TAMPICO - SPL CASE DIGESTS - Weeks 1-3

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS – CASE DIGESTS (TAMPICO, E.L.
SPECIAL
PENAL
LAWS Case Digests
Submitted by:
Eldene L. Tampico
JD 3-1
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Garcia vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 157171
March 14, 2006
Doctrine:
When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law.
Facts:
pg. 1
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS – CASE DIGESTS (TAMPICO, E.L.)
In May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of the May 8, 1995 elections, in Alaminos, Pangasinan,
Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia and four other people who were engaged in the canvassing conspired
and confederated together and mutually helped each other to willfully and unlawfully decrease the votes
received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from 6,998 votes in 159 precincts of said
municipality to 1,921 votes with a difference of 5,077 votes.
Garcia was found by the court guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act 6646 Sec. 27
(b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881,
considering that this finding is a violation of Election Offense
Issue/s:
1) Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646 classified under mala in se or mala prohibita?
2) Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Ruling:
1) Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and
mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes
to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are
bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election
canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by
a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
a. Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which
the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence.
2) No, good faith and lack of criminal intent cannot be a valid defense.
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by
a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of
the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita,
the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says
they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.
2. Dungo vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 209464
July 1, 2015
Doctrine:
When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
Facts:
On January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva was brought by two men to the emergency room of
Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital where he was tried to be revived was later on pronounced dead. He had
a big contusion hematoma on his face and several injuries on his arms and legs. Due to the nature, extent
pg. 2
and location of the injuries, the medico legal opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. The Office of
the City Prosecutor of Laguna filed the information against petitioners Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal,
Jr., alleging that during an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and
present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity is not
yet known, assaulted and used personal violence upon the victim who was a neophyte as condition for
his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death.
Issue/s:
Is the violation of Anti-Hazing law is mala in se or mala prohibita?
Ruling:
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. R.A. No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of
1995 has been enacted to regulate hazing and other forms of initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and
other organizations.
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code while all mala
prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes
under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended. Similarly, there may be mala
prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation.
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of
the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in
itself, then it is a crime mala in se, on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute
prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita.
3. Teves vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 180363
April 28, 2009
Doctrine:
There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes
which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only.
Facts:
Petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district
of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves
filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of
violating Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary
or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code of
1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified
from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries
the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
Issue/s:
Does Teves’ violation of Section 3(h) R.A. No. 3019 involve moral turpitude?
pg. 3
Ruling:
No, Teves’ violation of R.A. No. 3019 does not involve moral turpitude. Moral turpitude has been defined
as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime
involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." Moral turpitude implies something
immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala
prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition
by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of
themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited." Whether or not a crime
involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the statute.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s conviction
and found that the same does not involve moral turpitude. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable
issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people,
there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter,
even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its
own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may
prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus,
it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such
choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less
reverse. Well has it been said that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

4. Fransdilla vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 197562
April 20, 2015
Doctrine:
The complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and robbery with violence against
or intimidation of persons was committed when the accused, who held firearms, entered the residential
house of the victims and inflicted injury upon the victims in the process of committing the robbery.
Facts:
Petitioner Aurora Fransdilla represented herself as one who came from the POEA. She went to the house
of Lalaine Yreverre and asked Lalaine if she could use the telephone and cigarette, which the latter
acceded to. Later, she asked Lalaine if she could use the comfort room. When she returned, the four men
who were with her came inside the house, one of them poked a gun at Lalaine’s neck and declared a hod-
up. They were able to get a vault, jewelries, and other things before they left the house.
pg. 4
Fransdilla and her other co-accused were charged with robbery.
Issue/s:
Is Fransdilla guilty of robbery as a co-conspirator?
Ruling:
Yes. Conspiracy of Fransdilla with her co-accused was established beyond reasonable doubt.
The State thus discharged its burden to produce before the trial court sufficient evidence against all the
accused, including Fransdilla, that would warrant a judgment of conviction. Fransdilla's non-presentation
of her defense, despite her being directly incriminated by Lalaine, denied the Court her explanation for
her specific overt acts of complicity in the robbery and thus rendered the incriminating evidence
unrefuted. By this the Court simply means that Fransdilla did not discharge her burden of evidence, which
is "the duty of a party to start and continue giving evidence at any stage of the trial until he has established
a prima facie case, or the like duty of the adverse party to meet and overthrow that prima facie case thus
established."
5. Zafra vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 176317
July 23, 2014
Doctrine:
An indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum
term.
Facts:
Manolito Zafra was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La
Union from 1993-1995. Among his duties was to receive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or the
revenue official receipts were issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer while a copy
thereof was retained by the collection officer. Every month, he submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly
Report of Collections indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection, name of taxpayer, the
amount collected and the kind of tax paid. The original copy of the MRC with the attached triplicate copy
of the issued RORs was submitted to the Regional Office of the COA. The Assessment Division of the BIR
Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the duplicate original of the Certificate Authorizing Registration.
The audit team found discrepancy from the BIR documents submitted by appellant to COA. Zafra denied
that he committed the crimes charged. He averred that as Revenue Collection Officer of San Fernando, La
Union, he never accepted payments from taxpayers nor issued the corresponding revenue official
receipts. RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the petitioner of 18 counts of malversation of
public funds through falsification of public documents.
Issue/s:
May Zafra be convicted of intentional malversation and malversation through negligence at the same time
Ruling:
Yes. Initially, the CA’s disquisition regarding malversation through negligence had the same tenor as that
of the RTC’s, and later on even went to the extent of opining that the petitioner ought to be held guilty of
pg. 5
malversation through negligence. But such opinion on the part of the CA would not overturn his several
convictions for the intentional felonies of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents. As can be seen, both lower courts unanimously concluded that the State’s evidence
established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents. Their unanimity rested on findings of fact that are now binding on the Court after he
did not bring to our attention any fact or circumstance that either lower court had not properly
appreciated and considered and which, if so considered, could alter the outcome in his favor. At any rate,
even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only of malversation through
negligence, the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for the intentional crime of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents because his appealing the
convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by appealing he waived
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving him open to being convicted of whatever
crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the records to have been actually committed by him
within the terms of the allegations in the information under which he had been arraigned.
Yet, we see an obvious need to correct the penalties imposed on the petitioner. He was duly convicted of
18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, all complex crimes.
Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for each count is that prescribed on the
more serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period. Falsification of a public document by a public
officer is penalized with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000.00. Prision mayor has a duration
of six years and one day to 12 years of imprisonment.26 In contrast, the penalty for malversation ranges
from prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods to reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua depending on the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to the amount
of the funds malversed or to the total value of the property embezzled.
To determine the maximum periods of the penalties to be imposed on the petitioner, therefore, we must
be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code constitute degrees; and (2) considering that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code are not composed of three periods, the time included in the penalty prescribed should be
divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming one period, pursuant to Article 65 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the
offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. The maximum term is the penalty under
the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after considering any attending circumstance; while the
minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the offense committed.
6. People vs. Lopez

G.R. No. 176317
November 14, 2008
Doctrine:
When the offense is punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, "the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same."
pg. 6
Facts:
On 1 November 2003, at around 10:00 a.m., a certain barangay official went to the Baler Police Station
reporting the peddling of illegal drugs by Larry Lopez. A buy-bust operation was planned where the police
officer assigned as the buyer accompanied a confidential agent in going to the residence of Lopez to buy
P500 worth of shabu. Lopez told them that he would deliver the shabu in front of Ditha's Hardware in half
an hour. The members of the buy-bust team strategically stationed themselves near the place of the
transaction. At around 11:05 a.m., Lopez, driving his tricycle, arrived and the confidential agent waved at
him to stop. The police and the agent approached appellant, they talked for a moment, and the exchange
took place. The agent handed the marked money to Lopez, who simultaneously handed the sachet of
shabu. Immediately thereafter, the arrest took place.
Issue/s:
Is Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of (1) Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for the sale of
0.06 gram of shabu; and (2) Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for the possession of 6.20 grams of dried
marijuana leaves?
Ruling:
Yes. The prosecution proved that a consummated sale of shabu transpired between the buy-bust team
which included the confidential agent, on one hand, and Lopez, on the other. The members of the buy-
bust team testified that Lopez sold shabu to the confidential agent, who simultaneously gave him the
marked money. The prosecution also established that the police officers recovered marijuana after
searching Lopez’s body. The subject drugs were also proven to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride and
marijuana. Generally, the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive and binding on this Court. In the present case, appellant gravely failed to show that the trial
court overlooked or misapprehended any fact or circumstance of weight and substance to warrant a
deviation from this rule.
While appellant is also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the
Court modifies the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 3189 for illegal possession of marijuana. In
People v. Mateo, the Court held that the period of imprisonment imposed on the accused should not be
a straight penalty, but should be an indeterminate penalty. Thus, the trial court erred in imposing the
straight penalty of imprisonment of 14 years.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that when the offense is punished by a law other
than the Revised Penal Code, "the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Accordingly, the penalty that should be imposed on
appellant is imprisonment ranging from 12 years and one day, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum.
7. People vs. Leonardo

G.R. No. 181036
July 6, 2010
Doctrine:
pg. 7
It is a fundamental rule that the trial court’s factual findings, especially its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
On or about May 10, 2022, in XXX City, Adriano Leonardo, being then the uncle-in-law of victim AAA, with
lewd design, by means of force and intimidation employed upon AAA, 12 years old, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said AAA, thereby subjecting the said minor
to sexual abuse which debased, degraded and demeaned her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.
Issue/s:
Is Leonardo guilty of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610?
Ruling:
Yes. For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610,
the penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding
that Republic Act No. 7610 is a special law, the appellant may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant shall be entitled to a minimum term to be taken
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Republic Act No. 7610. The penalty next
lower in degree is prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from 8
years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. On the other hand, the maximum term of the penalty should
be taken from the penalty prescribed under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, which is
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range of which is from 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to reclusion perpetua. The minimum, medium and maximum term of the same is as
follows: minimum – 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months; medium – 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 20 years; and maximum – reclusion perpetua.
In this case, the trial court imposed on the appellant an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum to 15 years, 6 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as maximum for each
count of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. The minimum term imposed
is correct because it is within the range of prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the
penalty next lower in degree to that imposed by Republic Act No. 7610. But the maximum term thereof is
wrong. The maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 14 years, 8 months
and one day to reclusion perpetua. We, thus, impose on the appellant the indeterminate sentence of 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum for each count of sexual abuse.
8. People vs. Matias

