Professional Documents
Culture Documents
International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral
Sciences, Second Edition
“Philosophy and Science Studies in Archaeology”
Timothy Webmoor
University of Colorado at Boulder
Hale Science Building 350
1350 Pleasant Street
233 UCB
Boulder, CO 80309‐0233
USA
timothy.webmoor@colorado.edu
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Abstract
Archaeology and philosophy share a long history of engagement. This engagement was
most pronounced in the 1960s and 1970s with the so‐called New Archaeology that drew
upon philosophy of science to build an epistemological and methodological framework.
The ensuing debates concerning how to adequately do this resulted in archaeologists
being largely disaffected with philosophy of science. In the 1980s and 1990s, while
philosophy of science shifted toward a more practice‐based post‐positivist philosophy,
increasingly merging with the interdisciplinary field of science studies, archaeology
began to engage with a wider suite of philosophies, including continental and
pragmatist sources. Currently, rather than epistemic issues, archaeology and science
studies share a growing interest in ontology and the role of materiality in human life.
Keywords
archaeological theory, archaeological history, continental philosophy, critical realism,
epistemology, hermeneutics, logical positivism, materiality, phenomenology, philosophy
of science, post‐positivist philosophy, pragmatism, ontology, science studies, science
and technology studies
Archaeology is a dirt‐driven enterprise. Despite appearances and certain clichés aside, it is also
philosophically sophisticated. In part, this is due to the long history of engagement between
archaeology and philosophy. This interaction was most pronounced during the ascendancy in
the 1960s and 1970s of what was self‐described as the New Archaeology. A legacy of the New
Archaeology is the continued association of philosophy in archaeology with a particular set of
issues. These issues center upon the scientific nature of archaeology and the type of philosophy
involved is, appropriately enough, the philosophy of science. While this was an especially
influential period of mutual interaction between the fields, the effects of which continue to
reverberate through archaeology, this is only a portion of the history. Recent developments,
both within philosophy of science and in archaeology’s approach to philosophy more broadly,
have considerably altered how the fields engage. There is increasing importance of the
interdisciplinary field of science studies and a broader range of philosophies that archaeologists
find useful.
In this contribution, I sketch archaeology and philosophy’s history of engagement,
emphasizing the legacy that explicit epistemological questioning continues to have upon
archaeologists’ attitude toward philosophy. I discuss the proliferation of “styles of reasoning” in
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archaeology, contributing to many camps operating somewhat autonomously within research
traditions. I relate this trend to philosophy of science’s turn to practice‐based reasoning and its
increased identification with science studies. I note the broader, more eclectic range of
philosophies used by archaeologists, including continental and pragmatist sources. I conclude
with discussions of ontology, as opposed to epistemology, that are increasingly encountered in
science studies and archaeology and the wider emphasis across the social sciences and
humanities upon the material dimensions of life.
History of engagement
Antiquarianism and early calls for science
There has been a long history of explicit engagement between the fields of archaeology
and philosophy. As with other sciences to emerge from the antiquarianism of the 18th and 19th
centuries, the discipline’s earliest practitioners were Renaissance men like John Aubrey or
Walter Scott, who were well versed in the philosophical writings of the day. By the late 19th
century archaeology increasingly distinguished itself from the supposed dilettantism of this
earlier natural philosophy. Eager to develop their field as a scientific enterprise, archaeologists
at the turn of the 20th‐century drew upon discussions concerning hypothesis testing and the use
of the scientific method in other, more mature sciences like geology. From then on, archaeology
experienced philosophical crises roughly every 20 to 30 years (Wylie, 2002). During these
introspective periods, engagement with philosophical sources and debate within archaeology
over scientific procedures and reasoning become more visible.
