Accord University

Knowledge & Vision

_____________________________________________________________________

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS

OF THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SECURITY INTELLIGENCE & STRATEGIC
STUDIES AT ACCORD UNIVERSITY

Department of Arts

Department of Master of Security Intelligene & Strategic Studies

Supervisor: Dr. Shantae‘ Coppock,

Submitted By: Abdirahman Muse Mohamed

MOGADISHU – SOMALIA

March 2022
 APPROVAL PAGE

This Thesis has been written with my guidance and supervision and thus recommends
submission for further consideration.

Yours Sincerely

Name

Title

Signature Date…/……/……/

i
 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Thesis entitled Role of Intelligence work for the control of crime
organized in Somalia. It's my original work and to the best of our knowledge, it has never been
presented in any other institution for any academic award. I also declare that any secondary
information used has been duly acknowledged in this dissertation

Students Name: Graduate Signatures:

Abdirahman Muse Mohamed ……………………………………….

ii
 DEDICATION

First, I would like to dedicate this research to Allah and our beloved parents who give Us
the greatest love, mercy, support, encouragement, nourishment, happiness, Protection from
harmful things to our, teaching, and all great appreciation to us.

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

First of All, Thanks Belonged to Allah who enabled us The Completion of This Thesis. I
would like to State my Gratefulness and Genuine Thanks to who has given us useful comments
and guidance throughout our research writing.

Second, I would like to give special thanks to my beloved parents, brothers, and sisters,
who encouraged us to attend this educational academic level, which we have attained, and their
efforts to our future as wholly and I would like to thank my deep sense of gratitude to everyone,
who contributed to our thesis project development process through encouragement, technical
support and much more cooperation and for being helpful to the finishing of this project.

Third, I would like to thank my dear Supervisor: Dr. Shantae‘ Coppock,for his professional
guidance, follow up and great support, useful comments, Remarks and engagement through the
learning process of this thesis.

I would like to thank everyone, who supported and encouraged us to Start and complete
this degree, including my lecturers and administration of Accord University

iv
 LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1.1. What is your Age?
Table 4.1.2. What is your gender?
Table 4.1.3. What is your marital status?
Table 4.1.4. What is your education level?
Table 4.1.5. What is your occupation ?
Table 4.2.1. Intelligence is the backbone of law enforcement as a strategic tool for preventing crime in
order to identify suspects, detect crime, direct operational activities, protect the weak, locate the missing,
and apprehend offenders.
Table 4.2.2. Intelligence gives law enforcement officials the information to analyze and select the most
suitable criminal risks.
Table 4.2.3. Intelligence helps people avoid wasting time and effort on unrelated tasks.
Table 4.2.4. Whether it's before or after a terrorist attack, intelligence is essential in preventing terrorist
attacks from happening and helping law enforcement officials catch suspects.
Table 4.2.5. The targeting of available resources and the identification of information gaps made possible
by intelligence analysis help investigations by sharpening their focus.
Table 4.2.6. Criminal intelligence analysis helps law enforcement agencies create a pro-active approach to
fighting crime.
Table 4.2.7. Law enforcement agencies respond to investigate and prevent crime.
Table 4.2.8. Law enforcement organizations are in charge of enforcing laws, maintaining peace, and
protecting public safety.
Table 4.2.9. Community policing is a technique for reducing crime that strives to be more effective.
Table 4.2.10. Fighting against organized crime is high on the political agenda of the present government.
Table 4.2.11. The police and security forces place a strong priority on combating organized crime.
Table 4.2.12. Terrorism directly affects human rights, with consequences for the enjoyment of the right to
life.
Table 4.2.13. Challenge the ideology that underlies terrorism and those who support it in order to reduce
its capacity.
Table 4.2.14. Detecting explosives and other types of weaponry it is one of the most successful tactics for
preventing terrorist attacks.
Table 4.2.15. Preventing vulnerable people from becoming involved in terrorism by providing them with
the right guidance and encouragement

v
 LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.8. Conceptual Frame work
Figure4.1.1. What is your Age?
Figure4.1.2. What is your gender?
Figure4.1.3. What is your marital status?
Figure4.1.4. What is your education level?
Figure4.1.5. What is your occupation ?
Figure4.2.1. Intelligence is the backbone of law enforcement as a strategic tool for preventing crime in
order to identify suspects, detect crime, direct operational activities, protect the weak, locate the missing,
and apprehend offenders.
Figure4.2.2. Intelligence gives law enforcement officials the information to analyze and select the most
suitable criminal risks.
Figure4.2.3. Intelligence helps people avoid wasting time and effort on unrelated tasks.
Figure4.2.4. Whether it's before or after a terrorist attack, intelligence is essential in preventing terrorist
attacks from happening and helping law enforcement officials catch suspects.
Figure4.2.5. The targeting of available resources and the identification of information gaps made possible
by intelligence analysis help investigations by sharpening their focus.
Figure4.2.6. Criminal intelligence analysis helps law enforcement agencies create a pro-active approach
to fighting crime.
Figure4.2.7. Law enforcement agencies respond to investigate and prevent crime.
Figure4.2.8. Law enforcement organizations are in charge of enforcing laws, maintaining peace, and
protecting public safety.
Figure4.2.9. Community policing is a technique for reducing crime that strives to be more effective.
Figure4.2.10. Fighting against organized crime is high on the political agenda of the present government.
Figure4.2.11. The police and security forces place a strong priority on combating organized crime.
Figure4.2.12. Terrorism directly affects human rights, with consequences for the enjoyment of the right to
life.
Figure4.2.13. Challenge the ideology that underlies terrorism and those who support it in order to reduce
its capacity.
Figure4.2.14. Detecting explosives and other types of weaponry it is one of the most successful tactics for
preventing terrorist attacks.
Figure4.2.15. Do you agree that increasing the rate of investments in rural areas would help to reduce
poverty?

vi
 CONTENTS
APPROVAL PAGE ........................................................................................................................... i
DECLARATION .............................................................................................................................. ii
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................. iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.................................................................................................................. iv
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................ v
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... vi
CONTENTS.................................................................................................................................... vii
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ ix
CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 1
1.0. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1
1.1. THE STUDY'S BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 1
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE STUDY'S PROBLEM. ....................................................................... 8
1.3. THE STUDY'S OBJECTIVE .................................................................................................. 10
1.3.1. General Objectives of the Study ........................................................................................... 10
1.3.2. Specific Objectives of the Study ........................................................................................... 10
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTION OF THE STUDY ........................................................................... 10
1.5. THE STUDY'S SCOPE ........................................................................................................... 11
1.5.1. The Study's Content Scope ................................................................................................... 11
1.5.2. The Geographical Scope of the Study ................................................................................... 11
1.5.3 Duration of the Research........................................................................................................ 11
1.6. THE STUDY'S IMPORTANCE .............................................................................................. 11
1.7. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION .............................................................................................. 12
1.8. CONCEPTUAL FRAME ........................................................................................................ 13
CHAPTER TWO ........................................................................................................................ 14
LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................................... 14
2.1. THE TOURISM AND INTELLIGENCE CONCEPT ............................................................ 14
2.2. INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE AND CRIME ANALYSIS ............................................... 16
2.3. TERRORISM PREVENTION AND VIOLENT EXTREMIS ................................................ 19
2.4. ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE CONTROL OF CRIMES ................................. 21
2.5. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN OPERATIONS IN SOMALI TERRORISM GROUPS .............. 30
2.6. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN TERRORISM ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT .......................... 33
CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................................... 37
METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................................... 37
3.0. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 37
3.1. RESEARCH STRATEGY ....................................................................................................... 37
3.2. POPULATION BEING STUDIED ......................................................................................... 37
3.4. STUDY AREA ........................................................................................................................ 37
3.5. SAMPLE SIZE ........................................................................................................................ 38
3.6. SAMPLE PROCEDURE ......................................................................................................... 38
3.7. RESEARCH INSTRUMENT .................................................................................................. 38
3.8. DATA GATHERING PROCEDURE ..................................................................................... 39
3.9. DATA EXAMINATION ......................................................................................................... 39
3.10 CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION .............................................................. 39
3.10.1. Criteria for Inclusion ........................................................................................................... 39
3.10.2. Criteria for Exclusion .......................................................................................................... 39
3.11 QUALITY ASSURANCE ...................................................................................................... 39

vii
 3.12 Ethical Consideration .............................................................................................................. 40
CHAPTER FOUR ...................................................................................................................... 41
RESULT & DISCUSSION......................................................................................................... 41
4.0. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 41
4.1. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA ........................................................................................................ 41
4.2. Section two: Role of Intelligence work for the control of crime organized in Somalia ........... 47
4.3. Result and Discussion .............................................................................................................. 62
CHAPTER FIVE ........................................................................................................................ 67
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION ........................................................................ 67
5.1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 67
5.2. CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY ...................................................................................... 67
5.3. RECOMENDATIONS........................................................................................................ 72
APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................. 73
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................... 73
QUASTIONAIRE ........................................................................................................................... 76
Budget Frame Work ........................................................................................................................ 80

viii
 Abstract

Criminal intelligence, as it is commonly operationalized, can provide decision makers and

police chiefs with a snapshot of criminality and criminal behavior. Crime analysis can provide
police leaders with an understanding of crime patterns and trends. Without this understanding of
both crime patterns and criminal behavior, people who have to make decisions that affect the
safety and security of communities will not have access to the vital, synthesized information
essential to good planning and strategy. For example, an intelligence unit may have good
information about a local group of offenders dealing in methamphetamine. Crime analysis,
however, suggests that the key problems in the area are vehicle crime and heroin. With a more
complete picture of the local criminal environment, the police executive can make a better
decision about the best use of resources for these competing priorities. Alternatively, crime
analysis might identify an area of a town where drug arrests have increased. The intelligence
officer for the drug unit can fill in the picture with a description of a drug dealer who lives in that
area and who has recently been released from prison. Knowledge of individuals and offender
behavior can improve understanding of crime patterns and vice versa (Khan, 2012)

In methodology of the study, I used descriptive in design. Also, it was also quantitative and

cross sectional in nature the target population of our Research was the political experts, security

experts, intelligence experts, students, and members of society, the sample size of our study was

80 respondents. Closed questionnaire was used to collect research data. Respondents were

briefed about the study and its objective. The content of the questionnaire was explained for

them and was also requested to answer the questions as honest as possible.

As a result, the first objective which to determine the effectiveness of law enforcement in
the Criminal Investigation Division control of crime organized in Somalia the researcher found
that the majority of the respondent 48 (60%) were Agreed that community policing is a
technique for reducing crime that strives to be more effective while the minority of the
respondent 32 (40%) were Neutral. Also most of the respondent 64 (80%) were Agreed that the
police and security forces place a strong priority on combating organized crime., it followed by
11 (13.8%) were Neutral while the minority of the respondents 5 (6.3%) were Dis-agreed. Even

ix
all the respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that fighting against organized crime is high on the
political agenda of the present government. It also most of the respondents 77 (96.3%) were
Agreed that the criminal intelligence analysis helps law enforcement agencies create a pro-active
approach to fighting crime, while the minority of the respondent 3 (3.8%) were Neutral.
Although all the respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that Law enforcement agencies respond to
investigate and prevent crime.

The second objective of our research was to investigate the role of enforcement National
Intelligence control of crime organized in Somalia, so we found that most of the respondents 74
(92.5%) were Agreed that Intelligence is the backbone of law enforcement as a strategic tool for
preventing crime in order to identify suspects, detect crime, direct operational activities, protect
the weak, locate the missing, and apprehend offenders, while the minority of the respondents 6
(7.5%) were Neutral. Even the majority of the respondent 63 (78.8%) were Agreed that
Intelligence gives law enforcement officials the information to analyze and select the most
suitable criminal risks while the minority of the respondent 17 (21.3%) were Neutral. It also
most of the respondent 72 (90%) were Agreed Whether it's before or after a terrorist attack,
intelligence is essential in preventing terrorist attacks from happening and helping law
enforcement officials catch suspects, while the minority of the respondent 8 (10%) were Neutral.
Also most of the respondent 75 (93.8%) were Agreed that law enforcement organizations are in
charge of enforcing laws, maintaining peace, and protecting public safety, while the minority of
the respondent 5 (6.3%) were Dis-agreed

The third objective of our research was to explain the role of National Intelligence for the
prevention strategies of terrorist attacks in Somalia, and researchers found that the most of the
respondent 60 (75%) were Agreed that Intelligence helps people avoid wasting time and effort
on unrelated tasks, it followed by 13 (16.3%) were Neutral, while the minority of the respondent
7 (8.8%) were Dis-agreed. Also most of the respondents 57 (71.3%) were Agreed that the
targeting of available resources and the identification of information gaps made possible by
intelligence analysis help investigations by sharpening their focus, while the minority of the
respondent 23 (28.8%) were Neutral. Even all the respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that
Terrorism directly affects human rights, with consequences for the enjoyment of the right to life.
It also the majority of the respondent 39 (48.8%) were Agreed that Challenge the ideology that
underlies terrorism and those who support it in order to reduce its capacity, it followed by 30

x
(37.5%) were Neutral while the minority of the respondent 11 (13.8 %) were Dis-agreed.
Although most of respondent 43 (53.8%) were Agreed Detecting explosives and other types of
weaponry it is one of the most successful tactics for preventing terrorist attacks, it followed by
30 (37.5%) were Neutral while the minority of the respondent 7 (8.8%) were Dis-agreed. The
majority of the respondent 53 (66.3%) were Agreed that Preventing vulnerable people from
becoming involved in terrorism by providing them with the right guidance and encouragement, it
followed by 19 (23.8%) while the minority of the respondents 8 (10%) were Neutral some
others were Dis-agreed

Based on the findings of the study, the following are strongly recommended to improve the
following actions:

 The intelligence analysis group must strengthen the investigations by targeting available

resources and identifying information gaps.