G.R. No. 186469
June 13, 2012
Doctrine:
A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.
Facts:
pg. 8
Jover Matias y Dela Fuente and private complainant AAA were neighbors in Brgy. San Antonio, Quezon
City. In the evening of June 6, 2004, AAA, a minor, was on her way to the vegetable stall to buy something
when, all of a sudden, Matias pulled her towards a house that was under construction. There, he forced
her to lie on a bamboo bed, removed her shorts and underwear, and inserted first, his finger, and then
his penis into her vagina. Matias threatened to kill her if she should report the incident to anyone.
When AAA arrived home, she narrated to her mother and aunt what Matias did to her. Together, they
proceeded to the barangay to report the incident and, thereafter, to the police station to file a complaint.
A physical examination was conducted upon AAA, who was found to have deep-healed lacerations at 3
and 7 o’clock positions and was in a non-virgin state physically at the time of examination. Subsequently,
Matias was charged with rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in an Amended Information.
Issue/s:
Is Matias guilty of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC and Art. III of RA 7610?
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 provides that children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12
years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article
266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the
victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of
RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the
offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will
be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise,
rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised
Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
In this case, Matias is convicted for "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, upon a finding that AAA was a minor below 12 years old at the time of the commission
of the offense on June 6, 2004.
9. Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 178626
June 13, 2012
Doctrine:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use.
Facts:
pg. 9
In 1996, the Office of the Provincial Auditor of the COA for the Province of Zambales directing an Audit
Team composed of State Auditor 1 Virginia D. Bulalacao, State Auditor 1 Teresita Cayabyab and Auditing
Examiner II Lourdes Castillo, to conduct an examination of the cash and account of petitioner Cecilia
Legrama, the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales.
After the audit, the COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and Accounts of Ms.
Cecilia U. Legrama. The report contained the findings that petitioner’s cash accountability was short of
₱289,022.75 and that there was an unaccounted IRA in the amount of ₱863,878.00, thereby showing a
total shortage in the amount of ₱1,152,900.75. From the total amount of the shortage, petitioner was
able to restitute the initial amount of ₱60,000.00. Consequently, petitioner and Romeo D. Lonzanida, the
Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales at the time the audit was conducted, were charged in an
Information dated December 15, 1998 with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.:
Issue/s:
Is the petitioner guilty of malversation of public funds?
Ruling:
Yes. In the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the
accountable officer had received the public funds and that he failed to account for the said funds upon
demand without offering sufficient explanation why there was a shortage.
However, as aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner enjoys the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and restitution. Although restitution is akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in
paragraph 727 of Article 13, in relation to paragraph 1028 of the same Article of the RPC, restitution should
be treated as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused when the two circumstances are
present in a case, which is similar to instances where voluntary surrender and plea of guilty are both
present even though the two mitigating circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of
the RPC. Considering that restitution is also tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part of the accused,
it was proper for the Sandiganbayan to have considered it as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor
of petitioner.
Taking into consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of two mitigating
circumstance, i.e., petitioner’s voluntary surrender and partial restitution of the amount malversed, the
prescribed penalty is reduced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, which has a range of 10 years and one day to 17 years and four months. In accordance with
paragraph 1, Article 64 of the RPC and considering that there are no other mitigating circumstance
present, the maximum term should now be the medium period of prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium, which is reclusion temporal minimum and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum term should be anywhere within the period of prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium. Hence, the penalty imposed needs modification. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 12 years, five 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
10. Flordeliz vs. People

G.R. No. 186441
March 3, 2010
pg. 10
Doctrine:
No child would knowingly expose herself and the rest of her family to the humiliation and strain that a
public trial surely entails unless she is so moved by her desire to see to it that the person who forcibly
robbed her of her cherished innocence is penalized for his dastardly act.
Facts:
Sometime in March 1995, ABC, the wife of petitioner and the mother of private complainants AAA and
BBB, left for Malaysia as an overseas worker. AAA and BBB were left under the care and custody of
Salvador Flordeliz in Baguio City. In April 1995, while sleeping with BBB and AAA, who was then 11 years
old, petitioner woke up AAA, touched her vagina, then played with it. AAA cried and told petitioner that
it was painful. The latter stopped, but warned AAA not to tell anyone about it; otherwise, she would be
harmed. Petitioner allegedly committed the same acts against AAA repeatedly.
On or about the 8th day of February 2003, Flordeliz, by means of force and intimidation and taking
advantage of his moral ascendancy, did the same to his other daughter BBB, a minor, 11 years of age at
that time, against her will and consent.
Issue/s:
Is Flordeliz guilty of racts of lasciviousness?
Ruling:
Yes. Act of lasciviousness is the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person. Based on the foregoing definition, petitioner’s act of touching
AAA’s vagina and playing with it obviously amounted to lascivious conduct. Considering that the act was
committed on a child less than twelve years old and through intimidation, it is beyond cavil that petitioner
is guilty under the aforesaid laws.
In crimes against chastity, like acts of lasciviousness, relationship is considered aggravating. Considering
that AAA was less than 12 years old at the time the crime was committed, petitioner should be meted the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14years, eight months and one day to 17 years and
four months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be meted the indeterminate
penalty of thirteen years, nine months and 11 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 16 years, five
months and 10 days of reclusion temporal as maximum.
11. Imbo vs. People

G.R. No. 197712
April 20, 2015
Doctrine:
The mere act of committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected
to sexual abuse constitutes the offense.
Facts:
From October 14, 2003 up to January 25, 2004, in Quezon City Philippines, Nonito Imbo, with force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon
pg. 11
AAA, his own daughter, 11 years old, by forcing her to remove her shorts, mashing her breasts and private
parts and kissing her, thereby subjecting said complainant to sexual abuse, with lewd design and against
her will, which act debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth of dignity of AAA as a human being,
to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
At the trial, AAA testified that while their entire household was asleep and had retired for the night, she
was awakened by petitioner, her own father, licking her vagina and mashing her breasts. At the time, AAA
was sleeping at the second level of their residence with her younger sister, BBB. AAA immediately and
repeatedly shouted for her mother, CCC, who was sleeping outside the room, but to no avail. AAA
continued to shout for her mother prompting petitioner to leave and run out of the room. AAA cried
herself to sleep, and on the very next day told her mother of what her father, petitioner, had done to her.
Issue/s:
Is the penalty imposed by the lower court failed to properly apply R.A. No. 4103, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law?
Ruling:
Yes. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides the imposable penalty for Acts of Lasciviousness
when the victim is under 12 years of age, albeit the offense is prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, is
reclusion temporal in its medium period. The range of the imposable penalty on petitioner of reclusion
temporal in its medium period is 14 years, four months and one day to 17 years and four months. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to prison sentence both for an offense punished by the RPC and
an offense punished "by any other law." The correct application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law has
long been clarified in People v. Simon which ruled that the underscored portion of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, i.e. the "offense is punished by any other law," indubitably refers to an
offense under a special law where the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to
the RPC.
Hence, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as minimum and 17 years and four months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
PROBATION LAW
12. Villareal vs. People
G.R. No. 151258
February 1, 2012
Doctrine:
Facts:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified
their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). Hazing was pre-requisite in
joining for which Lenny was one of few who had undergone the process. After the initiation, Lenny’s
pg. 12
condition worsened due to the blows he received, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. Four of the accused (Tecson,
et. al.) were found to be guilty of homicide by the trial court but was reduced to crime of slight physical
injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor by the Court of Appeals. However, upon appeal to
the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court ruled that they should be
liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide instead.
Issue/s:
May Tecson et. al. can be covered by the Probation Law despite their appeal of conviction?
Ruling:
Yes. First, the Court in resolving this issue ruled that the RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the
probation applications of Tecson et. al. for the law requires that an application for probation be filed with
the trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin (Branch 121).
Hence, its grant of probation with Tecson et. al. is void.
However, the Court abandoning its previous stance on ineligibility of those who have appealed their
conviction to probation, citing the then recent case of Colinares vs. People that the Probation Law never
intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. Had the RTC done what was
right and imposed the correct penalty, he would have had the right to apply for probation. Moreover, the
Court was quick to clarify that it remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when
they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
13. Colinares vs. People

G.R. No. 182748
December 13, 2011
Doctrine:
No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.
Facts:
Arnel Colinares was charged with Frustrated Homicide for hitting the head of the Rufino Buena with a
piece of stone. He alleged self-defense. However, the trial court found him guilty of the crime charged
and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals, invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for
the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him.
His conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Issue/s:
May Colinares still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial?
pg. 13
Ruling:
Yes, Colinares may still apply for probation.
The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his case to the RTC.
Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to
set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court
follows the established rule that no accused can apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer
from the erroneous judgment of the RTC with no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.
14. Bala vs. Hon. Martinez

