WILEY- BLACKWELL ‘he United States and the Diseipline of International “Tegemente Discipline” thera Steve Sith ‘behalf of The lucneion! Stes Asciton iuslegisg 1 tannin ‘enw he JSTOR wei ts yu ace fe Tens Condos Us vast Luin secon einuitonllssahara, STOR saat ratte tat els schlecht ses srs dbl von ide ge etna ote ies Wes horstan encontrar asin ew fs eit Foraefrmaon sow STOR pase anata lca thing aeration Sais ecinon se cls wih ISTORWighin, Feoraandenndicct nat Sues Afar ote omni The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: “HEGEMONIC COUNTRY, HEGEMONIC DISCIPLINE” Steve Smith University of Essex ‘This paper focuses on the relationship between the way the dis- ‘mological assumptions than with any simple relationship between U.S. policy interests and the assumed ontology of U.S. international relations. 1 want to argue that the dominance of a specific view of how to create knowledge con- structs a specific world of international relations, and that world is one that is decidedly ethnocentric. Moreover, itis a world that does not scem to “see” other kinds of inequalities. We have here a double inequality to consider: first, the dominance of the U.S. academic community in the world community of The US. and IR co) {ntemational relations; second, that this U.S.~dominoted discipline sees a very ‘world to study, one that renders relevant other forms of inequality —~ they simply do not fic the discipline as defined inthe United States. Nox, of course, my view of the discipline is a “view from somewhere," mainly related tomy social/cultural/gendered seting, and, toe cleat, [am not trying to offer “the tri about the nature of the discipline, only one contribu tion to thinking about the relationship between how we study the world out of ‘our own location, context and identity. It is precisely that self-consciousness that think is lacking in U.S. international relations, wien it presents itself as reporting on the way the world is. Locked within the “tenitorial trap” and based on a prior (and an a priori) set of distinetions between inside/outside, economics/polites, public/private, U.S. interational relations focuses on some inequalities, but deems others to lie outside the intemations! political realm since they are defined and classified as domestic, or economic, or private. As such, I think thatthe discipline reflects U.S. political, economic and cultural hhegermony. Let me reiterate that am not claiming that the U.S. discipline is in some way alone in reflecting its context, ony that what worries mis its lack of self-reflection, its inability to take s step back and see its own role in consti- 8 fields of study and the individuals who act within them. In Foucauldian terms the dominant, rationalist tendency within U.S. discipline does not engage im effective history, but rather presents the world as something “out there.” 28 something that can be studied according to the “social science” eanon. I dis- agree fundamentally with this view, preferring Foucault's position on the rela- tionship between knowledge and power. Foucault argues that truth and knowledge ave functions of power: ‘Truth isn't outside power... ruth isnt the reward offre spits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succooded i lberat- ing themselves. Truth i 2 thing ofthis world... Each society as its regime of truth, its “general poles” of wth: that i, the types of discorse which it accepts and makes function a true; the mechanisms and instance which enable ‘one to distinguish true and false statements. ..."“Truh” sto beundestood a5 4 system of ordored procedures forthe production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements “Truth” is inked in aetcular relation ‘ith systems of power which produce and sustain i... A“egkne" of truth? ‘Simitatly, for knowledge: We should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended snd that knowledge ‘can develop only outside is injunctions, its demands and its interests... We Michel Foucaul, “Truth and Power; (London: Penguin Books, 1986), pp. 72-74 Paul Rabinow, ed, The Foucault Reader70 ‘Steve Smith should admit rather that power produces knowledge... that power snd knowl- edge directly imply one another, that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of «field of knowledge, nor any Knowledge that does ‘not presuppose and constitute atthe same time power relations? It is important to note that the academic studying truth and power is not somcone free from the effects of power, but “must be regarded as so many effects ofthese fundamental implications of power-knowiedge.”"T believe that the dominant form of the discipline inthe U.S. does not reflect on these issues, ‘bat 10 make good on these bold claims [need to say something about how I see the state ofthe discipline in the U. Tae STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE want to summarize how Isee the current state ofthe discipline by making nine points: (1) The current scene can most usefully be divided into a mainstream com- prising neorealism and neoliberalism—Wasver's neo-neo synthesis*—and to sm increasing extent muck ofthe most cited work within social constructivism, ‘and a set of approaches that lie outside the mainstream, There aremany names for this mainstream, the most common being rationalism, although I find the label “explanatory theory” helpful since it accurately links the epproaches to the wider debates in the philosophy of the social sciences. I will discuss the ‘main features of the rationalist mainstream presently. The other approaches are ‘usted only by an opposition to this rationalist mainstream, and are usvally ‘grouped together under the title of reflectivism, although again T prefer the ‘generic socal science label of “constitutive theory.” The main elements of reflee- tiviam are ertical theory, postmodernism, ferninist theory postcolonial theory, ‘normative theory, peace studies, anthropological approaches and historical soc ology: As is obvious from this lis, the differences between these approaches are enormous, and in many cases the approaches are fundamentally incompatible. Nonetheless, they share a fundamental opposition to the main