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World Development Vol. xx, pp.

xxx–xxx, 2017
0305-750X/Ó 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.007

New Evidence on the Impact of Large-scale Conditional Cash


Transfers on Child Vaccination Rates: The Case of a
Clustered-Randomized Trial in Indonesia
DIAN KUSUMA a,b, HASBULLAH THABRANY b, BUDI HIDAYAT b, MARGARET McCONNELL a,
PETER BERMAN a and JESSICA COHEN a,*
a
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, USA
b
Faculty of Public Health Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia
Summary. — Despite recent progress, millions of children still die every year from vaccine-preventable diseases. One strategy is Condi-
tional Cash Transfers (CCTs), which provide cash payments to poor households in exchange for compliance with health-related condi-
tionalities including child vaccination. Using a randomized trial, we provide new evidence on the impact of large-scale CCTs on child
vaccination rates in Indonesia by investigating the Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) with a sample of over four thousand children
under two years old. After two years of implementation from 2007 to 2009, difference-in-differences (DID) estimates show that PKH
significantly increases child vaccination rates for all basic vaccine types by up to 30% compared to the control group means among
children aged less than 12 months old but PKH shows modest effects among children aged 12–23 months old. There is also evidence
that PKH is equity enhancing by increasing child vaccination rates for most vaccine types by up to 52% among children aged less than
12 months old living with less educated mothers (below six years). All this underscores the ability of cash transfers to reach poor children
for whom health systems supply-side-oriented strategies have been less successful.
Ó 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Key words — Indonesia, Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT), household, child vaccination, clustered-randomized trials

1. INTRODUCTION While there are several rigorous studies on the impact of


CCTs on child vaccination rates, the literature is limited in
Despite recent progress, millions of children still die every two ways. First, evidence from randomized controlled trials
year from vaccine-preventable diseases. The WHO (2016) (RCTs) is still inconclusive (Johri et al., 2015; Owusu-Addo
estimated that 19.4 million children did not receive routine & Cross, 2014; Ranganathan & Lagarde, 2012). Evidence
life-saving vaccinations in 2015. One explanation is a consider- shows that CCTs have positive impact on the coverage of
able inequality in child vaccination. Globally, countries in the measles-containing vaccine (MCV) by 11 and 3 percentage
African region have most unvaccinated children and very low points in Nicaragua (Red de Protección Social) and Mexico
national immunization coverage based on the WHO/UNICEF (PROGRESA). But evidence also shows that CCTs have no
report. In Indonesia, the proportion of one-year olds com- significant impact on the coverage of MCV and Bacille
pletely immunized among the poorest quintile is only half that Calmette-Guérin (BCG) in Honduras (Programa de Asig-
of the wealthiest—39% and 75% respectively (Utomo, nación Familiar), Mexico, and Zimbabwe (Robertson et al.,
Sucahya, & Utami, 2011). 2013; Barham & Maluccio, 2009; Barham, 2005; Morris,
One strategy is Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs), which Flores, Olinto, & Medina, 2004). Secondly, large-scale evi-
provide cash payments to poor households in exchange for dence on the impact of CCTs on child vaccination is limited
compliance with health-related conditionalities including child to only PROGRESA with over five thousand children under
vaccination (Fiszbein, Schady, & Ferreira, 2009). There are the age of three years. Other studies in Nicaragua and Hon-
several theoretical pathways from conditionality to improved duras used about a thousand children. While the evidence
vaccination. Based on the human capital theory, consumers from small-scale evaluations seems to be promising, one of
will invest in health if the expected private benefit exceeds the main challenges is whether the findings would be replicable
the cost (Grossman, 2000). In terms of vaccination, it is harder at scale. A large-scale evaluation helps establish whether the
to estimate the benefit since it comes years in the future partic- CCT impact on vaccination is possible when taking into
ularly while facing the cost such as geographical barriers (e.g., account the complexity of implementation namely issues with
no health facilities nearby, vaccine stock-outs), financial barri-
ers, and social barriers (e.g., belief that vaccines are harmful)
(Adato, Roopnaraine, & Becker, 2011). The cash element of * The authors are especially grateful to Vivi Yulaswati (National Planning
CCT can help with financial barriers and the conditionality Agency), Harapan Lumban Gaol (Ministry of Social Affairs), Jay
element might be seen as a way to transfer health information Rosengard (Harvard Kennedy School), and Ajay Mahal (Monash
on the benefit of vaccination and signal the importance of vac- University) for their support and many helpful discussions. We also
cination for both households and health workers. Implemen- thank seminar participants at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public
tation issues, however, might jeopardize this potential Health and Harvard Kennedy School for valuable suggestions. Research
effectiveness, rendering the conditions meaningless (Kremer fellowship from the Harvard Kennedy School Indonesia Program is
& Glennerster, 2012). gratefully acknowledged. Final revision accepted: May 13, 2017.
1
Please cite this article in press as: Kusuma, D. et al. New Evidence on the Impact of Large-scale Conditional Cash Transfers on Child Vaccination Rates:
The Case of a Clustered-Randomized Trial in Indonesia, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.007
2 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

