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    Peirce Logic

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    Itzamna Fuentes

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    Albert Atkin Peirce R fotecae, Five Logic Introduction Peirce was deeply committed to the study of logic. He came across iv early, fist reading his older brother's copy of Richard Whatly’s ‘ats of Lage when he was evelve, and he remained a devoted logician throughout his life. As we previously noted, he was the fist person w be Idemufed a5 logician sn Whot én, and even in times of near penury he remained dedicated to working on his logic. Even in his own lfesime, where Peirce's academic genius was known it was asa logician. During hie employment at Johns Hopkins University in the early 1880s, his contributions to and standing inthe field were frequendy noted by the celebrated fig ‘ures of what was then the dominant approach to logic. WS. Jevons (1881) pointed to Peirce’s work a8 greatly advancing the feld, and in his review of the Plrce-eited Stabe a Loic (Peirce 1883). English mathematician John Venn stated MrC.Peirce’s name's so well nowa to those who take an inter- ‘tin the development of the Boolean or symbolic treatment of ‘Logic that the knowledge that he was engaged in lecturing upon the subject o advanced clases 2 the Johns Hopkine University will have been assurance that some interesting contributions to the subject might soon be looked for [1] [=] [T]he volume under novice [.-] seems to me to contin [a] greater quanticy ‘of novel and suggestive matter than any other recent work on Logie 165 the same or allied subjects which has happened to come under ry notice, (Venn 1883, $94) Given the kind of work that Perce was producing on logic, not ‘only atthe time of his Johns Hopkins appointment bu throughout his hie, itis unsurprising that leading contemporaries knew of his ‘work and placed a high vale on it, We know that with the increased isolation that Perce experienced after the termination of his Johns Hopkins post, his logical work drew less attention, and, as we shall seein a moment, his pe place inthe history of logic is sill con- tetious. Nonetheless, we now know that Peirce was reeponsible for all manner of firsts and innovations, He developed complex func tional treatments of the logical proposition: made key developments in the notion of logical relations; developed a theory of quantifiers roughly contemporaneous with Frege but more direcly infuen: tial on the development of modern mathematical logic; originated such of the quantifier notation that we currenly use; developed ‘ruth- funcional treatments of logical connectives: introduced truth ‘ables; developed tradic logis; and generated an unngung di ‘grammasc logic that encompassed much that we now recognise 38 first-order logic, second-order logic and complex modal logics, ‘with protorypepossible-worlds' semantics. ‘This is certainly an impressive list of accomplishment, and for anyone who Inows anything about the offical history of modera ‘mathematical loge, these ae big claims, but the lit above actualy offers a relatively modest account of Peirce’ achievements. Other ‘commentators on Perce's work claim even more for bis is of frets. Jaako Hinakka (1997) places him a the heart of the model theoretic tmadiion, a a forebear of Tatsis work in logic, and names im as an eatly proponent of game-theorecal semantics. Randall Dipert, (1984) denies easly meta logical speculation on decdabity in Peirce’ work and, along with Christopher Hookway (1985, 199— 200), identifies an early anticipation of Peano's postulates for natural ‘numbers. To be clear, when judged against Peirce’s writings, none ofthese claims isthe least bit laboured or frfetched, Peirce’s pub lished contributions to the development of logic are mighty, and the depth and range of his overall body of work on logic, most of 166 Peirce it underappreciated or unrecognised, i simply suaggering ~ even ‘more so when one considers the relative isolation he experienced ‘hrough mach of his intellectual fe Arguably, though, Peirce i tll ‘underappreciated in the history of logic How one understands Peirce'splacein the history oflogicdepends| very much on how one places his workin relation to the mathemat- Jail development of moder logic chat characterises much of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries According t the official story, ‘moder logic begins with Frege's Eallacht in 1879, where we find the frst cheory of modern quantification, Jean van Feijenooe’s influential book From ret» Gl (1967) places Pisce’ early work in algebraic logic as part ofan interesting dead end, seeing it as having 1o real historical impact