Mind Association

The Structure of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference

Author(s): Graham Priest
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 103, No. 409 (Jan., 1994), pp. 25-34
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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 The Structure of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference

GRAHAM PRIEST

Introduction

When one meets the paradoxesof self-referencefor the first time, one is struck
by the fact that they all appearto be membersof a single family, generatedby a
common underlying principle. Indeed, Russell, who inauguratedthe study of
these paradoxesthis century,held thatthis is precisely what they are. It is notori-
ously difficultto pin down the commonunderlyingprinciple,however.Forexam-
ple, on closer scrutiny it is not at all clear what the Burali-Forti and Liar
Paradoxeshave in common. Russell himself was unableto say whatheld the fam-
ily of paradoxestogetherbeyond some ratherunsatisfactoryremarksconcerning
vicious circles in Principia Mathematica.(See for example Godel 1944.)
It is therefore unsurprisingthat the modern view of the paradoxes is to the
effect thattherearetwo distinctfamilies here, which arise from differentsources,
and which are to be treatedquite differently.(The view is now so orthodoxthat
this claim needs no documentation.)Although one can find something like this
view expressed in Peano (1906), the founder of the orthodoxy was Ramsey
(1925).
The only point of this paperis to demonstratethatRussell was right and Ram-
sey was wrong. The paradoxesof self-referencedo have a common underlying
structure,which generatesthe contradictioninvolved, andI shall spell out exactly
what that is. Moreover,as we shall see, Russell had been on the righttracksome
five years earlier.

1. Ramsey'sdivision

ThoughRamsey's division of the family into two classes is wrong, it will be use-
ful to have it before us. His exact words are not withouthistoricalinterest,so let
me simply quote him:
It is not sufficiently remarked,and the fact is entirelyneglected in Prin-
cipia Mathematica,that these contradictions[the paradoxesof self-ref-
erence] fall into two fundamentaldistinct groups, which we will call A
and B. The best known are divided as follows:
A. (1) The class of all classes which are not membersof themselves.

Mind, Vol. 103 . 409. January 1994 ? Oxford University Press 1994

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26 GrahamPriest

(2) The relationbetween two relationswhen one does not have it-
self to the other.
(3) BuraliForti's contradictionof the greatestordinal.

B. (4) "I am lying."

(5) The least integernot nameablein fewer thannineteensyllables.
(6) The least indefinableordinal.
(7) Richards'scontradiction.
(8) Weyl's contradictionabout "heterologische".
The principleaccordingto which I have divided them is of fundamental
importance.GroupA consists of contradictionswhich, were no provi-
sion made against them, would occur in a logical or mathematicalsys-
tem itself. They involve only logical or mathematical terms such as
class and number,and show that there must be something wrong with
our logic or mathematics. But the contradictions in Group B are not
purely logical, and cannot be stated in logical terms alone; for they all
contain some referenceto thought,language, or symbolism, which are
not formal but empiricalterms. So they may be due not to faulty logic
or mathematics,but to faulty ideas concerningthoughtand language.If
so, they would not be relevantto mathematicallogic, if by "logic" we
mean a symbolic system, though of course they would be relevant to
logic in the sense of the analysisto thought. [Footnote:these two mean-
ings of "logic" are frequentlyconfused...](1925, p. 171 of reprint)
In hindsight,the unsatisfactorynatureof Ramsey's criterionis clear.For a start,
if one wants to draw a fundamentaldistinction,this ought to be done in terms of
the structure of the differentparadoxes.Ramsey's distinctiondependson the rel-
atively superficialfact of what vocabularyis used in the paradoxes,and, in par-
ticular,whetherthis belongs to mathematicsproperlyso called. But worse, this is
a notoriouslyshifting boundary.Ramsey was, of course, writingbefore the hey-
day of meta-mathematics.Had he been writingten years later,it would have been
clear thata numberof items of vocabularyoccurringin paradoxesof GroupB do
belong to mathematics.In particular,both syntactical and semanticallinguistic
notions became quite integralpartsof mathematics.Indeed, in a sense, the work
of Godel andTarskishowed how these notions could be reducedto otherpartsof
mathematics(numbertheory and set theory,respectively).
Despite this, it behoves anyone who says thatRamsey is wrong to come good
with the structureunderlyingparadoxesof self-reference.This we will turnto in
a moment. But first it will also be convenient to divide Ramsey's GroupB itself
into two. In the firstclass, Bi, belong Ramsey's (5), (6) and (7); in the second, Bii,
belong, (4) and (8). A rough criterionfor-thedistinctionis that paradoxesin Bi,
but not B3ii,make explicit use of the notion of definability.More fundamentally,
paradoxes in Bii use diagonalisation,or some similar mechanism, to establish
somethingof the form a - a, and hence ct and -a; whereas paradoxesin Bi
give independentargumentsfor each of a and -a.