cash distribution, monitoring conditionality, and supply-side Table 1. Conditionality and target indicators for PKH
improvements (Madon, Hofman, & Glass, 2007). 1 Health indicators
Taking advantage of a large clustered-randomized trial in
Indonesia, we provide new evidence on the impact of large- 1. Four prenatal care visits
scale household cash transfers (PKH) on child vaccination 2. Taking iron tablets during pregnancy
rates using a sample over four thousand children under two 3. Delivery assisted by a trained professional
years old. Previous PKH study (Alatas et al., 2011) evaluated 4. Two postnatal care visits
complete vaccination among all children under three years old 5. Complete childhood immunizations
and showed that PKH did not increase complete vaccination 6. Adequate monthly weight increases for infants
overall. However, they showed significant effects by 3.3 per- 7. Monthly weighing for children under three and biannually
centage points among confirmed program beneficiaries (i.e., for children under five
participant effect). Our study provides a more in-depth analy- 8. Vitamin A twice a year for children under five
sis by investigating the PKH effects on different types of vac-
Education indicators
cines. There are at least two reasons: each vaccine combats a
different disease with its own prevalence and potential conse- 9. Primary school enrollment of children 6–to-12 years old
quences; vaccines can differ in doses, age, modality, and avail- 10. Minimum attendance rate of 85% for primary school-aged
ability (Barham & Maluccio, 2009). children
11. Junior secondary school enrollment of children 13–to-15
years old
2. BACKGROUND 12. Minimum attendance rate of 85% for junior secondary
school-aged children
(a) Vaccination programs in Indonesia
Source: MOSA (2007).
Indonesia has a decentralized health system with most
responsibilities shared to district governments. In public sec-
tor, district hospitals provide secondary/tertiary care; district
health offices provide public health services; and health centers households, was piloted in six provinces including West Java,
(Puskesmas) and network provide primary care. Puskesmas East Java, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, East Nusa Tenggara
network includes supporting Puskesmas (Pustu) and village (ENT), and Jakarta. It was designed to achieve the target indi-
midwife (Polindes). There are also integrated care posts cators or conditionality provided in Table 1. For child health,
(Posyandu) run by cadres with health services provided by conditionality includes complete childhood immunizations,
Puskesmas doctors, nurses, and midwives. In private sector, adequate weighting, and vitamin A (Sparrow, Moeis,
there are doctor practices, midwife practices, and hospitals. Damayanti, & Herawati, 2008; Alatas et al., 2011).
The country adopted basic child vaccination during the There are four features of PKH: (1) cash given to mothers
1980s. The Ministry of Health (MOH) in Indonesia has two quarterly; (2) conditionality and cash penalty; (3) field facilita-
main vaccination strategies: (1) to provide vaccinations at tors; and (4) improvements in supply-side readiness. First, the
public health facilities; and (2) to hold vaccination campaigns, cash, collected by mothers through the nearest post office, ran-
which typically take vaccines to households. The first strategy ged from $60 to 220 per household per year depending on the
relies on individuals bringing their children to facilities, which number and aged of children. There are no rules on how to
tends to result in incomplete coverage of the population. spend the cash. The cash is approximately 15–20% of the esti-
Health officials assert that barriers to this strategy include mated consumption of poor households. The fixed amount is
geography and social norms. The archipelagic nature of the $20 per year. If a mother is pregnant and/or has children aged
country makes it challenging to implement monthly vaccina- 0–6 years, she will receive additional $80 per year, regardless
tion in areas where facilities are lacking or less supply-ready of the number of children. If a mother has a child at primary
(MOH, 2010a). Also, negative perceptions of immunization school, she will receive additional $40 per year. If a mother has
still exist (Judarwanto, 2012). a child at secondary school, she will receive additional $80 per
Prior to the PKH program, officially reported vaccination year. The differences in cash amount for primary and sec-
rates in Indonesia were 84% for BCG, 82% for MCV, 72% ondary schools are due potentially to higher expenditures for
for OPV3, and 74% for DPT3 in 2007. These rates are lower the latter. Second, PKH was designed to enforce conditional-
than those in neighboring countries such as Thailand and ity with a cash penalty for noncompliance: the first breach is a
the Philippines where the rates for all those vaccines are at warning, the second reduces the cash by 10% in the next pay-
least 95% (WHO/UNICEF, 2012). Further, the MOH uses ment, and the third is expulsion. To comply with the condi-
an indicator called Universal Coverage of Immunization tionality, beneficiaries can choose various health facilities
(UCI) village. A village is considered universal if at least ranging from district hospitals, Puskesmas, Polindes, and
80% of all children aged 12 months or younger in the village Posyandu. Third, field facilitators are trained to advise benefi-
complete basic child vaccination. Data show a constant and ciaries to comply with conditionalities, to inform them of their
flat trend in the proportion of UCI villages at 70%, 76%, rights and obligations, and to monitor eligibility. Fourth,
73%, and 71% during the period of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, PKH is implemented mostly in urban areas that are supply
respectively, prior to PKH (MOH, 2007a). ready based on a statistical analysis of existing health and edu-
cation facilities in the sub-districts. Readiness is a precondition
(b) Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) to be part of the pilot. The threshold for readiness, however,
was set lower for off-Java island areas to ensure more inclusion
In 2007, the government launched a large-scale pilot of in the pilot. More details are provided elsewhere (Kusuma,
PKH, a CCT to household. The goals are to reduce poverty, Cohen, McConnell, & Berman, 2016; Alatas et al., 2011;
maternal and child mortality, and to ensure universal coverage Sparrow et al., 2008; Hicklin, 2008) and in Table A.1 of the
of basic education. PKH, a traditional CCT program to poor Appendix.

