Digested Cases Constitutional Law 1

1. Francisco vs.
House of Representatives
GR NO. 160261
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the

adopted a Resolution,
which directed the
Committee on Justice “to
conduct an investigation,
in aid of legislation, on
the manner of
disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
On June 2, 2003, former
President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices
of this Court for “culpable
violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of
the public trust and other high
crimes.” The complaint was
endorsed by Representatives
Suplico,
Zamora and Dilangalen, and
was referred to the House
Committee on Justice in
accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
The House Committee on
Justice ruled that the first
impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in
form,” but voted to dismiss the
same for being insufficient in
substance.
On October 23, 2003, the
second impeachment
complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of
the House against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated
by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second
impeachment
complaint was accompanied
by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment”
signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of
Representatives
which directed the
the manner of
disbursements and
President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an
G. Davide Jr.
betrayal of
Suplico,
accordance with
the Constitution.
“sufficient in
substance.
second impeachment
Jr., founded on the
impeachment
signed by at least
Representatives
which directed the
the manner of
disbursements and
President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an
G. Davide Jr.
betrayal of
Suplico,
accordance with
the Constitution.
“sufficient in
substance.
second impeachment
Jr., founded on the
impeachment
signed by at least
Representatives
Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court
was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to
controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.
Issue:
Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against

Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls
within the one year bar provided in the Constitution and whether the
resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.
Held:
Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is
sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this
Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort
to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor
legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest
lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution. In passing over the
complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of
the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among
the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
2. Gonzales vs. COMELEC

G.R. L-28196
Facts:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives
passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3 – i.e. to increase the seats of the Lower
House from 120 to 180; to convoke a Constitutional Convention of 1971;
and to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can become
delegates themselves to the Convention.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the

President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that
the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the
general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Two cases were filed against this act of Congress: One an is original action
for prohibition, with preliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-
28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have
instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens,
taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Another one is by PHILCONSA, in
L-28224, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the
objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to
defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever
source.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent
assembly — violates the Constitution?
2. May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a
General Election?
Held:
The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a
constituent assembly — violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.
In the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, said
resolutions are null and void because Members of Congress, which approved
the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to
propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen (based upon
Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, no apportionment has been made
been made by Congress within three (3) years since 1960. Thereafter, the
Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became
illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress
and/or de facto congressmen);
However, As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be
assailed collaterally. Referring particularly to the contested proposals for
amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of
the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967,
depends — in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar
as this phase of the case, constitute the minority — upon whether the
provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people
of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is —
under R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum number of seats in the
House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3 —
the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the duties of
such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We — who
constitute the minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such
requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of
certain proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on
the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the
people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the election.
3. Defensor-Santiago vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325
Facts:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend
Constitution, to lift term limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative.
Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said people’s initiative the
signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: “Do you approve
of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the
purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section
8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition
for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at
least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally
filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners
Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that
it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution
can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has
been passed.b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative
but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of
people’s initiative was left to some future law.c. COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.d.
People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to
revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.e.
Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for
people’s initiative.
Issue:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII
of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments
to the Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such
intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution providing for
amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitution
has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not

suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of
the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not
relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution.
Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec
5(c) does not include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This

conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of
the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. The
argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not
accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its
nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law,
or a law which only Congress can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law,
ordinance or resolution which only legislative bodies of the governments of
the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
can pass. Potestas delegata non delegari potest
4. Tolentino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150
Facts:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent
assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on
November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1,
1971.
In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved

Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING
SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE
VOTING AGETO 18."
On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the

mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with
the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main

thrust being that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing
resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far
as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial
elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is,
by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative
body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article
XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question
cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and
all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971

