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Incident Command
Incident Command
Incident Command
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Fire Service Manual
Volume 2
Fire Service Operations
Incident Command
3rd Edition
2008
London: TSO
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ISBN 978-0-11-341321-8
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Contents
Appendices
Acknowledgements 147
Incident Command Chapter
1
Chapter 1 – Fire and Rescue Service
Incident Command Doctrine
1.1 The Incident Command System framework. Building upon changes to legislation
and supporting guidance2 the broader role of Fire
The Incident Command System (ICS) constitutes
and Rescue Services in incidents other than fire is
the doctrine of the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS)
considered in relation to the capacities, objectives,
in the context of operational incident management,
and constraints of other responding agencies.
leadership, and the functional command and
control processes that flow from it.
The Incident Command System and supporting
processes described in the following chapters
The Incident Command System is the recognised
constitutes a template against which incident
“nationwide safe and effective system for managing
command policies and procedures can be written in
operations”.1 It presents the key elements of
FRSs, and the training and assessment of individuals
effective incident command in three functional
and teams to operate those systems safely and
areas; these are:
effectively can be conducted. Any amendment to
this template should be proposed to the Chief Fire
●● Organisation on the Incident Ground – this
and Rescue Adviser’s Unit (CFRAU).
gives the Incident Commander a recognised
system from which to work when organising
The Incident Command System itself operates
and using resources at an Incident.
within a wider framework of policies, values and an
●● Incident Risk Management – the principal
in depth understanding of operational issues which
consideration of Incident Commanders is
must be taken into account by staff in all roles in
the safety of their personnel. Therefore,
the FRS. Some of these are considered below.
prior to deciding upon the tactics an
assessment of risk must be performed. The
Incident Commander must identify the 1.2 Leadership
hazards, assess the risks, and implement The Fire and Rescue Service in England and
all reasonable control measures before Wales has chosen to express its values and vision
committing crews into a risk area. of leadership in the form of a simple model. The
●● Command Competence – considers the skills model has been named “Aspire”. It has at its heart,
knowledge and understanding required by an the core values of the service; which are:
Incident Commander and the importance of
maintaining such competencies. ●● Diversity
●● Our People
Additionally, this edition of the manual reflects the ●● Improvement
need for FRSs to be able to work effectively within ●● Service to the Community
a broader multi-agency incident management
Incident Command 7
Although not usually discussed in the context of Leadership Capacities:
incident command, it can be seen that the values
are intrinsic to everything we strive to achieve at ●● Organising and Changing
an operational incident, where we routinely serve ●● Partnership Working
all of our communities equally and professionally, ●● Delivering Services
with the safety and well being of our own crews ●● Community Leadership
at the forefront of our mind and reflecting on how ●● Setting Direction
well we have done in order to be better next time. ●● Priorities and Resources
●● Personal and Team Skills
The core values inform and underpin the personal
qualities and attributes (PQAs) at each role level. These are practiced in the three Leadership
Thereafter the model describes the “Leadership Domains:
Capacities” and “Leadership Domains”, which take
the model a stage closer to the actual behaviours ●● Operational
and outcomes: ●● Political
●● Personal-team approach
Incident Command 9
multitude of high-pressure situations. Therefore, by the Health & Safety Executive in HSG654
a critical success factor in responding to any provides an essential framework for designing
incident will be the commander’s understanding of and implementing organisational structures and
the whole context and the complete environment processes for managing successfully and safely.
within which command is to be exercised. HSG65 has five key elements which make up the
framework.
Of the three Leadership Domains identified within
the “Aspire” Leadership Model, incident command 1.5.1 Policy
resides largely within the operational context. This There should be effective policies which set a clear
assumption is more valid at operational levels of direction for the organisation to follow, contributing
response. However, the reference above to the to all aspects of business performance. Fire
requirement for commanders to fully understand and Rescue Service’s policies should set out the
the incident command environment is of increasing approach to delivering effective incident command.
relevance here. As the complexity/scale/intensity of The model described in this manual provides a
incidents escalates, so too does the requirement for a consistent approach that can ensure interoperability
broader understanding across the three Leadership throughout the UK. Interoperability is critical both
Contexts. At the lower end, incident commanders for routine cross border mutual aid operations and
will address, in the main, internal factors i.e. for larger scale incidents involving deployment of
those confined largely to the incident ground. As national assets, for example major emergencies
the complexity, scale and intensity increases, the requiring urban search and rescue or mass
incident commander will be faced with a greater decontamination. Apparently minor modifications,
degree and frequency of issues regarding external for example a change in terminology, can cause
FRS support, multi-agency considerations, as confusion when fire and rescue services have to
well as media, legal and political considerations. work together.
Therefore, the demands of the FRS Leadership
Model directly reflect the demands of competent
1.5.2 Organising
incident command throughout a successful FRS
There needs to be an effective management
career at all levels.
structure and arrangements in place to deliver the
policies. The arrangements should be underpinned
1.5 Leadership in Operation by effective staff involvement and participation
and be sustained by effective communication and
The Incident Command promotion of competence. All involved should
Policy Framework understand the Fire and Rescue Service’s approach
The procedures that form the Incident Command and objectives in relation to the command function,
System should be an integral part of a Fire in particular the procedures associated with their
and Rescue Service’s organisational systems area of responsibility.
for managing risk. The approach published
4 HSG65 Successful health and safety management 2nd Edition ISBN 0 7176 1276 7
Incident Command 13
in the initial stages, delegating responsibility for the first two being located on the incident ground.
the operational level if sufficient resources are These terms need to be understood in the context
available. At larger incidents the team of officers of the incident command structure. This section
responsible for the various command functions of the manual describes the broad command and
will be organised by the Incident Commander to leadership remit of each level, with more detail
discharge the operational tasks, while the Incident about the functions and lines of communication
Commander retains overall tactical command. being found in subsequent chapters.
Whereas it is highly unlikely that strategic decisions
will have to be made at this level, if the need were In the following paragraphs, it must be borne in
to arise, the responsibility to deal with the issues at mind that most incidents are managed without the
hand resides with the most senior officer available. need for an elaborate structure. The vast majority of
fires and Road Traffic Collisions (RTCs) are likely
Therefore, at any incident, the Incident and/or to be dealt with by crews being managed by their
Sector Commanders have a set of tactical priorities line supervisors. Even if an FRS incident escalates
to follow. These can be found in Chapter 2. and more senior fire officers assume command, it
should not be assumed that the multi-agency Bronze,
1.7 Operating within the Multi- Silver, Gold system will be applied. However, it is
Agency Bronze, Silver important to understand what the levels mean, and
what functions they have responsibility for if the
and Gold Structure
structure is implemented.
Bronze, Silver and Gold, reflecting operations,
tactics and strategy, are the descriptions given to
the managerial levels of fire service involvement,
Incident Command 15
(HVP) etc. When utilising resources provided by need to be addressed strategically through Gold or
the New Dimension Programme (often referred to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) as it may
as “national assets”) special provisions have become be referred to, or possibly even the Regional Civil
necessary. This includes a ‘Convoy Procedure’ for Contingencies Committee (RCCC), see Chapter 3.
moving a number of vehicles, potentially over
large distances throughout the country, a ‘Strategic SCG members are representatives drawn from
Holding Area’ for holding the vehicles close to all relevant agencies with the authority to
the scene of operations prior to deployment, and make executive decisions appropriate to the
Enhanced Command Support (ECS) which will be circumstances.
adopted to support the existing command structure
and assist in the control and co-ordination of these The Gold Commander will typically:
additional assets.
●● Be located away from the scene. Most
1.7.3 Strategic (Gold) Level Command agencies have dedicated facilities for such
Most incidents, and the early stages of more occurrences.
serious incidents, may only require operational, or ●● Establish a framework for the overall
operational and tactical, levels of command. If it management of the incident(s).
becomes apparent that the scale of resources or level ●● Establish a policy within which Silver
of decision making required are beyond the tactical Commanders will work, also known as
commander’s capacity or authority, or if there is setting ‘tactical parameters’ an example of
the need to co-ordinate more than one incident/ which may be ‘allowing a fire to burn itself
scene, then a Strategic or ‘Gold’ Command will be out’ where ‘run off water’ could cause an
necessary. Gold will be a major support to Silver, environmental catastrophe as oppose to
often discussing tactics and their implications and airborne pollution.
acting as an advisor. ●● Determine strategic objectives that should be
recorded and periodically reviewed.
The strategic or “Gold” level is the most senior in an ●● Provide resources, or determine limitations
organisation and rarely comes into play in pure Fire upon levels of resourcing.
Service operations. However, it can often feature in ●● Prioritise the demands from a number
multi-service operations such as major incidents, of Silver Commanders and allocation of
large-scale civil disorder, wide area flooding or resources.
other protracted and serious incidents. Whereas ●● Ensure that there are clear lines of
“Gold” does not directly deal with operations on communication.
the ground, at tactical or “Silver” level, it can often ●● Ensure that there is long term resourcing and
involve political considerations and policy level expertise for command resilience.
decisions that extend beyond a single organisation. ●● Undertake appropriate liaison with strategic
‘Gold’ or strategic command is invariably exercised managers in other agencies.
at a distance from the scene of the incident. It is ●● Plan beyond the immediate response phase
intended to take the longer view of the situation; for recovering from the emergency and
the time frame of Gold, or strategic command, is returning to a state of ‘new normality’.
in days rather than hours or minutes.
The requirement for strategic management may not
Major incidents may place considerable demands apply to all responding agencies owing to different
on the resources of the responding organisations, levels of engagement; however emergencies are
with consequent disruption of day to day activities, invariably multi-agency and rarely remain with a
and they may have long-term implications for a single agency. It may therefore be appropriate for
community or the environment. Such matters will an agency not involved at strategic level to send
Incident Command 17
Figure 1
2
Chapter 2 – Organisation on
the Incident Ground
Incident Command 19
As each operational incident is different, IC’s will 2.3 Levels of Command
need to adapt the strategic plans and systems of
There are three levels of command and control that
work, which are based on generic risk assessments,
may be brought into play at a multi-agency incident,
in the light of the specific circumstances of the
known as Bronze, Silver and Gold. The terms
incident, and the resources actually available to
are used to describe tiers of joint, multi-agency
deal with those risks.
emergency management and will normally only be
utilised where a combined multi-agency response
At any incident, the Incident and/or Sector
is necessary. The adoption of this nationally agreed
Commanders (SCs) have to set tactical priorities. The
management framework will assist to integrate
following is an example of a typical list of objectives
plans and procedures between agencies ensuring
that have to be prioritised at a structure fire.
that roles and responsibilities are understood.
1. Perform rescues and ensure medical support is
The UK’s emergency responders model (Strategic
called for casualties without delay.
– Gold, Tactical – Silver and Operational – Bronze),
2. If the building is already fully involved in fire,
which is described in more detail in Chapter one,
take steps to prevent spread to exposure risks.
can be summarised as follows.
3. Contain the spread of fire within the building
or affected portions of it as soon as possible.
●● Operational – which is the level at which
4. Extinguish the fire.
command of immediate “hands-on” or task
5. Commence damage control operations as soon
level work is undertaken at the scene of
as conditions and resources allow.
an incident. If the incident develops with
6. Commence ventilation as soon as conditions
several agencies needing to work effectively
and resources allow.
together, each sector would become a Bronze
7. Commence cutting away and investigations
Command in line with other agencies. It
to ensure all cavities and voids have been
must be emphasised that even if the incident
covered.
is “multi-agency”, the operational level role
8. Consider the welfare of victims or those who
would not be formally labelled “Bronze”
have suffered loss at the earliest possible time,
unless a tactical or silver level was in place,
calling in external support as necessary.
and usually when a multi-agency “Silver”
group had been formed.
This assumes an appropriate risk assessment has
●● Tactical – which is the level of overall
been completed, has been properly announced and
command on the incident ground and which
is under continual review (see Chapter 4). These
ensures that the Operational levels are
tactical priorities will also be helpful at debriefs
supported, and if there are several sectors
and when ICs or Sector Commanders are self
operating to ensure their operations are co-
assessing their own, and their teams’, performance
ordinated to achieve maximum effectiveness.
at an incident:
Again, if the incident develops along multi-
agency lines this role would become Silver
The IC has much to consider when dealing with an
Command. An incident may be formally
incident and this will become even more complex
structured with multi-agency Bronze and
with increased scale and duration. Clearly, no
Silver Commands functioning without a
officer can be expected to handle every aspect of
‘Gold’ being in place.
the operations in progress personally, so the system
●● Strategic – may be invoked where an event
of incident command described in this manual
or situation may have significant impact
will provide operational and managerial tools and
on resources, probably involving a large
support.
number of agencies or has impact for an
5 It should be borne in mind that the NATO hierarchy of Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels doesn’t align directly to the
structure of the UK Emergency Services, therefore allowances will have to be made where the military are deployed.
Incident Command 21
●● Establish effective arrangements for ●● Confirm the existing plan according to the
communications, both on the incident ground agreed tactical priorities.
itself and to provide regular updates to central ●● Confirm the risk assessment and Tactical
control and oncoming supporting officers. Mode, ensuring that safe systems of work are
●● Establish and maintain effective liaison with being utilised.
other agencies, whose knowledge may be ●● Ensure that the requested resources are
critical in helping to achieve the objectives. adequate and effectively deployed to reflect
●● Give early consideration to welfare, both of the tactical priorities. If the incident is under
fire crews and any other party affected by resourced a request for further assistance
the incident. should be made.
●● Prepare to brief a more senior officer using ●● Ensure that communications are effective
all available relevant information so that and well structured informative messages
a decision can be made as to whether that have been passed on and documented.
officer should assume command. ●● Review the command structure of the
●● Establish support in order to provide a incident and ensure that no one is fulfilling a
reporting and holding area for oncoming role beyond their experience and capability
resources, to assist with communications and that the spans of control of individuals
from the incident ground and to document remain manageable.
necessary information, this will be formally ●● Evaluate the tactical plan against all
referred to as Command Support. available information, ensuring that a risk v
●● Constantly update the risk assessment and benefit analysis is performed (see Chapter 4).
subsequent plan based on the availability of ●● Confirm that adequate measures have been
additional information. taken to address any welfare issues that may
●● Communicate plan to Sector Commanders arise from the incident.
and ensure regular updates are given and ●● Maintain effective liaison with other
received on progress. agencies ensuring that each are working
towards a common set of objectives.
