Casal Bértoa PP2012

Party Politics
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Party systems and cleavage structures revisited: A sociological explanation

of party system institutionalization in East Central Europe
Fernando Casal Bértoa
Party Politics published online 14 February 2012
DOI: 10.1177/1354068811436042
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DOI: 10.1177/1354068811436042
revisited: A sociological ppq.sagepub.com
explanation of party
system institutionalization
in East Central Europe
Fernando Casal Bértoa

Leiden University, The Netherlands
Abstract
Since Lipset and Rokkan (1967) published their seminal work on the importance of social
cleavages for the ‘freezing’ of party systems more than forty years ago, much has been
written on the field demonstrating or discrediting the original hypothesis. In the current
article, I examine how cleavage formation and development have influenced the different
levels of institutionalization in four new post-communist party systems (i.e. Visegrad).
Analysing distinct hypotheses, I arrive at the conclusion that neither the number nor the
type nor the strength of a cleavage is associated with the degree of party system insti-
tutionalization in East Central Europe. On the contrary, the main conclusion is that party
system institutionalization in these democracies has been determined by the way clea-
vages are structured. In particular, the process of party system institutionalization is
found to be hindered when cleavages cross-cut, while fostered in cases where they
cumulate (i.e. coincide).
Keywords
cleavages, East Central Europe, number of parties, party system institutionalization
Paper Submitted 1 March 2011; Accepted for publication 14 June 2011
Corresponding author:
Fernando Casal Bértoa, Leiden University, Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen, Instituut Politieke
Wetenschap, Pieter de la Court gebouw, Leiden, 2333 AK, The Netherlands
Email: f.casal.bertoa@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
2 Party Politics
Introduction
Since Franklin et al. (1992) trumpeted the decline of ‘cleavage politics’ in Western
Europe, Lipset and Rokkan’s seminal work (1967) on the social anchorage of party
systems has been considered to be nothing but a relic of the past (see Dalton, 2004).
In post-communist Europe, where societies are considered to lack structure (Mair,
1997), ‘dealignment appears not as an endstate but as a departure point’ (Enyedi,
2008: 297; see also Elster et al., 1998; Lawson et al., 1999).
In contrast to this scholarship, and notwithstanding the volatile character of the post-
communist electorate, this article constitutes an attempt to discover the social roots of
party system institutionalization in East Central Europe. In fact, and linking mainly with
Evans and Whitefield (2000) and Kitschelt et al.’s (1999) tradition, the main aim of this
work is to examine how cleavage formation and development relates to different levels
of institutionalization in new post-communist party systems.1
The article is divided in four parts. Section one offers an analytical perspective on the
conceptualization of cleavage and party system institutionalization. Some of the scho-
larly debate on the concept is addressed briefly, showing how certain aspects of these
two notions have led to a certain amount of confusion and misunderstanding within the
literature. Section two summarizes some of the most important arguments advanced by
scholars in the course of the ‘sociology of politics’ debate, examining how well they
travel through a test of their validity in four East Central European democracies. Sec-
tion three contains several new propositions concerning the possible implications the
different mode of cleavage formation and development may have for the institutiona-
lization of party systems. Finally, section four analyses the causal mechanisms linking
cleavage structuration and party system institutionalization in Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Poland.
Cleavage and party system institutionalization: Two debated

concepts
Although more than 40 years have passed since the publication of Lipset and Rokkan’s
seminal Party Systems and Voter Alignments (1967), the truth is that, despite the enor-
mous number of studies making use of the concept, a univocal definition of ‘cleavage’ is
still lacking in the literature (Maor, 1997; Tóka, 1998). In fact, following Lipset and
Rokkan’s ambiguous use of the notion,2 the majority of studies published immediately
afterwards simply limited themselves to presenting their own definition of the notion
depending on the different analytical approach being adopted (Zuckerman, 1975).
A first attempt to bring some order into this chaos was Taylor and Rae’s Analysis
of Political Cleavages published in 1970, where they provided a more explicit and
sophisticated definition of cleavage as the division of the members of a community
(or sub-community) into two or more nominal groups with important political differ-
ences at specific times and places according to three different types of division: ascrip-
tive, attitudinal, behavioural (1970: 1; see also Taylor and Rae, 1969: 536).
Building on Rae and Taylor, Bartolini and Mair (1990) maintained that these three
types of division should be present all together and at the same time. Thus, a cleavage
Casal Bértoa 3
not only requires social stratification (according to class, religion, etc.) and group
consciousness (according to different values and/or preferences), but also a certain orga-
nization (in the form of a political party, trade union, etc.) which helps the group to real-
ize their interests and/or beliefs. In other words, a cleavage is only formed ‘when a
particular social divide becomes associated with a particular set of values or identities
[which are] made politically relevant by means of an organized party or group’ (Mair,
2006: 373). In this context, a cleavage can be considered to be ‘a form of closure of social
relationships’ (Bartolini and Mair, 1990: 216).
A great advantage of this definition is that it immediately brings about a bridge
between the two most important approaches of political sociology (Maor, 1997: 21).
In this sense, it incorporates Sartori (1969) and Przeworski and Sprague’s (1977)
‘organizational’ component (top-down approach), while remaining faithful to Lipset and
Rokkan’s requirement of socio-structural origins (bottom-up approach). Similarly, it is
by asking the presence of both ‘objective’ (structure) and ‘subjective’ (values) aspects
of a conflict that Bartolini and Mair help to distinguish the notion of cleavage from other
proximate concepts, such as opposition, division or divide. Moreover, it is through this
semantic distinction that their conceptualization gains in simplicity as it avoids any
unnecessary qualification of the term (e.g. social, political, value ‘cleavages’) present
in many other works (e.g. Flanagan, 1980; Inglehart, 1984; Zieliński, 2002).3 It is for
all these reasons that in this article I rely on Bartolini and Mair’s more strict definition
of the concept.4
Similarly, and although it may be difficult to believe given its central importance, the
concept of party system institutionalization has no established definition. Putting it very
briefly, and summarizing a discussion sketched out elsewhere (Casal Bértoa, 2011), most
authors dealing with the concept simple propose a series of ‘dimensions’ of the notion
(Bielasiak, 2002; Grzymała-Busse, 2002; Morlino, 1998), without paying much attention
to the conceptualization itself.
Notwithstanding the latter, and despite the fact that scholars tend to point out different
dimensions of institutionalization, the truth is that all meanings of the notion of party
system institutionalization contain the idea of stability and persistence in the rules and
nature of inter-party competition (Lindberg, 2007; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mair,
2001). As a consequence, and bearing in mind that the core of a party system is to be
found in the patterns of interaction among its subunits (i.e. political parties; see Mair,
2006; Sartori, 1976), I consider party system institutionalization to be the process by
which the patterns of interaction among political parties become routine, predictable
and stable over time (Bakke and Sitter, 2005; Mair, 2001). In other words, a system
of parties can be said to be institutionalized when political parties cooperate, collaborate
and colligate in a standardized and structured way – a way that is independent of the rel-
evant issues in each moment and which random shocks cannot alter (Mainwaring, 1998).
In order to assess the level of institutionalization in new East Central European party
systems, I rely on Mair’s (1997, 2007) framework for party system analysis which,
focusing on the patterns of inter-party competition for government, determines whether
a party system is institutionalized or not (Table 1).5 Putting it briefly, party systems are
considered to be institutionalized if (1) alternations of governments are either total (i.e.
when the incumbent government leaves office in its entirety) or partial (i.e. when the
4 Party Politics
Table 1. Criteria and operational indicators of party system institutionalization
Dimension Criteria Indicators Operationalization
Stability Government IGA: Pedersen’s index of If MV 50, then IGA ¼ MV

alternation ministerial volatility If MV < 50, then IGA ¼ 100-MV
(MV)
Governing formulae IFA: % ministers of all If the very same combination ¼
familiar governments 100%
If entirely new combination or
new party forms single party
government ¼ 0%
If part of the new government is
familiar ¼ % of the familiar part
If a party earlier in government
forms a government on its
own ¼ 100 – % of previous
coalition partners
Access to IC: % ministers from ‘old’ ‘Old’ governing parties (see Sikk,
government governing parties 2005)
Source: Adapted from Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2010: 19).
cabinet in office is replaced by a wholly different party or group of parties), (2) govern-
ing alternatives are stable over a long period of time and (3) some parties (‘outsiders’) are
permanently excluded from participation in national government. On the contrary, party
systems are to be classified as weakly institutionalized when there are (1) partial alter-
nations of governments, (2) no stable compositions of governing alternatives and (3)
access to government has been granted to all relevant parties.
In order to minimize subjective judgements when measuring the main (and sole)
dimension of party system institutionalization, I quantitatively operationalize each of the
factors suggested by Mair (Table 1). First of all, the degree of governmental alternation
is measured by the so-called index of government alternation (IGA – see Mair, 2007:
140), which simply adapts Pedersen’s (1979) well-known index of electoral volatility
to the measurement of ministerial volatility.6 The second criterion, based on assessing
whether or not the party or combination of parties has governed before in that particular
format, is captured by the index of familiar alternation (IFA), which measures the per-
centage of ministries belonging to familiar combinations of parties. Thirdly, access to
government is measured by the index of closure (IC), which basically calculates the per-
centage of ministers belonging to ‘old’ governing parties.
Because time is particularly important when trying to measure the level of party sys-
tem institutionalization in a country (Mair, 1997), I also take into consideration all the
years a particular cabinet has lasted, understanding that if there have been two or more
cabinets in one year, then the averages of the scores for the different above-cited govern-
ment features are considered to characterize the year better than any such individual fac-
tors (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi, 2010: 20). Finally, and in order to avoid measuring
incompatible scores, I use the standardized (z-) score of the three variables. The addition
of all three z-scores gives the final degree of systemic institutionalization in what I have
Casal Bértoa 5
Table 2. Party system institutionalization in East Central Europe (1990–2009)
Countries IGA (%) IFA (%) IC (%) iPSI (z)
Hungary 98.8 89.6 91.0 2.5

