Consti 1 Cases - Page 1

Outline in Constitutional Law I
Atty. Roderick Villostas
A. Nature of the Constitution

1. Definition
2. Purpose
3. Classification
4. Qualities of a good written Constitution
5. Essential parts of a written Constitution
6. Interpretation/Construction of the Constitution
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Suplico,
Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in
form,” but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance.
On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives
the
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the
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution
Facts:
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On June 2, 2003,
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but
voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance.
On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated
by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section
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5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes. To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to
the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule
of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter
it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted
in accordance with the intent of its framers.
A fool proof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind
the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to
that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is
to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. While it
is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when
other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear.
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Conclusion:
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5)
of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred
to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October
23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991
FACTS:
The petitioner seeks for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987 on grounds that The President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure as provided in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.

The respondent interpreted that Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7 is “reasonably valid and
constitutionally firm,” and that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73,
series of 1987 is consequently constitutional.

According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3,
par.(2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council byvirtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. The petitioner insisted that because e of the phrase
“unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be
expressly provided in the Constitution.

Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B on the Civil
Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said
exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.

Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon Aquino is unconstitutional as assailed
in Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: Yes.
Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The President, Vice -President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure”. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. This being the case, the qualifying phrase “unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad
exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying
phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and
purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or
employment in the government during their tenure.
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is
to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle
and nugatory.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must
be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must
be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is
to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. 21 The phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances
cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2)
and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
7. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
Facts:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, Respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding shares of the Manila Hotel. There were two entities who
participated in the bidding: Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel (MHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to
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buy the shares at ₱ 41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the shares at ₱
44.00 per share. Eventually, MHC matched the bid price of Renong Berhad at ₱ 44.00 per share. MHC even
sent a manager’s check to GSIS which the latter refused. Apprehensive about the GSIS’ refusal, MHC filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court.
MHC invokes Paragraph 2, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (commonly known as the
“Filipino First Policy”) where it states that in grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. In the same vein,
MHC submits that Manila Hotel has become a part of the national patrimony for its importance in the
national Filipino heritage. Also, the ownership of shares by the GSIS shows that they are engaged in the hotel
business, which makes them part of the national economy. Thus, the aforementioned constitutional provision
can be invoked. Further, MHC should be considered the preferred bidder since the bidding rules provide that
the shares must be awarded to qualified bidders in case the highest bidder cannot be awarded the same,
provided that the qualified bidders matched the highest bid.
On the other hand, GSIS maintains that Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution cannot be invoked
because it is not self-executing and would require an implementing legislation. Granting that the said
provision is self-executing, the Manila Hotel cannot be considered a part of the national patrimony because it
only refers to lands of public domain, waters, minerals, etc. Further, granting that Manila Hotel is part of the
national patrimony, GSIS is not selling its land or the building, but its shares of ownership.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution may be invoked as a self-executing
provision.
2. Whether or not Manila Hotel can be considered part of the national patrimony in order for the
aforementioned provision to be applicable.
Rulings:
1. Yes. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force
and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation,
it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
While the Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) may be couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-
self-executing, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as it is consistent with the Constitution.
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The SC remarked that Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
The SC added further that there is a presumption that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing and minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature
of constitutional provisions.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. However, a provision which is complete and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
2. Yes. Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an
earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its
power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it
has become a part of the national patrimony. The national patrimony includes the national resources
of the Philippines, which necessarily includes those which are considered cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. Since, Manila Hotel itself has become a landmark of many events in the Philippine history,
with its existence impressed with public interest.
Since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which
is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of
respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered
by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
Hence, since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part
of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of
price per share.
B. Constitutional History
1. Malolos Constitution
2. American Regime and Organic Acts
3. 1935 Constitution
4. Japanese Occupation
5. 1973 Constitution
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. L-36142, March 31, 1973
Facts:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite
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cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the
provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.
This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a
class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated.
Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new
constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including
Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify
the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order,
decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question,
and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified
validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification)
by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.
HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new
constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution.
It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying
the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we
patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications
and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be
separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must
be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void.
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Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally
or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites.
This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the
Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and
furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit
judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the
COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73.
The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of
the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X
of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as
amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged
plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the
revised Constitution.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places
COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC
in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102.
Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor
the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens'
assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to
my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of
Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive
Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed
Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do
not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly
assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers.
The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to
the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards
Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or
instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto,
amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and
inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or
acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same
refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses,
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concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the
President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the
1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given
due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in
by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935
Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed
Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and
XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such
plebiscite.
Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it
is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to
declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
*** other case digest
Issues:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 involves a justiciable or political
question
2. Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified to said Art. XV of the1935
Constitution
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution aforementioned been approved by a majority of the people
in Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held throughout the Philippines.
4. Whether or not the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution.
5. Whether or not the parties are entitled to any relief
Ruling:
The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when thecrucial question of
whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court(Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar,
Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant therelief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution
First Issue
On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,Fernando,
Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation
No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote
squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified
his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into
the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court
should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both
factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices
Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond
the ambit of judicial inquiry."
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Second Issue
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,Fernando, Teehankee and
myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which
provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and
participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been
validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the
meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the
votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however,
of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the
majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual
form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox
legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they
did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what
counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the
1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified.
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view
there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.
Third Issue
On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no
majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution. "Two (2) members
of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has
even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance
or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law
Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the
effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the
people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such
doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what
is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question.
Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of
martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no
means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution."
Fourth Issue
On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition . Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the
strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and
ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore
beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable ."Four (4) members of the Court, namely,
Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due
course to the petitions.
Fifth Issue
11
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is
in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the
third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not
accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that
the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are
not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro,Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all
the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. It is so ordered
Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976
FACTS:
President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies (―Barangay) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of his present powers.
Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, amending P.D. 991 by declaring the provisions of P.D. 229 applicable as to
the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in barangays for the national referendum-plebiscite of October
16, 1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued, declaring therein that the question of the continuance of martial law will
be submitted for referendum at the same time as the submission of his (President) proposed amendments to
the Constitution through a plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin the COMELEC
from holding and conducting said Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitution, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution; hence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no legal basis.
Petitioner Guzman filed another action asserting that the power to propose amendments to or revision of
the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under
sec.16, Art. XVII of the Constitution.
A similar action was instituted by petitioners Gonzales and Salapantan arguing that even granting him
legislative powers under the martial law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, and that a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of
time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift martial law, the President need not consult the
people via referendum. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution,
which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General, in his comment for respondent COMELEC, maintains that Petitioners have no
