Organizational Crisis Management
Overview and Opportunities
Sheldene K. Simola
The field of modern organizational crisis man-
agement emerged largely in response to the
1982 cyanide tampering of Tylenol capsules
(Mitroff, 2001). Since that time, a substantial
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
body of scholarly research and practical wis-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
dom has developed. Despite the use of psycho-
logical research by crisis management scholars,
organizational crisis management has received
substantially less attention within psychology
itself. This article provides an overview of the
field and highlights current frameworks for un-
derstanding the stages of organizational crisis/
response. It extends previous theory by applying
the “levels of prevention” framework often used
in community and health psychology and by
offering a new assessment tool based on the “4
factor” (4 P) framework used in clinical assess-
ment. Areas for psychological consultation and
research are discussed.
In September 1982, Johnson & Johnson
experienced a potentially devastating cor-
porate crisis. The deaths of seven people in
the Chicago area had been linked to inges-
tion of cyanide through contaminated cap-
sules of one of its most successful products,
Extra-Strength Tylenol (Boatright, 2000).
Faced with growing public safety concerns
and the potential for significant long-term
damage to the Tylenol brand, executives
needed to intervene quickly. In doing so,
they considered the corporation’s own
credo, which clearly articulated a primary
responsibility to those who use their prod-
ucts (Boatright, 2000; Collins & Porras,
2000). Although there was strong evidence
that the tampering occurred outside of its
own facility and seemed to be contained in
one geographical area (Fink, 1986), John-
son & Johnson quickly proceeded with a
nationwide product recall, at a cost of $100
million (Collins & Porras, 2000; Fink,
180 Copyright 2005 by the Educational Publishing Foundation and the Society of Consulting Psychology, 1065-9293/05/$12.00
Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, Vol. 57, No. 3, 180 –192
University of Guelph
1986). Through this timely and compelling
action, Johnson & Johnson demonstrated
its commitment to safety and the people it
served. Public trust was strengthened, sales
and market share quickly rebounded
(Siomkos, 1992), and the value of the Ty-
lenol brand was protected.
It was following the imperfect, yet much
lauded, management (see Boatright, 2000;
Fink, 1986; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992;
Sobol, Farrelly, & Taper, 1992) of this
high-profile and high-stakes crisis that the
field of modern organizational crisis man-
agement emerged (Mitroff, 2001). Two de-
cades after the Tylenol crisis, a substantial
body of scholarly research and practical
wisdom exists. However, despite the use of
psychological theory and research by crisis
management scholars (e.g., Fischoff, 1989;
Gladwin & Kumar, 1987; Pauchant &
Mitroff, 1992; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Pow-
ell, 1991), the field of crisis management
has received substantially less attention
within psychology itself. Given the skill
sets that psychologists could bring to con-
sultation and research in crisis manage-
ment, this is somewhat surprising.
Sheldene K. Simola is an assistant professor
in the Department of Psychology at the Univer-
sity of Guelph, with research interests in the
areas of organizational behavior, leadership, and
business ethics.
I thank Ian R. Newby-Clark for his helpful
comments on a draft of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article
should be addressed to Sheldene K. Simola,
Department of Psychology, University of
Guelph, Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1, Canada.
E-mail: ssimola@uoguelph.ca
DOI: 10.1037/1065-9293.57.3.180
 The purpose of this article is to stimulate
increased interest in the field of organiza-
tional crisis management among consulting
psychologists. An overview of the field is
provided, including current frameworks for
understanding the stages of crisis/response.
This article extends previous theoretical ap-
proaches by applying the “levels of preven-
tion” framework often used in community
and health psychology and by offering
within those levels a new assessment tool
based on the “4 factor” (4 P) model used in
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
clinical (crisis) assessment. Potentially
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
fruitful areas for psychological consultation
and research are highlighted.
Understanding the
Organizational Crisis
Though scholars have defined the term
organizational crisis in a variety of ways
(Fink, 1986; Heath, 1998; Seeger, Sellnow,
& Ulmer, 1998; Weick, 1988), no single
definition dominates. In a recent integrative
review, Pearson and Clair (1998) suggested
that an organizational crisis is “a low prob-
ability, high-impact event that threatens the
viability of the organization and is charac-
terized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and
means of resolution as well as by a belief
that decisions must be made swiftly” (p.
