Austrian Philosophy Past and Present

AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY PAST AND PRESENT
BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHll.,OSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Editor
ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University
Editorial Advisory Board
THOMAS F. GLICK, Boston University

ADOLF GRUNBAUM, University of Pittsburgh
SYLVAN S. SCHWEBER, Brandeis University
JOHN J. STACHEL, Boston University
MARX W. WARTOFSKY, Baruch College of
the City University of New York
VOLUME 190
AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY
PAST ANDPRESENT
Essays in H onor of Rudolf H aller
Editedby
KEITH LEHRER
University ofArizona
and
JOHANN CHRISTIAN MAREK
Karl-Franzens-Universităt Graz
SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress
ISBN 978-94-010-6412-5 ISBN 978-94-011-5720-9 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-5720-9
Printed on acid-free paper
AH Rights Reserved
© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1997
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permis sion from the copyright owner.
RUDOLF HALLER
1996
CONTENTS
KEITH LEHRER AND JOHANN CHRISTIAN MAREK /

Introduction ix
BARRY SMITH / The Neurath-Haller Thesis: Austria and the Rise of

Scientific Philosophy 1
J. C. NYlRI / Haller on Wittgenstein on Art 21
DALE JACQUETTE / Haller on Wittgenstein and Kant 29
JAN WOLENSKI / Haller on Wiener Kreis 45
MA TJAZ POTRC / Haller and Brentano' s Empiricism 55
JOHANN CHRISTIAN MAREK / Haller on the First Person 71
THOMAS E. UEBEL / From the Duhem Thesis to the

Neurath Principle 87
JAAKKO HlNTIKKA / The Idea of Phenomenology in Wittgenstein

and Husserl 10 1
LEOPOLD STUBENBERG / Austria vs. Australia: Two Versions

of the Identity TheOIY 125
RICHARD SYLVAN / Issues is Regional Philosophy:

Austrian Philosophy? And its Austral Image? 147
RICHARD SYLVAN / Metaphysics: De-stroyed or

In-De (con) structible 167
JOHANNES L. BRANDL / Thinking and Talking About Oneself 177
CHRISTIAN PILLER / Humeanism and Prudence 189
MARIAN DAVID / Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth 203
ALFRED SCHRAMM / Inductive Knowledge 221
vii
viii CONTENTS
RUDOLF HALLER / An Autobiographical Outline 237
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RUDOLF HALLER 251
Index 269
KEITH LEHRER & JOHANN CHRISTIAN MAREK
INTRODUCTION
This book is about Austrian philosophy leading up to the philosophy of

Rudolf Haller. It emerged from a philosophy conference held at the University
of Arizona by Keith Lehrer with the support of the University of Arizona and
Austrian Cultural Institute. We are grateful to the University of Arizona and the
Austrian Cultural Institute for their support, to Linda Radzik for her editorial
assistance, to Rudolf Haller for his advice and illuminating autobiographical
essay and to Ann Hickman for preparing the camera-ready typescript. The
papers herein are ones preseJ,lted at the conference. The idea that motivated
holding the conference was to clarify the conception of Austrian Philosophy and
the role of Rudolf Haller therein.
Prof Rudolf Haller of Karl-Franzens University of Graz has had a profound
influence on modern philosophy, which, modest man that he is, probably amazes
him. He has made fine contributions to many areas of philosophy, to aesthetics,
to philosophy of language and the theOl)' of knowledge. His seven books and
more than two hundred articles testify to his accomplishments. But there is
something else which he did which was the reason for the conference on Austrian
Philosophy in his honor. He presented us, as Barry Smith explains, with a
unified conception of Austrian Philosophy. We all knew that there were
philosophers fro~ Austria throughout the years who wrote some important
treatises, but before Haller we did not think of there as being a tradition among
those philosophers, unified and continuous enough, rooted within the culture and
at the same time international. In his historical representation of Brentano,
Meinong, the great Vienna Circle of this century, and the enIgmatic figure of
Wittgenstein, we see the unifying character of the emphasis on psychology,
language, science, analysis and empiricism that marks Haller's conception of
Austrian Philosophy. This conception distinguishes it from the tradition of Kant,
Hegel and Heidegger in Germany characterized by metaphysical extravagance.
The conception of Austrian Philosophy Haller has articulated, practiced and
fostered in his students is one we treasure. Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle
had a profound influence on philosophy throughout the world, and, most
profoundly, on philosophy in the United States. As the shadow of Hitler
darkened Europe with tyrannical fascism, the light of Vienna brightened the
world with logical clarity. That is the stoI)' that emerged from the work of Haller
in Graz as the contributions of Brentano, Meinong, and the members of Vienna
Circle were clarified and exhibited. As the scholarly work proceeds at the
ix
x K. LEHRER & J. MAREK
Research Institute and Documentation Center for Austrian Philosophy founded

by Haller in Graz, and as Haller brings the world to Graz and Graz to the world,
we are touched. For he shows us Austrian Philosophy transcending borders,
crossing oceans, and creating a philosophy of analysis, science and empiricism.
This conception of Austrian Philosophy is, as Haller would modestly insist, not
his alone, others contributed to the· conception of it, of course, and not all would
agree with his conception. But there is no better way to celebrate Austrian
Philosophy than to celebrate Haller as we do this occasion.
We now turn to a detailed characterization of the contribution of Haller which
owes a great deal to the suggestions of Heiner Rutte and Werner Sauer to whom
we extend our thanks.
Rudolf Haller's philosophical work is best understood against the
background of the history of philosophy in Austria. Before World War IT,
Austrian philosophy had reached a peak in the work of the Vienna Circle. This
development was suddenly interrupted by the regime of National Socialism and
didn't continue in Austria even after the war with the exception of a few special
individuals, such as Viktor Kraft and Bela Juhos. An eclectic mixture of
Christian, idealistic, existential and holistic thinking dominated the lecture halls.
A younger generation of philosophers, who could not see the point of such
nebulous thinking, turned to analytic philosophy with the aim of reinstating the
tradition of the Vienna Circle in a modified form.
Working on the reevaluation and reinstating of this tradition, Haller
increasingly directed his efforts toward a problem-oriented historical
reconstruction of the various schools of thought pertaining to contemporary
analytic philosophy. By tracing those schools back to their roots, he attempted
to discover shared guiding ideas which were often overshadowed by later
developments. This perspective resulted in the discovery of surprising
similarities between superficially often diverging concerns about ontology,
language criticism, and empiricism, which gave rise to analytic philosophy. In
particular, such similarities could be detected between the schools ofBrentano
and Meinong, on the one hand, and the teachings of Ernst Mach, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, and the Vienna Circle, on the other hand. Haller waS concerned
with abolishing the all too familiar cliches that surround the origin, the leading
personalities, and the doctrines associated with these movements. This led him
to a new perspective on Austrian philosophy which emphasizes its independence
from those movements that dominate Germany and its connections with the
development of analytical philosophical thought in England, the U.S.A., Poland,
and so forth.
Accordingly, Haller attempts to develop a new view concerning the Vienna
Circle. First of all, there is a historical correction. The Vienna Circle did not,
according to Haller, only begin with the arrival of Moritz Schlick or Rudolf
INTRODUCTION xi
Carnap in Vienna,. but already had early roots in a circle of three friends, Otto
Neurath, Hans Hahn, Philipp Frank ('First Vienna Circle'), who, being followers
of Mach, discussed those problems in the philosophy of science that arose in the
context of conventionalism.
Secondly, there is a systematic correction. For Haller, the Vienna Circle is
much more closely connected both with the conventionalism of Henri Poincare
and Pierre Duhem and with pragmatism, and it is much less a positivism of brute
facts and hard data than is usually assumed. This is revealed by the radical ideas
ofNeurath, which met with much agreement, as well as in the work of Carnap
and others. For example, the Vienna Circle itself already anticipated the later
so-called 'anti-empiricist> criticism of the 'orthodox' neo-positivist
epistemology and philosophy of science. Haller demonstrates that holism,
conventionalism, naturalism, pragmatism, and historicism can already be found
in Neurath and others. Haller's thinking is also unorthodox with respect to the
relation between Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. In contrast to the
usual thesis that postulates both a principled disparity between Wittgenstein's
ideas and those of the Vienna Circle as well as an erroneous reception of
Wittgenstein's ideas by the circle, Haller attempts to show those commonalities
that Wittgenstein and the Circle share with respect to verificationism and
physicalism, which is not only true for Schlick and Waismann, but also for
Carnap and Neurath.
It is a general concern of Haller's to excavate the unified empiricist
orientation of a scientific world-picture which underlies the many open clashes
of ideas in the Circle. Haller also noticed that the boundaries between the early
and the late Wittgenstein dissolve quickly, when one studies in detail
Wittgenstein's development during the twenties and thirties. This made him an
early defender of the so-called 'thesis of unity' in the interpretation of
Wittgenstein's work. Haller is concerned to free the picture of the Vienna
Circle, its context and influence, from certain stereotypical images that were
conjured up by alleged anti-positivists, for example, Karl Popper, and in this way
to make the ideas of the 'Neopositivists' or 'Logical Empiricists' relevant for the
current discussion. As part of this softening of the usual perspective, Haller also
pays attention to the various original fringe personalities and outsiders of the
context of the Circle (e.g., Heinrich Gomperz). In this way, Haller tried to revise
the all too familiar cliche laden picture of Ernst Mach, who recently became the
focus of Haller's interest.
Haller pursues another thread of historical revision by bringing the
similarities and commonalities between the doctrines of Franz Brentano, Alexius
Meinong, and their followers, on the one hand, and the doctrines of the
empiricists and nominalists, on the other hand, to our attention. He traces the
empiricist elements in the philosophy of mind and ontology of Brentano and
X11 K. LEHRER & 1. MAREK
Meinong. In this way, he makes an important contribution to an understanding

of the convergence between empiricist and phenomenological (in the broadest
sense) perspectives which arose more recently in analytic philosophy in the
context of a revitalization of genuine ontological questions. Indeed, it is Haller's
accomplishment ( with Roderick Chisholm, Gustav Bergmann, and others) to
have furthered the spreading of the ideas of Brentano and Meinong as well as
some of their students into the current discussions within analytic philosophy
abroad, as he also brought attention to Chisholm's work in German speaking
countries at the same time.
In the context of such widespread historical research, Haller (as did Neurath)
sees the emerging picture of a unified Austrian philosophy with a common
empiricist, language-analytic, and anti-metaphysical character, which shows a
noticeable independence from the essentially idealist oriented German
philosophy.
It is furthermore important to remind the reader of Haller's early
investigations into the history of concepts, for example, the history of the
problem of meaning. His papers on this topic further attest to Haller's
fundamental concern to retrace the historical branching of analytic philosophy.
Like his later papers, those studies show him as an original, unorthodox historian
of analytic philosophy who never loses touch with contemporary problems but,
instead, attempts to bring historical considerations to bear on current
discussions.
Haller's wide ranging and systematic philosophical interests took him far
beyond the history of Austrian philosophy in the past and made him an innovator
in Austrian philosophy of the present The range of his interests is demonstrated
by the variety of topics concerned with conceptual analysis and clarification with
which he is and has been concerned. These include his work on the (1) the
analytic/synthetic dichotomy, questions concerning identity and the problem of
meaning (meaning - use - form of life); (2) relativity of concepts and theories,
as well as questions concerning the progress of knowledge; (3) knowledge and
perception, as well as the discussion concerning an act-oriented (praxeological)
foundationalism; (4) the nature of fictional objects and of aesthetic evaluations;
(5) subjectivity and objectivity, and, finally, questions concerning the I.
One fundamental tenet of Haller is revealed in all of these studies: a skeptical
attitude toward sharp and inflexible dichotomizing, which is often, in both
historical and systematic philosophical research, presupposed as obvious, but
which too often poses obstacles to a useful analysis of the complexity and
variety of actual cases, for example, the historical and substantial problems of
modem empiricism.
This attitude is expressed most strikingly, perhaps, in Haller's attempt to
reconcile empiricism and pragmatism, and in his closely related efforts to
INTRODUCTION xiii
establish what he calls praxeological foundationalism. The epistemological

foundationalism of Haller is indebted to Wittgenstein and finds the justification
of our basic beliefs in their role in practice. The regress of justification is ended,
the circle broken, and dogmatic assumptions avoided by the role of basic beliefs
in action The great Scots, Hume and Reid, adversaries though they were, agreed
that skepticism is blocked in by the demands of everyday activity. What Haller
has added is that those needs of practice contain the solution to the traditional
skeptical problem. Ifyou role up the sleeve of practice in epistemology, you find
that the skeptic has nothing up his sleeve. In his epistemology, Haller exhibits
the connection between empiricism and pragmatism that he finds in Austrian
Philosophy. At the same time, the unification of empiricism and pragmatism
reveals the unification of Austrian Philosophy and American Philosophy. This
unification created a dominant movement in international philosophy past and
present For sake of future philosophers and the cultures in which they live, we
hope this philosophy will dominate into the future as well.
University ofArizona & Karl-Franzens-UniversiUit, Graz

BARRY SMITH
THE NEURATH-HALLER THESIS:

AUSTRIA AND THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY
1. 'THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY'
It will be useful to begin by considering that peculiar creature of the North-

American university which goes by the name of 'Continental philosophy'. There
are many hundreds of courses with this title taught each year in universities
throughout the United States and Canada-a practice that is questionable, to say
the least, given that such courses prove on examination to deal not with
philosophy on the continent 'Of Europe as a whole, but rather with a highly
selective slice of Franco-German philosophy, a slice which sometimes seems
to include Heidegger as its sole fixed point. Around him is gathered a slowly
rotating crew of currently fashionable, primarily French thinkers, each successive
generation of which claims itself the 'end' of philosophy (or of 'man', or of
'reason', of 'the subject', of 'identity') as we know it, and competes with its
predecessors in the wildness of the antics with which it sets out to support such
claims. The later Husser!, Heidegger's teacher, is sometimes taken account of in
courses of this Continental philosophy; not, however, Hussed's own teacher
Brentano, and not, for example, such important twentieth-century German
philosophers as' Ernst Cassirer or Nicolai Hartmann. French philosophers
working in the tradition of Poincare (or Bergson or Gilson) are similarly ignored,
as, of course, are Polish or Scandinavian or Czech philosophers.
What, then, is the moment of unity of this 'Continental philosophy'? What
is it that Heidegger and, say, Derrida or Luce Irigaray have in common which
distinguishes them from phenomenologists such as Reinach or Ingarden or the
famous Daubert? The answer, it seems, is: antipathy to SCience, or more
generally: antipathy to learning, to scholarly and investigative activity, to all the
normal bourgeois purposes of the modem university. This is combined-in the
case, certainly, of all French thinkers accredited as 'Continental
philosophers'-with a substitution of politics for science (the former understood,
again, in a somewhat generalized sense). Philosophy, since Heidegger, who all
but terminated the previously healthy scientific line in phenomenology, becomes
an only lightly disguised form of ideologically motivated social criticism, the
disguise taking the form of styles of writing which-in their heady mixture of
elements derived from near pornography and pseudo-scientific jargonizing
inspired by sociology and psychoanalysis-have to be seen to be believed. l
K. Lehrer and J.C. Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy Past and Present, 1-20.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
2 BARRY SMITH
2. AUST~PHILOSOPHY
Here, however, it is the fate of philosophy in Austria which is our primary

concern, and the first thing which strikes us on turning to this topic is the extent
to which philosophers from Austria have fared so badly as concerns their
admission into the pantheon of 'Continental philosophers'. Why should this be
so? Why, to put the question from the other side, should there be so close an
association in Austria between philosophy and science? Bernard Bolzano, Ernst
Mach, Ludwig Boltzmann, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ludwik Fleck, Vienna Circle,
Karl Popper, Michael Polanyi, Paul Feyerabend, Wolfgang Stegmuller, Rudolf
Haller, is after all an impressive list, however much one might disagree with the
views and platforms of some of the individual figures mentioned.
Before canvassing an answer to this, our principal question, it is necessary to
pornt oui that even in Austria-and even in the innermost thickets of the Vienna
Circle-the strictly scientific orientation was not without admixtures of a
political sort. Indeed when the Vienna Circle manifesto was published in 1929
under the title "Scientific Conception of the World", Moritz Schlick, to whom
the work was dedicated, was dissatisfied with the result precisely because he was
not taken by the conception of the circie as a 'movement' of any sort, favouring
a more modest and more strictly scientific approach. As Heinrich Neider puts it
in his interview with Haller and Rutte of 1977: 'Schlick hated everything that
smacked of agitation, was against it all'. And in Schlick's own words:
It is not necessary for us to agitate: that we can leave to the political parties: in science we
say what we have found, we hope to say the truth; and if it is the truth, then it will win ouf
Or, as Thomas Masaryk expressed it in the words he chose in 1918 as the

State Motto of the new Czechoslovak Republic: the truth shall prevail!
Neurath, on the other hand, someone who would one year later serve in the
central planning office of the erstwhile Bavarian Soviet Republic, propounded
agitation. He, it seems, was a person who
looked at everything-ideas as well as facts-ilirough an often distorting lens of socialist

philosophy and with an eye to the possible effects of the ideas and facts on a socialization
of society. I have never seen a scholar as consistently obsessed with an idea and an ideal as
Neurath. (Menger 1994, p. 60)
For the 'proletarian front', as Neurath puts it, 'military technique and
propaganda-interest coincide with the holding high of science and the
overcoming of metaphysics' .3
THE NEURATH-HALLER THESIS 3
3. TRUTH VS. AGITATION
There is indeed a subtle tension by which the practice of scientific

philosophy in Austria has been marked since its inception in the work of
Bolzano, the tension between science, on the one hand, andpolitics, on the
other; between truth and agitation~r between Schlick and Neurath, as we
might also say-a tension whose subtlety derives from the fact that it is truth
or science on whose behalf such agitation is incited. The tension is present in
the very system of higher education in Austria, under which successive
Ministers of Science (and even, most strikingly in the case of Brentano, the
Emperor himself) have played an important role in appointing-and
disappointing-university professors in their posts. But the tension is present
also, and more importantly for our purposes, in the very talk of 'Austrian
philosophy'-as also in talk of 'Continental' or 'French' or 'Polish' or even
'women's' philosophy-talk which smacks not a little of earlier talk (of
'Aryan' chemistry, and the like) of a sort which should surely be anathema to
those who have embraced the scientific conception of the world and who
believe that it is the truth that we should be striving to find, and that, if it is the
truth, then it will win out.
Some, however, have defended the thesis that Viennese positivism ought to
be viewed precisely in a political light. In particular the Viennese sociologist-
historian Friedrich Stadler has provided a large body of documentation to
support a case along these lines. Stadler suggests that we see the University of
Vienna in the interwar period as split into 'two camps':
on the one side, in the reabn of scientific philosophy, there dominated democratic (enlighten-
ment, liberal, socialist) tendencies; on the other side there was a spectrum of almost all
forms of anti-democratic feeling, from neo-romantic conservatism to fascist-totalitarian
outgrowths. Thus it is tempting to see philosophical life [in interwar VIenna] as part of the
fierce party-political KulJurkampj of the time, between the bourgeois camp and the workers'
movement (Stadler 1979, p. 42).4
A similar thesis is defended by Ayer, who encountered the Vienna Circle on

his honeymoon in Austria in 1932:
The members of the Vienna Circle, with the notable exception of Otto Neurath, were not
greatly interested in politics, but theirs was also a political movement. The war of ideas
which they were waging against the Catholic church had its part in the perennial Viennese
conflict between the socialists and the clerical reaction. (Ayer 1977, p. 129)
And as Dvorak formulates the matter, citing Neurath:

4 BARRY SMITH
In light of the fact that the bourgeoisie-especially in Central Europe-had discharged itself
of all enlightenment traditions and paid homage rather to the cults of irrationalism, while the
proletariat struggled for a rational fonnation of society, the hope certainly prevailed that "It
is precisely the proletariat which will become the carrier of a science without metaphysics".
(1985, p. 142)5
In regard to Austrian society in general between the wars, the 'two camp'
thesis has a certain plausibility. It can on no account, however, be translated
into a thesis according to which the flowering of scientific philosophy in
interwar Vienna might be accounted for by regarding the work of the Schlick
circle as a manifestation of Austrian socialism, or of anti-clericalism, or as a
part of 'a non-capitalist socialization of science, a radical democratization of
science'. 6 Socialist anti-clericalism did not, after all, lead to similar
phenomena in France, or Spain, or Italy. Moreover, the too slavish adherence
to the two camp thesis has led on the part of its adherents to an undervaluation
of the role, discussed at greater length below, of the Brentanists and other
groups far from socialism in preparing the ground for scientific philosophy in
Vienna and elsewhere in the decades preceding the founding of the Vienna
circle. More importantly still, the thesis is not able to cope with the fact that
so few important Austrian philosophers of science, and not even a majority of
the members of the Vienna Circle, were of socialist persuasion. 7 Indeed as far
as the philosophers in interwar Vienna are concerned we must be careful to
distinguish three groups: the left (Neurath and his brother-in-law Hahn), the
right ('Christian socialists', Othmar Spann, et at., otherwise dominant in the
University, especially in the medical and legal faculties), and those of an
English-style liberal persuasion (Schlick, Mises, Popper, Hayek) in between. 8
This third group, as history proved, enjoyed under the then obtaining
circumstances a highly tenuous position. (When, in 1936, Schlick was shot by
a paranoiac former student on the steps to the auditorium of the University of
Vienna, newspapers close to the government saw the incident as a response to
Schlick's 'corrosive' philosophy.) Yet its ideas have shown themselves in the
longer run to be of first importance.
It was Neurath's conspicuous advocacy of crackpot schemes for
'international planning for freedom' associated with the project of an 'economy
in kind' as a substitute for prices and markets which dissuaded Hayek from
making overtures to the Schlick group after his interest had been sparked by
his friend and fellow member of the Ludwig von Mises circle Felix
Kaufmann. 9 As already the case of Schlick himself makes clear, however, it
would be overly simplistic to see the circle in particular or Viennese scientific
philosophy in general as in any sense a part of the Austrian socialist
movement. Certainly it is interesting that Austrian scientific philosophy (and
above all the thought of Mach) exerted some influence upon Austro-Marxists
such as Friedrich Adler. Another Austro-Marxist, Otto Bauer, came to value
the work of the Vienna circle enough to view logical positivism as pointing the
way forward for Marxist materialism itself. But the idea of a two camp theory
which would align all honest, scientifically-minded thinkers in Vienna with
progressivism, positivism and the Viennese socialist city government, and
would have them standing opposed to Catholicism, fascism and other dark
forces, breaks down precisely when confronted with liberal or conservative
intellectuals such as Schlick, Kraft, Waismann, Menger, Kaufmann and even
Wittgenstein.
4. THE LATE FLOWERING OF LffiERALISM
How, then, are we to ~plain the dominance of an analytic, scientific

orientation of philosophy in Austria, and especially in Vienna between the
wars? One answer to this question, due to J. C. Nyfri, might read as follows.
Austria, by the end of the nineteenth century, clearly lagged behind its more
developed Western neighbours in matters of intellect and science. The Empire,
it is often held,lO had witnessed a relatively late process of urbanization,
bringing also a late development of those liberal habits and values which would
seem to be a presupposition of the modem, scientific attitude. It therefore
lacked institutions of scientific research of the sort that had been founded in
Germany since the time of von Humboldt. On the other hand, as more liberal
ways began to be established in Austria-effectively in the second half of the
nineteenth century-the desire to enjoy the trappings of a modem enlightened
culture made itself felt. The Austrians were not of course in a position to
summon forth the means to create reputable institutions and traditions of
science in the narrow sense, and this, as Nyfri puts it, created 'a vacuum
which the theory of a practice so attractively pursued elsewhere could then fill'
(1986, p. 143).
Nyfri's thesis might be held to be illustrated particularly clearly by the case
of Boltzmann, whose lack of funds for serious experimental work seems to
"
have constrained him to tum instead to the (cheaper) field of theoretical
physics, as also to work in philosophy. (A variant of the thesis may be used to
explain the comparative advantage of smaller countries in certain fields not
requiring vast research expenditures-for example of Finland and Hungary in
the field of mathematics.)
The Nyfri account has its problems, however. The liberal, scientific,
enlightenment revolutions in England, France and Holland came before
massive urbanization, which was indeed to no small degree a product of
6 BARRY SMITH
science and liberalism (having been made possible, inter alia, by Pascal's
invention of the omnibus). It will not do, moreover, to provide an explanation
of developments in the intellectual or cultural sphere exclusively by appeal to
underlying social or economic factors. Explanations of this kind have been
found tempting by Marxist thinkers and by other advocates of a broadly
economic approach to human behaviour. Where, however, we are dealing with
complex movements of thought and doctrine, such explanations can be at best
only partial. For they rarely give us the needed insight into the precise
intellectual content of the movements in question. Why should the Austrians'
initial substitute for true scientific development have taken precisely these
(phenomenalist and physicalist) forms, rather than those? What is to account
for the peculiar blend of British empiricism and Russellian logic which
provided the basic framework within which, in their various ways, the
members of the Schlick circle would operate?
Clearly, and for all· the dominance of schools and movements in any
particular case, we must point to the influence of specific individuals if we are
to be in a position to provide satisfactory answers to questions such as these.
And there are a number of candidate individuals who come to mind in this
connection, including Boltzmann (whose vision of a unitary science made itself
felt not only among physicists but also in the wider intellectual community in
Vienna) and Wittgenstein (whose Tractatus exerted a not inconsiderable
influence on both Schlick and Carnap in precisely the formative years of the
Vienna Circle). We may presume, reasonably, that no social or economic
explanation of the genius of Boltzmann or Wittgenstein (or GOdel, or Einstein)
would be forthcoming. Equally we may presume that no social or economic
explanation will be forthcoming of the peculiar longevity of Brentano
(1838-1917) and the members of his wider circle-Marty (1847-1914),
Stumpf (1848-1936), Meinong (1853-1920), Hofler (1853-1922), Husserl
(1859-1931), Ehrenfels (1859-1932), Twardowski (1866-1938)-who did so
much to spread the gospel of scientific philosophy throughout the Empire and
beyond.
5. THE NEURATH THESIS
Even when all of this is granted, however, it would still be insufficient to

look at individuals in abstraction from the wider social and institutional context
in which they worked. This is not only because the individual is shaped by his
surrounding culture. It is also, and more importantly, because his ideas will
be able to take root in this culture only to the extent that they strike a congenial
chord in the thinking of those to whom they are addressed.
More importantly, however, an individual, even an individual of

genius-and even an individual of genius of great longevity-will be able to
exert an influence upon his contemporaries only to the extent that there are
institutions which can facilitate the dissemination of his ideas.
Hence there is a need, in regard to our specific problem of the rise of
scientific philosophy in interwar Vienna, to provide a mixed explanation, one
that makes room both for institutional and economic and sociopolitical factors
of the kind so far considered and also for the serendipitous role of individuals.
A forceful and coherent explanation along exactly these lines has been
provided by Neurath himself, in the section labelled "Prehistory" of the Vienna
circle manifesto.
Vienna, Neurath argues, provided especially fertile soil for the development
of the scientific conception of philosophy because of the growth of liberalism
in Vienna in the second half of the nineteenth century, and of an anti-
metaphysical spirit which stemined from the enlightenment, from empiricism,
utilitarianism and the free trade movement of England. Mach, too, was a
product of this Viennese liberal enlightenment, and the same anti-metaphysical
attitudes manifested themselves in Mach's attempt to 'purify' empirical science
of metaphysical notions:
We recall his critique of absolute space which made him a forerunner of Einstein, his
struggle against the metaphysics of the thing-in-itself and of the concept of substance, and
his investigations of the cortstruction of the concepts of science from ultimate elements,
namely sense data. (Neurath 1929, p. 302 of translation)
The influence of Mach and of his successor Boltzmann, Neurath now argues,
'makes it understandable' why there was in Vienna 'a lively dominant interest
in the epistemological and logical problems that are linked with the foundations
of physics'. Thus Hayek, for example, reports that he and his -contemporaries,
upon arriving in Vienna to take up their studies in the immediate post-war
years, 'found in Mach almost the only arguments against a metaphysical and
mystificatory attitude' such as was manifested by the dominant philosophers
in the University at the time. 11
Neurath mentions further a number of Viennese social thinkers, from both
the Marxist and the non-Marxist camps, who had 'served consciously in the
spirit of the enlightenment' in the late nineteenth century. 12 Thus 'in the sphere
of political economy, too, a rigorously scientific method was cultivated by the
school of marginal utility' which Carl Menger (father of Karl) had founded in
1871.
Neurath mentions in his account of the Viennese prehistory of logical
positivism also the role of Ftanz Brentano. As Neurath himself puts it, the
8 BARRY SMITH
ground was cleared for the endeavours of the Vienna circle in the direction of
a reform of logic and of a concern with problems of foundations also by
Brentano:
As a Catholic priest Brentano had an understanding for scholasticism; he started directly

from the scholastic logic and from Letbniz's endeavours to refonn logic, while leaving aside
Kant and the idealist system-philosophers. Brentano and his students showed time and again
their understanding of men like BoIzano and others who were working toward a rigorous
new foundation oflogic. (Op. cit., p. 302)
Brentano, too, was marked by the Austrian liberalism of the nineteenth

century. Thus for example he played an instrumental role in commissioning
the young Sigmund Freud to translate one of the volumes-a collection of
writings on female emancipation, socialism and Plato-in the Gomperz edition
of the works of Mill. (Freud was himself for a time a devoted admirer of
Brentano's work, though his youthful devotion seems to have been quashed,
for reasons as yet unexplained, on a trip to Manchester during the early period
of his studies in Vienna.) It is remarkable, finally, in support of Neurath's
contention as to the importance of Brentano, to consider the degree to which
the centres of scientific philosophy in Europe-Vienna, Prague, Lemberg,
Graz, Berlin, GOttingen--were precisely those cities in which Brentano's most
distinguished students had held chairs in philosophy from the 1890's onwards.
6. THE NEURATH-HALLER THESIS
Brentano was not only sympathetic to the idea of a rigorously scientific

method in philosophy; he also shared with the British empiricists and with the
Vienna positivists an anti-metaphysical orientation, manifesting an especially
forceful antipathy to the 'mystical paraphilosophy' of the German idealists and
stressing in all his work the unity of scientific method. Brentano' s writings
involve the use of methods of language analysis similar in some respects to
those developed later by philosophers in England. Moreover, he and his
students encouraged teamwork amongst themselves as well as an active
collaboration with logicians, psychologists and the representatives of other
extra-philosophical disciplines.
Rudolf Haller, now, has developed Neurath's account of the rise of
Viennese positivism along the lines set forth above, and transformed it into a
thesis to the effect that these and certain related features-which were shared
in common not only by the Brentanists and the logical positivists but also by
thinkers as diverse as Mach and Wittgenstein--serve to constitute a separate
Austrian line of regiolUll or natiolUll philosophy. Haller's writings on the
history of this 'Austrian philosophy' ,13 have extended and clarified, and even
institutionalized,14 the Neurath doctrine.
But now, if this Neurath-Haller thesis can be accepted, if, in other words,
it can truly be accepted that there exists a separate and internally coherent
tradition of Austrian philosophy, then it follows that the Vienna Circle itself
comes to be linked, via Brentano, to Catholic scholasticism. And one could go
further, and point to the method of communal philosophy-of philosophizing
by means of a sometimes ritualized process of discussion and argument-as
something that is shared, not merely by Brentano and the medieval schoolmen,
but also by Schlick, with his Thursday-evening discussion-circle, and by
Wittgenstein in his cell in Cambridge. 15
7. PROBLEMS WITH THE NEURATH-HALLER THESIS
Haller's own formulation of what I have called the Neurath-Haller thesis

is to be found in his paper "Wittgenstein and Austrian Philosophy":
I wish ... to defend two theses: first, that in the last 100 years there has taken place an
independent development of a specifically Austrian philosophy, opposed to the philosophical
currents of the remainder of the Gennan-speaking world; and secondly that this .development
can sustain a genetic model which permits us to affirm an intrinsic homogeneity of Austrian
philosophy up to the Vienna Circle and its descendants. (1981, p. 92)
The thesis, however superficially convincing, is not without its problems.

Thus, to take just one example, while it seems that the works of Brentano, like
those of Meinong and Hussed, were mentioned in discussions of the Vienna
Circle, in the case of Brentano, at least, these writings were discussed
primarily because Brentanian ethics was chosen by Schlick as a special object
of scorn.
The Neurath-Haller thesis has been attacked, too, by Friedrich Stadler, who
is reluctant to accept the running together of the 'two camps' of Catholic
reaction and progressive socialist neopositivism (of darkness and light) which
the thesis implies. Thus Stadler has pointed out, correctly, that-in contrast to
the picture of the typical Austrian philosopher painted by Neurath and
Haller-the influence of logical positivist ideas, or of scientific philosophy in
general, was in fact rather small, at least as concerns the official life of the
University of Vienna in the period from 1918 to 1938. He has pointed out also
that what predominated in this period, both in lecture courses and in
dissertation topics, was the history of philosophy of a rather old-fashioned sort,
dealing in Kant, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Plato, Nietzsche. 16 The circle around
10 BARRY SMITH
Schlick can be seen from this perspective to have consisted largely of philo-
sophical cranks and dabblers, or of mathematicians, fashioners of "ideal
languages", individuals who would be taken seriously as philosophers only
later, and then initially only outside the borders of Austria itself.
A somewhat different sort of criticism turns on the fact that the suggestion
that there exists a separate line of 'Austrian philosophy' must surely constitute
a sort of insult to the good citizens of Austria. For it amounts to the thesis that
philosophy in Austria is something outside of and apart from the tradition of
German-language philosophy as a whole. The educated Austrian surely wants
to believe, after all, that the intellectual tradition of his motherland is allied
with, is indeed part and parcel of, the great tradition of Kant, Goethe, Fichte,
Lessing, Schiller-of the Land der Dichter WId Denker. To ask young Austrian
philosophers to concentrate their energies on native tributaries in the suggested
fashion-the tributaries of Otto Neurath or Otto Weininger-for reasons of
national pride or loyalty"":"'would surely imply a restriction on their interests as
radical as that which would be involved if young literature students in Canada
or Wales were forbidden to read Chaucer or Shakespeare or Milton.
8. LANGUAGE AND STYLE
The attitude I have in mind, a still widespread attitude of dismissal at the

very idea of a special 'Austrian philosophy', can be illustrated very clearly in
the case of Edmund Husserl, the great German-speaking Jewish-Austrian
philosopher from Habsburg Moravia, whose newly published correspondence
reveals a thinker who conceives himself precisely as the legitimate heir of the
German culture of Lessing, Herder, Schiller and Goethe, and who takes it for
granted that it is the historical mission of the German people 'to light the way
for all other peoples in philosophy'. Husserl, like his teacher Brentano, at no
stage conceives his own philosophy in light of any putative distinction between
'Austrian' and 'German' traditions, and when he refers to 'myoid Austria' he
does so in purely geographical terms. Indeed like Meinong and Frege, Husserl
was from at least around 1910 a self-styled 'National-Deutscher' (though
unlike Meinong and Frege he was not an antisemite). Like almost all German
academics he became caught up in the furore of German nationalism at the
start of the First World War, and he looked forward at its close to the 'longed-
for unification of German-Austria and Germany' . 11
Yet as everyone can testify who is familiar with Husserl's early logical
writings or with the work of Bolzano, Brentano oder Mach, there are radical
differences of style and of mode of philosophizing as between these
Germanophone philosophers standardly associated with Austria and those, such
as Hegel, Heidegger, or Habermas, associated with Germany proper. 18 Most

simply put: the former employ a sober, scientific style, and shun pretentions.
There are also other striking and systematic differences, for example in the
degree to wbich the German, but not the Austrian, line is marked by a sort of
philosophical hagiography. (Thus there are Kant- and Hegel-"breviaries" which
one can buy in German bookshops, alongside similar compilations of gnomic
or uplifting sayings drawn from the writings of Goethe or Lutheror Jacob
Boehme.) There are also the differences adverted to already above-pertaining
to the differential role of science and logic as opposed to that of politics in the
two traditions-differences which serve to explain why it is (certain selected)
German and not Austrian philosophers who have been taken up into the bosom
of 'Continental philosophy' in North America. These are differences which,
as we shall see, are deeply and historically rooted, and they do much to
explain why Germany-in spite of the fact that it has brought forth such giants
of mathematical logic as Frege, Hilbert and Gentzen-has taken so long to
develop a community of analytic philosophers on its home-territory, and why
not a few of those most centrally responsible for this development-above all
Wolfgang Stegmiiller-have hailed from Austria. 19
Haller himself expresses it thus:
as we could easily confinn at every stage, academic geography has played an extensive role
in determining the historical dispersal of ideas. Whilst in Germany it was the influence of
Husserl, and later of Heidegger which grew, and remained dominant right up until the '60s
of this century, neither the remaining Brentano School nor the philosophy of the Vienna
Circle [has] been able to establish a foothold in German universities; empiricism just does
not seem to flourish in every climate. (1981, p. 97)'1tI
9. THE SICK MAN OF EUROPE
Perhaps, then, we should reformulate our initial question as to why

scientific philosophy should have taken root in (Catholic) Austria and ask
instead why such philosophy should have to such a great extent failed to
flourish in (protestant, northern) Germany. And here again we might turn first
to Neurath, who provides an explanation of this failure in religious terms:
Catholics accept a compact body of dogma and place it at the beginning of their reflections,
[thus] they are sometimes able to devote themselves to systematic logical analysis,
unburdened by any metaphysical details .... Once someone in the Catholic camp begins to
have doubts about a dogma, he can free himself with particular ease from the whole set of
dogmas and is then left a very effective logical instrument in his possession. Not so in the
12 BARRY SMITH
Lutheran camp, where ... many philosophers and scholars from all disciplines, while
avoiding a commitment to a clear body of dogma, have retained half-metaphysical or
quarter-metaphysical turns of speech, the last remnants of a theology which has not yet been
completely superseded .... This may explain why the linguistic analysis of unified science
prevailed least in countries where the Lutheran faith had dealt the hardest blows to the
Catholic church, despite the fact that technology and the sciences that go along with it are
highly developed in these countries. (Neurath 1933, p. 277 of translation)
Hence, Neurath claims (somewhat over-optimistically), the 'revolt against the

metaphysical tradition is succeeding outside Lutheran countries in Calvinistic
as well as in Catholic ones' and he notes with pride that there are in Austria
'no such metaphysical autocrats as Heidegger, Rickert or others' (loc. cit.).
Unfortunately for Neurath, however, Heidegger himself was steeped rather
in Catholic than in Lutheran metaphysics as a young man; and as we have
already noted, there are many Catholic countries in other respects comparable
to Austria where logical empiricism and analytic philosophy have failed to take
substantial root, just as there are Lutheran countries (Finland is here the most
striking example), and of course countries of Anglican-Episcopalian
filiation-not mentioned at all by Neurath-which have served as the veritable
bastions of the analytic tradition.
One must clearly look elsewhere; and from this perspective it seems that
features not of religion but of the political history of the Germans (as
contrasted to that of the English or the Austrians) are of particular relevance.
For philosophy has come to play a role in the political consciousness of the
German state in a way that it has not in that of England or Austria. Just as
England has its National Theatre, we might say, so Germany has its own
National Philosophy: Kant, Fichte and Hegel, like Goethe and Schiller, are
national monuments of the German people, whose memory is held sacred not
least because they are seen, retrospectively, as having been involved in
creating that unified national consciousness which made possible Germany
itself as a unified nation state. Philosophers and philoSophical master-texts
have thus acquired a role in the history of Germany that is analogous to the
role of Homer in the history of Greece or of Shakespeare and the Magna Carta
in the History of the English.
The characteristic property of such master texts, now, be they master texts
of a religion, a sect, a people or a culture, is their tendency to spawn a
commentary literature, with all that this implies by way of association with the
commentary literatures on, for example, Aristotle, the Bible, or the writings
of Marx and Engels. 21 It cannot be emphasized too often that German
philosophers have for at least a century been schooled systematically in the
habits of a philosophical culture in which the most important textual models
have that sort of status, and that sort of density and obscurity, which is
associated with the need for commentaries. They grow up further in a

philosophical culture which is sealed off by firm disciplinary boundaries from
the empirical sciences and which places a high value not on consistency and
clarity but rather on 'depth' and 'authenticity'. The work of the
philosopher-as of the poet-is after all an expression of the national spirit (as
Herder, long before Heidegger, and in much the same tone, insisted); hence
also it should not be seen as subject to revision, or to second, more carefully
considered thoughts on the part of its author, nor (a jorriorissimo) to criticism
on the part of others; rather it should be conveyed to the reader as far as
possible in the 'authentic' form in which it was first put down,as a direct
expression of the author's soul or 'spirit'. Consider, in this context, the mind-
deadeningly repetitive stream-of-consciousness rantings of Derrida, who shows
how, in this as in so much else, French philosophy (or more precis~ly: that
part of French philosophy that is dubbed 'Continental'), has become little more
than a parody of its German model. 22 Teamwork and the exercise of mutual
criticism and persistent argument, and indeed the search for any sort of 'truth'
in philosophy, are in French and German C.P.-philosophy simply out of
place. 23
In the wider world, however, it is not classical German idealism, with its
political and historical associations, but rather empirical, or at least
scientifically oriented, philosophy that has for a long time come to constitute
the contemporary mainstream. The latter is, for reasons not altogether
accidental, a philosophy which values logic, argument and technical
competence more highly than those literary, ideological and historical qualities
which are at a 'premium in certain philosophical circles in Germany and
France. Moreover it seems likely to be the case that (whether for good or ill),
as the discipline of philosophy becomes ever more a creature of the modem
university, it will come to be marked to increasing degrees by the factor of
professionalization, so that respect for technical competence and for the
scientific method, and the rejection of hagiography and the use of a
mystificatory style, will come increasingly to characterize the discipline of
philosophy as a whole. 24
The most prominent Austrian philosophers have accordingly, as we might
put it, been speaking prose all along without knowing it. Or to put the point
another way: Haller's institutional account of the rise of regional or national
philosophies in Europe oUght most properly to be seen as applying not to
Austria at all, but rather to Germany (and France), where the political and
literary associations of philosophy have had, from the perspective of the
disciplinary mainstream, serious negative consequences in holding back the
development of philosophy in ways which have become ever more striking in
recent decades.
14 BARRY SMITH
If, now, we return to our question as to how we are to explain the rise of
scientific philosophy inAustrla, then we can see that this question in fact needs
no answer. In Austria, exactly as in Poland and Scandinavia, and exactly as
in England and the rest of the Anglosaxophone world, the rise of scientific
philosophy is an inevitable concomitant of the simple process of
modernization. 2S 'Austrian philosophy', for all its usefulness in combining
togetIier in a single unity the philosophies of Vienna, Graz and Lemberg, of
Bolzanians, Machians and Brentanists, is thus a misnomer to the degree that
it suggests, erroneously, that there is a corresponding sectarian or regional or
ethnic philosophy. For Austrian philosophy is philosophy per se, part and
parcel of the mainstream of world philosophy: it is that part of German-
language philosophy which meets international standards of rigour,
professionalism and specialization. 26
In this respect, to repeat the point, it is Germany, not Austria, which is the
special case, Germany Which is the philosophical sick man of Europe.
Austrian philosophy after the Second World War could of course have very
easily gone either way. It could have become, like German, or Bulgarian,
philosophy, a backwater, shipwrecked on the reef of history (and such was
indeed for a time the fate of philosophy in Vienna). That it did not in this
fashion get stranded on the paraphilosophical fringe; that it did not go the zany
way of French (parisian) philosophy and become reduced to the level of a
mere sect, is due primarily to one individual-an individual, as we all hope, of
great longevity-it is due to Rudolf Haller. In this respect it may be said that
one signal contribution of Rudolf Haller to the philosophy of the twentieth
century has been to ensure that there is no such thing as 'Austrian philosophy' .
10. THE LAW OF CONSERVATION OF SPREAD
In analogy with the physicist's law of conservation of matter (and with

Robert Musil's law of the conservation of happiness), one might venture to
formulate also a law of conservation of the various branches of intellectual
concern which have traditionally, in the West, been grouped together under the
heading 'philosophy'. If one or other of these branches is in one way or
another suppressed, or so we might hazard, then it will somehow find a way
to force itself through in some new, unexpected territory, or in some other,
perhaps bastardized, form. (To paraphrase Bacon on matter and its protean
nature: should we drive it to extremities with the purpose of reducing it to
nothing, then it will, finding itself in these straits, turn and transform itself into
strange shapes, passing from one change to another till it has gone through the
whole circle.2) If Marxist philosophy, broadly conceived, is no longer able to
be taken seriously in the fields of economics or political theory, then it will

rise again in the field of, say, comparative literature (T. Eagleton et al.) or of
linguistic pragmatism (1. Habermas, K.-O. Apel). Something like this, I
suggest, has been the fate of many of the classical philosophical concerns now
customarily dealt with by those pleased to call themselves 'Continental
philosophers', many of whom are of course assembled not in philosophy
departments but in womens studies and 'humanities' centres, in departments
of film studies, and so forth.
But now, one reason for the explosive growth of C.P.-philosophy in these
extra-philosophical environs in recent decades lies in the fact that the
philosophers proper have too often ignored the corresponding issues and areas
of concern, having devoted their primary energies rather to logic and to other,
more technical branches of our discipline. Other. fields of traditional
philosophical concern have in this way been left clear for fools, knaves, and
others, who have rushed hi to fill the vacuum thereby created. Part of the
blame for the excesses of the latter is, accordingly, to be laid squarely at the
door of Carnap and Ryle.
How, now, should those-the contemporary heirs of Schlick and Masaryk,
be they in Providence or Canberra, in Helsinki or Graz-who believe in truth
in philosophy, react to these developments? Should they simply ignore
'Continental philosophy' and the text- and commentary-based traditions of
philosophizing in Germany and France from out of which it grew, in the hope
that they will simply go away? Should they, as is now all too customary, allow
the inhabitants of the C.P.-ghetto of Heideggerians, Derridians and Irigarians
to perform their antics undisturbed, whether in the spirit of pluralistic
tolerance or in that of scornful disdain? To react in this fashion would, I
believe, be a great mistake. This is not, be it noted, because I believe that the
proper reaction to the cynicisms, relativisms and irrationalisms which
predominate in so many corners of our 'postmodern' world would be to form
a new 'movement' charged with agitation on behalf of the scientific world-
conception along the lines promulgated by the 'linker Fliigel' of the Vienna
Circle. For as Schlick, however dimly, saw, the formation of a movement
of 'scientific philosophy'-to be ranked alongside 'women's philosophy',
'Australian regional philosophy', and the like-can only contribute to the
widespread confusion of supposing that there are different sorts of truth:
scientific truth, women's truth, aboriginal truth, Kiwi truth, and so on.
Rather, we should orient ourselves more steadfastly around the idea that it
is the proper business of philosophy to search for truth simpliciter, including
truth in the various fields of the history of philosophy. This, surely, must
imply also a search for truth even in relation to those byways of philosophical
history and of philosophical concern which do not fit well into the customary
16 BARRY SMITH
and rather narrow picture of philosophical history that has been favoured by
analytic philosophers hitherto. It must imply, indeed, a search for truth in the
history of German and even of French philosophy in all its breadth. Here, too,
something like rigour and technical competence is possible, as the best scholars
in the fields of the history of philosophy and of textual scholarship have
demonstrated.
It would be one incidental benefit of the study of the history of philosophy
along these lines that it would help to make clear to philosophers and others
that in former times, too, which is to say in previous dark ages of
philosophical development, generations of philosophers have repeatedly been
wont to declare themselves as constituting the 'end' of philosophy as we know
it and have engaged in competition with their predecessors in the wildness of
the antics with which they set out to support such claims.28 On the other hand,
however, it will become clear also to the student of this catholic history of
philosophy that such dark periods in philosophical history were in each case
succeeded by new and healthier phases, in which truth and reason were once
more, and with renewed vigour, given their due.
State University ofNew York, Buffalo
NOTES
1. Consider the following characteristically pretentious passage, chosen at random from

Derrida's Sp!lrs, in which Derrida seems to be arguing that the concepts of truth and
castration, hitherto commonly held to be distinct, are in fact identical:
The feminine distance abstracts truth from itself in a suspension of the relation with
castration. This relation is suspended much as one might tauten or stretch a canvas, or
a relation, which nevertheless remains-suspended-in indecision. In the epochl. It is
with castration that this relation is suspended, not with the truth of castration-in which
the woman does [not*] believe anyway-and not with the truth inasmuch as it might be
castration. Nor is it the relation with truth-castration that is suspended, for that is
precisely a man's affair. That is the masculine concern, the concern of the male who has
never come of age, who is never sufficiently sceptical or dissimulating. In such an affair
the male, in his credulousness and naivety (which is always sexual, always pretending
even at times to masterful expertise), castrates himself and from the secretion of his act
fashions the snare of truth-castration. (Perhaps at this point one ought to interrogate-and
·unboss"--the metaphorical fullblown sail of truth's declamation, of the castration and
phallocentrism, for example in Lacan's discourse). (1978, pp. 59f.)
*The 'not' is left out by the translator, to no apparent consequence
2. Haller and Rutte 1977, p. 31
3. Neurath 1981, vol. I, p. 355, quoted by Haller 1993, p. 157.
4. We note hereby the regrettable shift from the careful statement in the first sentence of this
passage to the convenient ideological simplification of the second sentence.
5. Compare also the passages from Neurath cited by Wartofsky 1982, pp. 94: 'the fight
against metaphysics and theology meant the destruction of the bourgeois world-order';
'Whoever joins the proletariat can say with justification that he joins love and reason.' 'It is
precisely Marxism that uncovers indirect relations and detours, and thus might ascertain that
cultivating pure logic and the most general problems of mathematics and physics is
especially favorable to revolutionary thinking. ' Such passages are, gratifyingly, absent from
Neurath's writings from about 1933 onwards.
6. Dvorak 1985, p. 134. On pp. 139f. of this work Dvorak puts forward a derivation of the
idea of unified science from the Marxist doctrine of historical materialism.
7. Apart from Neurath and Hahn (the Vorsitzende des Bundes der sozialistischen
Pro!essoren), Frank, Camap and Zi1se1 were strong socialists, and even G5del for some time
wondered if he should support the Communists. Socialists were represented, too, in the
institute of Karl Buhler, for example by Lazarsfeld and lahoda.
8. As Heinrich Neider puts it:
Schlick was a man who had no sympathy at all for politics and the state; he was a liberal
in the old sense, for whom the fire brigade and the police were admitted as at best a
necessary eviL Otherwise one did not need the state at all. (Haller and Rutte 1977, p. 24)
9. Personal communication of Professor Hayek.
10. For another view see Good i984.
11. Hayek continues, 'from Mach one was then led on to Helmholtz, to Poincare and to
similar thinkers, and of course, for those who went into the matter systematically such as my
friend Karl Popper, to all the natural scientists and philosophers of the period' (Hayek 1966,
pp.42f.).
12. Op.cit., p. 303. A comprehensive discussion of this aspect of the development of
positivism in Austria is provided by Stadler 1982.
13. Collected as Haller 1979; see also his 1981, 1986a, 1988, 1993 and the (in many
respects definitive) essay "Zur Historiographie der 5sterreichischen Philosophie" of 1986.
On the 'Neurath-Haller thesis' see also Uebel 1994, p. 632.
14. Through the foundation of the Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum Jilr
osterreichische Phi!osophie in Graz.
15. From various sources we learn that it was the possibility of genuine discussion which
was the reason why Wittgenstein so often felt the need to return to Cambridge.
16. Stadler 1979, p. 43. Compare also Menger 1994, p. 17.
17. Husserl's views in this connection are presented in more detail in Smith 1995.
18. See Smith 1991 and Mulligan 1993.
19. More precisely, in Stegmiiller's case, from the South Tyrol.
20. For a more forceful expression of this point, see Duhem1991, pp. 16ff., 67. One should
of course point out that it is not in every sphere that there is a line of division between what
is 'Austrian' and what is 'German' in the sense at issue here. Even the division between
Austrian and Germany philosophy becomes established only in the second half of the
nineteenth century.
21. See Smith 1991a
22. Thus consider Derrida (in a typically repetitive nonsense-passage) on the theory of
relativity:
The Einsteinian constant is not a constant, not a center. It is the very concept of
variability-it is, fmally, the concept of the game. In other words, it is not the concept
of some thing--of a center from which an observer could master the field-but the very
concept of the game. (1970, p. 267)
23. See Puntel1991.
18 BARRY SMITH
24. This prognosis may be over-optimistic: in American C.P.-circles hagiography is
explicitly embraced, as an element in the contemporary 'critique of the discursive politics
of truth'; see, for a representative sample, Halperin 1995, pp. 6, 15f., 25ff.
25. On this whole issue see my forthcoming papers: "Why Polish Philosophy Does Not
Exist', "The Non-Existence of Scandinavian Philosophy', ·Canadian Philosophy: A
Misnomer", "Against Australasian Regional Philosophy·, etc.
26. Dahms reveals his misunderstanding of the relevance of the last-mentioned feature when
he expresses his regret that the 'academization' which befell the Vienna Circle through the
emigration of its members above all to the United States 'had as a consequence also the
neglect of questions concerning the social circumstances and consequences of science of a
sort which for Neurath, ZiIsel and Frank: had been a matter of course.' (1987, p. 106. See
also Dahms 1985, pp. 25, 354.)
27. ·Proteus", Myth 13; see Bacon 1905, p. 838.
28. See, on this cyclic character of the history of philosophy, Brentano 1968.
REFERENCES
Ayer, Alfred J. 1977 Part ofMy Life, London: Collins.
Bacon, Francis 1905 The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, J. M. Rbberton, ed.,
London: Routledge.
Brentano, Franz 1968 Die vier Phasen der Philosophie, Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
Dahms, Hans-Joachim 1985 ·Versuch einer Charakterisierung des Wiener Kreises", in
Dahms (ed.), 1-29.
Dahms, Hans-Joachim 1985a 'Vertreibung und Emigration des Wiener Kreises zwischen
1931 und 1940", in Dahms (ed.), 307-364.
Dahms, Hans-Joachim 1987 "Die Emigration des Wiener Kreises", in F. Stadler (ed.),
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20 BARRY SMITH
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J.C. NYiru:
HALLER ON WITTGENSTEIN ON ART
Haller's writings on aesthetics and the philosophy of art are less well known
than his work on the history of Austrian philosophy, on Wittgenstein, and on
issues in the philosophy of science and epistemology. Haller himself seldom
refers to them. But there is a telling passage in the preface to his volume Facta
und Ficta where he says that the contrast expressed by this title, the contrast
of factual and fictitious objects, is a mirror in which he sees himself, can
recognize himself. "It reflects", he writes, "the wavering between various
positions of empiricism and the recurrent devoting of oneself to the world of
art." In it, also, the scintillating character of our ability to pursue scientific
research reveals itself: the austerity of rational thinking on the one hand, and
poetic fantasy on the other, the "unlimited freedom of supposing, positing and
feigning possible and impossible objects and states of affairs" . 1 Indeed Haller's
arguments on art and on aesthetics turn out to be the hidden link, the
connecting element, between the fundamental, sometimes apparently
diverging, positions he holds in other domains of philosophy.
Let me recall, by way of some brief descriptions, Haller's main papers on
the topic. Most of them, though not all, are collected in Facta und Ficta. And
in most of them, ~ough not in all, Wittgenstein's name appears. It does not
appear in the two pieces from which the volume's title is derived: in the essay
"Friedlands Sterne oder Facta und Ficta", first published in 1983, and in the
study "Wrrkliche und fiktive Gegenstande", first published in this volume, that
is, in 1986. In "Friedlands Sterne" the argument builds on Meinong's notion
of incomplete objects, objects whose characteristics are given exclusively by
the descriptions which introduce them. Fictitious events and persons are
incomplete objects. What Haller stresses is that fictitious frameworks, too,
ultimately depend on states of affairs that are entirely real. The argument
recurs, in an intricately elaborated form, in "Wirkliche und fiktive Gegensilin-
de".
Wittgenstein is very much present in the essay "Zur Frage: »Was ist ein
Kunstwerk?«", first published in 1959. This is a fascinating piece, Haller must
have been 29 or 30 when he wrote it, studying with Ryle in Oxford, or on his
way there from Graz. The essay has a particularly powerful German style,
reminiscent of the best in Heidegger, and in fact a major reference to
Heidegger's Der Ursprung des Kunstwefkes occurs rather early in the text,
earlier than a reference to Wittgenstein's metaphor "a family of meanings".
21
K. Lehrer and J.e. Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy Past and Present, 21-28.
22 J. C. NYiru:
Actually this is the only time Wittgenstein's name is mentioned in the paper;
the influence of his later theory of meaning, however, is conspicuous from the
very beginning, and indeed one could sum up the argument by saying that
Haller confronts the Heideggerian approach to meaning and essence with the
Wittgensteinian one, demonstrating the superiority of the latter. But calling to
mind Ryle' s earlier sympathetic attitude to Heidegger one should perhaps risk
a different formulation and say, rather, that Haller here to some extent
attempts to 11Ulke use of Heidegger within a Wittgensteinian framework,
displaying a receptivity not just to the givenness of ordinary language, but also
to the superficiality of, the lack of a deeper content in, everyday judgements.
In fuct Haller points out that ordinary linguistic usage might become unhelpful
when, for instance, new kinds of works of art, or new kinds of arts, emerge;
defining the essence of a work of art is not feasible, but-and this is the solu-
tion he proposes-a structured description of the various clusters of works of
art, along with descriptions of particular linguistic usages is both possible and
necessary.
There are some significant references to Wittgenstein in a talk Haller gave
in 1971, the revised text of which now forms the chapter "Das Problem der
Objektivi¥it asthetischer Wertungen" in Facta und Ficta. Haller here quotes,
from the Barrett lectures, the distinction between the expert and the amateur,
and exploits Wittgenstein's notion of aspect-perception. The amateur is blind
to certain aspects of works of art that for the expert represent well-defined
characteristics to which clear-cut criteria can be applied; in this sense expert
judgment is not subjective.
Wittgeristein is not explicitly mentioned in the chapter "Uber die Erfindung
neuer Kiinste", first published in 1980; but I take it that Haller's introductory
question here-"whether the thesis of essentialism holds or does not hold"2-is
not independent of the notion of family resemblances. In this chapter there are
two points I would like to return to later: first, Haller's formula of the "un-
tenable identification of art and knowledge" , die unhaltbare Gleichsetzung von
Kunst und Erkenntnis;3 secondly, his reference to the film as the contemporary
art form having the broadest impact. 4
One of the major studies, perhaps the principal mature study, by Haller on
aesthetics is the chapter "Das Kunstwerk als Gegenstand sup specie
aeternitatis", originally a paper given at Kirchberg in 1983. Here Haller offers
a thorough analysis of Wittgenstein's views. He begins by calling to mind that,
like all objects, works of art, too, can be regarded from various perspectives.
They do not possess inherent aesthetic qualities; rather, they come to have
such qualities by being set in an appropriate, namely aesthetic, perspective. It
is this state of affairs the early Wittgenstein grasped when he said-in the wake
of Spinoza and Schopenhauer, as Haller points out-that a work of art is an
HALLER ON WITTGENSTEIN ON ART 23
object seen sub specie aetemitatis. Now Haller formulates an important thesis
to the effect that the later Wittgenstein did not at all abandon this position; on
the contrary, he rendered it more concrete. For the later Wittgenstein an object
is not actually regarded from the aesthetic point of view unless it is seen in the
context of the entire culture to which it belongs. The volume Vermischte
Bemerkungen-Qr "Culture and Value"-contains many passages where
Wittgenstein provides aesthetic analyses. Haller quotes a number of these, and
finds that they entirely confirm his interpretation of Wittgenstein holding a
"holistic contextualism". Haller traces an influence of Goethe
here-Wittgenstein'sjudgments, he stresses, are guided by the perspectives of
German classicism. S
There are two other papers by Haller I would like to introduce into the
discussion here. First, "Tradition und asthetische Theone bei Ludwig
Wittgenstein" , a talk he gave .in Torwi, in 1982 or 1983 I think-the text was
published in 1987. 6 This is a parallel piece to the paper "Das Kunstwerk als
Gegenstand sup specie aeternitatis", with SOme of the emphases rather
differently placed however. When Haller here comes to interpret
Wittgenstein's aesthetic analyses, he locates a kind of contradiction between
them and the Wittgensteinian view that since expertise with regard to any cul-
ture as a whole is inconceivable, there can be no real expertise pertaining to
works of art either. "[D]ie Bemerkungen in den Vermischten Bemerkungen
sprechen eine andere Sprache", he says7-the remarks in "Culture and Value"
speak a different language.
The last paper I wish to mention in the present context is the crucially
important "Theorien, Fabeln und Parabeln", a chapter in Haller's Urteile und
Ereignisse. A slightly abridged English translation of this chapter had been
published both in the volume Science and Ethics, edited by Haller, and in the
Grazer Philosophische Studien in 1981. Haller has all along stressed that there
obtain significant parallels between fiction in art and theory construction in sci-
ence. But it is in this paper that he offers the most convincing instance of truth
being an essential precondition for aesthetic correctness. The instance is that
of fables, and Haller's felicitous idea is to present his case by reviewing
Lessing's Abhandlungen aber die Fabel-"a theory in which simplicity and
clarity are postulated as the necessary constituents of a successful fable" 8 • Only
a fable that is, as Lessing puts it, surveyable all at once, is able to convey a
moral truth. Elaborating on Lessing Haller points out that although the writers
of fables are free in the invention of their stories, they must "yet take into
consideration that the meaning of expressions should not vary and that the
reference remains fixed. This may only be achieved", Haller underlines, "if
the point of the fable really is made up as an actual example of a general case
or a general principle. It must obtain its confirmation independently of the
24 J. C. NYiRI
fictitious event: ... by facts which are independent of the fictitious story. ,,9
Fables are not theories, sums up Haller, but both must be, in a sense, true; and
both are concerned with the description and completion of incomplete
objects. 10
By extending the notion of incomplete objects to the domains of culture and
society, and by fully exploiting the possibilities this extended notion offers,
Haller, I think, has successfully reconciled two seemingly divergent strands in
his thinking: the Meinongian and the later Wittgensteinian. And his creative re-
construction of Wittgenstein's philosophy of art was, as I have tried to
indicate, an important step in the process of synthesis. However, there is a
major issue touched upon by that reconstruction which I think should be
further elaborated and to which I would now like to return. The issue I have
inmindisWittgenstein's relation to German classicism. And the examination
of this issue I would like to combine with a discussion of two other, only
seemingly irrelevant, pOints, namely the points I singled out earlier: first, the
relation of art to knowledge, and secondly, the significance of film as a new
art form. Both these latter points I will attempt to set in a Wittgensteinian
perspective.
Let me begin with the question of the relation of art to knowledge. Haller,
we have seen, rejects their identification, and surely he is right. We have also
seen that he assembles convincing arguments to the effect that art embodies
knowledge, and surely these arguments are compatible with the view that art
is not identical with knowledge. However, there is a remark by Wittgenstein
which in this connection merits attention. "People nowadays think",
Wittgenstein wrote in 1939/40, "that scientists exist to instruct them, poets,
musicians, etc. to give them pleasure. The idea that these have something to
teach them-that does not occur to them. ,,11
This remark of course carries an obvious historical allusion. Certainly there
was a time when poets were the ones who instructed-think of Homer-and
certainly to some there occurred the idea, not quite so long ago, that that time
must have been a particularly happy one. In the second half of the 18th century
the German thinker Herder wrote: "The best blossoming of youth in language
was the time of the poets: Now sang the CX01.a01. and the pCXWWa01., and
through songs they taught". 12 Now it appears that Wittgenstein was rather
attracted both by Herder's times and by Herder's terminology. In 1929 he
remarked: "Our time is in comparison to the 18th century like an adult in
comparison to a child. Perhaps one is sorry for youth that had been so
beautiful, but one has the age one has & every age in life has a task & and its
pathos & its adequate expression." 13 This remark is unpublished. A related
one, written at about the same time and printed in Vermischte Bemerkungen,
is of course well known. "I often wonder", Wittgenstein here wrote, "whether
my cultural ideal is a new one, i.e. timely [ein zeitgemiifies], or whether it

