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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

People vs. Sapla

GR No.244045
 
Facts:
On January 10, 2014, at around 11:30 in the morning, an officer on duty at the Regional Public
Safety Battalion (RPSB) in Tabuk, Kalinga received a text message from an informant (concerned
citizen) that an individual will be transporting marijuana from Kalinga to Isabela. PO2 Jim Mabiasan (not
the officer who received the text message) then relayed the information to the deputy commander who
coordinated with the PDEA.About 1:00 o’clock  in the afternoon of the same day, a follow up information
via text message was received by the RPSB this time detailing the description of the drug courier, to wit:
male, wearing collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack; he will be
boarding a passenger jeepney bearing plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.Based on this
information, a checkpoint was organized by the PNP.At around 1:20 o’clock in the afternoon, the jeepney
arrived at the checkpoint and was flagged down. The police officers stopped the jeepney and inside they
saw the person described in the text message they received. They approached said person and asked him
if the blue sack in front of him was his. The person answered yes. The police officers then requested the
person to open the blue sack. The person hesitated but he eventually complied. The content of the blue
sack was four bricks of marijuana. The person was later identified as Jerry Sapla.

In court, Sapla denied the allegations as he claimed that when he boarded the jeep, he did not
have any sack with him; that the blue sack was only attributed as belonging to him by the police. Sapla
was convicted by the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and ruled that the
informant’s tip was sufficient to engender probable cause upon the minds of the police officers; that it
was sufficient to conduct a warrantless search and seizure.
 
ISSUE: 
Whether or not an informant’s tip is sufficient to engender probable cause and police officer may
justify the search as consented search. 

HELD:
No. the Supreme Court has always said that a mere informant’s tip is not sufficient to engender
probable cause. The police officer receiving the informant’s tip must rely on his senses. The police officer
must not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. The police officer, with his/her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act and not merely rely on the
information passed on to him/her. Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of a tip. A tip is still
hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of
any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion. The Supreme Court noted that there were two previous
decisions (Pp. vs Maspil and Pp. vs Bagista) which ruled that a confidential tip was sufficient to engender
probable cause, however, the Supreme Court in this case declared that these two cases are now being
abandoned to settle the issue once and for all. The Supreme Court also found the text message to be
double hearsay:

(1) the person who actually received the text message was not presented, and (2) the person who received
the text message merely relayed it to the officers who conducted the warrantless search and seizure
without the latter actually seeing/reading the actual text message. Further, the text message was not
preserved. It also appeared that the phone which received the text message was not a government issued
one – this belies the claim of the officers that the message was received by their hotline. Based on the
testimony of the police officers, Sapla hesitated when he was requested to open the blue sack. This only
means that he did not give his consent and that his compliance was vitiated by the presence of the police.
With all the foregoing, the search and seizure conducted was invalid and any evidence obtained therefrom
is inadmissible. Sapla was acquitted. The Supreme Court likewise emphasized the need to adhere to strict
standards set by the Constitution otherwise “A battle waged against illegal drugs that tramples on the
rights of the people is not a war on drugs; it is a war against the people.” The Bill of Rights should never
be sacrificed on the altar of convenience. Otherwise, the malevolent mantle of the rule of men dislodges
the rule of law.
 
Accordingly, accused-appellant Sapla is acquitted and is ordered immediately released from detention. 
 Page |2

PP v Nuevas
G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007

FACTS:
Respondents Jesus Nuevas, Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencia were apprehended byPO3
Teofilo B. Fami and SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling after bricks of marijuana were seized from them on the
morning of September 27, 1997 in Olongapo City. Accused Jesus Nuevas voluntarily gave the bag
containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves. With respect to the confiscation of 2 ½ kilos of marijuana
and the apprehension of accused Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, it was a result of a continued
operation by the team which this time was led by accused Nuevas to get some concession from the team
for his own earlier apprehension. As the apprehension of Nuevas was upon a probable cause, in the same
vein was the apprehension of Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio and the recovery from them [of] 2½
kilos of dried marijuana leaves.

ISSUE:
Were the warrantless searches and seizure made by the police officers valid?

RULING:
In holding that the warrantless searches and seizure are valid, the trial court ruled as follows: Our
Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise,
such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. The constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of
exceptions, namely:

1.Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence);
2.Search of evidence in "plain view. “The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;3.Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;4. Consented warrantless search;5. Customs search;6. Stop and Frisk; and7.Exigent and
emergency circumstances. In Nuevas’s case, the warrantless searches and seizure were valid as the Court
is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the police officers.
 Page |3

People v. Tudtud,
GR. 144037, 26 September 2003

FACTS:

Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City
received a report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.
Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for
the proliferation of marijuana in their area.  Relating to the report, the police conducted surveillance in
Solier’s neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that
Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling
marijuana.

Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new
stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around
4:00 pm that same day, a team of policemen posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur
Highway to await. Tudtud’s arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 pm, 2 men disembarked from a
bus and helped each other carry a carton marked “King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the
men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s description. The same man
also toted a plastic bag. PO1Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified
themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that
stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied
that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud then
said “it was alright” and let them see the box which contained bundles of dried fish, one wrapped in a
plastic bag and another in newspapers. When the bundles were unwrapped, there contained marijuana
leaves.

The police arrested Tudtud and his companion. They were charged with illegal possession of prohibited
drugs before the RTC of Davao City which convicted the accused.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s alright”) is considered
a waiver.

RULING:

NO. The right against unreasonable searched and seizures is secured by Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Constitution. Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, appellants lack of objection to the
search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to
the warrantless search and seizure. As the search of appellant’s box does not come under the recognized
exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in
evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their
informant, the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.

Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the
following requisites are present: It must appear that the rights exist; The person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when
the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents of the
carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist
and opened the box himself. Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The
fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission.
 Page |4

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA

G.R. NO. 120915 (1998)
FACTS:
P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant named Benjie, that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be
arriving from Baguio City the following day, with a large volume of marijuana.  Acting on said tip,
Abello assembled a team. Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the
afternoon and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank building along Rizal Avenue and
the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the
evening of the same day from where two females and a male got off.
It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team “Aling Rosa” who was then carrying a
travelling bag. Having ascertained that accused-appellant was “Aling Rosa,” the team approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents.  When Abello asked “Aling Rosa” about the contents of her
bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana
leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “Cash Katutak.” 
The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his
signature.  Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt
of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves. Instead of presenting its evidence,
the defense filed a “Demurrer to Evidence” alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items
thereby violating accused-appellant’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well
as their inadmissibility in evidence. RTC convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and
five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.

ISSUE/S:
WON the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the latter’s
constitutional rights.

HELD/RATIO:
Yes. In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of
arrest.  To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant’s bag, accused-appellant
must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides that:
Sec. 5: Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime.  Neither was she about to commit one
nor had she just committed a crime.  Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting
in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and
conclude that she was committing a crime.  It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant
and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The
NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the
informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for
them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.  Neither was there any semblance of any compliance
with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to affect a warrantless search of accused-
appellant’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully
arrested.  Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent
search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant.  As such, the articles
seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree”
and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
 Page |5

SALUDAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 215305, April03, 2018
FACTS:
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine
Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco), a
member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing
the female passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the
entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals. SCAA Buco checked
all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the
rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small size. SCAA
Buco then looked at the male passengers lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later
identified as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the direction of the bag. Afterwards,
SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that petitioner
and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus
and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30
caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one
cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to produce
proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately
arrested and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.

ISSUE:
Does a warrantless inspection of petitioner`s bag by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint
constitute a reasonable search?

