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CHAPTER 2
The purpose of this chapter is to explain what an exchange rate is and how it is determined in a freely-
floating exchange rate regime, that is, in the absence of government intervention. This is done using a
simple two-country model. Because of its pervasiveness, we also examine the different forms and
consequences of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange markets. Since an exchange rate can be
considered as the relative price of two financial assets, the chapter discusses the asset market model of
currencies and the role of expectations in exchange rate determination. A separate section discusses the real
changes in a nation's economy that cause exchange rate changes.
KEY POINTS
1. Absent government intervention, exchange rates respond to the forces of supply and demand,
which, in turn, depend on relative inflation rates, interest rates, and GNP growth rates.
2. Monetary policy is crucial. If the central bank expands the money supply at a faster rate than
money demand, the purchasing power of money declines both at home (inflation) and abroad
(currency depreciation).
3. The healthier the economy is, the stronger the currency is likely to be.
4. Exchange rates are crucially affected by expectations of future exchange rate changes, which
depend on forecasts of future economic and political conditions.
6. A critical factor which helps explain the volatility of exchange rates is that with a fiat money
there is no anchor to a currency's value, nothing around which beliefs can coalesce. Since
people are unsure about what to expect, any new piece of information can dramatically alter
their beliefs. Thus, if the underlying domestic economic policies are unstable, exchange rates
will be volatile as traders react to new information.
ANSWER. The case suggests several causes of the Asian currency crisis. First was the loss of export
competitiveness. A number of Asian countries had tied their currencies to the dollar, so the dramatic
appreciation of the dollar against the yen, Deutsche mark and other currencies made their exports were less
price competitive. Their competitiveness problem was greatly exacerbated by the fact that during this
period, the Chinese yuan depreciated by about 25% against the dollar. A second contributing factor to
Asia’s financial problems was moral hazard–the tendency to incur risks that one is protected against.
Specifically, most Asian banks and finance companies operated with implicit or explicit government
guarantees. When combined with poor regulation, these guarantees distorted investment decisions,
encouraging financial institutions to fund risky projects in the expectation that the banks would enjoy any
profits, while sticking the government with any losses. Without market discipline or risk-based bank
lending, the result was overinvestment–financed by vast quantities of debt–and inflated prices of assets in
short supply, such as land. The Asian financial crisis then was touched off when local investors began
dumping their own currencies for dollars and foreign lenders refused to renew their loans to Asian
companies and banks.
ANSWER. Expectations were critical in causing the financial bubble and then popping it. Specifically, the
Asian financial bubble persisted as long as people believe the government can honor its implicit guarantee.
However, this guarantee brings with it the seeds of its own demise as inevitable glut of real estate and
excess production capacity leads to large amounts of nonperforming loans and widespread loan defaults.
When reality strikes, and investors realize that the government doesn't have the resources to bail out
everyone, asset values plummet and the bubble is burst. The decline in asset values triggers further loan
defaults, causing a loss of the confidence on which economic activity depends. Investors also worry that the
government will try to inflate its way out of its difficulty. The result is a self-reinforcing downward spiral
and capital flight. As foreign investors refuse to renew loans and begin to sell off shares of overvalued local
companies, capital flight accelerates and the local currency falls, increasing the cost of servicing foreign
debts. Local firms and banks scramble to buy foreign exchange before the currency falls further, putting
even more downward pressure on the exchange rate. This story explains why stock prices and currency
values declined together and why Asian financial institutions were especially hard hit. Moreover, this
process is likely to be contagious, as investors search for other countries with similar characteristics. When
such a country is found, everyone rushes for the exit simultaneously and another bubble is burst, another
currency is sunk. In the case of the Asian currency crisis, investors also realized that their loss of export
competitiveness gave the Asian central banks a mutual incentive to devalue their currencies to try to regain
their export competitiveness. According to one theory, recognizing these altered incentives, speculators
attacked the East Asian currencies almost simultaneously and forced a round of devaluations.
3. How did the appreciation of the U.S. dollar and depreciation of the yuan affect the timing and
magnitude of the Asian currency crisis?
ANSWER. Sooner or later, the moral hazard associated with implicit government guarantees of reckless
investments will result in a crisis. What dollar appreciation and yuan depreciation did was to speed up the
crisis. Specifically, the loss of export competitiveness slowed down Asian growth and caused utilization
rates–and profits–on huge investments in production capacity to plunge. It also gave the Asian central
banks a mutual incentive to devalue their currencies to try to regain their export competitiveness.
4. What is moral hazard and how did it help cause the Asian currency crisis?
ANSWER. As explained above, moral hazard is the tendency to incur risks that one is protected against. The
origin of the moral hazard faced by Asian countries were the implicit or explicit government guarantees
that most Asian banks and finance companies operated with. When combined with poor regulation, these
guarantees distorted investment decisions, encouraging financial institutions to fund risky projects in the
expectation that the banks would enjoy any profits, while sticking the government with any losses. Without
market discipline or risk-based bank lending, the result was overinvestment–financed by vast quantities of
debt–and inflated prices of assets in short supply, such as land. The Asian financial crisis then was touched
off when local investors began dumping their own currencies for dollars and foreign lenders refused to
renew their loans to Asian companies and banks.
