CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.

03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from the firm
(Promulgated June 21, 1988)
and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to
practice law currently.
CHAPTER I. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
THE LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN
conduct.
LAW REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
OF JUSTICE.
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if
SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW
it will admit of a fair settlement.
STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE
IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN
INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse
convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of
to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible
safeguard the latter's rights.
and is cause for disciplinary action.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
solicit legal business.
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed
public duties.
unless the circumstances so warrant.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL
said service.
USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
CHAPTER II. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall
be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased.
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any
person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other
relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,
FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES,
AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING
COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
or neglectful counsel.
CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST
IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in good
standing.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon
the latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate
or to persons specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan
even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.
CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT
DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST
ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT
HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE.
Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared
himself on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order
of its proferrence. He should also be ready with the original documents for
comparison with the copies.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse Court processes.
Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or
recess in the trial, while the witness is still under examination.
Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or
to impersonate another.
Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly
inconvenience him.
Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an
instrument, and the like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel.
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE
AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO
INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor
seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or
agency of the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.
CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT
CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO
THE NEEDY.
Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the
latter's race, sex. creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the
guilt of said person.
Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an
appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client
if:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or
between a present client and the prospective client.
Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his
professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations
with paying clients.
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon
as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his
own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 15.02.- A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in
respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as
mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating
nor understating the prospects of the case.
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness.
Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
PROFESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent
on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's
interest are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should
know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with
the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course
of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly
call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the
relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling
the case.
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE
FEES.
Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his
fees:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the client, be
entitled to a division of fees in proportion to the work performed and responsibility
assumed.
Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client,
accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance
or other compensation whatsoever related to his professional employment from
anyone other than the client.
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice
or fraud.
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND
SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATION IS TERMINATED.
 (e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except; with the retainer agreement;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the (f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
disclosure; (g) Other similar cases.
(b) When required by law; Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled,
associates or by judicial action. and shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter,
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own
advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give
information from his files to an outside agency seeking such information for
auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any similar
purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or
associates thereof unless prohibited by the client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those
whose services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of
the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's affairs even
with members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular
case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.

CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY

FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following case: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection
with the matter he is handling;
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons
and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of
the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him
to carry out the employment effectively;
 Lawyer's Oath
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 11256, March 07, 2017
FLORDELIZA A. MADRIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A lawyer who causes the simulation of court documents not only violates the court and its processes, but
also betrays the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client and must be disbarred to maintain the
integrity of the Law Profession.
Antecedents
In November 2002, complainant Flordeliza A. Madria consulted the respondent in his law office in
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan to inquire about the process of annulling her marriage with her husband, Juan
C. Madria. After giving the details of her marriage and other facts relevant to the annulment, the
respondent told her that she had a strong case, and guaranteed that he could obtain for her the decree of
annulment. He told her, too, that his legal services would cost P25,000.00, and that she should return on
November 19, 2002 inasmuch as he would still prepare the complaint for the annulment. At the time of
the consultation, she was accompanied by her daughter, Vanessa Madria, and her nephew, Jayson
Argonza.1
The complainant returned to the respondent's office on November 19, 2002. On that occasion, he showed
her the petition for annulment, and asked her to sign it. She paid to him an initial amount of
P4,000.00.2He acknowledged the payment through a handwritten receipt. 3
The complainant again went to the respondent's office on December 16, 2002 to deliver another partial
payment, and to follow up on the case. The respondent advised her to just wait for the resolution of her
complaint, and assured her that she did not need to appear in court. He explained that all the court notices
and processes would be sent to his office, and that he would regularly apprise her of the
developments.4 On December 28, 2002, she returned to his office to complete her payment, and he also
issued his receipt for the payment.5
The complainant's daughter Vanessa thereafter made several followups on behalf of her mother. In the
latter part of April 2003, the respondent informed the complainant that her petition had been
granted.6Thus, Vanessa went to the respondent's office and received a copy of the trial court's decision
dated April 16, 2003 signed by Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4,
in Tuguegarao City.7
According to the complainant, the respondent advised her to allow five months to lapse after the release
of the decision before she could safely claim the status of "single." After the lapse of such time, she
declared in her Voter's Registration Record (VRR) that she was single. 8
The complainant, again through Vanessa, received from the respondent a copy of the certificate of
finality dated September 26, 2003 signed by one Jacinto C. Danao of the RTC (Branch 4). 9
Believing that the documents were authentic, the complainant used the purported decision and certificate
of finality in applying for the renewal of her passport.10 However, she became the object of an
investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) because her former partner, Andrew Dowson
Grainge, had filed a complaint charging that she had fabricated the decision for the annulment of her
marriage. Only then did she learn that the decision and the certificate of finality given by the respondent
did not exist in the court records, as borne out by the letter signed by Atty. Aura Clarissa B. Tabag-
Querubin, Clerk of Court of the RTC Branch IV, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
MS. RACHEL M. ROXAS
Officer-in-Charge
Regional Consular Office
Tuguegarao City
Madam:
This is in reply to your letter dated June 23, 2011 inquiring on whether Civil Case No. 6149 for the
Annulment of Marriage between Flordeliza Argonza Madria and Juan C. Madria was filed and decided by
this Court.
As per records of this Court, the above-entitled case was filed on April 25, 2003 but was dismissed as per
Order of this Court dated April 6, 2004.
The signature of the [sic] Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino as appearing in the alleged decision attached to
your letter is a blatant forgery.
For your information and guidance.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
AURA CLARISSA B. TABAG-QUERUBIN
Clerk of Court 11 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
V
As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges for violation of the Philippine Passport Act in the
RTC in Tuguegarao City.12 She claims that she had relied in good faith on the representations of the
respondent; and that he had taken advantage of his position in convincing her to part with her money and
to rely on the falsified court documents.13
In his answer,14 the respondent denies the allegations of the complainant. He averred that he had informed
her that he would still be carefully reviewing the grounds to support her petition; that she had insisted that
he should prepare the draft of her petition that she could show to her foreigner fiance; that she had also
prevailed upon him to simulate the court decision to the effect that her marriage had been annulled, and to
fabricate the certificate of finality; that she had assured him that such simulated documents would be kept
strictly confidential; that he had informed her that the petition had been filed in April 2003, but she had
paid no attention to such information; that she had not appeared in any of the scheduled hearings despite
notice; and that he had not heard from her since then, and that she had not even returned to his office.
Findings and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
After conducting her investigation, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report
and Recommendation15 wherein she concluded that the respondent had violated his Lawyer's Oath; and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years.
The IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, modified
the recommendation of suspension from the practice of law for two years to disbarment through its
Resolution No. XXI-2015-242, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-242
CDB Case No. 14-4315
Flordeliza A. Madria vs. Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", considering violation of his lawyers' oath as a
lawyer and a member of the Bar by preparing a simulated Court decision granting the petition for
annulment of marriage of complainant and a certificate of finality of the annulment petition. Hence,
Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys.16
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 Ruling of the Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for annulment of marriage, and of the simulation
of the decision and certificate of finality. His explanation of having done so only upon the complainant's
persistent prodding did not exculpate him from responsibility. For one, the explanation is unacceptable, if
not altogether empty. Simulating or participating in the simulation of a court decision and a certificate of
finality of the same decision is an outright criminal falsification or forgery. One need not be a lawyer to
know so, but it was worse in the respondent's case because he was a lawyer. Thus, his acts were legally
intolerable. Specifically, his deliberate falsification of the court decision and the certificate of finality of
the decision reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery of the
administration of justice in this country. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the
Bar.
The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
xxxx
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness.
The respondent would shift the blame to his client. That a lay person like the complainant could have
swayed a lawyer like the respondent into committing the simulations was patently improbable. Yet, even
if he had committed the simulations upon the client's prodding, he would be no less responsible. Being a
lawyer, he was aware of and was bound by the ethical canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly those quoted earlier, which would have been enough to deter him from committing the
falsification, as well as to make him unhesitatingly frustrate her prodding in deference to his sworn
obligation as a lawyer to always act with honesty and to obey the laws of the land. Surely, too, he could
not have soon forgotten his express undertaking under his Lawyer's Oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent
to its commission."17 Indeed, the ethics of the Legal Profession rightly enjoined every lawyer like him to
act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of
law.18 As we have observed in one case:19
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to
always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship
between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good
faith.
Also, Canon 1520 and Rule 18.0421 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility required the
respondent be true to the complainant as his client. By choosing to ignore his fiduciary responsibility for
the sake of getting her money, he committed a further violation of his Lawyer's Oath by which he swore
not to "delay any man's cause for money or malice," and to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to
the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients."
He compounded this violation by taking advantage of his legal knowledge to promote his own selfish
motives, thereby disregarding his responsibility under Canon 17.22
Under Section 27,23 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any of the following
grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer
for a party to a case without authority so to do.
Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office, any of
which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court.24The moral standards of the Legal Profession expected the respondent to act with the highest
degree of professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of their practice of law. 25 That he turned his
back on such standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character, dishonesty, lack of probity and
general unworthiness to continue as an officer of the Court. 26
We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for unprofessional conduct. In Cruz-Villanueva v.
Rivera,27 he was suspended from the practice of law because he had notarized documents without a
notarial commission. This circumstance shows his predisposition to beguile other persons into believing
in the documents that he had falsified or simulated. It is time to put a stop to such proclivity. He should be
quickly removed through disbarment.
It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution and only for the most imperative
reasons or in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the bar.28 But we do not hesitate when the misconduct is gross, like in
the respondent's case. We wield the power now because the respondent, by his gross misconduct as herein
described, absolutely forfeited the privilege to remain in the Law Profession. As we reminded in Embido
v. Pe,29 in which we disbarred the respondent lawyer for falsifying a court decision:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a privilege
that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him
who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer's Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional
and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and
omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not
directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness
of the principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him. Verily, no lawyer is immune from the
disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer
misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity. The test is whether the conduct shows
the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the
conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. 30
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. CARLOS P. RIVERA guilty of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION OF THE LAWYER'S OATH; and, ACCORDINGLY,
ORDERS his DISBARMENT. Let his name be STRICKEN from the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b)
the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; (c) the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT for
appending to the respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar; and (d) the OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE for possible criminal prosecution of the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 [G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]
RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his
capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, Respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
DECISION
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court’s decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect
of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years
of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for al
least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Black defines "practice of law" as: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
PARAS, J.: general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr.
p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
[Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,
144). (Emphasis ours).
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and
public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he
does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of
their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111
ALR 23).
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among
others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the Philippine Bar’
— I am quoting from the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.’"
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision
on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the
COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem
it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law
for at least ten years is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement
of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will necessarily
involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now
would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Thank you." cralaw virtua1aw library
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are
the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys
called "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologies,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as "the
performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar
Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance
Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too
global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role colors much of both the
public image and the self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why
is this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a
lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept
of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and
the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially
more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do
both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more
time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice,
a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such
as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
— a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the
lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’ work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice
and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various
legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of companies
information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy
formulation, particularly "model-making" and contingency planning," has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of
acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational
analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a
model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses
of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of
the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized
attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various approaches
for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged
in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in
securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons
and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with
the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal
problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation.
His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research,
acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an
ability to deal with the law.
chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of
the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming
involved in management. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one’s work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation

(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter
the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys
while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate
Law Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines
of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot
problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are
we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation
Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management
issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition
of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel’s total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that
the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation’s
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and
other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and
laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. (Emphasis supplied).

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there
are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of
collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct
group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term
and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group- context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment,
coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general,
such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial
mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the
role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the systems dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties
and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the
general counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm
to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation’s evolving economic
and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The
practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has emerged in the
last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good
general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities.
And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the law’s effects on corporate
activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be
able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star,
The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p. 4). chanrobles law library : red
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since
its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. (p. 124, Rollo).
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the
Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous
hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted
to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No.
2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the
loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five
(5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as
key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled
"Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re negotiation. Necessarily,
a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation
of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of
the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
(Emphasis supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions
which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A
good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse
open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements — an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat no drums;
but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’
(See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide." (Emphasis supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements
are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,
subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law."
(Emphasis supplied).
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity."cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law
is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practiced two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for
ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law
practice." . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by
way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of
law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals,
in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines,
say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing,
how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion
for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion,
that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for
has been clearly shown.
chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Additionally, consider the following:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is
in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm
a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."
cralaw virtua1aw library
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
"No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins." cralaw virtua1aw library
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade
touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.).
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not
appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments — that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof,
be confirmed — was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not
only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in
voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were
the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod’s disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition
then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not
possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of" practice of low for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the
core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a
majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions
involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in
Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries." cralaw virtua1aw library
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are
that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounded duty
of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active,
habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to
exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide,
cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk,
cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a
business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People v. Villanueva: 2
"Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, M S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice
of law." It states:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644)
such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of
law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term ‘practice of law’ (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, `all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette Et. Al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359).
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience is within the term `practice of law’. (Martin supra).
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-
client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot
be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p.
30)." 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent
Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of
his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR
AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded
that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so
HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal
opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as
"practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of
acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People v. Villanueva: 4
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services." cralaw virtua1aw library
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified
for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There
are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting his viewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee’s credentials is made
on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that
discretion would still be subject to our review. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualify an appointee simply because he has
passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is
that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to
be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too
sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless.
From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one
does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become
involved in litigation." cralaw virtua1aw library
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business
and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company
organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the
ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or
government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner.
He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts
involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public
utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law
because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory
Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any
acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely
nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable." cralaw virtua1aw library
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting
wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent’s credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been
engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and
economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed
in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law
whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when
he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional
Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year
period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy
of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully
vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the
result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice
of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear
stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because
there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no
instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the
decision.chanrobles law library
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed
to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into
grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses
superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background,
experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in
the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.
stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has
not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to
have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if
there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding
committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to
pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate
choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional,
accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten
years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one’s decisive choice. It means
that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and
attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission
on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if
appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the
bar examinations when he worked in his father’s law firm. Even then his law practice must have been
extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a
member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1.15.1 Respondent Monsod’s activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin

American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities

Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines
 which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar
d. Semirara Coal Corporation Ass’n v.

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture

Corporation" (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given
the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all
sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working
as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving legal advice of legal services, he was the
one receiving that advice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the
practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.
chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts
as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has
reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal
knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain,
teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can
these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?.

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years.."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the
use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of
Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice
of law.’Practicing law’ has been defined as ‘Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the
laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person,
firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.’ Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel . Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344
III. 462, 176 N.E. 901." (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776).
For one’s actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar
to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of
"Respondent’s answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not
he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent.
He answered: ‘Very seldom.’ In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts
for the parties during the twenty-mine years of his business, he said: ‘I have no idea.’ When asked if it
would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose.’ Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: ‘I
don’t recall exactly what was said.’ When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances
where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: Well, I don’t believe so, that is not a practice.’
Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was
not the broker, he finally answered: ‘I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate
is concerned.’
x x x legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that
x x x may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as
". . . An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his
stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or
defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-
professional agents are properly styled ‘attorneys in fact;’ but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law.’ Abb.
Law Dict.’Attorney.’ ‘A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, ‘is an officer of a court of law,
legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients.’The principal
duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to
keep his secrets confided to him as such His rights are to be justly compensated for his services.’ Bouv.
Law
Dict. tit.’Attorney.’ The transitive verb ‘practice,’ as defined by Webster, means ‘to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaining;.......to
carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession,
trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,’ etc " (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus,
we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]): chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x
". . . Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127,
p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services......." (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required
component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644)
law (U S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA log
citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115).
x x x
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the
use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the
denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as
doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within
the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission
President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the
specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of
COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges
the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissents.
 B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A.
MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791and
passed the same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. 2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation. 6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the
Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7
cralaw virtualaw library
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated
“under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys
was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in the Roll of
Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.” 9 cralaw
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed
in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11cralaw virtualaw library
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013. 13 The
OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct
and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference,
petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys. 15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most
serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s
attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit
after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file
the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied: chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come
here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary. 16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as
SERENO, C.J.: members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to
the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses
the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company,
cralaw virtualaw library
and the Energy Development Corporation.19 cralaw virtualaw library
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege
from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
cralaw virtualaw library
inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
“neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.” 22
cralaw virtualaw library
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
virtualaw library
acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat;
ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of
fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the
Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance
record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado
should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. 26 When, in
spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to
complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.
cralaw virtualaw library
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer
of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court, 27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while
it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in
unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision,
because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they
are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him
from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him
in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to
engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of
law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNEDthat doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys
will be dealt with severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 5333, March 13, 2017
ROSA YAP PARAS, Complainant, v. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the disbarment complaint 1 (1995 complaint) filed by Rosa Yap
Paras (complainant) against her husband Justo de Jesus Paras (respondent) for which he was suspended
from the practice of law for a year. The issues before the Court now are (a) whether respondent should be
held administratively liable for allegedly violating his suspension order and (b) whether his suspension
should be lifted.
The Facts
In a Decision2 dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six
(6) months for falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and
for one (1) year for immorality and abandonment of his family, with the penalties to be served
simultaneously.3 Respondent moved for reconsideration4 but the Court denied it with finality in a
Resolution5 dated January 22, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion6 to declare in contempt and disbar respondent and his
associate, Atty. Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging that respondent continued to practice law, and
that Atty. Enojo signed a pleading prepared by respondent, in violation of the suspension
order.7Moreover, complainant claimed that respondent appeared before a court in Dumaguete City on
February 21, 2001, thereby violating the suspension order. 8 On March 26, 2001, complainant filed a
second motion for contempt and disbarment,9 claiming that, on March 13, 2001, Atty. Enojo again
appeared for Paras and Associates, in willful disobedience of the suspension order issued against
respondent.10 Complainant filed two (2) more motions for contempt dated June 8, 2001 11 and August 21,
200112 raising the same arguments. Respondent and Atty. Enojo filed their respective comments, 13 and
complainant filed her replies14 to both comments. Later on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift Suspension 15
dated May 27, 2002, informing the Court that he completed the suspension period on May 22, 2002.
Thereafter, respondent admitted that he started accepting new clients and cases after the filing of the
Motion to Lift
Suspension.16 Also, complainant manifested that respondent appeared before a court in an election case on
July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of his motion to lift suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Court
referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and recommendation. 17
On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory Order 18 on the status of
respondent' suspension, essentially inquiring whether respondent can resume his practice prior to the
Court's order to lift his suspension.19 Meanwhile, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the
same inquiry through a Letter20 dated March 21, 2003 signed by Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) Judge Romeo Anasario of the Second MCTC of Negros Oriental. Accordingly, the Court
referred the foregoing queries to the OBC for report and recommendation. 21
In a Report and Recommendation22 dated June 22, 2004, the OBC recommended that the Court issue an
order declaring that respondent cannot engage in the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted
by the Court.23 Citing case law, the OBC opined that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic
upon the end of the period stated in the Court's decision and an order from the Court lifting the
suspension is necessary to enable him to resume the practice of his profession. In this regard, the OBC
noted that: (a) respondent's suspension became effective on May 23, 2001 upon his receipt of the Court
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration with finality; and (b) considering that the suspensions
were to be served simultaneously, the period of suspension should have ended on May 22, 2002.24 To
date, however, the Court has not issued any order lifting the suspension.
Soon thereafter, in a Resolution25 dated August 2, 2004, the Court directed the IBP to submit its report
and recommendation on the pending incidents referred to it. Since no report was received until 2013, the
Court was constrained to issue a Resolution26 dated January 20, 2014, requiring the IBP to submit a status
report regarding the said incidents. In response, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline sent a letter27 to
the Court, conveying that the Board of Governors had passed a Resolution dated April 15, 2013 affirming
respondent's suspension from the practice of law.28 However, in view of the pendency of respondent's
motion for reconsideration before it, the IBP undertook to transmit the case records to the Court as soon
as said motion is resolved.29 Thereafter, in a letter30 dated September 22, 2015, the IBP advised the Court
that it denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. The Court received the records and relevant
documents only on February 15, 2016.31
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation32 dated January 16, 2012, instead of resolving only the pending
incidents referred to the IBP, the IBP Investigating Commissioner examined anew the 1995 complaint
filed against respondent which had been resolved with finality by the Court in its Decision dated October
18, 2000 and Resolution dated January 22, 2001. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for falsifying his wife's signature in
the bank loan documents and for immorality.33
In a Resolution34 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation dated January 16, 2012, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.35 Aggrieved, respondent Filed a motion for
reconsideration,36 alleging that his administrative liability based on the charges in the 1995 complaint had
been settled more than a decade ago in the Court's Decision dated October 18, 2000. He added that to
suspend him anew for another year based on the same grounds would constitute administrative double
jeopardy. He stressed that the post-decision referral of this case to the IBP was limited only to pending
incidents relating to the motion to declare him in contempt and his motion to lift the suspension. Such
motion was, however, denied in a Resolution dated June 7, 2015. 37
The Issues Before the Court
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent should be administratively held liable for
practicing law while he was suspended; and (b) whether the Court should lift his suspension.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation pertain to respondent's alleged violation of the suspension order and his request for the
Court to lift the suspension order. However, the IBP Investigating Commissioner evidently did not dwell
on such matters. Instead, the IBP Investigating Commissioner proceeded to determine respondent's
liability based on the 1995 complaint filed by herein complainant – which was already resolved with
finality by no less than the Court itself. To make things worse: (a) the IBP Board of Governors failed to
see the IBP Investigating Commissioner's mishap, and therefore, erroneously upheld the latter's report and
recommendation; and (b) it took the IBP more than a decade to resolve the instant matters before it. Thus,
this leaves the Court with no factual findings to serve as its basis in resolving the issues raised before it.
Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with,
except for valid and compelling reasons, 38 as it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be
heard on the issues raised.39 Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the Court usually remands the
administrative case to the IBP for further proceedings.40 However, in light of the foregoing circumstances,
as well as respondent's own admission that he resumed practicing law even without a Court order lifting
his suspension, the Court finds a compelling reason to resolve the matters raised before it even without the
IBP's factual findings and recommendation thereon.
According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge,
training[,] and experience."41 During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer
must desist from practicing law.42 It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not
automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period.43 The lawyer must submit the required
documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the
practice of law.44
In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent's suspension period became effective on May
23, 2001 and lasted for one (1) year, or until May 22, 2002. Therafter, respondent filed a motion for the
lifting of his suspension. However, soon after this filing and without waiting for a Court order approving
the same, respondent admitted to accepting new clients and cases, and even working on an amicable
settlement for his client with the Department of Agrarian Reform.45 Indubitably, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without waiting for the Court order lifting the suspension order against him, and thus, he
must be held administratively liable therefor.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so – acts which respondent is guilty of
in this case – are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, 46 to wit:
As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to meticulously, diligently, and efficiently act on the matters
referred to it for investigation, report, and recommendation, and to submit its report with reasonable
dispatch so as to ensure proper administration of justice. Any inordinate delay cannot be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months. However, considering that respondent has already been previously disbarred, this penalty
can no longer be imposed.
The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, prevailing case law 47 shows that the Court
consistently imposed an additional suspension of six (6) months on lawyers who continue practicing law
despite their suspension. Thus, an additional suspension of six (6) months on respondent due to his
unauthorized practice of law is proper. The Court is mindful, however, that suspension can no longer be
imposed on respondent considering that just recently, respondent had already been disbarred from the
practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys in Paras v. Paras.48 In Sanchez v.
Torres,49 the Court ruled that the penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed on a
lawyer who had been previously disbarred.50 Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the lawyer's
administrative liability for recording purposes in the lawyer's personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court
held that respondent therein should be suspended from the practice of law, although the said penalty can
no longer be imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the same manner, the Court imposes upon
respondent herein the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
although the said penalty can no longer be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment, but nonetheless
should be adjudged for recording purposes. That being said, the issue anent the propriety of lifting his
suspension is already moot and academic.

As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a pleading dated February 21, 200151 and indicating
therein the firm name Paras and Associates, Atty. Enojo conspired with respondent to violate the
suspension order.

Complainant's contention is untenable.

As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of representing clients before the courts. Thus, he can
sign pleadings on their behalf. The Court cannot give credence to complainant's unsubstantiated claim that
respondent prepared the pleading and only requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the pleading
averted to by complainant was dated February 21, 2001, when respondent's suspension was not yet
effective. Thus, the contempt charge against Atty. Enojo must be denied for lack of merit.
A.C. No. 10952

ENGEL PAUL ACA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RONALDO P. SALVADO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the October 11, 2014 Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
1

Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and approved with

modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
2

suspending Atty.
Ronaldo P. Salvado (Atty. Salvado) from the practice of law.

The Complaint:

