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Operating Systems 3rd Edition Deitel Solutions Manual

INSTRUCTOR’S MANUAL
FOR

OPERATING SYSTEMS, THIRD EDITION

DEITEL DEITEL CHOFFNES

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 Contents
1 Introduction to Operating Systems ............................................ 1

2 Hardware and Software Concepts ........................................... 6

3 Process Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4 Thread Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

5 Asynchronous Concurrent Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

6 Concurrent Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

7 Deadlock and Indefinite Postponement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

8 Processor Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

9 Real Memory Organization and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

10 Virtual Memory Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

11 Virtual Memory Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

12 Disk Performance Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

13 File and Database Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

i
Contents ii

14 Performance and Processor Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

15 Multiprocessor Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

16 Introduction to Networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

17 Introduction to Distributed Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

18 Distributed Systems and Web Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

19 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

20 Case Study: Linux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

21 Case Study: Windows XP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

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mentioned, to the British Government on 17 April 1934; the speech of
Foreign Minister Von Neurath, the defendant, to representatives of the
Berlin press, in which he commented on this French note, Number
Neurath-74 in my document book; finally, an excerpt from the speech of
the American delegate at the Disarmament Conference, Norman Davis,
of 29 May 1934. In these the sudden change in European politics which I
have just alluded to...
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give the number of that?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The last one, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Number Neurath-76.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; go on.
VON NEURATH: I think that before I answer this question, I might
perhaps comment on something else. The Prosecution showed me a
speech by Hitler on 23 September 1939 to the commanders of the Army,
in which he speaks of the political and organizational measures which
preceded the war.
THE PRESIDENT: You say that was on 23 September?
VON NEURATH: 23 September 1939. The Prosecution sees in the
mention of the withdrawal from the League of Nations and the
Disarmament Conference a sign of aggressive intentions which were
already in existence at that time, and reproaches me with this.
As I have repeatedly emphasized, up to 1937 there had never been
any talk at any time of any aggressive intentions or preparations for a
war of aggression. The speech mentioned by the Prosecution was made
by Hitler 6 years after these events and 18 months after my resignation
as Foreign Minister. It is clear that to a man like Hitler these events, at
such a moment, after the victorious termination of the Polish war,
appeared different from what they had actually been. These events,
however, cannot be judged afterwards, that is, before the date of the
speech, any more than German foreign policy can be judged today, but
they must be regarded from the point of view prevailing at the time at
which they took place.
And now in answer to your question: In my opinion the reasons lie,
first of all, more or less in the fact that the course of the preceding
diplomatic negotiations had shown that England and Italy no longer
stood unconditionally behind France and were no longer willing to
support France’s strictly antagonistic attitude toward the question of
equal rights for Germany. The same point of view was held by the
neutral states—Denmark, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland—in
a note addressed to the Disarmament Conference on 14 April 1934.
Therefore, at the time France apparently feared being isolated and thus
falling into the danger of not being able to maintain her refusal to
undergo any form of disarmament. I myself commented in detail on this
attitude on the part of France, from the German point of view, in my
afore-mentioned speech to the German press on 27 April 1934, I believe.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the further consequences
of this French note of 17 April, as far as the attitude of French foreign
policy was concerned?
VON NEURATH: Just a few days after this note the French Foreign
Minister, M. Louis Barthou, undertook a trip to the East, to Warsaw and
Prague. As was soon apparent, the purpose of this trip to Poland and
Czechoslovakia was to prepare the ground for a resumption of
diplomatic relations between these countries, and the other countries of
the so-called “Little Entente,” and the Soviet Union and thus to smooth
the way for the inclusion of Russia as a participant in European politics.
Barthou’s efforts were successful. Poland as well as Czechoslovakia
and Romania resumed diplomatic relations with Russia. On a second trip
Barthou was able to get the agreement of all the states of the Little
Entente to the Eastern pact proposed by France and Russia.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were not negotiations undertaken at
the same time for an Eastern pact which later also proved to be an
instrument directed against Germany?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I just mentioned it. An Eastern pact was
worked out and presented which we would have accepted, as far as the
basic principle was concerned, but which then came to naught because
we were supposed to undertake obligations which we could not keep,
namely an obligation to give aid in all cases of conflict which might arise
among the Eastern nations. We were in no position to do this, and thus
the Eastern pact came to naught.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: May I, in connection with the
statements just made, refer to three documents in my Document Book 3;
Number Neurath-72, an official communiqué on 24 April 1934 about the
Warsaw discussions of the French Foreign Minister; Number Neurath-
73, an official communiqué about the Prague discussions of the French
Foreign Minister on 27 April 1934; and an excerpt from a speech of the
French Foreign Minister of 30 May 1934, Number Neurath-77.
 What was your further policy after the rather abrupt breaking-off of
negotiations caused by this French note?
VON NEURATH: We tried first of all by means of negotiations
with the individual powers to bring about permanent and real peace on
the basis of the practical recognition of our equal rights and general
understanding with all peoples. I had given the German missions abroad
the task of carrying on talks to this effect with the respective
governments.
In order to get negotiations going again, Hitler had decided to
accept an invitation from Mussolini for a friendly talk in Venice. The
purpose of this meeting, as Mussolini later said, was to attempt to
disperse the clouds which were darkening the political horizon of
Europe.
A few days after his return from Venice Hitler made an important
speech in which he reaffirmed Germany’s desire for peace.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like in this
connection to refer to my Document Number Neurath-80 in Document
Book 3, which is an excerpt from this Hitler speech in Gera on 17 June
1934—only the part of interest from the foreign political point of view,
of course.
Would you like to break off now, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal hopes that
on Monday, when you continue, you will be able to deal in less detail
with this political history, which, of course, is very well known to
everyone who has lived through it, and particularly to the Tribunal who
have heard it all gone into before here.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I shall endeavor to do so, Mr.
President.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 24 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

 ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND DAY
Monday, 24 June 1946

Morning Session

[The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stand.]

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath, I have been told,
and I also heard it on the radio, that yesterday apparently a mistake
arose, possibly due to poor translation, regarding your activity from 1903
to 1914. Perhaps you can repeat it, for I believe that the Court also
misunderstood your statement.
VON NEURATH: It probably concerns my stay in London. From
1903 to 1907 I was in London, and after that I was in the Foreign Office
in Berlin.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then we will continue the
presentation of your policy as Foreign Minister. I should like to ask the
following questions:
In the fact that during your period of office as Foreign Minister, in
the spring of 1935, general rearmament was begun, compulsory military
service was reintroduced, and the Luftwaffe was created, the Prosecution
sees proof of your guilt in the alleged conspiracy against peace. Will you
comment on this?
VON NEURATH: First, I should like to emphasize that there was
no question of war plans in Germany in this year and in the following
years. I am also perfectly convinced that at that time neither Hitler nor
his entourage had any aggressive plans, or even considered any
aggressive plans, for that would not have been possible without my
knowing about it.
Rearmament as such involves no threat to peace unless it is decided
to use the newly made weapons for purposes other than defense. There
was no such decision and no such preparation at that time. The same
charge of preparations for aggressive war could be held against all the
neighboring states of Germany, who were rearming in precisely...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, this is
argument, not evidence.
 DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must hear how
things appeared to him. Decisions for action can only be excused if I
explain...
THE PRESIDENT: No, we are not prepared to hear argument in the
course of evidence. It is evidence for him to say that there were no plans
made at that time for offensive action, but it is argument to say that
rearmament does not necessarily involve offensive action. We do not
desire to hear argument at this stage.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes.
Then please answer the question once more, whether there were in
fact no plans to use the weapons created by rearmament for any
aggressive purposes or for other violent action?
VON NEURATH: That is what I just said. I do not believe I need
repeat it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What reasons were there, what
facts, which made the situation of Germany appear particularly perilous?
VON NEURATH: At that time Germany could not help feeling she
was encircled by her highly armed neighbors. Russia and France had
concluded a mutual assistance pact which could only be called a military
alliance. It was immediately followed by a similar treaty between Russia
and Czechoslovakia. According to her own statements, Russia had
increased the peacetime strength of her army by more than half. How
strong it actually was could not be ascertained. In France, under the
leadership of Pétain, efforts were being made to strengthen the Army
considerably. Already in 1934 Czechoslovakia had introduced 2-year
military service. On 1 March 1935 France issued a new defense law,
which also increased the period of military service. This whole
development, which had come about in a few months, could only be
considered as an immediate threat. Germany could no longer be a
defenseless and inactive spectator. In view of these facts the decision
which Hitler then made to reintroduce compulsory military service and
gradually to build up an army of 36 divisions was not an act which
seriously threatened the neighboring countries bound together by
alliances.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I
should like to ask you to take judicial notice of the following documents
in my document book:
Number 87, a document on the entry of the Soviet Union into the
League of Nations of 18 September 1934, in Document Book 3. Number
89, also in Document Book 3, is a statement of the reporter of the Army
Committee of the French Chamber, of 23 November 1931, on the entente
with Russia. Number 91, in Document Book 3, is the Russian-French
Protocol to the Eastern Pact negotiations of 5 December 1934.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I should like to say that Document
89 has not been submitted to us as yet. Therefore, it has not been
possible to examine this document and to say whether or not this
document is relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: When you get the book you will have the right
to object to the document, if necessary. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen is only
telling us what documents he contends support the evidence which has
just been given, that is all. He is offering these documents in evidence,
and as soon as you get the book and can scrutinize the document, you
will have the opportunity of making an objection to its admissibility.
M. DEBENEST: That is exactly the point, Mr. President. I wished
to reserve for myself the right to do that.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we agree with you.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then comes Document 92, in
Document Book 3, the call to the Army made by the President of the
Czechoslovakian Republic on 28 December 1934.