Please cite this article in press as: Kusuma, D. et al. New Evidence on the Impact of Large-scale Conditional Cash Transfers on Child Vaccination Rates:
The Case of a Clustered-Randomized Trial in Indonesia, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.007
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF LARGE-SCALE CONDITIONAL 3

In practice, however, there are some deviations from the ward were categorized into three groups: (i) households with
PKH design. The enforcement to comply with conditions were pregnant/lactating women, (ii) households with children
lacking due mainly to the lack of readiness of providers to fill aged 6–15 years, and (iii) the remaining households. Five
out verification forms and the slow establishment of manage- households were randomly selected: two from group (i)
ment information systems (MIS). It is important, however, to and three from group (ii). The selection of households is
note that enforcement to comply with conditions is just one of conditional on being in the unconditional cash transfer
the aforementioned features of PKH that were in place. In (UCT) 2005 list of poor households. Villages were first
fact, beneficiaries were likely to think that there were condi- screened on the UCT eligibility of all households and only
tionality and potential cash penalty because field facilitators villages with at least five UCT-eligible households per ward
informed them. A study shows that over 90% of beneficiaries were considered for sampling. The UCT program provided
in the spot check samples in Jakarta, West Java, and ENT cash transfers to poor households in 2005 and 2008 due
province knew about the terms and conditions of PKH to reduction of gasoline subsidy. All this results in samples
(CHR-UI, 2010; Ayala, 2010). of 6 provinces, 44 districts, 360 subdistricts, and 14,000
In addition, the government also launched the National households. More details are provided elsewhere (Kusuma
Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) was et al., 2016; Alatas et al., 2011; Sparrow et al., 2008) and
launched in 2007 toward poverty alleviation. This includes in Table A.2 of the Appendix.
PNPM Rural, PNPM Urban, and PNPM Generasi. PNPM In terms of datasets, we use a panel/longitudinal sample
Rural (previously called Kecamatan Development Program of 4,245 children under two years old with vaccination data
[KDP]) aims to empower rural communities and to provide followed for two years (a total of 8,490 observations for
financial support for building infrastructure and capacity in analysis) and repeated cross sectional samples of 4,636 in
subdistricts. PNPM Urban has similar objective but to 2007 and 2,066 children in 2009 (a total of 6,702 observa-
empower urban communities. PNPM Generasi is an incen- tions for analysis). We limit our analyses to children under
tivized community block grant program aiming mainly at two years because: (1) all basic child vaccinations should be
rural communities. PNPM Generasi provides annual block completed within the age of 9 months; (2) using children
grants to communities to be used for various purposes to sample of 12–23 month old to see any catch-up effects.
improve local health and education services. While PNPM For panel data, compared to 4,636 children under two at
Generasi has no overlapping districts with PKH, some PNPM baseline (2007), the attrition rates are 8.7% and 8.6% for
Urban and PNPM Rural were implemented in some PKH treatment and control group respectively—no significant dif-
areas. In 2007, 73 (out of 180) PKH subdistricts received other ference. Our attrition analysis shows similar characteristics
PNPM programs, as did 76 (out of 180) control subdistricts; in between attrited and not attrited children and households
2008, 107 treatment subdistricts received other PNPM pro- (see Table A.3 and Table A.4 of the Appendix). In terms
grams, as did 105 control subdistricts. However, since the of data collection, the questionnaire combines two sources
other PNPMs focus on basic infrastructure, not on health or of child immunization status: health card record (KMS/
education services, it is unlikely that they have substantial KIA) and mother’s response on whether a child was immu-
impacts on our results (Alatas et al., 2011; Olken, Onishi, & nized. We use the former in our main analysis for more reli-
Wong, 2011). 2 ability and provide the latter as robustness checks in the
Appendix.

3. METHODS (b) Dependent variables

(a) Evaluation design and data Dependent variables include the number of doses each child
had received since birth of each of the following: (1) BCG; (2)
We use the impact evaluation data from the baseline OPV; (3) DPT; (4) MCV; and (5) hepatitis B vaccine (HBV). A
(2007) and follow-up (2009) surveys conducted by the binary dependent variable was created to measure coverage
National Planning Agency and World Bank. The evaluation for each vaccine—it took the value one if a child received all
was large scale with the overall sample of approximately of the recommended doses of that vaccine at the time of each
14,000 households. The baseline survey took place from survey, and zero otherwise. A child was not considered vacci-
June to August 2007 and the follow-up survey was imple- nated against DPT or polio unless he or she had received a
mented from October to December 2009. Ethical approval complete dose of each vaccine. OPV3 was used in conformity
is not required because this study uses public data without with the international standard of completion and national
identifiable private information. Random assignment was performance indicator (WHO/UNICEF, 2012). The condi-
implemented at the subdistrict level to allow for a rigorous tionality in PKH is for children to have a complete course
evaluation. of vaccines.
Sampling of PKH is as follows. The levels of geography Table 2 shows the child vaccination schedule published
are ordered as follows: island, province, district, subdistrict, by the MOH. The schedule stipulates that a child be given
village, and ward. Within the PKH provinces, 80% poorest the BCG vaccine at birth; complete the OPV3, DPT3, and
districts were included (based on school transition rates, HBV3 vaccines at four months old; and be given the MCV
proportion of malnutrition, and proportion of poverty) vaccine at nine months old. For OPV, while the common
but only urban districts with no KDP subdistricts and practice in the country is four doses, three doses (OPV3)
supply-ready subdistricts were included. KDP is a sub- are used as a performance indicator conforming to the
district development program that provides financial support WHO standard (MOH, 2007a). The schedule shows that
for infrastructure and capacities in rural areas. And then eli- a child should have completed all basic vaccinations by
gible subdistricts were randomly allocated to treatment and the end of his/her first year. We examine the effects of
control groups with 180 subdistricts were randomly selected PKH for each type of vaccine and for two age groups:
in each. And then the sampling randomly selected 8 villages children aged less than 12 months (<12 months) and 12–
per subdistrict, and 1 ward per village. Households in a 23 months.

