistic channel.
Grouping of this sort, moreover, also happens to be effective
as a memory aid. Although there is abundant experimental data
illustrating this effect (Miller, 1956; Neisser, 1967), a person may
be convinced of it himself by considering how much easier it is to
remember letters in the sequence 'the dog eats meat' than in the
sequence 'thedogeatsmeat' perceived without verbal parsing.
Given the constraints on the capacities of a human language
system imposed by limitations of memory, this factor provides an
added impetus for the development of verbal groupings.
It is a reasonable conjecture that between language as merely a
20 3
Mentality
reservoir of meaningful sound sequences and contemporary
language replete with grammatical structure there existed in use
for a considerable period a language composed of word-like
groupings without grammatical refinement. The limitations of
such a system, however, would be similar to those of the language
without verbal groupings. There is a limit to the number of
words one can remember in random sequence, and to the number
of words in such a sequence that one can distinguish within a nor-
mal span of attention. Thus, for example, the apparently random
sequence 'but carrots meat dogs eat the not' would be difficult to
distinguish at a glance from the related sequence 'but carrots
meat dogs not the eat.' The case would be similar for random
word-like groupings.
Thus there will arise a stage in the growing dependency of
human society upon language at which the resources of a 'chunk-
ing' code are no longer sufficient, and at which further dimensions
must be added to the verbal channel to provide the basis for addi-
tional information-bearing capacity. The response of the evolv-
ing language system is the development of grammar, or syntactic
structure. 9
Thus we see that grammar imparts at least three advantages to a
linguistic communication system, anyone of which might be
adequate for its eventual selection. When we consider all three
working together, there appears no cause for wonder that all
languages known today are grammatically inflected. One is the
advantage simply of increasing the information-handling capacity
of the medium. When the sound lIed I can mean either 'led' or
'lead', it conveys more information in a single determinate
occurrence. The extent to which language has exploited this
additional resource is measured by the incidence of sound se-
quences with multiple meanings.
Another great advantage is grammar's aid to memory. To
appreciate this one need only compare the ease with which 'the
dogs eat meat but not carrots' can be remembered, in contrast
with the difficulty of the rearranged sequences above. 10
No less important is the added redundancy imparted to language
by grammatical distinctions. The strength of grammatical clues
to the identity of components may be seen in the pair of missing-
letter sequences, 'p_rk your car' and 'John ate p_rk', in which
different vowels obviously fall into different blanks. According
Z04
Language
to several independent measures, the redundancy of written
English, for example, is approximately fifty per cent (Shannon,
1951), and it is reasonable to assume roughly the same figure for
language at large. This means that roughly half the information-
handling potential of language is committed to counteracting
ambiguity and the effects of noise. The contribution of grammar
to this function is surely one of the major factors in the develop-
ment of language with syntactic structure.
This cursory account of the possible origins of grammar
brings us about to the point where many contemporary linguists
might begin to evince interest. For it now becomes relevant to
talk about particular grammatical structures, and the advantages
of particular theories of grammatical sentence construction.
The cybernetic approach offers hints in both directions. l l
One of the most basic distinctions of grammar is that between
verb and noun. This reflects in turn the distinction between an
agent's intentional activity and the goal state in which the inten-
tion is realized. According to the analysis above, such activity
is controlled by the stepwise operation of an afferent neuronal
configuration, terminating in an afferent pattern indicating the
goal state's presence. Such afferent configurations in their formal
aspects constitute meanings with which words are associated in
common language. We may conceive stepwise configurations of
this nature as meanings of verbs, the configurations in which
they terminate as meanings of nouns.
Since the structure of intentional behavior apparently is uni-
versal within the human species, there is reason to think that at
this stage in human development the distinction between verb
and noun is genetically determined. Thus we find support for the
currently prominent theory that some grammatical structures are
innately present in all language users. However, the question how
'one is able to understand an indefinite number of expressions
that are new to one's experience' (Chomsky, 1968, p. 100),
to which the theory responds, now appears to pose a problem of
dubious merit. Speaking a language is not an affair between a user
and a set of grammatical rules. To speak a language first and fore-
most is a social activity. Language is a means of making one's
intentions public, like filing law suits and marking boundaries.
That we understand an indefinite number of different expressions
is no more surprising than that the land can be subjected to any
20 5
Mentality
number of surveys or that the law can adjudicate any number of
grievances.
NOTES
I Around the turn of the century the Linguistic Society of Paris barred
papers on the origins of language, on the grounds that widespread
speculation on this topic during the nineteenth century had produced no
conclusive results.
2 The pioneer work in this field is von Frisch (1965). For a short but
informative summary of recent work, see Esch (1967). Philosophers
should be familiar also with the discussion in Bennett (1964).
3 Thorpe (1966, p. 101) expresses the opinion that 'although no animal
appears to have a language which is propositional, syntactic and at the
same time clearly expressive of intention, yet all these features can be
found separately (to at least some degree) in the animal kingdom.'
4 This could happen in much the same fashion as someone's wavering in
vocalization between 'don't shout so loud' and 'don't yell so loud',
coming out with the hybrid 'don't shell so loud'. The example is Hockett's
(1960, p. 92).
5 In the words of Katz (1971, p. 90), it is 'just this freedom from stimulus
control that makes natural languages suitable for expressing the products
of creative thought.' This is discussed in the following chapter.
6 It was on the joint basis of conscious patterns being instantiations of
mathematically formalizable structures and of computing machinery
being capable of instantiating mathematical relationships that I argued
in Consciousness that such machines in principle are capable of conscious-
ness. Further elaboration of this possibility comes with application of
various formalisms of communication theory to indicate how certain
conscious processes might come about. The argument for the possibility
of machine consciousness, however, does not depend upon any such
application of these formalisms, as apparently assumed in the critical
remarks of Campbell and Rosenberg (1973, pp. 554-6).
7 Hockett (1953, p. 85) estimates that the use of human language at present
employs only about one-tenth of one per cent of the bandwidth of
acoustic frequencies. (See also Hockett, 1955, pp. 215-18.)
:g The information-carrying capacity of a 'language' consisting of heads
and tails of a coin as basic units is doubled if two coins of different colors
are introduced. Similarly, tht: capacity of a language based on phonetic
units is increased by a distinction between different categories of combina-
tion. For instance, the occurrence in grammatical context of the sound
Iledl conveys more information in a language containing both 'led'
(verb) and 'lead' (noun) than it could in a language without distinction
between grammatical forms.
9 'When analyzed linguistically, the rules of grammar prove to be elabor-
206
Language
ate cases of redundancy or predictiveness' (Osgood, 1968, p. 191). We
may wish to add, 'although not only this.'
10 Miller (1956, pp. 90-1) cites increase in number of dimensions as one of
the most important devices for increasing both the capacity of immediate
memory and the powers of perceptual discrimination.
JI Ill-fated use of the concept of the Markov source and related concepts
in attempts to account for human production of grammatical sentences
(where the categories clearly do not apply; they pertain to constraints,
not rules of formation) perhaps has dissuaded linguists from exploring
other aspects of language from the viewpoint of communication theory.
(For documentation, see Chomsky, 1968, and Lees, 1957.) If so, the
result is unfortunate, for if there is any formal system that promises
fruitful application in the exploration of human communication, it is
surely communication theory itself.
2. 0 7
XII
REASON
1 WHAT IN REASON REQUIRES

EXPLAINING
Aristotle characterizes reason as the life of the mind, and finds it

present only in human beings (Nicomachean Ethics, 1I78a 5-8).
This tells us something important about human nature, but very
little about the nature of reason. From the evolutionary view-
point, we should expect the fact that reason is peculiar to man
to provide clues about the nature of reason itself.
A more promising tack is taken by Jonathan Bennett, who
defines 'rationality' to mean 'whatever it is that humans possess
which marks them off, in respect of intellectual capacity, sharply
and importantly from all other known species' (Bennett, 1964,
p. 5), and then sets about to construct an account of rationality
in terms of these particular differences. By Bennett's account,
reason is located in the ability, not merely to communicate
linguistically, but moreover to make universal and dated state-
ments appropriate to circumstances beyond current particulars.
His conclusion is that the 'idea of rationality is that of the ability,
given certain present and particular data, to unite or relate them
with other data in certain appropriate ways.'!
Bennett's account suggests something important about the
nature of reason, but we remain justified in seeking more. In
particular, we ought to inquire why reason thus conceived con-
stitutes an advantage to the organism possessing it, hence why it
has been favored in natural selection. A tempting answer is that
208
Reason
the capacity to reflect upon circumstances beyond those actually
present, and to infer what is general from particular cases, is
obviously important in the guidance of action. But since reflec-
tion and inference themselves are forms of reason, this answer
merely reaffirms what we seek to explain.
Another obvious answer is that reason makes possible such
undoubtedly advantageous developments as agriculture, weap-
onry, and other technology. But these are results of application
within only the last few millennia of a capacity that must have
developed over a much longer period, and hence could not have
been selected for those benefits particularly. One might as well
consider man's ability to control an automobile a factor in the
selection of his upright position as to consider these benefits a
factor in the initial development of human reason.
A more helpful consideration is that reason is not the only
capacity unique to the human species. In addition there are capa-
cities for language and social development, to which reason
accordingly may be presumed closely related. Another clue is that
reason, although recent in emergence among human capacities,
has become exceedingly prominent in human affairs. This sug-
gests that once the conditions necessary for the development of
reason converged in man, the resulting advantages were so over-
whelming that reason became a major factor in the guidance of
action. Certain adaptive processes of vital importance to early
hominid organisms must have been accomplished so much more
effectively by reason, once it began to develop, that individuals
capable of protorational behavior quickly became dominant
within their social group.
In this chapter we shall address the following general questions.
First (following Bennett), by the addition of what capacities does
reason emerge from the use of language? Second, how does
reason augment the ability of the organisms it favors to cope
effectively with environmental contingencies? In course, we shall
consider also the nature and the effect of logical inference. To
begin a discussion of reason with considerations of logic, how-
ever, would be as inopportune as beginning a discussion of
technological progress with a description of modern computing
machinery.
109
Mentality
2 LINGUISTIC DEVELOPMENTS PORTENDING
REASON
Let us introduce the term 'percept' to refer to the stable patterns

