[G.R. NO. 250288. JANUARY 30, 2023] JOHN KRISKA LOGISTICS, INC.

/ JOHN
KRISKA DISTRIBUTION CENTER INC., AND KAREN NERONA
(MANAGER), PETITIONERS, VS. ELIZARDO T. MENDOZA,* RESPONDENT

ISSUE ON MONETARY CLAIM

John Kriska Logistics Inc. filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of
the CA on April 24, 2019, which was later on dismissed by the CA, affirming the Decision of the
NLRC on June 27, 2017; assailed the CA’s resolution October 18, 2019, denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration – in favor of the respondent.
Petitioner: John Kriska Logistics Inc.
Respondent: Elizardo T. Mendoza

FACTS

 February 6, 2006 – P hired R as its delivery helper (manual carry and transport of
boxes to malls, SMs, etc.)
 September 2016 – R stopped working after a cataract surgery (left eye) following the
advice not to carry heavy objects – not fit to work anymore.
 P claimed that they need the medical certificate stating that the illness was incurable
within 6 months (pursuant to Article 299 of LC).
 BUT R’s med cert did not contain one and insisted payment of separation pay
 September 20, 2016 - R requested assistance via Single Entry Approach but failed to
reach agreement, therefore R filed a Complaint against P the next month before the LA
 October 2016 - The complaint’s content are as follows:
o Daily wage rates were below minimum wage rate
o Alleged deduction of cash bond (100.00) from his weekly wage
o Underpayment of wages resulting to underpayment of 13th month pay
o HENCE, he hoped to be awarded monetary claims of salary differential, 13 th
month pay differential, cash equivalent of his service incentive leave (SIL), cash
bond, atty’s fees, and other just and equitable compensation.
 P argued: it was R who decided not to report to duty removing his rights to separation
pay and that R already admitted to being paid his 13th month pay and SIL of 5 days.
 November 23, 2016 – LA hearing
o R – cleared that he was already paid his 13th month pay for 2015 and exhausted
his 5 days SIL; manifested not reporting to duty after the surgery and advice of
the doctor
o Settlement purposes: P offered 14,037.27 equating to R’s salary differentials,
proportionate 13th month pay, and cash bond
o R refused and replied on June 13, 2017 claiming that he was never illegally
dismissed and the complaint was anchored on the underpaid wages.
 January 31, 2017 – LA dismissed R’s complaint “with prejudice for lack of merit”
 o With only his pay slips attached – LA ruled that he was not underpaid given that
his daily wage and allowance was 365.00 on August 2016 (within minimum wage
of Wage Order No. RB-III-19 – taking effect on January 1. 2016).
o Since he was already paid his 13th month salary and used his SIL of 5 days.
o No separation pay since he was never illegally terminated from employment
 R appealed before the NLRC
 May 16, 2017 - NLRC Ruling – partly granting R’s appeal (reversing and setting aside
LA ruling, ordering P to pay R:
o SALARY DIFFERENTIAL in the amount of [P]17,377.88;
o THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY DIFFERENTIAL in the amount of [P]1,448.16;
o SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY in the amount of [P]12,562.92;
o CASH BOND in the amount of [P]15,600.00[; and]
o ATTORNEY'S FEES in the amount of [P]4,698.90.
o TOTAL: P51,687.86
 NLRC findings show that
o P failed to provide evidence to prove payment of R’s wages and benefits
o Meal allowance cannot be part of the basic salary (since P failed to meet the legal
requisites for its inclusion)
o R entitled to the monetary value of his 5-day SIL for every year of service from
February 6 - September 20, 2016 (excluding SIL for 2015-2016 that are already
consumed) since P did not argue whether these were exhausted or not.
o P did not deny deduction of 100.00 on R’s weekly wages (citing Article 305 of the
LC, only cash bond from October 13, 2013 can be awarded)
 June 2, 2017 – P filed their motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the NLRC
due to lack of merit
 P then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
 April 24, 2019 – the CA affirmed the NLRC Decision

ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it
granted respondent's monetary claims which consisted of salary differential, 13th month pay
differential, SIL, and cash bond.