On May 30, 2012, Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
3

against Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
4 5

the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met Atty. Salvado
through Atty. Samuel Divina (Atty. Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado
introduced himself as a lawyer and a businessman engaged in several businesses Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado, who at
including but not limited to the lending business; that on the same occasion, Atty. first, openly communicated with him, assuring him that he would not abscond from
Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in his business with a guarantee that he his obligations and that he was just having difficulty liquidating his assets and
would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month; and that he was assured collecting from his own creditors. Complainant was even informed by Atty. Salvado
of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various clients and that he owned real properties that could serve as payment for his obligations. As
investors. time went by, however, Atty. Salvado began to avoid complainant's calls and text
messages. Attempts to meet up with him through common friends also proved futile.
Because of these representations coupled by the assurance of Atty. Salvado that he This prompted complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer Atty. Divina, for
would not place his reputation as a lawyer on the line, complainant made an initial appropriate legal action.
investment in his business. This initial investment yielded an amount corresponding Check Number Date Issued Amount
to the principal plus the promised interest. On various dates from 2010 to 2011, On December
complainant claimed that he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to invest with 0060144 August 14, 2011 P657 ,000.00 26, 2011, Atty.
promises of high rates of return. Divina
0060147 September 29, 2011 P 530,000.00 personally
As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated 0060190 September 29, 2011 P60,000.00 served the
checks in the total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus Notice of
interests. All checks were drawn from PSBank Account number 040331-00087-9, 0060194 October 16, 2011 P90,000.00 Dishonor on
fully described as follows: Atty. Salvado,
0060206 October 17, 2011 P2, 120,000.00 directing him to
Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the settle his total
0060191 October 29, 2011 P1,060,000.00 obligation in the
aforementioned checks were dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient funds
or a closed account. amount of
0060195 November 16, 2011 P1,590,000.00
P747,000.00, corresponding to the cash value of the first two (2) PSBank checks,
within seven (7) days from receipt of the said notice. Nevertheless, Atty. Salvado
6
refused to receive the said notice when Atty. Divina's messenger attempted to serve it
on him.
Sometime in April 2012, complainant yet again engaged the services of Atty. Divina,
who, with his filing clerk and the complainant's family, went to Atty. Salvado's house
to personally serve the demand letter. A certain "Mark" who opened the gate told the
filing clerk that Atty. Salvado was no longer residing there and had been staying in
the province already.
As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing Atty. Salvado. Complainant
quickly alighted from his vehicle and confronted him as he was about to enter the gate
of the house. Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told him that he had not forgotten his
debt and invited complainant to enter the house so they could talk. Complainant
refused the invitation and instead told Atty. Salvado that they should talk inside his
vehicle where his companions were.
During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured complainant that he was working on
"something" to pay his obligations. He still refused to personally receive or, at the
least, read the demand letter.
Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his obligations.
For complainant, Atty. Salvado's act of issuing worthless checks not only constituted
a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) or the "Anti-Bouncing Checks
Law," but also reflected his depraved character as a lawyer. Atty. Salvado not only
refused to comply with his obligation, but also used his knowledge of the law to evade
criminal prosecution. He had obviously instructed his household staff to lie as to his
whereabouts and to reject any correspondence sent to him. This resort to deceitful
ways showed that Atty. Salvado was not fit to remain as a member of the Bar.
The Defense of the Respondent
On July 24, 2012, Atty. Salvado filed his Answer, denying that he told complainant
7
that he had previously entered into various government contracts and that he was
previously engaged in some other businesses prior to engaging in the lending and
rediscounting business. Atty. Salvado asserted that he never enticed complainant to
invest in his business, but it was Atty. Divina's earnings of good interest that attracted
him into making an investment. He further stated that during their initial meeting, it
was complainant who inquired if he still needed additional investments; that it was
Atty. Divina who assured complainant of high returns; and that complainant was fully
aware that the money invested in his businesses constituted a loan to his clients
and/or borrowers. Thus, from time to time, the return of investment and accrued
interest when due – as reflected in the maturity dates of the checks issued to
complainant- could be delayed, whenever Atty. Salvado' s clients requested for an
extension or
renewal of their respective loans. In other words, the checks he issued were merely
intended as security or evidence of investment.
Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were instances when he would
request complainant not to deposit a check knowing that it was not backed up by
sufficient funds. This arrangement had worked until the dishonor of the checks, for
which he readily offered his house and lot located in Marikina City as collateral.
The Reply of Complainant
On August 30, 2012, complainant filed his Reply, pointing out that Atty. Salvado did
8
not deny receiving money from him by way of investment. Thus, he must be deemed
to have admitted that he had issued several postdated checks which were eventually
dishonored. Atty. Salvado 's claim that it was complainant himself who prodded him
about making investments must be brushed aside for being self-serving and baseless.
Assuming arguendo, that complainant indeed made offers of investment, Atty.
Salvado should have easily refused knowing fully well that he could not fund the
checks that he would be issuing when they become due. If it were true that the checks
were issued for complainant's security, Atty. Salvado could have drafted a document
evidencing such agreement. His failure to present such document, if one existed at all,
only proved that the subject checks were issued as payment for complainant's
investment.9
Complainant also clarified that his complaint against Atty. Salvado was never meant
to harass him. Despite the dishonor of the checks, he still tried to settle the dispute
with Atty. Salvado who left him with no choice after he refused to communicate
with him properly.
Thereafter, the parties were required to file their respective mandatory conference
briefs and position papers. Atty. Salvado insisted that he had acted in all honesty and
1âwphi1
good faith in his dealings with the complainant. He also emphasized that the title to
his house and lot in Greenheights Subdivision, Marikina City, had been transferred in
the name of complainant after he executed a deed of sale as an expression of his
"desire and willingness to settle whatever is due to the complainant."10
Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
On January 2, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado
be meted a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six ( 6) months for
engaging in a conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law and for
behaving in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Atty.
Salvado's act of issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover the same constituted
willful dishonesty and immoral conduct which undermine the public confidence in the
legal profession.
The IBP-BOG Resolution
On October 11, 2014, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation with
modification as to the period of suspension. The IBP-BOG increased the period of
Atty. Salvado's suspension from six (6) months to two (2) years.
Neither a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-BOG nor a petition for review
before this Court was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire
records of the case for appropriate action with the IBP Resolution being merely
recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section
12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. 11
The Court's Ruling
The parties gave conflicting versions of the controversy. Complainant, claimed to
have been lured by Atty. Salvado into investing in his businesses with the promise of
yielding high interests, which he believed because he was a lawyer who was expected
to protect his public image at all times. Atty. Salvado, on the other hand, denied
having enticed the complainant, whom he claimed had invested by virtue of his own
desire to gain profits. He insisted that the checks that he issued in favor of
complainant were in the form of security or evidence of investment. It followed,
according to Atty. Salvado, that he must be considered to have never ensured the
payment of the checks upon maturity. Atty. Salvado strongly added that the dishonor
of the subject checks was "purely a result of his gullibility and inadvertence, with the
unfortunate result that he himself was a victim of failed lending transactions xxx." 12
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and adopts its recommendation in
part.
First. A perusal of the records reveals that complainant's version deserves credence,
not only due to the unambiguous manner by which the narrative of events was laid
down, but also by the coherent reasoning the narrative has employed. The public is,
indeed, inclined to rely on representations made by lawyers. As a man of law, a
lawyer is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. A13
man, learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is expected to make truthful
representations when dealing with persons, clients or otherwise. For the Court, and as
the IBP-BOG had observed, complainant's being beguiled to part with his money and
believe Atty. Salvado as a lawyer and businessman was typical human behavior
worthy of belief. The Court finds it hard to believe that a person like the complainant
would not find the profession of the person on whose businesses he would invest as
important to consider. Simply put, Atty. Salvado's stature as a member of the Bar
had, in one way or another, influenced complainant's decision to invest.
Second. It must be pointed out that the denials proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot
belie the dishonor of the checks. His strained explanation that the checks were mere
securities cannot be countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are expected to fully
comprehend the legal import of bouncing checks. In Lozano v. Martinez, the Court
14
ruled that the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
Hence, the excuse of "gullibility and inadvertence" deserves scant consideration.
Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware that promoting obedience to the Constitution and the
laws of the land is the primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued the worthless
checks, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws
were mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended and abused to satisfy
personal whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel, the Court wrote that the issuance of
15
worthless checks constituted gross misconduct, and put the erring lawyer's moral
character in serious doubt, though it was not related to his professional duties as a
member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is Atty. Salvado's business relationship
with complainant. His issuance of the subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an
officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
Third. Parenthetically, the Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado's deceiving attempts
to evade payment of his obligations. Instead of displaying a committed attitude to his
1âwphi1
creditor, Atty. Salvado refused to answer complainant's demands. He even tried to
make the complainant believe that he was no longer residing at his given address.
These acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and
duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. The
subsequent offers he had made and the eventual sale of his properties to the
complainant, unfortunately cannot overturn his acts unbecoming of a member of the
Bar.
Fourth. The Court need not elaborate on the correctness of the Investigating
Commissioner's reliance on jurisprudence stating that administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own and may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases, including violations of B.P. 22.
Accordingly, the only issue in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers is the
respondent's fitness to remain as a member of the Bar. The Court's findings have no
material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose to file against
each other.16
All told, the Court finds that Atty. Salvado's reprehensible conduct warrants a penalty
commensurate to his violation of the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado GUILTY of violating
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10548 December 10, 2014
CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG), dated January 3, 2013 and March 22, 2014, adopting and
1 2
approving the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found
Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco (Alty Francisco) administratively liable for multiple
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended the
penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law.
On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007, filed by
3 to Jimenez by virtue of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares
Caroline Castañeda Jimenez (complainant)against Atty. Francisco for multiple
violations of the CPR. On October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his Answer. On
4 (1) share was transferred to Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in
June 26, 2009, the mandatory conference was held and terminated. Only the counsel
for Atty. Francisco appeared. The notice of the said conference addressed to
complainant was returned with the notation "unknown at the given address." No new
address was provided by the complainant. Both parties wererequired to submit their
respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco adopted his Answer. The
Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for
estafa against complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo,
Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez. The 5 Edgar B. Francisco
said complaint was docketed as IS No. 074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Makati City. Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial owner of the
shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development Corporation (Clarion), which was
incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a residential house located in
Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The incorporators and original
stockholders of Clarion were as follows:
Thomas K. Chua - ₱500,000.00
Teresita C. Alsua - ₱500,000.00
Myla Villanueva - ₱249,998.00
Edgar B. Francisco - ₱1.00
Soledad Gamat - ₱1.00
Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of Incorporation, the above-
named stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of
assignment of their respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then
Jimenez’s common-law partner.Clarion’s total capitalization was only ₱5,000,000.00.
Thus, in order to achieve its purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion
simulated a loan from the complainant in the amount of ₱80,750,000.00. Thereafter,
Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the amount of ₱117,000,000.00 from
Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said amount which
was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed of
sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property was purchased for
₱78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was not reflected
in the books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion
were transferred to complainant based on a deed of assignment. The remaining one
Clarion’s General Information Sheet (GIS)filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Resultantly, the subscribed shares of Clarion were as follows:
Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00
Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00
- P 1.00
Soledad Gamat - P 1.00
On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another
deed of assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to
₱1,249,997.00.
According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in
2004, he learned from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel),
approached the complainant and threatened her, claiming that the United States
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)was about to go after their properties. Marcel
succeeded in persuading complainant to transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to
Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of assignment. Again, this was reflected in
Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means,
complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for
sale sometimein August 2004. The said property was eventually sold to Philmetro
Southwest Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro)for the amount of ₱118,000,000.00 without
Jimenez’s knowledge. This sale was again undervalued at ₱78,000.000.00 per the
deed of sale. Atty. Francisco relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received the
payment for the sale of the Forbes property and that he handed all the proceeds
thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.
Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on complainant’s alleged participation in
the fraudulent means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion
with Jimenez’s money. Complainant was duty bound to remit all the proceeds of the
sale to Jimenez as the true and beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-
respondents, however, misappropriated and converted the fundsfor their personal use
and benefit.
In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit
reiterating its factual averments. A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the
6
following claims and admissions, among other things, of Atty. Francisco:
1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance
in the documentation of the sale of the Forbes property owned by Clarion.
Atty. Francisco asked her if she had secured permission from Mark Jimenez
and complainant answered in the affirmative.
2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him
to negotiate the sale of the property.
3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San
Francisco Del Monte branch. When the cash payment was deposited, he
withdrew the amount and handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in
the presence of complainant.
4. All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The
transfer taxes, however, were paid.
5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm
that the sale of the Forbes property was without his knowledge and
approval. The proceeds of the sale had already been farmed out to different
corporations established by complainant and her sister.
6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to
steal the money of Mark Jimenez.
The Complaint
Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa
filed by Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit
of Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion’s
corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary
case against Atty. Francisco for representing conflicting interests. According to her,
she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco regarding the legal implications of
Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative to the sale
and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or
the members of his law office. Atty. Francisco was the one who actively participated
7
in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property. Without admitting the
truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution clearly
betrayed the trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason,
complainant prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.
The Respondent’s Position
In his Answer, Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in
8
1998 for the incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house
in Forbes Park, where he intended to live with his long-time partner, the complainant;
that the original incorporators and stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares
in trust for Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion
shareholdings were also pursuant to Jimenez’s orders; and that as the corporate
secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he prepared all the legal documentation togive
effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of the Forbes property.
Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the
United States for excessive contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this
time, Jimenez’s son, Marcel, and the complainant, asked him again to changethe
ownership of Clarion shares in order to avoid the attachment of Jimenez’s properties
in a tax evasion case; that he acceded to the request on the belief that this was in
accordance with Jimenez’s wishes; and that as a result, almost 100% of Clarion’s
ownership was transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio.
Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to
prospective buyers and to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold
for
₱118,000,000.00; that Marcel and complainant led him to believe that Jimenez had
knowledge of the sale as they were in constant communication with him; that all these
representations, however, turned out to be false when Jimenez returned tothe
Philippines and discovered that the proceeds of the sale were coursed through other
corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that Jimenez likewise learned of
the successive sale of his other properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the
members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the estafa case against the
complainant and the others. As a witness to the fraud committed against Jimenez,
Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and circumstances
surrounding the said transactions.
Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule on disclosures of
privileged communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting
interests, on the ground that complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of
Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never of the complainant. He might
have assisted her in some matters, but these were all under the notion that Jimenez had
given him authority to do so. Further, though he acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no
attorney-client relationship between him and complainant was formed, as a
corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its shareholders. While he
admitted that the legal documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the
Forbes property were prepared by him and notarized by the members of his law firm,
he averred that these acts were performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary
and legal counsel ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he served
no conflicting interests because it was not a "former client" and a "subsequent client"
who were the opposing parties in litigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on
privileged communication does not apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to
allege, muchless prove, the requisites for the application of the privilege. When Atty.
Francisco denied being her lawyer, the complainant should have established, by clear
and convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship indeed existed between
them. Complainant failed to do this.
Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful
narration of facts by a witness, Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Cañete, where the
9
Court ruled that "the fact that one of the witnesses for the defendant had been
formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this suit was no ground for rejecting his
testimony." In this case, he merely attested to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in
the course of which, he defended and served Jimenez as a client. This was likewise
pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal motives and purposes were not covered
by the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of complainant.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
In the Commissioner’s Report, dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating
10
Commissioner, Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found Atty.
Francisco guilty of violations of the CPR and recommended that he be suspended for
one (1) year from the practice of law. Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted
that the subsequent affidavit of desistance executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did
not affect the investigation conducted by the CBD as it was not an ordinary court
which accepted compromises or withdrawals of cases. After weighing on the claims
of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing in the records
would show that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and
Jimenez. The circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco was an original
11
incorporator and shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate
secretary of the said corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did not
include Jimenez as an original incorporator. He became a stockholder only in 2001,
when Jimenez acquired shares from Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenez’s
participation in Clarion affairs again stopped when he assigned the entirety of his
shares in favor of complainant.
Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco,
the report stated that it would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to
Clarion’s ownership to be reported to the SEC through its GIS. The Investigating
Commissioner also pointed out Atty. Francisco’s clear admission that the transfer of
shares within Clarion were "without any consideration," ran counter to the deeds of
assignment that he again admittedly executed as corporate counsel. Worse, Atty.
Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan and undervalued the consideration of
the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further, when he
executed the affidavit containing allegations against the interest of Clarion and
complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated the
rule on privileged communication and engaged in an act that constituted
representation of conflicting interests in violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the
12
findings and recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.
The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved
for its reconsideration.
13
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the
penalty of suspension of one (1) year is too severe considering that in his more than
three decades of practice, he had never been involved in any act that would warrant
the imposition of disciplinary action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client,
Jimenez, experienced a difficult crisis involving his children and common-law
partner that he experienced a major upheaval in his professional life. He apologized
for his not being too circumspect in dealing with the relatives of Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the
execution of the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all
connected to his capacity as Clarion’s corporate secretary and legal counsel, not to
mention his ties with his client and friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity
to Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that this duty extended to the incorporators and
shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when complainant sought advice in her capacity as a
shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own words, Atty.
Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice versa."14
Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by
Jimenez, stating that he had retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999.
Espousing Atty. Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez asserted that Atty. Francisco’s law
firm was in charge of all the companies he owned in the Philippines.He directed Atty.
Francisco to execute all the documentation to show his ownership of these
companies, including Clarion. These documents were in the possession of
complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for Congress in 2001,Atty. Francisco
personally
assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of candidacy and the proceedings before the
electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the United States, it was Atty. Francisco
who visited and told him that his children, Myla and Marcel, were then facilitating
the sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc., without his knowledge.
He asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his children’s betrayal and to wait until
he could go home. When he filed the criminal cases against his children and
complainant, the latter even filed a frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco.
According to Jimenez, the people who committed crimes against him were now
exhausting all possible means to keep Atty. Francisco silent and to prevent the latter
from performing his duties as a lawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied the respondent’s motion for
15
reconsideration.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
Violations of Canons 1 and 10
of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes.
To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and,
thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer’s personal deference
to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience
tothe law, on the part of the public.
Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance
of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not
necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to
include such element. To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
16
defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in
principle, fairness and straight forwardness while conduct that is "deceitful" means
17
the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is
used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of
the party imposed upon. 18
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act
and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach,
inorder to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession. "To say that lawyers
19
must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement
can never be over emphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions,
[lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by
the law."20
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the
laws," "do no falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion. 21
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his
sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to
the SEC, the significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its
corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of
assignment and the GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the
validity of these transfers of shares, making it appear that these were done for
consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the
alleged orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing
out that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he executed as corporate
counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to assume that
Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the
rules enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and
obligation to register valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to advance the
interests of his clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty.
Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have
undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property. He
permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the government of taxes. Unquestionably,
therefore, Atty.
Francisco participated in a series of grave legal infractions and was content to have
granted the requests of the persons involved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to
complainant’s misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty.
Francisco’s act of drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to be
embodied in public documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for
the specious reason that lawyers are constrained to obey their clients’ flawed
scheming and machinations, the Court would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and
falsity. This would undermine the role of lawyers as officers of the court.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of
their clients should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a
lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of
the law. It needs to be emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be
pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and mustbe held within the bounds of
reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the interests of
his client does not warranta course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions.
22
In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that he lacks candor regarding
his dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that "a
lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the
court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of
our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule oflaw. They are
expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court.
23
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied
in the CPR, namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1)
and to actwith candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty.
Franciso desecrated his solemn oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing
of the same.
Rule on Conflicting Interests and
Disclosure of Privileged
Communication
With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation of conflicting interests and
disclosure of privileged communication, the Court deviates from the findings of
the IBP-BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should
24
ideallybe imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information
between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to
his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions withthe client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in
this regard isto avoid representing conflicting interests…" Thus, even if lucrative fees
25
offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional
employment if the same would trigger a violation of the prohibition against conflict of
interest.
In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict of
26
interest in this wise:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf
of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
them to oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to
determine whether a lawyer’s conduct lies within this proscription. One test is
whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the
other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same actionor in an unrelated
action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one
client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be
no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage
of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature
or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a
lawyer-client relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the
fiduciary nature of the ties between an attorney and his client. Conversely, a lawyer
may not be precluded from accepting and representing other clients on the ground of
conflict of interests, if the lawyer-client relationship does not exist in favor of a party
in the first place.
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of
interests, a scrutiny of the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that the
complainant failed to establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.
First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s client remains unsubstantiated,
considering its detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty.
Francisco was Clarion’s legal counsel and that complainant sought advice and
requested documentation of several transfers of shares and the sale of the Forbes
property. This was only successful in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted
the documents pertaining to the transaction and that he was retained as legal counsel
of Clarion. There was no detailed explanation as to how she supposedly engaged the
services of Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what and how she
communicated with the latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With the
complaint lacking in this regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco,
accompanied with a detailed narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and
Clarion, would have to prevail.
Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of narrative details presented by the
parties. Atty. Francisco’s claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and
not of the complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by
Jimenez himself. Complainant’s evidence pales in comparison with her claims of
being the client of Atty. Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity
of circumstances.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty.
Francisco’s answer. This could have given her opportunity to present evidence
showing their professional relationship. She also failed to appear during the
mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD without even updating her residential
address on record. Her participation in the investigation of the case apparently ended
at its filing.
In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the
allegations in the complaint by preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence
means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1
of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the
court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b)
the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts towhich they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest
or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not
mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number. 27
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco
among the members of Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid stance in
dealing with Jimenez’s children and complainant. He could have been staunch in
reminding the latter that his tasks were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for
Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Francisco’s indiscretion does not
detract the Court from finding that the totality of evidence presented by the
complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that Atty. Francisco
was her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the
affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish
that Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v.
Vitriolo, the Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of the
28
said privilege, viz:
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-
client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made
the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the
lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the prospective client. xxx
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as
the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment
of the purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise
agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and
delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a
document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not
privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his
rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to
his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not
legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such
purpose.
[Emphases supplied]
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on
record fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant
failed to establish the professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The
records are further bereft of any indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the
Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a
demonstration of what she had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of
circumstances under which the confidential communication was relayed. All that
complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she sought legal advice from
respondent in various occasions." Considering that complainant failed to attend the
29
receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco
and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their
information and guidance.

hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific confidential information Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of
allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if this Decision so that the Court can determine the reckoning point when his
not impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged suspension shall take effect.
communication. As held in Mercado, such confidential information is a crucial link in
establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and SO ORDERED.
client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. It cannot be
30

gainsaid then that complainant, who has the burden of proving that the privilege
applies, failed in this regard.

The Penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office
as an attorney, for violating of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the CPR, for the practice of law is a profession, a
31

form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified
and who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer
32

depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 33

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice
or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an
attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.

While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of
privileged communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively
allowing Clarion tomake untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public
documents, still constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney,
for which a suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of

Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon
 [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657. February 23, 2004]
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E.
SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
19, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, respondent. [1]
DECISION
CALLEJO SR., J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents
without the requisite notary commission more than twenty
years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue presented
for resolution before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint
dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of
Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondents
appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the
notarial law, thus:
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX A, was not duly
commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but still
subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized
documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980
uncommissioned until the 9th of January 1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to
December 31st 1987 and January 6th 1988 to December 31st 1989 but
the records fail to show any entry at the Clerk of Court after
December 31st 1985 until December 31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the
expiration of his commission in December 1989.[2]
...
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order
respondent:
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all
future public service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any
delaying tactics from Judge Santos or any agency and or public
servants involved in this administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on
the premises.[3]
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court,
Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental,
which contained the following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and
available in this office, the following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned
notary public in the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony
E. Santos submitted his notarial reports in the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b. February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
 k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents
under the name Atty. Anthony Santos after December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty.
Anthony Santos was on January 6, 1988 until December 31, 1989.[4]
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge
categorically denied the charges against him. He also submitted a
certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that
[5]
there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the
City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized
documents/notarial register. The respondent further averred as
follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and
submitted by the respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on
account of the said notarized documents and therefore not the proper party
to raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334
entitled Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine
Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance & Sum of
Money, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro
City, wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge. The undersigned resolved
the case in favor of the plaintiffs. [6]
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator
recommending the need to resort to a full-blown investigation to
determine the veracity of the parties assertions, the Court, in a
Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a) treat the
matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case
to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA)
for investigation, report and recommendation. [7]
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002,
the complainant requested that the hearing be held at Cagayan de
Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied the request but upon the
complainants insistence, the matter was forwarded to the Court,
which favorably acted thereon in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002.
The complainant presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City
[8]
before retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo. [9]
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the following recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be
found guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by (a) notarizing documents
without commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c)
non-forwarding of his notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon
expiration of his commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be
suspended from the practice of law and barred from being commissioned as
notary public, both for one year, and his present commission, if any, be
revoked.[10]
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not
adduce evidence in his defense, while the complainant presented
documentary evidence to support the charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was
commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the
accuracy of the first certification. He merely alleged that there was no
proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de
Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register. And, as
already observed, he presented no evidence, particularly on his
appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was so
commissioned) and submission of notarial reports and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that there were only two
Record Books available in the notarial section of the RTC of Misamis
Oriental (Cagayan de Oro City); and that the (f)irst book titled Petitions for
Notarial Commission contains items on the Name, Date Commission was
issued and Expiration of Commission of the notary public. First entry
appearing was made on December 1982.
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the first book would
disclose so (at least, for the years 1982 and 1983). However, he did not
present said book. Neither did he present a certification from the Clerk of
Court, RTC of Misamis Oriental, or documents from his files showing that
he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983. Similarly, he did not submit a
certificate of appointment for all those years. Under Section 238 of the
Notarial Law, such certificate must be prepared and forwarded by the Clerk
of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor General, together with the oath
of office of the notary public.
[11]
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the
evidence presented by the complainant, that the respondent
notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without being
commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that his
earliest commission of record was on January 9, 1984. [12]
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant
complaint, a brief backgrounder.
On the Applicability of
Resolution A.M. No. 02-
9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-
02-SC, to wit:
[13]
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials
who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that
have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be
considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or
court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he
should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary
sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and
disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise
members of the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the
new rule, administrative cases against erring justices of the CA and
the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service
may be automatically treated as disbarment cases. The Resolution,
which took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall
supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to
administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not
yet been required to comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing
resolution, since the respondent filed his Answer/Comment on
June 13, 2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed
In Disbarment Cases Involving
A Retired Judge For Acts
Committed While He Was Still
A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a
retired judge; (2) the complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3)
the acts constituting the ground for disbarment were committed
when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer, before his
appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being
charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a
member of the bar, with notarizing documents without the
requisite notarial commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment
and Discipline of Attorneys provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any
person. The complaint shall state clearly, and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents
as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the
Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any
person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys
including those in the government service: Provided, however, That all
charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even
if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme
Court: Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and Judges
before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the
Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for
disposition and adjudication.[14]
The investigation may thereafter commence either before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in accordance with
Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before the Supreme
Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when
the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme
Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall
proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that
the review of the report shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated
Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the
Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court
shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact
and recommendations together with the record and all the evidence
presented in the investigation for the final action of the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment
is cognizable by the Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is
not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for
investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor General,
any officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the
Court will thereafter base its final action. [15]
Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary,
he is still considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not
immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at
[16]
the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan
de Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court
itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a justice
of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court, the complaint shall
be filed with the Supreme Court. [17]
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation
Of A Judge Will Not Preclude
The Filing Thereafter Of An
Administrative Charge Against
Him For Which He Shall Still
Be Held Answerable If Found
Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been
separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of
its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the
complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of
the bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero: [18]
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in
office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either
to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or
declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice
and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications... If innocent,
respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he
leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he
deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and
imposable under the situation. [19]
However, recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or
malicious administrative or criminal cases against members of the
judiciary for purposes of harassment, we issued A.M. No. 03-10-
01-SC which took effect on November 3, 2003. It reads in part:
[20]
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court
Administrator, an administrative complaint against any Justice of the
Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts filed
in connection with a case in court is shown to be clearly unfounded and
baseless and intended to harass the respondent, such a finding should be
included in the report and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or affirmed by the
Court, the complainant may be required to show cause why he should not
be held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may further
be required to show cause why he or she should not be administratively
sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory
retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that
occurred at least a year before such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it
is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for
dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator
must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from
receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and
recommendation not later than 30 days from receipt of the comment. The
Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of compulsory
retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6)
months from such date without prejudice to the release of the retirement
benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking
into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a
retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have
been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement of the
judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at
least a year before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the
complaint was intended to harass the respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21,
2001 was received by the Office of the Court Administrator on
March 26, 2001. The respondent retired compulsorily from the
[21]
service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise, the
ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been
committed by the respondent did not occur a year before the
respondents separation from the service. Furthermore, and most
importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie shown to be
without merit and intended merely to harass the
respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall within
the ambit of the foregoing resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined
For Acts Committed Before His
Appointment To The Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed
prior to his appointment to the judiciary. In fact, even the new
[22]
Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate
forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication
of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including
those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. It need not
[23]
be shown that the respondent continued the doing of the act or acts
complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports
the charge on the respondent, considering the gravity of the
offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act
complained of must be continuing in order for the respondent
judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre, the [24]
respondent judge was charged with violating Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, for acts committed while he was
still a practicing lawyer. The respondent therein refused to turn
over the funds of his client despite demands, and persisted in his
refusal even after he was appointed as a judge. However, the Court
also stated in this case that the respondents subsequent
appointment as a judge will not exculpate him from taking
responsibility for the consequences of his acts as an officer of the
court.[25]
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson, we held that proof of prior
[26]
immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for administrative
discipline against a judge if he is not charged with immorality
prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated, thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had
wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his
steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond
information and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position
of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for
that honor - his private and official conduct must at all times be free from
the appearance of impropriety.....
[27]
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to
prove the charges by substantial evidence. The complainant
[28]
therein presented evidence pertaining to the respondents previous
indiscretion while still a practicing lawyer; no evidence was,
however, adduced to prove that the latter continued to engage in
illicit acts after being appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent
was exonerated in this case because the complainant failed to
present evidence that the indiscretion continued even after the
respondent was appointed to the judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public
interest that it is both the right and duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The Constitution
vests this power of control and regulation in this Court. The [29]
Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys, which authority is not only a
right but a bounden duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity
to the Court is demanded of its members. [30]
Notarizing Documents Without
The Requisite Commission
Therefore Constitutes
Malpractice, If Not The Crime
Of Falsification Of Public
Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization by a notary
[31]
public converts a private document into a public one, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof
of its authenticity and due execution. [32]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary
public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court
[33]
has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without
the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as
it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of
public documents. For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has
[34]
sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law,
revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from
acting as such, and even disbarment. [35]
In the case of Nunga v. Viray, the Court had the occasion to
[36]
state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do
so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,
performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the
lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then,
too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he
is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood,
which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely
within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. [37]
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot,
therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the public faith in the
integrity of public documents is at stake in every aspect of that
function.
[38]
The Charge Against The
Respondent Is Supported By
The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainants formal offer
of evidence, prompting the Investigating Justice to decide the case
on the basis of the pleadings filed. Neither did he claim that he
[39]
was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, nor
deny the accuracy of the first certification. The respondent merely
alleged in his answer that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the
submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register. Furthermore, as
found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent presented no
evidence of his commission as notary public for the years 1980 to
1983, as well as proof of submission of notarial reports and the
notarial register.
[40]
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to
answer the charges and to controvert the evidence against him in a
formal investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges; he must meet
the issue and overcome the evidence against him. [41]
The respondents allegation that the complainant was not a
party in any of the documents so notarized, and as such was not
prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an
attorney and counselor which include the statutory grounds under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any
[42]
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate
disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right of a
citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and
doings of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with
the duties of the office and from which conduct the citizen or the
public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. [43]
An Administrative Complaint
Against A Member Of The
Bar Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement
which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the
bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is
essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession. It is a
continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore does
not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint,
into any question concerning ones mental or moral fitness before
he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice
merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer. The rule is settled that a
[44]
lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if
it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law. [45]
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own, distinct from and may proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases. As we held in the leading case of In re
[46]
Almacen: [47]
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit,
but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.[48]
In a case involving a mere court employee the Court [49]
disregarded the Court Administrators recommendation that the
charge for immorality against the respondent be dismissed on the
ground that the complainants failed to adduce evidence that the
respondents immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from being
found guilty of illicit conduct, the respondent was also found
guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her childrens certificates of live
birth to show that her paramour was the father. The complaint in
this case was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after
the illicit affair ended. The Court held that administrative
[50]
offenses do not prescribe. [51]
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion
than that an administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who
was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-
four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by
prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would
be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant
would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they
ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the
integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of
justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution
of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot
escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical
pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench
and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct,
or the Lawyers Oath. This should particularly apply in this case,
considering the seriousness of the matter involved - the
respondents dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the
requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The
Institution Of The
Administrative Case Would
Merely Mitigate The
Respondents Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by
law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality,
honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of
the bar. By his actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such
[52]
standards; he undermined the confidence of the public on notarial
[53]
documents and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes. The respondent also violated Rule 1.01
thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In representing that he
[54]
was possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he was,
in fact, not so authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer
that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate
to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar
him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end. Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case,
[55]
considering that the complaint against the respondent was filed
twenty-four years after the commission of the act complained of;
that there was no private offended party who came forward and
[56]

claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents so

notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a
retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-
earned retirement benefits. The Court finds that a fine of
[57]