2.5 Duties of the IC at ●● Initiate any necessary investigations as
Tactical (Silver) Level soon as practicable, ensuring that possible
evidence is recovered or preserved and
On arrival at an incident the Tactical officer witness statements are taken. Where legal
must report to Command Support and book in proceedings may follow the police should be
attendance, ensuring that mobilising control is involved in the operational decision making
made aware. Contact must be made with the IC as process at the earliest possible time and full
soon as practicable and the exchange of relevant co-operation afforded to them.
information regarding the incident undertaken. A ●● Consider any relevant points that would
decision whether to take over the incident, remain be of benefit during the debrief, including
at the incident in a mentoring or monitoring role, or good and bad practices, success or failure of
allow the existing IC to remain in charge, must be equipment or policies and the performance
taken and effectively communicated to all relevant of crews.
parties. To ensure that there is no doubt about the
‘handover’, the process would be confirmed by the The IC is responsible for securing and controlling
exchange of the IC’s tabard. resources on the incident ground. The assessment
of resources will include consideration of the need
Where the decision to take over the incident for additional:
is undertaken, the following points must be
considered:
OFF-SCENE
ON-SCENE
Sector 1
Command Support
Support Sectors
●● Appliances ●● Decontamination
●● Personnel ●● Water
●● Equipment ●● Foam
●● Firefighting media ●● Relief Management
●● Consumables (e.g. fuel, BA cylinders) ●● Crew Rehabilitation and Welfare
●● Safety
The degree of control an IC will need to maintain ●● Communications
will depend, in part, on the size and demands of ●● Press Liaison
the incident. At larger incidents specific areas of
resource control may be delegated to appointed Each of these functions may be assigned by the
officers. Such areas may include: IC to support sectors if the scale of the operation
demands it. If this occurs, the support Sector
●● Operational Sectors Commander will report in the line of command to
●● Command support the Command Support Officer, who has a similar
●● Marshalling command responsibility level to an Operations
●● BA Main Control Commander (see Chapter 2.11.2).
●● Logistics
Incident Command 23
Where complex or technical operations such as Gold Commander will direct or take charge of
High Volume Pumping, Mass Decontamination operations on the actual incident ground. The Fire
or Urban Search and Rescue are being carried Gold Commander will participate in the multi-
out in operational sectors, they can be assisted by agency Gold group where one has been deemed
support sectors in the same way as BA operations appropriate, and from that position:
are supported by a BA Main Control. The IC must
ensure that there is never any misunderstanding ●● Determine and promulgate a set of strategic
or confusion about the Incident or Sector aims and objectives and review them
Commander’s direct line of operational command regularly.
as opposed to the support and advice provided by ●● Set tactical parameters for Silver to operate
support sectors and their staff, some of which may within.
hold rank higher than those in the sectors being ●● Prioritise the demands of the Silver
supported. It is important that mutual assistance Commander(s) and allocate personnel and
arrangements and standard operating procedures resources to meet requirements.
fully address these issues. ●● Formulate and implement media handling
and communication with the public.
2.6 Duties of a Strategic (Gold) ●● Direct planning and operations beyond the
Level Commander immediate response in order to facilitate
recovery.
This paragraph refers to the role of the senior FRS ●● Support and advise Silver.
officer who will discharge the responsibilities ●● Work with partner agencies.
of a strategic commander when a multi-agency
Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) is brought
2.7 Structuring an Incident
into play during an operational incident. The task
is to take overall organisational responsibility for The ICS is based on a framework that assists with the
the management of that incident and to establish management of resources at an incident. It enables
the policy and strategic framework within which the IC to delegate responsibility for a range of tasks
Silver(s) will work. It is not intended that the Fire and functions during what may be a stressful,
Incident Command 25
Typical Example of Sectorisation
Structure Fire
Sector 3
Sector 2
Main Entrance
Sector 1 Sector 4
Primary Source
of Operations
supervise safety at both locations simultaneously. The principle to be borne in mind is that sectorisation
In this case the most appropriate response would is driven by the need to delegate responsibility and
be for the IC to retain command of the front of the authority in order to ensure appropriate command
building, and to assign all operations at the rear of and safety monitoring of all activities.
the building to another officer of appropriate level
and experience. 2.7.2 Vertical Sectorisation
In buildings or structures with multi-floors where
It is important to note that where this happens at operations may be spread over several levels, i.e.
small scale incidents only, it is not mandatory that high rise buildings or ships, the suggested model
this officer is nominated as a Sector Commander above would not prove to be effective or easy to
and equally does not necessarily mean that a execute. The vertical sectorisation model is based
separate Sector Commander has also to be created on maintaining effective spans of control when
for the front of the building. Sector Commanders cannot follow the normal
practice of being physically present in the sector,
Similarly, at an RTC there may be no need to due to smoke, heat etc.
formally sectorise, however if crews are assigned
to a vehicle, which has come to rest 30 metres At an incident in a multi-storey building external
down an embankment remote from the main sectorisation may be necessary as well as internal,
scene of operations on the roadway, it may be for example if aerial appliances are being used
necessary to assign that vehicle as a separate area
of responsibility, which might be a Sector.
Search Sector
Fire Fire
Sector Sector
Lobby Sector
Incident Command 27
●● Lobby Sector – this is a support sector and All support sectors must report to the IC via the
would cover the area of operations from the command support function. This is important to
ground floor lobby to the bridgehead, which preserve spans of control. At more serious incidents,
is normally two floors below the fire floor. it is likely that the command support function will
The Lobby Sector Commander will act as be headed by an officer of some seniority and
the co-ordinator of all the logistics needs of experience.
the fire and search Sector Commanders, who
will, on most occasions, need to be located at Although the diagrams give examples of five,
the bridgehead directing operations via radio eight, fifteen etc, pump incidents, this is illustrative
and liaising with the BAECO’s. The Lobby only and the range is, of course, variable and
Sector Commander would also co-ordinate dependent on the requirements of the incident and
all operations beneath the bridgehead level, the resources of the individual FRS.
including salvage and ventilation, liaising with
fellow Sector Commanders in the usual way. Services and organisations listed to the right of the
command support function, police and press, etc.,
It is not intended that the system be over-prescriptive (40 pump incident, p43) are examples only, and
and situations may arise where other approaches the list is far from exhaustive. It may include any
may need to be taken, for example in a large or or all of the agencies that are stakeholders in the
complex building it may be necessary to introduce incident.
more than one sector on a floor. This system was
necessary at an actual incident, where two sectors The larger number of crew members in the vicinity
were required each with its own bridgehead, of Command Support that appear in the diagrams
operating in different stairwells and an Operations after a command unit is in place, represent those
Commander co-ordinating the sectors from the allocated as command support and radio operators
lobby area. etc. Individual FRSs will have different ways of
managing this requirement.
All other aspects of the structure, e.g. lines of
responsibility, lines of communication and reporting 2.7.3 Location of Sector Commanders
for the Sector Commander would function in the It must be emphasised that Sector Commanders
normal manner. See figure 2.1 for an example of should be in direct communication with personnel
vertical sectorisation. in their sector. Sector Commanders provide direct
and visible leadership at each sector and need to
These principles can be readily applied to other remain directly accessible to the Crew Commanders
situations where vertical, internal sectorisation for whom they are responsible. In cases where it is
may be necessary. essential that an IC requires a Sector Commander
to leave their post, for a briefing or another purpose,
The diagrams on p37–p43 are examples of the they must be replaced by someone with appropriate
Incident Command structure applied to incidents, competence and authority to maintain continuity
and how the command structure expands to match of supervision. Any such replacement must be
the demands of an escalating incident. communicated to all those operating in the sector.
Incident Command 29
be tempted to self-deploy. This must be avoided The potential for post-incident stress must be
as it is essential to account for all of the available recognised and officers should be trained to identify
resources. A thorough briefing of crews must take signs of this. At protracted and complex incidents
place prior to deployment so that safety critical support and counselling may need to begin on the
information can be shared. The main priority of incident ground and must in any case be addressed
any Incident Commander is the safety of personnel as a post-incident consideration.
under their control. This must be established by
identifying the risks that are present, adopting 2.9 Line of Command
appropriate control measures and ensuring that
safe systems of work are used. Using this approach For the ICS to work effectively it is essential that
firefighters can carry out their duties and remain all of those involved at each incident:
safe whilst doing so.
●● are adequately trained,
At large and sectorised incidents in particular, ●● are competent,
it is important for crews to be aware of the IC’s ●● are confident in their ability,
intentions and the overall objectives which have ●● know who they are responsible for,
been set for the incident. This will form the ●● know who they need to report to,
parameters within which they are deployed in their ●● know what their operational brief is.
sectors and crews.
The system provides for a line (or chain) of
Once crews have been briefed they must follow command to form to ensure that every activity on
those requirements and work safely. This will the incident ground, be it within a crew or a sector,
include wearing the appropriate personal protective is working under the responsibility of a competent
equipment (PPE) and ensuring that access and person. The system must be flexible enough to
egress is properly secured at all times. The IC and meet the demands of every incident regardless of
Sector Commanders where appropriate will need size or complexity, however, these principles are
to maintain a position where, as far as practicable, central to the system.
progress can be monitored. Where the level of risk
requires it, the appointment of one or more safety 2.10 Span of Control
officers must be considered to act as advisors at
One facet of the span of control is the pivotal need
key levels.
to maintain lines of communications, which at
times may be numerous, in order to achieve the
Once crews are at work they will require a level of
objectives of the incident. This may consist of
supervision and support, this may mean having the
direct or indirect reports from individuals, crews
necessary resources available (e.g. BA cylinders
or sectors.
and servicing facilities etc) and to ensure that their
welfare needs are addressed. Care must be taken to
Communications will also be received from
give crews sufficient rest, relief and refreshment.
other emergency services, assisting agencies
The frequency of relief’s will depend upon the
and control centres. When analysing the span of
demands of the incident and the individual policies
control, careful consideration should be given as
of each FRS. A recognised problem exists at
to how communications will be managed, and the
protracted rescues where personal commitment
pressures that may be placed upon the Incident
to the victims is high. Under these circumstances
Commander.
the level of fatigue must be measured against the
continued desire to work. A balance must be found
The system requires that direct lines of
between safe operations and crew morale.
communication and areas of involvement need
to be limited to manageable levels to enable the
Incident Command 31
objectives agreed with the IC are to be delivered, the press, police, public and other agencies, the
but must at all times ensure that the IC is aware of number of lines of communication will potentially
the tactical mode being employed. Any change in become unmanageable.
tactics must have the IC’s explicit approval, (or the
approval of the operations commander where one The function of the Operations Commander is to
is appointed), other than to withdraw personnel supervise and co-ordinate the operations within
immediately from a potentially hazardous area. In sectors. The Operations Commander will also
such a case the IC must be informed as soon as is assume the responsibility on behalf of the IC of
practicable and the tactical mode should be updated approving changes of tactical mode. The Operations
accordingly. The officer assigned to command of a Commander is a member of the command team and
sector must assume the incident ground radio call operates on behalf of the IC at Tactical/Silver level.
sign for that sector e.g. Sector Two Commander,
sometimes just shortened to “Sector Two”. The Operations Commander should avoid
becoming involved in support activities or
2.11.2 Operations Commander dealing with the press etc, these functions being
The purpose of the Operations Commander is to addressed by Command Support. This allows
allow the IC to maintain a workable span of control the Operations Commander to co-ordinate the
when an incident develops in size or complexity. Sector Commanders, offering support, addressing
If, for example, an incident has more than four resourcing issues, and ensuring that risk
operational sectors and some support or functional assessments have been performed at the proper
sectors such as water, decontamination, and damage times, are of the expected quality, and have been
control for example, then taking into consideration appropriately recorded.
the likelihood that the IC would need to liaise with
Incident Command 33
with the police or Highways Agency Traffic ●● Mapping the progress of the incident.
Officers may be required to keep congestion ●● Logging decisions made and the rationale
to a minimum. behind them.
●● Liaising with crews of specialist units such ●● Constructing time lines and utilising them to
as BA Main Control, Urban Search and prompt the IC regarding progress.
Rescue and High Volume Pumping etc. to
ensure that they are utilised fully in support The amount of activity and span of control within the
of the incident. Command Support Sector must itself be continually
●● Arranging for additional resources or monitored and where required additional staff
specialist equipment as requested by the IC, should be requested to support the function.
in support of Sector Commanders.
●● Liaising with other agencies as necessary, 2.11.4 The Command Team
when such agencies attend an incident a The command team comprises of the IC and any
system of ‘logging’ personnel must be other staff that are operating in a supporting role
implemented, especially if they are to i.e. Command Support, Operations Commander
enter the inner cordon. Supervision for and despite the likelihood of working from a remote
such personnel may need to be arranged location, Sector Commanders.
and a safety brief delivered prior to their
deployment. At incidents requiring specialist equipment i.e.
●● Briefing designated personnel of their tasks USAR, HVP or Mass Decontamination etc, a
and safety critical information. specialist advisor may be deployed to assist the IC,
●● Arranging for relief crews and equipment to in an advisory capacity only.
ensure sustainability of deployment.
The command team comprises officers holding a In addition to the above the following are patterns
variety of roles and it is essential for each to be of uniform that appear in the forthcoming diagrams
easily identified. At any incident, but in particular at and are for illustration purposes only.
cross border and other large incidents where officers
who may not know each other personally have to
work together, it is important that a commonly
understood means of identification of roles is used.
The following means of identification are not part
of any standard but are in common usage:
Incident Command 35
Incident Operations Sector
Commander Commander Commander
Sector
Boundary
Support Area
Sector 2 Sector 1
Commander Commander
4 Pump Incident
Incident
Commander
Command Support
2 Pump Incident
Incident
Commander
Brigade Control
Command Support
Incident Command
37
Sector 2 Sector 1
38
Sector 2
Commander Safety Officer
Sector 1
Commander
Command Support
5 Pump Incident
Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 3
Sector 2
Commander Sector 3
Sector 1 Commander
Commander
Operational Sectors
Incident
Commander
Water Sector
Support Sectors
Commander
Water Sector
Command Support
Command Team
Incident Command
8 Pump Incident
39
40
Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 3 Sector 4
Incident
Commander
Decontamination
Director Support Sectors
Decontamination
Sector
Operational Sectors
Operations
Commander
Incident
Commander
Decontamination
Director Support Sectors
Decontamination
Sector
Incident Command
Command Team Ops Commander
Water Sector
41
42
Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 3 Sector 4
Sector 2 Sector 4
Commander Sector 1 Sector 3 Commander
Operational Sectors
Foam Sector
Commander
Operations
Foam Sector Commander
Incident
Commander
Decontamination
Director Support Sectors
Decontamination
Sector
Water Sector
Commander
Command Support
25 Pump Incident with
Command Team
SafetyOfficer
Water Sector Safety Sector Ops Commander
Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6
Sector 3 Sector 4
Commander Sector 5 Sector 6
Commander Commander Safety Officer
Commander
Sector 2 Sector 7
Sector 2 Sector 7
Commander Commander
Sector 1
Sector 8
Safety Officer
Sector 1
Commander
Sector 8
Commander
Operational Sectors
Operations Operations
Foam Sector
Commander Commander 1 Commander 2
Foam
Sector Incident Support Sectors
Commander
Ambulance Liaison
Environment Agency
Decontamination FRS Control
Director
Decontamination Police Liaison
Sector
Press
Council
USAR Sector
Commander Emergency Planning
Command Support
Water Sector
Commander 40 Pump Incident Multi
Incident Command
Command Team
USAR Sector Safety Sector
Ops Commanders
Water Sector
43
2.13 Briefing & Information 3. Establish communications with other agencies.
(This may employ communications equipment
Effective communication is of critical importance
on agreed channels or simple direct verbal
at all incidents. Information has to be relayed
communication.)
accurately from the IC to the crews carrying out
4. Establish communications with Sector
the work and vice-versa so that the crews are aware
Commanders for regular reporting between
of the tactics being employed and the IC is aware of
sectors and the IC and between Sector
developments on the incident ground. The IC also
Commanders themselves.
has a duty to relay messages and information back
5. Utilise local systems. Some new and complex
to mobilising control to ensure an accurate picture
buildings and structures, particularly those
of the incident is maintained and recorded.
extending underground, have communication
systems installed for emergency services’ use.