derives from Schumann's time. It does at least strike me as continuing that
ideal, though not in the way it was actually continued at the time. That is to
say, excluding [unter Aussch1u6] the second half of the Nineteenth Century. ,,14
Goethe and German classicism-there is a revealing reference to Klopstock in
the Barrett lectures-certainly had an impact on Wittgenstein. But the
Herderian flavour in many of his remarks suggests, also, a proximity to
German Romanticism. Now the simultaneous presence of classicist and
romanticist inclinations is of course nothing unusual; I believe however that,
in Wittgenstein's case, it is helpful to lay a stress on the latter. Thus when
Wittgenstein on the one hand maintains that any work of art is always
embedded in a homogeneous culture and in a continuous tradition, and on the
other hand emphasizes the importance of artistic individuality, he formulates
a contradiction very much characteristic of Romanticism. 1S
Romanticism has many facets; I am here focusing on romanticism as a
yeaming for the literary genre called romance. Romances have been so called
because, in the Middle Ages, they were composed in a living Romanesque
tongue instead of being written in Latin. Quite often they were not written
down at all, but entrusted to the memory of the minstrel, the troubadour.
Romanticism is then, in one of its meanings, a preference of the spoken word
as against the culture of literacy. 16 Permit me to quote Herder once more.
"The greatest singer of the Greeks, Homer", he says, "is at the same time the
greatest folk poet. He did not sit down to write, but sang what he had heard,
represented what he had seen and had in its vividness grasped. His rhapsodies
have not remained on bookshelves and on the rags of our paper, but in the ears
and hearts of living singers and listeners, whence they were later collected and
ultimately, overburdened with glosses and prejudices, handed down to us. ,,17
To this facet of Romanticism Wittgenstein must have been particularly
susceptible. I have tried to show in some earlier papers of mine that although
he was an obsessive writer, Wittgenstein had a problematic relation to written
language, especially to written language in its fully developed form: the
printed book. Already in the preface to his WlJnerbuch jllr Volksschulen Witt-
genstein had complained about the distorting effects of typography; and his re-
luctance to publish his writings is of course notorious. Here also come to mind
his poor orthography; his anachronistic predilection for having people read
texts out loud to him; the common observation that his favourite readings he
really knew by heart; the aphorism and the dialogue as conspicuous stylistic
features of his writing; and his inability or unwillingness to put together what
one would call a treatise in the modem sense.
Now a post-literal phenomenon clearly having specific impact on
Wittgenstein wasfilm, both in its silent and in its "talkie" versions-to apply
26 J. C. NYiRI
here the terminology of late twenties. 18 Going to the movies was almost an
addiction with Wittgenstein; and it is striking that he regularly used the film
metaphor to illustrate philosophical points, in particular points where the
relation of the signified to signs belonging to more than one media was at
issue. Thus in the Philosophical Remarks, in a telling passage originally from
a notebook of 193111932: "das gesprochene Wort, was mit den Vorgangen auf
der Leinwand geht, ist ebenso fliehend wie diese Vorgange und nicht das
gleiche wie der Tonstreifen. Der Tonstreifen begleitet nicht das Spiel auf der
l.einwand. .,19 Or in another passage in the Philosophical Remarks: "what I call
a sign must be what is called a sign in grammar; something on the film, not on
the screen" 20. In England the first "talkie" films were shown in 1928, in
Vienna towards the end of 1929. Wittgenstein must have been exposed to new
experiences of language through watching them, as also, earlier, through
watching silent films. One is not left without possible conjectures as to the
nature of those new experiences. Bela Balazs, in his book Der sichtbare
Mensch, published in Vienna in 1924-a book that soon became very in-
fluential-speaking of the silent film makes the following observation: "In film
.. . speaking is a play of facial gestures and immediately visual facial
expression. They who see speaking, will learn things very different from they
who hear the words. ,,21
Balazs also put forward some psychological and philosophical reflections,
reflections Wittgenstein would have found interesting, had he read them-as
I have no reason to believe he did. Thus after noting that it is actually "the
language of gestures" that is the "mother tongue of mankind" , Balazs remarks:
"It is not the same spirit that is expressed now in words, now in gestures ....
For the possibility of expressing ourselves conditions in advance our thoughts
and feelings .... Psychological and logical analyses have proven that our words
are not subsequent representations of our thoughts, but forms which will from
the beginning determine the latter. ,,22 The view that words are mere carriers
of thoughts from person to person Balazs associates with the emergence of
printing; and he observes that as a consequence of printing all forms of com-
munication other than reading and writing have receded into the background.
BaIazs-a friend of Georg Lukacs-was a critic, playwright, and poet, who
also experimented with inventing new fairy tales. And he came to believe that
the film was a kind of modern fairy tale-the folk art, as he put it, of the 20th
century.23 Certainly this was an aspect of film Wittgenstein was fascinated by
too-we know how he preferred the Western, the simple tale, the easily
surveyable fable of good defeating evil. The modern folk tale-made up of
formulaic elements, not confined to writing, its presentation a Gemeinschaft-
constituting event. We are back at the issue of Wittgenstein and Romanticism.
To conclude. I think Haller would find it helpful to associate Wittgenstein
not just with classicism but also with romanticism-when confronted with the
difficulty he registers in "Tradition und asthetische Theorie bei Ludwig
Wittgenstein", 1he difficulty in connection with which I have earlier in my talk
quoted him. If one assumes that, with regard to art, too, more than one soul
resides in Wittgenstein's bosom-zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in seiner
BlUSt-then one might expect that his particular aesthetic evaluations will not
always match his professed over-all approach. Neither will those evaluations
themselves necessarily add up to a single point of view. To attempt an
interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of art by focussing on his concrete
analyses, rather than on his general formulations, would seem to be a possible
venture. And I would be tremendously pleased if my present talk: had done
something to make Haller ponder undertaking such a venture.
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
NOTES
1. Rudolf Haller, Facta und Ficta: Studien zu listhetischen Grundlagenfragen, Stuttgart:
Philipp Reclam jun., 1986, p.5: "der Gegensatz von tatsichlichen und erfundenen
Gegenstlinden ... In diesem Spiegel sehe ich mich, kann man mich erkennen. Er reflektiert
das Schwanken zwischen verschiedenen Positionen des Empirismus und die wiederkehrende
Hinwendung zur Welt der Kunst. In ihm etblickt man auch den Abglanz jener Prinzipien des
Forschens, die unserVermogen, WlSsenschaft zu treiben, voraussetzt: die Sparsamkeit der
Rationalitlit, die dem Gebot der geringen Auswahl von Tatsachen, die einen Satz wahr
machen, folgt, und die poetische Phantasie, die die unbeschrinkte Freiheit des Annehmens,
Setzens und Fingierens von moglichen und unmoglichen Gegenstinden und Sachverhalten
zu erfiillen allein imstande ist .•
2. nob die These des Essentialismus zutrifft oder nicht", op. cit.• p.l25.
3. Ibid., p.127.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p.120.
6. Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici, Filologia Germanska X.
7. Loc. cit., p:93.
8. GPS 12/13 (1981), p.llO.
9. Ibid., p.1l4.
10. Ibid., p.1l7.
11. Culture and Value, p.36e.
12. "Die besteBliithe der lugend in der Sprache war die Zeit der Dichter: jetk sangen die
CXOl~Ol und die pcxt(')~Ol ••• durch Gesinge lehrten sie." ("Uber die neuere Deutsche
Litteratur" [1766-67], Herders Stlmmtliche Werke, ed. Bernhard Suphan, vol.1, Berlin:
1877, pp.153ff.
13. "unser Zeitalter ist im Vergleich dem 18ten lahrhundert wie ein Erwachsener im
Vergleich zu einem Kinde. Vielleicht ist es einem um die schone lugend leid, aber man hat
28 J. C. NYiru:
das Alter das man hat & jedes Lebensalter hat eine Aufgabe & sein Pathos & seinen
adliquaten Ausdruck", MS 107:37.
14. Culture and Value, p.2e. I have slightly changed Winch's translation.
15. On the one hand he writes: "You can say that every composer changed the rules, but the
variation was very slight; not all the rules were changed." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures
and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, p.6.) On the other hand: "Every artist has
been influenced by others and shows traces of that influence in his works; but his
significance for us is nothing but his personality". (CV, p.23e.)
16. "Von romantischen und Liebesliedern giebts eine Menge", says Herder in the
introduction to his collection of folk songs (Herders Werke, ed. Heinrich Kurz, vo1.2,
Leipzig: Verlag des Bibliographischen Instituts, n.d., p.71).
17. "Der groate Slinger der Griechen, Homerus, ist zugleich der graate Volksdichter.... Er
setzte sich nicht ... nieder, ... zu schreiben, sondern sang, was er geharet, stellte dar, was
er gesehen und lebendig erfafit hatte; seine Rhapsodien blieben nicht in Buchlliden und auf
den Lumpen unsres Papiers, sondern im Ohr und im Herzen lebendiger Slinger und Harer,
aus denen sie split gesammlet wurden und zuletzt, iiberhliuft mit Glossen und Vorurtheilen,
zu uns kamen." Ibid., p.65.
18. See e.g Jerzy Toeplitz, Geschichle des Fibns, vo1.2: 1928-1933, Berlin: Henschelverlag,
1985, pp.38ff.
19. Philosophical Remarks, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, p.104: "the spoken
word that goes with the events on the screen is just as fleeting as those events and not the
same as the sound track. The sound track doesn't accompany the scenes on the screen. "
Originally from: MS 113:519.
20. "Was ich Zeichen nenne, mna das sein, was man in der Grammatik Zeichen nennt;
etwas auf dem Film, nicht auf der Leinwand", Philosophical Remarks, p.98.
21. "Auf dem Film ... ist das Sprechen ein Mienenspiel und unmittelbar-visueller
Gesichtsausdruck. Wer das Sprechen siehl, erfiihrt ganz andere Dinge als jener, der die
Worte hart." Bela Balazs, Schriften zum Fibn, voU, Budapest: Akademiai, 1982, p.68.
22. "die GebliFdensprache ist die eigentliche Muttersprache der Menschheit", ibid. p.53;
"es ist nicht derselbe Geist, der sich einmal hier in Worten, ein andermal dort in Geblirden
ausdriickt. ... Denn die Maglichkeit uns auszudriicken, bedingt schon im voraus unsere
Gedanken und Gefiihle .... Psychologische und logische Analysen haben es erwiesen, dafi
unsere Worte nicht nur nachtrligliche Abbilde unserer Gedanken sind, sondern ihre im vor-
hinein bestimmenden Formen", ibid. p.55.
23. Ibid., p.46.
DALEJACQUETTE
HALLER ON WITTGENSTEIN AND KANT
1. AN APPRECIATION OF HALLER'S WITTGENSTEIN
I am an admirer of Rudolf Haller's Questions on Wittgenstein. Haller's

study of the historical influences on Wittgenstein's ideas and the relation
between Wittgenstein's early and later thought provides a much needed
corrective to many of the myths and interpretive inaccuracies that have
surrounded Wittgenstein's work. Haller's detailed knowledge of
Wittgenstein's writings in the context of Anglo-European and especially
Austrian intellectual currents make his examination of the well-chosen topics
in these essays among the most authoritative portraits of Wittgenstein's
philosophy. 1
Central to Haller's understanding of Wittgenstein are two seemingly
unconnected theses. The first is that Wittgenstein, contrary to trends in the
secondary philosophical literature, is not a neo-Kantian. Indeed, separating
Wittgenstein from German idealist traditions is part of Haller's larger theme,
that, despite a shared language, to use William M. Johnston's phrase, the
Austrian mind is fundamentally different in philosophical orientation from the
German. 2 The second thesis in Haller's account of Wittgenstein I wish to
emphasize is that· there is no sharp demarcation between Wittgenstein's early
and later philosophy, or between what Haller characterizes by means of
Roman numerals as the difference between Wittgenstein I and Wittgenstein II.
To a large extent I agree with both of these claims. I think it is neither
accurate nor particularly fruitful to try to fit Wittgenstein's philosophy into the
neo-Kantian framework, not even as an un-self-conscious attempt to elaborate
a new kind of theory within the critical idealist program. Nor do I think that
the differences in Wittgenstein's thought before and after 1929 justify the
attributions of ideological schizophrenia of two completely different
approaches to philosophy which some commentators have proposed. 3
2. THE PROBLEM OF WITTGENSTEIN'S NEO-KANTIANISM
As in most problems of historical interpretation, the controversy about

classifying one philosopher's ideas in terms of another's, as Wittgenstein
himself has taught us to appreciate, is a matter of seeing and seeing-as, of
29
30 DALE JACQUETTE
aspect and selective emphasis. I must therefore begin my examination of

Kantian elements in Wittgenstein's thought by saying that like Haller I am also
in one sense largely uninterested in the question whether Wittgenstein is or is
not .a neo-Kantian. I think that Wittgenstein's philosophy is sufficiently
interesting to stand on its own, without the need of comparison with other
theories. I also think that philosophers and historians of philosophy have better
things to do than fix neat labels to philosophical systems as though they were
etherized butterflies (or perhaps beetles in a box) with a cork and pin. Thus,
I am firmly in Haller's company when he maintains:
If the question is raised as to whether Wittgenstein was a neo-Kantian, then regardless of

how the question is answered, the answer should be motivated neither by reductive intentions
nor by a skeptical intent to relativise the significance of his work. Clearly it is not obvious
why one should integrate the founder of one school of thought-and Wittgenstein was
regarded as such among small circles in the 30s-to some other school of thought (p. 45).
I am not sure what it might mean to say that Wittgenstein is a neo-Kantian.

If an interpretation is specified, I am even more uncertain what could be
gained by deciding the issue in one way or the other. The encyclopedic
post-Kantians, whom I take to include notably Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and
Schopenhauer (though Schopenhauer, significantly, is no more easy to
pidgeon-hole as a neo- or post-Kantian than Wittgenstein), and the so-called
neo-Kantians like Paul Natorp and Wilhelm Windelband, are in "some sense
self-consciously Kant's philosophical successors. Wittgenstein studied Kant
and Schope~uer, but never explicitly categorized his thought as neo-Kantian.
The only intelligible way to address the question of Wittgenstein's Kantianism
or neo-Kantianism is therefore to try to identify aspects of Wittgenstein' s ideas
that share fundamental Kantian insights. 4
With these qualifications, I believe it is worthwhile to examine the two main
phases of Wittgenstein's thought for Kantian and neo-Kantian elements. This
project appears no more intrinsically misguided a method for illuminating
Wittgenstein's thinking than to inquire about the influences of or mere
similarities between Wittgenstein's philosophy and Frege's, Russell's, Hume's,
or any other for whom there exists a presumption of uncovering interesting
historical connections. Wittgenstein's selective kleptomania of certain of
Schopenhauer's concepts, distinctions, striking metaphors, and arguably even
his aphoristic style, has been remarked by many historical and philosophical
scholars. S This, it appears, without pointlessly trying to package
Wittgenstein's ideas as neo-Kantian, opens the door to serious consideration
of the possibility that there may be characteristically neo-Kantian dimensions
to Wittgenstein's thought, and hence of the question of their relative extent and
HALLER ON WITTGENSTEIN AND KANT 31
importance in the early and later periods,in the development ofWittgenstein's

philosophy.
3. ARGUMENTS AGAINST WITTGENSTEIN AS NEO-KANTIAN
I agree with Haller, in what I take to be the principal conclusion of his

argument, that in whatever spirit and for whatever reasons we approach the
question of Wittgenstein's neo-Kantianism or non-neo-Kantianism, an
impartial, historically and philosophically informed evaluation of the primary
texts and the evidence and arguments for connections between Kant or the
neo-Kantians and Wittgenstein in the secondary literature Haller considers,
does not reveal enough similarities or similarities of important enough kinds
to justify classifying Wittgenstein's philosophy in any meaningful sense as
neo-Kantian. Here are some illustrations of Haller's persuasive debunking of
the efforts of some commentators to make Wittgenstein out as a German
idealist.
Against Stanley Cavell's proposal in his essay "The Availability of
Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" to interpret Wittgenstein's grammatical
studies as transcendental deductions in the Philosophical Investigations, Haller
rightly in my opinion marshalls an impressive array of counterevidence
concerning the absence in Wittgenstein's work of anything comparable to
essential components of Kantian transcendental arguments. For Wittgenstein,
Haller notes, there is no explicit equivalent of Kant's table of categories, pure
concepts of the understanding, or synthetic a priori. 6
Similar refutations turn aside P.M.S. Hacker's claims in Insight and
Illusion to see necrKantianism in Wittgenstein's later period. 7 Haller identifies
overriding disanalogies between Kant's transcendental method and
Wittgenstein's grammatical investigations, on the grounds that for Wittgenstein
philosophical grammar is meant only to uncover conditions of the
understanding, and not to determine the truth or falsehood of any
transcendental metaphysical propositions. Some of Wittgenstein's
pronouncements in the Investigations from the standpoint of philosophical
grammar admittedly have the sound of Kantian or neo-Kantian analyticity. As
an example, consider Wittgenstein's remark in §248 that: "The proposition
, Sensations are private' is comparable to: 'One plays patience by oneself. "
Haller nevertheless finds it significant, and I certainly concur, that: "Although
this ... way of speaking of grammatical investigations, which has led us to the
grammatical sentence, appears to be analogous to the analytic investigation,
which results in analytic sentences-sentences which are true in virtue of the
32 DALE JACQUETTE
meanings of the expressions in them-nowhere does Wittgenstein use this

characterisation, which is originally a Kantian one" (p. 51).
Turning to allegations of neo-Kantianism in the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, Haller objects to Hacker's inference from superficial
similarities between Wittgenstein's conception that "All philosophy is 'Critique
of language "' (4.0031), to the Kantian transcendental critique of pure reason.
As Haller observes: "One cannot simply call every non-<iogmatic,
non-sceptical attempt at grounding experience a 'critical' one in the Kantian
sense, because this would render the specifically Kantian point of departure
quite empty" (p. 52). And again: "In Wittgenstein we search in vain for an
attempt to establish the self-activity of reason and to justify maxims of action.
The critique of language is not the critique of reason" (pp. 52-53).
The critique of language is not the critique of reason. Language is an
instrument for the expression alike of reasonable and unreasonable thought.
But neither are language and reason completely unrelated. If the two are not
exactly the same, still, in Wittgenstein's early narrow technical sense of what
is to count as a genuine language, they are importantly similar, because each
defines a limit or boundary outside or beyond which lies nonsense. Thus,
Wittgenstein speaks in recognizably neo-Kantian terms in the 'Preface' to the
Tractatus, when he explains that:
The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather-not to thinking, but to the
expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able
to think both sides of limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be
thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side
of the limit ~ be simply nonsense. 8
Haller explodes the hypothesis that Wittgenstein's early philosophy is

Kantian or neo-Kantian in its logical atomist commitment to simple objects as
counterparts of Kant's thing-in-itself. The differences between these two
conceptions are sufficient for Haller to regard Wittgenstein's ontology of
objects as definitely non-neo-Kantian. He states: "The way in which the
logical-mathematical form of representation of the thing-in-itself is expounded
in neo-Kantianism is entirely different from how it is done by Wittgenstein.
The objects of the Tractatus are not the points of connection of a synthesis, and
the use of signs and of linguistic expressions is not the creation or constitution
of a worldview" (p. 55). The disanalogy is extended as well to Wittgenstein's
later methodology in the Investigations involving description and comparison
of actual language use with imaginable language games. Haller continues:
"That which lies at the basis of a language game is neither a task nor a norm
as it is for the neo-Kantians ... but rather something factual, like a habit" (p.
55). Haller summarizes the differences he regards as sufficient to classify
Wittgenstein's thought as non-neo-Kantian in this epitaph: " .. .it is in making

reason ethical that the greatest distance is created between Wittgenstein's
praxeological foundationalism and the neo-Kantian position" (p. 55). Haller
underscores the non-Kantian, more purely empiricist bent of Wittgenstein's
philosophy, when he remarks:
...what internal reasons are there which tell against a Kantian interpretation? I have in mind,
in the first instance, one consideration: namely, the striking contrast on the one hand
between Kant's idea that the conditions of experience, like their possibility,. are given a
priori, and, on the other hand, Wittgenstein' s adamant empiricist conviction that no
component of experience is a priori. All that we could experience could also have been
otherwise! In other words, and expressed in terms of Kant's criterion of the a priori: there
is only logical, and there is no empirical, necessity. Wittgenstein seems to follow Mauthner,
who replied to the neo-Kantian motto 'back to Kant' with his own: 'back to Hume' (p. 53).
I largely accept Haller's assessment of Wittgenstein's philosophy as

non-neo-Kantian, and his judgment that empiricism predominates over
rationalism and especially critical idealism in Wittgenstein's writings of both
major periods. But I think 1hat the interpretive dangers of linking Wittgenstein
with the neo-Kantian school are just as prevalent in attempts to associate him
too closely with the neo-Humean (as in what I believe to be Kripke' s mistaken
interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument as a variation of
Humean skepticism).9 Kant, we should recall, also claimed to be deeply
influenced by Hume. In the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, he
acknowledges having been awakened by Hume from his rationalist dogmatic
slumbers, and in this spirit, he might equally have chanted 'Back to Hume!' ,
or perhaps 'Forward to Hume!', in criticism of rationalist dogmatism. 10
Although Kant would insist that the form of experience is in one sense
subjectively predetermined, I have no doubt that he would spring to the
defense at least of that part of Wittgenstein' s empiricist thesis that the content
of experience is always logically contingent.
As to whether Wittgenstein in Haller's words regards 'no component of
experience as a priori' , excluding both form and content as nonaprioristic and
logically adventitous, here on the contrary I would say that Wittgenstein too,
at least in the Tractatus, recognizes logically necessary forms imposed upon
the contingent content of experience. I have in mind that experience for the
early Wittgenstein is necessarily of complex states of affairs ultimately
constituted by atomic states of affairs, where these in turn are juxtapositions
of simple objects, the necessary forms of which, as he says in 2.0251, are
space, time, and color. The content of experience is contingent for Kant and
Wittgenstein. But for Wittgenstein as for Kant there is a necessary form which
makes possible the contingent content of empirical experience in any logically
34 DALEJACQUETTE
possible world. This is certainly how I understand Wittgenstein when he

maintains in Tractatus 2.021 that the simple objects are the 'substance' of the
world, in 2.023 and 2.026 that they are the 'fixed form of the world', and in
5.5561 that the totality of objects determines the bounds of empirical reality.
Wittgenstein writes:
2.022 It is clear that however different from the real one an imagined world may
be, it must have something_ form-in common with the real world.
2.023 This fixed form consists of the objects.
This feature of Wittgenstein's early philosophy, while not enough to qualify

his logical atomism as neo-Kantian (in particular, the spatio-temporal-
coloredness forms of experience for Wittgenstein are not explicitly subjective),
nevertheless bears a limited positive analogy to Kant's concept in the
transcendental aesthetic of space and time as pure forms of intuition of the
sensible manifold. 11
4. NEO-KANTIAN ELEMENTS IN WITTGENSTEIN'S EARLY

PHILOSOPHY
Although I do not want to make too much of these similarities, and I do not
want to overlook the kinds of disanalogies Haller correctly highlights (by
virtue of which I agree that Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy is not
neo-Kantian), neither do I want to underestimate the positive analogies at the
expense of seeing interesting connections between Wittgenstein's ideas and
other philosophical traditions, even if these were arrived at largely
independently and without deliberately or unconsciously borrowing from the
past.
There is something even more fascinating and important to be learned when
two disconnected philosophical systems identify similar kinds of problems as
worth addressing, and discover the need for similar kinds of solutions. From
the fact that Wittgenstein is non-neo-Kantian in some ways, it obviously does
not follow that he is not neo-Kantian in others. Without disputing Haller's
judgment that on balance Wittgenstein's philosophy is non-neo-Kantian, I shall
try to enrich and embellish the picture of Wittgenstein' s thought with a greater
appreciation for its impressive complexity, depth, and interrelation with other
historically important philosophical enterprises, by calling attention to some of
the Kantian and neo-Kantian elements in his early philosophy, which I do not
find carried over into the later period. This in turn will provide at least one
HALLER ON WITIGENSTEIN AND KANT 35
important difference between the early and later Wittgenstein, even if again it
is not enough to distinguish sharply in Haller's strong sense between
Wittgensteins I and n.
I want to explore what I regard as a genuinely Kantian or neo-Kantian
aspect ofWittgenstein's thought in the early period between 1912 and 1929,
represented in particular by the semantic theory of the Tractatus, an aspect,
I shall argue, that disappears entirely in the later period of the Investigations
and other posthumous writings. I am speaking of the distinction between sign
and symbol, which Wittgenstein understands respectively as phenomenal and
noumenally hidden aspects of conventional language and language as it is in
itself. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein states:
3.32 The sign is the part of the symbol perceptible by the senses [Das Zeichen
is! das sinnlich Wahmehmhare am ~mbol].
3.321 Two different symbols can therefore have the sign (the written sign or the
sound sign) in common-they then signify in different ways.
The sign-symbol distinction is indispensible for Wittgenstein's philosophical

semantics. The essential step in a complete Tractarian analysis must be the
discernment of symbol from sign in ordinary language expressions. This,
however, like trying to penetrate Kant's phenomena-noumena distinction or
Schopenhauer's veil of Maya to view the thing-in-itself, is, as 'a matter of
representational knowledge, strictly impossible. 12
The inability to take this first step moreover accounts for the fact that no
examples of an analysis of language into truth functions of elementary
sentences and of these to concatenations of names is ever attempted in the
Tractatus. This is not just because, as some commentators have claimed, that
Wittgenstein has not carried out the analysis far or deep enough to have come
upon the names for simple objects. That is one way in which the task of
Tractatarian analysis is incomplete. But in another and I believe more basic
sense the attempt to analyze any conventionally expressed bit of ordinary
discourse along Wittgenstein's principles cannot even get off the ground, if the
very first step of analysis is to begin with a natural language expression, and
attempt to see past its sign-aspect to its symbol-aspect. This is not merely
difficult or time-consuming, nor a project to be accomplished by braver,
smarter, beuer-equipped, or more fortunate souls in the future, but one that is
inherently impossible. If my interpretation is correct, it implies that a
Tractarian analysis of ordinary discourse for theoretical reasons cannot be
successfully completed, no more than it is possible for the Kantian
transcendental aesthetician to behold the naked Ding an sich.
36 DALE JACQUETTE
The problem can be appreciated when we take a sentence· like 'It is

raining', which on Wittgenstein's semantic theory oUght to express a genuine
proposition rather than a nonsensical pseudo-proposition or senseless tautology
or contradiction, and ask what we must first do to uncover the real symbolic
structure that underlies the expression's apparent conventional sign structure.
It is clear that there is nowhere to begin, no hint of how to proceed in stripping
away linguistic convention to see the sentence as it is in itself. If we refer to
this imagined effort as top-down analysis, I think it is clear that the prospects
for starting with 'It is raining' and working down to a conjunction of
elementary sentences describing atomic states of affairs, further reducible to
concatenations of names in one-one referential correspondence with simple
objects, are absolutely hopeless - not so much because in the ontic realm we
do not know what atomic states of affairs or simple objects are, or how to
recognize them, but because in the linguistic realm we cannot get past the
appearance-reality distinction of conventional sign and real symbol. 13
What then is the point of Wittgenstein' s projecting the possibility of analysis?
I think that several important purposes are served by the hidden reductive
analytic structures Wittgenstein maintains must obtain for all genuine
languages in their symbolic aspect. The explanation for Wittgenstein's appeal
to the necessary existence of the mirroring or scaffolding of logical atomism
by language in its symbol-aspect according to the picture theory of meaning
furthermore is easily understandable by analogy with similar claims made in
Kant's trancendental aesthetic. The answer for both philosophers is that theory
demands the existence of entities whose real nature is unknowable.
5. WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT OF ANALYSIS
I find the sign-symbol distinction in the Tractatus unintelligible except as an

application specifically to linguistics (and not as in Kant to experience
generally) of Kant's metaphysics of phenomena and noumena. The top-down
analysis was mentioned before as a procedure in which we are supposed to
begin with expressions in ordinary discourse, and somehow discern the real
symbols that underlie the conventional signs, breaking up truth functional and
concatenation compounds to an articulation of the simplest structures by which
language pictures the world. If we think of analysis as going instead as at least
partially from bottom-to-top, then Wittgenstein's account appears much more
enlightening, and much less pointless and frustrating. 14
Let us begin with Tatsachen, since intuitively we have some grasp of these.
They are the complex states of affairs which we suppose collectively to
constitute the world as a structure of facts in logical space. They presumably
include such mundane facts as that it is raining (at a certain time and place).
These we consider to be composed of copresences of Sachverhalten or atomic
states of affairs. Wittgenstein tells us that the forms of simple objects are
space, time, and color (the latter of which I believe he intends in the broad
Riemannian sense including any phenomenal property), and that Sachverhalten
are juxtapositions of simple objects. 15
The decomposition of fact and language in Wittgenstein's logical atomism
can be understood by analogy with the atomic theory of matter. The physical
theory similarly involves reductions of macrophysical material entities to
complex dynamic arrangements and interactions of molecules and subatomic
particles. The difference of course is that the Tractatus is committed to
something more like Russell's concept of a logical atomism. 16 Three objects
in juxtaposition, one from each of the categories of space, time, and color,
constitute the mutually ontically independent Sachverhalten, one of which we
might caricature as the state of affairs red-here-now. The copresence of
enough of the right kinds of these constitute a Tatsache, such as the fact that
it is raining. The (maximally consistent) copresence of every such existent
complex fact constitutes the world, that Wittgenstein calls' the reality', die
Wirklichkeit.
Now consider the mirroring of this atomic structure in language in its real
symbolic aspect. The juxtapositions of simple objects are pictured by
concatenations of their names in one-one correspondence. This is an
extremely naive notion which Wittgenstein himself later criticizes at enormous
length and with great subtlety and penetration in the many passages devoted to
the problem of naming in the Investigations; nevertheless, it is the official
semantic doctrine of the Tractatus. The concatenations of names constitute
elementary propositions that mirror the juxtapositions of simple objects as
corresponding Sachverhalten, so that elementary propositions picture atomic
states of affairs. The structured copresence of Sachverhalten intuni constitute
complex facts of the sort with which our partial bottom-to-top description of
Tractarian analysis began. Truth functions of the elementary propositions
picture these more ordinary facts, and in particular, since the relation among
atomic facts to be pictured is copresence, nothing more sophisticated than
conjunction is needed. Wittgenstein says in Tractatus 4.0621 that: "the
[negation] sign '~, corresponds to nothing in reality."
When we have arrived at this stage of bottom-to-top analysis, and we have
imagined constructions in the realm of symbols for complex facts or
Tatsachen, we need only make a relatively manageable leap from complex fact
symbols to complex fact signs, by supposing that for our symbol sentences we
are conventionally to substitute the corresponding sign sentences of natural
languages, such as English, German, and the like. From the bottom looking
38 DALE JACQUE'ITE
up, using the resources of a minimalist formal logic, we can get a rough idea
of how things are supposed to work in the realm of symbols, from which
standpoint the assignment of symbol sentences to sign sentences is purely a
~tter of convention. Beginning in the opposite direction with conventional
sign sentences, and trying to work downward through the sign-symbol barrier
to real symbol sentences, and from these to conjunctions of elementary real
s"mbol sentences, and finally to concatenations of real symbol names for
s/imple objects, is not going to get us anywhere.
There are problems and points of interest about the way of thinking about
Tractarian analysis which I have proposed. The whole apparatus in what we
imagine to be the realm of symbols merely substitutes the system of signs by
which names and sentences and concatenations and truth functions of these are
represented. When we use formal symbolic logic, limiting ourselves even to
the simple subpropositional vocabulary of names and concatenation and
sentential variables and ,conjunction which the Tractatus on this interpretation
prescribes, we are only substituting one sign system for the sign system of
whatever natural language we propose to analyze. We have not cut through
the sign-symbol, appearance-reality, or phenomena-noumena distinction to
behold language as it is in itself beyond the veil of Maya. Wittgenstein, in the
context of explaining the sign-symbol distinction, adds:
3.325 In order to avoid these errors [fundamental conceptual confusions (of which
the whole of philosophy is full)], we must employ a symbolism which
excludes them, by not applying the same sign in different symbols and by
.not applying signs in the same way which signify in different ways. A
symbolism, that is to say, which obeys the rules of logical grammar-of
logical syntax.
(TIle logical symbolism of Frege and Russell is such a language, which,
however, does still not exclude all errors.)
Yet by virtue of the simplicity, rigorous definition of formation principles,

basic formal structures, and precision of the conventions governing logical
syntax, we may at least arrive more closely to a true understanding of what
language in its symbol-aspect may be like when we try to understand linguistic
structures in the realm of symbols by means of the minimalist formal symbolic
logic Wittgenstein refers to as a correct logical notation. 17 We are on a higher
rung of the Tractatus ladder than if we were to reason about the nature and
meaning of language as mirroring the world entirely in terms of ordinary
discourse. This I believe is one of the most important senses in which
Wittgenstein regards mathematical logic as a window on metaphysics, at least
for the eye of the imagination. 18
HALLER ON WITIGENSTEIN AND KANT 39
6. WITTGENSTEIN'S TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT FOR THE

NOUMENAL SYMBOL-ASPECT OF LANGUAGE
Wittgenstein's pronouncements about the principles of logical atomism and

picture theory of meaning have the force of a Kantian transcendental
argument. The implicit structure is much the same.
Kant fashions his transcendental arguments by asking what must be true in
order for something given to be possible. In proving the noumenal existence
of the thing-in-itself in the transcendental B-deduction or 'Refutation of
Idealism' in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant begins with the consciousness
of his existence as determined in time as given, and asks what must be true in
order for such experience to be possible. The argument is complicated, but
in the end Kant concludes that there must be something 'outside of
consciousness, the thing-in~itself or as it is in itself independent of his
consciousness of it, by virtue of which it is possible for him to be conscious of
his existence as determined in time. 19 Wittgenstein, in parallel fashion, asks
what must be true in order for the given determinateness of meaning in
language to be possible. He concludes that language on analysis must picture
the world, and that both language and world must be reducible to elementary
facts composed of simples.
Whatever the differences between Kant's critical idealism and the substance
of Wittgenstein's early philosophy, I find this a remarkable positive analogy
between Kant's method of uncovering the absolute transcendental
presuppositions of given phenomena and Wittgenstein's presentation of the
necessary preconditions for the determinateness of meaning in a language.
There is nothing particularly Humean in this theory of meaning. Wittgenstein
not only does not discover reductions of facts to objects empirically in
experience, he does not even try to exhibit such an analysis. He maintains
without inductive evidence that language and the world must be like this in
order for it to be possible for language to have meaning.
As with Kant's thing-in-itself, Wittgenstein's ontic reduction of complex to
atomic facts and atomic facts to juxtapositions of objects mirrored by
isomorphic linguistic reductions of complex to elementary sentences and
elementary sentences to concatenations of names in their symbolic aspect,
transcends experience.20 We cannot do better than offer in formal logic a
maximally perspicuous sign system to represent the relevant structural
relations, which is no more than another particular language in rigorous
phenomenal dress for the imperceivable real symbolic aspect of
language-in-itself or as it is in itself. 21 Again, as in Kant's notion of the
thing-in-itself or noumenal aspect of an object of experience, what is chiefly
40 DALE JACQUETI'E
important about Wittgenstein's language-in-itself or symbolic aspect of

language in ordinary discourse, are the same two things. The first is that we
can correctly judge that it must exist despite being empirically unknowable.
The second, which is the mark of its proof by transcendental argument, is that
its existence plays a vital philosophical explanatory role in accounting for the
possibility of the given (consciousness of our existence as determined in time
for Kant; determinateness of meaning in language for Wittgenstein) by which
its existence is judged necessary. 22
7. WITTGENSTEIN'S NON-NEO-KANTIANISM IN THE

INVESTIGATIONS
The neo-Kantian transcendental elements of the Tractatlls, further exemplified

by Wittgenstein's assertions that logic, the philosophical as opposed to the
psychological subject, and ethics identified with aesthetics are transcendental,
is entirely abandoned in the Investigations. 23 This suggests an important
distinction between the early and later periods ofWittgenstein's philosophy.
The realm of symbols by virtue of which ordinary language, perfectly
logically in order just as it is, has meaning, its picturing the facts that constitute
the world in Wittgenstein's early philosophy, is hidden from us. We never
see, nor is it possible for us to see, language naked as a system of real
symbols, but, even in symbolic logic, only clothed as a system of conventional
signs. Yet in the later philosophy, where he is engaged in basically the same
inquiry of· trying to discover and explain the workings of language,
Wittgenstein remarks time and again that nothing is hidden, nothing
concealed. 24
§435 If it is asked: "How do sentences manage to represent?"-the answer might

be: "Don't you know? You certainly see it, when you use them. For
nothing is concealed."
How do sentences do it?-Don't you know? For nothing is hidden.
But given this answer: "But you know how sentences do it, for nothing is
concealed" one would like to retort "Yes, but it all goes by so quick, and I
should like to see it as it were laid open to view."
For the later Wittgenstein, whether or not he is Wittgenstein n, language does

not function by means of picturing isomorphisms between transcendent
symbols and the facts that constitute the world and the juxtapositions of objects
that constitute atomic facts. The meaning of language is to be explained by
something that is immediately before us and open to view. This, in Haller's
useful term, is the praxeological foundation of language, the forms of life,

habits and activities, with which linguistic activities are inextricably
interconnected as an organic part of a larger mechanism in the family of
language games that can only be described as no less complicated than human
culture, with the old center or Altstadt, modem sectors, suburbs, and slums,
of an ancient city. 2S
I 1hink, therefore, that Haller is quite correct to criticize commentators like
Cavell and Hacker for trying to attribute neo-Kantianism to Wittgenstein in the
Investigations, Philosophical Grammar, and other later writings. If my
interpretation is sound, then Wittgenstein in his later period completely turns
his back on the neo-Kantian transcendentalism or noumenalism of his early
semantic philosophy in the Tractatus. By the same token, my account of the
development of Wittgenstein's thought reinforces both the importance of
certain selected and duly limited Kantian elements in the early period, and
Wittgenstein's rather extraordinary dramatic separation from neo-Kantian
tendencies in the later philosophy. 26
The Pennsylvania State University
NOTES
1. Rudolf Haller, "Was Wrttgenstein a Neo-Kantian?", Questions on Wittgenstein (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1988), pp. 44-56 (all parenthetical page references in my
essay are to this source).
2. William M. Johnston, The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History 1848-1938
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). See Haller, "Wittgenstein and Austrian
Philosophy", Questions, esp. pp. 2, 8-11.
3. Haller, "Philosophy and the Critique of Language: Wittgenstein and Mauthner",
Questions, pp. 64-68.
4. I follow Haller in what I take to be his use of the phrase' neo-Kantianism'. By this I
mean any later system of thought that in however revisionary a way bears sufficient
resemblance to salient features of Kant's critical idealism, and more particularly the
neo-Kantianism ofNatorp, Wmdelband, and others in their circle. For that more particular
group of philosophers associated again in however revisionary a way with Kant's teachings
in the 1860's (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and, more problematically, Schopenhauer), I reserve
as I think is customary the term 'post-Kantian'.
5. G.H. von Wright, Wittgenstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p.
18: "If! remember rightly, Wittgenstein told me that he had read Schopenhauer's Die Well
als Wille und Vorstellung in his youth and that his first philosophy was a Schopenhauerian
epistemological idealism." A.J. Ayer, Wmgenstein (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1985), p. 13: "Wittgenstein was not entirely dismissive of the philosophers of the
past, but his reading of them was markedly eclectic. As a boy he was strongly influenced
by Schopenhauer's principal work The World as Will and Representation, and we shall see
that this influence persists in the Tractatus, though the only philosophers to whom he
42 DALE JACQUETIE
acknowledges a debt in the Tractatus are Frege and Russell. The book contains a passing
reference to Kant and has been thought by some critics to display a Kantian approach, but
there is no evidence that Wittgenstein made any serious study of Kant's writings and his
knowledge of Kant was most probably filtered through Schopenhauer. " Yet Ray Monk in
Witlgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 158, reports that
Wittgenstein read the Critique of Pure Reason with Ludwig Hansel when the two were
prisoners of war in Monte Cassino. Haller is well aware of Wittgenstein's adolescent
attraction to Schopenhauer's peculiar version of neo-Kantianism. See Haller, "Was
Wittgenstein Influenced by Spengler", Questions, p. 74: " ...Wittgenstein's preoccupation
with Schopenhauer-whose work visibly displays the principal themes of Kant's
philosophy-is apparent from his earliest notes onwards." Von Wright disputes the direct
influence of Schopenhauer's literary style on Wittgenstein, which he attributes instead to
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. See his 'Biographical Sketch' , in Norman Malcolm, Ludwig
Witlgenstein: A Memoir, with a Biographical Sketch by Georg Henrik von Wright (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1958). Von Wright writes, pp. 21-22: "It may appear strange that
Schopenhauer, one of the masters of philosophic prose, did not influence Wittgenstein's
style. An author, however, who reminds one, often astonishingly, of Wittgenstein is
Lichtenberg. Wittgenstein esteemed him highly. To what extent, if any, he can be said to
have learned from him I do not know. It is deserving of mention that some of [Georg
Christoph] Lichtenberg's thoughts on philosophic questions show a striking resemblance to
Wittgenstein's." Von Wright, "Georg Lichtenberg als Philosoph", Theoria, 8, 1942, pp.
201-217. See also M.O'C. Drury, "Conversations With Wittgenstein", in Recollections of
Wiltgenstein, edited by Rush Rhees, revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1984), p. 158: "WITTGENSTEIN: My fundamental ideas came to me very early in life.
DRURY: Schopenhauer? WITTGENSTEIN: No; I think I see quite clearly what
Schopenhauer got out of his philosophy-but when I read Schopenhauer I seem to see to the
bottom very easily. He is not deep in the sense that Kant and Berkeley are deep. " See Allan
Janik, "Schopenhauer and the Early Wittgenstein", Philosophical Studies, 15, 1966, pp.
76-95. S. Morris Engel, "Schopenhauer's Impact Upon Wittgenstein", The Journal of the
History oj Philosophy , 7,1969, pp. 285-302.
6. Stanley Cavell, "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy", The Philosophical
Review, 71,1962, pp. 67-93. Newton Garver, This Complicated Form ofLife: Essays on
Witlgenstein (Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), eSpecially pp.
3-72. Haller, "Was Wittgenstein a Neo-Kantian?", pp. 45-52.
7. P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy ofWittgenstein (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1972) (Haller refers without specific page references to this early
edition, rather than the 1986 revised version, in which Hacker tones down his neo-Kantian
attributions to the later Wittgenstein).
8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'Preface', Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, ed. C.K. Ogden
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922), p. 27.
9. Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1982), esp. pp. 62-68. I criticize Kripke's Humean interpretation of the
private language argument in Dale Jacquette, "Wittgenstein on Private Language and Private
Mental Objects", Wzttgenstein Studies, 1, 1994, Article 12 (computer disk format textname:
12-1-94.TXT) (89K) (c. 29 pp.). Related objections are found in Colin McGinn,
Witlgenstein on Meaning: An Interpretation and Evaluation (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984),
and in Gordon P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, Scepticism, Rules and Language (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1984).
10. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will be Able to Come
Forward as Science [1783], trans. Paul Carus, rev. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), p. 5: "I openly confess that my remembering David
Hume was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and
gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction."
11. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason [1787], trans. Nonnan Kemp Smith (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1929), A221B37-B73.
12. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Represemation [1844], trans. E.F.I.
Payne (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969), Vol. I, Appendix, 'Criticism of the
Kantian Philosophy', pp. 417-418: "Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of the
phenomenon from the thing-in-itself, based on the proof that between things and us there
always stands the intellect, and that on this account they cannot be known according to what
they may be in themselves." The veil of Maya is discussed by Schopenhauer in Vol. I, esp.
pp. 8, 17, 253, 378-379; Vol. II, pp. 321, 601. See also Iacquette, "Schopenhauer's
Metaphysics of Appearance and Will in the Philosophy of Art", 'Introduction' to
Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts, ed. Dale Iacquette (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), pp. 1-36.
13. It remains possible despite the sign-symbol distinction and inaccessibility of
supersensible symbols to give superficial sign-sign analyses according to the Tractatus.
Thus, ifwe begin with a sentence like 'It is raining and the wind is blowing' we can analyze
the conjunction into its component conjuncts 'It is raining' and' The wind is blowing'. We
might even be able to analyze these further into, say, 'Molecules of oxygen bonded to
double-bonded hydrogen atoms are descending from the Earth's upper atmosphere' , and the
like. But each of these constructions equally requires deeper analysis to move beyond the
conventionality of signs, and as such gets us not a whit closer to the real supersensible
symbols that represent the atomic facts of the world by on~ne correspondence of names
and simple objects according to Wittgenstein's early picture theory of meaning.
14. Wittgenstein in "Some Remarks on Logical Fonn", Aristotelian Society Supplementary
Volume 9, Knowledge, Experience and Realism, 1929, considers the limitations of a priori
or top-down efforts at analysis from conventional sign systems to transcendent symbol
structures, and concludes that, p. 163: " ... we can only arrive at a correct analysis by, what
might be called, th~ logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i. e., in a certain
sense a posteriori, and not by conjecturing about a priori possibilities." I offer a more
detailed interpretation ofWrttgenstein's Tractatus concept of analysis and his shift away from
his early Kantian transcendentalism through the transition period of1929-1933 to the later
philosophy in Iacquette, Wittgenstein's Thought in Transition (West Lafayette: Purdue
University Press, 1996).
15. Tractatus 2.0251.
16. Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy ofLogical Atomism, ed. David Pears (La Salle: Open
Court Publishing Company, 1985).
17. The concept of a correct logical notation is introduced in Tractatus 5.534. Wittgenstein
refers to 'an adequate notation' in 6.122 and 6.123. See also 3.325.
18. Tractatus 6.124: "The logical propositions describe the scaffolding of the world, or
rather they present it. They' treat' of nothing. They presuppose that names have meaning,
and that elementary propositions have sense. And this is their connexion with the world.
It is clear that it must show something about the world that certain combinations of
symbols-which essentially have a definite character-are tautologies. Herein lies the
decisive point. We said that in the symbols which we use something is arbitrary, something
not. In logic only this expresses: but this means that in logic it is not we who express, by
means of signs, what we want, but in logic the nature of the essentially necessary signs itself
asserts. That is to say, if we know the logical syntax of any sign language, then all the
propositions of logic are already given."
44 DALE JACQUETTE
19. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B275-276. For a more detailed discussion and
bibliography, see Jacquette, "The Uniqueness Problem in Kant's Transcendental Doctrine
of Method", Man and World, 19, 1986, pp. 425-438.
20. This is implied by Wittgenstein's definition of sign as the perceptible part or aspect of
language, by which the symbol part or aspect is excluded from experience as imperceptible.
See Tractatus 3.11 and 3.32.
21. Here it is tempting to compare Wittgenstein's Tractatus concept of transcendent
supersensible symbols under the sign-symbol distinction with Bolzano's concept of the Satz
an sich. See Bernard Bolzano, Theory of Science: Attempt at a Detailed and in the Main
Novel Exposition ofLogic with Constant Attention to Earlier Authors, ed. and trans. Rolf
George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 20-31; 171-180.
22. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Buv-xxvi: "That space and time are only forms of
sensible intuition, and so only conditions of the existence of things as appearances; that,
moreover, we have no concepts of understanding, and consequently no elements for the
knowledge of things, save in so far as intuition can be given corresponding to these
concepts; and that we can therefore have no knowledge of any object as thing in itself, but
only in so far as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance-all this is proved
in the analytical part of the Critique. Thus it does indeed follow that all possible speculative
knowledge of reason is limited to mere objects of experience. But our further contention
must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these objects as things
in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves;
otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without
anything that appears."
23. Tractatus 6.41-6.421; 5.5421; 5.631-5.6331; 5.641. Wittgenstein, Notebooks
1914-1916, ed. G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1969), p. 79 e.
24. See also Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. Anscombe (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1968), §§ 91, 126, 153, 164. A treatment of
some aspects of Wittgenstein's claim in the later philosophy that nothing is hidden is given
by Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: Nothing is Hidden (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
25. Ibid., §1'8: "Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and
squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this
surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform
houses." The philosophical implications of this image are explored in Robert J. Ackerman,
Wl1tgenstein's City (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988).
26. I am grateful to The Pennsylvania State University for research leave in 1993 which
made this project possible.
JAN WOLEN-SKI
HALLER ON WIENER KREIS
This paper is a comment on Rudolf Haller's following remark:
"[...] kein Bild einer philosophischen Richtung unseres Jahrhunderts so verzerrt und verunstaltet
wurde wie jenes der Wiener Kreises. In pausenlosen auf die letzten Endes einflubreichste
Philosophengruppe dieser Epoche wurde ihren Mitgliedem Auffassungen zugeschrieben, die sie
nichtteilten, wurden sie eines Dogmatismus bezichtigt, der ihnen fremd war, und wurden ihnen
Dogmem zugeschreiben, deren Mllglichkeit bereits innerhalb des Kreises bekarnpft war. nl
According to Haller, even some members of the Vienna Circle, for example
Victor Kraft and Herbert Feigl, who wrote historical surveys of this movement,
are guilty for its deformed picture. The most important deformations and
inaccuracies are listed by Haller as follows:
(1) internal differences between philosophers of the Vienna Circle are
neglected;
(2) the dominance ofWittgenstein and Carnap is overestimated;
(3) the difference between the atomistic and holistic approach to scientific
theories, both present in the Vienna Circle, is overlooked;
(4) misinterpretation of the departure of the Vienna Circle from physicalism
and phenomenalism, which was in fact connected with a new approach to
relations between language and science;
(5) the ascription to the Vienna Circle of an inconsistent opinion that, on the
one side, philosophy has no domain, but on the second, that its traditional
version must disappear.
Haller initiated studies, realized by himself and other persons (i.a. Dahms,
Oeser, Rutte, Stadler and Uebel), which aim to correct these weaknesses of the
traditional image of the Vienna Circle? It is not my task to describe in detail
what was achieved by Haller and his followers in their investigation of logical
empiricism However, let me at least note some important insights provided by
these studies:
(1) the real complexity of the Vienna Circle from the sociological point of
view: this movement consisted in fact of many circles (the Schlick-Circle, the
von Mises-Circle, the Menger-Circle, the Gomperz-Circle) mutually overlapping
and interrelated in many unexpected ways;
(2) the importance of the first Vienna Circle;
45
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers,
46 JAN WOLENSKI
(3) the Neurath-Haller thesis: the Vienna Circle was a continuation of the
Austrian type of scientific philosophy as an alternative to German idealism;
(4) a reevaluation of the philosophy of science of the Vienna Circle;
(5) a reevaluation ofWittgenstein's influence on the Vienna Circle;
(6) a reevaluation of the philosophical views of various members of the
Vienna Circle, the well-known, for example Otto Neuratb., as well as the lesser-
known, for example Heinrich Gomperz;
(7) a discovery of connections between the Vienna Circle and the general and
cultural atmosphere in Austro-Hungary and Vienna in particular;
(8) a reevaluation of the relations between the Vienna Circle and other groups
of scientific philosophy.
I agree with Haller that the traditional picture was deformed, although I have
some reservation with the phrase "as no other current of our century". I do so,
because I do not know any measure which could confinn such a contention. I
suspect one could say of any contemporary philosophical movement that it was
essentially deformed because, for example, its internal complexity was neglected
in most presentations of its views. Take, for instance, phenomenology. A
typical account concentrates on Hussed, mentions some other philosophers
(sometimes Scheler, sometimes Conrad-Martius, sometimes Ingarden) and
usually neglects the Munich Circle. Who reports on differences between
Heidegger and Sartre or remembers that Camus formulated a separate form of
atheist existentialism? Who observes differences between Marx and Engels or
Lenin and Lukacs? Of course, I do not suggest that the answer is always:
nobody. However, if we inspect general accounts and even many monographs,
we will see that not many authors go sufficiently deeply into the internal
differences of described philosophical schools or their cultural environment.
Thus, that philosophical ideas are deformed seems to be their natural fate,
particularly when they are interpreted from the outside.
What is surprising in the case of the Vienna Circle is, first, that deformations
were produced by its own members. The second point is perhaps even more
striking. Usually, many deformations from the outside are due to obscurities or
peculiarities oflanguage used by particular philosophers; typically, it is difficult
to enter into peculiar linguistic subtleties from the outside. This forms
interpretative problems and misunderstandings. Probably no philosophical
idiolect is completely transparent and free of its own hermeneutics. However,
on the other hand, particular languages are not al pari with hermeneutical
factors, some are less exotic than others. Take for example Heidegger. In order
to understand his writings one must know first phenomenological as well as his
own use of words and even grammar which gives sense even to das Nichts
nichtet. The situation with the Vienna Circle seems quite different. Though its
members employed technical tenns, their language is not difficult to learn on the
HALLER ON WIENER KREIS 47
basis of natural speech supplemented by words derived from logic, science and
the generally accessible philosophical vocabulary. The logical empiricists not
only recommended clarity in philosophy, but also successfully achieved it. Yet,
some commentators seem to base their remarks on completely different
formulations that those one can very easily fmd in the related writings.
Inductivism is a good example here. A prevailing view is, firstly, that everybody
in the Vienna Circle believed in inductivism, and secondly, that logical
empiricists recommended induction as a reasoning procedure from the particular
to the general as a good logical device for developing and testing scientific
theories. Now, first of all, not every logical positivist was an inductivist. For
instance, Neurath was not. Carnap, who really did accept inductivism, regarded
induction only as a tool of confirming, not developing science. These things
should be completely clear to any reader ofNeurath and Carnap; But they are
not, for example, for Popper, who simply misinterpreted this aspect of logical
empiricism. Another typical misunderstanding concerns the conception of
philosophy offered by the Vienna Circle. As Haller points out, most critics
lament that, according to the Vienna Circle, philosophy does not have its own
domain, but instead, traditional philosophy must come to its end. Yet the Vienna
Circlers called themselves "philosophers" without any hesitation. An open
contradiction: there are people doing philosophy and, at the same time, they
proclaim that philosophy is about nothing. Everybody who knows the
philosophy of the Vienna Circle should immediately reply that this criticism
confuses two things, namely the rejection of traditional philosophy and the
project of philosophy recommended by the Circle as its oWn. I do not argue that
inductivism or the tonception of philosophy proposed by logical empiricism are
correct, I only point out a confusion. The relation of the Vienna Circle to
metaphysics is a particularly good example of misinterpretation. Quite recently,
I participated in a discussion in Poland in which someone said that the
contemporary crisis of metaphysics is partly caused .by the totally
antimetaphysical attitude of the Vienna Circle. In my response, I remarked that
one must distinguish two uses of the word 'metaphysics' in the Vienna Circle:
one refers to the tradition of doing metaphysics, usually wrong on the standards
of logical empiricism, and the second refers to a certain stock of problems
considered by philosophers. Now, the Vienna Circle abandoned metaphysics as
untestable speculation and most of the problems considered in the past. On the
other hand, no philosopher of the Vienna Circle rejected the whole of
metaphysical problems. One can easily point out passages from Schlick and
Carnap in which they tried to show how some traditional questions of
metaphysics could be restated as meaningful and scientifically legitimate. My
opponent reacted: "I do not agree with you, because the Vienna Circle was totally
opposed to metaphysics." The further discussion became pointless. Now, there
48 JAN WOLENSKI
is a question: why do we observe such an insensitivity to the real content of