60).
This definition reflects common themes
from the crisis management literature, in-
cluding the fact that crises are often unex-
pected occurrences (Seeger et al., 1998)
that have the potential to threaten the orga-
nization’s viability or goals (Fink, 1986;
Seeger et al., 1998; Weick, 1988) and that,
if not managed in a timely way, can esca-
late, thereby causing significant reputational
or other damage (Caywood & Stocker, 1993;
Fink, 1986). Ambiguity in cause and effect
exist because of the range of potential con-
tributory factors and outcomes.
The term organizational crisis often
evokes thoughts of past situations in which
there was risk or harm to public health and
safety. These situations might include in-
Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research
Summer 2005
dustrial disasters, such as the Union Car-
bide chemical leak at Bhopal (Shrivastava,
1992), the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl
(Heath, 1998), or the Exxon Valdez oil spill
(Lukaszewski, 1993). They might also in-
clude the e-coli contamination of Jack-in-
the-Box products (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000)
or the Ford Pinto explosions associated
with rear-end collisions (Coombs, 1999).
However, situations need not present a
direct threat to the health of consumers to
be organizational crises. The 1998 eastern
Canadian ice storm caused extended power
outages, resulting in information systems
disasters for a number of businesses
(MacInnis, 1999). The emergence of un-
founded and false rumors that certain cor-
porations were affiliated with the Ku Klux
Klan or that certain restaurants had contam-
inated their food via AIDS-infected em-
ployees were also major public relations
crises that innocent companies had to man-
age (Fearn-Banks, 1996). Similarly, cus-
tomer demand for replacement of Pentium
microprocessors was a crisis situation for
Intel Corporation in 1994. Intel undertook a
$500 million recall, even though it esti-
mated that the flaw would occur only once
in every 9 billion random calculations and
was unlikely to affect most users (Smith,
Thomas, & Quelch, 1996/2000).
Organizational Crisis Management
Caywood and Stocker (1993) stated that
crisis management refers both to “the man-
agement of operations during the actual
crisis” and to the “management of the cor-
poration before. . .and after the crisis” (p.
410). Fink (1986) argued that crisis man-
agement involves removing risk and uncer-
tainty where possible as well as planning in
advance for potential crises. Pearson and
Clair (1998) noted that the practice in-
volves systematic efforts to avert crises
when possible and to effectively manage
situations that do occur. They highlighted
the criticality of responding to a range of
stakeholders.
181
 Effective communication with stake-
holders is crucial (Coombs, 1999; Fearn-
Banks, 1996; Seeger & Ulmer, 2001) as is
learning from a current crisis in order to
prevent future ones (Heath, 1998; Mitroff,
Pearson, & Harrington, 1996). Organiza-
tional crisis management requires more
than a delimited knowledge base or a dis-
crete set of technical skills. It requires the
ability to think broadly, from multiple and
diverse perspectives. It also requires the
capacity to conceptualize complex prob-
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lems within the dynamics of multiple inter-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
acting systems and subsystems at the indi-
vidual, group, and organizational levels
(Mitroff, 2001; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992).
Levels of Prevention in Organizational
Crisis Management
The so-called levels of prevention
framework originated within the public
health field (Golan, 1986). More recently, it
has been applied in relation to occupational
health psychology (Quick, 1999; Quick &
Tetrick, 2003). This framework is useful
because it provides a vocabulary through
which various levels of prevention can be
easily understood, distinguished, and
applied.
Table 1
Levels of Prevention in Organizational Crisis and Response
Level of prevention Fink (1986)
Health promotion
Primary prevention Prodrome
(Crisis) Acute crisis
Secondary preventionb
Tertiary prevention Chronic stage
Crisis resolution
(Promotion/primary
prevention)
a
See also Mitroff and Pearson (1993). b Includes assessment using the four-factor (4 P) framework (protective,
predisposing, precipitating, and perpetuating factors).