Constitutional Convention violative to the Constitution.
Held:
No. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must

be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a
plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly
held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for
an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as
its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly
started considering the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the
existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of
them cannot comply with this requirement.
5. In Re: Laureta Maravilla
148 SCRA 382
Facts:
Maravilla (for the third time) was involved in a controversy with the
estate of the late Digna Maravilla (Aunt) and was elevated to this court. It
was ruled that Digna’s will, was probated and proved her husband
Hermanio as universal heir. She and other siblings filed two motions for
intervention. The court of appeals resolved the issue of Intervention with the
escolin decision. Where the court agrees with private respondents that
Petitioner’s motions for intervention are devoid of merit, for failure on their
part to show any right or Interest in the estate in question Ilustre, with
Laureta as counsel, attempted to circumvent this ruling by filing for the
partition of the Estate and damages against the heirs of Herminio Maravilla,
which Ilustre won this case. A special civil action for certiorari was filed by
the defeated parties and the SC then remanded the Case to the Court of
Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition
initially, but eventually reversed its decision after a motion of
reconsideration from the defeated parties. Illustre then petitioned for review,
but was dismissed. The decision of the trial court overturns a decision
already, it will violate the principle of res judicata (a matter that has been
adjudicated by a competent court and may not be pursued further by the
same. The Supreme Court dismissed the same in a three minute resolutions
promulgated therein. The justices then received the letters with dangling
threats written by Maravilla and then she filed the complaint to the
Ombudsman. Atty. Laureta, the petitioner’s counsel reportedly circulated
copies of the complaint to the press, which was widely publicized with the
topic of graft charges.
Issues:
1. WON the act of filing an affidavit-complaint to the ombudsman
(tanodbayan) undermine the separation of powers and the independence of
the judiciary?
2. WON Ilustre be held in contempt and Laureta be subject to disciplinary
action?
Ruling:
Both yes. Illustre has transcended the line of fair comment and criticism to
the detriment of the orderly administration of Justice in her letters. The
constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used
as a shield for contemptuous acts against the court. In her statements,
conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official
actions of the justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to
them; she can no longer expect justice from this court. Atty. Laureta has
committed acts of unbecoming an officer of the court. His stance of dangling
threats of bringing the matter to the “proper forum” to effect change of the
court’s. Adverse resolution, his lack of respect for and exposing to public
ridicule the highest courts of the land for authoring or at the very least
assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous
statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client. An attorney’s
first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice “a lawyer is
an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice”
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are Sui generis
-not purely civil nor purely criminal
-held in investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers
The court en banc held Maravilla in contempt and was fined Php1000
while Atty. Laureta was found guilty of grave professional misconduct,
rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney. He was suspended from the practice of law
until further orders.
6. Demetria vs Alba
G.R. 71977
Facts:
The petitioners contend that the assailed provision authorizes the
illegal transfer of public funds for failing to specify the purpose of the
transfer and allowing the President to override the constitutionally
prescribed safeguards, form and procedure, which amounts to an undue
delegation of legislative power to the executive, the exercise of which is or in
excess of his authority and jurisdiction. The Solicitor General, for the public
respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and contend
that there is no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination,
and the provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Paragraph
5, Section 16, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, “No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the
Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
The petitioners filed the instant petition as concerned citizens, as
members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing
millions of constituents, as parties with shared general interest with the
people of the Philippines, and as tax payers whose vital interests they
sought to protect, replied to hold the resolution of the present case in
abeyance "until developments arise to enable the parties to concretize their
respective stands. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to
dismiss on the ground that Paragraph 5, Section 16, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution was abrogated by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986;
hence, rendered the instant petition moot and academic.
Issues:
1. Whether the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act
despite being moot and academic.
2. Whether the petitioners have
locus standi to question the constitutionality of paragraph 1 of The Budget
Reform Decree of 1977.
3. Whether the assailed provision authorizes undue delegation of legislative
power to the executive, hence, unconstitutional.
Ruling:
1.Yes. The Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case it being not only
the highest arbiter of legal questions but is also the conscience of the
government. Although the dispute has disappeared
with the abolition of the Batas Pambansa, this case need to be resolved for
the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. The legal ambiguities
cannot be disregarded and the case dismissed on the pretext of being moot
and academic.
It is the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial
power conferred by the Constitution.2.
Yes. As taxpayers, they have sufficient interest in preventing
illegal spending of public funds and may question the constitutionality of
statutes concerned with expenditure of public money to forestall abuses in
the expenditure of public funds.3.
Yes. Section 44 of PD 1177 goes beyond the tenor of Section 16(5) by
empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department of the Executive Department to any program of any department
included in the General Appropriations Act, with disregard to the standards
set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers. In the 1973Constitution, it is explicitly stated that one
cannot transfer an appropriation for one item to another. It only allowed
enactment of a law which authorized transfer of funds in order to augment
an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government
branch or constitutional body concerned. Such constitutional violations
therefore, render the provision in question null and void. Petition granted.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared
null and void for being unconstitutional.
7. Angara vs Electoral Tribunal/Commission