elsims of ratio- nalism, and thus the label is useful forthe purposes ofan initial discussion of the main features of the discipi Miche Foucault, Discipline ond Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Pot- cegriné Books, 1979), p. 27. “Thi, p. 28. Ole Woever, “The Rise and Fal ofthe Inter Paradigm Debate,” in Steve Sith, ‘Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds, International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 149-165, The US. and IR 1 (2) The core differences between neorealism and neoliberalism concera the ‘extent to which institutions can mitigate the effecs of international anarchy, and whether the main actos in international politics (states) pursue absolute of relative gains. The main areas of agreement concern the nature of international politics: it involves states as actors; it focuses on patterns of cooperation and conflict: actors are unitary and rational; and state interest, determined by the state's position in the international political system, drive foreign policy behav- for. These ontological similarities matter considerably, since they mean that both neorealists and neoliberals see essentially the same world of international politics. Their differences are not unimportant; after all, it does matter if inst ‘tutions matter and whether itis possible to get states to pursue absolute bot I strongly believe that this results in a very limited view of what inter- national politics is and can be. It serves to rule out of consideration an extensive set of political, social and economic questions, notably those that focus on actors otier than the state, on issues other than interstate war or economic ‘cooperation, snd on interests and identities other then those given exogenously by the rationalist worldview. What stikes me mostis just how sarrow a view of politics (and even economics) is involved inthis mainstream definition of iater- national relations, and how much and how effectively the discipline is disei- plined by this move. @) As I have argued elsewhere,* I believe an even more inportant conse- ‘quence follows on from the epistemological assumptions that dominate ratio nalist IR. Indeed I believe that increasingly itis these assomptions that perform the leading role in moves to reject much of the work of refectivist scholars, ‘The main epistemological assumptions are those of positivism, by whieh Emean a belief in naturalism in the social world (that isto sey thatthe social world is amenable to the same kinds of analysis as thase applicable to the natural world; a separation between facts and values, by which is meant both that “facts” are ‘heory-neutral and that normative commitments should no influence what counts as facts oras knowledge: a commitment to uncovering patterns and regularities in the social world, pattems and regularities that exist apart from the methods ‘used 10 uncover them; and finelly there is a commitment to empiricism 2 the arbiter of what counts as knowledge. It is important for me to point out thet virtually no rationalist scholar will accept that his or her work is based on these assumptions, and at conference after conference in the United States I am told “Steve Sith, "The Selfsmages of aDiscpline: A Genealogy of Istematonal Rela: tions Theory,” in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds, [niemational Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 1-37; and Stove Seuth, Beyond,” in Smith, Booth, and Zalewski, Intemational Theory, pp. U1~48,n Steve Smith that my view is outdated, that I am referring toa kind of naive positivist who no Jonger exists. leave it to readers Co assess this claim, The important point to ‘note is that most articles do not explicitly subscribe to any one theoretical position, that isto say they do not annovnce that they are based on a ncorealist, Fa neoliberal approach; rather, their theoretical assumptions are contained implicitly in their methodological (usually quantitative) and epistemological (nearly always empiricist) commitments. In this sense, most ofthe U.S. ltera- ture is not explicitly rationalist, but is so implicitly, Ontologically the literature {ends to operate inthe space defined by rationalism, and epistemologically itis empiricist and methodologically itis positivist. Together these define “proper” social science and thereby serve as the gatekeepers for what counts as legit imate scholarship. {@) Refiectvist approsches tend to be more united by their opposition to sealism end positivism than by any shared notion of what should replace i. As canbe immediately understood, any label that includes the range of approaches noted above contains some ofthe major disputes within the philosophy of soc science. Perhaps part ofthe problem is that writers such as myself have usod this label “reflectvist” asa useful way of summarizing thei opposition to rationalism. Nonetheless, the important point 1 note is that there are a rich variety of approaches tat offer a series of alternatives to both the ontological ‘and epistemological commitments of rationalism and thus se a different world ‘of international politics from that seen by rational, G) Although these differences are significant, the epistemological differ- ‘en0es are probably more important im determining the treatment of reflectivist approaches inthe profession of IR. Precisely because refletivist approaches do ‘not share the commitment co the form af foundational positivism found in ratio- nalist approaches, they are increasingly criticized for not being social science and thereby not counting as reliable knowledge about the world, Reflectivists ‘are thus presented by the mainstream as operating outside of the acceptable sealm of academic study; they are not intellectually legitimate, This tendency hos increased during the last decade, as reflectivist work was frst ignored, then seen as ielevant tothe concerns of the “real” world of jaernational politics, 10 thecurrent situation whereby they ae attacked forthe even more heinous crime ‘of not being part of the social science enterprise. I think itis very difficult for academics based in the rest of the world to appreciate the impact of this