In Document Book 3, Number 96 is the French Government
declaration of 15 March 1935.
In Document Book 3, Number 79 is a report of the Czech Minister
in Paris, Osusky, of 15 June 1934.
Document 101 is the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact of 2
May 1935.
Document 94 is an excerpt from the speech of the French President,
Flandin, to the French Chamber on 5 February 1935.
I ask you to take judicial notice of these documents.
[Turning to the defendant.] Was Germany’s decision to rearm
intended to mean that she would discontinue all further co-operation in
international efforts to limit general rearmament?
VON NEURATH: No, by no means. An English inquiry as to
whether Germany would be ready to continue to participate in general
disarmament negotiations in the same manner and to the same extent as
laid down in the so-called London Communiqué of February 1935 was
immediately answered in the affirmative. On 18 March—that is, 2 days
after the introduction of military service—the Embassy in London was
instructed to resume negotiations and, in particular, to suggest an
agreement to limit the strength of the Navy.
In May 1935 Hitler made a speech to the Reichstag, in which he
expounded a concrete German plan for peace. He emphasized
particularly the German will for peace, and again declared himself
willing to co-operate in any system of international agreements for the
maintenance of peace, even collective agreements. The only condition he
made, and this he had always done, was the recognition of Germany’s
equal rights. He also declared himself willing to rejoin the League of
Nations. By so doing he wanted to prove that Germany, in spite of the
conclusion of military alliances which she felt to be a threat, and our own
rearmament, continued to desire peace.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I wish to ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of the following documents in my Document Book 3:
Number 95, answer of the Reich Government of 15 February 1935,
to the so-called London Communiqué.
Number 97, an excerpt from the appeal of the Reich Government of
16 March 1935, for the reintroduction of the German military service.
Number 98 is the communiqué of 26 March 1935 on the talks of the
British Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, and the Lord Privy Seal, Mr.
Eden, with the Reich Government.
Number 102 is the communiqué of 15 May 1935 on the speech of
Foreign Minister Laval in Moscow.
Number 104, Hitler’s speech of 21 May 1935 on the Russian-
French Pact.
Number 105, the note of the Reich Government of 25 May 1935 to
the signatory powers of the Locarno Treaty.
[Turning to the defendant.] Did the German efforts and willingness
to negotiate have any success?
VON NEURATH: Yes; they led to the conclusion of the first and
only agreement to limit armaments which was actually put into effect on
the basis of the German proposals by the signing of the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement in June 1935. Of course, I would have preferred it if
the negotiations with all countries concerning proposals for armament
limitation had been successful. Nevertheless, this agreement between
only two states was warmly welcomed by us as the first step in this
direction. We know that at least England held aloof from the decision of
the League of Nations stating that Germany had broken the Versailles
Treaty by rearming. The German step was thus recognized as justified.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to
ask the Court to take judicial notice of two documents from my
Document Book 3:
Document Number 106 is a statement by the First Lord of the
Admiralty, Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, over the British radio on 19 June
1935.
The second is Document Number 119, an excerpt from the
statement of the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr.
Shakespeare, in the House of Commons on the occasion of the
ratification of the London Naval Agreement on 20 July 1936.
[Turning to the defendant.] Was German activity in the direction of
disarmament limited to the German-English Naval Agreement?
VON NEURATH: No; our willingness to co-operate in a positive
way for the limitation of armaments, which had been declared by us on
many occasions, also found expression in the negotiations for
disarmament in the air. Right from the outset, as early as 1933, Hitler had
stressed the importance of this point for the maintenance of peace.
Germany was ready to accept any limitation, and even the complete
abolition of air armament, if it was done on a reciprocal basis. But only
England reacted to such suggestions. The difficulty was to persuade
France to participate in the negotiations. She did this only after 3 months
through the efforts of England. But France stipulated conditions which
made it practically impossible for these negotiations to succeed.
Apart from a general agreement embracing all European states,
special bilateral agreements were to be permitted. In addition, the
continuation of negotiations on air armament was to be made dependent
on negotiations concerning the Eastern Pact. Germany could not
participate in this Eastern Pact, since she would have had to assume
military obligations whose consequences could not be foreseen.
Owing to this and the outbreak of the Italian-Abyssinian war, which
brought the differences among the Western Powers into the open, the
negotiations came to a standstill.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: One year later, in March 1936, the