of afferent activity which regulate the organism's behavior with
minimum outlay of information-processing capacity, and which
structure its field of perceptual consciousness (chapter IX).
Percepts are elicited by events at the sensory periphery which are
stimulated by events in the perceptual environment. In this sense,
percepts are controlled by external objects.
A subclass of afferent neuronal patterns are the conscious pur-
poses or intentions which individuals may share with other
persons, and which hence form the basis of human social activity
(chapter X). Although instantiated independently in different
organisms, the same intention can be formally present in many
individuals. The medium for sharing intentions is a common
language, wherein the same vocalization can stimulate equivalent
patterns in different organisms. Neuronal patterns thus shared
have been identified as meanings (chapter XI).
Meanings are neuronal patterns removed from exclusive con-
trol by external objects, and brought under the control of verbal
signals. Considerable benefits follow for the language-using
organism. By such signals an individual can induce in other per-
sons intentions matching his own, making possible regulation of
group activity by language as well as by environmental con-
tingency. Further, with control of neuronal patterns extended to
language, these patterns can continue their information-processing
activity independently of stimulation at the sensory periphery.
Thus a basis is provided for continuity with past experience and
for anticipation of future perceptual occurrences. That is, pat-
terns stimulated by past experience can remain active for compari-
son with structures of present perception, and present percepts
can function in purposes related to future activity.2
Most significantly, however, the use of verbal signals with
communal meaning fosters tendencies auspicious for the emer-
gence of reason. For one, there is a tendency toward increasing
perceptual specialization, yielding a repertoire of increasingly
various and selective percepts for information processing within
the group. Another is the development of redundancy among
meaning structures.
210
Reason
As an example of the first, consider a group of early hominid
hunters reliant upon meat from the woolly mammoth. The job
of distracting the prey, let us suppose, customarily falls to the
more agile members, while to the stouter falls the task of wielding
the spear. Given this division of labor, we should expect the two
groups of hunters to develop different skills of discrimination
regarding mammoth anatomy and behavior. The stronger will
concentrate their perceptual skills upon locating vulnerable spots
near the heart or brain, while the agile will concentrate on anti-
cipating the animal's aggressive charges. As a consequence, the
two groups will learn to perceive the mammoth in different ways,
and their behavior will fall under the guidance of different per-
cepts. In similar fashion, the hunter will perceive his spearhead
in different patterns from those of the artisan who crafted it, or
from those of the child who fashions it into an ornamental
necklace.
More patterns thus become available for processing informa-
tion of concern within the cooperating group than could be pro-
vided by the perceptual capacities of the individual members. In
effect, the individual gains the advantage of additional perceptual
resources without additional load upon his own nervous system.
The resulting increase in negentropic flexibility for the cooperating
organism encourages further diversification of role within the
social organization.
Although initially these specialized percepts operate only within
subgroups with specialized signals by which to communicate
them, when they become well established within the subgroup
they become available for assimilation by the group at large.
Consider again the paradigm of the hunter's spearhead. Spear
heads will be referred to by a common signal within the group's
common vocabulary, but by a special signal by the artisans who
fashion them from unworked stone. Perhaps there will be signals
corresponding to 'easy-to-chip-stone', 'stone-with regular-grain',
and 'stone-with-keen-edge-and-point'. The subgroup using the
crafted stones for spearheads, on the other hand, may share a
specialized vocabulary with the rough equivalents of ' stone-that-
rends-the-hide-of-mammoth' or 'stone-that-shatters-mammoth-
bone'. Through the participation of a few versatile individuals in
several specialized activities, the meanings of these more specific
signals will begin to propagate within the linguistic community.
CPM-H HI
Mentality
The stage is set for a number of developments that bring man
closer to rationality.
With respect to structure in the emerging language, an ele-
mentary distinction begins to arise between subject and pre-
dicate forms. The signal shared by all members of the group
regardless of specialty corresponds to 'spearhead' as a subject
term, while such expressions as 'stone-with-keen-edge-and-point'
and 'stone-that-shatters-mammoth-bone' correspond roughly to
whatwe call predicates. By uttering the first ('spearhead') followed
by one of the second (,stone-with-cutting-edge-and-point'),
while displaying an appropriate artifact before his listeners, an
individual could convey the sense of our sentence 'this spearhead
is a stone with sharp edge and point'. Although a distinction
of this sort is prior to grammar, it represents the kind of
verbal discrimination out of which grammar might begin to
develop.
With respect to neuronal structures in the individual, there
begins to develop a basic form of conceptual abstraction. One
stage in this development occurs as the individual hunter or
craftsman, operating with specialized percepts such as 'stone-
with-regular-grain' or 'stone-with-keen-edge-and-point', tends to
focus upon particular features while ignoring others. 3 The hunter,
for instance, concentrates upon the spearhead's keenness while
overlooking features of grain and color. Another stage begins
when the individual starts to effect comparable discriminations in
other perceptual circumstances, and thus to respond to similar
features in different objects. Suppose, for a fanciful example, that
a number of hunters are resting after a heavy meal of mammoth
meat, following a hunt in which one of their fellows was mortally
wounded by a tusk. In lament, someone utters sounds to the
effect 'mammoth-keen-mouth', in response to which the hunter
whose spear avenged his companion brags 'spear-stone-with-keen-
edge' while poking the carcass. At this point some keen-witted
individual grunts with amusement 'spear-keen-mouth', and the
group embarks on a game of naming other 'keen-mouthed'
objects in their immediate environment. With exchanges of this
nature, abstractions might emerge capable of supporting the
eventual growth of reason.
The abstraction in question is no 'intuition of essences' or other
highly intellectualized activity. It is rather the conjectured pre-
2.12.
Reason
cursor and ground of intellectual activity. It is the discrimination
of a specific aspect of an object of common awareness, accom-
panied by the realization that other objects possess similar fea-
tures. With the realization that an object possesses features that
can be shared with other objects, however, the percept of that
object takes on a new dimension of compositeness. Whereas
previously percepts such as those of 'spearhead', 'stone-with-
keen-point' and 'stone-that-shatters-mammoth-bone' functioned
as distinct patterns of awareness with no internal relationships,
now a spearhead comes to be perceived as a composite of several
distinguishable features. That is, whereas a percept or meaning
X (eg. 'spearhead') had functioned in individual awareness as
representing something also represented for special purposes by
A, B and C ('stone-with-keen-point', etc.), X now comes to
function as a complex pattern of awareness composed of A,
B and C as related but distinguishable component patterns.
The next step is a momentous one. With abstraction and the
formulation of composite meanings it now becomes possible to
generate meanings without direct perceptual reference out of
other meanings generated on a perceptual basis. The simplest
examples would be simple combinations of perceptual structures.
Thus the meaning of 'ripeness' as it pertains to a banana derives
from certain percepts of color, shape and size. Although ripeness
is not a feature of bananas that can be discriminated indepen-
dently of other properties, the meaning of 'ripeness' is com-
pounded of other meanings which in turn are generated directly
from percepts. This meaning becomes established within the
group's vocabulary as individual banana-eaters learn from re-
peated experience that only bananas with a certain shape and color
have the taste and texture that make for good eating. Since
ripeness is a meaning without direct perceptual basis, formula-
tion of such a meaning reflects a level of abstraction beyond that
merely of feature discrimination.
Even more advantageous to the emerging protohuman would
be the formulation of compound meanings summarizing inter-
actions among events that playa vital part in his daily activity.
Picking green and storing warm assures plenty of ripe bananas,
while hot weather and moist earth provide a good harvest of
corn. The individual for whom these factors are knit together in
a single guiding structure is more likely to succeed in his
2. 1 3
Mentality
food-gathering ventures than someone unaware of theseinterdepen-
dencies. More complex procedures may be summarized in a
similar fashion, ranging from the extraction of potions from
medicinal herbs to the construction of vessels from reeds and
timbers.
Perhaps the most important factor in the selection of this capa-
city for formulating compound meanings based on perceptual
discrimination, however, is the manner in which such meanings
come to encapsulate the wisdom of a linguistic tradition, built
up over generations of fortuitous experience. Although the num-
ber of compound meaning structures that might be shared
within a linguistic group increases with the number of charac-
teristics its members can discriminate, only those meanings that
respond to common needs and interests will find their way into
language under a common signal. The very retention of a mean-
ing within a linguistic community is evidence of its usefulness in
information-processing tasks commonly faced by the members.
Failure in utility of a meaning structure, on the other hand,
results simply in its disappearance from the linguistic repertoire.
Whereas in the biological sphere, the price of failure is the demise
of the unfortunate organism, in the realm of language a readjust-
ment of meanings will usually suffice. A group that can sustain
maladaptation by no more drastic means than alteration of its
information-processing formats has obvious advantages over
another that pays the penalty with the lives of its members.4
The second major tendency mentioned above leading to the
development of reason is increasing redundancy among meaning
structures. Redundancy arises with the formulation of compound
meanings. If all spearheads are 'stones-with-keen-points,' for
example, then it is redundant to cite the property of keenness in
identifying a particular object with the signal for spearheads.
Similarly, if all ripe bananas are yellow, it is redundant to mention
a particular banana as being both yellow and ripe. No more infor-
mation is communicated (in any sense of the term) by calling the
object both 'ripe' and 'yellow' than by the former signal on its
own. In a sense we shall examine shortly, applicability of 'ripe'
entails that 'yellow' is also applicable, in that the latter governs
the former as a necessary condition.
With relationships of this sort among linguistic structures,
meanings begin to take the form of rational concepts. I wish now
214
Reason
to argue that it is because of this redundancy relationship that
inference becomes possible as a rational exercise.
3 CONCEPTS AS MEANINGS FREED FROM

STIMULUS CONTROL
The following are typical inference patterns: if all A is B and all B

is C, then all A is C; if all A is C, then some A is C; and if every-
thing that is A is C, then everything that is A and D is C. Of
course we employ many other patterns of inference as well, but
these will serve a discussion of basic issues.
One basic question is this. What neuronal structures are in-
volved in reasoning? If we assign the term 'concept' to these
particular structures, the question is how concepts are related to
meanings. Another basic question follows. What relationships
among these structures in the central nervous system are involved
in the processes of reasoning and inference? The first question
pertains to the neurological elements of the reasoning process.
The second pertains to the neurological processes involved in
reasoning itself.
These questions are central to any attempt to reach a compre-
hensive understanding of human reason. Yet they are questions
that philosophers have generally ignored, and that when squarely
faced have proven resistant to coherent accounting. 5 But to
ignore such questions is not to make them disappear. In the
present section, I indicate how these questions can be answered
within the cybernetic framework.
Probability theory provides some suggestive analogues. Given
the classes A, B, C and D, the relationship 'all A is B' is rendered
by the conditional probability P(B/A) = I, indicating the proba-
bility of unity that something that is A is also B. Similarly, 'some
A is B' is rendered PCB / A) > 0, and 'if all A is B, then all AD is B'
is rendered ifP(B/A) = I, then P(B/AD) = 1. But in what sense
might concepts be conceived in terms of classes? A possible
approach would be to construe A, B, C, etc., as classes of concepts
active in particular instances, in the sense of neuronal structures
actually functioning within the cortex. Thus 'all men are bipedal'
would be construed as affirming that all cortical interactions
actively involving the concept of man actively involve the concept
2IS
Mentality
bipedal as well. But we often employ the concept of man in our
actual reasoning without any involvement of the latter concept.
In general, to think of a given situation or object is not to think
of all of its properties. So this approach appears unsatisfactory.
A more promising entry is suggested by the prospect that con-
cepts, like percepts and meanings, might be analyzed in terms of
communication theory, and hence understood as probability
functions. This is an attractive possibility, in view of the common
notion that causation and inference are somehow related, because
causation itself has been analyzed in terms of communication
theory (chapter V). Specifically, C is causally related to E if and
only if (i) for every event in E there is at least one event in C such
that the probability of the former given the latter is greater than
the probability of the former alone, and (ii) there is no other set
D such that D masks C with respect to E, where D masks C with
respect to E if and only if (a) the equivocation of E with respect
to D is less than the equivocation of E with respect to C, and (b)
no further decrease in equivocation on the part of E would be
achieved by combining C and D. Formally, a C-event is the cause
of an E-event if and only if (i) P(E/c) > P(E), and (ii) there is no
D such that (a) H(E/D) < H(E/c) and (b) H(E/D) = H(E/CD).
In this definition 'H' designates the relationship of equivocation
(chapter II).
In what sense might concepts be related by equivocation?
Conceived generally, equivocation is uncertainty regarding
particular states of affairs, removal of which constitutes informa-
tion. What sort of uncertainty attaches to concepts? To prepare
for an answer we must return to the question above, how concepts
as neuronal structures are related to meanings.
Percepts guide our behavior under stimulation from external
objects, while meanings operate under the stimulation of lin-
guistic utterances. Thus both operate in the presence of external
stimuli. Concepts, however, provide guidance to human activity
without respect to current sensory inputs.
Concepts are neurological structures in which diverse meanings
and percepts are interrelated independently of perceptual or
behavioral circumstances in which the organism may be involved
at any particular moment. The concept of ripeness in bananas,
for example, is a structure relating the meanings (or percepts)
'hand-length' and 'yellow', which by energizing behavior in
zI6
Reason
appropriate circumstances would lead to pleasant taste and the
relief of hunger. At the same time, it is a structure in which these
meanings (or percepts) can remain interrelated without respect to
perceptual or behavioral contingencies. In the presence of fruits
of various shapes and colors, a hungry person may be guided by
the joint percepts 'hand-length' and 'yellow' to select an object
that will suit his appetite. When no suitable object is present,
however, the concept 'ripeness' may operate as part of the in-
tention guiding the person in search of food. When the constituent
meanings 'hand-length' and 'yellow' give way to percepts, the goal
of the intention has been realized.
Concepts thus are meanings removed from the limitations of
direct stimulus control. Just as meanings have been understood
as percepts brought under the control of verbal signals, so con-
cepts may be understood as meanings brought under the control
of other meanings. In each case the additional control is cumu-
lative. Whereas percepts are activated normally only by the
presence of objects, meanings may be activated by both objects
and utterances, and concepts may be activated not only by objects
and utterances but also by the exercise of other concepts. The
percept 'yellow', for example, is normally activated only by yellow
objects, while the meaning may be activated by the sound 'yellow'
as well. But the concept 'yellow' may be activated not only by the
sound and by appropriately colored objects, but also by the con-
cept 'ripeness' itself.
The concept 'ripeness' is what was described in the previous
section as a compound meaning, composed of other meanings
pertaining to color, shape and size. In this association, the concept
'yellow' is under the control of the concept 'ripeness', in that
whenever the latter is applicable to bananas so is the former.
Involvement of the concept 'ripeness' in the processing of in-
formation from a perceptual, linguistic, or other source, is a
sufficient condition for the potential involvement of the concept
'yellow'. The concept 'ripeness', in turn, is under the (partial)
control of the concept 'yellow', in the sense that applicability of
the latter constitutes a necessary condition for applicability of the
former.
This relationship of necessary and sufficient conditionality,
identified in the previous section as the source of redundancy,
provides the sense of equivocation among concepts for which
21 7
Mentality
we have been searching. For redundancy and equivocation here
are different faces of the same relationship.
If applicability of the concept 'ripeness' is sufficient for ap-
plicability of the concept 'yellow', then the former precludes
application of any concept that cannot be applied conjointly with
'yellow'. Nonapplicability of 'yellow' in turn precludes applica-
bility of 'ripeness'. Each concept thus is determinate in its exclu-
sion of certain concepts, while remaining indeterminate in its
coapplicability with many others. The concept 'ripeness', for
instance, is indeterminate with respect to the possible application
of the concept 'mottled', while 'yellow' is indeterminate with
respect to concepts of shape and size.
A concept is equivocal in a given field of application to the
extent that it is indeterminate with respect to the applicability of
other potentially relevant concepts. When two concepts A and B
are related so that B (for instance, 'yellow') is necessarily applic-
able whenever A ('ripeness') is applicable, then all concepts pre-
cluded by B (such as 'red' and 'green') are precluded by A as well.
If yet other concepts beyond those precluded by B are precluded
by A ('finger-length', 'arm-length'), then A is more determinate
than B. That is, A is less equivocal than B if all concepts pre-
cluded by B are precluded by A also, but A precludes other con-
cepts besides.
The concept 'ripeness' is less equivocal with respect to
bananas than the concept 'yellow', but no further decrease in
equivocation is achieved by the concepts 'ripeness' and 'yellow'
combined. Thus the following relationships hold: (a) H('banana' /
'ripeness') < H('banana' /'yellow'), and (b) H('banana' /'ripeness')
= H('banana' !'yellow',
/'yellow', 'ripeness'). By definition of the masking
relationship reviewed above, the concept 'ripeness' masks the
concept 'yellow' with respect to bananas. This particular rela-
'M('ripeness', 'yellow'), banana.' In
tionship may be designated 'M(,ripeness',
general, concept A masks concept B with respect to C, formally
'M(A,B),C', if and only if all concepts precluded from application
by B with respect to C are precluded by A also, and perhaps more
besides. In application to C, A thus renders B redundant.
The concept 'ripeness' masks the concept 'yellow' with respect
to bananas if and only if all ripe bananas are yellow. Although it is
a reasonable empirical generalization that all ripe bananas are
yellow, this obviously is not true of ripe things generally. So it is
218
Reason
not the case that 'ripeness' masks 'yellow' without reference to
particular classes of objects. On the other hand, all human things
are mortal, and all squares are rectangles, without limitation of
reference class. If the relationship M(A,B),C holds for all possible
C, and hence without reference to particular C's, then it follows
simply that all A is B. The statement that all A is B then is analytic,
and A renders B redundant without qualification. The statement
that some A is not B, further, is inconsistent.
In chapter XI the meaning of a term was defined in the senses
both of reference and of intention. The referent of a term is the
object or state of affairs which constitutes the goal of the shared
intention (neuronal structure in its formal aspect) with which the
term is associated in the linguistic community. What one intends
in uttering a given term, on the other hand, is literally the shared
intention associated with the term in question. With the elevation
of meanings to the level of concepts, we are able now to define
meaning in the sense of content.
We may understand the content of a concept as a subset of the
field of concepts generally, namely that class of concepts such
that every member is determined applicable by the applicability
of the concept in question. Content thus may be defined in terms
of the masking relationship. The content of concept B is the set
of concepts A such that M(B,A) for each member of A.
The content of a given concept is measured by the uncertainty
removed regarding the applicability of other concepts by the
application of the concept in question. A concept which neither
precludes nor determines the applicability of other concepts is
contentless. On the other hand, the more extensive the content of
a given concept, the greater the richness of its conceptual con-
nections. 6
With the elevation of meanings to the status of concepts, in-
deed, the concept of 'meaning' itself may be extended to fill more
nearly the role in which philosophers pose it. Like meanings
conceived as neuronal structures (chapter XI), concepts are pat-
terns of interrelated elements the relations among which admit a
formal description. Concepts thus may be understood both as
formal structures and as instantiations of these structures in
different persons.
A full sense of the term 'meaning' may be defined in which the
meaning of a term is the formal concept with which it is associated
21 9
Mentality
throughout a linguistic community. Meanings in this sense may be
identically present in different cortexes, bearing throughout the
same content or set of semantic relationships.
In the form of structures instantiated in individual persons, on
the other hand, concepts sustain a level of personal awareness
beyond the scope of perceptual consciousness. As elaborated in
chapter IX, perceptual consciousness is the functioning of cortical
patterns (percepts) by which the perceptual field maintains stability
in a changing sensory environment. But functioning percepts do
not lose their conscious status when shifted from sensory to
conceptual control. A subject is conscious in perceiving a yellow
banana, but also in speaking and in thinking about it. Concepts
thus are patterns providing continuity of structured awareness as
the subject extrapolates plans from past experience. By enabling
reminiscence to shape anticipation, concepts provide the medium
of deliberative reason.
4 REASON IN THE GUIDANCE OF HUMAN