G.R. No L-45081
Facts:
Jose A. Angara was proclaimed as the member-elect of the National

Assembly (NA) for the First District of the Province of Tayabas in October 7,
1935. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution
confirming the election of its members against whom no protest had been
filed. On the other hand, Pedro Ynsua, one of the losing candidates for the
said position, filed before the Electoral Commission (EC) a Motion of Protest
against the election of Angara on December 8, 1935. A day after, the EC
adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 which provides that the Commission will
not consider any protest that has not been filed on or before the said date,
December 9, 1935.
Angara then filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by the virtue of the NA
proclamation, Ynsua could no longer file for a protest since the prescribed
period for filing of protests had already ended on December 3, 1935 and the
respondent filed the protest only in December 8, 1935.
Meanwhile, Ynsua claims that there was no constitutional or legal provision

which states that the confirmation of the NA could not be contested. The EC
then denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
The petitioner then filed a protest to the Supreme Court (SC) questioning the
EC’s jurisdiction over the case and argued that the EC could only regulate
proceedings, and that the SC has jurisdiction to pass upon fundamental
questions in the issue since it is an interpretation of the constitution.
In response to the petitioner’s argument, Solicitor General Hilado, who

represented the Electoral Commission, contends that the EC is a
constitutional body which has the jurisdiction to decide all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly and that the said acts is beyond the power of the SC.
Issues:
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral

Commission and the controversy, and if the Electoral Commission acted
within or without jurisdiction.
Held/Ruling:
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, declared that

the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with
specific powers and functions to execute and perform as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the National
Assembly (Section 11, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution). It is
held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by Ynsua against the election.
8. La Bugal-B’laan vs Ramos
G.R. No. 127882
FACTS:
On March 3, 1995, then Pres. Fidel V. Ramos approved the R.A.
7942, known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, an act that shall govern
the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral
resources of the country.
On March 30, 1995, a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) was executed between the government and the Western Mining
Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
On January 23, 2001, Western Mining Corporation, an Australian Mining
Company, sold its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc., 60 percent of
whose equity was held by Filipinos.
The Petitioners (La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. et al.) assails the
constitutionality of the RA 7942, DAO 96-40, asserting that its provisions
to allow fully foreign owned corporations like the WMCP to exploit our
natural resources goes against Article XII Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution.
On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its decision granting
the Petition and declaring certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40,
unconstitutional, as well as of the entire FTAA executed by the government
with WMCP. It was found that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited
under the 1987 Constitution.
Subsequently, the respondents Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and
Geosciences Bureau), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary) and WMC
(Philippines), Inc., filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining
Law) is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the FTAA executed between the government and
WMCP is unconstitutional.
RULINGS/HELD:
1. No. The R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act is not
unconstitutional. An objection has been expressed that Section 3(aq) of RA
7942 -- which allows a foreign contractor to apply for and hold
an exploration permit -- is unconstitutional. The reasoning is that Section 2
of Article XII of the Constitution does not allow foreign-owned corporations
to undertake mining operations directly. They may act only as contractors of
the State under an FTAA; and the State, as the party directly undertaking
exploitation of its natural resources, must hold through the government all
exploration permits and similar authorizations. Hence, Section 3(aq), in
permitting foreign-owned corporations to hold exploration permits, is
unconstitutional¸The objection, however, is not well-founded. While the Constitution
mandates the State to exercise full control and supervision over the exploitation of mineral
resources, nowhere does it require the government to hold all exploration permits and similar
authorizations. In fact, there is no prohibition at all against foreign or local corporations or
contractors holding exploration permits.
No. The Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) executed by the
government and the Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WCMP) is not
unconstitutional. Article XII Section 2 Paragraph 4 of the Constitution gives the President an
authority to enter agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided
by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country, thus, making the WCMP FTAA valid and Constitutional. However, Sections 7.8 and
7.9 of the subject FTAA are INVALIDATED for being contrary to public policy and for being
grossly disadvantageous to the government. Since the offending provisions is very much
separable from the rest of FTAA, the deletions of Sections 7.8 & 7.9 can be done without
affecting or requiring the invalidation of the entire WMCP FTAA itself.
9. La Bugal-B’laan vs Ramos
G.R. No. 127882
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528,