G.R. No. L-67301
January 29, 1990
Doctrine:
The expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation.
Facts:
Manuel Bala has been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria Diazen which had been
attached to her USA passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine public or official
document. The RTC adjudged Bala guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document. Bala appealed
the said conviction but the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court.
Bala then applied for and was granted probation by Judge Martinez. He was placed in probation under a
period of 1 year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein. By its terms, it should have
expired on August 10, 1983. However, on December 8, 1983, People of the Philippines through Assistant
City Fiscal Cajucom filed a motion to revoke the probation as Bala had violated its terms and conditions.
Bala now contends that the motion to revoke probation was filed after the lapse of 1 year, which means
that he should have been discharged from the same.
Issue/s:
Was the probation was revoked at the proper time?
Ruling:
Yes, the SC held that probation is revocable before the final discharge by the court, contrary to Bala’s
submission.
Under the Probation Law, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate
probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions of the probation
law. Probation is not co-terminous with its period. There must first be issued by the court of an order of
final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such can the
case of the probationer be deemed terminated.
Bala failed to unite reunite with responsible society. Precisely, he was granted probation in order to give
him a chance to return to the main stream, to give him hope, hope for self-respect and a better life.
Unfortunately, he has continued to shun the straight and narrow path. He thus wrecked his chance. He
has not reformed.
pg. 14
A major role is played by the probation officer in the release of the probationer because he is in the best
position to report all information relative to the conduct and mental and physical condition of the
probationer in his environment, and the existing institutional and community resources that he may avail
himself of when necessary.
The non-compliance the conditions set and fixed has defeated the very purposes of the probation law to:
a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized
treatment; b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less
probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and c) prevent the commission of offenses.
15. Moreno vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 168550
August 10, 2006
Doctrine:
In harmonizing the LGC and the Probation Law, the courts deem that the Probation Law is an exception
to the LGC.
Facts:
Urbano M. Moreno assails the Resolution of the COMELEC which disqualified him from running for the
elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. The disqualification was an off shoot of a petition filed by
Norma L. Mejes on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four months and one day to two years and four
four months by the RTC of Samar. Moreno fled an answer claiming that the petition states no cause of
action because he was already granted probation. The COMELEC contended that since he was only
released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end
two years thereafter, thus he is still disqualified for the upcoming elections. Moreno argued that the
disqualification applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because
the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception
to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even
assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an
implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
Issue/s:
Is Moreno disqualified to run as Punong Barangay?
Ruling:
No. On this score, the Supreme Court held that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to
the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation
which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in
its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions
of such earlier statute.
pg. 15
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope of the
disqualification to include Moreno, the COMELEC committed an egregious error. The Supreme Court ruled
that Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the
July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
16. Jalosjos vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 193237
October 9, 2012
Doctrine:
The offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.
Facts:
Dominador Jalosjos and Agapito Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte
in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been
convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court, of
Cebu City. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction
but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’
probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an
Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation.
Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification
filed against him on the same grounds.
Issue/s:
Is Jalosjos disqualified to run as Mayor of Dapitan, Zamboanga del Norte?
Ruling:
Yes. The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final
judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not
eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a
candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised
Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote
in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the
temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand, under
Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not
be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold
elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
pg. 16
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is
eligible to so run.
ANTI-FENCING LAW
17. People vs. De Guzman
G.R. No. 77368
April 10, 2013
Doctrine:
"Fencing” is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Facts:
In September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where
various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos were taken. An information, dated
30 September 1985, was instituted in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against spouses Danilo and
Isabelita Alcantara, from whose possession the jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal.
Issue/s:
Is the crime of "fencing" a continuing offense that could allow the filing of an information therefor in the
place where the robbery or theft is committed and not necessarily where the property, unlawfully taken
is found to have later been acquired?
Ruling:
No. A "continuous crime" is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal
resolution or intent not susceptible of division. For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed
separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; unity of criminal
intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one
and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. "Fencing", upon the other hand, is
the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on fencing does not
require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise
involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made
to depend on an act of fencing in order that it can be consummated. True, the object property in fencing
must have been previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or
pg. 17
theft occurs is inconsequential. It may not be suggested, for instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which
presupposes a prior subsisting marriage of an accused, the case should thereby be triable likewise at the
place where the prior marriage has been contracted.
18. Ong vs. People

G.R. No. 190475
April 10, 2013
Doctrine:
Mere possession of any goods, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
Facts:
Jaime Ong was the owner of Jong’s Marketing, a store that sells tires. Francisco Azajar bought 44 firestone
tires from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation for P223,401.81. This acquisition was evidenced by a
sales invoice and an inventory list acknowledging receipt of the tires described by their serial numbers.
He marked each tire with a piece of chalk before storing it inside his warehouse. On January 1995, he sold
6 tires. However, on February, the remaining 38 tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate forcibly
opened. He reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio. Hoping to locate the
stolen tires, Azajar canvassed from numerous business establishments until he entered Jong’s Marketing.
There he found a tire which was marked and matched one of the serial numbers of the stolen tires. A buy-
bust operation was conducted. 13 of the 38 tires were recovered. Ong was convicted of the crime of the
Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612). He denied that he had knowledge that the tires were stolen, having bought
them from Raymond Go of Goldlink.
Issue/s:
Is Ong guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law?
Ruling:
Yes. All the elements of Anti-Fencing are present in the case. First, Azajar was able to prove that ownership
of the tires through the sales invoice and inventory list, and the happening of the robbery through their
Sinumpaang Salaysay. Second, the facts establish that Ong was in possession of the tires. The serial
numbers of the recovered tires matched those of the serial numbers of the stolen tires. Ong also admitted
that he bought the tires from Goldlink. Third, the words “should know” denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or
would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Ong’s experience of 24 years from the
business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was
his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13)
tires in the streets. Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-
bust operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store. Fencing is malum prohibitum,
and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused
of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.
19. People vs. Dimat
pg. 18
G.R. No. 181184

January 25, 2012
Doctrine:
The violation of the Anti-Fencing Law is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal
intent.
Facts:
Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familara,
testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997
Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH-569 for ₱850,000.00.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the
Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and
inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis
number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They
brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered
owner, Jose Mantequilla.
For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good
faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as
TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also
claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers took into
custody had the same plate number, they were not actually the same vehicle.
Issue/s:
Is Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law?
Ruling:
Yes. The elements of "fencing" are: 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took
no part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the
deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.
Based on the evidence presented, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But
this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents
to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly
confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia
Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase.
20. Dizon vs. People

G.R. No. 111426
July 11, 1994
Doctrine:
pg. 19
Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
Facts:
During the period from February 12, to February 24, 1988, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Norma Dizon-
Paminutan, with intent of gain for herself or for another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
knowingly buy and keep in her possession and/or sell or dispose of the following jewelries, to wit: one set
of earings, a ring studded with diamond sin a triangular style, one set of earrings (diamond studded) and
one diamond-studded crucifix, or all valued at P105,000.00, which she knew or should have known to
have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery committed by Joselito Sacdalan Salinas
against the owner Teodoro and Luzviminda Encarnacion.
Issue/s:
Is Norma Dizon guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law?
Ruling:
Yes. Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that “mere possession of any good, article, item, object,
or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of
fencing.
In this case, the petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption. She relied solely on the testimony of her
brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence, and, on the contrary, even
disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy
from a certain Fredo who has the jewelry.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW

21. Medalla vs. people
G.R. No. 193362
January 18, 2012
Doctrine:
BP 22 punishes the issuance per se of a worthless check and not the failure to pay one’s obligation.
Facts:
Sometime in April 1998, the petitioner issued to Resurreccion Laxa a Far East Bank Check dated May 5,
1998 in the amount of ₱742,000.00 as payment of the loan which he obtained from the latter. However,
when the said check was deposited by the respondent on May 5, 1998, the same was dishonored as the
account from which it was drawn had already been closed. Thereupon, the respondent verbally informed
the petitioner of the dishonor of the said check and subsequently sent him a demand letter dated May 7,
1998. Nevertheless, the petitioner failed to pay the amount of the said check.
For his part, the petitioner admitted to having issued the subject check but averred that it was not meant
to be deposited or encashed, but that it was a mere guarantee for the loan he obtained from the
pg. 20
respondent. Likewise, the petitioner admitted to having been informed by the respondent of the fact of
the dishonor of the subject check.
The petitioner further alleged that he had executed a Real Estate Mortgage over his parcel of land in
Bulacan in favor of the respondent with the understanding that, should he fail to pay his loan, the latter
would foreclose the said mortgage and apply the proceeds thereof to his loan. Reneging on the said
agreement, the respondent opted not to foreclose the mortgage and deposit the subject check instead.
Issue/s:
Did the novation entered into by the party extinguish Medalla’s criminal liability?
Ruling:
No. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them
in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
22. LBP vs. Jacinto

G.R. No. 154622
August 3, 2010
Doctrine:
The mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22.
Facts:
The First Women’s Credit Corporation obtained a loan from the petitioner Land Bank in the aggregate
amount of ₱400 million, evidenced by a Credit Line Agreement dated August 22, 1997. As security for the
loan, respondent Ramon P. Jacinto, President of FWCC, issued in favor of Land Bank nine postdated checks
amounting to ₱465 million and drawn against FWCC’s account at the Philippine National Bank. Later,
before the checks matured, petitioner and respondent executed several letter agreements which
culminated in the execution of a Restructuring Agreement on June 3, 1998. Under the new agreement,
the loan obligation contracted under the Credit Line Agreement of August 22, 1997 was restructured, its
terms of payment, among others, having been changed or modified. When FWCC defaulted in the
payment of the loan obligation under the terms of their restructured agreement, petitioner presented for
payment to the drawee bank the postdated checks as they matured. However, all the checks were
dishonored or refused payment for the reason "Payment Stopped" or "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds."
Respondent also failed to make good the checks despite demands.
In a Resolution, the prosecutor dismissed the complaint against respondent, finding that the letter-
agreements between Land Bank and FWCC restructured and novated the original loan agreement. It was
held that there being novation, the checks issued pursuant to the original loan obligation had lost their
efficacy and validity and cannot be a valid basis to sustain the charge of violation of B.P. 22.
Issue/s:
pg. 21
Was the existence of novation determinative of respondent’s responsibility for violation of B.P. 22?
Ruling:
NO. There was no proof that he had been released from his obligation. On the contrary, the Restructuring
Agreement contains a proviso which states that "This Agreement shall not novate or extinguish all
previous security, mortgage, and other collateral agreements, promissory notes, solidary undertaking
previously executed by and between the parties and shall continue in full force and effect modified only
by the provisions of this Agreement."
It is well settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an accommodation, is
covered by B.P. 22. Thus, this Court has held that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored
checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense punished by
B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. Section 1 of B.P. 22 enumerates the following elements: (1) the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. Thus, even if it be subsequently
declared that novation took place between the FWCC and petitioner, respondent is not exempt from
prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for the dishonored checks.
23. Lim vs. People

