They are separate elements of delictual liability and must both be present for a delict to have taken place. For wrongfulness to be present there must be a breach of a legal duty. The judge says that a driver does owe a duty of care to an unborn child since there is a “foreseeable risk” that a mother might be pregnant with a child and therefore a legal duty is owed to both of them. The appellant also argued that allowing an infant to claim for pre-natal injuries will open the “floodgates” to litigation and parents will start claiming damages for their stillborn children and children who die after a couple hours. This will however not work in our law since the right of action only becomes complete when a child is born alive. A child who dies shortly after birth will have their claim for pre-natal injuries lapse unless they have already started proceedings. Conclusion: The special plea was dismissed. It was decided that only the principles of the law of delict have to be present for a child to claim for pre-natal injuries and that the nasciturus fiction is an unnecessary extension ROAD ACCIDENT FUND v MTATI 2005 (6) SA 215 (SCA) Summary Facts: The appellant raised a special plea against a claim brought by the respondent. The respondent claimed a large amount of money from the appellant, alleging that a motor vehicle collision between a negligent driver and the respondent’s pregnant wife caused their baby to be born mentally retarded with brain damages that arose from the serious bodily injuries that the mother sustained because of the accident. The appellant pleaded that the child is not entitled to compensation since it was not a ‘person’ according to art 40 at the time of the collision. It was a foetus in utero. Therefore the driver cannot be said to have owed a legal duty of care towards the unborn child. Legal Question: Should a child’s right to claim for pre-natal injuries be allowed by using the nasciturus fiction or by using the ordinary principles of the law of delict? Law Referenced: Pinchin and Another NO v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 (2) SA 254 (W) Application: Some legal issues raised in this case already came before the court in the Pinchin v Santam case. The court was satisfied with Hiemstra’s judgement since there was not enough medical evidence to prove that the pre- natal injuries caused the post-natal condition of cerebral palsy. Hiemstra concluded that a child has an action for injuries sustained while a foetus by applying the nasciturus fiction. The appellant in the Mtati case argued that the unborn child could not claim damages for injuries suffered pre-natally since it was not a person at the time of the collision. The judge mentions how the legal problems in the Pinchin case might be solved by applying the ordinary principles of liability for delict, without having to add the artificial extension of the nasciturus rule to the situation. This is because the minor’s claims are based on the damage he/she suffered as a living born person and not a foetus. It is further said that delictual liability does not stem from damage alone. Delictual liability only arises when when damage is caused by an invasion of legal rights – this is known as a wrongful act. Causation can happen long before the damages start to show. The judge uses a time bomb example to illustrate this. A bomb can be planted hours before it actually goes off, but ONLY once it goes off is the wrongful act actually committed. One cannot escape the fact that an invasion of rights can take place sometime before damages occur. Whether or not an action can mature depends on the claim. A delict only arises when rights are created, in other words: at birth.
Unlawfulness and damages
cannot be merged into one. They are separate elements of delictual liability and must both be present for a delict to have taken place. For wrongfulness to be present there must be a breach of a legal duty. The judge says that a driver does owe a duty of care to an unborn child since there is a “foreseeable risk” that a mother might be pregnant with a child and therefore a legal duty is owed to both of them. The appellant also argued that allowing an infant to claim for pre-natal injuries will open the “floodgates” to litigation and parents will start claiming damages for their stillborn children and children who die after a couple hours. This will however not work in our law since the right of action only becomes complete when a child is born alive. A child who dies shortly after birth will have their claim for pre-natal injuries lapse unless they have already started proceedings. Conclusion: The special plea was dismissed. It was decided that only the principles of the law of delict have to be present for a child to claim for pre-natal injuries and that the nasciturus fiction is an unnecessary extension