P5,000.00 is justified in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is
found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the requisite
notarial commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a
fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent
Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty,
malpractices, and unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004,
she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public
market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee
sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a
consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market
stall was government-owned.
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and financial
problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999
without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been
signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy from respondent. The other
contract was a sale agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent
drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by
the period within which it could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted three Special
Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino),
complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the principals named therein and bore
only the signature of the named attorney-in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit
corroborated complainant’s allegations against respondent. 2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to
submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice. 3
In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of
complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently
needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in
respondent’s computer, and the phrase “absolute and registered owner” was inadvertently left unedited.
Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the subject public
market stall under a “Build Operate and Transfer” contract with the local government unit and,
technically, she could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the
same property in which complainant was represented as the property’s absolute owner, but she did not
complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of
herself as owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and
encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that complainant
and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous mortgage contract over the same
market stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-
Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate
the latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on
complainant’s assurance that the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original
copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that
complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of
that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement was notarized, complainant did not present the
CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the
property was the subject of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent
maintained that the SPAs submitted by complainant as additional evidence were properly notarized. It can
be easily gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent;
hence, the notarization was limited to the former’s participation in the execution of the document.
Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized in the principal’s place
of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder,
complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional Evidence. 5 Attached thereto
were copies of documents notarized by respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of
Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the
signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures
of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked the signature of
the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the
Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank
Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position
Papers.6Notably, respondent’s Position Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached to
complainant’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended
the immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary
public for two years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures
of the parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He accepted respondent’s explanations with
respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he
found that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold
respondent liable for violation of Canon 18 7 and Rule 18.038 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus, he also recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for six months. 9
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the
modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year. 10
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration 11 and Second Motion for Reconsideration.12 She
maintained that the additional documents submitted by complainant were inadmissible, as they were
obtained without observing the procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC
(2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of complainant was actually a
supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under the rules of procedure of the Committee on Bar
Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating
commissioner should have expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving them due course.
Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following: absence
of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and emotional problems;
timely good-faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of her misconduct; full and free
disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character or
reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, denied
respondent’s motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the IBP’s
findings.14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago –
through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio – transmitted the documents
pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against respondent. 15
THE COURT’S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties’ submissions in
this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some
procedural matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible
for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A
comparable argument was raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent therein opposed the
admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct,
because those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.” There could be no dispute that the
subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the
rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in
violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons
violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth
records in violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the
Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal
searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and
seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. In People vs.
Hipol, we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and
the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual
against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search"
made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the
constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as
evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not
provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are,
therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this
administrative case against respondent. 18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of
documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the other
notarized documents submitted by complainant as additional evidence.
Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a supplemental
pleading must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or
adds something to the primary pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or
change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the
original complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant
was a supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is that the latter notarized
incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Complainant is not legally barred from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her
complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she committed
misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed
that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public
interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the
integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.20
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained
in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the
integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial
documents diminished. 21 In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the
mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage
contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for
tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 22and Rules
1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant sometime in
September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures,
she could have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement
is not a rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that on various occasions from
2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of
the parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a
notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his or her presence. 26
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones
who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared
before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath
as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood. 29
Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several
instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to the
solemnity of their oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.31 The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the less severe
punishment of suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a
notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and
Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary
public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her
notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and
furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN
E.
BAYDO, Respondents.
DECISION
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) 1
with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig)
and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s
when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their
graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time
that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.2 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having
married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was
followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 3 Atty. Catindig
however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez
would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized
his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.4 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to
dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been
decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was
lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage. 5
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of
America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce
decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by
Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he
would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the
laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son. 7
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a
petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent
of Gomez to the said petition. 8
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Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the mail informing her of
Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love
letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.”
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their
affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty.
Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez. 11
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.12 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective
comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002.14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed,
however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying
with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed
with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.
PER CURIAM:
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted
Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart
could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete
separation of property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican
Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them. 16 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed
to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent
was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a
Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.17 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by
the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew
that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig
marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA. 18 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage
to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was
afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship. 19 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.20 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
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He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr.
Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in
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September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact
rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001. 21 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty.
Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s
romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which
was the reason why she resigned from his law firm.22
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On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice. 23 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
9
On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order24 setting the mandatory
conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During
the conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on
the pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective
position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their
position papers on October 17, 200325 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position
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paper27 on October 24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report
and Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality,
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing
fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct,
which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined
that:
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In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig
established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct
was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal
conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity for
extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can
he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a
model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second
marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig
has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted
moral standards of the community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of
the alleged affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which adopted and approved
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s
uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a
complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence
of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the
status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent
with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion
for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the
Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
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Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
cralawred
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:
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[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent
for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of
bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vast interests are committed to
his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property,
reputation, his life, his all.”34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
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Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” 35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act,
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these
distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not
simply immoral, conduct. 36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968,
which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when
their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty.
Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy
problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their
conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and
married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that
time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a
semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at
that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his
previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s
sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on
marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion
is
that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to
render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in
order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that
time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he
was then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his
firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself,
cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his
propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral
conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’”37 In various cases, the Court
has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a child.38 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty.
Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is
indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty.
Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this
Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court
Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,
could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the
seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they are
uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed
married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such
admission provides ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove
the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by
Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents
were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty.
Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence. 39 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed
received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3, 2015
MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against
Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and
A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September
2014.
A.C. No. 7973
On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the
Office of the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged
that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist
and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia
filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage, which was eventually granted.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister
Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was
already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In
2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned
abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia
alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia
alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime
against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his
practice of law.
In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar
complaint against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreño alleged
that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because
he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a
complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that
Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal
Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has
not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD,
Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the same
facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and
the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted.
Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the
disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further
alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that
Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to
retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties
agreed on the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a
conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
found Sesbreño guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. On appeal, this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced
Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor
as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporalas maximum. The IBP-
CBD found that Sesbreño was released from confinement on 27 July 2001 following
his acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. Citing International Rice Research Institute v.
National Labor Relations Commission, the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide
1
may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The
IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this Court convicting Sesbreño for the crime of
homicide, and found that the circumstances leading to the death of the victim
involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:
Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was
shown to be a foe of respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor his
companion Christopher shown to have wronged the respondent. They simply
happened to be at the wrong place and time the early morning of June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear
the earmarks of moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court observed in
Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme
arrogance
and feeling of self-importance. Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to be
slighted by a couple of drunks who may have shattered the stillness of the early
morning with their boisterous antics, natural display of loud bravado of drunken men
who had one too many. Respondent’s inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of
drunken men who were not even directed at respondent reflected poorly on his fitness
to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was not only vindictive without a
cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority.
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon where the respondent
3
was disbarred for having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD
recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD.
Sesbreño alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty.
Dizon. He alleged that the attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate, distinct,
and different from his case. He further alleged that there was no condition set on the
grant of executive clemency to him; and thus, he was restored to his full civil and
political rights. Finally, Sesbreño alleged that after his wife died in an ambush, he
already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in the case for bigamy against Garcia
and that he already advised his clients to settle their other cases. He alleged that
Garcia already withdrew the complaints against him.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-
31 denying Sesbreño’s motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the
records of the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case
No. 08-2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the Court’s Resolution dated 30
September 2014, the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.
The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves
moral turpitude.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution
No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11
February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
4
duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. 5
The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was
discussed by this Court in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC where it
6
ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the
1âwphi1
degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not
shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but
not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado
not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by
classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes
which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes
which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that
moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must
be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
7
In People v. Sesbreño, the Court found Sesbreño guilty of homicide and ruled:
8
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul
H. Sesbreñois hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a
prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by
law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of
₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the
circumstances show the presence of moral turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his
companion Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by
Sesbreño’s house when the latter, without any provocation from the former, went out
of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at them. According to Yapchangco,
theywere about five meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreño when they heard
the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they saw Sesbreño
aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit.
An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he heard shots and opened
the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running away while
Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes’ house in the process.
Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then saw
Sesbreño in the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking back
towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and
Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that
justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of SO ORDERED.
Amparado.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full
civil and political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster his argument.
10

In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon" 11

which restored his "full civil and political rights," a circumstance not present inthese
12

cases. Here, the Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon was absolute and
13

unconditional. The accessory penalties were not mentioned when the original
sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation and they were also not mentioned
in stating the commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the authority conferred
upon me by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons
and Parole, the original sentence of prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA
convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and Supreme Court and sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years and 1 day to 16 years and 4 months
imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and
to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00. 14

Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and
unconditional and restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President
can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment. In this case, the executive clemency merely
15

"commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years

imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of
penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for
16 17

Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty,
for which reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release
and Discharge stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the
18

law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio
case has no application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is
nothing in the records that shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In
addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those
19

possessing good moral character. A violation of the high moral standards of the legal
20

profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer,

including the penalty of disbarment. 21

WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately

upon his receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a
copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.
A.C. No. 10134 November 26, 2014
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), represented
by its President, ATTY. VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment filed by the Philippine
Association of Court Employees (PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C.
Rafael (Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008 against Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty.
Diaz), former National Treasurer of PACE, before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).1
PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the Judiciary
held its 11th National Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005.
As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz was entrusted with all the money
matters of PACE.
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention
was submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national
convention in Iloilo City ; that during the 12th convention, an election of officers was
2
conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, but she was not
elected; that on the last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007,the outgoing
Board of Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007
appropriating the amount of 30,000.00as term-end bonus for each PACE official
qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the 12th
convention; that there was no turn over of monies belonging to the association as a
matter of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty.
Diaz; and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07
3
directing past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain
why they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo
conventions.4
In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation
for the 11th national convention in Davao in less than a week after the said
convention; that it was duly audited by the national auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that
the net proceeds of that convention was "fully accounted, liquidated and entirely
deposited to PACE accounts;" that she also filed the Statement of Liquidation for the
5
12th national convention on May 22, 2007; that the report, together with the cash,
checks and original receipts, were received by Rosita Amisola and witnessed by
former PACE officers; that she denied running for re-election as PACE national
6
treasurer during the Iloilo convention as she had already filed her certificate of
candidacy for Board Member of the First District of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay; that
7
the approval of the ₱30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest with her solely, rather, it
was approved by the previous board of directors; and that she never sponsored the
bonus, as it was initiated by Aliven Maderaza and seconded by Atty. Lourdes Garcia
and Sarah Ampong.
On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not privy to the disbursement of the
said term-end bonus. 8
Initially, the case was assigned to IBP Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano. After an
exchange of pleadings, the mandatory conference was held. Afterwards, the
protagonists were directed to submit their respective position papers. Thereafter, the
case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner
Fernandez).9
The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads:
"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez
recommended the dismissal of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty. Diaz
offered documentary evidence to show that she was able to submit the liquidation
reports for the two aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took note that Atty.
Rafael herself acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty. Diaz with respect to
the Davao City convention. As to the sufficiency and completeness of these reports,
10
this would be better resolvedthrough an audit rather than in disbarment
proceedings. Besides, Commissioner Fernandez did not consider the position of Atty.
1âwphi1
Diaz as national treasurer of PACE to have any connection with her being as a lawyer.
Thus, according to him, she should be sanctioned in accordance with the by-laws of
PACE instead of a disbarment case. 11
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for re-election in the PACE elections
even though she was no longer connected with the Judiciary and therefore
disqualified, Commissioner Fernandez opined that the best evidence, which was the
"certificate of candidacy," was never offered, and that Atty. Diaz, being a lawyer,
12
knew that her bid for re-election would be a useless exercise since she would not
beable to assume office if she won.13
Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty. Diaz’s assertion that she never
sponsored the appropriation of the 30,000.00 term-end bonus and that the approval of
Resolution No. 1-2007 was a collegial action among the Board of Directors. Again,
Commissioner Fernandez was of the view that her participation in the passage of the confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of this noble
questioned board resolution was not connected to her being a lawyer. 14
profession.21

On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution
adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Commissioner
Fernandez, and dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz. 15
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution,16 dated June 21,
2013, granting the complainant’s motion for reconsideration. It reversedand set
asideits earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz from the practice of law for one
(1) year. 17
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-
election, including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not by
her certificate of candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her
involvement in the approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE
officers, including herself even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary,
were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There was much to be desired in
Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter

The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz’ liquidation of 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
PACE funds;(ii) her running for re-election when she was no longer with the SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.
Judiciary; and (iii) her entitlement to the term-end bonus when she was no longer
working in the Judiciary, constituted a "triple -whammy" of questionable This decision shall be immediately executory.
actions committed by Atty. Diaz in contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
18

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for its distribution to
The Court’s Ruling all courts of the land; the IBP; and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into
respondent's personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar.
This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended
Resolution. Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. SO ORDERED.
It is definitely not a right. Inorder to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he
possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.

One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all
their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal
profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients,
the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath
to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge
and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. Time and again, the
19

Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of good moral
character. The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus,
lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are
dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment. 20

It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession
which society entrusts with the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.
For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been
exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the
Bar. They are always expected to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and to refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
 A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015
findings.”11 During the mandatory preliminary conference, however, both parties stipulated that the
complaint filed by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin. 12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.

Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant disbarment. She
stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of any unethical conduct, harassment
RESOLUTION
and malpractice.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine Antenor-
Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility(CPR).
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.0214 of the CPR
and thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months. It noted that
based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of LCI consequently making him
ineligible to be a member of the BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI
but was a mere signatory of LCI’s bank accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin
untrue.15
proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory

The facts are culled from the pleadings.

In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as
President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his
post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center as the Vice President for
Finance.

On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another
corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for “updating purposes”. The
GIS4identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President.

Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI
applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.

On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by
knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that
he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or
been President of LCI. He also never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment
as Chairman would be taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of
LCI.

Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of
the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC
requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary
dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her
certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008. 5
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she
sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of Assignment
concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that he would meet with her on
Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for
reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS
on November 27, 2008.

To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretary’s Certificates
dated May 16, 20066, May 22, 20067, and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarin’s signature.

Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the directors and
officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et
al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27,
2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that “when the criminal
prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary
 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate
directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was not legally
permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely
certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of the company. The Secretary’s
Certificates with Guarin’s signature Atty. Limpin presented were of no moment since in these Guarin
merely acceded to become a signatory of bank accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a
stockholder.

The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution 16 adopted in toto the CBD Report.
Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in the March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of the
IBP Board of Governors.

We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather
than seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. 20 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As
Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only
where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the
attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in
accordance
21
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary with his oath.”

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27,22 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice.

After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is
no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a
seat in the BOD and be the president of the company.23 It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and
certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same
in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the
statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of
Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no
submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that
in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not
conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr.
de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules
enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has
transgressed Rule
1.02 of the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin’s action in submitting a false document we see it fit
to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of law. chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this
Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED. cra lawlawlibrary

OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J
Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC.
(REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E.
VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial
office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The
complainant may be held liable for indirect contempt of court as a means of
vindicating the integrity and reputation of the judges and the Judiciary.
AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against Associate
Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice
Ricardo R. Rosario, all members of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their
oaths on account of their promulgation of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994
entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The Honorable Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA Land, Inc.
Antecedents
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project located
along Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack,
Mandaluyong City. Due to the project’s location, AMALI would have to use
1
Fordham Street as an access road and staging area for the construction activities. In
that regard, AMALI needed the consent of the Wack Wack Residents Association,
Inc. (WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which ignored the
notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along Fordham Street that it
enclosed with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field office
and set up a fence to deny access to AMALI’s construction workers, which prompted
AMALI to file a petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of way in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City. The petition, which included an
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (WPMI), was docketed as Civil Case No. 65668. On July 24,
2
1997, the RTC granted AMALI’s prayer for the WPMI. 3
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-storey
building of mixed use (to be known as the AMA Residences) after AMALI’s petition
for corporate rehabilitation was approved.4
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent motion to set
for hearing its prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
contained in its answer. The denial of the prayer for injunction by the RTC impelled
WWRAI to bring a petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin the RTC from proceeding in Civil Case No.
65668.5
After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted AMALI to file an Urgent
Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and later on a
Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration.
On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary injunction and required AMALI to file
its Comment. AMALI complied and filed a Comment which also served as its motion
for partial reconsideration of the July 28, 2011 Resolution. On October 12, 2011,
AMALI filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve and to Approve Counterbond. Allegedly,
these motions were left unresolved when the CA Tenth Division, which included
Associate Justices Bueser and Rosario, required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 6
On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a
decision granting the petition of WWRAI. 7
AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 202342, entitled AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents
Association, Inc.8
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices
had conspired with the counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and
Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI
stated that the decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious
and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In
thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of
gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and
10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the and
allegations of the complaint by substantial evidence. Failure to do so will lead to the
9

dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative
charge against any official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial
evidence. But when the charge equates to a criminal offense, such that the judicial
10

officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the service, the showing of
culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character.11

AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment against respondent Justices.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense.

Article 204, Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s]
an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision" is punished with
prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification. To commit the offense, the
offender must be a judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust
judgment, not one who merely committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular
side of a controversial point of law. The term knowingly means "sure knowledge,
12

conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice." Thus, the complainant must

13

not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law
or not supported by the evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to
perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge
of rendering an unjust decision. In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred,
14

revenge, greed or some other similar motive in issuing the judgment. Bad faith is,
15

therefore, the ground for liability. The failure of the judge to correctly interpret the
16

law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him
administratively liable.
17

But who is to determine and declare that the judgment or final order that the judicial
officer knowingly rendered or issued was unjust? May such determination and
declaration be made in administrative investigations and proceedings like a
preliminary investigation by the public prosecutor? The answers to these queries are
obvious – only a superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate or supervisory
jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make such determination and
declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative hearing officer may be
usurping a basic judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the Constitution or
by law elsewhere in the appellate court.

Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in

the CA through an administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the
pernicious practice by disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of resorting to
administrative charges against sitting judges instead of exhausting all their available
remedies. We do not tolerate the practice. In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar
L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport
Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals, we emphatically
18

held that the filing of administrative complaints or even threats of the filing
subverted and undermined the independence of the Judiciary, to wit:

It is evident to us that Ongjoco’s objective in filing the administrative complaint

was to take respondent Justices to task for the regular performance of their sworn
duty of upholding the rule of law. He would thereby lay the groundwork for getting
back at them for not favoring his unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be
tolerated at all, for even a mere threat of administrative investigation and
prosecution made against a judge to influence or intimidate him in his regular
performance of the judicial office always subverts and undermines the
independence of the Judiciary.

We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings
and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his
official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate
judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel
aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. (Bold emphasis supplied)

It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who
rule against it in its cases. That impression is not at all devoid of basis. The
1âwphi1

complaint herein is actually the second one that AMALI has brought against
respondent Justices in relation to the performance of their judicial duty in the same
case. In its first complaint entitled Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc.
against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R.
Rosario, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, AMALI accused respondent
19

Justices of: (a) dishonesty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross
misconduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, in violation of
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; and (b) violating provisions of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court dismissed the first complaint upon finding that
it centered on the propriety of the interlocutory orders issued by respondent Justices
in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994. The Court appropriately observed:

A perusal of the records of the case as well as the parties’ respective allegations
disclosed that the acts complained of relate to the validity of the proceedings
before the respondent CA Justices and the propriety of their orders in CA-G.R. SP
No.
118994 which were done in the exercise of their judicial functions. Jurisprudence is
replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of
his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings,
but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary
proceedings against justices do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial
remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies
accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.

xxxx
In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging
the questioned order of the respondent CA justices which is still pending final action
by the Court. Consequently, a decision on the validity of the proceedings and
propriety of the orders of the respondent CA Justices in this administrative
proceeding would be premature. Besides, even if the subject decision or portions
thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon proof
that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty
or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to
exist in this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of
the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before
he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith
or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a
party. Here, other than AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim that respondent CA
Justices "conspired with WWRAI’s counsel in knowingly and in bad faith rendering
an unjust judgment and in committing xxx other misconduct," no act clearly
indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that respondent CA
Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the
respondent judge has regularly performed his duties shall prevail. Moreover, the
matters raised are best addressed to the evaluation of the Court in the resolution of
AMALI’s petition for review on certiorari.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the
judicial issues involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt
rather than promote the orderly administration of justice and further clog the courts’
dockets. Those who seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic
legal rules and abuse of court processes in their efforts to vindicate their rights. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
This administrative case is no different from the first. They are identical, with the
complaint herein containing only a few but insignificant changes in relation to the
first. Both were intended to intimidate or to disparage respondent Justices in the
performance of their judicial functions.
The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only
repulsive, but also an outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court.
Unfounded administrative charges against judges truly degrade the judicial office,
and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although the
Court did not then deem fit to hold in the first administrative case AMALI or its
representative personally responsible for the unfounded charges brought against
respondent Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative to do so in order to uphold
the dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of the rest of
the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives have thereby demonstrated their
penchant for harassment of the judges who did not do its bidding, and they have not
stopped doing so even if the latter were sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations of
AMALI and its representatives would be to reward them with undeserved impunity
for an obviously wrong attitude towards the Court and its judicial officers.
Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to account or
to answer for performing his judicial functions and office because such performance
is a matter of public duty and responsibility. The office and duty to render and
administer justice area function of sovereignty, and should not be simply taken for
granted. As a recognized commentator on public offices and public officers has
written:
20
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil
action can be sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one
claiming to have been injured by the officer’s judicial action within his jurisdiction.
From the very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his
judgment in the matter, and the law holds his duty to the individual to be performed
when he has exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may
appear either to the party or to others.
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced in support of
this rule. Thus it is said of the judge: "His doing justice as between particular
individuals, when they have a controversy before him, is not the end and object
which were in view when his court was created, and he was selected to preside over
or sit in it. Courts are created on public grounds; they are to do justice as between
suitors, to the end that peace and order may prevail in the political society, and that
rights may be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the end to be
accomplished is public; the individual advantage or loss results from the proper and
thorough or improper and imperfect performance of a duty for which his controversy
is only the occasion. The judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice
between individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals, he may be
called to account by the State in such form and before such tribunal as the law may
have provided. But as the duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress,
as for an individual injury, is not admissible." 21
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized representative, Joseph B.
Usita, its Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors
of AMALI who had authorized Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in
writing why they should not be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the
unfounded and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice.
To be clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless administrative charges against sitting
judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions;
 (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of
any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to
enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for
the due administration of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt
is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such
guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky
foundation. (Bold emphasis supplied)
23

ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to

the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of
this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as
such without authority;
ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against
Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and
Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for its utter lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS
Joseph B. Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice President of AMA Land, Inc., and all the
members of the Board of Directors of AMA Land, Inc. who had authorized Usita to
bring the administrative complaint against respondent Associate Justices to show
cause in writing within 10 days from notice why they should not be punished for
indirect contempt of court for degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate
Justices, and for interfering with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.
SO ORDERED.

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody

of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending
such proceedings. (3a)

Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v.

Distribution Management Association of the Philippines: 22

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public

authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules
or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by
disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to
disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted
and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or
dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal
signification a variety of different acts.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be
specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial
system. Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of
their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence,
submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers
from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt
essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the
 A.C. NO. 11385, March 14, 2017 Tumulak from the practice of law for two years.

ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY JANICE

MONTERO, Complainant, v. ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM::

Under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is sworn to respect the law
and legal processes, and any violation thereof merits condign disciplinary action against the lawyer.

The present complaint asks for the disbarment of Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak for his participation in the
forcible intrusion into the complainant's property.

Antecedents

Complainant Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation owned the parcel of land located in Ortigas Avenue
Extension, Pasig City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-126797 of the Registry of Deeds
of Rizal (property).

The complainant alleges that at around 11:00 a.m. of November 29, 2012, Atty. Tumulak, accompanied
by uniformed guards of the Nationwide Security Agency, Inc., unlawfully entered and took control of the
entrance and exit of the property. It appears that prior to the incident, Atty. Tumulak had furnished
several documents to the complainant, including the deed of assignment executed by one Henry F.
Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes R. Rodriguez designating Atty.
Tumulak as an assignee.1 The documents furnished by Atty. Tumulak were all related to the intestate
proceedings of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez docketed as S.P. No. IR-1110 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in Iriga City (RTC), which involved the claim of the heirs of the late
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez to several parcels of land situated all over the country, including the
Provinces of Rizal, Quezon, and Bulacan, and Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, Antipolo City,
Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Marikina City, Baguio City, Angeles City, San Fernando City and
Tagaytay City.2

The complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, dishonesty and fraud for claiming to have
coordinated with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal and forcible intrusion. 3 The
complainant manifests that as a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak ought to know that the claim of his principal in the
property was barred by res judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title under its name.
Accordingly, his conduct constituted conduct unbecoming of a lawyer deserving of sanction.4

In his answer to the complaint,5 Atty. Tumulak denies having been present when the security guards of
Nationwide Security Agency entered the complainant's property. He insists that the allegations against
him were pure hearsay because Ms. Montero, the representative of the complainant, had no personal
knowledge of the incident; that the documents he had furnished to the complainant included records of the
intestate proceedings in the RTC involving the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez and Antonio
Rodriguez; that he had no hand in procuring the documents; that he did not himself enter the property; and
that the entry into the property was effected by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution.

Report and Recommendation of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP)

After due hearing, IBP Commissioner of Bar Discipline Ricardo M. Espina submitted his Report and
Recommendation,6 wherein he found Atty. Tumulak to have violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Espina recommended the suspension of Atty.
On October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXII-2015-57 adopting the
findings and recommendation of Commissioner Espina 7viz.:

RESOLUTION NO. XXII-2015-57

CIBD Case No. 13-3707
Ortigas Plaza Dev't Corp. vs.
Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak

RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of facts and recommended penalty of 2 years su5pension of Atty.
Eugenio S. Tumulak by the Investigating Commissioner.

Issue

Did Atty. Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he facilitated the implementation of the writ of execution and the entry into the complainant's
property?

Ruling of the Court

Atty. Tumulak deserves to be severely sanctioned for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Pertinent portions of Commissioner Espina's Report and Recommendation, which adequately illustrated
Atty. Tumulak' s transgressions, are worth quoting verbatim, viz.:

We enumerate respondent lawyer's violation of the following rules/principles when he led the forcible
intrusion into OPDC office in Pasig City:

a)
Atty. Tumulak knew, or ought to know, that property claims based on Spanish title can no longer
be cited as legitimate basis for ownership as of 16 February 1976 by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 892;

b)
Respondent lawyer, as a long-time practitioner (admitted to the Bar in 1971), is presumed to know
that the Supreme Court has promulgated a case specifically addressing the fake titles arising
from spurious "Deed of Assignment" of the supposed Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
This is the 2005 case of Evangelista, et al. vs. Santiago [G.R. No. 157447; April 29, 2005] where
the
same modus as the one adopted by respondent lawyer, was used by an "assignee" in claiming
properties located in Paranque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Cavitc, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig,
Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal, allegedly as part of
the Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez;

c)
x x x;

d)
While respondent lawyer claims that the "deed of assignment" in his favor has a consideration,
unfortunately we did not see any agreed consideration in the document. If there is no monetary
consideration, it will be treated as a donation with the corresponding payable taxes. Respondent
lawyer's documents don't show that taxes have been paid for the document to be legally binding;

e)
Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally but can only be questioned in a principal action x x x. If
respondent lawyer thinks that OPDC's title on the Pasig property is questionable, he could have tiled an
action to annul OPDC's title and not bring in the cavalry, so to speak, in the form of uniformed security
guards, to take over the property; and
f)
We find respondent's actions highly questionable and contrary to legal protocol; (i) the court documents
were issued by the RTC-Iriga City, Br. 94; (ii) it "affects" a property located in Pasig City; (iii)
respondent lawyer became the "assignee" of a Pasig City property; (iv) no taxes were paid for the
"assignment"; (v) assistance of the Sheriff of Pasig was not enlisted by respondent, instead, he enlists the
help of the Sheriff of Manila; (vi) all that the Sheriff of Manila did was to deliver the RTC-Iriga, Br. 34
court documents to complainant but with a twist; the Sheriff and respondent lawyer were escorted by a
phalanx of security guards; (vii) the uniformed guards, obviously upon instruction, took over and/or
controlled the gates of OPDC offices with attendant force and intimidation. Respondent lawyer's claimed
innocence cannot prevail over these illegalities of which he, or his agents, had a hand.
With the above highly questionable acts totally irreconcilable with a seasoned practitioner like respondent
lawyer, we find Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak liable for violation of Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 and 1.02 thereof. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Commissioner Espina correctly observed that the Court in the 2005 ruling in Evangelista v. Santiago8 had
already enjoined the successors and heirs of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez from presenting the
Spanish title as proof of their ownership in land registration proceedings, as follow:
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous
possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest.
Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by lsmael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of
their Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property
on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject Property on their
possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial carried the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish
conquest. If the Subject Property was already private property before the Spanish conquest, then it would
have been beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-interest could be traced
only as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired
portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better title to the said portions than
their predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same Spanish title.
Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from invoking the Spanish title as basis of
their ownership of the Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by discontinuing the
system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands recorded
under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. It further provides that within
six months from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
land under what is now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree. Thereafter,
Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under
the Torrens system. Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in
establishing ownership over real property.
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez
had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject Property.
In the absence of an allegation in petitioners' Complaint that petitioners predecessors-in-interest
complied with
P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No.
892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the
Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only confirm and record
title already created and vested. By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings under the
Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore
dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in
some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of title), only short of
ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D.
No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would
never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens
system and cause confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate.9
Moreover, in Santiago v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,10 the Court denied the petition of the
successors of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by applying the principle of stare decisis, ruling therein
that the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence were identical to those
in the situation in Evangelista v. Santiago, thusly:
The present petition is substantially infirm as this Court had already expressed in the case of Nemencio C.
Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago, that the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez,
the Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any evidentiary value to establish
ownership over real property.
Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago anchor their right to recover
possession of the subject real property on claim of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez being the sole heir
of the named grantee, Hermogenes Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos.
xxx
Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be denied by virtue of the principle of stare
decisis. Not only are the legal rights and relations of herein parties substantially the same as those passed
upon in the aforementioned 2005 Evangelista Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the issues, and the
testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case, under the principle
of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.11
Finally, the 2011 ruling in Pascual v. Robles 12 affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) setting
aside the amended decision rendered in S.P. No. IR-1110 by the RTC. This ruling should have alerted
Atty. Tumulak from taking the actions giving rise to the complaint against him inasmuch as he has
admitted to have derived his rights from the deed of assignment executed in his favor by Henry Rodriguez
as the administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez pursuant to said amended
decision. Moreover, Atty. Tumulak is presumed as a lawyer to know the developments in S.P. No. IR-
1110 not only by virtue of his becoming an assignee of the estate but also because of his being a lawyer
with the constant responsibility of keeping abreast of legal developments. 13
Atty. Tumulak cannot shield himself from personal responsibility behind the deed of assignment. The
deed was doubtful on its face, as borne out by the text, to wit:
DEED OF ASSIGNMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS
This Deed of Assignment is made and executed by and between
The INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE HERMOGENES R. RODRIGUEZ AND ANTONIO R.
RODRIGUEZ, represented by HENRY F. RODRIGUEZ, of legal age, widower, Filipino, x xx Judicial
Heir and Court-Appointed Administrator by virtue of AMENDED DECISIONdated August 13, 19999 of
Fifth Judicial Region, RTC Branch 34, lriga City in SPECS. PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue
of Heirship, Administratorship and Settled [sic] of the Estate of Hem1ogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y
Reyes Estate, hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNOR;
-and-

EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, of legal age, widower x x x hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNEE:
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the ASSIGNOR is the Court-Appointed Administrator and one of the Judicial heirs of the
Intestate Estate of the late HERMOGENES and ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ y REYES Estate by virtue of
AMENDED DECISION dated Augsut 13, 1999 of Fifth Judicial Region, RTC Branch 34, Iriga City in
SPECS. PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue of Heirship, Administratorship and Settlement of the
Estate of Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate, thereafter, petitions for certiorari tiled with
the SUPREME COURT assailing the aforesaid Amended Decision were DENIED and declared FINAL
& EXECUTORY in G.R. Nos. 140271, 140915, 168648, 142477 and 182645, affirming the same
Amended Decision;
Whereas, the ASSIGNEE has secured the property and actual occupant/s over the same property
they arc presently occupying and initiating steps for recovery of the same parcel and has shown
exemplary loyalty and faithfulness to the ASSIGNOR and also consistently protected the rights and
interest of the Estate against intruder, impostor, usurpers and false claimant with spurious title/s
over the same property;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing, the ASSIGNOR has agreed to
execute this DEED OF ASSIGNMENT and the ASSIGNEE, has accepted and both parties have
mutually agreed to the following terms and conditions herein stipulated;
A parcel of land situated in Ortigas Avenue corner Raymundo Avenue, Barangay Rosario, Pasig City,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon, with containing an area of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGTH [sic]
HUNDRED AND NINE[TY] ONE SQUARE METERS (35,891) more or less technical description
described below, to
xxx
1. That the ASSIGNEE shall shoulder all the expenses in the performance of the task as indicated x x x
above such as payment for the real taxes, titling, researching, liaising with government agencies, paying
lawyers involved in the litigation, and other incidental expenses relevant in the consummation of the
said transaction;
2. That the ASSIGNEE shall secure and facilities (sic] all documents from Land Registration
Authority, DENR-LMB, DENR-LMS, Register of Deeds and such other government agencies
concerned for the completion of titling process subject to the existing laws, rules and regulation in
accordance to Land Registration Act;
3. That the ASSIGNEE shall perform the task of relocation and verification[,] land survey,
possessing, fencing, guarding, surveying and or reviving plans, paying taxes, titling, selling,
leasing, developing, segregating and mortgaging;
4. That the ASSIGNEE shall be the AD-LITEM representative of the ASSIGNOR, before of [sic] any
Court[,] Administrative and Quasi-Judicial body and to bring suit, defend, in connection with the
actions brought for or against the ASSIGNOR of whatever nature and kind; and
5. That the ASSIGNEE shall report regularly to the ASSIGNOR per the above tasks and accomplishment.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their respective signatures on the date 22 March
2010 and place QUEZON CITY above written.14 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful and forcible intrusion into the
property just because the complainant did not establish his physical presence thereat at the time. In fact,
such physical participation was not even necessary in order to properly implicate him in personal
responsibility for the intrusion after he admitted having furnished to the complainant the deed of
assignment and other documents as the source of his authority. Specifically, his duties under the deed of
assignment included "shoulder[ing] all the expenses in the performance of [securing the property x x x
and initiating steps for recovery of the same parcel] x x x such as x x x or payment for the real taxes,
titling, researching, liaising with government agencies, paying lawyers involved in the litigation, and
other incidental expenses relevant in the consummation of the said transaction;" and "possessing,
fencing, [and] guarding" the property.
It is notable in this connection that Atty. Tumulak had been discharging his role as the assignee since the
time of the execution of the deed of assignment on March 22, 2010. Considering that he had been in
charge of doing all the actions necessary to enforce the interest of his principal since March 22, 2010, and
that the forcible intrusion complained about occurred on November 29, 2012, or more than two years from
the execution of the deed of assignment, he is reasonably and ineluctably presumed to have coordinated
all the actions leading to the intrusion.
Finally, even assuming that the amended decision was valid and enforceable, Atty. Tumulak could not
legitimately resort to forcible intrusion to advance the interest of the assignor. The more appropriate action
for him would be to cause the annulment of the complainant's title instead of forcibly entering the property
with the aid of armed security personnel.
All told, Atty. Tumulak was guilty of misconduct for circumventing existing laws and disregarding settled
rulings in order to commit injustice against the complainant. His conduct betrayed his Lawyer's Oath "to
support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein." He breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 -A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law, and to avoid any act or
omission that is contrary thereto. The lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his or her
commendable character but also inspires in the public a becoming respect and obedience to the law. 15
The sworn obligation of every lawyer under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility to respect the law and the legal processes is a continuing condition for retaining
membership in the Legal Profession. The lawyer must act and comport himself or herself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession. 16 Members of the
Bar are reminded, therefore, that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than to
seek exceptions as loopholes.17 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act that warrants disciplinary action against him or her. 18
The suspension from the practice of law or disbarment of a lawyer is justified if he or she proves
unworthy of the trust and confidence imposed by the Lawyer's Oath, or is otherwise found to be wanting
in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the performance of their
professional duties.19 Although the Court imposed a six-month suspension from the practice of law on
erring lawyers found violating Canon l, Rules 1.01 and 1.02,20 we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to
suspend Atty. Tumulak from the practice of law for a period of two years. Such penalty was appropriate
and condign in relation to the misconduct he committed as well as to the prejudice he caused the
complainant.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EUGENIO S.
TUMULAK guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 1, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period
of TWO(2) YEARS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with the STERN WARNING that any similar
infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the
respondent's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the
Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. P-15-3315
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3978-P)
SPOUSES RODEL and ELEANOR CANOS … Complainants
-versus-
ATTY. LOUISE MARIE THERESE B. ESCOBIDO, Clerk of Court
V, Branch 19, Regional Trial Court, Digos City … Respondent
Present: VELASCO, JR, J, Chairperson; BERSAMIN, REYES, and
JARDELEZA, CAGUIOA, *JJ.
Promulgated: February 6, 2017
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J:
This administrative case stemmed from a letter-complaint1 filed by
complainants, Spouses Rodel and Eleanor Canos (Sps. Canos), against
respondent Louise Marie Therese B. Escobido (Escobido), Clerk of Court,
Branch 19, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Digos City, before the Office of
Court Administrator (OCA) for grave misconduct, gross violation of oath
as a public official, and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
According to Sps. Canos, they have known Escobido since the latter part of
2009 when she assisted them on the cases they filed. before RTC Branch
19. When Escobido learned that Sps. Canos are engaged in selling jewelry
and imported goods, she offered to get some items to resell as she used to
be in the same business. Since Sps. Canos trusted Escobido as clerk of
court and as a lawyer, they agreed to her proposal.2
Sometime between January and November 2010, Escobido purchased from
Sps. Canos, on credit, various jewelry and imported goods amounting to
P4,777,945.00. The purchases were covered by Trust Receipt Agreements.3
As payment for the goods, Escobido issued postdated checks, some of
which were made good during the first ten months. However, the rest of the
checks amounting to P3,827,299.30 were returned or refused payment by
the drawee banks for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED."4
Aside from Escobido's purchases on credit, she also borrowed money from
Sps. Canos. As payment, she issued postdated checks in the total amount of
P1 64,866.10. The checks were likewise dishonored by the drawee banks
for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED." Escobido never informed Sps.
Canos on the status of her bank account until they received the returned
checks and asked her on the reason for the dishonor.5
On February 15, 2012, Escobido executed an Undertaking6 and
acknowledged only P2,545,339.25 as the amount she owed to Sps. Canos.
Sps. Canos made verbal and written demands on Escobido for her to pay
her debts.7 Despite demand,8 she refused to pay her obligations amounting
to P3,604,065.40.
Sps. Canos claimed that because of Escobido's large amount of debts, they
were forced to pay some of Escobido's account with their suppliers.9
Finally, Sps. Canos alleged that Escobido, as clerk of court and as a lawyer,
also used her position and profession to intimIdate and coerce them from
filing cases against her. She allegedly told them that should they decIde to
file a case against her, she could always find ways to delay the filing of the
same as she has friends and batchmates in the City Prosecution Office of
Davao City.10
In her defense, Escobido claimed that what transpired was a business
opportunity she and Sps. Canos took advantage of, but which,
unfortunately turned unsuccessful.11
She also belied Sps. Canos' allegation that they have known her only in
2009. She claimed she had known Rodel since 1993 when she was still
studying law. Rodel became her boyfriend when she was in law school, but
their relationship dId not last long. In 2009, Escobido met Rodel again as
he frequented her office to follow up cases which he filed and were
pending before RTC Branches 18 and 19. Rodel even introduced Escobido
to his wife. This new friendship paved the way for business transactions
and opportunities.12
Escobido denied that she offered to get jewelry and other imported items
from Sps. Canos. Instead, it was Rodel who persuaded her to help them
sell their goods. 13 Under their agreement, Escobido signed trust receipts for
imported goods obtained from Sps. Canos. She was allowed a certain
period to sell the goods, after which the unsold items were returned to Sps.
Canos. She would pay for the total amount of the items sold by issuing
checks covering three equal monthly installments.14
The business was doing well for months until Sps. Canos introduced the
jewelry business to Escobido. Rodel persuaded her that the business is
lucrative and that she can get more profits. Sps. Canos proposed that they
will give Escobido a "dealer's price," provided that anything she gets from
them will be consIdered sold unless defective. In effect, what Sps. Canos
and Escobido entered into was a contract of sale.15
In January 2010, Sps. Canos started giving jewelry to be sold, which
Escobido received by signing trust receipts. She usually issued checks for
the amounts due, payable in eight to ten monthly installments per
transaction. At first, she was able to pay her debts until most of her
customers started to miss their payments. Escobido allegedly told Rodel
about her problem and he merely advised her to be careful next time and
gave her an extended period within which to pay. Thus, despite her
outstanding balance, Sps. Canos continued to sell her jewelry. 16
Escobido went on to get more items from Sps. Canos until she decIded to
stop due to her increasing bad debts. She told them that she would just
return whatever jewelry she could get back from her customers who had
been remiss in their payments.17 Sps. Canos refused because the jewelry
was already consIdered sold and they feared that their quality might have
already deteriorated. 18 She tried to pay her debts, even borrowing from loan
sharks until she could no longer pay.19
In November 2010, Escobido recounted that aside from the checks to cover
business transactions, she also had to cover the checks she issued for
accommodation on behalf of her relatives and friends. Since she could no
longer cover all these checks, Escobido allegedly requested Sps. Canos not
to deposit her checks and to give her more time to pay them with cash.
Thus, contrary to their claims, she dId inform them of the status of her
bank account.20 In fact, Sps. Canos made her believe that they understood
her situation and assured her of their help in solving her problem.21
Escobido likewise denied refusing to pay Sps. Canos. She was paying them
even with meager amounts from December 2010 to February 2013. She
claimed that she paId Rodel in March 2013 which he dId not acknowledge
since he gave back her checks.22
When Sps. Canos realized that Escobido would never be able to pay them,
they agreed to accept the return of some of the jewelry.23 These were
supposed to be deducted from her outstanding accounts. When she asked
for the checks covering the returned jewelry, Sps. Canos told her that the
checks were still with their suppliers and that they would just sign the
acknowledgment receipts in the meantime. However, they failed to give her
the saId checks.24
Escobido further claimed that she executed the Undertaking upon Rodel's
initiative and after consultation with her sister, Atty. Genevieve Marie
Dolores B. Paulino (Paulino).25 The amount of P2,545,339.25 was arrived
at after deducting the value of the jewelry that she returned to Sps. Canos.
26
On March 14, 2012, however, Rodel gave to Escobido the final letter-
demand in the amount of P3,604,065.40.27 She was hesitant to accept and
sign the letter-demand because the previous Undertaking indicated a lower
amount. She was forced to receive and sign the letter-demand in the mIdst
of family and financial problems. 28
Escobido also denied the allegation that Sps. Canos dId not file a case
against her due to lack of funds. They, in fact, filed a complaint against her
for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22.29 She did not use
her position as clerk of court or profession as a lawyer to dissuade them
from filing a case against her. She did not boast about her connections in
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City.30
Furthermore, Escobido claimed that Rodel promised to be lenient with her
if she would help him with his cases. Escobido's sister, Paulino, agreed to
render legal services to Rodel, provIded that compensation for such
services would be deducted from the amount owed by Escobido. Thus,
Escobido asserted that the amount of debt demanded by Sps. Canos is
bloated.31 The amount she owed would be greatly reduced if her payments,
the value of the returned jewelry, and the legal services of her sister would
be deducted from her total debt.32
Finally, Escobido argued that she should not be held liable for any
administrative violations attributed to her by Sps. Canos because she never
denied her debt. She never refused to pay, but was only unable to do so.
She was also not motivated by ill-will against Sps. Canos since her only
desire to venture into business with them was to augment her family
income.33
The Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum34 dated December 10, 2014, the OCA found that
Escobido is guilty of deliberate failure to pay just debts. The OCA noted
the more than 100 postdated checks she issued amounting to more than
P4,000,000.00, which all bounced. The willfulness in not paying her
obligation was shown by the several years her debt remained unpaid from
November 2010 to May 2013. The measly payments Escobido made
served as mere tokens to appease Sps. Canos and dId not show a serious
intention to clear her debt.35
The OCA also noted that two administrative complaints have been
previously filed against Esco bi do for non-payment of debt.36 The first
complaint, docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1705-P (Pham Due Nhuan
v. Louise Marie Therese B. EscobidoEscobidoEscobido, Clerk of Court V,
RTC, Branch 19, Digos City), charged Escobido with Conduct
Unbecoming a Public Officer and Failure to Pay Just Debts. She allegedly
failed to return Pl,390,000.00, which was given by the complainant as part
of a business transaction between them despite repeated demands. As
guarantee, Escobido issued a check which was dishonored by the bank. The
Court dismissed the complaint for being premature as the complainant has
filed a criminal complaint involving the same issue, which was then
pending review before the Department of Justice. In March 2014, a
criminal case for violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No.
109,581-B-F-C-2003, with Pham Due Nhuan as private complainant, was
filed against Escobido before Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Davao City.37
The second complaint, docketed as A.M. No. P-06-2259 [formerly A.M.
OCA IPI No. 06-2386-P] (Fe Lutero Cajegas, et al. v. Louise Marie
Therese B. EscobidoEscobidoEscobido, Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 19,
Digos City, Davao Oriental), charged Escobido with non-payment of debts
to six persons despite repeated demands. She borrowed money from
complainants, who were her former officemates at the Commission on
Human Rights, Region XI, Ecoland, Davao City, and issued checks as
payment for the loans. When presented to the bank, the checks were
dishonored because the accounts against which they were drawn had been
closed. In a Resolution dated October 16, 2006, Escobido was reprimanded
for willful failure to pay just debts.38
Upon review of the three administrative cases, the OCA found that the
cases show a disquieting parallelism among them. In these cases, Escobido
paId her debts with checks which upon presentment to the drawee banks,
were dishonored because the accounts from which payments were drawn
had to be closed. It was also found that she indiscriminately opened
checking accounts in different banks, with numerous checkbooks per
account to cover the amounts she owed her creditors.39
The OCA discovered that three criminal complaints for estafa and In a Manifestation44 dated July 17, 2015, Sps. Canos informed the Court that
violation of BP 22 are pending before Branch 3, MTCC, Davao City. Two aside from the three criminal cases filed against Escobido, they have
of these, Criminal Cases No. 150,071-D-B-C-14 and 150,072-D-B-C-14,
were filed by Sps. Canos as private complainants, while Criminal Case No.
109,581- B-F-C-2003 was filed by Pham Due Nhuan as private
complainant. 40

The OCA also found that Escobido should be held liable for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Her insIdious and repeated
acts of issuing worthless checks with consIderable amounts involved, her
cavalier treatment of the affIdavit of undertaking to pay the debt which she
claimed she was forced to sign, and her second time to commit the offense
of willful failure to pay just debts evince bad faith and a disposition to
defraud.41

The OCA further noted that the recommendation is without prejudice to the
outcome of the pending criminal cases filed against Escobido.42

The OCA recommended the following:

(1) the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a

regular administrative matter against Atty. Louise Marie Therese B.
Escobido, Clerk of Court V, Branch 19, Regional Trial Court (R TC), Di
gos City;

(2) respondent Atty. Lou[i]se Marie Therese B. Escobido be

found GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and willful failure to pay just debts and that she be SUSPENDED for a
period of one (1) year, with a STERN WARNING that the commission of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely; and

(3) the PresIding Judge and/or the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 3,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City be DIRECTED to apprise the
Court on a quarterly basis, relative to the progress of Criminal Case Nos.
150,071-DB- C-14; 150,072-D-B-C-14 and 109,581-B-F-C-2003 and to
furnish the Court with copies of the decision in saId criminal cases.43
filed another complaint for estafa against her. The case is docketed as 2013. The total amount of P93,000 .00 she paId from December 2010 to
Criminal Case No. 27(15) and is pending before Branch 18, RTC, Digos February 2013
City.

On November 25, 2015, the Clerk of Court of Branch 3, MTCC, Davao

City, submitted45 the Orders of Dismissal46 of Criminal Cases No. 150
071- D-B-C-14 150 072-D-B-C-14 and 109 581-B-F-C-2003 filed
against
Escobido.

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the OCA that Escobido should be held
administratively liable for willful failure to pay just debts and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as the Administrative

Code of 1987, provIdes that a public employee's failure to pay just debts
is a ground for disciplinary action.47 Section 22, Rule XIV of the Rules
Implementing Book V of EO 292, as modified by Section 46, Rule 10 of
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), defines "just debts" as those: (a) claims adjudicated by a
court of law; or (b) claims the existence and justness of which are
admitted by the debtor.

Classified as a light offense, willful failure to pay just debts is

punishable by reprimand for the first offense, suspension of one to
thirty days for the second offense, and dismissal from the service for
the third offense.48

Record shows that Escobido admitted the existence of her debt to Sps.
Canos. First, she admitted in her Comment that she owed sums of money
to Sps. Canos, but she is only contesting the amount of the debt. She also
executed an Undertaking acknowledging the debt. The record likewise
shows that Escobido dId not exert any sincere effort to settle her
obligation to Sps. Canos. As the OCA correctly observed, Escobido
allowed her obligation to remain unpaId from November 2010 to May
was indeed paltry as to provIde a significant dent on her million-peso
obligation.49 As the OCA also aptly observed, this is not the first instance
that she faces a complaint for not paying her debts.
The Court has ruled that the penalty for willful failure to pay just debts is
imposed at a civil servant's actuation unbecoming a public official, thus
tarnishing the image of the public office:
In this relation, note that the penalty imposed by law is not directed at
respondent's private life, but rather at her actuation unbecoming of a public
official. As explained in In re: Complaint for Failure to Pay Just Debts
Against Esther T. Andres, willful refusal to pay just debts, much like
misconduct, equally contemplates the punishment of the errant official in
view of the damage done to the image of the Judiciary:
The Court cannot overstress the need for circumspect and proper behavior
on the part of court employees. "While it may be just for an indivIdual to
incur indebtedness unrestrained by the fact that he is a public officer or
employee, caution should be taken to prevent the occurrence of dubious
circumstances that might inevitably impair the image of the public office."
Employees of the court should always keep in mind that the court is
regarded by the public with respect. Consequently, the conduct of each
court personnel should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of onus
and must at all times be characterized by, among other things, uprightness,
propriety and decorum. x x x.
Also, as instructively held in Tan v. Sermania:
Indeed, when [respondent] backtracked on her promise to pay her debt,
such act already constituted a ground for administrative sanction, for any
act that would be a bane to the public trust and confIdence reposed in the
judiciary shall not be countenanced. [Respondent's] unethical conduct has
diminished the honor and integrity of her office, stained the image of the
judiciary and caused unnecessary interference, directly or indirectly, in the
efficient and effective performance of her functions. Certainly, to preserve
decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just
contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. Like
all other court personnel, [respondent] is expected to be a paragon of
uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but
also in her personal actuations, including business and commercial
transactions, so as to avoId becoming her court's albatross of infamy.50
Public employees may likewise be penalized for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.51 Acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of
his/her public office.52 Such violation is classified as a grave offense,
punishable by suspension of six months and one day to one year for the
first offense and dismissal from the service for the second offense. 53
We agree with the OCA that Escobido' s repeated acts of contracting loans
and paying them with worthless checks reflect bad faith on her part. We
must note that Escobido, as clerk of court, is not a mere public employee.
She is both an employee of the Court and a member of the Bar. Thus, she is
expected to meet a high standard of uprightness and propriety. By
deliberately failing to meet her contractual obligations, she fell short of
such standard.
We likewise agree that Escobido holds a position of trust and confIdence
with concomitant duties and responsibilities that require from its holder
competence, honesty, and integrity so essential for the proper and effective
administration of justice. Her actuation, although arising from a private
transaction, tarnished the image of the Judiciary.
Finally, we find the penalty of one year suspension appropriate. In the
imposition of penalties, Section 50, Rule 10 of the RRACCS provIdes that
if the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the
penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious
charge and the rest shall be consIdered as aggravating circumstances. Thus,
the penalty to be imposed should be that of the graver offense of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The charge of willful failure
to
pay just debts, being a light offense, shall be consIdered as an aggravating
circumstance.

WHEREFORE, respondent Louise Marie Therese B. Escobido, Clerk of

Court V, Branch 19, Regional Trial Court, Digos City is
adjudged GUILTY of willful failure to pay just debts and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for which she is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of ONE (1) YEAR. Further, she
is STERNLY WARNED that commission of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
 G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013
FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR., Petitioner, v. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN,
PHILIP RYAN DE GUZMAN, AND ROSELLA DE GUZMAN BAUTISTA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the November
23, 20091 and the February 11, 20102 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila (RTC), in
Civil Case No. 89-50138, entitled "Loreta A. Chong v. Sps. Pedro and Rosita de Guzman," denying the
Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees filed by the petitioner.
The Facts
Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman) engaged the legal
services of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. (petitioner) as defense counsel in the complaint filed against
them by one Loreta A. Chong (Chong) for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with
damages involving a parcel of land in Parañaque City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
1292, with an area of 266 square meters, more or less. Petitioner’s legal services commenced from the
RTC and ended up in this Court.3 Spouses de Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their case at all
levels. While the case was pending before this Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular accident.
Thereafter, they were substituted by their children, namely: Rosella de Guzman-Bautista, Lellani de
Guzman, Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman (respondents).4
On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees 5 before the RTC. He
alleged, among others, that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman that he
would get 25% of the market value of the subject land if the complaint filed against them by Chong
would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had successfully represented them, respondents refused his
written demand for payment of the contracted attorney’s fees. Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to an
amount equivalent to 25% percent of the value of the subject land on the basis of quantum meruit.
On November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed order denying petitioner’s motion on the ground
that it was filed out of time. The RTC stated that the said motion was filed after the judgment rendered in
the subject case, as affirmed by this Court, had long become final and executory on October 31, 2007.
The RTC wrote that considering that the motion was filed too late, it had already lost jurisdiction over the
case because a final decision could not be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes.
There would be a variance of the judgment rendered if his claim for attorney’s fees would still be
included.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition.
The Issues
This petition is anchored on the following grounds:
cra lavvonlinelawlibrary
I litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages. 13 Although both concepts are similar in
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
DETERMINE ATTORNEY’S FEES ON THE GROUND THAT IT LOST JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES WOULD RESULT IN A VARIANCE OF THE JUDGMENT THAT HAS LONG
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION DID
NOT BAR PETITIONER FROM FILING THE MOTION TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEY’S FEES. 6 nadcral avvonlinelawlibrary
Petitioner claims that Spouses de Guzman engaged his legal services and orally agreed to pay him 25% of
the market value of the subject land. He argues that a motion to recover attorney’s fees can be filed and
entertained by the court before and after the judgment becomes final. Moreover, his oral contract with the
deceased spouses can be considered a quasi-contract upon which an action can be commenced within six
(6) years, pursuant to Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Because his motion was filed on September 8, 2009,
he insists that it was not yet barred by prescription.7
For their part, respondents counter that the motion was belatedly filed and, as such, it could no longer be
granted. In addition, the RTC had already resolved the issue when it awarded the amount of ?10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. Respondents further assert that the law, specifically Article 2208 of the Civil Code, allows
the recovery of attorney’s fees under a written agreement. The alleged understanding between their
deceased parents and petitioner, however, was never put in writing. They also aver that they did not have
any knowledge or information about the existence of an oral contract, contrary to petitioner’s claims. At
any rate, the respondents believe that the amount of 25% of the market value of the lot is excessive and
unconscionable.8
The Court’s Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court because of the denial of his motion to determine attorney’s fees by the RTC.
Apparently, the petitioner pursued the wrong remedy. Instead of a petition for review under Rule 45, he
should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because this case involves an error of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Moreover, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which prohibits direct resort to this Court
unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. 9 In this case, petitioner should
have first elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which has concurrent jurisdiction, together with
this Court, over special civil actions for certiorari.10 Even so, this principle is not absolute and admits of
certain exceptions, such as in this case, when it is demanded by the broader interest of justice. 11
Indeed, on several occasions, this Court has allowed a petition to prosper despite the utilization of an
improper remedy with the reasoning that the inflexibility or rigidity of the application of the rules of
procedure must give way to serve the higher ends of justice. The strict application of procedural
technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits.12 Thus, this Court deems
it expedient to consider this petition as having been filed under Rule 65.
With respect to the merits of the case, the Court finds in favor of petitioner.
In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts of attorney’s fees –
ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his
client for legal services rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful
some respects, they differ from each other, as further explained below:
cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly speaking,
an item of damages. It differs from that which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s professional
services.
However, the two concepts have many things in common that a treatment of the subject is necessary. The
award that the court may grant to a successful party by way of attorney’s fee is an indemnity for
damagessustained by him in prosecuting or defending, through counsel, his cause in court. It may
be decreed in favor of the party, not his lawyer, in any of the instances authorized by law. On the other
hand, the attorney’s fee which a client pays his counsel refers to the compensation for the latter’s
services. The losing party against whom damages by way of attorney’s fees may be assessed is not bound
by, nor is his liability dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing party with his lawyer. The
amount stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however, be taken into account by the court in fixing the
amount of counsel fees as an element of damages.
The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms part of his
judgment recoveries against the losing party. The client and his lawyer may, however, agree that
whatever attorney’s fee as an element of damages the court may award shall pertain to the lawyer as his
compensation or as part thereof. In such a case, the court upon proper motion may require the losing party
to pay such fee directly to the lawyer of the prevailing party.
The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a prerequisite to
their grant, the intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a lawyer. As a client may not be
held liable for counsel fees in favor of his lawyer who never rendered services, so too may a party be not
held liable for attorney’s fees as damages in favor of the winning party who enforced his rights without the
assistance of counsel. Moreover, both fees are subject to judicial control and modification. And the rules
governing the determination of their reasonable amount are applicable in one as in the other. 14 [Emphases
and underscoring supplied]
In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the compensation for
professional services rendered, and not as indemnity for damages. He is demanding payment from
respondents for having successfully handled the civil case filed by Chong against Spouses de Guzman.
The award of attorney’s fees by the RTC in the amount of P10,000.00 in favor of Spouses de Guzman,
which was subsequently affirmed by the CA and this Court, is of no moment. The said award, made in its
extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages, forms part of the judgment recoverable against the
losing party and is to be paid directly to Spouses de Guzman (substituted by respondents) and not to
petitioner. Thus, to grant petitioner’s motion to determine attorney’s fees would not result in a double
award of attorney’s fees. And, contrary to the RTC ruling, there would be no amendment of a final and
executory decision or variance in judgment.
The Court now addresses two (2) important questions: (1) How can attorney’s fees for professional
services be recovered? (2) When can an action for attorney’s fees for professional services be filed? The
case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC 15 is instructive:
cralavvonlinelawlibrary
As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR Certified
Case No. 0466, private respondent’s present claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the NLRC even
though or, better stated, especially after its earlier decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed. It is
well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the
services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main
action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot be determined
until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of
the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the
fee is to be paid.
While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination
as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the
main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise,
the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s
fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof
delivered to the client.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for
professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and
waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the
award’s complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action
only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated
options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which is permitted by the
rules. As to the timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the questioned motion to determine attorney’s
fees was seasonably filed.
The records show that the August 8, 1994 RTC decision became final and executory on October 31, 2007.
There is no dispute that petitioner filed his Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees on September 8, 2009,
which was only about one (1) year and eleven (11) months from the finality of the RTC decision. Because
petitioner claims to have had an oral contract of attorney’s fees with the deceased spouses, Article 1145 of
the Civil Code16 allows him a period of six (6) years within which to file an action to recover professional
fees for services rendered. Respondents never asserted or provided any evidence that Spouses de Guzman
refused petitioner’s legal representation. For this reason, petitioner’s cause of action began to run only
from the time the respondents refused to pay him his attorney’s fees, as similarly held in the case of Anido
v. Negado:17
In the case at bar, private respondent’s allegation in the complaint that petitioners refused to sign the
contract for legal services in October 1978, and his filing of the complaint only on November 23, 1987 or
more than nine years after his cause of action arising from the breach of the oral contract between him and
petitioners point to the conclusion that the six-year prescriptive period within which to file an action based
on such oral contract under Article 1145 of the Civil Code had already lapsed.
As a lawyer, private respondent should have known that he only had six years from the time
petitioners refused to sign the contract for legal services and to acknowledge that they had engaged
his services for the settlement of their parents’ estate within which to file his complaint for collection
of legal fees for the services which he rendered in their favor. [Emphases supplied]
At this juncture, having established that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees and that he filed his claim
well within the prescribed period, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the RTC for the
determination of the correct amount of attorney’s fees. Such a procedural route, however, would only
contribute to the delay of the final disposition of the controversy as any ruling by the trial court on the
matter would still be open for questioning before the CA and this Court. In the interest of justice, this
Court deems it prudent to suspend the rules and simply resolve the matter at this level. The Court has
previously exercised its discretion in the same way in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay:18
In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his client, and the intervention
of the courts is sought, the determination requires that there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and
the extent and value of the services rendered, taking into account the facts determinative thereof.
Ordinarily, therefore, the determination of the attorney’s fees on quantum meruit is remanded to the lower
court for the purpose. However, it will be just and equitable to now assess and fix the attorney’s fees
of both attorneys in order that the resolution of “a comparatively simple controversy,” as Justice
Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, would not be
needlessly prolonged, by taking into due consideration the accepted guidelines and so much of the
pertinent data as are extant in the records.19 [Emphasis supplied]
With respect to petitioner’s entitlement to the claimed attorney’s fees, it is the Court’s considered view
that he is deserving of it and that the amount should be based on quantum meruit.
Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining an
attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of attorney’s fees on
the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the
fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part
of the
attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25% attorney's fees based
pursuing the client’s cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees. 20 on the value of the property subject of litigation because petitioner failed to clearly substantiate the details
of his oral agreement with Spouses de Guzman. A fair and reasonable amount of attorney's fees should be
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the proper 15% of the market value of the property.
amount of attorney fees, to wit: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion to Determine
Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Attorney's Fees filed by petitioner Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. Based on quantum meruit, the amount of
attorney's fees is at the rate of 15% of the market value of the parcel of land, covered by Transfer
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Certificate of Title No. 1292, at the time of payment.

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

c) The importance of the subject matter; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

d) The skill demanded; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which
he belongs; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

h) The contingency or certainty of compensation; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Petitioner unquestionably rendered legal services for respondents’ deceased parents in the civil case for
annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages. He successfully represented Spouses de
Guzman from the trial court level in 1990 up to this Court in 2007, for a lengthy period of 17 years. After
their tragic death in 2003, petitioner filed a notice of death and a motion for substitution of parties with
entry of appearance and motion to resolve the case before this Court.21 As a consequence of his efforts, the
respondents were substituted in the place of their parents and were benefited by the favorable outcome of
the case.

As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel for deceased Spouses de Guzman and
respondents for almost seventeen (17) years. The Court is certain that it was not an easy task for petitioner
to defend his clients’ cause for such a long period of time, considering the heavy and demanding legal
workload of petitioner which included the research and preparation of pleadings, the gathering of
documentary proof, the court appearances, and the various legal work necessary to the defense of Spouses
de Guzman. It cannot be denied that petitioner devoted much time and energy in handling the case for
respondents. Given the considerable amount of time spent, the diligent effort exerted by petitioner, and the
quality of work shown by him in ensuring the successful defense of his clients, petitioner clearly deserves
to be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees for services rendered. Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be
paid his professional fee based on quantum meruit.