 Special investigative techniques should be developed to help with organized crime investigations.

 The government must fight corruption through its organized crime investigation operations.

 To reduce the prevalence of organized crime, the law must be strictly enforced.

 The state police must be strengthened to prevent terrorism and organized crime because they play

critical roles.

xi
 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the following sections: background of the study; the
problem statement of the study; the purpose of the study; objectives of the study;
research questions; the significance of the study; justification of the study; the
scope of the study; operational definitions of the study; and the conceptual
framework of the study.

1.1. THE STUDY'S BACKGROUND

At the beginning of the 21st century, the resilience and solidity of criminal
organizations and illicit markets on the international stage are evident. So much
so that the major prospective studies on the subject agree that the criminal
phenomenon in its transnational dimension will continue its global expansion
during the first decades of the current century, taking advantage of the
permeability of both state territorial borders and administrations. The main
concern resides in the determination of criminal organizations to infiltrate and
take root at the structural level, especially political and economic, aspiring to
remain as chronic social ills. Even more so when its invulnerability is amplified
with access to power (economic, political, or social). At the same time, the
diversification of both legal and illicit activities developed by criminal
organizations is as varied as it is fruitful. Any imaginable activity that is lucrative
will be pounced upon by these organizations, generating more criminal scenarios
as a consequence of criminal contagion. The main idea that substantiates the
dangerousness of criminal association resides in the construction of rationally
oriented structures for the planning and execution of the crime, the harboring of

1
its members to avoid institutional persecution, as well as an efficient division of
labor. All of this, combined with transnationalization, creates a slew of problems
for the agencies and institutions in charge of criminal prosecution. In their search
for better and more efficient self-protection, criminal organizations have opted to
relocate to those countries with the most favorable characteristics to accomplish
their aims. States with more lax legal systems, more permeable immigration laws,
and underdeveloped or outdated criminal policies have been the favorite
candidates (Mingardi, 2007).

They also possess an abundance of means for the commission of crimes,

and they constitute networks that are difficult to access. They protect their
decision-making nodes and have highly sophisticated technical means due to their
high purchasing power. They systematically resort to financial engineering and
money laundering to hide the economic results of their operations and keep their
ill-gotten gains. Coherently, they use all the tools at their disposal to hide all
traces of their crimes (Anarte Borrallo, 1999).

The implementation of this work philosophy hinders the work of the

different crime-fighting agencies in that it doesn't allow them to have a deep
understanding of their inner workings, activities, structure, and organizational
capabilities. It has been said that criminals have always sought to leave no trace of
their crimes or have tried to make the evidence disappear, but criminal
organizations have elevated this almost to the level of science. And to that effect,
as well as developing a culture of group security, they use violence, intimidation,
or corruption. In short, the criminal culture of the suppression of evidence doesn't
just encompass forensic prophylaxis (the neutralization of evidence that could be
used for criminalist exploitation) but also the proactive concealing of the whole
criminal cycle (SansóRubert, 2010).

A detailed analysis of the practical applications of the abovementioned

2
criminal culture allows us to infer a set of measures, both preventive and reactive,
of a varied nature. A wide range of actions are being used by criminal
organizations to protect themselves from being investigated (counterintelligence).
To that effect, criminal organizations carry out informative poisoning
(disinformation) and even bait with the use of "honeypots" to test and measure the
response of the state security agencies and the Intelligence Services. By using
these strategies they can detect the extent of the surveillance and monitoring that
their members are being subjected to. Not in vain, criminal organizations carry
out different activities destined to cancel out infiltration attempts by the security
agencies (counterintelligence), and they try to hinder any attempts by the state to
gain a deeper knowledge and understanding of these organizations. At the same
time, they devise ploys to gain information about the political, economic, or
security spheres that will allow them to exploit them at their convenience,
permeating public and private institutions. In that respect, it is important to
highlight how these organizations have used the transformations that have
occurred in the field of new technologies (Martens, 1987).

To be more precise, as well as incorporating into their activities the most

advanced technological means, they have also invested heavily in their
information and intelligence-gathering capabilities. Another characteristic feature
of the masking of criminal activity is the structure adopted by the organization
itself. Hence the tendency to replicate administrative and operational patterns
used by the business sector, encouraging the illegal control of legal economic
sectors, both in the public and private spheres, to provide legal cover for illegal
activities. It should be especially emphasized that the threat posed by organized
criminal groups that are committed to network structures represents an upward
trend due to the operational advantages, as well as the additional protection
against security agencies it confers. Thus, by partitioning the group (and

3
information) into cells with varying degrees of autonomy, the knowledge and
decision-making processes both at the organizational and functional levels are
reserved for the most senior level of the leadership, thus hindering any infiltration
measures. In addition to structural factors, collaboration among organizations and
the outsourcing of specific tasks complicate understanding of the criminal
phenomenon. The recourse to individuals (facilitators) or structures that do not
strictly belong to the organization at certain stages of the criminal cycle is due to
the specialization of the service offered. They provide financial, economic,
technical, logistical, commercial, and legal services, as well as extensive
experience in risk control, enabling them to increase both the safety of the
operations and the benefits gained from them (Martens, 1987).

The instrumentalization of violence and corruption are commonly accepted

defining characteristics of organized crime. Both are especially important when,
in addition to their use in the commission of crimes, to maintain internal
discipline, or to resolve conflicts with rival criminal groups, they have as their
objective the elimination (through intimidation or destruction) of people who
might harm their lucrative activities; preferably members of the Security Forces,
members of the judicial system, or witnesses. The hitherto exposed observations –
the important changes both in the form of the commission of the offense and its
concealment – invite an open discussion about the challenges in the field of
security. Especially since the proven resistance to the crimefighting tools
traditionally employed, which have been eminently repressive, has led to their
losing their operational efficiency. Today, security intelligence is torn from an
outdated response, so its application to the field of organized crime
counterintelligence represents a range of challenges and opportunities beyond the
mere gathering of evidence. Twenty-first-century policing, as already shown,
cannot be exclusively restricted to the reactive repression of crime and the

4
maintenance of public order. We must overcome this anachronistic view. The
institutional systems that act against crime have traditionally been based on
reaction and not anticipation. Following this approach, the objective of policing
has always been to report crime and not its potential existence, ensuring the
enforcement of criminal laws by repressing offenders. However, reality requires a
change of view in the fight against crime, focusing not on the conduct and the
investigation and arrest of the perpetrators but on the assessment and management
of the threat of crime, which in itself is a behavior factor or element that can lead
to damage and criminal liability, but by definition has not yet caused such damage
(Moreno, 2009).

This reality creates tension in the structures and police procedures because
both the penal system and the police system were originally conceived as
instruments of reactive action before criminal damage had been perpetrated. If the
security forces' traditional reactive orientation has allowed for a strategically-
oriented model based on response capability against crime, several factors are
currently influencing police efforts toward a model of prospective strategy in
which the effort is focused not on the reaction to the commission of a crime but
on anticipating and taking measures to prevent such events from occurring.
Having lost the initiative to address the proliferation of organized crime in its
early stages, now that there's a will to react to its consolidation and expansion, it
turns out that, against a backdrop of a multi-faceted and ever-evolving security
scenario, state bureaucracies remain largely constrained by stagnant functional
frameworks. Security agencies have become fossilized against criminality that
exploits the advantages provided by globalization, asymmetric conflict, and its
lack of ethical or moral restrictions. This "functional ballast", added to the state's
own territorial and jurisdictional limitations, has hindered the institutional
response so far, conferring an advantage to organized crime. Consistent with this

5
descriptive framework, the need to address an ever more sophisticated form of
crime should stimulate a strong commitment toward specialization and
diversification (Levi, 1998).

Police intelligence is developed by and for the provision of policing and its
purpose is to provide the decision-maker, be it a police officer or a politician, with
informed knowledge for better management of police resources and to maximize
their preventive, proactive, and also reactive capabilities to strengthen the
protection of public order, social peace, and the preservation of coexistence
(public safety). In my opinion, the turning point that breaks the common
identification between both has taken place in the last decades. As shown in the
preceding paragraphs, in which I address briefly and concisely the
transformations that have taken place in the current criminal scenario, the
phenomenon of organized crime has acquired unusual importance to date,
requiring an intelligence typology that not only covers roughly part of the
functions of police intelligence but its specificity (specialization) leads to more
extensive requirements given the increasing complexity inherent to the organized
crime itself. Not surprisingly, the police themselves have experienced this process
of specialization, developing specific units to fight against organized crime. These
units even have, in some cases, subspecialties in terms of geographical areas,
types of crime, or other circumstances of police interest. It is in this context that
we must locate the blossoming of criminal intelligence, divided almost from its
origin from what was considered policing, strictly speaking, and characterized by
a set of features among which we can include similarities and dissimilarities in
comparison to police intelligence. (Cope et al., 2009).

Criminal intelligence, then, not only represents a specific application of the

generic capabilities of intelligence, that is, limited to the area of security that deals
with organized crime, but one can also identify a progressive specialization of the

6
agencies, services, or units dedicated to it. Equally, the untenable, indissoluble,
interweaving of criminal intelligence into the sphere of policing as if an
intelligence service, the Armed Forces, or a private company versed in the field of
security, could not develop, apply, and circumscribe intelligence on the
phenomenon of organized crime, that is, criminal intelligence. This prefabricated
link can only be sustained by another one of the greatest misconceptions that hang
over criminal intelligence: that its ultimate goal can only be the arrest of criminals
(offenders) and, therefore, inevitably, their prosecution. Criminal intelligence, by
definition, is not abrogated to a particular entity but, depending on circumstances
(administrative and political), it may well be housed in intelligence, either in
police units, customs, prisons or even in military organizations. In this regard, one
can emphasize that the cross-sectional nature of the organized crime itself makes
the attribution of powers and competencies to a service or another by their
competence in the exterior or interior area of security lack any sort of sense.
Given the transnationalization of organized crime, the traditional distinction
between internal and external security loses its functionality, rapidly blurring the
boundaries when we refer to the activities run by criminal organizations. Criminal
intelligence operates equally at both poles of security. However, based on the
theoretical distribution of security powers among different state actors, internal
security has traditionally gone to the police forces, while the armed forces have
been responsible for external security. The theory, however, doesn't always
conform to reality (Mingardi, 2007).

The intelligence process focused on the target is described as follows: The

users who have operational problems consult in the repository the current state of
the knowledge about a target (for example, a criminal organization dedicated to
transnational drug trafficking) and identify their information needs; the
intelligence analysts working with information collectors translate the needs into

7
knowledge pools and information requirements; the collectors get the required
information and they incorporate it into the shared repository of information about
the target; analysts extract usable intelligence and supply the users; and they, in
turn, can add their contributions about the target to the repository or insert new
information needs. Because the perspective that is focused on the intelligence
target is more interactive, it allows for better handling of complex problems like
organized crime, specific criminal markets, or activities. The key to success lies in
advancing two complementary and simultaneous lines of inquiry: understanding a
phenomenon while interacting with it through interventions that affect them
directly or modify its environment. That is the combination of criminal
intelligence with neutralization operations of police (criminal investigation) or
military nature, which disrupts the activities of organized crime under the prism
of target-focused intelligence. This represents a complex task, at least for now
(Martens, 1987).

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE STUDY'S PROBLEM.