RULING
The CA was correct in ruling the absence of the grave abuse of discretion on the
side of the NLRC by awarding the monetary claims.
1. The NLRC assumed the correctness of R’s claims SINCE it was never rebutted by P by
submitting R’s pay slips (they did not deny nor present evidence against it).
a. The overlooking of R’s pay slips inconsistency be however considered a mere
error of judgment (but not of jurisdiction); it cannot be counted as capriciously
disregarded seeing how P failed to raise the issue on labor tribunals.
 2. The NLRC was correct in excluding the meal allowance from the daily salary given that P
did not adduce any evidence showing that R’s meal allowance was paid in the form of
facilities.
3. R is undisputedly entitled to SIL pursuant to Section 2, Rule V, Book III of the Omnibus
Implementing Rules Implementing the Labor Code. "[e]very employee who has
rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave
of five days with pay." 
a. During the hearing, there was an ambiguity which year was referred to when
discussing the used 5-day SIL. It is settled rule that in labor cases, doubts are
resolved in favor of an employee in line with the policy of the State to afford
greater protection to labor. Hence, any ambiguity in the minutes regarding
respondent's admission cannot be interpreted to his prejudice.
4. The NLRC was correct in ordering P to refund R’s cash bond (100.00 x 3 yrs) pursuant to
Art. 306 of the LC.
a. LA greatly disregarded the 100.00 weekly deduction proof from R’s pay slips
b. Though they offered a check, no evidence was furnished to determine the balance
of R’s cash bond (not until the NLRC ordered P to refund R’s cash bond of
15,600.00)
c. P are also mistaken for arguing that NLRC should have not computed R’s cash
bond only in the appeal 1) employees are not required to compute their total
money claims and present it to the LA; thus, it only surfacing before the NLRC is
correct. The weekly pay slips showing the 100.00 deductions are enough (easy
math)
d. Although they presented evidence of cash bond in 2013-2015 as a response to the
appeal and it may be considered as evidence, IT IS SUBJECT TO THE RULE that
the submission of such evidence does not prejudice the other party (since R has
no opportunity to present counter-evidence).
e. AND it is suspicious to exclude 2016 from the evidence (where his employment
was severed). When a party refuses to provide evidence proving a material of fact
to impose liability on themselves, it is assumed that when produced it would
operate to their prejudice/interest. ALSO, by choosing not to present evidences at
the earliest opportunity, they fail to discharge the burden of proving payment.
5. The NLRC was correct in granting the 13th month pay pursuant to the 13th Month Pay
Law - an employee who has resigned or whose services were terminated at any time
before the time for payment of the 13th month pay is likewise entitled to 13th month pay
in proportion to the length of time he worked during the year. Thus, respondent is
entitled to receive his proportionate 13th month pay from January 1, 2016 to September
20, 2016.
a. Although this wasn’t specified by R, it is the duty of the Court to give what is due
for employees under the law.

THE COURT DENIED THE PETITION AND GRANTED RESPONDENT’S

MONETARY CLAIMS LISTED ABOVE.
Rule 45 review in labor cases – there will only be grave abuse of discretion when its
findings and decisions are not supported by substantial evidence; raise only questions of
law as a rule.
[G.R. NO. 236161. JANUARY 25, 2023] ALMA C. LUGAWE, PETITIONER, VS.
PACIFIC CEBU RESORT INTERNATIONAL, INC., RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether Lugawe was constructively dismissed from employment.
RULING:
No. PCRI's act of removing basic HR functions from Lugawe was a valid exercise of its
management prerogative in the pursuit of its legitimate business interest. The circumstances
alleged by Lugawe to demonstrate the discriminatory, insensible, and disdainful treatment of
PCRI are self-serving and uncorroborated by documentary or testimonial evidence. Instead, the
evidence on record would show that Lugawe voluntarily abandoned her employment.

[G.R. NO. 207153. JANUARY 25, 2023] DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MONSANTO COMPANY, RESPONDENT.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in finding that MISCO, or its assign Monsanto, a foreign corporation without license to transact
business in the Philippines, has the capacity to sue.

RULING:
The rule that an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippine does not have the capacity to sue
[26]
before the local courts is well-established.  Foreign corporations are required to obtain a license to do business in
[27]
the Philippines to be clothed with the capacity to sue as provided under Sec. 133  of Batasang Pambansa Big.
[28]
68  or the Corporation Code of the Philippines (Corporation Code):

SECTION 133. Doing Business Without License. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines
without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded
against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine
laws.