The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the administration
of justice underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the
decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A layer is as much entitled to judicial protection
against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his client as the client against abuse on the part of his
counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is
also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his
skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to
the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his
just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client he
himself would not get his due.22
 A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013
JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY
ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN
OROLA, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court’s resolution is a disbarment complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos
(respondent) for his violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).
The Facts
Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga (Mary
Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola
(Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio).2
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Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar) and
Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named complainants and the son of
Emilio. 3
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In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 18
(RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties were represented by the following: (a)
Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary
Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty. Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for
and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs4 of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with
respondent as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of
Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of Trinidad’s estate. In the course of the proceedings, the
Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his
stead, sought the appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in an Order 5
dated September 20, 2007 (RTC Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent filed an Entry
of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the reconsideration of
the
RTC Order. 6 cralaw virtualaw library
Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment complaint before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he
undertook to represent conflicting interests in the subject case; 7 and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the
Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of
Antonio.8Complainants further claimed that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the
mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of respondent’s appearance, the same was obtained only on
October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered his appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007. 9 In this
accord, respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain
their written consent as required under the Rules. 10 cralaw virtualaw library
For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he never appeared as counsel
for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed out that the records of the case readily
show that the Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were
exclusively represented by Atty. Azarraga.11 He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to
temporarily appear on her behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the scheduled June 16 and July
14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances thereat were free of charge. 12 In fact, he obtained Maricar’s
permission for him to withdraw from the case as no further communications transpired after these two
hearings. Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same case. 13 He
added that he had no knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted
that no information was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance. 14 Finally,
he clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator, rather than a
litigator,15 and that since no settlement was forged between the parties, he formally withdrew his
appearance on December 6, 2007.16 In support of his assertions, respondent submitted the affidavits of
Maricar17 and Atty. Azarraga18 relative to his limited appearance and his consultation with Maricar prior
to his engagement as counsel for Emilio.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15, 2008 submitted by IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), respondent was found guilty of
representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen as the records of the case show that he never
acted as counsel for the other complainants. The Investigating Commissioner observed that while
respondent's withdrawal of appearance was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent
nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of the Heirs of
Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code.20 cralaw virtualaw library
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of Section 20, Rule
138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that respondent “did not acquire confidential
information from his former client nor did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course
of his previous employment.”21 Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the Investigating
Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he
be severely reprimanded for his act with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be
dealt with more severely. 22
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The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the aforementioned report in its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated December 11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding
the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules but imposed
against respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-1725 dated January
3, 2013.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but reduced the
recommended period of suspension to three (3) months.
Rule 15.03 of the Code reads: chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action
or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good
taste.26 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.27 In Hornilla
v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit: chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether
the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions
that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the
lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former
client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. 30 cralaw virtualaw library
In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the following factors: first, respondent is
a first time offender; second, it is undisputed that respondent merely accommodated Maricar’s request out
of gratis to temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her
lawyer’s unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late
Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after
his first appearance as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in good
faith; and fourth, complainants admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from the
Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with
Emilio.
Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, Jr.,36 the Court similarly imposed the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for a period of three months to the counsel therein who represented parties whose
interests are hostile to his other clients in another case.

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP’s finding that respondent represented
conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable therefor.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by him, but
for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months,
with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for having committed acts SO ORDERED.
prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of
seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of
the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – in violation of the above-stated rule.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him
for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an
absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. In other
words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in the same case.
That respondent’s previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly
accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the
inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no
intention to represent conflicting interests. 31 cralaw virtualaw library

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator than a
litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among the family members render the rule
inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule 15.04, 32 Canon 15
of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned before he may act
as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as
the records show that respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending
engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally secure their
express written consent before consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer who
acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.33 Accordingly, for respondent’s
violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted.

In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was increased from severe
reprimand to a suspension of six (6) months by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-641. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the
bases of the IBP Board of Governors’ modification; as such, it contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of
the Rules which specifically mandates that “[t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be in
writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based.” 34 Verily, the
Court looks with disfavor the change in the recommended penalty without any ample justification
therefor. To this end, the Court is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of the
requirement to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in
disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on which the same is based is akin to what is
required of courts in promulgating their decisions. The reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no
lesser station than any other portion of the ratio.35
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A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent)
for unprofessional and unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private
complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her
attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim
(Pacita). She was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of
1 The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
an Order dated August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
2
Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201). At the time of her death,
Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring,
developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI),
Jespajo Realty Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation,
Jesus Uy Realty Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty,
Inc.
3
In her Complaint filed on May 9, 2005, Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella,
4 5
averred that respondent, her alleged illegitimate halfcousin, continuously failed and
6
refused to comply with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-
in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and
delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacita’s
stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations. She added that respondent
7
mortgaged a commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
133606 (subject property) in favor of Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of
54,000,000.00, despite an existing Trust Agreement executed on October 15, 1993
8 9
(subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as President of URCI,
already recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same. Accordingly,
10
she demanded that respondent return the said property by executing the
corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and
accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but to no avail. In this relation, Rebecca
11
claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or after she had already instituted
various legal actions and remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the
subject property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement. 12
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent denied Rebecca’s
13
allegations and raised the affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription.
He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several cases raising the single issue on the
correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also contended that the
parties’ transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a
complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted various
suits covering the same issue. As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and
14
further prayed for the payment of moral damages and attorney’s fees by way of
counterclaim.15
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint in CBD Case
16
No. 05-1484 for the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a
misunderstanding and misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute." 17
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File
Motion for Intervention, praying that the investigation of the charges against
18
respondent continue in order to weed out erring members of the legal profession. 19
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner issuedhis Report and Recommendation, finding respondent guilty of
20
serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of suspension for a period
of six (6) months. 21
On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebecca’s
motion to withdraw did notserve as a bar for the further consideration and
investigation ofthe administrative case against respondent. As basis, he cites Section
5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o investigation shall be
interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same." Separately, the Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum
shopping, noting that disciplinary cases are sui generis and may, therefore, proceed
independently. 22
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent
lacked the good moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter
failed to comply with the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not
to mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject property without
the former’s consent. In fine, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct in
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty was
recommended. 23
In a Resolution dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
24
apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession,
engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty –

depends on the factual circumstances of each case.

Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present
administrative case largely constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid
to rest by the parties. This is clearly exhibited by Rebecca’s motion to withdraw filed
in this case as well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil Case No. 04-108887
which involves the subject property’s alleged disposition in violation of the subject
trust agreement. As the Court sees it, his failure to complywith the demands of
Rebecca – which she takes as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust
agreement – as well as respondent’s acts of mortgaging the subject property without
the former’s consent, sprung from his own assertion of the rights he believed he had
over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the Court’s
determination,for that matter had never been resolved on its merits in view of the
aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that the
allegations she had previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts
surrounding their dispute" and even adds that respondent "had fully explained to [her]
the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x toher entire satisfaction," leading
her to state that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in fact
and in law." Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations
25

of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to

support the finding of "serious misconduct" which would warrant its recommended
penalty.1âwphi1

Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form
of misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the
should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not
have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation
nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the
Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his
26

integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other
words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian
of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what has been
ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01,
Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of ₱15,000.00 would
suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
ordered to pay a FINE of ₱15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Resolution.
Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as

attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7360 July 24,2012 Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense

ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against
Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action
against Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the
same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his
then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the
Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis
A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action
and recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice
modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to
a suspension of two years.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa
appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the
Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex
crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private
complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting the
case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.

In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as
private counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence
violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Catalan also
1

alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and
have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accused’s
favor. Atty.
Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by arguing against the
position of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching
granted Atty. Catalan’s request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon
case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005. On
23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused,
filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.

In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio.
In a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros.
from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before
Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the time,
Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge
of frustrated murder.

Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on
18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of
desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-
law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than
two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the
case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for
Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the
actual entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and
viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the
Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case
No. 27776 reads:

WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond

reasonable doubt, of the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of:

(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one
year, one month and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up
to three years, six months and twenty days of prision correccional, as
maximum;

(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and

(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.

SO ORDERED. 2

In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as
prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its
decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail.
Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the
reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and
the accused.

On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations
as "self-serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to
pursue persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral
turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount to a crime.’" He further claims
that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a public
officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling under the
category of crimes against public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal
Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would
be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the
facts of said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the case. Such
would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty.
Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such
act is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations
are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty.
Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone
unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred more than
seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on
November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the
veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be
ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has
no personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was
he ever involved in said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding
upon this Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a
disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged
extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of
the First Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
should be given the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted. 3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and
suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another
Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty
of Atty. Silvosa’s suspension from the practice of law to two years. The Office of the
Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 1
March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on
Rule 2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which provides that "A
lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he
entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty.
Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two
occasions can only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public
prosecutor was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He
likewise claims his subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited only
to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of our
ruling in Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a
lawyer or counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of
his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s
cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said
in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as
to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate
the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing.
Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which
is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although
the attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. 5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its
veracity by emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm.
Funa, by stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with
certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling,
however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio
and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the
failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President
of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false
testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the
accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar
is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet
the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of
him. Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
6
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative
complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a
respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are
not binding in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be
no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts
and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of
the office and from which conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable
consequences. Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
8
Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline
of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in government
service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No.
27776, and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in
the present case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal
Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan
supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayan’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his
interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment.
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
9
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. 10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v.
COMELEC, 11
we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime
of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present
by himself or through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the
public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration
of
 the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must
be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to
do; and

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes

is connected with the performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender
agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains
from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen
and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office
and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct
clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good
morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Italicization in the original)

Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing
Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction
1âwphi1

of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty.
Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more
severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the
exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His
excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer,
is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The
practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise
this privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and

his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015
ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA, Respondents.
DECISION
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of Section 27,2 Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled “Bobie
Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada”3 suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules
15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating Rules
15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and
executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as
well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in
respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for reconsideration.5
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07 entitled “Edilberto
Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.,” where complainant was one of the respondents, complainant
lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and
actively participated in the proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted certified true copies of the minutes of
the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name
as one of the counsels,6 as well as the transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada
conducted direct examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial proceedings. 7
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended from the
practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her from
the practice of law for two (2) years.
On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the complaint against
him. 8
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances
and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that
she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to
practice law, considering that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband
is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give
him legal assistance. 10 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.11 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02,
Rule
18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the practice of law
as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.
PERALTA, J.: On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification
the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.
RULING
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court orders a
lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist from
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. 13
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts
which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” 14
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty.
Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband,
conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-examination, all
constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of
Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done within the period of
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended from the practice of law by this Court in
May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to
2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No.
101-V-07 and actively participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-
year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she
represented her husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform
the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can represent
her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she believed has
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the
court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful disobedience to any lawful
order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the
Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a
family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was
prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a
spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court suspended further respondents from the practice
of law for six (6) months for practicing their profession despite this court's previous order of suspension,
we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for representing her husband as counsel despite lack of
authority to practice law.

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the
bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has
the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most
vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of
reforming
the errant lawyer is possible. 18
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of violating

Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months
from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a
more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is
DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent’s record as member of the Bar.

Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, so that we
can determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by complainant Teresita
B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious
misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of several post-dated
checks.
Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit 1 on June 26, 2009 before this court. The
Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension in relation to the
latter's issuance of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan. 2
cralawred
According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. She is acquainted
with Atty. De Vera through the business by subcontracting the cell site acquisition to Atty. De Vera. 3
Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of P20,000.00
per month until fully paid.4 Hbwever, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De Vera persuaded her
to borrow the amount from a common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary Jane), by mortgaging her
property located in Lucena City.5 Atty. De Vera issued IBank6 Check No. 310571 post-dated July 31,
2006 for P500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at least two more checks to cover the interest agreed
upon.7
Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Teresita's sister in the
amount of P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty.De Vera issued IBank Check No. 317689 post-
dated July 14, 2006 for P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her sister the amount
borrowed by Atty. De Vera.8
cralawred
Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the checks "bounced"
for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks for a second time.
However, the checks were dishonored because the account was closed.9
cralawred
Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her obligations, prompting
Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. 10cralawred
The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued the Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding probable cause
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. On
the same day, an Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued by the
trial court.11
cralawred
In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended for
violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 12
cralawred
On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to comment on the Complaint.13
Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24, 2010. She presented her version of the facts.
According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and Permitting
Project to Atty. De Vera's group. The project involved twenty-nine (29) Globe' Telecom sites across
Northern and Southern Luzon.15
cralawred
Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required 15% downpayment per site. Thus,
they agreed that Atty. De Vera would advance the costs for mobilization and survey, while Teresita
would cover the costs for application of building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her P195,000.00 per
site.16 cralawred
Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment by March 2006. 17 At that time, Teresita had to
deliver at least five (5) cell sites to Globe Telecom.18 However, Teresita did not have the funds required
LEONEN, J.: for the application of building permits that costs around P10,000.00 for each cell site. 19 cralawred
Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary Jane. Subsequently, Teresita approached
Atty. De Vera and asked that the latter lend Teresita checks to guaranty the loan. The main reason Teresita
gave was that she had been frequently arguing with her husband regarding the loan. 20 cralawred
Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita's sister.21 She only lent Teresita another check
as "additional guaranty for the five sites[.]" 22 cralawred
Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and delivered to Teresita for value. The
checks were not meant to be deposited.23
cralawred
Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case is baseless. She points out that the
proceedings before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were under reinvestigation since she' did not have
cralawred
the opportunity to answer the criminal complaint.24 cralawred
Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative complaint
was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or]
cralawred
abused her position against the interests of the complainant." 25 cralawred
Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused.26 In addition, "[a] 11 the bare allegations that
[Atty. De Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to mortgage her property and that the checks issued by
[Atty. De Vera] will be honored upon maturity do not constitute deceitful conduct on the part of [Atty. De
Vera]." 27
cralawred
On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera's Answer and referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for "investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from
receipt of [the] records[.]"28 cralawred
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines scheduled mandatory
conferences where the parties defined the issues, stipulated on facts, and marked exhibits. 29 Upon the
termination of the mandatory conferences, the parties were "directed to submit their respective verified
position papers within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order." 30.
Both parties failed to file their position papers.31 cralawred
The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines found Atty. De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and recommended
the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law. 32 The Investigating
Commissioner ruled:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent's assertion that the checks she issued to complainant were not security for the loans she
obtained but mere guaranty checks and not for deposit deserves no credence; it is contrary to the
ordinary experience.
cralawred
...
. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows [sic] that indeed respondent incurred
monetary obligations from complainant, and she issued postdated checks to 'the latter as security for the
payment of the loans.
Assuming . . . that respondent's version of facts were [sic] true, she is still guilty of serious misconduct.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing . . . worthless
check[s]; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The law is not intended
or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks........A check issued as an evidence of debt —
though not intended to be presented for payment — has the same effect as an ordinary check and would
fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in
violation of the provisions of the law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.
...
[A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but also for
gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity[.] 33 (Citation omitted) cralawlawlibrary
In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she also broke her oath as
a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 34 The Investigating
Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera violated the following provisions: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Cannon [sic] 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. 35 cralawlawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation36 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct and it is recommended
that she be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law. 37 cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-61238 dated May 11, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors resolved to adopt the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by issuing
a worthless check, the Attorney's Oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year.39 (Emphasis in the original)cralawlawlibrary
Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration40 dated September 17, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors' Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the Motion for
Reconsideration41 dated September 21, 2013.
In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-24142 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors denied the parties' respective motions: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent, there
being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution .subject of the
motion, they being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Moreover, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time pursuant to his
Motion for Extension of Time which is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B of the Rules and resorted
to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-612 dated May 11, 2013 is
hereby AFFIRMED.43 (Emphasis in the original)
cralawlawlibrary
The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the Lawyer's Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, we resolve to adopt and approve the
recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.
Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she did not incur the loans alleged by
Teresita, and the checks were issued merely as a guaranty and not as payment for the loan. She also raises
the prematurity of the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings
considering that "the allegations of deceitful conduct [are] intimately intertwined with the criminal acts
complained of."44 cralawred
This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that the lawyer's act of issuing worthless checks,
punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct.
In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for issuing post-
dated checks that were dishonored upon presentment for payment: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against respondent
Collado.. We do not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised against her is
essential, so far as either the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment charge against her is
concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the checks when she did not have enough money in her bank
account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid that the acts with which she was charged
would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We consider that issuance of checks in violation of the
provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar.46 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted) cralawlawlibrary
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment";47 it is serious or gross when it
is flagrant.48 cralawred
We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an administrative
case against a member of the bar: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 . . . is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and
altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or
with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
...
Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for. the law was penal in character and
application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and
public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and
obey the laws.49(Citations omitted) cralawlawlibrary
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or
private capacity.50 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
- OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
- deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
- INTEGRITY- AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
....
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
- his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
cralawlawlibrary

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera incurred monetary obligations from Teresita.
Atty. De Vera admitted issuing the checks to Teresita. She refused to answer for her liabilities by denying
the existence of the loan and claiming that the checks were mere "show checks."51 However, she failed to
present evidence to prove those allegations.

The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita civilly liable to Mary Jane for P540,000.00,53 and on
which Atty. De Vera relies upon, is not sufficient evidence to hold that there was no separate transaction
between Teresita and Atty. De Vera. The Decision involved the post-dated checks issued by Teresita to
Mary Jane only.54 Mary Jane merely claimed that she had no personal knowledge of any transaction
between Teresita and Atty. De Vera.55 cralawred

The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending" her
checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed to
know the consequences of her acts. She issued several post-dated checks for value that were dishonored
upon presentation for payment.

Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or professional
capacity. "Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer
but would also erode the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a whole." 56 A lawyer "may be removed or
otherwise disciplined 'not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him.'" 57
cralawred

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. De Vera's personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED. cra lawlawlibrary

 A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015
MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed
by complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Facts
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint for damages against his
2
own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other
defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07/09-QC
x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893/Issued on March 10, 2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time
of the filing of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of
his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his third Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for
grave threats and estafa5 against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a copy of the complaint, he
discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from
retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees,
saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his
unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's
why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of
money from [you], x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even
prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel 7 in the complaint for damages, which stated that
Maximino "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not
befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of
professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in
preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement, 8 both of
which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging
Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509 and 192210, and prayed for the disbarment of
respondent as well as the award of damages.
In his defense, Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission of the third
11
MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel
and Compromise Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in
default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his
text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in good
faith. 12
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was
downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty, Orlando
was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by
"texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x x."14
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement is
not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required information would merely cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP
Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on
the part of Orlando, considering that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who are brothers,
was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor intended to be published and known by
third persons.
In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to be
more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino moved for reconsideration17 which was however denied in a
Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification deleting the warning.
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certioranri.19 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against
Orlando.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and
morality.20 It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their
clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold
integrity and promote the public's faith in the profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times,
whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers. 22 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of the judicial forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of
the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another
colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of
insulting language to describe the opposing counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal
profession. 25 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual
communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor
of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to malign and annoy
Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that
Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against
his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the
crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and
purposes, an
admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum
which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions
such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession. Lawyers
are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with them, whether
in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the
standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely
relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been more
circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as
candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes
unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. 27 While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language.28 The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party. Considering the
circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his
client. 29
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure
to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed
against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for
the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records. 30
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues
and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED. cra lawlawlibrary

 A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015
MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO I.
GARCIA, JR., AND MA. PAMELA ROSSANA A. APUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE D.
PAJARILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo for allegedly
violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from
representing conflicting interests and Canon 15 of the same Code which enjoins a lawyer to observe
candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with clients.
The salient facts of the case follow:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided into two
opposing factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, was composed of Romulo M. Adeva, Lydia
E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I. Andrade. The other faction, called the Lukban Group, was
composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and Marcel N. Lukban.
In 1996, the complainant appointed the respondent as its corporate secretary with a total monthly
compensation and honorarium of P6,000.
On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an unnumbered Board Resolution which authorized Pilar I.
Andrade, the Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the complainant at that time, and Lydia E.
Cacawa, the Vice President for Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of
Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of the complainant.
On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application because the
Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were allegedly not registered as
stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the complainant, as members of the Board of Trustees.
The Lukban Group also alleged that the complainant was having financial difficulties.
On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of complainant's financial capacity to
pay the loan.
On July 13, 1999, RBP granted the loan application in the amount of P200,000 which was secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the complainant.
On September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order which nullified
the appointment of Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group as members of the Board of
Trustees of the complainant. As a result, complainant sent a letter to RBP to inform the latter of the SEC
Order.
On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and
informing the latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP's legal counsel, herein respondent. The
complainant alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that respondent is also
the legal counsel of RBP.
On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP increased the loan to P400,000.
On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage.
On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.
On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment against the respondent for
allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness, and loyalty.
Respondent raised three defenses against the complaint for disbarment. First, respondent argued that
Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot represent the
complainant in this disbarment case because they were not duly authorized by the Board of Directors to
file the complaint. Second, respondent claimed that he is not covered by the prohibition on conflict of
interest which applies only to the legal counsel of complainant. Respondent argued that he merely served
as the corporate secretary of complainant and did not serve as its legal counsel. Third, respondent argued
that there was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage
because all the documents and information related to the loan transaction between RBP and the
complainant were public records. Thus, respondent claimed that he could not have taken advantage of
his position as the mere corporate secretary of the complainant.
On February 14, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation 2 finding
respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and recommending that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for at least one year. The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent
appeared for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by his former client, the complainant
herein. The Investigating Commissioner cited cash vouchers 3 from 1994 to 2001 showing that respondent
was paid by complainant for his retained legal services. According to the Investigating Commissioner,
these vouchers debunk respondent's claim that the complainant merely appointed him as its corporate
secretary. The Investigating Commissioner also held that the personality of complainant's representatives
to file this administrative case is immaterial since proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
On June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-770 4 which
affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and imposed a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one year against respondent.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-2905 which denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent.
The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he entered
his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by complainant against
RBP.
We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770 and XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors.
Indeed, respondent represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client
in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. 6 Based on
the principles of public policy and good taste, this prohibition on representing conflicting interests enjoins
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which
is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 7 In Maturan v. Gonzales8 we further explained
the rationale for the prohibition:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's
case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge
must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of
the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused,
the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
Meanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained the test to determine the existence of conflict of
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though,
interest:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether
the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a
client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. 10 It also applies when the
lawyer represents a client against a former client in a controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to
the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.11 This rule applies
regardless of the degree of adverse interests. 12 What a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain
inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in
any matter in which he previously represented him.13 A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client
involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if
while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's
disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201,
Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his client is irrelevant in
determining the existence of conflict of interest.
Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a complaint for disbarment is imbued with
public interest which allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. Under Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court, "[proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person." Thus, in the present case, we find that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr.,
and Ma.
Pamela Rossana A. Apuya can institute the complaint for disbarment even without authority from the
Board of Directors of the complainant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2013-770 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-290
of the IBP Board of Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year
against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
cralawlawlibrary

the former client consents to it after consultation.14

chanrobleslaw

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that respondent represented conflicting interests when
he served as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by the complainant,
respondent's former client, against RBP.

The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent was compensated by complainant for his
retained legal services is supported by the evidence on record, the cash vouchers from 1994 to 2001.
Clearly, complainant was respondent's former client. And respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a
case filed by his former client against RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests since respondent failed to show any written consent of all concerned (particularly the
complainant) given after a full disclosure of the facts representing conflicting interests. 15 chanrobleslaw

We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest on the loan transaction between RBP
and the complainant when he sent a letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure the latter of the financial
capacity of the complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage, he clearly acted against the interest of the complainant, his former client.

Contrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no moment that all the documents and information in
connection with the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant were public records. In Hilado v.
David,16 we laid down the following doctrinal pronouncements: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from thereafter
appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even though during the continuance of the
employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the attorney by the client. (Christian vs.
Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)

Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly represented the
adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire as to
how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former client during that relationship, before
refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286,
F. 994.)

In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is unnecessary that
the court ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's affairs might have a bearing on the
matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)

This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on terminating his
 [G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996]
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA,
AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION,
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN,
and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING
THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S.
ROCO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996]
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial
system, upon which the workings of the contentious and
adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based - the
sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The
fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the
law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which
distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we have no
recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection
accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the performance
of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of
the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one
of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations
in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of
the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."[1]
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners
Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent
Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter
referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients, which included, among
others, the organization and acquisition of business associations
and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services
where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these
services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client
documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e.,
stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares
registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings
with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information
relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm,
petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they
assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the
said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. [2]
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on
Good Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG)
filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S.
Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant. Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private
[3]
respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will
reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case
No. 33.[4]
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on
the strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan,
Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the
Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA)
plotted, devised, schemed. conspired and confederated with each
other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the
financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK,
CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations,
including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA,
being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million
shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital
stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA
Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest
stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000
shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name
Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of
February, 1984.[5]
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,
petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers participation in the acts with which their
co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients,
defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala,
Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of
stock in the corporations listed under their respective names in Annex A of
the expanded Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring
stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest
in the said shares of stock.
4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the
incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was
organized for legitimate business purposes not related to the allegations of
the expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred
any material interest therein and therefore denies that the shares appearing
in his name in Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint are his
assets.
[6]
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated
from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the
allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-
gotten wealth. [7]
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their
"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991
with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the
same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as
accorded private respondent Roco. The Counter-Motion for
[8]
dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing
on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule
15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following
conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a)
the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of
documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the
submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in
favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. [9]
 Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to
substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the
conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-
defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent
PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989
reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in
PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed
by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated
in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law
Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in
behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the
reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the PCGG
against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. [10]
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private
respondent Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did
actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG
Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the
client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. [11]
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated
the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of
petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with
the conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:
x x x.
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of
the client for whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be
their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot
even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves
from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the
basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded
by the PCGG as defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency
and that Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation
could show the lack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed the
PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under
Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same
conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion
from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4,
1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures
required by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping
them as party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG
to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the
ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same
treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of
merit.
[12]
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above
resolution but the same was denied by the respondent
Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the
following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting
petitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving
as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law of agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not
considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated
and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.
 1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted
as nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to
reveal, the identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not
constitute a substantial distinction as would make the classification
reasonable under the equal protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue
preference in favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection
clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not
holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
includes the identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the
identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend
to other privileged matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not
requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be
based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to the
constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection
of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion
for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which was
denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing
respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same
grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as
party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorable
treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the
identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who are
in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners
further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been
assumed by private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from
revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate
and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the
confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client
relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners'
contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client
is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment)
protected, because they are evidence of nominee status. [13]
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent
PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as party-defendant because
he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right
to dismiss Civil Case No. 0033 as to Roco `without an order of
court by filing a notice of dismissal,'" and he has undertaken to
[14]
identify his principal. [15]
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the
PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of
their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but
the bigger fish as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite
clear from the PCGGs willingness to cut a deal with petitioners --
the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the
complaint.The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned
resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of
the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be
their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot
even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves
from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the
basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded
by the PCGG as defendants herein. (Underscoring ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the
Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled Primavera Farms, Inc., et
al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government respondent
PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing
on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through
the ACCRA that their so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;
that it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to
those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex A
of the Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers
executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name
of particular persons, some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these
ACCRA lawyers that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the
monies to these subscription payments of these corporations who are now
the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of
trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now, these
blank deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually
being held by the nominees for the late President Marcos.Fourth, they also
executed deeds of assignment and some of these assignments have also
blank assignees. Again, this is important to our claim that some of the
shares are for Mr. Cojuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that
most of these corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we
say that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of
directors at the time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the
crucial year. And not only that, they have no permits from the municipal
authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of
Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are
some of the principal things that we would ask of these nominees
stockholders, as they called themselves. [16]
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their
clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being
prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed
in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously,
petitioners inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely
being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and
consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being
the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against
petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended
Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the
Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of
lease of services) where one person lets his services and another
hires them without reference to the object of which the services are
to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated
by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency)
[17]
wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a
contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract
to the person who requested him. But the lawyer-client
[18]
relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-
lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an
attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he
possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him
by his client. A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the
[19]
court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to
those of an ordinary agent. Moreover, an attorney also occupies
[20]
what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in
fact an officer of the Court and exercises his judgment in the
[21]
choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are
rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among
those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of
fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and
[22]
public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from
[23]
seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice. [24]
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that
distinguishes him from any other professional in society. This
conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established
and stable tradition. In Stockton v. Ford, the U.S. Supreme
[25] [26]
Court held:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and
confidence than that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more
honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the
law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is
the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be
watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be
used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it.
[27]
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of
Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August
7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically forbids counsel,
without authority of his client to reveal any communication made
by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment. Passed on into various provisions of
[28]
the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently
worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon
in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an
attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge
of which has been acquired in such capacity. [29]
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself,
to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his clients business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a
lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from
him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor
or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his
duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is
steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be
performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of
attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client,
violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his
own conscience and not that of his client.
Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client
relationships are many and serve several constitutional and policy
concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to
one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right
to counsel. If a client were made to choose between legal
representation without effective communication and disclosure and
legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be
compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the
judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of
disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then
the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the
right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against
another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed
innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal
services opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal options which
would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information
engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client
relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence
which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a
situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and
flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain
effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not
as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional
responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be
asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in
the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be
shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our
[30]
jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not
invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of
his client.
[31]
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. A party suing
or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot be
[32]
obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. [33]
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is
however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, a state supreme court reversed a lower
[34]
court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her client on
the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so
closely related to the issue of the clients identity that the privilege
actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an
election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had
been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted
a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she
had advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that
she could not remember whether her client had been, in fact,
bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal
his clients identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower courts
contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the
circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described
above, even the name of the client was privileged.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig, involved the same exception, i.e.
[35]
that client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong
probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would
implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the
lawyers legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings
inquiring into the activities of the Sandino Gang, a gang involved
in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The
respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects
including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
 In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973,
the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to
produce documents and information regarding payment received
by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The
lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under
the facts and circumstances of the case, held:
A clients identity and the nature of that clients fee
arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the
privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure
of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal
activity for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of
California law, the rule also reflects federal law. Appellants
contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal
policy behind the attorney-client privilege. In order to promote
freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must
be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except
on the clients consent. 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In
furtherance of this policy, the clients identity and the nature of his
fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as
confidential communications. [36]
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity
is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances
of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,[37] prompted the New York
Supreme Court to allow a lawyers claim to the effect that he could
not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter
to civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when
the taxicab she was riding, owned by respondent corporation,
collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was
unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against defendant
corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the
information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney
of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the
fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name
of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the
insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to
him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was
apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of
the second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were
clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court
said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the
insurance company had hired him to defend its policyholders
seems immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly the
attorney for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to
report an occurrence contemplating that it would be used in an
action or claim against him.[38]
x x x xxx xxx.
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the
purpose of professional advice or assistance, are privileged,
whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any
other matter proper for such advice or aid; x x x And whenever the
communication made, relates to a matter so connected with the
employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it
was the ground of the address by the client, then it is privileged
from disclosure. xxx.
It appears... that the name and address of the owner of the
second cab came to the attorney in this case as a confidential
communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his
address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action
pending against him as service of the summons on him has not
been effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision
are sustained.
[39]
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, the [40]
lawyer involved was required by a lower court to disclose whether
he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose
of the courts request was to determine whether the unnamed
persons as interested parties were connected with the purchase of
properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought
the question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyers
refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order
appealed from, that he represented certain persons in the purchase
or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by such
evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such
testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose not only
that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of
communications made to him in the course of such employment as
such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain
transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case has
ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance
of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature
of the transactions to which it related, when such information
could be made the basis of a suit against his client. [41]
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an
attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said
name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients
name is privileged.
In Baird vs Korner, a lawyer was consulted by the
[42]
accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers
regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a
favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against
them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers returns of previous years were
probably incorrect and the taxes understated. The clients
themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax
laws and sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility
that they had. No investigation was then being undertaken by the
IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers
delivered to Baird the sum of $12,706.85, which had been
previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money
representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check
for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note
explaining the payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS
demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other
clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know
their names, and declined to name the attorney and accountants
because this constituted privileged communication. A petition was
filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Bairds repeated
refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil
contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer
could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed
him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in
settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no
government audit or investigation into that clients income tax
liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that a clients
name is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the
legal services rendered that the disclosure of the clients identity
exposes him to possible investigation and sanction by government
agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the
general rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by persons
who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in income
taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients are
useful to the government for but one purpose - to ascertain which
taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for
that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment
indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties
are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt
for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed.But it may well be the link that could form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly
the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here
involved was employed - to advise his clients what, under the
circumstances, should be done. [43]
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other
situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule.
 For example, the content of any client communication to a
lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter
of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance.
Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship
[44]
has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held
to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in
disclosure of the entire transaction. [45]
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the
identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when
the clients name itself has an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client confidences. [46]
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the
case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls
under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure
of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is
privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier,
protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there
would be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal
advice or legal service sought was duly established in the case at
bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three
specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes
petitioners ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship;
and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor
of their clients covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily
deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their
capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In
turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of,
among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering
their clients shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated
documents was part and parcel of petitioners legal service to their
clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that
identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity
for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned
corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the
client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the
link, in the words of Baird, that would inevitably form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a... crime."[47]
An important distinction must be made between a case where a
client takes on the services of an attorney for illicit purposes,
seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of
committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he
might have previously committed something illegal and consults
his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the
privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes
illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether
or not the act for which the advice turns out to be illegal, his name
cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not
yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to
possible action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the
privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act, as
in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case
against the client in the second example and cannot use the
attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The
reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional
character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime. which exists
The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above
[48]

discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for which
the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court
therein stated that "under such conditions no case has ever yet
gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of
the transactions to which it related, when such information could
be made the basis of a suit against his client. "Communications
[49]

made to an attorney in the course of any personal employment,

relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be
drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand
to each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to
protection as privileged communications." Where the
[50]

communicated information, which clearly falls within the

privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there would
be not much in the information known to the prosecution which
would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the client
would open up other privileged information which would
substantiate the prosecutions suspicions, then the clients identity is
so inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within
the protection.The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case,
is consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e.,
that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from
attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been
sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings and Tillotson v.
[51]