5. Why did so many East Asian companies and banks borrow dollars, yen, and Deutsche marks instead of
their local currencies to finance their operations? What risks were they exposing themselves to?
ANSWER. East Asian banks and companies financed themselves with dollars, yen, and Deutsche marks–
some $275 billion worth, much of it short term–because dollar and other foreign currency loans carried
CHAPTER 2: THE DETERMINATION OF EXCHANGE RATES 3
lower interest rates than did their domestic currencies. The risk they were exposing themselves—a risk that
manifested itself—was that their local currencies would devalue against the borrowed foreign currencies,
making these foreign currency loans more expensive to pay back in terms of their local currencies. This
risk was also borne by the banks that made these foreign currency loans, since a company that goes
bankrupt because it cannot repay its loans will eventually pass its loan losses on to its lenders.
ANSWER. Argentina had suffered for decades from a vicious cycle of inflation and devaluation. The
currency board system was an attempt to break that cycle and help stimulate economic growth. It would
also ensure that the government could no longer print money to finance a budget deficit. By effectively
locking Argentina into the U.S. monetary system, the currency board system mandated by the
Convertibility Act had remarkable success in restoring confidence in the peso and providing an anchor for
inflation expectations.
ANSWER. The object of the currency board was to end the inflation-devaluation cycle that had plagued
Argentina for some 50 years. From that standpoint, the currency board succeeded. It spurred rapid
economic growth, led to a rock-solid currency, and ended hyperinflation. The peso was fixed at one dollar
and inflation plummeted, falling from more than 2,300% in 1990 to 170% in 1991 and 4% in 1994. By
1997, the inflation rate was 0.4%, among the lowest in the world. Argentine capital transferred overseas to
escape Argentina's hyperinflation began to come home. In response to the good economic news, stock
prices quintupled, in dollar terms, during the first year of the plan.
ANSWER. The downfall of Argentina’s currency board stems from a series of external shocks and internal
problems that were suffered by the Argentine economy and that the economy was unable to adapt to.
External shocks included falling prices for its agricultural commodities, the Mexican peso crisis in late
1994, the Asian currency crisis of 1997, and the Russian and Brazilian financial crises of 1998-1999. The
financial shocks led investors to reassess the risk of emerging markets and to withdraw their capital from
Argentina as well as the countries in crisis. The devaluation of the Brazilian real in early 1999–which
increased the cost of Argentine goods in Brazil and reduced the cost of Brazilian goods to Argentines–hurt
Argentina because of the strong trade ties between the two countries. Similarly, the strong appreciation of
the dollar in the late 1990s, made Argentina’s products less competitive, both at home and abroad, against
those of its trading partners whose currencies were not tied to the dollar. Internal problems revolved around
rigid labor laws that make it costly to lay off Argentine workers and excessive spending by the Argentine
government. In a decade that saw GDP rise 50%, public spending rose 90%. Initially, the growth in
government spending was funded by privatization proceeds. When privatization proceeds ran out, the
government turned to tax increases and heavy borrowing. The result was massive fiscal deficits, a rising
debt burden, high unemployment, economic stagnation, capital flights, and a restive population. Simply
put, Argentina’s bold currency experiment unraveled amidst political and economic chaos brought about by
the failure of Argentine politicians to rein in spending and to reform the country’s labor laws. In effect,
forced to choose between the economic liberalization and fiscal discipline that was necessary to save its
currency board and the failed economic policies of Peronism, Argentina ultimately chose the latter and
wound up with a disaster.
4. What lessons can we learn from the experience of Argentina’s currency board?
ANSWER. The most important lesson from Argentina’s failed currency board experiment is that exchange
rate arrangements are no substitute for good macroeconomic policy. The latter takes discipline and a
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You will light me home? That’s a dear fly! Your name is Firefly? What
a sweet name! But how fast you go! Please don’t dart so quick, because I
cannot follow; for my wings are very, oh! very tired. Slower, slower,
that’s a kind firefly! Now we go nicely on.
What will you take for your lamp? Won’t sell? But you will forget, I
hope, our morning conversation. Perhaps, though, so little a fly can’t
remember so long. You can remember? Then what a kind, forgiving
creature you are! I shall certainly speak well of you to my friends. Call
on me almost any time,—that is, almost any evening,—and we’ll go out
together. We have come a very long way, and should now be near home.
Yes, the air is so fragrant here, that I am sure we have nearly reached the
flower-garden. I smell the perfume quite plainly. We are passing over
mignonette; that is the breath of sweet-pea; now the bed of pinks is
beneath us; here must be the honeysuckle-bower; here is balm; here is
lavender; and here’s the smell of the damask-rose.
Now thanks and good-by, my friend. I shall need you no longer: the
fragrance will guide me to bed. Good-night, little fly!