G.R. No. 190834
November 26, 2014
Doctrine:
Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex.
Facts:
Sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, Ariel T. Lim did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Magna B. Badiee to apply on account or
for value dated June 30, 1998 payable to Cash in the amount of ₱100,000.00 said accused knowing fully
well that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within 90 days from
the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED,"
but the same would have been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of notice of such dishonor
failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the amount of the said check or to make arrangement for payment in
full of the same within five banking days after receiving said notice.
After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters, and after receiving the
subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement check dated September 8,
1998 in the amount of ₱200,000.00. Magna B. Badiee was able to encash said replacement check.
Issue/s:
pg. 22
Should the criminal case against Lim be dismissed on the ground that he has fully paid the amount of the
dishonored checks even before the Informations against him were filed in court?
Ruling:
Yes. The gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon
their presentment for payment. However, the Court must find if the application of the law is consistent
with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law
ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. It is consistent
rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. And
since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether the application
of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law.
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period provided for
in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned cases show that the
Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or
offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society's sense of
justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, petitioner should not be penalized although all the elements of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be present. The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid
the value of the dishonored check after having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor
should have forestalled the filing of the Information incourt. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22,
is the protection of the credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing
people who have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even
before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the
information has already attained the purpose of the law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the information has
been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from the commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there is
no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate
the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to
preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.
24. Campos vs. People and FWCC

G.R. No. 187401
September 17, 2014
Doctrine:
he making, drawing, and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds.
Facts:
In March 1995, Ma. Rosario Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First
Women's Credit Corporation in the amount of ₱50,000.00. She issued several postdated checks in favor
of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments. Fourteen of these checks were dishonored when
presented for payment. After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite
pg. 23
demand, she was charged before the MeTC of Pasay City with violations of B.P. 22. Campos was tried in
absentia, as she failed to attend court proceedings after being arraigned.
Campos argues that the crime’s element requiring her knowledge at the time of the check’s issuance that
she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
presentment was not established by the prosecution. She denies having received a notice of dishonor
from FWCC. Insisting on an acquittal, Campos discredits the MeTC’s reliance on a supposed notice of
dishonor that was sent to her by FWCC through registered mail. She also invokes good faith as she
allegedly made arrangements with FWCC for the payment of her obligation after the subject checks were
dishonored.
Issue/s:
Is Campos liable of violation of B.P. 22?
Ruling:
Yes. To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or creditor dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized
the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor, although not as an element of the offense,
but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued
the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2 of
B.P. 22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section
2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. In the instant case, both the
RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding that the required notice of dishonor from FWCC was received
by Campos.
Campos categorically declared in her petition that, "she has in her favor evidence to show that she was in
good faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the
dishonor of the checks." Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually received the required
notice of dishonor from FWCC. The evidence referred to in her statement were receipts issued by FWCC
to Campos for payments in various. Campos would not have entered into the alleged arrangements if she
had not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her
funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.
25. Ocampo vs. People

G.R. No. 251254
July 28, 2020
Doctrine:
The gravamen of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon presentment for payment
Facts:
pg. 24
In 2010, Juliet P. Ocampo obtained a loan from private respondent Michael Lim in the amount of
P6,000,000.00 and as payment thereof, petitioner issued to him seven checks. Lim also claimed that
Ocampo agreed to pay P225,000.00 as interest for February, 2011 and for this purpose, Ocampo delivered
four more postdated checks. When these 11 checks were presented for payment, they were all
dishonored either by reason of account closed or insufficient funds in the account. Ocampo was verbally
apprised of the dishonor of the checks and a demand was made for her to pay private respondent the
face value of these checks. Apparently, Ocampo promised to settle her obligation and agreed to pay
P300,000.00 but no payment was made. In September 2011, Ocampo visited Lim in his office to discuss
matters for the mode of payment, that could not afford to pay the value of the 11 checks and P300,000.00
monthly interest for March, 2011 up to September, 2011, a monthly interest of P250,000.00 was supposed
to be paid by Ocampo from October, 2011 until full payment of the obligation. Ocampo issued five more
checks to cover the interest agreed upon.
When these checks were presented for payment, they were all dishonored due to "Account Closed."
Collectively, petitioner drew, issued and delivered to private respondent 16 postdated checks. Ocampo
was charged with 16 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Issue/s:
Can Ocampo not be held criminally liable for the nine checks that the CA already affirmed as having been
issued for no valuable consideration since the alleged interest for which the checks had been issued was
nullified?
Ruling:
No. B.P. Blg. 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties,
its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being
virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can easily be eroded if one has yet to determine the
reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate
application of the legislative enactment can be made. The gravamen of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 is
the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for
payment. The act effectively declares the offense to be one of ma/um prohibitum. The only valid query
then is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without so much
regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer
Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra
bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B.P. Big. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized
is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing
the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached, that is, if a bouncing check has been issued.
ANTI-ARSON LAW
26. People vs. Buebos
G.R. No. 163938
March 28, 2008
Doctrine:
pg. 25
The elements of arson are intentional burning and what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling.
Facts:
On New Year’s Day in 1994 around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at in
Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child. She was lying down when she heard some noise around the
house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito
Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she
saw the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her immediate
succor, the four fled.
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then drinking with
Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Year’s Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a number of
people jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to identify Sarmelito
Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr.6 He also saw Rolando Buela running away.
Issue/s:
Are the accused guilty of the crime of arson?
Ruling:
Yes. The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as
amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious
and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling
under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying
circumstances present. Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as
stated in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was
charged with the crime of Simple Arson—for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential
house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family . . . knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a
thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building,
together with some seven adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire."
27. People vs. Soriano

G.R. No. 142565
July 29, 2003
Doctrine:
Arson is the malicious burning of property.
Facts:
One midnight of September 1998, Nestor Soriano was having an argument with his live-in partner Honey
Rosario Cimagala concerning their son Nestor, Jr., nicknamed "Otoy", stemmed from the fact that Honey’s
pg. 26
brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their child out without the consent of Nestor who wanted both Honey and
Otoy instead to return with him to Manila. As their discussion wore on Nestor intimated to Honey his
desire to have sex with her, which he vigorously pursued the night before with much success. This time
Honey did not relent to the baser instincts of Nestor. In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the
forehead. Nestor then moved away as he muttered: "It is better that I burn this house," and then took a
match from the top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette and set fire to the plastic partition that served as
divider of Honey’s room. Subsequently, an Information was filed against accused-appellant Nestor for
Arson.
Issue/s:
Is Nestor guilty of arson?
Ruling:
Yes. Arson is the malicious burning of property. Under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and PD 1613, Arson is classified into two kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and (2) other cases of
arson (PD 1613). This classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned,
regardless of the value of the damage caused.
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of
structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. The classification
of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly
crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a
brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State mandates greater
retribution to authors of this heinous crime.
On the basis of the categorical testimony of Honey positively identifying accused-appellant as the one
responsible for the burning of the house of Fe Cimagala in the early morning of 18 September 1998, the
trial court found the accused Nestor G. Soriano guilty as charged.
28. People vs. Macabando

G.R. No. 188708
July 31, 2013
Doctrine:
Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments
by any person or group of persons.
Facts:
In December 2001, Cornelio Feliciano went out of his house and saw smoke coming from the Alamada
Macabando’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a
neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the Macabando, ran to the barangay headquarters
to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, Macabando, who was carrying a
traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three shots in the air.
Macabando also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed.
pg. 27
Issue/s:
Is Macabando guilty of destructive arson?
Ruling:
Yes. The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been
proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that
the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial through the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found credible and
convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that damaged houses
were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social
Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as dwellings.
The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the
appellant’s act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellant’s
act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when
compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only showed
that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring
houses.
ANTI-CARNAPPING LAW
29. People vs. Urzais
G.R. No. 207662
April 13, 2016
Doctrine:
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force upon things.
Facts:
Fabian Urzais, together with co-accused Alex Bautista and Ricky Bautista, was charged with violation of
the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, with homicide through the use of an
unlicensed firearm by shooting the latter with an unlicensed firearm thereby inflicting upon him gunshot
wound on the head which caused his death. At his arraignment, Urzais pleaded not guilty. The trial
proceeded against him. His two co-accused remain at large.
Shirley, the widow of the victim, testified mainly regarding her husband’s disappearance and discovery of
his death. She narrated that her husband used to drive for hire their Isuzu Highlander, that her husband
left their house in Bulacan and did not return home. That she was informed that her husband had passed
away. Shirley retrieved their vehicle from the Cabanatuan City Police Station, had it cleaned as it had blood
stains and reeked of a foul odor. The police officer of Cabanatuan testified that their office received a
“flash alarm” from Bulacan PNP about an alleged carnapped Isuzu Highlander in forest green color, and
was informed that the subject vehicle had been. The officers apprehended the vehicle and asked the
driver Urzais, who had been alone, to alight therefrom. When the officers noticed the accused-appellant’s
waist to be bulging of something, he was ordered to raise his shirt and a gun was discovered tucked there.
pg. 28
The officers confirmed that the engine of the vehicle matched that of the victim’s. Said vehicle contained
traces of blood on the car seats at the back and on its flooring. The officers detained accused-appellant
and led a case for illegal possession of firearm against him.
Issue/s:
Is Urnaiz guilty of carnapping despite there being no direct evidence that he robbed and murdered the
victim?
Ruling:
No. Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things: 1. The fact of the crime,
i.e. the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged; and (2) the fact
that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The Court finds the prosecution unable to prove both
aspects, thus, it is left with no option but to acquit on reasonable doubt.
The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against
persons, or by using force upon things. The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may
not be treated as an incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and
murder under the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds the guilt of accused-appellant was not established
beyond reasonable doubt.
30. People vs. Roxas