The effective briefing of crews is essential. This
may commence en route to an incident and will
The above duties will invariably be the role of
be supplemented on arrival once a risk assessment
Command Support under the guidance of the IC.
has been performed. Following the initial
assessment, crews will be briefed as to the tasks to
be undertaken and the hazards and risks they will 2.15 Inter-Agency Liaison
face. The extent of the briefing will depend largely The IC must establish and maintain effective
on the nature and extent of the incident; the pre- liaison with all other agencies, as appropriate.
briefing for small fires that crews regularly deal This will include tactical liaison with other
with is likely to be relatively straightforward. On emergency services to co-ordinate operational
the other hand, at incidents where crews have little activities effectively, and liaison with technical
experience and where there is a high risk factor, specialists whose specific knowledge may be
the briefing will need to be comprehensive. The critical in helping to resolve the incident. There is
need to debrief crews that have withdrawn from also a need to maintain effective liaison with the
a working area during the incident should not be media, if in attendance, in order that appropriate
overlooked as valuable safety critical information and accurate information is made available. This
may be sourced at this time. is best done in conjunction with other emergency
services and other agencies that are present to
2.14 Communications avoid conflicting reports.
Incident Command 45
varies considerably across the UK, therefore it ●● Post-incident considerations
is important that local planning and exercising
is conducted to ensure misunderstandings about 2.18 Maintaining Control
roles and responsibilities do not occur during an
incident. The process of task and hazard identification,
assessment of risk, planning, organisation, control,
In terms of accounting for the safety and whereabouts monitoring and review of the control measures
of personnel, it is already a responsibility of must continue until the last appliance leaves the
ICs, delegated to Sector Commanders when the incident ground.
incident has been sectorised, to be aware of which
personnel and crews are active in their sector. As the urgency of the situation diminishes, the
This responsibility may be more effectively IC may wish to nominate an officer to gather
discharged if the Sector Commander has a sector information for the post-incident review. In some
command folder or board, as used by some FRS’s cases this officer should start to take brief statements
already. The addition of space for other agencies’ from crews before they leave the incident, whilst
personnel, together with checklists for PPE, escorts events are still fresh in their minds, these records
if necessary, and details of working location, is a may form part of the contemporaneous notes should
minor but necessary addition. It would also be they be required.
necessary to consider a safety briefing, a record of
their presence and agreed evacuation signals. Details of all near misses i.e. occurrences that
could have caused injury must be recorded because
experience has shown that there are many near
2.16.2 Outer Cordon
misses for every accident that causes harm. There
This is used to prevent access by the public into
is usually no reason for having to accept significant
an area used by the emergency services while they
operational risks at this stage. At the closing stages
are attending an incident. The police will usually
of the incident, the responsibility for health and
control outer cordons. A traffic cordon may then
safety must be handed over to the appropriate
further supplement the outer cordon and the
person.
police, in liaison with the FRS and the ambulance
service, will identify safe routes into and out of the
At the closing stages of the incident the
cordon for further emergency vehicles and other
responsibility for health and safety must be handed
attending agencies.
over to the appropriate person.
Incident Command 47
evidence. Where there is a work-related fatality 6. Before finally closing an incident and
the procedures in the Work Related Death withdrawing all FRS resources, the IC
Protocol should be followed. should inform the person having ongoing
2. Recording and Logging: This might include a responsibility for health and safety on the
written log available from FRS control room, incident ground, or their agents, that FRS
in the Command Unit during the incident or operations have closed down and indicate all
voice recording of critical messages. The early hazards still present. In the absence of advice
attendance and planned deployment of service from other appropriate agencies, the IC may
photographic/video personnel can prove to be wish to give advice on how the hazards may
of great benefit in this area. The obtaining of ultimately be dealt with and advice about
security videos from on-site equipment can appropriate interim control measures. The
often be of value in subsequent investigations. IC must ensure that the responsible person
Action on this matter needs to be taken without fully understands the hazards and accepts
delay, as some systems will re-use the tapes. responsibility for ensuring health and safety
3. Impounding Equipment: Where accidents or on the site; this may include the control of
faults have occurred, any associated equipment potential environmental hazards caused by
should be preserved for later investigation. FRS operations.
Should major malfunction of FRS equipment 7. In a similar way, security issues, particularly
occur, in addition to the normal required where premises are left vulnerable, must be
notification being carried out, any associated properly communicated to those accepting
guidance involving any external agency or responsibility from the FRS commander.
department (i.e. Health and Safety Executive) FRS’s may wish to consider some form
which it is a requirement to inform, should be of documentary evidence of this kind of
observed. handover.
4. Identification of Key Personnel: The names
and location of witnesses to important events
should be obtained and recorded for later
interviews. It may be necessary or appropriate
to commence interviewing during the incident.
5. Managing the closure of the incident: This
includes considerations such as proper
handovers as the incident reduces in size,
continued vigilance regarding the hazards
that continue to exist or newly emerge,
making appliances and crews available again
at the earliest possible time, and ensuring that
site occupiers, neighbours and others who
have been affected by the incident are kept
appropriately informed.
Urban Search and Rescue Urban Search and Rescue Urban Search and Rescue Urban Search and Rescue
Mass Decon Team 2 Mass Decon Team 3 Sector 2 Sector 3 Mass Decon Team 1 Sector 3 Sector 1 Mass Decon Team 1
Operations
Commander
Area 1
Operations
Commander
Area 2 Operations
Commander
Area 3
Sector 2
Commander
Incident
Commander
Fire
Silver Command
Water Sector
Commander
Command Team
Water Sector
Command Support
Outer Cordon
Incident Command
Logistics
CBRN Incident Command Structure
49
Planning Gold
Finance/ Command Multiple Operations Command
Administration (Single catastrophic incident in one jurisdiction)
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1
50
Commander Commander Commander
Urban Search and Rescue Urban Search and Rescue Urban Search and Rescue
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1
Sector 3
Commander
Mass Decon Team 1 Mass Decon Team 2 Mass Decon Team 1 Mass Decon Team 2 Sector 2
Urban Search and Rescue Commander
Sector 3
Water Sector
Incident Incident
Commander Commander
Fire Fire
Silver Command Silver Command
Water Sector
Commander
Water Sector
Incident
Operations Commander
Commander Logistics
Search and Rescue
Command Team
Water Sector
Commander Command Support CBRN Incident Command Structure
Sector 2 Water Sector
Commander with Silver Command
Urban Search and Rescue
Sector 2 (Separate incidents in same jurisdiction)
Incident Command Chapter
3
Chapter 3 – Command within
the UK Resilience Framework
3.1 Introduction mid 1990’s it was clear that the civil defence and
emergency planning framework was no longer fit
Management and command of the most serious for purpose. A review was commenced involving all
incidents is rarely a single agency task. The Incident the major stakeholders, including local authorities,
Command system was developed to ensure that FRS emergency services, and other government
structures and protocols would fit seamlessly with departments. Issues such as the “Y2K Millennium
those of partner organisations and the UK’s overall Bug”, or millennium date change problem, became
approach to integrated emergency management. typical of the type of issue attracting attention from
That approach has been significantly revised and the planning and response communities, as did the
updated to reflect the new nature of the risks and fuel crisis, foot and mouth disease and other non-
threats that the country faces on a daily basis, and hostile action types of risk.
is formalised in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004,
including associated guidance and regulations. This perspective changed on 11th September
FRS commanders need to understand clearly the 2001, or “9/11”. The subsequent consultation and
various entities, and players, at various levels preparations, and resulting legislation, primarily
within the UK’s resilience framework, including the CCA 2004, and for FRSs the Fire and Rescue
knowledge of the powers and duties of officials at Services Act of 2004, has provided an expanded
key levels. This chapter examines that framework. range of duties. This has been accompanied by
detailed guidance for authorities to ensure that they
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 2004) will be able to deliver what is expected of them at
brought together elements of a number of older the required times, be able to work effectively with
statutory provisions, including the Defence of other partners, and have means in place to continue
the Realm Act of 1914, the Emergency Powers their operations at times of challenge to their own
Acts of 1920 and 1964 and the Civil Defence Act infrastructures.
1948, which have all now been repealed (with the
exception of S.2 of the Emergency Powers Act of For FRSs, the post 9/11 environment demanded
1964, which allows the Defence Council to authorise that their own capabilities be developed to cope
“the temporary deployment of Service personnel with a wider range of disruptive challenges to
on urgent work of national importance”). the community. This programme, which became
known as the “New Dimension” programme,
The UK’s emergency preparedness was previously delivered the capability to deal with mass
closely linked with the civil defence framework decontamination incidents; to detect, identify and
that developed post World War Two, during the monitor chemical substances; pump high volumes
period of the cold war. Even before that, the focus of water over large distances; search for, and rescue
was clearly changing, with the Civil Protection in persons from, urban collapses, landslides etc; and
Peacetime Act 1986 making provision for resources effectively command and control the large scale of
previously allocated to civil defence to be used in operations that may be necessary when bringing
preparation for peacetime emergencies. By the these capabilities into play.
Incident Command 51
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Part 1 covers likely to have a role in most emergencies that could
‘arrangements for civil protection’. The Act generate ministerial interest or national/regional
applies to England, Scotland and Wales with press coverage. Government departments may also
some differences in application. In Scotland, civil use GOs to cascade information and guidance to
protection is a devolved matter and therefore the local responders. Regional Resilience Teams (RRT)
responsibility of the Scottish Executive, whereas have been set up in each of the GOs to co-ordinate
the Welsh Assembly Government in Wales the response of the whole GO area, and to act as
exercises authority. In Northern Ireland the ‘Civil the first point of contact for any resilience issues
Contingencies framework’ discharges the principles in normal working hours. RRTs act as support
contained within the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. for lead government departments’ representatives
(The Fire & Rescue Service is not a Category One when they need to operate in the regions or support
Responder in Northern Ireland). In general Category Gold level or other operational decision making
One and Two Responders are obliged to co-operate groups during emergencies.
with each other and other organisations engaged in
response in the same local resilience area. Each local 3.2.2 Government Liaison Team
residence area is based on a police area. Government Office provides the focus for
communication to and from the Strategic Co-
A more detailed explanation of the slight differences ordinating Group (SCG), the Lead Government
of the arrangements within the devolved Department and the Government Liaison Team
administrations will be found in the Appendices (GLT). This would be headed by a senior Home
5 to 7. Office official in the event of the incident being
a result of terrorist action. Otherwise the team
Category One and Two Responders have a duty would normally be headed by the Regional
to share information with each other. Information Resilience Director of the GO. The team consists
sharing is considered both good practice, and of representatives from central government who
also essential to underpin co-operation. Although assist the Gold Commander by:
there is an initial presumption that all information
can be shared, there are in fact certain limits on ●● Keeping the Cabinet Office Briefing Room
disclosure. It is important when working in this field (COBR) fully informed of the involvement of
to understand the categorisation of information, the incident.
and the constraints on how it may be used. This ●● Accelerating liaison between the Gold
is described in Chapter 3 of the document entitled Commander and COBR when Central
Emergency Preparedness (HM Government, Government involvement is required in
November 2005); statutory guidance that supports decision making.
the Civil Contingency Act 2004. ●● Ensuring that the local interest is taken fully
into account at COBR, and conversely to
3.2 Local and Regional Structures ensure that the Government’s views are kept
in mind at the scene.
Before consider ing the FRS roles and
●● Ensuring smooth communication flow
responsibilities, the local and regional structures
between COBR and the incident.
and machinery that come into play during times of
crisis or major emergency should be examined.
3.2.3 The Local Resilience Forum
3.2.1 Government Offices of the Regions The Local Resilience Forum (LRF), comprising
Category 1 Responders as defined by the Civil
The nine Regional Government Offices (GOs) offer
Contingencies Act 2004, is the basic mechanism
a single point of access to central government for
through which local government, emergency
local responders in English regions. The GOs are
Category One Responders under the CC Act The provisions of the Regulations in Scotland are
include: largely the same as in England and Wales, however
Local authorities the LRF is called the Strategic Co-ordinating
Police (local and British Transport Police) Group, which if not properly understood gives
Fire and Rescue Authorities potential for misunderstanding with the English
Ambulance Services model. Additional Regulations made by Scottish
National Health Service (including Primary Care Ministers determine how Category One and Two
Trusts, Strategic Health Authorities and Local Responders within devolved administrations
Health Boards) should co-operate with each other.
Health Protection Agency (the HPA will represent
port health authorities if applicable) 3.2.4 The Regional Resilience Forum
Environment Agency
Unlike LRFs, Regional Resilience Forums (RRF’s)
Maritime and Coastguard Agency
are not statutory bodies. They are not hierarchically
superior to LRFs or inferior to other national level
Category Two Responders under the CC
committees. This status is defined as “subsidiary”.
Act include:
An RRF’s main function is to provide regional
Electricity distributors and transmitters
co-ordination of multi-agency resilience activities
Gas distributors
and delivery. A RRF will undertake a range of
Water and sewerage undertakers
functions, including compiling a regional risk
Telephone service providers
map; considering policy initiatives in the area of
Railway operators
civil protection that emanate from government;
Airport operators
facilitating information sharing, including lessons
Ports
from exercises and incidents at home and abroad,
Highways Agency
and co-ordinating multi-agency exercises and
HSE
training. RRFs are usually chaired by the Regional
Other Co-operating Bodies under the CCA Resilience Director of the Government Office of
include: the Region. The main exception is that in London
Regional Resilience Teams this function is performed by the Minister of
Military the Crown with the London portfolio. London is
Voluntary Sector unusual in the fact that the LRF and the RRF are
effectively the same body, given the boundaries
It is often the individual officials who represent of the Metropolitan Police Service, which is co-
their organisations as LRF members who find terminous with the area of the London Fire Brigade
themselves with operational responsibilities during and the London Ambulance Service.
the emergency response phase. Therefore, in
effect, the LRF constitutes the group of responders 3.2.5 The Regional Civil
engaged in planning and preparation, which Contingencies Committee
becomes the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) In a similar way to an LRF which will, at times
or multi-agency Gold group, in times of emergency of emergency, convene operationally in the guise
response. of a Strategic Co-ordinating Group, the RRF
Incident Command 53
member organisations may convene as a Regional appointed by central government, to deliver the
Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) On strategic objectives set by government to resolve
occasions the same individual may represent their the emergency.
organisation in both LRF and RRF arenas. This is
usually a consequence of a particular organisation’s 3.3 Central Government’s Role
geographical and operational boundaries.
Although the vast majority of crises, however
The RCCC can come into play to co-ordinate the significant, are handled effectively at local level,
response to, and recovery from, an emergency at from time to time, in the most complex and large
regional level in England. The RCCC is likely to scale incidents, central government support and co-
be convened only rarely and only when it can add ordination is necessary to control the emergency.
value to a response. Government will consider the overall strategic
position and provide direction where necessary.