which downgraded the status of Santiago from an independent component
city to a component, on the ground that it lacks provision for submitting the
law for ratification in a proper plebiscite, as required in Section 10, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution. Respondents and intervenors mainly argued,
among other things, that RA 8528 is a mere reclassification of status of
Santiago from independent component city to a component and did not
involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, hence plebiscite is not required.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning of

creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution?
2. Whether or not RA 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to

provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city should be
submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite?
RULINGS:
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Puno, teaches us that

the said “constitutional provision reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units
involve a common denominator — material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the
people therein. x x x The spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
calls for the people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a
plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities.
In the present case, “the changes that will result from the
downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to
a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial.
For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished.
The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the
provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of
Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes
that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the
province. X x x They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component
city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the
transition will radically change its physical and political configuration as
well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.”
As such, the downgrading of the city of Santiago is a material change

and within the scope of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires a plebiscite.

Hence, the Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. and the writ
of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from
implementing said law.
10. PACU VS. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
G.R. No. L-5279
Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
(PACU) questioned the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act
No. 3075, and Commonwealth Act 180. Act No. 2706 provides that before a
private school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit
from the Secretary of Education, which they aver restrains the right of a
citizen to own and operate a school.
Said Act also confers on the Sec. of Education the duty to maintain a
general standard of efficiency in all private schools xxx. Philippine
Association of Colleges and Universities contends this confers unlimited
power constituting unlawful delegation of legislative power. On the other
hand, RA 139 confers upon the Board of Textbooks power to review all
textbooks to be used in private schools and prohibit the use of those
deemed, in sum, unsuitable. Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities avers this is censorship in “its baldest form”.
Issue:
Whether or not PACU validly assail the constitutionality of the
statutes?
Held:
No. The action is premature. There is no justiciable controversy as
petitioners have suffered no wrong and therefore no actual and positive relief
may be had in striking down the assailed statutes. Petitioner private schools
are operating under the permits issued to them pursuant to the assailed
Act, and there is no threat, as they do not assert, that the Sec. of Education
will revoke their permits. Mere apprehension that the Secretary might,
under the law, withdraw the permit does not constitute a justiciable
controversy. Petitioners also do not show how the “general standard of
efficiency” set by the Secretary has injured any of them or interfered with
their operation. It has not been shown that the Board of Textbooks has
prohibited certain texts to which petitioners are averse and are thereby in
danger of losing substantial privileges or rights.
11. Mariano vs. COMELEC

G.R. 118577
Facts:
Juanito Mariano Jr., resident of Makati together with Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual,
Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba,residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig and Metro Manila, as
taxpayers file a case assailing certain provisions of R.A. No. 7854, An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati into Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati, as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Issues:
Whether or not:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
in relation to Section 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter o restart the “three-
consecutive term” limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section
8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution;
3. Section 52 of R.A No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
a. it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law the

Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three
(3) years following the return of every census;
b. the increase in legislative district as not expressed in the bill; and
c. the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not accord
with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest
survey (1990 Census), the population of Makati stands only at
450,000. Said section provides inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000), shall
have at least one representative.
Held:
1. No. The said delineation did not change even an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as municipality. Section 2 did not add,
subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In
language that cannot be any clearer, Section2 stated that the city’s
land area “shall comprise the present territory of the municipality”. The
court also takes judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also
refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas
of other local government units with unsettled boundary dispute. At
the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute
between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio
was under court litigation.
2. No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the

constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality
must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied
with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of
many contingent events. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which
has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are
residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no
jurisdiction.
3.
a.) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, "unless
otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly
what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing
for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment
law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation
where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
b.) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law
should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its
details. it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general
subject.
c.) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In
fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides
that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.
12. Montesclaros vs COMELEC

G.R. 152295
Facts:
Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a

later date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for
in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The
SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult"
to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002.
Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of age for membership in the
SK.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction imputable to respondents.
Held:
The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections,
petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to
any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK
elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same
law, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the
original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in
the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested
right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and

voters for the SK elections was held to be applicable on the July 15 2002
election. It’s constitutionality not having been assailed in the first place.
The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in
maintaining this suit, that the petition presented no actual justiciable
controversy, that petitioners did not cite any provision of law that is alleged
to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of public respondents.
13. Lacson vs. Perez

G.R. No. 147780
Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No.
38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the
PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several
alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.
Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and
habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the
declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by
virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court,
wherein the information against them were filed, would
desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also
contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests
and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against
them.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless
arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.
Held:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6,
2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and
academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the
police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the
courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort
to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the
rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are
not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition
is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has
adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for
preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing
for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to
the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such
may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no
legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention,
not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure
orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the
near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio
must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless
arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them
for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since
its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not
subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their

undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives,
and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting
Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in
relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
14. Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary

G.R. 159085
Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and
direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building
in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and
declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the
resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These
acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by
virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was
declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the
officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On
August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and
Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was
issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1)

SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of
the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to
call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners
contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the
President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as
Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep.
Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary
Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of
Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4)
Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of
warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional?
(2) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to
bring suit?
Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not
expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to
its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to
call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised
within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported
their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of
the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is
rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep.
Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing
to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers
of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
15. Pimental vs Ermita

G.R. No. 164978
Facts:
While Congress is in their regular session, President Arroyo,
through Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim

appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which
they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.Petitioners senators
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the
appointments issued.
They assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no

appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first
having obtained its consent.
Respondent secretaries, on the other hand, maintain that the

President can issue appointments in an acting capacity
to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session.
Issue:
Whether or not President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as
acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments
while Congress is in session is constitutional.
Held:
The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot because
President Arroyo had extended to respondents ad interim appointments on
23 September 2004 immediately after the recess of Congress.
As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already
done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a
question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its
resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the President’s
appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress
is in session will arise in every such appointment.
16.Joya vs PCGG
G.R. No. 96541
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a
Consignment Agreement with Christie’s of New York, selling 82 Old Masters
Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of
the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction sale,
COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition
to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the
proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
Issue:
Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an

agreement with Christie’s of New York for the sale of the artworks
Held:
Court has jurisdiction to review and interpret cases if there is a question
involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act and that petitioner
must comply with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry Petitioners failed to
comply with the requisites:
 The petitioners have no legal standing to raise the question. The
items involved are personal belongings/donation (of the Marcos
couple) therefor the true owners are the proper party.
 Given that there must be an actual controversy, which involves a
conflict of legal rights and must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. The issues raised by the petition long past the actual
selling, which have become moot and academic: making it not
cognizable by a court of justice.
 The appeal that the items are protected due to their historical and
cultural significance is also VOID as the National Museum
Director himself, the who have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, certified that not
constitute protected cultural properties.
 Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition. Petition
DISMISSED due to lack of merit.
17. Agan vs PIATCO