Around World War I, Roland Dixon (1913) and Clark Wissler (1917) published works
advocating a more systematic and problem‐oriented form of artifact collection. As Wylie (in
Rathje et al., 2012) notes, it was hoped that this promotion of scientific reasoning would move
the discipline from artifact and data collection for its own sake, a practice associated with
antiquarianism, toward a “real, new archaeology”, as Wissler called it (1917). Despite these
discussions, data collection remained the modus operandi of archaeology during this culture‐
historical period in archeology. Disparagingly branded narrow empiricism by later
archaeologists, this period of data amassment and systematization could be approvingly
characterized as epistemologically cautious. That is, a period when scholars did not draw
conclusions that were unsupported by their data. Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with the
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interpretive timidity of culture‐historians re‐emerged in the 1930’s. These critics, such as Clyde
Kluckhohn (1939) and Walter Taylor (1948), drew upon a range of philosophical literature to
insist upon the need to build up a body of theory in order to provide explanations for the
growing corpus of archaeological data. In Kluckhohn’s opinion, archaeologists had barely
progressed beyond antiquarian collecting. What was needed was a theoretical framework that
posed questions and guided the recovery of relevant data.
A wider, trans‐Atlantic set of debates developed in the 1940’s and 1950’s. These
debates continued the previous disagreements over the role of theory in archaeology. They
were much farther reaching, however, questioning the function and veracity of typologies and
the nature of the relationship of archaeologist to the archaeological record (see Classification
and Typology). These have come to be regarded as the typology debates. Essentially, the
dilemma was as follows: were typological schemes, which archaeologists developed based upon
formal variations of artifacts, directly indicative of inherent past culture traits, or did such
schemes reflect the heuristic purposes of archaeologists? Within philosophy this resembles the
nominalism versus conceptual realism controversy. The various responses within archaeology to
this perennial problem were situated along a spectrum polarized by Ford’s (1954) constructivism
and Spaulding’s (1953) common‐sense objectivism. Constructivism, much like philosophical
nominalism, embraced what would later be explicitly formulated as the theory‐ladenness, or the
impossibility of completely separating theory from data, of archaeological explanation. It
describes the typological schemes archaeologists deploy as tools for imposing order on what
would otherwise be indistinguishable material. Archaeologists, interested in certain questions,
inevitably impose a subjective ordering on the continuum of artifact assemblages. For the
constructivists, such orderings could not be tested against the reality of the archaeological
record.
Against this subjectivist position, and holding much in common with conceptual realism
in philosophy, the objective stance viewed the categorization by archaeologists as a process of
making manifest, or discovering, what was inherent in the record. These scholars rejected this
version of theory‐ladenness, or the supposed subjective ordering on the part of archaeologists,
and adhered to a relationship of independence between observer (archaeologist) and the real
world (archaeological record). This latter position found resonance with the influential logical‐
positivist philosophers of science of the time (e.g. Carnap, 1947). While the dilemma was often
cast in the form of a polarity, the majority of archaeologists opted for a middle ground between
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the two positions. Such a middle position seemed to offer a workable solution, allowing
archaeologists to get back to business and create the typologies so central to the operation of
the discipline without accepting either relativism, the outcome of a subjectivist approach, or
naïve empiricism, the outcome of an objectivist approach (see Cultural Relativism, Anthropology
of). The general pattern of archaeologists bolstering polarizing epistemic positions with
philosophical resources and then settling upon a workable middle ground will be encountered
again.
The New Archaeology and philosophy of science
In the 1960’s and 1970’s philosophy of science was drawn upon to support the
theoretical and methodological development of a “new” archaeology. This time Carl Hempel’s
(1965) logical empiricism, a modified version of positivism, was imported by outspoken
archaeologists, most notably Lewis Binford. While many of the themes encountered in previous
periods of contact with philosophy were the same, such as the explicit goal of establishing
criteria for the scientific formulation and evaluation of research questions, the New Archaeology
represented an especially sustained engagement. It also drew in the participation of more
archaeologists and, eventually, philosophers of science. At first there was a fairly direct
importation of Hempel’s ideas concerning covering‐law explanation. Modeled upon physics,
which was considered to be the paragon of scientific method and reasoning, Hempel
nonetheless felt that other, “softer” disciplines could equally generate universal laws applicable
across time and cultures.