ACTIVITY
Two questions were posed at the beginning of this chapter: (I)

By the addition of what capacities does reason emerge from the
use of language? and (2) How does reason augment the ability
of organisms possessing it to cope effectively with environmental
contingencies? The answer to (I) has been that reason arises when
meanings come to be controlled not only by perception and by
verbal signals but also by the operation of other meanings.
Meanings interactive in this fashion have been identified as
concepts. Concepts are associated by the relationship of re-
dundancy, which has been defined in terms of the masking relation-
ship. Let us now turn to question (2).
Consider a conceptual network to be a system of concepts
associated by the masking relationship. Because of the redundancy
provided by this association, concepts in such a network are
enabled to remove uncertainty in their application about the
applicability of other concepts. Conceptual relationships of this
sort thus carry information, and the conceptual network is a
vehicle for information storage (chapter II). The concept 'ripe-
ness', for instance, preserves the associations discovered through
220
Reason
prior banana experiences by which applicability of the concept
provides information about color, size and edibility.
Conceptual networks are formed on the basis of 'trial and error'
employment of conceptual associations in situations calling for
action under conceptual control. With respect to bananas, the
concepts 'yellow' and 'hand-length' became associated with the
concept 'edible' because ripe bananas were found consistently
to be succulent and nourishing. If some other association had
been formed on the basis of experimental circumstances that
failed generalization, it would have been altered through further
experience into a form more useful in matching food-gathering
behavior with appropriate conditions of stimulation.
'Private' conceptual networks can develop on the basis of solely
individual experience which contributes to differences in person-
ality. Such networks are not reflected in meaningful language.
Conceptual networks formed on the basis of group experience,
however, persist through generations and are communicated as
part of the language process. 7 Associations that have been found
generally favorable for alerting individuals to stimulus situations
of special importance, or for guiding individual behavior in
group activities, will become standard constituents of the con-
ceptual network by which members of the group confront environ-
mental realities. On the primitive level this provides resources
for the cooperative hunt of the woolly mammoth; with modern
man it provides for the cooperative practices of empirical science. 8
In either extreme, the advantages of such networks for the
individuals possessing them come with increased capacity for
guiding behavior in light of its probable consequences.
Prospective guidance is provided on a primitive level by antici-
patory feedback, in which corrective response precedes environ-
mental disturbance (chapter IV). Feedback of this sort enables an
organism to avoid potential danger, and in general to cope more
effectively with environmental contingencies. A further level of
prospective control is reached with human intention, by which
the flow of events is rendered conformable to immediate purposes.
When intention is augmented by the processes of reason, however,
human behavior comes under the control oflong-range planning. 9
The vastly superior flexibility of this mode of adaptive behavior
must account for the emergence of reason in the guidance of
human activity.
2.2.1
Mentality
The advantages of reason in this role may be viewed generally
from several aspects. One is the superiority of conceptual over
genetic procedures of adaptive information processing. When a
particular set of genetically established behavior patterns proves
poorly adapted to an organism's living environment, change by
genetic alteration could come about only through a period of
several generations with no assistance to those presently en-
cumbered with maladaptive behavior. When behavior is under
the control of conceptual structures, on the other hand, its course
can be quickly altered by conceptual change, and the affected
individual may go through several 'generations' of conceptual
networks without sacrificing his integrity as a viable organism.
Further flexibility in the guidance of human behavior by
reason stems from the communal nature of conceptual adjustment.
By means of a shared language, individuals with common needs
and interests can influence each other in the formation of concep-
tual structures without each participating in the full range of
'trial and error' experience necessary to assure an enduring con-
ceptual network. Shared conceptual structures in this way provide
the basis of cultural identity, and provide information for the
guidance of individual behavior in situations recurring within
the cultural group,lo Reason thus supports the processes of social
adaptation discussed in chapter X.
Of unique significance for rational man, however, is that the
formation of conceptual structures under recurring perceptual
situations makes possible the blending of concepts and action
sequences in combinations applicable far beyond possible bounds
of immediate experience. With such conceptual facility, the human
individual can learn procedures for making artifacts (bridges,
fortresses) and manipulating natural processes (farming, curing)
that involve integrated sequences of activities through extended
time periods and over considerable distances. Conceptual re-
sources of this sort that regulate behavior beyond the range of
immediate experience support a basic form of rational inference,
of which the practices of modern science are a very recent
fruition.
Reasoning, construed broadly, is the use of conceptual net-
works to explore the ramifications of stimulus and behavior
interactions independently of the circumstances in which they
actually occur.ll A conceptual network, as it were, serves as an
zzz
Reason
abstract mapping of stimulus configurations and behavior se-
quences adjusted to the common living environment through the
trials and errors of group experience. By exploring through in-
ference the likely consequences of certain chains of behavior
under certain stimulus conditions, the rational individual can
learn what to expect in a course of action before its actual occur-
rence. In short, reasoning is a form of information processing
based upon exploration of conceptual connections in an abstract
mapping of the agent's interaction with his living environment.
Since reasoning is independent of one's current beliefs, counter-
factual inference poses no additional problems.
Reason to be sure depends upon the resources of language. But
reason emerges as a distinct and uniquely powerful form of
information processing only when linguistic meanings are freed
from verbal stimulation and become concepts under the control
of other concepts. By tracing through the relationships of re-
dundancy by which this control is effected, the purposive and
conscious human agent is enabled to explore the practical con-
sequences of possible courses of action independently of cir-
cumstances requiring action commitment. This capacity to pro-
cess information pertaining to the guidance of action independ-
ently of the constraints of present stimulus conditions marks the
difference between reason and language, and establishes human
dominance over the courses of nature.
Nothing has been said thus far about formal inference, which
some take to be the paradigm of rational activity. What capacities
are involved in formal reasoning, and how does it enable the
rational person to deal more effectively with his living environ-
ment?
5 FORMAL REASONING
Philosophers who specialize in the formal employment of reason

assume that logic plays a special role in the reasoning process. If
not the very essence of rational inference, formal logic is thought
to provide the norms by which reasoning is regulated. It is a fact,
moreover, that the more successful natural sciences depend upon
the exercise of formal reasoning.
The basic question philosophers seldom pause to contemplate
2.2.3
Mentality
is how systems of logic, employing artificially formulated symbols
and arbitrarily defined relationships, can contribute to the prac-
tical employment of the reasoning process. 12 That both mathe-
matics and logic have this effect is beyond serious question. But
we have yet to understand how such an effect is possible.
Our problem is to understand how, and in what respect,
formalization of the reasoning process can contribute to in-
formation processing on the conceptual level to an extent adequate
to account for its central role in scientific inquiry. Thus we return
to consider certain familiar forms of inference, but with emphasis
upon utility rather than physiological status.
Among the simplest formal relationships employed in reasoning
are those of the syllogism. The basic relationship of the syllogism
is that of class inclusion, or more exactly in our terms the in-
clusion of concepts. Inclusion with respect to concepts is explicated
in terms of the masking relationship as reviewed above. To the
universal affirmative proposition 'all A is B' corresponds the
assertion that A masks B without respect to reference class,
symbolized 'M(A,B)'. 'No A is B', similarly, may be symbolized
'M(A, not-B)" whereas 'some A is B' corresponds to the assertion
that there is a reference class C such that M(A,B),C.
Masking in such cases is a physiological relationship, holding
between patterns of neuronal activity implicated in the conceptual
processing of information. Concept A masks concept B if all con-
cepts precluded from application by B are also precluded by
concept A. Just as it is physically obvious (in the sense of admitting
no further demonstration) that if box A is in B which in turn is in
C, then A is in C, so it is obvious among concepts that if concept
A masks Band B masks C, then A masks concept C in turn. That
is, if M(A,B) and M(B,C), then M(A,C). Transposed into logical
form, this amounts to the syllogism Barbara, figure four. The
basis of the entailment relationship in the syllogism thus is found
in a physiological relationship, explicated in terms of communi-
cation theory. In view of the persistent opinion that logical
entailment and physical causation have something important in
common,13 it is interesting to note that both have been explicated
in terms of the same communication-theoretic concept. Both
causation and entailment are forms of the masking relationship.
But these remarks do not constitute an answer to our present
question. Although syllogistic relationships can be formalized,
2.24
Reason
they also can be employed in ordinary language without benefit
of special symbolism. Yet formalism seems essential in the more
successful sciences. How does formal symbolism increase the
capacity of rational man to deal effectively with environmental
contingencies?
A complete answer to this question dearly would call for a great
expenditure of analytic effort and ingenuity. The proper emphasis
of such an answer, however, I believe would be that a formalization
of the relationships among concepts involved in practical reason-
ing enables us to separate the informational structures contributed
by the conceptual networks of rational inquiry from those con-
tributed by experience in the form of percepts. If yellow bananas
started to produce stomach-aches frequently, for example, it
would be helpful to be able to distinguish the experimental
component ('yellow bananas of hand-length generally are good to
eat') of the belief that ripe bananas are good to eat from the
conceptual component ('yellow bananas of hand-length are ripe'),
and to realize that the problem is to be overcome by attention to
the former component rather than the latter.
With increasing social influence in the formation of conceptual
structures, there is an increasing incidence of problems on the
conceptual as distinct from the observational level. Problems of
culpability under a legal or moral code, for example, often are not
settled by a review of relevant facts, but require in addition an
adjustment of relevant conceptual relationships (normative prin-
ciples) to fit the particular facts in question. In such problems of
law and morality the conceptual component may be relatively
easy to distinguish, with no assistance required of a formal nature.
Neither advocacy nor casuistry, that is to say, is a formal discipline.
In science, however, the distinction between the observational
and the conceptual is harder to draw, because even the most
observation-bound concepts are laced through with ties to other
concepts. The more abstract a science becomes, the more de-
pendent its observations become upon interpretation in terms of
conceptual networks. 14 The importance of formalism in sciences
such as theoretical physics is that only by the most carefully
drawn and general symbolic notations can what is dependent
upon observation be distinguished from what is dependent upon
conceptual structures. Hence only by such symbolic constructs,
on the one hand, can developing science be faced off against
ZZ5
Mentality
observation and experiment at the precise interfaces where ex-
perience bears most directly on the adequacy of a scientific system;
and only by such symbolization, on the other hand, can conceptual
inadequacies be effectively isolated for remedial treatment.
The role of formal inference within a scientific system, in short,
is to establish a 'spread' between the more purely conceptual and
the more purely observational, thus making the two components
more explicit and amenable to criticism,15 Formal reasoning,
despite its systematic abstractness, thereby contributes essentially
to the process of science in which man achieves his highest level
of negentropic flexibility.
Von Neumann has been quoted (Bar-Hillel, 1964, p. u) as
remarking, in the presence of Carnap and Bar-Hillel, that logic
forms a triple identity with thermodynamics and information
theory. Allowing room for uncertainty about the degree of serious-
ness in this remark, we see that it has a basis of credibility. Whereas
information and energy are forms of negentropy deriving from
and convertible into structure, applied formal reasoning itself
increases the structure of a conceptual network by separating the
conceptual from the observational component. But segregation
of any sort involves an expenditure of energy (chapter III). Thus
logic, like thermodynamics and communication theory, pertains
to transformations of negentropy in one of its alternate forms-
energy, structure, and information.
NOTES
1 Bennett, 1964, p. 85. An apparent shortcoming of Bennett's analysis, as