Czech Republic 96.7 86.1 91.3 1.4
Slovakia 96.5 81.9 87.0 0.3
Poland 92.4 68.7 76.6 -4.2
The Cronbach’s alpha score among the three sub-indexes is as high as 0.9, justifying their addition in one
(unique) composite ‘index of party system institutionalization’ (iPSI).
Source: Own calculations.
named ‘composite index of party system institutionalization’ (iPSI) which, giving equal
weight to all the elements of stability, has the advantage of paying due attention to it as
the sole dimension of institutionalization.
Application of the above-mentioned criteria to the four East Central European party
systems produces a clear conclusion: party systems in East Central Europe have institu-
tionalized in different ways and at different rates – for more details, see Casal Bértoa
(2011) and Casal Bértoa and Mair (2012). Examination of the scores in Table 2 indicates
that there is one extreme case at the top end of the scale: Hungary, which on all three
measures turns out to be highly institutionalized. In a similar vein, the Czech party sys-
tem is to be considered institutionalized, while its Slovak counterpart only achieves a
weak level. Finally, the Polish party system remains, after 20 years of democratic expe-
rience, completely under-institutionalized.
The ‘sociology of politics’: Traditional approaches

When trying to capture the social roots of party system institutionalization, scholars have
mainly adopted three different explanations: (1) the number; (2) the type; and (3) the
strength of cleavages. Let us examine each of them in turn as well as the extent to which
they can be applied to the East Central European context.
Cleavage number
There is now a considerable literature on the relationship between party system format
and the number of cleavages in a political system. Taagepera and Grofman speak for a
long line of scholars when they note that ‘the more axes of cleavage there are within a
society, the greater will be the number of political parties’ (1985: 343).
Reviewing the literature in the field, and in correspondence with the concept of clea-
vage adopted, two different approaches can be distinguished among scholars. The first
focuses on the relationship between ‘social’ cleavages and party system fragmentation
and maintains that, because political parties represent the political expression of under-
lying social divisions, social segmentation results in multipartism (Powell, 1982; Cox,
alone or together with Amorin Neto, 1997; Spirova, 2007: 160, etc.)
A second group of political scientists uses the number of ‘political’ cleavages to pre-
dict the number of ‘effective’ parties. The work within this tradition was initiated by
6 Party Politics
Table 3. Fractionalization data
Country Economic Religious Ethnic/linguistic Rural/agricultural Post-communist ENEP
Hungary 0.3 0.5 0.2/0 0.4/0.2 0.2 4.7

Czech 0.3 0.7 0.3/0.3 0.4/0.1 0.3 5.2
Republic
Slovakia 0.3 0.6 0.3/0.3 0.5/0.2 0.2 6.3
Poland 0.4 0.2 0.1/0.1 0.5/0.3 0.2 7.0
Source: Structural heterogeneity is measured using the Herfindahl index of fragmentation derived from census
and politico-economic data taken from (1) the UN Demographic/Statistical Yearbook, for economic (2008) and
rural (2007); (2) Alesina et al. (2003: 184–189), for religious/ethnic/linguistic; (3) FAO Agricultural production
yearbook (2008), for agricultural; and (4) Gryzmała-Busse (2002: 32, 36, 43, 52) and Szczerbiak (2001: 579), for
post-communist fractionalization. For the ENEP, see Gallagher’s ‘Electoral Systems’ web site.
Lijphart (1984), who, in his comparative study of the patterns of government in 21

democracies, found that the number of cleavages, operationalized as ‘issue dimen-
sions,’7 and the number of parties within a system are clearly correlated. The main logic
behind this is that ‘when there are several dimensions of political conflict in a society
[ . . . ] a relatively large number of parties are needed to express all of [them . . . ]’ (Lij-
phart, 1984: 147–148). Just one year later, and using Lijphart’s work (and data) as a
point of departure, Taagepera and Grofman found that the number of issue dimensions
‘alone can account well for the differences in [the number of parties] across countries,
even if we do not take electoral systems into account’ (1985: 350). More recently,
Horowitz and Browne (2005), in their analysis of 23 post-communist democracies at
three different points in time, found that regardless of the temporal period under study
‘political’ cleavages exert, by far, a more important influence on the number of parties
than institutional factors.8
Although the majority of studies quantitatively linking social segmentation and party
system format tend to focus on only one cleavage, generally the ethnic one (see Stoll,
2008), here I follow Powell’s (1982) seminal study and try to measure as many ‘social’
cleavages as possible.
In Table 3, I present scores for five different (social) cleavages: economic (Gini coef-
ficient), religious and centre–periphery (classical religious and ethnic/linguistic fractio-
nalization indexes), urban–rural (fractionalization indexes according to urbanization and
economic sector) and post-communist (social fractionalization in accordance with com-
munist or communist-satellite party membership). Contrary to what scholars have usu-
ally maintained (see above), there seems to be no association between cleavage
fragmentation and the ‘effective’ number of electoral parties (ENEP).9 Not even rural
segmentation, which seems to separate institutionalized Hungary and Czech Republic
from weakly institutionalized Slovakia and Poland, as it does not really explain the dif-
ferences observed within the previously mentioned groups.
In order to examine to what extent the above-cited second approach can be applied to
East Central European party systems, I use Lijphart’s (1984, 1999) framework of
analysis with one modification: post-materialism, almost irrelevant in post-communist
countries (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), has been substituted for a so-called ‘post-
Casal Bértoa 7
Table 4. Number of ‘issue’ dimensions, cleavages and party system fragmentation/institutionalization
Country No. of dimensions No. of cleavages ENEP iPSI
Hungary 3.5 3 4.7 2.5

Czech Republic 1.5 1 5.2 1.4
Slovakia 3.5 2 6.3 0.3
Poland 3.5 3 7.0 -4.2
Source: For the number of dimensions, see Table A in the Appendix. For the number of cleavages, see the text.
For the ENEP, see Gallagher’s ‘Electoral Systems’ web site.
communist’ dimension, much more relevant in countries exiting from 40 years of com-
munist dictatorship (Grabowska, 2004).
Table 4 displays the total number of issue dimensions per country (see appendix) as
well as the number of cleavages described in detail in section 4 (see below). When look-
ing at the table, neither the number of issue dimensions nor the number of cleavages
seems to explain the ranking of electoral fragmentation or systemic institutionalization
observed. In concrete, both the Hungarian and the Polish party systems, which are char-
acterized by the higher number of dimensions and/or cleavages, are respectively at the
top and at the bottom of the table in terms of electoral fragmentation and systemic insti-
tutionalization. Moreover, the country with the lowest number of dimensions and clea-
vages (i.e. the Czech Republic) is not even the least fragmented/institutionalized. In fact,
the rather low difference in terms of (electoral) fragmentation (i.e. half point) between
the latter country and Hungary cannot be explained by the rather large difference (i.e.
two points) in terms of issue dimensions. In a similar vein, and in spite of the fact that
a similar number of ‘issue dimensions’ (i.e. three and a half) can be detected in both
Slovakia and Poland, their ‘effective’ number of electoral parties clearly diverges.
Needless to say, the explanatory power of the ‘raw’ number of cleavages is not higher
either.10 A similar conclusion can be drawn when looking at the degree of systemic
institutionalization. In sum, it seems that neither the number of parties nor the level
of party system institutionalization depends on the number of cleavages (neither in its
social nor political dimension) present in a country.
Cleavage type
The second approach which is central to research on the sociological foundations of sys-
temic institutionalization relates to the implications of the type of cleavages for party
system stability. In this context, two different works are worth mentioning.
Echoing Offe’s (1991) ‘triple transition’, Evans and Whitefield (1993), who pio-
neered work in this tradition, established a link between the type of cleavage structuring
party competition and the level of electoral volatility observed in elections. According to
their view, the type of cleavage emerging in a country is ‘conditioned’ by the social and
historical characteristics present in a nation (see Table 5). Moreover, the stability of a
party system will be high, moderate or low depending on the predominance of ethnic,
socio-economic or ‘political’ (i.e. valence issues) cleavages, respectively. The logic
8 Party Politics
Table 5. Legacies, types of cleavage and party system competition
National preconditions
Type of Party system
Marketization Ethnic homogeneity Established state cleavage stability
þ – – Ethnic High
þ þ þ Socio-economic Moderate
– – þ/– Political Low
Source: Adapted from Evans and Whitefield (1993: 540, 542, 545).
behind the previous hypotheses is that ‘ethnicity involves identity questions on which it
may be extremely difficult to find a compromise [lowering electoral volatility], at least
by comparison with those concerned with economic distribution’ (Evans and Whitefield,
1998: 135). On the contrary, in those countries where ‘political’ cleavages predominate,
voters will be more willing to switch sides, as ‘the principal issues around which parties
will compete will be consensual’ (1993: 540).
In a similar vein, and around the same period, Kitschelt, alone (1995, 2001) or with
other colleagues (1999), developed what can be considered by far the most consistently
and rigorous work on the cleavage-party system linkage in post-communist Europe.
Kitschelt et al. (1999) found that in countries with prevalent economic-distributive clea-
vages, party systems would be more structured than in countries where cultural or
historical-regime cleavages predominated. More specifically, echoing Offe’s (1991) ‘tri-
ple transition’ debate, Kitschelt et al. maintain that where economic cleavages prevail, a
bi-polar structure of competition between programmatic political parties will develop.
As a result, party systems will not only structure strongly, but also in a shorter period
of time. On the contrary, because socio-cultural cleavages tend to polarize both elites and
masses hindering inter-party cooperation, party system structuration will be only mod-
erate. Last, but not least, in those countries where neither economic nor cultural clea-
vages are prevalent, but are combined with other (ethnic, geographical, etc.) divisions
reinforcing each other, party appeals will remain weakly crystallized, favouring the for-
mation of clientelistic parties and the lack of systemic structuration (1999: 383–391).11
Although the above-mentioned authors predicted a different degree of systemic insti-
tutionalization according to the type of cleavages prevailing in a country’s party system
(see section above), the truth is that when looking at the four countries analysed here no
association between these variables can be observed.
Thus, and as follows from Table 6, both Hungary and Poland should display a mod-
erate level of party system institutionalization. On the contrary, and in spite of the fact
that the structure of competition has been turned around religion, the level of institutio-
nalization observed in both countries is clearly the opposite: high in the first country, low
in the second. In the same vein, the Slovak party system is neither the most (Evans and
Whitefield, 1993), nor the least (Kitschelt et al., 1999) institutionalized. Finally, econ-
omy has brought a moderate level of systemic institutionalization to the Czech Republic,
something Evans and Whitefield, but not Kitschelt, had already hypothesized. However,
the problem here is that, contrary to their expectations, the level of institutionalization
displayed by the Czech party system is higher than the Slovak, rooted on ethnic
Casal Bértoa 9
Table 6. ‘Predominant’ cleavage type and party system institutionalization
Level of PSI (predicted)

