1.

Cybercrime
• Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice (716 SCRA 235, February 11, 2014)
• Fermin vs. People, 550 SCRA 132, March 28, 2008
• Bonifacio vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, G.R. No. 184800, May
05, 2010

2. Estafa
• Spouses Isidro Dulay vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215132, September
13, 2021
• People of the Philippines vs. Perlita Urquico, G.R. No. 238910, July 20, 2022

3. BP 22
• Julie S. Sumbila vs. Matrix Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015
• Maria Nympha Mandagan vs. Jose Valero Corporation, G.R. No. 215118, June 19,
2019
• Leonora Rimando vs. Sps. Winston And Elenita Aldaba, G.R. No. 203583,
October 13, 2014
• People of the Philippines vs. Cresencia C. Reyes, G.R. No. 101127-31, November
18, 1993
• Iluminada Batac vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191622, June 06, 2018

~~~~
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE
TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
Abad, J.

FACTS:
 RA 10175, also known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, aims to regulate
the use and access of cyberspace, protecting the individuals from crimes and/or
unlawful acts while on the internet. With the simultaneous access of billions of
individuals, connection is made faster and easier, but so is the committal of crimes that
can damage and harm the other. Thus, the existence of the RA 10175 to protect the
individual and to give punishment to these crimes.
The petitioner raised the unconstitutionality of some of the provisions of the Act,
stating that it violates certain constitutional rights. The government states otherwise,
that they merely want to reasonably put order in the cyberspace activities, prevent
hurtful attacks and punish wrongdoings on the system.

ISSUE:
WON Certain provisions in RA 10175 are void and unconstitutional.

RULING:
The court declares that 3 of the provisions raised were void and unconstitutional,
the rest are valid and constitutional.
VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
- Section 4(c)(3) Cybercrime Offenses> Content-related Offenses> Unsolicited
Commercial Communications
- “Spam”: repeats the same sentence or comment
- The government states that these aer nuisance and reduces the
efficiency of computers and is a great annoyance. However, no real
proof was given that it does reduce the efficiency.
- Spam has already existed even before computers—- through mails.
- It is a type of advertisement that may interest the people, thus, was
never penalized of discontinued
- Freedom of expression
- Section 12 Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data
- The Court states that Section 12 of RA 10175 is violative of the individual
privacy of the person as it invades the personal messages and data of a
person. It can also be used to abuse the power of a government employee.
- Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities “with due cause”.
Meaning that they can only look up the data with proper cause and
 nothing else. And that they can only do so with the “associated with
specified communications”.
- Still, this is too powerful for the law enabling authorities, and is too
vague.
- Void for vagueness Doctrine
- Overbreadth Doctrine
- Section 19 Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data
- Violates freedom of expression and right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
- The DOJ order cannot substitute for a judicial search warrant.
VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL
- Section 4(a)(1) Cybercrime Offenses> Offenses against the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of computer data and systems> Illegal Access
- Not met the strict scrutiny standard and interferes with the fundamental
rights f the people
- Ethical hackers= independent auditors
- An Agreement between the client and the ethical hacker; “get out
of jail free card”
- Section 4(a)(3) Cybercrime Offenses> Offenses against the con…> Data
interference
- Does not encroach the freedom, but punishes the form of vandalism,
destruction without the right of the things that belongs to others.
- Clear on what it wants to punish and does not violate any constitutional
rights.
- Section 4(a)(6) CBOffenses> Offenses against the con…> Cyber-squatting
- Does not violate the equal protection clause. Is clear and can differentiate
what is a pseudo-name and what is real name.
- Section 4(b)(3) CB Offenses> Computer-related Offenses> Computer- related
Identity Theft
- “Zones of Privacy”= any form of intrusion is impermissible unless
excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process
- 2 constitutional rights: 1) right to be let alone; 2) right to privacy of
communication and correspondence
- Section 4(b)(3) is intended for illegitimate purposes
 - Section 4(c)(1) CB Offenses> Content- related Offenses> Cybersex
- Seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade and pornography for
favor and consideration; interactive pornography, i.e.by webcam.
- constitutional
- Section 4(c)(2) CB Offenses> Content-related Offenses> Child Pornography
- Penalty one degree higher when the crime is committed in cyberspace.
- Petitioner states that the prosecution relates to persons who aid and abe
the core offenses of ACPA. discussed further below.
- Section 6
-
- Section 8
- Section 13
- Section 14
- Section 15
- Section 17
- Section 20
- Section 24
- Section 26(a)
- Art. 353, 354, 361 and 362 of RPC that penalizes libel.
~~~
Fermin vs. People, 550 SCRA 132, March 28, 2008
Nachura, J. | GR 157643

FACTS:
Gossip Tabloid, where the petitioner is the publisher whereas Bogs Togas is the
editor-in-chief, released an article regarding Annabelle Ram and her evading conviction
of estafa case from the US and how Annabelle Rama wasted their fortune from selling
cookware through gambling, how Annabelle Rma used the money of her fellow
Filipinos for her own gain.
RTC found the petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel. The petitioner and Tugas
raised teh case to the CA, to which the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but
acquitted Tugas due to non- participation. Then, the case is raised to the SC.