I see it, is that machines, once capable oflanguage, could rather easily be
prepared to issue statements that are both dated and appropriately general
in character (pace Bennett's claim to the contrary, 1964, ch. II). This
criticism is developed more fully in my review of Rationality (Sayre, 1966).
2 Commenting on experiments in the human rearing of apes, Kuhn re-
marks that whereas apes show some ability to form plans for arranging
objects in instrumental relationships, they apparently are capable of
maintaining such plans only while the objects are actually in view. Apes
also are able to imitate humans and other apes in making plans of this
sort, but cannot transfer these plans from one situation to another. In
short, although 'the ape can invent tools, he possesses no carry-over, and
he must invent the tool all over again the next time he needs it' (Kuhn,
1963, p. 210, author's emphasis). Human capacity to retain plans for
226
Reason
future use appears to be based on the resources of language, by which
intentions are preserved in the form of meanings.
3 Competency of this sort apparently can exist independently of language.
Broadbent (1965) reports an experiment in which an animal is trained to
select objects of one color in preference over another, and then is taught
exactly the opposite color preference. If the colored objects are suffi-
ciently different in respects other than color, the second learning task
generally is completed more quickly than the first. Thus, for example,
the animal can be trained to choose black over white more quickly if it
had been trained previously to make the opposite color choice than if it
had been subjected to no training at all regarding color preference. The
interpretation seems to be that the animal learns in its initial training not
only to select one particular color over another, but moreover that color
is the proper variable to discriminate. In a word, the animal learns to lay
particular stress in its perceptual tasks upon a specific perceptual feature.
4 As Dunn points out (1971, p. 84), 'those ideas that generate maladaptive
behavior ... can be sifted from the idea pool without necessarily result-
ing in extinction of the biological organism.' Thus, while 'the biological
death of the organism can result from maladaptive behavior even in the
social realm, the evidence of maladaption can usually be ascertained and
accommodated through adaptive behavior before this critical threshold
is reached.'
5 The most courageous attempt I know of to answer these questions is the
causal account of inference in Armstrong (1968). According to this
account, 'A infers p from q' means simply that 'A's believing q causes
him to acquire the belief p' (p. 194, author's emphasis), where the sense
of cause in question is that in which billiard balls cause each other to
move. An inference is judged good or bad according to the principle of
inference it follows, a good principle being a statement of the form 'if q,
then p' which reports a causal relationship between q and p (p. 199). One
difficulty of this account, as I read it, is that it allows no distinction
between mere falsehood of principle and contradiction. Contradiction
presumably would have to be interpreted as the inference of both p and
not-p, according to the conflicting principles 'if q, then p' and 'if q, then
not-p'. But in so far as such principles are construed as statements of
causal sequence, conflict between two such principles could always be
dispatched by educing additional causal factors leading to compatible
and more complete formulations 'if q and r, then p' and 'if q and s, then
not-p'. There are no criteria available within Armstrong's account, as I
understand it, by which principles of inference could be rendered re-
sistant to this type of adjustment, hence by which contradiction can be
distinguished from merely incomplete empirical knowledge. Another
apparent difficulty is that this account leads to a wholly implausible
interpretation of the way in which we (both Armstrong and ourselves)
are supposed to deduce consequences from his account of inferring itself
(p. 197). Surely there are no causal connections between theories of in-
ference like this and such consequences as 'that totally unconscious
inferring is possible' (p. 198). The most serious difficulty I find, however,
2.2.7
Mentality
is with Armstrong's account of counterfactual inference. If inference
from q to p is a matter of one's belief in q causing belief in p, then such
inference could not occur in the absence of belief in q. Armstrong antici-
pates this problem and attempts to handle it by suggesting that in such a
case the cause is not belief in q simply but rather 'the entertaining of,
or considering, a certain proposition, p,' the effect of which is 'the
acquiring of a belief that ~f q is true, then a further proposition, p, is
true. This whole causal sequence is called "inferring p from q" , (p. 199,
author's emphasis). But this is radically out of kilter. If q is believed, the
causal sequence goes according to the principle 'if q, then po' But if q is
not believed, the causal sequence goes according to the principle 'if p,
then if q then p', and this not only is quite different from the former
principle but moreover construed logically is a sheer tautology. Any
account according to which principles of inference change according to
whether the inferrer believes the premises would render sound counter-
factual inference unintelligible, and hence undermine the hypothetical-
deductive method of science. (This account is modified in Armstrong,
197~, to require that the protasis in 'if q, then p' refer to causes that both
produce and sustain the referent of the apodosis, and that the complex of
causal relationships manifests a disposition on the part of the inferrer;
but neither of these further conditions appears to alleviate the difficulties
above.) It should be noted that an apparently similar account of inference
is suggested in Sellars (197~). Sellars, however, does not consider such
matters as contradiction and counterfactual inference in this context, and
it is not clear to me how the difficulties above could be dealt with on the
basis of his particular conception of inference.
6 This definition of content can be related to discussion in both Carnap
and Bar-Hillel (1952) and Hintikka (1970). Bar-Hillel and Carnap define
the content of a statement as 'the class of all state-descriptions excluded
by' the statement in question (Bar-Hillel, 1964, p. 299, italicized in
original). In my account, however, content pertains to concepts included
rather than statements excluded. According to Hintikka, a given state-
ment admits certain possibilities, excluding the rest, and the number of
possibilities the statement admits 'can be considered a measure of the
uncertainty it leaves us with. The more alternatives a statement admits of,
the more probable it also is in some purely logical sense of probability.
Conversely, it is the more informative the more narrowly it restricts the
range of those alternatives it still leaves open, i.e. the more alternatives
it excludes. Thus probability and this kind of information (call it semantic
information) are inversely related: the higher the information, the lower
the probability, and vice versa' (lac. cit., p. 264, author's emphases). Al-
though analogous, the present approach may be preferable to someone
who finds the notion of 'statement' too mysterious to understand how a
statement, in and by itself, can exclude anything at all.
7 Readers familiar with Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960), will recognize
the relevance of the TOTE (Test-Operate-Test-Exit) hierarchy, that is of
'Plans that operate upon Plans, as well as Plans that operate upon in-
formation to guide motor behavior' (p. 98). A TOTE is a configuration
228
Reason
of activity with feedback characteristics, which according to the author's
'cybernetic hypothesis' represents 'the fundamental building block of the
nervous system •. .' (p. 26). Relevant to the concerns of this and the two
previous chapters is the suggestion that in 'man we have a unique capa-
city for creating and manipulating symbols, and when that versatility is
used to assign names to TOTE units, it becomes possible for him to use
language in order to rearrange the symbols and to form new Plans'
(p. 38). Moreover, 'because human Plans are so often verbal, they can be
communicated, a fact of crucial importance in the evolution of our social
adjustments to one another' (p. 38).
8 The 'populational' or 'intellectual ecological' analysis of scientific activity
and conceptual change in Toulmin (1972) is based on an understanding
of the function of reason compatible with the present approach. The
course of scientific development, as Toulmin sees it, is the history of
'conceptual populations' evolving in response to intellectual and more
broadly human problems of successive milieus. In this context, rationality
is to be judged with respect to procedures for changing conceptual
networks and beliefs under pressure of new and unfamiliar situations,
rather than with respect to some particular system of logical relationships
(op. cit., pp. 478, 486).
9 On the level of society generally, as Toulmin puts it (1972, p. 501), men
to some extent become able to 'bring their rational grasp of the current
situation to bear on their future expectations and patterns of life, in such
a way that they anticipated, and so were "rationally pre-adapted" to, the
novel problem-situations that would face them in the future.' Those
'whose rational procedures and innovations proved . . • to meet the
actual demands of history most adequately' would be rewarded in the
course of subsequent experience.
10 According to Dunn (1971, p. 81), the essence of culture is a 'more or less
integrated pool of acquired ideas and an associated set of behaviors
making these concepts manifest in action.' A similar point is expressed
even more strongly in Mead (1934, p. 78) by the claim that the social
process enables language not merely to symbolize an object or situation
existing independently, but moreover 'makes possible the existence or the
appearance of that situation or object, for it is part of the mechanism
whereby that situation or object is created.'
1I This characterization is reminiscent of Mead's remark (1934, p. 100) that
intelligence 'is essentially the ability to solve the problems of present
behavior in terms of its possible future consequences as implicated on the
basis of past experience-the ability, that is, to solve the problems of
present behavior in the light of, or by reference to, both the past and the
future; it involves both memory and foresight'. In his introduction
(Mead, 1934, p. xviii), Morris puts the point more forcefully,
saying that Mead gives an 'analysis of such reflection in terms of the self-
conditioning of the organism to future stimuli in virtue of being able to
indicate to itself through symbols the consequences of certain types of
response to such stimuli.'
12 One notable exception is Toulmin, who in discussing the so-called 'logic
229
Mentality
of discovery' emphasizes the problem of demonstrating 'not that the
rational procedures of scientific enquiry have, after all, a kind of "logic"
of their own,' but rather 'how the formal structures and relations of
propositional logic are put to work in the service of rational enterprises
at all' (Toulmin, 1972, p. 479). I endorse the following pronouncement
in Hintikka (1970, p. 289): 'CO D. Broad has called the unsolved logical
and philosophical problems concerning induction a scandal of philo-
sophy. IfI am allowed to exaggerate slightly-but only very slightly-I
should like to say that there is, in addition to the scandal of induction, a
closely related and equally disquieting scandal of deduction, viz. the
failure of philosophers and logicians to answer the question: How does
deductive reasoning add to our knowledge (information)?' The reason
philosophers have slighted this problem in recent years may be in part
the dogma of logical positivism that logical truths are analytic and hence
devoid of empirical content, coupled with the dogma that only proposi-
tions with empirical content are applicable toward a genuine increase in
knowledge. Both dogmas are rejected in the present approach.
13 Sellars, expressing reserved agreement with the view attributed through
Nagel to Blanshard that 'serious consequences for morals and the life of
reason follow from the denial that logical necessity is involved in causal
relations', says he believes 'this is a respectable position provided that
logical implication or entailment is not identified with the "subject-
matter neutral" implication which, until recently, has been the primary
object of attention by professional logicians' (Sellars, 1973, p. 179).
14 The dependency of the observational upon the conceptual in science was
fully appreciated by Kant and the British Idealists, and has been re-
emphasized with vigor by such contemporary philosophers as Hanson
(in Hanson, 1958, ch. I especially), Sellars (in Sellars, 196;, especially
'Phenomenalism'), and Toulmin (in Toulmin, 1972, chs I and II especi-
ally).
15 I am in sympathy with the attempt in Hintikka (1970, p. 289) to show
through his distinction between surface and depth information that the
former gives 'a measure of information that can be increased by logical
and mathematical reasoning.' The work of Hintikka in this regard is part
of an important new approach to inference relying on the resources of
communication theory. The volume Hintikka and Suppes (1970) provides
a good introduction to this approach, along with Dockx and Bernays
(19 65).
230
XIII
SUBJECTIVITY
I SUBJECTIVITY RELATED TO PREVIOUS

TOPICS
Human life, like other life forms, exists as a balance of organic

processes sustained by negentropy from the living environment.
Negentropy may be acquired in the form of energy, structure or
information. As molecular structure, negentropy provides
material for growth and for metabolic activity by which energy
is produced for other organic functions. As information, negen-
tropy enables the organism to adapt its behavior to environmental
contingencies and actively to pursue its goals and interests.
Many animals surpass the human in nutritional efficiency (for
example, the pig), as well as in flexibility (the cockroach) and
quantity (the elephant) of energy intake. Human beings, however,
excel in the acquisition of information, and also in versatility of
information processing. Our concern through the last four chap-
ters has been with progressive refinements in human informational
capacities, none of which are shared by other organisms. Since
superiority in information gathering and processing amounts
to superior adaptive capacities, this accounts for human dominance
over other kinds.
There has been little reference thus far to subjective awareness,
in any of the forms we consider typical of self-conscious experi-
ence. We have discussed perception as a process of cumulative
patterning through a cascade of information channels, but we
have said nothing about appearances or other alleged data of
231
Mentality
sense. We have discussed learning as a process based on reinforc-
ing experience, but have referred only in passing to pleasure and
pain. And we have discussed the relationship between concepts
and external objects without mentioning the feature of external
reference which philosophers usually label 'intentionality'. In
short, we have not considered these matters in view of the cons-
cious subject, hence have not considered their subjective aspects.
But surely, it may be urged, these subjective features are essential
to the mental activities by which man is distinguished from other
creatures.
To some, the omission may appear even more grievous. The
subject undergoing these activities is often identified with the
soul or spirit, a principle considered capable of immaterial exist-
ence. To ignore topics of such gravity would not be excusable
in an essay concerning the nature of man.
In fact, these features of subjectivity are implicated in the
account that has already been given. To put it in the idiom of
ultimate causes, if the Creator willed a creature with subjective
awareness, an available means would be to produce an organism
with perception and reason as these particular faculties are depicted
above.
2. COLOR PROPERTIES AND COLOR