and as art of the lumbering Aristotelian inosaur swept away by the powerful new quantifier logi of Frege and Russell, thers see the history differen: So what is Peirce’ place in the history of logical theory? He was 2 working member ofa tradition which war largely sippreseed im his own time and inthe next couple of decade, Because of this suppression, few iFany of his most interesting ideas were ‘developed by others. By the time the model-theortical tradition was revitalised again among logicians and philosophers, some of Prrce's problems and ideas had been superseded or even for gotten. (Hintkka 1997, 32) However, even this is not quite true. Important work by Diper (1989) and Puimam (1982) makes it abundandly clear ehat Peirce exercised incredibie influence over the development and dawning of moder logic, markedly moreso than Frege, in fat. The key t0 the rise of modern logic s undoubtedly the development of quant- fication, but the fctors which bring quantification to the forefro ‘of modern logic at the dawning ofthe twentieth century ster fo Peirce’s work, not Frege’. To quote Putnam a length: ‘When Isard to wace the later development oflogte, the first thing 1 did was to lok at Schroer’ Velengm her de Alp Li]. 1 simply wished to see how Schrdder presented the quantifier Logie 167 Well, Schrdder does mention Frege's discovery, though just barely; but e does not explain Frege's notation a all The nota- tion he both explains and adopts [...] i Peirce’... [Many famous logcians adopted Perce-Schréder notation, and famous results and systems were published i it Lowenheim stated and proved the Lowenheim theorem (Later reproved and strength ened by Skolem, whose name became attched to it together ‘with Lowenheim') in Peirian notation, In fc, there is n0 ref ference in Lowenheimn’s paper to any logic other than Perc’ (Putnam 1982, 295-297) ‘What this tll us is that whilst in the offical retelling Peire’s cealy influence was sidelined and Frege given credit for inventing system of quantification, Peirce’ work and influence were hardly Suppressed. He was instrumental ia establishing modern logic by Tying tthe root ofa chain of influential work that goes from Peirce to Schroder to Peano and on toWhitehead and Rusell and che dawn ‘of modern mathematical loge. We shal unpack thie more in what, follows, but if the historical origin of modera loge should focus ‘on the quantifier, then Peirce is there at che very hear oft. To para phrase Putnam (1982, 301), the dscovery of quantification may be Frege's, but Peirce discovered quantifiers ao that they stayed dis covered.’ And whilst this is sll an under appreciated Fic, itis no longer the well-kep secret i once was, Tris time, then, that we examined some of Peirce’ logical workin lle more deri. We shall begin by looking at some general char acersations of Perce’s view of logic, This is worthwhile because as ‘influential as much of his work was, his published papers especially Peirce was still working ina logical wadition that ca look strange to us We shall then examine his work in developing Boclesn or algebraic logic This i often seen as his ‘ealy" period of work and certainly covers the period of his life up to and beyond his Johns Hopkins appointment. It also represents that portion of Peirce’ log- ‘cal work which is most well known and which has the broadest Influence over the rise of modern mathematical logic, Finally. we stall look ar Perce’ later work on diagrammatic logic, This work 168. Peirce ‘was produced when Pelice was more isolated from the academic ‘world and so is es well known and less undertcod than his earlier algebraic work on logic, but as we salle, iis rich and interest ng aea of his philosophical ouput. Peirce's view of logic To the modern eye, Petce’s work on logic can look confused, ‘under-explained and dificult place i ine with ou current under. standing ofthe discipline. This is parly due, s we've mentioned, 0 his early work developing the approach to logic used by Boole, eran, Cifford and others of the algebraic eadtion, an approach mostly unfamiliar to us today. An addtional obscuring factor i the Kind of language Peire uses and his need to mark distinctions wherever he sees them, AS Quine notes in regard 0 Peiree's early work on relatives [ile made 2 hobby early and late of taxonomic terminology. Vie have self claves, aliveeaivs, cylic relatives, eure lisquiparents, concurrens, opponents, and copulaives, (Quine 1995, 25) ‘This modern under appreciation is also due to Peirce's deep under standing and awareness of the history of logical thought. In the ‘moder mind, logic begins with Frege, and belore him there e only ‘the dark ages Perce, however, saw himelf at pat of a continuum