G.R. No. 155001
Facts:
Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of
investing in the new NAIA airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging
Dragon Corp. They submitted proposals to the government for the
development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA
approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and among the
proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging
that preference was given to Paircargo, but still the project was awarded to
Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals
Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into
a concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal
for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in the matters of pertaining to the
definition of the obligations given to the concessionaire, development of
facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract.
Since MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA
terminals I and II, it has a contract with several service providers. The
workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that they would lose their
job, and the service providers joined them, filed a motion for intervention.
Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality
of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar petitions.
Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO
contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void.
Issue:
Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with
its amendments for being contrary to the constitution.
Held:
The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public
policy. The amendments have the effect of changing it into and entirely
different agreement from the contract bidded upon. The amendments
present new terms and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO
which may have the altered the technical and financial parameters of other
bidders had they know that such terms were available. The
1997 concession agreement, the amendments and supplements thereto are
set aside for being null and void.
The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by

the concession agreement as their livelihood is to be taken away from them.
18. CHR Employees Assoc. vs CHR

G.R. 155336
Facts
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal
Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR
promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. To
support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same
resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount
generated from savings under Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution
No. A98-062 the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the
positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III,
three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. The
CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM
with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin
Diokno denied the request. In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed
personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office,
through a memorandum recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the
subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the
plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in
representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the
CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional
Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency
with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve
matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and
reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading
scheme be censured.
Issue:
Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights validly implement
an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions
in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget
and Management?
Held:
CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office
both erred in sanctioning the CHR’s alleged blanket authority to upgrade,
reclassify, and create positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM
relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the
CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned, particularly with
regard to the upgrading and reclassification of positions therein. The CHR,
although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included
in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.as the law’s designated body to implement and administer a
unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an
administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is
accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the
courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,we echoed the basic
rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies.
19.Automotive Industry Workers Alliance vs Romulo

G.R. 157509
Facts:
Executive Order No. 292 initially established the National Labor
Relations Commission as an agency attached to the Department of Labor
and Employment for both policy and program coordination and
administrative supervision. However, on March 2, 1989, Republic Act No.
6715 Amended Article 213 of the Labor Code, specifying that the NLRC
should be attached to the DOLE solely for program and policy coordination,
with administrative supervision placed under the NLRC Chairman. Then, on
March 10, 2003, Executive Order No. 185 reinstated the Secretary of Labor
and Employment's supervision over the NLRC.
Ten labor unions, the petitioners, challenged the constitutionality of

EO 185, claiming that it reverted to the setup prior to RA 6715, an action
only Congress can undertake. The Solicitor General argued that petitioners
lacked locus standi to challenge EO 185, even in their capacity as taxpayers,
as labor unions are exempt from taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform Act
of 1997. Even if their individual members were taxpayers, respondents
argued that a taxpayer lawsuit would not succeed, as EO 185 did not
require additional appropriations for implementation.
Issue:
Whether or not the ten labor unions have legal standing to assail the
constitutionality of EO 185?
Ruling:
The petition is dismissed because it lacks merit. To have standing, a
citizen must demonstrate that they have experienced actual or potential
harm due to the government's alleged unlawful actions.
This harm must be directly linked to the challenged action and capable of
being resolved through a favorable decision. Petitioners have not presented
evidence of personal harm resulting from the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As
labor unions, it cannot be argued that E.O. No. 185 will adversely affect
their rights and interests since the Secretary of Labor's authority does not
extend to reviewing, reversing, revising, or modifying NLRC decisions in its
quasi-judicial capacity.
20.Tañada vs Tubera
G.R. No. L-63915
Facts:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as
recognized by the 1973 constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its
enforcement.
Ruling:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides
for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of
general applicability” is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees
that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive
orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.
21.Chavez vs PEA and Amari

G.R. No. 133250
Facts:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were
being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority
which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this
case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private
corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA,
several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and
several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be
transferred to AMARI .
Issue:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to
AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
Held:
Yes. Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain Section 3
of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates
of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is
outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void from the beginning.”
The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
22. KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia

G.R. No.115381 239 SCRA 386
Facts: :
Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum
Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando
allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range
of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1)
year.
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum

Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others, that "The existing authorized
fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and
jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the
authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis
for the expanded fare range."
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of

the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to
collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having
filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB
opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed
for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial
bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later
increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over
and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for
the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.
Held:
Yes. Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature
delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the
rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body
today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated
June 19, 1987. x x x However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of
law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to
delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other
public service.
23. IBP vs. ZAMORA