‘Predominant’
Country cleavage Evans and Whitefield Kitschelt iPSI (actual)
Hungary Religion Moderate Moderate 2.5

Czech Republic Economy Moderate High 1.4
Slovakia Ethnic High Weak 0.3
Poland Religion Moderate Moderate –4.2
Source: For the ‘predominant’ cleavage in each country, see Deegan-Krause (2004), Enyedi and Tóka (2007),
Jasiewicz (2007) and Brokl and Mansfeldová (2004).
oppositions. As a result, and similar to what we have seen in the previous section, it
seems clear that the degree of institutionalization in a party system does not at all depend
on the types of cleavages that are prevalent.
Cleavage strength
Other scholars, more in the tradition of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), do not distinguish so
much between types of cleavage as determinants of the degree of party system stabiliza-
tion, but focus on the different strength a particular cleavage may have.
Although many other scholars had attempted to study the above-mentioned relation-
ship before them (Alford, 1963; Devine and Stearns, 1985; Pappi, 1984, etc.), it was in
Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability that a first
attempt to measure cleavage strength independently of electoral behaviour was made. In
their work, and using an index of cultural heterogeneity and another index of organiza-
tional density, Bartolini and Mair managed to quantitatively operationalize two of the
three cleavage dimensions, namely: empirical and behavioural. Unfortunately, as they
recognized themselves, the second dimension (i.e. identity) was left aside. Moreover,
their analysis only referred to one of the four classical cleavages referred to by Lipset
and Rokkan, namely, class. Still, the results they found were quite striking: the greater
the strength of the (class) cleavage, the lower the level of electoral instability (1990:
225, 243).
Although some authors have preferred to follow the former approach and quantify
cleavage strength in relation to electoral behaviour (e.g. Franklin et al., 1992; Knutsen
and Scarborough, 1995; Tóka, 1998), other political scientists, when analysing the deter-
minants of party system stability whether in Africa (Ishiyama, 2003), Latin America
(Madrid, 2005; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999), Eastern Europe (Tavits, 2005), or the whole
democratic world (Mainwaring and Zocco, 2007), have preferred to continue the path
initiated by Bartolini and Mair of measuring the strength of a cleavage by the degree
of social homogenization (e.g. first three above-cited studies) or organizational density
(e.g. Mainwaring and Zocco’s work). Interestingly enough, notwithstanding the indica-
tor employed, and contrary to Lipset and Rokkan’s expectations and Bartolini and Mair’s
findings, the general conclusion has been that the impact cleavage(s) strength may have
10 Party Politics
Table 7. Cleavage strength and party system institutionalization*
Country Economic Religious Post-communist iPSI
Hungary –2.4 0.2 0.4 2.5

Czech Republic 2.1 –0.2 –0.7 1.4
Slovakia 0.6 –1.5 –1.6 0.3
Poland –0.2 1.5 1.9 –4.2
*Cleavage strength is calculated by summing the (z-)scores for each of the three components of a cleavage:
namely, structural (i.e. the fractionalization data in Table 3), normative (i.e. ‘issue salience’ in Table A) and
organizational (following Bartolini and Mair, 1990: 232, Duverger’s party-membership ratio is employed here).
When classifying political parties into different party families, Armingeon and Careja’s (2004) comprehensive
typology has been used.
on the stability of electoral behaviour has declined much in the past decade, reaching a
‘no-effect’ point in certain regions (e.g. Africa, Latin America or Eastern Europe).
Following Bartolini and Mair (1990), I combine each of the different cleavage dimen-
sions (structural, normative and organizational) into a single composite index of
‘cleavage strength’,12 before relating it to the different levels of systemic institutionali-
zation observed in East Central Europe. This is done in Table 7 for each of the cleavages
for which we have complete data (i.e. economic, religious and post-communist).13
As follows from Table 7, neither of the different cleavages reveals having explanatory
power in terms of the systemic institutionalization ranking. Thus, while Hungary and
Poland present fairly close figures in terms of cleavage strength (in all three cases), they
occupy opposite ranks in terms of party system institutionalization. Similarly, and con-
trary to previous findings (Grabowska, 2004; McAllister and White, 2007), neither reli-
gious nor post-communist cleavage strength figures explain why the Czech party system
is more institutionalized than its Slovak counterpart. Interestingly enough, and in clear
contrast to Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) findings for Western Europe, my analysis shows
no relationship between systemic institutionalization and economic cleavage strength,
confirming to a certain extent Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta (2000) or Mateju et al.’s
(1999) findings on the non-existence of a pure ‘class’ cleavage in East Central Europe.
All in all, it could be concluded that cleavage strength does not exert any impact on the
level of party system institutionalization.
Lipset and Rokkan revisited

The two questions that first arise in our mind in light of the previous findings are the
following: Were Lipset and Rokkan wrong when stating that party system ‘freezing’/
institutionalization [was] determined by the way cleavages form and develop? Can
sociological explanations to party system institutionalization travel to post-communist
democracies? According to the previous section, the number, type or strength of clea-
vages do not exhaust the ways in which the latter can affect the process of party system
institutionalization in a country. In fact, in my understanding, it is the way different clea-
vages relate to each other that really determines the degree to which party systems may
or may not institutionalize.
Casal Bértoa 11
The roots of such an approach can be traced back to Simmel (1908 [1955]) and Ross’s
(1920) works on the relationship between cross-cutting cleavages and social conflict. In
these studies, as well as in Coser’s analysis on The Functions of Social Conflict (1956),
cross-cutting cleavages are considered to diminish the potential for major social conflict
and political unrest by reducing ‘the intensity of individual political feelings’ as well as
preventing the formation of monolithic coalitions or ‘potential conflict group[s]’ (Rae
and Taylor, 1970: 87 f.). On the contrary, the more the cleavages reinforce one another,
the more intense a conflict in society will become (see Dahrendorf, 1959: 215).
Although Simmel’s idea of ‘cross-cuttingness’ found further development in the
anthropologic field (see Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Gluckman, 1954, etc.), it was
the ‘social pluralist’ school that put forward the argument that cross-cutting politically
relevant cleavages contributed to reducing social conflict and, therefore, led to more sta-
ble democratic systems (Almond, 1956; Lipset, 1960) in one of the most widely accepted
explanatory hypotheses in political science (Nordlinger, 1972: 93).14
Still, it was not until Dahl’s Political Opposition in Western Democracies, that the
party system was incorporated in the equation. In particular, Dahl considered that
cross-cutting cleavages would only have an inexorable ‘unifying effect’ if some of them
were less important than others (Dahl, 1966: 378–381; emphasis in the original). More-
over, and contrary to the Duvergerian ‘imperative’ associating two-party systems with
political compromise and multiparty systems with ideological conflict and instability,
Dahl maintained that both types of party system could lead to conflict depending on the
distribution of cleavages structures, namely: while two party systems will lead to mod-
eration and conciliation only when characterized by cross-cutting cleavage structures
with unequal salience, if the contrary is true (i.e. cumulative or cross-cutting cleavages
with equal salience), political conflict and unrest will be the main outcome, indepen-
dently of the type of party system at hand.
Was it the failure to confirm early hypotheses or the advent of the Institutional Rev-
olution which left aside all cultural explanations? The truth is that after Dahl’s classical
study, interest in examining the relationship between cleavage interaction and party
system development was neglected until Randall and Svåsand dealt with the subject
in passing. The very opportunity for party institutionalization provided by exclusive
forms of cleavage, above all religion and ethnicity, could be at odds with the institu-
tionalization of the party system through restricting the possibilities for cross-party
competition (2002: 9)
More recently, and in clear contrast to Randall and Svåsand’s theoretical expecta-
tions, Tóka and Gosselin (2008) found no evidence of any direct effect of cleavage
cross-cuttingness on the process of party system institutionalization itself.15
Bearing in mind all that has been said, and borrowing from the ‘social pluralist’ and
‘voting behaviour’ literature, the assumption that ‘cross-pressured’ individuals – voters,
elites, etc. – tend to be weak partisans, I would like to introduce here the idea that when
cleavages are cross-cutting16 party systems tend to be weakly institutionalized. The rea-
sons are twofold.
First of all, in systems with cross-cutting cleavages, parties will have difficulty find-
ing ideologically contiguous partners with which to cooperate, as being close in one
dimension may be accompanied by irreconcilable differences in another. Being forced
12 Party Politics
to interact in a multiplicity of non-coinciding directions will definitely diminish their