move (on careers, publication prospects and, of course, for the development of the 4iscipline inthe U.S. Given that rflectivist work is dismissed as intellectually weak, a illegitimate, then itis not surprising therefore that refletivist scholars are not well entrenched in North America, the homeland of the mainstream of ‘the discipline. The US. and IR B (6) There are three good examples of the elaim that rflectvist work is not legitimate scholarship. The first was that made by Robert Keohane in his 1988 address as President of the Intemational Studies Association. He noted that the greatest weakness of reflestivist approaches was “the lack of a clear re- Alective research program. ... Until the reflective scholars or others sympa- ‘thetic to their arguments have delineated such a research grogram ... they will remein on the margins of the field, largely invisible to the preponderance ‘of empirical researchers, most of whom explicitly or implicily accept one or another version of rationalist premises.” What was needed was for reflec- tivist scholars to develop “testable theories” without which “it will be impos- sible to evaluate their research program.”* The most significant point about this challenge was that it was, not surprisingly, made on the epistemological terrain of rationalism. ‘The second example ofthis d-legitimization of reflectivist pproaches comes in Stephen Wal’s review of the state of interational relaticns theory.? Walt argues that although the key debate in international relations theory bas been, ‘and continues tobe, that between realism and liberalism, there is athied approach which he sees as the main alternative to these two. The important point is that this approzch is not reflectivism nor any of the many approaches commonly placed under that label; the alternative approach is constructivism. What inter fests me about his argument is that he sees constructivism as dealing with the isaues commonly secn as the core concerns of reflectivist approaches. Walt sets ‘ut the main features of these three “paradigms” (realism, libaalism and con- structivism) and under the heading of constructivism he lists is “unitof analy- sis” a5 “individuals” and its “main instruments” as “ideas and discourse.” Its “post-cold war prediction” is “agnostic because it cannot predict the content of ‘doas” and its “main limitation” is described as “better at describing the past than anticipating the future." Constructivism is portrayed as the approsch that deals with things such as individuals, ideas, discourse and identities. Note just hhow de-legitimizing this is of reflectivist work and how it pelices the bound- aries of the discipline. ‘Tae third example comes in a 1998 article by Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner, wherein they characterize the current situation a one of a new debate between rationalism and constructivism: “rationalista ‘and constructivism now provide the major points of contestation for inter- "Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in Inter. ‘ational Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1989), p, 173. "bid, pp. 173-174, Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110 (1998), pp. 29-46,” Steve Smith national relations scholarship." ° They note three strands of constructivism: eal and postmodern, These are defined as follows: “Conven- sts insist that sociological perspectives offer a general theo- ‘retical orfentation and specific research programs that can rival or complement rationalism.” " Critical constructivists focus on “identity issues that include, besides nationalism, subjects such as race, ethnicity, religion, and sexuality. [They] aso accot the possibilty of social scientific knowledge based on emp ‘cal rescarch.”""* As such, rationalist scholars can debate with both conven- tional and critical constructivists, since their research programs are open to rationalist critiques. The problem is with postmodem constructivist: “What ‘separates critical constructivism and postmodernism is not the shared focus on discourse, but the acknowledgement by critical constructivists of the possibil- ly of a socal science and a willingness to engage openly in scholarly debate, Wwith rationalism.” ‘Thus it follows that the journal has published little post- ‘madera IR work “since 10 [Unternational Organization) has been commited to ‘an enterprise that postmodernism denies: the use of evidence to adj between trath claims. In contrast to conventional and critical constructivism, postiodemism falls clearly outside of the social science enterprise, and in IR ‘esearch itrisks becoming self-referential and disengaged from the world, pro- {ests to the contrary notwithstanding.” rationalism and constructivism, but this is alittle misleading because it implies that constructivism is positioned between the two approaches: I think that some of the most cited authors are not at all positioned between the two, but instead are really patt of rationalism. I would go so far as to say that social construc- tivism in its dominant (mainly North American) form is very cloreto the neolib- ‘eralit wing ofthe rationalist paradigm. This is precisely why itis teen by Walt, ‘and by Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner as acceptable. For these writers itis acceptable because it accepts both the ontology and much more important the epistemology of the mainstream. Some of the leading constructivists also want to locate constructivism as a middle way between rationalism and eflectivism, “Thus, Alexander Wendt’s self-proclaimed aim isto build a bridge between the {wo IR traditions of rationalism and reflectivism by developing a consiructiy- "peter Ketzenstein, Robert Keobane, nd Stephen Krasnet, “Intemational Orga- nization ane the Study of Word Politis,” International Organisation 2 (1998), p. 646. “bid, p 675. "Mid, p. 676. bid, p. 677. "Ibid, p. 678. The US. and IR 15 ism that builds on the shared features of the iberalist wing of the rationalist tradition and the modera constructivist wing of the reflectiv st tradtion.?? In his 1999 book he states his intention as wanting to defend a “naoderate,” “thin” Consiructivism against