Initiatives will require changes in attitudes and ways of thinking in the
structures of security and intelligence organizations, primarily in the relationships
between them. In conclusion, it is a must to articulate a true intelligence
community capable of connecting the entire cast of actors involved in the
intelligence cycle, both producers and consumers, managing to incorporate into
this community the information that is available throughout the state and social
fabric, to put it at the service of security. Within the list of possible initiatives,
criminal intelligence must aspire to something more descriptive than producing
reports. To put it simply, strategic analysis, coupled with prospective studies,
articulates the scrutiny of the criminal reality orientated towards the future.
Adopting diagnosis not as an end in itself but as a means to predict future
scenarios, ascribes to their probability and desirability to be able to design

8
appropriate plans and understated objectives, allowing us to acquire a deep
understanding of the etiology of crime and its phenomenology. Also, a good
criminal intelligence product not only establishes the current situation of the
phenomenon but also provides explanations for the existence of this phenomenon
and establishes possible developments or trends, defining possible or probable
scenarios. It also defines the viable alternatives to redirect the situation in the
most favorable way towards its eradication and control and establishes the
eventual social and economic costs resulting from the application of such
measures. Similarly, criminal intelligence stands out as an ideal tool for
developing security strategies to reorganize the procedures and instruments
available to governments to tackle crime and to help redefine the objectives in the
fight against organized crime: It establishes policies and plans to implement and
help reach the targets; to identify and understand the elements and factors
favoring the emergence and expansion of organized crime; pays attention to the
appearance of signs and the evolution of risk indicators to achieve early detection
before they materialize; and the discovery and identification of anything that
might represent a chance of success for organized crime (Strang, 2014).

Therefore, its development confers distinct advantages, allowing us to

minimize the impact of crime, especially when the cost of opportunity when
making a decision can even be qualitatively more burdensome or create
irreparable damage. To sum up, criminal intelligence represents a range of
challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, it allows not only a greater and
better grasp of the criminal phenomenon across the spectrum, but it also provides
an informed knowledge indispensable for the articulation of resources (formal
social control: criminal, security, and defense policies, corrections, legislative,
police...) at operational, tactical and strategic levels, designed to offset the
criminal risk. Time will tell whether the fight against organized crime is

9
advancing toward where we want it to go or simply advancing from where we can
manage it. The key does not lie in considering what we would like criminal
intelligence to be; rather, it lies in determining how far we want to exploit its
usefulness to seriously determine its future uses (Leong, 2016).

1.3. THE STUDY'S OBJECTIVE

1.3.1. General Objectives of the Study

The role of intelligence work in the control of organized crime in Somalia

1.3.2. Specific Objectives of the Study

1. To determine the effectiveness of law enforcement in the criminal

investigation division's control of crime organized in Somalia
2. To investigate the role of national intelligence in the control of organized
crime in Somalia
3. To explain the role of national intelligence for the prevention strategies of
terrorist attacks in Somalia

1.4. RESEARCH QUESTION OF THE STUDY

1. What is the effectiveness of law enforcement in the criminal investigation
division's control of crime organized in Somalia?
2. What is the role of national intelligence control in crime organized in
Somalia?
3. What is the role of national intelligence in the prevention strategies of
terrorist attacks in Somalia?

10
1.5. THE STUDY'S SCOPE

1.5.1. The Study's Content Scope

The role of intelligence work in the control of organized crime in Somalia.

1.5.2. The Geographical Scope of the Study

This research will be carried out in Somalia's Mogadishu and Banadir

regions.

1.5.3 Duration of the Research

The time scope of the study will be the period from August 2022 up to
February 2023.

1.6. THE STUDY'S IMPORTANCE

The findings of this research will contribute to understanding Somalia and
how to promote national security in the future. The study may contribute ideas to
policymakers in the national government by providing information and data about
the national security of Somalia. The study was also useful for federal state
members to promote the stability of the country, as this makes them aware of the
existing issues and also the proper ways to come up with long-lasting solutions
for the researched problems. The study will also benefit the local community
because it creates conscious awareness of the severity of a particular problem and
also the urgency of the need for a solution. This study will be useful for future
researchers because it will act as a source of information and also a guideline for
them to follow in subsequent studies related to the same problem under
investigation.

11
1.7. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION
Security refers to all the measures that are taken to protect a place or to ensure that only
people with permission enter or leave it.

National security is often understood as the capacity of a nation to mobilize military

forces to guarantee its borders and to deter or successfully defend against physical
threats, including military aggression and attacks by non-state actors, such as
terrorism,

Security strategies: a document prepared periodically that outlines the major security
concerns of a country or organization and outlines plans to deal with them.

Strategic stability has been defined as a characteristic of deterrence based on mutually

assured destruction and has been measured largely in terms of the potential
vulnerability of strategic force components, notably land-based missiles.

Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to

intimidate or coerce a government or its citizens to further certain political or social
objectives.

Counter-terrorism, also known as anti-terrorism, incorporates the practices, military

tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, military, law enforcement,
business, and intelligence agencies use to combat or eliminate terrorism.

Violent extremism describes the beliefs and actions of people who support or use
violence to achieve ideological, religious, or political goals. This includes terrorism,
other forms of politically motivated violence, and some forms of communal
violence. All forms of violent extremism, no matter what their motivation, seek
change through fear and intimidation rather than constructive democratic processes.

12
 1.8. CONCEPTUAL FRAME

DV
IV

Law enforcement

Control of crime organized National Security Intelligence

Prevention strategies of terrorist attacks

Figure 1.8. Conceptual Frame Work

13
 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents different kinds of literature related to determining the role of
intelligence work in the control of crime organized in Somalia. This literature has been
retrieved from various books, articles, journals, and studies related to the same problem at
hand. The literature will specifically focus on the concept of countering and preventing
terrorism, law enforcement, organized crime control, and terrorist attack prevention
strategies attacks.

2.1. THE TOURISM AND INTELLIGENCE CONCEPT

Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or sub-
national groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large
audience beyond that of the immediate victims. Terrorists try to circumvent the
democratic process by extorting concessions through the pressures that a targeted
citizenry may exert on their government to end the violence. The above definition
excludes state terror, where the state applies violence to intimidate its citizens, but
includes state-sponsored terrorism, where a state assists a terrorist group. Terrorists
employ myriad modes of attack—e.g., bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and
skyjackings—the mix of which is chosen to optimally trade off risks and returns.
Terrorists try to make their attacks appear random to maximize an audience's anxiety as
risks seem ubiquitous and unpredictable. In truth, attacks are not random but planned to
best exploit perceived target weaknesses and value. A terrorist group consists of members
of an organization whose objectives are furthered by terrorist attacks (Gaibulloev &
Sandler, 2008).

14
 Terrorists may invoke a wide range of political, philosophical, ideological,
racial, ethnic, religious, or other reasons to justify their actions. The OSCE (stands
for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) member states
categorically reject the association of terrorism with any "race," "nationality," or
religion. The OSCE member states categorically reject the association of
terrorism with any "race," "nationality," or religion. Misconceived policies and
actions targeting particular religious or belief communities can lead to increased
VERLT (Violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism) through the
combined effect of injustice, stigmatization, and alienation. For example,
simplistic associations of items of dress or cultural manifestations with terrorism
(Gaibulloev & Sandler,2008).

The intelligence process, traditionally called the intelligence cycle,

describes and outlines six widely recognized standard steps used to transform raw
data and information into value-added intelligence aimed for action. The process
ideally starts with a decision or a task, followed by a planning stage, after which
analysts engage in collecting information and data that must be evaluated
according to a formally recognized evaluation system. The next step is the actual
processing stage, starting with collating and structuring available data and
information and inserting them into a database. The data and information are then
analyzed, which results in the production of an intelligence product to be
disseminated to the client and other relevant stakeholders. The intelligence
product is evaluated by the client about their needs and demands. The received
feedback is used to improve the current product or as methodological input for
future similar products (Sternberg, 1997).

The intelligence cycle is initiated by a clear task for the sake of developing
concrete intelligence products. The criminal intelligence process, however, is
conducted on several different levels and is often not limited to the intelligence

15
 cycle. In addition to the cycle highlighted, there might be a need for a wider and
more constant process of strategically assessing intelligence requirements. This
ongoing assessment identifies extant and emerging threats and intelligence gaps
and is carried out per strategic priorities, policies, and goals. This process requires
a well-functioning and structured intelligence organization and Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) that enable the intelligence cycle to be fed with
information and that define the expected result of the cycle and its follow-up. The
strategic assessment of intelligence requirements as well as the criminal
intelligence cycle feed into the strategic planning process of a country, reflecting
national, regional, and local strategic priorities (Sternberg, 1997).

2.2. INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE AND CRIME ANALYSIS

Crime analysis is a term used to describe a broad range of activities and
ideas. Of potentially greater value is the term problem analysis. Problem analysis
stems from Herman Goldstein's concept of problem-oriented policing (1990) and
has come to signify a form of crime analysis that is "conducted within the police
agency [and] in which formal criminal justice theory, research methods, and
comprehensive data collection and analysis procedures are used in a systematic
way to conduct an in-depth examination of, develop informed responses to, and
evaluate crime and disorder problems. It is closely allied with the framework of
problem-oriented policing, a process that not only concentrates on the
identification and remedy of crime problems but also provides a more
comprehensive framework for the improvement of the police response to all
aspects of their work. Problem-solving is the thought process by which officers
and analysts achieve their goals and is often articulated through the SARA. For
our purposes here, we can consider crime analysis to be the overarching generic
term that can collectively represent these more specific activities (Ratcliffe,
2007).

16
 Criminal intelligence, as it is commonly operationalized, can provide
decision-makers and police chiefs with a snapshot of criminality and criminal
behavior. Crime analysis can provide police leaders with an understanding of
crime patterns and trends. Without this understanding of both crime patterns and
criminal behavior, people who have to make decisions that affect the safety and
security of communities will not have access to the vital, synthesized information
essential to good planning and strategy. For example, an intelligence unit may
have good information about a local group of offenders dealing with
methamphetamine. However, crime, However, crime analysis suggests that the
key problems in the area are vehicle crime and heroin. With a more complete
picture of the local criminal environment, the police executive can make a better
decision about the best use of resources for these competing priorities.
Alternatively, crime analysis might identify an area of a town where drug arrests
have increased. The intelligence officer for the drug unit can fill in the picture
with a description of a drug dealer who lives in that area and who has recently
been released from prison. Knowledge of individuals and offender behavior can
improve understanding of crime patterns and vice versa (Khan, 2012).

In post-conflict contexts, criminal intelligence is vital to protect civilians,

prevent crime, and address other security-related issues. The recording of criminal
information and its analysis may be conducted if it is believed that the recording
or dissemination of criminal intelligence is likely to be of value in carrying out the
mission mandate; in the interest of mission or host-State security; for the
prevention or detection of crime and disorder; or the maintenance of public and
community safety. By the mandate, criminal intelligence that contains personal
data will be processed following the legal provisions in the host state and the
principle of proportionality. The United Nations police should encourage and
assist the host state authorities with developing and installing a standardized

17
crime report and data collection system early on. A well-designed and well-
managed crime reporting system would provide a basis for the host state
authorities to obtain information on the occurrence of various types of crime,
enabling the police leadership to allocate resources more efficiently. Such a
system would also help the United Nations to assess the effectiveness of capacity-
building initiatives (Ratcliffe, 2007).

Strategic intelligence is an often-misunderstood aspect of criminal

intelligence and, yet, if real crime reduction is to be achieved, it has the potential
to be of the greatest value to police leaders and executives responsible for crime
prevention. Too many crime analysts have focused on the tactical end of the
intelligence spectrum, and too few concern themselves with longer-term crime
problems and challenges. There is usually a good reason for this: few police
managers are trained or experienced enough to be able to put a strategic
intelligence product to good use, and most cops demand tactical products that can
help alleviate an existing crime issue. This lack of demand from the client base
does not mean that strategic intelligence products are of little value to crime
prevention (Khan, 2012).

While analysts must ensure that sufficient data is collected to cover all
aspects of the topic(s) to be analyzed, they must also avoid data overload and the
collection of unnecessary or inadequate information. While analysts must ensure
that sufficient data is collected to cover all aspects of the topic(s) to be analyzed,
they must also avoid data overload and the collection of unnecessary or
inadequate information. The key to this phase is the intelligence staff's knowledge
of the existence, relevance, accessibility, and reliability of all sources and
agencies that are selected for a particular collection task, as well as knowledge of
any legal limitations and authorization requirements that apply to the use of
different types of information sources. Knowledge of and access to internal and

18
external data and information sources and awareness of potential limitations and
requirements are prerequisites for effective collection and intelligence analysis
(GJI & USA, 2005).

2.3. TERRORISM PREVENTION AND VIOLENT EXTREMIS

Combating terrorism should be based on a legislative framework that

provides for the appropriate criminalization of preparatory offenses. Definitions
of such offenses in national legislation, similar to defining acts of terrorism,
should be clear, precise, non-discriminatory, non-retroactive, and accessible to the
public. The Council of Europe's Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism has
been identified as an international good practice. practice. According to ODIHR
(2014) criminal offenses are defines as "public provocation to commit a terrorist
offense", "recruitment for terrorism" and "terrorism training (ODIHR,2014).