ability to behave in a rather patterned way, making it difficult for the structure of com-
petition to stabilize.
The second possible reason why cross-cutting cleavages may hinder party system
institutionalization is that, being pulled in different ideological directions, cross-
pressured political parties are characterized by lower partisan attachments (Huber
et al., 2005; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). In other words, and paraphrasing Green and
Shachar (2000: 4), because cross-pressured political parties are ‘caught in the middle’,
pushed one way by a certain ideological issue and pulled the other way by another, their
commitment to a certain group of ideological parties will be dependent on the ‘flavour
issue’ of the day or on the ‘dominant’ political faction. In order to see it more clearly,
here is an example.
Let us think of a four-party system where two cleavages – economy and religion – are
cross-cutting. Party A and party B are both secular; the former is economically liberal,
while the latter is socialist. On the other hand, party C and party D are both religious, but
they differ in terms of their economic views: the latter being statist and the former liberal.
In such an ideologically divisive party system, political parties will have difficulty inter-
acting in a stable and predictable way. First of all, it may even be impossible for them to
interact at all. In such case, especially if neither of them has an absolute majority, sys-
temic instability – characterized by frequent minority governments and elections – will
be the norm. Still, even if they manage to cooperate, and supposing that totally ideolo-
gical enemies will never colligate, I can distinguish four different ways: A-B, A-C, B-D
and D-C; which can be seven in the event three parties are necessary to form the govern-
ment (i.e. A-B-D; A-C-D; B-C-D). The fact that parties opt for one or another will most
probably depend, ceteris paribus, on the most salient issue at a particular moment (e.g.
abortion or religious education in schools would lead to a structure of competition pitting
AB against CD; a tax increase would face AC with BD; European integration could even
open the path to a ABC vs. D confrontation, etc.) or on the preferences of a party faction
predominant at a certain period (e.g. if liberals are predominant in C, a coalition between
AC is more likely than AD, and so on).17
Notwithstanding the different sources of alliance formation, the truth is that in
systems where cleavages are cross-cutting the possibility that a government contains a
party already existing in the previous cabinet will be high (i.e. partial alternation). More-
over, and although access can be closed rather quickly (but not necessarily), the governing
formula will remain innovative for some time. In summary, cross-cutting cleavages not
only render the formation of routinized and predictable coalitions difficult (when equally
salient), but also hinder the stability of existing partisan alliances (when not equally sali-
ent). As a result, and because cross-cutting cleavages make it hard for the emergence of
politics structured along the classical left–right dimensions (Kitschelt, 1992: 27; 1995:
462), party systems in such countries will need more time to institutionalize (if ever).18
On the contrary, when cleavages are cumulative (i.e. reinforcing) the structure of
inter-party competition will be quite stable as parties will be divided by two (or more)
different cleavages along the same ideological line (Huber et al., 2005: 369). Thus,
because in systems with reinforcing cleavages ‘all the politically relevant sources of
division lie parallel, [making party] loyalty [within each side of the cleavage]
Casal Bértoa 13
Table 8. Cleavages, competitive dimensions and party system institutionalization
Party system
No. cleavages Cleavage interaction Dimensions of competition institutionalization
One None Uni-dimensional High

Two or more Cumulative Very high
Cross-cutting Multi-dimensional Low
Two Bi-dimensional Medium
Source: Based on Kitschelt et al. (1999).
paramount’ (Evans and Whitefield, 1998: 117), parties will tend to interact only with
those other parties within the same side of the cleavages, rejecting any cooperation that
would lead to them crossing such a line. Because a large proportion of parties are orga-
nized into ideological groups of mutually reinforcing loyalties, the number of ‘volatile’
parties will be low. As a result, cumulative cleavages help to simplify the structure of
competition in two different (and separate) blocs of parties, making the patterns of inter-
action more predictable and stable. Think of the example above if parties A and B were
not only secular but socialist, while C and D were both religious and liberal. In such a
case, cumulative pressures would most probably lead to a ‘left–right’ (A/B vs. C/D,
respectively) type of party competition, typical of many (institutionalized) Western
European party systems.
Following the previous assumptions, and also bearing in mind the number of cleavages
and the dimensions of competition available, party systems could be classified into four
different basic types according to the degree of institutionalization observed (see Table 8).
Thus, as follows from the previous table, party systems in which the only existing
cleavage or two (or more) ‘cumulative’ cleavages create one dimension of competition
will tend to be highly institutionalized. The ‘reinforcing effect’ of the latter will make for
the different degree of institutionalization (high and very high, respectively) observed. In
contrast, party systems characterized by ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ will be weakly insti-
tutionalized. The level of ‘weak institutionalization’ will be higher or lower depending
on the number of cleavages and, therefore, competitive dimensions available.
One final remark is in order before proceeding to the analysis of cleavage formation/
interaction and its implication for party system institutionalization in East Central Eur-
ope. Although it may seem the contrary, this ‘new’ approach is compatible with both
Lipset and Rokkan’s original approach (the so-called ‘freezing’ hypothesis) as well as
with the conclusions of the ‘social pluralist’ school examined above. First, and contrary
to most works using Lipset and Rokkan’s scheme as a foundation (see section 3), my
theory allows not only for different types of cleavages but also for distinct party alterna-
tives to interact: a party system may institutionalize due to economic/religious and/or
ethnic/geographical cleavages, etc. In this context, neither the number nor the type of
cleavage is important. On the other, it is not the number of cleavages per se but the way
in which such cleavages (be it 2 or 6) structure party alternatives into two or more dif-
ferent politico-ideological blocs/camps/groups that really matters (Bartolini and Mair,
1990; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 2006).
14 Party Politics
Secular SZDSZ MSZP Fidesz FKgP MÍEP MDF Religious
Post-Comm. MSZP SZDSZ MDF Fidesz FKgP MÍEP Anti-comm.
Urban SZDSZ MSZP MDF Fidesz FKgP MÍEP Rural
Liberal SZDSZ MSZP FKgP MDF Fidesz MÍEP Statist
Figure 1. Cleavages and approximate placement of political parties (1995–2009)

Sources: Benoit and Laver (2006), Enyedi (2006), Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009: 14) and Vachudová
(2008).
Last, but not least, the approach explained here does not contradict Lipset (1960)
and followers’ statement that cumulative cleavages lead to political conflict while
cross-cutting cleavages help to resolve the latter. In fact, my theory departs from the
assumption that cumulative cleavages create a certain degree of tension between the two
different ideological camps, converting them into ‘irreconcilable’ political enemies.
Likewise, I accept that ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ [when not ‘felt with equal intensity’]
encourage conciliation’ and compromise (Dahl, 1966: 378; Sartori, 1969; Schattschnei-
der, 1960: 67–68). In fact, it is the different degree of disagreement created by cumula-
tive and cross-cutting cleavages that helps to ‘freeze’ party systems in the first place.
This is not to say, however, that too much conflict will not be inimical to democratic
stability, as social pluralists scholars have maintained.
Cleavage structuration and party system institutionalization in

East Central Europe
Let us now examine how the previous ‘innovative’ analytical framework works in the
real world and in the East Central European region in particular.
Hungary
Since the very beginning of the transition, and most clearly after 1994,19 party politics in
Hungary has revolved around cultural rather than economic conflicts (Enyedi, 2006;
Evans, 2006; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Markowski, 1997; Tóka, 2004; Tóka and Henjak,
2007). Within the first, three distinct types of cleavage can be distinguished: State vs.
Church, post-communist vs. anti-communist and urban vs. rural (Körösenyi, 1999a, b).
As follows from Figure 1, these three cleavages present a cumulative character which
allows for the division of the Hungarian political spectrum into two very antagonistic (and
stable) political camps: ‘a socially conservative, religious, somewhat nationalist, and anti-
communist camp [ . . . ] and [ . . . ] a secular, morally permissive and generally less nationalist
camp’ (Tóka, 2004: 322; see also Enyedi, 2006). Moreover, even when the economic divide
(not cleavage) is introduced into the picture it does not overlap with the more culturally-like
cleavages making the Hungarian structure of competition uni-dimensional: the ‘left’ vs. the
‘right’. As a result, and mainly from 1994, the structure of partisan competition has stabilized
around two antagonistic camps – the nationalist, anti-communist, clerical right (Fidesz,
Casal Bértoa 15
1993-2000 KSČM ČSSD SPR/RSČ HSD/SMS KDU/ČSL ODA ODS

Protectionism Liberalism
2001-2009 KSČM SZ ČSSD KDU/ČSL US/DEU ODS
Figure 2. Economic cleavage and approximate placement of political parties