Please cite this article in press as: Kusuma, D. et al. New Evidence on the Impact of Large-scale Conditional Cash Transfers on Child Vaccination Rates:
The Case of a Clustered-Randomized Trial in Indonesia, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.007
4 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Table 2. Basic vaccination schedule for up-to-date vaccinations in Indonesia


Disease Vaccine Dose Ages given
Tuberculosis BCG 1 0–1 month
Polio OPV 3 2, 3, 4 months
Diphtheria–pertussis–tetanus DPT 3 2, 3, 4 months
Measles MCV 1 9 months
Hepatitis B HBV 3 2, 3, 4 months
Source: MOH (2007a).

(c) Empirical specification status based on health card record in our main analysis, the
vaccination rates (column 1 panel b) are not as high as the
We use a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator to deter- national figures (Section 2). The rates based on mother’s
mine the average effect of treatment since it controls for differ- response are more similar to the national figures and provided
ences in vaccination rates at baseline. This estimator also in Table A.5 of the Appendix.
controls for all characteristics that do not change over time Table 4 shows the effects of PKH on vaccination rates
within treatment and control groups and all characteristics among children aged <12 months and 12–23 months using
that do change over time, but in the same way in each of panel data (columns 1–4) and repeated cross-section data anal-
the groups. We compare the results of panel data DID and yses (columns 5–8). Results show that PKH increases child
repeated cross-sectional DID in our analyses. The former uses vaccination rates for all vaccine types among children aged
the same group of children (panel data) and the latter uses the <12 months but also shows some effects among those aged
same age of children (<12 months or 12–23 months) at base- 12–23 months. Among children aged <12 months, panel data
line and follow-up data. The main regression equation is: analysis shows that PKH increases BCG, OPV3, DPT3,
HBV3, and MCV by 10.9, 10.3, 8.8, 6.4, and 10.5 percentages
Y ihjtv ¼ a0 þ a1 ðT j Þ þ a2 ðPostt Þ þ bðT j  Postt Þ þ ðX ihj Þc þ eihjtv points respectively; relative to the control group means in
ð1Þ 2009, these translate into increases of 28.7%, 30.3%, 28.4%,
26.7%, and 30% respectively. PKH also increases complete
where Y ihjtv ¼ 1 if child i in household h from sub-district j in vaccination rates by 7.2 percentage points, which translate
time period t is vaccinated with vaccine type v and zero other- into 40% increase compared to control group mean in 2009.
wise; Post = 1 if the year is 2009 (i.e., follow-up period) and Similarly, repeated cross-section analysis shows that PKH
zero otherwise; T = 1 if the household is in the treatment increases most vaccine types but only significantly increases
group and zero otherwise; X is a vector of characteristics for two types. Table 4 (column 7) shows that PKH significantly
children, households, and subdistricts; and e is the unobserved increases BCG and DPT3 by 6.2 and 5.1 percentage points
idiosyncratic error (assumed to be uncorrelated with all other respectively, which translate into 11.9% and 24.3% increases
variables). compared to the control group means in 2009. PKH also
We estimate the equation using ordinary least squares increases complete vaccination rates by 2.9 percentage points
(OLS) in Stata 14 (StataCorp, 2014). The characteristics of or an increase of 40% compared to the control group mean.
children, households, and subdistricts are included as control Among children aged 12–23 months, panel data analysis
variables to improve the precision of estimation. Robust stan- shows that PKH increases OPV3 and MCV by 5.1 and 6.2 per-
dard errors are calculated allowing for clustering at the subdis- centage points, which translate into 20.4% and 23.8% increases
trict level. The parameter of interest is the b estimate, which is compared to the control group means, respectively. Repeated
the DID estimate of treatment effects for 2009 (relative to cross-section analysis only shows increase for OPV3 by 6.9
2007). The program effects are identified by randomized percentage points or 15.3% increase compared to the control
design. And because we do not condition on actual program group mean. As a robustness check, Table A.6 in the Appen-
participation when using the survey data, but only on whether dix uses vaccination status based on mother’s response, which
a household resides in a treatment locality, the estimates reflect also shows that PKH increases vaccination rates particularly
the ‘‘intent-to-treat” average effect of the program. OPV3, DPT3, and MCV among children aged <12 months
but not much effect among those aged 12–23 months.
Next we provide subgroup analysis to see if PKH is equity
4. RESULTS enhancing for instance by reducing the differences in vaccina-
tion coverage between children living in more and less disad-
Table 3 shows the outcome of randomization by examining vantaged areas. Since the results using repeated cross-section
the differences in means at baseline between treatment and analysis are similar, we only include the results using panel
control groups for an array of child, household, and subdis- data analysis. Table 5 provides subgroup analysis on vaccina-
trict characteristics (panel a) and dependent variables of vac- tion rates by mother’s level of education. Results show that
cine coverage (panel b). The balance test shows that the PKH impact tends to be larger among children aged
differences are mostly not significant for both characteristics <12 months living with less educated mothers compared to
and vaccine coverage (column 5), which is expected from ran- those living with more educated ones (columns 3 and 7). For
dom allocation. In terms of vaccine coverage for children aged children living with less educated mothers, results show that
<12 months (panel b), only BCG is provided since it is sched- PKH significantly increases vaccination rates for BCG,
uled at birth so the coverage rate should include all children; OPV3, DPT3, and MCV by 13.6, 13.6, 10.1, and 9.7 percent-
other vaccine types are not provided for this age group age points respectively, which translate into 44%, 52%, 39%,
because they are scheduled at later months so the coverage and 33% increases compared to the control means in 2009.
rates would not include all children since many were probably For those living with more educated mothers, PKH signifi-
younger than the scheduled ages. Since we use vaccination cantly increases vaccination rates for BCG, OPV3, DPT3,