There are three levels of RCCC meetings; Information will be provided from a range of sources,
including the local SCGs, the Joint Terrorism
Level 1 – Preparedness in the phase prior to an Analysis Centre (JTAC), scientific advisory groups
Emergency via the Lead Government Department (LGD) and
other key stakeholders. Consideration may be
Level 2 – Co-ordination of Response in the given to such issues as the mobilisation of national
Region. assets and military resources, managing the public
information and international or diplomatic aspects
Level 3 – Declaration of Special Legislative of the emergency, ensuring a common picture of
Measures. the situation is developed, and assessing the likely
development of the situation to enable the recovery
The role at Level One, where the committee will be phase to commence as early as possible. Central
chaired by the GO Director, is one of monitoring and government will also make decisions involving
assessing the situation which may be developing, the prioritisation of use of scarce resources during
and establishing a state of preparedness. multi-site incidents, consulting the devolved
administrations where appropriate, and give
Level Two meetings are intended to co-ordinate consideration to whether existing legislation is
a response to an emergency across a region. It is adequate to cope with the challenge, and if not,
possible that a request to perform this role would implement emergency powers.
come from a Strategic Co-ordinating Group at
a local level. Level Two meetings are also co- 3.3.1 Cabinet Office Briefing Room
ordinated by the GO Director, or in the case of The Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR,
an event where a clear lead from a government sometimes referred to as “Cobra”) can be activated
department could be identified, e.g. a health or to support the co-ordination and decision making
veterinary crisis, then the chair would be provided that may be required. Officials and key stakeholders
by that department. will meet and prepare advice for ministers on the
most pressing issues.
Level Three meetings are only called when
Emergency Powers under Part Two of the Civil There are three levels of emergency described in
Contingencies Act 2004 have been invoked and the central government’s concept of operations:
have to be managed. A Level Three meeting would
be chaired by a Regional Nominated Co-ordinator,
Incident Command 55
●● Assist other agencies with the removal of ●● Co-ordinating search activities on land
large quantities of flood water. following an event where it is possible that
●● Assist the Ambulance Service with casualty persons may not be located in the immediate
handling and the police with body recovery. vicinity of a disaster scene.
●● Manage gateways into the inner cordon if
requested to do so by the police, recording 3.4.3 Role of the Health Service
the entry and exit of personnel. Note: the The role of the Ambulance Service is to co-
health and safety of personnel working in ordinate the on-site National Health Service (NHS)
the inner cordon remains with the individual response, and to determine to which hospital
agencies, however in the absence of casualties are transported, depending on the types
appropriate personal protective equipment of injuries sustained.
(PPE), refusal into the risk area should be
considered. The Ambulance Service will also (in conjunction
●● Assist the National Health Service (NHS) with a Medical Incident Officer):
with the decontamination of casualties
by undertaking where required the mass ●● Endeavour to sustain life through effective
decontamination of the general public where emergency treatment at the scene.
large numbers of people have been exposed ●● Determine the priority for release of
to chemical, biological, radiological or trapped casualties and decontamination
nuclear substances (CBRN). in conjunction with the Fire and Rescue
Service.
3.4.2 Role of the Police ●● Transport the injured in order of priority to
The police will co-ordinate the activities of those receiving hospitals.
responding at and around the scene of a land
based sudden impact emergency. The saving 3.4.4 Role of the Military
and protection of life is the priority, but as far as The national structure, organisation, skills,
possible the scene is to be preserved to safeguard equipment and training of the Armed Forces may
evidence for subsequent investigations. Other be of benefit to the civil authorities in managing
responsibilities include: the response to and recovery from emergencies.
This support is governed by the Military Aid to
Establishing and maintaining cordons around the Civil Authorities (MACA) arrangements. However
incident, in particular an outer cordon to facilitate the Armed Forces maintain no standing forces for
the work of other agencies. MACA tasks, and assistance will be provided on
an availability basis only. Therefore it is essential
●● Where terrorist action is suspected the police that responding agencies do not base plans upon
will assume overall control of an incident. the assumption of military assistance. The Armed
●● Carrying out a search for secondary devices Forces should only be called upon as a last resort
and performing an assessment of associated and approval is required by the Defence Minister.
risks involving terrorist incidents.
●● Oversee any criminal investigation including In normal circumstances, the ‘concept’ of the Lead
the preservation and retrieval of evidence. Government Department taking charge of an event
●● Process information surrounding casualties is applied, however in the event of a terrorist attack,
and the identification and removal of or when the local responses are overwhelmed
fatalities on behalf of the HM Coroner. Central Government would take charge.
Incident Command 57
58
Operational Sectors
ON-SCENE
OFF-SCENE
Regional Civil
Contingencies Committee
RCCC Sector 1
Multi-Agency
Commmunities and
Local Government Multi-Agency Fire Silver Incident
Briefing Room Emergency Room Commander Command Sector 2
COBR Silver
(Fire and Rescue)
Location determined
Incident Management by the nature of
Recovery Group the incident
IMRG
Command Support
Affected
Control Centre
Support Sectors
FRSNCC
Fire & Rescue Service USAR Water Sector 3
National Coordination Centre
Strategic Advice
Tactical Advice
of a robust national co-ordinating capability will 3.6.3 Convoy Procedure
be closely linked with the development of Regional In planning for large scale incidents, and following
Control Centres. the formalisation of national mutual assistance
arrangements, it can be seen that from time to time
The FRSNCC’s principal role is to co-ordinate there may be the need to move large numbers of
the national and cross regional mobilisation and vehicles and personnel around the UK. A guidance
deployment of all New Dimension resources in note has been issued by the Fire and Resilience
response to a major incident. It will do so in close Directorate which supports this. All guidance will
co-operation with the Communities and Local of course be kept current.
Government Emergency Room (Fire and Rescue)
where these arrangements have been activated, For example, all FRSs have been equipped by
and control room staff in both the affected FRS Communities and Local Government with the
and those FRSs being asked to assist. To enable capability to deal with mass decontamination of
it to undertake this role and maintain a database the public, in the form of Incident Response Units
of resource availability, FRSNCC continuously (IRU’s). In the event of a Chemical, Biological,
monitors and tracks New Dimension resources, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attack anywhere
using information provided by Fire and Rescue in the UK, the mobilisation of the IRU’s and
Services. supporting appliances will take place. FRSs are
expected to pre-plan for this in conjunction with
3.6.2 FRS Mutual Assistance the guidance document and their respective police
The existence of a national mutual aid agreement force, where Convoy Assembly Points (CAP) will
allows individual Fire and Rescue Authorities be identified as a starting point.
to secure assistance from other authorities in
the event of a major incident. Authorities have 3.6.4 Strategic Holding Area
for many years provided mutual support across Convoys of vehicles converging on a city or other
borders for responses to emergencies through the geographical point which has been affected by a
shared availability of fire crews and appliances. It serious incident need to be managed and marshalled
is important that this good practice is universally effectively. Accordingly, Strategic Holding Areas
applied at local, regional and national level to ensure (SHA) have been identified at key locations on the
an effective and efficient response to incidents. motorway and trunk road network. A SHA is an
area which will be used to ‘hold’ FRS resources
Every FRA in England has agreed to participate and national assets of all kinds in response to an
under the terms of the National Mutual Aid incident. It will be an area with suitable space and
Programme.7 Each FRA has confidence in being facilities to accommodate large numbers of crews,
able to request or provide assistance from each appliances and equipment where these resources
other should a serious incident occur. Full FRA can standby, or rest whilst awaiting deployment
participation in the protocol also means that the to marshalling areas and from there to the scenes
task of the FRSNCC co-ordinating New Dimension of operations. The SHAs are part of an overall
resources during serious incidents, is greatly deployment plan to support the operations on the
assisted. The protocol has enabled FRAs to agree in ground, and of the FRSNCC.
advance the terms under which they can support each
other during an incident such as a terrorist attack.
7 DCLG 20th July 2006; Fire and Rescue Service Circular 42/2006 invited FRSs to participate in the National Mutual aid Protocol for
Serious Incidents; FRSC 75/2006 of 12 Dec 2006 indicated that all FRSs agreed to participate.
Incident Command 59
The responsibility for co-ordination and ●● Under the direction of the IC, to facilitate
communication within the SHA will initially rest crew reliefs and rotation, and a structured
with the commander of the Enhanced Command rehabilitation of personnel and equipment to
Support facility. their point of origin in conjunction with the
FRSNCC (the FRSNCC will co-ordinate the
3.6.5 Enhanced Command Support recovery of ND resources).
Enhanced Command Support (ECS) will facilitate ●● Co-ordinate or conduct additional activities
the management of national assets following as requested by the FRSNCC or the IC.
mobilisation to a large incident. It will be adaptable,
flexible and complement the ICS. 3.6.6 FRS National Support
Arrangements
●● It will be located at the SHA and provide At times of the most serious challenge to the Fire and
a communications link to the IC through Rescue Services of the UK, and to assist in ensuring
Command Support. that operations are at all times co-ordinated and
●● ECS will co-ordinate resources into, effective, various teams of advisors have been
within and out of the SHA, facilitating the established to advise government ministers and
provision of logistics support to USAR, MD senior civil servants who may have to make critical
and HVP teams. decisions that will impact on operations. There
●● Provide communication links between the will in addition be specialists available to advise
IC, FRSNCC, the National Advisory Team Incident Commanders, Sector Commanders and
members and groups advising senior civil other relevant officials at a tactical and operational
servants and ministers. level in specialist areas including USAR, MD,
HVP, DIM etc.
Incident Command 61
●● Recognising obstacles that may impact on ●● When a decision has been made to seek
the affected authority’s ability to provide international support, CLG Emergency
adequate support to the emergency and Room may have a specific role with
supporting/prioritising in the areas of arranging this. The UK aims to be self
concern as quickly as possible to ensure that sufficient in dealing with events, and any
the response is not adversely affected decision to seek overseas aid would require
●● Preparing briefs, guides, submissions to policy approval, and likely to be brokered
ministers as directed by Director of FRD or through Cabinet office
the CFRA ●● Liaison with Devolved Administrations
●● Ensuring that sufficient national cover Emergency Rooms.
is being maintained whilst an incident is
being managed and prioritising resource The Communities and Local Government
deployment in the event that there is more Emergency Room (Fire and Rescue) main location
than one incident occurring is London Victoria with a number of contingency
●● Providing support to the affected FRS fallback locations (Fire Service College and
as necessary. Guildford).
4
Chapter 4 – Incident Risk Management
Incident Command 63
●● Control measure: this is any measure taken An important part of risk management at this
to reduce risk, e.g. remove the hazard level is the post incident review. This allows
i.e. roof tiles, or prevent access into the relevant information to be recorded and fed back
immediate area where harm could be caused. in to the Strategic decision making process via the
Section 4.11 ‘Hierarchy of Risk Control’ Systematic level, in order that safety standards can
gives further examples of how control be constantly improved.
measures can be applied at an incident.
Upon arrival at an incident the first task of the IC
In order to provide an acceptable level of protection must be to gather all available information relating
at operational incidents, the organisations health and to the incident. This is likely to include information
safety management must operate at three different obtained at the pre-planning stage and available on
levels – Strategic, Systematic and Dynamic. risk cards or electronic storage media. This is in
addition to information from the caller, received en-
●● Strategic – Strategic health and safety route or passed on by persons already in attendance
management is carried out by FRS i.e. occupiers or other agencies.
Management Teams and the Fire Authority.
They demonstrate management’s The IC must then apply professional judgement
commitment to safety by setting the in conjunction with the Standard Operating
organisation’s health and safety policy, deciding Procedures to decide the most appropriate course
priorities, providing resources and promoting of action, weighing the benefits of proceeding with
a positive health and safety culture. a task against the benefits likely to be gained. It is
●● Systematic – Systematic health and safety important to ‘think before you act rather than act
management is carried out by recognised before you think’. The consequences of a wrong
departments within the organisation. decision at this stage may be irreversible.
Initially, risk assessors identify the hazards
likely to be encountered at the various There will be occasions when rapid intervention
types of operational incident and assess the may be necessary to effect immediate rescues, or to
level of risk presented by these hazards. prevent escalation of the incident. When faced with
Management Teams act upon the results these situations, personnel are likely to be eager
of the risk assessments and commissions to commence operations immediately on arrival.
departments to develop and implement The highest level of Incident Command will be
additional control measures. These could, for required to ensure personnel undertaking any role
example, be information, personal protective do not act outside agreed safety procedures. In such
equipment (PPE), and equipment, systems circumstances, the IC must ensure that personnel
of work, instruction, training and safety are not subjected to unacceptable risks which will
supervision. outweigh the benefits. It is the responsibility of the
●● Dynamic – Dynamic risk management is IC to carry out a DRA and decide whether operations
carried out by all personnel at an operational should continue or adopt a defensive approach until
incident. The main responsibility lies with further information has been gathered.
the Incident Commander who must identify
the hazards, assess the risks, and then make 4.2 FRS Operational
professional judgements in order to use Risk Philosophy
the available resources in such a way as to
achieve an acceptable level of safety during The benefits of proceeding with a task must be
work activities. weighed carefully against the risks, it is important
to “think before you act rather than act before
you think”.
Incident Command 65
4.3.1 Statutory Requirements employees. It also requires employers to have
Fire and Rescue Authorities, as the employers, a general policy with respect to the health
have statutory duties towards their employees and and safety at work of their employees and the
others who may be affected by the way in which organisation and arrangements for the time
they carry out their undertaking. Employees also being in place for carrying out that policy.
have statutory responsibilities for themselves and ●● Section 3 requires employers to conduct their
anyone who may be affected by their actions or undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so
inactions. In practice, high standards of health far as is reasonably practicable, that people
and safety management can only be achieved if all they do not employ who may be affected are
concerned co-operate in delivering effective and not exposed to risks to their health and safety;
safe systems of work. ●● Section 7 requires employees to take
reasonable care of their own health and safety
Incident Commanders are responsible for and of the health and safety of others who
implementing safe systems of work at incidents. may be affected by their acts or omissions at
In deciding whether the health and safety of work and to co-operate with their employer
employees is, so far as is reasonably practicable as far as is necessary to enable the employer
being ensured, a number of factors have to be taken to comply with their duties.
into account. These include considering the benefit,
in terms of saving life, versus risk. Whilst it may Management of Health and Safety at Work
be suitable to commit appropriately equipped and Regulations 1999
trained personnel into a hazardous environment for ●● Regulation 3 requires employers to make a
the purpose of saving life, it may be unsuitable in suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks
a similar situation where it is known there are no to the health and safety of their employees to
lives to be saved. which they are exposed at work and the risks
to the health and safety of persons they do
Fire and Rescue Services should carry out suitable not employ arising out of the conduct of their
and sufficient assessments of the risks involved undertaking, to identify the measures that
in responding to incidents. Following paragraphs are needed to comply with their statutory
explain how this requirement is implemented in the duties;
FRS, with its wide range of unpredictable and fast- ●● Regulation 5 requires employers to put
changing incidents. The key elements of the risk in place arrangements for the effective
assessment process8 are: planning, organising, control, monitoring
and review of the control measures;
●● identification of the hazards; ●● Regulation 10 requires employers to provide
●● decide who might be harmed and how; employees with comprehensible and relevant
●● evaluate the risks and decide on precautions; information on the health and safety
●● record the findings and implement them; risks identified by the assessment and the
●● review the assessment and update if necessary. preventive and protective measures;
●● Regulation 11 requires employers, where
The key legal requirements include: they share a workplace (for example, an
incident ground), to co-operate with the
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 other employers and take all reasonable steps
●● Section 2 requires employers to ensure, to co-ordinate the control measures.
so far as is reasonably practicable, the
health, safety and welfare at work of their
Incident Command 67
appreciation of all material facts has been obtained. As the incident develops, changing circumstances
It is nevertheless essential that an effective risk may make the original course of action
assessment is carried out at all operational incidents. inappropriate, for example:
In a high risk, low time environment the Incident
Commander must implement greater levels of ●● Fire fighting tactics may change from
control and apply appropriate control measures, in defensive to offensive or vice versa.
order to reduce risk to an acceptable level. Only ●● New hazards and their associated risks
then can crews be committed into the hazard area. may arise e.g. the effects of fire on building
stability.