Sources: Deegan-Krause (2002), Evans and Whitefield (1998), Kitschelt et al. (1999), Markowski (1997) and Sax-
onberg (2003) until 2000. Benoit and Laver (2006), Hlousek and Kopeček (2008) and Rohrschneider and
Whitefield (2009:13) from 2001.
MDF, KDNP and FKgP), and the cosmopolitan, post-communist and anti-clerical left
(MSZP and SZDSZ) – which alternate in power in a wholesale manner, always adopting the
same familiar composition while excluding other (more extreme) parties (e.g. MIÉP). All in
all, and bearing in mind all that has been said, it is possible to conclude that ‘the gradual
return to a bipolar [almost over-institutionalized] system of alliances after 1994 [has to
be] interpreted as a natural adaptation, in the absence of deep cleavages cross-cutting each
other’ (Enyedi and Tóka, 2007: 150; see also Tóka, 2004).
Czech Republic
Contrary to Hungary, the Czech party system has been characterized since the indepen-
dence of the country by a one-dimensional structure of competition revolving around a
unique cleavage: economy (Brokl and Mansfeldová, 2004; Kitschelt et al., 1999: 230;
Markowski, 1997). Figure 13 presents the approximate socio-economic orientations of
the Czech political parties along this cleavage in two different periods.
As is evident from Figure 2, economic policy orientations vary from one party to
another although, as mentioned above, the gap between liberal and state-centred
socio-economic orientations puts communist and social democrats (KSČM and ČSSD)
on one side and liberal and/or conservative parties on the other (ODS, ODA, US/DEU),
with the Christian democrats (KDU/ČSL) somewhere in the middle, although a bit closer
to the liberal bloc (especially in the first period).
The above-mentioned cleavage structure based on economic considerations has cer-
tainly helped the stabilization of the pattern of partisan interaction into two different
blocs: social protectionists vs. market-liberals. Concretely,
[t]he composition of government coalition has so far been a perfect embodiment of these
bipolar and rather strongly pronounced line [ . . . ] of conflict: the right-of-centre coalition
of the ODS, ODA, KDU/ČSL formed the government in 1992, and again in 1996; the
left-of-centre CSSD formed the (minority) government in 1998 and, together with KDU/
ČSL and US, after the 2002 elections [ . . . ] the 2006 elections have again seen [ . . . ] a bipo-
lar pattern of competition (Kopecký, 2007: 120–121)
with the ODS, the KDU/ČSL and a new parliamentary party, the Greens (SZ), forming
the government while the ČSSD and the non-reformed Communist party (KSČM)
remained in opposition.
16 Party Politics
As can be seen from what has been said, the structure of inter-party competition in the
Czech Republic has been characterized by the alternation between ODS-liberal govern-
ment and ČSSD-social-democratic cabinets. As Kopecký has also recognized, the only
time this pattern was not absolutely observed was in 2002, when the socialists formed a
coalition government with the centrist KDU/ČSL and the right-of-centre liberal US
(2006: 129). To a lesser extent, I would add, the coalition formed by PM Topolánek
in 2007, which united ODS, KDU/ČSL with the centre-left SZ was also weakly consis-
tent in this respect. However, in this case, the formation of such ideologically diverse
coalition was facilitated by the clear ‘anti-communist’ stances of the SZ, which were
not willing to participate in a cabinet that could rely, even tacitly on Communist sup-
port. Moreover, the Green Party ‘modified its profile before the election’ incorporating
‘some liberal economic goals’ which placed it more on the right (Hloušek and Kope-
ček, 2008: 532). As a result, the SZ became the party that, together with the Christian
Democrats, came closest to being an ‘economically’ centrist party, giving both the
greatest coalition potential.
This is not to say that less ideologically homogeneous coalitions were not more prone
to political quarrelling. In fact, the amount of conflict within the last two governing coa-
litions has been the highest among the five different partisan cabinets the country has had
in the last twenty years. This has had important consequences for the process of party
system institutionalization, which has seen itself stopped by the increasing amount of
unstable cooperation/collaboration among the different parties. As a result, the degree
of systemic institutionalization after 2002 has decreased significantly.
Notwithstanding the latter, the Czech party system has continued to be among the
most institutionalized in Eastern Europe in general (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi, 2010;
Casal Bértoa and Mair, 2012), and the Visegrad region in particular. As a matter of fact,
this has been eased by the rather cumulative character of the other two ideological
‘divides’ present in Czech politics, namely: post-communism and religion.
In the Czech Republic, the so-called post-communist divide separates the non-
reformed communist party (KSČM) from its parliamentary counterparts, making the for-
mer a real political ‘pariah’. Thereby, the Czech structure of partisan competition has
always been characterized by the fringe character of the communist party, systematically
excluded from every single government coalition. In fact, as we have seen before, anti-
communist attitudes not only helped SZ in its travel to the right, but also KDU/ČSL
and US/DEU in their will to cooperate with ČSSD in 2002. Still, from 2005 onwards,
the willingness of the ČSSD to collaborate and, in case of necessity, ally with the
KSČM has certainly increased, reinforcing the already strong political division
between anti-communist Christian democrats and liberal-conservative parties and
socialist/communist forces.
On the other hand, and as follows from Figure 3, religion has also played a role in the
traditional division between left and right in Czech lands, even if the religious divide
constitutes only a second dimension in the structure of partisan competition: not only
are all parties secular, with the exception of the KDU/ČSL, but also the latter has tended
to place itself on the left–right dimension (Mateju et al., 1999; Sitter, 2002; Tóka and
Henjak, 2007). Thus, and when we look at the level of secularity displayed by the dif-
ferent political forces, we can see that the ideological spread of the different parties
Casal Bértoa 17
Secular KSČM ČSSD SZ (ODA) ODS (SPR) (US) (HSD) KDU/ČSL Religious
Communist KSČM ČSSD (HSD) (SPR) SZ (ODA) ODS KDU/ČSL (US) Anti-communist
Figure 3. Religious and post-communist divides and approximate placement of political parties
(1993–2009)
Sources: Benoit and Laver (2006), Kitschelt et al. (1999), Markowski (1997) and Saxonberg (2003). Currently
defunct political parties are given in parentheses.
basically coincides with their position along the post-communist, but also the economic
(see Figure 2), axes. In fact, if we leave aside all the parties which have already disap-
peared or whose role in the political system is irrelevant, we get a clear picture of the
Czech party system, where ODS and, to a lesser extent, KDU/ČSL constitute the political
right and KSČM and ČSSD form part of the left bloc, with SZ somewhere in between.
Still, the centrist position of KDU/ČSL in economic terms, the only ‘full’ cleavage in the
Czech Republic, facilitates possible centre-right and centre-left coalitions, giving place
to a rather institutionalized two-and-a-half party system.
In conclusion, in light of what has been presented it seems obvious that among the
four Visegrad democracies studied here the Czech Republic is where the economic clea-
vage has been most sharply articulated and where axiological divides (i.e. religious and
‘post-communist’) have cross-cut less the dominant left–right dimension, in the electoral
arena as well as at the level of elite opinion (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Markowski, 1997;
Vachudová and Hooghes, 2009).
Slovakia
From the moment of its independence in 1993, the Slovak party system has been
characterized by the presence of two cleavages (centre–periphery and economy) and one
structural divide (religion). However, as Eibl and Chytı́lek have wisely pointed out,
‘whereas up to 1998 the main axis of the party competition was determined by [the first],
after 2002 it approached [more] a systemic logic based on the evaluation of socio-
economic issues’ (2007: 175; see also Deegan-Krause, 2004). This difference has signif-
icant consequences for interpretation of the relationship between cleavage development
and the structure of partisan competition discussed below.
Figures 4 and 5 display, respectively, the structure of Slovak cleavages for the two
periods signalled above. In contrast to what we have seen for Hungary and the Czech
Republic, Slovak cleavages (and divides) present a cross-cutting, rather than a cumulative,
character (Deegan-Krause, 2002). As a result, four different political and ideological
camps can be distinguished: (1) the national-authoritarian camp, formed by the nationalist
SNS, the charismatic HZDS and other minor parties (the economically populist ZRS until
1998, and the communist KSS from 2002); (2) the Christian-liberal camp, made by the
religious KDH – a monothematic party; (3) the socialist camp, composed by the post-
communist SDL’, the social-democratic SDSS and the personalistic SOP until the
2000s, when the populist/charismatic Smer-Direction managed to capitalize on the emer-
ging socio-economic cleavage and take over the previous three parties, which finally
18 Party Politics
1993-2001 2002-2009
Periphery Periphery
MK SMK
DÚ ANO
SDSS SDKÚ
SDL’
SOP Smer
Statist Liberal Statist Liberal
KDH KDH
KSS
ZRS HZDS
HZDS SNS SNS
Centre Centre
Figures 4 and 5. Cleavages and approximate placement of political parties (1993–2009)

Sources: Deegan-Krause (2004), Gyárfášová and Krivý (2007), Krno (2005) and Markowski (1997) for the
period 1993–1998. For the period 1999–2009, see Benoit and Laver (2006), Gyárfášová and Krivý (2007),
Hloušek and Kopeček (2008), Krivý (2004) and Vachudová (2008).
I have included within the circles all parties with a certain religious background (in terms of both ideology and
support). All the other parties are considered to be secular, and some of them even anti-clerical (KSS, ZRS,
SDL’, Smer, ANO).
merged before the last legislative elections in 2006; and (4) the liberal-cosmopolitan camp,
characterized by its liberal stances in terms of both economy and nation-building, and
formed by the secular-conservative SDKÚ, the ethnic SMK and the neoliberal ANO
(already defunct).
The previous picture becomes even more complicated when we introduce the ever
increasing religious divide (Hloušek and Kopeček, 2008), which, with the exception
of the ferociously secular and anti-clerical socialist camp and the religious Christian-
liberal camp (unified around the KDH), divides the other two camps into two distinct
sides: secular (ZRS, KSS, ANO and SDKÚ) and pro-Church (SMK, HZDS and SNS).
With such a bi-dimensional (tri-dimensional at times) cleavage structure it is not dif-
ficult to understand why the patterns of inter-party competition in Slovakia have been
characterized by the presence of partial alternations (mainly from 1998), innovative gov-
erning formulae and open access (every single cabinet since 1994 has included at least
one new party – most of them formed just a couple of months ahead of the elections).
In particular, with the exception of Mečiar’s 4th cabinet, every coalition government
since 1994 has included political forces from at least two different political camps,
at times even three. This was the case of the 1994 Moravčik’s and 1998 Dzurinda’s
‘rainbow’ cabinets, which comprised five political parties/groups ranging from the
centre-right to the centre-left of the political spectrum (Szomolányi, 2004). In fact, each
of these two government was so ideologically heterogeneous as to bring together the
conservative DS, with the liberal DÚ (AD and APR in 1994) and the religious KDH (all
of them anti-communists) on the right, and the post-communist SDL’ and the historical
social-democrats (SDSS) on the left, together with the populist SOP, the ethnic SMK and
the environmentalist SZS. Dzurinda’s and Fico’s cabinet in 2002 and 2006, respectively,
Casal Bértoa 19
followed a similar pattern, although the level of ideological homogeneity increased to a