of concerns steiching fom Aristotle through medieval logicane and beyond to Leiba and at times his work reflects this conception ofthe Bld. However, when we look cloely at how Peirce sw logic, and especially when we dari certain points im bie work, we ci see that his view resonates strongly with many of our cureat ideas In what follows, we shill look a a variety of themes or views that axe realy apparent in Peire'’s take on logic. We shall start with some very simple and general definitions before turing to a distinction ve mentioned in Chapeer 1, namely the distinction between Peirce’ broad view of logi and the more narrow concera with deductive’ Jogi tha interests us here. For Peirce, a8 we shall see, this is not ogte 169 an entirely neat or natural division, and this can help us to under- stand his work more lary Next we shal look at how Peirce views logic as a combination of normative and descriptive elements. We shall then look at a clear ant-psychologis strain in his work before finally turning to what seems to be 2 clear ant-logcst element to his work, Tat is, here seems tobe a denial ofthe cai, familiar to tus from Frege and Russell, chat logics, in some sense, foundational for mathematics, Peirce’s general approach to logic Peirce spent much of his life wying to publish a complete and lengthy treatment on logic, and he give numerous definitions of its stad. These definitions tend to shift and change depending on just what else was driving his philosophical interest at given tie. ‘When he is developing his accounts of inquiry, we find reference to oubt and belie in his definitions,” and when he is developing bis middle typology ofsgas or the (e-fold sig disuaton aru ie turn of the century, we find a strong semioti element in his def nitions.This serves to emphasise just how crucial role Peirce sees logic playing within the broad scope of philosophy, but regardless, there ae some very straightforward definitions of logic in his work that givea good simple sense of his view: ‘Whatever opinion be entertained in regard tothe scope of logic, itwill be generally agreed that the heart of it Hes inthe elas cation and critic of arguments. (EP2. 200 (1903)) And further sl: Logic in the narrower sense is that science which concerns itself ‘Primarily with distinguishing reasonings into good and bad, and ‘with disinguishing probable reasonings ino stong and weak easonings. Secondary logic eoncers self with all ha it must study in order to make those distinctions about reasoning, and ‘with nothing else. (easing en the Logo Tings, 143 (1898) 170 Poice ‘This al seems quite familiar to us. Many simple, modern logic text- books will introduce the topic in exacly thie way. Lgieis the theory ‘of gd ming Studying logic not only helpe you to reason well but helps you unesond how reasoning works’ (Restall 2006, 1) When we gloss Flrce's interes in casifying reasoning and argument into good and bad in terms of validity, thie i simply logie more of lest 35 we understand it The scope of ogc: broad vs narrow Another imporant fer of Pere’ approach o loge that we must aot i that we can divie bis concerns eteen broader ad nat ‘ower eoncetons ofthe dxpine We metiond in Chapter | tat Peirce saw hime a login, bt also tha, for him ogi 8 very brad discipline incorporating uch of what we would new think oF = epistemology the philosophy of language and the pn losopty of scene: However, ou interes in ths chapter a wih Paes workin the much ncrower domain of defuse lope Mos porane fru ee though, is understanding tht hese Oo consrual of lopi~ broad and narow ~ are well secunted for Fire’ archteconic view of pulosophy, Moreover the way they are relied to each oer ells something very interesting sbout Ii view flog To begin wth, we can very bre touch pon how Pec ses the rehtioaship beeen bos lpi and narow loge in ahieconie terms As we noted in Chapter the eran view of pesphy is thats vided ino three broad ses of sad phenmenclogy, normative scene and metpbysc, Fries, the normative sence divide it eis, esthetic and log tis here thatthe acpi oflogic is given ts broadest consul in Pec’ philosophy his ‘her we nd hs views om sign theory is pagum theories ft ingury and alence ands on. Buta We abe noted logie, asa normative sence, ilo dvible int the thee sub diies of speculative eto, erie loge and rnethodeui: Specie "hetrcis where wend mich ofthe sign theory that we examined Jn Chaper 4, and mehodewic concen islf with the methods bogie 171 that ought to be pursued in the investigation, inthe exposition, and in the application of truth’ (EP2. 