APPEARANCES
According to the account developed in chapter IX, normal

perception of external objects involves a discrete series of in-
formation channels, with a distinct stage beginning at each junc-
ture in the transmission process. In vision, the cascade of channels
normally begins with the microstructure of an external object,
which by absorption and reflection initiates a configuration of
electromagnetic signals eventually reaching the cornea of the
perceiving organism. Passing through the lens to the retinal re-
ceptors, the message configuration then is transferred into a series
of electrochemical channels leading up the brain stem to the visual
cortex. In the course of passing from retina to cortex, the message
configuration is subjected to various smoothing, sorting and
summating operations which tend to diminish its information
content and to facilitate passage of dominant structures recurring
2.32.
Subjectivity
persistently in the retinal field. In the final stages, these inter-
mediate configurations are related to stable cortical patterns
through which guidance is channeled to the efferent system, the
result being a structured field of perceptual consciousness by
which the organism is enabled to cope with an environment of
repeating occurrences with a minimum outlay of information-
processing resources.
But this account leaves out color and other sensory appearances
which many philosophers consider fundamental to visual per-
ception. Are colors the objects of a special mode of awareness,
distinct from our awareness of physical objects? Are colors simple
elements into which perceptions are analyzable, themselves not
subject to analysis in turn? And how are we to account for their
'qualitative' character, as distinct from the 'quantities' of size
and shape? Questions such as these combine to make the nature
of color one of the most puzzling topics in the philosophy of
mind.
It may seem tempting to defend the omission of color from this
account on the grounds that color blindness is no deterrent to
visual perception, and that (as black and white movies demon-
strate) the customary range of visual objects could be revealed
as well on a monochromatic basis. But I believe this response
would be mistaken for several reasons. One is that for purposes
of the present discussion (having nothing to do with color mixing
and related phenomena) black and white are colors no less than
red and yellow, and that visual perception would be impossible
without some color contrast. Another is that many humanly
important distinctions are lost in monochromatic vision, such
as that between yellow and green bananas.! Most significant,
however, is the fact that the addition of chromatic distinctions
to his field of vision greatly increases man's capacity for adapting
to his living environment. In view of the general principle that
genetic changes tend to persist according to the adaptive capacities
they afford the favored organism, this accounts for the emergence
of chromatic vision in the human species. Let us attempt to con-
jecture the major stages of this development.
Perceptual consciousness of objects begins physiologically with
the detection of stimulation gradients across the field of retinal
receptors. Encoded electrochemically for further processing in
the intermediate visual channels, these structures finally emerge
233
Mentali~y
on the cortical level as ingredients in objective patterns of visual

awareness. These patterns are delineated with respect to planes
and contours more or less isomorphic in informational structure
with features of the objects by which the retinal gradients were
stimulated. We may refer to the figure marked off by these con-
tours as the shape 'image' or 'appearance' within the visual field,
and to the corresponding feature as the shape 'property' of the
external object. Clearly the shape image and the shape property
occur in different locations. Nonetheless the image and the
property to some degree may share identically the same structure,
in the sense explained in chapter IX. Veridical perception occurs
when this isomorphism (measured in terms of mutual information)
is sufficiently extensive, in which case the salient structures of the
perceptual object literally enter into the consciousness of the
perceiving organism.
But the object may be far richer in informational structure than
the corresponding patterns of visual awareness, depending upon
the amount of information reaching the visual organ and the
variety of discriminations accomplished at the stimulated retina.
If the contours discriminated are defined simply by presence and
absence of receptor activity, the images emerging in visual aware-
ness would be marked by a starkness in linear contrast displaying
only the bare outlines of the perceptual object. In such a case, the
visual field would be structured (as we could imagine it) only in
terms of black and white contrasts, without gradation in the range
of grays.
Further visual contrasts emerge with the discrimination of
retinal gradients formed by differing concentrations of retinal
activity and by different rates of firing among the receptors in-
volved. These contrasts might be conceived in terms respectively
of saturation and brightness, and would yield grays varying in
shade as well as intensity. With these additional powers of dis-
crimination, the organism'S visual field might be imagined as
comparable to that normally produced by a black and white
movie, and would represent a considerable increase in information-
processing capacity. In a simple analogy, a sound source emitting
signals of two durations at two frequencies with two degrees of
intensity, all with equal probability, would generate three bits of
information with each individual signal, compared with only one
bit for a source with states distinguished by frequency alone. The
2.34
Subjectivity
addition of saturation and brightness to the basic dimension of
linear contrast thus brings a considerable increase in flexibility
to the afferent system.
In the press for ever greater afferent capacities that spurred so
many momentous developments in human phylogeny (chapters
IX through XII), nature must have been groping through its
selective processes for yet further dimensions of visual discern-
ment. An available variable is the electromagnetic wavelength of
the light reaching the retina from the perceptual object. Perhaps
mechanisms could be evolved for discriminating a range of differ-
ent wavelengths and be distributed evenly across the retinal
field. If this should happen, visual patterns might be differentiated
according not only to shape, saturation and brightness, but also
to the 'grain' of the expanses which shape delineates.
But this 'grain' is not the hue of our visual perception, for the
expedient that would produce it was never developed. Perhaps the
discrimination of many distinct wavelengths was beyond available
'evolutionary technology.' Or perhaps the distribution of many
different wavelength detectors across the retina would have re-
quired more area than the eyeball provides. At any rate, it is clear
that nature found a superior alternative, for we currently enjoy
color discrimination far more keen than this expedient would
accomplish. 2
What nature provided instead remains a mystery in detail, for
psychophysiologists do not understand the mechanisms of color
vision (Wyburn, 1964, p. 105). But important clues have been
uncovered recently by the Land experiments. 3 These experiments
involve a pair of black and white photographic transparencies,
exposed through filters of different wavelengths in cameras
carefully aligned to assure registration of images. When these
transparencies are placed in two properly aligned projectors and
illuminated by light beams of different frequencies (higher wave-
length through transparency originally exposed to higher wave-
length), the composite image displays all (or almost all) the colors
of the original scene. Thus, for example, two different wavelengths
of yellow (579 and 599 millimicrons in Land's discussion, 1959,
p. 86) beamed through properly prepared black and white
transparencies will produce the entire spectrum of different colors.
But any combination of distinctly separated wavelengths will
serve the same purpose. In Land's terms, these results show that light
CPW-l 235
Mentality
rays 'are not in themselves color-making. Rather they are bearers
of information that the eye uses to assign appropriate colors to
various objects in an image' (ibid., p. 84). Instead of correlating
in any direct fashion with particular wavelengths, color in visual
images 'depends on a varying balance between longer and shorter
wavelengths over the visual field' (ibid., p. 89).
From the viewpoint of communication theory these results are
particularly significant. Suppose, in a simple comparison, that
nature had devised receptors capable of responding differentially
to wavelengths within (27 =) 128 different sections across the
visible spectrum (close to the approximately 150 that seem to be
involved in actual vision; see footnote 2 of this chapter). Addition
of this facility to the visual information-processing system would
increase the content of a visual image on the average by seven
bits of information. Now suppose instead that the visual system
discriminates ratios between wavelengths instead of wavelengths
as such. Since there are approximately (somewhat less because of
duplication) 214 different ratios formed by pairs of 27 elements,
in this case the added capacity would amount to about fourteen
bits of information. By detecting ratios rather than particular
wavelengths the system doubles its informational capacity. Land's
results indicate that nature somehow arrived at some similar
method of processing information conveyed by wavelength
differences.
As a result, our visual field exhibits distinctions not only with
respect to contour, brightness and saturation, but also with respect
to the 'grain' of the expanses which the contours figure. And in-
stead of differences in 'grain' manifesting differences among one
hundred or so different wavelengths, we are aware of differences
in 'grain' manifesting several thousand wavelength ratios. The
physiological processes by which these features emerge are still
unknown, but their effect is the appearance of different colors in
visual awareness.
It is instructive at this point to compare color with shape. A
shape appearance is a feature of visual awareness, isomorphic (in
veridical perception) with the shape property of an external
object. Since the structures of the appearance and of the property
may be informationally identical, there is a sense in which the
property may be literally present in the subject'S consciouness. In
parallel fashion, a color appearance (or image) is a feature of visual
23 6
Subjectivity
awareness, possibly isomorphic with a color property pertaining
to an external object. And when the appearance and the property
are identical in informational structure, the property is literally
present in subjective awareness.
But the disanalogies between color and shape are more instruc-
tive. If the account above is correct in general outline, color
appearances are not isomorphic with features of objects in and by
themselves. A color appearance rather is isomorphic with con-
figurations of light waves leaving an object's surface, and these
vary not only with changes in surface structure but also with
changes in illumination. Although the color of a banana is in-
dependent of a viewer's presence, it is not independent of the
conditions under which the banana is visible.
This is not to deny that colors are properties of physical objects.
It is to point out that colors are properties of a special sort. Unlike
shapes, they are not independent of perceptual conditions. Nor
are they dispositional properties, like frangibility and weight.
Although to be sure a banana is disposed to reflect wave forma-
tions isomorphic with yellow appearances under certain con-
ditions, it is equally disposed to reflect other formations when
conditions are different, and such a variable capacity ought not be
identified with the property yellow. Colors instead are what we
might call 'interactional' properties. Analogously, incandescence
is a property of meteorites, but only while moving through the
atmosphere. Although meteorites are incandescent apart from
possible viewers, they are not incandescent in outer space (in-
candescence is not a dispositional property) and not incandescent
in and by themselves. As incandescence is a property pertaining
to the interaction between atmosphere and meteorite, color per-
tains to the interaction between iIIumination and object.
A banana is labeled 'yellow' if and only if it interacts with
incident light rays to produce wave structures isomorphic under
normal conditions of illumination with yellow appearances in
normal observers.4 But what is normal depends upon convention,
and may vary with both observer and object: what is normal for a
Finn is not for an Arab, and what is normal for the moon is not
for an apple.
A related difference elucidates the distinction between shape as
'quantity' and color as 'quality.' Shape properties are features of
physical objects access to which is not limited to visual awareness
2.37
Mentality
(accessible through touch also), and which can be subjected to
public operations of comparison and measurement. Color prop-
erties, on the other hand, enter our awareness only in visual
appearances, and do not submit easily to public measurement
(even spectrometers do not measure wavelength ratios). Thus
while shapes are quantitative in being measurable in scalar units,
colors are qualitative in the sense of being comparable only on
the level of subjective appearances. 5
To the question whether colors are simple elements, it appears
we must respond both 'yes' and 'no'. Color properties exist in
the form of lightwave structures which can be analyzed in terms
of component wavelengths. Color appearances, in turn, exist in
the form of neuronal structures which presumably (if we under-
stand the color process) could be analyzed in terms of brain ac-
tivities. But this may be said of any feature of visual awareness
without prejudging the question whether it is a simple element.
The relevant consideration is that color appearances are not
patterns of isolable perceptual components as shape appearances
are patterns of perceptual contours. A color appearance rather is
what is subject to spatial patterning, the 'grain' of an expanse that
shape delineates. Since colors do not appear in the form of
analyzable structures, we may join a venerable philosophic tradi-
tion in speaking of color appearances as simple elements.
Finally, color appearances are not objects of a special mode of
awareness, because appearances are not objects of awareness at all.
Although to be aware of a colored object is to be subject to certain
color appearances, such appearances are not objects of which we
are aware in turn. To be aware of a colored object is to sustain
shape appearances isomorphic with shape properties of an external
object, delineating color appearances isomorphic with wave
configurations emanating from the object's surface. But appear-
ances neither of shape nor of color are objects of awareness
themselves. Such appearances rather are constituents of acts of
awareness; and such acts do not include their constituents among
their objects. It follows that to be aware of an after-image is not
to be aware of an object at all, but rather to sustain a color appear-
ance that fails isomorphism with wave configurations currently
conveyed through the retinal receptors. 6
Talk of appearances has a different logic from talk of objects.
Although '1 am aware of .. .' can be meaningfully completed with
23 8
Subjectivity
either 'a red object' or simply 'red', it does not follow that red is
a possible object of perceptual awareness. Analogously, although
'I am drilling .. .' can be completed with either 'a piece of wood'
or 'a hole', it does not follow that a hole like a piece of wood is a
possible object for drilling. The hole, rather, is part of the drilling
process.
3 PLEASURE AND PAIN
The point is often made in philosophic discussions of privacy

