Kant and the Philosophy of Architecture

Author(s): PAUL GUYER

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , WINTER 2011, Vol. 69, No. 1,
SPECIAL ISSUE: The Aesthetics of Architecture: Philosophical Investigations into the
Art of Building (WINTER 2011), pp. 7-19
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42635832

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 PAUL GUYER

Kant and the Philosophy of Architecture

I. BEFORE AND AFTER KANT lie that to the thought that a work of architecture
should give expression to more abstract, meta-
Architecture does not loom large in Kant's physical aes-
ideas, can be seen as a consequence of, or
at least allowed by, Kant's own loose specification
thetics, nor has Kant's thought about architecture,
of thought
such as it is, loomed large in the history of just what sort of intellectual content aesthetic
about architecture. But there is a profound ideas differ-
have.
ence in the philosophy of architecture- byTowhich the extent that the philosophy of architec-
I mean here views about architecture in the writ- ture might be thought to have had any influence
ings of canonical figures in the history of philoso-on architectural theory, Kant might then be seen
phy and philosophical aesthetics, not the broaderas responsible not only for the idea that architec-
body of professional writing that might go underture should express ideas but also for the com-
the name of "architectural theory"- before andpeting views about what ideas architecture should
after Kant.1 Given the indisputable influence of express. Of course, as Hegel famously said, the owl
Kant's aesthetics on the next epoch of the disci-of Minerva flies only at dusk, that is, philosophical
pline, above all the aesthetics of German ideal-analysis often follows changes in cultural or sci-
ism in the forty years following the publication ofentific practice rather than producing them, and
Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment in 1790,expressivist developments in architectural prac-
it thus seems natural to look for the shift in philo- tice and theory may have preceded rather than
sophical thinking about architecture within Kant'ssucceeded the Kantian and post-Kantian shift
aesthetics. The shift is there to be found. The shift
to an expressivist philosophy of architecture-
I have in mind is from an essentially Vitruvian think of the executed and unrealized but pub-
conception of architecture, according to which its lished work of Etienne-Louis Boullée and Claude-
two chief goals are beauty and utility, to a cogni- Nicolas Ledoux from the 1770s, for example.2 But
tivist or expressivist conception of architecture, in even if the Kantian shift in the philosophy of archi-
which, like other forms of fine art, architecture is tecture did not cause a shift in architecture proper,
thought of as expressing and communicating ab- it can at least be thought not to have closed off,
but to have left open, competing conceptions of
stract ideas, not just aiming for beauty and utility.
the intellectual ambitions and imperatives of ar-
The decisive factor in this turn, I would suggest, is
Kant's thesis that all art involves the expression of
chitecture in architectural practice and theory.
I will only briefly characterize the radically
"aesthetic ideas," that is, the expression of rational
ideas in a form that yields inexhaustible material divergent tone of philosophies of architecture
for the play of the imagination. But I will also prior to and after Kant before I give my ac-
argue that the range of forms that this general count of Kant's own incidental yet influential
thought can take in the philosophy of architec- thought about architecture. Philosophical thought
ture, from the thought that a work of architecture about architecture before Kant, I asserted, was
should express and communicate its own function dominated by the Vitruvian paradigm. The Ten
to the thought that it should express the nature of Books on Architecture of Marcus Vitruvius Pol-
its structure and of the physical forces that under- lio, thought to have been written between 33 and

© 2011 The American Society for Aesthetics

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8 The Aesthetics of Architecture

but, more
14 BCE, are primarily importa
a manual on
sign, and construction
buildingof public
for bu
its inte
ous types, fromtion of "sacred
breakwaters prec
and ci
ples and theaters, private with
bourhoods villas,
suian
machinery, and devote
proper only a few
locations of
lines to what wepicture
mightgalleries
think of re
and aesthetic theories of architectu
der, eurythmy, and
Chapter II, under to beauty, the heading while "T ar
tal Principles of tributeArchitecture," somewhat V t
that architecture The depends
two basic onvalue ord
tion eurythmia and
, beauty.
symmetria, decor ,
or oeceonomia , This
or Vitruvian
(in emphasisthe
on utility and beauty
early twe
translation of as M.
the two fundamental
H. values of architecture re-
Morgan) "Or
ment, Eurythmy, mained prevalent
Symmetry,in eighteenth-century philoso- Prop
omy."4 In Book phy of I, Chapter
architecture III,
prior to Kant. For illustration, I Vi
that all types ofchoose two authors who not only
building express this point
must be co
due reference" with fir
io particular mitas,
clarity but also who utilitas
enjoyed enor- ,
"durability, convenience,
mous popularity and influence in their and own times beau
tions between these two
and places precisely lists
because they gave andsuch clear the
them may be understood theto follow
voice to widely held assumptions. I refer Chris-
tas or durabilitytianisFreiherr
not von Wolff an in Germany
aestheticand Henry q
Home, Lord Kames,
but a physical and in Britain, Wolff being qualit
historical the
chief voice of the German Enlightenment
and its other properties: it is until what
he was dethroned by
ing with its utilitas or Kant and Kames being the
convenienc
chief voice of the Scottish
or beauty to endure and Enlightenment.
be enjoye Wolff
it is not a value(1679-1754)
in its wrote an enormous
own series of text-
right bu
books, beginning with
strumental condition for logic and metaphysics
the conti and
of the intrinsic values
then covering every known of a buildin
field of theoretical and
and beauty. Similarly,
practical philosophy, first on in Germanthe and then, tofirs
is not so much reachan independent
a wider audience, and at even greater length, v
ings but rather in Latin.
the In his Vernünftige Gedancken über Gott ,
requirement
and their other der Welt,
virtues und der Seele des Menschen
as efficien ("Ratio-
nal Thoughts
that is, as cheaply as on God, the World, and the Soul
possible of
relati
Man"), orthe
site durability of "German Metaphysics,"
structure: first published "E
in 1719, he used architectural examples
the proper management of tomater illus-
as well as a thrifty balancing
trate his central conception of perfection, which of
mon sense in the construction
he analyzed as the concordance of the parts of of w
any object or action for the realization
arrangement, eurythmy, symmetry of its goal.
are then left to But realize
Wolff does not just manifest
thethetwo Vitruvian mo
paradigm in his use of
of utility and beauty. architectural examples
More particul in
his metaphysics; he also devoted
rythmy, and symmetry all an entire
concern treatise
portions amongto thearchitectureshape,in his four-volume size,encyclopedia and
of mathematics, which appeared
members of a building, both in German
features o
contribute to itsand inbeauty;
Latin. Here, Wolff begins his treatise on
arrangeme
the Principles of Architecture
layout or "groundplan" of withthe
the claim thatbuild
"architecture is a science
tributes to its utility as for constructing
wella build- as to
also the elevation
ing so that of the
it is in complete building
correspondence with
the intentions of the architect."9 more
be thought to contribute This locates the to i
to its convenience.7
harmony or agreement And propriet
in which perfection always
consists in the relation between the intentions
some extent, observation of traditi of
the architect and the for
fore beloved patterns building thatconstruc
results from
orders of columnshis or her plans and and supervision. However, as he
entablature