RULING:
YES. As pronounced by the U.S. Supreme Court, which is doctrinal in this jurisdiction, the
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence,
only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable,
is the Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy
or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a "search"
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. In People v. Johnson, the Court declared that persons
may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.
Thus, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable
search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have
a reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and
minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-rayand physical inspections done at the
airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further be required to open their bags and luggage’s.
Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no
application, thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.
ISSUE:
Prior to entry and while on transit, can baggage’s inside private and public vehicles be searched
without a warrant?
RULING:
Yes, but only on public vehicles and not on private. The inspection of passengers and their effects
prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must satisfy the following
conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least
intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not
altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can
the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other
similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities,
children and other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be
continued to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts
must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted
against the accused.
 Page |6

However, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving
vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a
group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person until the
passengers on board alight from.

People of the Philippines vs Comprado

G.R. No. 213225, April 4 ,2018

Facts:  
A confidential informant sent a text message to P/Insp. Orate, that an alleged courier of marijuana
together with a female companion, was sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in his
possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro
City. The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet colors with the
marking "Lowe Alpine." Thus, at about 9:45 in the evening, the police officers stationed at Police Station
6 put up a checkpoint in front of the station. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the policemen stopped the
bus P/Insp.Orate, and others, boarded the bus and saw a man matching the description given to them by
the CI. The man was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap. After P/Insp. Orate
asked the man to open the bag, the police officers saw a transparent cellophane containing dried
marijuana leaves. The crime lab then identified the dried leaves as marijuana. 

Version of the Defense

 Accused-appellant denied ownership of the bag and the marijuana. He maintains that on 15 July 2011, at
around 6:30 in the evening, he and his girlfriend went to the house of a certain Freddie Nacorda in
Aglayan, Bukidnon, to collect the latter's debt. When they were about to leave, Nacorda requested him to
carry a bag to Cagayan de Oro City When they reached Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, their vehicle was
stopped by three (3) police officers. All of the passengers were ordered to alight from the vehicle for
baggage inspection. The bag was opened and they saw a transparent cellophane bag containing marijuana
leaves. At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, accused-appellant, his girlfriend, and the police officers
who arrested them boarded a bus bound for Cagayan de Oro City. When the bus approached Puerto,
Cagayan de Oro City, the police officers told the bus driver to stop at the checkpoint. The arresting
officers took photos of accused-appellant and his girlfriend inside the bus. They were then brought to the
police station where they were subjected to custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.
ISSUE:
Was there a valid “stop and frisk” search on the accused or a search of a moving vehicle?

RULING: 
No. The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to incite a
genuine reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the
records reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about
to commit a crime. In the case at bar, accused-appellant was just a passenger carrying his bag. There is
nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover, such circumstance, by itself, could not have
led the arresting officers to believe that accused-appellant was in possession of marijuana. Also, the
search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this particular
type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a· specific person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle,
the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the
information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying
marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person
matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover,
in this case, it just so happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such
breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless
searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a motor
vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it
arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person.
 Page |7

PEOPLE V OMAWENG
G.R. No. 99050. September 2, 1992

FACTS:
The accused was caught in the act of transporting the prohibited drug or, in other words, in
flagrante delicto. That he knew fully well what he was doing is shown beyond moral certainty by the
following circumstances: (a) the prohibited drug was found in a travelling bag, (b) he is the owner of the
said bag, (c) he concealed the bag behind a spare tire, (d) he was travelling alone, and (e) the Ford Fiera
in which he loaded the bag was under his absolute control, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court (on circumstantial evidence), the combination of all these circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Such circumstances, unrebutted by strong and convincing evidence
by the accused, even gave rise to the presumption that he is the owner of the prohibited drug.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING:
Accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been made, this Court would
be the first to condemn it "as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights
is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court." He willingly gave prior consent to the search and
voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of Prosecution
witness Joseph Layong was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by the accused for he chose not
to testify on his own behalf. Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures as this Court stated in People v. Malasugui.
 Page |8

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

Facts:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested shortly after embarking from M/V Wilcon 9 at around 8:30 PM in
Iloilo City on June 25, 1984. After having received a tip from one of their informers that the accused was
on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana, the PC officers, acting on this tip,
waited for him, and when he arrived, they simply accosted him, inspected his bag and found articles
which look liked marijuana leaves. They took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two
bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act was filed against him. Eventually he was convicted. In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the
marijuana, contending that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two
pairs of pants. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. He also contended that his bag was confiscated without a
search warrant.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the search and the arrest conducted to Idel Aminnudin is lawful.
2.Whether or not he is guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Held:
1.The Court held that the search and the arrest conducted to Idel Aminnudin is NOT lawful.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. In the case, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a
judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments
of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113of the
Rules of Court. Regarding the contention that there was no time to secure a search warrant, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could
have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing.
2.Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. The evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the
trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. Because the evidence was illegally
seized, it cannot be admitted. Without the evidence, IdelAminnudin must, therefore, be acquitted of the
charge.
 Page |9

PEOPLE VS. SUZUKI

Facts:
Appellant was found guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs and was sentenced to death.
Hence, the instant review.

The facts of the case are: Appellant was in the airport for his flight to Manila. PASCOM and
NARCOM agents were in the airport to follow on reports on drug trafficking.
When he walked through the metal detector, the alarm sounded. He was bodily frisked and
nothing was found on his person so they proceeded to check his luggage but appellant refused then
consented eventually and opened it. There they found packs of aluminum foil and when opened, it was
found to be marijuana.

Issue:
WON the PASCOM agents were authorized to conduct the search. WON accused consented to
the search. WON the search was conducted was incidental to a lawful arrest. WON the confiscated items
were in plain view.

Held:
In PP vs. Canton and PP vs. Johnson we validated the search conducted on the departing
passengers and the consequent seizure of the shabu found in their persons, thus: “Persons may lose the
protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable"
It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search and seizure is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right
by giving consent to the search or seizure.
Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM agents.
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search
conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights.
Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is deemed
to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such valid
search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant.
Nonetheless, we find the trial court’s reliance on the plain view doctrine misplaced. Such doctrine finds
application only when the incriminating nature of the object is in the "plain view" of the police
officer. Here, it is beyond cavil that the marijuana seized from appellant is contained in the box
of piaya, wrapped in aluminum foil and not immediately apparent to the airport authorities.
Neither was the search incidental to a lawful arrest since appellant was not yet arrested at the time
of the search. To be considered a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there must be a
lawful arrest before the search can be made.
 P a g e | 10

ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016

FACTS:
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search
warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be
so literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
Dela Cruz, an OJT of an interim-vessel, was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo.
While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter.
When his bag was placed in the x-ray machine, the operator saw firearms inside his bag. Upon
seeing the suspected firearms, the operator called the attention of port personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who
was the baggage inspector then. Dela Cruz claimed ownership for the bag and consented to manual
inspection. Dela Cruz was charged with violation of RA. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms. The trial
court held that the search conducted by the port authorities was reasonable and, thus, valid. The Court
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 7764 in
relation to Section 261 of BP Blg. 881. Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against
warrantless search.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and whether the
search was valid.