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 The Structureof the Paradoxes of Self-Reference 27

2. Russell's Schema

To exhibit the structureunderlyingall these paradoxes,let uAsstart with what I

shall call Russell's Schema, an idea dating from some years before he lighted
upon the Vicious Circle Principle.In his own words this is as follows:
Given a propertyq and a function 6, such that, if p belongs to all mem-
bers of u, 6(u) always exists, has the propertyq, and is not a memberof
u; thenthe suppositionthatthereis a class w of all termshavingproperty
qpand that 6(w) exists leads to the conclusion that 6(x) both has and has
not the property p. (1905, p. 142 of reprint)
Less tersely, given a propertyq9,and function 6, consider the following condi-
tions:
1) w = {x: qg(x)} exists
2) if x is a subset of w: a) 6(x)ox
and b) 6(x)Ew
For future reference I will call clause (2a) the Transcendence Condition and
clause (2b) the Closure Condition.
Given (1) and (2) we have a contradiction.For when Transcendenceand Clo-
sure are appliedto w, an irresistibleforce meets an immovableobject. The result:
b(w)Ewand 6(w)Ew.Hence, any qpand 6 thatinstantiateRussell's Schema gener-
ate a contradiction.Russell did not claim thatthis structurewas behindall the par-
adoxes. He did, however, demonstrate that it was behind all paradoxes of
Ramsey's GroupA. To see how, it is sufficientto examine a couple of examples.
In Russell's Paradox,the propertyq(x) is "x?x",so that w is the Russell set
R={y; yoy}; and the function 6 is simply the identity function, id. Suppose that
xcw; then x ex--xcx. Hence x4x, demonstratingTranscendence;it follows thatx
E R, which is Closure.The contradictionis thatRERand ROR.
Russell's Paradoxis a stripped-downversionof Cantor'sParadox(see Russell,
1905), so let us move on to Burali-Forti's.q(x) is "x is an ordinal",and so w is
the set of all ordinals,On; 6(x) is the least ordinalgreaterthan every memberof
x (abbreviation:log(x)). Transcendenceholds by definition,as does Closure.The
contradictionis that log(On)EOnand log(On)0On.
One further example: Mirimanoff's Paradox. In this, qp(x)is "x is well
founded",so thatw is the cumulativehierarchy,V; 6(x) is just the power set of x,
P(x). If xcV, Transcendenceand Closure hold simply in virtue of x being well-
founded.The contradictionin this case is thatVeV and VWV,since 6(V) is just V
itself. (Since all membersof V are well-foundedP(V)cV. But if xEV then every
memberof x is in V. Hence VcP(V).)

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28 GrahamPriest

We can tabulatethese observationsas follows:

Paradox | 3(x) 9(x) w

Russell id(x) x?x R

Burali-Forti log(x) x is an ordinal On

Mirimanoff P(x) x is well-founded V

3. Definabilityparadoxes

Let us now move on to the paradoxesin Ramsey's GroupBi, the definabilitypar-

adoxes, and recall that somethingis definableiff there is a (non-indexical)noun-
phrasethat refersto it. Now consider Konig's Paradoxas an example: there are
indefinableordinals,andthe least indefinableordinalhasjust been definedin that
very phrase.At first glance, this would appearto fit into Russell's Schema very
nicely. q(x) is the predicate"x is a definableordinal",so thatw is the set of defin-
able ordinals,DOn; and ((x) is lon(x) (the least ordinalnot in x). The contradic-
tion is thatthe least indefinableordinallon(DOn)both is and is not definable(that
is, a memberof DOn).
Unfortunately,things are not so simple. For whilst Transcendence is true,
lon(x)ox, Closureneed not be: even if every memberof x is definable,there is no
reason to suppose that x itself is definable.And if it is not, there is no reason to
suppose thatthe least ordinalnot in x is definable,i.e., that lon(x )e DOn.
If, however,x is definable,then we do have thatlon(x)EDOn;andthis suggests
a small modificationof Russell's conditions, as follows: For given propertiesw
and V, and (possibly partial)function 8:
1) w = {x: q(x)} exists and ip(w)
2) if x is a subset of w such that 4p(x):
a) 6(x) ox
and b) ((x)Ew
If these conditions are satisfied we still have a contradiction.For since 4(w), we
have both 6(w)ow and ((w)Ew.I will call this the QualifiedRussell'sSchema.The
essential qualificationis that applying ( to an arbitrarysubset of w is not now
guaranteedto transcendit; only if the set satisfies t will it do so. Thus ( works
on a sub-familyof the power set of w, P(w).
Bearing this in mind, it is clear that Russell's Schema properis just a special
case of the QualifiedRussell Schema, where the sub-family in question is P(w)
itself (i.e., where 4 is the universalproperty, =xx=x).Thus, the QualifiedRussell
Schema still encompasses the paradoxesof GroupA. But by choosing 4 appro-
priately,it also encompasses Konig's Paradox.We just take the property4p(x)to