ISSUE:
 WON the petitioner and Tugas are guilty of libel based on the article written by
the petitioner.
RULING:
Yes, the petitioner and Tugas are guilty of libel. The petitioner as the ‘publisher’
and the ‘president’ and chairperson’ of the Gossip Tabloid, she had full control of
making and publishing the article, thus her excuse of lack of consent, knowledge or
participation in the release of the article is invalid and nothing but lies; Tugas, however,
is also found guilty due to his involvement in the publishing of the article as he was
editor-in-chief, even if he did not write the article, the meer fact that he was part of the
publication is enough to condemn him. Aside from Article 355 and 360 of RPC which
states the criminal liability in libelous acts, it is noteworthy to include a phrase from the
case of U.S. v. Taylor which states that: “every author, editor, or proprietor of any book,
newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words
contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if
he were the author of the same.” Thus, the petitioner is guilty of libel, although Tugas is
acquitted and the SC cannot take this back.

~~~
Bonifacio vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, G.R. No. 184800, May 05, 2010
Carpio Morales, J.

FACTS:
Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) through their website,
published articles with derogatory statements and allegedly false accusations against
the Yuchengco Family, the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) and Malayan
Insurance Co.,Inc.
Gimenez, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family,filed 13 counts of libel against
PEPCI. The court found that the case of libel against PEPCI is a probable cause, but
PEPCI argued that ‘internet libel’ was non-existent and they could not be charged with
libel under Article 353 of RPC. The accused filed a Motion to Quash the Information on
the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; internet libel was non-
existent; and no designation of offense charged.
Makati RTC granted the motion and quashed the information, but the
prosecution filed for Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the information
merely needed formal amendment, which was granted. Petitioners moved to quash the
information but was not granted as the prosecution accessed the internet-published
article.

ISSUE:
WON there is a grave abuse of discretion attended by the public respondent’s
admission of the Amended Information.

RULING:
Yes, there is a grave abuse of discretion. In Macasaet, the case of Agbayani v.
Sayo, lays out the places wherein libel cases may be tried: 1) where the complainant
actually resides at the time of the offense, or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was
printed and first published. The mere translation of ‘first published’ and ‘accessed’ by
the Makati RTC poses great disadvantage to the accused and would abandon the
Agbayani ruling and would open flood gates to the libel suit being filed in all other
locations where the website was accessed or capable of being accessed. Thus, the Makati
RTC has a grave abuse of discretion in the admission of the amended information.

~~~
Spouses Isidro Dulay vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215132, September 13, 2021
Hernando, J.

FACTS:
Sps. Dulos expressed interest in purchasing property from Sps. Dulay, agreeing
to buy after inspecting it. They agreed that Sps. Dulos would receive the property title
upon payment of half the purchase price. Despite reaching 707k php in payments, no
title was given, revealing discrepancies in ownership details. Sps. Dulos ceased
payments. Petitioners, claiming ownership through donation, couldn't provide the title
due to pending transfer. They argued Isidro Dular's adoption by Maria Dulay made
him the rightful owner. The court found the petitioners guilty of Estafa under Article
315 (2)(a) of RPC, a decision affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners are guilty of the Crime of Estafa when private complainants
were aware that the subject property was not in their names at the time of transaction.
RULING:
Yes, the petitioners are guilty of Estafa. According to Article 315 (2)(a) of the
RPC: Swindling or Estafa is done by any person who makes false pretenses and
fraudulent misrepresentations as done by the petitioners—-the untruthful claims that
they own the subject property, the processing of the TCT, that they are the ones
registered in the TCT—- among others. The petitioners falsely presented themselves as
Sps. Dulos—-the owner of the subject property— and the reconstitution of the title.
Thus, the petitioners are guilty of Estafa.

~~~
People of the Philippines vs. Perlita Urquico, G.R. No. 238910, July 20, 2022
Hernando, J.:

FACTS:
Fhey (Urqiuco), and Boyet (Villavicencio) are operating under Mheyman
Manpower Agency (MMA)---recruiting people for overseas work. They are in
cooperation with Lathea (accused-appellant) who posed as the one handling the
overseas recruits. They had a series of transactions involving money with at least 31
individuals (5 giving their testimonies) who were looking for employment abroad.
Galendez, Lozano, Lopez, Calma and Merrera all had interactions with the accused and
all suffered the same fate of not being able to go to Cyprus for work despite paying all
fees.
They all filed instant complaints against the accused, but Lathea Contended that
she never knew the co-accused and the private complainants, that she is not familiar
with MMA nor promised any employment abroad to the private complainant.
The RTC ruled the accused-appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment and 4 counts
of Estafa. CA reaffirmed the ruling of RTC with modifications.
ISSUE:
WON the accused-appellant is guilty of Illegal Recruitment and 4 counts of
Estafa.

RULING:
Yes, the accused-appellant is guilty of such crimes. In Illegal Recruitment, the
prosecution has established the fact that the accused-appellant is guilty of such as the
elements are fulfilled: 1) undertook any recruitment activity; 2) does not have a license
or authority to recruit; 3) against 3 or more persons [group or individual. The same with
the case of Estafa as all elements were present: 1) false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; 2) [1] is executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud; 3) relied on the false pretense, act or means, how was induced to part with his
money or property; and 4) the offended party suffered damage. With all the elements
present and established, the accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