260 (1903)). Critical loge, however is concerned with the clasfication of arguments and the ‘means by which we determine ‘the validity and degre of force of cach kind" (EP2, 260 (1903)). Again, ertcallogie can be divided into deductive, abductve and inductive arguments, and itis here, in {is particular sub-division of the normative science of logic that ‘we find Peirce’ narow view ofthe discipline. ‘The upshot ofthis architectonic relationship between the broad and narrow constuals of logics that, for Piece, all elements ofthe isciplie are deeply interconnected and entangled. Semioties, a5 a part of speculative rhetoric, provides many of the principles and raterils for exploring deductive logic; this i why we find Peirce (@) 196 Peres hhave the same expressive power a8 ordinary propositional logic through De Morgan equivalences. Transformation in alpha graphs ‘We have seen albeit in ayy cursory way how to build alpha graphs, bur of course, since these are meant to give us moving pictures of thought, iis importan that we algo understand how these images ‘more’. Peirce gives us various rules for transformations, oF as he cals them, Codes of Peis” (CP4. 415 (1903), but these ae ust ally reduced to the following five rules fr transforming any graphs (ona sheet of assertion: Rule 1:The ru ofensne~ Any evenly enclosed assetion'” may be erased from the sheet of asertion Role 2: Theat ison ~ In any oddly enclosed area ofa graph any asertion may be scribed Rule 3: The el often ~ I an asertion occurs on the sheet of assertion, fn a cat, or in a nest of cus, t may be serbed on any other area which is contained within the area in which the assertion is made. Rule 4: The meol detente ~ any atsertion could be the result of iteration, it may be erased from the sheet of assertion, Rule 5: Thereof the donc A double cut may be removed from an assertion on any area ofthe sheet of assertion, or Inserted around any assertion on any area of the sheet of ‘To show these rules of transformation in action, itis worth looking st an example. In what fellows we shall see a transformation from 8 graph which represents an inal state of P or Q’ and ‘not to 8 ‘raph which represents a final sate of This will effectively give fone possible alpha graph that shows the reasoning of the disjunctive syllogism, Lovie 195 OOS Here we have a sheet of assertion with the simple astertions ~P and P v Q scribed upon it. How, using the rules of transformation, can we rur these graphs into Q? Here's one way OO Rule 2~the rule of insertion allows uso sarbe any assertion we [ke into an oddly enclosed area Since the aserionexpresied by pac- ing single cut around P gives us an oddly enclosed are, we scribed the assertion ‘not Q (.e a Q enclosed with cut inside that area 5C@ ars ews. 196 Perce ule 5 ~ the rule of the double cut ~ allows us to remove (or insert) double cuts from the sheet of asetion. Here, one part of the sheet of assertion contained a doubly enclosed P and doubly enclosed Q, so we removed those double cus 6D Finns Role 1 ~ the rule of erasure ~ allows us to remove any evealy enclosed assertion from the sheet of asertion, The assertion hat ero cus, ts evenly enclosed and can be erased, ae) ule 4 ~ the rule of deiteration allows us to remove any asser- tion thar could be the result f tration from the sheet ofanertion In this case, the singly enclosed P could be the result of applying the rule ofteration to the unenclosed , so we can remove it. As we've already seen, Rule 1~ the rule of erasure ~ allows us to remove any evenly enclosed assertion from the sheet of assertion ‘The assertion P has zero cuts and so is evenly enclosed and can be teste 197 © hes eased, leaving only the doubly enclosed Q on the sheet of assertion, ‘This leaves us wit the final sep of applying Rule § the rule ofthe double cut~to tat doubly enclosed Q to areive at: Fees? ‘Thus, by applying the rules of transformation we can tans- {form the graph on 3 sheet of assertion from our starting point in Figure 5.1 to our end point in Figure 5.7, thereby modelling the disjunctive syllogism." ‘Although there is much more that we might say bout the alpha graphs, we have seen enough to give at least some sense of how Peirce sees these existential graphs. One thing is worth emphasis- ing since ic i hard to capture in the example we have just given, Peirce sees these graph cransformations as a dynamic, processive ‘hing - the graph is iterlly changed. Construed in the manner just shown, it 8 t00 easy to think we ate looking a something sir toa style of natural deduction where we see which propositions 198 Peirce ‘an be derived by which rules, However, as we ave stated before, ‘hese graphs are iconic representations of the dynamic process of Jogial reasoning, and the transformations on graphs should be viewed in that light The beta graphs “Moring on to beta graphs, we