two positions: onthe one hand he want to argue against those in the mainstream who reject social constructivism as being tantamount to postmodernism; on the other he is opposed to those “more radial” eonstruc- tivists who want to go much further than he does, He wants to develop a “ph ‘osophically principled middle way” between these positions." Similaiy ‘Emmanuel Adler sees constructivism asthe “true middle ground” between ratio= nalist and elatvist (his wording) approaches.” Finally, Jeffrey Checkel claims that “[cJonstructivists thus occupy a middle ground betwees rational choice ‘theorists and postmodern scholars.” "® All Cure of these writers want to differentiate constructivism from relec- tivism, and crucially the litmus testis, yet again, a commitment to “the social science enterprise.” The most extensive justification of this position is to be found inthe work of Wendt"? Ashe put tin aby now infamous comment made ‘in an article he co-wrote with Ronald Jepperson and Peter Katzenstein, “The texm identity here is intended as a useful Iabel, not as 2 signa’ of commitment to some exotic (presumably Parisian) cocial theory."*" In his 1999 book Social Theory of International Politics Wendt spends a lot of ime discussing issues of epistemology. One quote gives a flavor of the horse he is trying to tide: “Epistemologically I have sided with positivist... our bast hope is social science... {but] ... on ontology—which is to my mind the more important ‘ssue—I will side with post-posiiviss. Like them I believe that social life is "S Alexandec Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It" international Organiza: tion 46 (1992), pp. 393-394 "Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Polis (Cambridge: Cam- bridge Univesity Pros, 1995), p. 2. Emmanuel Acter, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constrvctivian ia Word Poli ‘es;” European Joumal of International Relations 3 (1997), p. 322. 'elfvey Checkel, “The Constructivist Tum in International Relations Theory. World Potties 50 (1598), p. 327 "See Alexander Wendl, “The Agent Strocture Problem in Iterational Relations ‘Tneory” international Organication 41 (1987), pp. 335-370; “Anarchy Is Wht States Make of 1." pp, 393-394, 422-425; "Collective Ideatity Formation and the Inter: ‘ational State,” American Political Science Review 88 (1994), pp. 384-396; and Sactal Theory of International Politics. Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, “Norns, Identity, ‘and Culture in National Security." in Peter Katzenstln, ed, The Calture of Nationa ‘Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 34.% ‘Steve Smith “ideas all the way down’ (or almost anyway. .):"*" He is, he states, “a strong. believer in science... . am a positivist.” Indeed, [believe tha the inconsis- teacy between wanting it to be “ideas all the way down” and atthe same time ‘wanting to be a social scientist is the key tension running through his recent bbook.™ Adleris also explicit in distinguishing between constructivism and reflec- tivist (or as he terms them, relativist) approaches.* These approaches are, be claims, based on “untenable” sssumptions that essentially deny the separate existence of both foundational truth and an independent realty. Finally, for Jeffrey Checkel: “It is important to note that constructivists do not reject sci- ence or causal explanation: their quarrel with mainstream theories is ontologi- cal, notepistemological. The lst point is key, for it suggests that constructivism thas the potential to bridge the sill vast divide separating the majority of IR ‘theorists from postmodernist.”#° (8) Not all constructivism is so clase to rationalism, and many construc tivists will want to disassociate themselves from the kinds of Linkages to s0- cial science proposed by Wendt. Thus it is important to distinguish between the kind of constructivism developed by Wendt and thet of two of the other earlier founders of the approach, Nick Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil. The essence of this distinction concems the form of theory appropriate for analyz- {ng the social world. Wendt is fundamentally a positivist and a naturalist on ‘questions of knowledge. This means that analysis is limited ta certain kinds of things in the social world, and these things can be analyzed by using the same ‘methods as those used in the natural sciences. The problem wit allthis is that there is an important intellectual tradition that sees these worlds as distinct, requiring distinct and different analytical approaches, and this tradition is the * Wendt, Socal Theory of International Polite, p. 90. 2d, p.39. Fora detailed discussion ofthis tension soo Steve Smith, “Wenets World" Resiew of International Studies 26 (2000, pp. 151-163. adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground." p. 330-337. % Checkel, “The Constructivist Tam in Intemational Relations Theory.” p. 327. * See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Mating: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and Incerational Relations (Columbix: Universi of South Carolina Press, 1989), Nicholas Onut,“Constrocivism: A User's Manta,” in Vendlla Kubalkove, [Nihiolas Onuf, and Pat! Kower, ds, international Relations ina Contracted World (Armonk, KJ: ME. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 58-78; Fedrich Kratochwil and John Rg- Bic. “Intemational Organiraton: A State ofthe Areon the Att ofthe State," date ational Organtzation 40 (1986, pp. 753-773: redch Krstochwi, Rules, Norms, land Decisions: On the Conditions of Pretieal and Legal Reasoning in International ‘Relations and Domestic Afurs (Cambridge: Cambridge University res, 1989). The US. and IR n fone that is the basis of the form of constructivism prefered by Onuf and Kratochwril. Thus, the cracial distinction is that whercas Wendt ends up paint- ing a world that seems very similar to that painted by ratioralist, the social worlds seen by Onuf and Kratochwil are very different from those of the r tionalists. The Onuf/Kratochwil form of constructivism sees a very different kind of social world from that seen by Wendt. It is a world in which actors, whoever they ate, are governed by language, rules and choices. This view of the social world has its intellecual roots in the work of writers such as ttgenstein and Winch, and thus it isa view thet doos not subseribe to the naturalism of Wendt, (®) This distinction between fundamentally different forms of constructiv- ism fits with my long-stated claim that there are always at least two stories to toll about the social world.”” In this light the fact that Wendt and Onuf/ ‘Kratochwil have very different forms of socal theory underlying their construc- ism is not surprising, since they are on different sides o! the explaining/ ‘understanding divide. Wendt’s social theory ultimately his to fall on the explaining side of the divide, hence his concern to develop causal analysis, and to see constitutive analysis as secondary to it Having said all this, itis pre- cisely this fact that makes his form of social constructivism sc appealing 10 the rationalist mainstream, STILL AN AMERICAN SocraL ScrEncE? | now want to tum to examining whether IR remains an American ence.” Again, I want to summarize my argument in a set of five points: (1) In his 1977 article, Stanley Hoffmann famously argued that the disc pline of TR developed not inthe U.K. (where the first university department had ‘been founded in 1919) but in the U.S. in the aftermath of tke Second World ‘War. He noted that this was because of the confluence of a specific cireum- stance and three causes. The key circumstance was “the rise of fhe United States 27Sce Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanting International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950)- 7 smith, “Wendt's World" For a recent examination of this istue see the essays in Robert Crawford and Dany Jarvis, ds, ternational RelationsSill an American Socla Science: Towards Diversity in International Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).8 Steve Smith ‘world power. andthe causes were “intellectual predispositions, poi circumstances, ard institutional opportunties."®" There were thee intcles- tual predisposition: that problems canbe solved by the selentfi method, and that this will wesutin progres; that IR as a social science benefited from the Drstge accorded io the natural sciences and vo economics; that Bropean schol ars who had emigrated to the US. tended to ask much larger questions and to ask about them more conceptually than thie U.S. counterparts The political ciscumstances, especially the fact that the U.S's role in world affsirs was undergoing a fundamental transformation, meant that policy-makers were in- terested in precisely the kind of expertise and opinions thatthe developing TR community were willing to offer As Hofmann puts it: "Wht the leaders looked for, once the cold war started, was some intellectual compass --. “Realism”... precisely provided what was necessary.” Finally, there were tine sets of instimtional opportunities which Hofmann argues did not exist anywhere else inthe work other than the U.S. the link between the scholarly community and government, which meant that academics and policy-makers ‘moved back and forth between universities and think-tanks, and govern- ‘ment; the existence of wealthy foundations which linked the “kitchens of power” withthe “academic salons,” and thus eould create a “seamless plral- ‘sto link the policy concerns of govemment othe academic esearch com ‘munity; andthe fact thet the universities were flexible and operated in ¢ mess ceuction market which ellowed them to innovate and specialize in thelr r= Search activities—in short, they were able to respond to the demands of _goremment in a way that was impossible in the European university sector of the time. (@) This view of U.S. dominance was backed up by Kal Holst in his 1985 survey of te state of te field. Holst, having looked in detail at the discipline in eight counties, concludes that “[mJost of the mutually acknowledged liter- ‘ature has been produced by scholars from only two of more than 15S countries, the United States and Great Britain, There is, in brief, a British-American intel- Stanley Hoffinann, “An American Social Scence: International Relations" (1977), ‘eprnted in Stanley Hoffmann, ed, Janus and Minerva: Excays in the Theory and Pracice of International Potics (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1987), p. 6. Sid, pp. 7-8. Did, pp. 8-9, id, p. 10, Kalevi Holst, 7he Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in nernational Theory (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983). The U.S. and IR cr lectval condominium.” * But even here, the picture is one of a U.S-dominated condominium: in his survey of texts, he found that only 11.1 percent of refer- ‘ences were to British scholars, compared with 74.1 percenttoU.S. scholars. On the basis of his survey he concludes that thee isa “reliance solely on Ameri- cans to produce the new insights, theoretical formulations, paradigms, and data sets of our fields... {T]he trends are operating in the direction of greater concentration.” ** (3) One result of this dependence on the U.S. IR community is that certain kinds of insights, theories, paradigms and deta sets dominate the TR literature, Alker and Bierstoker’s 1984 survey revealed thatthe U.S. literature is concen- trated in one kind of methodology and in one kind of theory. They looked at soventeen reading lists from main U.S. universities and coded te literature into \raditional, behavioral and dialectical. The findings were that 70 percent ofthe literature was behavioral, slightly over 20 percent was traditianal and less than 10 percent was dialectical. The methodological concentration was very clear, but there was a similar ontological concentration: ofthe behsviorl literature, ‘72 percent was neorcalist, and of the traditional literature &2 percent was real- {st*? Their survey also supported Holsti’s claims about the parochial character of US. IR. The implication of these findings is thatthe discipline was then (and is still, 1 would argue) both parochial in the U.S. and focused on a specific methodology and ontology. Together these meant that not only did U.S. theory dominate IR but so