Interaction between the police and the public can provide an important
source of information for the intelligence process and guide the actions of the
police, both at the local and national levels. Members of the public can be
encouraged to share with the police their concerns in terms of personal and
community safety, exchange their perceptions of a specific crime issue, and report
any suspicious activity. Confidential mechanisms, such as anonymous telephone
lines, should be provided so that people may remain anonymous. However, efforts
in this regard should not exaggerate the nature of the danger or associate it with
particular groups, as it may be counterproductive and result in excessive reporting
about individuals belonging to certain groups and create distrust among
communities (Akram,2021).

Violent extremism as part of development interventions reflects a broader

international shift toward terrorism prevention and efforts to address the
environment that allows extremists to spread their ideologies and recruit

19
followers. Tackling violent extremism as part of development interventions
reflects a broader international shift toward terrorism prevention and efforts to
address the environment that allows extremists to spread their ideologies and
recruit followers. While combating violent extremism through education is a
relatively new concept in international discourse, it has been piloted through
many national and international programs and policies (Silva, 2017).

Active police-led engagement with a particular community on preventing

terrorism runs the risk of interactions between public authorities and that
community being reduced, in reality, or only in terms of perceptions, to
counterterrorism. This may result in members of this community disengaging
from, or avoiding interaction with, the police. Preventing terrorism cannot be
reduced to police work: it should be jointly delivered with other authorities.
Likewise, the interaction of the state, including the police, with communities
should not be reduced to countering terrorism: it should address the whole range
of issues and needs that are of concern to different communities in a society
(ODIHR, 2014).

On August 7, 2014, the U.S. began limited airstrikes against the Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants who were threatening the Kurdish
capital of Erbil. Erbil. The airstrikes were intended to support Kurdish military
forces and to protect U.S. diplomats, military advisors, and civilians. In a brutal
response, ISIL beheaded captured American photojournalist James Foley, posting
a gruesome propaganda video on the internet with a warning of further revenge if
U.S. airstrikes continued. U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel characterized ISIL
as a long-term threat that would require a long-term strategy to combat it. The
emergence of extremist actors with violent political agendas, advanced weapons
and communications capabilities, religious or ideologically-based interests, long-
term strategies, and the willingness to confront powerful states through terrorism

20
and other asymmetric means and methods continues to threaten U.S. national
interests (Vinson, 2015).

The president's vision refocuses U.S. counter-terrorism efforts on

anticipating and preventing conflict with VEOs. However, it may lack a timely or
sufficient path to address VEOs when prevention fails. The prevention strategy
relies on detecting the early indicators of conflict as well as on the cooperation of
host-nation governments and other partners to establish security and provide non-
military remedies to preclude a conflict. Besides training and advising, the
military must approach conflict prevention with a complementary range of ways
to provide a safe and secure environment, including deterrence, dissuasion,
corpulence, preemption, and even preventive attacks. Additionally, if prevention
fails and a conflict emerges with a dangerous VEO, like ISIL, then the strategy
must quickly counter the threat. For long-term conflicts with persistent VEOs, the
U.S. requires a long-term approach to manage the conflict until non-military
initiatives can succeed (Akram,2021).

2.4. ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE CONTROL OF

CRIMES
Law enforcement and intelligence operations have certain and clear
distinctions. Law enforcement; enforcement, by definition; definition, is
investigating and collating evidence to apprehend perpetrators for processing in a
court of law, while intelligence agencies work with information and assets; assets,
and the classified nature of the collected information does not always allow
presenting it in court. Similarly, intelligence agents cannot always appear in court
and testify. Some of the challenges faced are purely legal, while others relate to
the sharing of classified information with members of the police force or
intelligence service of a foreign government. Apart from official coordination and

21
cooperation, law enforcement agencies from different countries may cooperate or
coordinate on an informal level; in contrast, the same is true for intelligence
agencies. According to Bayer (2014), the benefit of informal cooperation is in the
joint interest of detaining criminals and in police being equally distanced from
major policymakers, foreign affairs officials, and intelligence personnel forming
the official liaison policies at the senior level (Dinev, 2014).

Law enforcement agencies employ a variety of tools to combat crime.

Some of these tools are new and driven by technological advances; others
represent long-standing police practices. While pedestrian stops and the frisks or
searches that may accompany them fall into the latter category, recent shifts in the
way police conduct and engage in stops and frisks have prompted renewed public
attention in recent years. In addition to police employing stops as part of their
routine work, police departments are increasingly concentrating this practice in
high-crime communities throughout the United States as a specific deterrence
strategy commonly referred to as stop and frisk, which conflates the two legally
separate actions of stopping and frisking individuals into one combined tactic.
This extensive, location-and person-based use of police stop, question, frisk, and
search powers has sparked widespread debate about its legality and fairness, as
evidenced by protests, lawsuits, and media coverage, particularly in New York
City (Gaines & Kappeler, 2014).

Traditional reactive law enforcement models have encountered severe

difficulties in coping with today's risks and threats and reacting to new criminal
opportunities caused by, inter alia, an increase in personal mobility and migration,
rapid technological and communication changes, free movement of goods and
services, and growing income inequality. Violent extremism and radicalization
that lead to terrorism (VERLT), as well as terrorist incidents in recent years, have
highlighted the need to share, connect, connect, and centrally analyze relevant

22
data and information (intelligence) from all levels, in compliance with national
legislation, international human rights standards, and OSCE commitments.
Intelligence-led policing (ILP) was developed as a response to these growing
challenges by inspiring and facilitating a proactive policing approach,
complementing the traditional, reactive policing model. It has proved to be an
effective tool to address organized crime, make better use of resources, and
identify and address priority tasks in a targeted manner. The proactive and future-
oriented approach of ILP facilitates crime prevention, reduction, disruption, and
dismantling. The key to the ILP approach is the systematic gathering and analysis
of information and data relevant to the prevention, reduction, and dismantling of
crime, followed by the development of intelligence reports. On this basis,
informed and forward-looking policy-making and managerial decisions can be
made and resources allocated to address the most pressing security concerns,
threats, crime types, and criminals. ILP has further proved to be an effective and
sustainable tool for countering terrorism and VERLT (Fafchamps & Moser,
2003).

The proliferation of transnational organized crime groups, their cooperation,

and the fast accumulation of funds bring their members access to advanced
capabilities, arms, and equipment that allow the use of innovative operational
intelligence and counterintelligence tactics. Hizballah (2014) is employing
advanced counterintelligence employing electromagnetic spectrum capabilities
and is constantly recruiting professionals from that field. Hizballah (2014) is
frequently portrayed as a purely terrorist organization. However, its structure
actively participates in the illegal drug trade and other criminal enterprise
exchanges. Hizballah (2014) is frequently portrayed as a purely terrorist
organization. However, its structure actively participates in the illegal drug trade
and other criminal enterprise exchanges. Other terrorist organizations also engage

23
in transnational crime activities as a source of organizational funding. It is no
surprise, then, those terrorist organizations are major players on the TOC (Theory
of Constraints) scene. However, policymakers and police leaders should have
realistic expectations about the results that community policing can deliver in
response to what is often a low-incidence, highly complex, and multidimensional
problem. Community policing cannot function as a stand-alone tool to prevent
terrorism and counter VERLT. It should be embedded in a comprehensive,
coherent, and human rights-compliant strategy to combat terrorism in all its forms
and manifestations and tackle conditions that are conducive (Dinev, 2014).

The development of the constitutional framework for law enforcement to

conduct pedestrian stops began in 1968 with the first U.S. Supreme Court case
concerning pedestrian stops, Terry v. Ohio. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled
that a police officer could stop an individual on the street if the officer has
reasonable suspicion that the individual is connected to criminal activity in some
way. This suspicion must be grounded in facts that are the product of personal
observation and that the officer could articulate upon questioning. According to
the Supreme Court's holding in the case, an officer would not be justified in
stopping a pedestrian who merely appeared to be out of place or generally
threatening, unless the officer could point to particular, observed facts that would
provide grounds for reasonable suspicion (La Vigne, 2016).

To the extent applicable, the Justice Information Privacy Guidelines for

privacy policy guidelines To the extent applicable, the Justice Information
Privacy Guidelines for privacy policy guidelines Developing, Drafting, and
Assessing Privacy Policies Policies for Justice Information Systems The goal of
the Justice Information Privacy Guideline is to assist justice leaders and
practitioners who seek to balance public safety, public access, and privacy when
developing information policies for their agencies or integrated (multiagency)

24
justice systems (Gaines & Kappeler, 2014).

Counterterrorism policies and measures, as with any action by public

authorities in a democratic state, should be accountable. Accountability means
that policies and measures are open to scrutiny by a variety of oversight
institutions. Accountability mechanisms should include both the executive and
legislative branches of government, as well as an independent, impartial, and
informed judiciary, and they should also include civilian oversight performed by
NGOs, the media, and the general public. As the police play a central role in
countering terrorism, they must be held accountable for their actions—ranging
from the behavior of individual police officers to commanders' decisions,
planning and implementation of specific operations, and overall strategy—
strategy—to ensure legitimacy, confidence, trust, and support from the public. All
police officers are ultimately bound by the law and should be held responsible for
infringements of the law. Effective police oversight and accountability
mechanisms benefit both the police and the public. They ensure more objectivity
in dealing with complaints against police action and help raise public confidence
in the police. They also provide protection for individual police officers by
ensuring due process in the investigation of complaints against them (Fafchamps
& Moser, 2003).

Human rights norms are set out in international legal instruments and
standards such as binding treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. To give effect to the rights outlined
in these treaties, states must put in place a legal and institutional framework for
the realization of human rights at the domestic level. Within this framework, it is
among the main duties of the police to protect individuals from acts that
compromise their human rights, including those resulting from crime and

25
terrorism, and to respect these rights. In combating and preventing crime, the
police must operate within domestic law and international standards. As a
proactive form of policing, ILP must also be firmly grounded in the human rights
framework. It should increase the protection of the individual's rights and
freedoms and must be carried out in a manner that fully respects human rights,
which is in line with key principles of democratic policing (La Vigne, 2016).

In fall 2001, law enforcement officials attending the annual IACP

conference in Toronto, Canada, identified the need for a comprehensive
assessment to identify the inadequacies of the law enforcement intelligence
process that, in part, led to the failure to prevent the tragic events of September.
As a result, law enforcement executives and intelligence experts met together at
the IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit held in Alexandria, Virginia, in
March 2002, and articulated a proposal for an intelligence-sharing plan that was
in alignment with President Bush's initiative to develop a cabinet-level agency to
coordinate homeland security. The Summit participants envisioned local, state,
and tribal law enforcement agencies fully participating with federal agencies to
coordinate, collect, analyze, and appropriately disseminate criminal intelligence
information across the United States to make our nation safer. The results of the
summit are documented in the August 2002 report entitled Recommendations
from the IACP Intelligence Summit, Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National
Plan for Intelligence-led Policing at the Local, State, and Federal Levels (La
Vigne, 2016).

Apart from the police and intelligence services, timely criminal intelligence
is also important for prosecutors in the performance of their duties. The
prosecution services usually rely on receiving analytical products from other
agencies. The investigations of organized crime groups operating in multiple
countries may naturally involve the use of modern surveillance techniques, assets,

26
or undercover officers. The dangers related to infiltrating and maintaining status
and reputation in transnational organized crime groups, as well as the ethical and
moral considerations, could cause the prevalence of SIGINT methods, including
interception of communication traffic going through satellites. Conversely,
Dandurand (2021) asserts that no international investigation can be launched
without the establishment of proper international cooperation among the
concerned entities. Conversely, Dandurand (2021) asserts that no international
investigation can be launched without the establishment of proper international
cooperation among the concerned entities. The antithesis is possible in cases of
covert or clandestine operations, sometimes through the utilization of paramilitary
units against highly armed and tactically sophisticated organized crime or terrorist
groups. Nonetheless, analogous actions carry legal and political risks that may
ensue in a diplomatic confrontation (Breitel, 1959).