Boughner. What these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the

[52]

exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing

expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative sources of information available
to the prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's
counsel as a convenient and readily available source of
information in the building of a case against the latter. Compelling
disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one
in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions a fiduciary
by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not
countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be
revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is
obviously protected by the privilege. It follows that petitioner
[53]

attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an

obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in turn
requires them to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges
on their expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their
clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence
painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not
from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of
their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about
the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The
logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so
intimate in this case that it would be difficult to simply dissociate
one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much
"communication" as information revealed directly about the
transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly
and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such
communication without exposing himself to charges of violating
a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client
relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his
client therefore imposes a strict liability for negligence on the
former.The ethical duties owing to the client, including
confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the
responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to
make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon, the US Second District
[54]

Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached
its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's former agent
in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client
hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no
harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of
relationship in any context comprise a special breed of cases that
often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation and
damages, and found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola,
Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v. Scheller requiring strict obligation
[55]
of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer
was fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and
sought payment quantum meruit of work done. The court,
however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought
to pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while
settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client
found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the
client to settle for less than what was originally offered.
Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in
Meinhard v. Salmon famously attributed to Justice Benjamin
[56]
Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court
found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved
no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his
client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not
only during the relationship, but extends even after the termination
of the relationship. [57]
Such are the unrelenting duties required of lawyers vis-a-
vis their clients because the law, which the lawyers are sworn to
uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "xxx is an [58]
exacting goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual and
moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to accept
respondents position without denigrating the noble profession that
is lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such
scope to realize the spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does
one plunge so deep in the stream of life - so share its passions its battles, its
despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? x x x But that is not
all. What a subject is this in which we are united - this abstraction called
the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our
lives, but the lives of all men that have been. When I think on this majestic
theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we
who are here know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained
and lonely passion - only to be won by straining all the faculties by which
man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal
the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary
duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case
clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the clients
name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client
confidential privilege under the circumstances obtaining here does
not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the
lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of
the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the exercise
of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the
defendants therein, including herein petitioners and Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the
use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework
and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM
and others and that through insidious means and machinations,
ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately
fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital
stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to
establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their
client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the
subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies,
nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to
be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through
government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of
official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust,
unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of
their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG documents
substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering
their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from
petitioners a link that would inevitably form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict the (client) of a crime.
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents
allege that the private respondent was dropped as party defendant
not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a
nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts
and circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which
includes... the identity of the principal."
[59]
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely
acted as a lawyer and nominee, a statement made in his out-of-
court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that
petitioners have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of-
court but also in their Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended
Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made
in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering. Being "similarly
[60]
situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there
exist other conditions and circumstances which would warrant
their treating the private respondent differently from petitioners in
the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary
consideration behind their decision to sustain the PCGG's dropping
of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose
the identities of the clients in question. However, respondents
failed to show - and absolutely nothing exists in the records of
the case at bar - that private respondent actually revealed the
identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking
happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr.
Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to
have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private
respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should
have required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a
"bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with
the undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three
documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which were
mere requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed certain
clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves
willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and
private respondent rendered legal services while all of them were
partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG
wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. [61]
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case
or the filing of the suit in the respondent court without him,
therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was
treated as a species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on
the basis of a classification which made substantial distinctions
based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist
from the records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal
protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a
wall of protection against uneven application of statutes and
regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against
uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. Those who
[62]
fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to
privileges granted but also as to the liabilities imposed.
x x x. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform
operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances
would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and
the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances,
which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
an unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The
binding the rest.
[63]

case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of

We find that the condition precedent required by the
respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as parties-
defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a
transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is grossly unfair to
[64]
exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without
allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGGs
demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their
clients but also on documents related to the suspected transactions,
not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one
looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of
such rights.
Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to
continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate to
recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction acts which violate
the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-
incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division)
promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is
further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo
J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A.
*

Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.

An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled
the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.".
proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are
called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in SO ORDERED.
confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners
are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their
position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to
testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their
fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of
attorney-client confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be
allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners
should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it
is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a
privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing
them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to
continue with respect to them when this Court could nip the
 [G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V.
HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and
GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner
seeks the annulment of the resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied
petitioners motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S.
Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of
March 7, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of its
preceding disposition.[1]
The records show that during the dates material to this case,
respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting
Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent
Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del
Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at present a
Congressman.Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who
served as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the
criminal charges involved in the present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976,
respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A,
Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His
application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to
him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for that
lot which is situated in the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for [2]
the cancellation of respondent Paredes patent and certificate of title
since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in
the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered
judgment nullifying said patent and title after finding that
[3]
respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent
Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.[4]
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon
the subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan and the
preliminary investigation conducted thereon, an information for
perjury was filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal
[5]
Circuit Trial Court. On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal
[6]
was, however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move
for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of
prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated. In this [7]
criminal case, respondent Paredes was likewise represented by
respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent Paredes was thereafter haled before
*
the Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on the charge that,
by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence
and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. For the third time, respondent
Sansaet was Paredes counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a
resolution recommending the criminal prosecution of respondent
[8]
Paredes.Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-
respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal
significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that
motion:
x x x respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the
Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on
detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the same evidence x x x
but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon
recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order,
certificate of arraignment and the recommendation of the Department of
Justice are hereto attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case
will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent herein x x x. (Italics
[9]
supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the
Sandiganbayan charging respondent Paredes with a violation of
[10]
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a
motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in
respondent courts resolution of August 1, 1991 and the case was
[11]
dismissed on the ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had
initiated the perjury and graft charges against respondent Paredes,
sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the
three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. He [12]
claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-
respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain
documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1,
1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken
during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. These [13]
falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes motion
for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a
graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the
same would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a
certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection
with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge
Ciriaco Ario that said perjury case in his court did not reach the
arraignment stage since action thereon was suspended pending the
review of the case by the Department of Justice. [14]
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but
Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated the submissions he
had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of
Explanations and Rectifications, respondent Sansaet revealed that
[15]
Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary
investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by
making it that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial
court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by
respondent Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were prepared
and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of
respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own
participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the
instigation and inducement of respondent Paredes. This was
intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government
witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was
filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, the
[16]
Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges against all
the herein private respondents. The proposal for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the
Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position:
x x x Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his
stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to conspire, would be
unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel for the
accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case
theory and the evidence which the defense was going to present.
Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the
mantle of privileged communication between the lawyer and his client
which may be objected to, if presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution and, [17]
ostensibly to forestall any further controversy, he decided to file
separate informations for falsification of public documents against
each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases, each of [18]
which named one of the three private respondents here as the
accused therein, were filed in the graft court. However, the same
were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on
July 27, 1993 for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state
witness. It was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as
provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were
satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic
postulate was that, except for the eyewitness testimony of
respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove the
confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada
and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan,
hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege adverted to by
the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents
in their opposition to the prosecutions motion, resolved to deny the
desired discharge on this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client
and lawyer relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino
Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in the
information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the case,
and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by accused Paredes,
as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional
capacity.Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding
the offense charged in the information is privileged.
[19]
Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise
denied, the controversy was elevated to this Court by the
[20]
prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at
bar actually turns are therefore (1) whether or not the projected
testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is
barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a
consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as
a particeps criminis.
I
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to
the lawyer-client relationship which existed between herein
respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the
facts surrounding the case and other confidential matters must
have been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent
Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss
it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness
against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters consent.
[21]
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client
privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof and the
actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to
the rule. For a clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will
first sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential
communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with
Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent
court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the
accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that
Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified
documents by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a
communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to
him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is
significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always
referred to any communication, without distinction or qualification.
[22]
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential
rule was taken, there is no particular mode by which a confidential
communication shall be made by a client to his attorney. The
privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications
made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to
information communicated by the client to the attorney by other
means. [23]
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process,
considering their past and existing relations as counsel and client
and, further, in view of the purpose for which such falsified
documents were prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes
and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher
for this conclusion is the undisputed fact that said documents were
thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the
motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the
graft case before the Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and words of the
[24]
parties during the period when the documents were being falsified
were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited
Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except
under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the
instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter stands
charged, a distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed, and
future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily,
it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a
crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is
bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe
that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that
respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of
respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a
somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the
falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned,
those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the
application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to
be considered is the date when the privileged communication was
made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be
committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his
lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has
theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares
cannot be broken by the attorney without the clients consent. The
same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with
regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in
the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a
crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an
attorney, consulted as such,
are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of
judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney
and client having to do with the clients contemplated criminal
acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak
of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications
between attorney and client. (Emphases supplied.)
[25]
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from
Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by
physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he
and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet
and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for
purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification
which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which
he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later
committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense,
those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client
privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the
commission of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes and
Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well
settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and
his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose
prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been
[26]
pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable
relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise
of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a
client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a
conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the
attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at
once in the interest of justice.
[27]
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent
Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful communications
intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are
nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To
prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime
which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of
the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble
profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the
consequential inquiry as to whether respondent Sansaet qualifies,
as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the criminal prosecution
in order to testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court,
having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did
not pass upon this second aspect and the relief sought by the
prosecution which are now submitted for our resolution in the
petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some
ancillary questions requiring preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass
upon the query as to whether or not respondent Sansaet was
qualified to be a state witness need not prevent this Court from
resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the
determinative facts and evidence have been submitted to this Court
such that it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, it will be
in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the expeditious
administration thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of
remanding it to the trial court.[28]
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private
respondents here stand charged in three separate informations. It
will be recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the
Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for
falsification of public documents against all the respondents
herein. That resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order to
obviate further controversy, one information was filed against each
of the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for
the same acts of falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away
during the deliberations in this case by the following discussion
thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaets discharge as
state witness, he can, nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a
separate information. I suppose the three cases were consolidated for joint
trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division of cases arising
from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common
questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes,
Sansaet stood as co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It
is of no moment that he was charged separately from his co-accused. While
Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the
word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the consolidated and
joint trial has the effect of making the three accused co-accused or joint
defendants, especially considering that they are charged for the same
offense. In criminal law, persons indicted for the same offense and tried
together are called joint defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along
the same vein, there having been a consolidation of the three cases,
the several actions lost their separate identities and became a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the
different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a
single action.[29]
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the
situation (w)hen two or more persons are charged with the
commission of a certain offense was too broad and indefinite;
hence the word joint was added to indicate the identity of the
charge and the fact that the accused are all together charged he was not the most
therewith substantially in the same manner in point of commission
and time. The word joint means common to two or more, as
involving the united activity of two or more, or done or produced
by two or more working together, or shared by or affecting two or
more. Had it been intended that all the accused should always be
[30]

indicted in one and the same information, the Rules could have
said so with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the
circumstances obtaining in the present case and the problems that
may arise from amending the information. After all, the purpose of
the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an
alternative mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the
crime of falsification, and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the
act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all
members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a
state witness is that he does not appear to be the most guilty. not [31]

that he must be the least guilty as is so often erroneously framed

[32]

or submitted. The query would then be whether an accused who

was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is
eligible to be a state witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. we find this obiter:
[33]

It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable

that he persuaded the others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised
fee. Although he did not actually commit any of the stabbings, it was a
mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state witness. All the perpetrators of the
offense, including him, were bound in a conspiracy that made them equally
guilty.

However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al., two [34]

conspirators charged with five others in three separate

informations for multiple murder were discharged and used as
state witnesses against their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in
Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., one of the co-
[35]

conspirators was discharged from the information charging him

and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court found that
guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced And by most guilty we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of
by his two co-accused to open the account with the bank and participation in the
which led to the commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent
appellate court that Lugtu was just as guilty as his co-accused,
and should not be discharged as he did not appear to be not the
most guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took into
account the gravity or nature of the acts committed by the
accused to be discharged compared to those of his co-accused,
and not merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty is
imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not
explicitly articulated found expression in People vs. Ocimar, et
al., which we quote in extenso:
[36]

Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the
conditions for the discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He
argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and
utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could satisfy the requisite
of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that since
accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the
others.

We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of

Bermudez. For, despite the presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none
of them could positively identify the accused except Bermudez who was
one of those who pulled the highway heist which resulted not only in the
loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the life of Capt. Caeba,
Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the case for the
prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was
available for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime.Third, his
testimony could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its
material points as indicated by the trial court in its well-reasoned
decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the
evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without having
any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even
assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear
to be the most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will
be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be sent to jail.
commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty
imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of
conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take into account
his degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is
no evidence that he has at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
xxx
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule
on the discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly
looks at his actual and individual participation in the commission of the
crime, which may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the
other accused. Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for the
killing committed on the occasion of the robbery except by reason of
conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the most
guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly
warranted. (Italics ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon
conspirators found guilty of a criminal offense is based on the
concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and translated into
concerted physical action although of varying acts or degrees of
depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the classical
school of thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is
considered the predominant consideration and, therefore, warrants
the imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory that
the act of one is thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be
equated with the procedural rule on the discharge of particeps
criminis. This adjective device is based on other considerations,
such as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order that
not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid
admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty
that he will testify truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide
for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial
experience distilled into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other
requisites for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness
are present and should have been favorably appreciated by the
Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the
actual commission of the falsification charged in the criminal cases
pending before respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with
the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-
respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest
their innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for
the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute necessity for
the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for
that purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto
and has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the
substance of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of
Explanations and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material
points by reputable witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a
digest of their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco
C. Ario, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman
Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant
who initiated the criminal cases through his letter-complaint;
Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando,
Agusan del Sur, who participated in the resolution asking their
Provincial Governor to file the appropriate case against respondent
Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained the certification of
non-arraignment from Judge Ario.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that
respondent Sansaet has at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the
requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special
Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose
that he be allowed to testify as a state witness.
 This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this
procedural aspect, the prosecution may propose but it is for the
trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the
merits of the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It
must be emphasized, however, that such discretion should have
been exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all
the facts and issues herein discussed, and not merely on the sole
issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan
eventually assumed, after the retirement of two members of its
Second Division and the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely
[37]

anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment dated June 14, 1995,

[38]

as required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the

chairman and new members thereof declared:
[39]

4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7,

1994 upon which the Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are
based, was penned by Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and concurred
in by the undersigned and Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;

5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and
passed upon by the Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however,
after going over the arguments submitted by the Solicitor-General and re-
assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully beg leave of the
Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are amenable to setting
aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the prosecutions motion to
discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon authority of the
Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to that
effect within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby

granted SETTING ASIDE the impugned resolutions and
ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by
petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent
Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 11043, March 08, 2017 ]
LIANG FUJI, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Failure to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing the
immigration records of an alien, which resulted in the alien's
wrongful detention, opens the special prosecutor in the Bureau
of Immigration to administrative liability.
Before this Court is an administrative complaint[1] dated
November 23, 2015 filed by Liang Fuji (Fuji) and his family,
against Bureau of Immigration Special Prosecutor Gemma Armi
M. Dela Cruz (Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz) for gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in relation to her
issuance of a Charge Sheet against Fuji for overstaying.
Through a letter[2] dated December 8, 2015, Deputy Clerk of
Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa directed
the complainants to file a verified complaint "with supporting
documents duly authenticated and/or affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts alleged"[3] in the
complaint.
Complainants replied by furnishing this Court with copies of
[4]
the Verified Petition to Reopen S.D. O. No. BOC-2015-357
(B.L.O. No. SBM-15-420) and for Relief of Judgment with
Urgent Prayer for Immediate Consideration, and Administrative
Complaint (Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint),
[5]
which Fuji filed with the Board of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Immigration, and prayed that the same be treated as
their verified complaint. Complainants further informed this
Court that they had difficulty obtaining certified true copies of
the November 21, 2013 Order of the Board of Commissioners,
which granted Fuji's Section 9(g) visa, Summary Deportation
Order dated June 17, 2015, and Warrant of Deportation from the
Bureau of Immigration personnel who just gave them the
"run[-]around."[6] They alleged that the Bureau of Immigration
personnel were not particularly helpful, and did not treat Fuji's
case with urgency.[7]
The facts of this case show that in a Summary Deportation
Order[8] dated June 17, 2015, Fuji, a Chinese national, was
ordered deported for overstaying. From the Order, it appears that
Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz was the special prosecutor who
brought the formal charge against Fuji and another person upon
her finding that Fuji's work visa had expired on May 8, 2013,
with extension expired on December 6, 2013.[9]Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz found that Fuji had overstayed for one (1)
year and six (6) months in violation of Commonwealth Act No.
613, Section 37(a)(7).[10] Her investigation was triggered by a
complaint-affidavit dated April 30, 2015 of a certain Virgilio
Manalo alleging that Fuji and another person had defrauded him.
[11]
On June 29, 2015, Fuji filed his Motion for Reconsideration.[12]
On July 28, 2015, the Bureau of Immigration Intelligence
Division served Fuji's Warrant of Deportation, and thereafter
arrested him at Brgy. Maloma, San Felipe, Zambales with the
assistance from local police.[13] Fuji was brought to and detained
at the Bureau of Immigration Detention Facility, National
Capital Region Police Office, Taguig City.[14]
On October 9, 2015, the Board of Commissioners denied Fuji's
Motion for Reconsideration.[15]
On November 23, 2015, Fuji filed his Verified Petition and
Administrative Complaint.[16] Subsequently, on March 10, 2016,
Fuji filed an Omnibus Motion to Reopen and Lift S.D.O. BOC-
2015-357, and Release on Bail through counsel.[17]
On March 22, 2016, the Board of Commissioners issued a
Resolution dismissing the deportation charge against Fuji on the
ground that "[t]he records show that Liang has a working visa
valid until 30 April 2016 under Jiang Tuo Mining Philippines,
Inc. as Marketing Liason."[18] Fuji was directed to be released
from Bureau of Immigration-Warden's Facility on March 23,
2016.[19]
In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his rights to
due process were violated since he was not afforded any hearing
or summary deportation proceedings before the deportation
order was issued against him.[20] Fuji further alleged that Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz failed miserably in discharging her duties
because a simple initial review of the Bureau of Immigration
records would have revealed that he was not overstaying
because his Section 9(g) work visa was valid until April 30,
2016.[21]
In her August 25, 2016 Comment,[22] respondent Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz denied that she committed any grave
misconduct.[23] She claimed that Fuji was accorded due process
during the summary deportation proceedings.[24] He was
directed, through an Order dated May 14, 2015 of the Legal
Division, to submit his Counter-Affidavit/Memorandum, which
he failed to do.[25] Fuji was also able to file his motion for
reconsideration and verified petition to reopen the case.[26]
Respondent further claimed that the Memorandum dated June 4,
2015 of the Bureau of Immigration - Management Information
System (BI-MIS) constituted a substantial evidence of Fuji's
overstay in the country, hence, her formal charge had legal
basis.[27]
Respondent added that as a civil servant, she enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in the performance of her duties.
[28]
She had no intention to violate any law and did not commit
any flagrant disregard of the rules, or unlawfully used her station
to procure some benefit for herself or for other persons.
[29]
Respondent pointed out that the Ombudsman had in fact
dismissed the complainant's charges against her.[30] She added
that Fuji stated in his March 29, 2016 Affidavit of Desistance
that he had mistakenly signed some documents including the
administrative complaint.[31]
We find respondent administratively liable for her
negligence in her failure to ascertain the facts before levying
the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying.
I
Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of
disbarment complaints against lawyers in government service
arising from their administrative duties, and refers the complaint
first either to the proper administrative body that has
disciplinary authority over the erring public official or
employee or the Ombudsman.[32]
For instance, in Spouses Buffe v. Gonzales,[33] this Court
dismissed the disbarment complaint against former Secretary of
Justice Raul M. Gonzalez, former Undersecretary of Justice
Fidel J. Exconde, Jr., and former Congressman Eleandro Jesus
F. Madrona, holding that the respondents were public officials
being charged for actions involving their official functions
during their tenure, which should be resolved by the Office of
the Ombudsman.[34] In that case, one (1) of the respondents
sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum-
shopping because he allegedly received an order from the
Office of the Ombudsman directing him to file a counter-
affidavit based on the same administrative complaint filed
before the Office of the Bar Confidant.[35]
Again, in the fairly recent case of Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay,
[36]
the Court dismissed the complaint against respondents -
government lawyers in the Civil Service Commission. The
Court held that the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint
were "connected with their . . . official functions in the [Civil
Service Commission] and within the administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction of their superior or the Office of the
Ombudsman."[37] It would seem that the complainant directly
instituted a disbarment complaint with this Court instead of
filing an administrative complaint before the proper
administrative body.
This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances in Spouses
Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records here show that the Office of
the Ombudsman had previously dismissed Fuji's administrative
complaint due to the pendency of his Verified Petition and
Administrative Complaint before the Bureau of Immigration,
and considered the case closed.[38]
The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's petition
to reopen his case and ordered his release. However, it was
silent as to the culpability of respondent on the charges levelled
by Fuji.
Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings
before the Office of the Ombudsman and the apparent inaction
of the Bureau of Immigration on complainant's administrative
complaint, this Court considers it proper to take cognizance of
this case, and to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
discipline respondent under its "plenary disciplinary
authority"[39] over members of the legal profession.[40]
Contrary to respondent's stance, Fuji's purported Affidavit of
Desistance is not sufficient cause to dismiss this administrative
complaint. This Court has previously held that proceedings of
this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of
the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same."[41] The primary object of disciplinary proceedings is to
determine the fitness of a member to remain in the Bar. It is
conducted solely for the public welfare,[42] and the desistance of
the complainant is irrelevant. What will be decisive are the facts
borne out by the evidence presented by the parties. In Rayos-
Ombac v. Rayos:[43]
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not
in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff
and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court
to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.[44]
II
Respondent Dela Cruz claimed that she issued the formal charge
against Fuji for overstaying on the basis of the Memorandum
dated June 4, 2015 of the BI-MIS.[45] A copy of the
Memorandum with attachments was attached to respondent's
Comment.[46]
However, nowhere in the Memorandum was it stated that Fuji
"overstayed" or that "Liang's working visa expired on 8 May
2013 and his TVV expired on 6 December 2013"[47] as
respondent claims. Relevant portions of the Memorandum read:
DOB: 18 October 1991)[48]
....
The Memorandum merely transmitted copies of immigration
records showing details of filing of applications, such as official
receipts, - and travel record of Fuji. It was respondent Dela Cruz
who made the determination that Fuji overstayed on the basis of
the'documents transmitted to her by the BI-MIS.

For :ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ Among the documents transmitted by the BI-MIS were
From :ACTING CHIEF, MIS DIVISION computer print-outs showing details of official receipts dated
REQUEST FOR IMMIGRATION STATUS; VISA June 14, 2013, August 7, 2013, and November 19, 2013 for
Re :EXTENSION PAYMENT, LATEST TRAVEL AND temporary visitor visa extension and official receipt dated July
DEROGATORY OF THE FOLLOWING: 15, 2013 for an application for change of immigration status.
1. MR./MS. LIANG FUJI Also, the travel records of Fuji show the following details:
2. MR./MS. CHEN XIANG HE
3. MR./MS. JACKY CHANG Date &
:4 June 2015 3:05 PM
HE Date :04 June 2015 Time
Verifier :DIMARUCOT J
Database :TRAVEL - ARRIVAL
IMMI
TRAV FLIG
Further to your request for verification of Immigration Status; TRAVEL G PO OFFIC3E REMA
DATE EL HT ACTION RKS
Visa Extension Payment and TRAVEL RECORD/S, please find STAT RT R
TIME NO US
the result/s as follows:
10- 11:34P NAI MIJARE ALLOWE
CZ37
.... FEBRUA 9G
RY-2014 M 7 A1 S D
Result/s : 1. LIANG FUJI 06- 11:51P CZ37 NAI PARAN ALLOWE
- Derogatory Record Not Found JANUAR 9A
- Latest Travel Record Found (Please see the attached Y-2012 M 7 A 1 GUE D
files for your ready reference. NOTE: DOB: 18 22- 11:25P NAI ALLOWE
CZ37
October 1991) SEPTEM 9A NUNEZ
- Immigration Status Found BER-2011 M 7 A1 D[49]
- Latest Payment Record Found in BI-Main (Please see the attached files for your ready reference. NOTE:
Fuji's travel records as of June 4, 2015, show his arrival in
the Philippines on February 10, 2014 under a work visa
immigration
status.[50] Simple prudence dictates that respondent Atty. Dela
Cruz should have verified whether or not the July 15, 2013
application for change of status had been approved by the
Bureau of Immigration Commissioners, especially since she had
complete and easy access to the immigration records.
Respondent failed in the performance of her basic duties.
Special prosecutors in the Bureau of Immigration should
exercise such degree of vigilance and attention in reviewing the
immigration records, whenever the legal status and
documentation of an alien are at issue. For while a deportation
proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, it
is however, a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding
affecting the freedom and liberty of a person.[51]
Respondent was expected to be reasonably thorough in her
review of the documents transmitted to her by the BI-MIS,
especially as it may ultimately result in the deprivation of liberty
of the prospective deportee. She should not have simply relied
on the handwritten note by a personnel from the BI-MIS at the
bottom portion of the receipt dated November 19, 2013 for 9A
visa extension stating "Valid until: 06-Dec-2013." Had she
inquired further, she would have discovered that Fuji's
application dated July 15, 2013 for conversion from temporary
visitor visa (9A) to work visa (9G) was approved by the Board
of Commissioners on November 21, 2013 — or one (1) year and
seven (7) months earlier - with validity until April 30, 2016.
Thus, even if Fuji's temporary visitor (9A) visa had expired on
December 6, 2013 his stay in the country was still valid under
the 9G work visa.
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of her duties as a government official.[52] However, if
said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a
violation of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[53] then she may be subject to disciplinary
sanction by this Court.
Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code of the
Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." As
a special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration, she is the
representative, not of any private party, but of the State. Her
task was to investigate and verify facts to determine whether a
ground for deportation exists, and if further administrative
action — in the form of a formal charge — should be taken
against an alien.
Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji, she
would have found out about the approval of Fuji's application,
which would negate her finding of overstaying. Because of her
negligence, Fuji was deprived of his liberty for almost eight (8)
months, until his release on March 23, 2016.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to give attention to
a task due to carelessness or indifference.[54] In this case,
respondent's negligence shows her indifference to the
fundamental right of every person, including aliens, to due
process and to the consequences of her actions.
Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious
with their professional obligations consistent with the time-
honored principle of public office being a public trust.[55] The
ethical standards under the Code of Professional Responsibility
are rendered even more exacting as to government lawyers
because they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the
State to promote a high standard of ethics, competence, and
professionalism in public service.[56] In this case, respondent's
negligence evinces a failure to cope with the strict demands and
high standards of public service and the legal profession.
The appropriate sanction is discretionary upon this Court.
[57]
Under the Civil Service Rules,[58] the penalty for simple
neglect of duty is suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day
to six (6) months. In previous cases,[59] this Court imposed the
penalty of suspension of three (3) months to six (6) months for
erring lawyers, who were negligent in handling cases for their
clients. We find appropriate the penalty of suspension of three
(3) months considering the consequence of respondent's
negligence. This suspension includes her desistance from
performing her functions as a special prosecutor in the Bureau
of Immigration.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.