182
The levels of prevention framework is
based on the belief that multiple levels of
prevention will reduce the occurrence of,
and minimize damage from, disease or in-
jury. These levels of prevention include
promotion (of health and resilience), pri-
mary prevention (to avert disease or injury
through education, planning, and immuni-
zation), secondary prevention (early inter-
vention or treatment to minimize damage
once an illness or injury has been acquired),
and tertiary prevention (rehabilitation when
earlier preventive efforts have been un-
available or unsuccessful; Klingman, 1986;
Taylor & Moore, 1994; Wilson, Nathan,
O’Leary, & Clark, 1996). Within the levels
of prevention framework, it is considered
most beneficial and least costly to engage
in promotion and primary prevention and to
use proximal interventions, such as second-
ary prevention, as opposed to distal inter-
ventions involving tertiary prevention.
These four levels of prevention can be
applied in a parallel way to organizational
crises. The first column of Table 1 lists the
levels of prevention in chronological order.
Each of three subsequent columns identify
the stages of crisis/response that occur
within frameworks proposed by Fink
(1986); Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia
Crisis/response framework
Mitroff et al. (1987)a Shrivastava (1993)
Warning signs Causes (antecedents)
Signal detection Caution (to potential crisis)
Preparation/prevention
Causes (immediate triggers)
Crisis Crisis
Containment and coping Coping
Recovery and repair Consequences (immediate)
Long-term recovery Consequences (long term)
Learning
Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research
Summer 2005
 (1987), and, Shrivastava (1993), respec-
tively. The stages of crisis/response articu-
lated by these authors are listed chronolog-
ically within columns, and analogous
stages among frameworks appear on the
same horizontal lines. Similarly, levels of
prevention corresponding to specific stages
of crisis/response appear on the same hor-
izontal line as those stages. The levels of
prevention are elaborated below.
Promotion of Organizational Health
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Organizational health promotion refers
to efforts made to promote a healthy, com-
petent, and resilient organization. Although
the specific elements of promotion can be
quite diverse, they are directed toward
achieving outcomes previously found to be
associated with factors such as organiza-
tional resilience.
One tenet of general system theory is
that in order to survive, open systems (such
as organizations) must be able to accom-
plish the dual yet seemingly contradictory
tasks of maintaining stability while under-
going change, or establishing “constancy
amid change” (Rapoport, 1986, p. 29). Re-
search into the question of what makes
corporations resilient despite substantial
challenges demonstrates the importance of
this very tenet. Collins and Porras (2000)
studied companies that were highly resil-
ient and prosperous in the face of signifi-
cant adversity. A number of features char-
acterized these companies, including the
ability to maintain internal stability as re-
flected in a core set of values, while simul-
taneously being able to stimulate progress
and change in response to opportunities and
threats. One way of achieving stability in
core values was the vigorous protection of
those values in hiring, separation, and pro-
motion decisions.
These findings support the importance
of establishing organizational culture by
design, as opposed to allowing it to develop
by chance (Bhide, 1996/1999). Moreover,
certain variables might be particularly rel-
Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research
Summer 2005
evant to organizational health and the abil-
ity to prevent and manage crisis situations.
For example, Pauchant and Mitroff (1988,
1992) distinguished between a “crisis-
prone” and a “crisis-prepared” organiza-
tion. They argued that crisis-prone organi-
zations show many similarities to dysfunc-
tional family systems. These similarities
include confusion reflected in poor bound-
aries. Also present are complementary and
mutually reinforcing tendencies toward
self-inflation (grandiosity, feelings of om-
nipotence, and the blaming of others) and
self-deflation (feelings of alienation, anxi-
ety, and inadequacy). Faulty rationaliza-
tions for action/inaction are present along
with the inability to recognize a dysfunc-
tional culture.
Crisis-prepared organizations, on the
other hand, are ones that recognize rather
than deny the possibility of crises. Prepared
organizations have a culture of positive
self-regard as opposed to self-inflation and
deflation. Faulty rationalizations are much
less common. Assumptions in the organi-
zation’s own structure, strategy, or culture
are open to challenge. Moreover, prepared
organizations exhibit a stronger apprecia-
tion of the interactions among all elements
in their organizational systems and
subsystems.