Please cite this article in press as: Kusuma, D. et al. New Evidence on the Impact of Large-scale Conditional Cash Transfers on Child Vaccination Rates:
The Case of a Clustered-Randomized Trial in Indonesia, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.007
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF LARGE-SCALE CONDITIONAL 5

Table 3. Differences in means of characteristics and dependent variables by treatment status at baseline
Treatment (T) Control (C) Difference (T-C)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
(a) Characteristics
Child N = 4245
Female (=1) 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 (0.02)
Age in months 11.7 7.25 11.85 7.24 0.16 (0.24)
Household N = 4122
Block wall (=1) 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.02 (0.03)
Dirt floor (=1) 0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.03 (0.03)
Zinc roof (=1) 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.01 (0.03)
Tile roof (=1) 0.70 0.46 0.71 0.45 0.01 (0.05)
Latrine in house (=1) 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.03 (0.03)
House has electricity (=1) 0.84 0.36 0.83 0.37 0.01 (0.03)
Piped water into house (=1) 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.00 (0.02)
Wood & coal cooking fuel (=1) 0.81 0.39 0.77 0.42 0.04 (0.02)
Land owned (square meters) 1615.85 4673.41 1960.15 5309.07 344.29 (354.26)
At least one animal (=1) 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.00 (0.03)
Per capita expenditure (Ln) 5.30 0.44 5.33 0.45 0.03 (0.02)
Mother’s education >6 years (=1) 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.01 (0.02)
Mother’s age in years 36.46 9.93 35.66 9.44 0.80** (0.39)
Household size 5.87 1.82 5.81 1.79 0.06 (0.10)
Number of under-five 1.40 0.58 1.41 0.57 0.01 (0.03)
Subdistrict N = 360
Doctor (number of, #) 6.13 6.44 6.04 6.32 0.09 (0.67)
Nurse (#) 10.87 7.90 9.89 6.37 0.98 (0.76)
Midwife (#) 11.38 4.72 11.37 4.69 0.02 (0.50)
Pharmacy (#) 2.43 2.34 2.55 2.28 0.12 (0.24)
Health Facility (#) 50.32 25.07 49.87 26.87 0.44 (2.74)
Stock-out at clinic last 2 months:
BCG 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.31 0.05 (0.04)
OPV 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.02 (0.03)
DPT 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.02 (0.02)
HBV 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.00 (0.03)
MCV 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.02 (0.03)

(b) Dependent variables


Cohort A: <12 months N = 2195
BCG 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.02 (0.03)
Cohort B: 12–23 months N = 2050
BCG 0.45 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.02 (0.03)
OPV3 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.01 (0.03)
DPT3 0.38 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.02 (0.03)
HBV3 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.01 (0.03)
MCV 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.00 (0.03)
Complete 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.00 (0.03)
Note: SD = standard deviation; SE = standard errors; LN = natural log. Data include children aged <12 months and 12–23 months old and their
households and subdistricts. Analyses use OLS regression comparing the means of treatment and control groups at baseline. For dependent variables,
vaccination status is based on health card record; only BCG is provided among children aged <12 months since the national schedule is at birth; other
vaccine types are not provided for this age group because the rates are not comprehensive since many children might be younger than the scheduled age.
SEs are robust and clustered at the subdistrict level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05.
The bold and italics show statistically significant estimates.

and MCV by 12.2, 7.9, 7.4, and 10.9 percentage points respec- HBV3, and MCV by 9.5, 9.7, 9.2, 7.8, and 10.2 percentage
tively, which translate into 29%, 20%, 22%, and 29% increases points respectively, which translate into 26%, 29%, 30%,
compared to the control group means. However, those differ- 34%, and 30% increases compared to the control group means
ences are mostly not statistically significant (column 9). As for in 2009. For those in rural, PKH significantly increases vacci-
children aged 12–23 months, our results show limited impact. nation rates for BCG and OPV3 by 15.2 and 11.6 percentage
Table 6 provides subgroup analysis on vaccination rates by points respectively, which translate into 39% and 33%
urbanicity. PKH impact tend to be larger among children aged increases compared to the control group means. However,
<12 months in urban areas compared to those in rural areas. those differences are not statistically significant (column 9).
For children aged <12 months in urban areas, PKH signifi- As for children aged 12–23 months, our results show limited
cantly increases vaccination rates for BCG, OPV3, DPT3, impact.