Archaeologists such as Binford were keenly aware of the discipline’s inability to directly
observe its subject matter: namely past societies. However, the natural sciences, like physics,
routinely produce generalizations concerning indirectly observed phenomena through the use
of mediating instruments of measurement and observation. By adopting a Hempelian
epistemological framework, New Archaeologists reasoned that the discipline could equally
develop a body of law‐like generalizations through the mediating aid of middle‐range theory
(MRT). It was hoped that MRT would serve as a tool permitting archaeologists to observe past
dynamic societies in the static archaeological record (see Archaeological Theory). Explanation of
the archaeological record would be according to Hempel’s covering‐law (C‐L) model. Under the
C‐L model, particular facets of the archaeological record could be sufficiently explained by fitting
or subsuming the data to the body of law‐like correlations established by MRT. This would move
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archaeological reasoning from induction, or amassing enough data until patterns emerge to
suggest explanations, to deduction. Deductive reasoning inverts this equation by beginning with
hypotheses pertaining to proposed laws, and then systematically searching for data relevant to
the empirical implications of such proposed laws. Relevant data meant that it could potentially
either support or refute the hypotheses. This was the basic workflow to Hempel’s hypothetico‐
deductive (H‐D) model of confirmation.
However, to begin confirming hypotheses about the observed record and build
explanations about what happened in the past, archaeologists needed the linking universal laws.
According to Binford this meant establishing "unambiguous cause‐and‐effect relationships
between the causal dynamics and the derivative statics" (1983: 14). The operationalization of
the New Archaeology would be a two‐step process, then. For this reason, much archaeological
attention turned to the processes responsible for transforming past behavior into the observed
archaeological record. Two influential programs developed to secure the socio‐material laws
necessary for New Archaeology’s fulfillment of the Hempelian ideal of scientific inquiry. Binford
himself turned to ethnoarchaeology to study the archaeological record “in the making” for his
MRT (see Ethnoarchaeology). Michael Schiffer and his colleagues established a behavioral
archaeology (BA) to study the relationships between human behavior and material culture in all
times and places through ethnoarchaeology, experimental and modern material culture studies
(Reid et al., 1975). There are important differences between these two approaches that bear
upon New Archaeology’s Hempelian philosophy. Most significantly is the scale or applicability of
generated laws. For instance, Binford, drawing upon a model of culture as a contained, self‐
functioning system, limits his generalizations derived from observation to the system‐wide level.
For Hempel inspired science, established laws were to be akin to those in physics and the other
natural sciences, not restricted to spatio‐temporal dimensions. Schiffer picks up on this inferred
deficiency and attempts to begin at a non‐culturally specific level of processes in order to
generalize universally, cross‐culturally (Tschauner 1996). Nonetheless, it was less the specific
differences between these two influential currents of research and more the general
assumption of uniformitarianism that united them which presaged the stringent criticisms of the
New Archeology.
Post‐positivist philosophy
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Uniformitarianism, or the assumption that the principles observed in the present
operated identically in the past, is central to both MRT and BA. It is difficult to imagine pursuing
archaeology without such a belief. For philosophers of science uniformitarianism represents the
intractable problem of theory‐ladenness. It is a more general example of where specific
background assumptions influence the course of research. For Hempel, the division of theory
from observation was crucial in his H‐D model of independent testing. Yet by the time New
Archaeology was producing manuals on how to conduct Hempelian science (e.g. Watson, et al.
1971), philosophy of science had largely conceded theory‐ladenness. In large part this was due
to internal commentators like Thomas Kuhn (1962) who convincingly demonstrated the role of
“extra‐scientific” or social, political and ideological factors that propel scientific progress. For
archaeology, the substantive criticism of theory‐ladenness and the possibility of the New
Archaeology program as modeled upon Hempel’s ideals quickly digressed into disciplinary
quarrels. Philosophers of science chastised the new archaeologists for not only
misunderstanding the details of Hempel’s positivistic platform, but for being behind the times in
not engaging the recent literature on post‐positivist philosophy (Levin, 1973; Morgan, 1974).
Archaeologists were being accused of not only doing bad science, but bad scholarship too.
At the same time, there was growing concern within archaeology that, despite drawing
upon Hempel’s models, the pursuit of meaningful generalizations was proving disappointing.
Generalizations about the past were either severely restricted to specific systems or contexts, or
so general as to be derided as “Mickey Mouse laws” (Flannery 1973). For instance, “objects left
on a sloping archeological site wash downhill” (Flannery, 1982: 270). The quest for Hempelian
covering laws was fairing little better in other sciences. Unsurprisingly, many New
Archaeologists became somewhat disillusioned.