find Peirce bulding upon the system ‘ven in the alpha graphs by introducing icons and graphical conven. ‘ons for representing individuals and relations What Peirce produces ‘with ths exenson of existential graphs covers many areas that are familar tous from quanaier loge with identity, and whilst desing such paral i wseful, we have to be careful sine Peirce’ interest in developing the ber graphs vary fora the inteess of modem log ‘ans Again, we shall examine the materials for building beta graphs before examining which transformations are permissible within them, ‘The primary materials added to the alpha graphs when building bea prphsare what we shall all 'sptsand’lines although steely speaking there i lice difference between them. Asta one may expect, is simply a heaey dot such asthe», and when scribed on & sheet of assertion, i asserts chat there i a individual in existence in the univers of discourse sepresented by the sheet of assertion, Jn Peirce’ beta graphs, spot can be spread out, sot speak, to form a lie A line, scribed on a sheet of assertion thusly would make the same assertion as; namely, that there san individual in feitence in the universe of discourse. So why have spot od lines? ‘The reason is simply that we want to assert more than that an {individual or individuals exist; we often want to say things about ‘hose individual, and theline ofthe beta graph allows us to do thi. For example, we are able to scribe monadic predicate tone end, oF “ook’ of aline, so chat ety asserts that ‘something is thisy’. Through justaposii the alpha graphs we can als scribe such chings as tte lennon) im onder to ater that Something is hungry and something is this’ However, we can aso use te “hook” of single line vo seribe an identity relation suchas canes ‘This simply asserts that ‘something (the same thing) is hungry snd thirsty’ “Les cs abo Lele i women ways a ones to predicate tiple properties of the same thing orto capture relations of multiple adic such ae dyadic or triadic relations. For example ‘vero sat ashe Jagan aoe RE an Herve pena sort nar Associative ‘Aigo This, scribed on a shet of assertion would assert that there exists someone who dedated something t samo who iment ‘existential graphs, is 2 logician, and was the son of someone wh was both a Harvard professor of mathematics and the author of Lins Ait Ag ‘As we can se, there are lines which represent monadic predi- ‘ates:'— is a logician’ dyadic predicates: "—is the son of —'s and ‘even triadic predicates: “dedicates —~ to —" And there are also 200 Peirce assertions of identity: something (the same thing) is the Harvard professor of mathematics andthe author of Lina Ascii Alp cuts ‘The final thing to note is that just as we can ‘cut’ an assertion in alpha graphs, we can do the same with beta graphs. So to enclose our earlier assertion something is thirty’ ike ths {sto aser ‘nothing is thirst’. However, we can also impose & cut ‘pon an assertion that, 50 to speak, iseects a line, like this ‘fwe were to scribe this onthe sheet of assertion, we would have asserted that ‘there is something which isnot thirsty’ We must be ‘careful here, though, since we cin also find juataposed assertions on a sheet which look very similar: (iti However, this graph asserts both that ‘here is something’ and ‘nothing is thirsty’ The difference beeween the two, as we case, 4s that in the ist case the line makes contact with the negative of Logie 201 enclosed assertion. Tis tells us the line Is making an asertion of identity. nthe ater case, the ine makes no contact and eo is an "independent’ assertion on the sheet, The relationship to quantifiers Before we move on and introduce the rules for transforming ‘graphs inthe beta portion by looking at an example, i s worth pausing to note something about the relationship between what wwe have just seen and quantifiers, Peirce’s main concern in the ‘beta grap iso give us an iconic diagrammatic logic for relations Homever, a corresponding teatment of the quantifiers falls out of this quite naturally Clearly, the notion of existential quantification, 3s given inthe simplest and most basic terms. To seribe a spot or line on the sheet of asertion is to make an existential claim, The makes for three interesting features of quansfcation in Peice’s beta graphs: existential quantifies are ‘base’, there are no vai able oF bin s01n0 free logic. The last point is simple — since one cannot scribe ‘an asertion upon the sheet of assertion without being committed to tat thing existing inthe domain of discourse, one cannot make any assertions free from existential import The second feature is ‘one of notation’: there need be no variables to designate individ ual with additonal symbols to quantify over them, since a sribed fr graphic presence on the sheet of assertion is enough to do both Jobs. And the fis feature is the simple observation that from the assertion of existence by scribing a spot or lin, one could then form equivalent bet-graph versions ofall the major quantifier expressions. For example, ifwe were insistent upon giving quant fer equivalences in beta graphs, we give the transformations seen la Figure 5.8 ng. and by extension chore are no fre variables and Transformation in beta graphs ‘The rules for transformation in beta graphs ae estenilly the same as those nthe alpha portion, except that they are updated to accom- ‘modate the elements introduced for building graphs in beta, 202 Peirce = ene = tone = (orb (one &) en) poate Role I:Thenee msur~Any evenly enclosed assertion and any evenly «enclose portion of ine may be eased fren the shee of asertion Rule 2: Thereof meron ~in any oddly enclosed area of graph, any assertion may be scribed and two lines ody enclosed in the same area may be joined Rule 3: The ral of tet ~ Fan assertion occurs on the sheet of assertion in a cut or ina nest of cus, may be scribed on any other area which is contained within the area in which the assertion is made. Further, (@) an addtional branching line may be added to line, provided it crosses no cus; i) line which ‘terminates’ ata cut may be extended into the cut; and (i) any line extended into a cat, as by clause (i), can be joined to any cotresponding iterated assertion in that aes. Rule 4: Thereof detention ~IFany assertion could be the result of| Aeration, it may be erased from the sheet of assertion, Farther, (9 any “oor ine of identity which could have been iterated Logie 203 under Rule 3 clause (1) can be etacted or removed fiom its ‘original line; and (ti) any ‘oase' line which could have been iterated under Rule 3 clans (i) can be retracted and removed back to the ouside ofthe cut it extends across." Rule 5: The maf the dele cut ~ A double cut may be removed from an assertion on any area of the sheet of assertion or inserted around any assertion on any aea of the sheet of asser tion regardless of whether the cus ros lines. ‘Again, the best way to see how these rules wotk i through some simple examples. First, le’ Jook tan argument whieh in quantifier logic i a simple insance of mas pes ~ (Vx)(Fx —» Gx), (2) Fs) NG: Here, our sheet of assertion simply gives the premises (Vs)(Fa—> Gr), (21) (Fs) -which we ae intending to wansform into (3x)(G). (Our first twansformation: is had through Rule 4~ the rule of deiteration ~ which allows us ‘remove from the inner area ofthe sheet since could be the result of iteration ofthe instance of ~F from the outer part ofthe sheet. Next we have: Here Rule 1 ~the rue of erasure allows uso seme any evenly enclosed assertion or lie. The remaining instance of -F was une closed, that, it had zero enclosures and so was removed. Filly we can make the following transformation by using Rule 5 ~the rule ofthe double cut. This leaves us with ‘the assertion we were aiming for ‘A more complex example using the Aristotelian syllogism Barbara ~ all M are Ball Pare , therefore all M are S~ shows ‘mone ofthe rules in action a they apply t ines in the beta graphs. As should be familia, we begin with our premises seribed on the sheet of assertion and aim to transform chem into our conclusion, First we have (ur tan poe By Fle 3th fan By Pulte otrasie 8} Fue 3 thende ct tton, use (we hav nena om te comectng Mand have ye 3 onde ct teat, use Ii) we hee estan ne ‘east vou op no 206 Peirce ict | © pee ee pemce i ee tyes strer te eoeeeniets ©) Stier: 2/5 enlect be dotio By Rule 3a ct oman - being suede wo Nes every eraoend net ve [Suldronavel tee sheet ‘Again, there is much more tht we could say about bea graphs, sand the way they are presented here omits many deals and nuances Logie. 207 fof Perce's view. Nonetheles, it should at last be possible to see how Peirce sees ths portion of his existential graphs working, The gamma graphs (Our treatment of both the aha and beta graphs has realy only skimmed the surface of those portions The final portion, the gamma graphs, wil receive an even les satisfactory eaten, part because theres much moreto thes raps than could posibly be covered ere, “More importantly, though, the gamma graphs extend fr beyond the alpha and bea portions and Peirce never managed to give a complete satement of them, returning and changing the system multiple times fom his earliest satements in 1903 10 mere complex and nuanced views inthe yeas immediately before his death in 1914. What we Sind is that Perce balieves he can use a system of graphs to explain the proces of absraction. Transforming assertions suchas 'the grapes are Sour tothe grapes have soumes allows us to abaract the propery fof ere frm the rignal stron and talk of sourmeet 2s though i ‘were 2 thing or entity in and of self He is also interested in using 2 system of graphs to ak about dhe nature ofthe alpba and beta graphs ‘hemsalves. This lids Peice to make a range of developments to his notions of spots and lines and cuts. Howeve,pechaps the learst wse to which Peirce puts his gamma graph isin giving an explanation of ‘modality, and it isis account ofa graphical weaument for the logic of | possibilty and necessity that we shall briefly review bere. Mattie sheets of assertion ‘The frst move that Peirce makes in giving an account of possibilty and necessity in terms of graphical logic i to develop his notion of the sheet of asetion. Instead of thinking of our domala of discourse as ranging over the single sheet of assertion we use to scribe graphs ‘on, we shoul instead think of our logical assertions a ranging over a collection of sheets of assertion which ae ted to eachother, s0 to speak, at diferent poins (CP¢, $12 (1903)).The very top sheet of assercon gives us the domain of discourse for our actual, or rather 2 acual, world, As Peirce pus 208 Peirce For our alpha sheet, asa whole, represents simply 2 universe of existent individuals, and the diferent parte of the sheet represent facts or true assertions made concerning that universe (CP4.512 (1903)) To use moviern terminology, we can obviously think ofthese dif ferent sheets of assertion 2s representing diferent universes of scours, or different psble wos. These diferent posible words or different sheets of assertion, are connected to each other at var- fous poins, but not every sheet wil be connected to other sheets Teiroe describes the ‘interaction’ between these diferent sheets in terms of cus or points of connection thusly At the cus we pass into other areas, areas of conceived prop- sitions which are not realize. In these areas there may be cuts wehere we pass into worlds which, in the imaginary ‘worlds of the outer cus, are themselves represented to be imaginary and flee, but which may forall hat, be true, and therefore continuous withthe sheet of acertion itself. (CPs, 512 (1903)) Peirce isnot entirely certain abou all ofthis but the picture of if ent sheets of assertion, connected at different points either through ssertions which run through al the sheets or trough ‘cus which allow us to pas into woeds, s quite evocative. An imaginary world, ‘which at some outer point may be ‘true’ and continuous with the sheet of assertion isl is enigmatically tentative but certainly hints aa kind of moda ratism, The broken cut ‘The next important development that Peitce makes is a means of seribing upon the sheets in these books’, What Peirce does is ‘maintain the alpha and beta elements and introduce a new kind ‘of eut which he calls the ‘broken cut” By enclosing an assertion upon the sheet with a cut compoted of a broken or dotted line, thusly, Logie 209 we ae att ht posible tht i ot oe Tht the be ut en se OR eo poste to combine this new nd of wrerion with he previous aro of spa and bet to bud gunn rapa Sf ml ney pace ipa ac bee cats enc ‘er ve inereingy hs llows aroma eons serio of poss and wee 210 Paice And we can, of course, even iterate the modal operators in the gamma graphs by more complicate nesting For instance: ‘and s0 0n. The rules of transformation in gamma Although there are other elements we might include here, the wse ‘of mulkiple sheets of assertion and broken cutis enough to give us 8 sense of how Peirce takes gamma graphs to represent possiity and necessity. The next task Is to say a litle about how Pesce sees ‘he transformation of gamma graphs taking place, The fst thing to note is that he is cautious about which ofthe rules of tansforma ‘on rom the alpha and beta portions could be used on broken cts im the gamma graphs. For instance, we find in 1903 (CP4, S16) 3 gamma version ofthe rule of insertion which can be given like this Rule 6: Teruo ier br ek cat —In a broken cut already on the sheet of assertion, any assertion may be scribed ‘But there are no rules relating to iteration, deiteration or dou. ‘le cuts forthe broken cus. Ineresingy Peirce sehoars such as Logie 211 1.-Zeman (1964) and Absi-Veikko Pietarinen (20068) have noted that byallowing more or les ofthe rues of tertion,deteration and dou- ble cuts to apply tothe arma graphs, we can chart the various modal systems familiar to contemporary logician. The only rues that sem to relate dredy tothe broken cus themselves are the fllowing S90: Rule 7: The nie of ct coven o ken ~ Any evenly enclosed unbroken cut may be wansformed into a broken cut Rule 8: The mle fet came tounbken ~ Any oddly enclosed ‘broken cut maybe transformed ito an uabroken cut ‘To see how these rules are supposed to govern the ‘movement’ of graphs concerning possibility and necessity, we can use some very simple examples which we would expect to hold fora modal system. For example, we would expect to find that & therefore OP holds. And it does Pre, or statin pint {om atphe or ei) le 7 tna ct canesen to broth outermost co he ep {fom sage ofthe rte Rae {ees wound and eo sv ‘read song uno tansorm ha 212 Peirce Similar, we would expect tobe abe to transform OP into P in the gamma graphs, And agen, we ca oe ed {nnanmost cis eurounded by oe cl and so @ ty enone we re parity ‘endowed oto to an unbroken at Fo §— th nda of dati ct (tom epta ob) Knee conentng ‘These are very simple examples, ofcourse and we have left out ots of details, some of which are rather important. All the same, we have at leas a partial sense of what we might do with Peire’s gamma por. ion of his graphs. However, before moving on, it is worth mentioning development tat Perce experimented with leading upto his 1906 piper for The Mit, "rclegomena to an spology for pragmatism’ Tinctures By 1906, just three years after the acount of gamma graphs out lined above, Peirce had developed the ides that by using diferent ‘tinctures’ on the sheets of assertion we could mark the difference berween modalities. Peirce thought that the modalities could be Alivded into thre classes ~ the actual, the posable and the destined — and he eventually setled on twelve diferent tinctures for graphs Logie 213 (four of ech cass). Its not important for us to spend ime exami {ng the divisions ofthe tinctures, how Peirce thought they could be ‘sed to build graphs, what the transformation rules would be and 0.00, but wha is especially intererting i that at an extension ofthe modal logic we find in che gamma graphs outlined above, i shows that, for Perce, the domain of gamma graphs included many ofthe ‘wide applications of modal logic that we use today For instance, one mode of tinctures applies to alethic modal logic, another looks 8 ‘Bough it covers what we would tink of as epistemic modal logics, others exist for erotetic modal logics, or deomtic mods! logis, and sore besides. In comparison tothe alpha and beta graphs, the gamma portion of Peirce's diagrammatic logic isles lear and less complete, bat it 1 Fich and promising area of investigation, All we have done here i {gesture tit, bur anyone wishing to indulge in a closer examination ‘will ind al kinds of suggestive and surprising things. The response tothe existential graphs ‘We have already noted that, although Peirce sw his graphical logic 8. continuation of his algebraic logic, many others sav tas rather drastic break with the manner and method of ordinary’ logic Before ‘we conclude this chaper chen, its worth pausing to make one oF tW0 observations about how Pezc's graphical logic hasbeen received Firs of al, there are obvious detractors. Quine's response to the existential graphs, for instance, was decidedly col ‘One questions the efficacy of Peirce's diagrams, however, in ‘their analytical capacity as well Their basic machinery is too complex to allow one much stisfction in analyzing propo- Sonal structure into terms of that machinery While i is not ‘inconceivable that advances inthe diagrammatic method might ‘open possibilities of analysis superior to those afforded by the algebraic method, yet an examination of Peirce's product tends rather, apagogieally ast were, to confirm one's ath inthe alge- bral approach. (Quine 1935, 552) 214 Peirce Problematic this was an early and influential review of Peirce’s diagrammatic logic by one of the premier logicans of his age. It would be putting martes too strongly to say thatthe views of peo. ple such as Quine more o less blocked philosophers paying serious attention o Peirce’ graphs during the ist half ofthe twentieth cen. ‘uy, but they certainly didn't help Worse, much ofthe mos fecund thinking about logic ofthat early period took place without paying attention to appreaches such a Peirce’, and we are now constrained ‘with a way of thinking about logical languages and logical eaeult ‘that makes the insights ofthe exstensal graphs even harder to se. weer, since serous work on Peirce’ existential graphs began to emerge inthe 1960s and 1970s with book-length treatments by Don Roberts (1973) and JJ. Zeman (1964), increasingly sophisti cated and important work has continied to emerge" Wit regard ‘o the gamma graphs especialy, there is lots of exciting research ‘aking place and as the dynamic and times dalogical nature ofthe

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