Please cite this article in press as: Kusuma, D. et al. New Evidence on the Impact of Large-scale Conditional Cash Transfers on Child Vaccination Rates:
The Case of a Clustered-Randomized Trial in Indonesia, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.007
6 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Table 4. Mean vaccination rates by treatment status and treatment effects


Year Panel DID Repeated cross-sectional DID
Mean Treatment effects Mean Treatment effects
T C b SE T C b SE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
<12 months N = 4390 N = 3437
BCG 2007 0.44 0.46 0.109** (0.032) 0.44 0.46 0.062* (0.037)
2009 0.47 0.38 0.56 0.52
OPV3 2007 0.23 0.26 0.103** (0.031) 0.23 0.26 0.046 (0.030)
2009 0.42 0.34 0.30 0.29
DPT3 2007 0.18 0.21 0.088** (0.028) 0.18 0.21 0.051* (0.028)
2009 0.38 0.31 0.23 0.21
HBV3 2007 0.17 0.18 0.064** (0.026) 0.17 0.18 0.030 (0.026)
2009 0.29 0.24 0.15 0.14
MCV 2007 0.08 0.09 0.105** (0.032) 0.08 0.10 0.000 (0.021)
2009 0.43 0.35 0.09 0.11
Complete 2007 0.04 0.06 0.072** (0.021) 0.04 0.06 0.029* (0.015)
2009 0.22 0.18 0.05 0.04
12–23 months N = 4100 N = 3265
BCG 2007 0.45 0.43 0.04 (0.033) 0.45 0.43 0.018 (0.040)
2009 0.35 0.28 0.56 0.52
OPV3 2007 0.37 0.37 0.051* (0.029) 0.37 0.37 0.069* (0.039)
2009 0.31 0.25 0.52 0.45
DPT3 2007 0.38 0.35 0.02 (0.029) 0.37 0.35 0.015 (0.040)
2009 0.30 0.24 0.46 0.42
HBV3 2007 0.33 0.32 0.04 (0.030) 0.33 0.32 0.021 (0.043)
2009 0.26 0.20 0.33 0.30
MCV 2007 0.36 0.36 0.062** (0.031) 0.37 0.36 0.024 (0.039)
2009 0.32 0.26 0.48 0.44
Complete 2007 0.23 0.23 0.04 (0.026) 0.23 0.23 0.003 (0.039)
2009 0.19 0.15 0.25 0.24
Note: T = treatment, C = control, SE = standard errors. Vaccination status is based on health card record. Panel DID data include panel children aged
0–23 months old followed for two years; sample size is panel sample both 2007 and 2009 of each children cohort (Table 3). Repeated cross-section DID
data include children aged 0–23 months in 2007 and 2009; sample size shown is from both 2007 and 2009. Analyses use OLS regression and the treatment
effects are b coefficient in equation (1). For children aged <12 months, OPV3 rates were low (23% and 26%) for treatment and control groups in 2007
because some children were too young for full doses; the rates went up as this cohort got older in 2009 (columns 1 and 2). Control variables include
characteristics of children, households, and subdistricts (Table 3 panel a). Robust standard errors (SE) are in parentheses and clustered at the subdistrict
level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05.
The bold and italics show statistically significant estimates.

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS The more prominent PKH effects among children aged
<12 months might be because of the timing since all the vac-
Our analyses provide new evidence on the impact of large- cine types should be completed by the first year and also
scale CCTs on child vaccination rates using a clustered- because mothers might be more attentive to younger children
randomized trial in Indonesia. After two years of implementa- since they are more prone to illness compared to older ones.
tion, results show that PKH increases child vaccination rates Further, the PKH effects on OPV3 and MCV both among
for all vaccine types including BCG, OPV3, DPT3, HBV3, children aged <12 months and 12–23 months might be
and MCV among children aged <12 months by up to 11 per- explained by the popularity of and public awareness toward
centage points or up to 30% compared to the control group those vaccines among PKH field facilitators and beneficiaries
means. PKH also increases complete vaccination rates by 7.2 from massive national television advertisements since 1990 s.
percentage points or 40% increase compared to the control Also, local policymakers are likely to align their efforts with
group mean. However, results show modest effects among chil- national/global agenda like MCV as a tracking indicator for
dren aged 12–23 months. Our analyses also show that PKH is MDG 4.
equity enhancing by increasing child vaccination rates for Results also show that vaccination rates among children
most vaccine types by up to 52% among children aged aged <12 months raised substantially over the period of
<12 months living with less educated mothers (below six 2007 to 2009 for both treatment and control groups. For
years). instance, OPV3 rose from 23% and 26% in 2007 to 42% and
All this contributes to the currently inconclusive evidence in 34% in 2009 in treatment and control groups, respectively.
the literature on the impact of CCTs on child vaccination rates While general health systems effects through routine vaccina-
particularly at scale (Johri et al., 2015; Owusu-Addo & Cross, tion programs (see Section 2) are likely to contribute to that
2014; Ranganathan & Lagarde, 2012). This also contributes to increase in both treatment and control groups, survey and
the previous evaluation that showed PKH did not increase administrative data do not indicate any big push vaccine pro-
complete vaccination rates among children under three years gram during the period. The national health survey (Riskes-
old (Alatas et al., 2011). das) reported that the national MCV rates were 82% in 2007

Please cite this article in press as: Kusuma, D. et al. New Evidence on the Impact of Large-scale Conditional Cash Transfers on Child Vaccination Rates:
The Case of a Clustered-Randomized Trial in Indonesia, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.007
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF LARGE-SCALE CONDITIONAL 7