A result of these developments was an understandable disaffection with philosophy of
science. Kent Flannery (1982) poignantly channeled this frustration with philosophy in
archaeology in his parody of the “Golden Marshalltown”. Philosophically minded archaeologists
had lost touch with the dirt‐driven details of actually doing archaeology. Robert Dunnell (1982)
suggested that concept borrowing from philosophy of science had done a disservice to the
discipline and that what was called for was an introspective examination of metaphysical
principles. Schiffer (1981) urged the continuation of philosophical analysis in archaeology, but
he noted that philosophers needed to better understand the epistemic problems particular to
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archaeological practice. This stance toward philosophy echoed David Clarke’s (1973) earlier call
for archaeologists to develop a discipline‐specific philosophy.
Several philosophers sympathetic to archaeological pragmatics offered post‐Hempelian
advice. Drawing upon statistics, Merrilee Salmon (1982) discussed statistical‐relevance (S‐R)
accounts of explanation and Bayesian confirmation and inference. Given the observed data,
these models generate a statistical probability for how likely a specific hypothesis or explanation
is relative to competing hypotheses. They also account for the updating of belief in a particular
explanation with the accumulation of new data. The partnership of archaeologist Jane Kelley
and philosopher Marsha Hanen (1988) produced an account drawing, in part, from an
altogether different source of philosophy with pragmatism, embracing inference to the best
explanation. For them, a satisfactory explanation is one that has more “cash value,” to use
pragmatist wording. Relative to competing explanations, it is the one that empirically coheres
with more of the data and so accounts for, or explains, more. At the same time, an adequate
explanation also theoretically satisfies or fits established principles. Guy Gibbon (1989), an
archaeologist trained in philosophy of science, presented arguments from scientific realism that,
contrary to positivist traditions, admitted “unobservables” into the explanatory process. This is
an important concession for archaeology, given the previous discussion of MRT and the
admission that the causal processes responsible for the archaeological record are no longer
directly observable. Similar to Kelley and Hanen, his scientific realism advocates a general
version of inference to the best explanation. Finally, Peter Kosso (1992) unpacked inference to
observation and draws upon models of multi‐component analysis used in the natural sciences.
Epistemic settlements
Alison Wylie (2002), in a work that collects and develops her many essays bridging
philosophy of science and archaeology, identifies the “interpretive dilemma” that the discipline
recurrently faces, demonstrating how theory‐ladenness represents the most recent formulation
of the intractable issue of relativism versus objectivity. Drawing upon scientific realism and
feminist standpoint theories, notably Sandra Harding’s “strong objectivity” proposal, Wylie
makes a compelling argument for mitigating the subjective bias of the observer (theory‐
ladenness) through, in part, turning the argument on its head. She argues that there are
multiple checks, or ”tackings”, that occur both within and across the source‐side (context of
interpreter) and subject‐side (relevant data) in the process of archaeological interpretation.
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Rather than attempt to remove subjective bias involved with background knowledge,
assumptions and proposed models, an ideal that post‐positivist philosophy discredited, Wylie
suggests bringing more interpreters and source‐side models and assumptions to bear upon the
data. Put simply, multiple sources of bias serve to mutually constrain one another in the
interpretive process. For the subject‐side of the equation, Wylie similarly explores how different
sources and types of data interact to place limits on potential interpretations. Taken as a whole,
these empirical and subjective constraints enter interpretation at several points, making it
difficult for a coherent account to emerge. Wylie deploys the Peircean metaphor of the cable to
indicate the strength of the inferences that result from weaving together these various
components or strands of the interpretive process. Rather than a deductive procedure, Wylie’s
“ampliative inference” nevertheless results in what she terms a “mitigated objectivism.”