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 The Structureof the Paradoxes of Self-Reference 29

be "x is definable".DOn is clearly definable, and as we have alreadyobserved,

for definablex, Transcendenceand Closurehold.
Unsurprisingly,all the other paradoxesin GroupBi fit the QualifiedRussell
Schema. Take Berry's Paradox. qp(x)is "x is a naturalnumber(= finite ordinal)
definable in less than 19 words", so w={n; n is a naturalnumber definable in
less than 19 words}, DN19;i(x) is "x is definable in less than 14 words";and
6(x) is just lon(x). Clearly,lon(x)ox, and if x is definable in less than 14 words
lon(x)EDN19.(Its definitionis "the least ordinalnot in" plus the definitionof x.)
Hence Transcendence and Closure are satisfied. The contradiction is that
lon(DN19)EDN19 and lon(DN19)4DN19.
One furtherexample:Richard'sParadox.In this, p(x)is "x is a definablereal
numberbetween0 and 1",so thatw is the set of such reals, DR; ip(x)is "xis defin-
able" and 6(x) is diag(x), a real, definedby diagonalisationon x, in such a way as
to ensurethatb(x)0x.If x is definable,diag(x) is definable.Hence bothTranscend-
ence and Closure are satisfied. The contradiction is that diag(DR)EDR and
diag(DR)(DR.
We can tabulatethese observationsas follows:

Paradox 6x (x) 9x w

Konig's lon(x) x is definable x is a definable DOn

ordinal

Berry's lon(x) x is definable x is a natural DN19

in less than 14 numberdefin-
words able in less
than 19 words

Richard's diag(x) x is definable x is a definable DR

real between
0 and 1

We have seen that all the paradoxesof GroupsA and Bi fit the QualifiedRussell
Schema.In fact, they all fit the Russell Schemaitself. To see this it sufficesto note
that (assuming the Axiom of Choice) for any structurethat fits the Qualified
Schema there is another,identical in all relevant respects, that fits the regular
Schema.
Let q, V and 6 be any quantitiessatisfying the QualifiedRussell Schema. As
usual, w={x: p(x)}.Let E)be a choice function on P(w). We now define a new
function, 6', as follows. Let xcw.
6'(x) = 6(x) ifp(x);
6' (x) = 8 (w-x) otherwise
It is easily seen that .pand 6' satisfy the Russell Schema. The only point to note
is that 8 (w-x) is undefinedif w=x. But since 'p(w), 6'(x) is simply 6(x) in this case.

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30 GrahamPriest

For the same reason,the contradictions6(w)EwA6(w)qwand b'(w)EwA6'(w)qw

are identical.

4. The Liar, etc.

We have seen thatRussell's Schema properunderliesthe paradoxesin Ramsey's

GroupsA and Bi. It remainsto show thatit underliesthe paradoxesin GroupBii.
The Liar Paradoxis a paradigmof this Group.Primafacie this paradoxappears
to have nothing to do with the Russell Schema: the Schema concerns totalities
which can be transcendedby means of the applicationof a suitableoperator;the
Liar Paradoxdoes not seem to involve totalities at all.
However,with a bit of care, it can be put into the appropriateform. In fact, for
reasons that will become clear later, it is safer to show that it fits the Qualified
Russell Schema, so let me show this. Assume for the momentthat it is sentences
(ratherthan propositionsor some other semantic entities) that are true or false.
Let q(x) be "x is true",so that w is the set of true sentences, Tr;let tp(x)be "x is
definable".6 is a function, a, definedby some suitabletechniqueof diagonalisa-
tion so that if a is any definableset o(a)=a where a=<a4a>. The angle-bracket
expression is a sentence expressing the fact that ctis not in the set a. (Hence, a
says "This sentence is not in a".) Note that a must be definable, or there would
be no guaranteethat there is such a sentence.
Now, if a is definableandacTr:
o(a)Ea <a4a>ea
<a4a>eTr
aea (by the T-schema)
=^o(a)ea