Primary Prevention
Primary prevention refers to those activ-
ities that help avert crises altogether or that
inoculate organizations against exposure to
potential crisis events. This could involve
staff education and training on how to pre-
vent or respond to relatively generic situa-
tions (e.g., fires). However, it could also
refer to the ongoing assessment of specific
operations in order to detect and ameliorate
risks. This would include the implementa-
tion of appropriate safety and quality assur-
ance procedures as well as the use of lead-
ing (as opposed to lagging) financial indi-
cators to obtain an accurate picture of the
true status of a company. Note that while
183
 Mitroff et al. (1987) acknowledge that (pri-
mary) prevention can occur before warning
signs of a crisis are present, it is difficult to
prepare for a crisis until indicators of po-
tential risk are present. Primary prevention
therefore occurs after signal detection in
the framework by Mitroff and colleagues.
A number of authors have offered spe-
cific frameworks or detailed guidelines for
primary prevention (Augustine, 1995/2000;
Battey, 2000; Fink, 1986; Harrington,
1996; Hearle, 1993; Heath, 1998; Mitroff
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& Pearson, 1993; Mitroff et al., 1996).
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Some brief highlights are offered below.
1. Establish a crisis management team
and crisis command center. Establish a
crisis management team with dedicated
time and resources and a specific mandate
to plan for crises. Given the significant role
of information technology in both normal
and crisis operations, it is critical to include
at least one expert from this area (Battey,
2000). Also establish a command center
with emergency communications systems.
Have a backup location in case the original
location is affected by the crisis (Augus-
tine, 1995/2000).
2. Conduct an organizational risk as-
sessment. Identify the core activities of
the organization and areas of potential vul-
nerability to crisis within these. Take steps
to reduce risk. Monitor and reevaluate.
Hearle (1993) specified questions for
use with all stakeholders in a risk assess-
ment process. Similarly, Mitroff et al.
(1996) formulated a 19-question audit
guide to be used with multiple sources. An
important feature is the inclusion of items
evaluating the nature of corporate culture
and whether it supports crisis management.
Fink (1986) developed a so-called crisis
barometer to help identify not only the
probability of potential crisis events, but
also the likely impact of those events in five
areas. The five areas include potential over-
all intensity of the crisis (as subjectively
determined, within a specific organization),
potential for media and government scru-
184 Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research
tiny, potential for disruption to business
operations, potential for public relations
damage, and financial impact. Rather than
relying strictly on expected values (the
probability multiplied by anticipated im-
pact) for crisis events, Fink argued that
events assessed as having high impact po-
tential have a higher priority for planning
than those with very low impact potential,
regardless of relative probabilities.
3. Construct written crisis plans for
various events. Mitroff and colleagues
(1996) argued that it is important to write at
least one plan for each of the 11 categories
of crisis they identified. Crisis plans need to
be specific and concrete and should clearly
articulate roles and responsibilities for
management team members.
4. Undertake business continuity or di-
saster recovery planning. Business con-
tinuity and disaster recovery plans specify
procedures for recovering from disruptions
to, or failures in, critical information ser-
vices (Groggins, 1999). Given the increas-
ing dependence of organizations on infor-
mation systems, disruptions are potentially
disastrous not only in lost revenues, but
also in long-term damage to customer rela-
tionships (see, e.g., Dayal, Landesberg, &
Zeisser, 1999, 2000). Several authors have
offered detailed guides on planning and
recovery relative to information systems
(Doughty, 2001; Hannah, Ball, & Edward,
1999; Holtsnider & Jaffe, 2001; Toigo,
1996).
5. Engage in communications planning.
Effective communication with all stake-
holders is critical. The general rule is to
communicate, communicate early, and
keep doing so (Augustine, 1995/2000).
Press materials such as brief company his-
tories, biographies of executives, and doc-
umentation about past positive accomplish-
ments in health and safety or corporate
citizenship can be prepared in advance
(Fink, 1986; Hearle, 1993). Also, key mes-
sages that would be critical in certain types
of crises could be drafted ahead of time,
Summer 2005
 and a spokesperson could be identified and
trained.
6. Practice. In addition to regular
practice drills or simulations, Loewendick
(1993) advocated for the use of so-called
table top practice exercises in crisis
management.
Secondary Prevention
Secondary prevention refers to early in-
tervention or management of a crisis in
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order to minimize its damage and to pre-
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vent it from escalating into a more signifi-
cant or chronic problem. A number of au-
thors have articulated guidelines for early
intervention and management of crisis sit-
uations (Augustine, 1995/2000; Caywood
& Stocker, 1993; Fink, 1986; Heath, 1998;
Mitroff et al., 1996).
1. Recognize there is a crisis and acti-
vate the crisis management team. Mitroff
(2001) identified two dimensions of signals
that are necessary for the detection of po-
tential crisis situations. These include the
source of a signal (internal or external to
the organization) and the type of signal
(those from technical sensing devices or
those noticed by people). Inclusion of two
levels for each of the two dimensions re-
sults in four domains in which organiza-
tions should specify warning thresholds rel-
ative to potential or emergent crises. When
signals are detected, this information must
be transmitted to those empowered to take
action.
2. Assess the crisis. A useful method
for assessing crises is through the applica-
tion of the 4-factor (4 P) framework often
used within mental health assessment and
consultation (e.g., Hunt, Richardson, & En-
gel, 2002; Maine, 2001; White &
Schweitzer, 2000). This framework in-
cludes consideration of the “4 Ps” of as-
sessment: protective factors, predisposing
factors, precipitating factor(s), and perpet-
uating factors (Weerasekera, 1996).
Each organization has its own unique
array of protective factors that might help
Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research
Summer 2005
mitigate negative outcomes or that can be
leveraged to achieve more positive out-
comes. Such factors might include having
previously established a high level of pub-
lic credibility and trust, having a solid fi-
nancial status, or having a complement of
wise and experienced board members. It
would also include having a crisis-prepared
organization (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1988,
1992).
However, organizations might also have
predisposing factors that make them more
vulnerable to crises or less able to manage
them. These factors might include a low
level of public credibility and trust, a shaky
financial status, weak or inexperienced
board members, or a crisis-prone organiza-
tion (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1988, 1992).
Precipitating factors represent the im-
mediate triggers for crises. For example, a
particular economic event might trigger a
financial crisis, or a nasty allegation by a
dissatisfied customer might spark a crisis of
gossip and rumor. As indicated above, the
trigger could occur within a context of
strong protective factors (which might al-
low the organization to manage well and
recover quickly) or within the context of
strong predisposing factors (which might
inhibit optimal management and recovery).
An assessment of precipitating factors is
important in terms of evaluating the poten-
tial magnitude of the current crisis, the like-
lihood of additional occurrences, and risks
related to the current crisis or prospective
responses.
Each organization would also need to
assess the degree to which certain perpetu-
ating factors are present. Factors perpetuat-
ing the crisis could be internal to the orga-
nization (e.g., adherence to an ineffective
crisis management approach, denial of the
crisis itself, failure to communicate effec-
tively with all stakeholders). They could
also be external to the organization (e.g., a
growing media frenzy, additional political
or economic events). When perpetuating
185
 factors are identified, intervention can
occur.
3. Contain the crisis. It is critical not
only to contain a crisis physically (e.g.,
contain a chemical spill), but also to con-
tain it in the minds of the public through the
use of appropriate communications strate-
gies (Mitroff et al., 1996). This sends the
message that the situation is under control
and that the business is continuing to
operate.
4. Identify and respond to stakeholder
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needs. Respond to a range of stakeholder
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needs, including those of shareholders,
board members, managers, employees, cus-
tomers, regulatory bodies, creditors, suppli-
ers, distributors, and the community at
large (Mitroff et al., 1996; Ulmer & Sell-
now, 2000). Ensure the health and safety of
stakeholders, and communicate in a timely,
ongoing, and appropriate manner.
Tertiary Prevention
Tertiary prevention refers to the man-
agement of chronic stages of a crisis or
rehabilitation of an organization, its finan-
cial status, and public image following a
crisis. As indicated earlier, it would be pru-
dent for a company to engage in promotion
and primary prevention and to use proximal
forms of intervention, such as secondary
prevention, as opposed to distal forms in-
volving tertiary prevention.