~~~
Julie S. Sumbila vs. Matrix Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015
Villarama, JR., J.

FACTS:
The petitioner obtained a cash loan from Matrix Finance Corporation
(respondent) and as partial payment of her loan, issued Philippine Business Bank Check
Nos. 0032863 - 0032868— 6 checks with the uniform value of 6,667php each. However,
upon maturity, all 6 checks were dishonored on the ground that they were drawn
against a closed account. Petitioner violet BP 22 upon her refusal to heed the demand
letter of payment to the respondent.
MeTC found the petitioner criminally and civilly liable for the issuance of 6
rubber checks, the penalty of fine amounting to 80k php (for each count of violation to
BP 22 involving a check with face value of 6,667 php). Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to MeTC but was denied, also filed a Notice of Appeal but was also
denied.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari to the Makati RTCbut was dismissed
due to MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion denying the Notice of Appeal.
A Motion for Recon was filed again but was dismissed. A petition for review was raised
to the CA but was denied too.

ISSUE:
WON the penalty imposed in the MeTC decision dated Jan. 14, 2009, which is
already final and executory, may still be modified.

RULING:
 Yes, the decision, even if final and executory, may still be modified. The
petitioner does not dispute the decision that she is guilty for the 6 counts of violation of
BP 22, but the excessive range of penalty imposed against her. Petitioner argued that the
maximum penalty of fine to her— accordion to BP22—is double the amount of the face
value of the dishonored check (13,334 php). The penalty fine imposed on her by the
MeTC which is 80k php is 11 times excessive than the face value of the check. Thus, the
petitioner does not question the decision but the excessive penalty fine imposed against
her, which is meritorious.

~~~
Maria Nympha Mandagan vs. Jose Valero Corporation, G.R. No. 215118, June 19, 2019
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
The petitioner was convicted of crime violating BP 22 by MeTC. Mandagan had a
client named Mrs. Rosie V. Gutierrez, who was the company director of JMV Corp. had
an arrangement that Gutierrez will use JMV’s name for a car loan and that after full
payment, the petitioner would then buy the car from JMV. JMV entered an agreement
with BPI. The petitioner gave 34 checks with a value of 12,796 php (monthly). 14 checks
were deposited and honored (179,144 php) while 11 were dishonored for insufficient
funds or accounts closed. JMV Treasury Head reminded the petitioner of her
obligations and she responded by requesting a photocopy of the dishonored checks and
will replace them upon receiving the photocopies.
The petitioner ignored when JMV demanded the payment of the money with
interest or the return of the vehicle with depreciation, thus JMV filed a legal action for
violating BP 22. MeTC ruled in favor of JMV, while RTC reversed due to the demand
letter not actually being received by the petitioner. CA reversed the acquittal and
affirmed the decision of MeTC.

ISSUE:
WON the CA committed reversible error in annulling the Decision by RTC.

RULING:
 Yes, the CA committed reversible error. The judgment of acquittal is immediately
final and unappealable, and regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness, the case
cannot be revisited again and reverse the acquittal as such will violet the accused’s
constitutionally-enshrined right against prosecution if the same would place him under
double jeopardy. In the case of the accused, it is stated under BP 22— as its second
element— that the state should present the giving of a written notice of the dishonor to
the drawer; with no mention of the receipt of demand letter or the agreement being in
writing, nothing can be used against the accused. Thus, the accused is acquitted of her
crime of violating BP 22.