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 Guyer Kant and the Philosophy of Architecture 9

We findthe
proceeds, Wolff makes it clear that exactlyintention
the same assumption in the
of an architect is always to produce a structure
comments on architecture in the Elements of Crit-
that is both formally beautiful icism as well
published asScottish
by the useful jurist and man of
and comfortable, so the perfection
letters Henryof the
Home, Lord inten-
Kames, in 1761. Kames,
a cousin the
tion can only be realized through of David Hume whose lordship came
perfection
from his seat on
of both form and utility in the building the highest
itself. court of Scotland,
Thus,
published"[a]
Wolff argues on the one hand that numerous works of jurisprudence
building is and
space that is enclosed by art inhistory,
order but his Elements
that of Criticism was one of
certain
the most widelyand
functions can proceed there securely read works
unhin-of the Scottish En-
dered," and that "[a] building is comfortable
lightenment and was certainly theif mostly widely
read work
all necessary functions can proceed of the Scottish
within school of aesthetics un-
it with-
out hindrance and vexation."10 til These definitions
well into the nineteenth century. The general
form the basis for a requirementpremise
ofofperfection
Karnes's work is in
that we enjoy the un-
hindered
the utility of a building. On the other motion
hand,of thehow-
mind along what he calls
ever, Wolff also introduces his "ideas
standard definition
in a train," and that beauty and other aes-
theticis
of beauty, namely, that "[bjeauty qualities facilitate such
perfection or motion in one way
the necessary appearance thereof, or another; this idea as
insofar maythebe regarded as one of
former or the latter is perceived, and of
the forerunners causes a
Kant's conception of our plea-
pleasure in us," and then asserts sure in beauty
that as due
"[a] to the free play of imag-
build-
ing must be constructed beautifully ination and and
understanding.
decora- But Kames does not
tively."11 This is the basis for make the any
requirement
explicit use of thisof thesis in his chapter
formal rather than utilitarian perfection on "Gardening inanda Architecture,"
build- which is the
ing. Through the remainder of the treatise,
penultimate both
chapter of the lengthy Elements ; by
conceptions of perfection are at this point inThus,
work. the book, he must assume that the
Wolff
argues that the parts of buildings reader understands
should exem- what beauty is. Instead, his
plify certain proportions simply pointbecause
is that gardens
they and are
buildings, and their var-
pleasing to the eye, and he gives iousacomponents,
lengthy "may
analy-
be destined for use solely,
sis of the proportions of the five for beauty solely, ororders
canonical for both," thus that build-
of columns that is based throughout on may
ings in particular the be as-
distinguished "into three
sumption that certain proportions simply
kinds, namely, appear
what are intended for utility solely,
more harmonious to us than others- this is indeed what for ornament solely, and what for both."13
the rationale for Wolffs inclusion of this trea- Thus, Kames does not suggest that each work of
tise in his mathematical compendium.12 But Wolff architecture must possess both utility and beauty,
but he does suggest that these two are the sole
gives equal time to considerations of utility, begin-
ning with a (Vitruvian) discussion of the correct merits of architecture. He also suggests that it is
use of building materials, continuing through dis-typically easy to design works that are intended
cussions of structural matters, such as that lowerto be either merely useful or merely beautiful,
stories of columns must be heavier than higher and that "[t]he great difficulty of contrivance, re-
ones because they carry more weight and that the spects buildings that are intended to be beauti-
pitch of roofs must be determined by balancing ful as well as ornamental."14 The greater part of
the need to shed rain and snow (which points his to- discussion thus concerns how these two goals
ward a steeper pitch) with the weight of the roof are to be conjointly realized in the same objects.
itself (which would argue for less pitch), and con-
Like Wolff, he begins his illustration of this point
cluding with discussions of such matters as (once with windows, doors, and stairs, mentioning how
again) the proper sizing of windows for both illu-various aspects of them are determined by util-
mination and the human pleasure of looking out ity-since human beings are all pretty much the
same size, for example, whether in a large build-
on the passing scene, the location of staircases for
proper circulation, and the construction of priv- ing or a small building, "[t]he steps of a stair ought
ies with proper ventilation and seats that can to re-be accommodated to the human figure, with-
main clean. Our overall pleasure in a building, out regarding any other proportion"- but yet con-
in other words, depends on both its beauty and siderations of utility must also be combined with
utility. the requirements of freedom- for example, while

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10 The Aesthetics of Architecture