Within the field of corporate crisis man-
agement, there has been an emphasis in
scholarly writing on both primary and sec-
ondary prevention. Considerably less atten-
tion has been devoted to the management
of chronicity that can occur when earlier
efforts are not used or are unsuccessful.
The paucity of writing on chronic or
long-term situations might reflect the early
exit of organizations from the market when
a crisis occurs. It has been noted that the
closer struggling organizations come to ex-
periencing (full-blown) crises, the greater
the rate of performance deterioration. Time
pressures for responding also become
186 Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research
greater, and the strategic capability of the
firm becomes weaker (Crossan, Fry, &
Killing, 2002). For these reasons, some or-
ganizations might experience an unantici-
pated exit from the market that precedes the
need to deal with long-term issues.
However, case studies do provide infor-
mation about management practices that
are useful during long-term or chronic cri-
sis situations. Hurst’s (1995) book Crisis &
Renewal provided some insight on this is-
sue. He argued that organizations change
over time from being primarily learning
organizations to being primarily perfor-
mance organizations. As this occurs, five
interacting elements within the organiza-
tion also change. Flexible roles become
formally defined tasks, teams become for-
malized into structures, networks become
systems, recognition becomes formal com-
pensation, and the qualities required of em-
ployees change. Conversely, when a per-
formance organization becomes a learning
organization (as occurs during longer term
crises), the five elements shift back toward
their original status.
Consider Hurst’s case example involv-
ing the hostile takeover of a company for
which he worked. The takeover left the
company in a precarious situation in that
the purchasers paid too much and over-
leveraged their financing. When the bank-
ers became fully aware of the financial de-
tails, they withdrew their support. All of
this occurred as the economy went into a
deep recession. The organization was at
risk of failing.
When the crisis occurred, the organiza-
tion shifted from a performance orientation
back to a learning orientation. It moved
away from formal structures and systems to
cross-functional teams and networks, as the
latter of these could be formed quickly and
flexibly in response to emergent concerns.
Similarly, the company shifted from using
formal, distanced relationships in commu-
nication to using proactive, open commu-
nication and joint problem solving (even
Summer 2005
 with bankers). Employees at all levels were
also willing to accept salary freezes and
rollbacks as recognition, rather than formal
compensation, became key. Ultimately,
these shifts in organizational elements
away from performance and toward learn-
ing were effective in that the company
survived.
Potential Roles for Consulting
Psychologists
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1. Provide Education on the Need for
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Organizational Crisis Management
An early survey by Fink (1986) showed
a marked discrepancy between the propor-
tion of Fortune 500 CEOs who thought a
crisis was inevitable and the proportion
who actually had a plan for dealing with
one. Harrington (1996) summarized re-
search by a major U.S. brokerage firm dem-
onstrating that nearly one quarter of 2,200
corporate executives reported the absence
of a formal disaster plan. Often when such
plans do exist, they comprise business con-
tinuity or resumption strategies only
(Stocker, 1993). They may fail to consider
the range of issues that emerge in diverse
types of crises or the broad array of meth-
ods to manage crises in a timely and effec-
tive way.
The failure to plan for a crisis may be
related to a number of factors. For example,
Mitroff and Pauchant (1990) found that top
managers demonstrate a range of faulty
cognitions that inhibit their ability to plan
appropriately. These include rationaliza-
tions about the properties of organizations
themselves (e.g., “Our size will protect
us”), the properties of the environment
(e.g., “Someone will rescue us”), the prop-
erties of crises (e.g., “Each crisis is so
unique that it is not possible to prepare for
them”), and the properties of crisis manage-
ment (e.g., “Only executives need to be
aware of our crisis plans”). Psychologists
are often skilled at helping individuals to
identify and modify cognitive distortions or
Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research
Summer 2005
rationalizations that might inhibit optimal
performance.