Table 5. Mean vaccination rates by treatment status and treatment effects by mother’s level of education
Year Mother education <6 years Mother education >6 years Difference
Mean Treatment effects Mean Treatment effects [3]–[7]
T C b SE T C b SE b SE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
<12 months N = 1449 N = 2941 N = 4390
BCG 2007 0.39 0.41 0.136** (0.058) 0.46 0.49 0.122** (0.042) 0.005 (0.069)
2009 0.42 0.31 0.49 0.42
OPV3 2007 0.17 0.24 0.136** (0.054) 0.26 0.28 0.079* (0.041) 0.060 (0.064)
2009 0.36 0.26 0.44 0.39
DPT3 2007 0.14 0.19 0.101** (0.050) 0.21 0.23 0.074** (0.037) 0.030 (0.059)
2009 0.33 0.26 0.40 0.34
HBV3 2007 0.12 0.17 0.03 (0.049) 0.19 0.19 0.051 (0.034) 0.002 (0.056)
2009 0.24 0.20 0.31 0.26
MCV 2007 0.05 0.09 0.097* (0.055) 0.09 0.10 0.109** (0.041) 0.014 (0.060)
2009 0.37 0.29 0.47 0.38
Complete 2007 0.02 0.07 0.004 (0.037) 0.06 0.06 0.092** (0.029) 0.082* (0.044)
2009 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.19
12–23 months N = 1342 N = 2758 N = 4100
BCG 2007 0.43 0.35 0.03 (0.062) 0.46 0.47 0.027 (0.039) 0.020 (0.067)
2009 0.30 0.22 0.37 0.32
OPV3 2007 0.31 0.29 0.08 (0.052) 0.39 0.41 0.029 (0.037) 0.055 (0.059)
2009 0.26 0.18 0.33 0.29
DPT3 2007 0.33 0.28 0.002 (0.052) 0.40 0.39 0.017 (0.036) 0.002 (0.058)
2009 0.25 0.17 0.33 0.28
HBV3 2007 0.26 0.26 0.042 (0.055) 0.36 0.35 0.026 (0.037) 0.030 (0.062)
2009 0.23 0.16 0.27 0.21
MCV 2007 0.32 0.28 0.022 (0.055) 0.38 0.39 0.064* (0.037) 0.030 (0.062)
2009 0.28 0.20 0.35 0.28
Complete 2007 0.16 0.16 0.043 (0.040) 0.26 0.26 0.027 (0.034) 0.024 (0.049)
2009 0.16 0.11 0.21 0.17
Note: T = treatment, C = control, SE = standard errors. Vaccination status is based on health card record. Data include panel data of children aged
0–23 months divided into two cohort groups and followed for two years. Analyses use OLS regression; the treatment effects are b coefficient in equation
(1) for each subgroup. Difference uses triple-difference estimates by interacting the treatment effects with a dummy for whether the mother had less than
6 years of education (=1). No control variables included. Robust standard errors (SE) are in parentheses and clustered at the subdistrict level. *p < 0.1,
**
p < 0.05.
The bold and italics show statistically significant estimates.

and 74% in 2010 and the MOH data show the proportion of programs they received namely BLT (unconditional cash
village with universal coverage of immunization was 72% in transfers) vs. PKH (Conditional Cash Transfers) vs. BOS
2007 and 70% in 2009 (MOH, 2007b, 2010b, 2009). The causal (school operational assistance). However, it is also possible
evidence from our analyses shows that PKH significantly con- that the payments were delayed or not received at all, which
tribute to that increase in vaccination rates particularly in the implies that our findings are potentially an underestimate of
treatment group by up to 30%. 3 And since PKH specifically potential effectiveness of PKH. In terms of inadequate
targeted poor households, our results provide policy options supply-side, our baseline data show that 19% of health cen-
to increase child vaccination among poor children who might ters in treatment areas experienced stock-outs of at least
be difficult to reach by the routine health systems. one vaccine type the previous two months. In addition to
The relatively limited impact of PKH (e.g., among children stock-outs, the PKH spot check also found inadequate num-
aged 12–23 months) might be due to implementation issues ber of midwives and lack of well-baby card (KMS) in some
such as payment delays and untimeliness, lack of condition- areas (CHR-UI., 2010).
ality enforcement, and inadequate supply-side, which might There are at least two policy implications. First, efforts
limit its impact on child vaccination. Payment delays were should be done to improve PKH effectiveness (e.g., solving
due to the lack of post offices to collect the cash or transfer some of the implementation issues) particularly among chil-
delays from central offices; payment was often not at the time dren aged 12–23 months since the effects are modest and their
of need such as during childbirth (Febriany, Toyamah, Sodo, vaccination rates are still low. The proportion of children aged
& Budiyati, 2011). Lack of enforcement of conditionality and 12–23 months with HBV3 was 63% and 58% in treatment and
cash penalty were due to slow establishment of MIS, which control groups in 2009, respectively. Secondly, efforts should
made PKH relied on ‘‘perceived conditionality” from field be done to improve the recording of vaccination status into
facilitators informing beneficiaries about the potential cash health card (KMS/KIA) since there is still considerable cover-
penalty. The follow-up survey shows that 50% of sampled age gap between vaccination rates based on health card record
households in the treatment areas said ever received PKH. and that based on mother’s response. Improved recording
While this relatively low coverage rate could partly explain should be useful for mother’s record (reminder), provider’s
the limited impact, such coverage rates might be due to record (tracking), and better evaluation by reducing the risk
households not really being aware of the various poverty of recall bias.