G.R. No. 141284
Facts:
Invoking his power as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of
the Constitution, The President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment of the Marines
to assist the PNP in preventing or obviate criminal and lawless violence. The
President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period of
time only, until such that the situation shall improve. The IBP filed a
petition requesting to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null
and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity
of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in
joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and civilian character of the PNP.
Held:
The power of the judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The deployment of
the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assts for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the
conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and
render logistical supports to the soldiers.
24. Executive Secretary vs CA

G.R. No. 131719
Facts:
Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect on July 15, 1995. Before the law
took effect, ARCO-Phil filed a petition asking the court to declare some
provisions of the law unconstitutional. The law required that only skilled
workers were to be deployed for employed abroad. According to the
respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because
they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It
cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by
employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was
pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses
by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of
unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal
recruiters. The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a)
to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment
agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that
while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders of
licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No.
8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b)
being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the
equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are
violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed
out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies
who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment
under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 8042 is valid

Held:
Section 6 of RA 8042 was previously upheld as valid. It provides that
employees of recruitment agencies may be criminally liable for illegal
recruitment.
Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers
and employees and their relatives employed in government agencies charged
with the enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and imposing life
imprisonment for those who commit large scale illegal recruitment is not
offensive to the Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal
recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after trial, the
prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime charged.
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and
registered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business
operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws cannot be
based on such conjectures or speculations. The respondent even failed to
adduce any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the enforcement
of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension that,
because of time constraints, its members would have to defend foreign
employees in cases before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even
if true, such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.
Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying
on innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the
primary considerations that led to the enactment of The Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater protection to
overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws in
the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment.
By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans
any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution
of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue victimizing hapless and
innocent people desiring to obtain employment abroad as overseas workers,
and blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in Rep. Act
No. 8042.
The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of
preliminary injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
25. Kilosbayan vs Guingona

G.R. No. 113375
Facts:
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), with the approval of the
President, entered into a Contract of Lease with Phil. Gaming Management
Corp. (PGMC) which was organized through the initiative of the Berjaya
Group Berhad, a foreign company. This was executed despite vigorous
opposition from petitioner Kilosbayan on account of its alleged immorality
and illegality. Kilosbayan, an organization of “civic-spirited citizens,” filed
the instant petition as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Respondents
challenge the petitioners’ legal standing to file this petition.
Issue:
Must the action fail for the alleged lack of a legal standing?
Ruling:
No. We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to
the public, and the issues it raised are of paramount public interest. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and
moral wellbeing of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country
and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-
line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to
raise. In the exercise of its sound discretion, in keeping with its duty to
determine whether or not the other branches of govt have exercised grave
abuse of discretion given them, this Court hereby brushes aside the
procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. The
Court voted 7-6 on this issue. (The Contract of Lease was eventually
declared invalid for being violative of the charter of PCSO)
26.Ople vs Torres
G.R. No. 127685
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation
of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on
our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion.
Petitioner contends that the establishment of a national computerized

identification reference system requires a legislative act. The issuance of
A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of the Philippines is, therefore,
an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue:
WON the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of
the Philippines is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of
the congress of the Republic of the Philippines?
Ruling:
Yes, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of
the congress of the Republic of the Philippines.
The Court held that the Constitution, as the will of the people in their
original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is
broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary
power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by
the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all
subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President
executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the Presidents. It is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance. The President has the duty of supervising the enforcement of
laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to
enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
In this case, A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to
be covered by an administrative order. It establishes for the first time a
National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-
gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Regulations are not
supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress
enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are
entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
independent source of power to make laws.
Hence, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of
the congress of the Republic of the Philippines.
27.Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560
Facts:
In 2001, following the impeachment trial of then President Joseph
Estrada, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight Informations
against him, including one for the violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA
7659, or the Plunder Law.
Estrada assailed the constitutionality of the said law, arguing that:
(a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;