did the specific U.S. commitment to a realist/ncorealist view of te world, and a commitment 10 studying that world sehaviorally. (4) This concer has been a theme of my own work aver the last twenty years" and I stil strongly believe tha this i sill the case today. The effect is Mid, p. 103, Bid, p. 128. * Hayward Alker and Thomas Bierscker, “The Dialetice of World Order: Notes for » Fature Archeologist of Intemational Savoir Fare," International Sues Quar~ ferly 8 (1984), pp, 129-130. * Steve Smith, ed, Incemational Relations: British and American Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985); "The Development of Intemational Re ation 28 Social Science,” Millennlum: Journal of fnteraational Studies 16 (1981), pp. 185-206;"Hleg- ‘emonic Power, Hegemontc Disc)pline? The Superpower Status of tie American Stady ‘of International Relations,” in James Rosenau, et, Global Voices: Dialogues in Inter ‘ational Relations (Boulder, Colo. Westview Press, 1993), pp. $5-82; nd “Foreign, Policy Theory andthe New Europe,” in Walter Carsnaes and Steve Smith, eds, Euro ‘pean Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe (London: Sege, 1994), pp. 10-15.80 Steve Smith to skew the discipline toward the policy concerns ofthe U.S., andto ensure that ‘the available theories for studying these concerns are theories that fit the U.S. definition of “proper” social science. This trend is exacerbated by two further ‘considerations: fits, the sheer size of the U.S. IR community compared with those in the rest ofthe world; second, the role of the main (U.S.-based) aca- ‘demic journals both in setting the theoretical agenda and in prestige terms. The result is a global IR community that hes historically followed the lead of the U.S. IR community, which has played the central role in defining what the iscipline is, (5) Ole Wacver, in an excelent paper, argues that there is US. hegemony inIR, and that itis currently centered on the extension of rational choice theory to cxamining questions of international relations. Waever looked a eight lead- {ng journals (foarU.S. and four Buropean) from 1970 to 1995 and found that in the four US. joumals American-based authors constituted 88.1 percent of the tot n the four European journals the picture was much more balanced, shoot 40 percent fr both American based and Buropean based. He notes that in the natural sciences U.S. journals tend to have about 40-50 percent American authors, whereas inthe social sciences itis typically over 80 percent, with the ‘wo highest figures found in two political science journals (American Political Science Review, 97%, and American Journal of Political Science, 96.8%)" ‘Turing tothe content of the journals, Waever looked at two fom the U.S. (International Organization en international Stes Quarter) and two fm Enrope (European Journal of International Relations and Review of Inter- national Studies) to see what kind of IR they published. He code the articles into six categories, tree “rationals,” tw “refletivist,” and one “ther” which mainly inclaged historical or policy articles. Note that one of his reflectvist categories was for “non-postmodem constructivism,” which, a8 I have previ ‘ously argued, isin fact much closer to rationalism than the other reflctivist estegory, and therefore the data somewhat overestimate the figures for reflec: tivst work. Nonetheless, the date revealed a clear contrast. The the rationalist ‘categories accounted for 77.9 percent of articles in International Studies Quar- ‘erly, and 63.9 percent in International Organization, compared with 42.3 per- cent in European Journal of International Relations and only V7.4 percent in Review of Intemational Studies. Te figures forthe two reflestvst categories ‘wet, respectively 7.8 and 25 percent forthe wo American jourals, and 4.4 Ole Waever, “The Sociology ofa Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in Intemational Relations,” Inernational Organization 532 (1998), pp. 687-727. bid, p. 697. The U.S. and IR 81 and 40.6 percent for the two European journals“! The data on postmodern, ‘Marxist and feminist works are, again respectively, 2.6 and 42 percent, 15.4 and 18.8 percent. In my view, these data provide overwhelming support for ‘the claim that the discipline remains a U.S.-dominated one, and also for the assertion that the form of IR that dominates the U.S. IR cemmunity is very specific and is theory that emerges out of the particular relationship among, political science, IR and the wider social sciences, found in that country but in virally no other. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INEQUALITY Jn my view IR remains an American social science both in terms of the policy agenda that U.S. IR exports to the world in the name of relevant theory, and in terms of the dominant (and often implicit) epistemological and methodological assumptions contained in that theory. Ths latter dominance is far more insidi- ‘ous than the former, especially because it is presented in the seemingly neutral language of being “the social science enterprise." The U.S. IR zommunity domn- tes the study of the subject through its sheer size and is wle in producing theory. At present che U.S. IR community adheres to one dominant theory, rationalism, which is engaged in debate with a form of constructivism, Other, reflectivist, approaches receive litle attention in U.S. jours, textbooks or syllabi. That picture is not found in the rest of the wold, where IR is a far ‘more pluralist subject, with no one theoretical approach dominant. In most of the rest of the world, certainly in Europe and Australasia, IR xemains sceptical of the merits of both positivism and the associated belief that there is one. standard to assess the quality of academic work: a much wider range of work is seen as legitimate than in the mainstream U.S. literature, This results in @ far more lively, vital and exciting IR community, one that can offer a varity Of responses to the major problems and features of the contemporary global political system, In the U.S. the central feature is the dominince of rational ism, with an emerging consensus around rational choice theery as a method, and this has the powerful effect of defining what counts as acceptable schol- arship. This consensus is simply not found in the rest of the world, Nonethe- less, IR remains an American social science. As the evidence of Holst, Alker and Biersteker, and Waever shows, the U.S. continues to be Fegemonic in the isciplin, just asthe U.S. is hegemonic in the international political and eco- nomic systems. Waever may be right that the most likely development is for USS. IR to become less dominant as it becomes more fixated o1 rational choice “bid, pp. 699-701. id, . 