views which are clearly stated in the commonly accessible sources? Before
offering an answer, let me make a remark in order to prevent some
misunderstandings. I am very far from thinking that logical empiricism is OK
in all respects. Neither do I maintain that only its critics are responsible for
interpretative defonnations of its philosophy. Part of the responsibility must be
ascribed to the Vienna Circle itself. Its members fonnulated their ideas too
radically and aggressively. They changed their views quickly, which could
deceive critics. And of course some of their philosophical productions were
unclear, for example those concerning the status of· the principle of
meaningfulness or the concept of logic. But even the obvious sins of the logical
empiricists in presenting their ideas, as well as several weak or unclear points in
their views, do not explain our encountering so many misinterpretations of this
movement.
My main thesis is that a typical contemporary criticism of the Vienna Circle
is mostly ideological in character. Perhaps Haller's thesis that "kein Bild einer
philosophische Richtung unseres Jahrhunderts so verzerrt und verunstaltet wurde
wie jenes des Wiener Kreises" could be understood in this way: no other
philosophical movement of our century was as defonned for ideological reasons
as the Vienna Circle.
There is not only an antipositivistic fashion. In many circles, "to be against
logical empiricism" is regarded as a necessary condition for being a good
philosopher. This attitude unifies Marxists, existentialists, personalists,
feminists, Thomists, phenomenologists, postmodernists, the Edinburgh School
in the sociology of knowledge, Karl Popper and Paul Feyerabend. Probably,
antipositivism (practically, anti-logical-empiricism or ant-Vienna-Circlism) is
the only factor which is common for this variety of schools and persons. The
strong antipositivistic attitude is usually connected with a diagnosis that
positivism is responsible for everything wrong in society and, fortunately, as the
critics proclaim, it rapidly retreats. 3 Perhaps Popper, with his ambitious claim
that he was the person who killed logical empiricism with his own philosophical
ideas, contributed as nobody else to various myths on the actual Vienna Circle.
Ideology in the historiography of ideas produces internal rules which usually
function unconsciously. They require that philosophical movements described
from the ideological point of view are presented in a radically unifonn and
simple way. Where can we look for such presentations? Certainly not in
textbooks of history of philosophy, except those written from the dogmatic point
of view forced by a particular ideology, for example Marxism or catholicism.
If an author has ten (or even fewer) pages for a particular philosophy, we cannot
expect an adequate picture or interpretation. Thus, we should look for
specialized monographs. I will base my further remarks on Leszek Kolakowski's
book on positivism, published in Poland in 1966, and then translated into
Western languages. 4 Kolakowski himself is a professional historian of
philosophy. He grew in an environment which was sympathetic to the Vienna
Circle; some of his teachers, for example Kotarbinski, were friends of logical
empiricism. He was not especially linrited in space, when he prepared his book.
And he never hid his antipositivistic sympathies. My further remarks are not
intended as a criticism of Kolakowski·for his preferences, but as an attempt to
show how his philosophical ideology generated the picture of logical empiricism
given by him.
Kolakowski constructs a general pattern of positivism. According to his
view, positivism covers: phenomenalism, nominalism, axiological anti-
cognitivism (evaluative and normative utterances have no cognitive value), and
the thesis that science is based on methodological unity. These four ingredients
lead to several prohibitions concerning human knowledge. In particular, all
versions of positivism are against any kind of reflection transferring experience.
Kolakowski says that one could begin the history of European positivistic
thought at any moment. However, he decides to concentrate on the modem
positivism and starts with David Hume. Then, he describes August Comte,
Claude Bernard, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, empiriocriticism (Mach,
Avenarius), conventionalism and logical positivism; Kolakowski also considers
relations between pragmatism and postivism, but pragmatism for him is not a
kind of positivism but rather a result of reinterpretations of positivistic
principles. I will not enter into the accuracy of looking at all the mentioned
philosophies as species of the general positivistic pattern, although some doubts
immediately appear, because, for example not every positivism accepted
axiological anticognitivism. Instead, I will pass directly to Kolakowski's picture
oflogical empiricism.
This picture is outlined in the chapter entitled "Logical empiricism--a
scientific defense of threatened civilization". The chapter is divided into the
following units: 1. The sources oflogical empiricism. How it defines itself; 2.
Ludwig Wittgenstein; 3. Scientific statements and metaphysics; 4. The
"physicalizing" of science; 5. The humanities and the world of values; 6. Logical
empiricism in Poland; 7. Operational methodology; 8. Ideological aspects.
According to Kolakowski, logical positivism accepts the four general
positivistic opinions. Its differentia specijica is marked by the adjective
"logical": this philosophy results from the marriage of mathematical logic with
the traditional positivistic claims. Thus, the rise and development of
mathematical logic became one of the two main sources of logical empiricism.
Wittgenstein and his ideas are mentioned as the second influence. Kolakowski
describes then: the criterion of demarcation between science and metaphysics
and its troubles, physicalism and the project of the unified science, and finally,
50 JAN WOLENSKI
views of the Vienna Circle on the humanities, values and the social sciences.
The section on logical empiricism in Poland is self-explanatory in the case of a
Polish author, and that on Bridgman is probably motivated by an opinion, quite
popular in Poland, that operationism was an American version of logical
empiricism (I leave this question without further comment). The chapter on
logical empiricism runs thirty pages, longer than any other in the book. It is
interesting how long particular sections in this chapter are. There are six pages
on sources, four on Wittgenstein, four on Poland and operationalism, nine on
ideological aspects. Thus, seven pages remain for the views. These proportions
are not accidental. The unit on the ideological aspects of the Vienna Circle and
its philosophy is not only the longest one, but also seems the most important for
Kolakowski. His conclusion is this:
Logical empiricism, then, is the product of a specific culture, one in which technological efficiency
is regarded as the highest vatue, the culture we usually call "technocratic." It is a technocratic
ideology in the mystifying guise of an anti-ideological, scientific view of the world, purged of value
judgements.s
It is remarkable that when Kolakowski speaks about the concrete views of the
Vienna Circle, his report is competent. Although one could point out various
inaccuracies, for example in his treatment of the criterion of demarcation, there
are certainly much worse descriptions. However, it is rather doubtless that the
presentation of the concrete views of the Vienna Circle is a secondary matter for
Kolakowski. His basic aim is to show that logical empiricism is "a technocratic
ideology in.the mystifying guise of an anti-ideological [... ] view."
The results of such a perspective are straightforward. It is not important how
logical empiricism was rooted in the history of Austrian philosophy. From this
perspective, it is not interesting that Brentano is mentioned in Wissenschaftliche
Weltaufassung, that the Vienna Circle proper was preceded by the first Vienna
Circle, that both circles were closely related to the cultural atmosphere in Vienna,
that Carnap studied with Frege and Hussed, that neokantianism strongly
influenced the early Carnap and the early Reichenbach, that two radically
different conceptions of protocol sentences, realistic and phenomenalistic, were
explicitly voiced in the Vienna Circle, that various conceptions of science arose
there, and so on. Also Kolakowski's glasses do not admit that the criticism of
traditional philosophy by the logical empiricists was authentic and not
ideological, no matter whether it was acceptable or not. Kolakowski writes:
Camap made a detailed analysis ofHeidegger's statement. "Nothing nihilates," in order to show
that it is purely verbal, devoid of empirical meaning. (Incidentally, it is the only sentence from
existentialist philosophy the majority of contemporary positivists appear familiar with.) Indeed,
most representatives of this school are much stronger on logical studies than on historical studies;
they have a low opinion of the results of previous philosophical thinking. 6
The judgements passed by positivists on the philosophical systems of the past

as well as on contemporary metaphysical speculation usually have the character
of summary condemnations; they are not based on study of the condemned
doctrines, but on ridiculing statements tom out of the context. 7
This, generally quite far from the truth, evaluation serves as a way of
justifying the antipositivistic ideology. None of the antipositivists try to show
that Camap was not right when he rejected das Nichts nichtet as a meaningless
utterance. Instead, they categorically assert in advance that Camap was
historically undereducated and unfair to Heidegger. Perhaps this persuasive
reaction to Camap's criticism is the most clear sign that Kolakowski's treatment
of the Vienna Circle is really ideological. As we can see, it contains all the
defects pointed out by Haller. .
However, one can ask whether it is possible to free the history of
philosophical ideas of any evaluative preferences. The answer must be: no, we
always deal with philosophical movements through glasses of more or less fixed
sympathies and antipathies. As far as the matter concerns sympathies, the
Vienna Circle is welcomed by friends of logic, analysis, scientific philosophy,
clarity, or simply those people who are proud of Austria and its culture. It is not
strange that images generated by various competing ideologies differ, because
they have to. Such controversies are rather inevitable. Yet, there is, I think, an
important difference between the results of positive and negative ideological
filtrations in the history of philosophy. The positive attitudes, I believe,
contribute to descriptions which are comprehensive rather than simplified and
are more directed toward the inner complexity of the reviewed doctrines than to
their uniformity. This explains why the monographic accounts of a given
philosophical school produced by its friends are basically more reliable than
those written by its enemies. The friends are normally not only more competent
in the subject, but also they are less inclined to exaggerations than the enemies.
In order to see the point, one can compare Kolakowski's The Alienation of
Reason with Haller's Neupositivismus. 8 Haller tells us much more, and the
reason is not that his book exclusively concerns logical empiricism, while
Kolakowski's has only one chapter on this branch of positivism, but because the
latter is limited in advance by a blinding ideology.
Disregarding the matter of ideology as a guide for the history of philosophy,
there are two patterns for dealing with this subject. Let me illustrate the point
by concrete examples. Assume that one is interested in the history of
transcendentalia. He or she can look at GUnther Schulemann's book on this
52 IAN WOLENSKI
subject.9 It discusses the Presocratics, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, St.
Augustine, Boethius, the Early Schoolmen, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas,
Duns Scotus, Pertrus Joannis Olivi, Suarez, Modem Philosophy and the New
Scholasticism. This is a very valuable book which provides a lot of information.
However, people who are not interested in details will probably complain that
this book does not outline the historical development of the theory of
transcendentalia. In fact, Schulemann's book is a typical and perfect case of the
idiographic history of philosophy. The complaints about doing the historical job
in this way are well know. The critics point out that such treatment is entirely
restricted to the so called "first-life" of ideas, and they neglect the second life,
namely the reception and influence of the described doctrines. In the case of the
general history of science, the opposite pattern was proposed by Imre Lakatos.
He says:
Thus in cons1ructing internal history the historian will be highly selective: he will omit everything
1hat is irrational in the light of his rationality theory. But this normative selection still does not add
up to a full-fledged rational reconstruction. For instance, Prout never articulated the "Proutian
programme": the Proutian programme is not Prout's programme. It is not only the (internal?
success or the (internal? defeat of a programme which can be judged with hindsight: it is
frequently also its content Internal history is not just a selection of methodologically interpreted
facts, it may be, on occasion, their radically improved version. 10
Leaving aside Lakatos' idea of the internal history of science as well as its
contrast with the external one, I would like only to note that for Lakatos external
history of science, that is, connections of scientific ideas with their cultural and
social environment, should be moved to footnotes. Perhaps the sentence "[... ]
Prout never articulated the 'Proutian programme': the Proutian programme is not
Prout's programme" is crucial for the proper interpretation of Lakatos' vision of
how the history of science should be done. Now it is clear that the internal
history happens in the Popperian third world, in the heaven without any
epistemological subject and populated by "improved versions offacts". I think
that this way of doing the history of ideas is unacceptable for everybody who
takes the word 'history' seriously. Personally, I must confess that I decisively
prefer the traditional "naive" history over its rational alternative. It is obvious
that Kolakowski's treatment of the Vienna Circle perfectly fulfills Lakatos'
advice. In fact, Kolakowski "improves" the history of positivism and he really
offers "a selection of methodologically interpreted facts". The mystery of this
approach is simply this: improved in Kolakowski's-Lakatos' sense usually does
not mean "correct from the historical point of view" . For this reason, improved
should be inserted into quotes, because "truly improved" is reminiscent of "true
freedom".
But what does it mean to say "correct from the historical point of view". If
we say that the old idiographic pattern does not satisfy what we expect from the
history of ideas and that rational reconstruction leads rather to a speculative
history than to history proper, we automatically recommend a compromise
between both extreme positions. Unfortunately, although it is easy to formulate
a claim that a compromise is needed, it is difficult to say what it should look like.
Fortunately, we have particular cases of a reasonable history of ideas. I think
that Haller's work is very remarkable in this regard. He gives not only a very
detailed description of views, but he also shows how they arose and developed,
not in the third world, but in concrete circumstances. This history improves not
facts, but our knowledge of facts. Of course, there are open and controversial
problems. Is Haller right in his treatment of Wittgenstein's influence on the
Vienna Circle? I am inclined to think that he is when he says that the early
Wittgenstein was a positivist in many respects. But I also understand the
reasons of those people who think an antipositivistic interpretation of
Wittgenstein is correct. Even if this debate is undecidable in principle, we can
still expect progress from new sources. One discovery that a philosopher
crossed a line with pencil or inserted a word in a margin says much more than
long deliberations on the successes and failures of research projects in the world
of methodologically selected and improved facts. This is perhaps the main
lesson derivable from Haller's historical studies.
Jagiellonian University
NOTES
1. R. Haller, "Ansichten und Deutungen des Physikalismus", in WlSsenschqft und

Subjecktivillil Science and Subjectivity Der Wiener Kreis und die Philosophie des 20.
Jahrhunderts The Vienna Circle and Twentieth Century Philosophy, hrs. von David Bell und
Wllhelm Vossenkuhl, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1992, p. 225/226.
2. Consult e.g. the papers in Philosophie, Wissenschqft, Aujkliirung. Beitrllge zur
Geschichte und Wirkung des Wiener Kreises, her. von Hans-Joachim Dahms, de Gruyter,
Berlin 1985, Jour Fixe der Vernuft. Der Wiener Kreis und die Folgen, hrs. von Paul
Kruntorad unter Mitwirkung von Rudolf Haller und Willy Hochkeppel, Verlag HOider-
Pichler-Tempsky, Wien 1991, and Wien-Berlin-Prag. Der Atifstieg der wissenschqftlichen
Philosophie, hrs. von Rudolf Haller und Friedrich Stadler, Verlag Holder-Pichler-Tempsky,
Wien 1993.
3. Recently, this diagnosis was fonnulated by Iohn Paul II in his long interview for Vittorio
Messori.
4. L. Kolakowski, Filozojia poz:ytywistyczna (Od Hume'a do Kola WiedeIiskiego)
(positivistic Philosophy (From Hume to the Vienna Circle), PWN, Warszawa 1966; Eng.
tr. as The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivistic Truth, tr. by N. Guterman,
54 JAN WOLEN-SKI
Doubleday and Company, Garden City 1968; Ger. tr. as Die Philosophie des Posilivismus,
R. Piper Verlag, Miinchen 1971.
S. ibidem, p. 202.
6. ibidem, p. 187.
7. ibidem, p. 203/204.
8. R. Haller, Neoposilivismus. Eine historische Ein.filhrung in die Philosophie des Wiener
Kreis, Wtssenschaftliche Buchgesselschaft, Dannstadt 1993. By the way, the title "The
Alienation of Reasons" has an explicit pejorative suggestion.
9. G. Schulemann, Die Lehre von den Transcendentalien in der scholastischen Philosophie,
Felix Meiner, Leipzig 1929.
10. I. Lakatos, "History of Science and Its Rational Reconstruction", in PSA 1970 in
Memory ojRudolfCamap, ed. by Roger C. Buck and Robert S. Cohen, Reidel, Dordrecht
1971, p. 106.
MATJAZ POTRC
HALLER AND BRENTANO'S EMPIRICISM
1. HALLER'S GENERAL THESIS THAT BRENTANO

IS AN EMPIRICIST
Haller claims that Brentano is an empiricist. Brentano is close to Comte's

positivism and to the Vienna circle in emphasizing the methods of natural
science as appropriate for philosophy. He also underscores the importance of
experience as a starting point of analysis. All this seems convincing.
One should nevertheless question these points, by first examining the criteria
for empiricism, in order to be· able to use them subsequently as a measure for
determining whether these claims about Brentano's empiricism merit our
agreement.
2. WHAT IS EMPIRICISM?
In general outline, empiricism is the view which accentuates the importance of

experience. This is stressed by the dictional)' meaning of the word "empirical",
which is close to "experimental, observed, practical and pragmatic" and is
predominantly opposed to "theoretical". According to empiricism, experience
has to be preferred to background theory. The use of the word "empiricism" in
the sense of the philosophical movement is perhaps close to this. According to
its general connotation, the expression "empiricism" simply means that
uninterpreted experience has to be preferred to experience mediated by theory,
and thus to experience as interpreted.
Empiricism is opposed to nativism. Whereas nativism emphasizes the
importance of theories in explanation, empiricism denies it. In the visual
perception of a rose, singular experiences of seeing particular roses are
important for an empiricist, whereas the already existing concept of a rose or the
theory involving the organism's overall views about roses is important for the
nativist. Empiricism presumes the basis of perception to exist in the
accumulation of singular experiences, whereas for nativism innate conceptual
structures play an important role in perception. l
55
K. Lehrer and J.C. Marek (etis.), Austrian Philosophy Past and Present, 55-69.
56 MATJAZ POTRC
3. BRENTANO INTERPRETS SENSATION AS PARTIALLY

NATIVISTIC, NOT SIMPLY AS EMPIRICAL
One:first hint that the thesis about Brentano' s empiricism is questionable stems
from the fact that he defends nativism for parts of sensation and that, related to
this, he argues at some length against empiricism.
Even if this is the case, it may still be thought that, although partly denying
an empiricism of sensation, Brentano defends empiricism as an overall
philosophical thesis.
This is what Haller presumably means? But I will argue against it. Thus
what holds for sensations-that their nature is best seen as nativist-should be
generalized. Empiricism is suspect for Brentano, and Haller's claim about
Brentano's empiricism fails.
As the argument depends on sensation, we should see how the dispute about
empiricism comes into play in theories of sensation. This should be clarified
before claims against empiricism are eventually extended.
Before critically presenting and evaluating Haller's claims about Brentano' s
empiricism, we should clarify what empiricism is.
4. EMPIRICISM AS DETERMINED THROUGH SENSATION
An interesting characterization of empiricism is needed. Such a characterization

may be provided through an understanding of sensation.
4.1. Sensation
Sensations are elements of which perceptions are made. So there is a

sensation of red color, and this sensation of course is not perception of a red
apple. Other features, such as perception of depth, are needed in addition to the
sensation of red to yield the perception of an apple. But sensations are clearly
one element which enters perception. A common point about sensation and
perception is that they are both mandatorily noticed by an organism. Sensations
nevertheless differ from perceptions in that perceptions require awareness, which
is not a characteristic of sensations. Because they do not require any awareness,
sensations may also be called physical rather than psychological entities. An
example of a sensation is the phoneme It! as compared with the acoustically
perceived word "cat" in which it appears. 3
HALLER AND BRENTANO'S EMPIRICISM 57
4.2. Nativism As The Thesis That Individuation Is Necessarily Spatial
The fact that sensations, such as a patch of red, appear mandatorily in our
visual field may be expressed by claiming that they belong to experiences which
necessarily involve space.
Space also serves as the criterion for the individuation of sensations. Two
patches of color, even if they share all other qualitative determinants, will still
differ because they occupy different spatial positions. So they are individuated
according to their position in space.
The thesis that sensations involve space is nativist (analytic or a priori) and
thus it is not empiricist. How may this be understood? In the most simple terms,
nativism already presupposes some background for experiences, and this
background may be interpreted as the space wherein experience takes place.
In order to understand appropriately the thesis that nativism involves space,
it will be useful to get acquainted with the case of phenomenal green.
4.2.1. Phenomenal Green
The thesis of phenomenal green claims that actually, in the ontological sense,
green does not exist as an independent color. There are yellow and blue, which
exist as independent colors, but not green. How can it thus be that we speak
about green at all? The thesis that color necessarily involves space now becomes
important. Each perceived sensation, such as color, requires some space. Color
as sensation is also individuated by space: as we said, two patches of color
necessarily differ at least in space they require. We can thus imagine a region of
space divisible in such a way that some parts are yellow and that some parts are
blue.
4.2.1.1. Nontransparency ofsensation. Each sensation is nontransparent. It is

not a mixture, it has its own space. This is the meaning of the claim that yellow
and blue are elementary colors. They do not mesh, they are elements. The
argwnent that sensory space is nontransparent comes from consideration of the
claim that either scale of color is infinitely divisible and extensible, or this is in
principle not the case. But the scale of color is not infinitely divisible. There is
not an infinity of different colors between any two colors on the color scale. The
scale of colors, secondly, is not indefinitely extendible either. We can think about
such an extension for the scale of tones, which may in principle be infinitely
extended in both directions. But nothing comparable, or so it seems, could even
in principle be claimed for the color scale. Colors are limited in number. Also,
there are no mixtures of colors. So there have to exist some independent
58 MATJAZ POTRC
elementary colors. Green, for example, does not exist ontologically. Only yellow
and blue exist. These are not transparent But even though yellow and blue exist,
green is phenomenally perceived. This happens because the divisibility of space
in yellow and blue patches is too fine grained to be noticed.
4.2.1.2. Divisibility of space. Space may be simply presented as a two

dimensional area. Such an area can be divided into squares, and these squares
may be further divided If these squares are interchangeably yellow and blue, we
shall identify them as being of this color when they are of a discernible size. If
the divisibility advances, at some point we will not be able to recognize the
yellow and blue squares any more (although they still will remain yellow and
blue). The threshold of discernibility will be reached. At this point we will
perceive the space as green. So there will be no green, but we shall be aware of
perceiving green. Such is phenomenal green.
4.2.1.3. Individuation. Two patches of color of the same quality will be two if
they differ spatially. So spatial position is a criterion for the individuation of
sensations.
4.3. Empiricism, As Opposed To Nativism,

Does Not Individuate Experiences Spatially
Nativism claims that space is necessarily involved in the individuation of

sensations: Empiricism, on the other hand, denies that spatial representation is
necessary for the experiencing of sensations. Empiricist opts for experience
without a background, a requirement of tabula rasa, of a blank page on which
our experiences start. Space, according to the empiricist, is derived from
experience, and it is not previously given.
4.4. Generalization a/The Space As Criterion For Individuation
The nativist thesis was claimed for the area of the sensory. May it be
extended to the perception as well? Is our perception of an apple spatially (and
qualitatively) individuated as well?4
The bet will be that perception, like sensation, but of course at another level,
also requires spatial individuation. The criterion for the individuation of apples
would then claim that two qualitatively identical apples are indeed two if they
appear in two different regions of space.
5. THE CRITERION
By considering the case of sensation, we have obtained the criterion for

empiricism. It is the negation of nativism. Empiricism should claim that no space
is involved in the individuation of sensations. If this criterion is generalized. then
it turns out that nativism stresses the importance of space in many areas,
whereas empiricism denies the importance of the spatial.
If absence of the spatial is now determined to be characteristic of
empiricism, I will claim that it turns out that none of the reasons given by Haller
for saying Brentano is an empiricist satisfy the criterion of empiricism. Since the
spatial is central to Brentano on several levels, he is to be interpreted as a
nativist and not an empiricist.
6. HALLER'S ARGUMENTS THAT BRENTANO IS AN EMPIRICIST
6.1. Arguments Catalogued
6.1.1. Brentano wrote on psychology from an empirical point ofview
6.1.1.1. Thesis about Brentano 's empiricism: Brentano is an empiricist as the

title ofhis best known book Psychology from an empirical point ofview clearly
indicates.
6.1.1.2. Reasons to believe that Brentano is a nativist in psychology, not an

empiricist. The expression "empirical" really appears in the title of the best
known of Brentano's books. But what does it mean? It does not indicate
"empiricism" in the sense of the philosophical movement known under this
name. It means first of all that one should take notice of (,outer' and 'inner')
experiences. But this all by itself, namely being attentive to experiences, does not
imply that the question about empiricism or nativism is already decided. One
may emphasize the importance of experiences and be empirical to this sense
while still holding that experiences are given innately, coming with their own
space, and not empirically in the sense that there would be no space included in
them. Contrary to empiricist beliefs, Brentano is convinced that any sensory
experience already necessarily includes space for the sensed, for otherwise it
could not have been appropriately individuated. Taking the space to be important
in individuation, Brentano is a nativist.
60 MATJAZ POTRC
6.1.2. Brentano is an empiricist because he understands the method of

philosophy to be the one of the natural sciences
6.1.2.1. Brentano's endorsement ofnatural sciences. Besides the Aristotelian

requirement of following the natural order of things in an inquiry, Brentano
endorses the method of the contemporary natural sciences. Thus Brentano is an
empiricist.
6.1.2.2. Reasons to believe that the endorsement of natural sciences is

compatible with a nativist interpretation. The conclusion that Brentano is an
empiricist does not follow. One may endorse the method of natural sciences and
still be a nativist.
According to Haller, the reasons for Brentano's empiricism are in that he
exclusively takes facts as the starting points of his inquiry. This is said to be in
agreement with the transition from the mere observation of nature (in the
Aristotelian manner). Comte is Brentano's model here in that he required
"explanatory theories" (Haller 1989, p. 23).
This stressing of the importance of theories in the observation of nature does
not seem to be characteristic of empiricism. To the contrary: nativism insists on
the importance of theory as the background of experience.
So we may say that the endorsement of natural science is at least compatible
with a nativist interpretation.
6.1.2.3. Comte and the phases of philosophy. Comte not only inspired
Brentano's thesis that the true method of philosophy is the method of natural
science, but also Brentano's conception of the phases of philosophy. Contrary
to Comte, who held that there are three phases, Brentano admits no final state
of philosophy. He thinks that there is a possible decay, as may be illustrated by
Schelling-Hegelian philosophy, which itself needs to be recognized as a science
although it may actually more closely resemble music. In this judgement,
Brentano was close to "the empiricists of Vienna Circle" (Haller 1989, p. 23).
Looking critically at all these facts, one may nevertheless claim that they do
not provide any firm reason to believe that Brentano is an empiricist. Rejection
of the idealist method does not suffice as a defense of empiricism.
To the contrary, "pure theoretical interest" (Haller 1989, p. 23), unbiased, not
overlapping with practical considerations, characterizes the prosperous phase of
philosophy, according to Brentano. Again, the highlighting of the theoretical
interest seems to be closer to the criteria of nativism than to these of empiricism.
The second requirement of the prosperous phase of philosophy is that
"method conform to nature" (Haller 1989, p. 23), where "natural" means "not
constructed". This requirement also does not show any exclusive compatibility
with empiricism: a method that conforms to nature may be interpreted in the

nativist manner.
6.1.2.4. Discussion ofmore ofHaller's points claiming to show Brentano 's

empiricism
- In Psychology from an empirical point of view, psychology as a science is presented as

basic for philosophy (Haller 1989, p. 26). A delineation of the psychological and the
physical is attempted, along with a classification of psychological phenomena such as
presentations and judgements. Here is the ·program of an empirical philosophy, where
experience" (Haller 1989, p.26) is most important, but metaphysics is also attended to.
Discussion: As experience is given as the main criterion for something being an
empiricist philosophy, the right conclusion is that Brentano's approach is nativist. The
concept of experience includes space. At least, it is not claimed by Brentano that it doesn't.
But if experience includes space, then Brentano's approach is nativist and not empiricist. The
view that this is the case is further stressed by the fact that Brentano is in general endorsing
the nativist thesis of inner experience-the inner experience is always endowed with
(experiential) space. 5 Thus, giving experience as the only criterion for empiricism will not
do-experience may be interpreted nativistically.
- Reasons are given for psychology being the chosen science: Psychological phenomena
are more important than physical phenomena because "they are closest to us· (Brentano
1989, p. 26).
Discussion: The importance of psychological phenomena may be interpreted in such a
way that psychological phenomena already include space. But if this is true, then the above
consideration and the whole approach based on it is nativist. And it is also generally known
that such is the case if one considers the overall direction of Brentano's philosophy.
- Psychological phenomena, including presentations as basis of psychical acts, are

perceived with direct evidence. Inner perception in this sense is contrary to the observation
of the objects of outer perception, including attention. Whereas psychical acts are perceived
by direct evidence, outer perception is fallible.
Discussion: All this seems to be congruous with a hypothesis of an inner perceptual
space directly accessible as evidence and thus as such it is compatible with the hypothesis
of nativism, not with the hypothesis of empiricism.
- Only phenomena of inner perception really exist. Whereas colors, tones, warmness,
pressures only have intentional existence. (Haller 1989, p. 27)
Discussion: Does this mean that sensations (physical, outer perceptions), because they
are spatial, are innatist-whereas inner perceptions do not include space?
It seems that inner perceptions include space as well. Furthermore it seems that the outer
perception gets its space, its individuation principle, through inner perception.
- Method of philosophy: A philosopher may only proceed step by step (Haller 1989, p.
25126), not by universalist hypotheses.
Commentary: Is this an indication of empiricism? Not necessarily, a nativist as well may
proceed step by step.
62 MATJAZ POTRC
- Reism claims that only things exist, and this is inspired by Aristotle's criticism of
Plato's theory of ideas.
Commentary: This does not show anything in favor of empiricism. It could be at least
compatIble with nativism. Things exist in space. This view of the spatial is perhaps central
to Brentano ~s reism.
- The general approach is to find a criterion for determining what is empiricist. It is

proposed that the empirical is that which is not spatially endowed. What is spatially
endowed, on the other hand, is nativist. This is shown first in the case of sensation. The
question is whether the nativist appeal to space is peculiar to the sensation debate or wether
spatiality is criterial of nativism in general, and whether the absence of the spatial is
generally indicative of empiricism. We have already opted for the spatial criterion.
- Brentano endorsed Aristotle, (and herewith) i. empirical philosophy, ii. positivist

philosophy (Mill, Comte, Spencer), iii. descriptive psychology "with which philosophy
should get a legitimate empirical basis and an example of its method" (Haller 1989, p. 25).
Commentary: All these, it has been indicated, are really empiricist. But their empiricism
is interpreted by Brentano· in the nativist sense of the endorsement of the importance of
spatial experiences.
6.1.3. Brentano is an empiricist in the area of concepts6 (a possible extension

of the thesis concerning sensations)
A possible claim would be that although he may be a nativist in the
area of sensations, Brentano is an empiricist in the area of concepts.
6.1.3.1. Brentano's theses. Brentano claims that knowledge about the sensory
may be a SJ,lbstantial help and the key in understanding the conceptual.
6.1.3.2. Brentano is a nativist concerning concepts. As it has been

demonstrated that Brentano is a nativist in the area of sensations, and as he
also claims that our knowledge of the sensory may be a guide to our
knowledge of concepts, it may be presumed t1:ult the most important
characteristics of sensation are common to concepts as well. But since the
single most important characteristic of the sensory has turned out to be its
spatial individuation, it may be presumed by analogy that the most important
characteristic of the conceptual will be spatial individuation as well. If this is
the case, then Brentano is not an empiricist but a nativist in the area of
concepts.
6.1.4. Brentano is a nativist in the area of sensations7
6.1.4.1. Brentano's theses. Brentano' theses about sensations are the theses
which we discussed in the section on sensory individuation, and where we
spoke about phenomenal green.
6.1.4.2. Demonstration that Brentano is a nativist in the area ofsensations.

In his views on phenomenal green and on sensations Brentano turns out to be
a nativist.
7. HALLER AS NATIVIST
According to our claim that nativism relies on space for the individuation of
sensations, and according .10 the extension of this thesis that spatial
individuation is important in general, e.g. for such areas as perception, Haller
is a nativist as well. This may come as a surprise. Yet such is the result of
applying the spatial criterion to his work.
7.1. Haller On Space
7.1.1. Haller's theses about space
Haller's ideas about space are evinced in his "Dinge im Raum" (1986).
There he writes: "Things are in space, and things are themselves spatial.
Space is our orientation from the very beginning on. As soon as we are in a
world, we are in a world of space."
"The very endeavor to determine a thing with its properties ends in the
dimensions of extension. "
"Our first experiences involve coping with vicinity and remoteness, with
conceiving and not reaching things-these are experiences of space."
"If someone sees something, then he sees whatever he means to see in space
or as a space in space."
This spatial experience, it has to be noted, applies to any animal, not just
to the human animal.
"The one who touches, feels, moves, even the one who only hears,
experiences closeness and remoteness, experiences space as something which
it inhabits. The space, from 1he point of view of /this creature/, stretches in the
visual trace of what is seen, in 1he perspective, and is extended in all directions
if observed more closely. "
64 MATJAZ POTRe
Z 1. 2. Demonstration That Haller Is A Super-nativist About Space
Haller indeed seems to be a nativist if we take into account his view on

space:
"Things are in space, and things are themselves spatial. Space is our
orientation, from 1he very beginning on. As soon as we are in a world, we are
in a world of space."
Haller is in agreement on this point with Brentano, who also holds an
innatist position about space.
Haller 1hus puts spatial experience into the foreground. This experience,
which seems to him to be exemplified most naturally in perception-perhaps
without directing attention to the sensory-is spatially determined.
Indeed, Haller's position concerning space seems to be super-nativist: "As
soon as we are in a world we are in a world of space." This position is
ontological and not only epistemic.
Z 2. Haller On Perception
Z2.1. Haller's theses about perception
Z 2.1.1. Haller on varieties of perception. Haller starts by describing

perception as founded on the following relation:
Sensory perception - > Physical reality.
To illustrate this, let us say that sensory perception delivers an image of an

apple to me, and that there is an apple outside as a physically real object.
The picture gets more complicated by differentiating this ordinary
perception from two kinds of unsuccessful perception. The first case of
unsuccessful perception is that of missing 1he object. I look at an apple, but I
perceive it as a pear. In this case 1he existing individual (the apple) was missed
in the course of my individuating it during perception: I have perceived it as
a pear.
A critical consideration shows that· the perception, as opposed to
hallucination, does deliver the real object to us. Why would we otherwise
speak about perception? If we mix it with cases of hallucination, the name
perception tends to become void.
The second case of unsuccessful perception is called (by Haller) farce
perception. Farce perception appears where 1here is nothing to identify, despite
the fact that something is being perceived. In explaining this further, Haller
says that farce perception is a case where there exists a description only,
without a referent.
This is the schematical rendering of the varieties of perception:
Perception
/
Ordinary Unsuccessful
I I
(points to physical
reality)
missing the object farce
(misidentification (only description
of the individual or name, without
(cow/horse» the referent)
There is an important conStituent in the farce perception, language:
Sensory perception - > Language - > Physical reality.
Perception is understood as using a description or name as a linguistic element

in order to pick out the referent in the usual case. But in farce perception there
is no referent.
One may ask: If there is no referent, why should this experience still be
called perception, and not hallucination?
Another curious thing is that the language element, a name, is included in
perception. Perhaps it is meant that judgement and inference are involved in
perception. But Haller himself quotes an affirmation to the effect that
perception is not necessarily linguistic. He probably means that perception is
judgmental. But judgement does not necessarily include linguistic element.
So there is the relation Perception - > Judgement, without any requirement
of a Physical reality:
Sensory perception -> Judgement (-> Physical reality).
So it seems appropriate to interpret the linguistic element as a judgmental

element.
There are two possible ways of understanding farce perception:
66 MATJAZ POTRC
Farce perception
(Only a description or name, without a referent)
to be analyzed as
I I
failed causal relation pseudo description
(no cause existing) (an empty name: Pegasus)
Causal perception (according to Haller) is the matter of an external object in

physical reality exercising its effect on the senses. If the causal relation fails
to hold, the following interpretation is offered: There is a judgement, and this
judgement is causing perception, but there is no object or state of affairs in the
real world to support the judgement, or so to support perception via
judgement. So we have
(A) Sensory perception <- Judgement «- Physical reality).

Thus if farce perception is understood as a failed causal relation, then
judgement only (without support of physical reality) causes sensory perception.
The pseudo description interpretation of farce perception has things the
other way round:
(B) Sensory perception -> Judgement (-> Physical reality).
Now sensory perception is directed via the judgement (language) towards the
physical reality which fails to appear.
These two directions of interpretation of farce perception are indeed two
directions of understanding perception and how to justify perception, according
to Haller. One way of justifying perception is to start with the object as the
cause of perception. Another way is that the organism's perception is being
directed at the object. (Haller 1982, p. 139.) The case of farce perception
distinctively shows these two directions of interpretation.
Haller embraces the second interpretation where the sensory perception
starts and is directed towards the judgement. One reason this interpretation is
preferable is because it follows the maxim of ontological scarcity. It does not
necessarily postulate an extra-empirical world. And neither it does postulate
an extra conceptual scheme, judgements which somehow independently
exercise their influence on perception. Haller thus does not embrace
interpretation (A), which seems to multiply the (non-existing in this case)
physical entities and conceptual schemes. He embraces interpretation (B)
which does not multiply either judgements or physical reality. In (B), sensory
perception is directed at the judgement.
7. 2. 2. Demonstration that Haller is a nativist about perception
What is involved in Haller's understanding of perception?

Haller's interpretation is compatible with Brentanian nativist view on
perception.
Perhaps lhe easiest way to understand perception according to Brentano and
Haller is to claim that perception is directly oriented towards judgement.
Actually, perception is the judgement! But if perception is the judgement, then
each perception as such is justified by the standard of evidence. Because each
judgement as such is evidence.
The Brentanian link comes in with the idea that each part of perceptual
space is individuated space. Each part of perceptual space is individuated
judgmental space. This is perhaps why the term 'farce' is appropriate.
Perception drives us to identify something in judgmental space which is
equivalent to it. If this sometbfug does not exist, a part of space is indicated as
if something did exist lhere. This is why farce perception is an important case.
But this seems to mean that perceptual justification succeeds without the
external physical object necessarily existing. Such is the case of color, or of
a rainbow: in perceiving lhem, I perceive something, but this something is not
necessarily an external object. The external object's existence is inferred,
moreover, even if it does exist. Similarly, Brentano says: "Den Glauben an
den wahren Bestand einer Korperwelt werden wir uns also nicht nehmen
lassen" (Brentano 1979, p. 88). So to see perception as an inferential
judgement is basic for this view. But then the perception may not be
interpreted as being caused by physical reality, it should be interpreted as
being directed at the perceptual (= judgmental) space.
If perception is (directed at the) judgement, Haller's view comes close to
Brentano's.
But now, according to Haller, Brentano is an empiricist. Whereas in the
area of the sensory, Brentano rejects empiricism and embraces nativism.
Nativism, here, is the view that perception or sensation already comes with the
spatial individuation. Contrary to this, empiricists say that the spatial is not
included in perception or in sensation.
So Haller seems to be forced to embrace nativism in perception, just like
Brentano does.
What does empiricism claim, again? It claims that one starts with physical
reality, without the space being included in perception. The judgement, in
which spatiality is included, is reconstructed from non-spatial physical reality.
But it is doubtful that there is such (spatially) non-individuated reality. All
perception includes space Gudgement), and it would be too much to postulate
68 MATJAZ POTRC
an external reality in addition to that. So the following empiricist minded

diagram (A) seems to be empty:
(A) Sensory perception < - Judgement « - Physical reality).
Contrary to this, Haller embraces diagram (B):
(B) Sensory perception - > Judgement (- > Physical reality)
where the justification of perception is secured.

But why then does Haller plead for the importance of Brentano's
empiricism?
The sensory is not perceptual. It is the basis of per~ption. Even this basis,
Brentano claims, is necessarily spatially individuated, and so perceptual objects
will be as well.
Haller also speaks about the importance of inference in the reconstruction
of perceptual objects, and inference starts with us.
Z3. The Relatedness of Theses On Space And Perception
It is easy to see that theses about space and perception are related. With this
in mind, it is also clear that the spatial is indeed extensible from the sensory
to the perceptual, and thus that generalization in this sense is justified.
8. HALLER'S AND BRENTANO'S VIEWS ON SPACE

ARE COMPATIBLE
It may be concluded that, insofar as space is taken as the criterion of

individuation in sensation and in perception, Haller's and Brentano's views are
compatible. They are both nativists.
University ofLjubljana
NOTES
1. Wilhelm Baumgartner stresses though that empiricism is "learned", not crude, but
methodological, "interpreted" experience. Such a view may be based on distinguishing, as
Baumgartner does, (1) the empirical level (sense-perception) from (2) the noetic or
conceptual level, and adding that (2) is not possible without some background of (1).
Whereas the opposed view of nativism would not necessarily require the support of sense
perception for concepts, and so some concepts are not empirically grounded for it.
As the dependency of (2) on (1) is basic for the overall Brentanian system of experiences,
Brentano would necessarily be an empiricist, which, as I shall try to show, is precisely not
the case.
2. Though this may perhaps be doubted, since Haller is preparing the edition of Brentano's
lectures against empiricism. I became attentive to this topic while listening to Haller's paper
at the Krakow Brentano conference in 1993. Later I had occasion to take a look at the book-
sized transcribed manuscript at the Dokumentationszentrum und Forschungsstelle fiir
osterreichische Philosophie in Graz, with the help of Dr. W. Gombocz (lEP 4310) and Th.
Binder. However substantial portions of Brentano's statements are already available in the
printed form.
3. Sensations include the empirical awareness of things sensed and the act of sensation
itself, which are both instances of the intentional relation. The analysis of sensation
distinguishes physical (e.g. a red spot) and logical (the parts of the deftnition of a red spot:
its quality and spatial position) elements.
4. Quality and space come together (now, therefore' time'is not discussed here). Quality is
necessary because there is no 'empty space'. Quality is that what 'fills' a space as its
'inherent moments' .
5. Inner experience is without hyle. Being 'inner' it is at most analogous to ha~ing a hyletic
structure. Notice that the use of the word' inner' implies some' outer' as its' counterpart.
6. Concepts rest on (former) sensations, being also a result of reflexions(Locke).
7. Each object of sensation, in order to be perceived, necessarily has to have a
space-quality .
REFERENCES
Brentano, F. (1968). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Hamburg: Meiner.
Brentano, F. (1979). Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie. Hamburg: Meiner.
Brentano, F. (1979). "uber Individuation, multiple Qualitiit und Intensitiit sinnlicher
Erscheinungen." In Brentano, Franz (1979). p. 66-89.
Chisholm, R. (1979). "Einleitung". In Brentano, Franz (1979), p. VII-XXVI.
Haller, R. (1986). "Dinge im Raum". Ein Fragment. Graz: Durch 1.
Haller, R. (1989). "Franz Brentano, ein Philosoph des Empirismus." Dettelbach: Bremano
Studien I., Roll Verlag, p. 19-30.
Haller, R. (1982). Urteile und Ereignisse. Studien zur philosophischen Logik und
Erkenntnistheorie. Munchen: Alber.
Potrc, M. (1993). Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Dettelbach: Roll Verlag.
JOHANN CHRISTIAN MAREK
HALLER ON THE FIRST PERSON
In some ofhis essays on Ludwig Wittgenstein and Ernst Mach, Rudolf Haller
considers various approaches to interpreting the use of the word "f' (and its
linguistic equivalents), or-in a more mentalistic diction-thoughts about
oneself. The aim of my paper is not a critical assessment of Haller's
interpretation of the self in Wittgenstein's and Mach's works. Rather, it is
supposed to be (1) a synopsis of the approaches Haller takes into consideration
combined with some additions to them, (2) a criticism of Haller's preferences
(especially his tendency to plea for the de se reference on the one side and for the
elimination of the self on the other side), and (3) an appeal for a referential and
(moderate) mentalistic account of the first-person pronoun.
The central focus of Haller' s investigations are the questions of what is meant
when someone says "f' and what is the referent of'T' if it has a referent at all. I
Haller imparts the idea that Wittgenstein does not have a unified theory of the
ego, that his views are oscillating. You can find in Wittgenstein the denial that
"I" is a referential term2 but also referential tendencies. Nevertheless, these
tendencies show the expression "f' not as an ordinary referring word like a
singular term, but as something more eccentric, though the problems of a de se
intentionality are not fully seen by Wittgenstein. 3 Ernst Mach's denial of the self
as a substance,·as a real unity, culminates in his statement that the I is
unsalvageable ("Das Ich ist unrettbar"). 4 The self is just an edifice of ideas,
constructed out of practical motives only. Mach's dispensing with the ego is
fOWlded on the thesis that substances do not really exist. There are only elements
(sensations) and complexes of elements, and physical things on the one side and
selves on the other side are mere interpretations of complexes of elements. The
philosophical reasons for Mach's dismissal of the ego are, therefore, to some
extent different from Wittgenstein's arguments in favour of the view that the
expression cor'
is sometimes not used as a referential term or that the first-person
pronoun can be eliminated from our language. s Although Mach does not attract
the reader's attention to the use of words, he already refers to Georg Christoph
Lichtenberg who says that (the epistemic function of) the cogito should not be
represented by "I am thinking" but by "It is thinking" similar to "It is ·lightning".
As Lichtenberg's saying has had such an influence-Wittgenstein also referred
to him-I am going to present the whole passage Mach quotes: 6
71
K. Lehrer and I.C. Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy Past and Present, 71-85.
72 JOHANN MAREK
Wrrwerden uns gewisser VorsteUungen bewuJ3t, die nicht von uns abh"ngen~ andere, g1auben
wir wenigstens, hingen von uns ab; wo ist die Grenze? Wir kennen nur aIlein die Existenz unserer
Empfindungen, VorsteUungen und Gedanken. Es denkt, soUte man sagen, so wie man sagt: es
blitzl. Zu sagen cogito ist schon zuviel, sobald man es durch Ich denke hbersetzt. Das Ich
anzunehmen, zu postulieren, ist praktisches Bedhrfuis.
Systematizing first-person accounts from the viewpoint of referentiality versus

non-referentiality has its philosophical merits. Although some of the approaches
you can compose seem to be obviously off-beat and erroneous, it is heuristically
valuable to distinguish fIrst-person accounts from this point of view. The
following list offust-person approaches is just a selection of possible views and
their criticisms. It is not supposed to be exhaustive or mutually exclusive, but to
be an incentive to further, more thorough investigations.
'l. "f' AS A PROPER NAME
Like Wittgenstein, Haller denies that the pronoun of the first person singular
can be interpreted as a name, although it can be used to introduce and explain my
name ("My name is J. C. M."; "J. C. M.? Who is that?" C "That's me"). That
the word "f' is not a customary proper name can be shown by pointing out that
"My name is f' would be an informative statement, which it is not when it is
used as first-person pronoun.
If"f' were everyone's name, or better, a name everybody has, we would get
only a very equivocal term. That is to say, if the expression "f' were used as a
proper name for individuals (and not as a pure family name), ''I am in pain"
would then be a very ambiguous utterance. But this utterance is usually not
equivocal. 7
Why not interpret "f' as a special kind of proper name "because everyone
uses it only to speak ofhimself?',g That is to say, "'I' will then be the name used
by each one only for himself (this is a direct reflexive) and precisely in that
aspect."9 In using this term, firstly, I purport to refer to myself and to no one
else, and, secondly, my purported reference never fails. This answer leads us
already to the thesis of intentionality de se as direct self-reference, an account
which has to be considered more specifIcally. (See section (4) below.)
2. "I" AS A DISGUISED DEFINITE DESCRIPTION
As far as I can see, Haller rejects the interpretation that "f' is used as an
abbreviation for a defInite description (which does not itself contain indexical
expressions). Let us distinguish (a) defInite descriptions with a contingently
HALLER ON THE FIRST PERSON 73
individuating property from (b) those containing an individual essence

(haecceity), i. e. a property which one has necessarily and nobody else can
have. 10
An example for case (a) would be:
'T' = "The philosopher born in Graz, 9th July 1948"
A better example would be an identifying description of me containing only pure

qualitative properties, i. e. properties which do not presuppose the existence of
any contingent things (like the city of Graz).
Anyway, against the proposal (a) 1 would like to maintain that the sentence
"I am the philosopher who is born in Graz, 9th July 1948", (and similarly all
others contingent descriptions of me) is informative in a way it would not be,
when the first person pronoun'were the abbreviation at issue. If it should turn out
that 1 am born at another time, the description at issue cannot applied to me:
"The philosopher born in Graz, 9th July 1948, is in pain" would be not true,
whereas "I am in pain" is still true. Also, it should be noted that, when 1 employ
the first-person pronoun, 1 do not convey a specmc sense which contains
identifying characteristics of mine. A further point is that in using a definite
description, 1 can always fail to refer to something to which 1 intend to refer,
whereas by using the first-person pronoun 1 am secure against reference-failure.
Case (b) could be stated by something like:
'T' , "The thing which has the property of being I (or: which has my individual essence)"
Chisholm developed and defended a haecceity approach of the mst-person

pronoun in his book Person and Object: "Each person who uses the mst person
pronoun uses it to refer to himself and in such a way that, in that use its
Bedeutung or reference is himself and its Sinn or intention is his own individual
essence."ll That is to say, in conceiving and knowing a proposition 'which
implies my individual essence 1 pick myself out as being that thing that is
identical with me, and nobody else can conceive and know this proposition. In
contrast to the case where the word "I" is an abbreviation for a definite
description containing a contingently individuating property, 1 cannot fail to refer
to myself when "r' is supposed to have as its sense my own individual essence.
1 am not sure if there are really any decisive arguments against such an
account But one objection to this suggestion is that we cannot get rid of the mst
person pronoun when we express our conception of our haecceities. Besides this,
when properties of abstract entities are presupposed, 1 wonder why it should be
necessary that 1 can refer to myself only by appealing to something other than
74 JOHANN MAREK
me, in this case to a specific property, namely my individual essence. Why

should not direct self-reference be possible? Chisholm himself criticized his
propositional approach by suggesting that the function of the first-person
pr'Onoun can be analyzed without presupposing that the word "f' has both a
reference and a sense. 12 The direct self-reference approach, advanced in
Chisholm's First Person, denies such things as first-person propositions,
although there are first-person sentences. These sentences have to be interpreted
as a special kind of property attribution, namely direct attribution (see section
(4) below).13 Chisholm's main reason for abandoning the haecceity approach is
that the notion of a haecceity twns out to be vacuous, because he cannot imagine
what the different special features are which are unique to the different
individual essences.- But do not all properties have an irreducible part in some
way? If I can grasp color properties like being red and being green, I may be
able to take into consideration general features of them, as for example being a
color property. But besides this, when I consider a color property how can I
single out in it those features that are unique to it?
3. "f' AS A DEMONSTRATIVE OR INDEXICAL

DEFINITE DESCRIPTION
Haller concurs with Wittgenstein that the first person pronoun is not a
demonstrative pronoun, like "this" associated with an act of pointing. I 4 I can
agree with this remark insofar as I do not choose myself in saying "f': "The man
who cries out with pain, or says that he has pain, doesn't choose the mouth
which says it"15 But this does not imply yet that it is not a referring expression
at all, as Wittgenstein suggests (see section (6) below). It can be treated as a
direct indicator, a pure indexical.
Haller further notes that "f' cannot be substituted salva veritate by "this
body".16IfI apply this substitution, how can I then wonder ifl could change my
body, have another one, or two bodies?-These are all questions Wittgenstein
too deems to be meaningful.I7 Another critical point is that "this" can always
lack a referent when used in association with something conceived as external,
whereas "f' is secure against reference-failure. In principle there is the
possibility that the object which one is directed at by "this" does not exist, is
only illusory. IS
What about "this" in connection with something experienced or something
internal, and as sucll immune to reference-failure? Bertrand Russell thinks that
all egocentric particulars, i. e. all words of which the meaning is relative to the
speaker and his or her position in time and space, can be defined in terms of
"this".19 "This" is taken as the fundamental term, as the only proper name of a
particular that 1 can grasp in an epistemically intimate and direct manner.

Accordingly, he reduces the use of "f' to a use of "this" as a name of an
experience. He defines "f' as ''the person attending to this", or alternatively "the
person experiencing this", or "what experiences this. '>20 1 agree to Heiner Rutte's
criticism21 that a severe difficulty of Russell's position is that it demands a
thinker always thinking about mental occurrences (a case of experience or
attention at least) when he or she states a self-attribution by using the first
person pronoun. But when 1 attribute to myself a physical property, for example,
when 1 believe that 1 am 1 m 72 tall, and when this belief is my total present
momentmy experience, why do 1 have to think about experiences, about mental
occwrences? A Russellian paraphrase for the belief in the just given example is
something like: "What experiences (is attending to) this [namely the belief
experience which is expressed here by the formulation under quotation marks]
is 1 m 72 tall." But this simple case already shows that a thought about a
physical fact of mine turns out to be a belief about something mental. And what
is it about?-It is about the thing which is referred to by "this".-And what is
designated by "this"?-It is the belief occurrence which has as content "What
experiences this is 1 m 72 tall." In this manner we get a strange spiral of
reflections. Another critical point against Russell can be shown by thoughts like
"I am the person experiencing this (and not a terrible pain). How lucky 1 am."
In such cases "I am experiencing this", interpreted as "What experiences this
experiences this", has at least a trivial component, it contains an odd doubling
of content. But such a triviality is not expressed originally.
Like Wittgenstein, Haller also rejects the suggestion that the word "f' means
the same as "the person who is now speaking". Assume the case where a
question concerns several persons at the same time ("Who has toothache", for
example) and you want to answer. When other people are also speaking you can
be separated out of the crowd by uttering "f' but not by the utterance "The
person who is now speaking".22 Furthermore, in the case where other people are
also speaking, "I am ill" can be a true statement, whereas its alleged paraphrase
"The person who is now speaking is ill" would be false or without truth value.
You can try to improve the suggestion by adding "this" to the locution; for
example, in "the person who is now speaking this" the speaker uses the
demonstrative "this" deictically to refer to this very utterance itself. However
this suggestion leads us back to the aforementioned attempts to reduce the use
of"f' to "this".
76 JOHANN MAREK
4. "f' AS AN INDICATOR OF DIRECT SELF-REFERENCE
In the papers mentioned above, Haller reflects on thoughts about reference de

sedevelop~ by Hector-Neri Castaiieda, Roderick Chisholm and David Lewis,
and he notes that Wittgenstein failed to notice that the problem of de se is
essentially anchored in the family of the "r'-expressions. 23
In cases where a belief is about the believer herself, you can distinguish the
case where the believer means herself in a special way from that case where she
means herself but not in that direct, "emphatic" way (as Chisholm puts it). It
makes a big difference whether the tallest man, for example, believes that he
himself is wise with a special kind of self-knowledge (belief de se), or whether
he believes that the tallest man is wise and "hits" himself by this attribution
(belief de re). In contrast to the second example, the first one leaves it open
whether the self-attributing person believes that the tallest man is wise, and in
contrast to the first exaJ,1lple, the second one does not imply that the attributing
person has the self-conscious belief of himself that he is wise (i. e. a belief about
himself in using the first-person pronoun or a linguistic equivalent of it). In this
sense one can say that the emphatic use of the reflexive pronoun "himself!
herself/itself' is correlated with the use of the fIrst person pronoun. Taking
believing as a kind of attribution of properties to something, one can say that in
the fIrst case, the tallest man directly attributes to himself a certain property,
whereas in the other case he only indirectly attributes to himself the property in
question, i. e. he considers further properties which single him out.
Chisholm claims to have "explicated the use of the first-person pronoun in
terms of direct attribution and without reference to the use of other
demonstratives, and without presupposing that 'I' has a sense.'>24 And to the
question "How does the believer go about directly attributing to herself a
property" Chisholm answers "He just does and that is the end of the matter.'>25
Since every theory of reference and intentionality has to stop at some point,
Chisholm chooses this stopping point and takes as undefmed the locution "x
directly attributes (the property) being Fto y," or in other words: "x believes
with respect to x itself that it is F. "26
There is not enough space here for me to discuss the problem of the relation
between reference de se and reference de re (In what sense can reference de se
subsumed under the notion of reference de re 1). But it is instructive to present
at least the following two conditions for reference de se: 27
(1) In attributing being F directly to x herself, x necessarily attributes being
Fto x and only to x (and not to something else). That is to say that in using the
first-person pronoun only, a person cannot fail to refer to something, and she
cannot fail to refer to something to which she purports to refer, and the purported
referent cannot be something else than she herself ("she herself' here not used
as an emphatic reflexive!). As opposed to the use of the first-person pronoun,

I can fail to refer to a purported object of attribution when I use singular terms
like names, descriptions, pronouns (except "this" in the "internal" sense, see
section (3) above), and self-reference is not guaranteed by using these terms
either.
(2) Fromx's direct attribution of being Fto x, it does not follow that x refers
to x with the aid of an identifying description of x, i. e., the use of the fIrst person
pronoun by x does not in volve defInite descriptions of x.
The thesis that in saying '<y' I am not concerned with characterizations which
single me out implies also the following: If 14 refer to myself in a direct manner
then, in doing so, I do not grasp myself by observation or by evidence.
It is important to note that, according to this de se account, I refer to myself
in a direct manner with the fIrst person pronoun, and, therefore, I do not identify
myself as an intentional, thinking object or as a mental self. There is something
intentional in this kind of de se reference, but in using the word "I" I am not
already conscious of the intentionality of myself or conscious of my experiences,
I am only aware of myself When I think that I am 1 m 72 tall, for example, I
neither think about my having experiences nor consider being a specifIc mental
thing, or sel( or soul or something like that which is having a body, or in a body,
or identical with a body or a part of a body.
On the other hand, I agree with Chisholm that the direct reference of "f'
together with its corresponding use of the emphatic reflexive can offer us a kind
of criterion of the psychological: Whenever it does not matter whether we say "x
is in Relation R to x" or "x is in Relation R to x itself' the relational term has a
non-psychologioal or non-intentional sense. We can express a difference by
saying that ''A hates A" in contrast to "A hates A itself' but we cannot contrast
in this way "A refuels A" and "A refuels A itself.'>28
Haller, as far as I know, has some inclination to the de se approach, but on
the other hand, his presentation of Mach and Wittgenstein also shows a tendency
to adhere to the following two non-referential views of some uses of the word "1"
views however which are highly debatable and difficult to reconcile with the
afore mentioned approach.
5. THE REDUCTION OF "I" TO "IT"
Lichtenberg's saying is often quoted as illustration for the renunciation of the

self. 29 But fIrst of all Lichtenberg's dictum seems to be a sketch of an
epistemological criticism of Descartes ' proof of the cogito. Instead of I think we
can only get it thinks (there is thinking) as the epistemic foundation, as the
cogito was thought to be by Descartes. However, Lichtenberg adds an
78 JOHANN MAREK
ontological claim, or better, he disclaims being ontologically committed to the

existence of the ego by offering a psychological, pragmatic reason.
It is worth noticing, :first, that this kind of denial of the self does not yet imply
that the first-person pronoun does not have a referential role at all.
Second, there is a misinterpretation of Lichtenberg's saying, that,
nevertheless, offers an account which should be mentioned at least. If the word
"it" is interpreted, or better, misinterpreted, as a pronoun for some not further
specified thing and not as an expletive/o then "it" would still refer to a thing, a
thinking object, which is not already an ego. Consequently, Lichtenberg seems
to claim that instead of having found his self thinking, believing, being in pain,
loving, and so on, he has only found something that is thinking, something that
is believing, something that is in pain, something that is loving, and so on. The
self would then be a special aggregate, metaphorically spoken, a state of some
specifically thinking individual. This position is faced willi the problem of how
the self is constructed out of the thinking particulars. Anscombe put this problem
in a concise way: "How do I know that 'I' is not ten thinkers thinking in
unison?"31 This question is a counterpart of the problem of the unity of
consciousness that an adherent of the self must also be prepared to answer. The
problem for the adherent of the selfis to find criteria ofidentity for selves and
to find a justification of her thesis that there are selves in manifold, complex
mental states. An answer from this standpoint to Anscombe's question goes in
the following direction: I am not ten thinkers thinking in unison, because if I
know directly (or cannot be mistaken) with respect to each thinker that it is
thinking and what it is thinking, I am that thing. 32
Of cours~, the adequate interpretation of Lichtenberg's saying is in an
analogous way also confronted with the problem of the unity of consciousness.
According to this interpretation, the word "it" is not referring at all, "it" is like
the "it" in "it rains"-a dummy, and not an ordinary referential pronoun. What
there is are experiences, mental occurrences: There are pain experiences, heat
experiences, occurrences of belief, of hate and so on. A person is nothing else
than a bundle, a complex of such mental occurrences, at least a bundle of all
momentary present experiences, or in a broader sense a whole series of such
occurrences. The problem of the unity of consciousness the bundle theorist faces
is that, in each moment, a lot of such mental occurrences take place, but how are
they unified that they make up different complexes we usually call persons?33
Let us assume that I am in pain and feel sorrow and you have a visual experience
and feel happy: Why do the pain experience and the visual experience not make
up a mental bundle? Or if there are several occurrences of consciousness of one
kind going on at the same time, how can one of them be picked out as niine?
Perhaps, Russell's bundle theory combined with his view about the "this" as a
fundamental tenn that is immune to reference-failure can escape this difficulty?34

I must leave this question open.
In cases where Wittgenstein ponders the possibility of having "a language
from which 'I' is omitted from sentences describing a personal experience" he
also follows Lichtenberg's suggestion that "[i]nstead of saying 'I think' or 'I
have an ache' one might say 'It thinks' (like 'It rains'), and in place of 'I have
an ache' 'There is an ache here."'35. From Haller's considerations of
Wittgenstein's idea that the "f' can be eliminated from our language, a further
non-referential approach of the first-person pronoun can be extracted:
6. "f' AS A NON-REFERRING EXPRESSIVE WORD
Wittgenstein takes into account that at least some uses of psychological

sentences of the first person present tense seem to be neither descriptions nor
reports of mental occurrences. Rather, the utterances of such sentences can be
characterized as avowals expressing emotions, sensations, attitudes. In his
Philosophical Investigations he says that there are cases where the utterance of
a sensation word, for example "pain" in "I am in pain" "replaces crying and does
not describe it,"36 and that it "can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a
joke) that I /mow I am in pain.'>37 Even ifWittgenstein admits that in a particular
context one can describe his state of mind (offear, say),38 he rejects the idea that
it could always be done, and hence he asks: "But if 'I am afraid' is not always
something like a cry of complaint and yet sometimes is, then why should it
always be a description of a state of mind?,>39
There are passages in The Blue Book where Wittgenstein also alludes to the
idea that some uses Qf the first person pronoun are not referential because the
whole psychological sentence in which the word "f' is embedded is an avowal: 40
And now this way of stating our idea suggests itself: that it is impossible that in making the
statement "I have toothache" I should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan
with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me. To say, ''1 have pain" is no more a
statement about a particular person than moaning is.
The difference between the propositions ''1 have pain" and "Smith has pain" is not that of"L. w.
has pain" and "Smith has pain". Rather, it corresponds to the difference between moaning and
saying that someone moans.
Wittgenstein notes further that the expression "f' in utterances like "I have pain"
"serves to distinguish me from other people", but with such subjective utterances
we do not point, not refer either to our body or to "something bodiless, which,
however, has its seat in our body."41
80 JOHANN MAREK
Wittgenstein calls this use of the word "r' ("my" resp.) "the use as subject"
(further examples are: "I hear so-and-so", "I have toothache") and contrasts it
to "the use as object" ("My arm is broken", "I have grown six inches").42 In the
object use, "My arm is broken" for example, I can make an error through the
following misidentification: I can misidentify something as my body or my arm
and, because of this reason, I make the false statement "My arm is broken".
However, it may even be the case that my arm is broken and, therefore, my belief
is correct, although the justification for this belief is not sound, because I have
seen another body than mine with a broken arm and misidentified this body as
mine. In the use of"r' as subject such an error is not possible. This use does not
only include infallible or incorrigible cogito sentences but also possibly false
sentences. When I claim to remember something or to hear something, I may be
wrong about this claim It may be not a factual remembering or hearing because
I only seem to remember or only seem to hear. But I can never misidentify
something with myself because there is no need of identification. For this
subjective use of the first person-pronoun, I do not need any justification.
Thus Wittgenstein gives the impression that in the subject use one is
"immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person
pronoun."43 But he does not come to the conclusion that the subject use entails
a kind of certainty or immediate knowledge of oneself. The purely expressive
interpretation of avowals disagrees with the cognitive and referential view of the
word "r'. Immunity to error is here no question of knowledge at all. 44
Quite a lot of objections against this purely expressive approach can be
raised. As we have seen, Wittgenstein himself already acknowledged that in
particular contexts such "r'-sentences can be used as statements about mental
states. Indeed there are situations where it obviously makes sense to say that the
person expresses a belief or a report in uttering "I am in pain": When I wonder
or when I am asked if I am still ill, my thought that I am in pain can serve as
evidence.45 Or take the situation where this thought serves as a reason for action.
Or when I say that "I have toothache. It's so terrible, I need a pill." Or when I
draw the conclusion from "I feel happy" to "There is at least one who is happy
here." Or "I am in pain. What a pity. Ifl weren't I could go out for a walk." In
all these cases there seems to be a descriptive sense-why not in all cases
(except in borderline cases where you use a locution quite automatically, nearly
neglecting the content; this happens sometimes in using swear words,
perfonningverbalrituals etc.)? I cannot see that immunity from error must lead
to a non-cognitivism and to a non-referentialism. (By the way, from the fact that
an utterance is not descriptive, a command for example, it does not follow that
common singular tenns or pronouns lose their ordinary referential force.) When
we consider that we can do things with descriptions-avowals for
example-Wittgenstein's question concerning "I am afraid" canjust as well be
modified by adding a "not' before "always": ''But if 'I am afraid' is not always
something like a cry of complaint and yet sometimes is, then why should it not
always be a description of a state of mind?"
Accepting this criticism allows one to state an additional, third condition for
using the first-person pronoun as a direct referential term: Only this pronoun has
this special use as subject, a use which leads to the immunity to error through
misidentification of the subject.
To sum up and clarify the main lines ofWittgenstein's arguments for the no-
reference view of the first-person pronoun used as subject: Wittgenstein's
reasons for rejecting the reference view are twofold even if he did not always
keep them separate:45 On the one hand, he considers subject uses of the word
"r', at least some of them, as expressive, embedded in avowals, and therefore,
according to him, no act of self-reference is involved. On the other hand, he tries
to dispense with the first-person pronoun by reducing it to "it"-locutions.
7. "f' ONLY AS AN INDICATOR OF A PERSPECTIVE
In his paper "Bemerkungen zur Egologie Wittgensteins" Haller also considers

the metaphor of the I as initial point of a perspective of the experiences47-a
point which cannot be experienced itself, and puts this picture in front of the
background ofWittgenstein's dualism of showing and saying. There is no room
for discussing this complicated matter of the metaphysical subject and the idea
of the I as a limit of the world. Instead of this, I would like to outline how the de
se reference view can make sense out of the notion of indicating and not
describing a perspective.
In stating self-attributions de se we refer to ourselves without any identifying
description, and in this sense we do not describe ourselves beyond the
descriptions given by the self-attributions themselves. In this way we can say
that we indicate and do not describe our first-person perspective. When I think
I am standing I refer to my myself, but I do not refer to myself by describing me
as a mental substance having or being a body which is such and such. And when
I think I feel happy the mental description is determined by the mental attribute
alone and not also by an explicit reference to something as being a mind. Insofar
as no one else can make my own direct self-attributions, we can metaphorically
speak of indicating a first-person perspective, and insofar as I can refer to myself
indirectly by using other tenns than the first-person pronoun, we can say that the
attributions express a third-person perspective. That I do not describe but only
indicate my first-person perspective does not prevent us from saying that from
direct self-attributions I can draw conclusions ("I am standing.-Therefore,
82 JOHANN MAREK
someone is standing"), or that another person can understand my direct self-

attributions or draw conclusions from them.
Since indicating a first-person perspective in this sense is connected with a
referential view of the first-person pronoun, we can say that there is a subject
and this subject is its direct object, unmediated by something else. Subjects in
this sense can be called substances, i.e., substances understood as things which
are neither contingent states nor abstract properties of other things,48 but
substances in this sense need not already be understood as Cartesian minds.
Nietzsche, certainly having a more metaphysical picture of a subject before his
mind, said that indicating a perspective does not involve positing a subject: "Or
even the little word'!,. Setting again a kind of perspective in seeing as cause of
the seeing itself. that was the trick in the invention of the 'subject', of the
'I' ."49_But one the other hand, what is seeing without someone who sees? A
possible answer which rejects the reference view of the first-person pronoun
leads us back to the aforementioned views of the "it" and "this", I think.·
Karl Franzen Universittit, Graz
NOTES
1. Haller, "Unklarheiten", 249.

2. Ibid., 260; Haller, "Bemerkungen", 365ff; and Haller, "Ernst Mach", 236.
3. Haller, ''Unklarheiten'', 262.
4. Mach,Ana~se, 20.
5. See Haller, ''Bemerkungen'', 368f; Haller, ''Unklarheiten'', 250.
6. Mach, Ana~se, 23; Haller, ''Ernst Mach", 235. A tentative translation of this passage is as
follows: "We become aware of certain presentations which are not dependent on us; other
presentations are dependend on us, or so we think; where is the border? We mow only the
existence of our sensations, presentations and thoughts. It thinks, should be said, as one says: it
rains [literal: there is lightning]. Saying cogjto is already too much if it is translated by I think.
Accepting, postulating the I is a practical need."
7. Cf. Haller, "Unklarheiten", 254; Anscombe, "First Person", 138.
8. Anscombe, ibid.
9. Ibid., 140.
10. Chisholm,Person and Object, 29.
11. Chisholm,Person and Object, 36.
12. See Chisholm, First Person, 15-17, 2lf; Chisholm Metaphysics, 47-48.
13. There is no space enough for discussing other alternatives which keep the notion of a
proposition though in a modified form to Chisholm's concept of an abstract proposition and of an
individual essence. But one example should be mentioned at least. In his paper ''Phenomena-
Logic", 166, Hector-Neri Castaneda denies ''that all propositions exist necessarily because they are
abstract objects: the first-person propositions belonging to a person X have a contingent existence:
they exist if and only if X exists
14. Haller, ''Bemerkungen'' 368f, 371.
15. Wittgenstein,BB,68.
16. Haller, ''Unklarheiten'', 254f.
17. Cf. Wittgenstein, PRo 90; Wittgenstein, Lectures, 62.
18. See Rutte, ''Ich'', 332t; A slightly different argument is given in Anscombe's ''First Person",
142-144.
19. Russell,lnquiry, 108; Russell, Human Knowledge, 100.
20. Ibid., 100, 108.
21. Presented to me in personal communication.
22. Wittgenstein,BB, 67; Haller, "Unklarheiten", 255.
23. Ibid., 262
24. Chisholm, FirstPerson, 46.
25. Ibid., 32.
26. The first locution is in First Person, 27f. The other is suggested by Chisholm in The
Philosophy o/RoderickM Chisholm. The Library o/Living Philosophers, ed. by L. E. Hahn,
LaSalle, D.: Open Court (in press).
27. Similar conditions for the use of the first-person pronoun are presented in a more detailed and
slightly alternative way by Heiner Rutte in his paper "gber das Ich".
28. See Chisholm, FirstPerson, 25. '
29. See this paper above, especially footnote 6.
30. Jerrold J. Katz explains "it" as an expletive in the following way: "Expletives are dummy
elements which occur in grammatical structures different from those in which the ordinary
referential pronoun 'it' occurs" (''Descartes's Cogito", 175).
31. "First Person", 147. Cf. also Chisholm, First Person, 85-91; Chisholm, "Questions".
32. See ibid., 971t is important to note that this criterion holds only for a moment of time but not
for a period of time. But the problem of the unity of consciousness over a period of time is an
additional difficulty for both views.
33. For further criticism and comments see Chisholm, Metaphysics, 157-159; and Chisholm,
"Questions, 95-97.
34. See Russell, Human Knowledge, 93, 317-325.
35. Wittgenstein,Lectures, 21. Cf. also Wittgenstein, Vienna Circle,49t; and Wittgenstein,PR,
88f.
36. '244.
37. Ibid., '246.
38. Ibid., p. 188.
39. Ibid., p. 189.
40. Wittgenstein,BB, 67 and 68. Cf. Haller, "Bemerkungen", 363.
41. Wittgenstein,BB,68f.
42. Wittgenstein,BB,67f.
43. See Shoemaker, "Self-Reference" with his criticism of a perceptual model of self-knowledge.
44. Cf. Wittgenstein, LW, '187: "Certainly one cannot be deceived about immediate experience,
but not because it is certain."
45. See Chisholm, "Opening Address", 26.
46. A more detailed analysis of the entanglement in which Wittgenstein is involved when he
argues for the no-reference view is presented in Puhl, ''Wittgenstein on Self-Identification."
47. See also Haller, "Unldarheiten", 261.
48. Cf. Chisholm Metaphysics, 156, where he refers to Bernard Bolzano's definition of
substance.
49. Nietzsche, "Nachlajl", 480: "Oder gar das W6rtchen 'ich'. Eine Art von Perspektive im
Sehen wieder als Ursache des Sehens selbst zu setzen: das war das Kunststhck in der Erfindung
des 'Subjekts', des 'Ichs'!"
84 JOHANN MAREK
* For helpful suggestions and comments I wish to thank Roderick M. Chisholm, Klaus Puhl,
Heiner Rutte, and Rudolf Haller himself I am also grateful to Linda Radzik for helping me get
over some language difficulties.
REFERENCES
Anscombe, G. E. M., "The First Person", in: P. Yourgrau (ed.),Demonstratives, Oxford:

Oxford Univ. Press, 1990 [first publication 1975], 135-153.
Castaneda, Hector-Neri, "On the Phenomeno-Logic of the ro, in: Q. Cassam (ed.), Self-
Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994 [first publication 1969], 160-166.
Chisholm, Roderick, Person and Object, London: Allen & Unwin, 1976.
Chisholm, Roderick, The First Person, Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1981.
Chisholm, Roderick, "Opening Address", in: R. M. Chisholm et a1. (ed.), Philosophy o/Mind,
Philosophy o/Psychology, Proceedings of the 9th International Wittgenstein Symposium,
Vienna: H'lder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1985,25-27.
Chisholm, Roderick, "Questions about the Unity of Consciousness " , in: K. Cramer et a1. (ed.),
Theorie der Subjektivit"t, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987,95-101.
Chisholm, Roderick, On Metaphysics, Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1989.
Haller, Rudolf, "Unldarheiten hber das Ich. Oder: 'lch' ,Ludwig Wittgenstein", Revue
Intemationale de Philosophie 43 (1989),249-263.
Haller, Rudolf, "Bemerkungen zur Egologie Wittgensteins", in: B. McGuinness and R. Haller
(eds.), Wittgenstein in Focus - 1m Brennpunkt Wittgenstein, Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi,
1989 (,Grazer Philosophische Studien 33134), 353-373.
Haller, Rudolf, ''Ernst Mach: Das unrettbare lch", in: J. Speck (ed.), Grundprop!eme der
groBen Phi!osophen - Phi!osophie der Neuzeit V, G'ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1991,210-244.
Katz, Jerrold J., "Descartes's Cogito", in: P. Yourgrau (ed.), Demonstratives, Oxford: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1990 [first publication 1987], 154-181.
Mach, Erns~Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verh "llnis des Physischen zum
Psychischen, Reprint of the 9th edition, Jena: G. Fischer, 1922 (lst Ed. 1886), Darmstadt:
Wiss. Buchgesellschaft, 1985.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, "Aus dem NachlaS der Achtzigerjahre", in: K. Schlechta (ed.),Friedrich
Nietzsche. Werke in dreiB"nden. Dritter Band, Mhnchen: Hanser, 1956,415-925.
Puhl, Klaus, "Wittgenstein on Self-Identification", in: K. Puhl (ed.), Wittgensteins' s
Philosophy o/Mathematics, Proceedings 0/ the 15th International Wittgenstein-
Symposium, Part 2, Vienna: H'lder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1993,263-269.
Russell, Bertrand,An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1980 (1st
Ed. 1940).
Russell, Bertrand, Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits, London Routledge, 1992 (lst Ed.
1948).
Rutte, Heiner, "gber das lch", in: W. L. Gombocz, H. Rutte, W. Sauer (eds.), Traditionen und
Perspektiven der analytischen Phi!osophie. Festschriftfhr RudolfHaller, Wien: H'lder-
Pichler-Tempsky, 1989,322-342.
Shoemaker, Sydney, "Self-Reference and Self-Awareness", in: Q. Cassam (ed.), Self-
Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994 [first publication 1968],80-93.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, LudWig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, ed. B. F. McGuinness,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
Wittgenstein,Ludwig,Phi!osophica!Remarks, ed. R. Rhees, Oxford: Blackwell, 1975.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Wittgenstein ' s Lectures. Cambridge 1932-1985, ed. A. Ambrose,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: Blackwell, 1958.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967 (Reprint of the
2nd Ed. 1958, 1st. Ed.1953).
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Last Writings on the Philosophy o/Psychology, Vol. 1, ed. G. H. von
Wright and H. Nyman, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.
THOMAS E. UEBEL
FROM THE DUHEM THESIS TO THE NEURATH PRINCIPLE
We owe to Professor Haller the forceful reminder that the common habit of
designating a central plank of post-positivist philosophy of science, the "Duhem-
Quine Thesis", misses out a most important "positivist" link. To rectify the
situation Haller coined the expression the ''Neurath Principle".
Ifthere obtains an incompatibility between a sentence and the scientific system, that is, ultimately,
the entire edifice of science---whether this happens in the course of the change of one and the
same theory or in the comparison of different theories about the same subject matter-then there
are always two possibilities for restoring harmony, the agreement of sentence and system: either
one changes the relevant sentence or one changes the system. It explains in the most simple
fashion which possibilities are open for the change of the system; at the same time it makes clear
that the decision concerning how to uphold the consistency of the system depends on the
circumstances of the case at hand and is pragmatically determined. This Principle then leaves us
in no doubt that its application lies in the hands of the members of the republic of scholars and that
its application is therefore determined by circumstances which determine and cause the decisions
ofindividua1s and collectives. Later this principle was elaborated in its structural respects by Quine
and in its sociological respects by Kuhn, but ofNeurath nothing more was remembered than the
motto of the sailors who had to rebuild their ship on the open sea. 1
This "decisionism" and "holistic conventionalism" ofNeurath's is traced by

Haller to 1913, namely to Neurath's paper on the "Lost Wanderers of Descartes"
where it is clearly implied that all statements-even the data statements of
science-are revisable. 2
The question I'd like to pursue today is simple: how did Neurath arrive at the
Principle Haller named after him?3
To begin with, we may note that Haller's dating is supported by the fact that
Neurath's famous simile of the sailors repairing their boat on the open
sea--surely a motto of radical antifoundationalism-made its fIrst appearance
also in his writings of the same year, in 1913-long before, that is, its famous
deployment in the Vienna Circle's protocol sentence debate and even its use in
Neuratb's devastating critique of Spengler published in 1921. Our question thus
can be put as follows: what enabled Neurath to arrive at the position expressed
by his famous metaphor (hereafter, "the Boat") already at the early date of 1913?
Here we must first note that, together with Hans Hahn and Philipp Frank,
Neurath belonged to what Haller elsewhere called the "First Vienna Circle".4
This group met between 1907 and 1912 and discussed, amongst other things, the
87
88 THOMAS E. UEBEL
views of the French Conventionalists Poincare, Duhem and Rey and their ability
to help in updating their basically Machian perspective on the philosophy of
science. s With great plausibility then, Haller pointed to the debt which the
Newath Principle owes to the "insight, derived from Poincare and Duhem, 'that
more than one self-consistent system of hypotheses can satisfy a given set of
facts. ,,,6 Is the Neurath Principle then simply a version of the Duhem thesis that
"An experiment in physics can never condemn an isolated hypothesis but only
a whole theoretical group"?7
That Haller did not claim. Of course, since, according to the Duhem Thesis,
no theoretical hypothesis in physics could ever be isolated so as to be submitted
to a crucial experiment, there obtains the underdetermination of physical theory
by data. Neurath shared this view. But note that for Duhem, his thesis applied
to physics specifically, not to all the sciences8 ; moreover, for Duhem, his thesis
deferred to the test of a group of hypotheses, not all of the pronouncements of
all the sciences.9 On'both counts, the Duhem Thesis differs from the Quine
Thesis (or the Duhem-Quine Thesis as commonly understood). Finally there is
the fact that for the Conventionalists, unlike for Quine, it is possible that we
should be "certain" of "raw facts": antifoundationalism of theory can be
accompanied by foundationalism of data.1O Significantly, Quine's views are
shared-or anticipated-by Neurath. Irrespective then of whether Quine's own
thinking was influenced by Neurath directly, we may thus view the Neurath
Principle in analogy to Duhem-Quine Thesis, namely as a further development
of the Duhem Thesis proper. Quite consistent with Haller's explorations so far
we can thus rephrase my question about Neurath thus: how did he get from the
Duhem Thesis to the Neurath Principle?
The general thesis I wish to defend is that it was Neurath's (for the Vienna
Circle distinctive) training in the social sciences and his reflection on their
various methodological disputes, and especially his familiarity with the work of
the then "new" German sociologists, especially Ferdinand Tonnies, that enabled
his early embrace of the radical antifoundationalism denoted by the Boat. ll My
question today concerns one aspect of this general thesis, for the Neurath
Principle directly concerns just one of three types of antifoundationalism that
fmd expression in that metaphor: descriptive antifoundationalism. In addition
there are also Neurath's antifoundationalisms in the normative and
metatheoretical domains. In these respects Neurath's grounding in the social
sciences of his day had tangible consequences as well, but given my narrower
topic here, however, these matters can only be mentioned in passing. I begin
with Neurath's position of 1910 and its mixture of Machianism and
Conventionalism; following a sketch of relevant aspects of Duhem's view I will
then discuss Neurath's innovations, his, as it were, horizontal and vertical
extensions of the Duhem's holism.
FROM THE DUHEM THESIS 89
In 1910 Neurath published a long review essay on Wilhelm Wundt's 3-part

Logik. At the time three years past his dissertation without a university position
in sight, Neurath used the occasion to present his own conception of scientific
metatheory and of economics. Neurath's review is interesting for us because it
marks certain ambiguities in Neurath's early programme for a general theory of
science. Well on his way to the radical antifoundationallsm as expressed in his
boat metaphor, crucial steps remained to be taken. OneMachian theme stands
out in this review: the unity of science. Unlike for some of his predecessors, for
Neurath the exact form of the unity of the science was to emerge from a close
investigation of all of the individual sciences. 12
And even though the demarcation of the individual sciences was not yet a
settled matter, Neurath stated some defInite theses concerning first-order
theories. The most immediately striking is that any scientifIc hypothesis can be
judged for its correctness only holistically: theories are judged in their entirety.13
N eurath also follows the Conventionalists' stress on the formal and abstract
nature of scientifIc theories. ScientifIc theories search out their objects in their
historical reality, yet consider them not only in their actual confIguration but also
in their possible ones: modal reasoning was an integral part of science. 14 It
followed that the distinction of practical and theoretical science was a false one.
All science is theoretical. 1s (That theory construction and choice must be
understood pragmatically was yet another matter.)
The "understanding that science is a unity"16 was to be promoted by a
"universal science" which would investigate "the foundations of the sciences in
general".17 What is the nature of this "foundational" inquiry? Universal science
was a descriptive and normative second-order inquiry which, of course, could not
be pursued in isolation from the fIrst-order sciences. Neurath advised universal
scientists to proceed in their descriptive work with the historical perspective
pioneered by Mach and Duhem: abstract concepts and principles must be
investigated in their development from the problems in response to which they
were originally devised. 1s Yet these descriptive studies were expected to yield
normative consequences: "A more general comprehensive research will set down
the common principles. "19 In other words, universal science corresponded to the
metatheoretical part of his later "unifIed science" which comprehended both
fIrst- and second-order theories. C
Already in his 1910 programme then, scientific metatheory bore a distinctly

Neurathlan cast: universal science was a historically located, collective enterprise
with a practical intent. What role did holism play in it?
90 THOMAS E. UEBEL
It is a great task to comprehend as far as possible the complete order of life

and to reduce as many relations as possible to simpler principles. Without doubt
one cannot always proceed step by step, often one will have to try to apply a
whole system or relations immediately, just as in the case of physics; there one
does not hold true one theoty after another and so increase the knowledge already
gained, rather, the system itself is often called into question. The biggest
difficulty consists in isolating individual inquiries while at the same time not
losing sight of the remaining connections. One must always know how long it
is useful to hold on to an entire system of theoty and to explain a certain fact by
auxiliaty hypotheses, and when it is, on the contraty, more useful to remodel the
entire system. 20
If all scientific theories can be considered only in their entirety, then all
scientific judgements must be holistic judgements.
Several important questions arise for our present inquity at this point for
which the text does not provide answers. First, what were Neurath's reasons for
extending Duhem's conclusions to rul sciences? Second, how radical was
Neurath's anti-foundationalism at this early stage? Was he prepared-as he was
three years later in 1913-to reject observation reports that contradicted a
theaty's predictions instead of changing the theoty? It seems not. In the face of
recalcitrant experience we can either choose to amend the system as it is or to
remodel it in its entirety. Both choices, it seems, leave the observation
unchallenged. So we need to ask what Neurath's reasons were to also radicalize
Duhem's antifoundationalism.
Neurath's Boat both extended Duhem's holism and radicalised his anti-
foundationalism. Neurath's holism is often regarded as a mere co~equence of
Duhem's underdetermination thesis. Yet Neurath himself claimed:'
Poincare, Duhem and others have adequately shown that even if we have
agreed on the protocol statements, there is an unlimited number of equally
applicable, possible systems of hypotheses. We have extended this tenet of the
indetermination of hypotheses to all statements, including protocol statements
that are alterable in principle. 21
It is important for understanding how the Neurath Principle was arrived at in
1913 to understand why he was right to make this claim. (There is still more to
this claim when Neurath made it in 1934.22) To see Neurath's moves, we must
briefly consider Duhem's own views.
According to Frank, the First Vienna Circle criticised Mach's failure to see
that the mathematical mode of expression of symbolic systems allows for the
formulation of high-level hypotheses whose correctness cannot be

experimentally tested. The Conventionalists did better. Duhem and Poincare
proclaimed the irreducibility of high-level postulates and hypotheses and
opposed reductionism with their holistic conception of scientific theories.
Duhem insisted that high-level hypotheses had to stand the test of experience,
even though there existed no crucial experiments whose outcome would force the
theorist's hand in rejecting particular hypotheses.
Duhem's holism depends on his view oflanguage of science. Duhem placed
increased emphasis on the mathematisation of physical science and investigated
its consequences. "A physical theoty ... is a system of mathematical
propositions, deduced from a small nwnber of principles, which aim to represent
as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental
laws. "23
Within the formulation of physical theories, Duhem distinguished three levels
of abstraction from evetyday observation and two types of cases in which the
detennination of scientific theoty formulation by "the evidence" fails. Physical
theoty correlates with evetyday observation ("practical facts"), first, a level of
mathematical formulations in terms of measurable quantities ("theoretical
facts"), second, a level on which these "theoretical facts" were systematised by
means of equally mathematically formulated laws ("experimental laws", often
caIled "phenomenal laws"), and, third, a level on which these experimental laws
themselves are systematised and unified in a theoty encompassing various sub-
fields ofinquity (what he and Poincare called "hypotheses"). The two cases of
the failure of determination are "the indetermination of theoretical facts and
practical facts,,24. and the underdetermination of a theoty's hypotheses by
experimental laws. The first failure springs from the logic of scientific language,
the second from the logic of theoty testing.
The first failure of determination oftheoty formulation is due to a difference
in the linguistic frameworks within which practical and theoretical facts are
comprehended. For Duhem, the (mutual) indetermination of practical fact and
theoretical fact thus results from the fact that intuitive and mathematical
conceptualisations are each embedded in different types of representational
frameworks: one defines terms individually, the second logically by axioms. Nor
can the meanings of the terms of the scientific language proper be fixed by
postulating a determinate correspondence between them and an isolatable feature
of experience, because scientific terms are far more precise than the vague terms
of practical observation, "evetyday testimony". Still, Duhem hoped that this
indetermination could be overcome by ever closer approximations of
experimental measurement The underdetermination of theoty that holds for the
hypotheses that unify experimental laws is different. For Duhem testing was
governed by the principle that "the physicist who carries out an experiment, or
92 THOMAS E. UEBEL
gives a report of one, implicitly recognises the accuracy of a whole group of

theories. "25
Nothing in the logical structure of the theory can thus stop scientists from
shifting the weight of the experimental contradiction away from the disputed
hypothesis to another one also employed. This phenomenon of
underdetermination was not to be overcome by improved experimental methods.
Given underdetermination, it may seem that Duhem too held that "any
statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough
adjustments elsewhere in the system". 26 Yet it is not at all clear whether Duhem
did give up on any and all foundations. What speaks against the view that
Duhem denied foundations to all scientific knowledge is, first, that he made his
holistic claims only for theoretical physics. More importantly, however, Duhem
did not cast doubt on the well-foundedness of natural language. Indeed, the
certainty he ascribed to "everyday testimony"27 suggests that Duhem saw
physical theory as a special case of uncertainty. We need not pursue Duhem's
views further here. It is enough to see that for close readers like those in the
First Vienna Circle, the question of the extent of the foundationlessness in
science could arise.
We can now ask what enabled Neurath both to extend Duhem's holism and
to radicalise his anti-foundationalism. I begin with Neuraths horizontal
extension ·of Duhem's holism to all sciences. Like his normative anti-
foundationalism-where he followed Simmel, Tennies and Weber on the issue
of value-freedom (unconditional value-statements are excluded from scientific
discourse)--this extension reflects his deep background in pre-WWl German
and Austrian social science. His training led him to realise that all scientific
theories make use of an abstract conceptual apparatus. Tennies' sociology
provides one example. It was divided into a 'pure' and an 'applied' sociology.
His Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft was an example of pure sociology in which
he attempted to provide an abstract reconstruction of social relations.28 Social
relations are imperceivable by the senses. The task is to analyse them into their
component parts and to "represent these elements by concepts, irrespective of
whether their pure form ever attains reality. "29
Tennies started from a psychological standpoint and employed two pairs of
theoretical constructs as his guiding notions. The pair "natural organic will" and
"artificial reflective will" organise the motivations and legitimations entering into
the two broad categories of social relations, relations of "community"
(Gemeinschaft) and "society" (Gesellschaft), and their various mixed modes.
By means of these abstract concepts Tonnies sought to describe and explain the
process Weber later called the "rationalisation" of life. This pure sociology
needs to be complemented by empirical studies: applied sociology. In these
studies the concepts of pure sociology are applied to order the mass of data.
Simmel's work provides the second example. His "formal" sociology
consists in the analysis of social forms, be they those of specific configurations
(like institutions of church and state) or of general forms of social interaction
(such ascompetition, imitation).30
Like Tonnies (and Durkheim), Simmel held that social relations are not
"inutitive".31 Simmel suggested that society be thought of as a structure of
reciprocal relations and effects (Wechselwirkung) that did not simply happen in,
but constituted, society and its socialised individuals through the process of
"sociation" (Vergesellschaftung). Simmel distinguished between the "form" and
"content" of these sociations. "Content" is whatever is required to realise a
social relation, i.e., persons, their interests, etc. Their reciprocal relation creates
and sustains the categorically distinct "form" by a process of "compression" or
"solidification" (Verdichtung).32 The forms of sociation-"the embodiment of
social energy in structures which exist and develop beyond the individual"33-are
defined in terms that abstract from the particular individuals who enter into the
relations. These abstract terms allow for the classification of apparently
disparate social phenomena.
Whatever the details and, for Neurath, even objectionable features of their
versions of ideal-type theories, Tonnies' and Simmel's (and Weber's)
sociologies demonstrate a need for abstract concepts in the social sciences not
unsimilarto that in· the natural sciences. Not only Austrian economics but also
the "new" German sociologists encouraged Neurath's conclusion that all sciences
posses (or can possess) an abstract vocabulary and that therefore all sciences
exhibit the holism-and the underdetermmation-attributed to physical theory
by Duhem. The task set for the philosophy of social science was not different
in kind from that of the philosophy of physics.
That tells us why Neurath extended Duhem's holism to all sciences already
by 1910. But was Neurath already then prepared to reject observation reports
that contradicted a theory's predictions instead of changing them? Did he
already then assert the Neurath Principle", that confronted with a recalcitrant
observation sentence we must chose either "to change the sentence to be
integrated or to change the system"?34 This is the view Neurath expressed in
1913:
94 THOMAS E. UEBEL
Whoever wants to create a world-picture or a scientific system must operate with doubtful
premisses. Each attempt to create a world-picture by starting from a tabula rasa and making a
series of statements starting with ones recognised as definitely true is necessarily full of trickeries. 35
Here Neurath was clearly committed to radical antifoun-dationalism: ifno

sentences are certain, then observation sentences are not certain and unrevisable
either! In 1910 Neurath conceived of the choices differently. Neurath's view
then was closer to Duhem's than his own position in 1913.
Suppose we accept Duhem's argument for underdetermination and also his
argument for the indetermination of theoretical by practical fact. The only
conceivable way now to provide any kind of foundation would be to hold that
common sense language is well-founded in the required sense or to hold that,
somehow or other, the operational definitions for theoretical tenns are tied
directly to experience without any symbolisation interfering. Both strategies fail.
The fIrst-holding natUral language to be well-founded-fails because just as
the language of science is unable to disclose bare reality, so the language of
common sense fails to provide anything but make-shift conceptualisations of the
world of experience. Since all conceptualisations are interest-relative, as already
Mach had pointed out,36 the tenns of "everyday observation" that are embedded
in customary practical ways of life are surely no less interest-laden than those of
scientifIc languages. The second strategy for avoiding all-out anti-
foundationalism-tying operational defInitions for theoretical tenns directly to
experience-presupposes per impossibile that we can get at experience in the
raw. Ifthese two points are accepted, then uncertainty pervades science, both at
its abstract hypothetical and its concrete observational end. When he realized
this, so my contention, Neurath arrived at his Boat.
There is a difference between the Duhem Thesis and the Neurath Principle:
the fonner left "practical facts" intact, whereas the latter questioned them. What
then is needed over and above Duhem's Thesis to legitimate the Neurath-
principle? The answer is: antifoundationalism at the level of practical fact. That
observation is in some sense "theory-laden" follows only once it is accepted that
none of our observation reports present raw data, but only conceptualisations
thereof (and that these are fallible). This presupposes that knowledge be thought
of as something essentially linguistic and not reducible to the experiential. The
next step on Neurath's path is plain: to conceptualise obserlration and
theoreticize common sense.
When N eurath denied that ordinary language can provide foundations for
knowledge claims and realized that there is no other starting point possible
besides natural language, he was supported in his convictions by Tonnies'
conception oflanguage. Tonnies' semiotics were presented in his Welby Prize
essay of 1899-1900 (published in the Gennan original in 1906). While I cannot
give a precise date for it, I'd like to suggest that Neurath adopted Tonnies'
semiotics as he continued to work on foundational problems of the sciences.3?
Tonnies' semiotics incorporate the Machian economy of thought and the
"economyoflanguage".38 All thought depends on signs; common and scientific
concepts are symbolising instruments. "Thought ... is for the main part
recollection of signs, and by means of signs of other things which are denoted. 1139
Given our present concern with the descriptive foundations of language, we must
ask how well these symbols are grounded in reality.
Tonnies distinguished between "natural" and "artificial" signs.
[O]ut of articulate sounds arise almost exclusively the completely different genus of signs which
we oppose to natural signs as being artificial signs. Here there is no longer any natural relation or
bond between the sign and that which it signifies; it is the human will alone which produces the
relation of ideal association through which the word becomes sign of the thing, as also the relation
through which writing becomes sign of the word, and the letter-unit becomes sign of the sound-
unit.40
In so far as thought requires learned conceptualisations, a 'natural' relation no

longer obtains between sign and signified, but only a 'willed' one. Discursive
thought required artificial signs.
Artificial signs must be distinguished as either private or social signs,
depending on whether they possess their meaning "according to the will of one
or more persons". A private sign is understood by one person alone, a social
sign is also understood by others. Social life consists in the habitual shared use
of signs, social signs: "the social will ... expresses itself in them and settles and
gives to them their meaning. "41
Social will is formed by custom or by rational deliberation. 42 Mutual
understanding is "a kind of constructive effort" on the part of interpreters: "for
mutual understanding a common idea-system is as necessaty as a common sign-
system".43 Artifical, that is, linguistic sign systems are either shaped and
preserved by tradition or conventionally agreed upon or determined. Natural
languages are forms of the former; artificial languages forms of the latter.
A private sign is one whose meaning is willed in contrast to, or in absence of,
previous customaty determination. "But all such systems of private signs, like
writing itself, presuppose an existing language, and refer to it, so that they
represent signs of signs. "44 No sign could be essentially private for Tonnies.
Any private or "subjective" meaning of artificial sign systems is "essentially
conditioned ... by the meaning which they have in regular usage". 45 (There were
no private natural signs, of course.) Natural language is a social sign system; its
meaning is learned in a social context. The need for a shared background of
understanding against which any non-customaty meanings can be determined is
96 THOMAS E. UEBEL
also brought out by the case of scientific languages. Science depends on the
possession of a conventionally determined system of artificial signs. It "forms
its concepts, exclusively for its own ends, as mere things of thought. "46 The
determination of the meaning of scientific concepts is not to be confused with the
unearthing of customarily accepted meanings. 47 Its meanings are conventionally
determined by agreed definition,
T onnies' semiotics did not provide thought with any recourse that would
enable it to deal with private signs alone. Natural language use is something that
humans grow into and that does not, in that process, receive critical scrutiny.
From Tonnies' own "terminological" efforts it is plain that natural language
provides no foundations for knowledge on its own-it stands itself in need of
clarification. Insofar as science creates its concepts anew, it either had to fInd
its own foundations (if there are any) or rely on the foundationless natural
language. It is clear that T onnies' semiotics fit well with a basically Machian
outlokk and usefully correct Duhem's implied views on natural language.
The significance of Tonnies' semiotics for Neurath can be swnmarised in two
points. First, all thought (of any relevance to science) is regarded as symbolic
and linguistically based. Second, language is social: "Words are essentially and
according to the law of their development social signs"; "private signs ...
presuppose an existing language".48 To hold that language is social,means that
thinking, insofar as it relies on language, depends on traditional concept
formations. Neurath concluded that even ordinary observation cannot provide
raw data but only conceptualised ones. Theories are not tested against bare
observations, but their conceptualisations. Being in this sense "theory-laden"
they can b~ rejected in principle for they are not rock bottom either. Natural
language meanings, we may say, are themselves Verdichtungen.
But perhaps that rough common language could be suitably clarified?
Neurath's 1913 reasoning rules this out Neurath noted that "the phenomena we
encounter are so much inter-connected that they cannot be described by a one-
dimensional chain of statements. "49 Neurath's talk of multi-dimensionality holds
the key to the following passage:
The correctness of each statement is related to that of all others. It is absolutely impossible to
formulate a single statement about the world without at the same time making tacit use of
countless others. Nor can we express any statement without applying all our preceeding concept
formation. On the one hand we must state the connection of each statement dealing with the
world with all other statements that deal with it. and on the other hand we must state the
connection of each train of thought with all our earlier trains of thought. We can vary the world
of concepts within us, but we cannot discard it. Each attempt to renew it from the bottom up is
by its very nature a child of the concepts at hand. 50
Duhem's holism of theory is clearly alluded to, but Neurath has added a
simple but powerful psychological observation about thinking. Nowadays,
philosophers are familiar with the insight that we cannot call into question all our
knowledge at once. Neurath formulated much the same thought in pointing to
the need for reliance on preceding concept formation. As a consequence a
theorist is faced with two, as it were, "holisms". Not only can theories only be
confIrmed as wholes at anyone time, but our thinking at anyone time also
depends on the thinking that came before. ScientifIc thinking can only be
understood by recognising its temporal dependence. Any thinking depends upon
at least some concepts not subject to scrutiny at the time.
Taken together, the considerations concerning the holistic nature oflanguage
and the historical conditioning of thought frustrate all foundationalist ambitions.
The latter in particular placed the cultural determinants of thinking in the
foreground, as did Tonnies's semiotics. "Everyday testimony" cannot provide
foundations for knowledge claims, nor can the ordinary, socially shared natural
language be by-passed. Neurath's move from the Duhem Thesis to the Neurath
Principle reflects his recognition of the historical conditioning of all cognition.
In addition to his early descriptive anti-foundationalism, Neurath also rejected

normative foundations (objective values) and metatheoretical ones (in particular,
ideal-type methodology and the strategy of grounding conventionalism by
evolutionary biology).51 He concluded:
We are never in the position to place eertain indisputable sentences at the very top and then clearly
and accurately display the whole chain of ideas, be it in logic or in physics, in biology or in
philosophy. That which is unsatisfactory seeps through the whole of the· realm of ideas, it is
detectable in the first premises as in the later ones. It is of no use to be careful and supposedly
renounce knowledge already gained in order to proeeed from a tabula rasa and improve things
heneeforth. as Descartes had the audacity to try. Such attempts only end with rough masquerades
of insight which tend to be worse than all that preceded them. We cannot but declare truthfully
that the current stste of knowledge has been presupposed and that we shall try to improve matters
by making changes here and there. Our thinking is of neeessity full of tradition, we are children
of our time, even if we fight against it as we may; there are only ages which recognise this more
clearly than others. What good did it do for Kant to try to tear himself away? Despite his eminent
genius we epigones are often able to show how some of his trains of thought can only be explained
by referenee to the thinking of his contemporaries and elders, but impossibly so by referenee to an
unprejudiced view ofthe world. We are like sailors who are forced to reconstruct totally their boat
on the open sea with beams they carry along, by replacing beam for beam and thus changing the
form of the whole. Sinee they cannot land they are never able to pull apart the ship entirely in
order to build it anew. The new ship emerges from the old through a proeess of continuous
transformation. 52
98 THOMAS E. UEBEL
Neurath's first Boat clearly reflects the reasoning that, I suggest, went into the
Neurath Principle. Given the constancy of the Boat's antifoundationalist
message throughout its uses, we may thus begin to see how the Neurath Principle
was able to work its influence, as it were, behind the curtains of the public
history of analytical philosophy on the beginnings of post-positivist theory of
SClence.
The London School ofEconomics and Political Science
NOTES
1. Haller 1979 [1991], p. 38; cf. 1977 [1991], p. 29.

2. Haller 1982 [1991], pp. 120-121.
3. For Neurath's naturalism' in the Vienna Circle and its development see Uebel 1992.
4. Haller 1985.
5. Frank 1941, 1949.
6. Haller 1982 [1991], p. 122.
7. Duhem 1906 [1962], p. 183.
8. Vuillemin 1979, p. 599.
9. Gillies 1993, pp. 111.
10. Haller 1993, p. 52.
11. For biographical and doctrinal dtails see Uebel (part II) in Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel 1996.
12. Neurath 1910 [1981], p. 25-26.
13. Ibid., p. 44/45.
14. Ibid., p. 29.
15. Ibid. .
16. Ibid., p. 45.
17. Ibid.,p.24.
18. Ibid., p. 27.
19. Ibid., p. 45.
20. Ibid., p. 44/5.
21. Neurath 1934 [1983], p. 105, trans!. of "UnbestimmtheU" changed from "uncertainty" to
"indetermination" and "not a limited number" to "unlimited number".
22. See Cartwright and Cat (part III) in Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel 1996.
23. Duhem 1906 [1962], p. 19.
24. Ibid., p. 144ff.
25. Ibid., p. 183.
26. Quine 1951 [1980], p. 43
27. Duhem 1906 [1962], p. 163.
28. TOnnies 1887.
29. TOnnies 1907, pp. 8-10.
30. Sirnme11890, 1908. On Simmel see, e.g., Liebersohn 1988 and Rammstedt 1988.
31. Simmel1908 [1992], p. 37.
32. Simmel1890 [1989], p.134, cf. 1898 [1992], p. 315 and 1908 [1992], pp. 604, 608.
33. Simmel1908 [1991], p. 15.
34. Haller 1982.