"[t]he height of which

a room it exceeding
is intended.niT
has little or no relation
following to utility,"
rule, That e
of proportion, that is, beauty,
corresponding will
to its d
a greater height than that, indeed
the only rule for In other words,
determining hav
a grea
A great hall with a low
ment that ceiling wou
will prod
mean and ugly evenin itsifinhabitants
it was as usefor
a higher ceiling.16 Indeed,
essary for the Karnes
utilit
does not
edge that architecture can promote
strive f
just
as well as utility- "Of not
all serving
the emotioits
Thus, in
raised by architecture, spite of is
grandeur rec
t
of the experience
the greatest influence on the mind o
therefore to be well
the within
chief study of
the Vitr
raise this emotion in great
beauty are itsbuildin
two g
How
please the eye"- and different
for thi
Kames, gran
ferent property after Kant. Let But
from beauty.17 us
Karnes's words indicate,
about architecture
grandeur i
please the
eye,"cians
and so of it can be r
post-Kanti
purely F. W. J. distinct
aesthetic
property Schelling,fro
G. W.
point remains that for F. Kames
Hegel. theIn h
Philosophy
works of architecture aim to (1800),
comb
the one hand withart more
(in general)
purely as aes
losophy,"
ties such as beauty more tru
and grandeur on
because
One point on which it is the
Kames seemspr
"identity
yond both Vitruvius and of the con
Wolff an
ward post-Kantian philosophies
the self, and conscio of
is his statement "[t]hat
years every
later, buil
in the
Schelling
have an expression gave a se
corresponding
tion: A palace ought
phy of toart
be at
sumptuo
Jena,
in 1804-1805;
a private dwelling, neat and modest;these
gay and splendid; and ain
mously monument
1859, but
melancholy. ... A ported
Christian to have church been .
In these
be decent and plain, without lectures, muchS
contrast between the conscious and the
because the congregation, uncon-
during w
scious with
to be humble, and a contrast between the real and thefrom
disengaged
Here it might seem as
ideal, roughly the if
material andKames
the mental, and ar- is
buildings ought guedtothat both philosophy and art each
express ideascombine or
both, though
pendently of both with an emphasis
their on the mental inand
utility
But even though philosophyhe and theuses the
material in art, althoughterm
art
which might beis never
taken merely material
tobutimply uses the material such
to
bring out the
his point is rather thatmental nature of reality. The arts
buildings m
certain moods indiffer
order in how real or material they are, with liter-
properly to se
ature obviously being
tions, in other words, forthe least the
dependent on the
sake
material media
broad sense. Thus, hein whichintroduces
it is recorded and com- th
just quoted withmunicated
these and architecture, needless to say, being
sentences:
intimately involved with and dependent upon the
Regularity and material realm. But in order are
proportion to count as essential
an art at i
tined chiefly or all, architecture must
solely tode-emphasize
please its own ma-
the ey
produce intrinsic teriality and emphasize
beauty. But the ideal,
a or intellectual
skilful ar
fine his view to content. Schelling puts this point
regularity and by radically de-
proport
study congruity, parting
which from the is
Vitruvian paradigm: instead of whe
perceived
ornaments of a combining utility and beauty,
structure are architecture
suited must to

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 Guyer Kant and the Philosophy of Architecture 11

demote utility to a mere condition suchofthatits

thesebeauty,
appear as one in the portrayed ob-
ject itself,"
not a goal in its own right, and beauty inand it is certainly
turn is not clear how this
leads to the claim that
understood as the expression of something intel-architecture must portray
the "purposiveness
lectual. Schelling puts the first point plainly: within itself" or exactly what
that conclusion is supposed to mean.24 One thing
Architecture . . . would not be fine art if it addressed that it could be taken to mean, however, is that
merely need and utility. For architecture as fine art, how- a work of architecture should portray, symbolize,
ever, utility and the reference to need are themselves or otherwise express its own purpose or intended
only condition , not principle. Every mode of art is bound function, thus that the functionality or utility of a
to a specific form of appearance existing more or less in- work of architecture is not its primary goal and
dependently of it, and only the fact that art puts into source of beauty, but that its expression of its own
this form the impression and image of beauty elevates it function is. Thus, each building type- a temple, a
to fine art. Hence, as regards architecture, precisely the church, a palace, and so on- should not merely
expediency is the form of the appearance, but not the serve its function, but also should express its func-
essence.22 tion. In his metaphysical way, Schelling thus seems
to state the premise that already informed the
The term 'form' has been used in a myriad of ways projects of such architects as Boullée and Ledoux.
in the history of aesthetics and philosophy more Arthur Schopenhauer was deeply influenced by
generally, of course, but here, contrasted to 'es- Schelling's opposition of the conscious and the
sential,' it pretty clearly means inessential: serving unconscious, but in his magnum opus The World
some need (of a client or patron) is of course what as Will and Representation (1819), he gave it his
it takes to get a building from drawing board to own unique twist: applying it to Kant's distinction
construction, but it is not, in Schelling's view, what between appearance and thing in itself, he identi-
architecture is really about. fied appearance with consciousness of the particu-
Schelling's second point, that the primary pur- lars and the in-itself with a single unconscious and
pose of architecture is intellectual, the expres- nonrational will manifesting itself in the particu-
sion of some idea, is more obscurely put. He lars of the phenomenal world. He then overlaid
next says that "[i]t was earlier proved that na- this metaphysics with an ethical doctrine accord-
ture, science, and art in their various stages ob- ing to which self-identification with the world of
serve the sequence from the schematic to the al- particulars is the source of nothing but misery and
legorical and from there to the symbolic," that frustration, for in that world the satisfaction of
"[t]he most primal sequence is numbers," and that one personal desire leads only to the emergence
"[architecture, as the music of the plastic arts, thus of another, not yet satisfied desire, and content-
necessarily follows arithmetical relationships."23 ment, if not exactly happiness, can be found only
This suggests that what architecture should ex- in detachment from the sensible world and self-
press or symbolize is mathematical relationships. identification instead with the common, underly-
Thus, insofar as its beauty lies in its expression, its ing will, which makes everything personal seem
beauty lies in its expression of mathematical rela- meaningless. He then famously argued that aes-
tionships, and that should be the primary goal of thetic experience is at least a preliminary step to
the architect. In spite of the metaphysical route such contentment, for in such experience the ordi-
to this conclusion, the result would in fact be nary human subject becomes, at least momentar-
a version of formalism in an ordinary sense of ily, a " pure will-less, painless, timeless, subject of
that term. However, several pages later, Schelling knowledge " because the object of such experience
states, with emphasis, that " [a] rchitecture, in or- is not an "individual thing as such," part of the
der to be fine art, must portray the purposiveness frustrating phenomenal world of particulars, "but
within itself as an objective purposiveness, that is, the Idea , the eternal form, the immediate objec-
as the objective identity between concept and thing, tivity of the will at this grade." In aesthetic expe-
the subjective and objective ." His "proof" for this rience, the particular thing at one stroke becomes
assertion is merely the general statement that "art "the Idea of its species, and the perceiving indi-
as such is merely the objective or real portrayal or vidual becomes the pure subject of knowing"25
representation of the identity of the universal and By contemplating the various forms in which the
the particular, of the subjective and the objective will manifests itself in particular things, the human