One of the major criminal- activities and the bloodline of transnational

organized crime groups is the laundering of illegal proceeds. On a global level, it
is the EGMONT Group of Financial Intelligence Units that is countering money
laundering through policies and operational directives, while on a national level;
we have the respective financial intelligence units. The 2012 Anti-Money
Laundering Report of the Swiss Federal Police offers an example of a national
specific. According to Swiss (2014) law, the Federal Supreme Court may rule on
a regime as a criminal organization after reviewing the details of an investigation
launched by the Office of the Attorney General. According to Swiss (2014) law,
the Federal Supreme Court may rule on a regime as a criminal organization after
reviewing the details of an investigation launched by the Office of the Attorney
General. The most recent cases related to declaring the whole regime of Hosni
Mubarak (clarify) as a criminal organization and likewise for the regime of
Gaddafi. As seen from the information found in the reports of the national

27
intelligence agencies, the collection of intelligence on transnational organized
crime groups necessitates international cooperation. Compounding on the role of
international cooperation, the work of Wippl (2014) presents the idea of creating
an Intelligence Interpol for sharing international intelligence. The author asserts
that foreign intelligence services have more reasons to cooperate in the
operational field than their domestic counterparts (Dinev, 2014).

Analyses and policy reviews that substantiate the value of CVE programs
come from many respectable sources, each validating the need for law
enforcement to establish lines of communication and build trust in all
communities, especially diverse populations. The RAND Corporation, known for
contributing policy and meaningful national and international research, has
studied programs, published literature, and assessed case studies of the
Department of Homeland Security and its local partners. A recent 2018 study
from RAND, Practical Terrorism Prevention, was assembled by researchers with
specialized expertise in terrorism prevention policy and examines the current
status of CVE programs. Its findings reveal the importance of synthesizing police
activities with community input while developing and involving non-
governmental organizations and CVE practitioners from the state and local levels.
Progress has been made in the CVE field when partnerships are valued and
dedicated teams work together. The study also highlights the goal of effective
CVE policy, characterized as community-driven intervention programs and
strategies that aim to reduce the threat of localized acts of terrorism. The approach
is uncommon and represents a shift from traditional criminal investigative
methods of surveillance, arrest, and prosecution. Local-level community teams in
Minneapolis and Colorado, for example, are steering adolescents away from
negative influences and potential recruitment for political extremism (Wyckoff,
2020).

28
 The Los Angeles Police Department and the New York City Police
Department are leading law enforcement agencies that embrace targeted violence
prevention through community policing in distinctive and dissimilar styles. A
close analysis of their community policing and targeted violence systems shed
light on the question of how police departments introduce and institutionalize
CVE and targeted violence prevention within the community policing model. A
comprehensive literature review regarding community policing strategies
generally demonstrates the synergy between the police and community members
when they work together toward safer communities. Not readily apparent,
however, are the specific internal and external modifications of the community
policing model when introducing and institutionalizing CVE. The comparative
research model helps to answer these questions and provides an opportunity to
identify (1) the strategies most needed to create CVE programs within the
community and (2) what kind of internal and external changes are needed by local
police to develop successful CVE programs (Breitel, 1960).

American police have their hands full when investigating serious crimes,
and despite professional-grade criminal investigations and contemporary
investigative techniques, most violent crimes go unsolved. Each year, American
law enforcement agencies voluntarily report hate crime data to the Department of
Justice for record-keeping purposes.. However, only 12% of U.S. law
enforcement agencies report that hate-motivated crimes occur within their
jurisdictions. With many crimes of the hate left undocumented, law enforcement
is left with no information upon which to base an investigation or intervention.
Over 90 American cities with populations greater than 100,000 reported to the
FBI that zero hate crimes occurred within their jurisdictions in a one-year
timeframe. FBI data on hate crimes is difficult to quantify, making it nearly
impossible to understand the true rates of these crimes in the country. Making

29
matters worse, hate crime statutes are inconsistent from state to state, and some
states have no hate crime ordinances whatsoever. Annual statistics about hate
crimes are submitted voluntarily to the FBI by police agencies around the country,
and for some states, only a small percentage of law enforcement agencies choose
to share data (Wyckoff, 2020).

2.5. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN OPERATIONS IN SOMALI

TERRORISM GROUPS
Since 2007, therefore, the U.S. has supported AU personnel fighting
alongside the federal Somali authorities against al-Shabaab, which Washington
designated a foreign terrorist organization in March 2008. Despite some limited
progress in building a Somali National Army (SNA) and drafting a new national
security architecture in 2017, the war against al-Shabaab is effectively at a
stalemate. There has been very little change in terms of the territory controlled by
the main conflict parties across south-central Somalia over the past few years,
while in-fighting between the federal government and regional authorities
persists. Furthermore, in AFRICOM's assessment for the final quarter of 2019,
there had been no significant progress towards the goal of creating a security
cocoon around Mogadishu. In summary, given the current strategy and levels of
resource investment, there are no signs that either side can achieve a decisive
victory (Williams,2020).

The United States faces an increasingly complex and evolving threat of

terrorism and targeted violence. As was the case sixteen years ago at the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security's founding, foreign terrorist organizations
remain intent on striking the homeland, whether through directed attacks or by
inspiring susceptible individuals in the United States. Today, though, the nation
also faces a growing threat from domestic actors inspired by violent extremist

30
ideologies, as well as from those whose attacks are not ideologically driven.
Domestic threat actors often plan and carry out their acts of violence alone and
with the little apparent warning, in ways that limit the effectiveness of traditional
law enforcement investigation and disruption methods. We must confront these
evolving challenges by building on existing best practices developed against
foreign terrorist threats, identifying promising new approaches, and developing a
strategic vision that provides a more holistic approach to preventing terrorism and
targeted violence that originates here at home. In an age of online radicalization,
violent extremism, and disparate threats, we must not only combat foreign
enemies attempting to strike us from abroad but also those enemies, both foreign
and domestic, who seek to incite violence among our youth and disaffected,
encouraging them to strike at the heart of our nation and attack the unity of our
vibrant, diverse American society (GJI & USA, 2005).

In January 2020, Somalia briefly made U.S. media headlines when three
U.S. security personnel (one service member and two department of defense
contractors) were killed in an attack by al-Shabaab on the Manda Bay naval base
in Kenya. This was the latest in a long string of al-Shabaab attacks, which
included a laptop bomb on a flight leaving Mogadishu in February 2016, a
massive truck bomb in central Mogadishu in October 2017, and attacks on
Nairobi's DusitD2 hotel in January 2019, as well as the US base at Baledogle in
September of that year. In a statement to the US Senate Armed Services
Committee shortly after the Manda Bay attack, General Townsend described al-
Shabaab as the largest and most kinetically active al-Qa'ida network in the world
and as being the most dangerous to U.S. interests today (Williams, 2020).

Apart from the number of airstrikes, U.S. policy on Somalia has been
broadly consistent in its strategic aims across several administrations. Since the
early 2000s, Washington has sought to help stabilize Somalia by working with a

31
variety of local and international partners, including Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, the
African Union (AU), the UN the European Union (EU), and various Somali
forces. Since the early 2000s, Washington has sought to help stabilize Somalia by
working with a variety of local and international partners, including Ethiopia,
Uganda, Kenya, the African Union (AU), the UN, the European Union (EU), and
various Somali forces. The plan has been to achieve U.S. national objectives by
building an effective set of Somali state institutions, including local security
forces, and using U.S. military power to help contain and degrade al-Shabaab.
However, this strategic goal has been frustrated by Washington's understandable
reluctance to pour large amounts of resources into Somalia's fragmented and
notoriously corrupt political system (Williams, 2020).

The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan supports policies that will
protect the privacy and constitutional rights while not hindering the intelligence
process. When agencies are reviewing or formulating their policies, it may be
helpful to view the intelligence process as a series of discretionary decisions. At
each step, a decision must be made, usually involving a choice among several
possible alternatives. Consider, for example, how a criminal intelligence unit
might respond to an unsolicited, anonymous tip alleging that a particular
individual is engaged in criminal activity. Should the unit query various police
records systems to learn more about the suspect should they query commercial or
other public record databases? Should they conduct surveillance of the suspect or
should they disseminate the information to other law enforcement agencies to
learn more about the person? What kinds of additional records are created when
these actions are taken? And then, after those actions are taken, additional
decisions must be made regarding what to include, what to exclude, and how
much, if any, to store about the suspect in the criminal intelligence files.
Violations of privacy and constitutional rights may potentially occur when

32
choices are selected from these various alternatives. To be effective, a policy that
addresses the protection of individual privacy and constitutional rights should
attempt to eliminate unnecessary discretion in the decision-making process, guide
the necessary discretion, and continually audit the process to ensure conformance
with the policy goals (GJI & USA, 2005).

2.6. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN TERRORISM ON SOCIAL

DEVELOPMENT
Terrorism can lead to a substantial loss for a country's economy. These
losses are mainly due to uncertainties brought about by the confidence lost to
terrorism and the transfer of a significant portion of the country's resources to
military expenditure. On the other hand, a terrorist can directly and directly target
key sectors of the economy. These results suggest that the purpose of terrorism,
which aims to achieve political and economic demands illegitimately, is a clear
indication of the government's intention to intimidate and create fear and horror in
society. In other words, the purposes of terrorism reach a political goal by
creating pressure on political authorities and digesting public interest through
violence (Marinara, 2017).

The September 11 attacks inflicted casualties and material damage on a far

greater scale than any terrorist aggression in recent history. The destruction of
physical assets was estimated in the national accounts to amount to $14 billion for
private businesses, $1.5 billion for state and local government enterprises, and
$0.7 billion for the federal government.. Rescue, cleanup, and related costs have
been estimated to amount to at least $11 billion. Lower Manhattan, New York lost
approximately 30% of its office space, and scores of businesses went out of
business. At least 200,200, 000 jobs were destroyed or relocated out of New York
City, at least temporarily. Within weeks of the attacks, bio-terrorism came to the

33
fore. Lethal anthrax spores were found to have contaminated mail, causing several
deaths. At the same time, awareness of the number of other sources of threats
increased. Concerns were raised about the vulnerability of critical infrastructure
(power plants, nuclear facilities, chemical factories, dams, bridges, pipelines, and
water supply). The threat of mega-terrorism has rose and colleagues, 2017).

In recent years, some major terrorist attacks in EU member states have put
the fight against homegrown and international terrorism at the top of the agendas
of European policymakers. This paper analyzes the costs of terrorism in the
European Union from both a theoretical and empirical perspective to evaluate
counter-terrorism policies by comparing their costs and benefits. Two important
policy implications can be derived from our exercise. First, individuals'
behavioral predispositions typically result in a biased perception of the risk of
terrorism, leading to too high a demand for counter-terrorism measures relative to
what the objective probability of terrorist events suggests. This results in a
tendency to favor repressive measures over preventive measures against terrorism.
Second, uncoordinated European policies against terrorism have the potential to
undermine the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures. If there is a
justification for the existence of the European Union (which an increasing number
of populist parties in Europe seem to doubt), then it is to provide supranational
answers to coordination failure in European counter-terrorism policies (Krieger &
Meierrieks, 2019).

Terrorism can potentially affect economic growth in the short run through
some channels. Such attacks can increase uncertainty, which limits investments
and diverts foreign direct investment. For developing countries, foreign direct
investment is an important source of savings to fund investment. Terrorism
campaigns lead to government expenditures on defensive actions to strengthen
targets and proactive measures to capture terrorists and their assets. This increased

34
government spending on security can crowd out more growth-enhancing public
and private investments. Public investment in the form of social overhead capital
(e.g., canals, highways, and bridges) is especially important to bolster growth in
developing countries. Terrorism also hinders growth by raising the cost of doing
business in terms of higher wages, larger insurance premiums, and greater
security expenditures. These higher costs result in reduced profits and, thus,
smaller returns on investment. Terrorist attacks can also destroy infrastructure,
thereby leading to business disruptions. The Irish Republican Army attacks on
London's financial district at the Baltic Exchange (10 April 1992) and
Bishopsgate (24 April 1993) resulted in £800 million and £350 million in direct
damage, respectively. The July 7, 2005 attacks on the London transport system
resulted in over £1 billion in damage. Finally, terrorism can impact some key
industries—the airline, tourism, and export sectors—which can reduce gross
domestic product (GDP) and growth (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2019).

Following the attacks, primary insurers and reinsurers have hiked their
premiums and curtailed or dropped altogether coverage for terrorism-related risk.
The hikes in insurance premiums have hit several industries. The strongest impact
has been on aviation, but other sectors, including transportation, construction,
tourism, and energy generation, have also been affected. Overall, commercial
property and liability insurance rates are estimated to have increased by 30% on
average, with target structures such as chemical and power plants and iconic
office buildings seeing steeper increases. This should be viewed in the context of
a sharp decline in premium rates in the 1990s, which has only begun to reverse in
the case of reinsurance in 2000. This should be viewed in the context of a sharp
drop in premium rates in the 1990s, which had only recently begun to reverse in
the case of reinsurance. Even with the projected hikes, reinsurance rates should
remain well below the peaks reached in 1993, especially given the enhanced

35
competition in the industry, which limits the scope for further rate increases (Rose
et al., 2017).

