Public Relations Review 47 (2021) 102113

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Full Length Article

“Are they allowed to do that?” Content and typology of corporate

socio-political positioning on TWITTER. A study of DAX-30 companies
in Germany
Romy Fröhlich *, Aline Susanne Knobloch
Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaft und Medienforschung (IfKW), Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Oettingenstr. 67, 80538, München, Germany

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: In the USA, corporate attitude communication has been identified as an irreversible trend. Outside the USA, it is a
CEO communication comparatively new phenomenon. We have conducted a content-analytical study on the publicly communicated
Corporate Social Advocacy (CSA) socio-political positioning of DAX-30 corporations and their CEOs in Germany. Based on the Corporate Social
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
Advocacy (CSA) approach, our results reveal a typology of different strategies. It shows that the companies under
Corporate Political Activity (CPA)
investigation differ significantly in terms of the degree of controversy and positioning frequency. The study
Socio-political issues
Socio-political controversy provides evidence that corporate characteristics (e.g. size), timing and thematic factors, as well as the
TWITTER communicative behavior of other companies/organizations determine positioning strategies. We identified two
different strategic motives for socio-political positioning: The aim to (1) further improving trust, image, and
reputation while avoiding risk as far as possible or (2) to secure room for maneuver within the framework of
specific, very concrete (socio-political) challenges and in doing so accepting certain risks in the process.

1. Introduction example, that corporate ‘attitude communication’ is an unjustified

As early as 2003, Matten et al. (2003) expressed the opinion: “[T]he
more that governmental power and sovereignty have come under threat,
the more that relevant political functions have gradually shifted towards
the corporate sphere […]” (p.109). If this were indeed the case, it would
not necessarily be a welcome development. What can already be
observed, however, is that more and more business representatives and
managers worldwide are taking a public stand on current socio-political
controversies in society – predominantly via social media. We call this
kind of corporate communication ‘attitude communication’. Siemens CEO
Joe Kaeser is only one example among many. For several years now, he
has not only been commenting on socio-political events such as the arrest
of Carola Rackete, captain of the civil sea rescue service (Kaeser, 2019a),
but has also criticized concrete political actors such as US President
Donald Trump (Kaeser, 2019b) or the right-wing populist party Alternative
for Germany (AfD) (Kaeser, 2018a) on the social media microblogging
platform TWITTER. So far, it has been the exception for German managers
and business representatives to publicly take a stand on societies’ current
controversies, because such positionings polarize – especially on
socio-politically controversial and explosive issues. Critics admonish, for
interference in politics. Overall, this could even endanger the success of a
company (see e.g. Höpner, 2018; Knieps, 2019; Schnaas, 2019). Empirical
studies do indeed show that controversial, highly polarizing issues in
particular give rise to critical reactions that can even lead to a boycott (e.
g. Clemensen, 2017; Edelman, 2018). The German management expert
Reinhard Sprenger (quoted in Knieps, 2019) also finds clear words: "In the
economic system we have only one central value: the customer, who pays
or does not pay for our products and services in free decision and in
compliance with the law – everything else must be left to the churches".
Be that as it may: Positioning on socio-political issues in front of the public
is comparatively new territory for many companies, not only German
ones (Weinzimmer & Esken, 2016).
But: Kaeser also received encouragement, new followers for his
TWITTER account and praise for his unusual commitment (Höpner,
2018). His statements brought the Siemens CEO a great deal of attention
in society, the media and among PR professionals (Spangenberg, 2019).
Experts explain that a sharp distinction between companies, politics and
society as described by Sprenger seems to be purely idealistic anyway
(Bowen, 2008), as companies already play a major role in shaping so­
ciety through their activities. According to Kaeser (2018b), this is