Rhineland was reoccupied by German troops. The Prosecution see in this
a breach of the Locarno Treaty and further proof of your coresponsibility
in the alleged conspiracy against peace. Will you please comment on
this?
 VON NEURATH: This assertion is completely untrue. There was
no decision or plan to wage aggressive war any more than there had been
the year before. The restoration of full sovereignty in all parts of the
Reich had no military, but only political significance.
The occupation of the Rhineland was carried out with only one
division and this fact alone shows that it had only a purely symbolic
character. It was clear that a great and industrious people would not
tolerate forever such a drastic limitation of its sovereignty as had been
imposed by the Versailles Treaty. It was simply a dynamic development
which the leaders of German foreign policy could not oppose.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did the reoccupation of the
Rhineland take place according to a plan which had been made some
time beforehand, or was the decision spontaneous?
VON NEURATH: It was one of those sudden decisions of Hitler
which was to be carried out within a few days.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the events which led to
this immediate decision?
VON NEURATH: On 16 January 1936, the French Foreign
Minister, M. Laval, announced that after his return from Geneva he
would present the Russian-French Pact to the French Chamber for
ratification. The fact that Hitler, in an interview with M. de Jouvenel, the
correspondent of the reputable French paper Paris Midi, while pointing
out the dangers of this pact, once again held out his hand to France in an
attempt to bring about an honorable and permanent understanding
between the two peoples, was of no avail. I had previously discussed this
interview in detail with Hitler, and I received the definite impression that
he was absolutely serious in his desire for a permanent reconciliation of
the two peoples. But this attempt also was in vain. The strong opposition
to the pact from large portions of the French people, under the leadership
of the Union Nationale des Combattants, and in Parliament itself could
not prevent the French Government from ratifying the pact. The voting
took place on 27 February 1936 in the French Chamber.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to ask the Court to take
note of the following two documents from my Document Book 4: The
first is Number 108, Hitler’s interview with the correspondent of Paris
Midi, M. de Jouvenel, of 21 February 1936. The second is Number 107,
an excerpt from the speech of the Deputy Montigny in the French
Chamber on 13 February 1936.
 On 7 March 1936, by way of answer to the ratification of this treaty,
the German troops marched into the demilitarized Rhineland zone. What
considerations caused the German Government to take this very serious
step? In view of the hostile attitude of the French, there was a danger that
this time the Western Powers would not be satisfied with paper protests
and resolutions by the League of Nations, but would proceed by force of
arms against this one-sided...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, is this a question or a
statement?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: It is a question. I should like to
know the attitude of the Government at that time. If I may make a
comment, I must hear these explanations on the grounds for the decisions
taken at that time from the defendant himself, for when in my final
address...
THE PRESIDENT: You were stating a number of facts. It is not for
you to state facts. It is your duty to ask the witness.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not want to state facts. I
wanted to know from the witness what considerations led to the decision.
[Turning to the defendant.] Will you please describe to us what
factors entered into your consideration at that time?
VON NEURATH: In my previous answers I have already stated
why we saw in the Franco-Russian Pact and in France’s whole attitude a
most serious threat. This accumulation of power in French hands through
the various mutual assistance pacts could be directed only against
Germany. There was no other country in the world at which it could be
directed. In the event of hostilities—a possibility which, in view of the
whole situation, any responsible government would have to reckon with
—the western border of Germany was completely open owing to the
demilitarization of the Rhineland. This was not only a discriminating
provision of the Versailles Treaty, but also one which threatened
Germany’s security most. However, it had become obsolete through the
decision of 11 December 1932 by the Five Powers in Geneva.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal thinks this
is all argument. If there are any facts as to what the German Government
did at the time, after the French and Russian Pact and before the entry
into the Rhineland, the witness can give these facts, but this is mere
argument and the Tribunal is well aware of the argument. It does not
require them to be restated, and certainly not to be restated in the course
of the evidence.
 DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I merely wanted to
avoid that when later in my final speech I refer to this point, the
objection might be made that these are my opinions. I want to show...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, that is quite a wrong
conception. We are now hearing evidence. When we hear you we shall
be hearing arguments and we shall be prepared to hear any argument