Wylie’s epistemic settlement, much of which was worked out in earlier essays, appeared
during this period of circumspect rapprochement with philosophy of science. Other epistemic
settlements, in the wake of the New Archaeology, appeared over the same time. Notably
Binford (1989), while accepting that observations are paradigm dependent (theory‐laden),
nonetheless advanced his more moderate ”relative objectivity”. By distinguishing between ”first
order observation” and ”pattern recognition work”, Binford argued that archaeological data
have a chance in the latter step to talk back, or challenge our initial observations. Bias enters
into “first order observation,” where human choice influences which attributes or qualities of
the archaeological record are deemed relevant. However, the next stage of “pattern recognition
work” removes bias from the gathered data because it involves nonhuman, and so objective,
measurements by technology. For example, while the archaeologist must identify and sample
features or artifacts for radiocarbon analysis, a process that involves a host of decisions, the
instruments and technology producing a range of dates for the samples do not involve a human
‘subject’. They therefore produce objective data.
Worrying about a discipline strung along the spectrum from idealism to realism to
positivism, Bruce Trigger (1998) drew upon Darwinian common‐sense to suggest that
knowledge claims, in the present or past, work to aid our existence in the real world. The
general idea is that for knowledge claims to be true they must correspond to reality. No matter
how probable they initially appear, if such explanations do not match reality than they will
hinder our adaptation to our complex environment. Consequently, false claims will be
deselected for over time. The hope was that such an evolutionary approach to epistemology,
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one that resonates with pragmatist accounts of truth confirmation, might offer a unifying,
common‐sense “moderate relativism”.
Initially cast as hyper‐relativist, Ian Hodder over the course of the 1990’s drew upon
hermeneutics, or the philosophy and method of interpretation of texts, to propose a “guarded
objectivity” as a solution to the evaluation of archaeological claims. With other so‐called post‐
processualists, such as Michael Shanks or Christopher Tilley, Hodder argued for a strong
contextualism of the archaeologist. While these archaeologists drew upon an alternate
philosophical literary network, this might be understood as an expanded form of theory‐
ladenness. More strongly than its formulation in philosophy of science, Hodder and his
colleagues argued that the contemporary context of the archaeologist must be considered. It is
a contextualism that draws more attention to the wider social, economic and political factors
brought to bear in archaeological activities. Hodder’s (1999) framework for how these
influences take part in archaeological research was described as the hermeneutic spiral of
interpretation.
Figure 1: Visual rendering of Hodder’s hermeneutic spiral of interpretation (after Hodder, 1999).
Rather than a vicious circle of interpretation, one leading to relativism, Hodder presents
a reflexive analysis of how archaeologists make claims about the past and argues that the
process is never‐ending (or only arbitrarily suspended). No definitive hypothesis testing or
protocol is given for determining when a question has been decisively answered. Instead,
questions lead to partial answers and, more importantly, the answers provided lead to further
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questions. These furthering‐on questions then prefigure, as incorporated into part of the
archaeologist’s own context, additional queries of the past. There are multiple, ongoing
opportunities for the data to resist or disrupt the process, which would generate new questions.
The result is a dialectic or, to use Gadamer’s (1989[1960]) hermeneutic phrase, a “fusing of
horizons”, between archaeologist and past materials.
While there are sympathies in this process to Wylie’s idea of multiple points of contact
between the empirics and the archaeologist’s background assumptions, Hodder’s epistemic
settlement differs in granting the archaeological material more agency in the process. It marks
an increasing concern with ontology, or questions of what entities exist and how they relate, as
opposed to epistemological concerns with how we know about such entities. While twinned to
epistemology to form the pillars of Western philosophy, ontology had been little regarded by
analytic philosophy, of which philosophy of science is a part. Furthermore, ontology and broader
issues of metaphysics were explicitly regarded by the Vienna School, the progenitors of
positivism, as nonsense and superfluous to the purpose of creating an observational language to
facilitate making knowledge claims in science.
The disunity of science and science studies
Put within disciplinary context, these epistemic settlements can be appreciated as
attempts for unification at a time when archaeology was seen to be splintering into a “thousand
archaeologies”(Schiffer, 1988: 479). Some view the plurality of approaches as beneficial,
drawing upon metaphors of democratic inclusion and racial diversity (e.g. Hodder, 2003). Others
believe it to be worrisome and attempt to accentuate shared operational and reasoning
principles among archaeologists despite apparent theoretical divergences (e.g. Vanpool and
Vanpool, 1999). For example, despite the polarization, processual and post‐processual practice
was argued earlier on to be very similar. Tschauner (1996) suggested that post‐processualists
such as Hodder rely upon MRT and principles of BA to make arguments about the past in a
manner similar to processualists. It has also been pointed out that regional techniques aside,
methodologically both camps excavate in a comparable manner (Chadwick, 2003).
