What do we typically believe?

Now i have a perception of you which is genuine

My perception of you is that you are genuine in the mind independent world. You are causally
responsible for the experience I am experiencing right now. My perception must be accurate in
respect to your size, shape, location - the properties that define who you are. On that basis, we
can make the claim that my perception of you is genuine.
Problem: we don't know whether we are in the mind independent world. Also, we dont know if
we are causally responsible for our experience. How could we have evidence for all 3 claims?
How do we verify it except through other perceptions? In response to the doctor who says you
arent here, neither am I - Quaid reached out and touched him, giving a tactile confirmation that
he is there. But these sensations are just more perceptions. But this is a natural instinct we
have- to confirm with our perceptions.

How do we dismantle this system of belief?

Argument from illusion and deception

1. Optical illusions
a. Is it a black and gold, or a blue and white dress?
2. Delusions, dreams and visions
a. Hallucinations, schizophrenia
3. Natural illusions
a. Mirage of an oasis
4. Relative or subjective sensations
a. Hot water to a cold hand vs to a warm hand. It seems very reliable but is it really?

But how far do these arguments go? Is it not true that we can be deceived about some things,
but very quickly can correct ourselves - and our senses are largely reliable, and only in these
fringe cases do we need to consider how they are deceiving us
DZ Phillips raises 3 arguments

1. The mistakes we make take for granted some accuracy of the sensory information, such
as that the ground exists, or that light is in fact there
2. Philosophical doubt ignores the fact that these errors are sometimes consistent with our
understanding and view of the world
3. Most philosophical doubt raises the worst case scenario where we are tired, or have a
mental illness - not when we rub our eyes and are awake and alert, or when we are in
the right of mind

This shows that the argument from illusion or deception, while substantial, requires further
extension. While these arguments apply to fringe cases, they cannot be said to apply to all
cases where we use our senses, and when we are alert and awake as we usually are.

That is why the radical skeptic supplements their argument with the argument from dreaming
- How can we distinguish between a dream and an awake state?
Rene Descartes - when we dream we often believe that what we are experiencing is real, so
how can we be sure that what we are experiencing now is not a dream of some sort?
He used this argument to show that there is no way we can firmly establish, without a shadow of
doubt, that we have knowledge about the world - after all, there is a possibility that we might be
in a dream, and we cannot disprove it.

Berkeley argues that we can distinguish this dreaming from reality. Reality, which is produced by
God, is more regular, consistent, and vivid than the Ideas produced by us while dreaming,
hallucinating, or reminiscing. (However, his argument invokes God, which is dubious - lets look
more at Berkeley later)

One way to respond to the genuineness of perceptions is in the context of other perceptions; i.e.
memories of past perceptions. (Raised by philosopher Bertrand Russell: posited argument is -
what if you have been created 5 minutes ago with all the memories you have now)

But how can we know our memory is reliable? Our past perceptions.

1. Previous perception must have occurred.

2. That previous perception must be causally responsible for the current memory.
3. The current memory must accurately represent the previous perception.

So what is the problem posed by these arguments?

The problem posed by sceptical hypotheses is that we seem unable to know that they are false.
After all, if our experience of the world could be exactly as it is and yet we are the victims of a
sceptical hypothesis, then on what basis could we ever hope to distinguish a genuine
experience of the world from an illusory one? The first key claim of the sceptical argument is
thus that we are unable to know that we are not the victims of sceptical hypotheses.

The second component of the sceptical argument involves the claim that if we are
unable to know the denials of sceptical hypotheses, it follows that we are unable to
know very much at all. Right now, for example, I think that I know that I am sitting
here at my desk writing this chapter. Given that I do not know that I am not the victim
of a sceptical hypothesis, however, and given that if I were the victim of a sceptical
hypothesis the world would appear exactly the same as it is just now even though I
am not presently sitting at my desk, then how can I possibly know that I am sitting at
my desk? The problem is that, so long as I cannot rule out sceptical hypotheses, I don’t
seem able to know very much at all.

1 I am unable to know the denials of the sceptical argument

2 If I am unable to know the denials of the sceptical argument, I cannot know very much about
the world
C I am unable to know very much about the world
What supports premise 2?
1. The closure principle
If I know one proposition, and I know that this proposition entails a second
proposition, then I know the second proposition as well.
For example, if I know that I am sitting here in my office right now, and I also know
that if I am sitting in my office right now then I can’t be standing up next door, then
it seems that I must also know that I am not standing up next door. So expressed, the
principle seems entirely unremarkable.
Notice, however, that it follows from the fact that one is seated at one’s desk in one’s
office that one is not encased in a large vat being ‘fed’ the experiences as if one were
sitting at one’s desk (aside from anything else, if one were in the vat then one wouldn’t
be seated at all, but floating in the nutrients contained therein).Accordingly, given the
closure principle, it follows that if I know that I am currently seated in my office then
I also know that I am not encased in a large vat being ‘fed’ experiences that are
designed to deceive me. However, as the sceptic points out in premise 1 of her
argument, that seems precisely the kind of thing that I could never know. As a result,
concludes the sceptic, it must be that I don’t know that I am presently seated in my
office either.

The Evil Demon Argument

(1) If I know that p entails not q, then if I don't know not q, I don't know p (principle of closure)
(2) I know that There is a table in front of me entalls There is no ED fooling me.
(3) I do not know There is no ED fooling me.
Therefore,
(4) I do not know There is a table in front of me.

So if scepticism is so strong, what can be said against it?