2. Provide Education or Training in
Crisis Prevention and Management
Though psychologists might choose to
offer general training programs on crisis
prevention and management, there are spe-
cific areas within the field for which psy-
chologists are particularly well suited. One
of these is related to the range of factors
that contribute to crises or interfere with the
ability of managers to anticipate, recognize,
and manage crises. For example, cognitive
heuristics are common methods by which
people solve problems or make predictions
under conditions of uncertainty. Despite the
efficiency that can be achieved through the
use of heuristics, these strategies often lead
people to make erroneous judgments about
the likelihood of certain events (e.g., Fisch-
hoff, 1989; Nisbett & Ross, 1980).
The availability heuristic is used when
we judge as more probable those events for
which we already have readily available
examples in mind (Tversky & Kahneman,
1973). Similarly, the vividness criterion is
used when we differentially attend to vivid,
as opposed to pallid, data (Nisbett & Ross,
1980). In organizational crises, managers
might overestimate the probability of expe-
riencing a crisis for which there is a cur-
rently available example in the media or
other sources, particularly if that example is
vivid. Managers might underestimate the
probability of events for which there is no
readily available example or for which only
pallid information is available. Nisbett and
Ross (1980) examined a range of common
intuitive strategies in making inferences
and predictions and provided an analysis of
the causes of inferential errors as well as
the consequences and “cures” for counter-
acting them.
Similarly, the phenomenon of “groupthink”
(Janis, 1971/2001) occurs when there is a
psychological drive for consensus among
cohesive groups, such that the drive does
187
 not allow full and appropriate consideration
of a range of options in decision making.
Symptoms of groupthink among high-level
governmental decision makers included an
illusion of invulnerability among group
members along with the construction and
use of collective rationalizations in order to
discount warnings and negative feedback.
There was a belief in the inherent morality
of the group that disinclined members to
consider the ethical or moral consequences
of their decisions. Stereotyped and negative
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
views of out-group leaders were present as
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
was the application of direct pressure to
anyone who questioned or expressed doubt
about the shared illusions or decisions of
the group. Self-censorship and minimiza-
tion of misgivings were also apparent as
was an illusion of unanimity. People who
served as “mindguards” protected the
leader and group from information that
could diminish their support of past deci-
sions (Janis, 1971/2001).
Specific recommendations for prevent-
ing groupthink were offered by Janis
(1971/2001), including the use of outside
experts to prevent insulation of the group,
requirements to consider scenarios from al-
ternative viewpoints, the explicit use of
critical evaluation during planning, and
having so-called second chance meetings at
which all members express any residual
doubts.
3. Conduct Risk Assessments or
Postcrisis Audits
Risk assessments, as well as postcrisis
audits through which learning can occur,
can be conducted by a number of candi-
dates, either internal or external to the or-
ganization. Caywood and Stocker (1993)
argued that outside consultants might be
more objective in the assessment of orga-
nizational strengths and weaknesses. In ad-
dition to this, psychologists are well trained
to assess in behavioral terms and to do so in
ways that are both reliable and valid.
188 Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research
4. Provide Consultation With Respect
to a Specific Crisis Event
Many organizations have specific exec-
utives or senior managers dedicated to is-
sues like public relations and communica-
tions (see, e.g., Gottschalk, 1993). Practi-
tioners with specialized training in these
areas might seem to be the most logical
choice as consultants. However, for certain
types of crises, a consulting psychologist
might well be the most appropriate choice.
For example, public or private sector so-
cial and health service organizations might
suffer crises with a human element (e.g.,
multiple suicides of clients or public allega-
tions of abuse of clients). Psychologists with
competencies in these settings would be well
positioned to understand and manage the
complexities of dealing with multiple, and
sometimes conflicting, requirements among
various pieces of legislation, professional
codes of ethics, and organizational policies.
Similarly, many psychologists could provide
excellent management recommendations
with respect to clinical issues that might arise
as part of the crisis (e.g., the necessity of
establishing a clinical crisis response in addi-
tion to a corporate one or of ensuring conti-
nuity of care for clients).
Alternatively, some consulting psycholo-
gists would bring specialized knowledge not of
a particular setting (e.g., health care) but, rather,
of a particular type of organizational crisis. For
example, psychologists who have worked in the
area of workplace violence could consult on
those areas within the broader context of orga-
nizational crisis management. Braverman
(1999, 2002) and Denenberg and Braverman
(1999) not only demonstrated substantial exper-
tise in the area of workplace violence, but also
considered this issue as a specific form of orga-
nizational crisis.