[G.R. NO. 246410. JANUARY 25, 2023] I-PEOPLE MANPOWER RESOURCES,

INC., ELEC QATAR AND LEOPOLDO GANGOSO, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS AND JOMER O. MONTON, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS
 On June 24, 2013, Elec Qatar, a Qatar-based company offering electro-mechanical services, hired Monton
as one of its electrical engineers through its local manpower agency, I-People Manpower Resources, Inc.
(IPMR).[6]
  Monton and Elec Qatar executed an employment contract for two years, from November 9, 2013 to
November 9, 2015, with a monthly basic salary of QAR 6,000.00 and an allowance of QAR 3,000.00.[7] His
employment contract stipulated that he will be assigned to the State of Qatar. The contract also provided
that Elec Qatar could terminate the contract by giving a one-month prior written notice to Monton.[8]
 On November 7, 2013, Monton flew to Qatar and started his work on November 9, 2013. Monton
subsequently paid IPMR the placement fees in the amounts of QAR 2,000.00, QAR 2,260.00, and QAR
2,000.00, or a total amount of QAR 6,260.00. These amounts were deducted from Monton's salary for July,
September, and October 2014.[9]Thereafter, Monton received a letter from Elec Qatar on October 6,
2014, informing him that his employment contract will be terminated within 30 days from the receipt of
said letter by reason of the low activity in the company and the lack of projects, forcing the company to
reduce cost and manpower.
 On November 10, 2014, Monton was repatriated to the Philippines—a year before the end of his
employment contract on November 9, 2015. Then, on November 14, 2014, Monton filed with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency-Licensing Regulation Office Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch in Mandaluyong
City a request for conciliation of his complaint and grievance against IPMR. Two conferences were
conducted from December 10 to 15, 2014. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement.[12]
 On December 15, 2014, Monton filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against IPMR, Elec Qatar, and
Leopoldo Gangoso, Jr., the latter being the corporate officer of IPMR (IPMR et al.). Monton prayed for the
payment of his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, reimbursement of the placement
fee paid to IPMR, damages, and attorney's fees.[13]
 Monton asserted that overseas Filipino workers may only be terminated for just or authorized causes, and
after compliance with procedural due process. He claimed that he was illegally dismissed since Elec
Qatar failed to prove that a valid retrenchment existed. He alleged that the latter was unable to provide
evidence of substantial 1oss in the business, besides bare allegations that the company was experiencing
low activity or a shortage of projects.[14]
 On the other hand, Elec Qatar argued that there was a valid exercise of management prerogative when
it terminated Monton's employment due to retrenchment, as Monton's position as electrical engineer was no
longer needed. Moreover, Elec Qatar claimed that the termination was mutually consented to as could be
inferred from the e-mail Monton. sent to Elec Qatar's managing director.

NLRC:

The National Labor Relations Commission ruled that Monton's dismissal was valid because his employment contract
with Elec Qatar was lawfully discontinued under its provisions. It found that based on the employment contract,
either the employer or the employee may choose to end the contract without the need to specify a cause for
termination.[20] It further held that "[t]he cause of termination therefore is not a significant issue because the
employment contract itself does not state any just and valid cause for its termination, as long as the notice
requirement is complied with[.]"[21] The National Labor Relations Commission further concluded that Elec Qatar had
validly effected Monton's dismissal by complying with the only requirement of giving Monton a month prior
written notice of termination.

 Monton acquiesced to his termination through his e-mail sent to Elec Qatar's managing director. Thus, the
termination of the employment contract was with the mutual consent of the parties and with prior
notice. Consequently, Monton is estopped from claiming that the cessation of his employment is illegal
(prevent from contradicting prior statements)

Afterwards, Monton filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals alleging that the National
Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
affirming the labor arbiter's Decision.

CA

The Court of Appeals ruled that Monton was illegally dismissed as the termination of his employment was without any
justifiable or authorized cause. It opined that the employment contract's termination clause should not be interpreted
as a form of blanket license by which Elec Qatar may just unilaterally terminate the contract at will.[27] It is a basic
principle that laws should be read into every contract without the need for any express reference thereto; more so,
when it pertains to a labor contract that is imbued with public interest.[28]

The Court of Appeals found that IPMR et al. failed to adduce anything beyond bare allegations to prove that a valid
retrenchment existed which would serve as a justifiable or authorized cause for respondent's dismissal.[29]

IPMR et al. filed a motion for reconsideration, which was subsequently denied in the assailed Resolution.[30]

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it reversed the National Labor Relations Commission and declared Monton to have been illegally dismissed.

RULING:
Yes.