that pains are objects beyond the awareness of all but the subject.
But the point is gratuitous; for pains are not objects of which the
subject is aware either. Like colors, pains simply are not objects
of sensory awareness. There are no information-processing
channels leading from something called 'pain' to the seat of
awareness in the subject'S cortex. Pain rather is a feature of the
informational processes occurring within the final stages of the
perceptual cascade. This can be brought out best in a comparison
between pleasure and pain.
Neither pleasure nor pain answers neatly to an unambiguous
concept. Pain may occur as a pressure, an ache, a searing burn, or
a raw flash that rends the fabric of one's perceptual field. And
pleasures range from the alleviation of thirst and hunger to the
anticipation of listening to a favorite symphony. We shall ignore
pains and pleasures pertaining to privation and satiation on the
supposition that they occur also in organisms lacking self-aware-
ness, and focus instead on those that relate to the structure of
perceptual consciousness.
One major difference between pleasure and pain has to do with
their relationship to objects of perceptual awareness. Although a
fire may cause a painful burn, it is the burn and not the fire that is
characterized as painful. Similarly, the pain from a pinprick is a
characteristic of neither the pin nor its shape. On the other hand,
we often speak of pleasant faces and persons, conceiving the
agreeable features as characteristic of the objects themselves. The
shape of a comely person may be literally pleasant in a sense in
which a pin's shape is not literally painful.
As a result, pleasure often is identified with reference to the
object that provides its occasion, while pain usually is identified
2.39
Mentality
with reference to the bodily part in which it occurs. Although the
pleasure deriving from listening to a symphony depends upon
one's ears and other organs of hearing, the experience is describ-
able as listening to pleasant music but not as having pleasure in
one's ears. The expression 'I have a pleasure in my .. .' is deviant,
no matter how completed. On the other hand, 'I have a pain in
my .. .' is a common locution. The pin causes pain by rending the
subject's flesh, to which he may respond by saying he has a pain
in his finger. But he would not respond by complaining about a
painful pin.
A second major difference regards the involvement of pleasure
and pain in objective awareness itself. To be aware of a pain in a
part of one's body is not necessarily to be aware of that part as a
perceptual object. To be aware of a stomach-ache is not to be
aware of the stomach itself. A pleasant experience, on the other
hand, usually accompanies awareness of a pleasant object. Border-
line cases occur with pleasures like relief from itching that in some
way are bound up with the experience of pain. By and large, how-
ever, while pleasure tends to accompany awareness of perceptual
structures, pain tends to be disruptive of the perceptual state.
Indeed, the effect of pain is often to block out awareness of
objective structures. A person may be literally blinded by pain,
which in the extreme may precipitate total loss of consciousness.
By contrast, pleasure seems to open up a fuller and more coherent
awareness of objective structures in one's perceptual field.
Although neither pleasure nor pain constitutes a distinct sense
modality, pleasure seems to accompany a synoptic awareness, a
feeling that 'all is right with the world.' The person pleasurably
engaged in perceptual ventures is acutely aware of certain features
of the world around him, and less aware of himself as a perceiving
subject.
This must be one reason why religious practice throughout
human history has relied upon aesthetic sensitivity. To listen to
the 'Kyrie' from Faure's Requiem is to sense the offer of divine
forgiveness, even when one lacks conviction of a divine forgiver.
The 'mystical experience'is the awareness of complete integration,
and at the same time the highest ecstasy reported in the records of
man. In the realm of the secular, the experience of listening to a
later Beethoven quartet fosters a sense of reciprocity between
suffering and human fulfilment, the sense that all fits together in
2.40
Subjectivity
a grander scheme. If there is any empirical basis for the identity of
the One and the Beautiful that philosophers have envisaged since
the ancient Greeks, it is that both are aspects of a totally inte-
grated field of awareness.
Pain, however, is the result of overstimulation, with poor sen-
sory integration as the unpleasant consequence. Pain arises from
absorption of excess energy by the sense receptors, hence from the
presence of more information than can be filtered out at the peri-
pheral levels or processed on the level of patterned awareness.
Relief from pain comes either from removing the receptors from
the offending circumstances (withdrawal), interrupting the flow
of information beyond the peripheral levels (anaesthesia), or
overriding the disturbing information at the cortical level by
increased concentration on other interests (diversion).
In short, awareness characterized by pleasure tends to be
particularly well integrated, while pain tends to be disruptive of
patterned awareness. These differences carry over from percep-
tion to anticipation, where one is concerned with planning future
participation in the perceptual environment. If the hopes and
intentions with reference to which one anticipates future activity
point to a coherent and highly structured set of perceptual
experiences, the anticipation itself is well structured and generally
pleasant. If the anticipated experiences are inchoate or discordant,
however, the anticipation may be unpleasant and sometimes down-
right painful. A young person may declare quite ingenuously that
it pains him to think of entering military service. On the other
hand, the anticipation of spending time with friends may be
genuinely pleasureful.
This leads to the third and most basic distinction between
pleasure and pain. Although pleasure is not merely the absence of
pain, or vice versa, there is one respect in which they are directly
opposed. Pleasure is a powerful reinforcer, while pain has a
punishing effect. This is obvious in connection with the element-
ary modes of experience that serve directly the needs of nutrition,
reproduction and self-preservation, and that the human shares
with other animals. But it is true as well of the pleasures and pains
that contribute to the texture of perceptual awareness. That is to
say, activities that lead the organism to a well integrated perceptual
field are normally encouraged, while those leading to a faulty
integration are strongly suppressed.
241
Mentality
This is just what should be expected from an evolutionary
viewpoint. Since pain constitutes an overload on the sensory
system, with results unresponsive to the organism's needs, any
system that reacted to pain with behavior tending to perpetuate
the discordant stimulation would be at a severe disadvantage in a
competitive environment. Mechanisms for pain-avoidance must
be encouraged by natural selection. One way this is accomplished
in the human nervous system is by building capacities for punish-
ment into sensory formations that are excessive or incoherent.
By comparable processes of natural selection, responses within
the sensory system that foster well integrated perceptual structures
acquire capacities for reinforcement. 7 The sense of well-being is
no accidental accompaniment of the aesthetic experience. In so
far as the aesthetically pleasureful is also the well integrated and
comprehensive awareness, it reflects the ability of the organism
to adjust its behavior to predictable structures within a changing
environment. The organism that is able to accommodate and to
predict repeatable structures within its environment is likely to pass
this competency on to subsequent generations. What we think of as
the pleasures of aesthetic sensitivity must be one of the expedi-
encies provided by the processes of phylogenetic development in
producing an organism capable of patterned awareness.
This association between the well structured and the reinforcing
nonetheless is biologically contingent. Variants sometimes
appear within the species in which sensory overload seems to
yield reinforcing awareness. A masochist is not someone who,
paradoxically, 'finds pleasure in pain,' but rather is someone for
whom sensory stress and poor sensory integration have acquired
capacities of reinforcement.. Variants of this sort are exceptional
within the species simply because they tend to propagate less
consistently than other members.
In its most general form, pleasure is lack of tension within one's
total sensory and conceptual field. Pleasure thus may be typified
as well by the feeling that accompanies running, skating, skiing
or dancing, when these activities are effortlessly and skillfully
performed. Such experiences themselves become reinforcing as
they are molded to the service of individual needs and interests. S
Similarly, with respect to perceptual awareness, the more a given
pattern serves to integrate our perceptual field the more we enjoy
it and anticipate its occurrence. Some patterns (like the golden
242
Subjectivity
section) seem to share this status without benefit of conditioning,
while others (like spinach) we have to learn to enjoy. And of course
pleasures vary with different daily pursuits. A woodsman may
find pleasure as readily in the ragged edges of a crosscut saw as a
scholar in the ragged pages of a European book. The more widely
experienced a person in terms of memories and anticipations, the
wider the range of perceptual forms that afford him pleasure. One
may learn to find pleasure in almost any object of art or nature,
but whether the pleasure will be beneficial is another matter.
4 INTENTIONALITY
To explain a person's actions very often is to cite his intentions.

It is in this sense of the term that a father may inquire regarding
the intentions of his daughter's suitor, and that the road to hell
allegedly is paved with good intentions. Intention in this sense
of conscious purpose has figured prominently in the discussion
of the last three chapters, and poses no problems for the under-
standing of subjectivity beyond those posed by consciousness
itself.
There is another sense of the term, however, that is not essen-
tially bound up with motive and purpose, and that cannot be
illustrated through ordinary locutions employing the verb
'intend'. This sense has to do with the 'directionality' of mental
phenomena. According to Brentano (1960, p. 50), the founder
of what some have called 'intentional science',
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the
scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and also
mental) inexistence (InexistenV of an object (Gegenstand), and
what we could call, although in not entirely unambiguous
terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object....
To perceive is to perceive a specific object, and to hope is to hope
for a particular state of affairs. In general, every act of mental
awareness is directed upon an object, with reference to which it is
distinguishable within its kind. 9 Intentionality in this sense is
thoroughly implicated in mental phenomena, and must be
accommodated in an adequate account of subjectivity.
A mental state is intentional in this sense if it is focused upon
243
Mentality
an object distinct from the state itself, in such a manner that the
state can be identified only by identifying the object but that the
object need not exist for the state to occur.tO Three factors are
involved in this characterization. An intentional mental state (I)
isolates a particular content from the range of possible objective
contents so that the subject's attention is focused upon this
object specifically. In perceiving a piece of fruit on the kitchen
table, my awareness is directed upon this particular object in
exclusion of countless others of which I otherwise might be
aware. Further, an intentional state (2) is identified with reference
to the object around which it is structured. There is no other way
of distinguishing my perception of the fruit phenomenologically
from other perceptions than by reference to the content upon
which it is focused. Finally, an intentional mental state (3) may
exist independently of its particular object. Hoping to find a piece
of fruit in the kitchen when he arrives home from school, my
son instead may find the fruitbowl empty. Directionality of a
mental state upon a particular content does not require that the
latter exist as an independent object.
Precisely the same characteristics have been found present in
the experience of pleasure. A pleasant state of awareness (I) is
focused upon particular objective structures, to the extent that
we often speak of these objects as pleasant themselves. Moreover,
pleasures (2) are commonly identified with reference to pleasant
objects, in contrast with pains that are usually identified by bodily
locus. Finally, pleasure (3) often is found in mere anticipation,
independently of whether the object of anticipation ever comes to
exist. Indeed, the pleasure of anticipation derives from its in-
tentional character, as we 'experience in advance' the enjoyment
we conceive associated with its intended object.
This parallel does not indicate that intentionality is a form of
pleasure, 01' vice versa, for there are other features by which the
two phenomena are clearly distinguished. Pleasure often character-
izes an entire perceptual field, too diverse to find focus around
any particular object. On the other hand, intentionality is involved
whenever language is used for referring to objects, and language
use itself is not always pleasureful. The indication rather is that
pleasure provides a paradigm for the analysis of intentional
phenomena. Like pleasure, intentionality is a manifestation of well
integrated awareness.
244
Suijectivity
Intentionality is not confined to such obviously directional
mental acts as wishing and willing, but is present in perceptual
awareness as well. Although the status of taste and smell in this
regard is doubtful, it is the case in general that objects of sight
and touch and hearing are presented as existing apart from the
subject in three dimensional space. They are perceived as 'other'
than the subject in the act of perception, and this 'otherness' is
intimately involved in the intentional character of the subject's
awareness. Indeed, this 'otherness' is a consequence of their
spatial structuring. Since self-awareness does not arise from
the stimulation of sense receptors, and since spatiality is a mode of
presentation confined to perceptual awareness (matters to which
we return presently), the subject is not invested with spatial
features. Thus perceptual objects necessarily are presented as
other than the perceiving subject. l1
Spatial features are presented within the subject'S awareness
only in the patterns of perceptual consciousness. As percepts
come under the control of verbal signals, hence taking on the
capacities of verbal meanings (chapter XI), modes of perceptual
presentation are replaced by other formats serving the require-
ments of linguistic communication. And as meanings are further
generalized to serve as concepts and hence divested of all represen-
tational features, the 'outerness' that is essential to objective
structures comes to be presented in a different way. 'Outerness'
no longer is merely a mode of spatial structuring, but is retained
in a form divested of spatiality. This is the source of the intention-
ality of concepts. The intentional feature of concepts pertaining
to objective structures is but another coded form of certain
informational configurations, which in perception are coded in
the form of spatial structures. The spatial structure is super-
seded, but the 'otherness' remains.
A thought, volition, or other mental state structured by an
objective concept (I) is directed upon an object, because it is part
of any such concept to represent its content as other than the
conscious subject. A mental state (2.) is identifiable phenomeno-
logically only with reference to its content or object, since the
concepts by which such states are structured differ only with
respect to their objective patterns. Finally, the occurrence of a
mental state (3) does not require the independent existence of its
object, inasmuch as rational concepts (as distinct from percepts)
245
Mentality
are not dependent upon sensory control. It is this latter feature
that Brentano called the 'intentional inexistence of objects'.
The 'outerness' of perceptual objects becomes a nonspatial
'otherness' on the level of information processing by language and
reason. But as 'outer' presupposes a correlative 'inner,' 'other'
correlates to a self that remains the same. To complete this brief
sketch of intentionality thus requires a discussion of self-aware-
ness.
5 SELF-AWARENESS
The distinction 'self and other' begins as an aspect of a perceptual