G.R. No. 172604
August 17, 2010
Doctrine:
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force upon things.
Facts:
In January 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, Vencancio Roxas, by means of force, violence against and
intimidation of person and at gunpoint, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain
Agnes Guirindola depriving her of her liberty, and thereafter bring her to an uninhabited place in Barangay
Bagong Pook, San Jose, Batangas and with intent to kill and with treachery, evident premeditation, and
abuse of superior strength, shot her in the face with a hand gun, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of murder as consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, that is, the able and timely medical assistance given to said Agnes
Guirindola which prevented her death, resulting to her utmost grief, sorrow, sufferings and sleepless
night, compensable in actual, moral and exemplary damages in such amounts as may be awarded to them
under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Moreover, with intent to gain and by means of
force, violence against and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, took away and carried away one Nissan
Sentra Model 1993 then driven by Agnes Guirindola but owned by her mother Elvira G. Guirindola.
Issue/s:
Is Roxas guilty of carnapping and attempted murder?
Ruling:
pg. 29
Yes. It is evident that the commission of the killing, albeit frustrated, was formed from the moment the
accused took the victim in Quezon City until she was ultimately "executed" in Batangas. The lapse of more
than eight hours, that is, approximately from 1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., satisfies the last requisite for the
appreciation of evident premeditation as there was sufficient time for meditation and reflection before
the commission of the crime yet appellant proceeded with the same.
Roxas is also guilty of violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law. R.A. 6539, otherwise known as An Act
Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things." More specifically, the elements of the crime are as follows:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
A careful examination of the evidence presented would show that all the elements of carnapping were
proven in this case. It cannot be denied that the 1993 Nissan Sentra was unlawfully taken from Agnes
without her consent and by means of force or intimidation, considering that he and his co-accused
alternately poked a gun at Agnes. After shooting her, appellant also flee with the subject vehicle which
shows his intent to gain. Agnes also positively identified appellant and Gungon as the ones who took the
subject vehicle from her.
31. People vs. Donio

G.R. No. 212815
March 1, 2017
Doctrine:
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the
motor vehicle.
Facts:
Enrile Donio, together with his two co-accused, were charged of carnapping with homicide. Donio pleaded
not guilty when arraigned while his two co-accused were at-large. One of the witnesses for the
prosecution is a police officer who in line with their duties and functions, conducting a checkpoint on in
November 2003 were implementing their campaign against hijacking, carnapping, and kidnapping along
McArthur Highway. A speeding tricycle abruptly stopped near the check point which caught the attention
of the police officers. They approached the vehicle and asked the identity of the driver, and the driver
handed over to the Police Officer a temporary license bearing the name Raul Layug and likewise identified
himself as Raul Layug although his real identity is that of Enrile Donio. When asked by the Police Officers,
Donio and his two companions to produce the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt of the
vehicle, they failed to do so and were asked to bring the tricycle to the check point. Upon visual search,
the police officers discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo inside. The motorcycle and the bolo were
seized by the policeman and brought the three to the police station. While in the police station, Donio
was allowed to leave when he asked permission to get the OR and CR of the vehicle, but he never returned.
pg. 30
Subsequently, the remains of Raul Layug was found sprawled with multiple stab wounds and was noted
in a state of rigor mortis after thorough search conducted by his family after the former’s failure to return
home since he left the night before, driving his tricycle.
Issue/s:
Is Donio guilty of carnapping of the motorcycle and the murder of Layug?
Ruling:
Yes. "Unlawful taking" is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. It is deemed complete from
the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the
same. The Rules of Court provides the presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in
the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act.
The presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects belonging to the person robbed
and killed is considered the author of the aggression, the death of the person, as well as the robbery
committed, has been invariably limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the
proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. The
said principle may be applied in this case as the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and
carnapping being the same. Here, Donio failed to produce the vehicle's papers at the checkpoint. He
impersonated the victim before the police officers when his identity was asked, and left under the guise
of getting the said documents. It was also established that he and the others were strangers to Rodrigo.
Donio's unexplained possession, coupled with the circumstances proven in the trial, therefore, raises the
presumption that he was one of the perpetrators responsible for the unlawful taking of the vehicle and
Raul's death.
Intent to gain is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit
but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is
performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent constitutes
gain. Donio's intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was proven as he and his companions were using
it as means of transportation when they were confronted by the Concepcion police officers.
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY

32. People vs. Catantan
G.R. No. 118975
September 5, 1997
Doctrine:
Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
Facts:
pg. 31
Emiliano Catantan and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" were charged with violation of PD No. 532
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while
armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of violence
and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene
Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing
boat, to their damage and prejudice.
Catantan argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that there be an attack on or
seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the
Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they
were already on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place.
Catantan also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving
complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the
brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat.
Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
Issue/s:
Is the crime committed by Catantan and Ursal grave coercion?
Ruling:
No. This case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr.
were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously
part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of one of the victims shows that the appellant actually
seized the vessel through force and intimidation.
Sec. 2(d) of PD No. 532 defines Piracy as “Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of
the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or
passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and
punished as hereinafter provided.”
While Catantan insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their
boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal
abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to
another pumpboat that would take them back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new"
pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the
matter to the local authorities.
33. Ramparo vs. People

G.R. No. 204990
February 22, 2017
Doctrine:
Robbery in band is committed when four (4) or more malefactors take part in the robbery.
Facts:
pg. 32
One April in 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Ahmed Alcubar, Roberto Guarino, Juanito Salmeo,
and Ramon Amparo conspired and confederated together and helped one another armed with deadly
bladed weapons and therefore in band, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, that is, by boarding a passenger jeepney at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and T. Mapua
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila and immediately poked said arms upon Raymond Ignacio, and announced the
hold-up, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took, robbed and carried away the Nokia
6680 of said Raymond G. Ignacio against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
same amount as aforesaid.
Issue/s:
Did the appellants commit the crime of robbery in band?
Ruling:
Yes. Robbery is the taking, with the intent to gain, of personal property belonging to another by use of
force, violence or intimidation. Under Article 294 (5)46 in relation to Article 295, and Article 296 of the
Revised Penal Code, robbery in band is committed when four or more malefactors take part in the
robbery. All members are punished as principals for any assault committed by the band, unless it can be
proven that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the crime.
Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public highway, the crime is
still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532.
It is highway robbery only when it can be proven that the malefactors primarily organized themselves for
the purpose of committing that crime.
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT

34. People vs. Asislo
G.R. No. 206224
January 18, 2016
Doctrine:
In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal transaction.
Facts:
Sometime in April 2008, the PDEA-CAR Office received intelligence information from PDEA-La Union about
the proliferation and distribution of marijuana in La Union, and the same revealed that the accused Juan
Asislo had delivered a huge volume of marijuana in Baguio City to an unidentified buyer a week earlier.
PDEA Agent Ferdinand Natividad was tasked to coordinate and communicate with PDEA-La Union to build
a case against Asislo. After a week, the confidential informant, "Jojo” was instructed continue dealing with
Asislo, and to inform them of any developments regarding Asislo's alleged illicit activities. Jojo reported
that he met Asislo along with his unidentified companions. Asislo asked him to look for a buyer of the 300
kilos of marijuana in exchange for a commission. Natividad ordered Jojo to inform Asislo that a buyer from
pg. 33
Manila was interested to purchase 200 kilos of marijuana. Per Natividad's instruction, Jojo apprised Asislo
that the buyer from Manila who was willing to buy 200 kilos of marijuana will be in Baguio for a vacation.
In a phone call, Asislo insisted in talking with the buyer. Natividad talked with him through the phone and
reiterated to him his interest to buy 200 kilos of dried marijuana leaves. However, Asislo notified him that
he only had around 110 kilos of marijuana leaves. Natividad settled with Asislo, and asked the latter to
wait for his call for the delivery of the marijuana.
Week after, they agreed to have their transaction within the vicinity of Dontogan, Green Valley, Baguio
City, near a certain "car wash" are. The entrapment and arresting team proceeded to the area. Natividad
asked Asislo to see the marijuana before he pays. Thereafter, Asislo ordered the van's driver, Jose
Astudillo, to open the compartment. Natividad saw five sacks and a plastic bag. Asislo asked his other
companion, Samuel Pal-iwen, to help him pull out one sack and opened the same in front of Natividad.
The sack was loaded with bricks of marijuana.
Issue/s:
Is Asislo guilty of violation of R.A. 9165, Art. II Sec. 5?
Ruling:
Yes. In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and
the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal transaction.30 In the case at bar,
the sale was not consummated since there was no receipt of the consideration. Natividad arrested Asislo
immediately after the latter opened one of the sacks loaded with bricks of marijuana. It was also admitted
that the agents did not prepare marked money for the buy-bust operation.
Nevertheless, Asislo can still be liable for violation of Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal delivery
and transportation of marijuana. In the instant case, records established beyond any doubt that accused-
appellant Asislo was found in possession of the sacks containing marijuana, and was arrested while in the
act of delivering or transporting such illegal drugs to Natividad, the poseur-buyer, at the agreed place in
Dontogan, Green Valley, Baguio City, near a certain "car wash."
In the case at bar, Asislo was found in possession of 110 kilograms of dried marijuana leaves contained in
five sacks and a plastic bag, and that his drug test yielded negative result. The following circumstances
strongly indicate that he has the intention to sell, distribute, deliver or transport the said marijuana. Based
on the charges against Asislo and the evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant Asislo is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal delivery and transportation of marijuana under Article II, Section
5 of R.A. No. 9165.
35. San Juan vs. People

G.R. No. 177191
May 30, 2011
Doctrine:
The essential element of transport of illegal drugs is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place
to another.
Facts:
One day of December 2003, between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m., Michael San Juan, Rolando Pineda, and Cynthia
Coderes were inside Unit 1225 and were preparing to go out shopping. Somebody knocked on the door
pg. 34
and Pineda asked who that person was, but there was no reply. The door was forcibly opened and armed
men gained entry and ordered them to lie down on the bed face down. The men searched the unit and
took their personal belongings and money. They later recognized the said armed men as Pasay City police
officers though they presented no warrant of arrest and/or search warrant. San Juan, Pineda, and Coderes
were brought to separate rooms in Sinta Court Motel in Pasay City and that the police officers demanded
money from them in the amount of ₱500,000.00 in exchange for their release.
Issue/s:
Is San Juan and the other accused guilty of violation of R.A. 9165, Art. II Sec. 5?
Ruling:
No. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean: "to carry or convey from one
place to another." The essential element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one
place to another. In the present case, although petitioner and his co-accused were arrested inside a car,
the car was not in transit when they were accosted. From the facts found by the RTC, that car was parked
and stationary. The prosecution failed to show that any distance was travelled by petitioner with the drugs
in his possession. The conclusion that petitioner transported the drugs merely because he was in a motor
vehicle when he was accosted with the drugs has no basis and is mere speculation. The rule is clear that
the guilt of the accused must be proved with moral certainty. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused. It is the responsibility of the prosecution to prove the element of transport of dangerous drugs,
namely, that transportation had taken place, or that the accused had moved the drugs some distance.
36. People vs. Goyena