A DRA must be reviewed continuously and updated ●● Existing hazards may present different risks.
as required, and as a result of which it is important ●● Personnel may become fatigued.
to declare a ‘Tactical Mode’. The mode must be
communicated to everyone on the incident ground Incident and Sector Commanders, therefore,
and transmitted over the main scheme radio where need to manage safety by constantly monitoring
it will be recorded and time stamped. For example, the situation and reviewing the effectiveness of
during Offensive operations, new information is existing control measures.
received concerning fire spread to a previously
unaffected out-building containing cylinders. During the development stage of the incident, the
A new Defensive Tactical Mode should now be DRA will form the basis of the analytical risk
declared (See section 4.5.4 Defensive Mode). assessment (see section 4.10).
Step 3 Select safe systems of work Even when a safe system of work is in place the
The Incident Commander will then need to IC must take into account changing priorities as
review the options available in terms of standard this may alter the perception of risk. Where risks
procedures. Incident Commanders will need to are present, an assessment of the benefits gained
consider the possible systems of work and choose by performing the tasks must be made taking into
the most appropriate for the situation. account the possible consequences. Thus:
The starting point for consideration must be ●● If the benefits outweigh the risks, proceed
procedures that have been agreed in pre-planning with the tasks.
and training and those personnel available at the ●● If the risks outweigh the benefit do NOT
incident have sufficient competence to carry out proceed with the tasks, but consider viable
the tasks safely. alternatives.
Incident Command 69
Figure 4.1
Incident Command 71
being identified). Offensive Mode would be declared
and suitable and sufficient control measures put in
place to deal with the risk of falling roof tiles i.e.
PPE, crew briefing and safety officers.
Further examples:
This is where the operation is being fought with ●● Road Traffic Collision involving a chemical
a defensive position. In Defensive Mode, the tanker leaking a hazardous substance, no
identified risks outweighs the potential benefits, so persons reported. Crews are standing by
no matter how many additional control measures awaiting attendance of a specialist advisor
are put into place the risks are too great. and second tanker for decanting.
Incident Command 73
74 Fire Service Manual
Incident Command 75
76 Fire Service Manual
4.8 Responsibilities within Any message sent should include the current
Tactical Mode Tactical Mode which is in operation at the incident.
This should be repeated at regular intervals or as
Everyone on the incident ground has a responsibility the risk to crews change, until all FRS operations
for their safety and the safety of others. Although have finished.
specific responsibilities are outlined below, if
anyone sees anything developing which may The Incident Commander should review and
compromise the safety of others, they have a clear confirm the Tactical Mode on initial and
duty to intervene to prevent harm. This duty is all subsequent briefings to Crew and Sector
absolute. Commanders. If appropriate a Safety Officer(s)
should be appointed.
4.8.1 Incident Commander
The Incident Commander is at all times accountable Where an Operational Commander has been
for approving and declaring the Tactical Mode. An appointed, they will be responsible for approving
assessment of the incident should be made and changes of the Tactical Mode for the sectors under
an appropriate plan implemented. The prevailing their control and ensuring that the IC is aware of
Tactical Mode should ref lect the Incident the prevailing modes at all times.
Commanders plan and associated risks at the
incident. 4.8.2 Sector Commanders
Sector Commanders should continually monitor
conditions and operational priorities in the sector
and ensure that the prevailing Tactical Mode
Incident Command 77
remains valid. The Sector Commander must liaise Although a hazard area has been identified by the
with the Incident Commander to ensure the current IC, a decision has been made that crews should
Tactical Mode is appropriate. operate within that hazard area, so the incident is
in Offensive Mode.
Sector Commanders must immediately react to
adverse changes, withdrawing personnel from risk Later, the fire on the ground floor has been knocked
areas without delay if necessary and advise the down. The BA team with a hose reel enters ground
Incident Commander of the change in conditions floor to continue fire fighting. The incident is still
as soon as possible thereafter. in Offensive Mode.
Incident Command 79
Due to the continually changing nature of identified risks. Where this is the case, the Incident
the environment at an incident, the Incident Commander is likely to declare the incident
Commander must ensure that as soon as resources ‘Offensive’ and commit crews into a ‘Hazard Area’
permit, an ARA is carried out and, when necessary, to perform an identified role. Where this approach
new control measures implemented whenever the is appropriate the Incident Commander must
hazard or degree of risk demands it. The ARA endeavour to reduce the risks to an acceptable level
must be recorded. The outcome of the review of the to complement the training, safe systems of work
risk assessment will either confirm that the DRA and specialist equipment the UKFRS has adopted.
and chosen Tactical Mode was correct, or will
result in a change of mode with the appropriate The expression ‘Hierarchy of Control Measures’ is
announcements and action occurring without used to detail, in preferential order, measures that
delay. It will also form the basis of a future or may be implemented to eliminate or reduce risk.
ongoing DRA. The mnemonic ‘ERIC PD’ can be used as a prompt
to assist in the process.
At smaller incidents that do not require
sectorisation, responsibility for the completion of ●● Eliminate the risk or substitute it for
the analytical review of the risk assessment lies with something less dangerous, e.g. declare
the Incident Commander or nominated suitable defensive mode at an incident thus preventing
person. At incidents that have been sectorised, the personnel access into the hazard area, or
responsibility for the analytical risk assessment substitute a hand operated branch for a
may be delegated to the Sector Commanders. The ground monitor, again removing personnel
Incident Commander remains accountable for from the hazard area.
approving the Tactical Mode on all occasions. ●● Reduce the risk by preventing or reducing
the number of personnel that come into
The ARA should be kept constantly under review. contact with it or reducing the time of the
Whenever the risk to crews changes (or at 20 exposure to the risk.
minute intervals, whichever is the sooner) the ●● Isolate the risk by separating persons from
Tactical Mode should be reviewed and the risk the risk, e.g. the use of a physical barrier to
assessment confirmed or changed as required. protect a casualty from cutting operations
Any documentation used should be updated if the during extrication from a vehicle following a
information or overall assessment has changed collision.
after such a review. ●● Control the risk, e.g. the IC would adopt
safe systems of work e.g. tactical ventilation
For incidents where a formal debrief may take could be used to improve conditions within
place, the ARA documentation should be submitted the building, in conjunction with the
to the Incident Commander for use at the debrief. appropriate standard operating procedures.
Analytical Risk Assessments should be kept for ●● Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), is
audit and periodic review purposes. An example always the last line of defence because it
of a procedure to conduct a review and record doesn’t contribute to a safer environment,
the outcome of the risk assessment is shown in in the FRS it must be assumed that all
Appendix 1. personnel are provided with suitable and
well maintained PPE and that this is utilised
4.11 Risk Control Measures at every incident. The use of additional
PPE can be requested where circumstance
It has already been discussed that the IC has a dictates e.g. the use of eye protection at a
decision to make at every incident to determine Road Traffic Collision (RTC) or chemical
whether the potential benefits outweighs the protection suits at a chemical spill.
Incident Command 81
●● To act as an extra set of eyes and ears to the ●● evaluate the situation gathering all available
Sector Commanders in monitoring the safety information
of personnel ●● declare a Tactical Mode. (As an outcome
●● Liaise with IC or Operations Commander of the DRA. ‘Defensive Mode’ would
ensure that crews are operating in a safe
Safety Officers will be responsible for following list, environment thus reducing risk of injury.
which is not exhaustive and updating the Incident Operating in an ‘Offensive Mode’ would
Commander of any changing circumstances. require additional control measures.)
●● brief the crews ensuring that all relevant
●● Identify safety issues information is passed regarding the hazards,
●● Initiate corrective action incident objectives and the plan
●● Maintain safe systems of work; ●● committing BA crews in accordance with
●● Ensure all personnel are wearing appropriate approved guidance
personal protection equipment ●● ensure a safety jet is provided for the
●● Observe the environment protection of crews
●● Monitor physical condition of personnel ●● options for tactical ventilation to reduce or
●● Regularly review remove smoke and hot gases
●● Record an Analytical Risk Assessment ●● alternative safe means of access and egress
●● thermal image cameras for BA crews
The following two examples identify some safety ●● appointing a Safety Officer where
considerations for a safety officer at operational resources allow
incidents.
Example 2 RTC
Example 1 Derelict property fire At a Road Traffic Collision some of the potential
At a fire in a derelict property some of the hazards hazards may include:
present may include:
●● moving traffic
●● structural collapse ●● vehicles involved and their loads
●● difficult access /egress ●● airbags, pre-tensioners or hazardous
●● unsafe floors and staircases materials
●● the presence of asbestos ●● the occupants of the vehicles or others
●● discarded or deliberately placed hypodermic involved
needles or other booby traps ●● broken glass or sharp metal and plastics
●● the unstable state of utilities and services due ●● hypodermic needles
to vandalism ●● soft and uneven ground where a vehicle has
●● poor state of repair of the structure, e.g. roof left the carriageway
tiles ●● contamination by body fluids
●● contents and fire loading of building ●● manual handling
●● specialist rescue equipment i.e. those
The likelihood of injury to crews is increased due operated by hydraulic fluid etc.
to state of the building and subsequent hazards. ●● alternative powered vehicles e.g. dual fuel
Therefore, it will be necessary to assess the risk to ●● fluoroelastomers, fuel/brake fluid lines
crews against the benefits of saving the building or ●● composite materials e.g. carbon fibres
life should ‘persons’ be involved.
Incident Command 83
Details of all ‘near misses’, i.e. events that could 4.14 Summary
have, but did not on this occasion
●● Evaluate situation
●● Carry out DRA and announce Tactical Mode
result in personal injury or equipment damage,
●● Communicate Tactical Mode
must be recorded. Experience has shown that there
●● Commence operations
are a number of near misses prior to an accident
●● Review Tactical Mode
occurring. If we fail to eradicate the causes of a
●● A risk assessment must be performed at all
near miss, we will probably fail to prevent injury
incidents
or damage in the future. Appropriate information
●● The Incident Commander remains
must then be fed back into the strategic decision
accountable for declaring the Tactical Mode
making process via the Systematic Level (see
on all occasions
reference to HSG 65 below) in order to:
●● The Incident Commander may delegate
the completion of the Analytical Risk
●● Review performance of the organisation,
Assessment to other suitable personnel when
team and individuals
appropriate
●● Improve procedures and equipment
●● There are two operational Tactical Modes
●● Develop staff and training strategies
– Offensive and Defensive
●● For audit purposes
●● Sectors can only be in Offensive Mode or
Defensive Mode
Equipment, PPE, systems of work and training etc
●● If combinations of Offensive Mode and
can all be improved as part of this performance
Defensive Mode are in use, the whole
management system. HSG 65 – Successful Health
incident (which must have been sectorised)
and Safety Management gives further guidance
will be deemed to be in Transitional Mode.
on the principles of effective health and safety
This is an operational code which signals to
management in the workplace.
any individual with a responsibility for their
own, or others’ safety that both offensive and
It is important to highlight any unconventional
defensive operations are being carried out at
system or procedure used which was successful or
the same time.
made the working environment safe. It is equally
important to highlight all equipment, systems or
The Tactical Mode must be current and recorded as
procedures which did not work satisfactorily or made
appropriate, throughout the incident.
the working environment unsafe. More information
on closing down incidents and debriefing can be
When a Tactical Mode has been decided, the
found in Chapter 2 (2.17 and 2.20)
Incident Commander must ensure that everyone
on the incident ground is aware of it.
5
Chapter 5 – Command Competence
Incident Command 85
●● A range of occupational skills – the skills, the means for assessing performance in a job. In
standards and practices associated with an the early 1980s, the Government were determined
occupation. to improve the effectiveness of British Industry
●● The ability to transfer knowledge, skills and by introducing national standards of occupational
experience to situations e.g. experiences competence. These standards were to be ‘explicit,
gained and utilised within other contexts. agreed, widely accessible, flexible, progressive
●● Personal qualities and attributes i.e. problem and testable’ (Manpower Services Commission
solving, planning and implementing (as per 1981). National Occupational Standards are
FSC 51/2004) concerned with what an individual can do, not
just what they know.
The Incident Commander will be operating within a
risk environment that is possibly wide and complex, The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority
with many variables added by the actual situation provides guidance that NOS should focus upon the
being dealt with. The IC will have to satisfy four critical aspects of competence at work. NOS can
inter-related components; these are: also be used for training, appraisals, recruitment,
retention planning and Continuous Professional
●● Task skills, which are routine and largely Development (CPD) needs.
technical components.
●● Task management skills to manage a group The concept of assessing competence against
of tasks and prioritise between them. (NOS) units, elements and the performance criteria
●● Contingency management, which means the can be a complex process.
skills to recognise and deal with things that
go wrong and with the unexpected. Regarding Incident Command there are 3 separate
●● Role/job environmental skills, which are standards that provide learning outcomes for the
about ensuring safety, interacting with National Occupational Standards, listed opposite.
people and the ability to deal with the
environmental factors required in fulfilling 5.4 Unit
the wider role.
A unit of competence defines the broad functions
It is important that the individual is not only able carried out in a particular job role. It is the smallest
to demonstrate adequately those physical skills sub-division of a key area of work.
involved in carrying out a range of tasks, but can
manage a range of tasks at the same time. This must As an example:
be done while planning contingency arrangements
to cope if something goes wrong or there is an Lead, Monitor and Support people to resolve
unexpected problem to solve. This must be achieved operational incidents (unit EFSM2). A unit
whilst considering the wider environmental issues describes a workplace activity that can be performed
and personal/interpersonal skills that are most by a single person.
appropriate to the situation.
5.5 Element
5.3 National Occupational Each unit is made up of at least two elements
Standards that provide a description of the main activities
NOS are statements of the skills, knowledge and necessary for the completion of the unit.
understanding needed in employment and clearly Therefore for Unit EFSM2, this unit comprises
define the outcomes of competent performance. of 3 elements, i.e.