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: romy.froehlich@ifkw.lmu.de (R. Fröhlich), Aline.Knobloch@gmx.de (A.S. Knobloch).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2021.102113
Received 7 September 2020; Received in revised form 8 July 2021; Accepted 27 August 2021
Available online 1 October 2021
0363-8111/© 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
R. Fröhlich and A.S. Knobloch
precisely what obliges them to position themselves and assume re­
sponsibility. In the USA, political statements and positioning of top
managers from companies have even been identified as an irreversible
trend (Chatterji & Toffel, 2018; Gaither et al., 2018; Gelles, 2017;
Hogan, 2019). But if this is indeed the case, then corporate communi­
cations may well face a new challenge.
Against this backdrop and in view of the fact that there have been
hardly any empirical studies on the phenomenon of socio-political po­
sitionings1 via TWITTER, we have conducted a study on – as we call it at
first – corporate ‘attitude communication’ of the DAX-30 companies in
Germany and the communicative socio-political positioning of their
CEOs via TWITTER. The theoretical foundation of the study is based on
the concept of Corporate Social Advocacy (CSA). This approach allowed
us to identify specific characteristics of different socio-political posi­
tioning strategies. Using a cluster analysis, we finally developed a ’ty­
pology of positioning’, which distinguishes between five different
positioning strategies. In the following, we will present selected aspects
of the study’s findings and briefly address the question of what exactly
corporate communications/PR has to do with all this (if anything).
2. Theoretical foundation
The relationship between companies and society has changed
significantly in recent decades. One of many signs of this shift, for
example, is the increase in what Edelman’s Earned Brand Global Report
(2018) calls "belief-driven buyers." The report’s representative data
collected from eight countries shows that the "belief-driven buyer" is on
the rise everywhere. In Germany, the share of this consumer type is still
comparatively low at 54 % (Japan 60 %, USA 59 %, UK 57 %; p. 10), but
recorded the third-highest growth rate between 2017 and 2018 at 17 %.
In the course of this development, the concept of ‘Corporate Social Re­
sponsibility’ (CSR) grew increasingly relevant. This concept provides
practitioners with an approach that enables them to live out ’corporate
responsibility’ and make it visible. But especially in recent years, the
paradigm of CSR has expanded in a complex way to include the area of
socio-political corporate responsibility. The most prominent trigger of
this trend is globalization (cf. Dodd, 2018). Moreover, “processes of
mediatization” are forcing corporations “to engage with such social is­
sues that are part of broader political discourses” (van der Meer &
Jonkman, 2021, p. 1). Finally, we also consider the digitalization of
society and its communication to be a key development that compels
firms to amplify their ties to socio-political issues. Social media in
particular increases the power of stakeholders and activists and thus also
increases the pressure on companies to meet public expectations in
terms of standards and values (e.g. Austin et al., 2019; Boyd et al., 2016;
Kampf, 2018). Against this background, stakeholders today more than
ever demand the extension of corporate responsibility to the political
sphere. However, classical CSR approaches do not include political
components; the focus here is on the core business and/or philanthropic
actions.2 Since the classic concept of CSR does not cover this expanded
1
An exception are studies specifically on the impact and perception of CEOs’
political tweets and its effects on company performance or other particular
outcomes (see for instance Chatterji & Toffel, 2019; Yim, 2019).
2
For the sake of completeness, it should be pointed out here that there indeed
have been isolated attempts to link the model of classical CSR with political
theory: Against the background of the declining impact of nation-states, com­
panies today are considered ‘good citizens’ if, for example, they actively
participate in public discourse or make or support decisions for the benefit of
society (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et al., 2006, 2016). This describes a
socio-political participation that goes far beyond egocentric models such as
lobbying, for instance. As a result, new sub-concepts such as’ corporate political
responsibility’ or ‘political corporate social responsibility’ have been intro­
duced for the model of classical CSR. These new concepts, however, are lacking
theoretical foundation and partly contradict existing definitions of classical
CSR.
2
Public Relations Review 47 (2021) 102113
paradigm, we bring a different approach into play that can meet the
challenges described more precisely than CSR: the concept of Corporate
Social Advocacy (CSA) (see Dodd & Supa, 2014). CSA is a comparatively
new approach, which was developed specifically in the course of the
changes described above. It is also different from the concept of
Corporate Political Activity (CPA) and offers interesting starting points
for the analysis of companies’ socio-political positioning.
2.1. Differentiating examination of seemingly related concepts: CSA, CSR
and CPA
The concept of Corporate Social Advocacy (CSA) is understood as a
communicative measure which a company (predominantly members of
its leadership circles) explicitly responds to events or developments that
are not self-initiated and that affect it only indirectly if at all (cf. Dodd &
Supa, 2014, 2015). CSA is seen as a more transparent form of political
engagement that takes place outside of formal channels (such as
lobbying and other forms of Corporate Political Activity (CPA)) and is
not only directed at institutional actors. Unlike CSR activities, CSA ac­
tivities are pure communication measures that may be accompanied by
corporate actions and decisions but can also stand on their own at any
time.3 According to our understanding of CSA, which is adapted from
Dodd et al. (2014), another distinct characteristic of CSA is that the
respective matter is characterized by controversy (see also Austin et al.,
2019). Furthermore, the topics and contents of the communicated
messages do not have an immanent intrinsic connection to the core
business of the company, although a perceived fit between the actual
issue and the respective brand may well exist (e.g. Lim & Young, 2021).
van der Meer and Jonkman (2021) speak of “issue arenas (…) that do not
per se relate to their [the firm’s] core business” (p. 2).
What is decisive for CSA is the public adoption of a clear position on a
socio-political issue. Indifferent statements on socio-political issues are
therefore not regarded as CSA. Another characteristic of CSA is that
companies do not derive any direct benefits from CSA activities (Wett­
stein & Baur, 2016). The following table presents the different charac­
teristics of CSA, CSR and CPA in a comparative overview (Table 1).
In the context of our study and in the light of the above, we under­
stand ‘socio-political positioning’ to mean that an actor takes a certain
stand or attitude on a specific issue within the framework of a public
communication act (cf. Gaither et al., 2018). Based on the theoretical
conceptions of CSA by Dodd and Supa (2014, 2015) and Wettstein and
Baur (2016) we developed the following working definition:
A socio-political positioning is (1) a public communication measure
through which a company/its official representative (CEO) (2)
personally takes a (3) clear position on (4) a socio-political issue. The
positioning is (5) a reaction to a social event that was not initiated by
the company itself or the official representative personally. (6) The
topics and contents of the communicated messages do not have an
immanent intrinsic connection to the core business of the company
although a perceived fit between the actual issue theme and the
respective brand may well exist.
Against the background of this definition, we consider it irrelevant
for which –- possibly also dishonest –– purpose CSA is actually used. We
therefore assume that within the framework of CSA, more or less
disputable means such as’ woke/green washing,’ ‘virtue signaling’
(Orlitzky, 2018), or ‘moral grandstanding’ (Tosi & Warmke, 2016) can
be used as particular measures. They represent socially conscious mea­
sures (e.g. marketing) without there actually being an honest commit­
ment to the respective cause (Tosi & Warmke, 2016; pp. 210-215). In our
understanding, CSA represents the communicative strategy, while
3
For a deeper understanding of the interconnectedness and differences
among engagement, CSR, and corporate social advocacy, see Waymer and
Logan (2021).
R. Fröhlich and A.S. Knobloch Public Relations Review 47 (2021) 102113

Table 1 rational considerations, which assume that socio-political positioning

Comparison of Characteristics of Corporate Social Advocacy, Classic Corporate makes it easier for companies to achieve (other) more far-reaching
Social Responsibility and Corporate Political Activity (authors’ own strategic goals (cf. Hond et al., 2014). Finally, approaches of ’issues
compilation). management’ also provide sound arguments for understanding posi­
Dimension of Corporate Social Corporate Social Corporate tioning in general and CSA in particular as a strategic and functional
Comparison Advocacy (CSA) Responsibility Political Activity component of corporate communications/PR (e.g. Dodd & Supa, 2014,
(CSR) (CPA)
pp. 2-5, 13; James, 2015, p. 38). The PR task ’Issues Management’ aims
Degree of Public Public Non-public to secure current or future room for maneuver by publicly or
Publicity/ non-publicly distributing corporate positions, topics, issues etc. to
Public
Attention
opinion leaders in the media and the public as well as to decision-makers
Target Group Diverse Diverse Political in politics in order to influence and steer developments, at least to some
stakeholders stakeholders stakeholders extent (see e.g. Heath, 2018; Heath & Palenchar, 2009). Actually, a
Form Communication Action Action and/or study by Parcha and Westerman (2020) revealed that a corporate
communication
statement on a controversial social issue is effective in changing an in­
Controversy Controversial/ Non-controversial Controversial &
potentially topics non-controversial dividual’s attitude toward the issue.
controversial topics
topics 2.3. Research questions
Thematic No direct Mostly with direct Direct connection
Connection connection connection
to the Core
First studies from the USA (cf. Gaines-Ross, 2017) show two things:
Business (1) The microblogging platform TWITTER is increasingly playing a
Positioning (Publicly) Taking/ Not taking/ Take/adopt/ decisive role in the distribution of companies’ socio-political posi­
adopting/ex- adopting/ex- express a clear tioning. This is hardly surprising, because social media as a whole
pressing a clear pressing a (clear) position/stand
provides platforms on which and through which the exchange of views
position/stand position/stand behind closed
doors can take place very easily among a company’s different stakeholder
Reactiveness Reference to Amongst others, Reactive or groups – more easily, at any rate, than in the offline world. In this
external causes/ specifically proactive sense, social media functions as “issue arenas” (Luoma-aho & Vos,
reasons (reactive) initiated causes/ 2010; Vos et al., 2014) and “sub-arenas” (Coombs & Holladay, 2014).
reasons (proactive)
Possible Ethical and/or Ethical and/or Strategic motives
Against this background, TWITTER in particular appears to be the ideal
Motives strategic motives strategic motives social media tool for the concise and rapid spread of CSA messages.
Here the dissemination of news, information, claims, etc. is in the
foreground and rather less the potentially profound discourse about
issues. (2) At US companies, it is predominantly CEOs who tweet
socio-political positionings (often via their own TWITTER channel). A
CEO’s prominence lends more weight to socio-political positioning and
phenomena like ’woke/green washing’, ’virtue signaling,’ or ‘moral at the same time personalizes the communicative presentation (Gain­
grandstanding’ represent a particular, although questioned4 kind of es-Ross, 2017). In order to further secure the positioning, other cred­
tactic to implement this strategy. ible communicators, such as other C-suite members, company
employees or external actors such as NGOs, also occasionally can have
2.2. CSA as a functional task of corporate communications/PR? their say on such channels. This is often done by sharing or tagging
contributions from suitable actors (retweets, mentions (Twitter,
Corporate socio-political positioning as a CSA measure can expand 2019)). The involvement of other actors from outside the company and
and secure corporations’ scope of action, although the respective posi­ the taking up of their statements represent opportunities to cushion the
tionings are not directly (that is, thematically) related to the company’s individual risk of a (polarizing) socio-political positioning (Gain­
core business. This is precisely where it becomes clear that, optimally, es-Ross, 2017).
socio-political positioning should at least to some extent be strategically Against the backdrop of the previous remarks on the theoretical
integrated into communicative umbrella concepts, and should not foundation of our research interest, this study pursues the following
appear purely situational or incidental or give the impression that it is a research questions:
communicative solo activity of a company’s ’dominant coalition’5 . RQ1: To what extend and how do German DAX-30 companies (and/or
Dodd and Supa (2014) for example, write: "Corporate social advocacy their CEOs) position themselves on TWITTER on socio-political topics?
clearly falls in the wheelhouse for public relations practitioners" (p. 15), Due to the increasing relevance of corporate communication about
and Dodd (2018) states that “CSA refers to the public relations function” responsibility through corresponding societal demands, we assume that
(p. 222) (similar also Pompper, 2013). As a result, we assume that the frequency of positioning has increased over time:
strategic corporate communications/PR has more than just a distribu­ RQ2: Does the frequency of German DAX-30 companies’ (and/or their
tion function for CSA activities. CEOs’) socio-political positioning on TWITTER increase over time and can
This view is supported, for instance, by normative understandings of we thus speak of a communicative trend?
PR, such as Grunig’s ’Excellence Theory’ (1992), the approach of A comprehensive aim of our research is to learn more about how
society-focused and public welfare-oriented PR (see Grunig & Grunig, and why individual components of positionings are probably being
2003) or the critical approaches to the role and function of PR in liberal implemented in respective TWITTER postings in practice. In other
democracies (L’Etang & Pieczka, 2006; Spicer, 2000). Added to this are words, we are interested in the characteristics of the strategy behind
the positionings. This research interest is represented by the following
research question:
4
For an interesting counter position see Levy (2020): “… signalling is not a RQ3: Can certain characteristics of positionings on TWITTER be used
perversion of the central function of moral discourse (…)” but instead “a central to identify specific positioning typologies for different DAX-30 companies
function of public moral discourse” (p. 15) (and/or their CEOs), and if so, can defined positioning strategies be derived
5
According to Grunig (1992) “the group of senior managers who control an from the typology?
organization” (p. 5). To answer RQ 3 we combined our findings on specific characteristics