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 12 The Aesthetics of Architecture

being supposedhis toformer schoolmate

is be able Schelling, but hetoeventu-detach h
herself thoseally gave it his own terminology: for Hegel,
from
particular things re- and
always frustrated alitydesires
and its history are constituted
for not bythem,
the at
time. Schopenhauer struggle between the conscious
then argues and the uncon- that diff
express different sciousaspects
but by "Spirit" coming toor know itself; but
"Ideas" of
the objectificationunlike
of Schopenhauer,
the who despised
will. him for Architect
this
first art because difference,
it expressesfor Hegel what thus gradually man-"Ideas th
ifests itselfwill's
lowest grades of the in natural and human history is not
objectivity": b
nonrational will but reason of
his view that the function itself: "the
artrational, is to fre
which is synonymous
all our concerns with the with the Idea, becomes ac-
practical, he a
Schelling that the tual by entering into of
goal external existence," where
architecture
"it emerges in an infinite
mere utility, but instead of wealthinferring
of forms, appear- from
works of ances, and shapes andshould
architecture surrounds its core withexpress
a t
brightly colored
purposes, he instead holds covering in that
which consciousness
their fun
at first arises,
present the "Ideas" orbut express
which only the concept can the
pen- natur
elementary forces etrate
ofin orderthe
to find the inner pulse," and "[t]o
physical world
writes, recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the
present and thereby to delight in the present- this
Now if we consider architecture merely as a fine art and rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality
apart from its provision for useful purposes, in which it which philosophy grants to those who have re-
serves the will and not pure knowledge, and thus is no ceived the inner call to comprehend ."27 This view,
longer art in our sense, we can assign it no purpose other which Hegel first developed in his Phenomenol-
than that of bringing to clearer perceptiveness some of ogy of the Spirit (1807) and then elaborated in
those Ideas that are the lowest grades of the will's objec- his Science of Logic (1812-1816) and Encyclope-
tivity. Such Ideas are gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hardness, dia of Philosophical Sciences (1817), became the
those universal qualities of stone, those first, simplest, foundation for the lectures on aesthetics that he
and dullest visibilities of the will, the fundamental bass- gave from 1818 (in Heidelberg) to 1829 (in Berlin),
notes of nature; and along with these, light, which is which were edited, amplified, and posthumously
in many respects their opposite. Even at this low stage published by his student H. G. Hotho in 1835.28
of the will's objectivity, we see its inner nature reveal- Hegel's view is that "spirit alone is the true ... so
ing itself in discord; for, properly speaking, the conflict that everything beautiful is truly beautiful only as
between gravity and rigidity is the sole aesthetic ma- sharing in this higher sphere and generated by it,"
terial of architecture. . . . From what has been said, it and that "[t]he beauty of art is beauty born of the
is absolutely necessary for an understanding and aes- spirit and born again" that is, all beauty is a man-
thetic enjoyment of a work of architecture to have direct ifestation of "spirit" in general but artistic beauty
knowledge through perception of its matter as regards is the spirit in general made visible by spirit in par-
its weight, rigidity, and cohesion.26 ticular, that is, human artists with their particular
mentalities and capabilities.29 By spirit in general,
In other words, the conclusion that Schopenhauer Hegel means both reason and its personification
draws from his complicated metaphysical and eth- in the idea of the divine, and thus fine art
ical argument is that works of architecture should
express not their own function, but rather the na- only fulfils its supreme task when it has placed itself in
ture of their own construction and the physical the same sphere as religion and philosophy, and when it
forces involved in and affecting that construction; is simply one way of bringing to our minds and express-
by his own idiosyncratic route he reaches a con- ing the Divine , the deepest interests of mankind, and the
clusion that we associate with Eugène-Emmanuel most comprehensive truths of the spirit. . . . Art shares
Viollet-le-Duc and John Ruskin later in the nine- this vocation with religion and philosophy, but in a spe-
teenth century and with classical modernists of cial way, namely by displaying even the highest [reality]
the mid-twentieth century, such as Walter Gropius sensuously, bringing it thereby nearer to the senses, to
and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe. feeling, and to nature's mode of occurrence.30
Yet another variant of an expressivist approach
to architecture is found in Hegel. Hegel initially But the fact that art gives sensuous representation
developed his philosophy in close contact with to the ideas of the spirit or the divine is both the

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Guyer Kant and the Philosophy of Architecture 13

glory and also the doom of art, or"[f]or

ideas, precisely
with functionality being at m
on account of its form, art is limited
essary to a specific
condition but not part of the a
content." "Only one sphere andof stage
the of
goal truth is art and with beauty
of the
capable of being represented in ingthe elementasof
redefined expression rather tha
art," namely, an understanding of the
more nature
formal. of general view, as we
This
thought, reason, or divinity in physical imagery forms:
takes different or in Schelling the
that a building
symbolism that is ultimately incapable of compre- should express its own
hending the true nature of spirit and thus must
in Schopenhauer that it should express
eventually give way to religionof anditseven
own more so
construction and the physic
to philosophy, because religion also
whichis still
that too de-
depends, and in Hegel that it
pendent upon imagery and toopress tied up with art
metaphysical ideas about divinity
to yield "absolute knowing" of the spirit.31
itself. All of This is views have been pr
these
why "art, considered in its highest
latervocation,
philosophyis and
of architecture and ar
remains for us a thing of the past,"
theory, even
but though
our question here is how
so rapidly
people will still go on building, painting, andreplaced
poet- the Vitruvian para
izing, but necessarily for lower "vocations."32 This
dominated eighteenth-century philoso
is Hegel's notorious thesis of the "death of To
chitecture. art."
see how this transition c
we must now at last
That art is necessarily an expression ofturn to Kant.
ideas
about the spirit but also necessarily an inadequate
expression of an adequate conception of the spirit
or at best an adequate expressionII. kant's
of an views about architecture
inadequate
conception of the spirit is particularly evident in
As I said
Hegel's treatment of architecture. at the outset,
Hegel regards architecture does not loom
architecture as having begun with the
large incrudely
Kant's ownsym-
exposition of his aesthetic the-
bolic representation of crudely symbolic
ory. concep-
But his general philosophy of fine art would
have profound
tions of the spirit, as in "the constructions ofimplications
older for the subsequent
art in Babylonia, India, and Egypt,"
philosophy and as hav-
of architecture, and architectural ex-
ing reached its apogee in classical architecture,
amples, or the examplein of architecture in gen-
the form of the Greek temple, eral,where
figurethe temple different ways at crucial
in significantly
serves as the housing for the representation
stages in Kant's overallof argument.
a So let us now
god in the human form of thesee statue
what Kantthat sits
says at
explicitly about architecture
its heart.33 But such a representation
as well asofhow divinity,
his general philosophy of fine art
although better than the purely symbolic
bears forms
on the philosophy of architecture.
of earlier antiquity, is still inadequate to an
Kant expounds ul-
his aesthetic theory in the form
timately philosophical understanding of spirit
of a "critique of taste"asand begins his exposi-
reason, and in any case in thetion classical temple
with the simplest form of judgments of taste,
"the spiritual meaning does not namely,
residejudgments
exclusively
of beauty, paradigmatically the
in the building . . . but in the fact that
beauty this mean-
of individual natural objects or works of
ing has already attained its existence
decorativein freedom
rather than fine art, that is, works of
outside architecture," that is, art
in that
thedo statue
not havethat
content and meaning.35 He
the temple houses.34 Christian architecture,
proposes first that with
our pleasure in beauty is dis-
its domes or Gothic arches, points toward
interested, thusa that
more our pleasure in a beautiful
adequate conception of spirit, butobjectin so dependent
is not doing, uponit the judgment that it
also begins to dissolve the "immediate" unity
serves any function in of
which we have an interest.
classical architecture. Thus, architecture
Such a judgmentnecessar-
would of course presuppose a
ily tries to express a profound, concept
metaphysical idea,an object is supposed to
of the function
but is equally necessarily undermined
serve, so Kantbyexcludes
its in- any concept of the func-
escapable attempt to do so. tion of an object from playing a role in the paradig-
In post-Kantian idealism, we matic
thusjudgment
find aofuni- beauty. In the next step of his
form acceptance of the view that argument
the goal he generalizes
of archi-this conclusion into the
tecture is by no means simply exclusion
to combine utility
of any concept whatsoever from playing
with beauty, but is rather to express some ideajudgment of beauty. Yet
a role in a paradigmatic