The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution, shall

immediately serve her suspension. She shall formally manifest
to this Court that her suspension has started, and copy furnish all
courts and quasi-judicial bodies where she has entered her
appearance, within five (5) days upon receipt of this Resolution.
Respondent shall also serve copies of her manifestation on all
adverse parties in all the cases she entered her formal
appearance.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant to be attached to Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz's
personal record. Copies of this Resolution should also be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its proper
disposition, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, A.C. No. 6697 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE GARCIA and
Complainant, IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF VELASCO JJ.
BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT Promulgated:
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
- versus - July 25, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, - - - - - - -x
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------x
DECISION
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY.
LEONARD S. DE VERA, Bar Matter No. 1227
INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE Per Curiam:
INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around
x--------------------------------------------x Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive
Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains
IN THE MATTER OF THE
REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD to a disbarment caseSCquestioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to
remain as a member of the Philippine Bar,A.M. No. 05-5-15-
the second refers to
S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP Present: Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP
BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS National President, and the third case concerns the validity of
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT PANGANIBAN, his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP
AND GOVERNOR PUNO, Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national
QUISUMBING, presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

IN THE MATTER OF THE YNARES-SANTIAGO,

LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. SANDOVAL-GUTIAER.CR. ENZo,. 6697
LEONARD S. DE VERA CARPIO,
MARTINEZ,
DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO CORONA, The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked
FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE CARPIO MORALES,
THE IBP RESOLUTION CALLEJO, to make an investigation, report and recommendation on subject
UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, AZCUNA, case,[1] summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:
ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY TINGA,
REMOVING HIM FROM THE CHICO-NAZARIO,
 In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005,
complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty.
Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:
1) respondents alleged
misrepresentation in concealing
the suspension order rendered
against him by the State Bar of
California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of
the so-called rotation rule
enunciated in Administrative
Matter No. 491 dated 06 October
1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in
appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client,
was found to have performed an act constituting moral
turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing
Department San Francisco, State Bar of California in
Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant
alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign
or surrender his license to practice law in the said state
in order to evade the recommended three (3) year
suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent
lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the
countrys most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the
respondent violated the so-called rotation rule
provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when
he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He
claimed that the respondent failed to meet the
requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining
to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that
the respondents transfer was intended only for the
purpose of becoming the next IBP National
President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be
enjoined from assuming office as IBP National
President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005,
respondent stated that the issues raised in above-
mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an
earlier administrative case filed by the same
complainant against him. In fact, according to him,
the said issues were already extensively discussed and
categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision
dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No.
6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De
Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant
administrative complaint be dismissed following the
principle of res judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before
the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of
evidence in support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June
2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial
evidence showing respondents moral baseness,
vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis
for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the
respondent never denied that he used his clients
money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed
to present evidence that the Supreme Court of
California accepted the latters resignation and even if
such was accepted, complainant posited that this
should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle
of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He
 asserted that the first administrative case filed against
the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty.
de Veras letter-request to this Court to schedule his oath taking
as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other
hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National
President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz)
furnishing this Court with the IBPs Resolution, dated 13 May
2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and
as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and
the IBP in general.[2]
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-
SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of
Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote
(6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the
withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed
as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et
al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-
R165108. The Petition was intended to question the legality
and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing
the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase
filing fees.[3]
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution
approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition were
herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor
Carlos L. Valdez.[4]
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of
the decision taken by the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-
mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP
Boards 14 January 2005 Resolution.[5]
On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de
Veras request for oathtaking as National President, was filed.
The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697,
the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.[6]
On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the
10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-
Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this
forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful
statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the
IBP Boards Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the
legality of Republic Act No. 9227.[7]
On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as
IBP National President.[8]
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP
National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the
removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having
committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the
IBP.[9]

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the
Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board,
by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the
IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.
[10]
Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said
Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS
IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard
S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP
Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for
committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful
statements, innuendos and blatant lies in
public about the Supreme Court and
members of the IBP Board of
Governors, during the Plenary Session
of the IBP 10th National Convention of
Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay
Convention Center on 22 April 2005,
making it appear that the decision of the
IBP Board of Governors to withdraw
the PETITION docketed as Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the
Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition With Prayer for the
Issuance of A Temporary Restraining
Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
S.C.-R. 165108, was due to influence
and pressure from the Supreme Court of
the Philippines;
2. For making said untruthful
statements, innuendos and blatant lies
that brought the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP as a whole in
public contempt and disrepute;
3. For violating Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers which mandates that A lawyer
shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by
others, by making untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies during the
Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National
Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;
4. For instigating and provoking
some IBP chapters to embarrass and
humiliate the IBP Board of Governors
in order to coerce and compel the latter
to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;
5. For falsely accusing the IBP
National President, Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the
10th National Convention in Baguio City
of withholding from him a copy of
Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25
January 2005, granting the withdrawal
of the PETITION, thereby creating the
wrong impression that the IBP National
President deliberately prevented him
from taking the appropriate remedies
with respect thereto, thus compromising
the reputation and integrity of the IBP
 National President and the IBP as a whole.
[11]
1. The denial of the right to
answer the
charges formally or in writing.
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to The complaint against me was in
this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. writing.
Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring
Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to 2. The denial of the right
the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de to answer the charges within
a reasonable period of time after
Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due
receipt of the complaint.
Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely
Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately 3. The denial of the right to a fair
Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less hearing.
Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment
Without Formal Investigation.[12] 4. The denial of the right to
confront the accuser and the
witnesses against me. I
In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied
challenged Gov. Rivera to testify
having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board.He under oath so I could question
alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed him. He refused. I offered to
by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him testify under oath so I could be
posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even questioned. My request was
the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his denied.
letter read:
5. The denial of my right to
present witnesses on my behalf.
It is evident that the Board of Governors has
committed a grave and serious injustice against me
6. The denial of my right to an
especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice
impartial judge. Governor Rivera
President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my
was my accuser, prosecutor, and
position as National President of the IBP on July 1,
judge all at the same time.
2005. x x x
7. Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my
I was denied the very basic rights of due
case becomes even more evident
process recognized by the Supreme Court even in
because when his motion to expel
administrative cases:
me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to
 his inhibition to vote), Gov.
Rivera asked for another round
of voting so he can vote to
support his own complaint and
motion to expel me.[13] (Emphasis
and underscoring in original.)
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May
2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.[14] In their Reply, the IBP Board
explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de
Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect
itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and
elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:
(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative
media campaign and solicited resolutions from
IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of
Governors for its decision to withdraw
the PETITION, all with the end in view of
compelling or coercing the IBP Board of
Governors to reconsider the decision to
withdraw the PETITION.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and
maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the
IBP National President in public or during the
Plenary Session at the 10th National
Convention of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated
solicited speakers (at the plenary session),
Atty. de Vera fanned the fire, so to speak, and
went to the extent of making untruthful
statements, innuendos and blatant lies about
the Supreme Court and some members of the
IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and
intentionally did so to provoke the members of
the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in
an acrimonious public debate and expose the
IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of
the members of the IBP Board of Governors
voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition
(without mentioning names)
because nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court,
nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may
mga kaibigan tayo sa Court. He made it
appear that the IBP Board of Governors
approved the resolution, withdrawing the
petition, due to influence or pressure from the
Supreme Court.[15]
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation
during the Plenary Session was the last straw that broke the
camels back. He committed acts inimical to the interest of the
IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove
him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with
copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from various
IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board
and as IBP EVP.[16]
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief
Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at
the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board
took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought
about by Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP Governor
Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as
IBP EVP.[17]
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the
election of Atty. Santiago.[18] On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago
voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter
addressed to the IBP Board.[19] Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its
last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the
person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty.
Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through
a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court
Atty. Salazars election.[20] IBP National President Cadiz also
requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazars election be
approved and that he be allowed to assume as National
President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from
the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved by
this Court.[21] Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the
election of Atty. Salazar.[22]
In his Extended Comment dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de
[23]
Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal
basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board
because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his
removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal
from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise
executed without due notice and without the least compliance
with the minimum standards of due process of law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly
false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers at the
Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably
impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language
and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in
general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He
posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the
Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid
cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP
Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only
shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent
is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President
of withholding a copy of this Courts Resolution granting the
withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic
Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such
remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de
Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was
contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning
national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President
and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for
a term of two years from July 1 following their
election until 30 June of their second year in office
and until their successors shall have been duly chosen
and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to
act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the
Executive Vice President, and in the event of death,
resignation, or removal of the President, the
Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting
 President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the
event of death, resignation, removal or disability of
both the President and the Executive Vice President,
the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting
President to hold office for the unexpired portion of
the term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws,
all other officers and employees appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board shall hold
office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as
the Board may fix.[24]
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when
both the President and the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are
disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an
Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP
was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is
contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly
removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come
from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to
the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of
the IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005
IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27
January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with
sufficient power and authority to protect itself
from an intractable member by virtue of Article
VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;
(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of
the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of
his disagreement with the IBP Boards position
but because of the various acts that he
committed which the IBP Board determined to
be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a
whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from
liability by invoking his constitutional right to
Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it
is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and to insist on similar conduct by others;
(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of
Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental
principles of due process. As the records would
bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the
Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13
May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor
Riveras Letter-Complaint the day before the
said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said
Meetings Agenda; and was allowed to
personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov.
Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because
the required number of votes under Section 44
of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as
a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP
was duly complied with;
 (vi) Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need
not come from Eastern Mindanao Region
because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII,
Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had
already been complied with when Atty. de
Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was
elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need
not be enforced if the same will not be
practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable;
and, finally, that
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP
and, thus, should now be allowed to take his
oath as IBP National President.[25]
The Courts Ruling
AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant
[26]
tendered the following issues for the consideration of the Court:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY
LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED
MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO
MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN
THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS
LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF
ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)
WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT
NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL
T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF
RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN
THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27]
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on
the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we will start
with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to
the filing of the present
administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar
Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension
and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De
Vera is grounded on the following:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation
in concealing the suspension order
rendered against him by the State Bar
in California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-
called rotation rule enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06
October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised
the said issues in an earlier administrative case against
the respondent. Verily, these issues were already
argued upon by the parties in their respective
pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court
in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in
Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to
Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this
Court held that:
As for the administrative complaint filed
against him by one of his clients when he
was practicing law in California, which
in turn compelled him to surrender his
California license to practice law, he
maintains that it cannot serve as basis
for determining his moral qualification
(or lack of it) to run for the position he is
aspiring for. He explains that there is as
yet no final judgment finding him guilty
of the administrative charge, as the
records relied upon by the petitioners
are mere preliminary findings of a
hearing referee which are
recommendatory findings of an IBP
Commissioner on Bar Discipline which
are subject to the review of and the final
decision of the Supreme Court. He also
stresses that the complainant in
the California administrative case has
retracted the accusation that he
misappropriated the complainants
money, but unfortunately the retraction
was not considered by the investigating
officer. xxx
On the administrative complaint that
was filed against respondent De Vera
while he was still practicing law in
California, he explained that no final
judgment was rendered by the California
Supreme Court finding him guilty of the
charge. He surrendered his license to
protest the discrimination he suffered at
the hands of the investigator and he
found it impractical to pursue the case to
the end. We find these explanations
satisfactory in the absence of contrary
proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that
he who alleges a fact has the burden to
prove the same. In this case, the
petitioners have not shown how the
administrative complaint affects
respondent De Vera's moral fitness to
run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second
issue:
Petitioners contend that
respondent de Vera is disqualified for
the post because he is not really
from Eastern Mindanao. His place of
residence is in Paraaque and he was
originally a member of the PPLM IBP
Chapter. He only changed his IBP
Chapter membership to pave the way for
his ultimate goal of attaining the highest
IBP post, which is the national
presidency. Petitioners aver that in
changing his IBP membership,
respondent De Vera violated the
domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the
last paragraph of Section 19, Article II,
a lawyer included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court can
register with the particular IBP Chapter
of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted
section of the By-Laws that it is not
automatic that a lawyer will become a
member of the chapter where his place
of residence or work is located. He has
the discretion to choose the particular
chapter where he wishes to gain
membership. Only when he does not
register his preference that he will
become a member of the Chapter of the
place where he resides or maintains
office. The only proscription in
registering one's preference is that a
lawyer cannot be a member of more
than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of
the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this
Section, transfer of IBP membership is
allowed as long as the lawyer complies
with the conditions set forth therein,
thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the
foregoing rule is that the transfer must
be made not less than three months prior
to the election of officers in the chapter
to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera
requested the transfer of his IBP
membership to Agusan del Sur on 1
August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP
National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar
wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador
Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP
PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J.
Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del
Sur Chapter, informing them of
respondent de Vera's transfer and
advising them to make the necessary
notation in their respective records. This
letter is a substantial compliance with
the certification mentioned in Section
29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's
transfer was made effective sometime
between 1 August 2001 and 3
September 2001. On 27 February 2003,
the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers
were simultaneously held all over the
 Philippines, as mandated by Section
29.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides
that elections of Chapter Officers and
Directors shall be held on the last
Saturday of February of every other
year. Between 3 September
2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen
months had elapsed. This makes
respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it
was done more than three months ahead
of the chapter elections held on 27
February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty.
Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27
November 1996), this Court declared that:
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and
not to the exercise of the [Courts]
administrative powers.
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was
dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly
prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously
substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale
from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a
complaint for disbarment was filed against the
respondent on the basis of the same
incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued
that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the
same incident. This Court held that while the
respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the
same misconduct, this does not amount to double
jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly
administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in
the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as
an erring court personnel under the Courts supervisory
power over courts while, in the second case, he was
disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts plenary
authority over membersof the legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it
appears that res judicata still applies in administrative
cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera
vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter
No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:
While double jeopardy does not lie in
administrative cases, it would be
contrary to equity and substantial justice
to penalize respondent judge a second
time for an act which he had already
answered for.
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge
Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon,
Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes
(Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14
December 2004), this Court held that:
Applying the principle of res judicata or
bar by prior judgment, the present
administrative case becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that
has been adjudicated by a court of
competent jurisdiction must be deemed
to have been finally and conclusively
settled if it arises in any subsequent
litigation between the same parties and
for the same cause. It provides that
 [a] final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights
of the parties and their privies; and
constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same
claim, demand, or cause of action. Res
judicata is based on the ground that the
party to be affected, or some other with
whom he is in privity, has litigated the
same matter in the former action in a
court of competent jurisdiction, and
should not be permitted to litigate it
again.
This principle frees the parties from
undergoing all over again the rigors of
unnecessary suits and repetitious
trials.At the same time, it prevents the
clogging of court dockets. Equally
important, res judicata stabilizes rights
and promotes the rule of law.
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that
the issues raised by the complainant had already been
resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative
case. The complainants contention that the principle
of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as
the first administrative case was one for
disqualification while the instant administrative
complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment
should be given least credence. It is worthy to note
that while the instant administrative complaint is
denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment,
it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of
the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the
respondent from assuming office as IBP National
President.[28]
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case
No. 6052 entitled, In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de
Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP
Election and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not
constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697.Although
the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case
No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the
issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the
application of res judicata.
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to
apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the
judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the
case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there
must be between the first and second action identity of parties,
identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. [29] In
the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot
argue res judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve
different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No.
6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to
run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern
Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject
matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative
case, complainants cause of action was Atty. de Veras alleged
violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present
administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de
Veras alleged violation of lawyers oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same
relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty.
de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern
Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his
Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Veras
suspension or disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The
previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties rights and
obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de
Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor
as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the
disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently,
we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand
on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the
proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes
that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file
with the IBP President a written protest against the
candidate. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera
cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit
was mere obiter dictum.Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow
for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de
Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative
findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California
suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We
held in that case that
There is nothing in the By-Laws which
explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before
he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so
because the determination of moral fitness of a
candidate lies in the individual judgment of the
members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on
each member's standard of morality, he is free to
nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter
possesses the basic requirements under the law. For
another, basically the disqualification of a candidate
involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from
his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law
by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an
offense which involves moral turpitude.[30]
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by
the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every
lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is
presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not
be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition
for disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment
or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the
instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and substance,
we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior
judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for
consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended
or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence
submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the
hearing officer of the State Bar
of California, standing alone,
is not proof of malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law
In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera, [31] we were
confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the
Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign
jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in
said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the
Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in
the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of
law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.)
and against whom charges were filed in connection with his
practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty.
Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was
meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of
suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to
practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme
Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of
suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction
does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in
the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not
grounds for disbarment and suspension in this
jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer
may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in
the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts action
includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign
court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts
as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section
48, of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. -
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi
Enterprises, Inc.,[32] we explained that [a] foreign judgment is
presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption
of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the
foreign forum.
 In herein case, considering that there is technically no
foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the
hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty.
de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the
facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was
based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these
acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of
malpractice on the part of Atty.
de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension
by the hearing officer of the
State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he
has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for
his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such
action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign
court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension.[33]
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect
the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[34] The statutory enunciation of
the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a
lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot
be restricted.[35]
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or
dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a
special and technical meaning to the term Malpractice.[36] That
meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the
practice of law is a profession, not a business.[37]
 Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which
violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is
unbecoming a member of that profession.[38]
Now, the undisputed facts:
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed
before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm.
Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case
Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who
figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera
was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who
was given authority by the son to control the case because
the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for
the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de
Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he
then deposited to his personal account;[39]
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case
recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the
practice of law for three years;[40] and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which
resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of
California.[41]
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts
do not prove that he misappropriated his clients funds as the
latters father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the
same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider
this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis
testified under oath that he expected de Vera might use the
money for a few days.
By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father
and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly
admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.
In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation
in the latters memorandum that he (de Vera) received
US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said
amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust
account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal
purposes.[42]
At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[43] It means such
evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in
issue can be reasonably inferred.[44]
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his
clients funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST
ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
 Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each
client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep[45] we held that
The relation between attorney and client is
highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires
utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and
disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its
fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the
client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from
the client. Even more specific is the Canon of
Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from
any action whereby for his personal
benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in
him by his client.
Money of the client or collected
for the client or other trust property
coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted
for promptly and should not
under any circumstances be commingled
with his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the funds or property held by him on behalf
of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice
of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his
client. It is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds
entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence
in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such
infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely
from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself
that he used his clients money for personal use, he has
unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes
more than substantial evidence of malpractice.Consequently,
Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence
which he himself supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized
by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latters
son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full
amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the
administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.
[46]
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we
cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that
indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of
his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera[47] we declared that
When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which
at all times is expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing
officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he expected
de Vera might use the money for a few days. As Atty. de Vera
had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document
containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying
thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis expected de Vera might
use the money for a few days was not so much an
acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his
clients funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty.
de Vera might, indeed, use his clients funds, which by itself did
not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such
character was perceived.
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his
clients money without the latters acquiescence is conduct
indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty.
de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using
the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor,
not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he
belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to
the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of
the profession betrays their trust and confidence.[48] Respondent
violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar
respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must
be exercised with great caution.[49] Where any lesser penalty can
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan
two years suspension from his practice of law for depositing the
funds meant for his client to his personal account without the
latters knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;[51]Castillo v. Taguines;
[52]
Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,[53] the respondents were meted
one year suspension each for failing to remit to their clients
monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00,
respectively, received by them for their clients without the
latters permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,[54] we
indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his
client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing
the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering
the amount involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the
penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership
to a chapter where the lawyer
is not a resident of is not a
ground for his suspension or
disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of
membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and Muntinlupa
(PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a
circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole
purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant
stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor
does he hold office therein.
In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of
transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his
disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is
allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the
qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three
months immediately preceding any chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer
his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical
conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a
legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not
see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based
on the rotation rule will produce the next IBP EVP who will
automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next
term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the
Lawyers Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring
to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts
in accomplishing such goal.
Bar Matter No. 1227
Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No.
05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be addressed:
I. ther the IBP Board of Governors acted with
grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera
as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors
complied with administrative due process
in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De
Vera for just and valid cause.
II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as
EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and
can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for
the term 2005-2007.
The IBP Board observed
due process in its removal of
Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP
Board is vested with the power to remove any of its members
pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which
states:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of
Governors should determine after proper inquiry that
any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any
reason become unable to perform his duties, the
Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining
members, may declare his position vacant, subject to
the approval of the Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or
otherwise, may be removed for cause, including
 three consecutive absences from Board meetings
without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted
by two-thirds of the remaining members of the
Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of
Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the
region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from
among the members of the Chapter to which the
resigned governor is a member to serve as governor
for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board
may be removed for cause by resolution adopted by two-thirds
(2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the
approval of this Court.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the
Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds. He
argues that he was denied very basic rights of due process
recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases
like the right to answer formally or in writing and within
reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the
right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was
not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H.
Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his
expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the
same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera
initially inhibited himself from voting on his own
motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of
his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered,
Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote
to support his own motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were
present during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and
heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an evidentiary or formal
hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and
heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an
opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against
him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of
the complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting
on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was
part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be
heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.
We are in agreement with the IBP Board.
First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due
process safeguards life, liberty and property.[55] It cannot be said
that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the
constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security
of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required to
remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a
resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the
board.
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully
invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side.[56] At the
outset, it is here emphasized that the term due process of law as
used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes
due to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a
fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law,
is not susceptible of more than one general statement. [57] The
phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension, [58] because it depends
on circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the
necessities of the situation.[59]
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with
judicial process for a trial in court is not always essential to due
process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since
they rest upon different principles. The due process clause
guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements
are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative
character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due
process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is
met by a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings
be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is
available trial and tribunal before which all objections and
defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and
considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process
requires. What is required for hearing may differ as the functions
of the administrative bodies differ.[60]
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due
process.[61] Nor is an actual hearing always essential [62]especially
under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the
IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the
cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court all witnessed Atty. de Veras
actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.
It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the
complaint against him and that he was present when the matter
was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of
the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it
is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend
himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.
Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty.
Rivera, who authored the complaint against him, also voted for
his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the
same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty.
Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when this
resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3
vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he
voted in favor of his motion.
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP
Board, six voted for Atty. de Veras expulsion (including Atty.
Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:
Any member of the Board, elective or
otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without
justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-
thirds of the remaining members of the Board,
subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is
done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining
members. The phrase remaining members refers to the members
exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent
member. The reason therefore is that such members are
interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve
said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys.
Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only
the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of
the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while
two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote
requirement for expulsion.
The IBP Board removed Atty.
de Vera as IBP Governor for
just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what
constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP Governor has not
been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it
includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings
without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is
vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from
an intractable member whose removal was caused not by his
disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts
committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical
to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in
disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the
Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or
expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors
and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to
freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by
the IBP Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in
keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that
Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was not capricious
or arbitrary.
Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying
degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal
life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers
are said to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other
organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its
governing body for then there would be the impression that the
IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not
and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It
would accordingly diminish the IBPs prestige and repute with
the lawyers as well as with the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus
be adjusted within the governing board itself so as to free it from
the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are
made public.
The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a
mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts and
disagreements within the group after the members have been
given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface
conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is
reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound
thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those
elected to the governing board are deemed to implicitly contract
that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the
authority of the board.[63]
The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing
Atty. de Vera as the latters actuations during the 10thNational
IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as
the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen
by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively
perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code
of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as
improve the administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and
unity, the expulsion of a member of the board who insists on
bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution
approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be
faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body will
be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a
board member.
Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the
voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so that he
could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his
hearts content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary
action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as
member of the Board of
Governors ipso facto meant his
removal as EVP as well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of
Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well. Section
47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines shall have a President and Executive
Vice President to be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among nine (9) regional governors,
as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member
of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Veras removal from the
Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting
as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47
of the IBP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere
with the Resolution of the IBP
Board to remove Atty. de Vera
since it was rendered without
grave abuse of discretion
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an
extensive power of supervision over the IBP, [64] it is axiomatic
that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not
preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion
especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed
by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were
precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers and
functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational
structure, and govern relations and transactions among its
officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the The election of Atty. Salazar by
Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to the IBP Board as IBP EVP in
carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Courts interference. replacement of Atty. De Vera
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and was conducted in accordance
activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of with the authority granted to
Governors.The members of the Board are elective and the Board by the IBP By-Laws
representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as
delineated in its By-Laws.[65] The Board acts as a collegiate body
and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the
action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in
foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board
acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from
the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same
members.Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board
deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption[66] of validity, is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of
discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-
which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by
substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Laws of the IBP.
Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial
With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by
proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its
virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was
authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be
also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant
persuaded to overturn and set aside the Boards action or
vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.
resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants
remove its members as provided in Article VI, Section 44 [67]of
to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in
the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board
the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the
abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty.
Integration Rule,[68] and Section 11 (Vacancies),[69]Section 44
de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been
(Removal of members),[70] Section 47 (National officers),
previously established herein, Atty. de Veras removal from the [71]
Section 48 (other officers),[72] and Section 49 (Terms of
IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP
Office)[73] of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and
Board acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it
sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in
by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the
the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith
part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the
and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical
Boards resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007
Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP
Rules and By-Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of
a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-
2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to
the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section
47, which provides that [t]he EVP shall automatically become
President for the next succeeding term. The phrase for the next
succeeding term necessarily implies that the EVP that should
succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding
term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the
2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-
19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from
assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet
to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from
the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.
Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13
June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25
June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of
Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.
Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De
Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor and EVP was
valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern
Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in
Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.
According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-
Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on
a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar
Matter 491, wherein we ruled:
ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP President
and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board
of Governors (composed of the governors of the
nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as
provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-
Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the
presidency upon the expiration of their two-year
term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No.
287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the
Executive Vice-President shall automatically
succeed to the office of president. The incoming
board of governors shall then elect an Executive
Vice-President from among themselves. The
position of Executive Vice-President shall be
rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who
has served as president may not run for election as
Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election
until after the rotation of the presidency among the
nine (9) regions shall have been completed;
whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)
 In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual
EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional
succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is
Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely
a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from
Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are
position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at
pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to
Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule assume the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed
provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied
spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to
with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each
assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement
of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus,
EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of
the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the
Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP
supervening event of Atty. de Veras removal as IBP Governor
of 2003-2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would have
and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP
served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the
Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had
highest position.
been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to
the IBP Presidency.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of
the automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a
will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of
license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic
Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that
succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the
the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a
latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership
month before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-
transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President
2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor
to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to
would not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two
expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership
years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.
consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting
a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a
 In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase
as much as practicable to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is
not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling
and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced
by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be
assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from
where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the
intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft
of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one
who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the
IBP would have.
We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted
in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as
IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the
IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have
been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1
July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C.
No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO
(2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this
Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be
attached to the personal record of Atty.
Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty.
Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the
disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May
2005, of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing
him from his posts as Governor and
Executive Vice President of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution
having been rendered without grave abuse of
discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of
Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar
as Executive Vice President of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of
the term 2003-2005, such having been
conducted in accordance with its By-Laws
and absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to
immediately take his oath of office and
assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in
accordance with the automatic succession
rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-
Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney towards his client in which the
former is found and declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement.
Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to
perform during his professional engagement?
Antecedents
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with
misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional
services despite his not having performed the contemplated professional services. She avers that in March
2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in the annulment of her marriage
with her estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his
fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the initial
amount of P90,000.00;1 that she had gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the developments in
her case, but he told her that he would only start working on the case upon her full payment of the
acceptance fee; that she had only learned then that what he had contemplated to file for her was a petition
for legal separation, not one for the annulment of her marriage; that he further told her that she would
have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage;2 that she subsequently withdrew
the case from him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as
he had already started working on the case;3 that she had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C.
Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever amount corresponded to the legal services he
had already performed;4 that the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered
any appreciable legal services to her;5 and that his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her to
bring an administrative complaint against him6 in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20,
2007.
In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the respondent alleges that the complainant and her British fiancee
sought his legal services to bring the petition for the annulment of her marriage; that based on his
evaluation of her situation, the more appropriate case would be one for legal separation anchored on the
psychological incapacity of her husband; that she and her British fiancee agreed on P150,000.00 for his
legal services to bring the action for legal separation, with the fiancee paying him P70,000.00, as
evidenced by his handwritten receipt;8 that for purposes of the petition for legal separation he required the
complainant to submit copies of her marriage contract and the birth certificates of her children with her
husband, as well as for her to submit to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal
separation; that he later on communicated with her and her fiancee upon finalizing the petition, but they
did not promptly respond to his communications; that in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent
the money that her fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional fees; and that in June 2005,
she returned to him with a note at the back of the prepared petition for legal separation essentially
requesting him not to file the petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the action for the
annulment of her marriage instead.
The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty. Martinez, but states that he
dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand lacked basis in law. It is noted that he
wrote in the last part of his answer dated May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand letter the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund dated 15 August 2005 (Annex "B"
of the complaint) as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel ATTY. ISIDRO
S.C. MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied on an unverified information furnished him, to the urinal
project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose. 9 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a mandatory conference on
August 3, 2007,10 but only the complainant and her counsel attended the conference. On his part, the
respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007 to the IBP-CBD to reiterate his answer. 11 Due to his non-
appearance, the IBP-CBD terminated the conference on the same day, but required the complainant to
submit a verified position paper within 10 days. She did not submit the position paper in the end.
In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008,12 IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama,
Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for legal separation based
on the psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable because he himself was
apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal separation; that because he rendered some legal
services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him
as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the services rendered under the principle of quantum
meruit; and that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount of P30,000.00.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the respondent's statement in the last part
of his answer, to the effect that the demand letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the complainant
should be treated as a scrap of paper, or should have been addressed "to the urinal project of the MMDA
where it may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for and improper; and he opined that such offensive
and improper language uttered by the respondent against a fellow lawyer violated Rule 8.01 13of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately recommended as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending the following:
(1) To order the respondent to return to the complainant the amount
of P30,000.00 which he received for the purpose of preparing a
petition for legal separation. Undersigned believes that
considering the degree of professional services he has extended,
the amount of P40,000.00 he received on March 10, 2005 would
be sufficient payment for the same.
(2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation
and annulment of marriage, respondent should be sanctioned.
(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
towards his colleagues and for using offensive or improper
language in his pleading, which was filed right before the
Commission on Bar Discipline, he must also be sanctioned and
disciplined in order to avoid repetition of the said misconduct.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended that Atty. Romeo
G. Aguilos be ordered to return to complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which
the former received as payment for his services because it is excessive.
It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months for failure to show his respect to his fellow lawyer and for using offensive and
improper language in his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008,14 the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr., but modified the recommendation
of the penalty, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondent's failure to show respect to his fellow lawyer and for showing offensive and
improper words in his pleadings, Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to
Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice. 15
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,16 which the IBP Board of Governors denied through
Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated March 23, 2014.17
Issues
The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or not the respondent should be held
administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) whether or not he should be ordered to return the attorney's
fees paid.
Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-177, but modify the
recommended penalty.
1.
Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire
amount received from the client
The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who had the requisite professional
competence and skill to handle the action for the annulment of marriage for her. He required her to pay
P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of the filing fees and his appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. Of
that amount, he received the sum of P70,000.00.
On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional relationship with the complainant as his client,
we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis and findings by IBP Investigating Commissioner De La
Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's contract between the respondent and the
complainant, there is a sweeping evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship. The respondent
agreed to accept the case in the amount of P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed upon to be paid
on installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the payment of appearance fee, filing fee and other
legal documentation.
That next question is - for what case the P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it intended for the filing of
the annulment case or legal separation?
In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is quite confused as to what action he is
going to file in court. The intention of the British national and the complainant was to get married. At that
time and maybe up to now, the complainant is still legally married to a certain Jovencio C. Sanchez. That
considering that the two are intending to get married, we can safely assume that the complainant was
contemplating of filing a petition for annulment of marriage in order to free her from the marriage bond
with her husband. It is only then, granting that the petition will be granted, that the complainant will be
free to marry the British subject. The legal separation is but a separation of husband and wife from board
and bed and the marriage bond still exists. Granting that the petition for legal separation will be granted,
one is not free to marry another person.
A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he himself is not well versed in the
grounds for legal separation. He stated the following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation case for the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband to comply with his marital obligations developed or of their marriage on
February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 of the Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-SC, the grounds are as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 2. Petition-
(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the husband or the
wife, as the case may be, within five years from the time of the occurrence of any of the following causes:
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside
the Philippines;
(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;
(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or
(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the complainant, is not one of
those mentioned in any of the grounds for legal separation.
Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, psychological incapacity is never a ground for
the purpose of filing a petition for legal separation.
On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for the purpose of filing a petition for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage.
That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that "a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization."
That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal education
program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent repetition of such kind
of advise that respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish
between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for annulment of marriage. But as the respondent
stated in his answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the law. 18
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. As the
foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for
annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer
accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client initially
intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably
contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an action for
annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British
fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to re-marry.
That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition for legal separation, and
that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for annulment was,
therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for
services
rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus
transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should know that he is
not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We can easily agree that every attorney is
entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special
instance and request of his client. As long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent
and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. 19
The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and the attorney,
which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy or public order.20 The underlying theory is that the retainer's agreement between
them gives to the client the reasonable notice of the arrangement on the fees. Once the attorney has
performed the task assigned to him in a valid agreement, his compensation is determined on the basis of
what he and the client agreed.21 In the absence of the written agreement, the lawyer's compensation shall
be based on quantum meruit, which means "as much as he deserved."22The determination of attorney's
fees on the basis of quantum meruit is also authorized "when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not
able to finish the case to its conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery of
compensation by the attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will be contrary
to the parties' expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation.
Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable compensation based on the
obtaining circumstances,24 provided that the attorney does not receive more than what is reasonable, in
keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees - An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its
own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal services rendered is not only for the purpose
of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees charged, but also for the purpose of
preserving the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. 25
cralawred
The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later revealed, it was way
above his ability and competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a consequence, he had
no basis to accept any amount as attorney's fees from the complainant. He did not even begin to perform
the contemplated task he undertook for the complainant because it was improbable that the agreement with
her was to bring the action for legal separation. His having supposedly prepared the petition for legal
separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage was either his way of covering up for his
incompetence, or his means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the amount he
had already received.
The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the respondent received P70,000.00 as acceptance
fee. His refusal to return the amount to the complainant rested on his claim of having already completed
the first phase of the preparation of the petition for legal separation after having held conferences with the
complainant and her British fiancee. In this respect, IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. opined
that the respondent could retain P40,000.00 of the P70,000.00 because the respondent had rendered some
legal services to the complainant, specifically: (a) having the complainant undergo further interviews
towards establishing the ground for legal separation; (b) reducing into writing the grounds discussed
during the interviews based on her statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after he could not
understand the written statement prepared for the purpose by her British fiancee; (c) requiring her to
submit her marriage contract with her husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3), and the certificates of live
birth of her four children: Mary Joy, Timothy, Christine, and Janette Anne, all surnamed Sanchez
(Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for legal separation (Annex 8) in the later part of
April, 2007.
The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too
generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any compensation because he did not really begin
to perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his version, he would prepare the petition for legal
separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney who fails to accomplish the
tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform during his professional engagement does not discharge
his professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The respondent was thus guilty of
misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he
may be ordered to restitute to the client the amount received from the latter in consideration of the
professional engagement, subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if warranted.
Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation of his
professional competence, and he is further to be ordered to return the entire amount of P70,000.00
received from the client, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision
until full payment.
2.
Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleague
The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged."26 This duty of lawyers is further emphasized in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated lawyers to use
strong language in the advancement of the interest of their clients. 27 However, as members of a noble
profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their clients' cause, or, as in this case,
to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but that should not be used as license for the
use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer's language - spoken or in his pleadings - must be dignified.28 As such, every lawyer is mandated to
carry out his duty as an agent in the administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only
towards his clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal
Profession.
The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a
mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the
MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose" constituted simple misconduct that this Court cannot
tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and improper language by
asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper. He explained that he had
sufficient cause for maintaining that the demand letter should be treated as a mere scrap of paper and
should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse the offensiveness and impropriety of his
language. He could have easily been respectful and proper in responding to the letter.
As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern warning that a repetition of the
offense will be severely punished.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008 of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo
G. Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the client,
and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney,
with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be severely punished.