from you.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but I want to avoid it being said
these are my arguments. These arguments come from the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: I am pointing out to you that it is the function of
counsel to argue and it is the function of the Tribunal to listen to
argument. It is not the function of the Tribunal to listen to argument in
the course of evidence.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well.
VON NEURATH: Perhaps I may make one statement. In the course
of the winter of 1936, we had learned through our military intelligence
service that the French General Staff already had a military plan for
invading Germany. This invasion was to take place through the
Rhineland and along the so-called Main River line toward
Czechoslovakia in order to join the Russian ally.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On the basis of what the President
just said, I shall dispense with the evidence, or rather with your
considerations, and reserve for myself the right to bring this up in my
final speech. I should like to ask just one more question. Did the decision
to reoccupy the Rhineland constitute any aggressive intention for the
moment or later on?
VON NEURATH: No, none whatever. The reoccupation, as can be
seen from my statements, had a purely defensive character and was not
intended to have any other purpose. The occupation by such a weak
force as a single division made it clear that it was a purely symbolic act.
It has been testified to here by the military—the witness Milch, for
example—that the Luftwaffe had no part whatever and had learned of the
action only 2 or 3 days before. That there were no aggressive plans for
the future is shown by the fact that the German Government, at the
suggestion of England, on 12 March 1936 undertook, until such time as
an understanding had been reached with the Western Powers, particularly
with France, not to increase the garrisons in the Rhineland and not to
move the troops any closer to the border than they were already, on
condition, however, that France would do the same. France did not want
to accept this offer. Then, in the memorandum of 7 March 1936
addressed to the signatory powers of Locarno, which the Prosecution has
already submitted here, Germany not only made definite suggestions for
an agreement with France, Belgium, and the other Locarno Powers, but
also declared her willingness to sign a general Air Pact to avoid the
danger of sudden air raids, and in addition to join the League of Nations
again. In a speech to the Reichstag on 7 March 1936 Hitler explained to
the world the reasons for the reoccupation of the Rhineland. This speech,
as well as the memorandum, I had discussed beforehand with Hitler, and
I can only repeat that I did not have the slightest suspicion that Hitler
was not honest or that he was trying to conceal his real intentions which
tended toward war. Even today I have the firm conviction that at that
time Hitler was not thinking of war. I need not emphasize that any such
intention was far from my own thoughts. On the contrary, I considered
the restoration of sovereignty throughout the Reich a step toward peace
and understanding.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us get on. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, you are
allowing the defendant to make long, long speeches. That is not the
object of evidence.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit various
documents in this connection and ask the Court to take judicial notice of
the following documents in my Document Book 4. First, Number 109,
memorandum of 7 March 1936 from the Reich Government to the
signatory powers of the Locarno Treaty; Number 112, the official
statement of the German Reich Government on 12 March 1936, and
Number 113, the communication from the German Ambassador in
London to the British Foreign Minister Mr. Eden, on 12 March 1936; and
Number 116, a memorandum dated 3 January 1936 sent by the German
Government to the British Government through the Ambassador
Extraordinary in London, Herr Von Ribbentrop.
[Turning to the defendant.] What were the consequences of the
reoccupation of the Rhineland as far as foreign policy was concerned?
VON NEURATH: In consideration of the wishes of the President of
the Court, I will not comment on this question.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What did the Western Powers do?
Did they take any political or diplomatic steps?
VON NEURATH: Foreign Minister Eden said in the House of
Commons that Germany’s procedure did not constitute any threat and
promised to give careful considerations to the German peace proposals.
 DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit and ask the
Court to take judicial notice of the following documents in my
Document Book 4: Number 125, excerpts from a speech by the
American Under Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, on the Versailles
Treaty and Europe, of 7 July 1937; Document Number 120, excerpt from
the decree of the People’s Commissars of Russia on the reduction of the
age for military service; and Number 117, a report from the
Czechoslovakian Minister in The Hague dated 21 April 1936.
Herr Von Neurath, did you or the Foreign Office forego any further
steps and attempts toward a peaceful understanding with the other
European powers, or did they continue?
VON NEURATH: These efforts were continued. The next
opportunity was provided by our relations with Austria. The
development of these relations since 1933 has already been described in