certain extent. Thus, the former again included Christian Democrats (KDH) with
the Catholic Hungarian SMK (now itself divided along two different economic trends:
liberal and populist), together with the liberal-secular SDKÚ (DÚ’s successor) and the
neoliberal-anti-clerical ANO. In a similar vein, the current government also includes par-
ties from two different camps, namely: the national-authoritarian (with the religious
HZDS and SNS) and the socialist (secular) Smer (Hloušek and Kopeček, 2008; Rybář,
2006; Szomolányi, 2004). The fact that these parties differed in terms of economy (SDL’
vs. KDH/APR/ADSR; SDL’/SDSS vs. KDH/DÚ; SMK vs. ANO/SDKÚ), religion (SDL’
vs. KDH; SDL’/SDSS vs. KDH/SMK; ANO vs. KDH/SMK; Smer vs. HZDS/SNS), and
national identity (SMK vs. KDH; Smer vs. HZDS and SNS) clearly hindered the stabiliza-
tion of the patterns of inter-party competition in Slovakia.
This is not to say, however, that the national-authoritarian based government consti-
tuted an ideologically homogeneous ‘oasis of peace’. In fact, the parties forming Mečiar’s
cabinets in 1993 and 1994 also quarrel over economy (ZRS/HZDS vs. SNS) as well as reli-
gion (ZRS vs. HZDS/SNS). However, the fact that they shared a common view on the way
the process of national (in terms of both identity and institutions) building should develop
certainly helped to make the patterns of partisan interaction at the beginning of the 1990s
more predictable and stable, although not much stable, than ever afterwards.
All in all, when analysing the process of party system configuration in Slovakia and
its chances of developing an institutionalized structure of inter-party competition, it is
important to note that the cross-cutting nature of the Slovak cleavages, boosted by the
territorial and socio-demographical heterogeneity of the population, fostered the formation
and development of a bi-dimensional structure of competition characterized by unstable
partisan alliances and unpredictable patterns of government formation (Pridham, 2002;
Rybář, 2006; Sitter, 2002; Szomolányi, 2004).
Poland
In contrast to the most institutionalized East Central European party systems (i.e.
Hungarian and Czech) the Polish party system has been characterized since the very
beginning by a multi-dimensional space of inter-party competition revolving around
two different type cleavages: cultural/axiological (religious and post-communist) and
economic (Grzybowski and Mikuli, 2004; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Markowski, 2007a;
Szczerbiak, 2006; Tworzecki, 2003). As Jasiewicz has recently remarked, ‘the salience
of these two [types], as well as their cross-cutting configuration in the political spectrum,
has been well documented in empirical studies (Markowski and Tóka, 1993; Zukowski,_
1994; Jasiewicz, 1995, 1998; Kitschelt et al., 1999)’ (2007: 88, the emphasis is mine).
Similarly, he was the first scholar to point out that on the basis of these two different
cleavage types it was possible to structure the Polish party system into four different
politico-ideological fields:
The combination of relatively strong support of secularism/universalism and a free-market/

free-enterprise orientation may be described as the liberal-democratic field [ . . . ] The
combination of pro-market attitudes and high religiosity (with the emphasis on Christian
20 Party Politics
values and economic nationalism) brings about the conservative field (usually in a
Christian-democratic version) [ . . . ] Support for state interventionism combined with reli-
giosity/particularism gives the populist field [ . . . ] State interventionism combined with
secularism may be identified as the socialist field [ . . . ]. (2007: 88 f., emphasis in the orig-
inal; see also Markowski, 1995 and Szczerbiak, 2006)
Figures 6 to 11 locate the most important political forces – and, in any case, all the par-
liamentarian parties – within the four above-mentioned fields along a bi-dimensional axis
built on the basis of the two primary dimensions of partisan interaction, namely: religion
(most salient until 2001) and economy (extraordinarily relevant ever after). The post-
communist cleavage is also indicated, so that parties with a non-negative perception of the
communist regime and contrary to the adoption of ‘justice-distributive’ measures like lus-
tration or de-communization are grouped together.20 Moreover, and because Polish polit-
ical parties have more often than not come and gone after every election, it has been
necessary to portrait the position of the different parties within the cultural–economic axis
along each of the different legislative periods.
As shown in the figures below, religion cuts across the economic cleavage dividing
both the economically interventionist ‘left’ and the pro-liberal-market ‘right’. In a sim-
ilar vein, the post-communist cleavage separates the so-called ‘successor parties’ (SLD
and PSL) from the post-Solidarity parties, which can be found in all but in the socialist
field. Moreover, the latter cleavage cuts across individual political parties like UP or
UW/PD (see figures). Finally, and although not reflected in the figures presented above,
the post-communist cleavage also cross-cuts its economic counterpart, separating all
those bitter anti-communist post-Solidarity parties (e.g. PC, AWS, PiS, LPR) from all
those anti-communist forces, also stemming from the Solidarity movement, which adopt
a more pragmatic approach to their relationship with both PSL and SLD (e.g. UW/PD or
PO). As a result, both post-communist and religious cleavages clearly overlap each
other, but only at the right side of the political spectrum. In this sense, the higher the level
of religiosity among the pro-market camp,21 the lower the chances a political party will
collaborate – not even ally – with the post-communist forces.22
Bearing in mind all that has been said, it is clear that the social protectionist camp
(socialists þ populists) differs from the pro-market camp (liberals þ conservatives) in
terms of economy; the secular camp (socialists þ liberals) from the religious camp
(populists þ conservatives) in terms of religiosity; and the post-communist successor
parties (SLD and PSL) from all the other parties in terms of ‘nostalgia’ for the previous
(communist) regime. At the same time, the socialist field (mainly SLD and UP) differs
from the populist field in terms of religiosity (all), but also in terms of ‘nostalgia’ (all but
the PSL); the liberal field (mainly UW/PD and PO) disagrees with the conservative par-
ties in the degree of religiosity and anti-communism. As a result, parties have found it very
difficult to establish stable governmental coalitions and/or electoral alliances. As a rule,
cabinets have been short-termed and the only one to endure the entire legislature (SLD-
PSL from 1993 up to 1997) was characterized by its quarrels, rather than by its agreements.
Moreover, and as explained elsewhere (Casal Bértoa, 2011), not even one of the coalition
governments in Poland managed to unite all parties from the same political field23 – in
the majority of cases not even two parties from the same political field (the only exceptions
Casal Bértoa 21
1991-1993 1993-1997
Secular Secular
SLD PPPP SLD

UD UP
SP SO UD
KPN KPN
PSL KLD KLD
Statist PL Liberal Statist PSL Liberal
BBWR
‘S ’ PC
PC ‘S’
ZChN ZChN
Religious Religious
1997-2001 2001-2005
Secular Secular
SLD
UP
UP SLD
UW UW
PO
Statist Liberal Statist Liberal
PSL SO
PSL
PiS
AWS AWS−P
ROP LPR
Religious Religious
2005-2007 2007-2009
Secular Secular
UP
SLD
PD LiD
SdPL
PO
PO
Statist SO Liberal Statist Liberal
PSL
PSL
PiS SO
PiS
LPR LPR
Religious Religious
Figures 6 to 11. Cleavages and approximate placement of political parties (1991–2009)

Sources: I have included within the circles all parties with a certain post-communist background. All the other
parties are considered to be anti-communist (mostly post-Solidarity). From the 1991-1997 period, Kitschelt et
al. (1999), Markowski (2006a), Wesołowski (1996) and Zarycki (2000). Masłyk and Kocór (2000), Wiatr (2000)
and Zarycki (2000) for 1997-2001. For 2001-2005, see Castle and Taras (2002), Markowski (2006b),
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009: 16), Vachudová (2008) and Wiatr (2004). For the final period (i.e.
2005-2009), Benoit and Laver (2006) and Markowski (2007b).
22 Party Politics
Table 9. Cleavage cross-cuttingness and party system institutionalization
Cross-cutting score
Type of
Country cross-cuttingness Selway (2009) Benoit and Laver (2006) PSI
Hungary Religious-regional 0.83 0.33 2.5

Czech Republic Economic-religious 0.87 0.88 1.4
Slovakia Ethnic-economic 0.89 0.90 0.3
Poland Religious-economic 0.90 0.97 –4.2
Using the Benoit and Laver (2006) dataset, I have calculated the degree of cleavage cross-cuttingness in each of
the political systems under study by locating the ‘relevant’ political parties within the dimensional space of each
country and obtaining the R2 of the line of fit. The main logic behind such analysis is that the higher the latter
will be, the lower the degree of cross-cuttingness.
are Suchowska’s 7-party cabinet – if not then, when?, and Kaczynski’s controversial
three-party coalition, where LPR and Samoobrona allied together with PiS).
In sum, with such an ideologically heterogeneous and dogmatically complex political
panorama, it is hardly surprising that the level of party system institutionalization in
Poland has remained the lowest among the four countries examined here.
Cleavage cross-cuttingness: Does it make a difference?