HELD:
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured
if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Hence, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by private persons are not
covered by the exclusionary rule. However, Court held this doctrine is not applicable in this case since
port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed agents of
government. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The
security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security
procedures in airports. It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here,
we find the search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his
constitutional rights. The search rendered was not unreasonable when the baggage inspector opened
petitioner’s bag and called the attention of the police. The port personnel's actions proceed from the
authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner
already submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning
machine. It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person's right to travel if
weighed against the safety of all passengers and the security in the port facility. In cases involving the
waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety.
 P a g e | 11

When his bag went through the x-ray machine and the firearms were detected, he voluntarily submitted
his bag for inspection to the port authorities. It was after the port personnel's inspection that Officer
Abregana's attention was called and the bag was inspected anew with petitioner's consent. Also, there was
probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to the search of his personal effects. With
the foregoing reasons, the search conducted on petitioner's bag is valid.

Posadas v Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 89139, 02 Aug 1990

Facts:
Two policemen were conducting a surveillance, when they spotted Posadas carrying a “buri” bag
and acting suspiciously. The policemen approached the Posadas and identified themselves as members of
the INP. Posadas attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding
his resistance Found inside the “buri” bag were one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, a smoke
(tear gas) grenade, and two (2) rounds live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. Posadas failed to show the
necessary license or authority to possess the firearms and ammunitions. He was subsequently prosecuted
for and found guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest is a valid warrantless arrest.

Held:
At the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the
buri bag. They did not know what its contents were the said circumstances did not justify an arrest
without a warrant.

Nevertheless, the search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation. When the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect
the same. To require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant
might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was
reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or
to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and
allow a crime to occur.
 P a g e | 12

People vs. Solayao

G.R. No. 119220. September 20, 1996

Facts:
While SPO3 Nio and two CAFGU members were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify
reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays, they met the group of Solayao
numbering five. The former became suspicious when they observed that the group was drunk and that
Solayao himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Solayao's companions, upon seeing
the government agents, fled. Nio told Solayao not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after
which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch
long homemade firearm locally known as "latong." When asked who issued him a license to carry said
firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that
he had no permission to possess the same. There upon, SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and turned him
over to the custody of the policeman of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him
with illegal possession of firearm.

Held:

There was found justifiable reason to apply the “stop-and-frisk” rule, because of the drunken
actuations of the Solayao and his companions, and because of the fact that his companions fled when they
saw the policemen, and finally, because the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to
verify reports that armed persons were roaming the vicinity. 
 P a g e | 13

Manalili vs. People

G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997

Facts:

The policemen conducted surveillance because of information that drug addicts were roaming the
area in front of the Caloocan City Cemetery. The policemen chanced upon a male person in front of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be
walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached
him and introduced themselves as police officers. They then asked the male person what he was holding
in his hands. The male person tried to resist but later showed his wallet where a crushed marijuana residue
was found inside. 

Held:
The policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually
high on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area
was a haven for drug addicts.

No valid Terry Search

 P a g e | 14

Privacy of Communication and Correspondence

Morfe vs. Mutuc

G.R. No. L-20387 , January 31, 1968

FACTS:

Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public officials and
employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. One of
the specific provisions of the said act is that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its
approval or after his assumption of office “and within the month of January of every other year
thereafter”, as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the
office to which he belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and
the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar.”  Said provision was challenged for
being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of
the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed
together with the prohibition against self-incrimination.         

ISSUE:

Whether or not the periodical submission of statement of assets and liabilities of an official is
violative of the petitioner’s constitutional rights.

RULING:

No. The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is
intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public
trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all.

When a government official accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed
the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of
office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. While in the attainment of such public
good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical,
and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows. The due process clause is not
susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power. It cannot
also be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on
the right of a person to privacy. It is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such compulsory
revelation, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.
 P a g e | 15

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom from
testimonial compulsion. It appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure has been shown to exist by such requirement. Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater
plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation of the non-incrimination clause. The court
stresses that it is not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s conduct from
judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice.

Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College

GR 202666, 29 Sept. 2014

Facts:
Daluz, Suzara, among others, who were graduating high school students of St. Theresa’s
College, took digital pictures of themselves being covered only in their undergarments, drinking hard
liquor, and smoking cigarettes. The photos were shown to Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s HS
department. She reported the matter and the identified students were then barred from joining their
commencement exercises. Petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Data. The RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data. Hence, this certiorari.

Issue:
Was there an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of
the minors that will entitle them to the writ of habeas data? Up to what extent is the right protected in
Facebook and other social networking sites? Did STC violate the right to privacy
of the minors?

Ruling:
No. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. Using
Facebook’s privacy tools, users can choose as to when and to what extent to disclose facts about
themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences. The utilization of these
privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy. In the case at bar, the petitioners’ children’s Facebook accounts, allegedly, were
under “Only Friends.” However, the Court said that setting the privacy to “Friends” is no assurance since
a user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
resulting to a greater number of users who can view the content. In addition, respondent STC got the
information from persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, STC did not violate
petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy. Hence, the petition for habeas data is denied.
 P a g e | 16

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board

GR Nos. 157870, 158633, 161658
November 3, 2008

Facts:
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165, a.k.a. the Comprehensive
Drugs Act of 2002. Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, particularly those who are charged with offenses
punishable by a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day of imprisonment.
On December 23, 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution 6486, which provides the rules on the mandatory
drugs testing of candidates for public office. It requires the COMELEC offices and employees concerned
to submit two separate lists of candidates: one for those who complied with the mandatory drug testing
and the other of those who failed to comply.
It was Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who opposed such resolution, contending that it was unconstitutional as it
imposes an additional qualification for senators.

Issues:

1. Do Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution 6468 impose an additional

qualification for candidates for senator?
2. Is RA 9165 unconstitutional?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws
or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Section 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution provides. The COMELEC resolution
effectively enlarges that qualification requirements for senator, enumerated under Section 3,
Article VI of the Constitution.
2. The provision of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing for students (Section
36[b]) are constitutional as long as they are random and suspicion less. This is because schools
and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students, and schools have the
right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair and non-discriminatory.
The provision requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and employees of public and private
offices (Section 36[d]) are also justifiable. The privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is reduced. A degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. To the
Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to
override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises.On the other hand, the Court finds
 P a g e | 17

no justification in the mandatory drug testing of those prosecuted for crimes punishable by
imprisonment of more than 6 years and 1 day (Section 36[f]). The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicion less. In this case, it cannot be said that the
drug testing is random. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165.In sum, Section 36(c) and (d) are constitutional, but 36(f) is not.

Alejano vs. Cabuay

G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005

FACTS:

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321-armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”), an upscale
apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security
officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers
publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’état with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003
Oakwood incident. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers
Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (“Trillanes”) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of
ISAFP. Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the same was denied.
Petitioners’ argued that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees’ right
to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a
sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center.
Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights unless
authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters. The
appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of
his right to privacy of communication; this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The
violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Constitutional rights of the petitioners were violated in connection with the
right to privacy of communication.
 

HELD:
NO. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the
detainees’ letters in the present case violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a
sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed
letters for the inspection of contraband.

The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestre
 P a g e | 18

campo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the
letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the
letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention
officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the
detainees.

That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights is a
guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned.

Pollo v. Constantino-David
GR 181881, 18 October 2011

FACTS:

Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an

anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a
memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mama Mayan Muna
(PALD) and Legal divisions. “Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of
PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were
examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17
diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative
cases in the CSC and other tribunals.

On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the
petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five
days from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of
“fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.

He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For
Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having
proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power
pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the
charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution,
petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex
parte. The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by
the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed
a motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: 

 Whether or not the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an
illegal search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy.
  