standing to sue and that the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the court. At this
state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power.
The referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUES:
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees 991, 1031, and 1033 political or
judicial?
12
2. Does the President possess the power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the
required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposal, in the absence of
an interim National Assembly?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefore
a sufficient and proper submission?
HELD:
1. YES. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the
domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification,
raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate
the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments of the constitution resides in the interim National
Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution).
The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself
into a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and
submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments,
written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the
force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is
plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of
the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty,
executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten
Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in the
Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is
vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its
limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent
President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or
to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that
power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found,
the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or
the authority assumed was valid or not.
2. YES. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the Interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This
is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally
constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the Interim Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and
Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.
Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments
without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to
13
undertake the amending process would leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the
powers of the State a destructive vacuum. After all, the constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people.
3. YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall
be held, but simply states that ―it shall be held not later than 3 months after the approval of such
amendment or revision. The period from September 21 to October 16, or a period of three weeks is not too
short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The issues are not new. They are
the issues of the day, and the people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four
years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding,
the contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional
amendments.
C. 1987 Constitution
Lawyer’s League for a Better Philippines v. Corazon Aquino, G.R. No.73748, May 22, 1986
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 on February 25, 1986 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of
the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines."
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD: Yes.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge.
The Supreme Court further held that:
 The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
 It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
 The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
14
FACTS:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a petition for forfeiture
under RA 1379 against Ramas. Upon assumption to office following the EDSA Revolution,
President Corazon C. Aquino issued EO №1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Through Chairman Jovito R.
Salonga, PCGG created an Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired.
The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent
Major General Josephus Q. Ramas, and issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendations on his unexplained wealth. Evidence in the record showed that respondent
is the owner of a house and lot located in Quezon City which value may be estimated
modestly at P 700,000.00, and also a house and lot in Cebu City. The raiding team
confiscated some equipment/items and communication facilities found in the premises of
Elizabeth Dimaano, and money in the amount of P2,870,000, and $50,000 in the house of
Elizabeth Dimaano. The said items and facilities could not be in her possession if not given
for her use by the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Josephus Ramas. The said
money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There
was an intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth.
FACTS:
retired.
The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent
Major General Josephus Q. Ramas, and issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendations on his unexplained wealth. Evidence in the record showed that respondent
is the owner of a house and lot located in Quezon City which value may be estimated
modestly at P 700,000.00, and also a house and lot in Cebu City. The raiding team
confiscated some equipment/items and communication facilities found in the premises of
Elizabeth Dimaano, and money in the amount of P2,870,000, and $50,000 in the house of
Elizabeth Dimaano. The said items and facilities could not be in her possession if not given
for her use by the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Josephus Ramas. The said
money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There
was an intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth.
retired.
FACTS:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a petition for forfeiture under RA 1379
15
against Ramas. Upon assumption to office following the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon C. Aquino
issued EO No l creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover all ill-gotten
wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
Through Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, PCGG created an Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate
reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired.
The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas, and issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendations on his unexplained
wealth. Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located in Quezon
City which value may be estimated modestlv at P 700.000.00. and also a house and lot in Cebu City. The
raiding team confiscated some equipment/items and communication facilities found in the premises of
Elizabeth Dimaano, and money in the amount of P2.870.000, and $50,000 in the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano.
The said items and facilities could not be in her possession if not given for her use by the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, Josephus Ramas. The said money was never declared in the Statement of
Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of these money because
these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth.
The Board finds that a prima facie (sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or
rebutted) case exists against respondents for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. It was recommended that
Maj. Gen. Ramas be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act', and RA 1379, as
amended, otherwise known as «The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property Thus, the PCGG
filed a petition for forfeiture under RA 1379 against Ramas.
SolGen Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines
("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG as plaintiff, and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint
impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano as co-defendant. The Amended Complaint prayed for the forfeiture of
respondents' properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint, and contended that his property consisted only of a
residential house at Quezon City valued at P700,000 which was not out of proportion to his salary and other
legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City, and the cash, communications
equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano. Dimaano filed her own Answer to the
Amended Complaint, admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-
November 1978 only and claimed ownership of the monies, communications and equipment, jewelry and
land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team. The Sandiganbayan noted that
petitioner has already delayed the case for over a vear because of its postponements. And during the trial on
March 1990, the petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence. The Sandigannbayan reset
the trial to May 1990 and
warned the petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents Ramas and Dimaano then filed their motion to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino, in
which the court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
military officers by reason of mere position held without showing that they are "subordinates" of former
President Marcos.
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision dismissing the Amended Complaint. Counterclaims are likewise
dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land
16
titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano. The records of this case are hereby amended and referred to
the Hon: Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under RA No1379. This case is
also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of an tax liability of
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano. The petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
1. The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino which involve the same issues.
2. No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas
and Dimaano.
3. The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
4. There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
Hence this appeal, petitioner wants the Supreme Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted
the search and seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSArevolution."so Petitioner
argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will
of the Filipino people." Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents' exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning
2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the
Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the
government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against
her since at that time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
ISSUES:
4. whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective takeover of power by the revolutionary government
following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the
adoption of the Provisional Constitution); NO
(2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ('Declaration") remained in effect
during the interregnum. YES
HELD:
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.
5. The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February1986. As succinctly stated in President
Aquino's Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the
provisions of the1973 Constitution." The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law
higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a
person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
17
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility or the
State's good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the
Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence. The Declaration, to which the
Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being
only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State.« Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights, of individuals under the Declaration.
6. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the
Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court
considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant.
The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way
it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the State's good faith compliance with its treat obligations under international law.
It is obvious from the testimony of raiding team that the warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly
describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no
legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search
and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items. Petition dismissed.
Sandiganbayan judgement affirmed.
De Leon v. Esguerra, G. R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987
FACTS:
In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and
the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986
but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the
OIC Governor was “by authority of the Minister of Local Government.”
Also on February 8, 1987, Esguerra signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating
respondents Remigio M. Tigas, et al., as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
Petitioners maintain that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Esguerra no longer has the authority
to replace them and to designate their successors.
However, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue
in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
18
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year
from February 25, 1986.
ISSUE:
Whether the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year
period which ended on February 25, 1987.
HELD:
NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline under the Provisional
Constitution, the same must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution reading: ―This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, Section 2, Article III of
the Provisional Constitution could not be relied on by the respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum dated
February 8, 1987 by the respondent OIC Governor could no longer have any legal force and effect.
The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The canvass of the votes thereafter is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite, and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino
people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.
D. Amendment
1. Amendment vs. Revision
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
Facts:
Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a ―Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People‘s amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Art. XVII
of the 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The proposed amendments
consist of the submission of this proposition to the people—―Do you approve the lifting of the term limits
of all elective officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of Art.VI, Section 4 of Art. VII and Section
8 of Art. X of the Philippine Constitution?
The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the notice of hearing and
thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared
as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco moved to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the
initiatory party cognizable by the COMELEC.
Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents COMELEC and Delfin‘s Petition to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under sec.2 of Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioners raise the following arguments:
1. The constitutional provision on people‘s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law
to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. It
only provides for the effectivity of the law after the publication in print media indicating that the Act covers
19
only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter takes effect only upon ratification and not
after publication.
3. COMELEC Resolution No.2300, adopted on January 16, 1991 to govern the ―conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative or
amendments to the Constitution are concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulation for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only the Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
4. The people‘s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, to the revision thereof. Extending or
lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision and is therefore outside the power of the people‘s initiative.
5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people‘s initiative, neither the COMELEC nor any other
department, agency or office of the government has realigned funds for the purpose.
The Supreme Court gave due course to this petition and granted the Motions for Intervention filed by
Petitioners-Intervenors DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco
ISSUES:
1.)Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws)
regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the
law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition
for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
RULINGS:
1.) R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT
SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This provision is not self-
executory. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides
for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right, which is the RA 6735.
20
R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. However, it is not in full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed
afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a
petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the Constitution sought
to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. The
argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is
"national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only
Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or
resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass.
2. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND

REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein
are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law
where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient
standard" tests.
3. The discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and
local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary, if not academic.
Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
FACTS:
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
(“Lambino Group”), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section
7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act (“RA 6735”).
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
21
three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article
VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article
XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due
publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the
voters’ ratification.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
HELD:
NO.
FIRST, the court declared that Lambino Group’s initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally
fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on his or
her behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If
so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the
millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Section2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text
of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that
the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative. In particular, the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a
petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and
Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the “petition x x
x as signatories.”
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures
in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can
impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
22
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their
proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – which the petition contained, or incorporated, by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments.
SECOND, the Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives.
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to
its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions
to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3
million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. Revision
broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in
our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions." 36 The
court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government
is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes
"change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." 38 A change in the nature
of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and
the system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely
an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on
the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
23
Constitution.40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of
powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of government.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment.
Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."
4. Constituent vs. Legislative Power
Imbong v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L32432, September 11, 1970
FACTS:
Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both interested in running as candidates in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, impugning the constitutionality of
RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as candidates.
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No.2, which called for the Constitutional
Convention to propose Constitutional amendments. After its adoption, Congress, acting as a legislative body,
enacted R.A. 4914 implementing said resolution, restating entirely the provisions of said resolution.
Thereafter, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the
Resolution No. 2 by providing that ―xxx any other details relating to the specific apportionment of
delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of the Constitutional Convention shall be
embodied in an implementing legislation xxx
Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and
expressly repealing R.A. 4914.
ISSUE:
May Congress in acting as a legislative body enact R.A.6132 to implement the resolution passed by it in its
capacity as a Constituent Assembly?
HELD:
YES. The Court declared that while the authority to call a Constitutional Convention is vested by the
Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly, the power to enact the
implementing details or specifics of the general law does not exclusively pertain to Congress, the Congress in
exercising its comprehensive legislative power (not as a Constitutional Assembly) may pass the necessary
implementing law providing for the details of the Constitutional Conventions, such as the number,
qualification, and compensation of its member.
The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132 are as
follows:
 Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution has

authority to propose constitutional amendments or call a convention for the purpose by ¾ votes of
each house in joint session assembled but voting separately.
24
 Such grant includes all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power by
necessary implication.
 Implementing details are within the authority of the Congress not only as a Constituent Assembly
but also in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power which encompasses all matters not
expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of
legislative action so long as it does not contravene any provision of the Constitution; and
 Congress as a legislative body may thus enact necessary implementing legislation to fill in the
gaps, which Congress as a Constituent Assembly has omitted.
5. Steps in the amendatory process
Occena v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 56350, April 2, 1981
Facts:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings is against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of landfor residential purposes was approved by the
vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealingwith the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the
National Assembly by avote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the
Articleon the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention) proposing constitutional
amendments. Petitioners urged that the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far
beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as successor of the Interim
National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and not to amend.
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers.
The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the
fundamental law. The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 and March 12, 1981.
Issues:
WON the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments? If yes, what is the extent of the
changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard
required for a proper submission.
Held:
Yes. The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision
in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: “The Interim Batasang Pambansa
shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges,
and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members
thereof.” One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. Article XVII, Section 15 of the
1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to
propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be
ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by
virtue Of such impotence its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the
amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.
AS TO EXTENT OF THE CHANGES THAT MAY BE INTRODUCED, The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law
because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether
25
the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the
moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."
AS TO THE NUMBER OF VOTES, The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can

propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well
when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a
requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this
case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover,
even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was
obtained.
AS TO THE REQUISITE STANDARD FOR A PROPER SUBMISSION, the question may be viewed not
only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the
standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly
be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes.
AS TO THE PERIOD, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no
ambiguity to the applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision." The three resolutions were approved by
the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day
period provided by the Constitution. Thus any argument to the contrary is unavailing.
Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967
Facts:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3 – i.e.to
(RBH1)increase the seats of the Lower House from 120 to 180; (RBH2) to convoke a Constitutional
Convention of 1971;and (RBH3) to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can become
delegates themselves to the Convention.
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for
the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held
on the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned
by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no
proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the
general election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with their
proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents
interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political
question
Issues:
1. WON Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) Nos. 1 and 3 are valid.
2. Won the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
26
Held.
1. NO. It is urged that said resolutions are null and void because:
a.) The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution
calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
Since the report of the Director of the Census on the last enumeration was submitted to the President
on November 30, 1960, it follows that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not expire
until 1963, or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question, therefore, that the
Senate and the House of Representatives organized or constituted on December 30, 1961, were de
jure bodies, and that the Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners
herein, upon expiration of said period of three years, or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its
Members, or at least, those of the House of Representatives, became illegal holder of their respective
offices, and were de facto officers.
b.) Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose — amendments or call a convention
therefore but may not avail of both — that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention
— at the same time;
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either propose amendments to
the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it can not do both, at the same time. This
theory is based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the
disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances — and
none has brought to our attention — supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact,
the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or
context of the law warrants it.
c.) The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for
ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, in which officers of the national
and local governments — such as the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 —
will be chosen;
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a
general, election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been
submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best
to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed
amendments for ratification in general elections.
d.) The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment
shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions — which,
allegedly, do not exist — as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of
the nature and implications of said amendments.
27
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a
constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967,
depends — in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case,
constitute the minority — upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly
apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is — under R. B. H.
No. 1 — the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180,
and — under R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without
forfeiting their seats in Congress. We — who constitute the minority — believe that Republic Act No.
4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
2. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well
as the powerto propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant
of legislative powers toCongress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress.
On the contrary, such powersare inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a
republican state. That being, whenCongress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it
is not actually doing so as Congress; butrather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such
act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislativeact, it is reviewable by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not suchact of the constituent
assembly is within constitutional limitations.
Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1970
FACTS:
A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines,
in which, the delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of resolutions and the
implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1,
amending section one of article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines to lower the voting age to 18. Said
resolution also provided in its Section 3 that the partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification
for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the
entire Constitution.
The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions
thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws as far as they are in
contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution. Under the said provision, the proposed amendment
in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.
ISSUE:
WON the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention constitutional.
HELD:
NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and
resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite, as well as the resolution
of the respondent COMELEC complying therewith are null and void.
The Court is of the opinion that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and
separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention’s Organic
Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the condition in
Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one “election” or plebiscite for the ratification of all the
28
amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the
proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same
should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed
by this present Convention.
Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed
frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be
required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to
enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on
the proposed amendment. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the
Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing
whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the
Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may
divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on
the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the
existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed
plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions,
which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea? Clearly, there is
improper submission.
6. Judicial Review of Amendments
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. L-36142, March 31, 1973
(refer back to page 6)
Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976
(Refer to page 10)
29

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Outline in Constitutional Law I

Atty. Roderick Villostas

A. Nature of the Constitution

Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

7. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. L-36142, March 31, 1973

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void.

*** other case digest

Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

where only the people are the judge.

The Supreme Court further held that:

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003

De Leon v. Esguerra, G. R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987

Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

2. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND

Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

4. Constituent vs. Legislative Power

Imbong v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L32432, September 11, 1970

 Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution has

5. Steps in the amendatory process

Occena v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 56350, April 2, 1981

AS TO THE NUMBER OF VOTES, The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can

Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967

Article XV of the Constitution provides:

Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1970

6. Judicial Review of Amendments

Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. L-36142, March 31, 1973

(refer back to page 6)

Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976

(Refer to page 10)

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