While regional specialties and methodologies create differences in practice, the
perception of splintering is due in large part to groups of archaeologists orienting their craft
according to versions of the epistemic settlements presented above. While these settlements
are general heuristics of how archaeological reasoning proceeds, they nevertheless are
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informed by more specific and divergent background assumptions (such as how culture is
modeled), operational procedures (is data acquisition strictly problem‐oriented), and evaluative
work‐flow (fitting in coherentism or testing under falsificationism). A result is that some
archaeologists practice hypothesis testing or statistical‐relevance, others operate according to
interpretive hermeneutics, and many more mix the various procedures in their overall practice.
Whether detrimental or beneficial for the discipline, the disunity of archaeology into
semi‐autonomous working camps is related to the discipline’s former reliance upon the
philosophy of science as well as the larger trend within philosophy of science toward dispersion.
Former debates about how to properly pursue explanation of the past were more focal for the
discipline, particularly with respect to the New Archaeology. They also drew, importantly, upon
a small range of philosophies in their arguments (or in the case of the New Archaeology, two or
three prominent philosophers). Discussion could anchor itself to common philosophical ground,
as it were. Indeed, the unification of science was the explicit function of positivism according to
the Vienna School founders. But whereas philosophers of science or philosophically minded
archaeologists formerly could aid in arbitrating debates, there is now a philosophical vacuum
left by the dispersion of philosophy of science into science studies.
Like Clarke (1973) or Schiffer (1981) within archaeology, the need to attend to the
specific problems, practices, and history and social setting of a discipline was increasingly voiced
by philosophers of science themselves. The problems of fit between philosophical models for
inquiry and disciplinary practitioners’ ability to put them to work were not restricted to
archaeology. Other disciplines were experiencing a troubled engagement. Kuhn’s (1962) analysis
of how science progresses meant, among other things, that scientific practice was not served by
idealized heuristics. It was far messier and contingent. Philosophers of science would need to
work in the trenches (sometimes literally) to appreciate these contingencies and incorporate
them into their models if they were to be of help. This recognition created a sort of crisis of
relevance for philosophy of science (Stoll, 2000). Clearly, generating a single, comprehensive
and unified theory for how science works was no longer the goal of philosophy of science.
Rather, it was necessary to acknowledge the specific workings of particular scientific disciplines
in order to create accurate descriptions and models. In practical terms this meant that there
were many sciences. In the face of what was called the disunity of science (Dupre, 1993; Galison
and Stump, 1996), philosophers interested in science began to embed themselves in specific
disciplines. Historians and philosophers of science, sociologists, and anthropologists, among
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others, increasingly found themselves under the umbrella of the emerging field of science
studies. As Wylie (in Rathje, et al., 2012) relates, the changes endemic to philosophy of science
meant that if one was interested in pursuing a career, one had to be an ”amphibious
philosopher”: immersing oneself in a scientific discipline and obtaining practical training and
credentials in the relevant fields of study. With philosophers of science attending more to the
pragmatic details of particular disciplines, fewer general, trans‐disciplinary programmatic
statements have been offered. While some archaeologists still hold to concepts and heuristics of
philosophy of science of the pre‐Kuhnian period, these are largely implicit and infrequently
discussed in open forums. Philosophy of science has largely gone underground in archaeology.
Other varieties of philosophy have come to the fore of archaeological conversations.