RULING:
 
No, the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful
and did not violate his constitutional right. The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office and computer files. The search authorized by the CSC Chair, the
 P a g e | 19

copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer is reasonable in its inception and scope.
The case at bar involves the computer from which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to
regulate and monitor.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Caunca vs Salazar
82 Phil.851

Facts: 
Bartolome Caunca filed a petition for habeas corpus in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who
was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar. An advanced payment
has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However,
Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency.
Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance
payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita
before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue: 
Whether or not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid who has not yet
paid the advance payment it made?

Held: 

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or

maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has
been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her
personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one’s
residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to
erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly
obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the
unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the
mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who
is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion. (Caunca vs Salazar, 82 Phil 851)
 P a g e | 20

Genuino v. De Lima
GR 197930, 17 April

FACTS:
The case is a consolidated case of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against former DOJ
Secretary Delima for her issuance of DOJ circular no. 41. Series of 2010, known as the “Consolidated
Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders (HDO), Watch
list Orders (WLO) and Allow Departure Orders (ADO)”. The Petitioners questions the constitutionality of
this DOJ circular on the ground that it infringes the constitutional right to travel. The petitioners in these
consolidated cases are former President Arroyo and her husband, and Efraim and Erwin Genuino.Former
DOJ Secretary De lima issued HDO and WLO against petitioners on the ground that criminal charges of
plunder, qualified theft and violation of the Omnibus Election Code were filed against them. Petitioners,
particularly Spouses Arroyo, file temporary restraining order against the issued HDO and WLO of DOJ
seeking relief and grant from court to allow them to travel so that former president Arroyo may seek
medical treatment abroad. The court granted relief sought on a condition that petition will file a bond of
PhP2M, an undertaking that petitioners shall report to Philippine consulate in the countries they are to
visit (Germany, Singapore, USA, Italy, Spain and Austria) and shall appoint a representative to receive on
their behalf subpoena, orders and other legal processes. Petitioners complied with all the conditions
instead of following the order of the court, DOJ caused for the refusal to process the Petitioners travel
documents.
 
ISSUE/S: 
Whether or not the DOJ Circular No.  41 is unconstitutional for being a violation of the
right to travel.

RULING:
Yes. The DOJ has no authority to issue DOJCircular No.  41 which effectively restricts the right
to travel through the issuance of Watchlist Orders Departure Orders (HDOs).

There are only three considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to 

travel:  national security, public safety or public health.

Further, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or Rules of Court providing for the

impairment. DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law.  It is not a
legislative enactmentbut a mere administrativeissuance designed to carry out the provisions of an
enabling law. DOJ is not authorized to issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the constitutional right to travel.
There is no mention of the exigencies statedin the Constitution that will justify the impairment. The
provision simply grants the DOJ the power to investigate the commission of crimes and
prosecute offenders.  It does not carry the power to indiscriminately devise all means it deems proper
in performing its functions without regard to constitutionally-protected rights.

DOJ cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of movement imposed by the circular on the ground

that it is necessary to ensure presence and attendance in the preliminary investigation of the
complaints. There is no authority of law grantingit the power to compel the attendance of the
subjects of a preliminary investigation pursuant to its investigatory powers.  Its investigatory power is
simply inquisitorial and, unfortunately, not broad enough to embrace the imposition of restraint on the
liberty of movement.
 P a g e | 21

LEAVE DIVISION VS. HEUSDENS

A.M.NO. P-11-2927,December 13,2011

Facts:
Heusdens, a staff clerk of MTC Tagum, left abroad without waiting for the results of
her leave application. It turned out that no travel authority was issued in her favor. Heusdens explained
that it was another intention to violate the rules (OCA Circular) as her leave was approved by her superior
judge.

Issue:

Whether the circular issued by the OCA can restrict a citizen’s right to travel as guaranteed by the
Constitution.

Ruling:
YES. The exercise of ones right to travel or the freedom to move from one place to another, as
assured by the Constitution, is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations
regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides that neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest.
 P a g e | 22

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES- OFFICE OF THE

COURT ADMINISTRATOR V JUDGE MACARINE
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, 18 July 2012, SECOND DIVISION

FACTS:
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) issued the Circular No. 49-2003 requiring all foreign
travels of judges and court personnel to be with prior permission from the Court. Moreover, a travel
authority must first be secured from the OCA. Accordingly, Judges must submit the complete
requirements to the OCA at least two weeks before the intended time of travel.  
Judge Ignacio Macarine requested for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family. Said travel
was to be charged to Judge Macarine’s annual forced leave. However, Judge Macarine did not submit the
complete requirements so his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. Judge Macarine
proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel authority. Judge Macarine was informed by
the OCA that his leave of absence had been disapproved and his travel considered unauthorized by the
Court. Accordingly, the absences of Judge Macarine shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from
his salary. The OCA found Judge Macarine guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003 for traveling
out of the country without filing the necessary application for leave and without rst securing a travel
authority from the Court.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Judge Macarine is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003 .

HELD:
 The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not
absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel
provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may
be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent
power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but
merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can
go on leave to travel abroad. To “restrict” is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to
“regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule. To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid
disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to
travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of absence duly recommended for
approval by his Executive Judge, a certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of
the OCA. The said certification shall state the condition of his docket based on his Certificate of Service
for the month immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has decided and resolved all
cases or incidents within three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.  Thus, for traveling abroad without having been officially allowed
by the Court, Justice Macarine is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
 P a g e | 23

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Estrada vs. Escritor,

492 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651,  August 4, 2003

Facts:
Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada requested an
investigation of respondent for cohabiting with a man not her husband and having a child with the latter
while she was still married. Estrada believes  that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which
tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed  therein as it
might appear that the court condones her act.
Escritor admitted the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for the alleged gross immoral
conduct for the reason that she is a member of the religious sect Jehovah’s Witness and Watch Tower
Society and her conjugal arrangement is approved and is in conformity with her religious beliefs. She
further alleged that they executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” in accordance with her
religion which allows members of Jehovah’s Witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to
enter into marital relations. The Declaration makes the union moral and binding within the congregation
throughout the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.

Issue:
Is Escritor guilty of gross immorality for having an illicit relationship?
Does her religious belief justify such act?

Ruling:
Yes, the act was grossly immoral. In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government
employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for which he/she
may be held administratively liable. In these cases, there was not one dissent to the majority's ruling that
their conduct was immoral. The respondents themselves did not foist the defense that their conduct was
not immoral, but instead sought to prove that they did not commit the alleged act or have abated from
committing the act.
No, Escritor is not guilty of gross immorality and she cannot be penalized for her freedom of religion
justifies her conjugal arraignment. In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the realm of belief poses no
difficulty. The early case of Gerona v. Secretary of Education is instructive on the matter, viz:
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So
is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most
anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when
weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the
exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.

The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedom, including religious
freedom, may be enjoyed.
 P a g e | 24

Garces Vs. Estenzo

104 SCRA 510 G.R. L-53487 May 25, 1981

 Facts:
Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed: a. Resolution
No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said
projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations. b. Resolution No. 6- The
chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and
that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The
image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s feast
day. These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image
was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s
property since church funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the
authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image.
Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his
answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of
the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution
was violated.

Issue:
Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held:
No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image
was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring
any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended
to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image
was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to
borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy
the image; therefore, it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if
they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were
used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some
religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom
of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
 P a g e | 25

UCCP vs. Bradford UCCI

G.R. No. 171905; 20 June 2012

FACTS:
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is a national confederation of incorporated and
unincorporated self-governing Evangelical churches of different denominations, devised for fellowship,
mutual counsel and cooperation. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), is likewise a religious
corporation with a personality separate and distinct from UCCP.
UCCP has 3 governing bodies: The General Assembly, the Conference and the Local Churches. BUCCI
belonged to the Cebu Conference Inc. and enjoyed a peaceful co-existence until late 1989 when the
BUCCI constructed a fence that encroached upon the right of way allocated by the UCCP for CCI.