If the most important conclusion following from the previous analysis is that it is the
cleavage structure in a country that determines the degree of institutionalization of its
party system, the next question should be: can the degree to which cleavages cross-
cut hint at the level of institutionalization a party system is able to achieve?
Table 9 shows the degree of cross-cuttingness for the two most important ‘cleavage’
dimensions – for which data are available – in each of the countries analysed here.24 As
follows from the table, cleavage cross-cuttingness and party system institutionalization
are highly related,25 providing an explanation for the different degrees of institutionali-
zation observed in the four East Central European party systems. Moreover, and what is
more striking, the difference in the degree of cross-cuttingness among the countries and
the level of party system institutionalization almost perfectly associate (see also Casal
Bértoa, 2010: appendix B). For all these reasons, it is possible to complement my pre-
vious conclusions with the more specific statement that the higher the level of cleavage
cross-cuttingness, the lower the institutionalization of a party system will be.
Conclusion
In this article, and following the steps of the sociological approach initiated by Lipset and
Rokkan’s (1967) seminal work, I have tried to examine how a nation’s cleavage structure
affects the process of party system institutionalization. Using Bartolini and Mair’s
(1990) rather strict concept of ‘cleavage’, and distinguishing three main cleavages in
Hungary and Poland, two in Slovakia and one in the Czech Republic, I have presented
the most important scholarly theories linking both cleavage formation and development
with party system institutionalization. An in-depth analysis of the first three most
Casal Bértoa 23
important hypotheses led to the watertight conclusion that neither the number nor the
type nor the strength of a cleavage is associated with the degree of party system institu-
tionalization in East Central Europe.
As a result, and building on Dahl’s original idea that both cleavage and party system
structuring are deeply entangled, I decided to pursue an analysis of the consequences dif-
ferent modes of cleavage formation and development may have for stabilization of the pat-
terns of partisan competition. The idea is that when cleavages are cross-cutting, parties will
find it difficult to identify ideologically contiguous partners with which to cooperate, as
being close in one dimension may be accompanied by irreconcilable differences in
another. On the contrary, when cleavages are cumulative (i.e. coinciding), parties will tend
to interact only with other parties on the same side of the cleavage, rejecting any cooper-
ation that would lead them to cross such a line. In this context one-dimensional cleavage
configurations are considered to have a similar effect, although to a lesser degree, than the
latter.
After a thorough analysis of the distinct cleavage configurations in the different East
Central European countries, the main conclusion needs to be that the process of party
system institutionalization is hindered when a country’s cleavages cross-cut and fostered
when coinciding (i.e. cumulating). Moreover, the degree to which cleavages cross-cut
with each other exerts an unquestionable influence on the level to which party systems
institutionalize: the lower the cross-cuttingness, the higher the institutionalization.
For all this, I can conclude with Whitefield stating that ‘[a]lthough parties and poli-
ticians have come and gone [ . . . t]he term cleavage, [ . . . continues] to be meaningful
for post-communist societies’, as the way they structure helps to ‘define the behavior
of politically relevant [ . . . ] actors’ (2002: 195). Hence, party system institutionalization
does appear to be determined, to an enormous degree, by the way cleavages form,
develop and, overall, configure.
Funding
This research was completed while I was a ‘MAEC-AECI’ funded PhD candidate at the
European University Institute.
Acknowledgements
This article is dedicated to the memory of my mentor, Peter Mair (R.I.P. 1951–2011).
Previous versions of this article were presented at the 3rd ECPR General Conference in Dublin
(August 2010) and at the IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference in Sao Paulo (February 2011). I thank
participants at these conferences, especially Simon Bornschier (Universities of Zurich and St.
Gallen, Switzerland), as well as three anonymous reviewers for useful comments. I am also
grateful to Kevin Deegan-Krause (Wayne State University, USA) and Zsolt Enyedi (Central
European University, Hungary) for sharing their expertise with me regarding cleavage salience
and issue dimensionality. The usual disclaimers apply.
Notes
1. However, this is not to deny the fact that other institutional variables (e.g. electoral system or
the type of regime) may contribute to explaining the different degree of institutionalization
observed in East Central European party systems (Casal Bértoa, 2011).
24 Party Politics
2. Lipset and Rokkan alone are to blame as they avoided any explicit definition of the term. In
fact, and despite Zuckerman’s (1975) laudable effort to interpret Lipset and Rokkan’s will, the
truth is that the latter authors even used different terms (e.g. ‘contrasts’, ‘divides’, ‘conflicts’,
oppositions’ . . . ) as synonyms (see Meisel, 1974: 6; Randall, 2001).
3. Interestingly enough, and as Mair (2006: 373) himself has recently pointed out, such efforts
at qualification have not resolved the existing conceptual confusion as there is almost nothing
in a so-called ‘political’ or ‘social’ cleavage that differs from a political conflict or a structural
divide, respectively.
4. This is not to say that, when appropriate, I will refer and address other conceptualizations of
the notion: namely ‘social’ or ‘political’ cleavages, depending on whether only the structural
or the normative element is present. In this context, ‘political’ cleavages, ‘issue dimensions’
and/or ideological ‘divides’ are used indistinctly.
5. For previous applications of Mair’s framework in a similar context, see Müller-Rommel
(2005), O’Dwyer (2006), Rybář (2004) or Toole (2000).
6. Ministerial volatility is computed by adding the net change in the percentage of ‘ministers’
(including the prime minister), rather than ministries or portfolios gained and lost by each
party in the cabinet from one government to the next, and then dividing by 2.
7. Lijphart defines ‘issue dimensions’ in terms of ‘differences [derived or not from social divi-
sions] between rather than within parties’ (1984: 128).
8. In contrast to Lijphart’s approach, political cleavages are operationalized here using the ideo-
logical vote-share of parties distributed in a two-dimensional political space based on eco-
nomic and ethnic issues.
9. The ‘effective’ number of electoral parties is calculated according to the following formula:
ENEP¼1/Svi, where vi is the proportion of seats/votes of the ith party (Laakso and Taagepera,
1979). Here, I use the ENEP rather than the ‘effective’ number of parliamentary parties
(ENPP), as the latter may well also be influenced by other factors, mainly the electoral system
(Duverger, 1954). Still, none of my findings would have been changed by the use of such a
‘legislative’ indicator.
10. When dealing with electoral fragmentation scores, similar conclusions can be made but for the
number of ‘full’ cleavages, whose explanatory power is a bit higher.
11. Notwithstanding Kitschelt et al.’s thorough work (1999), the only empirical study of the
above-cited relationship is Birnir’s (2007a, b) analysis of the relationship between ethnicity
and electoral politics in new democracies. Using a nested research design, the author con-
firmed Evans and Whitefield’s hypotheses when finding that, far more than religious clea-
vages, ‘identity that is expressed through ethnic parties [ . . . ] jump-starts party system
stabilization’ (2007a: 602–603).
12. For each cleavage, the composite index represents the sum of the three dimensions in standar-
dized form (or z-scores). Cronbach’s alpha for the different indexes is rather high (always
higher than 0.70 but in one case: three-dimensional composite economic index), a relatively
respectable figure given that the scale consists of three items only (inter-item correlation was
always between 0.56 and 0.75, with the sole exception of the economic cleavage, in any of the
two versions, three- or two- dimensional).
13. The fact that data for the ethnic and urban/rural cleavage are unavailable does not undermine
the findings, as these two cleavages are only present in one (Slovakia and Hungary, respec-
tively) of the four countries (see section 3).
Casal Bértoa 25
14. In addition to the studies explaining political conflict or democratic stability, Simmel’s ‘cross-
pressure’ theories are echoed within the ‘voting behaviour’ literature (Berelson et al., 1954;
Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Tingsten, 1937). Very briefly, the main idea was that ‘cross-pressured’
individuals tended to become politically indifferent. Consequently, they might withdraw from
voting, change their vote intention, decide for whom to vote at the last minute, ‘feel a reduced
sense of partisanship’, etc. (Rae and Taylor, 1970: 86; Lane, 1959: 197–203).
15. As far as I am concerned, this is the only empirical work attempting to link both variables.
16. Building on Rae and Taylor’s (1969: 537) definition, I consider cross-cutting cleavages all
those that divide the political spectrum in such a way that two political parties share a common
ideological direction while differing on a second one. On the contrary, cumulative cleavages
are those that divide the political spectrum in two distinct camps, each one characterized by
the presence of at least two completely different ideological preferences.
17. In this context, cross-cutting cleavages could also hinder the process of party institutionaliza-
tion, facilitating the splits of different factions and the creation of new political groups and
parties.
18. Note, however, that the example is theoretical, as it is difficult for new party systems to remain
with the same parties all the time.
19. As the majority of scholars have recognized (Enyedi and Tóka, 2007; Körösenyi, 1999a, b;
Markus, 1998), and as one of the reviewers has accurately pointed out, cleavages in Hungary
took their current structure only in 1994. Enyedi (2005) contains the most detailed account to
date on how agency can influence the way cleavages structure in a country.
20. It is important to note here that, in clear contrast to the separation of Slovak religious parties,
the grouping of post-communist parties is only indicative and does not present the exact dis-
tance other ‘post-Solidarity’ may have to the previous group.
21. In contrast to the word ‘field’, I use the notion of ‘camp’ to indicate the sum of two fields (on
the basis of economy or religion or ‘communist nostalgia’). As a result, ‘camp’ has a stronger
connotation than ‘field’.
22. A clear example of what has been said is the electoral collaboration of PD with SLD within
LiD, or the formation of a coalition government between PO and PSL. In contrast, and despite
intensive talks at the beginning of 2006, PiS did not manage to agree on stable governmental
cooperation with PSL.
23. The only exception was AWS (2000–2001) and PiS (2005–2006) minority governments,
which, on the other hand, required the parliamentary support of political forces from other dif-
ferent ideological fields (ROP in 2000 or Samoobrona and LPR in 2005).
24. For example, and due to the lack of reliable data, I could not compare the degree of cross-
cuttingness between religiosity and post-Communism in Hungary.
25. No other comparison attempted (i.e. economic-religious, economic-ethnic, economic-
regional, religious-ethnic, religious-regional, ethnic-regional) achieved such a high degree
of coincidence.
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Appendix A
‘Political’ cleavages in East Central Europe[1]
Similarly to what has been observed in the most consolidated Western European democ-
racies, the two most important dimensions of partisan conflict in East Central European
party systems have a socio-economic and religious character (McAllister and White,
2007). Notwithstanding the former general statement, it is important to note here,
however, that, in relation to the former, Table A below assigns ‘medium’ ratings only
to Hungary which, during Kadar’s ‘goulash communism’ (1966–1988), had the most lib-
eralized economic system within the Soviet bloc. This obviously helped political elites to
adopt a gradual approach to economic reform during the 1990s, and consequently dimin-
ished the level of political conflict on the issue. In a similar vein, religious conflict did
not achieve high quotas in those countries where, on the one hand, the religious popula-
tion has been lower (e.g. the Czech Republic) and where, on the other, the Catholic
Church was marginalized during communism (e.g. Slovakia), playing also a smaller role
after the democratic transition (Kostelecký, 2002: 96–103).
In general, when the four ratings for these two issues are added up – with an H counted
as 1.0 and an M as 0.5 – the total is 3.5 and 3.0, respectively, as indicated in the bottom
line of Table A. This total score for the above-cited dimensions is more than twice as
high as the total score for any other dimension (with the exception of post-communism).
Furthermore, the socio-economic and religious dimensions are also the only ones present
to a significant extent in all four East Central European party systems.
Differences between post-communist successor and opposition parties constitute the sec-
ond most important issue dimension. Interestingly enough, such differences can be
found in the two countries where democratic transition was negotiated, allowing Com-
munist leaders not only to maintain a certain control over the transition, but to conserve
their property and the remaining economic assets (Bozóki and Ishiyama, 2002). This
obviously made it difficult to resolve former nomenklatura’s ‘debts with the past’,
allowing also the successor parties to keep a core of electoral support which helped
them to recover power quickly (the so-called ‘Velvet Restoration’ took place in Poland
in 1993 and just one year later in Hungary) and stop the ongoing process of de-
communization and/or lustration (Grabowska, 2004). As a result, conflicts over the
past in these two countries reached great importance, while in the lands of former
Czechoslovakia were kept to a minimum.
Cultural–ethnic and urban–rural conflicts have been possible only in those countries
were an ethnic minority (Slovakia) or a rather large agricultural population has been
present (Hungary). Surprising is the case of Poland, where, despite having the highest
percentage of farmers among the four, the urban–rural divide has been embedded within
_
the more general economic conflict (see Zarycki and Nowak, 2000). Similarly, the regime-
support dimension has appeared in the only country where nationalistic forces have held
34 Party Politics
Table A. ‘Issue dimensions’ in four East Central European party systems (1990–2009)
Socio- Cultural– Urban– Regime Foreign Post- No. of
Country economic Religious ethnic rural support policy communism dimensions
Hungary M H – H – – H 3.5
Czech H M – – – – – 1.5
Republic
Slovakia H M H – M M – 3.5
Poland H H – – – M H 3.5
Total 3.5 3.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 2.0
Source: Benoit and Laver (2006), Deegan-Krause (2004), Enyedi and Tóka (2007), Jasiewicz (2007), Mansfeldová
(2004) and Whitefield and Rohrschneider (2009: 675).
fairly stable support for some time (Slovakia). Here, the salience of the issue passed from
very high in 1994–1998 to very low in 2006–2009, thereby, the ‘medium’ score.
Interestingly enough, the so-called ‘foreign policy’ dimension (perhaps, also, Lij-
phart’s most controversial dimension) could only be found in Poland and Slovakia,
mainly as a result of the process of European integration (Ladrech, forthcoming). In both
Hungary and the Czech Republic, no major party (except for the marginalized KSČM)
raised its voice against joining NATO and/or the EU.
Appendix B
List of acronyms
Czech Republic: CˇSSD ¼ Czech Social Democratic Party; DEU ¼ Democratic Union;
HSD – SMS ¼ Movement for Self-Governing Democracy – Society for Moravia and
Silesia; KDU/CˇSL ¼ Christian and Democratic Union/Czechoslovak People;s Party;
KSCˇM ¼ Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; ODA ¼ Civic Democratic Alliance;
ODS ¼ Civic Democratic Party; SPR-RSCˇ ¼ Association for the Republic-Czech Repub-
lican Party; SZ ¼ Green Party; US ¼ Freedom Union.
Hungary: Fidesz ¼ Federation of Young Democrats; FKgP ¼ Independent Party
of Smallholders; KDNP ¼ Christian Democratic People’s Party; MDF ¼ Hungarian
Democratic Forum; MIE´P ¼ Hungarian Justice and Life Party; MSZP ¼ Hungarian
Socialist Party; SZDSZ ¼ Alliance of Free Democrats.
Poland: AWS ¼ Solidarity Electoral Action; AWS-P ¼ Solidarity Electoral Action-
Right; BBWR ¼ Non-Partisan Bloc in Support of Reforms; KLD ¼ Liberal Democratic
Congress; KPN ¼ Confederation for an Independent Poland; LiD ¼ Left and Democrats;
LPR ¼ League of Polish Families; PC ¼ Centre Alliance; PiS ¼ Law and Justice; PL ¼
Peasant Alliance; PO ¼ Civic Platform; PPPP ¼ Polish Beer-Lovers’ Party; PSL ¼
Polish Peasant Party; ROP ¼ Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland; ‘S’ ¼ Solidar-
ity; SdPL ¼ Social Democracy of Poland; SLD ¼ Democratic Left Alliance; SO ¼
Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland; SP ¼ Labour Solidarity; UD ¼ Democratic
Union; UP ¼ Union of Labour; UW/PD ¼ Freedom Union/Democratic Party (democra-
ci.pl); ZChN ¼ Christian National Union.
Casal Bértoa 35
Slovakia: AD ¼ Alliance of Democrats; ANO ¼ Alliance of the New Citizen; APR ¼