3
R. Fröhlich and A.S. Knobloch
of positionings on TWITTER with general company characteristics and a
specifically calculated positioning index (see Section 3. ‘Methodology/
Research Design’). This resulted in a positioning typology with a total of
five distinguishable positioning types.
Conclusively, we discuss the question to what extent socio-political
positioning should be a task of PR and whether the TWITTER
communication we examined indicates that the DAX-30 companies of
our study already take this into account.
3. Methodology/research design
We have carried out a content analysis of TWITTER posts by
German DAX-30 companies6 to identify and analyze socio-political
positioning there (RQ1). We have focused on the DAX-30 companies
because they are regarded as role models in their industries and
because their size means that they have a comparatively large influ­
ence on society in economic, political and social terms (Kilian &
Hennings, 2014).
In order to be able to answer the questions about a possible trend
(RQ2), i.e. a long-term (linear) change in the mean level (Chatfield,
1996), we included all TWITTER posts by these companies and their
CEOs between January 1, 2014, and July 1, 2019. This analysis period
covers the time before, during and after the European refugee crisis in
summer 2015 (cf. Azizi, 2018), which led to prolonged controversial
debates among citizens, civil society, politicians and business repre­
sentatives. In our view, that is what makes this period interesting for
our study.
For reasons of internal comparability, only the official group
channels were taken into account. This means that the TWITTER
channel ’VW Group’ is part of the study, but not the channels of in­
dividual brands such as ’VW’ or ’Audi’. Channels of individual de­
partments were not considered either. CEO channels, on the other
hand, were explicitly the subject of the analysis, as the few previous US
studies had shown that their statements in particular often took the
form of social positioning (Gaines-Ross, 2017).
The first surprising finding was already apparent when determining
the population of the study material: Only six of the thirty DAX CEOs
had their own TWITTER channel in June 2019. These were Guido
Kerkhoff (Thyssenkrupp), Joe Kaeser (Siemens), Markus Steilemann
(Covestro), Markus Braun (Wirecard), Bill McDermott (SAP) and Rolf
Buch (Vonovia). With the help of Twitter Advanced Search, we
searched a total of 36 different TWITTER channels for German and/or
English language ’socio-political positioning’ according to our defini­
tion presented above. Initially, the individual tweet was considered the
unit of analysis and context. However, retweets with the re-tweeter’s
own additions to the channels were included in the sample, since this is
another mode for companies to position themselves. The population
thus determined from the 36 channels in the period under study, with
an extrapolated total of about 154,770 postings, was then further
narrowed down with the help of key terms based on our research in­
terest and our definition of ’socio-political positioning’.
With the help of a method developed by Stokes (1963), we identi­
fied ten topics with a controversial character from the TWITTER posts
under investigation. Based on Stokes’ classification of criteria for the
degree of controversy, we have further differentiated between “posi­
tional issues” (controversial) and “valence issues” (less controversial).
Of the ten topics identified as relevant to our context, seven were
valence issues (economic, social, and environmental policy, basic
democratic rights, education, equal opportunities, health, and security
policy) and three were positional issues (migration, foreign as well as EU
policy).
In order to investigate whether specific positioning typologies can be
identified (RQ3), we subjected the variable ’degree of controversy of the
6
The leading Stock Index in Germany.
4
Public Relations Review 47 (2021) 102113
positioning topic’ (e.g. migration policy = high degree of controversy)
to a cluster analysis.7 This variable is already discussed in the literature
on the concept of CSA as a relevant differentiating factor (Dodd & Supa,
2014). In our case, we have used the shares of positionings on the
controversial topics of migration, foreign, and EU policy.
We combined this variable with a specifically calculated positioning
index: Only looking at the frequency of postings carries the risk of dis­
tortions, because if an actor has only been active on TWITTER for a short
time, for example, he has had fewer opportunities for positioning him­
self. We have therefore also taken into account the total number of
postings during the period under review (based on an extrapolation).
With this positioning index we can differentiate between relative and
absolute frequency and thus identify actors whose TWITTER postings
contain socio-political positioning above average.
For the cluster analysis, we furthermore collected selected enterprise
characteristics. In the literature, there are indications that, for example,
a company’s own tangible and intangible resources can have an influ­
ence on the impact of corporate responsibility communication in general
(cf. Eisenegger & Schranz, 2011). The affiliation to a specific industry or
branch can also determine and explain corresponding communication
behavior (cf. Palazzo & Richter, 2005). Further potential for explaining
cluster-analytical typologies arises from the fact that positioning should
ideally correspond to other actions of the company and to organizational
characteristics like for instance employee numbers, sales figures, B2B vs.
B2C or cognitive legitimacy (cf. Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hond et al.,
2014). By considering these relevant criteria for analyzing the
arrangement of companies’ socio-political positioning, we indeed ob­
tained first indications of (five) different types of corporate positioning
that may represent different positioning strategies.
4. Results
A total of 934 cases of socio-political statements including neutral
statements were identified in the period under study. All six CEO
channels contained statements on socio-political topics. With an
extrapolation of around 154,770 postings by the 36 channels, 934 cases
correspond to a share of only 0.00605 % of socio-political statements in
total. Of the thirty companies, 26 made at least one statement on a
respective topic. No corresponding posts at all were found on the
channels of Fresenius, Fresenius Medical Care, Continental and Hei­
delbergCement. For Continental, again, only a special investor relations
account could be included into our analysis. Of the 934 statements, 437
cases were socio-political ’positionings’ in the sense of our definition.
Actual socio-political positionings (n = 437) account for 0.00282 % of
all tweets between 2014 and 2019. This does not sound like a significant
amount, but on average it still means 6.62 socio-political positionings of
DAX companies per month (and five of them did not even post a single
positioning).
374 of the 437 socio-political positionings of the DAX 30 companies
identified in this study come from 30 institutional corporate TWITTER
channels, 63 from six personalized CEO TWITTER channels. 76 % of
CEO positionings originate from statements made between 2018 and
7
A cluster analysis assembles trait carriers into natural groups on the basis of
selected properties (no predefined classes). It has an exploratory character,
since hidden patterns are to be discovered. The individual clusters should (1)
differ from each other as much as possible and (2) each cluster should be as
homogeneous as possible (instances share certain properties). We used the
squared Euclidean distance as a proximity measure. With the hierarchical
cluster procedure of the Ward method it was determined after consideration of
the dendrogram and based on content logic that the channels can be divided
into five clusters. χ2 tests with the two cluster variables indicate the discrimi­
natory power of the clusters (grouped share of controversial positioning: χ2(20)
= 97,389, p = .000, Cramers V = .822; positioning index: χ2(28) = 112,956, p
= .000, Cramers V = .886). However, the statistical tests only provide an
indication, but not significant results, because the number of cases is too small.
R. Fröhlich and A.S. Knobloch
2019.
In order to check the trendiness of a possible development, all socio-
political statements (N = 934) and actual socio-political positionings
(N = 437) in the individual months from January 2014 to June 2019 per
year were examined. And indeed: The observation of the relevant
postings over time indicates a slight increase (see Fig. 1).
According to the data calculation presented here, a significant in­
crease in socio-political statements by the companies studied or their
CEOs cannot be detected until early summer 2019. It is not easy to speak
of a ’trend’ in the sense of a continuously increasing change on the basis
of this type of calculation. On the contrary, the number of socio-political
posts (both statements in total and positionings) rises sharply in some
phases, only to fall back below the average of 14.15 posts per month
afterwards. Behind this are concrete events and developments that are
responsible for the temporary swings: for September and October 2015,
the increase can be attributed to the ’refugee crisis’ (from summer
2015); the regular peaks in March of the years 2014–2019 can be
attributed to the periodically recurring event of International Women’s
Day (in the coded statements, the topic of ’equal treatment’ clearly
predominates); a detailed analysis of the topics for the peak in June
2016 shows the BREXIT vote in the UK as the cause of the increase; the
peak in May 2017 was partly triggered by the "WE 4 EUROPE" initiative,
which German companies joined to plead for more cohesion in the EU;
the peak in September 2017 can be explained by that month’s Bundestag
elections, which is also confirmed by the topic analysis of the posts (79
% positioning in the context of the Bundestag elections alone). From
March/April 2019 there was then a strongly above-average increase in
statements on socio-political topics, which by the end of the period
under review still had not fallen below the previous average level - and
there is a further (extreme) peak in May/June 2019. The latter - as the
topic analysis also revealed - has to be seen in connection with the
elections to the European Parliament at the end of May 2019. The EU
elections have been used by far more companies (20 out of 30) as a topic
for socio-political statements than was the case for the 2017 federal
elections.
Equally interesting is a consideration of those topics on which there
were no or very little socio-political statements (let alone positioning) on
the TWITTER channels examined. These include, for example, the
debate on public security, which was triggered by various terrorist at­
tacks in Europe. It is possible that companies may have considered this
topic too sensitive, especially in view of the tragic events. The presi­
dential elections in the USA were also hardly discussed by DAX com­
panies and/or their CEOs.8 Finally, climate change, which has received a
great deal of attention in the media and society since 2018 as a result of
the "Fridays for Future" movement, was hardly taken up as an issue in
the context of socio-political positioning by the DAX 30 companies
investigated and/or their CEOs. It is possible that the topic (including
environmental protection, sustainability, etc.) is regarded by the DAX 30
companies more as a classic CSR topic, which can be better communi­
cated through measures related to the core business.
A different picture emerges when comparing the number of socio-
political statements bundled per year (see Fig. 2).
Neutral statements have steadily decreased since their peak in 2016,
while concrete positionings have steadily increased. While the com­
panies surveyed have tended to express themselves neutrally in the past,
in 2018 for the first time more concrete socio-political positionings than
neutral socio-political statements were communicated on TWITTER. The
gap has not reversed since then. We interpret this development as a
’trend’.
8
This is quite different in the USA, where both the election of Donald Trump
and some of his actions triggered a variety of socio-political positionings among
US companies and/or their CEOs (see Gaines-Ross, 2017).
5
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4.1. Communication occasions
Approximately 51 % of the cases of positioning have Periodically
Recurring Events (e.g. political elections, commemoration days, days of
action) as an occasion for communication (see Fig. 3).
This is by far the most dominant group of occasions. Our explanation
for the great importance of periodically recurring events as a commu­
nication occasion for socio-political positioning likely arises from the
fact that many other companies and organizations also express their
views at the time of such events. The respective positioning of the in­
dividual corporation and/or CEO is thus less the focus of attention,
which allows the individual risk to be spread. In addition, periodically
recurring events can also lead to a kind of domino effect: If a particularly
large number of companies and/or CEOs comment on an event –
particularly comparable companies, for example from the same industry
or size class – others come under pressure to comment as well.
Other communication occasions included perceived social de­
velopments, with a good 28 %; only in 12 % of cases did a concrete key
event represent the occasion for a socio-political positioning. Other one-
off events are also comparatively seldom the occasion for positioning
(around 8%). The fact that attention-grabbing key events are relatively
seldom the occasion for socio-political positioning is surprising at first
glance, since attention-grabbing key events usually offer high news
value, which in turn promises relevance and reach – all in all, therefore,
a good starting point for delivering messages and attracting compara­
tively high media attention. On the other hand, however, the risk of
presenting a larger target for attacks and criticism increases in such
particular event situations, which companies may rarely be willing to
do. And if they are willing to take the risk, then ideally companies have
to invest a comparatively large amount of time and resources in order to
be able to make a solid assessment in advance of how relevant and
profitable the (surprising) key event in question actually is for the
company.
4.2. Topics of socio-political positioning
Our data show that the companies studied position themselves more
frequently on certain topics in society and politics than on others (see
Fig. 4).
Topping the list by a wide margin are ’equal opportunities policy’
and ’basic democratic rights’. This corresponds to 29 % and 27 % of
cases, respectively. ‘EU policy’ (15 %) and ’migration and asylum pol­
icy/themes’ (11 %) are also relatively often the subject of DAX 30
companies’ socio-political positioning. The fact that environmental
policy issues (6%) as well as economic and social policy issues are so
rarely the subject of the companies’ socio-political positioning does not
mean that these issues are irrelevant to them. Instead, we assume that
there is a strong case for them being addressed in conjunction with a
core business reference within the framework of classic CSR measures
(environmental issues) and/or the risk associated with such issues being
assessed as too high for a public positioning (economic and social pol­
icy). As a result, for these topics it is more likely that the companies take
the path of directly addressing political actors and decision-makers via
classic (non-public) corporate political advocacy and lobbying. Or,
alternatively, it is possible that they simply believe that such complex
and complicated issues are fundamentally unsuitable for positioning via
TWITTER.
The findings on how controversial the topics were for which socio-
political positionings are also interesting (see Fig. 5).
Of the 437 socio-political positionings taken during the period under
study, 61 % were on topics of low controversy, while the remaining 39 %
were on topics of comparatively high controversy. This could indicate
that German companies consider TWITTER to be rather unsuitable for
taking a stand on highly controversial and therefore risky topics. The
very limited space on TWITTER, which does not allow complex depths
and discourses, may also be one of the reasons for this.
R. Fröhlich and A.S. Knobloch
Fig. 1. Frequency of Socio-Political Statements in Total (N = 934) and Actual Socio-Political Positionings (N = 437) over Time.
Fig. 2. Frequency of Communication Activities per Year: Socio-Political Con­
tributions in Total (n = 934); of These Concrete Socio-Political Positionings
(n = 437) and Neutral Statements (n = 497) over Time (2014–2019).
4.3. Tenor and form
Most of the socio-political positionings we analyzed were positive
formulations (n = 375) - i.e. a position was advocated, not rejected
(n = 62), and for the most part (75 %) there were no calls for action.
Fig. 3. Shares of Different Positioning Occasions of Concrete Socio-Political Positionings (n = 437) in %.
6
Public Relations Review 47 (2021) 102113
However, while corporate channels formulated a positive position in 89
% of cases, this was ’only’ the case for 68 % of the positionings on CEO
channels. CEOs therefore speak out more frequently against circum­
stances/matters on their own channels. Since negative formulations can
be understood as criticism, they tend to be riskier, and are therefore
probably less suitable as a collective position (of the companies) and
must be represented as an individual statement, if at all. Who, if not the
CEOs, could afford to do this and withstand any headwind that might
arise? Moreover, the social positioning of DAX companies revolved
mainly around themselves: They rarely referred back to other com­
panies/organizations or external persons (e.g. through retweets or
mentions). The CEO channels, on the other hand, had about six times as
many retweets as the corporate channels. This may be an indication that
CEO positioning is less planned and more (spontaneously) reactive
communication measures than positioning on corporate channels. A
further indication of this is the finding that CEO positioning used
multimedia design options, links, and hashtags much more rarely than
positioning on corporate channels.
4.4. Typology of socio-political positioning (Cluster Analysis)
The question of how active the DAX-30 companies are in the area of
R. Fröhlich and A.S. Knobloch Public Relations Review 47 (2021) 102113

Fig. 4. Frequency of Individual Topics of Socio-Political Positioning (n = 437).

Fig. 5. Shares of Positional und Valence Issues of Topics of Socio-Political Positioning in % (n = 437).

’socio-political positioning’ (including CEO channels) varies greatly. In

Table 2
the top group, the quantities were very close together. This group in­
Division of the Channels (N = 36) into five Different Clusters.
cludes Volkswagen (41 positionings), Deutsche Bank (40), Deutsche Post
(39), and Siemens (39). Five companies did not position themselves on Cluster TWITTER-Channels
TWITTER once during the period under review. Cluster 1 (non-positioning Adidas, Continental, Fresenius, Fresenius Medical
Siemens is a particularly interesting case, because here Joe Kaeser channels) Care, HeidelbergCement
acts as communicator for two-thirds of all socio-political positioning Cluster 2 (all-around Allianz, Bayer, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Post, Joe
positioning channels) Kaeser (Siemens), RWE, Thyssenkrupp
posts. Socio-political positionings have also integrated Bill McDermott Cluster 3 (harmonic BASF, Beiersdorf, Bill McDermott (SAP), BMW,
from SAP and Guido Kerkhoff from Thyssenkrupp into their communi­ positioning channels) Covestro, Daimler, EON, Guido Kerkhoff
cation on TWITTER with above-average frequency – although not to the (Thyssenkrupp), Markus Braun (Wirecard), Merck,
same extent as Joe Kaeser. Siemens, Vonovia, VW
Cluster 4 (emergency Deutsche Börse, Münchner Rück, Telekom
In order to investigate whether specific positioning strategies can be
positioning channels)
found (RQ3), we conducted a cluster analysis (see Table 2).9 Using the Cluster 5 (commonly Henkel, Infineon, Linde, Lufthansa, Markus
positioning channels) Steilemann (Covestro), Rolf Buch (Vonovia), SAP,
Wirecard

9
The cluster analysis has an exploratory character, since structures are to be
discovered through collected data. The squared Euclidean distance was used as
a proximity measure. With the hierarchical cluster procedure of the Ward
method it was determined after consideration of the dendrogram and based on
content logic that the channels can be divided into five clusters. χ2 tests with the
two cluster variables indicate the discriminatory power of the clusters (grouped
share of controversial positioning: χ2(20) = 97,389, p = .000, Cramers V =
.822; positioning index: χ2(28) = 112,956, p = .000, Cramers V = .886).
However, the statistical tests only provide an indication of the trend, but not
significant results, because the number of cases is too small.
variable of controversy in combination with a specifically calculated
positioning index,10 we were able to identify a total of five different
positioning types (see section ‘Results’).
4.4.1. Cluster 1: non-positioning channels
This cluster brings together the five companies that did not position
10
Our positioning index takes into account in data analysis whether an actor
was active on Twitter for only a short time (between 2014 and 2019). Thus, a
distinction can be made between absolute and relative frequency of social-
political positionings.

7
R. Fröhlich and A.S. Knobloch
Fig. 6. The five Clusters in an Axis Diagram.
themselves on TWITTER during the period under review. It is striking
that four of the five channels can be assigned to the B2B sector. The risk
of a customer boycott can thus be classified as lower here (see Clem­
ensen, 2017), so the risk of socio-political positioning is comparatively
low. However, these companies may consider online and social media
communication in general to be less relevant for them because they
rarely reach their target groups through these channels.
4.4.2. Cluster 2: all-around positioning channels
The companies and the one CEO (Siemens) in this cluster are
distinguished by the fact that they each achieve the highest values in the
positioning index (50 % of cases in total) and socio-political positioning
is thus to a certain extent part of their basic communication behavior on
TWITTER. We have called it an ’all-round’ cluster because (1) the
comparatively high number of positionings on controversial topics is
striking here, (2) both valence issues and positional issues are regularly
discussed, (3) both periodically recurring events and specific de­
velopments are occasions of communication, and (4) the selection of
topics is broader than in any other cluster. In six out of seven cases in this
cluster, the companies concerned are those with relatively medium to
high employee numbers and sales figures. These companies may have
more extensive resources available for frequent strategically planned
communication activities. Accordingly, it could also be that those
responsible for communication can plan/control the strategic posi­
tioning process more fundamentally and comprehensively (e.g. identify
issues that threaten the scope of action of the company at an early stage).
At the same time, large companies may receive greater public attention
and thus also more pressure from outside to face up to social re­
sponsibility (cf. e.g. Sethi, 1975). As large companies they probably also
have greater political influence, which also means better chances of
effectiveness for socio-political positioning. Together with the fact that
their size alone gives these companies greater cognitive legitimacy (see
Hillman et al., 1999) – they are less vulnerable – this greater political
influence could also be the reason why comparatively more positionings
on controversial issues can be found in this group.
4.4.3. Cluster 3: harmonic positioning channels
With ten companies and three CEOs, the ’harmoniously positioning’
cluster represents the largest group. This group also positions itself on
socio-political issues more frequently than average (35 %). However,
these are mainly valence issues that are considered less controversial
and antagonistic. Cluster 3 also takes little risk when it comes to
8
Public Relations Review 47 (2021) 102113
communication occasions: Concrete socio-political positions are taken
particularly frequently on the occasion of periodically recurring events
(55 %). With all due caution, one could argue that this cluster brings
together companies that aim to enhance their reputation by gaining the
greatest possible number of supporters through less polarizing issues.
4.4.4. Cluster 4: emergency positioning channels
This cluster brings together three companies (including two from the
financial and insurance sectors) whose positioning index tends to have
lower values and is thus responsible for only just under 9% of all cases.
But: These companies tend to position themselves more on controversial
issues. In the finance and insurance sector it is fitting that the focus is on
issues such as ’EU scepticism’ or ’brexit’ and that specific key events are
more often than not the occasion for positioning. The companies in this
group have positioned themselves most notably when their own room
for maneuver seemed to be under concrete threat – for example, through
the endangered cohesion of the EU.
4.4.5. Cluster 5: commonly positioning channels
The six companies and two CEOs in this cluster position themselves
comparatively rarely on socio-political issues. Only just under 7% of all
cases can be assigned to this cluster. Similar to Cluster 3, less contro­
versial valence issues are mainly addressed here. The trend in this group
is towards comparatively small to medium-sized companies (number of
employees and sales value). It is possible that this is why the actors
assess their political and social impact as rather low, which is why they
expect little attention for their company’s socio-political positioning and
consider it to have little impact. This is in line with the fact that the
companies in this cluster position themselves predominantly on peri­
odically recurring events. This may also be due to the better possibilities
for preparation and planning (resource question) as well as the fact that
other companies/organizations also position themselves on such occa­
sions. You have to keep up with them somehow and it also reduces the
individual risk (see Gaines-Ross, 2017). And indeed: in this group the
share of retweets with reference to other companies/organizations is
comparatively high at 23 %.
The cluster analysis has shown that the strategies of the individual
DAX 30 companies differ significantly in terms of the degree of con­
troversy and positioning frequency. An overview of the differences is
provided by the non-metric representation in Fig. 6.
The axis diagram suggests two basic strategic motives for socio-
political positioning for the companies studied: The use of this specific
R. Fröhlich and A.S. Knobloch
form of communicative message and its distribution with the aim of (1)
further improving trust, image, and reputation while avoiding risk as far
as possible or (2) securing room for maneuver within the framework of
specific, very concrete (socio-political) challenges and in doing so
accepting certain risks in the process. Our findings have also provided
evidence that corporate characteristics (e.g. size), timing and thematic
factors, and the behavior of other companies/organizations determine
positioning strategies.
4.5. CSA as a functional task of corporate communications/PR?
At the beginning, we argued that, against the backdrop of PR theory,
it is plausible to integrate socio-political positioning measures into a
corporation’s general strategic communication process. We therefore
assume that CSA measures do not differ in this respect from other classic
corporate communications strategies. In addition to the advantage of
better planning (strategic thematization and timing), the integration
would also have the advantage of systematic evaluation of CSA. This
would in turn strengthen the strategic character of socio-political posi­
tioning as a strategy of classic corporate communications. All in all,
there is much to be said for locating socio-political positioning tactics as
part of an umbrella CSA strategy within the responsibility of corporate
communications/PR.
Overall however, according to our data, there is not much to suggest
that socio-political positioning in the DAX 30 companies surveyed is
actually integrated into an overarching strategic communication
concept. In particular, the findings on the positioning of individual CEOs
suggest that these are predominantly individual decisions (sometimes
perhaps even highly spontaneous and ’lonely’) that achieve a high de­
gree of authenticity, but in which strategically relevant contextual fac­
tors of the company (e.g. the fit of the topic with the company or
stakeholder demands) are inevitably not taken into account. According
to our data, it is probably primarily large and powerful companies (or
their CEOs) that accept the risks that can arise from this. Ultimately,
however, it is precisely this that can create opportunities, as shown by
the Kaeser case presented at the beginning of this article.
5. Conclusion, outlook, and limitations
Our content analysis on the socio-political positioning of German
DAX-30 companies is a first national case study that can serve as a model
for further research. Our findings suggest that CSA via TWITTER is still a
comparatively new phenomenon among German DAX30 companies:
first, the average 6.62 socio-political positionings per month represent
just 0.00282 % of all tweets over the entire 5,5-year study period
(n = 437), and second, 76 % of the CSA positionings originate from
statements made between 2018 and 2019. One could say that, in all
likelihood, the great attention paid to it is mainly due to the rarity of CSA
positionings. Specific data calculations have also revealed a continuous
and stable increase in CSA positionings over the six-year period under
review. Here one can certainly speak of a continuous increase in the
sense of a trend. Future studies must show whether this assumption is
justified.
Our findings also indicate that specific events are an important
trigger for CSA positioning. Such events provide initial stimuli for
companies and/or CEOs to speak out – without being asked. In partic­
ular, periodically recurring events are of great importance as driving
forces for socio-political positioning. We interpret this with all due
caution as an indication of the relevance of socio-political positioning to
issues management.
As far as future developments of CSA are concerned, based on our
findings for German companies, we forecast two trends in particular:
Firstly, in times of increasing globalization and digitalization as well as
mediatization and growing stakeholder demands like those represented
by what Edelman (2018) calls “belief driven buyers,” the corporate
personalization (concrete prominent corporate communicators) of
9
Public Relations Review 47 (2021) 102113
socio-political positionings will increase. And secondly, as a result,
socio-political positionings will become another highly specialized task
of corporate communications/PR – a communication task that is likely
to lead to even greater proximity between the management elite of
companies and their communication professionals. We see this as a
welcome opportunity for gaining status and further professionalizing
corporate communications. However, this will definitely be a particular
challenge: From an unpublished study by Will et al. (2011, as cited in
Talanow, 2015, S. 146), we know that CEOs in Germany consider it part
of their job to participate in social discourse. At the same time, however,
they are not particularly fond of having to submit to detailed planning
and control of their communications as part of strategic corporate
communications. They prefer to have more room for individual and
authentic communication, which they probably also indulge in via their
personal TWITTER communication – much to the chagrin of their
communications executives. This fits with findings by Zerfaß et al.
(2013), according to which about two-thirds of CEOs and managing
directors in Germany see communication more as a one-way trans­
mission of information intended to have an effect on the respective re­
cipients and target group (66 percent). This view contrasts with German
communications executives’ demand for a more strategic character of
CEO communications (pp. 21-22).
Since the positioning through CSA is determined by what Mog­
haddam and Harré (2010) call “moral order,” our findings are not easily
transferable to other countries and cultural contexts. This is especially
true for our result on specific event occasions as triggers of CSA
communication, on our typology of CSA strategies and on the posi­
tioning on certain topics. Also, the rather low degree of willingness of
German companies/CEOs to take risks and address at times highly
controversial issues with their CSA communication is probably not
easily generalizable for CSA in other countries and cultures. James
(2015) states in this regard: “What makes up the nature of positioning
theory’s rights and duties depends on the local moral order within which
the positioning efforts are taking place – that is, what is considered to be
right to do and say at a given time in a given place (…). Such local moral
orders are socio–culturally specific (…)” (p. 35). Cultural, political,
socio-economic, social, etc. exegesis provides the framework for this. For
instance, in the case of Germany, the collective memory and experience
of totalitarianism and dictatorship during the Third Reich as well as the
special economic order that Germany adopted after World War II – the
so-called social market economy –– certainly determine the resulting
social mainstream on taboos and peculiarities in dealing with related
topics and also how controversial, explosive, urgent, etc. the German
society considers a topic to be at a given time.11 Against this backdrop,
CSA can become a balancing act, especially for globally acting com­
panies and CEOs. This again has great practical significance for applied
public relations (cf. James, 2014, 2015), and it shows that we must
overcome the limited scope and validity of national case studies through
international comparative studies. These need to investigate under
which conditions (cultural, economic, political, etc.) companies and/or
their representatives have the possibility or even the right to take a
public position on certain controversial social-political issues in a
certain way.
Further research should also take into account relevant structural
characteristics of the companies investigated (including unlisted com­
panies) such as resources of the PR departments, values lived within the
company, issue ownership, stakeholder claims, and/or attitudes of
communications managers and CEOs towards socio-political
11
Indeed, studies show that in countries with a strong social system (as is the
case in Germany), corporate social engagement for instance tends to be less
rewarded than in the USA, an economically more liberal country (cf. Kampf,
2007; Moon et al., 2005). In countries with stronger social systems, the solution
to or an engagement with social problems is more likely to be expected from the
state.
R. Fröhlich and A.S. Knobloch
positioning. This could provide further insights into the motives for
socio-political positioning and the different ways in which it is carried
out. The content of the positioning should also be analyzed more spe­
cifically in future studies. Qualitative frame analyzes, for example, could
help to analyze particular patterns of interpretation/argumentation
used by the companies. This would provide a deeper insight into their
chains of argumentation.
Another, equally interesting question is whether and how CSA
communications are also disseminated through other communications
channels (for example in press releases or on other social media chan­
nels), and if so, what forms and formats they take. In this way, the socio-
political positioning of companies that do not (yet) use TWITTER as an
established communication channel could be included into the analysis.
Finally, we should closely monitor the role and function of strategic
corporate communications/PR in the context of socio-political posi­
tioning in the future. This, however, requires alternative methodological
approaches, such as survey studies.
Furthermore, some methodological limitations of our study need to
be kept in mind: By using Twitter Advanced Search, it was not possible
to include those retweets that were not supplemented by the channels’
own comments. Nor does the search function show the total number of
postings in the relevant period. For this reason, extrapolations had to be
made to determine the relative positioning value. In addition, the
TWITTER platform itself changed during the period under investigation.
Until the end of 2017, only 140 characters were allowed; afterwards this
number was doubled. This may have an impact on, for instance, the
decision for or against an additional hashtag or link. And of course it
offers communicators the possibility of forming more complex chains of
argumentation. When considering our findings, such (structural and
technical) particularities must be taken into account – just as they should
be taken into account when designing future studies.
Declaration of Competing Interest
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding
agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
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