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 14 The Aesthetics of Architecture

Kant also holdsinitially that judgments

analyzes such things as beautiful birds or of
with a "universal crustacea, decorative patterns on
voice" or,wallpaper, andlike othe
do not purport "fantasias" merely or "music withoutto a text."41report
But he th
response of one judge,
does not exclude that purely formalbut beauty may rather
for all who would be found in more respond
complex works of human arti- to the
at least under optimal circumstanc
fice, and indeed he uses an architectural example
though a judgment of oftaste
in his very first illustration what he means by a must b
of any concept, in judgment
disinterested Kant's or taste: I would beview,mak- it
dependent of our cognitive
ing an interested judgment, thus failing to make faculties
a
it is legitimately to ofclaim
genuine judgment taste if, when "someone such
asks univ
thus Kant introduces me whether I find the palace his before mefamous
beauti- h
our pleasure in ful,beauty is
I . . . say that I don't like that sort ofduething, to th
of the cognitivewhich powers
is made merely to be gaped of imaginati
at, or ... in true
standing in which Rousseauesque the presentation
style, I . . . even vilify the vanity
ifold" of experience of the great who waste as the sweat anof the people object b
nation (any experience on such superfluous things."42 This of would a seem manifo
that lasts more than a moment must involve the to suggest that a properly aesthetic judgment of a
imagination, since that is involved in any tempo- work of architecture is made, so to speak, merely
rally extended experience that requires "repro- by gaping at it, that is, that the aesthetic judg-
duction" of more than immediately current expe- ment of architecture concerns only formal beauty,
rience) satisfies the understanding's general inter- not utility or disutility, not social costs or benefits,
est in cognition, namely, its interest in unity and not any function or dysfunction of the work. This
coherence, but without any "determinate concept might suggest that Kant departs from the Vitru-
restricting the imagination] to a particular rule of vian paradigm for architecture, not by adding a
cognition."37 Such a mental state of free play requirement
is of conceptual meaning and expres-
particularly pleasurable precisely because it feels sion to it, but rather by subtracting utility from
to us as if our general goal of cognition is being the chief goals of architecture and reducing the
satisfied apart from the condition that would nor- goal of architecture to beauty alone.
mally guarantee it.38 Kant then says that the qual- This would be a misleading conclusion, how-
ity of an object by means of which it can induce thisever. For no sooner has Kant completed his initial
pleasurable state of free play can be called "the analysis of simple judgments of taste and the for-
mere form of purposiveness," and then he equates mal beauty that is supposed to be their object than
the "mere form of purposiveness" in an object he complicates his model of aesthetic judgment by
with "the purposiveness of [its] form," where by introducing a distinction between pure judgments
"form" he now means what both aestheticians and of "free" and "self-subsisting" beauty that fit the
artists have generally meant by form, namely, theinitial analysis and more complex judgments of
spatial or temporal structure of objects, Gestalt or"adherent" and "conditioned" beauty that go be-
"figure," for example, "drawing" {Zeichnung, de-yond it; and the latter judgments are character-
sign) rather than coloration in the case of paintingized precisely by the fact that they do presuppose
or "composition" rather than instrumentation ina "concept of what the object ought to be . . . and
the case of music.39 This last step in Kant's argu- the perfection of the object in accordance with it."
ment, by which he reaches his famous and influ-In particular, judgments of adherent beauty pre-
ential "formalism," is a non sequitur , but as wesuppose a concept of what the intended function
shall see, it is not in fact fatal to Kant's ultimateor "particular end" of the object is, "by which the
theory of fine art , which turns on a much more imagination, which is as it were at play in the ob-
liberal conception of what aspects of aesthetic servation of the shape" of the object, would be
objects can genuinely induce the mental state of"restricted"- although apparently without the op-
the free play of the cognitive powers of imagina-portunity for free "play" disappearing altogether,
tion, understanding, and, as it turns out, reason assince Kant does after all call adherent beauty a
well.40 kind of beauty.43 Kant then immediately illustrates
Kant offers as paradigmatic examples of the his conception of adherent beauty with architec-
objects of the simple judgments of beauty that he tural examples: thus he says that "the beauty . . .