The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30)
days from notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date
of this decision until full payment.

Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as a member of
the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED. cra lawlawli

A.C. No. 6281 September 26, 2011
VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D. Carpio filed by Valentin C.
Miranda.1
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land consisting
of 1,890 square meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila.
In 1994, complainant initiated Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-
226 for the registration of the aforesaid property. The case was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275. During the course of the
proceedings, complainant engaged the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel
in the said case when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a
vehicular accident.
In complainant's Affidavit,2 complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was
to pay respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two
Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the
amounts due him, as evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last
hearing of the case, respondent demanded the additional amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a memorandum, which he said would
further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus twenty percent (20%) of the
total area of the subject property as additional fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their
agreement. Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property with his siblings,
and he could not have agreed to the amount being demanded by respondent without
the knowledge and approval of his co-heirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to
satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became furious and their relationship became
sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case No. M-226, granting the
petition for registration, which Decision was declared final and executory in an Order
dated June 5, 1998. On March 24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent
complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Las Piñas
City, which transmitted the decree of registration and the original and owner's
duplicate of the title of the property.
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover
that the same had already been claimed by and released to respondent on March 29,
2000. On May 4, 2000, complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked
him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed without
complainant's knowledge, consent and authority. Respondent insisted that
complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property
equivalent to 378 square meters, in exchange for which, respondent would deliver the
owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused the demand, for not
having been agreed upon.
In a letter3 dated May 24, 2000, complainant reiterated his demand for the return of
the owner's duplicate of the OCT. On June 11, 2000, complainant made the same
demand on respondent over the telephone. Respondent reiterated his previous
demand and angrily told complainant to comply, and threatened to have the OCT
cancelled if the latter refused to pay him.
On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000, respondent registered an
adverse claim on the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on the
payment of his legal services was 20% of the property and/or actual market value. To
date, respondent has not returned the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to
complainant and his co-heirs despite repeated demands to effect the same.
In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the appropriate penalty upon
respondent, complainant invokes the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and properties of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x
In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his alleged retaining lien over the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94. Respondent admitted that he did not turn over to
complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 because of complainant's
refusal, notwithstanding repeated demands, to complete payment of his agreed
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the property covered by the
title, i.e., 378 square meters out of 1,890 square meters, or its equivalent market
value at the rate of PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus, yielding a sum of
PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire
378-square-meter portion and that he was ready and willing to turn over the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, should complainant pay him completely the aforesaid
professional fee.
Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of PhP32,000.00, however, he alleged
that the amount earlier paid to him will be deducted from the 20% of the current value
of the subject lot. He alleged that the agreement was not reduced into writing, because
the parties believed each other based on their mutual trust. He denied that he
demanded the payment of PhP10,000.00 for the preparation of a memorandum, since
he considered the same unnecessary.
In addition to the alleged agreement between him and complainant for the payment of
the 20% professional fees, respondent invoked the principle of "quantum meruit" to
justify the amount being demanded by him.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated June 9, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for
unjustly withholding from complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 in the
exercise of his so-called attorney's lien. In Resolution No. XVII-2005-173,5 dated
December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors adopting the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Pending the
resolution of his motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for
review6 with this Court. The Court, in a Resolution7 dated August 16, 2006, directed
that the case be remanded to the IBP for proper disposition, pursuant to this Court's
resolution in Noriel J. Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala.8
In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated December 11, 2008, the IBP
Board of Governors affirmed Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated December 17,
2005, with modification that respondent is ordered to return the complainant's owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 within fifteen days from receipt of notice. Hence, the
present petition.
The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, which affirmed with
modification the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Respondent's claim
for his unpaid professional fees that would legally give him the right to retain the
property of his client until he receives what is allegedly due him has been paid has no
basis and, thus, is invalid.
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides:
Section 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and
may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may
apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from
and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to
be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client
and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.
An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following
elements concur: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's
funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees.9 Further,
the attorney's retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account between
the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of the client which
may come into the attorney's possession in the course of his employment.10
In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such agreement for the
payment of professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject property
and submits that their agreement was only for the payment of the acceptance fee and
the appearance fees.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any agreement between
the complainant and the respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area covered by OCT No. 0-94. The
agreement between the parties only shows that respondent will be paid the acceptance
fee and the appearance fees, which the respondent has duly received. Clearly, there is
no unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees that would entitle respondent to retain his
client's property. Hence, respondent could not validly withhold the title of his client
absence a clear and justifiable claim.
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with the obvious aim
of forcing complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees sought is an alarming
abuse by respondent of the exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which by no
means is an absolute right, and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of
money and property to his client when due or upon demand.11
Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and
failing to deliver the title of the complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise
of an alleged entitlement to additional professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which read:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESS.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to his client and
conduct. imposing unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said title deserve the
imposition of disciplinary sanction. Hence, the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors,
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND adopting and approving with modification the report and recommendation of the
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. IBP- CBD that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months and that respondent be ordered to return the complainant's owner's
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 is hereby affirmed. However, the fifteen-day period from
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
1âwphi1
notice given to respondent within which to return the title should be modified and,
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice instead, respondent should return the same immediately upon receipt of the Court's
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all decision.
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court. WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon RETURN to the complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately
20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer shall upon receipt of this decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
charge only fair and reasonable fees." It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose act shall be dealt with more severely.
additional professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor agreed
upon at the time of the engagement of his services. At the outset, respondent should Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
have informed the complainant of all the fees or possible fees that he would charge appended to the personal record of Atty. Macario D. Carpio as a member of the Bar;
before handling the case and not towards the near conclusion of the case. This is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
essential in order for the complainant to determine if he has the financial capacity to circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
pay respondent before engaging his services.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional
professional fees on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no merit.
"Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining
the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from
his client."12The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a
price agreed upon for his services. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what
he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. 13 In the present case, the parties
had already entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and
thus, the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find application because the
respondent is already compensated by such agreement.

The Court notes that respondent did not inform complainant that he will be the one to
secure the owner's duplicate of the OCT from the RD and failed to immediately
inform complainant that the title was already in his possession. Complainant, on
April 3, 2000, went to the RD of Las Piñas City to get the owner's duplicate of OCT
No. 0- 94, only to be surprised that the said title had already been claimed by, and
released to, respondent on March 29, 2000. A lawyer must conduct himself,
especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond
reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest
degree of good faith and fairness.14 By keeping secret with the client his acquisition of
the title, respondent was not fair in his dealing with his client. Respondent could have
easily informed the complainant immediately of his receipt of the owner's duplicate
of the OCT on March 29, 2000, in order to save his client the time and effort in going
to the RD to get the title.
 A.C. No. 5408, February 07, 2017
ANITA SANTOS MURRAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELICITO J. CERVANTES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
We sustain, with modification, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors' Resolution
No. XVI-2004-4811 and Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711.2
Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 modified the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XV-2002-599.3 The
latter ruled that respondent Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes must be reprimanded and ordered to return to
complainant Anita Santos Murray the sum of P80,000.00.4 Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 modified this
with the penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law, with an additional three (3)-month
suspension for every month (or fraction) that respondent is unable to deliver to complainant the sum of
P80,000.00.5 Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711 denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.6
On February 2, 2001, complainant filed before this Court a Complaint7 charging respondent with violating
Canon 188 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that sometime in June 2000, she sought the services of a lawyer to assist in the
naturalization (that is, acquisition of Philippine citizenship) of her son, Peter Murray, a British national.
Respondent was later introduced to her. On June 14, 2000, she and respondent agreed on the latter's
services, with complainant handing respondent the sum of P80,000.00 as acceptance fee. 9
About three (3) months passed without respondent doing "anything substantial."10 Thus, on September 11,
2000, complainant wrote respondent to inform him that she was terminating his services. She explained:
I am not satisfied with the way things are going regarding my petition. I am expecting that you keep me
abreast of your activities but I am left in the dark as to what have you done so far. You do not show up on
our scheduled appointments nor do you call me up to let me know why you cannot come. You stood me
up twice already which shows that you are not even interested in my case.
....
Since I already paid the P80,000.00 acceptance fee in full, I expect to get a refund of the same from you.11
As respondent failed to return the P80,000.00 acceptance fee, complainant instituted the Complaint in
this case. She also instituted criminal proceedings against respondent for violation of Article 315(1)
(b)12of the Revised Penal Code.13
This case was subsequently referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its investigation, report,
and recommendation.14
After the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Investigating Commissioner Demaree
J.B. Raval (Commissioner Raval) furnished a Report 15 dated September 9, 2002 recommending that
respondent be reprimanded and required to return the sum of P80,000.00 to complainant. In its Resolution
No. XV-2002-599,16 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted Commissioner
Raval's recommendations.
Respondent filed before this Court a Motion for Leave to Admit Additional Evidence with Motion to
Dismiss.17 He asserted that he never required complainant to immediately pay him P80,000.00 as
acceptance fee.18 This Motion was forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines19 and was treated as
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.20 For her part, complainant filed several manifestations and
motions asking that a heavier penalty be imposed on respondent. 21
Acting on the pending incidents of the case, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa
(Commissioner Funa) furnished a Report22 recommending that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year, with an additional three (3)-month suspension for every month (or
fraction) that respondent fails to deliver to complainant the sum of P80,000.00.
Commissioner Funa justified the penalty of suspension by emphasizing that, in a hearing conducted by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines on August 18, 2004, respondent was "orally directed" to return the
P80,000.00 not later than the end of August 2004.23 Respondent acceded to this; however, he failed to
return the P80,000.00.24
In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-481,25 the Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Puna's
recommendation.
The Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711 later denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration.26
It is evident from the records that respondent failed to deliver on the services that he committed to
complainant despite receiving the amount of P80,000.00 as acceptance fee. Although respondent asserted
that he did not actively solicit this amount from complainant, it remains, as Commissioner Funa
underscored, that respondent accepted this amount as consideration for his services.27 Moreover, following
complainant's engagement of his services, respondent failed to communicate with complainant or update
her on the progress of the services that he was supposed to render. Not only did he fail in taking his own
initiative to communicate; he also failed to respond to complainant's queries and requests for updates.
Respondent's failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional undertaking justifies the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines' conclusion that he must restitute complainant the amount of P80,000.00.
Luna v. Galarrita28 has explained the parameters for ordering restitution in disciplinary proceedings:
In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar, the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after which respondent received
P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the townhouse and lot. However, respondent did not
turn over this amount to developer Crown Asia, and no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to
complainant. This court suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of law for three (3) years, but did not
grant complainant's prayer for the return of the P937,500.00.
Ronquillo held that "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but
rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers." Thus, disciplinary proceedings
are limited to a determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar."
Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from disciplinary
proceedings "remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance,
when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and
distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement." This court has thus ordered in
administrative proceedings the return of amounts representing legal fees.
This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative proceedings when
respondent's civil liability was already established:
Although the Court renders this decision m an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court's silence about the respondent lawyer's legal
obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical
misconduct concerning the client's funds or property should be required to still litigate in another
proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent's liability. That
has been the reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief
in the cited cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, Small v. Banares.29 (Citations and
emphases omitted)
It is proper, in the course of these disciplinary proceedings, that respondent be required to return to
complainant the amount of P80,000.00. This amount was delivered to respondent during complainant's
engagement of his professional services, or in the context of an attorney-client relationship. This is neither
an extraneous nor purely civil matter.
By the same failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional undertaking (despite having
received fees for his services), as well as by his failure to keep complainant abreast of relevant
developments in the purposes for which his services were engaged, respondent falls short of the standards
imposed by Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not
qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain
as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
impels a concomitant recognition that, pending favorable action by this Court on its recommendations, its
determinations and conclusions are only provisional. Therefore, rulings on disciplinary cases attain
finality and are enforceable only upon this Court's own determination that they must be imposed.
The oral instruction given to respondent in the August 18, 2004 hearing has, thus, not attained such a
degree of finality as would immutably require him to comply, such that failure to comply justifies
additional or increased penalties. Penalizing him for non-compliance is premature.
Nevertheless, respondent acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of
P80,000.00 and made his own commitment to make this compensation. 31 He may not have been bound by
a juridical instruction, but he was certainly bound by his own honor. That he has failed to adhere to his
own freely executed commitment after more than a decade speaks volumes of how he has miserably failed
to live up to the "high standard of ... morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing"32 that is apropos to
members of the legal profession.
For this reason, we exact upon respondent a penalty more severe than that initially contemplated by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Moreover, to impress upon respondent the urgency
of finally returning to complainant the amount he received, we impose on him an additional penalty
corresponding to the duration for which he fails to make restitution. We adopt the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors' position in Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 that an additional period of
suspension must be imposed on respondent for every month (or fraction) that he fails to pay in full the
amount he owes complainant. However, instead of a three (3)-month suspension for every month (or
fraction) of non-payment or incomplete payment, he is to be suspended for one (1) month for every such
period of failure to make full payment.
This approach hopefully underscores the burden that respondent must justly carry. By automatically
extending his suspension should he not return the amount, we save complainant, the victim, from the
additional costs of having to find and retain another counsel to compel the return of what is due her.
Counsels who have caused harm on their clients must also suffer the costs of restitution.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
(1) year and six (6) months. He is ORDERED to restitute complainant Anita Santos Murray the sum of
therewith shall render him liable.
P80,000.00. For every month (or fraction) the he fails to fully restitute complainant the sum of
P80,000.00, respondent shall suffer an additional suspension of one (1) month.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information. (Emphasis supplied)
He is likewise WARNED that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Disciplinary sanctions more severe than those considered proper by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Let copies of this Resolution be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
are warranted.
Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Resolution
be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.
We emphasize that, during the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent
acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of P80,000.00. He then made a
SO ORDERED.
commitment to return that sum to her. To date, however, he has failed to deliver on the commitment
made almost twelve and a half years ago.

We clarify that the oral instruction given to respondent in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' August
18, 2004 hearing was not a juridically binding order. Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court sanctions and
spells out the terms of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' involvement in cases involving the
disbarment and/or discipline of lawyers. The competence of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is only
recommendatory. Under Article VIII, Section 5(5)30 of the 1987 Constitution, only this Court has the
power to actually rule on disciplinary cases of lawyers, and to impose appropriate penalties.

Rule 139-B merely delegates investigatory functions to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. With the
exercise of its delegated investigatory power, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines refers proposed actions
to this Court. Recognizing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' limited competence in disciplinary cases
 A.C. No. 8172, April 12, 2016
ALEX NULADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment by reason of dishonesty
and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude filed by Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in his favor a check in the amount of
P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's debt. Because of respondent's standing as a respected member of
the community and his being a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo, complainant accepted the check without question.3
Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient fluids.
Respondent failed to make good the amount of the check despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands,
prompting complainant to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP)
224 against respondent,5 before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo, docketed as I.S.
No. 2006-637,6 which issued a Resolution7 dated May 26, 2006 recommending the filing of the
appropriate information against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Miagao, Province of
Iloilo (MTC).8 Subsequently, said information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2604. 9
After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision 10 dated October 30, 2008 finding respondent guilty
of violation of BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of failure to pay. Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the sum of P650,000.00
representing the amount of the check with interest pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
computed from the time of the filing of the complaint; (2) filing fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and (3)
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 plus appearance fees of P1,500.00 per hearing. 11
Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Guimbal, Iloilo,
Branch 67 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 346.12 In a Decision13 dated March 13, 2009, the RTC
affirmed in toto the MTC ruling. On April 16, 2009, the RTC Decision became final and executory. 14
Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009, complainant filed this
administrative complaint before the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant.
In his defense,15 respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against complainant, as prior to
September 30, 2005, he informed the latter that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of the
check. Respondent claimed that he merely issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in whose
favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he did not personally benefit from the proceeds
thereof.16Unfortunately, said friend had died and respondent had no means by which to pay for the amount
of the check.17 He also claimed that complainant threatened him and used his unfunded check to the
latter's personal advantage.18
Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14, 2011,19 referred this administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and recommendation.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP issued a
Report and Recommendation20 dated June 26, 2013, recommending that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral
turpitude.21
It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e., violation of BP 22, involved moral
turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when he committed the said offense.
Stressing the importance of the lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the said crime,
respondent has shown that he is "unfit to protect the administration of justice or that he is no longer of
good moral character"22 which justifies either his suspension or disbarment. 23
Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of
Resolution24adopting and approving with modification the IBP's Report and Recommendation dated June
26, 2013, suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for having violated
the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as well as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral
turpitude.25 cralawred
The Issue Before the Court
The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be administratively
disciplined for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as approved, adopted, and
modified by the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
Or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law x x x." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the
law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of justice. 26 As such, he can be
disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to
be an officer of the
court. 27 cralawred
In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed the purpose and nature of a violation of BP 22 in relation to
an administrative case against a lawyer, as in this case, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public
checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by [BP] 22 [x x x] is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment
and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and
pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is
deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
xxxx
Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he did not, he
was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance
of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his indifference
towards
the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his
Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws. 29 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the
trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. 30

In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had been
indubitably established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final. Consequently, respondent
violated the lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and, thus,
must be subjected to disciplinary action.

In Heenan v. Espejo,31 the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1
Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,32 the same penalty was imposed by the Court to respondent who issued
worthless checks to pay off her loan. Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza,33 the Court meted the penalty of
suspension for a period of two (2) years to respondent for having issued bouncing checks, among other
infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II,34 respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts,
respondent also breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a
wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings. Accordingly, and in view of the
foregoing instances when the erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years for the same
violation, the Court finds it appropriate to mete the same penalty to respondent in this case.

As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened
with conditions.35 A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether
acting in a public or private capacity.36 Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish
his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the legal profession as a whole. 37 In
this case, respondent's conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a member of the
bar, for which he must suffer the necessary consequences. chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Paulma's personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and copies be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED. cra lawlawlibrary

 A.C. No. 10483, March 18, 2016
THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDWIN A. PANTE, Complainant, v. ATTY.
DANIEL D. MANGALLAY, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case against the respondent attorney did not arise from any attorney-client relationship
gone wrong between the parties but from the ejectment action in which the respondent attorney, as the
plaintiff, successfully defeated the local congregation of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc.,
Pico Local Center (CSP-PLC), whose church building and other structures were the objects of the action.
After the defendants filed their notice of appeal, the parties agreed to settle among themselves, with the
defendants withdrawing the notice of appeal and agreeing to voluntarily vacate and remove their
structures by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00.
But, despite receiving the respondent's financial assistance, the defendants reneged on their end of the
agreement; hence, at the respondent's instance, the trial court issued the writ of execution and the writ of
demolition, by virtue of which the structures of the defendants were ultimately demolished.
The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante (Pante), to bring
the disbarment complaint against the respondent based on his allegedly gross misconduct and deceit in
causing the demolition of the structures without the demolition order from the court, violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, and disobedience to a lawful order of the court, positing that he thereby abused his legal
knowledge.
Antecedents
Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its church building on the land located in JE 176 Pico, La
Trinidad, Benguet, which was owned by Maria Omiles who had bought it from Larry Ogas; 1 that on June
11, 2012, Omiles and Pastor Elvis Maliked received the summons issued by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet requiring them to answer the complaint for unlawful detainer filed against
them by the respondent; that based on the allegations of the complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. R-
1256 entitled Daniel Dazon Mangallay v. Maria Tomino Omiles and all persons staying with and/or
acting on her behalf, including all Officers and/or patrons of the Church of the Christian Spiritists in the
Philippines, represented by Pastor Elvis S. Maliked), the respondent claimed ownership of the land where
the church of the CSP-PLC had been erected, attaching the copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 45241 issued by the Register of Deeds of Benguet, and the deed of absolute sale executed between
him and one Pedro Loy;2 that the MTC later on decided the case by declaring the respondent to have the
better right of possession; and that the MTC further declared that the CSP-PLC was a builder in good
faith, without prejudice to the respondent exercising his option to appropriate the building in accordance
with Article 448 of the Civil Code.3
As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and obtained the writ of execution from the MTC after the
defendants, including the complainant, reneged on the promise to voluntarily vacate and surrender the
premises by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00. The
writ of execution was issued on December 13, 2013 and the writ of demolition on December 19, 2013.
Sheriffs Joselito S. Tumbaga and John Marie O. Ocasla, accompanied by the respondent and elements of
the Philippine National Police, implemented the writ of execution and writ of demolition on January 22
and January 23, 2014 by demolishing the church building and the pastoral house of the CSP-PLC. 4
Pante now insists that the demolition was done without a demolition order from the MTC; that the
dismantled materials worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken away by the respondent, who had taken
advantage of his legal knowledge to cause the premature demolition of the structures sans the demolition
order; that such taking away of the dismantled materials constituted robbery and malicious mischief; and
that his act warranted his disbarment.
In response, the respondent denies any wrong doing. He counters that the demolition was backed up by a
court order;5 that after receiving the decision of the MTC, the parties entered into a compromise
agreement by virtue of which the CSP-PLC withdrew its appeal and promised to voluntarily vacate and
surrender the disputed premises in consideration of P300,000.00 to be paid by him; 6 that despite his
having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not vacate the premises even within the grace period given to
them;7 that he then moved for the execution of the judgment, and his motion was granted by the MTC;8that
the sheriffs report dated November 21, 20139 stated that after the CSP-PLC did not comply with the writ
of execution to remove or demolish its structures on the premises; that he consequently sought from the
MTC the writ of demolition; and that the MTC issued the writ of demolition. 10
The respondent avers that it was not he but the sheriffs who implemented the writ of demolition; that the
sheriffs report dated January 30, 2014 stated that the conduct of the implementation was peaceful, and that
Pante and the other members of the church personally observed the conduct of the demolition; and that the
sheriffs report further stated that Pante showed no defiance of the lawful order of the court. 11
The respondent submits that there was nothing wrong in his appropriating the dismantled materials to
ensure compensation for the expenses incurred in the demolition; and that the complaint for his
disbarment should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Court
The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of merit and substance.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, provides as follows:
Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of
and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in the government service. Provided, however, That all charges against Justices
of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower
courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court; Provided,
further,That charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment in the Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any
of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an
investigator. (As amended, Bar Matter No. 1960, May 1, 2000.)
Under the foregoing rule, the proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of an attorney
may be taken by the Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP itself upon the verified complaint of any person.
Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be filed directly with the Court, the complaint is
referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. The reference to the IBP is resorted to
whenever the factual basis for the charge may be contested or disputed, or may require the reception of the
evidence of the complainant and the respondent attorney. After the referral and hearings, the IBP renders
its findings and recommendations on the complaint, subject to the review by the Court. 12 Yet, the Court
may dispense with the referral to the IBP and resolve the charge without delay. This happens particularly
when the charge is patently frivolous, or insincere, or unwarranted, or intended only to harass and spite the
respondent attorney.
The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the direct filing with it of administrative complaints the defendants in Civil Case No. R-1256.
against attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the guardian of the legal profession with the ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. The disciplinary power of the Court is both a right and a duty.13 Quite
recently, however, the Court has revised Rule 139-B14 to eliminate any ambiguity about the authority of
the Court to directly receive administrative complaints against attorneys, thus:

Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or upon the filing of a verified complaint of any person
before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall state
clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment,
suspension and discipline filed against incumbent Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court
of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or against lawyers in the government service, whether or not
they are charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and whether or not such complaint deals with
acts unrelated to the discharge of their official functions. If the complaint is filed before the IBP. six (6)
copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its
chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an
investigator.

xxxx

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court, or in other
proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Office of the Bar Confidant, or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of
a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to
11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme
Court.

The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation,
[bold emphasis supplied to indicate the revisions]

Under the foregoing revisions of Rule 139-B, the administrative complaints against attorneys are
generally not dismissed outright but are instead referred for investigation, report and recommendation
either to the IBP, or the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), or any office of the Court or even a judge of a
lower court. Such referral ensures that the parties' right to due process is respected as to matters that
require further inquiry and which cannot be resolved by the mere evaluation of the documents attached to
the
pleadings.15 Consequently, whenever the referral is made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC or other
authorized office or individual must conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint, and
this investigation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with except for valid and
compelling reasons because it serves the purpose of threshing out all the factual issues that no cursory
evaluation of the pleadings can determine.16

However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case can be decided on the
basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP for the conduct of formal
investigation would be redundant or unnecessary, such as when the protraction of the investigation
equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even be directed at the outset should the Court find the
complaint to be clearly wanting in merit.17 Indeed, the Rules of Court should not be read as preventing the
giving of speedy relief whenever such speedy relief is warranted.

It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer the complaint against the respondent to the IBP for
the conduct of the formal investigation. The documents he submitted to substantiate his denial of
professional wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court, and, as such, are sufficient to establish
the unworthiness of the complaint as well as his lawful entitlement to the demolition of the structures of
Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order issued by the MTC on December 19, 2013. 18 In
the execution of the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs dutifully
discharged their functions. The presence of the respondent during the execution proceedings was by no
means irregular or improper, for he was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-1256. The complainant was
then represented by Pante and some other members of the congregation, who did not manifest any
resistance' or objection to any irregularity in the conduct of the execution. After all, elements of the
Philippine National Police were also present to ensure the peaceful implementation of the writ of
execution.

Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking away the
materials of the demolished structures. The parties put an end to their dispute by the defendants,
including the complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw their notice of appeal and undertaking to
voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent by August 31, 2013 in
exchange for the latter's financial assistance of the P300,000.00. The respondent paid the amount in the
MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount was later on received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano Omiles, Jr.,
and Noralyn T. Abad as the representatives of the CSP-PLC on the same day.19 But the latter reneged on
their part of the agreement without returning the P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left to exhaust
his legal remedies to enforce the judgment against them. It is notable that the judgment expressly
directed him "to exercise his option pursuant to the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of
the Philippines within thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment insofar as the improvements
introduced by the defendants on the subject property."20 Article 448 of the Civil Code granted to him as
the owner of the premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548." His act of taking the
materials of the demolished structures was undoubtedly the exercise of the right of appropriating them
in light of the fact that the P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial assistance was most likely meant to
indemnify the supposed builders in good faith.

The respondent has called attention to the letter of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., 21 the
mother organization to which the CSP-PLC belonged, to the effect that it was disavowing knowledge of
or participation in the disbarment complaint, and that it was categorically declaring that the complaint
had been filed by Pante only for his personal interest at the expense of the congregation. The sentiments
expressed in the letter manifested the inanity of the complaint, and the ill motives behind Pante's filing
of the complaint against the respondent. The proper outcome for such a complaint is its immediate
dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Daniel Dazon
Mangallay for its utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED