IL. STATUTES 1) Read the statute, 2) read the statute, 3) read the statute.” — Justice Frankfurter’s advise to law students. Statute, defined—An act passed by a legislative body. Act, defined—An alternative name for a statute.” Legislation—Preparation and enactment of laws. Pees Nord Certain kinds of legislation: a. Confiscatory legislation - the seizure of private property by a government without compensation to the owner. b. Consolidation or revision of statutes — a consolida- tion refers to the updating of legislation to reflect amend- ments, whereas a revision permits the form of legislation to be changed c. Delegated or subordinate legislation — legislation made not by Parliament but by persons or bodies on ® Eric B, Appleby, Legal Research Guide to Statutes, Maritime Law Book Ltd, 2007, 45CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION * Dennis B. Funa whom Parliament has conferred power to legislate on specified subjects. d. General law and special law - A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class.* In People v. Palma (GR. No. L-44113, March 31, 1977), “a general law is one which applies to the whole State and operates throughout the State alike upon all the people or all of a class. A special law is one which applies to a particular community, in- dividual or thing.” 5. Types of Legislation.—The type of measures that Con- gress may consider and act upon (in addition to treaties in the Sen- ate) include bills and three kinds of resolutions. They are: a. Bills. - These are general measures, which if passed upon, may become laws. A bill is prefixed with S,, fol- lowed by a number assigned the measure based on the order in which it is introduced. The vast majority of leg- islative proposals—recommendations dealing with the economy, increasing penalties for certain crimes, regula- tion on commerce and trade, etc., are drafted in the form of bills. They also include budgetary appropriation of the government and many others. When passed by both chambers in identical form and signed by the President © The Oxford Companion to Law by David M, Walker, p. 347, 1982. © Valera v. Tuason, G.R. No. L-1276, April 30, 1948, citing Crawford, Statutory Construction, p. 2645. ® Adopted en foto from www.senate.gov.ph, citing Pastrana and Raval, Essentials and Dynamics of the Senate, 2001,Statutes 7 or repassed by Congress over a presidential veto, they become laws. b. Joint Resolutions. - A joint resolution, like a bill, re- quires the approval of both houses and the signature of the President. It has the force and effect of a law if ap- proved. There is no real difference between a bill and a joint resolution. The latter generally is used when deal- ing with a single item or issue, such as a continuing or emergency appropriations bill. Joint resolutions are also used for proposing amendments to the Constitution. c. Concurrent Resolutions. - A concurrent resolution is usually designated in the Senate as S. Ct. Res. It is used for matters affecting the operations of both houses and must be passed in the same form by both of them. How- ever, they are not referred to the President for his signa- ture, and they do not have the force of law. Concurrent resolutions are used to fix the time of adjournment of a Congress and to express the “sense of Congress” on an issue. d. Simple Resolutions. - It is usually designated with P. S. Res. A simple resolution deals with matters entirely within the prerogative of one house of Congress, such as adopting or receiving its own rules. A simple resolution is not considered by the other chamber and is not sent to the President for his signature. Like a concurrent resolu- tion, it has no effect and force of a law. Simple resolu- tions are used occasionally to express the opinion of a single house on a current issue. Oftentimes, it is also used to call for a congressional action on an issue affect- ing national interest.8 CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION : Dennis B. Funa 6. Bill. —A bill is an incipient statute. When a bill has been assed in Parliament or a legislature, and has received royal Assent or presidential approval, it becomes a statute. Under Section 26, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution: Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shay embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a lay unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate en- actment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be al- lowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, be- fore it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsid- eration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the ob- jections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be re- considered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Mem- bers of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.Statutes 49 (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particu- lar item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. 7. Enrolled Bill.—“After both houses have given final ap- proval to a bill, a final copy of the bill, known as the ‘enrolled bill’ shall be printed, and certified as correct by the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives. After which, it will be signed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President.” The weight and binding effect of an enrolled bill upon the ju- diciary was discussed in Arroyo et al. v. De Venecia et al., GR. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268: “Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the en- rolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case we “went behind” an enrolled bill and consulted the Jour- nal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate. XXX “The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well es- tablished. It is cited with approval by text writers here and 6 Adopted en toto from www.senate.gov.ph, citing Pastrana and Raval, Essentials and Dynamics of the Senate, 2001.50 CANons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following consid. erations: : ++ As the President has no authority to approve a bil] not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the cus- tody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Represen- tatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive de- partments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitu- tion.”4 “The enrolled bill — which uses the term ‘urea formalde- hyde’ instead of ‘urea and formaldehyde’ — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961, 3 SCRA 1). If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot specu- late, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our & Citing Marshall Field & Co, v, Clark, 143 U.S, 649, 672, 36 L. Ed, 294, 303 (1891),Statutes 51 democratic system — the remedy is by amendment ot cura- tive legislation, not by judicial decree,”«5 8. Kinds of statutes.—The following are some kinds of statutes: a, Declaratory statute ~ is enacted for the purpose of removing doubts about what the law is in relation to a particular subject matter. b. Enabling statute - A statute which makes it lawful to do something which would not otherwise be lawful is called an enabling statute. c. Mandatory statute - Statutes which require a course of action, A mandatory provision in a statute is one the omission of which renders the proceedings, to which it relates, void.” d. Penal statute ~ A statute that imposes penalties and punishments for an offense committed. e. Peremptory statute - It is an obligatory statute, as opposed to a permissive statute. f. Private statute - They are generally in the interest of individuals or local governments and are distin- guished from measures of public policy in which the whole community is interested. & Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, et al., G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963. “ Craies on Statute Law (7thEd.), p. 61. © Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed,), p. 962, © Earl Jowitt, The Dictionary of English Law, p, 1329, 1959, Mozley and Whiteley’s Law Dictionary (7 Ed.), p. 273, 1962.52 Canons OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B, Funa g. Public statutes - Statutes that affect the whole com. munity or a considerable part of it. h. Prospective statute - One applicable only to cases which arise after its enactment. i. Retroactive statute - A law to have come into force ‘on a date prior to its enactment means retroactive; and “be operative with respect to transactions occur- ring prior to its enactment” means retrospective. j. Temporary statute - A statute with a limited period of operation. Thus, in Espiritu v. Cipriano et al. (GR. No. L-32743, February 15, 1974), the Court ruled: “The law being a ‘temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation’, it had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and un- equivocal language that ‘No lessor of a dwelling unit or land ... shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon be- tween the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act.’ Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was effective on March, 1970, up to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by the express mandate of the Act itself, oper- ate.” A statute passed to meet an emergency is necessarily tem- porary. Thus, the Court explained in Homeowners’ Association of the Philippine et al. v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila et al.” 7 Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 1S.CR. 271; 7 NLR. 401, 1977, 7 GR. No. L-23979, August 30, 1968.Statutes 53 "The practical reason for the requirement that a statute passed to meet a given emergency, should limit the period of its effectivity, is that, otherwise, a new and different law would be necessary to repeal it, and said period would, ac- cordingly, be “unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncer- tain”, so that “that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become a permanent law”, because “Con- gress might not enact the repeal, and, even if it would, the repeal might not meet with the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto”. In line with the basic philosophy underlying the authority to affect individual rights, this Court felt that Commonwealth Act No. 671, otherwise known as the Emergency Powers Act, was meant to be and “became inoperative when Con- gtess met in regular session on May 25, 1946,” and that Ex- ecutive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 — promulgated subsequently thereto — “were issued without authority of law”, because, otherwise, said emergency regulations would purport to be in force for an indefinite and unlimited period of time, and, hence, would be unconstitutional. “The same considerations impelled the Court to invalidate Executive Order Nos. 545 and 546, issued on November 10, 1952. Indeed, otherwise “the result would be obvious un- constitutionality”, by making permanent a law intended to afford a relief for a temporary emergency, the length of which should be ‘fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either Congress or the President’.” Other definitions: a. Rules of court - rules that regulate the practice and procedure before the various courts. b. Codification - the process of collecting and arrang- ing systematically, usually by subject, the laws of a54 Canons or STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa state, or the rules covering a particular subject of the law. c. Presumptions - an inference in favor of a particular fact. A presumption is a rule of law by which the finding of a basic fact gives rise to the existence of presumed fact, until the presumption is rebutted, 10. How a bill becomes a law.—Pursuant to the current practice of the House of Representatives, hereinbelow is the sys- tem by which a bill becomes a law.” PREPARATION OF THE BILL The Member or the Bill Drafting Division of the Reference and Research Bureau prepares and drafts the bill upon the Member's request. FIRST READING 1. The bill is filed with the Bills and Index Service and the same is numbered and reproduced. 2. Three days after its filing, the same is included in the Or- der of Business for First Reading. 3. On First Reading, the Secretary General reads the title and number of the bill. The Speaker refers the bill to the appropriate Committee/s. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION/ACTION 1, The Committee where the bill was referred to evaluates it to determine the necessity of conducting public hearings. ™ www.congress.gov.ph/legisinfoStatutes 55 If the Committee finds it necessary to conduct. public hear- ings, it schedules the time thereof, issues public notices and invites resource persons from the public and private sectors, the academe and experts on the proposed legisla- tion. If the Committee finds that no public hearing is needed, it schedules the bill for Committee discussion/s. 2. Based on the result of the public hearings or Committee discussions, the Committee may introduce amendments, consolidate bills on the same subject matter, or propose a substitute bill. It then prepares the corresponding com- mittee report. 3. The Committee approves the Committee Report and for- mally transmits the same to the Plenary Affairs Bureau. SECOND READING 1. The Committee Report is registered and numbered by the Bills and Index Service. It is included in the Order of Busi- ness and referred to the Committee on Rules. 2. The Committee on Rules schedules the bill for considera- tion on Second Reading. 3. On Second Reading, the Secretary General reads the number, title and text of the bill and the following takes place: a. Period of Sponsorship and Debate b, Period of Amendments Voting which may be by: i, viva voce ii, count by tellers division of the House; or iv. nominal voting7 56 Canons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Denis B. Funa THIRD READING 1. The amendments, if any, are engrossed and printed cop. ies of the bill are reproduced for Third Reading. 2. The engrossed bill is included in the Calendar of Bills for Third Reading and copies of the same are distributed to all the Members three days before its Third Reading, 3. On Third Reading, the Secretary General reads only the number and title of the bill. 4. A roll call or nominal voting is called and a Member, if he desires, is given three minutes to explain his vote. No amendment on the bill is allowed at this stage. a. The bill is approved by an affirmative vote of a ma- jority of the Members present. b. If the bill is disapproved, the same is transmitted to the Archives. TRANSMITTAL OF THE APPROVED BILL TO THE SENATE The approved bill is transmitted to the Senate for its concur- tence. SENATE ACTION ON APPROVED BILL OF THE HOUSE The bill undergoes the same legislative process in the Senate. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 1. A Conference Committee is constituted and is composed of Members from each House of Congress to settle, rec- oncile or thresh out differences or disagreements on any provision of the bill.‘Statutes: 57 2. The conferees are not limited to reconciling the differ- ences in the bill but may introduce new provisions ger- mane to the subject matter or may report out an entirely new bill on the subject. 3. The Conference Committee prepares a report to be signed by all the conferees and the Chairman. 4. The Conference Committee Report is submitted for con- sideration/approval of both Houses. No amendment is allowed. TRAI ‘AL OF THE BILL TO THE PRESIDENT Copies of the bill, signed by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and certified by both the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House, are transmitted to the President. PRESIDENTIAL ACTION ON THE BILL 1. If the bill is approved the President, the same is assigned an RA number and transmitted to the House where it originated. 2. If the bill is vetoed, the same, together with a message citing the reason for the veto, is transmitted to the House where the bill originated. ACTION ON APPROVED BILL The bill is reproduced and copies are sent to the Official Ga- zette Office for publication and distribution to the implementing agencies. It is then included in the annual compilation of Acts and Resolutions,58 Canons OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION . Dennis B. Funa ACTION ON VETOED BILL The message is included in the Order of Business. If the Con- gress decides to override the veto, the House and the Senate shall proceed separately to reconsider the bill or the vetoed items of the bill. If the bill or its vetoed items is passed by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of each House, such bill or items shall become alaw, 11. Reading of Bills.—Section 26 (2), Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides: (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and Printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate en- actment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be al- lowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. “The requirement that each bill have three separate readings, prescribed either by constitution or legislative rule, is one of the many restrictions imposed upon the passage of bills pre- vent hasty and inconsiderate legislation, surprise, and fraud. The requirement is mandatory, imposing an unqualified obli- gation upon the legislature which it has no discretion but to observe, and the validity of legislation depends upon a com- pliance therewith. There is other authority, however, that such a provision is merely directory in character, and that its obser- vance by the legislature is secured by its sense of duty and offi- cial oath, and not by any supervisory power of the courts.” ® Vicente J, Francisco, Statutory Construction, 3" ed., p. 2, (1968), citing 59 CJ, sec. 48, p, 548,Statutes 59 “A reading by title is considered a reading of a bill, unless it is required by the constitution that a bill be read at length or in full. Where the constitution expressly declares that on fi- nal passage the bill must be read section by section, the leg- islature has no power to dispense with a reading in the manner and a bill cannot become a law unless it was so tead; but where the constitution does not in terms direct that the reading shalll be at length, a reading twice by title and once at length has been held sufficient.* “Where a bill is vetoed and reconsidered it may be passed at once, and is not required to go through the prescribed readings as if an original bill.””3 12. Authentication of bills.—“Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill, It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his ap- proval or rejection. The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the statute invalid. The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in it- self is a strong argument to the contrary. There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where 1 Francisco, ibid, citing 59 CJ, sec. 50, p. 550, % Francisco, ibid,, citing Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction, 2%! ed., Vol. 1, p. 94 (1904).60 CANoNs OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: Dennis B. Funa the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding offi. cers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President, “In one case in the United States, where the (State) Con. stitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authen- ticated enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. Another case however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. But in the case of Field us. Clark, the US. Supreme Court held that the signatures of the pre- siding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point.” “Tt has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enact- ment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a num- ber of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.” “As far as Congress it- self is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certi- fication made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Con- gress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that “[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President, In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in theStatutes 61 State Constitution, said that the same ‘makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not at- tested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has “passed both houses” will satisfy the constitutional re- quirement.”””6 13. Appropriation, revenue and tariff bills.—The passage of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills are provided for in Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Thus: Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local applica tion, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appro- priations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appro- priation to which it relates. (3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. % Astorga v. Villegas, et al., G.R. No, L-23475, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 74,62 14. Canons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa (4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which itis intended, and shall be supported by funds ac. tually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or tg be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of propriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constj. tutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to aug. ment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their re. spective appropriations, (6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular offi. cials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be sup. ported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guide- lines as may be prescribed by law. (7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. Parts of a statute.—Different jurisdictions would have different forms of statutes; hence, the parts of statutes may also differ from one jurisdiction to another. Basically, the determining factor would be the form of government such that parliamentary forms of government would have a different form of statute from that of a republican form of government. For the Philippines, a ba sic statute would have the following parts: a. Title.—Under the Constitution, the Title of a statute is mandatory. Thus:Statutes 63 Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. As for the mandatory nature of titles, the Court ruled in Ag- caoili v, Suguitan™; “In the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, supra, it was de- cided that said provision of the Jones Law was mandatory and not directory and its violation was fatal to any provi- sion of the law to which no reference was made in the title. In the decision of this court in the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, the decisions of the courts of many of the states of the Union were followed. Many of the constitutions of the States of the Union contain similar provision to that quoted above from the Jones Law. Among such states may be men- tioned Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indi- ana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michi- gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wis- consin and Wyoming. “Mr. Justice Sutherland, now an Associate Justice of the Su- preme Court of the United States, in his valuable work on “Statutory Construction,” vol. 1, 2nd ed.) at section 111, states the reason and the purpose of such a constitutional provision. He says: 7 GAR. No. L-24806, February 13, 1926; see also Philippine Constitution Association Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965; People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535; Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288; Li- brares v, Executive Secretary, 9 SCRA 2616; Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines, 17 SCRA 77; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed,, Vol. 1, p. 162.Canons of STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa In the construction and application of this constity. tional restriction the courts have kept steadily in viey, the correction of the mischief against which it wa, aimed. The object is to prevent the practice, which was common in all legislative bodies where no such restriction existed, of embracing in the same bill in. congruous matters having no relation to each other, or to the subject specified in the title, by which meas. ures were often adopted without attracting attention, Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests, and were combined in order to unite the members of the legislature who favor either in support of all, These combinations were corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the state. Such omnibus bills some- times included more than a hundred sections on as many different subjects, with a title appropriate to the first section, and for other purposes. The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved. And not only were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so that legislative provisions were stealth- ily pushed through in the closing hours of a session, which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The constitutional clause under discus- sion is intended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures, by confining each act to one subject; to prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be expressed in the title.Statutes 65 “The Supreme Court of the State of Alabama, in discussing the effect of the violation of a similar provision of the consti- tution of that state in the cases of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) and Lindsay vs. United States Savings and Loan Asso- ciation (120 Ala., 156), had the following to say, quoting with approval, what Mr. Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, at page 143, had said upon that question: The object sought to be accomplished, and the mis- chief proposed to be remedied by this provision, are well known. . . . Legislative assemblies for the dis- patch of business often pass bills by their titles only, without requiring them to be read. A specious title sometimes covered a legislation which, if its real character had been disclosed, would not have com- manded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision, the title of a statute was often no indication of its subject or contents. ... “An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same statute of such things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage of several measures, no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up his review of the authorities, defining the ob- jects of this provision: It may, therefore, be assumed as set- tled, that the purpose of these provisions was: First, to pre- vent hodge-podge, or log-rolling legislation; second, to pre- vent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceed-Canons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa ings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise if they shal] so desire. (49 Ala., 330, 331.) “The purposes of constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind, when it becomes necessary to determine whether there has been legislative observance of it. The ex- position of these purposes by Judge Cooley is accepted, we believe, in all the states in which a like limitation prevails. . . = (120 Ala., 172.) “In the case of People vs. Parks (58 Cal., 624) the Supreme Court of the State of Califomia had occasion to discuss the question now before us and said: At the least, then two heterogeneous subjects are em- braced in the act, one of which is not expressed in the title, and they cannot be segregated. The title does not express the objects of legislation embodied in the pro- visions of the act. It is, therefore, narrower than the body of the act, and fails to impart that notice of the measures enacted, which the Constitution requires. To prohibit such legislation was the sole end and aim of the constitutional requirement. The practice, says the Supreme Court of Missouri, of comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse and antagonistic nature, in order to combine in its support members who were in favor of particular measures, but neither of which could command the requisite majority on its own merits, was found to be not a corruptive influence in the Legislature itself, but destructive of the best inter- ests of the State, But this was not more detrimental than that other pernicious practice, by which, through dexterous and unscrupulous management, designing men inserted clauses in the bodies of bills, of the true‘Sratutes 67 meaning of which the titles gave no indication, and by skillful maneuvering urged them on to their pas- sage. These things led to fraud and injury, and it was found necessary to apply a corrective in the shape of a constitutional provision. (City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 590.) The provision has been framed in the constitutions of many of the States of the Union; and the courts, whenever it has come before them, have liberally construed it as the will of the people in the interests of honest legislation.” The title must identify generally the subject of the bill. By reading the title, a person should be able to determine whether the Dill deals with a subject in which the person is interested. The pur- pose of the constitutional title requirement is to prevent the con- cealment of the true nature of the provisions of the bill from the legislature and the public ‘The most significant rule on this subject is the so-called One Subject-One Title Rule. In Comelec v. Cruz et al, this Rule was ex- plained: “One Subject- One Title Rule “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Farifias v. Executive Secretary®, provides the reasons for this consti- tutional requirement and the test for its application, as fol- lows: % Bill Drafting Manual, Legislative Counsel, Oregon State Legislature, 2008 ed., citing Northern Wasco County PUD v, Wasco County, 210 Or. 1, 305 P.2d 766 (1957); see also Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418, ® GAR. No. 186616, November 20, 2009, 605 SCRA 167, ® 463 Phil, 179 (2003).68 Canons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa “The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so. called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as wel] as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. “To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that - “Constitutional provisions relating to the subject mat- ter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legis- lation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act. XXXX “x x x This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general sub- ject. KANNStatutes 69 “x x x Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitu- tional directive that the subject of a bill should be em- braced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legis- lators and the public. We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one title rule. “First, the title of RA No. 9164, “An Act Providing for Syn- chronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabaiaang Elections, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,” states the law's general subject matter - the amendment of the LGC to synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is neces- sary. Closely related with length of term is term limitation which defines the total number of terms for which a baran- gay official may run for and hold office. This natural linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign to the gen- eral subject expressed in the title of the law. “Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public they represent were fully informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the law's provisions. Term limitation therefore received the notice, consideration, and action from both the legislators and the public. “Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the ti- tle of RA No, 9164 is to make the title an index of all the subject matters dealt with by law; this is not what the con- stitutional requirement contemplates.”70 Canons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B, Funa In addition, the title of the statute must be certain. In Lidasay v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967, 21 SCRA 496, the Court invalidated a law whose title was found misleading. “It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the consti. tutional provision contains dual limitations upon legisla. tive power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomera- tion, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second, The title of the bill is to be couched in a language suffj- cient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. “Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be “expressed in the title” of the bill. This con- stitutional requirement “breathes the spirit of command.” Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its ti- tle was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives where the bill, being of local appli- cation, originated. “OF course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such preci- sion as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it in- form the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and conse- quences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and dis- cuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.Statutes 71 “In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines: The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not es- sential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the en- actment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real sub- ject or scope of the act, is bad. XXX XK XXX, In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitu- tional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.® “With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title — ‘An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur’ — projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent prov- ince of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates 5182. CJS. pp. 365.72 Canons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur, “The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill, These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790, “Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in “the substantial diminution of territorial limits” of Cotabato province is “merely the inci- dental legal results of the definition of the boundary” of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away “need not be expressed in the title of the law.” This posture — we must say — but emphasizes the error of constitutional di- mensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact. “Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, Octo- ber 29, 1966, as controlling here, The Felzva case is not in fo- cus, For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads:Statutes 73 “An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Prov- ince, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao.” That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective of- ficials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit “for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof” — which is “manifestly germane to the subject” of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing, The lumping to- gether of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa. “As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title “An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Mus- kegon.” The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: “The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following de- scribed territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: .. . be, and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport.” This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on “Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads; “No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.” The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted7 CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa to uphold the decree of nullity, The following, said in Hume may well apply to this case: " It may be that words, “An act to incorporate the vil. lage of Fruitport,” would have been a sufficient title, and that the words, “in the county of Muskegon” were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage. .. Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the pur. pose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 NJ. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539. A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to “chal- lenge the attention of those affected by the act to its provi- sions.” Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich, 316, 200 NW 262. The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the restric- tion. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: “The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading.” “Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional.” “We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.” In People v. Ferrer, et al. (GR. No. L-32613, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382), the Court ruled that the “title of a bill need not bea catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the de- tails of the Act.” Thus: “The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional com mand that ‘no bill which may be enacted into law shall em-Statutes ict brace more than one subje ct which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.’ “What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in the title of the Actis the last Proviso of section 4 which reads: And provided, finally, That one who conspires with any other person to overthrow the Government of the Re- Public of the Philippines, or the government of any of its political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means, for the purpose of plac- ing such Government or political subdivision under the control and domination of any lien power, shall be punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with all the accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code, “It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes not only membership in the Communist Party of the Philip- pines or similar associations, but as well ‘any conspiracy by two persons to overthrow the national or any local govern- ment by illegal means, even if their intent is not to establish a totalitarian regime, but a democratic regime, even if their purpose is not to place the nation under an alien communist power, but under an alien democratic power like the United States or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communist power like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwan or Indonesia’ “The Act, in addition to its main title (“An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Asso- ciations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and for Other Purposes”), has a short title. Section 1 provides that “This Act shall be known as the Anti-Subversion Act.” Together with the main title, the short title of the statute unequivo- cally indicates that the subject matter is subversion in gen- eral which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionCanons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 76 Dennis B, Funa of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the existing Goy. ernment and not merely subversion by Communist con. spiracies. “The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear terms the na- ture, scope, and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narrow or technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. We hold that the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.” As for amendatory statutes, the Supreme Court ruled in Peo- ple v. Buenviaje™: in her fourth assignment of error the appellant attacks the constitutionality of Act No. 3111, amending section 770 of the Administrative Code, on the ground that the subject of the Act is not sufficiently expressed in its title and that it embraces more than one subject. There is no merit in this contention. The title of Act No, 3111 reads as follows: ‘An Act to amend sections seven hundred and fifty- nine, seven hundred and sixty, seven hundred and sixty-one, seven hundred and sixty-two, seven hun- dred and sixty-five, seven hundred and sixty-seven, seven hundred and seventy, seven hundred and sev- enty-four, seven hundred and seventy-five, seven hundred and seventy-six, seven hundred and sev- enty-eight, seven hundred and eighty, seven hundred and eighty-two, seven hundred and eighty-three, and twenty-six hundred and seventy-eight of Act Num- bered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known a5 ® GR, No, L-22945, March 3, 1925, 47 Phil. 536.STATUTES 77 the Administrative Code, increasing the number of the members of the Board of Medical Examiners, con- ferring upon the same certain additional powers and responsibilities and for other purposes. “All of the sections enumerated in the title quoted relate to the same general subject, namely, defining and regulating the practice of medicine, and section 770 is expressly men- tioned as one of the sections amended. “This is sufficient. Under constitutional provisions similar to ours the general rule is that a title which declares the amendatory statute to be an act to amend a designated sec- tion or the like of a specified Code is sufficient and the pre- cise nature of the amendatory Act need not be further stated. (Ross vs. Aguirre, 191 U.S., 60; Udell vs. Citizens Street R. Co., 152 Ind., 507; McGuire vs. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340; Lankford vs. County Commissioners of Som- erset County, 73 Md., 105; Tabor vs. State, 34 Tex. Crim., 631; Com. vs. Brown, 91 Va., 762.)” The abovecited ruling in Buenviaje was reiterated ten years later in Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Reyes®: “Act No. 4122 is entitled, “An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between sections fourteen hundred and fifty- four and fourteen, hundred and fifty-five thereof a new sec- tion, to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty- four-A.” It is argued that the Act amends the Civil Code and the Chattel Mortgage Law, Act No. 1508, As a conse- quence, it is alleged, that one of the subjects covered by the Act, the amendment of the Chattel Mortgage Law, is not expressed in the title thereof, in violation of section 3 of the Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 which ® GR. No. L-43263, October 31, 1935, 62 Phil. 461.78 CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa provides that no bill which may be enacted into law shay embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be ex. pressed in the title of the bill.” “We think that this is taking altogether too narrow ang technical a view of the matter. Legislation should not be embarrassed by overly strict construction. The constitu. tional provision, while designed to remedy an evil, was not designed to require great particularity in stating the object of the law in its title. In reality, while Act No. 4122 deals with three subjects, sales of personal property on the in- stallment plan, chattel mortgages, and leases of personal property with option to repurchase, all three are compre- hended within the subject of installment payments. (Macondray & Co. vs. R. de Santos [1935], 61 Phil. 370.) “It would be well, however, to scrutinize this point a little more closely. The portion of the Civil Code which is amended is Book IV, Title IV having to do with contract of purchase and sale and Chapter I having to do with the na- ture and form of this contract. The Chattel Mortgage Law, in section 3, defines a chattel mortgage as conditional sale of personal property as security for the payment a debt or the performance of some other obligation specified therein. The close analogy between chattel mortgages as covered by Act No. 1508 and conditional sales as covered by the Civil Code gave this court considerable difficulty, but eventually it was determined that a chattel mortgage, under Act No. 1508 is not of the Same effect as a contract of purchase and sale with right of repurchase under the Civil Code. (Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Tamaraw Plantation Co. [1925], 47 Phil. 513, reconciling Meyers vs. Thein [1910], 15 Phil. 303; Bachrach vs, Mantel [1913] 25 Phil, 410, and Bachrach Motor Co, vs. Summers [1921], 42 Phil. 3.) Likewise the close rela- tionship between chattel mortgages and conditional sales in other jurisdictions is evidenced by the fact that a well-STATUTES 79 known text writer saw fit to choose this as the title for his work. (Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, 1933 ed.) “It could be added, if necessary, that the general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specific code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. (People vs. Buenviaje [1925], 47 Phil. 536.) On the supposition, therefore, which seems reason- able, that the purpose had in mind by the Legislature in en- acting Act No. 4122 was to provide legislation concerning sales of personal property on the installment plan, this sub- ject was sufficiently expressed by indicating that the law had to do with an amendment of the Civil Code in the por- tion thereof given up to contract of purchase and sale.” Another leading case on this topic is Ichong v. Hernandez et al.