field, in which self is indicated by 'reverse intentionality' as the
subject with respect to which objects are 'outwardly' directed. As
implied in Russell's distinction between the 'place at which' and
the 'place from which' things appear (Russell, 1917, p. 153), the
'outwardness' of intentional presentations is balanced by an
'inwardness' toward a locus from which the intentionality origin-
ates. The distinction between self and other is reinforced by the
organism's ability to alter its perceptual fields either by mani-
pulation of external circumstances (distance and direction from
perceptual object, refractive devices) or by alterations independ-
ent of the external environment (squinting or crossing eyes, taking
drugs). This duality of control supplies additional evidence for
the distinction between subject and object, even though the
subject never appears within the perceptual field.
There are as many distinct perceptual fields as there are sense
modalities presenting objects with intentional status. Since in-
tentionality in perception is a spatial structure, perceptual fields
are generated by those sense modalities in which objects appear
joined by spatial relationships. Thus we speak of the visual, the
auditory and the tactual fields of awareness, but seldom of any field
pertaining to taste or smell.
Perceptual fields in turn are temporally associated. If the ob-
jective presentations constituting a given field from moment to
moment are focused around a constant 'inward' locus, this sub-
jective locus assumes the character of self-identity through time.
The subject thereby both provides temporal continuity to the
individual field of awareness and serves as a reference by which
2.46
Suijectivity
different fields can present simultaneous appearances. As Kant
remarked with typical acuity, while space is the form of all outer
appearances, all inner determinations are represented in relations
of time (Kant, 1787, pp. 67-71).
Spatial representation is removed as a condition for objective
awareness when consciousness is extended from perception to
reason. Structures of awareness in reason are organized instead
around conceptual relationships, often reflecting forms oflanguage
in which reason originates. An example is the relationship be-
tween substance and attribute, reflecting the grammatical relation-
ship between subject and predicate. Similarly, the concept of the
self as the source of conscious activity is supported by the gram-
matical format of first person locutions.
For one thing, '1' signifies a different person from 'you' and
'he', standing in a different relationship to the act of speech. '1'
is the active source of the message communicated, while 'you'
is the recipient and 'he' the topic. More importantly, language
serves different functions in first person locutions from any
within the range of other grammatical persons. Whereas in the
latter we describe, remark and report, only the first person is
available for promising, pleading and praying. The speaker of
a person-inflected language thereby learns to conceive himself
as empowered for special performances in his role as initiator of
certain speech activities.
The subject thus comes to be conceived as the agent responsible
for certain performances, much as a physical cause is responsible
for the effects it generates. In fullblown conceptual consciousness,
moreover, the subject is presented not only as the source of
linguistic utterances, but also as the principle sustaining such
mental activities as remembering, reflecting, intending and fore-
seeing. With such a range of powers the subject achieves the
status conceptually of an active entity, on a par with other entities
exhibiting characteristic activities.
In brief, a human subject is conceived as sustaining several
fields of awareness, notably those of perception and of the various
forms of reasoning, each of which is characterized by an inten-
tional polarity in which the subject is posed as 'other' than the
object of which it is currently aware. When the activity of the
subject within one field of awareness becomes the object of
awareness in another, the subject is conceived as implicated in
2.47
Mentality
the reflexive activity we commonly speak of as self-awareness.
Since the mode of presentation is never spatial, it is impossible
to perceive the subject thinking. But we commonly think about
our own perceivings, and remember our thoughts and antici-
pations.
Self-awareness is our access through one field of awareness to
another exhibiting the polarity between subject and object.
6 IMMATERIAL EXISTENCE
But selfhood according to the above portrayal is only a particular

aspect of the human information-processing system. What sense
is to be made, if this account is correct, of man's age-old vision
of incorporeal existence? To this awesome topic we turn in the
final moments.
Spirit may be defined as that portion of selfhood that is capable
of immaterial existence. But what portion this might be is not
easily determined.
Perceptual capacities depend upon sensory inputs, and language
is dependent upon physical media. Conscience has to do with
social behavior, and intention is directed upon temporal goals.
Even the concepts of reason are perceptual in origin. On the
other hand, rational concepts once acquired may be exercised
without perception, enabling consciousness to persist beyond its
sensory basis. Perhaps spirit is best conceived as the capacity to
respond to information, however received initially, in conscious
patterns without sensory input. Thus conceived, spirit might be
subject to beatific vision.
Let us understand immaterial existence to be existence in any
mode that is independent of both space and time. Such existence,
however possible for the human spirit, must find its source out-
side the evolutionary framework. No system evolves and is
naturally selected for its ability to remain integral apart from
bodily functions, for to lose bodily support is equivalent to dying
and hence tantamount to deselection. If man is capable of im-
material existence, it must be on the basis of functions developed
to support other capacities.
Thus the story of mankind evolving stops short of the topic of
what speaking religiously we call immortality. No religionist
z4 8
Subjectivity
would have it otherwise. Nonetheless, the present viewpoint can
accommodate the possibility of immaterial existence, and even
lend it a measure of credibility.12
Wiener finds amusing and instructive the possibility of encod-
ing all the information contained in the structure of the human
body by some extremely subtle reading mechanism and then
transmitting this information to a receiving station at which
point some extremely sophisticated receiving mechanism would
reconstitute the body in its original form (Wiener, 1954, p. 96).
If all goes well at either end, the person will have been moved at
the speed of electromagnetic transmission without existing bodily
during the intervening period.
Many problems emerge in considering this possibility, of an
ethical and social as well as a technical nature. Its value for present
purposes, however, lies merely in the illustration it provides of
one way in which information contained in the composite human
being can be constituted in structures other than those of the
conventional human body. The human person in this case, his
capacity for consciousness included, exists for a moment in a
nonbodily state. His existence, however, should still be counted
material, since the modulated electromagnetic waves transporting
his person are part of the material world.
The term 'material' is far from unambiguous. 13 Yet, following
Wiener's lead, I think there is an intelligible sense in which in-
formation structures constituting a person might exist in a form
not to be counted material by our present criterion. That is to
say, I think it is possible for human consciousness to exist in a
form that is neither spatial nor temporal.
If the cybernetic account of man I have been developing is
basically sound, then the procedures by which the human organ-
ism operates may be understood as a set of statistical structures.
Consciousness in particular is a mode of information processing,
and as such is describable in terms of communication theory.
However formidable the task might be in practice, the informa-
tional structures of consciousness might be exhibited as equations
on paper, as functions across a transmitting line, or in any other
fashion available for the representation of mathematical relation-
ships. There is no necessity that this means of representation itself
be dependent upon material structures.
Let us conceive a universe comprising only a field of elements,
249
Mentality
each existing in one of only two states. The elements have no
properties beyond these states of existence, and hence are not
related either spatially or temporally.14 Conceive now as an added
factor that these elements are indicated in serial order (by some
unimaginable act of creation; 'in the beginning was the logos,'
'logos' being Greek for 'due relation'). Thus each element becomes
identifiable by its place in the series, and characterized with
reference to its binary state. But since the ordering relation by
itself is neither spatial nor temporal, the elements have no exist-
ence in a spatiotemporal matrix. Thus this universe does not
admit characterization according to the principles of physical
science. In short, what we have conceived is not a material system.
Imagine now that this series of elements is divided in some
particular fashion, each subseries characterizable with reference
to its own constituents. Each series then may be conceived as a
binary information source, emitting elements in the atemporal
sequence of its serial ordering. Any two series of this sort, more-
over, can be conceived as constituting an information channel,
characterized by a specific set of conditional probabilities. And
any group of more than two is a cascade of channels.
But it is just cascades of this sort which, in sufficient detail,
constitute the information-processing functions of human con-
sciousness. Thus, by an appropriate selection of ordered series,
the spirit of a given human being could in principle be constituted
on an immaterial basis.
Fantastic as this may be to conceive, it is no more fantastic than
the concept of the universe before the initial formation of hydro-
gen atoms, which themselves are informational structures ac-
cumulating substance out of insubstantial probabilities. But both
beginnings and endings prove too much for our conceptual
powers. This, of course, is what should be expected, since reason
has been adapted for understanding what comes in between.
NOTES
1 Pickford remarks (Wyburn, 1964, p. 207) that 'since red, yellow, brown,
and green are important indicators of ripeness, overripeness and rotten-
ness in many edible fruits and meat, it is not unlikely that colour-blind
children or infants have been killed by food poisoning in primitive peoples
more often than among ourselves ••• .'
25°
SlIbjectivity
2 Geldard (1953, p. 54) mentions a color chart containing 7,000 different
samples. For these to be discriminable within the visual range of approxi-
mately 380 to 760 millimicrons would require about eighteen detectable
differences per unit wavelength. Experimental evidence indicates, how-
ever, that only about 150 such discriminations are accomplished by the
human visual apparatus over the entire spectral range (Geldard, 1953,
p. 51; Wyburn, 1964, p. 101).
3 Land, 1959. Among the few attempts by philosophers to accommodate
Land's results in their analysis of perception are Smart (1963) and Den-
nett (1969).
4 The ease with which we assign color descriptions to common objects,
despite the fact that perceptual objects produce many colors across their
surfaces (Pickford, in Wyburn, 1964, p. 99), is abetted by the phenomenon
of color constancy, accountable in terms of 'grain' stability through time.
Land observes (1959, p. 93) that color appearances result from wave-
length balance over the entire visual scene, and that the same balance may
occur under different circumstances. The differences marked by particular
color appearances are not limited to particular sets of perceptual conditions.
6 The fact that colors are subjective in this respect does not preclude their
having objective criteria. As Smart points out (1963, p. 80), 'the objective
criteria for the redness of an object ... are the discriminatory responses
of normal percipients,' available in different forms to both the blind and
the sighted.
6 We may endorse a non-topic-neutral version of Smart's account of after-
image (1963, p. 94): a yellow after-image is something going on in a
subject's information-processing system like what goes on when he is
perceiving a yellow object.
7 In his introduction to Mead (1934, p. xxxi), Morris remarks that
for Mead 'the aesthetic object brings the emotionally toned impulses into
a harmonious whole; the object capable of so stimulating and integrating
the impulses has aesthetic character or value.'
8 There is no need to follow Lorenz (1965, p. 75) in postulating a 'per-
fection-reinforcing mechanism.' The pleasure of skilled performance is
its own reward.
9 Brentano maintained that all mental presentations are intentional in
character: 'we can define mental phenomena by saying that they are such
phenomena as include an object intentionally within themselves' (Bren-
tano, 1960, pp. 50-I). Although counterexamples are certainly available
(malaise by definition is a feeling not focused upon any particular object),
phenomena of perception, want, hope, desire, love, hate, etc., are such
that they can be distinguished from others of their kind only with refer-
ence to the object upon which they are directed.
10 Some phenomenologists would object to speaking of mental states as
intentional instead of mental acts or presentations. Although I would
maintain that for every activity of an organism there is an organic state,
nothing hangs upon the distinction for present purposes. I do not attempt
here to give an adequate exposition of the role the concept of intention-
ality plays in phenomenology.
2.51
Mentality
I IIt is not inevitable in principle that objects appear structured in three-
dimensional space. If our information-processing systems were adapted
to treat time as a dimension in the same homogeneous continuum as
space (rather than as two distinct modes of dimensionality in a hetero-
geneous space-time continuum), then subject could be related to object
in a common framework, since self-awareness admits of temporality. As
matters stand, however, perceptual objects are presented as 'other' with
respect to a nonspatial reference point, a relationship we customarily
(but problematically) speak of in terms of 'outer' and 'inner'.
12 Armstrong provides the valuable service of suggesting a number of
requirements any adequate theory of mind should meet. The charac-
teristics of a 'completely satisfactory theory,' he says (1968, p. 36) are
that '(i) It should allow for the logical possibility of the disembodied
existence of a mind. (ii) It should treat mental happenings as things in-
capable of independent existence [from something having them]. (iii) It
should account for the unity of mind and body. (iv) It should provide a
principle of numerical difference for minds. (v) It should not be scientific-
ally implausible. (vi) It should allow for the causal interaction of mind and
body.' Further (ibid., p. 41), it 'must be able to give some account or
analysis of the intentionality of mental states... .' Although his first is
my last, with this final section my account becomes a plausible contender
by these criteria. It should be noted that criterion (i) is to allow for the
logical possibility of disembodied existence of the mind. My account
goes one step forward, providing also for its systematic intelligibility
(more than can be said for most dualistic theories). It does not, however,
constitute anything like a 'proof' of immaterial existence.
13 A careful mustering of philosophically important and distinct senses of
'materialism' is accomplished in the dissertation 'Cybernetics and
Materialism' by Kristin Shrader-Frechette. I am indebted to Dr Shrader-
Frechette for her critique of earlier versions of the present section, which
I hope has been altered sufficiently to meet her approval.
14 Compare the elements of Plato's 'dream theory' in Theaetetus 201D-
202C, and the simple objects of Wittgenstein's Trac/a/usTrae/a/us Logico-Philo-
Logieo-Philo-
sophicus (eg., 2.02, 3.221).
252
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259
INDEX
Abramson, N., 34, 160 Brentano, F., 243, 246, 25 I