Please cite this article in press as: Kusuma, D. et al. New Evidence on the Impact of Large-scale Conditional Cash Transfers on Child Vaccination Rates:
The Case of a Clustered-Randomized Trial in Indonesia, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.007
8 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Table 6. Mean vaccination rates by treatment status and treatment effects by urbanicity
Year Urban Rural Difference
Mean Treatment effects Mean Treatment effects [3]–[7]
T C b SE T C b SE b SE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
<12 months N = 3288 N = 1102 N = 4390
BCG 2007 0.45 0.45 0.095** (0.037) 0.42 0.49 0.152** (0.072) 0.057 (0.080)
2009 0.46 0.37 0.50 0.39
OPV3 2007 0.24 0.27 0.097** (0.036) 0.21 0.24 0.116* (0.062) 0.018 (0.071)
2009 0.41 0.34 0.45 0.35
DPT3 2007 0.18 0.22 0.092** (0.034) 0.18 0.19 0.069 (0.053) 0.024 (0.063)
2009 0.37 0.31 0.41 0.33
HBV3 2007 0.17 0.19 0.078** (0.031) 0.16 0.15 0.016 (0.046) 0.062 (0.056)
2009 0.29 0.23 0.29 0.25
MCV 2007 0.08 0.10 0.102** (0.037) 0.08 0.09 0.107 (0.070) 0.005 (0.079)
2009 0.42 0.34 0.47 0.36
Complete 2007 0.04 0.07 0.075** (0.025) 0.05 0.05 0.05 (0.044) 0.025 (0.050)
2009 0.22 0.17 0.23 0.18

12–23 months N = 3224 N = 876 N = 4100


BCG 2007 0.44 0.42 0.043 (0.036) 0.47 0.48 0.055 (0.075) 0.012 (0.083)
2009 0.33 0.26 0.41 0.35
OPV3 2007 0.36 0.38 0.054 (0.033) 0.38 0.37 0.048 (0.065) 0.006 (0.072)
2009 0.29 0.24 0.37 0.29
DPT3 2007 0.37 0.34 0.031 (0.033) 0.39 0.38 0.008 (0.062) 0.024 (0.070)
2009 0.29 0.22 0.34 0.30
HBV3 2007 0.32 0.31 0.035 (0.033) 0.33 0.35 0.08 (0.063) 0.045 (0.071)
2009 0.24 0.19 0.30 0.22
MCV 2007 0.36 0.35 0.071** (0.034) 0.37 0.38 0.033 (0.068) 0.038 (0.075)
2009 0.31 0.24 0.36 0.32
Complete 2007 0.22 0.23 0.047 (0.030) 0.24 0.24 0.026 (0.057) 0.021 (0.064)
2009 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.18
Note: T = treatment, C = control, SE = standard errors. Vaccination status is based on health card record. Data include panel data of children aged 0–
23 months divided into two cohort groups and followed for two years. Analyses use OLS regression; the treatment effects are b coefficient in equation (1)
for each subgroup. Difference uses triple-difference estimates by interacting the treatment effects with a dummy for whether a child lived in urban (=1). No
control variables included. Robust standard errors (SE) are in parentheses and clustered at the subdistrict level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05.
The bold and italics show statistically significant estimates.

Our paper is limited in terms of subgroup analysis using implementation issues, our study is limited to estimate only
distance to health facility due to data limitation. Further the effects from perceived conditionality (lack of enforce-
research should explore this to see if there is variation of ment of compliance) rather than full-blown conditionality.
PKH effects by distance or supply readiness. Also, qualita- Future research should analyze the effects of different
tive studies could be proposed as a follow-up to understand conditionality types namely perceived conditionality vs.
the barriers and facilitators for lack of impact among partial (random sample check) conditionality vs. full-blown
children aged 12–23 months and low proportion of vaccina- conditionality. This is to provide policy options based on
tion coverage based on health card record. Lastly, due to a country’s capacity to implement.

NOTES

1. For quasi-experimental evidence, Attanasio, Gomez, Heredia, and 2. As a robustness check, we use a dummy variable that accounts for
Vera-Hernandez (2005) used Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and found these other regular programs (PNPM Urban or PNPM Rural) in 2007
that the Familias en Accion in Colombia increased DPT vaccination and 2009 when estimating PKH program effects and found similar
coverage among children under two years old but not among those aged results.
2–4 years. Shei, Costa, Reis, and Ko (2014) also used PSM and found that
the Bolsa Familia in Brazil was associated with increased odds for child
vaccinations. Carvalho, Thacker, Gupta, and Salomon (2014) also 3. Another reason is positive spillover effects. However, we were
employed PSM and found that Janani Suraksha Yojana in India not able to estimate the latter due to lack of administrative data
increased the proportion of fully vaccinated children by 9.1 percentage but we note that potential spillovers might limit the observed
points. effects.

Please cite this article in press as: Kusuma, D. et al. New Evidence on the Impact of Large-scale Conditional Cash Transfers on Child Vaccination Rates:
The Case of a Clustered-Randomized Trial in Indonesia, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.007
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF LARGE-SCALE CONDITIONAL 9

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Please cite this article in press as: Kusuma, D. et al. New Evidence on the Impact of Large-scale Conditional Cash Transfers on Child Vaccination Rates:
The Case of a Clustered-Randomized Trial in Indonesia, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.007

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