detail before the Court; but I should like especially to stress the fact that
in our relations with Austria my views remained unchanged from start to
finish, that is, I wanted a close economic connection, such as a customs
union, between the two countries and a foreign policy run on common
lines on the basis of state treaties and close contact between the two
Governments, but whatever happened I wanted to see the full
independence of Austria guaranteed. For that reason I was always a
determined opponent of any interference in the internal political affairs
of Austria, and I was against any support being given to the Austrian
National Socialists by the German National Socialists in the fight of the
former against Dollfuss and Schuschnigg; and I constantly urged Hitler
to take the same line. I need not repeat that I sharply condemned the
murder of Dollfuss from the moral as well as the political point of view
and that the Foreign Office under my direction had nothing whatever to
do with this murder, as the Prosecution recently asserted. But that Hitler
too had absolutely nothing to do with the murder, I can confirm from
various statements which he made to me. The deed was carried out by
Austrian National Socialists, some of whom were much more radical
than the Germans. This attitude of mine is best proved by the fact that
when shortly after the murder of Dollfuss the German Minister in
Vienna, Herr Rieth, without my knowledge demanded of the Austrian
Government safe conduct to Germany for several persons involved in the
murder, I at once recalled him from Vienna and dismissed him from the
Foreign Service. I myself, as well as a number of other ministers, also
opposed the travel embargo imposed on Austria by Germany.
 But I did welcome the efforts for an understanding with Austria,
which started in 1935 and were carried through with success by Herr Von
Papen, and I always tried to influence Hitler to bring this about. As to
Von Papen’s actions in Vienna during this time, I was only imperfectly
informed, as Herr Von Papen was not subordinate to me and received his
orders directly from Hitler. It was only during this Trial that I learned
about the series of letters which Von Papen wrote to Hitler.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to quote two passages;
one is from a letter from Herr Von Neurath to the head of the political
section of the Foreign Office dated 28 June 1934, Number 84 in my
Document Book 3, Page 227, which says in regard to conditions at that
time:
“The development of events in Austria cannot be foreseen. It
appears to me, however, that the acute danger....”
THE PRESIDENT: You are going a little bit too fast. You did not
observe the light. Go on.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: “The development of events in
Austria cannot be foreseen. It appears to me, however, that the
acute danger has been averted due to rapid action. We should
act with great reserve now and to this end I spoke to the Reich
Chancellor yesterday. I found complete understanding.”
Then I should like to quote a passage from the affidavit of Bishop
Wurm, already submitted by me as Number 1 in my Document Book 1,
on Page 3. It says:
“I remember especially his”—Herr Von Neurath’s—“severe
condemnation of the occurrences in Vienna during which
Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered, and of the person used by
Hitler during the agitation in Austria.”
Then, in this connection, I should like to refer to a document which
Herr Seyss-Inquart, or his defense counsel, has already submitted under
Number Seyss-Inquart-32, which is an interview of the State Chancellor,
Dr. Renner, of 3 April 1938. As a precaution, I have included it once
more in my Document Book 4, under Number 130.
Herr Von Neurath, you know that the charge is made against you
that on 11 July 1936 a treaty was made between Germany and Austria in
the course of these negotiations by Von Papen, and that this treaty, which
has been discussed here in detail, was concluded with intent to deceive,
that is, with the purpose of lulling Austria into a sense of security and
preparing for her future incorporation into the Reich. Will you please
comment on this point?
VON NEURATH: This assertion is absolutely untrue. In effect I
honestly and gladly welcomed this treaty. It corresponded to my point of
view in every respect. I saw therein the best means of clearing up the
unnatural dissensions, and for that reason I did everything I could to
bring it about. The assertion of the Prosecution has been disproved by
the statements of the former Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Guido
Schmidt. I found satisfaction in the fact that the treaty had a special
significance as regards foreign policy. By this treaty, in which the Reich
clearly recognized Austrian independence, the German-Austrian
differences, which were of danger to peace in Europe, were removed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I
submit the agreement between Germany and Austria of 11 July 1936
under Number 118 in Document Book 4, and I ask the Court to take
judicial notice of it.
Herr Von Neurath, apart from clearing up the Austrian question in
the years before 1937, you also carried on negotiations with eastern
European states. In the affidavit of the American Consul General Mr.
Messersmith, which the Prosecution has submitted as USA-68, 2385-PS,
it is asserted that the purpose of these negotiations was to get these
southeastern states to acquiesce in the destruction and splitting up of
Czechoslovakia contemplated by Germany, and even to take an active