Abstraction, 212 f. Brillouin, L., 38,44-7, 83
Aesthetic pleasure, 240 Broad, C. D., 230
Amino acids, 93, 97, II2, II4 Broadbent, D. E., 160, 227
Anaxagoras, 6 Buchsbaum, R., 166
Anderson, c., xiii Buckley, W., 183
Anticipatory feedback, 58 f., 64,159, Bush, R. R., 34
172, 221 Butler, S., 101
Appearances, 231, 233 f., 236-8
Aristotle, xii, 7, Il7, 153, 155, 208 Call system, 192 ff., 196
Armstrong, D. M., xi f., 18, 161, Campbell, R., 184 f., 206
227 f., 252 Carnap, R., 34, 226, 228
Ascher, R., 192, 194 ff. Catania, A. c., 132, 136 f., 150
Ashby, W. R., 60, 159 Changeux, J.-P., 52, 61
Asimov, I., 88 Chomsky, N., 17, 187, 205, 207
Attneave, F., 34 Clausius, R., 37, 45
Austin, J. L., 184 Coacervates, II3 ff., 120, 165
Color, 232-9, 250 f.
Bar-Hillel, Y., 34, 226, 228 appearances, 236 ff., 25 I
Barlow, H. B., 160 brightness, 234 f.
Beadle, G., 88, 96 f., 103, Il9, 121 constancy, 25 I
Beadle, M., 88, 97, 103, II9, 121 'grain', 235 f., 238
Bee language, 189 ff. property, 237 f.
Behaviorism, 133 saturation, 234 f.
Bennett, J., 206, 208 f., 226 Concept, 215-26, 245
Bent, H. A., 46 Conditioning, 124, 134 ff., 137 f.
Berkeley, G., 9 f., 153, 155 operant, 134, 136f.
Bernays, P., 230 respondent, 134 ff., 137 f.
Blanshard, B., 65, 230 Conscience, 178, 182
Blum, H., 46, 103 Crick, F. H. c., 95
Boltzmann, L., 36, 38,41,46 Crutchfield, R., 149
261
Index
Darwin, c., 162 Grtinbaum, A., 74
De Laguna, G. A., 104 Gutting, G., xiii
Dennett, D. c., xi f., 25 I
Descartes, R., 8, 187 Hanson, N. R., 230
Determinism, 66, 76 f., 79 ff., 104 Hartley, R. V. L., 2J, 23, 25, 34
Deterministic channel, 76, 79 Havelock, E., 171, 184, 186
Dobzhansky, T., 94, 109, 120 Hebb, D.O., 132, 143
Dockz, S., 230 Heffernan, J., xiii
Dualism, 12 Herrick, C. J., 12 I, 166 f.
Dudel, J., 131 Hess, E. H., 123, 136
Dunn, E. S., 17, 184 f., 227, 229 Heterotelic feedback, 54 if., 58, 63,
159, 17 2
Eccles, J., 131 Hiller, L., 34
Edelhoch, H., 88, 103 Hintikka, J., 228, 230
Einstein, A., 6 Hobbes, T., 183
Empedocles, 6 Hockett, C. F., 192, 194 ff., 202, 206
Entropy (communication theoretic), Homeostatic feedback, 52-6, 59,63,
27, 37,40-4, 75 ff., 146 91, 100 ff., 104, 106-9, 159, 172
Entropy (thermodynamic), 37-44, Hume, D., 65, 69
74 f., 78 f., 83, 87, 89 ff., 93, Huxley, J., 87
99 Hydrogen bond, 95, J03
Equivocation, 28, 216 f.
Esch, H., 189 ff., 206 Imprinting, 123, 136
Ethical relativism, 180 Information channel, 26-35, 150 f.,
Evolutionary progress, 106, II5-J9, 153-6,231 f., 239
J89 Informational realism, xiii, 156
Ewing, A. c., 65 Innate language, 187, J91-6, 202, 205
Explanation, 67-70, 78 ff. Intentionality, 232, 243-6
Intentions, J68, J72, J76 ff., 185,
Feigl, H., J8 197-200,205 f., 210, 217, 219, 221,
Figure closure, I 51 f. 243
Figure-ground reversal, 158 formal patterns of, 199, 20J, 205,
Fisher, R. A., 87 210, 2J9 f.
Fogel, L., 103 Interactional properties, 237
Ford, K. W., 68, 72 Isaacson, L., 34
Frost, R., 87, 90
Jacob, F., 5I
Gabor, D., 47 Jaynes, E. T., 36
Galambos, R., 132 Johnson, H. A., 47
Galanter, E., 34, 228
Gardner, M., J03 Kandel, E. R., 131, 133, 137, 150
Garner, W., 34 Kant, 1.,153,155,230,247
Garvick, S., xiii Katz, J., 206
Geldard, F. A., 251 Knudsen, K. D., 47
Gibbs, J. W., 36, 39 Krech, D., 149
Greenberg, J. L., 188 Kuffier, S. W., 131
Greenstein, J. L., II I Kuhn, A., 184, 226
262
Index
Land, E., 235, 251 139,143, 145, 167, 170, 188, 21I,
Laplace, P. S. de, 79, 82 226
Lashley, K. S., 161 Negentropy, 44 f., 47, 82, 90, 1I6-
Lees, R. B., 2.07 119, 169 f., 2.3 I
Lettvin, ]., 142 Neisser, U., 2.03
Locke, ]., 7, IB, ISS Neutral monism, 12., 16, 18
Lorenz, K., 56, 58,87,120,12.3,125,
58, 87, 120, 12.3, 125, I., 68
Newton, 1.,
136, 168,2.5 1 Noiseless channel, 2.9, 76 ff.
Luce, R. D., 34 Nucleic acids, 88, 94 fr., I 12, 114
Nyquist, H., 21
MacArthur, R. H., 1I9
McIntosh, R., xiii Odum, E. P., 12.0
McKim, V., xiii OIds, ]., 132., 137
Magoun, H. W., 132. Olds, M. E., 132, 137
Margalef, R., 108, 12.0 Ontology, xii, 4,8, 10, 15 ff.
Markov source, 2.9, 53, 73, 2.07 Oparin, A. I., 92, 120
Masking relation, 73 f., 82, 216, Osgood, C. E., 132, 207
2.18 fr., 22.4 Ovenden, M., 87
Masochism, 242. Owens, A., 103
Massey, J., xiii
Materialism, 9-12, 17,252.
Pain, 126, 239-42
Maxwell, ]. c., 36,45
Pattern, 152. ff., 156-9, 161 f., 174 f.,
Maxwell's Demon, 44 f., 79
188, 198, 2.06, 2.10 f., 2.13, 2.2.0,
Mead, G. H., 103, 2.2.9, 2.51
2.34,241 f.
Meaning, 189, 196 f., 2.00 f., 205, 210,
Percept, 2.10-13, 2.16 f.
213 f., 2.16 f., 219 f., 22.3, 2.45
Perception, 153-6, 161, 201, 211,
content, 2.19 f.
2.32 ff., 2.45-8
reference, 200
Perceptual consciousness, 139, 144,
sense, 200
146,156,159,161,167,169,175,
Mendel, G., 94
184, 22.0, 233, 2.45
Miller, G., 17, 2.02. f., 2.07, 22.8
Perceptual field, 158 f., 2.46
Monnard, G., xiii, 121
Performative utterances, 170, 177,
Monod, ].,51 f., 61, 97 f., 103 f.
18 4,2.47
Moore, E. F., 103
Philosophic method, 6 ff.
Morgan, T. H., 94
Pickford, R. W., 2.50 f.
Morris, C. W., 2.29, 2.51
Piel, G., 166
Mutual information, 28, 34, 146,
Pittendrigh, C. S., 104
15 I f., 155
Planck, M., 36, 38, 46
Plato, xii, 186, 252.
Nagel, E., 104, 2.30 Pleasure, 5, 13 2,239-44
Natural selection, 105 f., 109, 117, Positive feedback, 50, 109, 12.7, 137,
119, 130, 188,242. 15 1
Negative feedback, xi, 15, 50 f., 54, Postulate of perceptual efficiency,
61, 66, 78, 91, 93, 99, 103, 105, 146, 15 I
109, III, 114, 12.0, 12.7, 130, 137, Pribram, K., 2.2.8
151 Pringle, J. W. S., II9, 137
Negentropic flexibility, II7 fr., 121, Protoscience, 8, 14
2. 63
Index
Punishers, 12.6-31,135,137,241 f. appearance, 234, 236 fT.
Purpose, 63, 172-6, 179, 184 f., constancy, 156 f.
197 f., 210, 223, 243 property, 234, 236 fT.
Pythagoreans, 6 Shrader-Frechette, K., xiii, 252
Simpson, G., 107 fT., II9
Quantum physics, 16, 68, 72, 75 f. Skinner, B. F., 17, II9, 134, 137
Quastler, H., 34 Smart, J. J. c., 18, 2p
Spatiality, 65,238,245-50, 252
Spence, K. W., 135
Rapoport, A., 18;
Spinoza, B., 65
RatlifT, F., 159
Spirit, 248
Reason, 167, 184, 191, 208 f., 212.,
Steiner, R., 88, 103
21 4,220-6,229,2;2,247 f., 250
Stimulus control oflanguage, 196 f.,
Redundancy, 147, 203 f., 207, 210,
217, 222
214, 217, 220
Stimulus discrimination, 124, 134
Reichenbach, H., 68, 71 f., 75, 82
Strawson, P., 6, 185
Reinforcement, 12.5 fT., 129-32, 134-
Subject of awareness, 12, 232, 245-8
137,200,2;2,241 f.
Suppes, P., 230
Rescher, N., 185
Szilard, L., 44
Roller, D. E., 17
Roller, D. H. D., 17
Rorty, R., 18 Tait, P. G., 45
Rosenberg, A., 184 f., 206 Teleonomy, 90, 99, 101 f., 104
Rosenbleuth, A., 63, 104, 184 Teuber, H. L., In, 161
Russell, B., 6, 12 f., 16, 18, 67, 149, Thorpe, W. H., 133, 136 f., 168,
246 189 f., 206
Russell, W. M. S., 17, 1I9 Time, 13,67 f., 72, 74-9, 81, 247-5 0,
2F
Toulmin, S., 229 f.
Sahlins, M. D., 169, 183 f. Tribus, M., 39,43,45 f.
Salmon, W., 69 fT., 136
Sayre, K. M., 18, 34, 63, IF, 156,
160, 226 Uncertainty, 22 f., 171, 201
Schneirla, R., 166
Schramm, D. V., 120 Values, 22 f., 171, 201
Schr6ciinger, E., 89, 1I6 Veridical perception, 154, 161, 234,
Scott, J. P., 168 23 6
Searle, J., 184 von Foerster, H., 160
Second Law of Thermodynamics, von Frisch, K., 183, 206
37, 39,42,44 fT., 61, 74, 79 f., 82, von Neumann, J., 103, 160, 226
89
Self-awareness, 140, 23 I, 246 fT. Walker, V., xiii
Sellars, W., 228, 230 Wall, P. D., 131
Semantic information, 201 Walls, G. L., 140
Sentient feedback, 51 f., 63, 103, Walsh, M., 103
14 1, 159, 172 Warren, R. M., In
Shannon, C. E., 21, 25, 34, 46, 60, Warren, R. P., In
141,145,159, 20 5 Watson, J. D., 95
Shape, 149, 156 f., 234, 236 fT. Weaver, W., ;4,60,159
26 4
Index
Weiss, P., 143 Wooldridge, D. E., 61, 103, no,
White, L., 167, 184 140, 160
Wiener, N., 18,63,87,119, 184,249 Wyburn, G. M., 23S, 2S0 f.
Williams, G. c., 183
Wilson, v. J., 131 Yerkes, R. M., 140
Wittgenstein, L., 148, 2 S2 Young, L. B., 87 f.
2. 65

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ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:

CYBERNETICS AND THE

London and Henley

ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL

Part One The Mind-Body Problem

Part Two Fundamentals

Part Three Organism and Environment

VIII Learning 122

Part Four Mentality

XII Reason 2.08

XIII Subjectivity 2.;1

A star at midlife is balanced thermally by negative feedback

I THE SCIENTIFIC SIDE OF THE MIND-BODY

The purpose of inquiry is understanding. In general (more may be

Science disengaged from philosophy only recently in human

3 TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO THE

If one thinks of mind, with Descartes, as characterized essentially

4 THE CYBERNETIC APPROACH

My purpose in this book is to recommend an approach to the

5 RELATIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE

This approach to the mind-body problem shares the advantages

Cybernetics is based upon the concepts of information and

Imagine an investor who needs information (advice) about the

3 ENTROPY AND MUTUAL INFORMATION

Given the concept of information, we may now define other

4 INFORMATION STORAGE AND

With this conception of information as a decrease in uncertainty,

an P(bl/an) P(b 2/an) ••. P(bm/an)

Hence, by substitution in (3), I(A;B) = I(B;A).

I COMMUNICATION THEORY AND

Information transmission has been defined as the change in

2 THERMODYNAMIC ENTROPY DEFINED

The term 'entropy' was coined by Clausius a century ago to mean

3 THE TWO ENTROPIES RELATED

The entropy of an ensemble of events (A) is defined in communi-

A thought-experiment known as 'Maxwell's Demon' has become

I This result is shown in M. Tribus (I96Ib). A more succinct discussion

that there is no justification in the discussion above for conceiving the

I THE PRIORITY OF INFORMATION OVER

Feedback processes existed in nature before life's first stirrings, and

2 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FEEDBACK

Feedback is a process by which the behavior of an operating

A homeostatic process can be described as a series of interactions

Negative feedback of a different sort occurs when a system's

16 SENTIENT AND ANTICIP A TORY

The following account of the territorial behavior of brightly

We have traced in outline a course of possible development of

1 This process is described in nontechnical detail by Wooldridge (1963,

4 The following conditional probability matrix provides an example:

As specified in this matrix,

8 These provisions may be depicted

I THE NEED FOR A CYBERNETIC MODEL

According to the Humean account of causation, two events c and

I refer to these various conceptions of causation as models to

Causation and explanation obviously are closely related. To

4 THE CYBERNETIC MODEL

In discussing the communication-theoretic model we will con-

tropy decreases with advancing time (Reichenbach, 1956, sec·

5 THE CAUSAL MODEL IN BIOLOGICAL

I DISTINGUISHING LIFE FROM THE

The statistician Fisher, Julian Huxley informs us, once described

The black stream, catching on a sunken rock,

in which the brook runs counter to itself.