Philosophical pluralism in archaeology
Due to the prominence of analytical philosophy in Anglo‐American philosophy
departments beginning in the early 20th‐century, continental and pragmatist traditions within
philosophy received little attention from archaeologists. There had been isolated exceptions,
such as Raymond Thompson’s (1956) use of American pragmatist John Dewey. Yet with the
growth of science studies and the decline in influence of analytic philosophy as handmaiden to
science, many more archaeologists began to import ideas from continental sources. Interpretive
or post‐processual archaeologists drew upon a range of philosophers in their arguments against
the positivist leanings of the New Archaeology. As noted above, Hodder cited hermeneutic
authors, such as Collingwood, Dilthey and Heidegger, and later Gadamer and Riceour, in
developing his interpretive platform. Other post‐processualists, such as Shanks and Tilley (1992),
looked to social and political philosophers like Althusser, Bachelard, Derrida and Foucault. Much
less consolidated around epistemic questions of scientific explanation, continental sources tend
to be more interested in subjectivity and the role of the individual in society (as are some
pragmatist thinkers). A broad range of social theorists were likewise enlisted to build arguments
against some of the fundamental tenets that New Archaeologists had advanced. Among other
differences, interpretive archaeologists construed culture as a dynamic between individual
agency and societal structures rather than framed as the extra‐somatic means of adaptation to
the environment. The corollary meant that past cultures were not framed in eco‐materialist (or
eco‐determinist) models, and so were less amenable to causal analysis. Hempelian models for
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scientific inquiry were viewed not only as overly idealistic, as post‐positivist philosophers had
argued with archaeologists, but also as inapplicable to archaeology’s domain of study.
Such interpretive accounts, like Hodder’s hermeneutic spiral, greatly contrasted with
previous forms of evidential reasoning discussed in archaeology, whether analogical reasoning,
simple inference and inference to the best explanation, falsificationism and verificationism.
Given the already circumspect relationship of archaeologists to philosophy of science, the new
flurry of less familiar and seemingly eclectic philosophical sources in archaeological research
cumulatively effected a largely negative reaction to the post‐processualists. Perhaps perceived
as adding insult to injury, there had been a fairly quick succession of (at times acrimonious)
theoretical debates involving philosophy in archaeology.
The array of philosophical sources introduced to archaeology continues unabated. As
one example, the compendium, Philosophy and Archaeological Practice (Holtorf and Karlsson,
2000), added philosophers as disparate as Feyerabend, Irigaray, Levinas, Merleau‐Ponty and
Wittgenstein. The use of these philosophical sources varies greatly. Many are employed in a
manner similar to what philosophers of science would regard as source‐side work. That is, the
development of new models for investigation in a manner similar to the role that ethnographic
analogy served MRT. At other times, certain philosophies are used to build up a more thorough
going archaeological program, extending from problem formulation through to modes of
investigation and sometimes explanatory justification. Tilley’s (1994) use of Merleau‐Ponty and
Julian Thomas’ (1996) work with Heidegger to develop phenomenological approaches to
landscapes are notable examples. Here the archaeologist him or herself is used as an analogue
for past individuals’ perception of archaeological features. Another example is Robert Preucel’s
(2010) refinement of Hodder’s initial work on hermeneutics and the active role of archaeological
materials for the interpretive process with his use of American pragmatist C. S. Peirce’s
semiotics. Here Peirce’s tripartite scheme of icon, index and symbol is used to demonstrate how
cultures and social groups variably ascribed meaning to materials and how such materials had a
part within social contexts to determine their own significance.
In addition to these continental and pragmatist inspired approaches, there continues to
be sporadic engagement with post‐positivist philosophy. As a sampling, William Krieger (2006)
argues for the mutual benefit that would result from archaeology re‐embracing the scientific
realism of Bunge and Harré. Sandra Wallace (2011) presents Bhaskar’s critical realism and
suggests that its concern with open systems, in contrast to scientific ideals of closed, laboratory‐
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like systems, could better model past societies. She also contends that critical realism’s concern
with “depth ontology” could aid archaeology in avoiding unhelpful dichotomies, such as that
between the social and material, or between explanatory tendencies of reduction and
conflation. This is because critical realism is a relational approach to ontology that emphasizes
shifting internal relations among different levels or strata that make up reality, such as the
social, biological or material. The hope is to avoid conventional conceptions of reality that are
argued to be either too atomistic, with reality composed of individual and distinct bits, or overly
holistic, with reality being an undifferentiated soup. In addition, and similarly to Gibbon’s
“unobservables” in his scientific realism, absence is theorized to be real and have effects in
Wallace’s relational account.