§4; “4 subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads: No bill which may be enacted in the law shall em- brace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. “What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or the public * GR. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957, 101 Phil. 1155.80 Canons oF StaTuToRY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its opera- tion (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297, A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term “regulate” does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of “nationalization” and “prohibi. tion”, which terms express the two main purposes and objec- tives of the law. But “regulate” is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation. Under the title of an act to “regulate”, the sale of in- toxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.) Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of in- toxicating liquors, ete.” sufficiently expresses the sub- ject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to mi- nors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the sub- ject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.) The word “regulate” is of broad import, and necessar- ily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute rea" son why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which it~ volves suppression, (State vs, Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.) —_——-—~dStatutes 81 “The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not be an in- dex to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was fol- lowed the title of the Act in question adopted the more gen- eral term “regulate” instead of “nationalize” or “prohibit”. Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the regu- lation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms “nationalization” or “prohibition”; so were the title changed from “regulate” to “nationalize” or “prohibit”, there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the Act inva- lid. The use of the term “regulate”, therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the ti- tle, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act. “One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the leg- islators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provi- sions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provi- sions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval, It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.”Statutes: 83 Islands exercised jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; \, WHEREAS, all the waters within the limits set forth in the above-mentioned treaties have always been regarded as part of the territory of the Philippine Islands; WHEREAS, all the waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the Philippines archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, have always been considered as neces- sary appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland or internal waters of the Philippines; WHEREAS, all the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of the boundaries set forth in the aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea of the Phil- ippines; WHEREAS, the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining appro- priate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago; and WHEREAS, the said baselines should be clarified and specifi- cally defined and described for the information of all concerned; Now, therefor, Section 1. The baselines for the territorial sea of the Philip- pines are hereby defined and described specifically as follows: c. Enacting clause. - The enacting clause immediately pre- cedes the text of the bill. The enacting clause is the formal expression of legislative enactment. It is also indicative of a statute's origin. The Philippine Constitution does not require any particular enacting clause. Thus, the omission of an enacting clause would not consti- % Bill Drafting Manual, Legislative Counsel, Oregon State Legislature, 2008 ed.84 CANons OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis 8. Funa tute a fatal defect provided that the statute was signed by the Proper legislative officers and signed into law by the President.” In Philippine laws, the following would be the enacting clause: “Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representa. tives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:”#* d. Body. ~The content of the statute which would be the in- tended legislation. e. Repealing clause. - A clause in a statute repealing a pre- vious enactment.” Example of a repealing clause would be: "SEC. 8. Repealing Clause.—Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, adminis- trative order, rule or regulation contrary to or inconsistent with any provision of this Act is hereby amended or modi- fied accordingly.” f Savings clause. - Savings clauses are designed to pre- serve remedies under existing law. The purpose of a savings clause is merely to nix an inference that the statute in which it appears is intended to be the exclusive remedy for harms caused by the viola tion of the statute. A corollary is that a savings clause typically does not create a cause of action.” * Watson v. Corey, 6 Utah 150; 21 P. 1089 (1889). * Act No, 2711 (The Revised Administrative Code of 1917) provided: Section 6, Form of enacting clause, — The enacting clause ofall statutes passed by the Philippine Legislature shall be conceived in the following terms: Beit enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by authority of the same: © Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, 1996. ” Yule Kim, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, Congressional Research Service, p. CRS-33, August 31, 2008, citing PMC, IneStatutes 85 Examples: Republic Act No. 7354, also known as the “Postal Service Act of 1992”: SECTION 31. Savings Clause.—All orders, determinations, tules, regulations, permits, certificates, licenses and privi- leges which have been issued, made, granted or allowed to become effective by the former Postal Services Office or its predecessor, shall continue to be in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or repealed. No suit, action or other proceeding commenced by of against any officer in his official capacity as an officer of any division or agency of the former Postal Services Office (Bu- reau of Posts), the functions of which are transferred by this Act to the Corporation, shall abate by reason of this Act. In like manner, no cause of action by or against such division or agency or by or against any officer thereof in his official capacity shall abate by reason of the enactment of this Act. Causes of actions, suits, or other proceedings may be as- serted or against the Corporation or such official of the Cor- poration as may be appropriate. Republic Act No. 1792, also known as the “Social Security Act of 1954”: Section 31. Saving Clause.—The Congress hereby reserves the right to amend, alter, or repeal any provision of this Act, and no person shall be or shall be deemed to be vested with any property or other right by virtue of the enactment or operation of this Act. After the first two years of operation, v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610 and Cooper Industries v, Aviall Servs., 543 US. 157 (2004).CANoNs oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa an actuarial and financial valuation of the funds and opera. tion of the System shall be made and, based on the results thereof, the President of the Philippines shall determine and recommend to Congress whether additional benefits, such as unemployment, may be included in the System’s cover. age, and the additional premiums to be imposed commen. surate with the additional benefits.” Republic Act No. 8371, also known as “The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997”: SEC. 81. Saving Clause.—This Act will not in any manner adversely affect the rights and benefits of the ICCs/IPs un- der other conventions, recommendations, international trea- ties, national laws, awards, customs and agreements. Republic Act No. 7356, also known as the “Law Creating the Na- tional Commission for Culture and the Arts”: Ee Sec. 26. Saving Clause.