5. Provide Coaching During or After a
Specific Crisis Event
Crisis situations might occur during an
executive coaching contract. Similarly, the
Summer 2005
 improved prevention and management of
organizational crises might be a goal of the
coaching relationship (Kilburg, 1996,
2000). In fact, for those who are knowl-
edgeable and experienced in executive
coaching, organizational crisis manage-
ment might simply be an example of, or
extension of, the kind of work already be-
ing done.
A useful resource with respect to coach-
ing is Kilburg’s (2000) book, Developing
Managerial Wisdom in a World of Chaos.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
He provided an extremely thorough and
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
compelling integrative analysis of system,
psychodynamic, and complexity theories.
The concepts and techniques described for
executive coaching have particular import
for organizational crisis management.
For example, Kilburg (2000) discussed
Schon’s (1987) levels of learning frame-
work and Hargrove’s (1995) triple loop
learning framework, respectively. Given
the prescription within the field of crisis
management to learn from current crisis
events in order to help prevent future ones
(Mitroff & Pearson, 1993), the frameworks
offered by Schon and Hargrove are very
valuable tools.
Similarly, Kilburg’s (2000) techniques
for modifying executive character and be-
havior within a psychodynamic perspective
and his models of organizational and indi-
vidual regression have clear implications
for organizational crisis management,
where psychodynamic factors are often
cited as contributory (see, e.g., Elmes &
Barry, 1999; Mitroff, 2001; Pauchant &
Mitroff, 1992; Schwartz, 1987).
Summary and Recommendations
The purpose of this article was to stim-
ulate increased interest in the field of orga-
nizational crisis management among con-
sulting psychologists. It provides an over-
view of organizational crisis/response and
identifies potential practice opportunities in
the field. The article also extends previous
perspectives on crisis management through
Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research
Summer 2005
the application of the levels of prevention
framework and the introduction of the
4-factor (4 P) crisis assessment tool.
Though a number of potentially fruitful ar-
eas for consulting psychologists are identi-
fied, these also raise several practice and
research issues for future consideration.
In terms of practice, one important issue
for psychologists is what comprises com-
petence. Certain organizations provide cre-
dentialing in the area of crisis management.
For example, the Business Continuity Insti-
tute (2002) and Disaster Recovery Institute
International (2003) identify specific stan-
dards through which individuals can be-
come certified as business continuity plan-
ners. However, these credentialing bodies
focus most specifically on issues related to
ensuring business continuity in the face of
disruptions to information systems, as op-
posed to issues related to crisis manage-
ment as more broadly defined and under-
stood. Moreover, neither body considers
the specific areas in which psychologists
practice or the codes of ethics or profes-
sional conduct that psychologists follow.
For this reason, standards of practice, cre-
dentials, and levels of competence for psy-
chologists are best identified within the
psychological community.
In terms of future research, Pearson and
Clair (1998) noted that there is still a good
deal of speculation and that more empirical
research is required. They identified a num-
ber of difficulties associated with this task.
These include the often unpredictable na-
ture of crisis events and the caution that
corporate executives have about allowing
researchers to investigate such events. For
these reasons, the establishment of long-
term, trusting relationships with organiza-
tions was recommended as was the use of
sound qualitative research approaches, in-
cluding content analysis of media reports.
In terms of specific topics, relatively lit-
tle attention has been paid to managing
longer term organizational crises. Further
research could, therefore, investigate fac-
189
 tors such as the leadership styles, coping
characteristics, and strategic decision mak-
ing of executives who have been successful
in managing chronic (rather than acute) sit-
uations (see, e.g., Hill & Wetlaufer, 1998/
2000). Also, further evaluation of organi-
zational shifts that facilitate successful
management of longer term situations
would be helpful (e.g., Hurst, 1995).
In addition, a good deal of research has
focused on private sector organizations or
large public sector (governmental) organi-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
zations. Further research could consider the
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
types of crises affecting a broader range of
public sector organizations, including
smaller nonprofit ones, and the challenges
in prevention and management faced by
executives in those settings.
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