Current orientations
Despite this diversity of uses for, and types of, philosophy in recent archaeology, several
emerging research orientations have re‐focused upon science studies as the contemporary
inheritor of philosophy of science. Most of these work with ideas developed by ethnographers
of science in observing the practicalities of “science in action” (e.g. Latour, 1986). Sometimes
identifying themselves as science and technology studies (STS), these observers have
influentially drawn attention to the active role of things (objects, instruments, inscriptions) as
they operate as networks with humans to accomplish tasks (Webmoor 2012). Many of these STS
scholars have explicitly rejected epistemology as being unhelpful due to its deep‐seated
assumption of a subject‐object split (often attributed to René Descartes). One resulting mantra
has been to avoid making assumptions beforehand regarding what or who the “actants” are in
any given investigation (hence modifying the human‐centric term in favor of actant).
Andrew Jones (2002) draws upon science studies in his account of archaeological
practice. Demonstrating that archaeological materials have agency in partially determining their
interpretation, he offers an integrationist approach that obviates concerns over subjectivity and
objectivity and might unite science‐based and interpretive archaeologists. Combining insights
from philosophy of mind, cognitive science and STS, Carl Knappet and Lambros Malafouris
(2008) develop Colin Renfrew’s cognitive archaeology in non‐anthropocentric directions.
Drawing upon a range of archaeological examples, from experimental studies with pottery
making to reflexive analyses of archaeological recording, Knappet and Malafouris focus
Page 15 of 19
attention on the manner in which action in the past is never the exclusive domain of social or
material factors.
Those advocating relational ontology likewise bring attention to non‐anthropocentric
ideas of identity and agency in the past, such as the mutual constitution and dependence of
humans, nonhumans and other life‐fellows. Christopher Watts (2013) brings together an
assortment of archaeologists who draw upon STS authors, indigenous metaphysics and
continental philosophers, such as Deleuze and Guattari and Manuel De Landa, to develop a
concept of existence as an emergent, fluid assemblage of connected components rather than a
fixed and stable given. The emphasis upon ontology for most of these scholars alters the role
and practice of the archaeologist. It shifts from a traditional concern with accurately
representing the reality of the archaeological record, to presenting alternate possible realities of
the past.
Olsen, Shanks, Webmoor and Witmore (2012) draw together this growing interest in
ontology and material agency by articulating a dissatisfaction with the increased prevalence of
social constructivism and social theory more generally in a discipline that is, as they remind
archaeologists, surely “the discipline of things”. Working with STS, but also engaging with a
group of trans‐Atlantic philosophers who identify as speculative realists (e.g., Harman, 2010),
the authors present a series of arguments for how taking seriously the active (but non‐
deterministic) role of materials involved in the practice of archaeology might contribute to
disciplinary self‐confidence vis‐à‐vis philosophy or other social sciences. To do this they offer the
principle of symmetry as an attitude regarding reality that avoids a priori theorizations about the
nature of things, as in relational, atomistic or holistic accounts. Instead, they advocate the
unique expertise of archaeologists to empirically document settings whereby any conception of
the realities involved is an outcome not a starting point. For example, careful recording of an
artifact and its context enables post‐excavation analysis where it may emerge that objects and
their qualities are the locus of explanation, or, alternatively, that the entire assemblage with its
relations needs emphasizing, or that a dialectical explanation moving between singular objects
and the larger contexts fits best. The point is that the principle of symmetry applied along the
entire work flow keeps archaeologists agnostic until the empirics overwhelmingly compel. This
ontological outlook avoids privileging relations among things, the relations themselves, or the
inherent qualities of things themselves.
Page 16 of 19
In all there has been a discernible shift in archaeology toward an engagement with
science studies and a wider suite of philosophies. This has accompanied a greater complacency
toward issues explicitly concerned with epistemology and a growing interest in ontology and the
role of the material in human life past and present. Given the wider conversation taking place
across the humanities and social sciences around the importance of material things, archaeology
and philosophy’s current engagement stands to make a vital contribution to these wider
matters of concern. Despite the changes over their long history of interaction, the partnership of
philosophy and archaeology stands to continue in new and interesting directions.
Cross References
anthropology of science, archaeology of ritual and symbolism, cognitive archaeology,
theory in archaeology
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