I do think it is very strange, and say so, now he is out of hearing, that
such mean-looking little flies should have lamps to carry, while we
Butterflies, who would light up so beautifully, and are so much superior
to them, should be obliged to do without.
THE MAPLE-TREE’S CHILDREN.
Now I am going into the hall to see the Pilgrim relics, some of which
were brought over in “The Mayflower.”
On the wall of the ante-room hangs Lora Standish’s sampler, wrought
in silks of divers colors, bright enough two hundred and fifty years ago,
no doubt, though, alas! all faded now. Using again my dream eyes, I
behold the fair young girl, intent on learning “marking-stitch,” bending
over the canvas, counting the threads, winding bright silks; her cheeks as
bright as they. Little thinks she how many shall come centuries after to
view her work. Underneath the alphabet are stitched these lines, which
with my real eyes I read:—
The captain was polishing his sword, I said; and here it lies inside.
Need enough it has of polish now! And here is one of his great pewter
plates. Poor Lora Standish, with a pile of those to wash and to wipe and
to scour!
Whose spoon? “Elder Brewster’s,” the label says,—a dark iron spoon
with a rounded bowl (a bit nipped off the edge) and a short handle. A
spoon suggests “chowder;” and no doubt this one often carried that
delicious food to the lips of the elder: for what says the ballad?—
And, speaking of spoons, they used stout forks in those days. Here is
one a foot long, with a short handle, and two prongs very wide apart,—
certainly not made to eat peas with!
That inlaid cabinet on the upper shelf must have been a pretty thing in
its day. It belonged to Peregrine White, and came to him, so the label
says, from his mother,—just as likely as not a present to her from Mr.
White in their courting-days, and used to keep his love-letters in: who
knows? With my other pair I can see the rosy English girl sitting alone
by her cabinet. Its little drawers of letters are open, and with a smile and
a blush she reads over the old ones while awaiting the new. I wonder if
any fortune-teller ever told her that she would sail over the seas to dwell
in a wilderness, and that she would be the first New-England mother,—
the first bride too; for, after Mr. White’s death, she married Mr. Edward
Winslow, the third governor; and their wedding was the first one in the
colony. Yonder, among other portraits, hangs that of Mr. Winslow. On
the top of this relic-case is a flaxen wig worn by one of the Winslow
family, and underneath it is Mr. White’s ivory-headed cane.
What is this sealed up in a bottle? Apple-preserve, made from the
apples of a tree which Peregrine White planted. Think of apple-preserve
keeping so long!
On one of these shelves inside I see dingy old Bibles; also the
spectacles with which they were read, looking as if they could almost see
without any eyes behind them. There is an ancient Dutch Bible, with
brass studs and clasps, and an English one, open at the titlepage,
“Imprinted at London by Robert Barker, printer to the King’s most
excellent Majestie.”
And—is it possible? can this really be? yes, there it is in black and
white—John Alden’s Bible! O John! you young rogue, I’ve read in a
poem what you did!—made love to Priscilla Mullins, when Capt. Miles
Standish was going to ask her to be his second wife, and sent you to do
the errand for him. Naughty, naughty youth! But Priscilla knew pretty
well the feelings of your heart, John, and knew very well the feelings of
her own, or she would never have dared to ask that question, so famous
in story, “Why don’t you speak for yourself, John?” Mr. Longfellow has
told us all about your wedding; and how, when taking home the bride,
INDIAN DOLL.
CHARACTERS.
L C .F , little daughter of L C .M ,
her maid, an elderly person. E , a young girl in attendance upon
F .T , dressed as an old gypsy-man. T ’ W , dressed as
an old gypsy-woman. T ’ D P , dressed as a gypsy-girl.
T , a showman. A B F , old and gray. G and B ,
who dance the May-dance, and sing May-songs.
(Old couple sit in silence for a few moments, turning over the silver.)
M (thoughtfully). ’Tis deep water; but I sees through.
P (bending forward). Let’s hear. (W listens.)
M . Tomkins’s show draws all the crowd, missy among ’em.
P . Go on, dad.
M (rising). They two, missy and maid, stands agapin’ at it,—so.
(Imitates.) You creeps in between,—so. (Imitates.) I stays outside.
P . Yes, yes!
M . In the middle of it I gets myself knocked down outside, and
groans and roars, “Help, help! thieves! murder!”
W (eagerly). Then everybody’ll run.
M . Then everybody’ll run. Peg catches hold o’ little miss, runs her
off. I say, “I’ll take care of yer.” Neat job, hey? (Rubs hands.)
P (briskly). Then I’ll lend her some of my clothes, ’cause they’s
better for her, you know, an’ help her eat what’s in the buful basket; an’
she’ll be my little sister, an’ she’ll tramp with us (rises) an’ our merry,
merry crew. (Sings. Old couple join in chorus, and all keep time with feet
and hands.)
Oh! we’re a merry gypsy crew, Roaming all the country thro’,
Plenty to eat and little to do, Roaming thro’ the wildwood. Sing ri
fa la li
lu li oh! Plenty to eat and little to do, Roaming thro’ the
wildwood.