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Guyer Kant and the Philosophy of Architecture 15

of a building (such as a church, a palace,

for architecture anhad
that he ar-
initially seemed to re-
senal, or a summer-house) presupposes
ject. What basis doaweconcept
find within his theory for the
of the end that determines what remarkable
the thing
transformation
should of this paradigm that
we found in the
be, hence a concept of its perfection, andaesthetic theories of his imme-
is thus
merely adherent beauty. . . . Onediatewould
successors be such
ableas Schelling,
to Schopenhauer,
add much to a building that wouldand Hegel?beWe pleasing
find this inin Kant's theory of fine
art, which
the intuition of it if only it were not comes
supposedonly much to later in the Critique
be a church."44 Kant does not of expand
the Power upon these
of Judgment (namely, §§43-53) than
comments, but presumably he thehas
opening
in "Analytic
mind such of the Beautiful" (§§1-22)
commonplace assumptions as that to which a
ourpalace
discussion has thus far been confined.
must
Kant's theory
appear grand and imposing to project the of fine art is designed to solve the
author-
paradox
ity of government, that an arsenal mustthat judgments
have thick of beauty must be inde-
walls with few openings to servependent asof a secure
concepts, bas-of art are products
yet works
tion, that a summer house on of the contrary
intentional must
and rational human activity, which
be light and airy, that a (Protestant) church
is, of course, guided bymust
concepts.47 Kant's resolu-
keep its decor simple to induce tion
the of proper mood
this potential paradox of
is that both the cre-
humbleness (as Kames had argued),
ation and and so forth.
the experience of works of art are guided
Thus, Kant seems to recur to by
the
and traditional Vi-
indeed aimed at the presentation of con-
truvian paradigm that a successful cepts, but,
work like the
of experience
archi- of natural beauty
tecture must be judged to have andboth utilitas
the production and
and experience of decorative
venustas. art, they are never fully determined by such con-
To be sure, Kant is not very specific about cepts.
pre-Kant expounds this solution by offering a
cisely how utility and beauty or function and form
theory of both the production of works of fine art
are to be related to each other in the "adherent and of the contents of such works. His theory of
beauty" of a work of architecture. Some of the the lan-production of fine art is his theory of genius, ac-
guage that has just been quoted suggests that, cording
like to which the production of successful art is
Schelling after him, he might think that the func-guided by concepts, including technical rules, but
tionality of a building is just a precondition of depends
our upon an innate "originality," a "natural
finding it beautiful, that is, that our appreciation
gift," that takes the artist beyond his own rules in
of the beauty of a building might be blocked ifways we that he cannot formulate and allows him to
found it dysfunctional but that its functionalitypassis on exemplars of originality but not determi-
not a proper part of its beauty, which would then nate rules to successive artists.48 His theory of the
presumably lie only in its formal properties. How-
content of successful works of fine art is his theory
ever, Kant's remarks that the rules that mightofbe"aesthetic ideas." According to Kant, a beauti-
prescribed with regard to adherent beauty (unlikeful work of art must have "spirit": "A poem can be
free beauty, which does not allow any rules atquiteall) pretty and elegant, but without spirit. A story
are "rules for the unification of taste with reason"
is accurate and well organized, but without spirit."
and that "the entire faculty of the powers of rep- And spirit, "the animating principle in the mind,"
resentation gains if both states of mind"- the re- comes from an "aesthetic idea," by which he
sponse to function and the response to form- "are means
in agreement" might seem to suggest that both
functionality and formal beauty are proper parts that representation of the imagination that
of the judgment of architectural success.45 Indeed, much thinking though without it being possible
such remarks might even be thought to suggest determinate thought, i.e., concept , to be adequ
that architectural success requires some sort of in- which, consequently, no language fully attai
timate interaction between function and form, that make intelligible- One readily sees that it is the
certain forms and functions be not merely compat- part (pendant) of an idea of reason, which is, co
ible with each other but in some way enhance each a concept to which no intuition (representati
other, thus that in such cases our pleasure in ob- imagination) can be adequate.49
jects is not so to speak just added but multiplied.46
But this conclusion would only bring Kant back By this in turn Kant means that a work of a
to the point of accepting the Vitruvian paradigm spirit presents an intellectual idea, indee

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16 The Aesthetics of Architecture

view, ultimately a moral

ment comes idea, but
in the f
an imaginative use of both
sculpture andform
archita
whatever counts as material in a p
form, perhaps images in the
[Sculpture] case cor
presents of
cidents in the case ofexist
could the in
novel or (a
nature d
or pigments in the caseto
regard of painting,
aesthetic pu
rich materials inart
theofordinary
presenting,sense
with
architecture- that
timecannot be reduce
in an aesthetically
and that stimulate
thata are
free play only
possible of th
th
with or between the
its content, ground
determining the f
matter of the work of latter
In the art. Ultimately
a certain us
conception of beauty
thing,intoart is not
which, the
as a co
mal beauty that stricted.
he discussed
In the in the
former
sections of the
"Analytic of chief
ideas is the the Beaut
aim.
ception is rather imals,
that beautiful
etc., are of art
the al
fi
some profound intellectual
buildings for content
public gat
by means of form and matter
umphal so
arches, rich t
column
be reduced to any rule but instead
as memorials, belong tt
haustible and pleasurable "motion"
ateness of the product
in the mind of its audience.
work Of course
of architecture ,
must result from which is made
free play with strictly
an ide
of the genius who produces
itself, is, as it, but ev
a corporea
conception of theof object
nature, cannot ful
though with
the audience's response to it, truth
then, sensible for in s
latter would not also be
looking anart
like instance
and a p
and would not be pleasurable.50
Kant next offersThis is a complex
a classification anc
of the fine arts sert
premised on the ass
a straightforwar
all of the fine other. It assumes
arts- that it is an essential aim of
rhetoric, both
poetry,
arts not only to music
chitecture, painting, be beautiful but also to express
(includin
aesthetic ideas, that is, rational ideasideas
dance- present intellectual conveyed by aest
though of course aesthetic
some means, by their
do use ofitforms better
and materi- o
als: "Both make shapes in space
than others.51 (Actually, Kant into expressions
next c
beauty, whether ofIt also
of ideas."53 nature or art, i
assumes (as any pre-twentieth-
thetic ideas [ CPJ century , §51,
theory would) that 5:320];
sculpture imitates nat-he fa
this claim, but neither
ural objects- even when itdoes he
presents something su- rest
pernatural,
it.) Kant's position issuch as a god, it does
thus that so by imitating
as a fi
tecture does contain
natural forms, for aesthetic
example, by adding the wings ideas
of a bird to a human figure- while
means presents intellectual architecture
ideas, alth
not do so as fully does not as
imitate poetry,
natural forms and is thus but not ma
limited to natural forms.
fully than, for example, its In this regard architec-
sister amon
arts, namely, ture would seem to have less constricted means
sculpture.
Kant's explicit for presenting ideas and thus perhaps
discussion of bearchit
able to
brief. Kant divides the
present a wider sphere
range of of "p
ideas through the indef-
(bildende Künste inite number of forms and combinations
, which could of them bett
lated as available toarts"
"formative it. However, anywere
work of architecture
"form
also has a "voluntary
such an overworked termend" or intended
in use that
Kant'
restricts it and, apparently,
into the two domains of what aesthetic ideas
"plastic" (
it can present, and (Malerkunst),
the "art of painting" indeed this intended use is
the "main thing," and of
subdivides the domain in all architecture
"plastic" the "ap- in
and architecturepropriateness
(using of the product to a certain
the use is
two Ge
Bildhauerkunst essential."
and Thus,Baukunst).
the restriction on what or how His