The General Assembly attempted to settle the dispute and rendered a decision in favor of CCI. This
triggered a series of events, which further increased enmity and led to the formal break-up of BUCCI
from UCCP. Consequently, BUCCI filed its amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, which
provided for and affected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved the same. UCCP filed a complaint
before SEC to reject the same but SEC dismissed UCCP's petition. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not, SEC has the jurisdiction over matters involving UCCP and BUCCI.

RULING:
YES. Being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction of
the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A provides that SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all corporations. Even with their religious nature, SEC may exercise
jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and corporate. Well-settled is the judicial dictum that
factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as SEC, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. They
are binding upon this Court which is not a trier of facts. Only upon clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion, or that such factual findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on
record will this Court step in and proceed to make its own independent evaluation of the facts. No cogent
reason exists in the instant cases to deviate from this settled rule.
 P a g e | 26

GERONA VS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

Facts:
RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The implementing rule
Department Order 8 says that the anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It also says that
everyone must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while the ceremony is being held. After the
flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge. Petitioners belong to the Jehovah’s Witness whose children
were expelled from Buenavista Community School in Uson, Masbate when they refused to salute, sing
the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. They did not do so out of religious
belief. They are Jehovah's Witnesses. They consider the flag to be an image in the context of what is
prohibited in their religion and because of this they were expelled from the school. Gerona wrote to Sec
of Education that their children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent and stand at
attention but this was denied. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against
the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.

Issue:
Whether Department Order No 8 is valid.

Held:
Department Order 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to
determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one. The court held that the flag is
not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of
national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and
protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is
utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious
ceremony. After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must
rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or
sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many
interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or
sects or followers.
 P a g e | 27

Ebralinag, et al. vs. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu

GR Nos. 95770 and 9588,March 1, 1993

Facts:
The petitioners (Ebralinag, et al.) are elementary and high school students who were expelled
from their classes by public school authorities for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and Department Order No. 8 of the DepEd.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion” which
they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God". They feel bound by the Bible's
command to "guard ourselves from idols — 1 John 5:21". They consider the flag as an image or idol
representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the
intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control

Issue:
Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may
be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to
take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national
anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

Ruling:
No, they cannot be expelled for this reason. We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to
the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their
religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to
participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest
regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean
that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by
actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or
pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135
SCRA 514, 517)
 P a g e | 28

American Bible Society v City of Manila

101 PHIL 386 (1957)

Facts: 

New York’s Education Law requires local public-school authorities to lend textbooks free of
charge to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education
contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. An order
barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellant’s members from office for
failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of
textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional.
The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no
standing. The New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not
unconstitutional.

Issue:
Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free
exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).'

Held:
Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:(7) No law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The
provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. It may be true
that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a
little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the
provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in
doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as
its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the
Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution,
nor tax the exercise of religious practices. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be
considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As
to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is
powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.
WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from
it.
 P a g e | 29

Soriano vs. La Guardia

FACTS:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but
almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then
a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program AngTamangDaan. The remarks stated:
“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o
diba. Yung putangbabaeanggumaganalangdoonyungibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana angitaas, o
di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lolakomasahol pa saputangbabaeyan.
Sobraangkasinungalingan ng mga demonyonito.”
 

ISSUE:
Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse
and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

HELD:
 No. The petitioner’s statements did not convey any particular religious belief, and nothing
furthered his avowed evangelical mission. Merely being in a bible exposition program does not
automatically entail that statements made are of a religious discourse. “…he was moved by anger and the
need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction.” Under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights
as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him
from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that
petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as
a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the
public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast
media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than
the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use
of less offensive language.
 P a g e | 30

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.: 119673; July 26, 1996

FACTS:

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review
for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offended and
constituted an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner
INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs. 

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of the respondent Board. The RTC ordered
the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by
the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has
jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board
did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three
series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another
religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good
customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
 Does the respondent Board have the power to review the petitioner’s TV program?
 Assuming it has the power, did the respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of the petitioner’s religious program?

RULING:
1. YES, the respondent Board has the power to review the petitioner’s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent
Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs like its program “Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the
Constitution which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.” The Court, however, rejected
the petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the
bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The
Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will
bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent
i.e. serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public moral, or public welfare. The
Court shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened
scrutiny, but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides
and its exercise destroy, the State should stand still.

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of the
petitioner’s religious program.
 P a g e | 31

The evidence shows that the respondent Board X-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” other
religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence will show that the so-called
“attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The
videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they
were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be
prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner’s
freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. Under our constitution, it is not
the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. The
freedom of religion is the freedom of thought. The embers of truth will be fanned in the heat of colliding
ideas. The respondents failed also to apply the CLEAR and PRESENT DANGER RULE. In this case, it
was not present. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially
the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil
which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

Falcis III vs Civil Registrar General

G.R. No. 217910 September 3, 2019

Facts:
On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. His Petition sought to
“declare article 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles
46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.”The high court was asked about the constitutionality of the provision
of the Family Code of the Philippines defining marriage as "between a man and a woman”. Falcis claims
that Art 1 and 2 of FC deny the existence of individuals belonging to religious denominations that believe
in same-sex marriage and that they have a right to found a family accordance with their religious
convictions.

Issues:
Marriage is a legally-binding relationship that unites two (2) individuals, marriage becomes an
"enabling constraint" that imposes certain duties on married couples and even limitations on their actions.
What are the certain limitations on the property relations between spouses?

Held:
 
The law imposes certain limitations on the property relations between spouses.
For instance, the Family Code prescribes that in the absence of any settlement between the spouses, their
properties shall be governed by the regime of absolute community of property. (art 74, FC)
Under this regime, each spouse is considered a co-owner of all the properties they brought into the
marriage, as well as those properties they will acquire after marriage, regardless of their actual
contribution. The spouses may also choose a system of conjugal partnership of gains as their property
regime.
 Under this, "the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income
from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance " The spouses may also decide on a separation of property during the marriage, subject to a
judicial order. Should the spouses choose this property regime, they may, in their individual capacity,
dispose of their own properties even without the consent of the other. However, despite the separation, the
law mandates that the income of the spouses shall account for the family expenses.
 P a g e | 32

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

& ACCESS TO INFORMATION

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. vs. ROGELIO S. SOLUTA

G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006

FACTS:
Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker
room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in
barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly
opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open
the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn. Soluta immediately
lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in
barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon
instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions
began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search
warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops. As a result of the discovery of the
presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a
complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the
accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights?

HELD:
Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: In the present case, petitioners
had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego
conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their
companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample
time for them to obtain one. The course taken by petitioners and company was illegal. Petitioners’
violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus
furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents,
being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search
and seizure.

Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the
 P a g e | 33

violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who
must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer
for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together
with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and
severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in
accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6)
and (10) of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred
to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with approximately six feet (6′) by
ten feet (10′) in size, for public viewing within the vicinity of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One of
the tarpaulins stated: “Conscience Vote” and lists of candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a
check mark or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. 

Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who
voted against it form “Team Buhay” .When the said tarpaulin came to the attention of Comelec, it sent a
letter to Bishop Navarra ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin because it was in violation of
Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as the lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by
three feet (3’); otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against the latter. 