—All laws, rules, regulations, other issuances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. All provi- sions of Executive Order No. 118 not inconsistent with this Act shall however remain in full force and effect. Separability clause.—This is also known as the sever ability clause. A separability clause is a statement within the document that says, in effect, that if any part of the document is held void, this will have no effect on the validity of the remainder of the document. Congress frequently includes a pro forma sever’ ability clause in a statute, and this reinforces a “presumption” of severability by removing much of the doubt about congressional intent. A severability clause does not guarantee, however, that what remains of a statute after a portion has been invalidated is “fully operative”; courts sometimes find that valid portions of aStatutes 87 statute cannot stand on their own even th jough Congress has in- cluded a severability clause. e It is well-settled that when Provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the uncon- stitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceabil- ity of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided sections. Examples: Republic Act No. 9367, also known as the “Biofuels Act of 2006”: SEC. 20. Separability Clause.—If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity, of the other provisions hereof. Republic Act No. 7394, also known as the “Consumer Act of the Philippines”: Article 172. Separability Clause.—If for any reason any arti- cle of provision of this Act or any portion thereof or the ap- plication of such Article, provision or portion thereof to any person, group or circumstance is declared invalid or uncon- stitutional, the remainder of this Act shall not be affected by such decision, Republic Act No. 9165, also known as the “Comprehensive Dan- Serous Drugs Act of 2002”: Section 99. Separability Clause,—If for any reason any sec- tion or provision of this Act, or any portion thereof, or the application of such section, provision or portion thereof to 2 Yule Kim, ibid, p, CRS-38. % Manalo v. Sistoza et al., G.R. No, 107369, August 11, 1999, 312 SCRA 239,88 Canons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa any person, group or circumstance is declared invalid oru constitutional, the remainder of this Act shall not be atfeteg by such declaration and shall remain in force and effect. Republic Act No. 8762, also known as the “Retail Trade Liberalizg. tion Act of 2000”: Sec. 14. Separability Clause.—If any provision of this Act shall be held unconstitutional, the other provisions not oth- erwise affected thereby shall remain in force and effect. h. Effectivity clause.—This provision of the law states when the law will take effect, provided itis after its approval. Example: Republic Act No. 9225, also known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003”: Sec. 8. Effectivity Clause.—This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Ga- zette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation. 15. Statute showing its different parts: EXAMPLE 1: Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Eleventh Congress Third Regular Session Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fourth day of July, two thousand. ---000--- anStatutes: 89 IREPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048] AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Er- ror and Change of First Name or Nickname.—No entry in a civil regis- ter shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regula- tions. SECTION 2. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: (1) “City or Municipal civil registrar” refers to the head of the local civil registry office of the city or municipality, as the case may be, who is appointed as such by the city or municipal mayor in accordance with the provisions of existing laws, (2). “Petitioner” refers to a natural person filing the petition and who has direct and personal interest in the correc- tion of a clerical or typographical error in an entry or change of first name or nickname in the civil register.90 Canons OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa (3) “Clerical or typographical error” refers to mis committed in the performance of clerical work in ae ing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the én register that is harmless and innocuous, such as te ! spelled name or misspelled place of birth or the ig, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the under. standing, and can be corrected or changed only by refer. ence to other existing record or records: Provided, hoy. ever, That no correction must involve the change of na- tionality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (4) “Civil Register” refers to the various registry books and related certificates and documents kept in the archives of the local civil registry offices, Philippine Consulates and of the Office of the Civil Registrar General. (6) “Civil registrar general” refers to the Administrator of the National Statistics Office which is the agency man- dated to carry out and administer the provision of laws on civil registration. (6) “First name” refers to a name or nickname given to 2 person which may consist of one or more names in addi- tion to the middle and last names. SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where.—Any pet son having direct and personal interest in the correction of a cler cal or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified pe tion with the local civil registry office of the city or municipal) where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place : the country and it would not be practical for such party, in oe of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person fore the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be correStatutes 71 or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where the interested party is presently resid- ing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition. Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates. The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames may be availed of only once. SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. —The petition for change of first name or nickname may be al- lowed in any of the following cases: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ri- diculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that by that first name or nickname in the community: or (3) The change will avoid confusion. SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition.—The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affida- vit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the peti- tion and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall state the par-92 Canons oF StatutoRY CoNsTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa ticular erroneous entry or entries, which are sou, ight to be COttectey and/or the change sought to be made. The petition shall be supported with the followii NE docy. ments: (1) A certified true machine copy of the Certificate or of th page of the registry book containing the entry or enttig sought to be corrected or changed. (2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the Correction of change shall be based; and (3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or my. nicipal civil registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition. In case of change of first name or nickname, the Petition shall likewise be supported with the documents mentioned in the im- mediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks ina newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate law enforcement agen- cies that he has no pending case or no criminal record. The petition and its supporting Papers shall be filed in three (3) copies to be distributed as follows: first copy to the concerned city or municipal civil registrar, or the consul general; second copy to the Office of the Civil Registrar General; and third copy to the petitioner, SECTION 6. Duties of the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General.—The city or municipal civil registrar or the con- sul general to whom the petition is presented shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, He shall post the petition in a conspicuous place provided for that purpose for ten (10) comStatutes 93 secutive days after he finds the petition and its supporting docu- ments sufficient in form and substance, The city or municipal civil tegistrar or the consul general shall act on the petition and shall render a decision not later than five (5) working days after the completion of the posting and/or publication requirement. He shall transmit a copy of his decision together with the records of the proceedings to the Office of the Civil Registrar General within five (5) working days from the date of the decision. SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar Gen- eral.