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Guyer Kant and the Philosophy of Architecture 17

aesthetic ideas may be expressed there thatis isno supposed

room to pursue that complicated sub-
to follow from this is also essential to architec- ject here; it will have to suffice that for Kant, un-
ture. So sculpture is restricted in what aesthetic like other authors such as Gerard and Kames, the
ideas it can represent or how it may represent experience of sublimity is only triggered by nature,
them by its restriction to the imitation of natural and works of human architecture can at most be
forms, while architecture is restricted in its ex-"colossal," which is " almost too great for all pre-
pression of aesthetic ideas by its requirement of sentation" and "which borders on the relatively
functionality, which is now apparently neither amonstrous," but not infinite or even apparently
mere precondition of its aesthetic value nor oneinfinite enough to trigger the experience of the
component in its aesthetic value, but the primary sublime.54 Without a discussion of the sublime, I
component. will rest here with the conclusion that Kant at least
Thus, Kant concludes that, in architecture, util- cracked open the door to an architecture of ideas.
ity, or in his own terminology "objective purpo- In his theory of fine art as the expression of aes-
siveness," is always essential, but that the presen- thetic ideas he had already swung the gate to the
tation of aesthetic ideas is also always some part of expressivist philosophy of fine architecture wide
its beauty. Aesthetic ideas are in turn the expres- open. Although Kant remained more committed
sion of "rational" ideas, so Kant's position might to the primacy of function and thus to the Vi-
seem to prepare the way for something closest truvian paradigm in the philosophy of architecture
to Hegel's position, that architecture, like other than his idealist successors were to be, it seems fair
arts, always aims at the expression of metaphysi- to conclude that his theory of fine art opened the
cal ideas, although even with this addition, Kant way from the Vitruvian to the post- Vitruvian con-
clearly remains closer to the Vitruvian paradigm ception of architecture within philosophical aes-
than do Schelling, Schopenhauer, or Hegel by ul- thetics. It also seems fair to conclude that the ab-
timately insisting that suitability to intended use sence of an argument for Kant's own specification
is essential to the success of architecture. But in of what kind of ideas fine art must express left the
practice, Kant seems to restrict the ideas presenteddoor open for the variety of expressivist theories
by art to moral or morally significant ideas, and inof architecture that we find in German idealism
this regard, his conception of what sorts of ideas and beyond.
art, including architecture, can express seems nar-
rower than or at least different from Hegel's. How-
ever, what we should probably conclude here is PAUL GUYER
that Kant does not offer any actual argument forDepartment of Philosophy
why all art must express rational ideas, a fortiori University of Pennsylvania
specifically moral ideas, so what his theory actuallyPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
does is open the door for the post- Vitruvian con-
ception of architecture as expressing ideas with-internet: pguyer@sas.upenn.edu
out entailing any particular restriction on what
ideas it can represent. Thus, while himself assum-
1. For discussion of this term, see Hanno- Walter Kruft,
ing that architecture must express moral ideas,
A History of Architectural Theory from Vitruvius to the
Kant prepares the way for the different ideas that
Present , trans. Ronald Taylor, Elsie Callander, and Antony
architecture should express ideas of its own func-Wood (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1994),
tion (Schelling), ideas of the nature of physicalpp. 13-15.
forces and its own construction (Schopenhauer), 2. Hegel's famous statement about the owl of Min-
or metaphysical ideas (Hegel). Kant does cross erva comes from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Ele-
ments of the Philosophy of Right , ed. Allen W. Wood,
the Jordan between pure Vitruvianism and post-trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge University Press, 1991),
Vitruvian expressionism in the philosophy of ar-Preface, p. 23. For the classical discussion and illustrations
chitecture, but once on the other side he does notof Boulée's and Ledoux's work and the expressivist phi-
conclusively specify what road should be takenlosophy of architecture, see Emil Kaufman, Architecture
further. in the Age of Reason: Baroque and Post-Baroque in Eng-
land, Italy, and France (Harvard University Press, 1955),
Kant also mentions stock architectural exam-
especially chap. 12, pp. 141-180; for more recent discussion,
ples such as the Egyptian pyramids and St. Pe-
see Kruft, Architectural Theory , chap. 13, pp. 141-165, and
ter's in Rome in his discussion of the sublime, but
Henry Francis Mailgrave, Modern Architectural Theory: A