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, Bishop Navarra, et
al. prayed for the Court to declare the questioned orders of Comelec as unconstitutional, and permanently
restraining the latter from enforcing them after notice and hearing. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which the Comelec has the
power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute an abridgment of freedom of speech.

RULING: 
It is not election propaganda. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group. 

Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of
Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining “political advertisement” or “election propaganda.” 

The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech. That petitioners chose to
categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue—and a complex piece of
legislation at that—can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the candidates and party- list
organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other
Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners. But, the Bill of Rights enumerated
in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes
good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to
others but also in judgment of the acts of others. 
 P a g e | 34

New Sounds Broadcasting vs Dy

G.R. No. 170270

 Facts:
Petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayor’s permit on 2002. Bagnos Maximo [the City
Zoning Administrator-Designate] required the petitioner to submit "either an approved land conversion
papers from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) showing that the property was converted from
prime agricultural land to commercial land, or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or
Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the re-classification of the property from agricultural to
commercial land." Petitioners had never been required to submit such papers before, and from 1996 to
2001, the OMPDC had consistently certified that the property had been classified as commercial.

Due to this refusal by Maximo to issue the zoning clearance, petitioners were unable to secure a
mayor’s permit. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cauayan City to compel the issuance of the 2002 mayor’s permit.

RTC denied the application of the petitioners; CA dismissed the case due to the availability of
other speedy remedies with the trial court.

Then DAR Region II Director Abrino L. Aydinan (Director Aydinan) granted the application [of
the petitioner] and issued an Order that stated that "there remains no doubt on the part of this Office of the
non-agricultural classification of subject land before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988."

On 16 January 2003, petitioners filed their applications for renewal of mayor’s permit for the year
2003, attaching therein the DAR Order. Their application was approved. However, on 4 March 2003,
respondent Felicisimo Meer, Acting City Administrator of Cauayan City, wrote to petitioners claiming
that the DAR Order was spurious or void, as the Regional Center for Land Use Policy Planning and
Implementation (RCLUPPI) supposedly reported that it did not have any record of the DAR Order

The controversy continued into 2004. In January of that year, petitioners filed their respective
applications for their 2004 mayor’s permit, again with the DAR Order attached to the same. A zonal
clearance was issued in favor of petitioners. Yet in a letter dated 13 January 2004, respondent Meer
claimed that no record existed of DAR Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002 with the Office of the Regional
Director of the DAR or with the RCLUPPI. As a result, petitioners were informed that there was no basis
for the issuance in their favor of the requisite zoning clearance needed for the issuance of the mayor’s
permit.

On 17 February 2004, respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of
Cauayan City, arrived at the property and closed the radio stations. Petitioners proceeded to file a petition
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking enforcement of the Omnibus Election Code,
which prohibited the closure of radio stations during the then-pendency of the election period. On 23
March 2004, the COMELEC issued an order directing the parties to maintain the status prevailing before
 P a g e | 35

17 February 2004, thus allowing the operation of the radio stations, and petitioners proceeded to operate
the stations the following day.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act of
prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press.

Held: Yes.
Ratio:Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression
in advance of actual publication or dissemination. While any system of prior restraint comes to court
bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. That the
acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents
who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a long-standing tradition of special
judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a
greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most other forms of behavior. At the
same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with
the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined
standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of
the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral
laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression. Content-neutral
regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened
scrutiny.

Chavez Vs Gonzales
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

Facts:
Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to
the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6June
2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press conference in Malacañang Palace,
where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations
between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but
claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been "spliced" to make it appear that President
Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and
television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a "cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with
officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP), to dispel fears of
censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom.

Issue:
WON the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an
impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

Held:
When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four
categories of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent
lawless action, and danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior restraint
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-
based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression
means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship Prior restraint on expression is content-
based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the expression. Courts will subject to strict
scrutiny content-based restraint. If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression,
it is content-neutral even if it burdens expression The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes
is a content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s
claim that the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful misrepresentation," and thus
should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based The public airing of the
Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four existing categories of
unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a
political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations
 P a g e | 36

with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections. The
content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of
the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. Public discussion
on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the highest political expressions of any electorate, and
thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political
expression would occupy the highest rank. The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be
no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is
unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not,
endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may
be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the
Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the
State. The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of
any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of expression. The only exceptions to
this rule are the four recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the content of the Garci
Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of unprotected expression.

Penera vs. COMELEC

G.R. No.181613

Facts:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar (Andanar) were mayoralty candidates in Sta.
Monica Andanar filed... a Petition for Disqualification... against Penera... for unlawfully engaging in
election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period.
Andanar claimed... that... before the start of the authorized campaign period Penera and her party mates
went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the
people to vote for them on the... day of the elections. Penera admitted that a motorcade did take place, she
explained that it was simply in accordance with the usual... practice in nearby cities and provinces, where
the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade... the COMELEC...
disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty candidate... for engaging in premature campaigning
Whether or not [Penera] has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside the
campaign period.

Issues:

Whether or not [Penera] has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside
the campaign period.

Ruling:
We find no merit in the instant Petition under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. It shall
be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan... political activity except during the campaign
period. If the commission of the prohibited act of premature campaigning is duly proven, the consequence
of the violation is clearly spelled out in Section 68... which reads: Any candidate who... violated any of
Sections 80... shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office. In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not just by Andanar's evidence, but also
those of Penera herself, that Penera and her party mates, participated in a motorcade which passed
through the different barangays... of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw candies to
the onlookers. Additionally, the Joint Affidavit... gave an even more straightforward account of the
 P a g e | 37

events, thus:... after actual registration with the COMELEC... the motorcade proceeded to three (3)
barangays out of the 11 barangays while supporters were throwing sweet candies to the crowd;... there
was merriment and marching music for violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing
election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period, Penera must be disqualified
from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica.

PRIMICIAS vs FUGOSO
80 PHIL 71;L-1800;27 JAN.,1948

Facts:
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent Mayor Fugoso to issue
a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government.
The reason alleged by the Mayor Fugoso in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, especially
on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Mayor Fugoso
also invoked the delegated police power to local government. The Philippine Legislature has delegated
the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila. The Municipal Board is
also granted the following legislative powers, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression
of riots, affrays, disturbances and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets, avenues, . . .
parks, cemeteries and other public places" and "for the abatement of nuisances in the same," and "(ee) to
enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants." Section 844 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense
against public peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any
act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect
with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Issue:
Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.
Held:
Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two
constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse,
to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and
other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to
 P a g e | 38

determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate
and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First
construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic
system of government, no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government,
except perhaps in cases of national emergency. The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious
injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free
men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil
to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction
of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the
state.

JBL Reyes vs. Bagatsing

125 SCRA 553; L-65366; 9 NOV 1983

FACTS:
Petitioners sought a permit to hold a peaceful march and rally, requesting for the removal of the
foreign military bases in Manila, starting from Luneta park to the gates of the US Embassy. Respondent
Mayor denied the request as recommended by the police authorities and suggested another area where the
safety of the participants and the general public may be ensured. Petitioner contends that said denial was a
violation of free speech and assembly.

ISSUE:
WON denial of a public rally on a public park and the US Embassy is a violation of
constitutional guarantee to free speech and assembly.

HELD:

Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication
that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places,
especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the
applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent of clear
and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta and US Embassy as the place for the
peaceful rally. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Moreover, denial of permit for a rally in front
of the US Embassy is justified only in the presence of a clear and present danger to life or property of the
embassy.
 P a g e | 39

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioners argue that Section 11 (b) of RA No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional
guarantees comprising freedom of expression and it amounts to censorship as it selects and singles out for
suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely,
media-based election or political propaganda. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's
role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to
election issues. Further, petitioners contend that it abridges freedom of speech of candidates, as it would
bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and
issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

ISSUE:
WON Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.