G.R. No. 229680
June 6, 2009
Doctrine:
Settled is the rule that as long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer
was accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered
consummated by the delivery of the goods.
Facts:
On November 28, 2012, PDEA Legazpi City received information from a confidential informant that
Michael Goyena and his sister Cyramil Goyena were engaged in the sale of dangerous drugs in Cabangan,
Legazpi City. Upon further verification, it was confirmed that Cyramil was indeed included in the PDEA's
list of persons suspected of selling dangerous drugs in Albay.
In the presence of PDEA Agents Enrico Barba and Jonathan Ivan Revilla the CI called Cyramil to set up the
purchase of ₱3,500.00-worth of shabu for a buy-bust operation. Cyramil agreed and informed the CI that
it was appellant who would meet him for this purpose as she was indisposed. The PDEA thereafter
coordinated with the Legazpi City Police Intelligence Unit for the conduct of a buy-bust operation against
appellant and Cyramil. During the pre-operational briefing, a buy-bust team was formed with Agent Revilla
as poseur-buye. At around 2:00 p.m., the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area where Agent Revilla
and the CI posed as passengers waiting for a ride along the road in front of a dilapidated building; the rest
of the team positioned themselves strategically around the area.
pg. 35
Not long after, appellant approached Agent Revilla and the CI. After introductions were made, appellant
asked Agent Revilla if he was indeed buying ₱3,500.00-worth of shabu, and the latter replied in the
affirmative. Appellant then handed Agent Revilla one medium-sized, heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected as shabu. Agent Revilla, in return, gave appellant
the ₱500.00-marked money and the boodle money. Once the exchange was completed, Agent Revilla
turned his baseball cap, the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been consummated
Issue/s:
Is the arrest valid considering it being warrantless and that the PDEA agents' failure to mark and conduct
the inventory of the same at the place of arrest?
Ruling:
"In a prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, such as shabu, the following elements must be
duly established: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor." Simply stated, the prosecution must prove that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation of the seized dangerous drugs as
evidence in court.
In People v. Dumlao, we explained that the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is consummated upon the
completion of the sale transaction between the buyer and seller, to wit: The commission of the offense
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which
happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. Settled is the rule that as long as the
police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by appellant and the
dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of the
goods.
In this case, the prosecution positively identified appellant as the seller of the white crystalline substance
which was later found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, more commonly known as shabu, a
dangerous drug. It was also shown that appellant had sold the shabu to Agent Revilla, the poseur-buyer,
for a sum of ₱3,500.00.
We also find that the prosecution had sufficiently established that appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu in a legitimate entrapment operation. Aside from the Authority to Operate44 and
the Pre-Operation Report45 on record, the prosecution witnesses also described in detail the events
leading to and during the conduct of the buy-bust operation against appellant. Hence, appellant's
warrantless arrest and the subsequent search on his person are perfectly legal. We find no sufficient
reason to overturn the presumption of regularity in favor of the PDEA agents, given appellant's failure to
present clear and convincing evidence that the PDEA agents did not properly perform their duties or that
they were inspired by improper motive.
37. People vs. Pancho

G.R. No. 206910
October 14, 2015
Doctrine:
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
pg. 36
Facts:
On the basis of a search warrant, members of the Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Bureau of Cebu
City conducted a search in the house of Juliet Pancho and her husband Samuel Pancho located in Sitio
Plastikan, Barangay Duljo-Fatima, Cebu City. Police Superintendent Pablo Labra served the search warrant
on accused-appellant. Police Officer 1 Roy Carlo Veloso was designated as the searcher, while PO2
Benigno Andrew Ilagan was assigned as the recorder of the raiding team. The raiding team was
accompanied by three barangay tanods. The search yielded three big plastic packets of suspected shabu
weighing a total of 14.49 grams, which were recovered under a jewelry box placed on top of a cabinet
divider. PO1 Veloso handed the packets of shabu to PO2 Ilagan who recorded them in the confiscation
receipt and made markings on the plastic packets.
Issue/s:
Will the failure of the prosecution to present photographs of the seized items and that there were no
representatives from the media and the Department of Justice during the conduct of the inventory of
the seized items absolve Pancho from criminal liabilities?
Ruling:
No. "What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and [the] evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
In the instant case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not broken. The prosecution
established that PO1 Veloso seized three packets of shabu from the bedroom of accused-appellant. He
handed them over to PO2 Ilagan, who made markings on the items and prepared a confiscation receipt
of the same while in appellant's house. PO2 Ilagan brought the confiscated shabu to the police station
where he prepared a letter-request addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory. It was PO2 Ilagan,
accompanied by PO1 Veloso, who went to the PNP Crime Laboratory to bring the specimen and the letter-
request. PO2 Roma received the shabu and forwarded the same to the forensic chemist. The chain of
custody was testified to by the police authorities. Clearly, the recovery and the handling of the seized
illegal drugs were satisfactorily established in this case.
The failure of the members of the raiding team to deliver the seized items to the judge who issued the
warrant becomes immaterial because records show that the chain of custody is intact.
38. People vs. Eda

G.R. No. 220715
August 24, 2016
Doctrine:
What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in
court of the prohibited drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence.
Facts:
In February 2011, a buy-bust operation was conducted in Balayan, Batangas against Ronnie Boy Eda. While
the civilian asset was negotiating with Eda, PO2 Bejer was on board the tricycle being driven by said civilian
pg. 37
asset, carefully watching the transaction unfold. Upon the exchange of one plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance with the marked money, PO2 Bejer approached them and introduced himself to Eda
as a police officer. Accused-appellant was then arrested and an additional of four plastic sachets with
white crystalline substance were found in his right pocket.
Eda denied selling the illegal drug seized and claimed that never did he use shabu in his entire life. He
further alleged that (1) he only admitted to owning the illegal drugs then for fear as the police officers
gave him blows; and that (2) the alleged sachets of prohibited drugs recovered from him after the conduct
of body search were actually planted by PO2 Bejer.
Issue/s:
wrongly charged with violation of RA 9165
Ruling:
No. For a successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165,
the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the
sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery
of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the
illegal transaction. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the
presentation in court of the prohibited drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence.
In this case, the Court believes and so holds that all the requisites for the illegal sale of shabu were met.
As demonstrated by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the supporting documents they
presented and offered, the identities of the buyer, the seller, the prohibited drug, and the marked money,
have all been proven by the required quantum of evidence.
Against the prosecution evidence, Eda merely denied the accusations against him and raised the defense
of frame-up. We note, however, that the defense of denial and frame-up has been invariably viewed with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for
violation RA No. 9165. In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong
and convincing evidence. In this connection, Eda has the burden of proof to defeat the presumption that
the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity and that they properly performed their official
duties. He failed. No bad faith or planting of evidence was actually shown. He did not substantiate any
illicit motive on the part of the police officers, as to why they would choose to falsely implicate him in a
very serious crime that would cause his imprisonment for life. For this failure, the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses deserve full faith and credit.
39. People vs. Bulawan

G.R. No. 204441
June 8, 2016
Doctrine:
The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Facts:
pg. 38
Michael Kurt John Bulawan was introduced to Arresting Officer Rodolfo dela Cerna who acted as a poseur
buyer. After he was introduced, the accused handed to him the marijuana wrapped in a magazine paper.
After Bulawan gave him the marijuana, he inspected it if to verify if it was indeed marijuana and after
confirming it, he made a “miss-call” signal to their team leader who was inside the vehicle which was
parked about 10 to 15 meters away from them. He then immediately announced that he is a PDEA agent
and he informed Bulawan of the latter’s violation.
He further testified that he did not prepare the buy bust money in the amount of P1,000.00 and that when
he met the accused, he had no P 1,000. 00 with him and that he arrested the accused when the latter
showed him the marijuana. He then informed the accused of his rights and when the other members
arrived, he conducted an inventory right at the place. Then, they proceeded to the Office where he made
the markings “RDC”.
Issue/s:
Is Bulawan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that no sale was consummated as the consideration, much less its receipt by Bulawan
were not established. The elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs are the following: 1) The identities
of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and 2) The delivery of the thing sold and the payment
for it.
The Court held that no information was presented by the prosecution on the prior negotiation between
the confidential informant and accused-appellant. Moreover, the testimony of IO1 de la Cerna failed to
show any kind of confirmation of the alleged prior negotiation. Thus, there is no proof of the offer to
purchase dangerous drugs, as well as the promise of the consideration. Moreover, the chain of custody
of the seized alleged marijuana was not sufficiently established, thereby casting doubt on the identity and
integrity of the supposed evidence. In the case at bar, as the seized substance was not sealed, the
prosecution should have presented all the officers who handled said evidence from the time it left the
person of the accused to the time it was presented in open court.
In the present case, as the prosecution failed to establish every link in the chain of custody of the subject
dangerous drugs, thus compromising its identity and integrity, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
40. Dela Cruz vs. People

G.R. No. 200748
July 23, 2014
Doctrine:
Mandatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless.
Facts:
In January 2006, at Cebu City, Jaime dela Cruz, a public officer in the position of Police Officer 2 of the
Philippine National Police assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after having
pg. 39
been arrested by agents of the NBI in an entrapment operation, was found positive for use of shabu, as
the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused.
Dela Cruz denied the charges and testified that while eating at a Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly
for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug
examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call
his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.
Issue/s:
Is the drug test conducted upon Jaime dela Cruz legal?
Ruling:
No. The drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or jurisprudence.
Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower court reasoned
that "a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while he
is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony against himself. Extracting
urine from one’s body is merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation."
The Supreme Court found the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation
by the CA, erroneous on three counts. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended
or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court failed to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge
of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s
urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a
custodial investigation."
41. People vs. Morilla

