CLIFFORD CYRIL D.

DEDASE
ADRIENN EARL NARZABAL
JD-1B

JD 109 (Philosophy of Law)

Atty. CARLO T. NABO

CASE STUDY:
Jose Jesus M. Disini Jr., et al v. The Secretary of Justice., et al
(G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)

1. Facts
From the 14 consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines arises the case. These petitioners include the Philippine Bar Association, the
National Press Club, a number of other NGOs and prominent academics. In these
petitions, it challenges several provisions of the R.A. No. 10175 famously known as
CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012. The petitioners argued that even though
the Act is the government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities and it
aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace, petitioners claim that the means
adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate
certain of their constitutional rights, 21 separate sections of the Act violate the
constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression and access to
information including the right to privacy of individual person.

2. Main Issue
Whether or not certain provisions of the cybercrime prevention act
are constitutional insofar as they regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for
their commission as well as would enable government to track down and penalize
violators.

3. Decision

The Court held that Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act were
unconstitutional. It found that Section 4(c)(3) restricted freedom of expression by
prohibiting the unsolicited transmission of commercial communications, such as spam.
Section 12 was declared in violation of the right to privacy because it lacked sufficient
specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data. Section 19 was found
to violate the rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, which gave the
government the authority to restrict or block access to computer data without a judicial
warrant.

Further, the Court DECLARES:

1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with
respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with
respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of
cybercrimes as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on
Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System

4. Philosophical Underpinnings

Freedom of speech is one of the human rights inherit by humans in

the world as stated in Article 19 of the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights),
the article states that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and speech,
including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
convey information and ideas through any media regardless of boundaries (region).
As what implied in the decision of the case mentioned, free speech
is not absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be
provided by law. With her dissenting opinion, Justice Sereno stated her concurrence on
the ponencia’s partial invalidation of Section 4(c)(4) on libel insofar as it purports to
create criminal liability on the part of persons who receive a libelous post and merely
react to it; and of Section 7, in so far as it applies to libel.
This statement embodies the principle behind the limitation of
freedom of speech. This limitation subjects the person involve on the said libelous act
but not the person who just receives and reacted upon. Proof of truth is important
when expressing freedom of speech especially if it backed with good motives and for
justifiable ends.
Freedom of speech is subject to limitations, but it doesn’t mean that
these limitations will be the result of its violation. These limitations means that exercise
of one’s freedom of speech or expression it carries with it special duties and
responsibilities.
In my concurring opinion, it is vital for the state to protect the
fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. In relation the above case,
restricted freedom of expression by prohibiting the unsolicited transmission of
commercial communications, such as spam is indeed unconstitutional.
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out
that unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the
storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of
commerce and technology, and interferes with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his
property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person
sending out spams enters the recipient’s domain without prior permission. The OSG
contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that
unsolicited electronic ads reduce the “efficiency of computers.” Secondly, people, before
the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by
mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in
such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading
these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipient always has the option to delete
or not to read them. This means that the government have not given sufficient proof
that there is violation. Therefore in this, way freedom of speech must not be curtailed.