Modern-day terrorists are bent on causing sufficient harm to society to force

its government to concede to the terrorists' demands. The harm may be in terms of
human and/or economic losses—e.g., the al-Qaida training manual invokes
followers to attack vital economic centers. Both kinds of losses expose a
government's inability to protect its people and property, thereby causing a loss in
citizen confidence and government legitimacy. When terrorist attacks are
sufficiently deadly, costly, and persistent, an atmosphere of fear and terror may
pervade society, making virtually everyone feel at risk, which is the terrorist
group's aim. If a besieged government views the anticipated costs of future
terrorist actions as greater than the costs of conceding (including lost reputation)
to terrorist demands, then the government will grant some accommodation. A
determined terrorist organization may obtain its demo quickly by augmenting the
economic consequences of its terrorist campaign. Thus, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
(ETA), the Basque group, targeted hotels and resorts in the 1980s to hurt tourism
in Spain. Jemaah Islamiyah's car-bombing attack on a Bali nightclub on October
12, 2002, was intended not only to kill Westerners but also to cripple Bali's
lucrative tourist industry. A subsequent JI attack on a Marriott hotel in Kuningan,
Jakarta, in 2003 had economic ramifications on tourism. Although Abu Sayyaf is
based on the southern Philippine islands of Sulu and Basilan, a few high-profile
attacks by Abu Sayyaf in Manila caused the Philippine government to reallocate
some expenditure to security, thereby crowding out growth-promoting public
projects.

36
 CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on the research design, research population, and
research instruments to be used for data gathering. It also will discuss the data
gathering procedure, data analysis, and ethical considerations as well as the
expected limitations of the study.

3.1. RESEARCH STRATEGY

The study will be a cross-sectional design. A cross-sectional study design
will be used to investigate the population by selecting samples to analyze and
discover the occurrence of the data collected in the questionnaire. This design will
be selected for this study because it is effective, less costly, and easily accessible
for collecting information from the target population. This design is used for the
role of Intelligence work for the control of crime organized in Somalia

3.2. POPULATION BEING STUDIED

The target population of the research will be political experts, security
experts, intelligence experts, students, and members of society.

3.4. STUDY AREA:

The study will be conducted in Mogadishu, Banadir, and Somalia.

Mogadishu, Banadir-Somalia. During the period from August 2022 to February
2023, Mogadishu was the capital city of Somalia.

37
3.5. SAMPLE SIZE
A sample is part of the target (accessible) population that will be
procedurally selected to present it. The sample will consist of 80 participants.
participants. The sample size consisted of 80 to determine the best sample size for
the population, and the sample size for this study will be 80 respondents.

n = 400

1+400(0.1)2

=80

3.6. SAMPLE PROCEDURE

In this study, non-probability sampling procedures, especially pure
sampling, will be used by the researchers because they cannot find the list of
employees of the target population. So, what data is collected from those people
who are expediently available and willing to co-operate?

3.7. RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

The researchers will use a self-administered questionnaire in this study to
collect the required information. The questionnaire will be a suitable instrument to
obtain the information needed and can be easily described in writing. Since the
sample size is fairly large and there is limited time, a questionnaire will be
considered ideal for collecting such data and is a suitable tool for collecting a lot
of information over a short period. The researcher used an open-ended
questionnaire.

38
3.8. DATA GATHERING PROCEDURE
The respondents will be briefed about the study and will be asked to sign
the Informed Consent Form. Secondly, the respondents will be asked to answer
completely and not to leave any part of the questionnaire unanswered. The
researchers and assistants will emphasize the retrieval of the questionnaires within
five days from the date of distribution. Finally, the data gathered will be
organized, encoded into the computer, and statistically analyzed using the
Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) version 20.

3.9. DATA EXAMINATION

Data will be analyzed using the statistical package for social science
(SPSS)(SPSS). Descriptive analysis will be done, and then frequency tables and
charts will be used to present study results for easy understanding.

3.10 CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

3.10.1. Criteria for Inclusion

The study will target the role of Intelligence work for the control of crime
organized in Somalia. Also, political experts, security experts, intelligence experts,
academics, and members of society

3.10.2. Criteria for Exclusion

The exclusion from the study will be anyone who does not live in Somalia
and does not have any role in the study.

3.11 QUALITY ASSURANCE

Validity relates to the relevance of the research instruments to study

objectives; in other words, it is the ability of the instruments to measure what they

39
are supposed to measure and the data collected accurately represents the
respondent‗s opinions. To ensure validity, a pre-test will be conducted and the
questionnaire will be given to five research experts who will judge the relevance
of the questions to the objectives. Then, a content validity index, or CVI, will be
calculated. A pre-test will be done before the data collection to ensure the validity
of the questionnaire. Five questionnaires will be distributed to five research
experts who will be asked to vote on the validity of the tool. Then, the content
validity index will also be calculated. For the questionnaire to be accepted as
valid, the average CVI should be 70% or above (Amin,2005).

Reliability, on the other hand, relates to the consistency of the respondents

when answering the items of the questionnaire. In other words, the instrument can
be considered reliable only if it produces or replicates the same results whenever
it is repeatedly used to measure a phenomenon with the same respondents, even
by other researchers. Reliability tests were observed using test-retest and stability
tests The test is the extent to which scores on the same test by the same
individuals are consistent over time (Amin, 2005).

3.12 Ethical Consideration

The researchers treated the participants as being capable of making
decisions. The researchers respected the respondents' freedom when entering their
private places and when asking questions. The researchers were to guarantee
maximum confidentiality for the participants. participants. Their information will
only be used for the study. Participants were informed that they were free to
participate. They were also informed that they had the right to withdraw. Consent
will be secured from the participants after fully informing them of the nature,
potential risks, and benefits of the study.

40
 CHAPTER FOUR

RESULT & DISCUSSION

4.0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents results, discussion and its interpretation. The data
study and interpretation was based on the research questions as well as research
objectives, the demonstration is divided in to two parts. The first part presents the
respondents profile or demographic information, while the second part deals with
analysis, interpretation and presentation of the research questions and objectives.
Below are the data presentations and analysis of research findings. The analysis,
interpretation and presentation of the data collected were accordance with the
main purpose of the study ―Role of Intelligence work for the control of crime
organized in Somalia. The analysis and presentation of the data was based on
research objectives and questions

4.1. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

The first research question of the study asked about the profile of the
respondents. It gives the profile of respondents using a self-administered
questionnaire. The profile of the respondents included aspects of, age on the
questionnaire and the results are presented ―Role of Intelligence work for the
control of crime organized in Somalia

41
 Table 4.1.1.. What is your age of the respondent?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

18-28 11 13.8 13.8 13.8

29-38 25 31.3 31.3 45.0
Valid 40-50 35 43.8 43.8 88.8
Above 50 9 11.3 11.3 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

According to this table the majority of our respondent 35 (43.8%) were 40 50, followed by
25 (31.3%) were 29-38 of our respondents, also it followed by 11 (13.8%) were 18-28 of
our respondents while the minority of our respondent 9 (11.3%) were Above 50.

Figure 4.1.1.What is your age of the respondent?

42
 Table 4.1.2. What is your gender of the respondent?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Male 69 86.3 86.3 86.3

Valid Female 11 13.8 13.8 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

Based on this table most of the respondent 69 (86.3%) were Male while the
minority of the respondent 11 (13.8%) were Female

Figure 4.1.2.What is your gender of the respondent?

43
 Table 4.1.3. What is your marital status of the respondent?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Single 23 28.8 28.8 28.8

Valid Married 57 71.3 71.3 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

According to this table the majority of the respondent 57 (71.3%) were married,
while the minority of the respondent 23 (28.8%) were single.

Figure 4.1.3.What is your marital status of the respondent?

44
 Table 4.1.4. What is your education level of the respondent?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
High School Degree 15 18.8 18.8 18.8
Bachelor Degree 30 37.5 37.5 56.3
Valid Master Degree 26 32.5 32.5 88.8
Others 9 11.3 11.3 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

According to this table on the above 4.1.4. The most respondents 30 (37.5%) were
Bachelor degree, followed by 26 (32.5%) were Master, also it followed by 15
(18.8%) were high school level while 9 (11.3%) were others

Figure 4.1.4.What is your education level of the respondent?

45
 Table 4.1.5. What is your occupation of the respondent?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Employed 49 61.3 61.3 61.3

Self-Employed 18 22.5 22.5 83.8
Valid
Un-Employed 13 16.3 16.3 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

Based on Table 4.1.5. The researchers were discussed respondents by

employment status, most of the respondents 49 (61.3%) were employed, followed
by 18 (22.5%) were self-employed, while 13 (16.3%) of the respondents were Un-
employed

Figure 4.1.5.What is your occupation of the respondent?

46
4.2. Section two: Role of Intelligence work for the control of crime
organized in Somalia
Table 4.2.1. Intelligence is the backbone of law enforcement as a strategic tool for preventing
crime in order to identify suspects, detect crime, direct operational activities, protect the
weak, locate the missing, and apprehend offenders.

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 74 92.5 92.5 92.5

Valid Neutral 6 7.5 7.5 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

This table shows that most of the respondents 74 (92.5%) were Agreed that
Intelligence is the backbone of law enforcement as a strategic tool for preventing
crime in order to identify suspects, detect crime, direct operational activities,
protect the weak, locate the missing, and apprehend offenders, while the minority
of the respondents 6 (7.5%) were Neutral

Figure 4.2.1.Intelligence is the backbone of law enforcement as a strategic tool for preventing crime
in order to identify suspects, detect crime, direct operational activities, protect the weak, locate the
missing, and apprehend offenders.

47
 Table 4.2.2. Intelligence gives law enforcement officials the information to analyze and select
the most suitable criminal risks.
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 63 78.8 78.8 78.8

Valid Neutral 17 21.3 21.3 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

Based on this table the majority of the respondent 63 (78.8%) were Agreed that
Intelligence gives law enforcement officials the information to analyze and select
the most suitable criminal risks while the minority of the respondent 17 (21.3%)
were Neutral

Figure 4.2.2.Intelligence gives law enforcement officials the information to analyze and select
the most suitable criminal risks.

48
 Table 4.2.3 Intelligence helps people avoid wasting time and effort on unrelated tasks.
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 60 75.0 75.0 75.0

Neutral 13 16.3 16.3 91.3
Valid
Dis-agree 7 8.8 8.8 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

According to this table most of the respondent 60 (75%) were Agreed that
Intelligence helps people avoid wasting time and effort on unrelated tasks, it
followed by 13 (16.3%) were Neutral, while the minority of the respondent 7
(8.8%) were Dis-agreed

Figure 4.2.3.Intelligence helps people avoid wasting time and effort on unrelated tasks.

49
 Table 4.2.4. Whether it's before or after a terrorist attack, intelligence is essential in
preventing terrorist attacks from happening and helping law enforcement officials catch
suspects.
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 72 90.0 90.0 90.0

Valid Neutral 8 10.0 10.0 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

Table 4.2.4. Shows that the majority of the respondent 72 (90%) were Agreed
Whether it's before or after a terrorist attack, intelligence is essential in preventing
terrorist attacks from happening and helping law enforcement officials catch
suspects, while the minority of the respondent 8 (10%) were Neutral.

Figure 4.2.4.Whether it's before or after a terrorist attack, intelligence is essential in

preventing terrorist attacks from happening and helping law enforcement officials catch
suspects.

50
Table 4.2.5. The targeting of available resources and the identification of information gaps
made possible by intelligence analysis help investigations by sharpening their focus.

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 57 71.3 71.3 71.3

Valid Neutral 23 28.8 28.8 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

This table shows that the most of the respondents 57 (71.3%) were Agreed that
the targeting of available resources and the identification of information gaps
made possible by intelligence analysis help investigations by sharpening their
focus, while the minority of the respondent 23 (28.8%) were Neutral

Figure 4.2.5.The targeting of available resources and the identification of information gaps
made possible by intelligence analysis help investigations by sharpening their focus.

51
 Table 4.2.6. Criminal intelligence analysis helps law enforcement agencies create a pro-
active approach to fighting crime.
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 77 96.3 96.3 96.3

Valid Neutral 3 3.8 3.8 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

This table shows that most of the respondents 77 (96.3%) were Agreed that the
criminal intelligence analysis helps law enforcement agencies create a pro-active
approach to fighting crime, while the minority of the respondent 3 (3.8%) were
Neutral

Figure 4.2.6.Criminal intelligence analysis helps law enforcement agencies create a pro-
active approach to fighting crime.

52
 Table 4.2.7. Law enforcement agencies respond to investigate and prevent crime.

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Valid Agree 80 100.0 100.0 100.0

Based on this table all the respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that Law
enforcement agencies respond to investigate and prevent crime.