They are benchmarks of performance, providing
2.1 Review and determine incident status. ●● Role, responsibilities and level of authority at
2.2 Assume responsibility and implement action operational incidents
to support those involved in the incident. ●● Lines of communication at incidents and the
2.3 Debrief following resolution of incident incident command system
Incident Command 87
Command, where naturally occurring and the effects of a fire upon the structure. The
opportunities are not available on a regular IC must also be aware of the capabilities of the
basis, then simulation could be used. available resources in order to make an effective
●● People and assessors generate, collect and deployment.
record relevant evidence to demonstrate
competence An IC must consider many other factors, to varying
●● Assessors make decisions and provide degrees. A Crew Manager (CM) at a relatively
feedback small incident who is working at the operational
●● Decisions and feedback are recorded level must have a highly detailed knowledge and
understanding of the professional fire domain.
The assessor judges this evidence against all of Wider political or social implications factor less
the performance criteria and makes a decision that in the resolution of smaller scale incidents so
the standards have been met or that a development while the CM must have an appreciation that these
need has been identified. considerations exist, they need not concentrate too
much on them.
5.9 Knowledge and Understanding
in Incident Command In contrast, a Brigade Manager (BM), working at
major incidents, possibly involving the strategic or
In order to function effectively, ICs must possess ‘Gold’ level, must have a detailed understanding of
knowledge and understanding of the domain in the political, social and environmental implications
which they are operating (and of the domains that the incident may generate. The BM’s specific
operating above and below). For example, to make domain knowledge and understanding does not
an appropriate assessment of risk in a building, there need to be as technically detailed as that of the CM.
must be an appreciation of building construction For example, the BM in charge of a 25 pump fire
Domain Knowledge
and Understanding
Wider Organisational
Operational Tactical Strategic
Level Level Level
Incident Command 89
In all cases regarding Incident Command, direct ●● A recording methodology is required to
observation is crucial but can be supported by support the demonstration of competence
questioning or other means to explore the skills, and further development needs of people
knowledge, understanding and how, why and when ●● This methodology must complement the
the evidence was produced. IPDS and withstand the scrutiny of audit
(this is necessary to confer consistency and
The Assessment Process transferability across organisations)
In most instances it will be line managers who will ●● Systems should be non-bureaucratic and
carry out workplace assessments, although they encourage people to feel that they ‘own’ their
may also be completed by: development
●● The systems should inform the development
●● Trainers at a training/development centre planning process on a needs basis, for
●● Other service assessors (e.g. observers at individual, teams or the organisation
exercises/simulations)
●● Other independent assessor’s e.g. external 5.12 Continuing Personal
organisations during Gold Command
Development
simulation exercises at the Fire Service College
●● People with specialist skills who are qualified Personal Development to meet the NOS and IPDS
is a phased approach, incorporating:
Regardless of who carries out the assessment, all
assessors must be familiar with the relevant NOS ●● Acquisition of knowledge skills and
and suitably trained and competent to do so. understanding
●● Application of knowledge skills and
If the assessment is to gather evidence for a relevant understanding in the workplace
qualification (S/NVQ) then the assessor must be ●● Maintenance of knowledge skills and
qualified to do so. understanding and CPD
Incident Command 91
5.13 Guidance for assessors of the garage. Upon attendance, the crew were met
by the occupier of the garage who stated that there
The following are provided as examples only.
was a car on fire inside the garage.
Demonstration of competence against WM7.1
Example scenario:
Incident Command 93
Performance Criteria Example characteristics of an Incident Commander’s
performance which would meet the required standard
Determine the current The current and potential involvement of other Category 1 & 2
involvement of other agencies, responders as defined in Parts 1 & 3 of Schedule 1 to the Civil
their current activities and key Contingencies Act 2004. These include Police, Ambulance
contacts Service, Local Authority, Health Services, Utilities, Environment
Agency, Environmental Health, Health Protection Agency,
Highways Agency, etc. and any other relevant persons such as
the premises occupier or owner was evaluated in full, taking into
account wider implications of the incident such as: interruption
to utility services, environmental pollution resulting from the
incident, potential effect upon health in the area, preservation of
evidence, disruption to transport infrastructure.
Appendices
Acknowledgements 147
Incident Command 95
APPENDIX 1
Analytical Risk Assessment Process
Organisation
Strategic
Systematic
Tactical Mode
Incident Command 97
APPENDIX 1
Analytical Risk Assessment Process
A1.2.1 The Analytical Process Any relevant notes or plans should be included on
1. Complete the information surrounding the the rear of the form prior to it being signed by the
incident or sector and identify the appropriate Incident or Sector Commander taking responsibility
GRA number if applicable (see reverse of form for operations in the relevant area of operations.
for index). Identify the significant hazards,
those that may be at risk and the existing Additional consideration should be given to
control measures. environmental issues as soon as reasonably
2. Using the five-point grid to decide the practicable,(the requirement to address this on the
SEVERITY and the LIKELIHOOD associated rear of the form should act as a prompt to IC or
to each hazard. Multiply the severity and Sector Commander).
likelihood scores together and enter the total
to calculate the risk rating: e.g. tolerable, The completed forms should be collated by
moderate, high, very high. Command Support for debriefing and audit
3. Enter the total and the risk rating in the purposes.
appropriate columns and decide if the existing
control measures are adequate.
4. Where this is not the case, list additional
controls measures that are necessary to make
the management of the risk tolerable.
Incident Command 99
APPENDIX 2
Incident Command System
Sector 3
Sector 5
Sector 2 Sector 3
Main Entrance
Sector 1 Sector 4
Main Entrance
Sector 1 Sector 4
Incident Command
101
APPENDIX 2
Figure A2.1
Example of Sector Designation at a multiple RTA
102
Sector 3
APPENDIX 2
Embankment
Sector 1
Sector 2 Lorry
Coach
Figure A2.2
APPENDIX 2
Figure A2.3
Figure A2.5
Figure A2.6
106
APPENDIX 2
Machinery Sector
Figure A2.6
APPENDIX 3
The Psychology of Command (courtesy of Professor Rhona Flin)
A3.1 Decision Making In theory, this type of approach should allow you to
The decision making skill of the Incident make the ‘best’ decision, provided that you have the
Commander is one of the essential components mental energy, unlimited time and all the relevant
of effective command and control in emergency information to carry out the decision analysis.
response. Despite the importance of high speed This is typically the method of decision-making
decision making in the fire service and a number in which managers are trained. But we know from
of other occupations, it has only been very our everyday experience that when we are in a
recently that research psychologists have begun to familiar situation, we take many decisions almost
investigate leaders’ decision making in demanding, automatically on the basis of our experience. We
time-pressured situations. do not consciously generate and evaluate options;
we simply know the right thing to do. This may be
The traditional decision-making literature from called intuition or ‘gut feel’ but, in fact, to achieve
management, statistics and economics is very these judgements some very sophisticated mental
extensive but it offers little of relevance to the activity is taking place. So we can compare these
Incident Commander, as it tends to be derived two basic types of decision-making, the slower but
from studies of specified problems (often artificial more analytic comparison and the faster, intuitive
in nature), inexperienced decision makers and low judgement. Which style do commanders use when
stake payoffs. Moreover, it is rarely concerned with deciding what to do at the scene of an incident?
ambiguous, dynamic situations, life threatening
odds or high time pressure, all important features A3.2 Naturalistic Decision
of a fire or rescue environment. Making (NDM)
In the last ten years there has been a growing
If we turn to the standard psychological literature interest by applied psychologists into naturalistic
on decision-making it tells us almost nothing of decision making (NDM) which takes place in
emergency decision making, as so much of it is complex real world settings (Klein et al, 1993;
based on undergraduates performing trivial tasks Zsambok & Klein, 1997; Flin et al, 1997). These
in laboratories. Similarly, the management research researchers typically study experts’ decision
is concerned with individuals making strategic making in dynamic environments such as flight
decisions when they have several hours or days decks, military operations, fire-grounds, hospital
to think about the options, carefully evaluating trauma centres/intensive care units and high hazard
each one in turn against their business objectives industries, for example nuclear plant control rooms.
using decision analysis methods. These provide a This NDM research has enormous significance for
range of explanatory frameworks, which may have the understanding of how commanders and their
value for managers’ decision making where they teams make decisions at the scene of an incident as
are encouraged to emulate an analytical style of it offers descriptions of what expert commanders
decision making. At its simplest form this usually actually do when taking operational decisions in
incorporates the following stages: emergencies.
they would implement it, to check whether anything (an ‘action replay’ in reverse) and if it is deemed
important might go wrong. If they envisaged any problematical then an attempt will be made to
problems, then the plan might be modified but only modify or adapt it before it is rejected. At that point
if they rejected it, would they consider another the commander would re-examine the situation to
strategy. generate a second course of action.
Klein Associates have also studied other decision Key features of the RPD model are as follows:
makers faced with similar demand characteristics
(e.g. tank platoon captains, naval warfare ●● Focus on situation assessment
commanders, intensive care nurses) and found ●● Aim is to satisfy not optimise
the same pattern of results. On the basis of these ●● For experienced decision makers, first option
findings they developed a template of this strategy is usually workable
called the Recognition-Primed Decision Model. ●● Serial generation and evaluation of options
This describes how experienced decision makers (action plans)
can rapidly decide on the appropriate course of ●● Check action plan will work using mental
action in a high-pressure situation. simulation
●● Focus on elaborating and improving
The model has evolved into three basic formats action plan
(see Figure A 3/1). ●● Decision maker is primed to act
In the simplest version, shown as Level 1, the To the decision maker, the NDM type strategies
decision maker recognises the type of situation, (such as RPD) feel like an intuitive response rather
knows the appropriate response and implements it. than an analytic comparison or rational choice of
alternative options. As ‘intuition’ is defined as,
If the situation is more complex and/or the decision “the power of the mind by which it immediately
maker cannot so easily classify the type of problem perceives the truth of things without reasoning
faced, then as in Level 2, there may be a more or analysis” then this may be an acceptable label
pronounced diagnosis (situation assessment) phase. for RPD which is rapid situation assessment to
This can involve a simple feature match where the achieve pattern recognition and associated recall
decision maker thinks of several interpretations of of a matched action plan from memory.
the situation and uses key features to determine
which interpretation provides the best match with At present this appears to be one of the best models
the available cues. Alternatively, the decision maker available to apply to the emergency situation whether
may have to combine these features to construct a the environment is civilian or military; onshore or
plausible explanation for the situation; this is called offshore; aviation, industrial, or medical. In the
story building, an idea that was derived from legal USA, the RPD model is being widely adopted,
research into juror decision-making. Where the it is being used at the National Fire Academy as
appropriate response is unambiguously associated well as in a number of military, medical, aviation
with the situation assessment it is implemented as and industrial settings (see Klein, 1998). The RPD
indicated in the Level 1 model. model and associated research techniques have
begun to generate a degree of interest in the UK,
In cases where the decision maker is less sure of most notably by the Defence Research Agency and
the option, then the RPD model, Level 3 version the Fire Service.
indicates that before an action is implemented there
is a brief mental evaluation to check whether there
are likely to be any problems. This is called mental
simulation or pre-playing the course of action
110
Experience the Situation in a Experience the Situation in a Experience the Situation in a
Changing Context Changing Context Changing Context
APPENDIX 3
Diagnose Perceived as
Perceived as typical typical Perceived as typical
[Feature Matching] no
[Prototype or Analog] [Prototype or [Prototype or Analog]
[Story Matching]
Interference
yes
Clarify
The Psychology of Command
Recognition has four byproducts Recognition has four byproducts Recognition has four byproducts
Plausible Goals Typical Action Plausible Goals Typical Action Plausible Goals Action 1 ...n
A3.4 Command roles and If we consider the Orasanu model, the key
decision style skill is matching the correct decision style to
the demands or allowances of the situation. For
Obviously the RPD approach is not appropriate for example, not using the fast intuitive RPD style
all types of operational decisions and other NDM when there is time to evaluate options. Furthermore
researchers have been developing taxonomies of senior fire officers in strategic command roles
the different types of decisions other emergency may require special training to discourage them
commanders, such as pilots, make in different from using the fast RPD approach when a slower,
situations (see Figure A3/2). The NASA Crew analytical method would be more appropriate
Factors researchers (Orasanu, 1995) have found that (Fredholm, 1997).
two key factors of the initial situation assessment
are judgements of time and risk and that these There are significant differences in the balance
may determine the appropriate decision strategy of cognitive skills required of commanders,
to use. The issue of dynamic risk analysis is a depending on their role (rather than rank) in a
significant component of situation assessment on given operation, ascending from operational or
the fireground as discussed in Chapter 3 (see also task level, to tactical command, and to strategic
Fire Engineers Journal, May, 1998). command (Home Office, 1997). From studies of
CUES
Problem
Understood Problem Problem NOT
OR NOT Understood Understood
Understood
Multiple
Rule Multiple No Options
Options
Available Tasks To Do Available
Available
commanders’ decision strategies (see Flin, 1996; and structured by ‘feed-forward control’ through a
Flin et al, 1997; Zsambok & Klein, 1997) these stored rule. Stored rules are of the type if (state) then
roles are briefly outlined below in terms of the (diagnosis) or if (state) then (remedial action).
decision skills required.
The tactical decision maker is likely to be on scene,
The figure below shows the decision process with a remit to maintain a good mental model of
model for fixed wing pilots. (Orasanu 1995B) the evolving plan and unfolding events. Situation
Reprinted with permission of the Human Factors assessment is expected to be a more significant
and Ergonomics Society component of tactical decision-making than
spending time choosing appropriate responses.
Strategic Command However the tactical commander may have to
This involves the overall policy of command ‘create’ time to engage in reflective thinking and
and control, deciding the longer term priorities when necessary to use more analytic decision
for tactical commanders and planning for strategies to evaluate alternative courses of action.
contingencies depending on the enemy’s response.
The task also contains a strong analytical element, Kerstholt (1997, p189) found from an interview
as co-ordination of multiple sources of information study with battalion commanders of peace-keeping
and resources demands an awareness that cannot operations, that, “decisions were mostly made
be based on procedures alone. analytically in the planning phase and intuitively
during the execution of the mission. By analytic
The decision making style assumed to be adopted procedure we meant that several options were
for strategic decision making is creative or explicitly weighed against each other, whereas
analytical, since the situations encountered will an intuitive decision meant that the commander
feature a number of novel elements or developments immediately ‘knew’ which decision to take.”
the strategic commander has not previously
encountered. Operational Command
This involves front line or sector commanders who
Neither time pressure nor high immediate risk have to implement orders from the tactical level.
should be influencing command at this level, where They are operating in real time and have to react
the aim, if possible, is to devise an optimal solution rapidly to situational demands. Decision making
for the situation, taking into account the wider and at this level is assumed to contain rule-based
longer term implications. The strategic commander and intuitive elements. It is assumed that under
is usually remote from the incident and will be time pressure and at high risk, they primarily
supported throughout by a team of lower ranking make decisions based on pattern recognition (e.g.
officers. RPD) of the situations encountered. Ongoing
situation awareness must remain very high as their
Tactical Command performance depends on rapid identification of the
This refers to the planning and co-ordination of the situation and fast access to stored patterns of pre-
actions determined at the strategic level. programmed responses.
Due to the higher time pressure at this level, Only when time permits will they be able to engage
decision-making is based to a much greater extent in analytic decision making and option comparison.
on condition action matching, or rule-based Striving to find optimal solutions runs the risk of
reasoning. This style is characterised by controlled ‘stalling’ their decision making, therefore their
actions derived from procedures stored in memory. main objective is to find a satisfactory, workable
Control of behaviour at this level is goal oriented course of action.