RULING:
COMELEC has been expressly authorized by Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution to supervise or
regulate enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication
and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" is spelled out in the
Constitution to ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and
reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information
campaigns and forums among candidates." The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution
may be seen to be that no  presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or
regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among
candidates for  political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of
 P a g e | 40

the rights of free speech and free press. For supervision or regulation of the operations of media
enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the
general, time-honored one that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its
unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.

Southern Hemisphere vs Anti-terrorism Council

G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010

FACTS:
Six petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the
Human Security Act of 2007 for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. They argue that the
definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth finds application in
RA9372?

RULING:
No, it does not. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein
certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted. RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They
are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
 P a g e | 41

GSIS v. Villaviza
G.R.NO. 180291,JULY 27, 2010

Facts:
PGM Garcia filed formal charges against respondents for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. That on May 27, 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt
together with some employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at outside of the office of the
investigation unit in a mass demonstration/rally protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert
Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises. The petitioners argued that the
memorandum circular was merely an Administrative issuance aimed at stream lining the GSIS operations
and did not violate the CBA or the respondents right to self-organization. The CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the Memorandum Circular issued by the GSIS
violated the CBA and the respondents right to self-organization.

Held:
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s ruling and held that the Memorandum Circular
issued by the GSIS violated the CBA and the respondents right to self-organization. The CBA between
the GSIS and its employee’s union contained an automatic renewal clause and a non-diminution clause,
which guaranteed that the benefits enjoyed by the employer. The circular effectively repealed these
provisions of the CBA by stating that any agreement between the agency and the union would be subject
to the budgetary limitations and other laws and regulations. The court also held that the respondents were
not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing the petition as the issue involved a
violation of a contractual obligation and a constitutional right.
 P a g e | 42

GSIS v Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS

GR No. 170132, December 6, 2006

FACTS:

Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS
personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
(“KMG” or the “Union”), a public sector union of GSIS rank -and-file employees. On or about October
10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-
union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in
said rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on
the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to
the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the
filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. KMG filed a petition for prohibition
with the CA against these charges. The CA granted the petition and enjoined the GSIS from
implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising from the same
facts and events. CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar
activities available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that
inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees’ organization,
petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and
demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action.
 P a g e | 43

ISSUE:
WON the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or
prohibited concerted mass action.

HELD:
Yes. With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondents’
members launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to
the same thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase prohibited concerted activity refers to any
collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employee’s
organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts
of similar nature. This was shown when 48% of employees took to the streets on the first day, leaving the
other employees to fend for themselves in a government office.

CABANSAG V. FERNANDEZ
G.R No. L-8974, October,1957

Facts:
Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint seeking the ejectment of Germiniana Fernandez from a
parcel of land. He later wrote a letter to the Presidential Complainst and Action Commission (PCAC)
regarding the delay in the disposition of his case before the CFI Pangasinan. The judge order Cabansag
and his lawyers to show cause why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending such letter
which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the president (Magsaysay) and the people. After due
hearing, the court rendered sa decision finding Cabansag and his lawyers guilty of contempt and
sentencing them to pay a fine.

Issue:
Whether or not Cabansag’s letter created a sufficient danger to a fair administration of justice.

Held:
No. The letter was not sent to the office of the President asking for help because of the
precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had taken may not be a wise one for it
would have been proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court,
such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so danger, must cause a serious imminent threat to the
administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has “dangerous tendency” to be little the court or
 P a g e | 44

undermine the administration or justice for the writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition
the government for the redress of a legitimate grievance.

Petition is Granted and appealed is Reversed.

US v. FELIPE BUSTOS ET AL
GR No. 12592, Mar 08, 1918

Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and
prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law
office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice
of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from
persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a
writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

Issue:
Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech
and free press.

Held:
Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace
or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty
 P a g e | 45

which everyone owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It
is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful
act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish
them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably
for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances.
The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration
of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or
moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact
he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were
believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think
that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens
— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did
they abuse the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A
privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity.

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. Vs Capulong,

160 SCRA 861, G.R. NO. L-82380; 29APR 1988

FACTS:
 Respondent Sen. Enrile files a case against private petitioners for the production and filming of
the projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution”, which relates to the non-bloody change of
government that took place at EDSA, for its unlawful intrusion upon the former’s right to privacy.

Petitioners contends that the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of speech and
expression; and the subject matter of the motion picture is one of public interest and concern and not on
the individual private life of respondent senator.

ISSUE:
WON the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free speech.

HELD:
 P a g e | 46

Yes. The EDSA revolution where private respondent is a major character is one of public interest.
Private respondent is a public figure due to his participation in the culmination of the change of
government. The right of privacy of the a “public figure” is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary
citizen.

ZALDIVAR VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7,1988

FACTS:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution filed by the Petitioner: a Motion, dated 9
February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Saldivar against public respondent
Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707
and G.R. No. 80578. and a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul
Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions for making certain public statements.

The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the
information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing
certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578.
In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article which appeared in
the 30 November 1987 issue of the “Philippine Daily Globe.”

ISSUE:
 P a g e | 47

Are lawyers entitled to the same degree of latitude of freedom of speech towards the Court?

HELD:

No. The Court begins by referring to the authority to discipline officers of the court and members
of the Bar. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate
admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of
justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected
in any manner with a case before the Court.

Gonzales vs Katigbak
G.R. No. 69500, July 22, 1985

FACTS:
In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October 23, 1984, a permit to exhibit
the film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions
enumerated was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the
classification of the film "For Adults Only" was without basis. 4 Then on November 12, 1984, respondent
Board released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 October
1984, the Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee and an examination of the film,
resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-committee. Considering, however, certain vital deficiencies
in the application, the Board further Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the
issuance of the Permit to exhibit until these deficiencies are supplied

ISSUE:
WON the rating made with grave abuse of discretion.

 HELD:
 P a g e | 48

Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex
in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works,
is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.
Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been a subject of absorbing
interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern.
In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino cultural values as a standard.
Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the
arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of the State. Given this constitutional mandate, it will be less
than true to its function if any government office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an
artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine
what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belles-lettres deal primarily with
imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to
respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. On
the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed
in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a recent decision
in Trinidad- an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of construction, applied when considering
constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will maintain
and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. There can be no valid objection to the
controlling standard. There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and its perception of
what obscenity is is very restrictive. But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES TO
MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in
the fact that some scenes were not for young people. They might misunderstand the scenes. The
respondents offered to make it GP if the petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they
refused. The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the
consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance.
This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches
every home where there is a set. It is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the
adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an
attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.

PEOPLE vs. J. J. KOTTINGER

G.R. No. L-20569 October 29, 1923

FACTS:
In 1922, detective Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera Supply Co. Confiscated were
post-cards portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in
the regions in which they live which subsequently were used as evidence against Kottinger, the manager
of the company. Hence, Kottinger was in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The information filed in
court charged him with having kept for sale in the store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and in
decedent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No. 277. Kottinger interposed a contention that the
alleged acts did not constitute an offense and were not contrary to law; but trial court overruled and the
defendant duly excepted thereto. The trial court found Kottinger guilty of the offense charged and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs. In
the appeal, defendant-appellant argues that section 12 does not prohibit the taking, selling, and publishing
of alleged obscene and indecent pictures and prints, and second, that the information in this case charges
no offense prohibited by section 12.