Figure 4.2.7.Law enforcement agencies respond to investigate and prevent crime.

53
 Table 4.2.8. Law enforcement organizations are in charge of enforcing laws, maintaining
peace, and protecting public safety.

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 75 93.8 93.8 93.8

Valid Dis-agree 5 6.3 6.3 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

According to this table most of the respondent 75 (93.8%) were Agreed that law
enforcement organizations are in charge of enforcing laws, maintaining peace,
and protecting public safety, while the minority of the respondent 5 (6.3%) were
Dis-agreed

Figure 4.2.8.Law enforcement organizations are in charge of enforcing laws, maintaining

peace, and protecting public safety.

54
 Table 4.2.9. Community policing is a technique for reducing crime that strives to be
more effective.
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 48 60.0 60.0 60.0

Valid Neutral 32 40.0 40.0 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

Table 4.2.9.. Shows that the majority of the respondent 48 (60%) were Agreed
that community policing is a technique for reducing crime that strives to be more
effective while the minority of the respondent 32 (40%) were Neutral.

Figure 4.2.9.Community policing is a technique for reducing crime that strives to be more
effective.

55
 Table 4.2.10. Fighting against organized crime is high on the political agenda of the
present government.
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Valid Agree 80 100.0 100.0 100.0

According to this table all the respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that fighting
against organized crime is high on the political agenda of the present government.

Figure 4.2.10.Fighting against organized crime is high on the political agenda of the
present government.

56
 Table 4.2.11. The police and security forces place a strong priority on combating
organized crime.
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 64 80.0 80.0 80.0

Neutral 11 13.8 13.8 93.8
Valid
Dis-agree 5 6.3 6.3 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

This table Indicates that the majority of the respondent 64 (80%) were Agreed
that the police and security forces place a strong priority on combating organized
crime., it followed by 11 (13.8%) were Neutral while the minority of the
respondents 5 (6.3%) were Dis-agreed

Figure 4.2.11.The police and security forces place a strong priority on combating
organized crime.

57
 Table 4.2.12. Terrorism directly affects human rights, with consequences for the
enjoyment of the right to life.
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Valid Agree 80 100.0 100.0 100.0

According to this table all the respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that Terrorism
directly affects human rights, with consequences for the enjoyment of the right to
life.

Figure 4.2.12.Terrorism directly affects human rights, with consequences for

the enjoyment of the right to life.

58
 Table 4.2.13. Challenge the ideology that underlies terrorism and those who support it in
order to reduce its capacity.
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 30 37.5 37.5 37.5

Neutral 39 48.8 48.8 86.3
Valid
Dis-agree 11 13.8 13.8 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

Based on this table the majority of the respondent 39 (48.8%) were Agreed that
Challenge the ideology that underlies terrorism and those who support it in order
to reduce its capacity, it followed by 30 (37.5%) were Neutral while the minority
of the respondent 11 (13.8 %) were Dis-agreed

Figure 4.2.13.Challenge the ideology that underlies terrorism and those who
support it in order to reduce its capacity

59
 Table 4.2.14. Detecting explosives and other types of weaponry it is one of the most
successful tactics for preventing terrorist attacks.
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 43 53.8 53.8 53.8

Neutral 30 37.5 37.5 91.3
Valid
Dis-agree 7 8.8 8.8 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

Table 4.2.14. Shows that the most of respondent 43 (53.8%) were Agreed
Detecting explosives and other types of weaponry it is one of the most successful
tactics for preventing terrorist attacks, it followed by 30 (37.5%) were Neutral
while the minority of the respondent 7 (8.8%) were Dis-agreed.

Figure 4.2.14.Detecting explosives and other types of weaponry it is one of

the most successful tactics for preventing terrorist attacks

60
 Table 4.2.15. Preventing vulnerable people from becoming involved in terrorism by
providing them with the right guidance and encouragement
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Agree 53 66.3 66.3 66.3

Neutral 19 23.8 23.8 90.0
Valid
Dis-agree 8 10.0 10.0 100.0
Total 80 100.0 100.0

This table Indicates that the majority of the respondent 53 (66.3%) were Agreed
that Preventing vulnerable people from becoming involved in terrorism by
providing them with the right guidance and encouragement, it followed by 19
(23.8%) while the minority of the respondents 8 (10%) were Neutral some others
were Dis-agreed

Table 4.2.15. Preventing vulnerable people from becoming involved in

terrorism by providing them with the right guidance and encouragement

61
 4.3. Result and Discussion

The main findings of this study, after data analysis and interpretation, allow
researchers Role of Intelligence work for the control of crime organized in
Somalia.

In demographically, according to the age of the respondent the majority of

our respondent 35 (43.8%) were 40 50, followed by 25 (31.3%) were 29-38 of our
respondents, also it followed by 11 (13.8%) were 18-28 of our respondents while
the minority of our respondent 9 (11.3%) were Above 50. Most of the respondent
69 (86.3%) were Male while the minority of the respondent 11 (13.8%) were
Female. The majority of the respondent 57 (71.3%) were married, while the
minority of the respondent 23 (28.8%) were single. Most respondents 30 (37.5%)
were Bachelor degree, followed by 26 (32.5%) were Master, also it followed by
15 (18.8%) were high school level while 9 (11.3%) were others. Most of the
respondents 49 (61.3%) were employed, followed by 18 (22.5%) were self-
employed, while 13 (16.3%) of the respondents were Un-employed

As a result, the first objective which to determine the effectiveness of law

enforcement in the Criminal Investigation Division control of crime organized in
Somalia the researcher found that the majority of the respondent 48 (60%) were
Agreed that community policing is a technique for reducing crime that strives to
be more effective while the minority of the respondent 32 (40%) were Neutral.
Also most of the respondent 64 (80%) were Agreed that the police and security
forces place a strong priority on combating organized crime., it followed by 11
(13.8%) were Neutral while the minority of the respondents 5 (6.3%) were Dis-
agreed. Even all the respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that fighting against
organized crime is high on the political agenda of the present government. It also
most of the respondents 77 (96.3%) were Agreed that the criminal intelligence

62
analysis helps law enforcement agencies create a pro-active approach to fighting
crime, while the minority of the respondent 3 (3.8%) were Neutral. Although all
the respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that Law enforcement agencies respond
to investigate and prevent crime.

Law enforcement and intelligence operations have certain and clear

distinctions. Law enforcement by definition is investigating and collating
evidence with the objective of apprehending perpetrators for processing in a court
of law, while intelligence agencies work with information and assets and the
classified nature of the collected information does not always allow presenting it
in court. Similarly, intelligence agents cannot always appear in court and testify.
Some of the challenges faced are purely legal, while others relate to the sharing of
classified information with members of the police force or intelligence service of
a foreign government. Apart from the official coordination and cooperation, law
enforcement agencies from different countries may cooperate or coordinate on an
informal level; meanwhile, the same is true for intelligence agencies. According
to Bayer, the benefit of informal cooperation is in the joint interest of detaining
criminals and in police being equally distanced from major policy makers, foreign
affairs officials and intelligence personnel forming the official liaison policies on
senior level (Dinev, 2014)

Law enforcement agencies employ a variety of tools to combat crime. Some

of these tools are new and driven by technological advances; others represent
long-standing police practices. While pedestrian stops, and the frisks or searches
that may accompany them, fall into the latter category, recent shifts in the way
police conduct and engage in stops and frisks have prompted renewed public
attention in recent years. In addition to police employing stops as part of their
routine work, police departments are increasingly concentrating this practice in
high-crime communities throughout the United States as a specific deterrence

63
strategy commonly referred to as ―stop and frisk, which conflates the two legally
separate actions of stopping and frisking individuals into one combined tactic.
This intensive, place- and people-based use of police stop, question, frisk, and
search powers has sparked widespread debate on its legality and fairness, as
evidenced by protests, lawsuits, and media coverage on the topic, especially in
New York City (Gaines& Kappeler, 2014)

The second objective of our research was to investigate the role of

enforcement National Intelligence control of crime organized in Somalia, so we
found that most of the respondents 74 (92.5%) were Agreed that Intelligence is
the backbone of law enforcement as a strategic tool for preventing crime in order
to identify suspects, detect crime, direct operational activities, protect the weak,
locate the missing, and apprehend offenders, while the minority of the
respondents 6 (7.5%) were Neutral. Even the majority of the respondent 63
(78.8%) were Agreed that Intelligence gives law enforcement officials the
information to analyze and select the most suitable criminal risks while the
minority of the respondent 17 (21.3%) were Neutral. It also most of the
respondent 72 (90%) were Agreed Whether it's before or after a terrorist attack,
intelligence is essential in preventing terrorist attacks from happening and helping
law enforcement officials catch suspects, while the minority of the respondent 8
(10%) were Neutral. Also most of the respondent 75 (93.8%) were Agreed that
law enforcement organizations are in charge of enforcing laws, maintaining
peace, and protecting public safety, while the minority of the respondent 5 (6.3%)
were Dis-agreed

Criminal intelligence, as it is commonly operationalized, can provide

decision makers and police chiefs with a snapshot of criminality and criminal
behavior. Crime analysis can provide police leaders with an understanding of
crime patterns and trends. Without this understanding of both crime patterns and

64
criminal behavior, people who have to make decisions that affect the safety and
security of communities will not have access to the vital, synthesized information
essential to good planning and strategy. For example, an intelligence unit may
have good information about a local group of offenders dealing in
methamphetamine. Crime analysis, however, suggests that the key problems in
the area are vehicle crime and heroin. With a more complete picture of the local
criminal environment, the police executive can make a better decision about the
best use of resources for these competing priorities. Alternatively, crime analysis
might identify an area of a town where drug arrests have increased. The
intelligence officer for the drug unit can fill in the picture with a description of a
drug dealer who lives in that area and who has recently been released from prison.
Knowledge of individuals and offender behavior can improve understanding of
crime patterns and vice versa (Khan, 2012)

The third objective of our research was to explain the role of National
Intelligence for the prevention strategies of terrorist attacks in Somalia, and
researchers found that the most of the respondent 60 (75%) were Agreed that
Intelligence helps people avoid wasting time and effort on unrelated tasks, it
followed by 13 (16.3%) were Neutral, while the minority of the respondent 7
(8.8%) were Dis-agreed. Also most of the respondents 57 (71.3%) were Agreed
that the targeting of available resources and the identification of information gaps
made possible by intelligence analysis help investigations by sharpening their
focus, while the minority of the respondent 23 (28.8%) were Neutral. Even all the
respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that Terrorism directly affects human rights,
with consequences for the enjoyment of the right to life. It also the majority of the
respondent 39 (48.8%) were Agreed that Challenge the ideology that underlies
terrorism and those who support it in order to reduce its capacity, it followed by
30 (37.5%) were Neutral while the minority of the respondent 11 (13.8 %) were

65
Dis-agreed. Although most of respondent 43 (53.8%) were Agreed Detecting
explosives and other types of weaponry it is one of the most successful tactics for
preventing terrorist attacks, it followed by 30 (37.5%) were Neutral while the
minority of the respondent 7 (8.8%) were Dis-agreed. The majority of the
respondent 53 (66.3%) were Agreed that Preventing vulnerable people from
becoming involved in terrorism by providing them with the right guidance and
encouragement, it followed by 19 (23.8%) while the minority of the respondents
8 (10%) were Neutral some others were Dis-agreed

Preventing terrorism should be based on a legislative framework that

provides for the appropriate criminalization of preparatory offences. Definitions
of such offences in national legislation, similar to defining acts of terrorism,
should be clear, precise, non-discriminatory, non-retroactive and accessible to the
public. The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism has
been identified as an international good practice. It defines the criminal offences
of ―public provocation to commit a terrorist offence‖, ―recruitment for
terrorism‖ and ―training for terrorism (ODIHR, 2014)

Terror and terrorism can lead to a substantial loss for the economy of the
country. These losses are mainly due to uncertainties brought about by the
confidence lost with terrorism and transferring a significant portion of the
country‗s resources to military expenditure. On the other hand, terrorist can also
target directly key sectors of economics. These results suggest that the purpose of
terrorism, which aims to achieve political and economic demands of the
illegitimate way, is a clear indication of the government to intimidate and create
fear and horror in the society. In other words, the purposes of terrorism reach a
political goal by creating a pressure on political authority and digesting public
interest through violence (Çinar, 2017)

66
 CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1. INTRODUCTION

After collecting data through questionnaire survey, the data were analyzed.
The results are discussed in the following subsections. This chapter was discuss
the findings of the study as presented in chapter four.