Hence o(a)ea, andTranscendenceis satisfied.Moreover,it follows that a4a, and

hence by the T-schema<aca>c=Tr,i.e. o(a)ETr.Hence, Closure is satisfied too.
The Liar is the sentence c(Tr) and the contradiction is that c(Tr)ETr and
o(Tr)4Tr.
Anotherparadoxin this family is the KnowerParadox.This is the same as the
Liar, except that q(x) is"'x is known to be true",and so w is the set of known
things, Kn. Transcendenceis verified as before, since knowledge implies truth;
Closure follows, since it has been establishedthat a4a, and so aEKn. The para-
dox is that o(Kn)EKnand o(Kn)eKn.
A varianton these paradoxesis the liar (or knower) chain, where several sen-
tences are inter-related.These fit the pattern,too. To see this, just consider the
simplest paradoxof this kind: the Liar pair.This is exactly the same as the Liar,
except that a is slightly more complicated.This time, o(a)=a, where a=<fleTr>
and fl=<a4a>. To see that a satisfies the appropriateconditions, suppose that
acTr and thata is definable.Then:

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 The Structureof the Paradoxes of Self-Reference 31

o(a)Ea aaca
aaETr
<PETr>-eTr
=i c-Tr (by the T-schema)
= <aqa>eTr
aa4a (by the T-schema)
r(a)qa
Hence, u(a)4a, which is Transcendence.To see thatClosureis satisfied,note the
following:
u(a)4a a4a
<a4a>eTr (by the T-schema)
=ic3Tr
<pf3Tr>ETr (by the T-schema)
aaETr
OF
(a)-Tr
The contradictionis that o(Tr)ETrand u(Tr)4Tr.
A final example from this Groupof paradoxeswill suffice. This is the Hetero-
logical Paradox. p(x) is "-x sat x" where x is the satisfaction predicate, so
w={y: -y sat y}, Het; t(x) is "x is definable",as before; if a is a definable set,
b(a)=<vEa>, where v is any new variable,and so this is an open sentence. Now,
suppose that acHet anda is definable.Then:
<vEa>ea <vEa>elHet
-<vEa> sat <vEa >
<vEa>ea (by the SatisfactionSchema)
Hence <vEa>ea, i.e., Transcendence.So by the SatisfactionSchema -<vEa> sat
<vEa>, i.e., <vEa>EHet, Closure. The paradox is that <vElHet>EHetand
<vEHet>eHet.
We can recordthese observationsin the following table:

Paradox | (x) 4(x) | q(x) w

Liar a, where x is definable x is true Tr

a=<a(4x>
Knower a, where x is definable x is known Kn
a=<a4x>

Liar Chain a, where x is definable x is true Tr

a=<f3=E-Tr>
where
<fl>=<a4x>

Heterological <vex> x is definable -x sat x Het

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32 GrahamPriest

Finally, note that nothing is changed essentially if we take propositionsor some

other semanticentities (not sentences) to be truthbearers;we just take <aex> to
be the appropriateproposition.Similarly,in the HeterologicalParadox,we take
<vex> to be the appropriateproperty.In fact, things are actually simplified by
this. For presumably,for any set (not just a definableone), x, there is a proposi-
tion, a, such that a=<a0x> (the propositionthatthis propositionis not in x). Sim-
ilarly, in the Heterologicalparadox,if x is any set there is a propertyof being in
x. In this case, one no longer needs to assume that x is definable;and the para-
doxes fit the regularRussell Schema directly.