part in it. For this purpose, in the course of these negotiations, you are
even supposed to have promised these states, or got others to promise
them, that they would receive parts of Czechoslovakia and even Austrian
territory as a reward. Will you please comment on this?
VON NEURATH: These assertions of Mr. Messersmith are pure
invention and a figment of the imagination from beginning to end. There
is not one word of truth in them. I can only describe this affidavit as
fantastical. It is not even true that he was, as he says, a close friend of
mine. I met Mr. Messersmith a few times at large gatherings, but I
avoided discussing politics with him, because I knew that in his reports
and other statements about talks which he had had with diplomats he
repeated things in a way which did not always correspond to the truth. It
is significant that incidentally this affidavit contains hardly any accurate
indications of the sources he employed.
 My negotiations with the southeastern countries, as well as my
personal trips to their capitals, in reality had the sole purpose of
strengthening the existing economic relations and promoting mutual
trade and exchange of goods. In addition, I wanted to gain information
about the political situation in the Balkans, which is always difficult to
grasp.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In my Document Book 2, under
Number 30, Page 87, I have a short excerpt from another affidavit of Mr.
Messersmith, dated 29 August 1945. The Prosecution has already
submitted it as Exhibit USA-750, Document Number 2386-PS, in
another connection. I should like to quote one passage from this excerpt.
It is on Page 87 of my Document Book 2, and reads:
“During the years 1933 and 1934 the Nazi Government left the
German Foreign Office for the most part in charge of
conservative officials of the old school. Generally speaking,
this situation continued throughout the period during which
Baron Von Neurath was Foreign Minister. After Von
Ribbentrop became chief of the Foreign Office, the situation
gradually changed as regards the political officials. During Von
Neurath’s incumbency, the German Foreign Office had not
been brought into line with Nazi ideology, and Von Neurath
and his assistants can hardly be blamed for acts of German
foreign policy during this period, though his continuation in
office may appear to indicate his agreement with National
Socialist aims. In defense of these activities Von Neurath might
easily adduce reasons of patriotic motives.”
Then, in regard to these trips and the policy of the defendant in the
Southeast, I am submitting the three communiqués on Von Neurath’s
visit to Belgrade, Sofia, and Budapest in June 1937 under Numbers 122,
123, and 124 in my Document Book 4. I ask the Court to take judicial
notice of them.
Herr Von Neurath, the Prosecution is using your speech of 29
August 1937, made in Stuttgart at a demonstration of Germans living
abroad, to bring a charge against you, inasmuch as it sees in one of your
remarks the aggressive intentions of your policy. It quotes the following
words which you are alleged to have used in your speech:
“The unity of the heroic national will created by National
Socialism in its unparalleled élan has made possible a foreign
 policy by which the terms of the Versailles Dictate are
exploded, freedom to arm is regained, and sovereignty is
restored throughout the state. We are again masters in our own
house, and we have created the power to remain so in the
future. In our foreign political actions we have taken nothing
from anyone. From the words and deeds of Hitler the world
should see that he has no aggressive desires.”
I should like to point out that these sentences can be understood
only if taken with their context. I should like to ask the permission of the
Court to state briefly what the context is. This excerpt from the speech is
submitted by me in Document Book 4, Number 126. I quote:
“We have again become masters in our own house. We have
created the means to remain so....”
THE PRESIDENT: You have just read that. You have read it once.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I should like to read the
sentence in between.
THE PRESIDENT: You may read anything which is relevant and
which was omitted, of course.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The quotation that I am submitting
reads:
“But this attitude of the new German Reich is in reality the
strongest bulwark for safeguarding peace, and will always
prove itself as such in a world in turmoil. Just because we have
recognized the danger of certain destructive tendencies which
are attempting to assert themselves in Europe, we are not
looking for differences between countries and peoples, but are
trying to find connecting links. We are not thinking of political
isolation. We want political co-operation between
governments, a co-operation which, if it is to be successful,
cannot be based on theoretical ideas of collectivity, but on
living reality, and which must devote itself to the concrete
tasks of the present. We can state with satisfaction that in
pursuing such a realistic peace policy, we are working hand in
hand with our friend Italy. This justifies the hope that we may
also reach a friendly understanding with other governments
regarding important questions of foreign policy.”
Do you, Herr Von Neurath, wish to add any comment to this?
 THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a convenient time to break off.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath, just before the