~~~
Leonora Rimando vs. Sps. Winston And Elenita Aldaba, G.R. No. 203583, October 13,
2014
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:

FACTS:
Rimando, a friend of Sps. Aldaba, convinced them to invest 500k php in her
business. Sps. Aldaba agreed and provided a check, and in return, Rimando issued
three post-dated checks and had them sign an investment contract with Multitel
International Corp. However, the post-dated checks bounced due to insufficient funds,
leading to an estafa complaint against Rimando. Rimando denied their friendship and
her involvement, stating that she referred Sps. Aldaba to Multitel's manager for the
investment. She claimed the post-dated checks were temporary while awaiting a check
from Multitel. Sps. Aldaba filed a BP 22 case against Rimando, resulting in acquittal due
to reasonable doubt. The RTC acquitted Rimando of estafa but held her liable for the
500k php. Rimando argued in the CA that her BP 22 case acquittal should absolve her
from civil liability in the estafa case.

ISSUE:
WONthe CA correctly upheld Rimand’s civil liability in the estafa case despite
her acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in the BP22 cases.

RULING:
 No, the petitioner is still civilly liable in the estafa case. Rimando's acquittal in
the estafa case doesn't absolve her from civil liability to Sps. Aldaba. The legal principle
holds that an acquittal doesn't necessarily extinguish civil liability. Civil liability can
persist even if the criminal charges are acquitted under certain conditions: (a) if the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, (b) the court declares only civil liability, and (c)
the civil liability isn't based on the acquitted crime. In this case, Rimando's civil liability
doesn't stem from the estafa charge, but from acting as an accommodation party for
Multitel, making her directly liable for a check. Rimando's acquittal in BP 22 cases
doesn't affect the estafa case since they involve distinct causes of action, allowing
separate proceedings for both criminal and civil aspects.

~~~
People of the Philippines vs. Cresencia C. Reyes, G.R. No. 101127-31, November 18,
1993
Cruz, J.:

FACTS:
Reyes requested Garcia for the delivery of rice as Reyes had no more stock to sell.
Garcia refused at first but agreed on the condition that Reyes first make a purchase
order, pay 50% upon delivery and the rest be paid thru postdated check. 6 checks were
drawn against the Bank of Philippine Islands at its Espana Branch. 3 were made good
but the other 3 were dishonored due to insufficient funds. Garcia informed Reyed of
this and the latter promised to pay the total value, but was never replaced with good
checks or with cash.
Thus, the violation of BP 22f or 3 counts and 2 counts of Estafa. Reyes stated that
she would file a demurrer to evidence but failed to do so, hence she is convicted for
imprisonment of 22 years.

ISSUE:
WON Reyes is criminally liable under BP 22.
RULING:
Yes, the accused can be held accountable for a criminal offense under BP 22. The
underlying principle of BP 22 aims to prevent checks from becoming worthless and to
discourage the issuance of bounced checks. While Reyes contends that a check
primarily acts as a safeguard for payment, BP 22 contradicts this assertion. Whether a
check is used to settle a debt or to guarantee an obligation, Reyes cannot evade her
breach of BP 22. Consequently, Reyes bears criminal liability in accordance with BP 22.

~~~~
Iluminada Batac vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191622, June 06, 2018
Martires, J.:

FACTS:
Batac allegedly went to Frias’ Store to have her checks rediscounted. Upon
Batac’s assurance, Frias was persuaded and bought a total of 14 checks. On the due
dates, the checks were returned for the reason ‘Account Closed’. Despite demand and
after the lapse of 5 days to make the payment, Batac failed to do so prompting Frias to
file a case for estafa. Batac argued that she is not to be convicted of estafa but of the
violation of BP 22 due to the bouncing checks.

ISSUE:
WON Batac can only be held liable for violation of BP 22.

RULING:
No, the accused is liable of Estafa and not of the violation of BP 22. Differences
exist between estafa and BP 22, including: (1) BP 22 convictions can occur even if a
check is issued for a preexisting obligation, whereas this negates estafa liability under
Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code; (2) distinct penalties are assigned to each
offense; (3) estafa pertains to property crime, while BP 22 impacts the public interest
and the banking system; (4) Article 315 violations are mala in se, whereas BP 22
violations are mala prohibita. Batac's attempts to challenge Frias' testimony were
unsuccessful, as Batac's own admissions and unrefuted evidence validated the deceit
and harm suffered by Frias.