1. Idea of epistemic contextualism
One final anti-sceptical theory that we will look at is contextualism. This view holds
that the key to resolving the sceptical problem lies in recognising that knowledge is a
highly context-sensitive notion. Think for a moment about other terms that we use
that might plausibly be thought to be context-sensitive, such as ‘flat’ or ‘empty’. For
example, if, in normal circumstances, I tell you that the fridge is empty, then you will
understand me as saying that it’s empty of food, and not that it’s empty of anything –
it contains air, after all. Similarly, if, in normal circumstances, I tell you that the table
is flat, I mean that it’s not especially bumpy, and not that there are no imperfections
whatsoever on the surface of the table. In different contexts, however, what is meant
by calling something ‘flat’ or ‘empty’ could change. When a scientist requests a ‘flat’
table to put her highly sensitive instrument on, for example, she probably has in mind
something an awful lot flatter than the sort of table that we would normally classify
as ‘flat’.
On closer inspection, however, the contextualist response to scepticism is not nearly
so compelling. For one thing, consider again the analogy with terms like ‘flat’ and
‘empty’. Hasn’t science shown us that, strictly speaking, nothing is every really flat or
empty (because every surface has some imperfections, no matter how small, and there
are no vacuums in nature)? Of course, we talk as if there are flat surfaces and empty
containers, but in fact when we think about it we realise that nothing really
corresponds to these ascriptions of flatness and emptiness – we are just talking loosely.
Accordingly, if we follow through the analogy with ‘knows’, then the natural
conclusion to draw is that we don’t really know anything – because no one could rule
out all possibilities of error, including sceptical error possibilities – even though we
often talk, loosely, as if we do know a great deal.

2. Common Sense Realism (G.E. Moore)

What we can do: combine the idea of epistemic contextualism with Moorean appeal to common
sense - the idea that - i look at my right and left hand, and hence prove that they exist!
This pushes forth the notion that such high standards only apply to the philosophical realm

Tackling the deductive evil demon argument: modus tollens. GE Moore’s proof of an external
world

Modus ponens -
Modus tollens -

What he says: modus tollens doesn't hold weight. He makes a logical impasse. Both are
logically valid, what next?
(1) here is a hand (2) here is another hand (3) therefore, there now exists two hands.
What he is trying to get at: (through sleight of hand) why should we privilege philosophical
claims over common sense claims that are clearly secure? These common sense claims are
deductively and logically sound and true.
Problem - kind of begging the question. We presuppose that we have knowledge to prove that
the argument that we have no knowledge is false. So logically, it doesnt make sense. But if we
apply epistemic contextualism, it certainly is a powerful argument.
 3. Principle of Certainty
Also a continuation of common sense realism and contextualism, the question is whether we
need to be maximally certain.
Motive of scepticism - what is our understanding of the notion of knowledge?
Idea of Certainty

The sceptic says: to know P, your evidence has to be maximally good. So good that no one
could have that evidence without P being true. This is the certainty principle.

The fallibilist says: to know P, you need to have good evidence for P, and in addition P has to be
true - so there is no way of having true certainty as the evidence itself usually won't prove P is
100% true.

Scepticism wants to establish certainty, which we most likely cannot. However there is good
evidence that we know P, and under the right context we can in fact know a lot!

Basically if we argue this train: we use common sense realism to show how absurd the
demands of scepticism are, then we show that principle of certainty is not needed, especially in
most contexts
Hence we can know most everything, and radical scepticism cannot claim so much ground to
doubt us when we are in a clear, awake, state.

4. Subjective Idealism

What else can we do? We can change our notion of what knowledge is
Remember the problem we initially raised - we can't go from perception to reality because of all
the problems we raised.
But what if there is no mind independent world?

George Berkeley - mind independent world doesn't exist. Rather, just our minds and perceptions
exist
“To be is to be perceived”
Since we cannot know that there is an independent world, all we know is that there is me
trapped in my own world. Idea of perceiver to perception. This is it! We only have ourselves and
our perceptions existing in a bubble.
there are no mind-independent objects - only minds and ideas exist - objects are collections of
perceptions

Perceiver -> Perception -> Object

Representational realism? - The problem is if there are objects.

Perceiver -> Perception

Subjective Idealism - there is no object but only a perception?

One fundamental problem is what we saw earlier: the tree example. When i'm looking at this
desk, it exists. When I turn around it disappears. Objects disappear when they are not being
thought of or perceived. This is somewhat odd for a commonsensical understanding of our
world. Trying to make sense of the jerky way objects work. When I’m not perceiving it, the world
behind me doesn't exist. He attempts to refute this. To counter this, Berkeley falls back to the
idea of a God who observes everything all occurring at once

5. Transcendental Idealism
According to Kant, a noumenal world exists, but we cant gain any knowledge of it. All we can
gain knowledge of is the phenomenal world.

Kant outlines how space and time are pure forms of human intuition contributed by our own
faculty of sensibility. Space and time do not have an existence "outside" of us, but are the
"subjective" forms of our sensibility and hence the necessary a priori conditions under which the
objects we encounter in our experience can appear to us at all. Kant describes time and space
as "empirically real" but transcendentally ideal.

Kant argues that the conscious subject cognizes the objects of experience not as they are in
themselves, but only the way they appear to us under the conditions of our sensibility. Thus
Kant's doctrine restricts the scope of our cognition to appearances given to our sensibility and
denies that we can possess cognition of things as they are in themselves, i.e. things as they are
independently of how we experience them through our cognitive faculties.
- We can only experience objects and phenomena through our intuitions of, for example,
space and time. We are hardwired that way - which is why its called idealism. Our
experience of reality cannot be separated from our own intuitions which generate this
reality, meaning “true” knowledge of the world that is can never be formed
- This sidesteps the argument from deception, and argument from a dream. It also stops
the ED argument, but its not particularly useful. Lets say transcendental idealism is true -
that means we are limited by our cognition, which is essentially not a refutation but a way
to understand the world within the limits of our cognition