G.R. no. 189833
February 5, 2014
Doctrine:
Transport means to carry or convey from one place to another.
Facts:
In October 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran Real, Quezon, Javier Morilla, the incumbent Municipality of
Panukulan Ronnie Mitra, Willie Yang, and Ruel Dequilla, who all belong to an organized/syndicate crime
group as they all help one another, were caught to be transporting by means of two motor vehicles,
namely a Starex van with commemorative plate to read "Mayor" and a municipal ambulance of
Panukulan, 503.68 kilos of shabu.
During the trial, Mayor Mitra argued that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and
explained that he only accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his
fishing boat. Likewise, Morilla insisted that he thought what he was transporting were wooden tiles and
pg. 40
electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense,
did not bother to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was merely an accommodated passenger
of the ambulance.
Issue/s:
Is intent or knowledge material in determining the culpability of an accused?
Ruling:
No. Intent or knowledge is not material in determining the culpability of an accused in drug cases.
The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished
as an offense under a special law. Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of
transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs
Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another." It was well established during trial that Morilla
was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to
Manila. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by
proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.
42. People vs. Cabugatan

G.R. No. 172019
February 12, 2007
Doctrine:
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
Facts:
In August 2002 in the City of Baguio, Baguio City Police conducted a buy-bust operation to apprehend
Boisan Cabugatan with PO2 Del-ong as the designated poseur-buyer. When they reached the designated
place, they were met by Cabugatan. After the civilian informant introduced PO2 Del-ong and appellant to
each other, the latter asked PO2 Del-ong how much worth of shabu was he willing to purchase. PO2 Del-
ong replied that he had only ₱150.00 with him. After he handed this sum to appellant, the latter drew
from his right front pocket a small sachet which he gave to PO2 Del-ong. PO2 Del-ong then examined the
content of the sealed plastic sachet. Cabugatan have been found in his possession and control one
transparent plastic containing four small transparent plastic sachet containing shabu weighing
approximately 0.2 gm without the corresponding license or prescription.
Issue/s:
Is the arrest conducted upon Cabugatan illegal?
Ruling:
No. Cabugatan failed to substantiate his claim that he was an unfortunate prey to a supposed ploy
concocted by the police. By all indications, he did not know anyone of the members of the buy-bust team
which apprehended him. There was, therefore, no motive for them to frame him up. Absent any proof of
motive to falsely accuse him of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over
appellant’s bare allegation that he was framed-up.46 In other words, the categorical and convincing
pg. 41
testimonies of the policemen, backed up by physical evidence, overcome the unsubstantiated claim of ill-
motive by appellant.
In this jurisdiction, the conduct of buy-bust operation is a common and accepted mode of apprehending
those involved in illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been proven to be an effective way
of unveiling the identities of drug dealers and of luring them out of obscurity. Thus, unless the defense
could persuade us otherwise, we are inclined to confer full credit and faith to the testimonies of the
members of the buy-bust team as regards the conduct of their operation.
Appellant’s claim that his warrantless arrest was invalid is similarly devoid of merit. The rule is settled that
an arrest made after an entrapment does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid
warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court.
pg. 42
43. People vs. Mantalaba

G.R. No. 186227
July 20, 2011
Doctrine:
A buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending
drug peddlers and distributors.
Facts:
Allen Mantalaba is a 17-year old from Butuan City. Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response
(RACER) in Butuan City received a report that Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu. After a
buy-bust operation, two informations was filed against Mantalaba which was later on consolidated.
Mantalaba pleaded not guilty. RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized
of reclusion perpetua to death and fine of P500,000 for selling shabu and (2) for illegally possessing shabu,
Mantalaba was penalized, in application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum of
prision mayor and fine of P300,000. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the present appeal.
Mantalaba contended that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that there was no evidence
of actual sale between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation. He also claims that the
chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established.
Issue/s:
Is Mantalaba guilty of violation of R.A. 9165?
Ruling:
Yes. The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore.
From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been
satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug,
as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to
the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an
accused arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
44. People vs. Laylo

G.R. No. 189833
February 5, 2014
Doctrine:
What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time and venue of
the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting the sale and delivery of the prohibited
drugs.
pg. 43
Facts:
In the afternoon of 17 December 2005, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both wearing civilian clothes, were
conducting anti-drug surveillance operations at Lozana Street, Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal. While the
police officers were in front of a sari-sari store at around 5:40 p.m., appellant Laylo and his live-in partner,
Ritwal, approached them and asked, "Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?" PO1 Reyes replied, "Bakit mayroon
ka ba?" Laylo then brought out two plastic bags containing shabu and told the police officers, "Dos
(₱200.00) ang isa." Upon hearing this, the police officers introduced themselves as cops. PO1 Reyes
immediately arrested Laylo. Ritwal, on the other, tried to get away but PO1 Pastor caught up with her.
PO1 Pastor then frisked Ritwal and found another sachet of shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was
carrying.
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets of shabu recovered from Laylo and Ritwal and
forwarded them to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for forensic testing. Forensic Chemist
Police Inspector Yehla C. Manaog conducted the laboratory examination on the specimens submitted and
found the recovered items positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
Issue/s:
Is Laylo guilty of violation of R.A. 9165?
Ruling:
Yes. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer
and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Here,
appellant intended to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the commission of the intended crime by
showing the substance to PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor. The sale was aborted when the police officers
identified themselves and placed appellant and Ritwal under arrest. From the testimonies of the
witnesses, the prosecution was able to establish that there was an attempt to sell shabu. In addition, the
plastic sachets were presented in court as evidence of corpus delicti. Thus, the elements of the crime
charged were sufficiently established by evidence.
45. People vs. Musa

G.R. No. 199735
July 6, 2011
Doctrine:
Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
Facts:
On 14 December 1989, the accused sold 2 wrappers containing marijuana leaves to Sgt. Amado Ani in a
buy-bust operation in Zamboanga City. The said buy-bust operation was planned since a civilian informer
told that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana and therefore, a test-buy was conducted the day
prior to the said buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust operation, after Sgt. Ani handed the money to
Musa, Musa entered his house to get the wrappings. Upon his return and with the inspection of the
wrappings, Musa was arrested, but the marked money used as payment cannot be found with him,
prompting the NARCOM agents to go inside his house. There, they could not find the marked money, but
they found more marijuana leaves hidden in a plastic bag inside the kitchen. The leaves were confirmed
pg. 44
as marijuana by the forensic chemist of the PC crime laboratory, who later on served as a witness, along
with T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, the team leader of the buy-bust operation and Sgt. Ani.
The defense gave a different version of what happened on 14 December 1989 wherein he and his wife,
Ahara Musa, served as witnesses. They said that the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside
their house since the door was open, and upon entering, declared that they were NARCOM agents and
searched the house, despite demands of the couple for a search warrant. The agents found a red bag
whose contents were unknown to the Musas.
Issue/s:
Is the seized plastic bag containing marijuana admissible as evidence?
Ruling:
No. The "plain view" doctrine may not, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures
nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain
view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason
for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used
to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will
not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the
"plain view" of the object. Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items
that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
46. People vs. Lacerna

G.R. No. 109250
September 5, 1997
Doctrine:
Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
Facts:
In September 1992, accused Marlon and Noriel Lacerna were riding in a taxicab on their way to the North
Harbor to board a boat bound for Iloilo City. While plying along Pier 15 their taxicab was flagged down by
a patrol mobile car. Marlon was sitting in front while accused Noriel Lacerna was at the back of the taxicab.
The accused carried two bags. One bag contained their personal belongings and the other bag contained
things which their uncle Edwin Lacerna asked them to bring along.
pg. 45
PO3 Valenzuela looked at the occupants of said taxi, the latter bowed their heads and slouched, refusing
to look at him. Feeling that something was amiss, PO3 Valenzuela and his companion stopped the vehicle,
signaling the driver to park by the side of the road. PO3 Valenzuela and his co-police officer asked
permission to search the vehicle. As the occupants readily agreed, the police officers went about searching
the luggages in the vehicle which consisted of a knapsack and a dark blue plastic grocery bag. They asked
appellant what the contents of the plastic bag were. Co-accused Noriel Lacerna immediately answered
that the bag contained his vomit. Skeptical of what appellant and co-accused disclosed as regards the
contents of the plastic bag, PO3 Valenzuela made a hole in the bag and peeped inside. He found several
blocks wrapped in newspaper, with the distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. PO3 Valenzuela
opened one of the boxes and saw dried marijuana leaves. He told appellant and co-accused that the
contents of the bag were marijuana, which co-accused readily affirmed.
Issue/s:
Are the accused liable for illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act?
Ruling:
Yes. Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs. It is
indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the sale be identified and presented in court.
It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala prohibita. On
grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, courts have always recognized the power of the
legislature, as the greater master of things, to forbid certain acts in a limited class of cases and to make
their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient
if the prohibited act was intentionally done. Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference
between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. In the case at bar, appellant
was found to have in his possession a plastic bag containing 18 kg of marijuana formed into 18 bricks
which were separately wrapped. His possession thereof gives rise to a disputable presumption under
Section 3[j], Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,47 that he is the owner of such bag and its contents.
47. People vs. Narvas

G.R. No. 241254
July 8, 2019
Doctrine:
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these elements, but
also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime.
Facts:
In March 2011, a concerned citizen gave a tip to the desk officer of the Sta. Barbara Police Station
regarding drug-related activities in Villa subdivision in Sta. Barbara. PO2 Christopher Idos, who was also
at Sta. Barbara Police Station, was instructed by the desk officer to conduct a buy-bust operation in the
target area. In line with the operation, the buy-bust team prepared two bills worth Five Hundred Pesos
pg. 46
each. PO2 Idos acted as the poseur-buyer and PO1 Quibrantos acted as the back-up. The team, consisting
of PO2 Idos and PO1 Quibrantos, proceeded to the place of operation in Barangay Minien West.
PO2 Idos told the bystanders that he wanted to buy shabu. One of the bystanders, later identified as Armie
Narvas, obliged, going in and coming out of his house carrying two plastic sachets. He handed to the police
officers said plastic sachets. In exchange, PO2 Idos gave the marked money consisting of the two bills. The
moment Narvas took the marked money, the police officers arrested him. PO2 Idos searched the person
of Narvas which yielded two more plastic sachets.
Issue/s:
Is Narvas guilty for violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165?
Ruling:
No. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section
5, Article II of RA 9165] the prosecution is required to prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.
Section 21 of RA 9165 requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items
and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. The said inventory must
be done in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase "immediately after seizure and
confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law
to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable
that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to
be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team. In this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should
already be physically present at the time of apprehension — a requirement that could easily be complied
with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
Verily, a buy-bust team normally has enough time to gather and bring with them the said witnesses.
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, as borne by the evidence on record, it cannot be denied that
serious breaches of the mandatory procedures required in the conduct of buy-bust operations were
committed by the police. These cast serious doubt as to the integrity of the allegedly confiscated drug
specimens, hence creating reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant Narvas.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these elements, but
also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the
very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective
and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law
nevertheless requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are
safeguarded. In all drugs cases, therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any
prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The rule is
imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very
same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that required to make a finding of guilt.
pg. 47
48. People vs. Sood