Alternative of Political Realism; DS ¼ Democratic Party; DÚ ¼ Democratic Union;
KDH ¼ Christian Democratic Movement; KSS ¼ Communist Party of Slovakia;
HZDS ¼ Movement for a Democratic Slovakia;; MK ¼ Hungarian Coalition; SDK ¼
Slovak Democratic Coalition; SDKÚ ¼ Slovak Democratic and Christian Union;
SDL’ ¼ Party of the Democratic Left; SDSS ¼ Social Democratic Party in Slovakia;
Smer ¼ Direction; SMK ¼ Hungarian Coalition; SNS ¼ Slovak National Party;
SOP ¼ Party of Civic Understanding; ZRS ¼ Association of Workers of Slovakia.
Author Biography
Fernando Casal Bértoa is currently a Post-doctoral Fellow at the University of Leiden. He stud-
ied Law and Political Science at the University of Pamplona and the University of Salamanca,
respectively. After specializing in Eastern and Central European Studies (Jagiellonian University),
he obtained his PhD at the European University Institute (Florence). His work has been published
or is forthcoming in various edited volumes as well as in the Hungarian Political Science Review
or Government and Opposition.

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Party Politics

Party systems and cleavage structures revisited: A sociological explanation

The online version of this article can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

>> OnlineFirst Version of Record - Feb 14, 2012

Fernando Casal Bértoa

Paper Submitted 1 March 2011; Accepted for publication 14 June 2011

Cleavage and party system institutionalization: Two debated

Table 1. Criteria and operational indicators of party system institutionalization

Dimension Criteria Indicators Operationalization

Stability Government IGA: Pedersen’s index of If MV 50, then IGA ¼ MV

Table 2. Party system institutionalization in East Central Europe (1990–2009)

Countries IGA (%) IFA (%) IC (%) iPSI (z)

Hungary 98.8 89.6 91.0 2.5

The ‘sociology of politics’: Traditional approaches

Table 3. Fractionalization data

Country Economic Religious Ethnic/linguistic Rural/agricultural Post-communist ENEP

Hungary 0.3 0.5 0.2/0 0.4/0.2 0.2 4.7

Lijphart (1984), who, in his comparative study of the patterns of government in 21

Table 4. Number of ‘issue’ dimensions, cleavages and party system fragmentation/institutionalization

Country No. of dimensions No. of cleavages ENEP iPSI

Hungary 3.5 3 4.7 2.5

Table 5. Legacies, types of cleavage and party system competition

Table 6. ‘Predominant’ cleavage type and party system institutionalization

Level of PSI (predicted)

Hungary Religion Moderate Moderate 2.5

Table 7. Cleavage strength and party system institutionalization*

Country Economic Religious Post-communist iPSI

Hungary –2.4 0.2 0.4 2.5

Lipset and Rokkan revisited

to interact in a multiplicity of non-coinciding directions will definitely diminish their

Table 8. Cleavages, competitive dimensions and party system institutionalization

One None Uni-dimensional High

Secular SZDSZ MSZP Fidesz FKgP MÍEP MDF Religious

Post-Comm. MSZP SZDSZ MDF Fidesz FKgP MÍEP Anti-comm.

Urban SZDSZ MSZP MDF Fidesz FKgP MÍEP Rural

Liberal SZDSZ MSZP FKgP MDF Fidesz MÍEP Statist

Figure 1. Cleavages and approximate placement of political parties (1995–2009)

Cleavage structuration and party system institutionalization in

1993-2000 KSČM ČSSD SPR/RSČ HSD/SMS KDU/ČSL ODA ODS

Figure 2. Economic cleavage and approximate placement of political parties

Figures 4 and 5. Cleavages and approximate placement of political parties (1993–2009)

followed a similar pattern, although the level of ideological homogeneity increased to a

The combination of relatively strong support of secularism/universalism and a free-market/

SLD PPPP SLD

Figures 6 to 11. Cleavages and approximate placement of political parties (1991–2009)

Table 9. Cleavage cross-cuttingness and party system institutionalization

Hungary Religious-regional 0.83 0.33 2.5

Cleavage cross-cuttingness: Does it make a difference?

Almond G (1956) Comparative political systems. Journal of Politics 18(3): 391–409.

Grzymała-Busse A (2002) Redeeming the Communist Past: the Regeneration of Communist

Slovakia: AD ¼ Alliance of Democrats; ANO ¼ Alliance of the New Citizen; APR ¼

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