A3.5 Styles of Command far greater cognitive processing. Thus, they take a
Decision Making longer time to accomplish, and for most individuals
can only be used in situations of relative calm and
From the above description of decision making minimal distraction.
techniques associated with particular command
roles, there appear to be four main styles of decision In fast moving, high-risk situations these styles are
making used by commanders: creative, analytical, difficult if not impossible to use, and in order to
procedural and intuitive. maintain command and control, officers have to
rely on procedural or intuitive styles which will
The most sophisticated (and resource intensive) is produce a satisfactory, if not an optimal decision.
creative problem solving which requires a diagnosis
of an unfamiliar situation and the creation of a novel Procedural methods involve the identification of
course of action. This is the most demanding of the the problem faced and the retrieval from memory
four techniques, requires significant expertise and of the rule or taught method for dealing with
as Kerstholt (1997) found, is more likely to be used this particular situation. Such decision methods
in a planning phase rather than during an actual (e.g. drills, routines and standard procedures) are
operation. frequently practised in training.
Analytical decision making also requires a full With experience, officers may also use the fastest
situation assessment, rigorous information search style of decision making, intuitive or recognition-
and then recall, critical comparison and assessment primed decision making described above. In this
of alternative courses of action. Again with proper case there may not be a written rule or procedure
preparation, some of these option choices may but the commander rapidly recognises the type of
already have been evaluated during exercises situation and immediately recalls an appropriate
or planning meetings. These are the two most course of action, on the basis of prior experience.
powerful decision techniques as they operate on
large information sets but consequently they require
The evidence suggests that commanders use all be discussed with the team and/or the trainer. This
four decision styles to a greater or lesser degree assists officers to learn the critical cues for given
depending on the event characteristics and resulting types of situations and to store methods of dealing
task demands. For more senior commanders, with new situations.
distanced from the front line, the task characteristics
change in terms of time frame, scale, scope and In essence the basis of good command training must
complexity, necessitating greater use of analytical be a proper understanding of the decision making
and creative skills (Fredholm, 1997). processes utilised by effective commanders.
Studies of military and aviation commanders have Psychologists can offer a range of research
shown that the following factors are of particular techniques to begin to explore in a more scientific
significance in determining decision style: fashion the skills of incident command (e.g. Burke,
1997; Flin et al, 1997). For instance, one of the
●● available time most salient features of a fireground commander's
●● level of risk decision task is the speed of fire development.
●● situation complexity/familiarity,(or none at all) Brehmer (1993) is particularly interested in this
●● availability of information type of dynamic decision task, which he believes
has four important characteristics: a series of
The training implications of applying this new decisions which are interdependent, a problem
decision research to fire and rescue operations is which changes autonomously, and as a result of the
first to determine the types of situations where decision maker's actions, and a real time scenario.
experienced fire commanders use the intuitive
RPD type of decision making. In these situations He gives the following example, “Consider the
the critical focus will be on situation assessment. decision problems facing a fire chief faced with
So the next stage is to discover the cues these the task of extinguishing forest fires. He receives
experts use when quickly sizing up an incident and information about fires from a spotter plane and
the responses they would choose to apply once they on the basis of this information, he then sends out
have assessed the situation. commands to his firefighting units. These units
then report back to him about their activities and
Less experienced commanders need to be trained locations as well as about the fire and the fire
to recognise the key features or cues of different chief uses this information (and whatever other
scenarios using simulated incidents with detailed information he may be able to get, e.g., from a
feedback on their decision making. They need to personal visit to the fire and the fire fighting units)
develop a store of incident memories (from real to issue new commands until the fire has been
events, simulator training, case studies, expert extinguished.” (p1).
accounts) which they can use to drive their search
for the critical classifying information at a new Brehmer and his colleagues have developed a
incident. computer programme (FIRE) based on a forest
fire scenario which incorporates the four elements
The US Marines who favour the RPD model have of dynamic decision making described above.
developed a very useful volume of 15 decision The decision maker takes the role of the fire chief
exercises in Mastering Tactics: A Tactical Decision and using the grid map of the area shown on the
Games Workbook (Schmitt, 1994, see Klein, 1998). computer screen, she or he has to make a series
These are a series of tactical decision scenarios of decisions about the deployment of fire fighting
where a description of a problem is presented resources with the goal of extinguishing the fire
and officers are required to quickly work out and and protecting a control base.
explain a solution to the problem which can then
The commander's actions are subject to feedback Weiseath (1987) discussing the enhanced cognitive
delays, that is time delay in actions being demands for leaders under stress describes reduced
implemented or in the commander receiving status concentration, narrowing of perception, fixation,
update information. Brehmer's studies have shown inability to perceive simultaneous problems,
that decision makers frequently do not take such distraction, difficulty in prioritising and distorted
feedback delays into account, for example sending time perception.
out too few firefighting units because they do not
anticipate that the fire will have spread by the time Brehmer (1993) argues that three ‘pathologies of
they receive the status report. decision making’ can occur, he calls these
He argues that the decision maker needs to have a I. thematic vagabonding when the decision
good 'mental model' of the task in order to control a maker shifts from goal to goal
dynamic event, such as a forest fire, and his research II. encystment the decision maker focuses on
has enabled him to identify several problems only one goal that appears feasible, and as in
of model formation: dealing with complexity, (i) fails to consider all relevant goals; and
balancing competing goals, feedback delays and III. a refusal to make any decisions.
taking into account possible side effects of actions.
Brehmer (1993) uses control theory to encapsulate Not all researchers agree that the decision making
the dynamic decision process, “the decision maker of experienced Incident Commanders will be
must have clear goals, he must be able to ascertain degraded by exposure to acute stressors. Klein
the state of the system that he seeks to control, he (1998) points out that these effects are most typical
must be able to change the system, and he must when analytical decision strategies are used,. In
have a model of the system.,” (p 10). contrast, the recognition-primed type of decision
strategy employed by experts under pressure may
A3.6 Causes of Stress for actually be reasonably stress-proof.
Commanders
A3.7 Leadership
In fireground operations, stress may also have
an impact on commanders’ decision making and Leadership ability is generally deemed to be a key
techniques for managing this need to be considered attribute of an Incident Commander and to some
(see Flin 1996 for further details). extent may be regarded as an umbrella term for the
required competencies which have to be trained.
The effects of stress on commanders’ thinking and However, finding a precise specification of the
decision making ability are of particular interest. required behaviours or the style of leadership is
Charlton (1992) who was responsible for the rather less frequently articulated.
selection of future submarine commanders referred
to the ‘flight, fight or freeze’ response manifested Leadership within a military context embodies the
as problems in decision making, ‘tunnel vision’, concepts of command, control, organisation and
misdirected aggression, withdrawal, and the duty. There has been extensive military research
‘butterfly syndrome’ “where the individual flits into leadership much of which unfortunately never
from one aspect of the problem to another, without sees the light of day outside the defence research
method solution or priority” (p54). He also mentions community.
self delusion where the student commander denies
the existence or magnitude of a problem, regression
to more basic skills, and inability to prioritise.
The dominant model of leadership for training in are unlikely to work. The contingency theories
the British armed services, the emergency services emphasised that leadership style cannot be
and in lower level management is Adair’s (1988) considered in isolation. Thus, what is effective
Action Centred Leadership with its simple three leadership behaviour is likely to be dependent on
circles model. the leader’s personality and skills, the situation and
the competence and motivation of the group being
Adair developed his ideas from his experiences led. Thus the most effective leader needs to:
with the British Army, and he maintained that the
effective leader must focus on the needs of the I. be able to diagnose the situation (the task/
individual, the task and the team. This functional problem, the mood, competence, motivation
model has not changed significantly since its initial of the team),
exposition thirty years ago and continues to be II. have a range of styles available (e.g. delegative,
taught in a wide range of management courses. consultative, coaching, facilitating, directive),
While the three circles diagram and the associated III. match her or his style to the situation (for
advice to leaders is intuitively appealing, there example Hersey and Blanchard’s (1988) model
has been little empirical work to test whether it of situational leadership).
can actually function as an explanatory theory
of leadership in routine managerial duties or In an emergency which has high time pressure
emergency command situations. and risk, then it is unlikely that a consultative
leadership style would be totally appropriate and
The managerial research literature on leadership while the Incident Commander needs to solicit
is a progression from a long standing focus on advice from available experts and to listen to the
leadership characteristics, to research in the 1960s sector commanders, the appropriate style is likely
on leader behaviours (e.g. autocratic vs democratic; to be closer to directive than democratic.
team vs task), to an awareness that “one size fits
all” recommendations of the best leadership style
Adair’s
Leadership
Model
Task
Needs
Group
Needs
Individual
Needs
The need for a perceptible change in leadership studied this particular type of human factors
style is very obvious when observing simulated training have argued that it has clear applications
emergency exercises when the time pressure and for the fire service (Bonney, 1995, Wynne, 1994).
task demands are increased. Moreover, this sends a
very important message to the rest of the team that References to Appendix Three
the situation is serious and that they will also have Brunacini, A. (1991) Command safety: A wake-up
to ‘change gear’ and sharpen their performance. call. National Fire Protection Association Journal,
January, 74-76.
Within the business world, the current fashions
in leadership style are the delegative, consultative Burke, E. (1997) Competence in command:
styles, couched in the language of empowerment Research and development in the London Fire
and transformational leadership. These approaches Brigade. In R. Flin, E. Salas, M. Strub & L. Martin
have not been developed with the Incident (Eds) Decision Making under Stress. Aldershot:
Commander in mind and while it was argued above Ashgate.
that a consultative style may be inappropriate,
particularly in the opening stages of an incident, this Driskell, J. & Salas, E. (1996) (Eds) Stress and
does not mean that there should be no delegation to Human Performance. Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
more junior commanders.
Flin, R. (1995a) Incident command: Decision
In a larger incident considerable authority has to making and team work. Journal of the Fire Service
be devolved to sector commanders who will be College, 1, 7-15.
required to take critical decisions and who will not
always have time or opportunity to seek the opinion Flin, R. (1995b) Crew Resource Management
of the Incident Commander. These individuals for teams in the offshore oil industry. Journal of
need to have the expertise and the confidence to European Industrial Training, 19,9, 23-27.
make decisions as the need arises.
Flin, R. (1996) Sitting in the Hot Seat. Leaders
The essential point is that the commander should and Teams for Critical Incident Management.
be comfortable with the style required and that Chichester: Wiley.
the front-line commanders should have a clear
understanding of their delegated authority and the Flin, R., Salas, E., Strub, M. & Martin, L. (1997)
Incident Commander’s plan of action. (Eds) Decision Making under Stress: Emerging
Themes and Applications. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Finally, the Incident Commander does not, and
should not work alone. The need for effective Fredholm, L. (1997) Decision making patterns in
team performance on the incident ground remains major fire-fighting and rescue operations. In R.
paramount. Recent advances in team training, Flin, E. Salas, M. Strub & L. Martin (Eds) Decision
known as Crew Resource Management (CRM) Making under Stress. Aldershot: Ashgate.
have been developed by the aviation industry and
are now used in medicine and the energy industry. Home Office (1997) Dealing with Disaster. Third
The focus is on non-technical skills relevant to edition. London: TSO
incident command, such as leadership, situation
awareness, decision making, team climate and Klein, G. (1998) Sources of Power How People
communication (see Flin, 1995b; Salas et al, in Make Decisions. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
press for further details). Fire officers who have
Klein, G. (1997) The Recognition-Primed Decision Orasanu, J. & Fischer, U. (1997) Finding decisions
(RPD) model: Looking back, looking forward. In in naturalistic environments: The view from
C. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds) Naturalistic Decision the cockpit. In C. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds)
Making. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Naturalistic Decision Making. Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Klein, G., Calderwood, R., & Clinton-Cirocco, A. Salas, B., Bowers, C. & Edens, B. (in press) (eds.)
(1986) Rapid decision making on the fireground. Applying Resource Management in Organisations.
In Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 30th New Jersey. LEA.
Annual Meeting. San Diego: HFS.
Schmitt, J. (1994) Mastering Tactics. Tactical
Klein, G., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R. & Zsambok, Decision Game Workbook. Quantico, Virginia. US
C. (1993). (Eds.) Decision Making in Action. New Marine Corps Association.
York: Ablex.
Zsambok, C. & Klein, G. (1997) (Eds) Naturalistic
Murray, B. (1994) More guidance needed for senior Decision Making. Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
commanders on the fireground. Fire, 87, June,
21‑22.
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
The Decision Making Model
●● Improves the knowledge and skills of any 2. The Decision Making Model
personnel who may undertake the role of
2.1 The Decision Making Model is formed
manager at any level.
around two main activities, Deciding and Acting.
Each stage identified in the model falls into one of
1.5 Use of the Decision Making Model will
these activities.
confirm best practice and identify training needs
when applied to a dynamic situation. The feedback
Deciding
process will also identify when policy, procedures
●● Gathering and thinking about all available
or equipment need to be introduced or improved.
information.
●● Identifying appropriate objectives.
1.6 The following are examples of when the
●● Defining a plan.
decision making model could benefit personnel
●● Considering the results of evaluations.
other than those attending operational incidents.
The list is not exhaustive:
Acting
●● Communicating the objectives and plan to all
●● Accidents, accident investigation and post
those at the incident.
accident action.
●● Controlling the activity.
●● Performance or conduct issues.
●● Evaluating the outcome of the plan.
●● Compliments or complaints procedures.
●● Welfare issues.
2.2 The functions within the two main
activities of the Decision Making Model are
explained as follows.
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Gathering and Thinking
APPENDIX 4
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Information about the Task or Event
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Information about Resources
5. Information about
available resources
5.1 What is available to assist in the resolution
of the task or event? This may include:
●● People
●● Equipment.
●● Agreed policies and procedures.
●● Information sources.
●● Other agencies and knowledge or training.
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Information about the Risks and Benefits
6.2 In considering risk and benefit the broadest 6.4 This will only become apparent when the
approach should be taken since they may apply to process is applied to a specific task/event.
people, property, the environment or a combination
of all of these and/or many others.
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Information on Progress
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Objectives
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Planning
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Communicating
10.8 The most appropriate medium will depend comply with the plan and safe systems of work are
on the individual situation and the nature of the put into place. Responsibility for certain areas may
information to be passed. It would be inappropriate, be delegated to make sure control is maintained
for example, to rely on verbal communication in a over the whole event and to enable individuals to
noisy environment to pass a complex chemical name carry out tasks effectively.
when a written note would avoid misinterpretation.
The use of established communication routes and 11.2 The degree to which the responsibility is
methods will assist in ensuring the effective flow delegated will depend on the complexity of the
of information to all those involved. event and vary as it progresses. Delegation should
aim at increasing rather than reducing the level of
10.9 Confirmation: It is important to confirm control the Decision Maker has over the event.
that the communication has been received and
understood. Often the easiest way to make sure 11.3 If the risks are not proportionate to the
that the recipient has accurately understood what is benefits of taking the action, additional control
expected of them is to have them repeat it back. measures should be introduced. Here the link is
made to Step 4 of the Dynamic Risk Assessment:
11. Controlling
Introduce additional control measures
11.1 Having communicated the plan to those
involved it is necessary to make sure that resources
are allocated appropriately, that the actions taken
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Controlling
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Evaluating
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Information on Progress
13. Information on progress achieved. This will allow the Decision Maker to
determine whether the plan is effective or requires
13.1 As discussed earlier, Information on
amendment.