5. ThePrinciple of UniformSolution

We have now seen that all the paradoxesof self-reference,whetherfrom Group

A, Bi or Bii, fit the Russell Schema.The structurethatthis describesis, therefore,
the structuire that generatesall the paradoxes.Russell was right:there is a single
family here. What one should make of this demands a largerdiscussion than is
possible here;but I will at least indicate what seems to me to be the single most
importantconclusion.
If two paradoxesare of differentkinds, it is reasonableto expect them to have
differentkinds of solutions; on the other hand, if two paradoxesare of the same
kind, then it is reasonableto expect them to have the same kind of solution. Gen-
eralising, it is naturalto expect all the paradoxesof a single family to have a sin-
gle kind of solution. Any solution that can handle only some members of the
family is boundto appearsomewhatone-eyed, andas not having got to gripswith
the fundamentalissue. Of course, this observation puts a lot of weight on the
notion of kind;to convince ourselves thattwo paradoxesare of the same kind we
must convince ourselves (a) thatthere is a certainstructurethat producescontra-
diction and (b) thatthis structureis commonto the paradoxes.Still, once kindred-
ship has been establishedin this way the point seems undeniable.Let us call it the
Principleof Uniform Solution (PUS, sorry):same kind of paradox, same kindof
solution.
Post Ramsey, logicians have accepted that there are essentially two distinct
families of paradoxand, with an intuitive appreciationof the PUS, have, gener-
ally speaking,been content with two differentkinds of solution. Typically,solu-
tions to paradoxes of GroupA are of the Zermelo Fraenkel kind and deny the
existence of the totality w (Clause 1 of the Russell Schema). There is much less
agreementabout solutions to GroupB paradoxes,but, typically, such solutions
have denied principles such as the T-schema,or cognate principles,involved in
establishingTranscendenceand Closure.(All this is documentedin Chs. 1 and 2
of Priest 1987.)
Whetheror not each kind of solution is satisfactorywithin its own group(nei-
ther is), neitherkind of solution gets a grip on paradoxesfrom the other group.
Clearly,semanticprinciplessuch as the T-schemado not occur in the paradoxes

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 The Structureof the Paradoxes of Self-Reference 33

of GroupA. Totalitiesdo occur in paradoxesof GroupB. However,in most cases,

these are totalities of a size whose existence is guaranteedby Zermelo Fraenkel
set theory.Typically,they are countablesets (e.g., the set of definableordinalsin
Konig's Paradox),but they can even be finite! (as in Berry's).Hence, the PUS, in
conjunction with the main result of this paper,is sufficient to sink virtually all
orthodoxsolutions to the paradoxes.
It is worth noting that some logicians have found Ramsey's categorisation
problematicon the ground that the schema 3xVy(Rxy<->'Rxx) underlies para-
doxes in both of Ramsey's classes; again with an intuitive appreciationof the
PUS, they have proposedfaulting this as a solution to the paradoxes.(See, e.g.,
Martin1977.) However adequatesuch solutions are, it shouldbe noted that, as a
general approach,this fails because there are many paradoxes,such as Berry's,
that are simply not of this form. (See e.g. Priest 1983.)

6. Curryparadoxes

Let me conclude with a word on a kind of paradoxthat is relatedto some of the

paradoxesI have been discussing, and which also cuts across Ramsey's division:
Curryparadoxes.Some of the paradoxesI have discussed proceedby establish-
ing a sentence of the form a<->-a. (All the paradoxesin GroupBii do this and
some of the paradoxesin GroupA, notablyRussell's, but not the paradoxesin Bi
or the other paradoxesin GroupA.) For each paradoxof this kind, we can form
a new paradoxby replacing - a uniformlywith a-->3, where/ is an arbitraryfor-
mula, or, more simply, with a--I, where I is some logical constant entailing
e-verything.Using the Absorptionprinciple(a-*(a->f3)F a-*f3) we can then infer
a--I, and hence a, and hence l. (See Priest 1987, 6.2.)
Do such paradoxesfit the general scheme given here? Yes and no, depending
on what -- is. If it is a materialconditionalthen, in most logics, a--L is logically
equivalent to -a, and so the curried version of each paradoxis essentially the
same as the uncurriedform. If, on the otherhand,-- is a non-materialconditional
(e.g., a strict conditional),then a->L and -a are quite differentnotions, at least
primafacie. (Evaluatingthe truthof the first at a world first requiresa consider-
ationof whatis happeningat otherworlds;evaluatingthe truthof the second does
not.) In this case, the curriedversions of the paradoxesbelong to a quite different
family. One may thereforeexpect them to be solved in a differentway, most obvi-
ously by the rejectionof Absorption.'

Departmentof Philosophy GRAHAM PRIEST

The Universityof Queensland
Brisbane Queensland
4072 Australia
I A version of this paperwas given at the meeting of the AustralianAssociation for

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 34 GrahamPriest

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