35. Neurath 1913b [1983], p. 3; trans!. amended.
36. Mach 1883 [1909], p. 507.
37. TOnnies 1899-1900. Late in his career, Neurath recollected its importance to his longstanding
preoccupation with questions ofthe language of scientific theories (1941a [1983], p. 217). It first
acquainted him with 'tenninology' which he regarded as primary even to the disciplines of syntsx,
semantics and pragmatics, because "it introduces the terms which are used in these disciplines"
(1941b [1981], p. 919). In a letter of29 January 1922 to TonniesNeurath recounted rereading
his writings, amongst them Terminologie.
38. TOnnies 1899-1900, p. 312. TOnnies endorsed the economy of thought as a regulative
principle of thought and justified by its means the contention that "all pure science refers
exclusively to [abstract] objects of thought" (1887:xxiii), i.e., ideal types.
39. Tonnies 1899/1900, pp. 293.
40. Ibid., p. 297.
41. Ibid., pp. 297-98.
42. Ibid., p. 305.
43. Ibid., pp. 299-300.
44. Ibid., p. 315.
45. Ibid., p. 326.
46. Ibid., p. 319.
47. Ibid., p. 32l.
48. Ibid., pp. 297-8 and 315.
49. Neurath 1913b [1983], p. 3.
50. See Uebel (part ll) in Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and Uebel 1996.
51. See Uebel (part ll) in Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and Uebel 1996.
52. Neurath 19138, p. 456-7.
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Vuillemin, J., 1979, "On Duhem's and Quine's Theses", Grazer Philosophische Studien 9, pp.
69-96.
JAAKKO HINTIKKA
THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN

WITTGENSTEIN AND HUSSERL
Most of my colleagues these days seem to assume that they know well enough
what the major thinkers meant who created the contemporary philosophy.
Among these philosophers, the two figuring in my title, Wittgenstein and
Husserl, loom particularly large. Over the years I have come to believe that
my colleagues are wrong and that we have not fully grasped the import of the
philosophy of the likes of Hussed and Wittgenstein. I have also come to
believe that in trying to understand the founding fathers of twentieth-century
philosophy comparative studies are extremely useful. Of course comparisons
alone will not do the whole job. One of the reasons why Hussed and
Wittgenstein have not been appreciated better is that the philosophical issues
themselves with which they were struggling have not really been mastered.
We have been unable to place the ideas of a Hussed or a Wittgenstein on the
map of the relevant concepts, problems and issues because we have not
succeeded in mapping the relevant philosophical landscape in the first place.
It is not that philosophers have not discussed major figures like Hussed or
even their relations to other thinkers and other scl\ools. Right down my alley
in this paper one can :find extensive works like Manfred Sommer's Husserl und
der jrt[he Positivlsmus (1985). But typically such works traffic in theses,
doctrines, schools and ready-made systems and not in concepts; problems,
attempted solutions and arguments. As a consequence, they miss far too often
the real dynamics of philosophy, both the dialectic of its development and the
internal tensions that are there often within a single philosopher's work.
In this paper, I will show by means of examples how we can improve our
grasp of the basic problems and ideas of contemporary philosophy through a
careful analysis of their role in major philosophies like Husser! and
Wittgenstein jointly with an analysis of their systematic import.
To begin with a specific question, why do I bracket Wittgenstein and
Hussed together? The answer is simple: they were both phenomenologists.
Wittgenstein is reported to have uttered: "You can say of my work that it is
'phenomenology'." (Cf. Spiegelberg 1982.) And in his notebooks from 1929
on (MSS 105-107, von Wright) he frequently speaks of phenomenology and
initially identifies his philosophical task as a construction of a purely
phenomenological language. Why, then, has this been ovedooked? One
reason is a failure to realize that Wittgenstein means what he says. He is
101
102 JAAKKO HINTIKKA
envisaging a philosophically privileged language which faithfully captures what

is directly given to me, so to speak the given, the whole of the given and
nothing but the given. And while that is not all that is involved in
phenomenology, it is an important and central kind of phenomenological
enterprise.
But even the happy few among Wittgenstein commentators who have
realized their role of phenomenology and phenomenological language in the
Wittgenstein of the 1929 vintage have usually dismissed it as a short passing
episode in the saga of Wittgenstein's philosophical development. In doing so,
they have missed the first and foremost point about Wittgenstein's development
and about his early philosophy.
The phenomenological philosophy Wittgenstein is taOdng about in 1929 is
the philosophy of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein's famous book is, I can say
without stretching the term, an exercise in phenomenology. The ideal
language envisaged in the Tractatus is ideal precisely in that it captures
faithfully what is given to me. The simple objects postulated there are
therefore the objects of my immediate experience, that is to say,
phenomenological objects. The world according to the early Wittgenstein is
the world of phenomenological objects. Massive evidence for this conclusion
is assembled in chapter 3 of Hintikka and Hintikka (1986).
I will mention only one item of this evidence here. It is the fact that
Wittgenstein even has a designated term for phenomenological objects.
Unfortunately, the force of this term in Wittgenstein's writings has not been
fully appreciated, perhaps in part because he avoided the telltale word
"phenomenological". Wittgenstein's term for a phenomenological object is the
German word Aspekt. It is, not unexpectedly, usually translated into English
as "aspect". This translation is not so much incorrect as misleading. The
reason is that the English word is further ahead in its parallel semantical
development than its German cognate. The German word has still a stronger
element of the old sense which in English is illustrated by the OED example
''he is a man of stern aspect". Here the man in question does not only display
a stern side to us. Sternness is a property of the entire phenomenological
object that he presents to us. This meaning of "aspect" has in English receded
into semantical history, but it is still alive in Wittgenstein's German. We
cannot understand Wittgenstein without taking it into account. At an especially
crucial junction of his philosophical line of thought he writes, speaking of
figures that can be seen in two different ways:
I might for instance ask the question: When I said to myself "What at one time appears
to me like this, at another.. .", did I recognize the two aspects, this and that, as the same
which I got on previous occasions? Or were they new to me and I tried to remember them
for future occasions? Or was all that I meant to say "I can change the aspect of this figure"?
THE IDEA IN PHENOMENOLOGY 103
The danger of delusion which we are in becomes most clear if we propose to ourselves
to give the aspects 'this' and 'that' names, say A and B. (The Brown Book, pp. 171-172.)
Wittgenstein's self-confessed mistake is not that "this" and "that" refer to

mcets of objects, but that they refer to objects and hence can be given names.
These alleged objects obviously are not physical objects, but phenomenological
ones. In other words, Wittgenstein's mistake lies precisely where I am
suggesting that it does. Wittgenstein's usage elsewhere conforms to, and
confirms, this reading of his "Aspekt".
If this perspective on the TractaJus still strikes you as contrived, I can make
it more acceptable by putting it in a wide historical framework. In an earlier
paper (Hintikka 1995) I have pointed out a remarkable parallelism between
Husserlian phenomenology and Russell's one time theory of acquaintance.
Both speak of reduction, Russell of reduction to acquaintance and Husserl of
phenomenological reductions. Russellian knowledge by acquaintance
corresponds in Husserl to what he calls intuitive knowledge. Both
philosophers acknowledge objects of direct experience other than perceptual
ones. Indeed, in Russell's posthumously published Theory of Knowledge
(1913) we even find a neat counterpart to Husserl's categorial intuition, to wit,
the idea that logical forms are among the objects of acquaintance.
Furthermore, the Russellian construction of objects of description from the
objects of acquaintance corresponds in Husserl to constitution; and so on.
Now it is (or at least ought to be) beyond reasonable doubt that
Wittgenstein's Tractatus is historically speaking nothing but a variant of
Russell's theory of acquaintance. Hence, the, pa,rtial analogy with Husserl can
be extended from Russell to the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus.
I have rehearsed the reasons for these interpretations earlier, and I do not
want to repeat the evidence here. I will not comment extensively, either, on
the reasons why many philosophers have failed to see this deep kinship
between Husserl, Russell and Wittgenstein. Prominent among the sources of
this failure is a failure to grasp the meaning of such crucial terms as
"phenomenology" (which is mistakenly confused with phenomenalism) and
"intuition" (which is wrongly thought of implying a special mental source of
insights). The former confusion may be partly explained, although not
excused, by the loose earlier (pre-191O) usage in which no sharp distinction
was made terminologically between phenomenalism and phenomenology. (Cf.
Blackmore 1995, pp. 30-32.) It may even be the case that Mach was guilty of
assimilating the two to each other. All this does not eliminate the distinction,
however, as applied to the likes of Boltzmann, Husserl or Wittgenstein.
One way of highlighting the kinship of Husserl and Wittgenstein qua
phenomenologists is to point out that in all likelihood their use of the term
104 JAAKKO HINTIKKA
"phenomenology" and their ideas of what phenomenology is had a common

source. It has not always been recognized that the term "phenomenology" had
an established usage in the early decades of this century in the philosophy of
physics. It was used there, not as any sort of synonym of "phenomenalism" ,
but as a label for a view according to which physics ought to deal only with
observable variables and to forsake all use of purely theoretical concepts. No
reference to Hegelian or peculiarly Husserlian phenomenology is involved.
This is the way the term "phenomenology" is used among others by Boltzmann,
Planck and Einstein, to list only a few physicists whose writings attracted a
wide readership.
A typical use of the adjective "phenomenological" is found in
thermodynamics, where a phenomenological approach was contrasted to a
statistical approach. The former operated only with directly measurable
variables, such as pressure, temperature, volume etc., whereas in the
statistical approach thermodynamic phenomena were treated as statistical
manifestations of the movements of a large number of unobservable atoms and
molecules. This example illustrates vividly the fact that a "phenomenological"
theory in physics has nothing to do with phenomenalism.
To some extent, a parallel use of the term "phenomenology" was current in
the philosophy of psychology. The main difference is merely that in
psychology (and in the philosophy of psychology) the distinction between
phenomenology and phenomenalism is more easily overlooked than in physics.
Mach describes his project of a phenomenological science e.g. in (1898,
especially p. 250).
In both af these two directions, the most prominent "phenomenologist" was
Ernst Mach. It was this phenomenological approach of his that prompted his
tenacious attempt to exorcise atomism from physics.
Now Husserl acknowledges himself that his phenomenology is a
continuation and a radicalization of Mach's phenomenology. In his
Amsterdam lectures we read (Husseriiana, vol.IX, pp.302-303):
Around the turn of the century there grew out of the struggle of philosophy and psychology
for a strictly scientific method a new science, hand in hand with a new method of
philosophical and psychological research. The new science was called phenomenology, the
reason being that it, and its new method arose through a certain radicalization of the
phenomenological method that had earlier been propagated and used by individual natural
scientists and psychologists. The gist [Sinn] of this method, as it was used by men like Mach
and Hering, consisted in a reaction against the bottomless theorization that threatened the 80-
called "exact" sciences. It was a reaction against theorization that used unintuitive
conceptualizations and mathematical speculations ...
Hussed makes it clear that he is talking here about natural sciences like
physics and of their philosophy by adding:
Parallel to this we find some psychologists, in the first place Brentano, striving to create
systematically a strictly scientific psychology based on pure inner experience and on a strict
description of what is given in it ...
HUSserl recognizes also the terminological continuity between his own thinking
and that of his "phenomenological" predecessors:
Hence the radicalization of these methodological developments (which incidentally were

often already called phenomenological) was ... what led to a new methodology of purely
psychological [psychischJ research ...
The authority of these pronouncements is enhanced by the fact that they are
expansions of the first paragraph of Husserl' s famous Encyclopedia Britannica
article (op. cit. p.237). They leave no room whatsoever for doubting that
Hussed saw his phenomenology as a continuation and radicalization of the
methodological views of philosophers of physics like Mach. In particular,
there is little doubt at the very least that the term "phenomenology" had the
same basic meaning for Husserl and the "phenomenologists" like Mach in the
philosophy of physics.
In general, the ubiquitous role of the idea of phenomenology in the
philosophy of science of Mach's and Husserl's time is seldom mentioned and
never emphasized in the phenomenological literature. It is for instance not
even mentioned in the Manfred Sommer's (1985) learned and careful work on
Husserl and the early positivism.
Furthermore, it is demonstrable that Wittgenstein was familiar with this
sense of the term "phenomenology". In listing crucial influences on his own
thinking, one of the first names Wittgenstein mentions is that of Ludwig
Boltzmann. It is reported that he hoped to study under Boltzmann, a plan
made impossible by Boltzmann's death. It is known that he possessed several
volumes of Boltzmann's writings, including Boltzmann's PopullJre Schriften
(1905). One of the centerpieces of this collection is the essay "On the
Development of the Methods of Theoretical Physics in Recent Times". There
Boltzmann discusses sympathetically but critically Mach's "phenomenology"
using the very word "Phiinomenologie".
When Wittgenstein uses the term in his notebooks in the late twenties, it is
therefore amply certain that he has in mind something not unlike the
phenomenology of his predecessors and contemporaries in the philosophy of
106 JAAKKO HINTIKKA
physics. Indeed, when Wittgenstein indicates what he means by the term, his
typical explanation turns out to be a freedom of "everything hypothetical".
This is very much in step with Boltzmann's usage and completely out of step
with any form of phenomenalism.
What has been found has also implications for Wittgenstein's use of terms
other than "phenomenology". One historical warning that we can extract from
what has been said is that we have to be sensitive to Wittgenstein's use (and
non-use) of terms like "atom" and "atomic" which are geschichtlich belastet
through an association with atomism in physics. For instance, my analysis
shows inter alia the expository tension between Wittgenstein's so-called logical
atomism and atomism in statistical physics. In physics, atoms were at the time
of the old Ernst Mach and 1he young Ludwig Wittgenstein the prime examples
of unobservable, non-phenomenological entities. Wittgenstein's and Mach's
simple objects are by definition cast into the role of the basic entities directly
given to us. It is not at all accidental that Wittgenstein does not normally use
the term "atomic", speaking of "elementary propositions" instead of "atomic
propositions". In hindsight it is thus highly significant that the entire
terminology of "logical atomism" was introduced by Russell, not by
Wittgenstein, and that Wittgenstein in contrast to Russell never identifies the
philosophy of the Tractatus as "logical atomism".
It is thus a total misunderstanding of 1he spirit and the letter of the Tractatus
to try to assimiJate his simple objects with physical atoms. One of the crucial
ideas of the Tractatus was on the contrary to dispense with all hypothetical
entities like physical atoms.
It is striking how badly understood this parentage ofWittgenstein's notion
of phenomenology is. That Wittgenstein got his notion from Boltzmann is
mentioned by Spiegelberg (1981, p. 227) as a hypothesis, which he more or
less rejects.
The difficulty for such a hypothesis is that Wittgenstein's Phiinomenologie is opposed to

physics, physiology and psychology, whereas Boltzmann's is apparently [sic] a subdivision
of physics.
But the "opposition" Spiegelberg finds here is a resultant of factors that include
much more than the meaning of the term "phenomenology". Even though
Wittgenstein nowhere (as far as I know) proffers an explicit definition of
phenomenology and of the phenomenological, his usage makes it amply clear
what he means. As was pointed out earlier, the phenomenological is
characterized by its independence of all hypotheses, according to him. And
this freedom of hypotheses is, mutatis mutandis which in this case is the
intellectual context (epistemological vs. physical), precisely what was at issue

between "phenomenologists" like Mach and realists like Boltzmann.
But now we are presented wilh a new problem. If Wittgenstein's Tractatus
is a phenomenological tract, and if he was familiar wilh lhe use of lhe term
"phenomenology" as referring to essentially lhe same attempts to reduce
everything to lhe immediately given as he was himself engaged in, why did he
not call1he spade a spade or, ralher, call his own position in lhe Tractatus
phenomenological?
Or, if we try to put lhe shoe on lhe olher foot, why did Wittgenstein
emphasize Boltzmann's influence on himself? We have seen lhe similarity
between Mach's proto-phenomenology and Wittgenstein's philosophy in lhe
Tractatus. In contrast, Boltzmann offered highly interesting criticisms of lhe
phenomenological approach in lheoretical physics. He pointed out lhat it was
not only such ontological assumptions as lhe postulation of atoms lhat introduce
hypolhetical elements into a physicallheory. Even if one tries to give merely
a description of a physical system as in malhematical terms, for instance by
means of differential equations, this very malhematical apparatus introduces
hypolhetical elements into one's lheory which cannot be based on direct
observation alone. For instance, lhe use of differential equations are as based
on continuity (and differentiability) assumptions lhat are substantial and
nontrivial. Yet in spite of this criticism by Boltzmann of phenomenology in
lhe philosophy of physics, Wittgenstein lhe phenomenologist admirers
Boltzmann and criticizes Mach not only for his flat style but also for his flat
ideas.
In reality, Wittgenstein's judgements are not idiosyncratic obiter dicta, but
rooted deeply in his own approach. They offer an interesting perspective in
Wittgenstein's early philosophy. I have characterized it earlier (earlier in this
paper and in earlier publications) as a result of revising Russell's 1913 lheory
of acquaintance by omitting logical forms from lhe range of objects of
acquaintance. This parentage shows olher things about Wittgenstein's
approach as compared wilh lhat of lhe "phenomenologists". Unlike Mach,
Wittgenstein was not only interested in lhe direct experiential basis of our
knowledge. Like Boltzmann and Hertz, he was also, maybe even primarily,
interested in how lhe immediately given reality was represented in thought and
in language, including of course the language of mathematics. Those
representations were typically referred to by Boltzmann as "pictures" (Bilder).
Theories according to him are related to phenomena "as a sign to its
designatum". Even lhough Boltzmann lhought lhat physicists cannot afford not
to go beyond phenomena, he recognized lhat by devising suitable "pictures" or
notations one could eliminate "metaphysical" notions like lhe concept of force.
(Cf. here Hiebert 1980.)
108 JAAKKO HINTIKKA
This enterprise is closely similar to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In keeping

with the thought of Boltzmann and Hertz, the way in which Wittgenstein thinks
that conceptual problems should be solved is by devising a suitable notation.
This is for instance the case with the problem of color incompatibility. The
problem is dealt with in Proposition 6.3751 as follows:
For example, the simultaneous presence of two colors at the same place in the visual field
is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of
color.
Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics: more or less as follows-a particle
cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be at two places at the
same time; that is to say, particles that are in different places cannot be identical.
Many commentators ,have thought that Wittgenstein is here appealing to the

physical structure of color. However, Wittgenstein's reference to physics is
calculated to explain his problem rather than his solution. Wittgenstein's later
remarks on the color incompatibility problem show that what he was
concerned with was the development of a notation that would turn color
incompatibility into a tautology. What the mathematics of physics does that
Wittgenstein mentions is not an explanation of color incompatibility, but an
example of how to turn apparent dependencies between elementary
propositions into logical truths (tautologies). What Wittgenstein was doing is
very much like what Hertz saw as the first task of a physicist: to develop a
system of ~ncepts ("images") governed by laws which match the laws that
govern the phenomena they represent. His reference to physics is calculated
to indicate this parallelism.
It is this emphasis on the representation of reality in language that
distinguishes Wittgenstein from Mach and aligns him with Boltzmann. It
represents one of the most characteristic features of Wittgenstein's early
philosophy.
In the end-meaning, in the final version of the Tractatus- Wittgenstein's
emphasis nevertheless reverted back to pure phenomenology. The reasons are
rooted deeply in Wittgenstein's thinking. Reality was for him always
phenomenological, and that reality determines in the last instance the way in
which it is to be represented. In a correct notation, if such a notation is
possible, there is no trace of the methods of representation used. And this is
what Wittgenstein thought that he had shown in the Tractatus how to do
through his idea of propositions as pictures. It does not reflect on the
importance of the problem of representation, but it amounts to the thesis that
a purely phenomenological language is possible, a language which represents

faithfully what is immediately given to me.
lt is not surprising, in view of Wittgenstein's heroic struggles with the
problem of representation, that he resented Mach's failure even to see the
problem clearly. Of course, this does not mean that he did not in the end
come down in a sense on the side of Mach rather than Boltzmann in so far as
the possibility of a hypothesis-free representation is concerned. However, he
had to put his struggles past him before he was ready, a dozen or so years
later, to call his own position phenomenological.
There is more to be said here, however. As Haller (1993, pp. 39-40)
points out, from a suitable point of view there is apparently a great deal in
common between Mach, Hertz and Boltzmann here. Mach was after all
interested in the way we represent the objects of our thoughts to ourselves and
how we operate with them. Even on the logico-mathematical level,
Wittgenstein's vindication of a phenomenological ontology and
phenomenological language through the idea of tautology was in a sense
anticipated by Mach and early Schlick, both of whom maintained that purely
logical inference cannot yield any new information.
The real differences between Wittgenstein and Mach are far subtler.
Mach's idea of logical inference is a simplistic one, largely because his idea
of logic is a crude Aristotelian one. It took the logical sophistication of Russell
and Frege to bring home to Wittgenstein the full difficulty of the problem
whether our language, including our mathematical language, contributes to and
influences our knowledge of the world. His ultimate answer in the Tractatus
is the picture theory of language, which very nearly takes the entire book to
develop and defend.
This is the reason why we find in the Tractatus ever so much more
argumentation for the tautological nature of logical truths than in Mach or
early Schlick. What Wittgenstein envisaged as a reasonable approximation to
a universal Begrijfsschrijt is clearly something like the language of Russell's
and Whitehead's Principia. In order to bring out what he considered its true
logical forms he first proposed to eliminate quantifiers in terms of truth-
functions. Then he argued for the pictorial character of elementary
propositions. Finally, he tried to extend this picture idea to all truth-functions
of elementary propositions by means of the Sheffer stroke representation of all
truth-functions. Right or wrong, all this is on an altogether different level of
logical sophistication than Mach's musing about Aristotelian syllogisms or
proofs in elementary geometry, in spite of the fact that the thesis he is thus
defending is verbally very close to Mach and early Schlick.
Wittgenstein might also have been put off by the unfortunate confusion in
Mach between phenomenology and phenomenalism. Mach sometimes
110 JAAKKO HINTIKKA
expresses himself in a way that literally taken would commit him to a

phenomenalist position, for instance speaking as if our immediate knowledge
were restricted to our sensations. I will not try to decide here to what extent
Mach was merely expressing himself in an inappropriate way and to what
extent we really have to classify him as a phenomenalist. Unfortunately, many
subsequent philosophers have not only taken Mach to be a phenomenalist, but
have assimilated the very meaning to "phenomenology" as applied to Mach
with phenomenalism. In this respect, it is instructive to note that no such
identification was made by the other philosophers of science at the time or by
Husserl.
What is even more interesting than the similarities between Husserl and
Wittgenstein (the early one) are nevertheless the dissimilarities. Surprisingly,
these dissimilarities are differences within a phenomenological framework.
They do not concern the question whether the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus
was a phenomenologist, but the question as to what kind of phenomenology he
favored, i.e., what the structure of the given is according to him.
Here we come to a most clear-cut and most remarkable difference between
Wittgenstein and Husserl. It is a phenomenological difference. For Husserl,
as we know, empirical experience does not come to us already articulated
categorially. We structure it through our noetic activity; we impose the forms
on the raw data (hyletic data) of experience that are needed to make that
experience into experience of objects, their properties, relations, etc. We do
not need to raise the question here whether these forms or essences are
somehow components of the given which are merely brought to bear or hyletic
data or whether they are so to speak imported from the outside for the purpose
of "informing" the hyletic data. On either reading, they enjoy independent
existence. These forms or essences can be considered in their own right, and
we can have direct knowledge (I almost said, knowledge by acquaintance) of
them, too, in what Husserl calls categorial intuition.
In contrast, for Russell and Wittgenstein the most primitive, unedited
experience is already articulated categorially. The building blocks of the
world of the TractafUs are objects of different logical types. There is no place
in this scheme for unarticulated hyle. By the same token, there is no place in
the Russell-Wittgenstein theory for our constitutive activities, either. Many,
perhaps almost all of the differences that there are between Husserl and
Wittgenstein are ultimately due to this fundamental phenomenological
disagreement between them. The crucial philosophical task both for Husserl
and for Wittgenstein is to understand the relationship to our concepts, codified
in a language, to the reality they can represent. For Husserl, this task involved
a detailed examination of the all and sundry constitutive activities that mediate
between the immediately given and our concepts (language). For
Wittgenstein, of the Tractatuf, there is no mediation. His task is merely to see
clearly and distinctly how our language works. A clarification of the logic of
our language is all that is needed, and that is his project in the Tractatus.
Moreover, if and in so far as we can reach a perfect (purely
phenomenological) language, it merely reflects what is immediately given to
me. It is therefore determined completely by the phenomena, without any
contribution by my noesis. In this sense, Wittgenstein is a far purer
phenomenologist than Husser!.
Admittedly, there is in Tractatus a kind of reduction. Indeed, the main
argument of the entire book is a gradual working out of this reduction. The
main lines of his argument were sketched above. But, unlike what we can find
in Husserl, this reduction is an intralinguistic one. Wittgenstein assumes that
something like the language of Principia Mathematica is our true Sprachlogik.
Given such a language, as was explained above, Wittgenstein's first attempts
to reduce quantifiers to proposjtional connectives. Then he strives to show that
all propositions are truth-functions of independent elementary propositions.
In Wittgenstein's view, this suffices to establish a direct "pictorial" relation
between propositions and states of affairs. It is a presupposition of this
reduction that we do not have to carry it further. And this presupposes that a
language with discrete names that are combined in different ways into
elementary propositions is adequate for describing what is given to one in
immediate experience. This assumption was not shared by Husserl, who
therefore had to carry his reductions further and to account among other things
for how our spontaneous sensory experience is articulated into objects which
can be referred to by discrete names (in Wittgenstein's wide sense of the
word).
In this way, these phenomenological differences between Husserl and
Wittgenstein come to color their respective conceptions of language. For
Wittgenstein, no process of constitution is needed for the purpose of providing
our language with the objects it refers to. Hence, the idea of a
phenomenological language is an unproblematical one. In contrast, for
Husser! the basic given in empirical experience includes an amorphous hyle,
which does not yet provide objects for our language to refer to. Hence a
purely phenomenological language of empirical experience is impossible for
Husserl. Also, whatever analysis or reduction is needed to uncover the basis
of our language and concepts in the given, will not reveal for Wittgenstein any
influence of our constitutive noesis on the objects that our language refers to.
Hence we can understand some of the main differences in emphasis between
our two fellow phenomenologists. Wittgenstein emphasized phenomenological
language while for Husser! phenomenological reductions loom especially
large. It may sound like a paradox, even though it is not to emphasize that the
112 JAAKKO IDNTIKKA
founder of phenomenology did not have, and could not have, a conception of
a purely phenomenological language.
The other side of the same coin is that phenomenology was not for
Wittgenstein, as it was for Husserl, a special method. Husserl needs such a
method to disentangle the given from the contributions of our constitutive
activities. According to Wittgenstein, all logical forms are given in full
together with the objects they are forms of. Therefore, no special technique
is needed to uncover them. The only question is how they are to be
represented in language. Some people might claim that this absence of any
phenomenological method in Wittgenstein disqualifies him as phenomenologist.
Purely historically, there might very well be, something to be said for such
terminology. Yet in a deeper sense this differrence between Husserl and
Wittgenstein is merely a disagreement between two fellow phenomenologists.
It concerns the structure of the immediately given. It nevertheless has
extremely important consequences as to what kind of phenomenology it is that
Wittgenstein or Husserl represented. For Husserl, our noetic activity is
indispensable for the purpose of articulating the world into objects and hence
indispensable for our knowledge of objects. We cannot disentangle the
contribution of our own thinking to what we know about the world. Hence
there can, and must, be an a priori element in all our knowledge, put into
objects as it were in our activities of coming to know the objects of our
knowledge. In contrast, for Russell and Wittgenstein there is no need and
indeed no room for such a priori knowledge.
Furthermore, there is another basic difference is evidence here, this time
between Husserl and Russell (of the 1913 vintage) on the one hand and
Wittgenstein on the other. For Edmund Husserl and Bertrand Russell, the
forms (logical forms, essences, whatever you choose to call them) are among
the objects of intuition or acquaintance. They can be considered in separation
from their particular embodiments in sensory material. In contrast, the leading
idea of the Tractatus is that there is no separate class of entities called logical
forms. Logical forms are forms of objects, ultimately of simple objects. They
do not exist separately, and they cannot be conceptually disentangled from the
objects whose forms they are. They are given to us ipso facto when the
objects themselves are given. They are not brought by us to bear on the
objects or an some raw material of which the objects are made. As a
consequence,logical forms are not, and must not be, represented in language
by any logical constants. So-called logical constants do not represent anything
at all. Complex logical forms are simply combinations of the logical forms of
simple objects.
The resulting conceptions oflogic, logical form and logical (a priori) truth
are so radical that few Wittgensteinians have dared to follow their master fully
when it comes to these notiom. First, logic is traditionally thought of as being

grounded on the most general concepts and on the most general laws that there
are. For instance, Frege said that logic deals with the most general laws of
Wahrsein. In the early Wittgenstein, logic is grounded solidly on the simplest
objects (of any logical type). All logical forms that there are are forms of
simple objects and combinations thereof. This is the reason why I cannot tell
a priori what logical forms are needed to describe the world, for instance, tell
whether I need a 27-place relation in my language. Only experience can show
me that. What is usually thought of as logic, for instance propositional logic,
deals merely with the way in which simpler logical forms (pictures) can be
combined into more complex logical forms (pictures).
Since there is no constitution by us of the basic logical forms nor any
imposition of logical forms on sensory raw material in experience, there is no
non-trivial (synthetic) a priori. In this respect, Wittgenstein's well-known
criticism (Waismann 1979,pp. 67-68) of Husserl's idea of the synthetic a
priori, which at first sight might seem merely to echo Schlick's attacks on
Husserl, is in reality founded deeply in his own ideas. These criticisms
nevertheless do not show or even suggest that Wittgenstein's own early
philosophy was not phenomenological, only that Wittgenstein's phenomenology
was different (I am tempted to say, phenomenologically different) from
Husserl's.
This point is closely related to Wittgenstein's idea of logical truths as
tautologies. Husserlian and Kantian notion of synthetic a priori knowledge is
based on the idea that, as Kant put it, the reason has insight only into what it
puts into objects according to a plan of its own. In other words, or in another
metaphor, we can see reality only through glass darkly, the glass being a
metaphor for our own conceptual system. Our synthetic a priori knowledge
concerns what there is written on the glass. For the early Wittgenstein, the
glass is crystal clear. It does not color our knowledge of reality, but by the
same token there is nothing to be said or known about it. This is the basic
reason why there are no synthetic truths a priori according to Wittgenstein.
Here we can see also the reason why there was not, and could not have
been, in the Tractatus any counterpart to Husserl's notion of categorial
intuition. The reason is not that there could not be according to Wittgenstein
immediate (or "intuitive", if you insist on the term) grasping of logical forms
in one's thinking. (As we will soon see, in a sense Wittgenstein believed in
such an immediate grasping.) Rather, Wittgenstein's point is that strictly
speaking there are no separate entities to be so grasped.
Thus, in a comparative perspective, we can see how the differences
between the ideas of the early Wittgenstein and Husserl about logic and logical
truth are firmly based on differences between their phenomenological
114 JAAKKO IDNTIKKA
assumptions. Even Wittgenstein's doctrine of logical truths as tautologies,

which looks like a purely logical idea, turns out to be closely connected with
his phenomenological views concerning the structure of the given.
Wittgenstein's conception of logic in the Tractatus has a striking further
feature which has not been emphasized sufficiently in the literature. Since
logic is determined by the forms of simple objects, and since these objects are
phenomenological, logic and phenomenology virtually coincide in the early
Wittgenstein. This is in fact one of the most characteristic features of
Wittgenstein's conception of logic. It should not be obscured by the fact that
in his later writings he uses, instead of the word "logic", such euphemisms as
"grammar".
Thus we find in Wittgenstein's writings statements like the following:
Phenomenology is Grammllr. (Section title in TS 213, Chapter ·Phiinomenologie·.)
Physics wants to detennine regularities; it does not set its sights on what is possible. For this
reason physics does not yield a description of the phenomenological state of affairs. In
phenomenology it is always a matter of possibility, i.e., of sense, not of truth and falsity.
(Waismann 1979, p.63.)
It is also highly instructive to see how the problem of color incompatibility

is for Wittgenstein at one and the same time a phenomenological problem and
a logical (conceptual) problem. (Cf. above.)
There is an even more striking feature of Wittgenstein's conceptions of
logic and \ogical form. This feature is illustrated by my second quote from
Wittgenstein. The logical form of an object is what governs its possibilities of
being combined with other objects into a fact. This is in fact (no puns, please)
how logical forms determine the logical structure of the world. The sum total
of these possibilities is rather like the law that governs. the logical behavior of
an object, and the logical form of the object can be thought of as codification
of this law. Yet the object in question, in ending into logical form, is a
phenomenological entity, given to me in my immediate experience. And this
seems to lead to an unbelievable or at least paradoxical combination of views.
How can direct experience give me a law governing the entire totality of
possible combinations into which the phenomenological object in question can
enter? Isn't this view completely outrageous?
Outrageous or not, it is Wittgenstein's view. How deeply rooted it is in his
thinking is shown by his own confession concerning a closely related learning
process, viz. the way we learn the rule that governs the meaning of a word:
Earlier I thought at one time that grammatical rules are an explication of what I experience
on one occasion when I once use the word. They are as it were consequences or
expressions of the properties which I momentarily experience when I understand the word.
(MS 116, sec. 128 Nyman.)
(Cf. here Hintikka 1989a.) More generally speaking Wittgenstein held that:
Senstxlata are the source of our concepts. (Lee 1980, p. 81.)
If you ask me how this kind of instantaneous grasp of general rules is

possible, I have no simple answer. There is nevertheless no doubt whatsoever
that Wittgenstein held such a view. The best I can do to make such a view
understandable is to 1hink of it as a generalization of ostensive defining. There
is in fact no doubt that Wittgenstein's later criticisms of ostensive definitions
were in the first place directed against his own earlier views as to how logical
forms (and hence meanings) ~n be acquired.
Another partial explanation why Wittgenstein thought at the time of the
Tractatus that his version of Wesensschau is possible lies in his assumption of
atomism. It is seldom understood fully what this assumption really means. It
does not mean just that· the wodd can be articulated into phenomenological
objects of different logical types. It means that these atoms are mutually
independent in the sense that the laws governing their mutual combinations will
never create logical connections between different elementary propositions.
Wittgenstein vitally needs such independence in the Tractatus, but he has
precious little to say in its defense. Even the famous claim concerning color
incompatibilities (6.3751, quoted above) is a promissory note rather than a
fully worked-out eXample. And later, probably in 1928, the rejeqtion of this
atomistic assumption was the first step off the plateau to which Wittgenstein's
dispensable ladder had enabled him to climb in the Tractatus onto the slippery
slope that eventually led him to the philosophy of Philosophical Investigations.
Moreover, it is extremely important to realize that Wittgenstein is not
assuming any mysterious capacity of the human mind which is supposed to
intuit general rules. His assumption, whether true or not, is a
phenomenological assumption, It is an assumption concerning the nature of
our experience, more specifically what can be given to me in my immediate
experience.
Even though I cannot place Wittgenstein's view into a deeper topical
perspective, I can place it into a collateral historical perspective. What
Wittgenstein assumes possible is to all practical purposes Husserlian
Wesensschau. The reason is that what Wesensschau is supposed to do is
precisely to serve to grasp the general concept or essence which is embodied
in an experientially given particular case. Hussed's notion of Wesensschau
has often been taken a weak point in Hussed's thinking or at least a
116 JAAKKO mNTIKKA
dangerously mysterious idea. No matter how we ultimately judge Hussed, we

can now see how it can be demythologized. For one thing, Wittgenstein
assumed an essentially (no pun intended) equivalent access to logical forms.
Secondly, and more importantly, we can see precisely what it is that Hussed
was assuming. Just as Wittgenstein was not postulating any mysterious
intuitive capacities of the human mind when he thought that immediate
experience gives us logical forms, as little is there a reason do we have to
impute to Husserl any assumption of a special source of "intuitive" knowledge
in the vulgar sense of the word as a basis of his notion of Wesensschau.
Moreover, we can see here how the Husserlian and Wittgensteinian
Wesensschau is related to other notions in Husserl. Roughly speaking,
Wesensschau serves to separate a form from the hyletic data in which it is
embedded. Eidetic reduction means concentrating one's attention on the forms
and bracketing the matter in which they are embedded. Categorial intuition
is one's direct access to the forms.
Thus a comparison with Wittgenstein throws some light on Hussed's central
notions. Conversely, the same comparison' also helps us to understand better
Wittgenstein's thought. Among other things, the differences between Hussed
and the eady Wittgenstein which we have noted also provide an answer to a
question which a skeptical reader undoubtedly raised in the back of her mind
long ago. If the Tractatus is a phenomenological treatise, where are the
phenomenological reductions?
This question can be countered by another one: What are such reductions
supposed to accomplish? They are calculated to take us back to what is
immediately given to me. But what is it that is added to the primary unedited
self-presented direct experience that we have to reduce away, that is, what is
it that happens on the way to our unreduced experience? As we saw,
according to Husserl our noetic activities bring general essences to bear on our
experience. Hence the phenomenological reductions have to lead us step by
step to the different basic ingredients of our experience, on the one hand to the
unarticulated hyletic data and on the other hand to the essences that are used
to articulate them. In contrast, in Wittgenstein there are no uninformed data
and no free-floating logical forms to bring to bear on something. Therefore,
all that a reduction can do, if we think: of the process on the level of sentences,
is to take us from complex sentences to the elementary ones, and from
elementary sentences to their ingredients, the simple names. (Since language
and thought operate in tandem in the Tractatus, this logical reduction reflects
the conceptual reduction which is at issue here.) This is precisely what
Wittgenstein seeks to establish through his pictorial analysis of elementary
propositions and through the extension of the picture theory to all other
propositions 1hrough 1he truth-function 1heory. These are hence Wittgensteinian

counterparts to phenomenological reductions, mutatis mutandis.
Conversely, a comparison between Wittgenstein and Husserl shows why
there was a need of a special eidetic reduction in Husserl's phenomenology,
but not in Wittgenstein's. Categorial (logical) forms are for Husserl imposed
on hyletic data. Hence a phenomenological reduction must among other things
by able to isolate those forms from the rest of our experience. In contrast, for
Wittgenstein, logical forms are there as a component of the already articulated
given, and they are thus given to me as a part of my experience.
But Wittgenstein's interest as an object of comparison for other
phenomenologists does not stop with his early philosophy. Admittedly,
Wittgenstein came to reject the possibility of phenomenological languages as
independent basic languages in October 1929. But some of the basic issues
that concern anyone interested in phenomenology remained with him.
First, Wittgenstein's change of mind was not just a one casual change in the
multitude of his philosophical views. It was the crucial step in the
development of his views away from the Tractatus and toward his later
philosophy. His rejection of the possibility of phenomenological languages in
one fell swoop changed Wittgenstein's entire philosophical methodology,
including his ideas about the aims of philosophical activity.
In order to see this, we have to ask: What precisely was involved in
Wittgenstein's change of mind? For one thing, we have to realize that
Wittgenstein's change of his basic language was just that: change of language,
not a change of his view of the world. Perhaps the most revealing statement
Wittgenstein ever made is among the ones recorded by Desmond Lee (1980).
This statement was made well after Wittgenstein rejected the possibility of
independent phenomenological languages.
The world we live in is the world of sense-data. but the world we talk about is the world of
physical objects. (Lee 1980, p. 82.)
This statement (and other easily forthcoming evidence) shows the sense in
which Wittgenstein remained a phenomenologist to the end of his days. The
reality which he is dealing with and which we are trying to capture in language
and in thought is the world of phenomenological entities. This is the reality that
a philosopher is trying to capture. Unfortunately, that cannot be done directly
by constructing a phenomenological language that would accurately reflect the
structure of the given, as Wittgenstein thought in the Tractatus. But a
comparative study of the different ways in which our language can serve, its
purpose can do the same job as the construction of a phenomenological
118 JAAKKO HINTIKKA
language and in a sense give us indirectly a representation of immediate

experience, that is, a representation of the world in which we live according
to Wittgenstein. Indeed, this is what Wittgenstein says in so many words on
the first page of Philosophical Remarks.
What we have here is nothing more and nothing less than an explanation of
the reasons why the later Wittgenstein did not try to develop an ideal language,
did not believe a sharp logic, emphasized the intrinsic imprecision of our
actual language and above all why he concentrated on studying the actual use
of language instead of forcing it to conform to a logically precise ideal
language. Wittgenstein's reasons, it turns out, have nothing to do with the
elusiveness of our actual language or of our actual usage. Even in the
TractaJus, Wittgenstein had been fully aware of the complexities of our actual
everyday language, and he had been perfectly happy to let this complexity be
shown by the way we use our language. (See Tractatus 4.002, 3.326-7,
5.557.)
Nor do Wittgenstein's reasons for not believing in a rigid logic that
underlies our language have anything to do with the differences between the
different purposes that language can serve or, as he would have put it, with
differences between different language-games. His original point can be
made, and was made by him, by reference to descriptive (Augustinean) uses
of language only. Wittgenstein's reasons have nothing to do with the richness
and elusiveness of the experience that we are trying to capture in our language.
Wittgenstein's reasons are very specific, and they concern the general
conditions of the successful operation of our language, including purportedly
phenomeoologicallanguages.
But what, then, is the difference between the two kinds of language and
why are the physicalistic languages the basic ones according to Wittgenstein7
And why did he largely stop speaking of phenomenological language after
19297 We are here approaching the most important questions not only of
Wittgenstein's philosophy, but of philosophy of language in general.
Wittgenstein's reasons for rejecting the primacy of phenomenological
languages have to do with the conditions of comparing a sentence with reality
with a view of verifying or falsifying it. The sentence is a physical object
(configuration), and as such can be compared directly only with physical
configurations. Hence the sentence can speak only of physical facts.
Moreover, the comparison takes place in physical time ("information time")
and indeed takes a non-negligible amount of (physical) time. Hence, again,
the sentence can only speak of physical objects persisting in physical time.
Unlike such physical objects, phenomenological objects (Wittgenstein thinks)
are restricted for their identity and existence condition to the specious present
and hence cannot be spoken of directly in language. (Cf. here Hintikka,

"Wittgenstein on Being and Time", this volume.)
It is important to see that there is absolutely nothing in Wittgenstein's
argument that rules out phenomenological objects really existing in the real
world. The problem is how to speak of them.
Thus we can see what the original reasons were why Wittgenstein came to
reject a strict logical approach to language and to philosophy. We saw earlier
that Wittgenstein nearly identified of logic and phenomenology. This near-
identification allows a concise statement of Wittgenstein's reasons for denying
that our language can directly embody a sharp logic. Our language cannot
reflect (Wittgenstein claims) the genuine phenomenology of the world, ergo
it cannot have a genuine, sharp logic, either.
Thus, an insight into the phenomenological character of Wittgenstein's
thought enables us to reach a most important insight into' his entire
philosophical methodology, io:cIuding his changing relationship to logic and its
role in philosophy. We can also see that Wittgenstein's original reasons for
his later philosophical methodology have absolutely nothing to do with the
views of his own followers, who base their views on the alleged elusiveness
of ordinary usage and other such reasons that we just saw Wittgenstein not
embracing, except perhaps as an afterthought.
All this leads to a new set of questions, however. We have not reached, or
perhaps I should say, Wittgenstein has not been seen to reach, a clarity even
about the most basic concepts he is using. One absolutely fundamental
question concerns the consequences of the distinction between phenomenology
and phenomenalism which we encountered in exploring the ancestry of
Husserl's and Wittgenstein's common background. "Phenomenological"
theories in physics are not phenomenalistic. They do not deal with our
impressions of physical objects but with physical objects themselves qua
observable. And since this was the conceptual model of both Husserl and
Wittgenstein, neither was dealing 'with our impressions of reality.
Wittgenstein's phenomenological objects, including the simple objects of the
Tractatus, are part of1he real world quite as firmly as Russell's sense-data are.
And 1he reasons why we do find equally realistic phenomenological objects in
Husserl is merely that he does not believe that the immediately given in
experience is not structured into objects. This is nevertheless a fact about the
(phenomenological) reality, not a concession by Husserl to phenomenalism.
Wittgenstein makes it very clear that for him phenomenological objects are
quite as fully real as physical ones. They are real objects directly given to us.
A phenomenon is not a symptom of something else but is the reality.

120 JAAKKO HINTIKKA
A phenomenon is not a symptom of something else which then makes a sentence true or
false but is itself what verifies the sentence. (MS 107, pp.223-224, dated Dec. 1, 1929.)
Also in Philosophical Remarks and elsewhere Wittgenstein makes it clear

that a phenomenological language is but another way of speaking of what is
actually going on in the world. The subject should not even be mentioned in
such a phenomenological language. In some sense, a phenomenological
language speaks of the same reality as a physicalistic one. All this illustrates
strikingly how closely related Wittgenstein's conceptions of phenomenology
and of phenomenological objects were still in 1929 to the sense of
phenomenology in "phenomenological physics" .
This reality of objects qua phenomenological objects enabled Wittgenstein
to continue to envisage a separate discourse for them even after he gave up the
possibility of self-contained phenomenological languages. Such a
reconstructed "phenomenological" language is sketched by Wittgenstein in
Philosophical Remarks, secs. 67-68. However, "reconstruction" has to be
taken here in the dixie sense. In Wittgenstein's new sense, phenomenological
(hypothesis-free) discourse is possible only as a special kind of sub-language
or dialect of a more comprehensive physicalistic language. The contrast
between physicalistic and phenomenological languages thus lost its absoluteness
and most of its general philosophical interest for Wittgenstein.
But what, then, is the difference between physical and phenomenological
objects? And what is the difference between physicalistic and
phenomenological languages in the first place? Wittgenstein never tells us.
In his writings, for instance in the last few pages of The Blue Book, he
nevertheless gives us some hints. He allows that phenomenological or, as he
also refers to them, solipsistic, languages or "notations" are in principle
possible, if only as a species of physicalistic languages. But what distinguishes
them from normal physicalistic languages? The only clear-cut explanation that
Wittgenstein offers is that in such phenomenological or "solipsistic" languages
the person himself or herself serves as a reference point. For instance,
Wittgenstein contrasts there "the geometrical eye" which is the vantage point
of any seeing object from "the physical eye" which is one physical object
among many. He adds:
The grammar of the word • geometrical eye" stands in the same relation to the grammar of
the word 'physical eye" as the grammar of the expression "the visual sense-datum of a tree"
to the expression "the physical tree". (The Blue Book, p. 64.)
Even though Wittgenstein can scarcely be said to have reached a full clarity,
it is unmistakable he is dealing with a distinction (or contrast) that is readily
generalizable. For instance, instead of the geometrical and the physical eye,
Wittgenstein could have spoken of the perspectival (geometrical) I and the
physical (public) I. And when the contrast is generalized, it becomes patent
that the distinction that he is making is to all intents and purposes the
distinction which I have diagnosed as a difference between two different types
of methods of identification. This is an extremely important distinction whose
significance has not yet been fully appreciated by philosophers. (See Hintikka
1989b.) In the case of one type of identification method, we identify persons,
objects, events, places and times in what might seem the obvious way, that is
to say, by reference to some publicly available, object-oriented framework of
reference. I have called such object-oriented modes of identification public,
not to mark a contrast with what is only privately accessible, but to highlight
the impersonal character of the framework of reference which is relied on in
public identification. The contrast is, rather, with a mode of identification in
which a person's vantage point plays a crucial role. For instance, in visual
cognition the perceiver's visual space provides the requisite frame of
reference. Even ifI do not see who the people around me are, in so far as I
can make each of them out so clearly as to occupy a definite slot in my visual
space, I will have to treat them as so many well-defined objects. For instance
if I see a man there in the doorway, I can-and in some sense must-treat him
as one and the same individual even if I do not see (or otherwise know) who
he is. To adopt Quine's sometime quip for my purposes, there is room only
for one man there in the doorway, even for only one phenomenological man,
so to speak. I have called this kind of identification method perspectival. (See
Hintikka 1989b.) . What such a method amounts to in the case of memory or
knowledge is not hard to see. Indeed, in both instances, the contrast between
different identification methods has been recognized, named, studied and
sometimes misinterpreted independently of Husserl, Wittgenstein, and
Hintikka. In the cognitive psychology of memory, the contrast is known as a
distinction between episodic memory and semantic memory, introduced by
Endel Tulving. In epistemology, we are dealing with nothing less than
Bertrand Russell's contrast between knowledge by acquaintance and
knowledge by description. In both cases, the true nature of the distinction as
concerning two modes of identification rather that two different kinds of
memory or knowledge has often been misunderstood.
By in effect turning phenomenological languages into mere alternative
"notations" within the general physicalistic framework, characterized by a
different mode of identification rather than by a different ontology,
Wittgenstein domesticated them and deprived them of their status as serious
rivals to physicalistic languages. That meant also that Wittgenstein lost most
ofhis interest in them. Spiegelberg's emphasis is misleading when he speaks
122 ]AAKKO HINTIKKA
(1981, p. 211) of the "vanishing" of Wittgenstein's phenomenology. It

remained alive and well in those works, such as Remarks on Color, that dealt
with phenomenological problems. But the grand contrast was in his mind
replaced by a contrast within a general framework of physicalistic languages,
which implied a tremendous loss of interest in his own original notion of
phenomenology .
The ramifications and implications of the distinction between perspectival
and public identification are too vast to be spelled out here. They are best left
for another occasion, even though they play an important role in the evaluation
of Wittgenstein, of Husserl, and of the very idea of phenomenology.
Boston University
REFERENCES
Blackmore, John, editor, Ludwig Bollzmann: His Later Life and Philosophy, Kluwer
Academic, Dordrecht, 1995.
Boltzmann, Ludwig, Populii.re Schriften, Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 1905.
Boltzmann, Ludwig, Theoretical Physics and Philosophical Problems, ed. by Brian
McGuinness, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974.
Haller, Rudolf, Neopositivismus, WlSsenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1993.
Hiebert, Erwin N., "Boltzmann's Conception of Theory Construction", in Jaakko Hintikka,
D. Gruender and Evandro Agazzi, editors, Probabilistic Thinking, Thermodynamics and
the Interaction ojthe History and Philosophy of Science, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1980,
pp. 175-198.
Hintikka, Merrill, and Hintikka, billo, Investigating Wlltgenstein, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, 1986.
Hintikka, Jaakko, "Rules, Games and Experiences: Wittgenstein's Discussion of Rule-
following in the Light of His Development", Revue Internationale de Philosophie vol. 43
(1989)(a), pp. 279-297.
Hintikka, Jaakko, "The Cartesian cogito. Epistemic Logic ·and Neuroscience: Some
Surprising Interrelations', in Jaakko Hintikka and Merrill B. Hintikka, The Logic of
Epistemology and the Epistemology ofLogic, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 1989(b).
Hintikka, Jaakko, "An Anatomy ofWittgenstein's Picture Theory", in C.C. Gould and R.S.
Cohen, editors, Artifacts, Representations and Social Practice, Kluwer Academic,
Dordrecht, 1994, pp. 223-256.
Hintikka, Jaakko, "Husserl: The Phenomenological Dimension", David W. Smith and Barry
Smith, editors, The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, Cambridge U.P. 1995, pp. 78-
105.
Hintikka, Jaakko, "Wittgenstein on Being and Time" , in this volume.
Husserl, Edmund, Gesammelte Werke (liusserliana), Martinus Nijhoff (Kluwer Academic),
The Hague, 1950-.
Lee, Desmond, editor, Wlltgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930-32, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, 1980.
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Open Court, Chicago, 1898.
Russell, Bertrand, Theory o/Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript (Vol. 7 of Collected Papers,
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Sommer, Manfred, Husserl und derfrilhe Positivismus, Vittorio Klostennann, Frankfurt am
Main,1985.
Spiegelberg, Herbert, "The Puzzle of Wittgenstein's Phtinomenologie (1929-7)", in The
Context o/the Phenomenological Movement, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1982, pp.
202-228.
Waismann, Friedrich, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, ed. by Brian McGuinness, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1979.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Kegan Paul, London, 1921.
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Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Remarks, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975.
LEOPOLDSTUBENBERG
AUSTRIA VS. AUSTRALIA:

TWO VERSIONS OF THE IDENTITY THEORY
1. INTRODUCTION
According to the received view the identity theory was developed in the decade
stretching from the mid fifties to the mid sixties. At the time the identity
theory seemed like an outrageous minority view. In the face of near universal
opposition the early identity theorists developed a remarkable esprit de
corps-they emphasized the similarities and de-emphasized the differences of
their respective views. This sort of team spirit may have seemed essential to win
a philosophical battIe; but it also helped to obscure the crucial differences
between the various theories that sailed under the flag of the identity theory.
Today I want to invert the strategy of the early identity theorist-I want to
emphasize the differences and de-emphasize the similarities between the early
versions of the identity theory.
In adopting this strategy of division I hope to achieve two things. First, I
want to distinguish and characterize two importantly different versions of the
identity theory-tbe Austrian version and the Australian version. Second, I want
to reassess the standing of the identity theory in the light of this distinction.
There is widespread agreement that the early identity theorists have suffered
total defeat, their excellent morale notwithstanding. But note that this
judgment does not reflect a clear appreciation of the crucial differences between
the Australian and the Austrian versions of the identity theory. As long as this
distinction isn't clearly drawn the two versions stand or fall as one. Unlinking
the two versions of the theory opens up the possibility that criticisms of the one
version will not necessarily translate into criticisms of the other version. I
want to suggest that the defeat of the identity theory was, primarily. a defeat of
the Australian version of the identity theory. Therefore the case against the
Austrian version may still be open.
I can state the criterion that informs my assessment of the Austrian and the
Australian versions of the identity theory in form of a question: How well do
these respective versions of the identity theory fare in face of the most serious
problem that has confronted the identity theory? The identity theory has had to
face many problems. But I shall only be concerned with one of those. In his
inimitable way Searle has recently put this objection into the bluntest words
possible: the identity theory "leaves out the mind." [Searle, 1992, p. 53] That
125
K. Lehrer and J.C. Marek (eds.). Austrian Philosophy Past and Present. 125-146.
126 LEOPOLDSTUBENBERG
is, if you were to "try on" (another one of Searle's evocative terms) the identity
theory then being you would be like nothing at all. Though this isn't the most
discussed problem with the identity theory, it is, to my mind, the most important
objection to any theory of the mind. If a philosophical theory of the mind does
not pass the test ofphenomenological adequacy then this theory is absolutely
worthless as a theory of the mind. Other objections to the identity theory do
raise important issues. But those are the sorts of issues that the engineers can
hopefully take care of by prolonged tinkering. But if a theory of the mind "leaves
out the mind" then no amount of tinkering will cure it.
2. COUNTING IDENTITY THEORIES
Counting versions of the identity theory is not a simple matter. I do not believe
that there is one correct answer to the question: How many versions of the
identity theory are there? The result of your count will depend on which criterion
of individuation for versions of the identity theory you choose. And I can see
that a number of different criterion choices could be defended. I shall
distinguish three versions of the identity and discuss only two of them. I
distinguish three versions of the identity theory because I see three strikingly
different metaphysical pictures or visions that seem to inform or inspire the
writings of the various identity theorists.
Very roughly, the three visions amount to this. First, there is the picture
that takes matter as a given and attempts to reduce the mental to the material. As
it happens, this picture inspired the three Australian philosophers whose names
are most frequently associated with the identity theory: U.T. Place, I.I.C. Smart
(both Australians in spiritu only), and D.M. Armstrong. Thus the label Australian
version of the identity theory. Second, there is the picture that takes the mental
as a given and attempts to integrate it into a properly enlightened conception of
the material world. As it happens, this is the picture that lies behind Herbert
Feigl's famous development of the identity theory. Thus the label Austrian
version of the identity theory.1 And finally there is the picture that takes
matter as a given and that simply denies all else. Since this view has a
multinational ancestry we shall give it the more neutral label disappearance
version of the identity theory.
The version that I shall not consider (beyond mentioning it here) is the
disappearance version of the identity theory, as it was defended by (the
Austrian) Paul Feyerabend2 and Richard Rorty. 3 In time this version of the theory
rid itself of the problematical label "identity theory" and became eliminative
materialism. Eliminative materialism is currently taken very seriously by many
AUSTRIA VS. AUSTRALIA 127
thinkers. Why this should be so, I do not know; nor do I plan to pursue this
question any further at this time.
3. AUSTRIA VS. AUSTRALIA: SIMILARITIES
I now turn to the discussion of my main topic: the Austrian and the Australian
versions of the identity theory. I promised to focus on differences between them.
But before I cando that I must mention what they have in common, that which makes
them both into identity theories in the style of the fifties and sixties.
3.1. The Focus on Sentience
Both versions focus on the problem of sentience (or: experience, raw feels, the
phenomenally given, subjectivity, qualia) paying little or no attention to
propositional attitudes and their contents.
This focus on sentience marks a striking contrast between the work of the
fifties and sixties and most of the work on the mind-body problem that has been
done since then.
3.2. Type Identity
Employing Davidson's distinction between type and token identity theories, it

appears that the Austrian and the Australian versions of the identity theories
were type identity theories.
This focus on type identity is another characteristic feature of the early
states of the identity theory, placing it into sharp contrast with current
thought on these matters. Exaggerating only slightly4 we can say that the current
consensus among philosophers is that the type identity thesis is obviously false
whereas the token identity thesis is obviously true.
Sometimes it is suggested that the early identity theorists weren't so much
type identity theorists rather than token identity theorist, but that, first and
foremost, they were confused identity theorists, blithely switching to an fro
between type and token claims. This is greatly exaggerated. There may be
unclarities here and there. But there can be no question that Feigl, for example,
had a clear grasp of the type/token distinction as it pertains to mind-body
identifications:
Psychophysiological identity may be identity of particulars (this twinge of pain with a specific
cerebral event at a certain time), or of universals (pain of a certain kind, and a type of cerebral
process). [Feigl, 1958, p. 463]
3.3. Physicalism
Both versions of the identity theol)' are physicalist, in the following sense.
Both endorse the thesis that the ultimate physics will afford a complete
description and explanation of the world All knowledge, without exception, will
be physical knowledge.
This uncompromising physicalism defInitely sets the early identity theorists
apart from much cmrent work on the mind-body problem that is carried on in the
spirit of nonreductive physicalism with its attendant dualism of properties.
3.4. Contingent Identity
The-supposedly-;nost characteristic mark ofthe pre-Kripkean identity theories is

their claim that the mental and the physical are only contingently identical. The
contingent identity thesis holds that the vel)' pains that have been discovered to
be c-fIber stimulations might be something else entirely. Expressed in possible
worlds jargon we get: though the pains of this world happen to be identical with
c-fIber stimulations, there are other possible worlds in which these pains exist
and fail to be c-fIber stimulations. This, we are told, is the view held by the
Austrian and the Australian identity theorists. But we enlightened post-
Krlpkeans don't believe in such possibilities.
I do not believe that the contingent identity thesis can usefully serve as a
distinguishing mark of the identity theol)'. Minimally I want to claim this: the
Austrian version of the identity theol)' is not committed to the contingent
identity thesis. This is not something that is close to my heart; so I shall not
spend much time with the point. I shall simply quote two passages from Feigl's
text and let you make up your mind.
Now, while I grant that the word "identity" has only one meaning, and this is the meaning
defined by the (properly understood) Leibniz principle of identitas indiscernibilium, the modes
of ascertainment of identity are for our purposes the essential consideration. I shall therefore
take the terminological liberty of speaking of different kinds of identity, viz., (1) logical, (2)
empirical... In more precise but also more cumbersome language this would amount to
distinguishing the various modes of ascertainment of identity, or the types of validity that
assertions of identity may have. [Feigl, 1958, p. 440]
Keep this distinction between identity proper and the mode of ascertaining
identity in mind when listening to the next quote. Considering the possibility of
disembodied survival, Feigl has this to say:
'P-lli identification being empirical [empirically ascertained that is!], it could of course be
mistaken. But if the identity does hold, then survival [of bodily death] is indeed logically
impossible. [Feigl, 1958, p. 472]
These quOtes speak for themselves. There is nothing I can add in order to make it
clear that Feigl did not accept the thesis of contingent identity. What Feigl is
saying here is exactly what Kripke wants us to say, viz., that mind-body
identities are "necessary if true." [Kripke, 1979, p. 487]
So much for the discussion of the common traits our two identity theories. Now
it is time to emphasize the differences between the Austrian and the Australian
version of the identity theory.
4. AUSTRIA VS. AUSTRALIA: DIFFERENCES
All proponents of the identity theory want to identify something mental with
something physical. And all proponents of the identity theory acknowledge that,
prima facie, this identification appears problematical. This is how far the
agreement goes. The Austrians and the Australians differ sharply in their
assessment ofwhat causes the problem and in the measures they propose to solve
the problem.
If you encowiter a problem in identllYing As with Bs this means that you
encountered some "identification resistant traits" somewhere along the line.
First you will have to assess what those identification blocking features are.
Second you will have to assess whether the As or theBs are to be blamed for having
these recalcitrant features. Thirdly you will have to show that, somehow or
other, these features don't really block identification. Perhaps you will argue
that the As or the Bs don't really have these features at all; perhaps you will
argue that they do have those features, but the features aren't really as
identification resistant as they first appeared; or perhaps you will argue that
those supposed features are merely illusory. You will have to do something along
these lines if you want to go through with the identification.
I believe that the Austrians and the Australians differ (I) in their
assessment of what the identification resistant features are; (ii) in their
judgment of which pole of the mind-body problem has the offending features; and
(iii) in the strategies they use to defuse the threat that these features pose to
identification.
4.1. Austria: Feigl (and Schlick)
For Feigl the body is the problematical pole of the mind-body problem. Our
misconception of the physical stands in the way of an identification of mind and
body. A clarified conception of the physical rids it of its identification
resistant properties. The raw feels of immediate acquaintance can then be seen to
identical with certain features of the central nervous system. Our
misunderstanding of the physical is rooted in a confusion of the evidence for
something with the thing so evidenced. Features that belong to the evidence are
mistakenly attributed to that for which they provide evidence. It is Feigl's view
that matter does not really have any of the identification resistant features
that it appears to have. These features do, instead, belong to the mental states
that serve as evidence for the belief in these physical states. This confusion of
evidence and evidenced has no parallel for the mental pole of the mind-body
problem. For in the case of the data of immediate experience evidence and
evidenced coincide. In the having or raw feels (or qualia) we come into unmediated
contact with reality. There is, in this case, no intermediary whose properties we
could mistakenly attribute to the raw feels.
On this view the identity of the mental and the physical-or, more precisely,
the identity of the raw feels of experience with certain neurophysiological
states-comes to this: the qualia that present themselves directly to us in
experience are the reality that is denoted both by phenomenal terms and by
neurophysiological terms. As far as living, experiencing brains are concerned,
raw feels are the basic reality. And it is this one, basic reality that is the
subject matter of introspective psychology and of neurophysiology.
Because I suspect that you may not believe that Feigl really says these things,
I shall now elaborate and support some of the preceding claims by quoting
Feigl.
4.1.1. Distinguishing Evidence and Reference: ClarifYing the Concept ofthe

Physical
We misconstrue the nature of physical because we take features of our evidence for
the physical to be features of the physical itself. That is, we think of the
physical in terms of the sensory impressions-the looks, the feels, the sounds,
the smells-that the physical causes us to experience. Thereby we furnish the
physical with properties that do not belong to it; properties that make it
impossible to hold that, for example, certain neurophysiological states are raw
feels. Feigl's way of putting the matter is that we confuse evidence and
reference. He makes it quite clear that this distinction is central to his version
of the identity theory:
The central core of the proposed solution rests upon the distinction between evidence and
reference ... we must eliminate the ... confusion of the pictorial appeals (attached to evidential
terms) with the conceptual meaning or the reference of neurophysiological concepts. [Feigl,
1958, p. 466]
The mistake of taking properties that belong to the evidence for an object for
properties of the object itself makes the identity theory appear strange or
absurd. As Feigl sees it, no one is immune to this mistake:
even sophisticated analytic philosophers tend to confuse the meaning of physical concepts with
the perceived or imaged appearance of physical things. No wonder then that we are told that
the identity of certain neurophysiological states (or features thereof) with raw feels is a logical
blunder. If the denotatum of "brairl process (or a specified sort)" is thus confused with the
appearance of the grey mass of the brain as one perceives it when looking into an opened skull,
then it is indeed logically impossible to identify this appearance with the raw feels, e.g., of
greenness or of anxiety. [Feigl, 1958, p. 454]
4.1.2. The Physical as "mere that which"
What, then. is the correct conception of the physical? For Feigl the crucial fact
appears to be that the concepts of neurophysiology (and all physical concepts)
are non-intuitive (wumschaulich). When we apply a neurophysiological concept to
an event we say noJ:bing whatsoever about the intrinsic, qualitative nature of the
event-for all we know it could be anything, it could even turn out to be of the
nature of raw feels. Here, then. are some of Feigl's observations on the non-
intuitiveness of physical concepts and how this non-intuitiveness opens up the
road to identification.
The concepts of neurophysiology are non-intuitive and must not be confused with their
logically irrelevant pictorial connotations. These connotations lend, psychologically speaking, a
certain "root flavor" to these concepts. But once the pictorial appeals connected with the
evidential roots of our physical or neurophysiological concepts are dismissed as irrelevant, they
no longer pre-empt those places in the conceptual system of which we may then say that they
denote some raw feels. [Feigl, 1958, p. 455-456]
This conceptual system [the physical! conceptual system] or any part of it is in principle non-
intuitive (unanschaulich as Germans call it, i.e., unvisualizable). Hence, an identification of a
small subset of its referents with something directly given and knowable by acquaintance is in
principle left completely open. [Feigl, 1958, p. 454]
the physical sciences consists of knowledge-claims-by-description. That is to say that the

objects (targets, referents) of such knowledge claims are ''triangulated'' on the basis ofvaOous
areas of observational (sensory) evidence. What these objects are acquaintancewise is left
completely open as long as we remain within the frame of physical concept formation and
theory construction. But, since in point of empirical fact, I am directly acquainted with the
qualia of my own immediate experience, I happen to know (by acquaintance) what the
neurophysiologist refers to when he talks about certain configurational aspects of my cerebral
processes. [Feigl, 1958, p. 450]
The insight into the abstract or non-intuitive nature of the physical concepts
makes the identification of the physical with the mental possible. In effect this
amounts to "thinning out" the notion of the physical to the point where it can
accommodate qualia. Borrowing a term from the Australian tradition, we can say
that Feigl makes matter into a "mere that which" whose intrinsic nature is left
wide open by our scientific grasp of it. It is up to acquaintance to fill the "gap"
that the scientific description of matter leaves open.
4.1.3. Qualia as the basic reality
What then of the claim that qualia are the basic reality? There can be no doubt
that Feigl makes the claim that living, experiencing brains (or certain features
thereot) are qualia. Feigl's preferred way of making this point is in the
following formal mode of speech:
The "mental" states or events (in the sense of raw feels) are the referents (denotata) of both the
phenomenal terms of the language of introspection, as well as of certain terms of the
neurophysiological language. [Feigl, 1958, p. 447]
But he does not hesitate to come right out and say that the qualia are the ultimate
reality where living, experiencing brains are concerned:
According to the identity thesis the directly experienced qualia... are the realities-in-themselves
that are denoted by the neurophysiological descriptions. [Feigl, 1958, p. 457]
Speaking "ontologically" for the moment, the identity theory regards sentience (qualities
experienced, and in human beings knowable by acquaintance) ... [as] the basic reality. [Feigl,
1958, p. 474]
4.1.4. Collapsing Evidence and Reference: Knowledge ofQualia
F eigl takes himself to know the intrinsic nature of the brain states that the
neurophysiologist observes in his (Feigl's) brain: their intrinsic nature is
that of raw feels. How does Feigl arrive at this conclusion? He knows it because,
as he puts it:
But since in point of empirical fact, I am directly acquainted with the qualia of my own
immediate experience, I happen to know (by acquaintance) what the neurophysiologist refers to
when he talks about certain configurational aspects of my cerebral processes. [Feigl, 1958, p.
450]
Quite a lot is packed into this innocent sounding paragraph. I shall only comment
on two ofthe controversial theses upon which the view expressed in this paragraph
rests. Both considerations will show that Feigl's identification of raw feels
with neural states is fallible and controversial. But that is just as we should
expect it to be.
First we should ask: Why does Feigl think that what he knows by acquaintance is
the very same thing that the neurophysiologist knows by description? This is just
a special version of the old question: Why identify when all you have got is
evidence for correlation? That is, Why chose the identity theory over parallelism
or epiphenomenalism? The' answers to these questions .are notoriously
unsatisJYing. For they always seem tum on some time honored but, nonetheless,
questionable principle like the parsimony principle. As I see it, Feigl's case
is, in this respect, no better or worse than that of the other identity theorists.
I shall, therefore, not discuss this matter any further. The originality of the
Austrian version of the identity theory does not consist the in reasons it offers
is support of the identification. Its originality resides in the manner in which
it lays to rest doubts about the (in principle) identifiability of the mental and
the physical.
The second question we should ask is this: What is Feigl acquainted with and
how does he com~ to know it? Feigl holds that experience acquaints us with raw
feels or qualia. The fact that we have experiences proves that there are raw feels
of qualia. For an experience is simply a matter of being acquainted with (or
having) a quale. s Experience (or direct acquaintance) isn't knowledge, however,
for there is nothing propositional about it. 6 But the step from acquaintance to
knowledge by acquaintance is short (at least for human beings). Thus we can know
by acquaintance what the inner nature of our brain states is.
What is important to notice here is that Feigl holds that acquaintance gives us
direct access to the raw feel itself: unmediated by any evidential middleman. For
he believes that
Evidence and reference coincide .. .in the case of statements about the immediate data of first-
person experience. [Feigl, 1958, p. 438]
This coincidence of evidence and reference is epistemically significant. It

excludes one kind of error, viz., that of mistaking features of the evidence for
features of the evidenced. There is then a striking asymmetry between our
knowledge of the physical and our knowledge of our own raw feels. The latter is
"direct" in a sense in which the fonner isn't But despite is immediacy knowledge
by acquaintance is fallible. The passage from acquaintance to knowledge by
acquaintance transforms brute experience into a datum that any theoty of the
mind-body relationship will have to respect But elevation in status comes at a
price: the immediate givenness of lived experience itself is traded in for an (in
principle) fallible knowledge claim.
Thus we have uncovered a second way in which Feigl's identity claim might fail
to be true. It might turn out that raw feels aren't identical with the inner
nature of neurophysiological events because that which Feigl claims to know by
acquaintance might be different from what he takes it to be. This possibility is
opened up by the fallibility of knowledge by acquaintance.
4.1.5. Interim Summary ofFeigl's Position
So much for a brief sketch ofFeigl's version of the identity theoty. This sketch
leaves many questions open. Some of these questions I shall address after I have
outlined the Australian version of the identity theoty. But whatever the
shortcomings of the Austrian version of the identity theoty mayor may not be-I
want to underline one outstanding virtue of this account This version of the
identity theoty preserves experience unscathed. On Feigl's version of the theoty
the raw feels (or qualia) of experience are a basic reality. Fodor has written:
"ifaboutness is real, it must really be something else." [Fodor, 1987, p. 97] And
manyphilosophers-amongthemtheAustralianidentitytheorists---seemtoacceptan
analogous slogan for qualia: If raw feels are real, they must really be something
else. Feigl's version of the identity theoty does not buy into this reductivist
criterion of reality. Qualia are real on their own terms. And, if Feigl is right,
the acknowledgment of their ultimate reality poses no threat whatsoever to a
physicalists view of the world. To my mind, Feigl's insistence on the reality of
''untampered-with'' qualia counts strongly in favor of his theoty. For this way the
phenomenological adequacy ofFeigl's identity theoty is beyond reasonable doubt
In other words: the thought experiment of !tying on the theoty definitely yields
the result that it is like something to function according to the Austrian version
of the identity theoty. I believe that phenomenological adequacy is the primaty
responsibility of a philosophical theory of consciousness. On this count,
Feigl's theoty succeeds brilliantly.
4.2. Australia: Place, Smart, and Armstrong
The "United Front of Sophisticated Australian Materialists" [Feigl, 1967, p.