Progress will become of greater importance as the
Acting elements of the Model are put in place.
13.6 The results of the comparison between
expectation and reality can then be used to
13.2 It is at this stage that the Decision Making
supplement other information about the task/
Model completes the loop and the first three
event in the ‘Gathering and Thinking’ part of the
elements along with the Information on Progress
model. This additional information should then be
should be revisited.
considered and used by the Decision Maker to re-
evaluate their objectives and plan.
Comparing progress made to that expected
13.3 Expected progress – Having formulated
13.7 The evaluation phase completes the
the plan and allocated the required resources with
information-gathering loop and ensures that the
the relevant levels of control, the Decision Maker
control of the task/event remains dynamic.
will have decided the timeframe within which
objectives and events should be achieved. This is
13.8 Whenever new information becomes
the expected progress to be made.
available it is fed into the process and enables
decision makers to make sure that the act of
13.4 Actual progress – By receiving regular
directing and controlling personnel and resources
updates in the form of progress or situation reports
within an effective plan is based on all the available
the Decision Maker will be able to determine the
information.
actual progress being made.
DECIDING ACTING
EVALUATING
Information Information on
about the Task Progress
or Event
COMMUNICATING
Information GATHERING
about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME
Resources THINKING
CONTROLLING
Information
about Risk
and Benefit
Outcome
Local response is the building block of resilience The Wales Resilience Forum
across the UK with operational response to
The principal mechanism for multi-agency co-
emergencies being managed locally by the Strategic
operation and co-ordination is the Wales Resilience
Co-ordination Groups (SCGs). The UK government
Forum (WRF), which senior representation from
and the Welsh Assembly Government work together
the Welsh Assembly Government, Cabinet Office,
on the development of civil protection policy. The
local authorities, emergency services, armed
concordat between UK Government and the Welsh
forces, Environment Agency Wales, NHS Wales,
Assembly Government on the Civil Contingencies
Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Health
Act 2004 provides clarity on the anticipated role(s)
and Safety Executive.
of the Welsh Assembly Government under this Act
and, in particular relation to Emergency Powers
The WRF is a planning body that considers
under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
resilience planning and preparation in a similar
The Welsh Assembly Government plays a vital
manner to the Regional Resilience Forums in
role in the co-ordination of emergencies in or
England, but with a higher level of political
affecting Wales. Co-ordination arrangements in
involvement. The WRF works alongside other
Wales are established to provide links and joint
elements of the multi-agency protection framework
working protocols between multi-agency groups
at local and UK Government level. The framework
and organisations.
is not a hierarchy; LRFs are not subordinate to the
WRF, this allows for the free flow of information
Welsh Assembly Government across the multi-agency structure.
The Assembly Government has devolved powers
in agriculture; housing; education and training; The Wales Civil Contingencies
the environment; health and health services; Committee
local government; and social services. It has
responsibility for the front line public services of The Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC)
the Ambulance Service, NHS, Fire and Rescue is constituted and functions in a similar way to
Services. The Welsh Assembly Government, with the Regional Civil Contingencies Committees in
its devolved powers, has an important role to play in England. The WCCC will be established for wide
terms political, social and economic aspects of the spread disruptive incidents requiring a pan Wales
critical national infrastructure in Wales. In relation response and recovery effort. The membership of
to this plan the Assembly Government will: the WCCC will be determined by the nature of the
incident and will be lead by a pre-determined lead
●● Inform stakeholders of the activation of the official from a list of strategic officers and officials.
pan-Wales Response Plan The WCCC will not interfere with local command
●● Set up an run the ECC(W) and control arrangements, but will ensure local
●● Act as Secretariat to the WCCC responders are fully informed. The WCCC will
●● Establish links with COBR and the UK meet at three levels:
Government through the ECC(W)
Level 1 – prior to an emergency where warning
Deploy Assembly Government Liaison Officers, is available. The meeting would be held to review
where appropriate, to Strategic Co-ordination the situation and update local stakeholders, with
Groups. a view to escalating to Level Two if the situation
warranted.
consultation with relevant members of the WRF. inform local SCGs of the pan UK picture ensuring
They might also be convened if a national response good communication is maintained in order that
or national co-ordination of an event was required. local decisions reflect the needs of the UK.
The WCCC may also be convened for an emergency
which occurs in Wales where the Strategic Co- The ECCW will assist in co-ordination of mutual
ordinating Group or the WRF feels it will be able aid/assistance and cross border issues during
to add value to the response. a major emergency, and where there are no
established protocols in place the ECCW will
Level 3 – could only be called once an assist in facilitation of a central link between
emergency arises which requires the making of UK Government departments and the devolved
emergency regulations under Part 2 of the Civil administrations. The decision to implement the
Contingencies Act. ECC(W) will depend very much on the nature of
the emergency in or affecting Wales.
The WCCC will request situation reports from
local responders to ensure Welsh Ministers are Agencies that are not transferred functions will
fully briefed. Welsh Ministers will inevitably use report directly to their respective UK department,
this same information to brief UK Government although copy reports will be forwarded to the
Ministers, thus reducing the need for duplication. ECC(W) where appropriate.
The Emergency Co-ordination In addition to their normal roles the Fire and Rescue
Centre Wales Service will provide a representative as a liaison
officer at the ECC(W) to act as a communication
When there is a requirement or expected escalation link between the ECC(W) and those Welsh Fire and
of an incident, the Welsh Assembly Government Rescue Services involved. They will also provide
will activate the Emergency Co-ordination Centre situation and exceptional reports to the ECC(W)
Wales (ECC(W)). The ECC(W) provides an and link with the Welsh Assembly Government’s
important role in the consequence management Department for Social Justice and Regeneration on
issues that arise from emergencies, particularly policy issues.
where the impact of those emergencies that affect
devolved functions. The ECC(W) is a facility Under the provisions of the Civil Contingencies
that supports the WCCC and Welsh Ministers in Act 2004 if emergency regulations are introduced
providing briefings and advice. Additionally, the that impact upon Wales the UK government will
EEC(W) provides a link between the SCGs, the appoint a Wales Emergency Co-ordinator.
office of the Secretary of State for Wales and Civil
Contingencies Secretariat.
Welsh
Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC)
Assembly PNICC
COBR
Government ACPO
UK Goverment Minister
Ministers
Lead UK
Government
Department
Other
Devolved
Administrations
Strategic Co-ordinating Group
Gwent, North Wales, South Wales,
and Dyfed Powys Gold
Command Rooms
SCOTTISH UK
ARRANGEMENTS ARRANGEMENTS
Scotland
EST Office
EAT
SECC
MGCC CCC
Strategic
Tactical
LOCAL Operational
ARRANGEMENTS
Figure 1
Key to Figure 1
MGCC – Ministerial Group on Civil Contingencies
The UK Government and the Northern Ireland The Lead Department Principle
Assembly work together on the development of
Where the nature of the emergency is such that
Civil Protection Policy and ensure resilience at a
some degree of central government co-ordination
local and National level.
or support becomes necessary, the Northern Ireland
Executive, in keeping with best practice, operate
The primary legislation in Northern Ireland
the lead Department principle. This in practice
relating to Fire and Rescue Services is ‘The Fire
means that the nominated department who has
and Rescue Services (Northern Ireland) Order
overall responsibility for the type of emergency in
2006’ with the ‘Civil Contingencies Framework’,
progress will:
the mechanism for discharging the principles of the
Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
●● act as the focal point for communication
between the Northern Ireland Assembly,
While Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCG’s)
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and the
provide a local response to UK resilience in
CMG/ESSCG;
England, Scotland and Wales, in Northern Ireland
●● brief devolved administration Ministers and
this role is carried out by the Crisis Management
where necessary Northern Ireland Office
Group (CMG).
(NIO) Ministers;
●● take whatever executive decisions and
Crisis Management Group actions are needed from the centre to handle
The principal mechanism for multi-agency co- the emergency or to help local responders to
operation and co-ordination in Northern Ireland deal with it;
is the Crisis Management Group (CMG). This is ●● draw upon and apply resources to support
chaired by the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil the local response to the emergency;
Service or the head of the Lead devolved government ●● ensure effective liaison with UK Lead
department as appropriate. Membership is made up Government Departments on all devolved
of representatives of the nine devolved government matters;
departments. This group is supported at the ●● co-ordinate and disseminate information
planning and co-ordination of policy levels by the for the public and the media on devolved
Emergency Services Senior Co-ordinating Group matters;
(ESSCG), comprising Fire, Police, Ambulance, ●● engage with stakeholder representatives
Maritime and Coastguard Agency and Military at national level on matters of interest for
and the Integrated Emergency Planning Forum Northern Ireland on devolved matters;
(IEPF), made up of private and public sector ●● account to the Northern Ireland Assembly
major utility and transport organisations, who and lead in the submission of evidence to any
help co-ordinate and brief Category 2 responders subsequent Government appointed inquiry
in the event of a Regional/National emergency. on all devolved matters;
Both of these forums participate in the sharing of ●● identify and share the lessons from the
information, the development of good practice and emergency;
promote consistency in preparation and training in ●● at all times assess whether the emergency
line with the principles of integrated emergency remains within its scope or whether
management. CMG will, in most instances, be to activate UK central government
activated in the event of incidents requiring a arrangements.
strategic level of management.
Civil Contingencies
Committee (CCC)
COBR
Crisis Management
Group (CMG)
}
Emergency
Service Senior
Co-ordinating
Group (ESSCG)
Planning and
Co-ordination
Integrated
Emergency
Planning Forum
DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT (DRA) – this INTER AGENCY LIAISON OFFICER (ILO) –
is the continuous assessment of risk in the rapidly a trained and qualified officer who can advise and
changing circumstances of an operational incident, support Incident Commanders, Police, Medical,
which is done in order to implement the control Military and other Government Agencies on the
measures necessary to ensure an acceptable level organisations operational capacity and capability
of safety. Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) is to reduce risk and safely resolve incidents at where
particularly appropriate during the time critical an attendance may be required. This will include
phase of an incident, which is usually typical of major incidents, public order, domestic or any other
the arrival and escalation phase of an incident, situation that would benefit from the attendance of
but at the earliest opportunity the Dynamic Risk the ILO.
Assessment should be supported by analytical risk
assessment. MARSHALLING AREA – area to which
resources not immediately required at the scene
COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERN- or being held for future use can be directed
MENT EMERGENCY ROOM (FIRE AND to standby. May be a sector function under a
RESCUE) – an advisory group established by Marshalling Sector Commander, reporting to
the Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor to support the Incident Commander via Command Support.
Director of Fire and Resilience and the fire minister
during serious incidents. NATIONAL CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
(FRS NCC) – a facility established to co-ordinate
ENHANCED COMMAND SUPPORT (ECS) the mobilisation of national resources such as
– a communications and co-ordination facility USAR teams, mass decontamination units, DIM
to support operations during incidents requiring vehicles etc when needed.
national mobilisation and use of strategic holding
areas. OPERATIONS COMMANDER – an officer
tasked with co-ordinating and directing the
FORWARD COMMAND POST – point, near operations of several sectors. Responsible
the scene of operations, where the officer delegated directly to the Incident Commander. When an
responsibility for command in that area is sited. Operations Commander is assigned, operational
This may be at a bridgehead. Sector Commanders will report to the Operations
Commander rather than the Incident Commander.
GENERIC RISK ASSESSMENT – risk Assigning an Operations Commander at an incident
assessments that have been produced to assist which has several operational sectors keeps the
the FRS with their regulatory requirements and span of control of the Incident Commander to be
published in “Volume 3 – A Guide to Operational maintained at a satisfactory level.
Risk Assessment”.
OUTER CORDON – an area which surrounds
INCIDENT COMMANDER – the nominated the inner cordon and seals off a wider area of
competent officer having overall responsibility for the incident from the public. This designates the
dictating tactics and resource management. controlled area into which unauthorised persons
are not permitted access. It encompasses the inner
INNER CORDON – a secured area which cordon, and the area between into which command
surrounds the immediate site of the incident and positions and other essential activities (such as
provides security for it. Such an area will typically post-decontamination casualty management) are
have some formal means of access control. This set up.
surrounds the immediate scene and provides
security for it.
SECTOR – a sector is the area of responsibility STRATEGIC HOLDING AREA (SHA)– a key
of a Sector Commander (i.e. a sector should not be location that has been identified on a motorway
created unless someone is given the responsibility or trunk road as a suitable space to accommodate
for running it.) Sectors should be created to manage FRS resources and national assets in response to a
spans of control and provide tighter supervision major incident.
of operations. Boundaries between geographic
sectors may be geographic features, walls, roads STRATEGY – in the context of incident command,
differences in elevation or separate areas of plant. this is the highest level of planning for dealing with
Operational sectors are those dealing directly with situations either in advance of an incident or while
the incident, typically operational sectors will incidents are underway (sometimes called “Gold
undertake fire fighting, rescue, cooling and so on. Command”).
Support sectors are those not dealing directly with
the incident. Support sectors are usually defined TACTICS – the deployment of personnel and
by the function they undertake, for instance equipment on the incident ground to achieve the
decontamination, foam supply, marshalling or aims of the strategic plan.
water supply.
References and Bibliography
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Pitman. and Teams for Critical Incident Management.
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Bonney, J. (1995) Fire command teams: what makes
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Brigade Command Course Project 2/95. Command: Tales from the Hotseat, Aldershot,
Ashgate.
Brunacini, A. (2002) Fire Command (2nd Ed)
Quincy, Mass. National Fire Protection Association. Flin, R., Salas, E., Strub, M. & Martin, L. (1997)
ISBN 0-87765-500-6 (Eds) Decision Making under Stress: Emerging
Themes and Applications. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Burke, E. (1997) Competence in command:
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Brigade. In R. Flin, E. Salas, M. Strub & L. Martin major fire-fighting and rescue operations. In R.
(Eds) Decision Making under Stress. Aldershot: Flin, E. Salas, M. Strub & L. Martin (Eds) Decision
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Driskell, J. & Salas, E. (1996) (Eds) Stress and
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Flin, R. (1995) Incident command: Decision
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(1986) Rapid decision making on the fireground. in naturalistic environments: The view from
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Annual Meeting. San Diego: HFS. Naturalistic Decision Making. Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Klein, G., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R. & Zsambok, Salas, B., Bowers, C. & Edens, B. (in press) (eds.)
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Murray, B. (1994) More guidance needed for senior Schmitt, J. (1994) Mastering Tactics. Tactical
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Further Reading
Fire Service Guides to Risk Assessment
CFOA
Operations Committee and its command and
control sub-committee, the National Command
and Control Co-ordination Group (NCCCG)
who considered a series of drafts, made useful
observations and contributions throughout and
approved the draft. Richard Haigh of Grampian
FRS, Louis Jones of Northern Ireland FRS
Incident Command
www.tso.co.uk