7272 Steve Smith theory (an approach be claims does not travel well) and as European IR de- ‘velops more powerful national (and Buropean) communities: butat the tura of the millennium Toffmann’s assertions about IR as an American social seience remain accurate ‘What does this mean forthe theme of inequality? There are two main impli cations. The first relates to the simple dominance of the disciple worldwide, by the U.., and the effect of the ontological, but, mainly, the msthodological and epistemological assumptions of the dominant, rationalist tradition, As noted above, the need tobe part ofthe “social science enterprise” is becoming increas- ingly important in the U.S. literature, and is becoming the litmus est for schol- arly enquiry. Note that although [believe the socal science enterprise so narrowly defined to be inappropriate forthe study of international relations, T am not saying that it should not be undertaken. My only claim is that this approach reflects a peculiarly U.S. definition of social science, and to maiatain that it is the standard for measuring whether scholarship is serious, ori the academy, or is legitimate, is itself a political act. Ultimately I want to see a discipline that is Phralist in terms of the approaches that are deemed legitimate. This does not ‘mean that Iam a relativist,nor that I would meekly defer to someone who held a different view: but it does mean that I would not want to use a definition of ‘what constituted “proper social science" to demarcate and police the borderline between legitimate and illegitimate scholarship. My worry, thes, is that the export of the U.S. view of the social science enterprise will lead to inequalities {nthe global discipline of international relation if it becomes seen asthe trans- cultural, tcanshistorical standard of scholarship, ‘The second implication is that the field of knowledge constituted by the US. mainstream has a very specific impact on the kinds of inequalities “seen” bythe dominant theories and methodologies. Put simply, and possibly ‘oo crudely, the mainstream of the U.S. discipline sees political and militay inequalities, but it does not deem other forms of inequality as relevant tothe discipline, Thus sender inequalities are either domestic polities or private or both, and questions ‘of migration, the environment, human rights ané cultural clashes either axe seen, as falling outside the core of the discipline or are features to be studied accord ing to the canon of the social science enterprise, which thereby reconstitutes ‘them as atomistic and extemal, Similarly, the massive economic inequalities in the world are seen as having to do with the discipline of economics, or as falling into the field of domestic politics or development. Yet, to take one gen- eral indicator, the aggregate income in 1960 of the countries wih the richest fifth ofthe world’s population was thirty times as great a the aggregate income ‘of the countries with the poorest fifth. By 1997 this rato had grown to 74:1. AS ‘of the mid-1990s, 358 billionaires held more assets than the combined annual ‘incomes ofthe poorest 45 percent ofthe world’s population. international rela- ‘tions as practiced in the U.S, does not focus on these kinds oF issues. The US. and IR 33 In both these ways I believe that the U.S. discipline of international rela- tions constructs afield of knowledge and the actors within itn such a way as to ‘mask its own involvement inthe einforcement and reconstitution of these prac- tices. Precisely by portraying the discipline as having a core that reflects the ‘world “out there,” and precisely by deeming some methods a: appropriate (and others as inappropriate) to studying that world, intemational relations, U.S.- style, engages in the politics of forgetting its owa role inthe practices of iter- national relations. By objectfying and reifying same aspects ofthe social world the discipline engages in politics, never more so than when itrules out of court some approsches and methodologies as not being “serious soil science." The increasing prominence of rational choice theory in the U.S. international rela- tions community will exacerbate this trend, and thereby limit the possibilities of creating a discipline that can contribute to the understanding of the main patterns of intemational inequality inthe new millennium. CONCLUSION All ofthis takes me back to the events of September 11. These events were not Just an atack onthe dominance ofthe U.S. in word polities, they also represent ‘an attack on many ofthe assumptions, particularly epistemolegieal ones, ofthe ‘mainstream ofthe discipline of inteational relations. [none important sense they brought the use of force back tothe center stage of the discipline an thus Feinforced those who see the world through realist eyes. Bu in a auch moce sigoificant sense, both the atacks and the “war on teroris! that followed implicate the ways in which we teach and study intereational relations. The discipline of ntemational relations has focused on politics asa realm of social sctvity separate from economics, and has tended, in either Weltzin structural realism orrational choice theory, to eat actors as responding oan overarching logie of motivation and logic, founded ultimately on aniversilist assumptions about human nature, Thus, inthe U.S, just as political science generally, and international relations specifically, inereasingly converge on the methodologi- cal consensus around rational choice theory, September 11 shows that there ‘may be more than one logic to anarchy and more to identity than intorest-based theories