5.2. CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY

Criminal intelligence, as it is commonly operationalized, can provide

decision makers and police chiefs with a snapshot of criminality and criminal

behavior. Crime analysis can provide police leaders with an understanding of

crime patterns and trends. Without this understanding of both crime patterns and

criminal behavior, people who have to make decisions that affect the safety and

security of communities will not have access to the vital, synthesized information

essential to good planning and strategy. For example, an intelligence unit may

have good information about a local group of offenders dealing in

methamphetamine. Crime analysis, however, suggests that the key problems in

the area are vehicle crime and heroin. With a more complete picture of the local

67
criminal environment, the police executive can make a better decision about the

best use of resources for these competing priorities. Alternatively, crime analysis

might identify an area of a town where drug arrests have increased. The

intelligence officer for the drug unit can fill in the picture with a description of a

drug dealer who lives in that area and who has recently been released from prison.

Knowledge of individuals and offender behavior can improve understanding of

crime patterns and vice versa (Khan, 2012)

Apart from the police and intelligence services, timely criminal intelligence

is also important for prosecutors in the performance of their duties. The

prosecution services usually rely on receiving analytical products from other

agencies. The investigations of organized crime groups operating in multiple

countries may naturally involve the use of modern surveillance techniques,

HUMINT assets, or undercover officers. The dangers related to infiltrating and

maintaining status and reputation in transnational organized crime groups, as well

as the ethical and moral considerations, could cause the prevalence of SIGINT

methods, including interception of communication traffic going through satellites.

Conversely, Dandurand asserts that no international investigation can be launched

without the establishment of proper international cooperation among the

concerned entities. Conversely, Dandurand asserts that no international

investigation can be launched without the establishment of proper international

cooperation among the concerned entities. The antithesis is possible in cases of

68
covert or clandestine operations, sometimes through the utilization of paramilitary

units against highly armed and tactically sophisticated organized crime or terrorist

groups. Nonetheless, analogous actions carry legal and political risks that may

ensue in a diplomatic confrontation (Breitel, 1959).

In methodology of the study, I used descriptive in design. Also, it was also

quantitative and cross sectional in nature the target population of our Research

was the political experts, security experts, intelligence experts, students, and

members of society, the sample size of our study was 80 respondents. Closed

questionnaire was used to collect research data. Respondents were briefed about

the study and its objective. The content of the questionnaire was explained for

them and was also requested to answer the questions as honest as possible.

As a result, the first objective which to determine the effectiveness of law

enforcement in the Criminal Investigation Division control of crime organized in

Somalia the researcher found that the majority of the respondent 48 (60%) were

Agreed that community policing is a technique for reducing crime that strives to

be more effective while the minority of the respondent 32 (40%) were Neutral.

Also most of the respondent 64 (80%) were Agreed that the police and security

forces place a strong priority on combating organized crime., it followed by 11

(13.8%) were Neutral while the minority of the respondents 5 (6.3%) were Dis-

agreed. Even all the respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that fighting against

69
organized crime is high on the political agenda of the present government. It also

most of the respondents 77 (96.3%) were Agreed that the criminal intelligence

analysis helps law enforcement agencies create a pro-active approach to fighting

crime, while the minority of the respondent 3 (3.8%) were Neutral. Although all

the respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that Law enforcement agencies respond

to investigate and prevent crime.

The second objective of our research was to investigate the role of

enforcement National Intelligence control of crime organized in Somalia, so we

found that most of the respondents 74 (92.5%) were Agreed that Intelligence is

the backbone of law enforcement as a strategic tool for preventing crime in order

to identify suspects, detect crime, direct operational activities, protect the weak,

locate the missing, and apprehend offenders, while the minority of the

respondents 6 (7.5%) were Neutral. Even the majority of the respondent 63

(78.8%) were Agreed that Intelligence gives law enforcement officials the

information to analyze and select the most suitable criminal risks while the

minority of the respondent 17 (21.3%) were Neutral. It also most of the

respondent 72 (90%) were Agreed Whether it's before or after a terrorist attack,

intelligence is essential in preventing terrorist attacks from happening and helping

law enforcement officials catch suspects, while the minority of the respondent 8

(10%) were Neutral. Also most of the respondent 75 (93.8%) were Agreed that

law enforcement organizations are in charge of enforcing laws, maintaining

70
peace, and protecting public safety, while the minority of the respondent 5 (6.3%)

were Dis-agreed

The third objective of our research was to explain the role of National

Intelligence for the prevention strategies of terrorist attacks in Somalia, and

researchers found that the most of the respondent 60 (75%) were Agreed that

Intelligence helps people avoid wasting time and effort on unrelated tasks, it

followed by 13 (16.3%) were Neutral, while the minority of the respondent 7

(8.8%) were Dis-agreed. Also most of the respondents 57 (71.3%) were Agreed

that the targeting of available resources and the identification of information gaps

made possible by intelligence analysis help investigations by sharpening their

focus, while the minority of the respondent 23 (28.8%) were Neutral. Even all the

respondents 80 (100%) were Agreed that Terrorism directly affects human rights,

with consequences for the enjoyment of the right to life. It also the majority of the

respondent 39 (48.8%) were Agreed that Challenge the ideology that underlies

terrorism and those who support it in order to reduce its capacity, it followed by

30 (37.5%) were Neutral while the minority of the respondent 11 (13.8 %) were

Dis-agreed. Although most of respondent 43 (53.8%) were Agreed Detecting

explosives and other types of weaponry it is one of the most successful tactics for

preventing terrorist attacks, it followed by 30 (37.5%) were Neutral while the

minority of the respondent 7 (8.8%) were Dis-agreed. The majority of the

respondent 53 (66.3%) were Agreed that Preventing vulnerable people from

71
becoming involved in terrorism by providing them with the right guidance and

encouragement, it followed by 19 (23.8%) while the minority of the respondents

8 (10%) were Neutral some others were Dis-agreed

5.3. RECOMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the study, the following are strongly recommended
to improve the following actions:

 The intelligence analysis group must strengthen the investigations by targeting

available resources and identifying information gaps.

 Special investigative techniques should be developed to help with organized

crime investigations.

 The government must fight corruption through its organized crime investigation

operations.

 To reduce the prevalence of organized crime, the law must be strictly enforced.

 The state police must be strengthened to prevent terrorism and organized crime

because they play critical roles.

72
 APPENDIX

REFERENCES
Akram, Q., Afzal, F., & Siddique, A. (2021). Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in
Africa: A Case Study of Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in Nigeria. Pakistan Journal
of International Affairs, 4(3).

Breitel, C. D. (1960). Controls in criminal law enforcement. The University of Chicago

Law Review, 27(3), 427-435.

Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), US Dept of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

United States of America, US Dept of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing
Initiative, & United States of America. (2005). National Criminal Intelligence
Sharing Plan, CD.

Çinar, M. (2017). The effects of terrorism on economic growth: Panel data approach.
Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci: časopis za ekonomsku teoriju i
praksu, 35(1), 97-131.

De Silva, S. (2017). Role of Education in the Prevention of Violent. Worldbank

Documents.

Dinev, Y. (2014). Legal considerations of intelligence operations in countering

transnational organised crime. Information & Security, 31(1), 7.

Fafchamps, M., & Moser, C. (2003). Crime, isolation and law enforcement. Journal of
African economies, 12(4), 625-671.

Gaines, L., & Kappeler, V. (2014). Policing in America. Routledge.

Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T. (2008). The impact of terrorism and conflicts on growth
in Asia, 1970–2004.

73
Gottschalk, P. (2009). Policing organized crime: intelligence strategy implementation.
Crc Press.

Innes, M., Fielding, N., & Cope, N. (2005). ‗The Appliance of Science?‘ The Theory
and Practice of Crime Intelligence Analysis. British journal of criminology, 45(1),
39-57.

Khan, Z., Ludlow, D., McClatchey, R., & Anjum, A. (2012). An architecture for
integrated intelligence in urban management using cloud computing. Journal of
Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications, 1(1), 1-14.

Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2019). The economic consequences of terrorism for the
European Union. Published as: Krieger, Tim, 87-108.

La Vigne, N. G., Lachman, P., Rao, S., & Matthews, A. (2016). Stop and frisk:
Balancing crime control with community relations.

Leong, A. V. M. (2016). The disruption of international organised crime: an analysis of

legal and non-legal strategies. Routledge.

Levi, M. (1998). Perspectives on organised crime: an overview. How. J. Crim. Just., 37,
335.

Mingardi, G. (2007). The role of Intelligence work in the control of Organized Crime.
estudos avançados, 21, 51-69..

Martens, F. T. (1987). The intelligence function. Major Issues in Organized Crime

Control, 26-39.

ODIHR, O. (2014). Preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism and

radicalization that lead to terrorism: a community-policing approach.

Ratcliffe, J. H. (2007). Integrated intelligence and crime analysis: Enhanced information

management for law enforcement leaders. (Ratcliffe, 2007)

74
Ratcliffe, J. H. (2010). Intelligence-led policing: Anticipating risk and influencing
action. Intelligence, 1(1), 1-12.

Ratcliffe, J. H. (2016). Intelligence-led policing. Routledge.

Rose, A., Avetisyan, M., Rosoff, H., Burns, W. J., Slovic, P., & Chan, O. (2017). The
role of behavioral responses in the total economic consequences of terrorist
attacks on US air travel targets. Risk analysis, 37(7), 1403-1418.

Sparrow, M. K. (1991). The application of network analysis to criminal intelligence: An

assessment of the prospects. Social networks, 13(3), 251-274.

Strang, S. J. (2014). Network analysis in criminal intelligence. In Networks and

network analysis for defence and security (pp. 1-26). Springer, Cham.

Sternberg, R. J. (1997). The concept of intelligence and its role in lifelong learning and
success. American psychologist, 52(10), 1030.

Vinson, M. (2015). An Israeli approach to deterring terrorism: managing persistent

conflict through a violent dialogue of military operations. Prism, 5(3), 60-75.

Williams, P. D. (2020). Understanding US Policy in Somalia.

Wyckoff, R. (2020). TERRORISM PREVENTION THROUGH COMMUNITY

POLICING (Doctoral dissertation, Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School).

75
 QUASTIONAIRE

Dear Respondents

I'm Abdirahman from accord University‘s department of Master of

Security intelligence & strategic studies conducting a research project on “Role of

intelligence work for the control of crime organized in somalia‖.

You are kindly requested to sacrifice a few minutes of your valuable time

and fill up this questionnaire. This research is for academic purpose and any

information you give wasbe treated with us most confidentiality. Thank you for

your participation.

Instructions: please put tick (√) where possible only.

PART ONE: Socio- Demographic

1. What is your Age?

A) 18-28. ( ) B) 29-38 ( ) C) 39-50 ( )

D) Above 50 ( )

76
2. What is your gender?

A) Male. ( ) B) Female ( )

3. What is your marital status?

A) Single ( ) B) Married ( )

4. What is your education level?

A) High School Degree. ( ) B) Batcholer degree. ( )

C) Master. degree ( ) D) Others ( )

5. What is your occupation ?

A). Employed ( ) B) Self-employed B) Un-employed( )

77
 Part Two: Please Tick (√) The One Which Represents Your Opinion In
These Statements By Using These Terms Of Scale:
1. Agree 2. Neutral 4. Disagree

1. Intelligence is the backbone of law enforcement as a strategic tool for preventing

crime in order to identify suspects, detect crime, direct operational activities,
protect the weak, locate the missing, and apprehend offenders.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

2. Intelligence gives law enforcement officials the information to analyze and select the
most suitable criminal risks.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

3. Intelligence helps people avoid wasting time and effort on unrelated tasks.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

4. Whether it's before or after a terrorist attack, intelligence is essential in preventing

terrorist attacks from happening and helping law enforcement officials catch
suspects.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

5. The targeting of available resources and the identification of information gaps made
possible by intelligence analysis help investigations by sharpening their focus.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

6. Criminal intelligence analysis helps law enforcement agencies create a pro-active

approach to fighting crime.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

7. Law enforcement agencies respond to investigate and prevent crime.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

78
8. Law enforcement organizations are in charge of enforcing laws, maintaining peace,
and protecting public safety.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

9. Community policing is a technique for reducing crime that strives to be more

effective.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

10. Fighting against organized crime is high on the political agenda of the present
government.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

11. The police and security forces place a strong priority on combating organized crime.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

12. Terrorism directly affects human rights, with consequences for the enjoyment of the
right to life.

13. Challenge the ideology that underlies terrorism and those who support it in order to
reduce its capacity.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

14. Detecting explosives and other types of weaponry it is one of the most successful
tactics for preventing terrorist attacks.

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

15. Preventing vulnerable people from becoming involved in terrorism by providing

them with the right guidance and encouragement

A. Agree B. Neutral C. Disagree

79
 Budget Frame Work
Tasks Costs

$ 40
Materials.

$50
Transportation

Running Cost $25

Network $35

Total $150

80