recess I confronted you with a quotation from your speech of 29 August
1937 and I asked you whether you wished to make any statement.
VON NEURATH: I should think this statement shows exactly the
opposite of what the Prosecution is trying to make out. The peaceful
character of my speech could hardly have been brought out in a more
convincing way.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As proof for their assertion that your
whole policy could be summarized as the breaking of a treaty, the
Prosecution adduces further from the following sentences in a speech
made by you before the Academy for German Law on 30 October 1937,
when you said; and I quote:
“Realizing these fundamental facts, the Reich Cabinet was
always in favor of handling each concrete international
problem by the methods which are appropriate, and was
against merging it unnecessarily with other problems and thus
complicating matters, and insofar as problems exist between
two powers only, of choosing the way for an immediate
understanding between these two powers. We are in a position
to state that these methods have proved to be good ones, not
only in the interests of Germany, but also in the general
interests.”
What is your comment on this?
VON NEURATH: First of all this quotation is torn completely from
its context. The entire speech was a presentation of the reasons why I,
representing Germany’s policy, considered the conclusion of bilateral
agreements to work better in the interests of peace than the so-called
collective agreements, and only from this angle can the passage just
quoted be understood. Therefore, I would ask that you quote the passage
with its context.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: This speech of Herr Von Neurath on
the League of Nations and international law, which he delivered on 30
October 1937 before the Academy of German Law, will be found under
Number 128 of my Document Book 4. With the permission of the
Tribunal I should like to quote this particular passage in its entirety and
we shall see that the passage selected by the Prosecution has not the
meaning which the Prosecution has given it. It says here:
“I am convinced that the same or similar considerations will
also arise in other cases where it is intended to set up a
schematic structure, such as an absolutely mutual system of
assistance for a more or less large group of states. Such
projects, even in favorable cases, namely, when intended to be
an equal guarantee by all participants, will only remain as a
piece of paper....”
THE PRESIDENT: Is it not sufficient to refer to the document? The
defendant has just said that the speech contained the reasons why he
considered bilateral rather than general agreements possible. He said
that. The document appears to confirm that. Could you not refer to the
document without reading the words?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I read it because it was torn from its
context and I believed that I would be permitted to quote the context as
well. However, if the Tribunal wish to read the matter I shall not
continue quoting it.
THE PRESIDENT: It does not seem to me to add to it. It is just the
words which the defendant has quoted the substance of.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I omitted one sentence as I thought
it was superfluous. But it may be seen from the context. If the Tribunal
prefers to read the entire speech with reference to my quotations, then, of
course, I shall be satisfied.
Herr Von Neurath, under Number L-150, USA-65, the Prosecution
have submitted a note by Mr. Bullitt, who was American Ambassador in
Paris at that time, regarding a discussion he had with you in May 1936,
and the Prosecution adduced, on Page 8 of the English trial brief, that as
Foreign Minister you participated in the planning of aggressive war
against Austria and Czechoslovakia.
Will you please comment on this document which is known to you,
and on this accusation which is leveled against you?
VON NEURATH: At first the occupation of the Rhineland had
naturally created unrest in the cabinets and public opinion and among the
signatory powers of the Treaty of Versailles. This applied especially to
France and Czechoslovakia. Therefore it was natural, if a reasonable
German foreign policy was to be conducted, to allow this unrest to die
down, so as to convince the world that Germany was not pursuing