13 8] is a good deal less united than I shall make it appear. But there is,
nevertheless, a substantive overlap between the views of these philosophers. I
shall dwell on these common themes, glossing over many subtle and not so subtle
differences among the Australians.
The Australians see the mind pole as the problematical pole of the mind-body
problem. The physical pole they take to be unproblematical. They don't come right
out and say that. But we can infer as much from the complete absence, in their
relevant writings, of any critical discussion of the body-pole of the mind-body
problem. As they see it, the physical picture of the world is accurate and
complete, with only one apparent exception, viz., sentience (or consciousness,
or experience). As the Australians see it, the mind, as traditionally and
mistakenly conceived, is the seat of the problematical, identification resistant
properties of sentience. Therefore they judge that the mental pole of the mind-
body problem must give if a successful identification of mind and body is to be
had. Their general strategy is to reconceptualize experience in such a way that
the identification resistant properties (that experiences allegedly have) are no
longer instantiated by anything. The upshot is that nothing has the properties
that make identification look like an impossible feat. Hence there is no longer
any obstacle to go ahead with the identification.
The properties that the Australians single out as the problematical (i.e.,
identification resistant) properties of experience are precisely those
properties that Feigl made into the core of reality: the raw feels (or qualia or
phenomenal properties) of experience. By denying the existence of phenomenal
properties (or raw feels, or qualia) the Australians clear the way for a smooth
reduction of the mental to the physical. Nothing stands in the way of identifying
experiences sans qualia with the neurophysiological processes in the living
human brain.
Note how this qualia eliminativism of the Australian approach differs from
Austrian way of dealing with raw feels. Feigl relocated the problematical
properties: the identification resistant properties that appear to belong to the
physical really do belong to the mental. More accurately: Feigl relocates the
problematical properties that appear to qualify the external perceptual object
by identifying them with certain features of the mental (i.e., neural) states of
the perceiving subject. Thus the problematical properties are pushed "into the
head.'" The Australians don't relocate but eliminate the problematical
properties: the identification resistant properties that appear to belong to the
mental aren't properties of anything real. This is a significant difference in
the two approaches to the mind-body problem. It makes the Australian version of
the identity theory harder to defend, for the following reason. The degree to
which our ordiruuy views are mistaken is greater on the Australian view than on
the Austrian view. On the Austrian model all the properties that we seem to
confront in experience are really had by something. The mistake we make is limited
to a confusion about what bears which properties. On the Australian model some of
the properties we seem to confront in experience are entirely illusory. The
mistake we make is not just one of location but one of feigning acquaintance with
properties that aren't there. Since the Australian model posits a more profound
mistake it is harder pressed to explain how a mistake of this magnitude is
possible.
4.2.1. Austria vs. Australia: The Differences
The Australian approach to the problem of identiJYing mind and body represents a
stunning reversal of the Austrian approach. The Australians and the Austrians
disagree about:
(l) which pole of the mind-body problem appears to have the identification resistant
properties. The Austrians hold that the bodily pole is the culprit. The Australians
blame the mind pole.
(ii) what the identification resistant features are. The Austrians single out the pictorial
connotations mistakenly associated with the nonintuitive concepts of
neurophysiology. The Australians focus on the so-called qualia of experience.
(iii) what the correct strategy for dealing with these identification resistant problems is.
Th~ Austrians attempt to solve the problem by putting the pictorial connotations into
their proper place, i.e., the mind. The Australians attempt to solve the problem by
denying that experiences (or anything else, for that matter) have phenomenal
properties.
4.2.2. Singling out the Mental Pole
The Australian conviction that the mental pole of the mind-body problem is
responsible for the apparent problems with mind-body identifications appears to
be grounded in a mixture of robust commonsense and a heavy dose of scientific
realism. The more extreme forms of scientific realism hold that reality has all
and only those properties that scientific theories postulate. And "raw feel" is
not a predicate of contemporary physical science, nor is it likely that any likely
extension of contemporary theories are going to incorporate any such "spooky"
predicates. This philosophical stance blends seamlessly with the strong gut-
level feeling that such queer properties like qualia couldn't be part of the
fabric of the world Undoubtedly we have here yet another manifestation of what
the "strong sunlight and harsh brown landscape of Australia" does to its
indigenous philosophers. 8 Smart's original paper on the identity thooty [Smart,
1959] contains an eloquent statement of this Australian sentiment After
emphasizing the stunning successes of the scientific world picture Smart tells
us-in what he himselftenns "largely a confession offaith"--that he cannot accept
that this triumphant success stoty should come to grief on the cosmically
insignificant and localized phenomenon of sentience:
So sensations, states of consciousness, do seem to be the one sort of thing left outside the
physicalist picture, and for various reasons I just cannot believe that this can be so. That
everything should be explicable in terms of physics ... except the occurrence of sensations
seems to me to be frankly unbelievable. [Smart, 1959, p. 53-54]
This conviction that the physical picture of the world is more or less complete
and accurate, conjoined with the belief that the physical world, so conceived,
cannot house properties like qualia, naturally leads the Australians to isolate
the mind as the seat of all trouble.
4.2.3. The Nonexistence ofRaw Feels (Qualia)
As we have already seen, the Australians hold that raw feels are the problematical
(because identification resistant) properties. UT. Place, the first writer to
espouse the identity thooty, made it vety clear that the Australian version of the
identity thooty had no place for qualia:
We [should] describe our conscious experience not in terms of the mythological 'phenomenal
properties' which are supposed to inhere in the mythological 'objects' in the mythological
'phenomenal field', but by reference to the actual physical properties of the concrete physical
objects, events, and processes which normally, though not perhaps in the present instance, give
rise to the sort of conscious experience which we are trying to describe. [place, 1956, p. 50]
This idea that there are no phenomenal properties and that the only properties
involved in experience are those of the perceived, external objects is one that
all of the Australians have adopted.
It shows up in Smart who speaks of the "singular elusiveness of 'raw feels '"
and the fact that "no one seems to be able to pin any properties on them." [Smart,
1959, p. 61] And while this talk of the elusiveness or transparency of qualia may
not amount to an outright denial of qualia, such a denial is more strongly
suggested by Smart's replies to typical Leibniz Law objections against the
identity thooty. These objections have the following pattern: the after-image is
orange; no brain process is orange; therefore the after-image isn't identical
with a brain process. To these sorts of objections Smart replies that the
experience of seeing something orange does not involve any orange individual.
Nothing in the mind bears an orange quaIe when you see something orange. For all
practical purposes this amounts to a denial of the existence of phenomenal
properties.
The denial of phenomenal properties is a central claim of Armstrong's version
of the identity theory. I think that this tendency is clearly present in
Armstrong's writings of the sixties. But it has found its clearest expression in
his more recent writings. I shall, therefore, quote from these later sources.
Perception, as we experience it introspectively, is entirely qualityless. The only qualities

involved are qualities, not of mental phenomena, but of the physical things perceived. In
particular, I maintain that the so-called secondary qualities: colour, sound taste, smell, heat and
cold: qualities which have often been thought to be inner qualities, are in fact qualities of
objective physical phenomena. [Armstrong and Malcolm, 1984, p. 170]
It is undeniable that the elimination of raw feels greatly facilitates the mind-
body identification. But one wonders in which sense, if any, a mind purged of
qualia is still capable of sentience at all. That is, one worries that the
Australian qualia surgeons, driven by a purgative enthusiasm, may have cut a just
a little too deep, inadvertently performing a complete "senti-ectomy" as it were.
4.2.4. The Topic Neutral Maneuver and the Problem ofPhenomenological

adequacy
Place and Smart never seem to have been troubled by doubts about the
phenomenological adequacy of the identity theory. We can distinguish three
closely related steps in the manner in which Place and Smart address the issue.
The fIrst of these we have already seen. It consists in the denial of
phenomenal objects and properties.
Since this denial does away with what seemed to be the candidates for
identifIcation, the second step must supply us with new mental candidates to
identuy with the physical. Place and Smart accomplish this by switching the
focus from experienced raw feels to experiences-of-raw-feels. 9 That is, the
experience-of-a-red-quale takes the place of the experienced red quale. In the
eyes of Place and Smart this fusion maneuver constitutes signifIcant progress.
For they take it that the Leibniz Law objections that block the identification of
raw feels with neural properties pose no problem for the identification of
experiencings-of-raw-feels with neural events.
Concurrently with the fusion maneuver Place and Smart execute the third step
of their argument-the famous topic neutral maneuver.lO In the hands of these
authors the topic neutral maneuver turns into a remarkably versatile instrument.
It seems to accomplish at least the following three tasks: (i) it allows one to
describe one's experiences in nonmentallstic or topic neutral terms; (ii) by
providing nonmental, topic neutral descriptions of our experiential states the
topic neutral maneuver seems to licence the inference that these experiential
states do not have any of the offensive mental properties; and (iii) topic neural
descriptions of our experience appears to afford an illuminating account of the
"qualitative character" of our experience. That is, topic neutral descriptions
take the mystery out of the fact that seeing a ripe tomato is like this, and that
seeing grass is like that. The red and the green that characterize these
respective experiences are simply the physical red and the physical green that
adorn the surfaces of tomatoes and grass respectively.
At this point Place and Smart appear to declare victory. As they see it, three
things have been achieved. First, the identification resistant phenomenal
properties have been successfully discarded. Second, in their place we now have
more well behaved mental entities-experiencings-that are identifiable with
neural events. And third, topic neutral formulations afford a perspicuous and
physica1istically acceptable way of describing sensory events. The topic neutral
description of an experience reveals that observable physical properties of the
perceived physical object are the only qualities with which experience acquaints
us. This, so Place and Smart appear to thitlk, should lay to rest all worries about
the phenomenological adequacy of the Australian version of the identity theory.
4.2.5. Armstrong vs. Place and Smart: The Problem ofSecondary Quality
But things are not that simple. And no one has made this clearer than Armstrong
who has undertaken heroic attempts to square the identity theory with the
requirement of phenomenological adequacy.
I believe that Armstrong is right to demand that the identity theorists tell us
more about the place of secondary qualities in their scheme of things. Place and
Smart haven't said the last world on this matter. But I also believe that
Armstrong's own manner of dealing with secondmy quality is unsatisfactory in the
end.
The two central stratagems that Place and Smart employ-the fusion maneuver
and the topic neutral maneuver-are not free of tension when employed
together.
The fusion maneuver is suggestive of a move towards an adverbialist analysis
of experience. 10 Adverbialism reconstructs phenomenal properties (or qualia,
or raw feels) as manners or modes in which the act of sensing takes place. The
details of this transmogrification are obscure; but surely it is clear that

theses successors of qualia are still mental.
But the topic neutral maneuver seems to suggest the more radical view that
nothing in the mind either is red or goes on in a red manner; the only red that
there is in the event of perceiving a ripe tomato is the physical red of the
tomato's surface. That is, the topic neutral maneuver is suggestive of some form
of physical color realism.
Armstrong proposes to solve this tension between the adverbialism and the
color realism that is latent in the Place and Smart by simply rejecting
adverbialism. "Going adverbial" does seem to spare you the embarrassment of
having to acknowledge phenomenal properties. But in their place you get modes of
sensing that are no less strange than the abhorrent properties that they are
supposed to replace. Here is how Armstrong expresses his discomfort with this
adverbialist "solution":
According to some philosophers, when, as we ordinarily say, we perceive a green leaf,

perceiving it as green, it would be truer to say that it is the mental act of perceiving which has
the green quality. We perceive greenIy... But wherever we locate the quality of greenness in the
mind, its presence there will falsity a purely causal theory of the mind. [Annstrong, 1984, p.
171]
Armstrong does think that reductive color realism is the way to go. But unlike
Place and Smart, Armstrong has an acute awareness of the "enormous
phenomenological difficulty" [Armstrong, 1984, p. 179] that this theory
presents.
4.2.6. Armstrong's Reductive Color Realism and the Problem ofIUusion
For Armstrong the question poses itself as the question of the location of
secondary qualities. 1 I For the secondary qualities appear problematical, no
matter where you end up locating them. Startmg with the view that secondary
qualities are inner, mental properties of sensory states you will be lead to ask
the question: "How is it possible that mental states could be physical states of
thebrain?"[Armstrong, 1977,20] The answer to this problem may seem simple: push
the secondmy qualities out of the mind and onto the minds object. (This was the
movethatPlace and Smart seemed to make). But pushing the secondmy qualities out
of the mind and onto the mind's object is not that easy. For the reason that the
secondary qualities ended up in the mind in the first place is precisely the fact
that it proves very difficult to find a home for secondary qualities in the
external physical world. The "obvious" solution to this problem, viz., to
identifY the secondmy qualities with the physical properties with which they are
associated (surface reflectances, etc.), is no less problematical than the

original question that first led us to push the secondary qualities out of the
mind. We began with the question: How is it possible that mental states could be
physical states of the brain? And now we face the analogous question: ''How is it
possible that secondary qualities could be purely physical properties of the
objects they are qualities of?" [Armstrong, 1977, p. 29] The standard answer to
this question consists in the causal analysis of physical redness. But that will
not do in the present context. For such an analysis will analyse physical redness
in terms of its propensity to give rise to red sensations in normal observers. And
now we have come full circle. For either the redness of the red sensations is a
nonphysical property, in which case physicalism and the identity theol)' are
false. Or the redness of sensations is a physical property, in which case we are
back at a specific version of the question with which we started: "How is it
possible that red sensations should be physical states of the brain?" [Armstrong,
1977, p. 30]
Armstrong does offer a solution to this problem. It's core consists in
maintaining that secondal)' properties are not at all like we think they are. They
do not have the higher order, identification resistant properties that they
appear to have. The simplicity, homogeneity, and unanalyzability of secondal)'
qualities is an illusion. "Secondal)' qualities are primal)' qualities not
apprehended as such." [Armstrong and Malcolm, 1984, p. 185] The face that these
qualities present to you in your experience is thoroughly and unalterably
illusol)'. Armstrong struggles valiantly to account for the origin of this
"illusion of concrete secondal)' quality." [Armstrong, 1984, p. 180] But these
struggles are to no avail. For any account that saturates experience with
illusol)' qualities, no matter what their origin, is still stuck with those vel)'
illusory qualities. Calling an experienced quality "illusol)'" does not make it go
away! If we agree that secondary qualities are complexes of primal)' qualities not
apprehended as such, then identification is easy. For then secondal)' qualities
simply are primal)' quality complexes and that is the end of the stol)' about
secondary qualities. But it is not the end of the stOI)'! For where does this stOI)'
leave all those illusol)' properties that suffuse our experience? After all,
Armstrong grants that secondary qualities present themselves to us cloaked with a
mantle of illusory qualities. And the properties that form this mantle pose all of
the difficulties for the identity theol)' that the secondal)' qualities originally
appeared to pose. So I cannot see that Armstrong has made any significant progress
on this issue.
4.2.7. A Different Approach to Illusion: Phenomenal vs. Doxastic Seeming
Perhaps it will be objected that I misunderstand Armstrong's appeal to illusion.

The illusion in question is not to be construed as a matter of one's being
acquainted with problematical illusory qualities. Rather it is a matter of one's
being related to unproblematicalprimary quality complexes (that are secondary
qualities)while mistakenly believing oneself to be acquainted with simple,
homogeneous, and unanalyzable properties. If this is how the illusion occurs,
then the only qualities involved are the primary quality complexes on the surface
of the external physical object of perception; and in addition to that there are
only numerous false beliefs (or other propositional attitudes) on the part of the
perceiving subject. At no point do we need to appeal to problematical illusory
qualities. In other words: the seeming involved in its seeming to one that there
is a simple, homogeneous expanse ofred before one is not a phenomenal seeming at
all; the seeming in question is a doxastic seeming, a matter of one's having false
beliefs about simplicity and homogeneity, not a matter of one's being directly
acquainted with something simple and homogeneous.
This is the sort of reply that lets you win a battle while losing the war. It is
true that this story does not involve an appeal to any problematical illusory
qualities. But it is also true that this story violates the requirement of
phenomenological adequacy in a rather spectacular way. The basic problem with
this account of our experience of secondary qualities (e.g., colors) is its
failure to distinguish the conscious experience of sighted and blind people. For
neither sighted nor blind people can become visually acquainted with colors as
they are in themselves-the primary quality complexes that the colors are, are
forever beyond our scope. There is, then, no significant difference between the
sighed and the blind on this account. So if there is a difference between these
two groups it must reside in the false beliefs that make it seem like that to see a
ripe tomato. But it would appear that the beliefs that determine the nature of
this seeming can all be shared by blind and sighted people. I3 So we get the result
that the sighted and the blind are phenomenologically indistinguishable, which
is false.
5. THE SPECTRE OF IDEALISM: IS THE AUSTRIAN VERSION OF

THE IDENTITY THEORY TOO ABSURD TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY?
I have tried to show that there are all sorts of significant differences between
the Austrian and the Australian versions of the identity theory. I have made it
clear that my sympathies are squarely on the side of the Austrian version of the
identity theory. It is the Austrian Version's ability to better satisfy the
requi.retllent of phenomenological adequacy that makes it more deserving of our

acceptance. But it may seem that this virtue of the Austrian version comes at a
price that is too high to pay. For many have detected a foul idealistic or
panpsychistic odor emanating from Feigl's identity theory. And the stench of
idealism is more then most contemporaries can handle. To them one whiff of this
stink constitutes a reductio of its source. Schlick and Feigl were well aware of
this charge. And the vehemence with which they repudiated it may well lead one to
think that they had a guilty conscience.
I do not, myself, share the powerful aversion to everything nonmaterialistic.
So I am not particularly worried how this debate about possible idealistic or
panpsychistic consequences ofFeigl' s theory turns out. But the existence of this
debate does help to highlight what appears to me to be the most significant
metaphysical difference between the Austrian and the Australian versions of the
identity theory. To my knowledge no one has ever suspected the Australians of
covert idealism. The idea strike$ one as perfectly ridiculous-for no one is more
passionately materialistic than the Australians. But many have wondered whether
Feigl's theory isn't simple panpsychism under a new name. For, to put it simply,
he seems to say that matter is made of qualia. Whether this be idealism or
panpsychism is not clear to me. But it is clear to me that this view deeply
antimaterialistic in spirit. And I should say that it is none the worse for that.
Feigl (and Schlick before him) struggle valiantly to contain the raw feels
within the matter that makes up living brains. Feigl freely acknowledges that the
stuff of our brains is "illuminated by the inner light". But he wants to resist
the argument from analogy that would lead us to believe that all matter is
suffused with the inner glow of phenomenal properties. The intrinsic nature of
the matter that is not the matter of our brains we do not know (and Schlick would
have argued: we cannot know). What we can say is that all reality is, at bottom
qualitative. But that these qualities are all of a piece, all raw' feels, is a
conjecture that isn't supported by any known facts. Here is how Feigl puts the
matter:
in the physical account of the universe as provided in the four-dimensional Minkowski

diagram, there are sporadically some very small regions (representing the brains of living and
awake organisms) which are "illuminated by the inner lighf' of direct experience or sentience.
This view differs from panpsychism which assumes that the 'internal illumination" pervades
all of physical reality. [FeigJ, 1958, p. 451]
And towards the end ofhis famous essay we find an even more illuminating summary
of his deepest metaphysical or ontological views. There Feigl writes:
Speaking "ontologically" for the moment, the identity tliCOl)' regards sentience (qualities
experienced, and in human beings knowable by acquaintance) and other qualities
(unexperienced and knowable only by description) the basic reality. In avoiding the
unwarranted panpsychistic generalization, it steers clear of a highly dubious sort of inductive
metaphysics. It shares with certain forms of idealistic metaphysics, in a vel)' limited and (I
hope) purified way, a conception of reality and combines with it the tenable component of
materialism, viz., the conviction that the basic laws of the universe are "physical." [Feigl, 1958,
p.474]
I fmd this strange version of nonmaterialistic physicalism enormously

attractive. I combines a profound respect for phenomenology with an
unconditional acceptance of a rational, scientific view of the world. And nothing
less will do. For all theories that slight phenomenology are simply false, and we
know that. So it would be silly to even pretend that we believe them. And all
theories that would furnish the mind with the power to break the scientific order
ofthe world appear-well, crazy. Many have held that you cannot do full justice to
both, phenomenology and science. Others have held that you can do justice to both;
but inevitable they slighted the one or the other. But if we want to avoid blatant
falsity and lunacywemust, somehow, combine phenomenology with science without
shortchanging either. And Schlick and Feigl have shown us how to do just that. 14
University o/Notre Dame
NOTES
1. It is also the vision that inform's Moritz Schlick's much earlier reflections on the mind-body
problem. Feigl's version of the identity thCOl)' was profoundly influenced by Schlick's
discussion of the mind-body problem in his General Theory of Knowledge [Schlick, 1985
(1925)]. The parallels between Schlick's and Feigl's versions of the identity thCOl)' run so deep
that I shall apply the label "Austrian version of the identity" to cover both versions. But for
reasons of space I shall limit my discussion to Feigl's views.
2. See, for example, his [Feyerabend, 1963].
3. See, for example, his [Rorty, 1965].
4. More accurately, I should say "exaggerating considerably." See footnote # 14
5. This is a controversial view, as will become clear when we discuss the Australian version of
the identity thcol)'.
6. Much like Schlick, Feigl is vel)' concerned to mark the principled distinction between
acquaintance (or experience) and knowledge by acquaintance: "I quite emphatically want to
distinguish acquaintance from knowledge by acquaintance. "Acquaintance as such"... is to
mean simply the direct experience itself, as lived through, enjoyed, or suffered; knowledge by
acquaintance, however is propositional." [Feigl, 1958, p. 404]
7. This migration of the problematical properties is the net effect of Feigl's insistence that
properties of the evidence not be attributed to the evidenced.
8. Compare Michael Devitt's speculations on the origin of Australian realism in his [Devitt,
1991, p. x].
9. This is an outstanding example of the power of "pinky finger metaphysics", so called

because it helps you solve metaphysical problems by using your pinky finger to type en dashes
between select words.
10. Here is one of the passages in which Smart explains the nature and the point of the topic
neutral maneuver: ''When I say 'it looks to me that there is a yellow lemon' I am saying,
roughly, that what is going on in me is like what is going on in me when there really is a yellow
lemon in front of me, my eyes are open, the light is daylight. and on. That is, our talk of
immediate experience is derivative from our talk about the external world. Furthermore, since
our talk of immediate experience is in terms of a typical stimulus situation ... we can see that our
talk of immediate experience is itself neutral between materialism and dualism." [Smart. 1963,
p.162]
11. Roderick Chisholm, for example, has read Smart in this way. See his [Chisholm, 1966,
pp. 99-102] for a development of this idea.
12. What follows is a summary of Armstrong's illuminating discussion of this issue in his
[Armstrong, 1977].
13. The proponent of this doxastic account of seeming must resist the temptation to make the
relevant beliefs so that only sighted people can have them-by, for example, postulating that
these beliefs contain constituents that are only available to the sighted. For in that case we shall
reply that these special constituents are nothing but the problematical illusory properties that
this construal of seeming is designed to avoid.
14. My presentation may have created the misleading impression that debate between the
Austrian and the Australian versions of the identity theory is a thing of the past. This is not so.
Both versions have their contemporary champions. Apparently indestructible, the Australians
have continued to defend their version of the theory up to the present day. They have been
joined by, for example, Chris Hill [Hill, 1991] and, most notably, David Lewis-another
Australophile-who says of himself: ''My position is very like the 'Australian materialism' of
Place, Smart. and especially Armstrong." [Lewis, 1994, p. 412] With friends such as these the
Australian version of the identity theory is in good hands. The Austrian version is in good (if
not quite as prominent) hands too. The main source of inspiration for the contemporary
champions of of thl? Austrian version are Grover Maxwell, Bertrand Russell (who inspired
Maxwell), and William James (who inspired Russell). For recent presentations of the view see,
for example, [Chalmers, 1996; Lockwood, 1989; Lockwood, 1993; Rosenberg, 1996; Sprigge,
1994; and it is hinted at in Blackburn, 1990]. It must be granted that there is nothing especially
Austrian about the authors of this lineage. Given the admirable convergence of their views with
those of Schlick and Feigl this fault may, however, be forgiven.
REFERENCES
Armstrong, D. M and Norman Malcolm. 1984. Consciousness and Causality. A Debate on
the Nature a/Mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Armstrong, D. M. 1977. "The Causal Theory of Mind." Neue Heftefiir Philosophie 11. Pages:
82-95. Reprinted in [Armstrong, 1980]. Pages: 16-31. Page references are to this
reprinting.
Armstrong, D. M. 1980. The Nature a/Mind. Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press.
Armstrong, D.M. 1984. "Consciousness and Causality." In [Armstrong and Malcolm, 1984].
Pages: 103-191.
Blackburn, Simon. 1990. "Filling Space." AnalySiS 50. Pages: 62-65.
Borst. C.V., ed. 1970. The Mind-Brain Identity Theory. London: The Macmillan Press.
Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Chisholm, Roderick M. 1966. Theory of Knowledge. (1st Edition). Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Devitt, Michael. 1991. Realism and Truth. Second edition. First edition published 1984.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Feigl, Herbert, Michael Scriven and Grover Maxwill, eds. 1958. Concepts, Theories, and the
Mind-Body Problem. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume II.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Feigl, Herbert. 1958. "The "Mental" and the "Physical"." In [Feigl, et aI., 1958]. Pages: 370-
497.
Feigl,Herbert 1967. "PostscriptAfier Ten Years."In [Feigl, 1967]. Pages: 135-169.
Feigl, Herbert. 1967. The Mental and the Physical. The Essay and the Postscript.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Feyerabend, Paul. 1963. "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem." Review ofMetaphysics
17. Reprinted in [Borst, 1970]. Pages: Page references are to this reprinting.
Fodor, Jerry. 1987. Psychosemantics. The Problem ofMeaning in the Philosophy ofMind.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Guttenplan, Samuel, ed. 1994. A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hill, Christopher S. 1991. Sensations. A Defence ofType Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. .
Honderich, Ted and Myles Bumyeat, eds. 1979. Philosophy asItIs. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books.
Kripke, Saul. 1979. ''Identity and Necessity." Originally in [Munitz, 1971]. Reprinted in
[Honderich and Bumyeat, 1979]. Pages: 478-513. Page references are to this reprinting.
Lewis, David. 1994. "Reduction of Mind." In [Guttenplan, 1994]. Pages: 412-432.
Lockwood, Michael. 1989. Mind, Brain and the Quantum. The Compound ,!'. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Lockwood, Michael. 1993. "The Grsin Problem."In [Robinson, 1993]. Pages: 271-291.
Munitz, Milh>n K., ed. 1971. Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University
Press.
Place, U.T. 1956. ''Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" The British Journal of Psychology
XLVII. Reprinted in [Borst, 1970]. Pages: 42-51. Page references are to this reprinting.
Robinson, Howard, ed. 1993. Objections to Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rorty, Richard. 1965. "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories." The Review of
Metaphysics 19. Pages: 24-54. Reprinted in [Borst, 1970]. Pages: 187-213. Page
references are to this reprinting.
Rosenberg, Gregg. 1996. "Dualism and Functionalism." Unpublished Manuscript
Schlick, Moritt. 1985 (1925). General Theory ofKnowledge. LaSalle: Open Court.
Searle, John R. 1992. The Rediscovery ofthe Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Smart, J.J.C. 1959. "Sensations and Brain Processes." The Philosophical Review 68.
Reprinted in [Borst, 1970]. Pages: 52-66. Page references are to this reprinting.
Smart, H.C. 1963. ''Materialism.'' The Journal ofPhilosophy 60, 22. Pages: 651-662.
Sprigge, T.L.S. 1994. "Consciousness." Synthese 98. Pages: 73-93.
RICHARD SYLVAN*
ISSUES IN REGIONAL PHILOSOPHY.

AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY? AND ITS AUSTRAL IMAGE?
There are regional philosophies. Philosophy is not universal and

drably uniform, transcultural and boringly international, comprising one and
the same complex of problems and inquiry, methods and style everywhere; it
does vary, and could vary much more, with cultural region. One such region
of contemporary significance is Austria, which has a distinctive tradition of
philosophy. Another region, so far of much less moment, is its austral image,
Australia. Another, which by cantrast contains diverse subregions, is Africa,
with rediscovered interrelated traditions of African philosophy (so at least
several recent texts aver). And so on, for other geographic regions.
But none of these claims, comparatively innocuous as they appear, passes
uncontested. Instead they raise many issues. 1 Among many reasons for
contestation, a prominent one is present domination of realism, according to
which there is only one correct way in philosophy-a way which is now (by
contrast with the recent past where, in many places, first British
commonsense, then Oxbridge ordinary language and practice, took
precedence) often taken to be that delivered by mainstream Euro-American
science. Such a colonializing (scientific) realism appears to leave little room
for regional alternatives. However appearance does here fall short of reality.
To begin upon shattering this widespread realist illusion, ask which
distinguished ethical theory or which uniform political philosophy this (sort ot)
realism uniquely supplies? Or which logic and coupled reason?
There are philosophies and philosophies, as there are logics and
logics, ethics and ethics. Too many philosophies now pretend to universality:
not merely realisms of various form, but fundamentalisms of different casts.
There are also philosophies that are less presumptuous and pretentious,
presented as less than universal, that are offered or forged or found in this
place or that, this culture or that, this community or nation or state or that.
Such philosophies, sometimes more like ideologies, differ considerably in style
and calibre, in make-up and merit. A supporter of regional philosophy is not
obliged to endorse them all, or even welcome them all, any more than a
pluralist, though pleased with variety and diversity, need approve all that is
offered in a pluralist basket. Much that is presented may be unsatisfactory,
some may be unsound, logically, ideologically, or otherwise. As elsewhere
147
148 RICHARD SYLVAN
there may be difficulties in distinguishing what is relatively good-but fewer

difficulties in detecting what is unremittingly bad.
A regional philosophy is linked to a region, not, except indirectly, to
a nation or state, or church or company. It is regionally linked by many-many
relations. Region is defined as usual, ecologically and geographically (e.g. 'a
tract of land, air, space, etc ... having certain prevailing characteristics, as of
fauna and flora ... ' Concise Oxford Dictionary). For example then, an
Austrian (the Austro-Hungarian) region is broadly demarcated by the
watershed of the Danube in central Europe; the Australian region by the
continent. 2 Presented this way, regional philosophy can, like regional
movements and regional culture, be seen as part of wider regionalization much
favoured in the green movement. Such regionalism, often distinguished as
bioregionalism or ecoregionalism, stands opposed to prevailing national and
state arrangements; for instance, it favours primarily bottom-up and anti-
centralist organizational structures, it is environmentally, socially and anti-
militarily committed, it is anarchically inclined, and so on. It accordingly
stands in heavy contrast with what it is nonetheless often confused with,
namely state or national philosophies, sectarian and parochial philosophies.
It should be evident that many regional philosophies are not national or state
philosophies, that there is no serious problem of differentiation in this regard.
Consider, for instance, African philosophy; Africa is a large, diverse region,
not a state or nation.
Like philosophies more generally, regional philosophies form a very
mixed selection, in which there are good and bad, indifferent and evil
examples: There are broadly regional philosophies of nasty and repressive
varieties, for instance, philosophies from which everyone opposed to national
elitism or racial or other chauvinism would want to be far distanced, such as
neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic philosophies to select just two highly conspicuous
sorts of examples. Regional philosophies worth their while and worth support
are very different, and should afford resources to undermine racism,
chauvinism and dangerous nationalism.
It will hardly have escaped notice that there are more and less
substantial, more and less controversial, notions of regional philosophy.
Indeed less substantial and inoffensive versions may be so enfeebled as to be
hardly worth dignifying by a separate title at all; for instance where regional
philosophies simply comprise different philosophers doing more or less the
same sorts of things philosophically (e.g. speculative philosophy of mind, but
perhaps using local examples and names) in different regions. For regional
philosophies things sufficiently different philosophically have to be happening
or espoused in different regions; it is not enough just to have regional actors
or some dispensable local colour. But what is different can nonetheless vary
ISSUES IN REGIONAL PHILOSOPHY 149
importantly in depth. It can differ, firstly, as to whether it touches only

surfaces features of style, tone and medium, such as differences of language,
format, procedures, local celebrities and mentors-or whether it affects
substance as well, with different underlying notions of truth and reason, right
and value, to select four features of critical philosophical moment. Regional
philosophy in this more substantial form means pluralism.
Within the "substance" side of the style-substance divide further
important differences occur. For the pluralism involved may assume
common-place 1heoretical form only-for instance, materially different 1heories
prevail, or are in vogue, in different regions-or pluralism may penetrate
deeper, to matters of correctness, conceding different facts, as well as
1heories, in different regions. Upon some recent accounts of facts, where facts
correspond to those propositions a community can achieve consensus upon,
such regional variation upon facts proves unproblematic; different communities
wi1h different consensual outputs will recognise, and be restrained by, different
facts; for instance, in one region it will be a fact 1hat o1her animals feel pain
and have interests, in another, such as Enlightenment France, it will not.
Under definite realism, however, such variation will appear intolerable. How
could hard truth change wi1h a change of space-time geography?
Regional philosophy in this deeper pluralistic form not merely
challenges prevailing realism, as a 1heoretical pluralism may, but furthermore
rejects it, as absolute or especially privileged. Unremarkably then issues
concerning substantial regional philosophy are entangled with those of realism
and anti-realism, relativism and pluralism. No doubt prevailing realism is,
like its prevailing alternatives, anti-realism and relativism, astray. 3 Different
notions of tru1h and reason, value and right, can obtain correctly in different
regions, with validity and truth varying, like permissibility, from region to
region, as from world to world. But of course a substantial philosophical
regionalism does not have to venture quite so far from present tenuous
philosophical consensus. What changes where can be pushed back: changes
of logic, for instance from regions to worlds or even to frames of worlds or
models. Correspondingly it can be said 1hat logic does not change wi1h region,
wi1h mere terrestial or intragalactic travel: what may change are evolutionary
developments or choices of logics, as of languages. Reapproachment is
none1heless limited. Realism and anti-realism will try to insist 1hat poor or
wrong choices are made elsewhere, in regions 1hat diverge from 1heir own
heartlands, 1hat practitioners 1here are substandard or incompetent, and so on.
Dominant philosophies, which 1hetnselves vary from place to place,
can, because of 1heir uniformity 1hemes (1hat reason, existence, and tru1h
cannot vary from region to region), only really admit a somewhat enfeebled
philosophical regionalism. Variation can only affect style, not philosophical
150 RICHARD SYLVAN
substance (reason, 1ru1h and all that, variously construed under their auspices).
But 1hey can admit a duly weakened regionalism, with different regional styles
and their aspects; different regional languages, texts, characters, examples,
anecdotes, and so on. Such enfeebled regionalism, or less, has been offered
to us, as regards Austrian philosophy, by a recent distinguished commentator
upon it, Barry Smith. Indeed, on the basis of an assumed scientific realism he
tries to force us not only to adopt a much weakened regionalism, but in the end
would have us throwaway the very ladder he has climbed, Austrian
philosophy, altogether. Interestingly, Smith repeats for Austrian philosophy
some of 1he elementary moves that have been attempted against Australian
philosophy. What we find is 'scientific philosophy in Austria', which needs
no special explanation. For 'in Austria' , as everywhere else where philosophy
is practiced decently,
the rise of scientific philosophy is an inevitable concomitant of the simple process of

modernisation [I]. "Austrian philosophy· is thus a misnomer, since there is no
corresponding sectarian or regional (or ethnic) philosophy: Austrian philosophy is
philosophy per se, part and parcel of the mainstream of world philosophy: it is that part of
German-language philosophy which meets international standards of clarity, rigour and
professionalism. 4
Fortunately none of these confident pronouncements withstands much

examination. The partisan 'international standards' are neither necessary nor
sufficient for distinguishing Austrian philosophy (consider e.g. German
philosophy of science and on-going Viennese philosophy). Scientific
philosophy is only one concomitant of modernisation; others are new-age
philosophy, existentialism and so on. Of course scientific philosophy itself is
by no means a single thing. For one, philosophy can stand in various relations
to science, more exalted, as a sort of super-science or, differently, meta-
science, or less exalted, as some sort of servant or lackey. While it can
function as both, it is neither. For another, despite the hegemonic structure
of contemporary Western science, there are sciences and sciences, and, still
more exuberantly, philosophies thereof.
What is more dismaying, however, comes with the attitudes indicated:
a (mis)conception of philosophy as properly bound up with science, its many
other artistic, intellectual and cultural features suppressed or scrapped,s a
latent au1horitarianism, reflected in conformity to standards, and dismissive of
nonconforming philosophy. These international standards we have seen efore,
with logical positivism and other forms of scientific philosophy. They have
meant classical logic, the reference theory and much else that appears wrong
and eminently rejectable. Nor does what we have glimpsed so far of "world
philosophy", at world congresses, through UNESCO arrangments, and the

like, augur at all well: stand-offs, squabbles, and little genuine philosophy. It
is perhaps too easy to poke fun at monolithic world philosophy, that it looks
set to yield, like the World Bank, problematic output and bad investments,
that, like world books, it is a fraudulent and strait-jacketing imposition, and
even that it may function like the emerging world car, as cheap, unreliable and
polluting junk:.
1. A SMALL DETOUR, ON WORLD PHILOSOPHY
As it happens, there are different conceptions of world philosophy

itself, competing on the predominantly American "world market". Sharply
opposed to the sort of scientific philosophy, a spiced-up positivism, heavily
promoted in Anglo-American regions of influence, is another dubious model
of world philosophy, what might be called "enquiry" or "arty-crafty"
philosophy, favoured by a range of minority groups within the Anglo-
American sphere, groups with affiliations with literary criticism, "Continental"
philosophy, feminism, and so forth. Enquiry philosophy represent part of the
range of "philosophy" scientific philosophy seeks to eradicate. And, to some
extent, vice versa: enquiry philosophy disparages scientific philosophy, and
seeks to displace or remove it. In many ways, the scientific/enquiry
philosophy contrast resembles the sciencelhumanities divide of the ridiculous
"two culture" stand-off and shoot-out.
Like scientific professional philosophy, enquiry philosophy too appears
unduly restrictive of philosophical methods. Indeed this sort of feature is
typical of new fashions in philosophy, new philosophies so-called, in almost
every age: they not merely emphasize a previously less conspicuous set of
philosophical methods, but endeavour to constrict other and older methods: so
it is with such movements as critical philosophy, phenomenology, deep
ecology, hermeneutics, and so forth. What some seeking to elevate enquiry
philosophy to world philosophy particularly wish to dispose of includes
the current emphasis on argumentation-often summarized as rationality-as the essence of

philosophy [which] excludes much of the more poetic and nondisputational wisdom of
nonWestern cultures ... 6 •
Instead they would substitute, what they suggest has much merit: a
hermeneutical approach, conversational rather than teaching models,
engagement rather than casual acquaintance, and a critical approach. Apart
from the 'hearing of other voices' (a slogan of new age and feminist
152 RICHARD SYLVAN
philosophies) which they append, it could all have come direct from Frankfurt
or elsewhere in Europe that has a school of critical philosophy prepared to
encompass hermeneutical elements and is critical of mainstream American
methods; it is among they very sort of stuff scientific philosophy condemns.
"World philosophy", a dubious and even dangerous idea, has to
encompass more than either scientific philosophy or more liberal critical
philosophy. Although they produced a book purportedly in the topic, Solomon
and Higgim do not say what would philosophy comprises or should comprise.
Their apparent strategy is to widen philosophy, so that it includes much that is
only marginally philosophy or not philosophy at all (e.g. general folk wisdom,
stories and myths telling of origins, practices and so on). But again this
widening proceeds in a substantially unexplained way; they do not say what
widened philosophy comprises, though they offer some (inadequate) hints,
such as freedom to disagree (fortunately, philosophy has often persisted
nonetheless), understanding of claims rather mere acceptance, 'reading
philosophy from other cultures: getting inside, into a culture' (while no doubt
virtuous, hardly necessary for worthwhile local philosophy).
Widening philosophy often nowadays consists in weakening it, diluting
it so that it even loses its essential attributes. It is frequently observed that
there are various (weaker and stronger) ways in which a group, a society, or
culture, may have a philosophy. In an unduly weak sense, where a philosophy
is equated with a way of life, even animal communities and trade organisations
have philosophies. A plumber has a philosophy, as well as a philosophy of
plumbing, which may include a code of good practice with ethical overtones.
None of these are really good enough, unless sufficiently examined, critically
examined (thus it really should be: a critically examined and coherent way of
life). In another weaker sense, a philosophy (or better, a system of ideas) is
embodied in religious and social practices. Whereupon every historical human
society has a philosophy; each can claim a chapter in world philosophy, and
anthropology includes practical philosophy. But some of these ideologies may
exhibit few or none of the critical and other attributes expected of philosophy;
some tribes may be unaware of, or hostile to, devotion to wisdom and
furtherance of "higher" intellectual endeavours, some may be banners or
burners of books. In a stronger sense, it is sometimes required for a
philosophy that a society has a tradition of systematic investigations of its own
ideas. But even if a society supported professionals (not simply witch-doctors)
for this purpose, it may still lack philosophy in a truer sense. It may have a
priesthood, theological institutions and a theology, but little real philosophy,
or it may have a technological university with all its experts but no philosophy
section. Missing may well be philosophical investigations and philosophical
issues. Thus not only have many human societies (some primitive, barbarian,
religious and other societies) lacked genuine philosophy; even in "advanced"

societies, philosophy may languish at best at the margins (and be in danger of
becoming further marginalised through a combination of international forces,
including popular entertainment and communications, and economic
rationalism) .
What could well substitute for world philosophy is evident enough: a
grand basket of genuine philosophies, open for free inspection, sampling,
thorough testing, and choice. In short, a suitable intellectual framework is that
of full pluralism, and distinctive among the plurality concerned are regional
philosophies. A fairly natural way to pluralize, a route natural evolution has
certainly taken, is through regionalization (including regional isolation). But
it is not the only way.
So far world philosophy, as distinct from a pluralistic substitute,
deservedly remains something of a joke, though it is what international
philosophy might be expected to deliver. Fortunately. international
philosophy, which remains substantially a cover for Anglo-American
philosophy, though now dominant almost world-wide, has by no means won
the field. It should be resisted. For such dominant philosophy is bad news for
much that matters: other cultures and creatures, local regions and natural
environments. Also it contains much that is wrong or dubious. Moreover,
there are appealing and viable alternatives to internationalism in philosophy
(whether Anglo-American, Franco-German, comparative or some other
pretender), namely again regional philosophies. 7
There is no compelling reason why regional philosophy should not
take a vigorous substantial form. Nothing forces uniformity, except what are
mostly undesirable, oppressive conformity, imposed consensus, practices of
powerful authorities, and forms of transnationalism (neo-colonisalism,
economic imperialism, etc.). In short, nothing of overwhelming merit forces
uniformity. Admittedly again, philosophical realism-with its Islamic-style
doctrines, such as that there is no other truth than truth, the Truth, that there
is no other reason than reason, namely classical logical theory and its
accoutrements-tries to do so. But how, given the feasible divergence of
theory, does it impose its doctrine that there is only one way of truth, in each
case a unique fact of the matter? Mainly through the sorts of forces already
recorded as forcing uniformity (but some of the authorities may be less
conspicuous these days, such as guardians of correct science, a coalition of
members of Royal Society and National Academies, boards of prestigious
journals, educational authorities, and so forth). Provided they are prepared to
suffer economic and social penalties, regional philosophical groups can often
thumb their noses at these forces (though not always, as, like some sects, they
may excite coercive forces operating in their regions).
154 RICHARD SYLVAN
2. AUSTRIAN PHll..OSOPHY AS A SPLENDID EXAMPLE?

CHARACTERIZATION AND OTHER PROBLEMS
Among regional endeavours, Austrian philosophy stands out as a

magnificent example, with recent period after period of extraordinary
richness. Against this bright contrast, Australian philosophy thus far appears
a strange impoverished creature, though one gaining occasional stature
inadvertently 1hrough the widespread confusion (courtesy of expanding world
ignorance) of Austria with Australia. As some compensation, philosophers
from outside Austria can bask to some extent in the reflected glory of an
Austrian past, for instance by attaching themselves to some moments in it: to
insights into 1he Vienna circle, reconstruction of Meinong's ideas, elucidation
and elaboration ofWittgenstein's work, or similar.
Taking Austrian philosophy itself as an object of investigation can also
help in resolving difficulties for and meeting criticisms of regional philosophy
more generally. For 1here are undoubtedly problems for regional philosophies
(as for the very idea of a regional philosophy) even for that prominent
example, Austrian philosophy. These range from such apparently mundane
matters as supplying identity criteria for such vague objects to such more
appealing matters as gathering ideas for how to induce worthwhile regional
enterprise in places where philosophy is stagnating, dying or dead--or was
never properly initiated. 8
Certainly by the sorts of standards tougher Austrian-connected
philosophers have tried to impose, Austrian philosophy is itself a problematic
object. Granted it does not have zero or greater mass, or non-metaphoric
momentum (immediate blackmarks from a physicalist angle), what is its extent
or coverage? Was it larger in its earlier great days, and did it contract with
1he break-up of1he Austro-Hungarian empire, or are 1here outposts of Austrian
philosophy outside Austria, in Slovenia and Ukraine for example? Should we
try to distinguish Austrian philosophy by it distinguished contributors, then
who counts as Austrian philosopher? There are many critical problematic
cases, beginning with the philosopher who was regularly said to have founded
Austrian philosophy, Brentano. 9 After all, Brentano, born in Germany of a
distinguished Italian-German family, was already a mature philosopher when
he moved to Austria from Germany; a seminal philosopher, who, when in
effect expelled from Austria, went on to establish a following in Italy (so was
he perhaps an Italian philosopher?). Ano1her critical case is Wittgenstein, who
took up philosophy in England and did much of his salient work from there.
The list goes on: what of Husserl, Popper, Carnap, other members of the
Vienna circle?
While a certain amount can be conceded to such objections, that

Austrian philosophy is not an ordinary garden physical object, that it is a vague
elastic temporarily-extended object, not too much should be given away. It is
not utterly or damagingly vague. Neither Naess nor Ayer are Austrian
philosophers, neither contributed directly to Austrian philosophy, though both
joined the Vienna circle for a period. Austrian philosophy is entirely distinct
from Australian, or for that matter Norwegian philosophy, with no overlap.
And problem issues can be answered, variously, but for instance as follows:
Wittgenstein and Popper were British philosophers as well as Austrian ones
(though they wrote philosophy in other places, Wittgenstein was not a
Norwegian philosopher, nor Popper a New Zealand one, any more than
Gaugin was a Tahitian painter). Roughly, a regional philosophy can be
characterized in terms of enough of its on-going history in the given region,
its recognised contributors, actors and their engagements, their projects and
topics, as well as their themes, their relevant activities and controversies,
movements and schools. Such philosophy resembles in this respect a local
group of intertwined persons, each of whose evolving identity is similarly
elaborated. A helpful working model, for which there is an embryonic theory
is that of a club, or a regional coalition, or a family.
Moreover the characterization has to proceed in some such partially
particularized way, if it is not to be excessively vague and otherwise
problematic. With only universalistic abstract elements, it becomes a difficult
exercise to distinguish English philosophy from American, except perhaps
through pragmatism, or English from Scottish, or for that matter, if particular
language differences are discarded, Austrian from Finnish philosophy. A
purely abstract characterization, meeting for instance often imposed
requirements for a law-like statement, will hardly serve on its own. Examples
are those criteria offered for Austrian philosophy, namely (to take one list
proferred by Hallerl~:
- rejection of a synthetic a priori;

- identification of necessity with logical necessity;
- rejection of transcendental and dialectic methods;
- commitment to science, and its unity;
- attention to language and logic.
These criteria are satisfied by logical empiricism, in many places (e.g.

by Russell in England). As set within German-language philosophy (as Haller
intended), such a list does much better; but that already particularizes. Nor
is it then adequate; for consider Reichenbach's circle in Berlin, or the present
analytic movement in parts of Germany.
156 RICHARD SYLVAN
Admittedly by augmenting lists of criteria or marks, improvements

can be made, entry tightened, some further separation achieved. Consider a
fuller list of criteria, which adds to that given (as refined) the following
connected features: ll
- commitment to exact philosophy , and its methods (though not
exclusively).
- sympatica1ity with British empiricism, its themes and methods,
including sometimes detailed study of it and rootedness in it,
- adaptation of methods of analytic and piecemeal philosophy, and of
philosophy "from below", working from detailed examination of
particular examples.
- rejection of speculative and grand methods
-rejection of the Kantian revolution, and of various sorts of historicism
and relativism that developed in its wake.
-readiness however to accept controversial disciplines,such as Gestalt
theory and phenomenology.
- concern with structure, of complexes, worlds and so on, especially
with how parts of moments fit together to form structured wholes of
various sorts.
-heavy interest in relations of macro-phenomena to micro-phenomena
(experiences, individuals, moments, atoms) that underlie, explain, or are
associated with them. Reduction or supervenience may, or may not, be
presumed.
Observe that this expanded list of family characteristics is impure, and

violates lawlikeness, making allusion to other regional philosophies and
schools. .Observe that part of it really consists of topics focussed upon.
Neither of these sorts of features should be regarded as damaging; both assist,
for instance in distancing Austrian philosophy from British (especially the last
three marks cited). Both sorts of features also aid in showing that no
differential imperative requires pure lists of family characteristics; families can
be variously distinguished.
The familial image of philosophies being infiltrated also helps in
removing various misconceptions concerning regional philosophies, not least
regarding that distinguished family, Austrian philosophy (for which discourse
concerning a family pedigree is especially apposite). It seems that
misconceptions arise from all sides, those supporting (the idea of) Austrian
philosophy, those opposing it, those fence-sitting or not caring, and so on. On
the one side, those discerning a 'specifically Austrian philosophy', such as
most notably Haller, have expected and demanded excessive uniformity (as if
all the family members had to have the same sort of face, a nose of identical
profile, or whatever). For example, so claimed by Haller of Austrian
philosophy is 'intrinsic homogeneity' and an 'internally coherent tradition'.
Such unnecessary demands make quite insufficient allowance for alternative
streams within the broad current of Austrian philosophy, for dissident groups,
and clashing minority positions. They make it much too easy for an opposition
to point to different currents or, switching images, different camps (thus e.g.
politically, progressive socialism and Catholic reaction, which Haller is
accused of 'running together' or 'confusing' .12)
A regional philosophy is usually not a single monolithic item, uniform
and homogeneous. More typically such a philosophy forms a rich fabric
woven of many strands. Typically such a philosophy will include dominant
and recessive strands, and, like most families and clubs, squabbling factions.
So it is with Austrian philosophy, so it is with Australian. Both can be
represented as bundles of interconnected strands; each can be given family
characterisation, from which relevant details of members of the family, their
changing circumstances and locations, their particular projects, their divisions
and disputes and so on, will not be excluded, but may feature. While there is
no genetic transmission, no shared gene pool, as in a literal family, there can
be much that is transmitted (through new students, exchanges, and so on) and
shared in philosophy of a region.
Furthermore, it is no objection to a family characterization that there
are marks not shared in common by all members of the family. Such a simple
and familiar observation demolishes much criticism of Austrian philosophy,
for instance all that based on the rather naive assumption that the marles are
'shared in common' by all practitioners of Austrian philosophy. 13 Marks are
marks, family characteristics family characteristics, not necessary and or
sufficient conditions.
By virtue 'of such a historical process characterisation of familial cast,
there is a reasonable basis for presuming an object, and for speaking about it,
about Austrian philosophy as about Australian philosophy, though not (yet)
about Arizonan philosophy. For example, there is then a reasonable basis for
talking of Australkm philosophy, rather than merely· philosophy in
Australia-all that is warranted, according to many Australian opponents of
regional philosophy. 14
3. OBJECTIONS BOTH TO THE IDEA OF REGIONAL PHILOSOPHY,

AND TO AUSTRALIAN PHILOSOPHY AS A WORKING EXAMPLE
Instead of looking for reasons why Australian philosophy has not

matched Austrian philosophy in calibre, though in main conventional respects
the Australian regional resource base appears superior (with many more
educated humans, much bigger cities with big seaports, much larger mineral,
forest and agricultural wealth, and so on), instead of looking accordingly for
158 RICHARD SYLVAN
ways to excel regionally, the rather uniform Australian philosophical

community, by and large too complacent about its efforts and standing, has
tried to evade such enquiries, and to savage the notions of regional philosophy
and Australian philosophy. Objections include the very different claims that
- it can't be done;
- it isn't done;
- at least isn't done in a distinctive worthwhile way;
- it oughtn't to be done.
In Australia only a select minority espouses regional philosophical causes.