(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and,
(c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under the RPC, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Issues:
The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
Held:
The whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to
be in harmony with the Constitution
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to
at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration
provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets... belonging to the
National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal
acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par.
(d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all
of which fall under Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or
distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken
greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
28. Umali vs Guingona

G.R. 131124
Facts:
Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in
Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994
to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a
confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of
internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as
Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance
and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former
President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension
of the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to
the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for
investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And
was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets,
and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial
hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On
August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the
evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994,
finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges
against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of
the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152
dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all
benefits under the law.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of
Tenure.
(2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law
(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency

and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly
in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision.
(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges

against the petitioner is still basis for the petitioner's dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152
Held:
Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be
removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of
confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal.
Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence
violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful
study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled
correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the
right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner
filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of
internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings before
the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of
non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis.
Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as
his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of
Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of
tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of
evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO
eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the
matter. His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality
of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly
too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to
last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the
administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the
institution of the criminal case. The charges included in Administrative
Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the
PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the Ombudsman. In sum,
the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by the
petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding
and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into
account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court,
in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of
the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and
unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the
position taken by the Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for
Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening
events that cannot be overlooked.
29.Arceta vs. Mangrobang
G.R. 152895
Facts:
On 16 September 1998, Ofelia Arceta issued a check to Oscar Castro
payable to cash for the amount of Php 740k even with full knowledge that
the account has no sufficient fund for the said amount. The check was
subsequently dishonoured by the bank. The City Prosecutor of Metro Manila
charged Arceta of violating BP Blg 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). She did not
moved for the charge to be dismissed and pleaded not guilty. She then
petitioned for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the
constitutionality of BP Blg 22 citing the Lozano doctrine.
Issue:
Whether or not the constitutionality of BP Blg 22 is the lis mota of the
case
Held:
Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. Every law has in its favour
the presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution and not one that is
speculative, doubtful or argumentative. Petitioner failed to show that BP Blg
22 by itself or by implementation transgressed a provision of the
Constitution.
30.Tan vs COMELEC
G.R. 73155, 142 SCRA 727
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as
the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay,
Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador
Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a
plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for
Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in
complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those
living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not
included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte
would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum
area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional
requisites of the Consititution, which states that — “Sec. 3. No province,
city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO.
Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a majority of votes
in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. The
creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily
result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros
Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be
affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental
because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected
entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother
province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or
compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is
applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all
of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as
in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected.
The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to
mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the
points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent
nullity.

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1. Francisco vs.

On July 22, 2002, the

Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against

2. Gonzales vs. COMELEC

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the

Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not

No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This

In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved

On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the

Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main

Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971

No. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must

7. Angara vs Electoral Tribunal/Commission

Jose A. Angara was proclaimed as the member-elect of the National

Meanwhile, Ynsua claims that there was no constitutional or legal provision

In response to the petitioner’s argument, Solicitor General Hilado, who

Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, declared that

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528,

1. Whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning of

2. Whether or not RA 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Puno, teaches us that

As such, the downgrading of the city of Santiago is a material change

The Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires a plebiscite.

11. Mariano vs. COMELEC

3. Section 52 of R.A No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

a. it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law the

2. No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the

12. Montesclaros vs COMELEC

Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a

RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and

13. Lacson vs. Perez

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their

14. Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1)

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and

15. Pimental vs Ermita

After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim

They assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no

Respondent secretaries, on the other hand, maintain that the

Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an

17. Agan vs PIATCO

The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by

18. CHR Employees Assoc. vs CHR

19.Automotive Industry Workers Alliance vs Romulo

Ten labor unions, the petitioners, challenged the constitutionality of

21.Chavez vs PEA and Amari

22. KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia

This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum

Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of

23. IBP vs. ZAMORA

24. Executive Secretary vs CA

25. Kilosbayan vs Guingona

Petitioner contends that the establishment of a national computerized

Estrada assailed the constitutionality of the said law, arguing that:

(a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;

28. Umali vs Guingona

(2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law

(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency

(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges

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