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 18 The Aesthetics
Historical Survey,
1673-1968
2005), pp. 36-43.
3. See Kruft, Architectural
4. Marcus Vitruvius
ture, trans. Morris Hotho's
Warren (Harvard University
terms, see Kruft, Architectural
5. Vitruvius, Ten Books
ory , p. 24.
6. Vitruvius, Ten Books , p. 16.
7. Vitruvius, Ten Books , pp. 13-14.
8. Vitruvius, Ten Books , pp. 14-15.
9. Christian Freiherr von Woltl, The Principles of Ar-
chitecture, in Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen Wis-
senschaften, new edition (Frankfurt, Leipzig, and Halle:
Renger, 1750-1757, reprint, ed. J. E. Hofmann, Hildesheim:
Georg Olms, 1999), Division I, Vols. 12-15, §1, p. 305.
10. Wolff, Foundations of Architecture, §4, p. 306, and §7,
p. 307.
11. Wolff, Foundations of Architecture, §8, p. 307, and
§18, p. 309.
12. Wolff, Foundations of Architecture, §§20-21, pp.
310-311.
13. Henry Home, Lord Kames, Elements of Criticism,Critique (henceforth "CP/") will be located by Kant's sec-
sixth edition (Edinburgh: Bell and Creech, and London:
Cadell and Robinson, 1785), modern edition by Peter Jones text as it appears in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, ed. Royal
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), vol. II, chap. XXIV, pp.Prussian (later German, then Berlin-Brandenurg) Academy
685, 699.
14. Kames, Elements, p. 685.
15. Kames, Elements, vol. II, chap. XXIV, pp. 700, 701.
16. Of course, one might argue that considerations of
acoustics and HVAC as well as bodily circulation affect the
utility of a room, and therefore also enter into determination
of its height, but the point remains that whatever consider-
ations one enters onto the side of utility, there will still be
room for further features of design determined by consider-
ations of beauty alone.
17. The quotation is from Kames, Elements, vol. II, chap.
XXIV, p. 709. For the difference between grandeur and
beauty for Kames, see Kames, Elements, vol. I, chap. IV,
pp. 150-178.
18. Kames, Elements, vol. II, chap. XXIV, pp. 706-707.
19. Kames, Elements, vol. II, chap. XXIV, pp. 706-707.
20. F. W. J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism,
trans. Peter Heath (University Press of Virginia, 1978), p.
219.
21. F. W. J. Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, ed. and
trans. Douglas W. Stott (University of Minnesota Press,
1989). For information about the original presentation and
later publication of the lectures, see Translator's Introduc-
tion, pp. xxvii, liii.
22. Schelling, Philosophy of Art, p. 165.
23. Schelling, Philosophy of Art, p. 165.
24. Schelling, Philosophy of Art, p. 168.
25. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Rep-
resentation, trans. E. F. J. Payne, 2 vols. (Indian Hills, CO:
Falcon's Wing, 1958), vol. I, §34, p. 179.
26. Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation, vol.
I, §43, pp. 214-215.
27. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Pretace, pp. 20-22.
28. The standard English version ot the lectures is based
on Hotho's second edition of 1842: G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthet-
ics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford:
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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
of Architecture
Clarendon Press, 1975). In recent
years, there has been much
(Cambridge Univ
debate about the authenticity of Hotho's edition, and some
of the original transcriptions
Theory of Hegel's lecture courses,
, p. in- 21.
Pollio,
cluding Hotho's own, which turn The Ten
out to be much shorter thanBooks of
Hicky published version, have been published (although
Morgan, ed. Herbe
not yet translated into English).
Press, These include the course
1914), p. 13;
of 1820-1821, G. W. F. Hegel, VorlesungTheory über Ästhetik, ed.
, p. 25.
Helmust Schneider
, p. (Bern: 17;
Peter Lang,Kruft,
1996); that of 1823, Archite
G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst,
ed. Annemarie Gethmann-Seifert (Hamburg: Felix Meiner,
2003); and the course of 1826, G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophie der
Kunst oder Ästhetik, ed. Annemarie Gethmann-Seifert and
Bernadette Collenberg-Plotnikov (Munich: Wilhelm Fink,
2004).
29. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. I, p. 2.
30. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. I, pp. 7-8.
31. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. I, p. 9.
32. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. I, p. 11.
33. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. II, p. 636.
34. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. II, p. 661.
35. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment,
ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2000), §9, 5:216. References to this
tion number and then the volume and page number of the
of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, subsequently Walter de
Gruyter, 1900-) (the so-called "Academy edition"), where
it was edited by Wilhelm Windelband. The Academy edi-
tion pagination appears in the margins of the Cambridge
edition, so references to the page numbers of the latter itself
are not given. The best contemporary edition of the German
text is Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. Heiner F.
Klemme, notes by Piero Giordanetti, Philosophische Biblio-
thek 507 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2001), which also includes
the Academy edition pagination as well as the pagination of
the 1793 second edition of the Kritik, the preferred original
edition.
36. Kant, CPJ, §8, 5:216.
37. Kant, CPJ, §9, 5:217.
38. See CPJ, Introduction, section VI, 5:187-188.
39. Kant, CPJ, §11, 5:221; §13, 5:223; and §14, 5:225.
40. For detailed support of the interpretation of Kant s
argument offered in this paragraph, see my Kant and the
Claims of Taste (Harvard University Press, 1979; rev. ed.
Cambridge University Press, 1997), chaps. 3-6, and among
my more recent writings, especially "The Harmony of the
Faculties Revisited," in my Values of Beauty: Historical Es-
says in Aesthetics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap.
3, pp. 77-109.
41. Kant, CPJ, §16, 5:229.
42. Kant, CPJ, §2, 5:204.
43. Kant, CPJ, §16, 5:229-230.
44. Kant, CPJ, §16, 5:230.
45. Kant, CPJ, §16, 5:230-231.
46. For a fuller discussion of this point, see my Free
and Adherent Beauty: A Modest Proposal," The British
Journal of Aesthetics 42 (2002): 357-366, reprinted in Values
of Beauty, chap. 5, pp. 129-140.
47. Kant, CPJ, §43, 5:303-304.
48. Kant, CPJ, §46, 5:307-308. 1 have discussed Kant's
theory of genius in detail in "Autonomy and Integrity in
Guy er Kant and the Philosophy of Architecture 19

Kant's Aesthetics," Monist 66 (1983): 49. Kant, CP/,reprinted

167-188, §49, 5:313-314.
under the title "Genius and the Canon 50.ofForArt" indetail,
further my see Kant
my "Kant's Conception of Fine
and the Experience of Beauty (Cambridge University
Art," The Press,
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (1994):
1993), chap. 8, pp. 275-303, and "Exemplary Originality:
175-185, reprinted as chap. 12 of the revised edition of Kant
Genius, Universality, and Individuality,"
and theinClaims
TheofCreation
Taste, pp. 351-366.
of
51. Kant,,CPJ,
Art: New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics ed.§§51-52,
Berys 5:321-326.
Gaut
52. Kant, CPJ,
and Paisley Livingston (Cambridge University §5:322. 2003),
Press,
53. Kant, CPJ,
pp. 116-137, reprinted in Values of Beauty §5:322. 10, pp.
, chap.
242-262. 54. Kant, CPJ, §26, 5:253.

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