imply. To the extent that international relations, U.S, style, eats iden- tity as exogenous to interest formation, and as long as it searches for an over- arching explanation of world politics, it risks missing out on the kinds of approaches tha allow us best fo understand (as distinct from explain) events suchas September 11. Uhimatly to comprehend faly the motivations of those ‘who undertook the atiack and of those who celebrated it in rainy non-Westem countries may require revising the assumptions about individual identity that pervade positivistic TR theory.4 Steve Smith September 11 has also shown that there is no one overarching logic of ‘world polities, and certainly no trajectory to history. ust asthe Federal Bureau of lavestigation (BD had no category of trois ofthe profil ofthe nine- teen men who seized the flights on Soptemibec 11,20 the discipline of inter ‘ational relations risks being unable to understand why it was that these relatively ‘iestemzed, relatively mile cas, and relatively educated men chose (ifindeed they all did choose) to be part ofa suicide mission, Their actions didn’ tthe paradigm of which Kinds of people commit verorist acs since they seemed to have bought in to modernization and tothe “Westen” way of lie. Similarly, intornational relations faces significant problems when tcomes to ty and explain the actions of inividuals whose mindsets so different fom the kinds of iden- tities supposedly constructed by interests, “There were many shocks on September 11, not the least of which was the ‘widespread support fr the hijackers in many non-Western parts ofthe work. For many, it was good tht the U.S. was onthe receiving end fora change, and this begs the question of whether many in the U.S. understand, or wish to understand, why the U.S, is so unpopular in many parts of the world. Com- nenlssbout the linkage between the U.S. and Israel do not realy soratch the surface ofthe problem. My worry stat the discipline of international relations as currently practiced inthe United States doesnot assist civil society in com prchending the complexities, and the many forms of life, of contemporary world politics. Thus, although the “war on terrorism” may well satisfy pars of the U.S, public, the danger remains that it will i the long run undermine U.S. interests by creating yet another generation of suicide bombers and terorists, and yet at the same time, a dominant vetsion of U.S. patois has silenced ‘any US. critics of such an approach. This is precisely the kind of occasion “where civil society neds a vibrant and questioning academy, and yet I believe {he overriding logic of U.S. international relations significantly limits the con- twibution thatthe discipline can make tothe debate. This is ultimately because the commitment (0, and valorization of, a specific and narrow definition of ‘what counts as legitimate social science undermines exactly those methodolo- ses and epttemologes that provide the kinds of “think descriptions” neces- sur tounderstand the opposition bot othe US. as the world’s only superpower, and tthe categories and concepts ofthese other cultures. Simply resorting to argoments about an axis of evil (which came as a massive shock tthe Buro- pean leaders who had strongly supported the war in Afghanistan, since there ‘was no evidence linking atleast two ofthe three states cited as forming the axis with the events of September 11) may satisfy some, butts surely not the Kind See Steve Smith, “Unanswered Questions.” in Kon Booth and Tim Dunne, ed, Worlds in Collision (London: Palgrave, 2002), Tortheoming. The US. and IR 8s of analysis that will ultimately construct world order that makes the U.S. ‘more secure, since it threatens to create exactly the kind of reaction that will lead to further rejection of the U.S. in large parts ofthe world Finally, the U.S.'s reaction to September 1] has been, despite a brief flirta- tion with & more multilateral approach to foreign policy, far more uniateral- ist This will severely strain U.S. relations with key allies, with the litmus test being the likely forthcoming U.S. attack on Iraq. I am not arguing for a direct linkage between the way international relations is studied in the U.S. and this ‘move toward an increasingly unilateralist U.S, foreign policy; however, the similarities are significant. In both cases there is one way t> think about the ‘world, with altematives being seen as irrelevant at best and at worst dangerous. Itis not that I wish to sec the U.S. version of social science jetizoned or replaced, bbut [do want to see a more pluralistic and open disci relations, one that does not rule out more anthropological and hermeneutic accounts of the world as illegitimate forms of social enquiry. These approaches are more likely to contribute to an understanding of the events of September 11 than are the theories and modcls of the mainstream of the discipline because they admit that there are different rationalites in diferent eukures and eschew the idea of one logie of human development. Untimately the problem of the hegemonic discourse of U.S. IR is that its ‘underlying commitment to the “social science” enterprise, narrowly and historieally/cultorally defined, makes the mistake of assuming that is “regime ‘of truth is both self-evident and universal. Under that gaze it ses some inequal- ities in the world, but it does not see all, since it defines them as lying outside the purview of the discipline of international relations; they are economic, cal tural, social, religious or private. Under that gzze it sces one logic to anarchy, ‘one pay-off matrix, regardless of identity. Under that gzze it sees one converg- ing world. But under that gaze it omits by definition much of world politics, ‘any competing notions of rationality, and any other regimes of truth, and thus runs the risk of constituting the common sense of tomorrow's U.S. civil society 2 specific, and decidedly political, way, all under the guise of being legiti- ‘mate, neural, value-free social science. “ Steve Smith, “The Bad ofthe Unipolar Moment? September [1 and the Fature of ‘World Ordes" Iniernational Reletions 16, No. ? (2002), forthcoming.