—The civil registrar general shall, within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision granting a petition, exercise the power to impugn such decision by way of an objection based on the following grounds: (1) The error is not clerical or typographical; (2) The correction of an entry or entries in the civil register is substantial or controversial as it affects the civil status of a person; or (3) The basis used in changing the first name or nickname of a person does not fall under SECTION 4. The civil registrar general shall immediately notify the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general of the action taken on the decision. Upon receipt of the notice thereof, the city or mu- nicipal civil registrar or the consul general shall notify the peti- tioner of such action, The petitioner may seek reconsideration with the civil regis- trar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court. If the civil registrar general fails to exercise his power to im- pugn the decision of the city or municipal civil registrar or of the94 Canons OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa consul general within the period prescribed herein, shall become final and executory, Where the petition is denied by the ci registrar or the consul general, the petitioner decision to the civil registrar general or file tion with the proper court. such Aecision ity or municipal civil may either appeal thy the appropriate pet, SECTION 8. Payment of Fees.—The city or munici registrar or the consul general shall be authorized to co sonable fees as a condition for accepting the petition. An petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of the said fe, Pal civil lect rea. indigent e, SECTION 9. Penalty Clause.—A person who violates any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years but not more than twelve (12) years, or a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court. In addition, if the offender is a government official or em- ployee he shall suffer the penalties provided under civil service laws, rules and regulations. SECTION 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations.—The civil registrar general shall, in consultation with the Department of Jus- tice, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Supreme Court Administrator, the University of the Philippines Law Centet and the Philippine Association of Civil Registrars, issue the neces- sary rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this Act not later than three (3) months from the effectivity of this law. SECTION 11. Retroactivity Clause.—This Act shall have tet roactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested ot acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws.Statutes 95 SECTION 12. Separability Clause.—If any portion or provision of this Act is declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining por- tions or provisions thereof shall not be affected by such declaration. SECTION 13. Repealing Clause.—All laws, decrees, orders, tules and regulations, other issuances, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SECTION 14. Effectivity Clause.—This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. Approved. EXAMPLE 2: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7656 AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO DECLARE DIVIDENDS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 1. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared the policy of the State that in order for the National Government to realize additional revenues, government-owned or -controlled corporations, without impairing their viability and the purposes for which they have been established, shall share a substantial amount of their net earnings to the National Government. Sec. 2. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act, the term: (a) “National Government” refers to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local governments.“7 9% Canons oF Statutory Construction Dennis 8. Funa (b) “Government-owned or controlled Corporations” refe to corporations organized as a stock or non-stock conporatice, vested with functions relating to public needs, whether gover” mental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty one percent (51%) of its capital stock. This term Shall also include financial institutions, owned or controlled by the National Government, but shall exclude acquired asset corporations, as de. fined in the next paragraphs, state universities, and colleges, (©) “Acquired asset corporation” refers to a corporation: (1) which is under private ownership, the voting or outstanding shares of which were: (i) conveyed to the Government or to a gov- ernment agency, instrumentality or corporation in satisfaction of debts whether by foreclosure of otherwise, or (ii) duly acquired by the Government through final judgment in a sequestration pro- ceeding; or (2) which is a subsidiary of a government corporation organized exclusively to own and manage, or lease, or operate spe- cific physical assets acquired by a government financial institution in satisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in any case by law or by enunciated policy is required to be disposed of to pri- vate ownership within a specified period of time. (d) “Net earnings” shall mean income derived from what- ever source, whether exempt or subject to tax, net of deductions allowed under Section 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and income tax and other taxes paid thereon, but in no case shall any reserve for whatever purpose be allowed as a deduction from net earnings. Sec, 3, Dividends,—All government-owned or -controlled corporations shall declare and remit at least fifty percent (50%) of their annual net earnings as cash, stock or property dividends to the National Government. This section shall also apply to thoseStatutes 7 government-owned or -controlled corporations whose profit dis- tribution is provided by their respective charters or by special law, but shall exclude those enumerated in Section 4 hereof: Provided, That such dividends accruing to the National Government shall be received by the National Treasury and recorded as income of the General Fund, Sec. 4, Exemptions.—The provisions of the preceding section notwithstanding, government-owned or -controlled corporations created or organized by law to administer real or personal proper- ties or funds held in trust for the use and the benefit of its mem- bers, shall not be covered by this Act such as, but not limited to: the Government Service Insurance System, the Home Develop- ment Mutual Fund, the Employees Compensation Commission, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, and the Philippine Medical Care Commission. Sec. 5. Flexible Clause.—In the interest of national economy and general welfare, the percentage of annual net earnings that shall be declared by a government-owned or -controlled corpora- tion may be adjusted by the President of the Philippines upon rec- ommendation by the Secretary of Finance. Sec. 6. Penalty.—Any member of the governing board, the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer of a govern- ment-owned or -controlled corporation who violates any provision of this Act or any of the implementing rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, in addition to other sanctions provided by law, upon conviction thereof, shall suffer the penalty of a fine not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000,00) or imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than three (3) years, or both, at the dis- cretion of the court. Sec. 7. Implementing Rules and Regulations,—The Depart- ment of Finance shall formulate and issue the necessary rules and“y 08 Canons oF STATUTORY ConstRUCTION 1 Dennis B. Funa regulations within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of ¢ haptastbatt this and shall exercise primary jurisdiction in its implementatio, “ mn. Sec. 8. Separability Clause.—If for any reason or Teasons an part of the provision of this Act shall be deemed to be unconstity. tional or invalid, the other parts or provisions hereof which ate not affected thereby shall continue to be in force and effect, Sec. 9. Repealing Clause.—Executive Order No. 399, dated April 29, 1990, and other laws, decrees, executive orders, letters of instruction, rules and regulations, and portions thereof inconsis. tent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or mod. fied accordingly. Sec. 10. Effectivity Clause.—This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation, whichever comes earlier. Approved: November 9, 1993 16. Nomenclature of Philippine laws.—Over the years, the following have been the legislative enactments under different terms: a. Act - Legislations during the American rule of the Philippines between 1900 to 1935. The first legislative body was the Philippine Commission and succeeded by the Philippine Congress. b. Commonwealth Act - Legislations during the Philip- pine Commonwealth between 1935 to 1946. c. Batas Pambansa — Legislations during the tenure of President Ferdinand Marcos enacted by the Batasan Pambansa between 1978 to 1985.