ISSUE:
Whether pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and
can be seen in the regions in which they live, are obscene or indecent.

RULING:
 P a g e | 49

No. The pictures are not obscene. The word "obscene" and the term "obscenity" may be defined
as meaning something offensive to chastity, decency, or delicacy. "Indecency" is an act against behavior
and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular
publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another
test of obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. The
pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons
in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of all
the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of this type. We are convicted that
the post-card pictures in this case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy. The
Court ruled that pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and
can be seen in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel
Law. Disagreeing therefore with the appellant on his technical argument but agreeing with him on his
main contention, it becomes our duty to order the dismissal of the information.

Bayan vs. Ermita

G.R. NO. 169838 April 25, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that their right as organizations and individuals were violated
when the rallies they participated in on October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 were violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a
peaceful mass action they were preempted and violently dispersed by the police. Petitioners contended
that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They assert that the right to
peaceful assembly, are affected by BP 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR)
being followed to implement it. They argue that BP 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought.

Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of
some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law
applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated.
 P a g e | 50

ISSUE:

Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive Response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, are
unconstitutional.

HELD:

The constitutionality of BP 880 was sustained but the provision on Calibrated pre-emptive
response (CPR) was declared as null and void. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a
right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this right represent the very
basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected.

PBM Employees Org Vs PBM Co. Inc.

5 June 1973]GR No. L-31195

FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. [PBMEO] is a legitimate labor union.
Petitioners decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police. Respondent company, Philippine Blooming Mills, Co. Inc. warned the petitioners that any
demonstration should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company and all those employees
who belong to the first shift and are required to report for work will be dismissed if they join the
demonstration. Petitioners and their members, numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration.
Respondent firm charged the employees of violating the CBA- No Lockout No Strike provision.
Petitioners claimed that it was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech. CIR ruled in
favor of the firm, thus this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of violating the CBA.

HELD:
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While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupied a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions and such priority “give these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions.” Property and property rights may be lost thru prescription but human rights are
imprescriptible. The mass demonstration was not a strike, there being no industrial dispute between the
labor union and the respondent firm. It is merely an exercise of their right of free expression, peaceable
assembly and redress of grievances. Wherefore, respondent firm is directed to reinstate the eight
petitioners.

Malabanan v. Ramento
G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984

FACTS:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought
and were granted by tile school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on
August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit,
not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second-floor lobby. At such gathering they
manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of
Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the
Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They
continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities
and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also,
the non-academic employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created.
They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal
assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were formed through a memorandum that they were under
preventive suspension for one academic year for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly
in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with damages against private respondents.
 P a g e | 52

ISSUE:
WON the suspension of the students for 1 academic year was violative of the constitutional rights
of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech?

DECISION:

Yes. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 6 the invocation of the right to
freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise
been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression which is Identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment
and which “is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing … of a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.” It would be most appropriate then, as was done in
the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 21 for this Court to lay down the principles for the guidance of school
authorities and students alike. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students
of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or
involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there
be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a
corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances
made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under
the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the
ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting
such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of
classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its
terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. Petition Granted. One-week
suspension had been served.

RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of

Atty. Marcial A. Edilion | A.M. No. 1928, 3 August 1978

FACTS:
   
The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll
of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of
Court 139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to
the organization of the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of this, compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
no legal force and effect.
 P a g e | 53

ISSUE:
   
Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to the
IBP.

HELD:
    The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of a
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers
are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment of
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual
dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional free to associate. Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues.

    The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

    The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys of
the Court

ACCESS OF INFORMATION

Francisco I. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority &

Amari Coastal Development Corporation
G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

Facts:
• In 1973, the government signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also
included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to
carry out all the works in consideration of 50% of the reclaimed land.
• In 1977, then President Marcos created the Public Estates Authority (PEA), tasking it to “reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas” and “to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands” and issued another Presidential Decree transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay” under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project(MCCRRP).
• In 1981, then President Marcos issued a memo directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that
“All future works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by PEA.
• In 1988, then President Aquino issued a Special Patent transferring to PEA the reclaimed parcels of
land. Then, the Register of Deeds of Paranaque issued titles in the name of PEA, covering the “Freedom
 P a g e | 54

Islands”.
• In 1995, the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to
develop the Freedom Islands without public bidding.
• In 1998, Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends that
the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a violation of Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the polydomain private corporations.
• Court denied his motion for a TRO.

Issue:
Whether the stipulations in the amended Joint Venture Agreement for the transfer to Amari of
certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint
which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

RATIO: The Regalian Doctrine

• The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
Doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all “lands, territories and possessions” in the Philippines passed
to the Spanish Crown. • The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution adopted the Regalian Doctrine
substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public
domain. It is a time-honored principle of land ownership that “all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain.”
• AMARI as a private corporation cannot acquire the reclaimed Freedom Islands, though alienable lands
of the public domain, except by lease, as provided under Sec. 3, Article XII of the Constitution.
• The Decision does not bar private corporations from participating in reclamation projects and being paid
for their services in reclaiming lands. The Decision however prohibits, private corporations to acquire
reclaimed lands of the public domain.
• Despite the nullity of the Amended JUA, AMARI is not precluded from recovering from the PEA in the
proper proceedings, on a quantum merit basis, whatever AMERI may have incurred in implementing the
Amended JUA prior to its declaration of nullity.

LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

GR No. 132601, 1998-10-12

FACTS:
On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed [1] the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for
the crime of rape of the 10-year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of
the death penalty for the said... crime.

Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and on its heels, a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659[2] (the death penalty law) ... and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime
of rape.

On February 7, 1998, this Court denied [3] petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection,[4] and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING
DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL
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PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.

On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition[8] for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from
carrying out the execution by lethal injection of... petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing
rules as these are unconstitutional and void for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per se
as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process,... On March
16, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General[11] filed a Comment (On the Petition and the Amended
Supplemental Petition)[12] stating that (1) this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death
Penalty Law, and... has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment; (2) execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the
questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more...
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); (3) the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty;

ISSUES:
I. DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A CRUEL,
DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.

II.

THE DEATH PENALTY VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL

AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, WHICH IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.

III.

LETHAL INJECTION, AS AUTHORIZED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND THE
QUESTIONED RULES, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS AN UNNECESSARY AND
WANTON INFLICTION OF PAIN ON A PERSON AND IS, THUS, A CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND
INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.

RULING:
I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT
UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons,[23] this Court held that "punishments are cruel...
when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life."

First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only
of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective.

Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task.

Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death
penalty and does not fall within the constitutional prescription against cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment.

II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE

INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS.
 P a g e | 56

Legaspi vs. CSC

G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987

FACTS:

The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request for information on the civil
service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil
service eligible who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information,
petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to
disclose said information.

The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the
 P a g e | 57

petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Songhay
and Agas.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

HELD:
The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the
case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as
the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is
a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. Height’s .It becomes apparent that
when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general public which possesses petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality
to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

VALMONTE vs BELMONTE
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their
right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of
the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the
subject information on June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "We are now considering ourselves free to do
whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
interest."
 P a g e | 58

 ISSUE:

WON Valmonte, et. al. is entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on
behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to
the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

 HELD:
Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations
of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not
what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.
The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted.
It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their news worthiness, public figures,
most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy
as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The
"transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract,
and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which,
though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-
owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right
to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although
citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.