Mostly there has been, and continues to be, heavy opposition to themes of
regional thought, inquiry and philosophy, particularly from disciples of
Anderson and their cohorts, and from connected parts of the power structure
of Australian philosophy (much other effort occurs behind the scenes). By
contrast with Melburnian internationalism, the Andersonian opposition is more
than a little curious, given that Anderson established what is widely considered
the most distinctive school that Australian philosophy has seen. Andersonian
opposition to regional proposals emanates from Anderson himself (always
apparently a maverick).
According to Anderson, '1here is no more an Australian literature than
an Australian philosophy or mathematics ... There is a world literature to
which Australians contribute'. 15 Reflection renders this pronouncement,
plausible as it may initially sound (to internationalists), increasingly ridiculous.
Firstly, consider a few substitutions upon 'literature': art (no Australian art?),
culture, medical fund, tax system, vegetation, bush, ... . Second, if there is
no regional literature or art, then ipso facto there is no world literature or art,
such as is presumed, either. For these, as terrestrial, are also regional from
galactic and wider perspectives: There is, is there, (only) a 'universal'
literature to which earthlings contribute? In any case, Anderson's
pronouncement appears to fly against now established discourse and supporting
data. For there is now a strong tradition in Australian literature, well
anthologized, taught in Australian schools and universities, and even abroad,
a relatively unproblematic if rather recent tradition. By contrast, there is
hardly a 'world philosophy', catering to the terrestrial region, but not to
universal theorizing, to which Australia contributes: philosophy is too
piecemeal and fragmented, among other things, for that (as again exchanges
at 'World Congresses' tend to demonstrate). There are many well recognized
varieties of regional philosophy: Western, Continental, British, Indian, and
so on (for all their vagueness, no worse cha~acterized than very many
terrestrial ideologies). There is contribution after contribution on Austrian
philosophy (including now a few books, so designated at any rate). Why not
Australian philosophy?
Not so remarkably, Andersonian themes have been pushed heavily by
Andersonians, such as Kamenka, an enthusiastic internationalist, who explicitly
rejected the notion of Australian culture ('so-called "culture"') in favour of
culture in Australia, and by his former team at the late History of Ideas Unit,
The Australian National University, by Brown, by Rose, and, with typical
reservations, by another Andersonian disciple, Passmore. 16 In his diligent
exercise on Australian philosophy, Brown reiterates Passmore but in more
trenchant form. Were Brown right, then the significance of, for instance, the
rise of non-classical logic or of ecological philosophy in Australia are much
exaggerated; they resemble another fairytale of small frogs temporarily
protected in a large isolated backwater (a cautionary tale with conceals
messages for terrestrial intellectual endeavour). But if Brown is right, which
is doubtful, his arguments do not show it. A first argument is from analogy,
with this case resting on an even weaker reed than usual, as there are widely
recognized differences between natural sciences and subjects like philosophy.
According to Brown, 'the personal characteristics and cultural background of
an author do not seem to be relevant in any obvious way to matters at issue in
these fields', namely 'biology or physics or mathematics' in the basic case. 17
Then Brown moves (with a 'therefore') to philosophy o/these fields, and
thence to philosophy (also what does not matter is implicitly expanded, to
include place and region). The relevance of regional culture, while now
recognized in fields like medicine, is regularly underestimated in fields such
as mathematics-and biology, and is not more extensive only as a matter of
accident and suppression. 18 In any case, philosophy is different: history and
language, culture aad tradition, do assume greater importance. 19
As if aware of the fragility of his first argument, Brown offers three
further reasons why 'Australian philosophers are highly unlikely ... to make
an intellectual contribution that is uniquely Australian'. al As there already are
distinctive contributions (dialethic logics are just one), initial scepticism is
warranted, which proves to be well-founded. Curiously, the reasons offered
all turn on proportions, statistics which an original philosopher, because
exceptional, may well evade (more likely though that university philosophers
will exclude or hobble such a person): proportions of Australian ~tellectual
life imported from Great Britain, proportion of academics who obtain training
abroad (against which they may however react or rebel), proportion committed
to Anglo-American analytic philosophy (in some decline, along with analytic
philosophy). As regards the first, immigrants who may bring such cultural
baggage, can nonetheless contribute significantly to the culture of a region.
The birth of 20th century Austrian philosophy could plausibly be traced to
160 RICHARD SYLVAN
Brentano, a German in origin; that of Sydney Andersonianism to Anderson,

an intellectually rebellious Scot; that of Australian logical enterprise to
Goddard, an Englishman educated in Scotland. 21
A further argument adduced, turns, in order to succeed, on the
assumption that only moral and social topics in philosophy can connect suitably
with social and cultural background in a way that would serve in regional
exercises. 22 The connection of any other programs, such as in logic and
metaphysics, is so remote from regional concerns, 'so indirect and complex',
as to be utterly tenuous, not to say unintelligible, and certainly unviable.
Really, this whole drift of argument is astray. For one reason, a regional
program does not have to be based in local culture, but can be established by
contrived or fortuitous circumstances, for instance through work-skilling
programs or the accidental assemblage of outsiders in a place.
Australian logical activity, for all its non-classical diversity, affords
one striking example of such regional intellectual endeavour. There is more
than one way in which intellectual endeavour may depend upon regional and
local influences. For instance, things, especially cultural and environmental
matters, may be integrated with local culture which depends essentially on the
regional landforms and ecological forms. With logic matters are not like this,
but there may still be a significant regional dependence, things being done and
fostered in the region, that are done nowhere else (cf. local industries, which
could in principle have established elsewhere). For another, a converse
connection, cultural ethos may be very influential even as regards such esoteric
matters as metaphysics. Consider, for example, the enormous impact of
uniform mOllQtheism in medieval Europe or modem Arabia, and the (negative)
effects of an excessive maximizing individualism in contemporary America,
which distorts not merely social and economic practice but reverberates right
through metaphysics and philosophy of nature (consider e.g. the:distortion,
different from that of fundamentalism, within evolu,tionary theory and
philosophy of biology).
To force the internationalist propaganda through, what should appear
after can't be done, and isn't done, but oughtn't to be done. Whether or not
local distinctiveness obtains, should it really? Ought regional distinctiveness
be encouraged? Or does it simply not matter, as Brown would have us believe
it did not matter in medieval Europe? While medieval Europe is hardly
flawless as a contemporary modal even for philosophical practice, as it
happens, regional features did matter then, as they matter now. Moreover
there were significant regional differences; for instance, interesting logical
developments which occurred in late medieval Spain were replicated or
transmitted nowhere else. What further argument is presented is also both
convoluted and inconclusive in a similar kind of way to that for descriptive
distinctiveness. For example, the issue is put in terms of a false contrast of

analytic and national philosophy (the responses to the rhetorical question
'whether the absence of local distinctiveness or of uniqueness [I] really
matters' runs 'If modem analytic philosophy is a cooperative enterprize, does
it make any difference whether members of the discipline produce work that
bears few signs of national origin?23) Once again, national origin is not the
focus nor at all what was being advocated. Nor is analytic philosophy, the
dominance or superiority of which appears assumed, any panacea. For, to put
points briefly and starkly, it is predominantly Anglo-American, and comes
laden with ideological messages, including those of piecemeal engagement
within the received system, and non-interference, politically or intellectually,
on wider issues. Connected therewith, it imposes an artificial and damaging
separation upon problems, and it fails to engage, satisfactorily or even at all,
with a range of significant philosophical issues, grander issues not amenable
simply to analytic methods. In. any case, philosophy-in-place ought to matter,
for a range of reasons: local quality of intellectual life, local competitive
advantage, local cultures, regional environments, and so on: mundane
arguments on the regional side of the dialectic are as before,24 or as outlined
below (in concluding).
There are also considerations of more idealistic kind. It would be
pleasant to encounter regions where philosophy was not an entirely marginal
activity, where inhabitants lived different and intellectually richer lives, whose
lives and cities were not dominated by noisy commerce and its accoutrements,
and mostly founded (outside sabbath hours and days) upon a shallow
mercantilism and -utilitarianism. It would be particular pleasant to come upon
regions where decent logic, reasoning and arguments, mattered, where
prevailing logic, though development, was not however classical, fraught with
and fuelling paradox, and reasoning was no longer, perhaps never had been,
bound by consistency and completeness (or maximization) imperatives. Asia
and the Pacific, though offering havens of promise for non-standard logics,
refuges from European systematizations, have not been left alone for beneficial
alternatives to flourish, where they may. Granted there used to be outposts
where classical logic, "Russellian logic" as it was called in British intellectual
colonies, was ridiculed, and traditional logic adopted (Sydney under
Anderson's influence was one place in the South that adhered to this old-
fashioned, inadequate but paradox-free, Northern product; Tonga another), but
these outposts have fallen to classical barbarism, part of progressive modem
science. Now there are really no regions for idealistic escape: there is only,
to exaggerate but little, classical modernism and the void. More of the void
(vacuous regions where nothing transcendental, at least, flourishes) is what is
now newly on offer from many Northern philosophical pacesetters.
162 RICHARD SYLVAN
An awful alternative is that regional philosophy should, like its genus

philosophy, be somehow eliminated: dispersed, disappeared, deconstructed.
It is an alternative not to be taken very seriously in those (few) places where
arguments matters, given the shabbiness of its supporting arguments. Yet,
particularly as regards metaphysics, that is a prime idea in much recent
European philosophy, including remarkably Austrian philosophy itself.2!i It is
also an objective, for different reasons, of totalitarian and other regimes,
which do not focus just upon metaphysics.
One of purer, less political, reasons for this type of removal effort is
this:- Austrian philosophy itself-like one of its prime targets, meta-
physic--appears to be a transcendental signified, or presence. Both are some
kind of nonlinguistic items which serve to provide "determiners of sense" or
meaning. But such sense is not ever determinate, according to Derrida and
others. So such transcendental signifieds are to be denied. So presumably is
Austrian philosophy . It, along with philosophy and metaphysics, is to be
deconstructed; it is, so to say, undercut and (quietly) disappears.
Rather similarly, under high phases of Austrian philosophy,
metaphysics and such kinds of philosophy as Austrian philosophy itself, were
supposed to be eliminated or to dissolve. Later no doubt, along with meanings
and universals, they would be not exorcised but naturalized. That at least lets
them persist, diminished though they may be.
4. FURTHER ISSUES: ROLES, RESOURCES, REGRETS?
What, if anything, ought to be done about Australian philosophy,

future Austrian philosophy, regional philosophy in other regions, and regional
philosophy itself more generally? What roles should they assume? They
should, in my estimations, be fostered and furthered, though not without care
and due qualification, and not exclusively. They should be furthered for many
reasons, not least for stimulating and enriching regional culture, and
broadening and enhancing regional intellectual life.26 They could not only
further regional intellectual life, and help in lifting philosophy out of its present
doldrums; they could assist in combating fundamentalisms and authoritarian
ideologies, and in indicating new ways.
An important connected role occasionally envisaged for regional
philosophies is as a bulwark against colonization and imperialism, against
environmental and social exploitation or domination of a region, and therewith
as defence against the grand philosophies accompanying and justifying such
intrusions and practices. An analogy may help. Where, as in Melanesia, land
is not individually owned but communally held, it is much more difficult for
exploitative forestry companies to gain access to timber in a free and easy

way: regional tenure systems provide a major obstacle to exploitation. So
similarly can local environmental philosophies, where they can be acted
upon. 27
Ecological and social problems which extend beyond a region indicate
that a purely regional philosophy is not enough. Such a philosophy has to be
interlinked with and come to terms with other philosophies of other regions,
or it has to have breath of vision beyond its own region ('to think globally'),
or preferably both, since regional independence and self-sufficiency are now
features of the past. This points too in the direction of the sort of model of
regional philosophies here favoured: a plurality of regional philosophies. 28
As to how it can be done, Austrian philosophy provides again a fine
working example; through promotion of the notion, and support of work on it,
through formation of active societies concerning it, books about it, conferences
on it, and similar. We can all learn much from the sustained efforts of Haller
and helpers as regards Austrian philosophy. No doubt even a plant as vigorous
as Austrian philosophy does not flower all the time; it has its cycles, its peak
productive times, and so on. And presently, despite the considerable efforts
of Haller and others, and despite its natural advantages (e.g. a well-established
intellectual culture, a language barrier to American domination, etc.) and
resources, Austrian philosophy has some problems. For example, Vienna
appears to be locked into peripheral squabbles, its great days definitely past,
though it could no doubt flourish again. But regional philosophies are tricky
plants; although very favourable conditions may be prepared (something not
happening in philosophy anywhere much in these constrained material days of
economic-rationalism), they cannot be made to bloom; there is no simple sure-
fire care-free recipe.
For a mix of reasons, not difficult to outline in a conjectural way (and
touched upon above), Australian philosophy has been markedly less successful
than Austrian. Nor were opportunities for making something much more of
Australian philosophy, opportunities that reemerged in recent decades, taken.
To the contrary, in hide-bound circles that mattered, opposition to the very
idea grew.
Australian National University

164 RICHARD SYLVAN
NOTES
* The untimely death of Richard Sylvan prevented his final referencing and proofreading
of these articles. We include them as homage to his philosophical contributions knowing his
friends and admirers will be glad to have them.
1. They raise more issues than can be adequately addressed here. Some of these are
however tackled elsewhere, e.g. Sylvan 85 and 92.
2. In what follows, Austria should not be equated with the contemporary state of Austria.
For a rather more adequate idea of Austria, see Grassl and Smith.
3. A detailed case is presented in Sylvan 96.
4. Smith 95, pp 16-17. Whitehead has already made some colourful, but warranted,
remarks about such claims:
. . .. modern scholarship and modern science reproduce the same limitation as
dominated the bygone Hellenistic epoch, and the bygone Scholastic epoch. They
canalize thought and observation within predetermined limits, based upon
inadequate metaphysical assumptions dogmatically assumed. The modern
assumptions differ from older assuptions, not wholly for the better. They exclude
from rationalistic thought more of the final values of existence. The intimate
timidity ofprofessiona1ized scholarship circumscribes reason by reducing its topics
to triviality, for example, to bare sensa and tautologies ... (p.ll8).
5. The point can be filled out and reinforced by examining what Smith has to say, both in
his 95 and in more detail elsewhere, about German philosophy, Continental philosophy, and
what does not fall within scientific philosophy.
6. Solomon and Higgins, p.xi, whose way of putting the matter reveals excessive
immersion in Anglo-American modes. For in "Continental philosophy", which is hardly
underexposed (by present human intellectual standards), there is no heavy emphasis on
argumentation, or upon adversarial (as opposed to ad hominen) methods; rather, at its best,
it too can be seen as weaving sustained thoughtful enquiry.
7. Issues of internationalism verus regionalism in philosophy share aspects with those
concerning international trade and regional protection, aspects made more manifest through
debates over the merits and drawbacks of the World Trade Organization.
8. As in much of the "Third" world. There is also much to try to avoid, as for instance
what has happened in Australia, capture of academic philosophy by the (liberal) right.
9. See the statements by Haller and by others, in Nylri 81. But it is now claimed that there
is an even earlier phase of Austrian philosophy, centred on Bolzano, who is now being
elevated to one of the great philosophers of the 19th century. BolZano' s elevation introduces
still further minor difficulties, not least that Bolzano worked in Prague, in what later and
(temporarily) became Czechoslovakia.
10. See, for example, his article in Nylri 81.
11. Based on a list assembled by Smith 94 pp.2-3. As for refmement of Haller's list, to
which this list is added, Smith offers the following indications (personal communication):
I think Haller is wrong to see rejection of the synthetic a priori as a characteristic
of Austrian philosophy (obsession with the problem of the synthetic a priori get
much closer). Arguments: Brentano, Hussed, Schlick, Felix Kaufmann, many
others, all believed in the synthetic a priori (or in what others called the synthetic
a priori in one form or another) and surely Wittgenstein's notion of grammar gets
close to amounting to the synthetic a priori too (it is something, as he puts it,
"midway between logic and physics"). Similar caveats would apply to
"identification of necessity with logical necessity".
12. Smith 94,95.
13. The basis of much of Smith's criticism; the quote is taken from Smith 95 p. 11.
14. See Srzednicki and Brown (anticipating Smith).
15. Rose quoting Anderson in Srzednicki and Wood, p.270. Passmore introduces his lead
essay in this collection precisely in tenns of this Andersonian disjunction, 'Australian
Philosophy or Philosophy in Australia?' It is a question, however, which Passmore
addresses but does not answer; for, with typical ambivalence, he wants to bet both ways.
Still he is inclined, it seems, to buck Anderson. By contrast, the editors of the collection are
certainly in no doubt, for all their antipathy to Anderson's philosophical practice, and for all
that they appear to lack solid reason for their commitment.
16. See articles by Passmore, by Brown (both reprints of previously published exercises),
and by Rose in Srzednicki and Wood, and several by Kamenka (for a sample see his 1984).
Part of the present section is also a variation on previous work, from Sylvan 92.
17. Brown, in Srzednicki and Wood, p. 276.
18. There is growing literature on these topics, including a vigorous feminist literature. For
examples concerning mathematics and further references, see Sylvan 96.
19. Passmore is far from alone in contending that a philosopher is 'a thinker confronted with
problems that he attempts to solve within existing, but [perhaps) conflicting traditions'
(75:150). For some small examples, consider issues concerning the translations of
W11tgenstein's wodes, entertainingly discussed in Rossi-Landi in Nyfri 81, pp.119-185, and
concerning translation, lanaguage and style of high Gennan philosophy in Smith 91.
20. Brown ibid, p. 276. He is loading the issue with 'uniquely'. Regional and like
purposes would be well enough served by something distinctively regional.
21. On Brentano see above, see again Haller 81, p. 93; on Goddard, see Sylvan 92.
22. For this murky argument, see Brown p. 279.
23. Brown ibid, p. 279. The stress of analytic philosophy is no aberration; soon it is
compared and connected with trans-national science.
24. E.g. as assembled in Sylvan 85.
25. This paragraph and the next formed a link section to another exercise defending
metaphysics against deconstruction, where certain arguments that philosophy and its
forms, metaphysics and regional varieties, ought to disappear, are themselves
deconstructed.
26. All the reasons assembled in Sylvan 85 re-enter, along with additional reasons.
27. These points are elaborated in Routley 83.
28. It represents, in certain respects,what gets derided as "brave new world" philosophy.
But it needn't claim superiority, simply nice fit for the region concerned. It needn't say
others elsewhere mightn't be able to do it well; but others mightn't do it, or may labour
under assumptions it is concerned to jettison.
29. Many thanks to Barry Smith (whose emerging position on regional philosophies stands
substantially opposed to mine) for much positive input.
REFERENCES
Grassl, W. and Smith, B., 'A theory of Austria', in Nyfri 86,11-30.
Haller. R., 'Wittgenstein and Austrian philosophy', in Nyfri 81,91-112.
Nyfri, J.C. (ed.), From Bo/zano to Wiltgenstein: The Tradition of Austrian Philosophy,
Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna also Reidel, Dordrecht 1986.
Nyfri, J.C., (ed.), Austrian Philosophy, Studies and Texts, Munich: Philosophia, 1981.
166 RICHARD SYLVAN
Passmore, J., 'The making of an Australian philosopher', in Philosophers on Their Own

Work, (ed. A Mercier et aI), Helbert Lang, Bern, 1975.
Routley, R., 'Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action', in
Environmental Philosophy (eds. R. Elliot and A Gare), University of Queensland
Press, St. Lucia, 1983, pp.260-293.
Smith, B., 'German philosophy: language and style', Topoi 10(1991) 155-161.
Smith, B., Austrian Philosophy, Open Court, Chicago, 1994.
Smith, B., 'The Neurath-Haller thesis: Austria and the rise of scientific philosophy', draft
for the present collection, 1995.
Solomon, R. and Higgins, K., From Africa to Zen:. An Invitation to World Philosophy,
Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham MD, 1993.
Srz.ednicki, J. and Wood, D. (eds.) Essays on Philosophy in Australia, Kluwer, Dordrecht,
1992.
Sylvan, R., 'Significant moments in the development of Australian logic', Logique et
Analyse 137-138 (1992) 5-49.
Sylvan, R., 'Prospects for regional philosophies in Australasia', Australasion Journal 0/
Philosophy 63(1985) 188-204.
Sylvan, R., Transcentient(# Metaphysics: from radical to deep plurallism, White Horse
Press, Cambridge, 1996.
Whitehead, A.N., Adventures o/Ideas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.
RICHARD SYLVAN*
METAPHYSICS: DE-STROYED OR IN-DE(CON)STRUCTIBLE
Toward metaphysics a curious love-hate, attraction-antagonism relationship

is displayed in Europe. On the one side of the dialectic, most of the main and
extravagant metaphysical edifices on display are European. The rest of this
world, excepting perhaps India, may have supplied a rich variety of mythical
stories, but has built few or no elaborate metaphysical systems. On the other
side, most of the most trenchant criticisms of metaphysics also emanate from
Europe, especially from Austria. Indeed a marked hostility to metaphysics is a
conspicuous trait of Austrian philosophy, and one notable component of what
separates Austrian philosophy from German philosophy. German philosophy
tries to build grand (but ultimately substandard) metaphysical edifices; Austrian
philosophy tries (without evident success) to demolish them.
Demolition of metaphysics-these equated with unscientific
mystification----became a major objective of the Vienna circle, where the exercise
was to be carried through with improvements upon weapons inherited from
positivistic predecessors, notably verification principles. That objective failed,
in part through self-refutation, in part through unwarranted imposition of over-
restrictive empiricist demands. It was also an objective of another Austrian,
Wittgenstein, as part of larger campaigns against philosophy, particularly
against speculative philosophical theses. These campaigns failed also, for
similar reasons, earlier over-restrictive demands, and later self-refutation.
More than a little curiously, overthrowing of metaphysics also became an
objective of German contemporaries of the Vienna circle, whose very work (on
Being and Nothingness etc.) Offered paradigmatic examples of what the circle
aimed likewise to demolish and bwy for ever. Heidegger, like Wittgenstein-by
a procedure with some remarkable similarities, aimed at dissolving the
questions-proposed to overcome metaphysics and put an end to philosophy.l
According to Heidegger, of course imposing his own slant on things, the main
question of metaphysics is that of the origin of entities. In this unduly
restrictive construal, Heidegger gets followed by French anti-metaphysicians
such as Derrida. 2 The issue of origins Heidegger swiftly transforms into the
different question: why is there something rather than nothing?-a question also
of physics. As it happens, physical theory has evolved rather rapidly since
Heidegger was ending philosophy and overthrowing metaphysics, so much so
that we can now offer an attractive scientific story about origins, thereby much
enfeebling Heidegger's approach. 3 But let us indicate the Heidegger (and
167
168 RICHARD SYLVAN
Wittgenstein) response. By contrast with rationalist (and theological) answers

which begin from a principle of sufficient reason, Heidegger
proposes no response[.] for he begins by deconstructing the very question: it is necessary not to
search for a cause, but to let the mystery unfold fully; the answer is a question mark.4
On its own, that is very dissatisfying, and it does not indicate what, if anything,
is the matter with the question itself (which does not look like disguised
nonsense).
French deconstruction of metaphysics is regularly said to take up and to
develop this Heidegger approach; it should no doubt be added this Austrian
approach, this Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle approach. The limited objective
of the present endeavour is to defend metaphysics against this sort of
deconstruction disposal effort.
As a prelude to easy deconstruction of French deconstruction of metaphysics,
consider the following mce illustration of what dialecthic logic can accomplish
in the way of paradoxes resolution, that nonparaconsistent logics cannot. 5 The
illustration varies a very sweeping style of argument advanced for anti-
realism-but it might almost as well be directed, from a deconstructiomst stance,
against metaphysics-an argument tot he effect that there can be no complete
correct description of world, no such adequate presentation, no metaphysical
text, or put differently, no adequate linguistic structure corresponding to the
world.
Suppose for a moment that there exists or comes into being in the historical fullness of time, a
languageL so·rich that every proposition is expressed by some sentence L. Now draw a rectangle,
and consider the proposition-call itPandora-that no sentence ofL ever written in the rectangle
expresses a true proposition. Choose the sentence ofL which expresses Pandora, and write it in
the rectangle. Clearly it expresses a true proposition if and only if it does not. This thought
experiment is one which, if you begin to execute it, leads you to the conclusion that you cannot
execute it. It is certain that either the proposition Pandora, or the language L, does not exist. But
ifL existed, there would be nothing wrong with the described proposition. So the language L
cannot exist. And therefore our natural language cannot be, and cannot become, like L. 6
Observe that Pandora is but one of many paradoxical items (in this case a Liar-
like internally-generated supplement) that can be exploited in this sort of
limitative exercise.
Now, in defiance of the claimed advanced, let us execute the experiment, draw
the rectangle, write the offending sentence, and so on:
METAPHYSICS: DE-STROYED OR IN-DE(CON)STRUCTIBLE 169
THE RECTANGLE
NO SENTENCE OF L
(EVER) WRITTEN IN THE RECTANGLE
EXPRESSES A TRUE PROPOSmON
The intended outcome, yielded by an elementary paradox argument, is

supposed to be:
Pandora is true iff Pandora not true
whence Pandora is true and Pandora is not true (given further rule Reduction
and Simplification). Thus execution, which is entirely feasible, produces none
of the acclaimed certainties. . Instead what it appears to show is fIrstly that
Pandora is a true (though inexistent) proposition, and hence no doubt both
unusual and an anathema to mainstream logic; and further that L is a language
capable of representing such unusual propositions. But so are natural languages,
the resources of which we have not really exceeded. In short, then, in a dialethic
setting the sweeping contentions (and further argument) fall to the ground.
This attractive illustration of the power of dialethic logic in removing alleged
limitation and incompleteness (here as regards what can be expressed) is but a
prelude to many more similar striking applications of dialethic logic. Very
roughly, the vast array ofrestrictive and limitative results, generated by clever
contradiction-avoiding variations ofself-referential paradoxes, is neutralized
Included therewith are metaphysical deconstructing results; that is, dialethism
deconstructs deconstruction arguments.
The illustration offered can be adapted directly to Derrida's deconstruction
ends. For, according to Derrida, metaphysics is tied essentially to meaning as
well as being, but the essence of meaning resides in the use of written signs
rather than use of spoken ones. Metaphysics is in fact a grand text "about"
being and the world; so the illustration does admit direct adaptation. 7
Theories of very general import concerning metaphysics, philosophy, truth,
meaning, language and so on, are liable to apply to themselves. They are also
liable, unless carefully and over-restrictively confIned, to admit contradiction,
notably through self-referential features. Such has been the usually unintended,
fate of many logical and philosophical theories. It has been the fate of Kant
(talking about things in themselves that cannot be talked about), of Frege, of
Wittgenstein and many others. 8
These major examples help in beginning to explain why other reactions to
inconsistency and other resolutions of self-referential paradoxes are not
170 RICHARD SYLVAN
ultimately satisfactory. Language does not cancel parts of itself out, these
disappearing from view or concern; truth does not stratify; and so on. Most
important, metaphysics, however characterized, has to be comprehensive enough
to include its own history and present development. And that includes systems
and structures that are inconsistent, for example because they comprehend
inconsistent items, such as absolutes and grand totalities. Metaphysics, taken
as a whole, is accordingly bound to be inconsistent; that is so whether it is taken
as some sort of collection of systems, or in other straightforward ways. (The
question of the characterization and extent of metaphysics, no doubt important,
does not have to be settled one way or another for present argumentative
purposes.)
A major argument used by Derrida in deconstruction is the logic of the
suppleT!lent. Roughly the supplement, which is forced by the notion under
investigation, provides an inconsistent extension, thereby demolishing the
notion. Observe already that a destructive theory of the role of contradiction is
taken for granted (at this stage it could be either a cancellation view or an
explosion view). By contrast, on a decent dialethic theory of negation, all that
supplementation yields is that Hegelian metaphysics for example expects, an
inconsistent totality.
Let L be the notion under investigation, with L for Logos. In fact, L
represents any fundamental philosophical notion
such as Nature, Language, Reason, Origin, Meaning, Truth and Subject, which appear as full, self-
sufficient and the cause of themselves. The point is to deconstruct the claim of Logos to affirm
itself as complete and self.sufficient, the ambition of philosophy to have immediate access to pure
1ruth, the illusion of mastery on the part of the human subject who puts himself in place ofGod. 9
The grand claim that 'every philosophical text deconstructs itself', through
"supplemental logic", depends on the proposition that every such text includes
some such philosophical notion. It is taken as given that for any such L, LS. L
is duly self-sufficient (self-contained, complete, etc.) For example, ifL is an
origin of everything, it does not, and cannot, depend upon anything else.
primary
L(ogos) level
yields
sccondaJy
level
Figure 1. Schematization of Logos and its Supplement
Now, rather like paradoxical items such as Cantor's set and the Russell class,
L is self-productive, it produces an indispensable supplement S (perhaps a
Pandora). The supplemental claim, which really has to be argued, is that
anothertenn, supposed to be secondary and subordinate, and which should be nothing other than
a derivation or complication of the primary Concept (for instsnce: culture, writing, form, etc.)
Appears as indispensable to the constitution of the latter. The origin (for example) appears as full
and pure but, without the supplement which nevertheless follows from it, it would lose all [self-
sufficiency and coherence].lo
In short, L produces S which completes it. Whence contradiction ensues,

contradiction which can be variously expressed: L is both self-contained, by LS,
and not self-contained, because it requires the supplement S. The secondary
form S is both perfectly dispensable and perfectly indispensable. Whence L is
a paradoxical item. The language used too is reminiscent of turn-of-the-century
discussion of logical paradoxes. While L purports to be 'self-sufficient, a
vicious circle sets in, which undermines this pretension to .autonomy from
within'.ll
Paradox is supposed to enter also in crucial supplemental arguments.
Consider, for example, the acclaimed hierarchical opposition between
metaphysics and its supplement, or between philosophy and its supplement,
writing (or expression). The ideal of Philosophy is to proceed without
mediation, to reach the truth without mediation. It accordingly must reject the
only means it has of expressing itself: writing. Thus it is seemingly that
Philosophy 'writes' W:
W. This (expression) is not writing.

172 RICHARD SYLVAN
While it is said12 to be 'the obvious form of a self-referential paradox', it

amounts only to reflexiveness (not content self-reference) as in 'This sentence
is not in English', which is not paradoxical but simply false.
Like other supplemental arguments (where they are offered at all), the
argument itself appears to need supplementation (else to lapse through
feebleness). For on the face of it, philosophy can proceed propositionally,
without written or other expression-somewhat as thinking can proceed
conceptually without talk. However semantical paradox arguments, like that
concerning Pandora, can be reworked, using semantical notions such as truth,
satisfaction, reference and so on, notions that philosophy and metaphysics are
bound to encounter.
Suppose then that the deconstruction argument worked, that the logic of the
supplement was sound: what would it show? That some vel)' high level notions
are inconsistent, something already appreciated (in some places) for several such
notions, especially some large totalities touched by paradox.13 But all that
reveals is that grand metaphysics that encompass such notions are inconsistent,
not that they collapse, unravel, deconstruct.
Just such an attitude towards deconstruction, and resulting inconsistency
where it works, has been taken some heavily influenced by Derrida, Derrida
followers (in a broad sense), Girard and McKenna for example. Girard claims
that the logic of supplement 'applies more spectacularly and obviously than it
does to philosophical text's to aetiological myths', that is 'theories of origins
of non-scientific ... cultures'.14
Aetiological myths yield paradox. If the community concerned is in a
position to· be visited by someone, to be supplemented by a stranger, as at the
beginning of these myths, then it must already exist. And yet it cannot so exist,
because after the stranger is expelled he is perceived as the God or divine
ancestor without whom the community would not be what it is, or even would
not be at all. IS
Mythological 'texts are full of logical inconsistencies, and the supplement
confinns this'. What goes unappreciated is how rational 'these inconsistencies
are.... The valuable aspect of the supplement ... is to show that the logical
inconsistencies are organised in a ... [coherent] pattern.... The [mythological]
supplement ... is a specific and rather complex scheme ... [which] fits the crudest
as well as the most sophisticated myths' .16 Girard insinuates that supplemental
logic more generally is not a basis for 'despair of Western thinking', for negative
conclusions concerning rationality and metaphysics. 'Philosophers reacting
against the tradition of German idealism and phenomenology in which they have
been raised' have drawn wrong conclusions. They have wrongly exploited the
enonnous power of self-reference. The supplemental logic of the myth provides
a superior guide to improved exploitation of this technology, a guide which

beckons back to Hegel and forward to dialethic logical theory.
To sum up part of the development. Metaphysics (and similarly philosophy)
has to be comprehensive enough to permit formulation of classically damaging
self-reference, for instance through grand totalities and objects, such as gods and
absolutes. Otherwise it forfeits its historical role. But the result is almost
inevitably inconsistency. The outcome then depends heavily upon both the
underlying theory of negation and the preferred treatment of self-reference.
What Derrida assumes, without evident basis, does no justice to the situation;
rather it is a travesty of what seems required. While there are undoubtedly many
proposed resolutions of self-referential paradoxes, others do not look adequate
in the context of metaphysics, which is historically clean-cut extensional, or
neatly stratified, or otherwise confined; rather it is robustly self-reproductive,
and, in conspicuous historical parts, simply inconsistent.
Other interlinked parts ofDeirida's philosophy also lead to paradox and self-
refutation-or also to coherently absorbable inconsistency. One widely noted
problem for Derrida is that he appears trapped in his own scope: given he is
expressing certain views with a determinate sense (namely a denial of the
determinacy of sense), he is expressing something that, ifhe is right, cannot be
expressed. A second similar problem concerns the inexpressibility of differance
(in effect stated by Derrida himself), which follows directly from texts (by
Derrida) replete with expressions of differance. 17 Derrida has ended in the same
predicament as Wittgenstein earlier did-his metaphysical assertions are
inexpressible by his own standards-and he appears to have taken the same
suicidal stance, namely that his assertions too in the end mean nothing.
There is an alternative less suicidal (harikari) route Derrida could have taken,
which would align with improved outcomes for supplemental logic, namely
displacement of inexpressibility-now seen as short for expressibility avoiding
inconsistency (i.e. as the negation of consistent expressibility}-by
inconsistency. In these terms, transcendental signifieds such as metaphysics,
meaning, and differance are not meaningless or inexpressible, but inconsistent,
and in place of subjects which are, or appear, both expressible and
inexpressible,18 we encounter inconsistent subjects which are, as they appear,
intellegible and textually presentable, not nonsense or inexpressible.
Such a proposal fits too with features we do encounter with certain grand
transcendental signifieds (e.g. totalities), namely a certain "impredicativity",
their capacity to reproduce themselves with inconsistent outcomes. More
exactly, a contradiction is generated because there is some associated operation
(such as deconstruction, supplementation) which, when applied to a totality of
certain kinds, produces a novel item of that kind; thus when applied to the
totality of all items of that kind it produces something inconsistent, something
174 RICHARD SYLVAN
that is both inside and outside the given totality. Moreover, just this sort of
structure underlies the span of logical and semantical paradoxes. 19 Accordingly,
what we say about these paradoxes should, by uniformity, be what we conclude
about the further inconsistencies. But what it seems best to say is, increasingly
clearly, some elaboration of a dialethic resolution, letting these contradiction
stand. 20
Metaphysics too enjoys this sort of propensity; as a totality it is robustly self-
reproductive. Attempts to dispose of it, as in regions bordering its modem
heartland, Germany, have produced more of it. There are several relevant recent
examples: Wittgenstein both early in the Tractatus and later with therapeutic
neo-positivism, the Vienna Circle, Derrida and school. The broad reason is that
disposal efforts typically involve development of metaphysical structures, which
regularly apply to themselves, with contradictory results. For (short of special
pleading) they can only remove all metaphysics by removing themselves, the
supposed removal agent, along with rest.
Not only can metaphysics not be destroyed from within, or without; but
further, metaphysics can proceed largely unconstrained, provided it becomes
transconsistent. Metaphysics is highly resilient.
Australian National University
NOTES
• The untimely death ofRichard Sylvan prevented his final referencing and proofreading of these
articles. We include them as homage to his philosophical contributions knowing his friends and
admirers will be glad to have them.
1. The final chapter of The End of Philosophy 73 is entitled 'Overcoming metaphysics'.
However Heidegger's argument is extraordinarily hard to discern. By contrast, part at least of
Wittgenstein's naturalistic demoliton of prime metaphysical questions (ontological issues
connected with meaning and universals) is now easily accessible; e.g. it is clearly explained in
Strawson, chapter 4, 'The Matter of Meaning' . It is an appealing dissolution, however, only for
those already metaphysically immersed, in prevalent referential empiricism.
2. It was only one of several connected construals that Heidegger offers. Elsewhere Heidegger
wants to represent metaphysics as the history of Being (but much of this history concerns origins):
see the first chapter of The End ofPhilosophy 73. As for his distinguished successor (philosophy
not actually terminating), Derrida is said to 'isolate in Husserl' s theory of meaning the concept of
livingpresent as the root concept of being ofthe whole metaphysical tradition.' Presencing also
features in Heidegger, but only as one part of the history of Being (see again 73 p. 5).
3. On the cosmological story, duly neutralized, see e.g. CS.
4. Dupuy and Varela, p. 2. They continue: "La rose est sans pourquoi" (Rimbaud), she has no
reason or cause'. But we suspect she does, several. The general unsatisfactoriness of this sort of
Heideggerean response is explained briefly in CS, and much further elaborated in Sylvan and
Griffin..
METAPHYSICS: DE-STROYED ORIN-DE(CON)STRUCTIBLE 175
Incidentally (as Griffin pointed out) the quote derives from Angelus Silesius (though Rimbaud
may have appropriated it), and in its larger setting is less favourable to deconstructionists:
The rose, it knows not why.
It grows because it grows.
Heedless of self, without concern
Who sees it or who knows.
s. Paraconsistent logics are logics where contradictions are not explosive, i.e. a pair of inconsistent
statements A and -A does not yield arbitrary statement B. Thus paraconsistent logics can support
inconsistent theories. Dialethic logics are paraconsistent logics where there are inconsistent theses,
i.e. both A and -A are asserted for some statement A.
6. Van Fraassen p. 214.
7. Derrida's further case against metaphysics appeals to similar assumptions. As observed,
Denida 'isolates in Husserl's theory of meaning the concept of "living presenf' as the root of the
concept of being ofthe whole metaphysical tradition'. Given that his principal philosophical thesis
is a denial ofpresence, a repudiation of metaphysics is almost immediate. The claim is variously
argued. One version ofDerrida's "argumenf' runs as follows:
a) the world is a kind of text, or what a text is about.
b) every text and writing implies the disappearance ofits reference or of the 'presence'
which it designates,
c) therefore the world itself-as the referent of the 'text' -disappears. Metaphysics being
itself a text 'about' being at the world, its object, disappears as well.
The argument rests upon an equivocation, between the world as a text (under which b) has better
prospects, but c) is unwarranted) and what it designates (whereupon b) is strictly irrelevant). In
any event b) is implausible (even with a cancellation account of negation).
8. SeeParaconsistentLogic, chapter 18.
9. Dupuy and Varela, p. 2. The extended quote is intended to give some impression of the way
this sort of discourse proceeds, in giant unsound strides. Most of the arguments offered by Derrida
and Co are, in fact, invalid line by line. But some admit of improvement.
10. Ibid. p. 2. But all this is merely asserted; requisite argument is missing.
11. Ibid. p. 2.
12. Ibid. p. 3.
13. See e.g. Sylvan 92.
14. Girard p. 28.
15. Girard paraphrased, p. 28. There is a wealth offurther interesting speCUlation about myths
in Girard, for instance as regards the striking resemblance of community action in myths to that
of mobs on the rampage, e.g. pp. 32ff.
16. Girard pp. 30-1. Girard is inclined to write of "consistent inconsistencies" (which resembles
not "impossible possible worlds" but "possible impossible worlds"). While something can be made
of this, it is wiser in these times to express matters in somewhat less inflammatory fashion.
17. For details of the argument from the texts expressing differance (an expression introduced by
Derrida) to the inexpressibility of differance, see Priest pp. 108-9.
18. Priest's tentative suggestion in 94, p. 110. While no doubt rather more faithful to Derrida
(and to early Wittgenstein, whose Tractatus implies that certain claims, which are indirectly
expressed, cannot be expressed) the suggestion looks nonetheless somewhat intellectually
repulsive. Moreover, it appears avoidable, by a two step (classical!) strategy. First distinguish
relative inexpressibility, inexpressibility in such and a language or framework or system, from
inexpressibility simpliciter. Then, for instance, richer intensional expressions are inexpressible in
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (they are not also expressible in it); negation is inexpressible per se. They
can all be expressed in richer natural languages (for unbounded extensions of which it is tempting
to suppose, despite "inexpressible ordinals", that nothing is ultimately inexpressible). Secondly it
176 RICHARD SYLVAN
can be argued that what significantly presents itself as inexpressible, but is expressed, is not
inexpressible simpliciter also, but exhibits other maladies, such as nonassumptibility or
inconsistency. AF, an example of the former, consider 'the least ordinalinexpressible in a finite
vocabulary such as present English'.
19. The general point was known to Russell and others, but became lost sight of through the
misguided differentiation efforts of Ramsey and of the Hilbert school. For a sharpened
restatement, see Priest 94a.
20. See e.g. Sylvan 92.
REFERENCES
Girard, R., 'Origin: A view from the literature' in Varela and Dupuy, cited below.
Heidegger, M, The End o/Philosophy (trans. J. Stembaugh), Harper & Row, New York, 1973.
Priest, G., and others (eds.) Paraconsistent Logic, Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1989.
Priest, G., 'Derrida and self-reference' ,Australasian Journal o/Philosophy 72 (1994) 103-111.
Priest, G., 'The structure of the paradoxes of self-reference' Mind 103 (1994a) 25-34.
Strawson, P., Scepticism and Naturalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985.
Sylvan, R., 'Towards and improved cosmo-logical synthesis', Grazer Philosophische Studien
25/26 (1986) 135-178; referred to as CS.
Sylvan, R., 'Grim tales retold' , Logique etAnalyse 139-140 (1992) 349-374.
Sylvan, R. and Griffin, N., Provisional Answers to Ultimate Questions, Canberra and Harnilton,
1996.
Van Fraassen, B., 'The world we speak of, and the language we line in', Philosophy and Culture
(proceedings of the XVllth World Congress of Philosophy), Montreal, 1986, 213-22l.
Varela, F. J. and Dupuy, J.P. (eds.), Understanding Origins, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1992.
JOHANNES L. BRANDL
THINKING AND TALKING ABOUT ONESELF
Current debates about self-knowledge often take as their starting point

questions about the first-person pronoun. 1 What do I refer to by the pronoun
'I' , if I refer to anything by this term, and what propositions do I express by
sentences of the form 'I am such-and-such', if these sentences express
propositions at all? These questions replace the more traditional questions
about self-directed thinking: What is it that I think about when I think about
myself, and what is the content of my thoughts when they concern myself?
In this paper I explore the merits of this semantic move. What do we gain
by bringing language into the discussion of self-knowledge? In section 1, I
suggest that Hume's scepticism about the self gets additional force from a
subtle linguistic distinction. In sections 2 and 3 I argue that the two main
theories of self-directed thinking, namely the propositional and the non-
propositional theory, are unable to meet Hume' s challenge in this form. This
leaves us with the nominalist alternative according to which thinking is itself
an essentially linguistic affair. The question in sections 4 and 5 is whether a
nominalist can steer a middle course between a propositional- and a non-
propositional theory of thinking. It is from this perspective, I conclude, that the
advantages of a linguistic approach to a theory of self-directed thinking must
be assessed.
1. ME AND MY SELF
In a famous passage in the Treatise Hume expresses his doubts about the object
of self-reflection:
• ... when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular
perception or other .... I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never
can observe any thing but the perception." (Book I, iv, 6)
Hume's point here can be taken in two ways. On one reading he is argueing
for the conception of a self as a mere bundle of perceptions without a
substance that exists independently of these perceptions. On a second reading,
Hume cuts even deeper and challenges the very idea of a self that can be
analysed as a substance, a bundle of perceptions, or whatever.
177
178 JOHANNES L. BRANDL
I want to pick up this more radical interpretation. On this reading Hume's

problem is very much a linguistic one. It requires a fine distinction between the
term 'myself' as it is used in everyday discourse, and the expression 'my self'
as it is used by philosophers. It is good everyday English to say for instance:
'I see myself in the mirror', but not 'I see my self in the mirror'. The latter
sentence is philosophers' jargon at best.
In my view Hume rejected the philosophical idiom as an unjustified
extension of the way we talk ordinarily. What he demands is that a semantic
theory of the first-person pronoun should be as innocent as our everyday
discourse. This raises the question where exactly the 'innocence' of everyday
discourse ends and where philosophical theorizing about the self begins. I have
no recipe for deciding 1his question, but I would draw the line as follows: The
first person pronoun 'I' is used innocently for referring to oneself as long as
its referent can be picked out in other ways too, e.g. by a proper name or a
definite description. 1Dn0cence ends when it is claimed that the first person
pronoun is taken to refer to some kind of entitiy which can be referred to
exclusively only by this pronoun.
I should mention here that 1his way of drawing the line is markedly different
from what has been suggested by some interpreters of Wittgenstein: 2 On their
view we are facing the following dilemma: either there is something that can
be referred to by the pronoun 'I'-1Ind only by the pronoun 'I'-or this singular
term should be eliminated. I do not see why anyone should accept this
dilemma. That there may be no exclusive referent for the pronoun 'I' provides
no reason for avoiding that term completely. Perhaps Wittgenstein feared that
the pronoun 'I' makes us susceptible to assuming that such an exclusive
referent exists. But this misses the point. What is worrysome is not the
pronoun'!', as it is commonly used for referring to oneself, but the distinctly
philosophical use of the term 'self'.
The moral here is that we should not get distracted by discussing whether
'I' is a referential term or not. Common sense allows us to assume that the
pronoun'!' is used as a singular term with a referential function. This still says
very little about how this term fits into a general theory of meaning. What we
must concentrate on, is the sense, not the reference of the term 'I'. Here the
real problems begin.
2. PROPOSITIONAL VERSUS NON-PROPOSITIONAL THEORIES OF

SELF-DIRECTED THOUGHTS
There is a basic distinction between two ways of analysing self-directed

thoughts, namely the propositionalist and the non-propositionalist analysis.
THINKING AND TALKING ABOUT ONESELF 179
Both strategies accept that the first person pronoun 'I' is - at least sometimes
- used as a referring term. What these theories disagree about is the following
question:
(Q1) Do 'I'-sentences express complete propositions?
Propositionalists (like Castaneda and Evans) give a positive, non-

propositionalists Qike Chisholm and Lewis) a negative answer to this question.
These parties also disagree about another question, however, which is closely
related to the first one, namely:
(Q2) Are self-directed attitudes fonnally like propositional attitudes?
At first, this may seem to be just a different version of the same question. To
say that 'I' -sentences do -or do not - express complete propositions may
seem to be equivalent to saying that self-directed attitudes must-or must not
- be formally treated as non-propositional attitudes. Despite first appearances,
however, the two questions are not the same.
As we shall see, it is possible to give a negative answer to question (QI)
while still maintaining a positive answer to question (Q2). This opportunity
opens up when we take a closer look at the difference between the
propositional and the non-propositional strategies. This difference is best
explained by way of an example.
Consider the case of Oedipus who discovers that he himself killed king
Laius. The circumstances are such that sentence (I) is true before, sentence
(2) only after his "discovery:
(1) Oedipus believes that there is somebody who murdered Laius.
(2) Oedipus believes that he himself murdered Laius.
How does a propositionalist explain the difference between these two belief-
ascriptions? His view is that both sentences are instances of the relational
scheme for propositional belief:
(PB) Ii(s, p)
Here'S' and 'P' are terms designating a subject and a proposition

respectively, whereas B designates the attitude that S has towards P, namely
believing to be true. Let me emphasize that the term 'P' here must not be
confused with the sentential variable in the scheme'S believes that p'. In this
latter scheme, what corresponds to the term P is the clause 'that p' which
functions as a nominal designating the second term of the belief-relation.
180 JO~SL.BRANDL
This formal point turns out to be crucial for solving the Oedipus-problem.
The propositionalist must say which proposition Oedipus believes after his
discovery. Oedipus himself would express it (if we assume that he speaks
English) by saying:
(3) I am the murderer of Laius.
But Oedipus is dead and we cannot use sentence (3) for expressing what he
discovered. Neither will any sentence do in which we replace the pronoun'!'
by some singular term denoting Oedipus:
(4) 0 is the murderer of Laius.
Whatever we substitute for '0' here, sentence (4) will express a proposition
that Oedipus may believe without believing that he murdered Laius.
I make a long story short here by concluding that there is no independent
sentence by which we could express the proposition that Oedipus discovered
to be true. Does that mean that we cannot tell at all what this proposition is?
This would be rash. Even if there is no independent sentence by which we can
do it, there are sentences in oralio obliqua which do the trick. This is the
solution of Hector-Neri Castaneda. With the quasi-indicator 'he*' we can say,
but only in indirect discourse, what Oedipus believed, namely that he*
murdered Laius. 3
However, there is also a more straightforward solution. As I said, the
propositionalist does not need a sentence to express, but only a term to denote
the proposition in question. 'That' -clauses are not the only option, one may
also use a description like the following:
(5) the proposition that Oedipus would express by sentence (3).
A speaker using this description does not actually say what Oedipus
discovered, but he neverthelesss conveys his belief.
This may help to understand the point Frege makes about Dr. Lauben:
"Wenn nun Dr. Lauben denkt, da(3 er verwundet worden ist, wird er dabei wahrscheinlich
diese urspriingliche Weise, wie er sich selbst gegeben ist, zugrunde legen. Und den so
bestimmten Gedanken kann nur Dr. Lauben selbst fassen ....
According to Frege, only Dr. Lauben can grasp the thought that he himself has
been wounded. Why should this be so? The explanation that comes to mind is
that only Dr. Lauben can express this proposition by the sentence 'Ich bin
verwundet worden'. That does not mean that Dr. Lauben has some
extraordinary linguistic ability, since we all understand the sentence and know
what Dr. Lauben says with it. The point is that we cannot use this or any other
sentence for expressing the same proposition as Dr. Lauben does.
From this Frege concluded that 'I' -thoughts are not communicable, which
is an exaggeration.5 It is true, however, that they are not communicable in the
same way as thoughts which both speaker and hearer can grasp. Here Frege
pays his price for a propositional analysis of self-knowledge. His explanation,
why certain propositions are not expressible and graspable by everyone, is that
these propositions involve some special mode of presentation in which each
one is given to himself and only to himself. 6 They involve what Castaneda
calls anT-guise of that person.
Surely that will ring the alarm bells of the sceptic. What are these special
concepts or guises that are required to explain the peculiarity of first-person
propositions? Is there something unique about each of us that each of us knows
only by himself? Anyone reluctant to make that assumption should quickly
leave the camp of the propositlonalist.
3. THE ATTRIBUTION-THEORY AND ITS PRESUPPOSITIONS
Roderick Chisholm and David Lewis are the main proponents of a non-
propositional theory of intentionality.7 (John Perry's theory is a different
case;8 I think his views have more affinity with the nominalist position I shall
discuss below.) The slogan of the non-propositional theory is: not propositions,
but attributes are the content of our intentional states. Attributes can be
ascribed in two ways, either to oneself or to an object other than oneself. The
difference is formally important. Self-ascribed beliefs (or 'direct attributions',
as Chisholm calls them) are two-place relations between a subject S and an
attribute A:
(DA) IY (S, A)
By contrast, the scheme for an indirect attribution is a three-place relation

between a subject S, an object 0 and an attribute A:
(IA) It (S, 0, A)
The relation between these two schemata raises some complex questions.
Chisholm and Lewis take the two-place relation B2 to be primitve, not reducible
to the three-place-relation B3 by assuming that S and 0 are identical. De se
beliefs are not a special kind of de re beliefs, or as Chisholm puts it, direct
attributions are not a special kind of indirect attributions. It is just the other way
182 JO~SL.B~L
round because underlying the three-place relation B3 we only find self-directed

beliefs. These are the only beliefs that we really have, so to speak. Indirect
attributions do not descnbe different kinds of beliefs, they only describe different
relations in which we stand to other things in virtue of having self-directed
beliefs.
This view can be challenged in two ways. Either one can argue that de se
beliefs are in fact reducible to de re beliefs, or one can argue that both kinds of
belief are primitive and genuine kinds of mental attitude. It is not these possible
variants, however, which I want to discuss. I want to look at the consequences
of regarding only de se beliefs as primitive.
Consider how Chisholm and Lewis would handle the Oedipus-case. They
would describe Oedipus' mental state after his discovery as follows:
(2*) Oedipus believes himself to have the attribute 'being the murderer of
Laius'.
This belief would seem to imply the propositional belief that there somebody is
who killed Laius. How do Lewis and Chisholm explain this inference? They do
so by reconstructing the propositional belief as a non-propositional attitude as
well. Thus the attitude which Oedipus had already before his discovery must be
redescribed as follows:
(1*) Oedipus believes of himself to have the attribute 'being such that (or
'living in a world in which it is true that) someone murdered Laius'.
This reduction of propositional to non-propositional attitudes has the following

peculiarity: It works only if to any proposition P there corresponds an attribute
of the form 'being such that p'. There is such a corrresponding attribute only if
for every proposition P there exists a sentence p that expresses this proposition
for us. In this way, Chisholm and Lewis rule out the existence of special first-
person propositions. At the same time, however, they require some special ca-
pacities of the subject. She must be able to grasp pretty complex attributes and
take herself as exemplifying these attributes. Moreover these capacities are
supposed to be primitive:
·We presuppose two things about the abilities or faculties of believers: First, a believer can
take himself as his intentional object; that is to say, he can direct his thoughts upon himself.
And, secondly, in so doing, grasps or conceives a certain property which he attributes to
himself."9
The presupposition here is not just that believers have these capacities, but that
no further explanation can be given how 1hey are acquired and how they work:
"But to the question: 'What makes his direct attribution of a property to himself an attribution
of a property to him? there can be no answer at all, beyond that of 'He just does - and that
is the end of the matter! .wIO
Will this be the end of the matter for the sceptic too? I doubt it. Surely the
sceptic will deny that grasping a property is a primitive capacity. This ability,
he will say, rests on our understanding of predicates which express these
properties. We can, and must, explain this faculty by explaining how we learn
to understand and use the respective predicates.
The same goes for the allegedly primitve capacity of directing ones thoughts
upon oneself. This too, the sceptic will say, is an ability we acquire by
learning a language, namely by using the first-person pronoun. We can explain
what it means to self-ascribe a property by explaining how we learn to
understand sentences in the first-person singular. In this way the sceptic
demands a nominalistic explanation just where the attribution theory stops.
4. A NOMINALIST. THEORY OF SELF-PREDICATION
Quine has marked the route for the nominalist to go. "Instead of speaking of
intensions", he says, "we can speak of sentences, naming these by quotation ...11
The propositional scheme gives way to the following nominalistic paraphrase:
(Q) S believes-true' ... '.
This immediately" leads back to the Oedipus-problem. The trouble is, as we

have seen, that only Oedipus himself can express his discovery by a quotable
sentence. Still assuming that he speaks English, Oedipus could say:
(6) I believe-true 'I am the murderer of Laius'.
This is the nominalist paraphrase of 'I believe that I am the murderer of

Laius'. But what is the paraphrase of the belief-ascription in the third person:
(7) Oedipus believes that he is the murderer of Laius.
Quine's strategy of quoting the sentence embedded in the belief context gives
us the wrong result here. Oedipus does not believe-true the sentence 'He is the
murderer of Laius' . At this point the nominalist seems to be forced to fall back
on the propositionalist or the non-propositionalist strategies. If he turns to the
attribution theory he can say that we ascribe predicates instead of attributes.
This may help to avoid postulating a primitive capacity of grasping properties.
184 JOHANNES L. BRANDL
But what about the other capacity, the capacity of directing ones thoughts upon
oneself? In this respect the nominalist has gained nothing so far. When he
makes use of the primitive notion of 'self-predication' he still raises the
suspicion of the sceptic that some dubious notion of a self is involved here.
Thus it seems that the nominalist must pick up the trail of the propositional
theory. As we have seen, the propositionalist may use any term for denoting
the propositions believed by other subjects, so for instance also the description:
(5) the proposition Oedipus would express by sentence (3),
where sentence (3) was:
(3) I am the murderer of Laius.
Consider now the beli~f-ascription which we get by using description (5):

(7*) Oedipus believes in the truth of the proposition which Oedipus would
express by sentence (3).
This is a correct instantiation of the propositional scheme (PT). Yet the

reference to a proposition does no work here. The nominalist can simply take
this analysis and drop the idle part. Thus he gets:
(7**) Oedipus believes-true sentence (3).
This is unobjectionable on the (counterfactual) assumption that Oedipus is an

English speaker. Without this assumption the nominalist must bring in the
notion of translation and say: Oedipus believes-true a sentence that is the literal
translation of sentence (3). This complicates matters, but it still avoids the
appeal to a primitive capacity of self-predication.
Having followed the nominalist this far, it is time to take a critical look at
his position. I do not want to rehearse some standard arguments against this
view here, because there is a special problem that arises for it in the case of
self-directed thoughts.
5. THE PROSPECTS OF A NOMINALIST THEORY OF

SELF-DIRECTED THOUGHTS
For a propositionalist the peculiarity of self-directed thinking consists in the

fact that the subject can express the proposition which she believes and which
everybody else can only denote. The nominalist, we have seen, makes a
similar move by distinguishing between saying and indicating what somebody

believes. Whereas the propositionalist relies on the expressing/denoting
contrast only in explaining self-referential attitudes, however, the nominalist
applies this method across the board. When he speaks about somebody's
attitudes, he never says, but always only indicates what the other one wants,
believes, etc. He indicates it by qUoting an appropriate sentence. Self-
referential attitudes make no exception to this rule.
The nominalist cannot deny, however, that attitudes about oneself pose
special problems. For instance, when both Oedipus and his mother believe that
Laius is dead they have a belief in common. But when they both take them-
selves to be guilty they have different beliefs with different truth-values.
Where does this fine-grainedness of self-directed beliefs come from?
Attitudes differ either in qUality -being a belief, a desire, a hope, etc.-or
in content-what is believed, desired, hoped. Given only these two criteria
Oedipus and his mother should have the same attitude when they both accept
the sentence 'I am guilty'. Yet their attitudes are clearly different.
Can the nominalist solve this problem in the same way as an adherent to the
attribution theory does? He would say that Oedipus and his mother have the
same belief in one sense (they self-attribute the same property), but in another
sense their beliefs are different because they are true under different
circumstances. Two persons may share the same belief if we individuate it by
quality and content, not however if we include the truth-maker of the belief
as an individuating factor.
For a nominalist this would mean to steer a middle course between a
propositionalist aDd a non-propositionalist view. On the one band he would
agree with the propositionalist that there is no formal difference between self-
referential and other attitudes. On the other hand he would agree with the non-
propositionalist that the content of a self-referential attitude goes beyond what
is self-attributed or acccepted by the subject. What is believed depends in this
case on who the believer is.
For the present, 1 think, we must regard it an open qUestion whether this is
a stable position. It is therefore also an open qUestion, 1 think, whether
traditional problems about self-directed thinking can be avoided by the
linguistic turn. This leads me to a final, broader observation.
Traditional epistemology since Descartes bas tried to exploit the fact that we
look at the world through our own eyes, thereby occupying a special position.
Anti-Cartesian naturalism has lowered the epistemological temperature. For
a naturalist, looking at the world through his own perspective has first of all
a practical advantage. By fixing the reference to himself he can refer to other
things relative to his own position. This can have practical advantages without
requiring any special knowledge about ones own position. One way to make
186 JO~SL.B~L
this point is by saying that self-referential attitudes have nothing special about
them: They are neither formally different from other attitudes, nor do they
involve special first-person concepts. Viewed in this way they can hardly bear
the weight of a Cartesian epistemology. 12
University of Salzburg
NOTES
1. For an introduction to the current literature see [Cassam 1994].

