Manzano v. Sanchez, A.M. No.

MTJ 00-1329, March 8, 2001

Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage.
On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda
Payao before Judge Roque-Sanchez.

When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
“separated.”

However, the judge claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.

What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him,
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

In 2 separate affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they
were married before; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both
have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years
under Article 34 of Family Code.

No. The supreme court held that In Article 34 of the Family Code provides

“No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.

Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were “separated.”

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. respondent Judge
cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same
was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry.

Thus, SC held that neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.

Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26,
2013

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.

Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara
and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish their relationship. Fujiki then
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan declaring her marriage in
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.

Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment before the RTC (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). However, the trial court
dismissed the petition maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality file the petition. The RTC cited
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either
Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. The trial
court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue
under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third
person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by
the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized

Issues:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

MAIN ISSUE:
*2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

I. No. The Rule on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. The Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply
if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies
to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would defeat the purpose of recognizing
foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." For
Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence.

While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from
the beginning. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II. YES. the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact.”Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry
is located.
In this case, there is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. The Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning.

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay.

The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or
dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect
his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of
the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

It does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a

subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a)
states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages
are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Being a real party in interest, the
prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose,
he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines.

III. Yes. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an

action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to

substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot
 decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity”
of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts
are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a
citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect
to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize
the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita
Delizo that at the date of her marriage with Delizo on December 1954, concealed the fact that
she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their
marriage, gave birth to a child. Delizo claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock
between her and Fernando Aquino.

During the trial, only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the
marriage contract between the parties without the birth certificate of the child born after the
marriage. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence. Trial court dismissed the
complaint. CA affirmed the ruling of RTC on the ground that the claim of the Fernando to not
have noticed the pregnancy when he married her was found to be unbelievable. It was not
impossible for the two of them to have nave sexual intercourse during their engagement, so it is
possible the child could be his.
Fernando Aquino filed a motion praying the decision be reconsidered. He attached following
documents:

1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Plaintiff's brother)

 Delizo was living with Cesar at the time she and Fernando Aquino met
 Delizo had two more children with Cesar aside from their firstborn, they are in common-
law relationship
 Cesar admitted he was the father of the defendant's first born, Catherine
 Cesar admitted that he and Delizo hid the pregnancy from the Fernando at the time of
their marriage
2. Affidavit of defendant Conchita Delizo
 Admitted her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino
 Admitted she hid her pregnancy from the petitioner when they got married
3. Affidavit of Albert Powell
 Stating he knew Cesar and Delizo lived together before December 27, 1954, when she
married Fernando
4. Birth certificate of defendant’s first born, Catherine Bess Aquino (born 26 April 1955)
5. Birth certiticate of Carolle Ann Aquino, second child or defendant with Cesar
6. Birth certticate of Chris Charibel Aquino, third child of defendant with Cesar
 7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to late November 1954
which does not show defendant's four-month pregnancy

ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy by another man can be a ground for annulment

Ruling: YES. Under the New Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.

NCC 85: A marriage may be annulled for any f the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledse of the
facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wile, as the case may be

NCC 86: Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband.

Defendant Delizo was only more than four months pregnant when she married the plaintiff
Court is not prepared to say her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as
alleged by plaintiff. Plaintiff could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at
the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. No support
of the statement that plaintiff and defendant could have had sexual intercourse before marriage. Evidence sought to
be introduced at the new trial can be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff

In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set aside.