G.R. No. 227394
June 6, 2018
Doctrine:
Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in
actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility.
Facts:
On 28 January 2009, a certain "Florence" was apprehended in a buy-bust operation conducted by police
operatives belonging to the Station Anti--Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task Group, Kamuning Police
Station, Quezon City Police District. Upon their return to the police station, they were informed by the
confidential informant that the dealer of the alleged drugs, accused-appellant, was due to arrive from
Caloocan City that afternoon.
Norjana Sood vehemently denied the prosecution's version of the events which occurred on 28 January
2009. She testified that on the same day, she was laying out her merchandise on the Luzon Overpass,
being a sidewalk vendor, when she was apprehended by two men who she thought were officers of the
Metro Manila Development Authority. She was taken to the police station where allegedly, the
apprehending officers demanded P35,000.00 pesos for her release, but she did not file any case against
them. Accused-appellant denied selling shabu at the time of her arrest.
Issue/s:
Is the buy-bust team’s failure to comply with the requirements of the law material to the conviction of
the accused?
Ruling:
Yes. The prosecution actually failed to establish the unbroken chain of custody. The inconsistencies in the
testimony of the buy-bust team and lack of information at specific stages of the seizure, custody, and
examination of the seized drugs create doubt as to the identity and integrity thereof.
The prosecution cannot find cover in the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police
officers' duty, and the RTC erred in applying this presumption as against compliance with Section 21 of RA
9165. In a prosecution under RA 9165, all the requirements of Section 21 thereof should be proven; there
is no presumption that a buy-bust team has complied with the requirements of this section. The Court
supports the State's drive against illegal drugs. But such drive should strictly comply with the law and the
Constitution. Although the amount of drugs involved in this case is not insubstantial, this alone does not
warrant a relaxation of the rules. In fact, the procedure outlined in Section 21 is straightforward and easy
to comply with; and the prosecution should account for and explain any deviations from the mandatory
procedure outlined in Section 21. As shown above, the prosecution failed to comply with Section 21 or
justifiably explain the deviations from it. Given this, the Constitutional right of accused-appellant to be
presumed innocent stands.
pg. 48
49. Estipona Jr. vs. Lobrigo

G.R. No. 22679
August 15, 2017
Doctrine:
Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.
Facts:
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise
use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one piece heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.084gram of white crystalline substance, which when
examined were found to be positive for shabu, a dangerous drug.
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches
on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because
plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to
plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute. Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of
Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal
cases.
Issue/s:
Is Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate Rules of Procedure?
Ruling:
No. At this point, the Supreme Court shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future
discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending
deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, the
Supreme Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug
cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
issued for the purpose.
pg. 49
50. Sayre vs. Xenos

G.R. No. 244413
February 18, 2020
Doctrine:
A plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the approval of the
court.
Facts:
Nurullaje Sayre was charged with violation of Sections 5, 11, and 12, Article II of R.A. 9165. Pursuant to
OCA Circular No. 90-2018, adopting the Court En Banc Resolution dated April 10, 2018 in Adoption of the
Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases, Sayre filed a Motion for Approval of Plea-Bargaining Proposal
with Modification. City Prosecutor filed a Comment and Counter-Proposal in accordance with a DOJ
Circular known as the “Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for Republic Act No. 9165”. Despite several
negotiations, the parties failed to reach a consensus. Consequently, in an Order, the RTC denied Sayre’s
Motion to Plea Bargain and set the case for Pre-Trial.
Issue/s:
Did Judge Xenos commit a grave abuse of discretion in setting the case for pre-trial for failure of the parties
to reach consensus in plea-bargaining?
Ruling:
No. In this petition, A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is a rule of procedure established pursuant to the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court that serves as a framework and guide to the trial courts in plea bargaining
violations of R.A. 9165.
Nonetheless, a plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the
approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by
the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
court.
The use of the word “may” signifies that the trial court has discretion whether to allow the accused to
make a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Moreover, plea bargaining requires the consent of the accused,
offended party, and the prosecutor. It is also essential that the lesser offense is necessarily included in the
offense charged.
Taking into consideration the requirements in pleading guilty to a lesser offense, We find it proper to treat
the refusal of the prosecution to adopt the acceptable plea bargain for the charge of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs provided in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as a continuing objection that should be resolved by
the RTC. This harmonizes the constitutional provision’ on the rule making power of the Court under the
Constitution and the nature of plea bargaining in Dangerous Drugs cases. DOJ Circular No. 27 did not
repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.
Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea bargain for Section 5 of R.A.
9165 did not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ Circular No. 27 merely serves as an
internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may give their consent to proposed plea
bargains.
pg. 50
Presiding Judge Xenos did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he disregarded the provisions of OCA Circular No. 90-
2018.
51. Luna vs. People

G.R. No. 231902
June 30, 2021
Doctrine:
Intent to commit the crime is not necessary, but intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law
must be shown.
Facts:
Dennis Oliver happened to drive several times for a certain "Sexy", a woman introduced by Susan, his
former neighbor, to him. During those instances, "Sexy" would contact Susan and the latter would go to
his house to ask him if he can drive for someone the following day. If he agrees, he will wait at the corner
of Retiro Street in Sampaloc, Manila where Susan will pick him up. When Susan arrives, she will instruct
him to drive for "Sexy". In all those times, "Sexy" carried a handbag and papers kept inside a brown
envelope.
On July 28, 2005, his passenger was "Sexy". He recalled that in the morning, Susan was already with "Sexy"
when they picked him up at his usual spot on Retiro Street. Thereat, Susan alighted from the Toyota Revo
while he and "Sexy" went to Icebergs located in Timog, Quezon City. Upon arrival, "Sexy" disembarked
and went inside the restaurant while he parked the vehicle and waited for "Sexy" until noon. When "Sexy"
came out of the restaurant, she directed [him] to drive towards Sandiganbayan along Commonwealth
Avenue. When they reached Sandiganbayan around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, "Sexy" instructed him
to park the vehicle along Filinvest Street while she went to an alley nearby. "Sexy" returned to the vehicle
at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and told him to proceed to Hap Chan along Quezon Avenue by himself as
her companions brought their vehicles. "Sexy" instructed her that if "Mike", whom she was supposed to
meet, will arrive early at Hap Chan, he will have to tell "Mike" to get the bag at the rear passenger's seat
and if "Mike" has something to leave for "Sexy", he will just have to leave it at the back of the Toyota
Revo. Afterwards, he drove towards Hap Chan and waited inside the vehicle. At around 4:30 in the
afternoon, a man approached the Toyota Revo, introduced himself as "Mike" and asked where "Sexy"
was. In reply, he told "Mike" to get the bag placed at the back seat and wait for "Sexy" because she was
on her way. As instructed, "Mike" took the bag. Suddenly, "Mike" announced that he is arresting him for
carrying illegal drugs.
Issue/s:
Did Luna for violate Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165?
Ruling:
The Court acquits petitioner Luna for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala prohibita. A
person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime. But if he did intend to commit an act, and
that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself, then he can be held liable for the malum
pg. 51
prohibitum. In other words, "intent to commit the crime is not necessary, but intent to perpetrate the act
prohibited by the special law must be shown." Nevertheless, despite the offense of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs being malum prohibitum, "this, however, does not lessen the prosecution's burden
because it is still required to show that the prohibited act was intentional." In cases involving the illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, "the prosecution is not excused from proving that possession of the
prohibited act was done 'freely and consciously,' which is an essential element of the crime." Hence, a
critical element of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs is the element of intent to possess
or animus possidendi.
Therefore, to prosecute an accused for illegally possessing illegal drugs, it is not enough to show that the
accused knowingly and intentionally possessed the bag or receptacle that contained illegal drugs. The
prosecution must go beyond and provide evidence that the accused knowingly, freely, consciously, and
intentionally possessed illegal drugs.
pg. 52

TAMPICO - SPL CASE DIGESTS - Weeks 1-3

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TAMPICO - SPL CASE DIGESTS - Weeks 1-3

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SPECIAL PENAL LAWS – CASE DIGESTS (TAMPICO, E.L.

1. Garcia vs. Court of Appeals

2. Dungo vs. People of the Philippines

3. Teves vs. COMELEC

INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

Fransdilla and her other co-accused were charged with robbery.

5. Zafra vs. People of the Philippines

6. People vs. Lopez

7. People vs. Leonardo

8. People vs. Matias

9. Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan

10. Flordeliz vs. People

11. Imbo vs. People

13. Colinares vs. People

14. Bala vs. Hon. Martinez

15. Moreno vs. Comelec

16. Jalosjos vs. COMELEC

18. Ong vs. People

19. People vs. Dimat

G.R. No. 181184

20. Dizon vs. People

BOUNCING CHECKS LAW

22. LBP vs. Jacinto

23. Lim vs. People

24. Campos vs. People and FWCC

25. Ocampo vs. People

27. People vs. Soriano

28. People vs. Macabando

30. People vs. Roxas

31. People vs. Donio

ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY

33. Ramparo vs. People

COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT

35. San Juan vs. People

36. People vs. Goyena

37. People vs. Pancho

38. People vs. Eda

39. People vs. Bulawan

40. Dela Cruz vs. People

41. People vs. Morilla

42. People vs. Cabugatan

43. People vs. Mantalaba

44. People vs. Laylo

45. People vs. Musa

46. People vs. Lacerna

47. People vs. Narvas

48. People vs. Sood

49. Estipona Jr. vs. Lobrigo

50. Sayre vs. Xenos

51. Luna vs. People

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