2. For a discussion ofWittgenstein's views on the self see [Haller 1989a, 1989b].
3. See [Castaneda 1966, 1968, 1969].
4. [Frege 1918], 39.
5. See [Dummett 1991], 320f.
6. For two (different) attempts at defending this Fregean explanation see [Evans 1981] and
[Kiinne unpubl.].
7. See [Chisholm 1981] and [Lewis 1979].
8. See the papers collected in [perry 1993].
9. [Chisholm 1981],28
10. [Chisholm 1981], 32.
11. [Quine 1956], 109.
12. I thank John Bacon for polishing the English of this paper.
REFERENCES
Cassam, Qassim. 1994. (ed.): Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Castaneda, Hector-Neri. 1966. "He: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness.· Ratio 8:
130-157.
Castaneda, Hector Neri. 1968. "On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others.'
Journal o/Philosophy, 65: 439-456.
Castaneda, Hector-Neri. 1969. "On the Phenomeno-Logic of the I." Akten des XIV. Interna
tionalen Kongresses fir Philosophie ill: 260-266.
Chisholm, Roderick M. 1981. The First Person. Brighton: The Harvester Press.
Dummett, Michael. 1991. "The Relative Priority of Thought and Language.' In his Frege
and Other Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 315-324.
Evans, Gareth. 1981. ·Understanding Demonstratives." In his Collected Papers. Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1985,291-321.
Frege, Gottlob. 1918. "Der Gedanke." In his Logische Untersuchungen. Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1966, 30-53.
Haller, Rudolf. 1989a. "Bemerkungen zur Egologie Wittgensteins." In: McGuinness, Brian
and Rudolf Haller, eds.: Wittgenstein in Focus. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 353-373.
Haller, Rudolf. 1989b. "UnkIarheiten iiber das Ich oder 'Ich', Ludwig Wittgenstein.· Revue
Internationale de Philosophie 43: 249-263.
Kiinne, Wolfgang. unpubl. "Frege on 'I'-Thoughts."
Lewis, David. 1979. •Attitudes De Dicto and De Sea (with a Postscript). In his Philosophical
Papers. Vol. I. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press 1983, 133-159.
Perry, John. 1993. The Problem of the &sential Indexical and Other &says. New
York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Quine, Wt1Iard Van Onnan. 1956. "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes." In Linsky,
Leonard, ed. Reference and Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1971, 101-111.
CHRISTIAN PILLER
HUMEANISM AND PRUDENCE
Humeanism is a doctrine about practical reasons. It says that all practical

reasons involve desires. According to this doctrine, beliefs alone cannot be
practical reasons, Le. they cannot by themselves be reasons for doing
something, for wanting to do something, or for wanting something to happen.
If, for example, you did not want to stay healthy, then your belief that
exercising would improve your health could not by itself be a reason to
exercise. Humeanism thus echoes Hume's famous slogan that reason,
conceived as the belief-producing faculty, is and ought only to be the slave of
the passions: what we believe cannot alone determine what we rationally
should do, should want to do, or should simply want to happen. Beliefs guide
our actions towards goals that belief itself is not capable of rationally setting
for us. But-and at this point Humeanism might be seen to depart from the
position held by David Hume himself-our actions and desires do have to
answer standards of rationality. So according to Humeanism, though maybe
not according to Hume, there is a genuine notion of practical reason.l This
faculty of practical reason determines what we rationally should do or desire.
A theory of practical reasons tells us what sort of considerations are to be
taken into account when we determine what is practically rational. According
to Humeanism, practical reasons involve desires. Desires or, to use Hume's
term, passions, are thus rationally controlled by other passions.
Humeanism has many friends. In everyday situations we all commonly
appeal to beliefs and desires when we explain or try to justify our actions. But
within moral philosophy there is not so much sympathy for Humeanism, and
it is easy to understand why this is so. A Humean conception of practical
reasons seems to open the door for moral skepticism. If Humeanism is right,
then what you have reason to do will depend on what you desire. If I do not
desire what you desire then what you have a reason to do need not be
something I have a reason to do as well. This agent-relativity of the Humean
notion of practical reason seems to conflict with the supposed universality of
moral demands: morality, if it gives us reasons to act, should you give reasons
as well as me. If morality forbids some action A, it will be hardly a morally
acceptable excuse for doing A to point out that one really wanted to do A. But
if the Humean theory of reasons is correct, this might well be an acceptable
189
190 CHRISTIAN PILLER
excuse, acceptable not from a moral but from a rational point of view. So
Humeanism might turn out to be an obstacle to efforts to show that what is
moral is always also what is rational. Is this bad news for Humeanism
(because it has difficulties to account for 1he rationality of morality) or is it bad
news for morality (because it might be irrational to follow its demands)?
There seems to be a general problem with attempts to use intuitions about
morality to criticize Humeanism. For consider 1he following two cases. One
philosopher, a Humean, offers a defense of moral skepticism, based on 1he
observation that different agents have different desires, and so no one set of
actions can be rational for all of 1hem. Another philosopher, an anti-Humean,
offers a criticism of Humeanism which goes as follows: Take some horrible
act A. If Humeanism were correct, even doing A could be rational, given 1he
appropriate desires. But doing A is something horrible and it doesn't sound
right to praise 1he horrible as the rational. This philosopher presupposes 1he
correctness of some rational justification of morality-what is horrible or, in
general, what is immoral just cannot be rational. Clearly, both philosophers
would feel that 1he other begs 1he question.
As a way to avoid this stalemate of intuitions I suggest 1hat we ought to try
to find a way of assessing 1he merits of Humeanism as an account of practical
reason that is independent of considerations about morality. And in fact, we
can look at two major alternatives to 1he Humean 1heory, 1he axiological and
1he Kantian approach, as arguing against Humeanism in such away. The basic
idea of the axiological approach is that desires should track value. If you
believe 1hat some activity is wor1ilwhile, or 1hat some end is valuable, 1hen this
belief alone' provides you wi1h a reason to engage in that activity or to pursue
that end. The anti-Humean intuition in this case is that pursuing what is
wor1h1ess, for example to organize one's life around 1he project of acquiring
1he smallest handwriting, is irrational. Our projects and interests are rational
roughly insofar as 1hey aim at what is valuable. Contrary to Humeanism,
beliefs alone, namely beliefs about what is valuable, would 1hen be reasons for
wanting or doing some1hing. 2 The other alternative to Humeanism, the
Kantian approach, takes a different line: It is not that facts about values are the
universally accepted court of appeals in matters of what one should desire, it
is rather 1he notion of a practical reason itself that, correctly understood,
incorporates universality and, thus, opposes the individualistic Humean
conception in which an agent's reasons depend on what this particular agent
happens to desire. Desires only enter the picture as rational consequences of
having recognized something as a desire-independent reason. Whereas the
Humean says 1hat doing A is rational because of what the agent wants, both of
his opponents would say that an agent's rationality commits him to desire to
do what he has desire-independent reasons for doing.
HUMEANISM AND PRUDENCE 191
Thomas Nagel has defended a Kantian theory of practical reasons. In the

following I will focus on the critical part of Nagel's theory. The Humean
theory of practical reasons is wrong, Nagel thinks, because it cannot
adequately deal with the phenomenon of prudence. His criticism fits my
suggestion above-it is a criticism independent of intuitions about morality.
Nagel argues that Humeanism fails as a theory of practical rationality because
it gives a wrong account of the rationality of prudential behavior. 3 (And, in
contrast to moral behavior, the rationality of prudential behavior is, at least in
straightforward cases, undisputed.) I will try to defend Humeanism against this
charge.
Prudence concerns our attitude towards our own future. Most of us act
prudently in many ways: We save available goods for future use, we forego
pleasures we could presently have because indulging in them might hurt us
later, we anticipate future needs and prepare for their satisfaction. Why are we
acting in this way? The Humean answer is simple: we just have future-directed
concerns. We want our future to go well. We care not only about today but
also about tomorrow.
According to the Humean view, the rationality of any case of prudential
behavior depends on a contingent fact, the fact that we happen to have desires
for some future events. If we did not have these desires, then prudential
behavior would not be rational. If you did not care about your future it would
be, according to Humeanism, irrational to act in the light of your future needs
and desires. For example: It is late in the evening and you ask yourself:
"Should I have another drink?" If you care about how you will feel tomorrow,
then, given your present state, you should rather go to bed. But if only today
matters to you, you have no reason to forgo the present pleasure of having
another drink. Whether prudential behavior is rational depends on what you
currently desire. 4
I said that prudence is an attitude towards our own future that manifests
itself in prudential behavior. Now, let me draw a parallel to the case of
prudence. To be able to draw this parallel, I need a new word:
"instru-mentality". Instru-mentality concerns our attitude towards means to
ends we want to achieve. It manifests itself in instrumental behavior, in, as I
will call it, "acting instrumentally". If we want some event E to occur we also
want, other things being equal, those events to occur that will bring E about.
And if it is within our capacity, we will act in order to bring E about. In other
words, we will take the necessary means in order to fulfill our desires. Most
of us act instrumentally in many ways. Why are we acting instrumentally?
Remember the Humean account of prudence. It is rational to act
prudentially, because we are concerned about our own future. Could a parallel
account be correct in the case of instru-mentality? Is it rational to act
instrumentally, because we have desires for the means to our ends? As in the
case of prudence, the rationality of instrumental behavior would then rest on
a contingent basis. Its basis would consist in the fact that we happen to have
desires for means. This account would imply that ifwe did not care about the
means to our ends, we would not have any reason to take the steps necessary
to achieve our ends. But this iscleady unacceptable. It contradicts the basic
Humean principle of practical reason which, in the words of another
philosopher, goes as follows: 5
Whoever wills the end, wills (so far as reason has decisive influence on his action) also the
means that are indispensably necessary to his action and that lie in his power.
So, what is the correct answer to the question: why are we acting
instrumentally? It is the following: Instrumental behavior is rational. It is a
principle of practical reason that we have reason to do what we think would
achieve our ends. We act instrumentally, because (and to the degree that) we
are rational. The rationality of instrumental behavior does not depend on the
contingent fact that a desire for the means is present. The presence of this
desire for the means is required by a principle of practical reason. Focusing
on the order of explanation we would make the following claim: We explain
our desire for the means by appeal to our rationality, we do not explain the
rationality of acting instrumentally by appeal to a desire to do so.
Thomas Nagel's objection to Humean theories of practical reason is the
following: what holds for instrumental behavior also holds for prudential
behavior. Humeanism fails, Nagel says, because it gives the wrong account of
prudential behavior. It is wrong in the same way that the contingency account
of the rationality of instrumental behavior is wrong. For the Humean, the
rationality of prudential behavior depends on the presence of a desire for
future events. But, Nagel claims, the presence of this desire is itself required
by a principle of practical reason. And he explains this principle as follows:
... we have a reason to promote any event, actual or possible, if it is tenselessly true that at
the time of the event, a reason-predicate applies to it. If the event is past, one cannot of
course do anything to promote it, but if the event is future this principle has the consequence
that one has a present reason to promote it simply because there will be a reason for it to
happen when it happens, and not because of any further condition that obtains now. (PoA,
p.48)
Let me apply this principle to the example of whether you should have
another drink. If it is true that tomorrow you will desire (and thus have a
reason) to be in good physical condition, then, according to Nagel, there is
always a reason for you to promote this event. Therefore, you have a reason
now not to have another drink. If today you do not care about tomorrow,
although you know quite well that tomorrow you will, then, according to
Nagel, you are irrational. The rationality of prudence, like the rationality of
instru-mentality, is secured by the structure of practical reasons: they extend
across time as they extend across means-end relations.
Where do we stand now? We have two different accounts of prudence.
The Humean account says that it depends on the presence of future-oriented
desires whether considerations about your future are reasons for acting now.
Nagel's account says that considerations about your future desires are reasons
because, to put it shortly, it is your future. In the case of instru-mentality it
was obvious that an account like Nagel's is correct. In the case of prudence,
the two accounts have still to be tested against our intuitions. Having laid out
the structure of the two accounts of prudence, we need further arguments to
decide which one is the correct account. We have to show that there are
examples in which the two accounts recommend different actions and in
which, intuitively, only one of these actions is rational.
Where should we look for such examples? The Humean device to explain
prudential behavior is a present desire for some future event E. In the absence
of this desire, the Humean has to claim, prudential behavior would be
irrational. And because desires have to be present in order to be reasons,
prudential behavior would still be irrational, even if in the future we will have
a desire for the event E. For Nagel, on the other hand, the future desire gives
us a reason now. So, this is the first class of examples: we lack a present
desire for a future event although we expect that in the future we will have a
desire for this event. What is central to these cases is that expectations of
future desires and present desires for future events can come apart. They can
also come apart the other way around: we have a desire for a future event but
we expect that when the time comes at which the event will take place we will
not have a desire for this event anymore. This is the second class of examples.
Once more, the contrast we are dealing with is the following: The Humean
says that all and only present desires are reasons. Nagel disagrees in both
directions: first, not all present desires are reasons-those for future events we
will not desire in the future are no reasons-and, second, other things are
reasons as well-namely expectations of future desires. Nagel argues that in
these two groups of cases Humeanism leads to counterintuitive results:
First, given that any desire with a future object provides a basis for a
reason to do what will promote that object, it may happen that I now desire for
the future something which I shall not and do not expect to desire then, and
which I believe there will then be no reason to bring about. Consequently, I
may have reason now to prepare to do what I know I will have no reason to
do when the time comes. Second, suppose that I expect to be assailed by a

desire in the future: then I must acknowledge that in the future I will have
prima facie reason to do what the desire indicates. But this reason does not
obtain now, and cannot by itself apply derivatively to any presently available
means to the satisfaction of the future desire. Thus in the absence of any
further relevant desire in the present, I may have no reason to prepare for
what I know I shall have reason to do tomorrow. (PoA, p. 39f.)
Humeanism seems to be in serious problems because, in the circumstances
of Nagel's examples, Humeanism seems to recommend actions that are
irrational according to the following two principles:
(PI) It is irrational for you to prepare to do something of which you believe that you
will have no reason to do it.
(P2) It is irrational for you not to prepare to do something of which you believe that
you will have reason to do it.
The Humean can choose between one of two available defense strategies: first,
he could try to argue that Humeanism does not recommend what it seems to
recommend and, second, he could attack the two principles questioning
whether they really reflect our intuitions about rationality. Let me start by
saying something about the first strategy.
According to this strategy, the Humean will deny that Nagel's allegations
really apply to the Humean position. Sometimes this strategy will work. It
works in the following example, in which it is clearly irrational to violate
Nagel's principles, but in which the Humean can plausibly argue that he does
not recommend what would be an irrational course of action: You are in a
restaurant and you have to order the full course now. You want to have a
dessert. But then you realize that after having eaten the pork chops, you will
not want to have any more food. Your present desire for dessert, which let us
suppose you still have, conflicts with your expectation about what you will
desire in the future. What should you do? Of course you should not order
dessert if you think you will not want to have one. But can the Humean
accommodate this intuition? According to Nagel, the Humean has to say that
your present desire for a dessert gives you a reason to order a dessert and,
consequently, the Humean recommends the irrational choice.
But the Humean will give the following response. Intuitively, it would not
only be irrational to order a dessert, it would already be irrational to desire to
have a dessert when you are quite sure that you will be full after the main
course. Your present desire for a dessert, let's assume, is based on a belief,
for example on the belief that it would be enjoyable to have a dessert later. But
then your expectation of losing this desire commits you to the belief that you
will believe that having a dessert is not enjoyable. This is not yet a
contradiction. There are cases in which you can rationally believe both: (1)
that it will be the case that p at some later point t', and (2) that at this later
point t' you will not believe that p. For example: you believe that tomorrow
will be Saturday and you also believe that tomorrow you will not believe that
it is Saturday. Why not? Because you know that tomorrow you will take one
of these believing-that-it's-Sunday pills. Such cases are possible, but if you
believe now that your later belief that p will be true, as is the case in our
dessert-example and not in the example about Saturday, then you already
believe that p. So sticking with your desire for dessert, while expecting to lose
it, would commit you to a theoretical irrationality. Given your beliefs, you do
not have any reason to desire a dessert. This desire, if you had it, would be
irrational, on purely Humean grounds. Therefore, the desire cannot justify
acting in accordance with it: Humeanism has thus its own account of the
irrationality of ordering dessert. 6
Nagel will object that his criticism of Humeanism is restricted to examples
of what he calls "unmotivated desires". The desire for dessert was motivated
by the belief that it would be enjoyable to have some dessert, and thus it is no
wonder that the Humean can account for the irrationality of acting on this
desire.?
This is, I think, a correct response. But let me mention that, if we accept
this response, it severely restricts the range in which we could find good
examples to illustrate Nagel's point. The option of introducing some Humean
reason on which the desire depends seems often to be readily available. From
now on I will set this first Humean defense-strategy aside. Let us take a look
at the second defense-strategy according to which the Humean tries to attack
Nagel's principles (PI) and (P2). This will lead us to a philosophically more
interesting response to Nagel's criticism.
It is easy to find counterexamples to these two principles. To prepare to
do something, as well as to resist such preparations, can have its own rewards.
If that's the case, the principles (PI) and (P2) lose their plausibility. For
example, I have no reason to paint my apartment red, but if someone promises
me a lot of money if I prepare today to paint it red tomorrow, I have a good
reason to prepare to do something which I believe I will have no reason to do.
And if it should be the case that I had a reason to paint it red, then the promise
of money for not preparing for my work today might render it rational not to
prepare to do something of which I believe that I will have a reason to do it.
What is going on in these counterexamples? Do they really refute the point
Nagel is trying to make? I don't think so. The rationality-judgments in (PI)
and (P2) are a11-things-considered judgments. Nagel's claims are claims about
what is a reason (and what is not). These claims about reasons transform into
rationality-judgments only, "other things being equal". Nagel's reasons, he
would agree, might be outweighed by other reasons. So Nagel can account for
counterexamples that are of the preparation-might-have-its-own-reward kind.
The Humean in arguing against Nagel must be aware of this response.
Nevertheless, let me start my argument against Nagel's account of prudence
by considering a further example. This will be an example that, though an a
different level, will lead us to a counterintuitive consequence of Nagel's
theory.
When a desire for a future event and the expectation of a future desire
come apart, then a change in one's desires and preferences is expected to
happen. I desire now something for then which I expect then not to desire
anymore, or I do not desire now what I expect to desire then. Let me focus on
examples in which this preference change is itself the object of a desire, in
particular, let me focus on examples in which one desires that one will not
have desires one expects to have. Suppose you developed a fascination about
some subject matter, the Roman Emperors for example. You buy books in
order to read about Caligula and his poor uncle Claudius and all these other
fascinating figures. You even do your own little research on some question or
other. And you like all this. You want to keep this hobby. But, based on
previous experiences, you expect that after a while you will get bored with all
this stuff about Roman history. You believe that a change in your desires and
interests will take place and, being now fascinated with yourself as a scholar
of Roman history, you strongly dislike the prospect of this change. Suppose t'
is a time of which you believe that you will not have any interest in Roman
history anymore. Does this give you a reason now to prepare for doing
something that will make sense only in the lights of your future preferences?
Does it, for example, give you a reason for getting rid of all your history
books at t'? Should you now call someone to ask whether he wants to buy your
history books at t'?
It is Nagel's principles (P2) that I try to challenge with this example.
Wouldn't we completely understand you if you didn't arrange for your history
books to be sold? After all, you hate the prospect of losing your interest in
history. You do not want to give in to this change of interests. Arranging for
your books to be sold would be to give in, it would thus be something you do
not want to happen. Let me spell out the example a bit more in order to be
able to apply it also to the other of Nagel's principles. (PI) tells us that it
would be irrational to prepare for doing something of which you believe that
you will have no reason to do it. In my example you believe that at t' you will
have no reason that is grounded in your interests in history because you believe
that you will not have these interests anymore. But couldn't it nevertheless be
rational to prepare for doing something that presupposes such interests? For
example, couldn't it be rational to agree to give a talk about some aspect of
Roman history? It could be rational if committing yourself to this talk promises
some chance that the expected preference change will not take place. Even if
the chances of this strategy working are low, and you still believe that it will
not work, it might be the rational thing to do if what is at stake is important
enough.
Thus it might be rational not to prepare for doing something of which you
believe you will have reason to do it in the future, for example you will not
arrange that your books will be sold, and it might be rational to prepare for
doing something of which you believe that you will have no reasons to do it,
for example scheduling your talk. The latter is definitely rational if you see
some chance, however small, that this commitment will prevent the expected
preference change from happening. Is this counterexample to Nagel's
principles (PI) and (P2) of the kind preparation-might-have-its-own-reward
and thus one that, as we said before, Nagel can account for? It is of this kind,
but, I think, it shows us something else that points to a fundamental problem
in Nagel's account.
Why, let us ask, might it be rational for you to commit yourself to an
action you do not think you will have reason to do? Because your desire that
your desires will not be changed provides you with a reason to do this, and,
Nagel could claim, this reason might outweigh the one deriving from your
future indifference towards Roman history. So, in this case, preparing has its
own rewards. It promises some chance that a desire of yours-in this case the
desire that you will not lose certain desires-will be fulfilled. (Remember the
example I gave above: When I have no reason to paint my apartment red,
preparing for doing it might still be rational because, in the circumstances of
my example, it promises to fulfill my desire for money.) But let me focus on
another aspect of this example and thereby we will come to the crucial point
of the discussion. What you want is to resist the expected preference change.
This is your reason for committing yourself to give the talk. What you want
is not to become the kind ofperson whose reasons do not include interests in
historical matters. Can Nagel make sense of a project in pursuit of this aim?
I think he cannot.
Hobby-historians and people who are not hobby-historians differ in their
interests. Let me abbreviate the characteristic interests hobby-historians have
as "h-interests". The interests of people who are not hobby-historians I will call
"anti-h-interests". (I assume here that people who are not hobby-historians have
interests that are actively opposed to that of the hobby-historian, e.g. they want
to sell all their history books.) Your project is not to become a person whose
reasons derive from anti-h-interests. But if you believe that there will be some
time at which you will be such a person, then, according to Nagel's theory of
timeless reasons, you already have reasons now for doing something in the
future that derive from your future anti-h-interests. Accepting Nagel's account
of reasons, you cannot sensibly pursue your project of never having reasons
of a certain kind, because if you believe that you will acquire some interests
then you have to admit that you already have reasons of the kind you do not
want to have.
I argue that Nagel's theory cannot make sense of what looks like a sensible
project. But someone might doubt whether it really is a sensible project to try
to achieve something which one believes one will not achieve. In answer to
this worry, let me point out that it is not unusual that we try to bring something
about although we believe that it will not happen. Think about all the lottery
tickets you bought so far, or think about the game of chess you thought you
had lost, but as long as there was some chance for you to win, however small,
you continued to fight, In general, if the costs of engaging in an activity are
low or if what is at stake is very important to you (or both), then it is rational
to act although you believe that you will not succeed-seeing only a small
chance to succeed is enough. Thus, you can rationally try to prevent a change
in your preferences, though you still believe that it will occur. But, on Nagel's
account, if you believe that you will become that person you do not want to
become, then, in a way, you are already that person. A condition under which
your project makes sense turns out to be, on Nagel's account, a condition
under which you recognize that your project has already failed. Therefore it
is, according to Nagel's theory of reasons, not a consistent project, i.e. it is
not a project you could consistently pursue.
Let me be explicit about the principle I use in this argument: Though it
makes sense to try to prevent that a certain future event will occur, it doesn't
make sense to try to prevent that a present event has occurred (at least if you
acknowledge that it has already occurred). Nagel's account of prudence makes
your future reasons your present reasons. But then not to become a person
with a certain set of reasons, which intuitively can be a rational project, cannot
have this status in Nagel's theory-its status in Nagel's theory is that of an
inconsistent project. The Humean, on the other hand, can make perfect sense
of it. You can try to avoid ever having reasons of a particular sort, because the
belief that you will have some reasons does not imply anything about the
reasons you have now. In this case our intuitions about what is a rational
project are on the side of the Humean.
My example does not point to some isolated feature of Nagel's account.
It attacks the very point of Nagel's theory. His criticism of Humeanism, put
in a nutshell, is that "it sharpens the possibility of conflict by grounding an
individual's plotting against a future self in the apparatus of rationality" (PoA,
p. 40). Plotting against one's future self, I claim, can be a rational project. If
one hates the prospect of becoming the kind of person one expects to become,
then one has good reasons to oppose the expected development. Furthermore,
one seems not to have any reason to prepare for the projects of a person one
does not like to become-and if one sees no way to resist this development,
then not to prepare for projects with which one cannot identify is at least an
expression of symbolic resistance, and that can be reasonable too. Our desires
concerning what kind of person we want to be can justify a dissociation from
one's future self. Nagel is right when he detects this possibility in Humeanism.
But I think that he is mistaken to reject Humeanism on these grounds.
Humeanism's alleged vice should be taken as a virtue. 8
What I have done so far is to point out a counterintuitive consequence of
Nagel's theory of prudence. But in order to defend the Humean theory, more
needs to be done than just to criticize Nagel's own view. An opponent of
Humeanism could continue the'discussion in the following way: Agreed, there
seems to be a problem for Nagel's view if an expected preference change is
not welcome. But doesn't the Humean have an analogous problem with a
different class of cases, namely those in which the preference change is
welcome? Think: of an example in which you endorse a preference change that
you expect to happen. You desire to have desires that you think you will
acquire in the future. In such a case you seem to have a reason to prepare for
your future projects? But how can the Humean allow for that, if the desires
which are awaited are not yet present and thus cannot give any reason for
acting now? Here is such a case: You think that after hearing a lecture on
Schonberg's music you will acquire a taste for it. Furthermore, you want to
be able to appreciate and enjoy SchOnberg's music. Should you not now buy
some of the SchOnberg records that are on sale just for this week? Intuitively,
the answer is "Yes". But what can be your reason for doing so? It is not your
desire to acquire an interest in SchOnberg's music. This desire only gives you
a reason to attend the lecture. The Humean has to appeal to a desire for the
fulfillment of a future desire: you want now that your future desire to listen to
SchOnberg will be fulfilled.
On Nagel's behalf one could answer that introducing a present desire for
a future desire's fulfillment can only mimic the results of his account; but that
this does not give the right sort of explanation for prudential behavior. It is not
the presence of the desire which renders prudential behavior rational, the
relation of dependence is the other way round: it is a condition of rationality
to have this desire. The task for the Humean is the following: Take an example
in which it seems to be rational to act prudently. The Humean will appeal to
the presence of a desire that a future desire will be fulfilled. Take this desire
away; after all it is, on the Humean view, not a requirement of rationality to
have this desire. Ask yourself whether it would still be rational to act
prudently. If the Humean is right we will not think that it is.
I think it is not easy to follow this procedure. After all, we are asked for
our intuitions about some examples and in order to have a clear intuition, the
situation should be psychologically realistic. Take the SchOnberg example and
eliminate the desire for the fulfillment of the future desire to listen to
Schonberg. Is it then rational to buy SchOnberg records? We do not know,
because we do not understand why you would lack this desire it seems so
natural to have in your situation. We can imagine circumstances in which this
desire is absent and you are still looking forward to the expected preference
change: maybe you want to cultivate an interest, but you also want to punish
yourself by not allowing yourself to satisfy this interest. This would be a case
in which the desire for the future desire's fulfillment is absent. But such a case
will not support Nagel's purposes-to the contrary, it supports the Humean
theory-because in those circumstances it would not be rational to prepare for
the future desire's fulfillment.
What would be a realistic example in which someone lacks a concern for
his future? Here is one: A man struck by deep grief might look at the world
without concern for the future at all. He lacks all desires for future events.
Having lost his wife, whether he wins in the lottery, or is run over by a truck,
is all the same to him. He knows that he will slowly recover from his grief and
will regain interest in the world. But this is no comfort to him now. He does
not care whether it will happen or not. Is this man acting irrationally if he
doesn't renew his subscription for next year's performances at the Comedy
Club? We would take it as a sign of recovery if he did so. But while his grief
lasts he has, I think, no reason to prepare for future entertainment. The upshot
is: the expectation of a future desire does not rationally commit one to prepare
f&this desire's satisfaction if presently the agent has no desire that his future
desire will be fulfilled.
Let me summarize: In ordinary cases Humeanism can explain prudential
behavior by our present future-directed desires. Nagel's criticism of
Humeanism focused on peculiar conflicts between present desires concerning
the future and expectations of future desires. I have argued against Nagel that
to disassociate oneself from one's future self can be part of rational projects
and that only Humeanism can make sense of the rationality manifested in such
projects. The relation between one's present self and one's future self need not
always be one of unanimous endorsement. The nature of this relation is
determined by our present desires concerning our future self. These desires
determine to what degree reasons that our future self will possess should
already be incorporated into our present plans. Humeanism sets a limit to
prudential behavior, but it seems to me that this limit is rightly set: going
beyond Humeanism would be going beyond practical rationality. 9
Princeton University
NOTES
1. In this paper I have to leave aside the interpretative issue whether Hume indeed endorsed a
Humean theOlY of practical reason or whether he was a skeptic in these matters, denying that any
action or desire could be either rational or irrational.
2. I take the example of the project to acquire the smallest handwriting from David Brink,
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989, p. 227. This line of argument against Humeanism is widely employed; for another
recent example see Richard Kraut, "Desire and the Human Good", Proceedings and
Addresses ofthe American Philosophical Association 68, 1994, pp. 39-54. I have discussed
such theories elsewhere.
3. My discussion of Nagel's theory will focus on Nagel's early work, in particular on
Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970
(henceforth referred to as PoA). Although Nagel has changed his views in some important
respects since then, he still holds on to the claim that an appropriate understanding of
prudential reasons reveals a fundamental weakness of the Humean position. (Here I refer to
Nagel's Hempel-Lectures, "The Last Word", given at Princeton University in January 1995.)
Thus, the arguments I am going to discuss must still be regarded as articulating a major
objection to a Humean theory of practical reasons.
4. Note that I am not claiming that a particular desire for some future event, e.g. to feel fit
tomorrow, could not be justified along Humean lines. A Humean just has to maintain that
the justification of any desire must appeal to an agent's other desires. If there were no
Humean reasons that would compel the agent to care about her physical fitness, then, the
Humean would say, no irrationality is involved if she lacks any concern for how she will feel
tomorrow.
5. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans!. by James W.
Ellington, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981, p.27.
6. In the above case I appeal to a principle according to which a desire that is based on an
irrational belief is itself lacking in rationality. In other words, rationality, or better
irrationality, is transmitted along the lines of justification.
7. Nagel introduces the distinction as follows: "The desires which simply come to us are
unmotivated though they can be explained. Hunger is produced by lack of food, but it is not
motivated thereby. A desire to shop for groceries, after discovering nothing appetizing in
the refrigerator, is on the other hand motivated by hunger. Rational or motivational
explanation is just as much in order for that desire as for the action itself." (PoA, p.29).
8. Nagel acknowledges cases in which it is legitimate to try to hinder one's own future
projects. To use his example, it could be quite rational for someone to put a time lock on the
liquor cabinet. But this is only rational "because he expects to want to do what he will at
that time have reason not to do" (PoA, p. 40). But notice that my criticism is different. The
agent in my example does not expect that at a future time he will be mistaken about what he
has reason to do. He does not think that he will be irrational in the future, he thinks that he
will have reasons then he now does not want to have. Nagel seems to be aware of the
particular problem I am raising for his theory. He comments on an example in which a
change of character is expected but not wanted as follows: "The individual may be strongly
enough convinced of the worthlessness of his inevitable future values simply to refuse them
any claim on his present concerns. He would then regard his present values as valid for the
future also, and no prudential reasons would derive from his expected future views· (PoA,
p.74, fn 1). Note that, in contrast to Nagel's case, my example doesn't make any use of
considerations about what is valuable. Who knows whether the agent thinks that studying
Roman history is especially valuable? Even if he doesn't think so, he still could rationally
try to oppose his expected preference change. Furthermore, in the passage above Nagel
seems to switch from anti-Humeanism based on considerations about the structure of
practical reasons to a form of anti-Humeanism based on the idea that we should desire what
we take to be valuable. This move is implausible given Nagel's general Kantian approach.
A Kantian, according to my understanding, cannot criticize Humeanism by invoking a notion
of value that would be prior to the notion of practical reason. And, as I said at the beginning,
I limit my discussion here to a critic of Humeanism from a Kantian perspective.
9. I have profited from discussions at the University of Arizona, at the University of
Florida, and at Princeton University. I want to thank Sarah Buss, Gilbert Harman, Mark
Johnston, Elijah Millgram, and Jim Pryor for helpful comments on an earlier version of this
paper. Let me also express my gratitude to Rudolf Haller for making the University of Graz
a place where philosophy can flourish.
MARIAN DAVID
ANALYTICITY, CARNAP, QUINE, AND TRUTH
Quine's paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is famous for its attack on

analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction. But there is an element of
Quine's attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his
objection to Carnap's account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this
objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away
with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Quine
does not want to do away with, in particular, it will also do away with truth.
I shall argue that there is, indeed, no way for Quine to protect truth against the
type of argument he himself advanced in "Two Dogmas" against Carnap' s
notion of analyticity. If he wants to keep his argument, Quine has to discard
truth along with analyticity. At the end of the paper I suggest an interpretation
of Quine on which he can be seen as having done just that.
Carnap's final account of analyticity can be found in his paper "Meaning

Postulates". The .account is quite simple. A sentence of a specified formal
language is analytic in that language just in case it is logically implied by the
(conjunction of the) meaning postulates of the language. Of course, Carnap
does not make use of the notion of a meaning postulate when defining
analyticity. Instead, he uses the meaning postulates themselves. Let P be the
conjunction of the meaning postulates of a certain formal language. Carnap
defines a sentence of the language as analytic in that language just in case it is
a logical consequence ofP in that language. The meaning postulates are given
simply by enumeration. For example, the specification of the language in
question might contain the list of postulates
('Ifx)(Bx- -.Mx),
('Ifx)(Rx-Blx).
To us these postulates will suggest that the sentences "All bachelors are
unmarried" and "All ravens are black" count as analytic in the language under
consideration. But strictly speaking, the postulates should not be regarded as
203
204 MARIAN DAVID
fully interpreted formulas. The meaning postulates are part of the specification
of the language in question and are laid down prior to the semantic
interpretation of its non-logical constants. They merely stipulate the logical
relations that obtain between some of the non-logical constants. In other
words, the meaning postulates restrict the range of possible interpretations (the
range of admissible models) for the language.
Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" antedates Carnap's "Meaning

Postulates" by a year. Nevertheless, all concerned in the debate have taken the
passages of "Two Dogmas" that contain Quine's criticism of Carnap's proposal
(section 4) as directed against the strategy outlined in "Meaning Postulates",
and rightly so. What is Quine's criticism? Quine observes that Carnap defines
analyticity for one particular language with its particular list of meaning
postulates. Let us call the language in question "Lo". Carnap merely defines the
one-place predicate'S is analytic-in-Lo', which remains undefined for any
sentence S that does not belong to Lo. But the notion that is in need of
illumination, according to Quine, is the relational notion of analyticity, i.e., the
two-place predicate'S is analytic in L', with variable'S' and variable 'L'.
This relational notion remains unaccounted for.
Quine makes two additional remarks. First, he says that his criticism does
not depend on the issue whether semantic notions can have a precise definition
only in the realm of formal languages. Even granted the point-a point dear to
Carnap but less dear to Quine-analyticity should be defined for variable
formal languages: Carnap has not done that. Second, Quine suggests that
Carnap's choice of terminology is slyly question begging. Carnap dubs his
newly defined term 'analytic-in-Lo'. Less tendentiously, the term might better
be written as 'K', says Quine, "so as not to seem to throw light on the
interesting word 'analytic "'1.
Prima facie it seems clear which feature of Carnap's definition gives rise to
Quine's objection. It is the fact that the definition takes the form of a recursion
based on the enumeration of some members of a particular language. The
basic analytic sentences of the language, its meaning postulates, are simply
enumerated. They serve as base clauses for a recursion that generates all other
analytic sentences of the language by (possibly repeated) application of the
ANALYTICITY, CARNAP, QUINE, AND TRUTH 205
relation of logical consequence. Such a recursion based on a list of members

of a particular language cannot yield anything but a definition that is restricted
to that particular language. Also, it seems clear that Quine's objection is not
merely that Carnap did not in fact succeed in defining analyticity for variable
languages. The objection must rather be that one cannot define analyticity for
variable languages with the kind of strategy adopted by Carnap. Carnap could,
of course, specify additional languages, say Ll> ~, etc. and define additional
terms, say, 'analytic-in-Lt ', 'ana1ytic-in-~', etc., where each definition
would take the form of a recursion based on an enumeration of the meaning
postulates for the respective languages. But that would not get him any closer
to a definition of analyticity for variable languages. Call the notion expressed
by the two-place predicate'S is analytic in L' (with variable'S' and variable
'L ') the general or relational notion of analyticity. Call the notions expressed
by the one-place predicates'S is analytic-in-Lt ', 'S is analytic-in-~' , etc. the
restricted or indexed notions of analyticity. Quine's objection is simply that
Carnap's restricted, indexed notions fail (as a matter of principle) to shed any
light on the general, relational notion of analyticity.
It does not take much reflection to realize that Quine's objection is rather
puzzling. His case against Carnap is part of his over-all case against the notion
of analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction as traditionally conceived.
But how could Quine object to Carnap's treatment of analyticity on the
grounds given in "Two Dogmas"? Quine's objection does not hinge on anything
that is very special about Carnap's treatment of analyticity. The objection is
rather general. If it is a good objection, it must work equally well against the
treatments given to other semantic notions, including notions like logical
consequence, logical truth, reference, satisfaction, and especially truth. No
precise definitions are available that define any of these other notions for
variable languages, not even for variable formal languages. The only precise
definitions available are definitions by recursion based on enumeration. Like
Carnap's definition of' analytic-in-Lo' , they define indexed predicates that are
restricted to specific (formal) languages-the most prominent example being
Tarski's definition of truth. Yet, Quine does not seem prepared to raise
analogous objections against any of these other notions or against the
distinctions that come along with them, e.g., the true/false distinction.
The initial reaction of the Carnap camp to "Two Dogmas" registers some
measure of bewilderment along these lines. 2 Admittedly, so far the issue is
largely ad hominem Quine. But a more serious issue looms in the background:
206 MARIAN DAVID
Quine's line of attack constitutes a fundamental threat to the fruitfulness of the

linguistic turn. Traditionally, some of the most basic philosophical
notions-notions like truth, logical truth, necessity, logical consequence,
analyticity-had been applied to psychological states Gudgments, beliefs) or to
metaphysical entities (propositions, Bolzano's Slitze an sich). The linguistic
turn (Vienna-Circle style) proposed to shift the application of these basic
notions to linguistic items, to sentences. The advantage of this shift was
supposed to be twofold: first, the avoidance of psychologism and metaphysics;
second, the increase in precision resulting from the fact that the basic
philosophical notions, when applied to sentences, could be rigorously defined
by bringing to bear the powerful tools of formal logic-philosophy would
become as rigorous as science. Since Quine's objection to Carnap's linguistic
version of analyticity is easily transferred to the linguistic versions of the other
basic philosophical notions, his objection suggests that these alleged advantages
are illusory; they are bought at the price of pointlessness. The linguistic
movement was unable to come up with rigorous definitions of the basic
philosophical notions for variable languages. All it was able to come up with
were rigorously defined ersatz notions, restricted to particular languages,
which fail to shed any light on the original notions they were supposed to
clarify.
What did Quine think he was up to when he launched his criticism of Carnap?
Why did he treat analyticity differently than other semantic notions? In
particular, why did he treat analyticity differently than truth? It turns out that
Quine and Carnap were able to reach some clarification on this point.
However, it seems the clarification was achieved largely because Quine
reinterpreted the original point of his own argument along lines suggested by
Carnap.
It appears that Carnap put the matter to Quine in the following way. 3
Distinguish between the explicandum, the notion to be explicated, and the
explicans, the precisely defined notion that is offered to explicate the
explicandum. In the present case, the explicandum is the relational notion of
analyticity. The explicans offered by Carnap is the indexed notion of
analyticity-in-Lo. Surely, Quine's criticism is not directed against the
explicans; this notion is rigorously defined. So, Quine's criticism must be
directed against the explicandum, the relational notion of analyticity. Once
Carnap has stated the issue in this way, he feels he can handle Quine's worries
with relative ease. Quine is right in pointing out that the relational notion of
analyticity is inexact, vague, and partly unclear. It is, after all, a notion of
ordinary (Philosopher's) English. But that is precisely why this notion is in
need of explication. From Camap's point of view, all Quine has done is to
point out (once more) that the notion of analyticity has to be made more
precise by way of explication. On this score, truth is no better off than
analyticity. The ordinary (Philosopher's) notion of truth is likewise inexact,
vague, and partly unc1ear-even paradoxical. It, too, is in need of explication.
Surprisingly, Quine seems to have agreed with Camap' s suggestion that
1heir debate concerns merely 1he explicandum. We find 1he following remark
in a letter from Quine to Carnap:
The main illumination for me, in our joint performance at Chicago, was that your "analytic-
in-La", and "analytic-in-L1 " etc., which I have represented as mutually irrelevant and
irrelevant to "analytic-in-L" (for variable' L '), do have a principle of unification precisely
in the sameness of the explicandum. The issue therefore becomes: is it a reasonable
explicandumr
Apparently Quine now sees himself as arguing-contra Carnap-1hat 1he notion

of analyticity is unclear to a degree that makes it unfit as a reasonable
explicandum. This explains his differential treatment of truth, a notion which
he regards as sufficiently clear to serve as a reasonable explicandum.
However, it should come as a surprise that Quine allowed Camap to shift
the debate in this direction. For when we look at the section of "Two Dogmas"
in which Quine criticizes Carnap's account of analyticity (section 4), it is
evident that in this section he neither attacks Carnap's explicans (the indexed
notion of analyticity-in-Lo) nor his explicandum (the relational notion of
analyticity). Instead, Quine attacks Carnap's claim that the one can serve as
an adequate explication of the other. The following passages from "Two
Dogmas" make this perfectly obvious:
The notion of analyticity about which we are worrying is a purported relation between
statements and languages: a statement is said to be analytic for a language L, and the
problem is to make sense of this relation generally, that is, for variable'S' and 'L'.
By saying what statements are analytic in La we explain 'analytic-for-La' but not' analytic' ,
not' analytic for'. We do not begin to explain the idiom'S is analytic for L' with variable
'S' and 'L', even if we are content to limit the range of 'L' to the realm of artificial
languages. 5
It is true that Quine's overall aim in "Two Dogmas" was to show that the
traditional notion of analyticity, even in its linguistic version, is bankrupt
because it cannot be made sufficiently clear. However, his criticism of
208 MARIAN DAVID
Carnap's approach does not have this form at all. In the passages of "Two
Dogmas" in which Quine criticizes Carnap, he commands his understanding
of the notion of analyticity-however fragmentary-to point out that, however
unclear the notion might be in other respects, we at least understand that much
about it: it is a general, relational notion for variable'S' and variable 'L'.
And he argues that, since Carnap's indexed notions lack precisely this feature,
they cannot serve as adequate explications of analyticity; they miss their target.
In the passage from the letter quoted above, Quine simply drops this point
when he concedes that Carnap's indexed notions of analyticity "do have a
principle of unification precisely in the sameness of the explicandum". But why
does he make this concession? As far as one can see, the "principle of
unification" alluded to consists merely in Carnap' s intention to use his indexed
notions to explicate the relational notion of analyticity. But this is hardly
satisfactory. The suspicion arises that Quine conceded his own point to Carnap
for bad reasons. If stressed, the point would threaten not only the notion of
analyticity but various other semantic notions that Quine does not want to
threaten, in particular, it would threaten the notion of truth. One suspects that
Quine allowed Carnap to shift the discussion to the question whether analyticity
is a reasonable explicandum merely because he felt that the ground was safer
in this area, because he felt that he could discredit analyticity on this score
without endangering the semantic notions against which he did not have an
antecedent distaste.
There are, then, two sets of issues involved. The first issue could be called the
issue of the adequacy of the explicandum: On what grounds does Quine say
that analyticity is not a sufficiently clear explicandum? And what justifies his
differential treatment of analyticity as opposed to other semantic notions? In
particular, why does Quine think that the notion of truth is a sufficiently clear
explicandum? The second issue could be called the issue of explicatory
adequacy. It concerns the relation between the explicandum and the proposed
explicans: Can any indexed notion of analyticity be an adequate explication of
the relational notion of analyticity? If not, what justifies differential treatment
of an indexed notion of analyticity as opposed to other indexed semantic
notions? In particular, why should we think that an indexed notion of truth
offers an adequate explication of the relational notion of truth for variable
languages?
ANALYTICITY, CARNAP, QIDNE, AND TRUTH 209
Concerning the adequacy of analyticity as an explicandum, Carnap and Quine

soon agreed to treat the issue in terms of empirical criteria: Will there be
enough empirical evidence for a radical translator to decide which sentences
of an alien language should be taken as analytic, which as true, etc.76 This is
the road that leads to Word and Object and, as Richard Creath has pointed out,
ultimately to an ironic standoff and to the discontinuation of the debate between
Carnap and Quine. 7 While Quine apparently saw his thesis of the
indeterminacy of translation as the final refutation of Carnap, Carnap could
see it as Quine's final concession. For he could read Word and Object as
having shown the following: Ordinary semantic notions are vague and inexact,
which is why they are in need of precise explications in formal languages.
Which explication to choose is only partly a question of empirical evidence;
to a large part it is a question of pragmatic convenience. Moreover, on this
score, there is no important difference between notions of extensional
semantics (truth, reference, satisfaction) and notions of intensional semantics
(analyticity, synonymy, meaning).
I do not wish to follow up on this strand of the debate. Once the issue of the
adequacy of the explicandum was recognized by Carnap and Quine, they
largely lost sight of the issue of explicatory adequacy. With one noteworthy
exception, the issue of explicatory adequacy tends to drop out in the writings
that eventually lead to Word and Object. This is somewhat unfortunate. After
all, it was the primary issue posed by Quine's criticism of Carnap in "Two
Dogmas". Moreover, as I have indicated, it may well be the far more serious
one. For it does not merely question the respectability of this or that semantic
notion, it has the potential to threaten the whole point of the linguistic approach
to philosophy.
There is one short paper by Quine in which both issues are still in evidence,
his "Notes on the Theory of Reference". In this paper Quine attempts to
show-mostly along lines inspired by Tarski' s work on truth-that the theory
of extensional semantics (truth, reference, satisfaction) is better off than the
theory of intensional semantics (analyticity, synonymy, meaning). In effect,
his attempt focusses on a comparison between truth and analyticity. First he
addresses what I have called the issue of the adequacy of the explicandum.
210 MARIAN DAVID
Why does Quine think that truth is a reasonably clear explicandum while
analyticity is not? Quine's answer is that 'true', or rather, as he writes it,
'true-in-L' , possesses a "peculiar clarity" in view of paradigm
(1) ' _ _ ' is true-in-L if and only if _ _ ,
which holds when the same sentence is substituted twice for ' '. This
paradigm is supposed to show that 'true-in-L' compares favorably with
'analytic-in-L' , for which-as Quine says- "we have no clue comparable in
value" to (1)8. According to Quine, the paradigm demonstrates why truth is
better off as an explicandum than analyticity. 9
This is a curious demonstration. Notice that Quine should demonstrate that
'true inL' with variable 'L' is fundamentally clearer than 'analytic inL' with
variable 'L'. But paradigm (1) does not do that. For, as Quine remarks
himself, to make (1) come out right, the language indicated by 'L' has to be
the same as (or a fragment of) the language in which (1) itself is couched,
which is English. Otherwise, an instance of (1) might come out as meaningless
jumble after twofold substitution of a sentence that does not belong to English.
More importantly, without the restriction we might even get false instances of
(1). False instances will result if there is a string that counts at once as a
sentence of English and as sentence of another language in which it has a
different meaning and if this string is true in its English meaning and false in
its other meaning, or vice versa. So the restriction that the language indicated
by 'L' has to be the same as (or a fragment of) the language in which (1) itself
is couched (English) is indispensable. 1o But the restriction undermines the point
of the demonstration. Given the restriction, (1) shows at best that 'true-in-
English' (or 'true-in-fragment-E1-of-English') poS'sesses a peculiar clarity.
Yet, truth':'in-English is not the general, relational notion of truth. It is a
restricted, indexed notion. 'True in L' with variable 'L' is nowhere in sight.
At one point Quine remarks that paradigm (l) serves to endow what he calls
"true-in-L" with "every bit as much clarity, in any particular application, as is
eJUoyed by the particular expressions of L to which we apply [it]". 11 Obviously,
Quine's 'true-in-L' is truth-in-English and not the real notion of truth for
variable languages. For the latter notion, in marked contrast to the one Quine
is talking about, is nicely applicable even if the expressions to which we apply
it belong to an alien language and enjoy no clarity at all.
Surely, the Quine of "Two Dogmas" should have appreciated the force of
this point. Remember that Quine did not object on the grounds that Carnap had
defined the wrong indexed notion of analyticity, 'analytic-in-Lo', instead of
'analytic-in-English'. Even if Carnap had somehow managed to define the
indexed notion of analyticity-in-English, Quine's criticism would still apply.
The English term 'analytic' is the general, relational term 'analytic inL', with
variable 'L', and not the restricted, indexed term 'analytic-in-English'.
Accordingly, we should object to Quine's demonstration on the grounds that
the EngJisb term 'true' is the general, relational term 'true inL', with variable
'L', and not the restricted, indexed term 'true-in-English'. To paraphrase
Quine, 'true-in-English' might better be written untendentiously as 'K' so as
not to seem to throw light on the interesting term 'true'. 12
Could Quine have used a different paradigm-one that would have avoided the
awkward restriction? Remembering Tarski, one might think of the alternative
paradigm
(2) x is true in L iffp,
which holds when 'x' replaces a quotation name of a sentence of Land 'p'
replaces the translation of that sentence from L into the language in which (2)
is couched (English).
On the face of it, this looks to be better suited as a paradigm for the general
notion of truth for variable languages. But it is dubious whether it could serve
Quine's purpose. Paradigm (2) presupposes the notion of translation (or
rather, correct translation) in order to elucidate truth. In "Notes to the Theory
of Reference" Quine doesn't tell us explicitly whether he counts the notion of
translation with the reputable notions of the theory of extensional semantics or
with the disreputable notions of the theory of intensional semantics. However,
one can venture the surmise that he did not regard the notion as particularly
clear-not as sufficiently clear, in any case, to be of much use in a
demonstration that truth is clearer than analyticity.
Moreover, even if it is supposed that the notion of translation is sufficiently
clear to elucidate truth, this would not help demonstrate that truth is clearer
than analyticity. (Notice that the supposition at hand might still leave room for
the view that it is to some extent indeterminate what counts as a correct
translation of a given sentence.) If the notion of translation were freely
available, one could produce a paradigm for' analytic in L' , with variable 'L',
that would conform to the spirit of Carnap's approach and would have to be
acceptable to Quine:
(3) x is analytic in L iff y is logically true in L,
212 MARIAN DAVID
which holds when x=y or x is a translation of y from L into L. This tells us

that a sentence of a language is analytic in that language just in case it is either
a logical truth in that language or a (correct) translation of a sentence that is
a logical truth in that language. If the notion of translation were available, (3)
would clarify Carnap's notion of analyticity about as adequately as (2) would
clarify truth (modulo the notion of logical truth, which Quine accepts along
with truth as a reasonably clear explicandum).
10
When Quine addresses the second issue, explicatory adequacy, he refers to

Tarski's technical definition. He says that Tarski has shown how 'true-in-L'
(Quine's notation) is genuinely definable in a metalanguage L', provided Land
L 'satisfy certain gen~ral requirements, and provided L ' contains L:
Now Tarski shows how to formulate within the notation of L' a sentence' -x-'
which fulfills:
-x-- if and only if _ _
whenever a statement of L is put for' _ _ ' and a name of that statement is put for
'x'. In short, he shows that 'true-in-L', in a sense conforming to [(1)], is definable
inL' ... 13
If this demonstration is to succeed in showing that truth is better off than

analyticity. with regards to the issue of explicatory adequacy, it will have to
show that the string definable through a Tarski-style truth definition can serve
as an adequate explication of the general, relational notion of truth. But it is
hard to see how Quine's demonstration can show that.
First of all, a Tarski-style definition of truth is a definition by recursion
based on enumeration-although in this case the enumerated items are
satisfaction clauses for the predicates of the language under consideration
("'horse' is satisfied by horses") and reference clauses for its singular terms
('" John' refers to John"). The truth predicate for the language is later defined
recursively on the basis of these clauses. So a Tarskian truth predicate
(indicated by Quine through the open sentence' ---x---') is restricted to the
specific language under consideration. In general, Tarski-style truth definitions
define merely indexed predicates, say 'true-in-Lo', 'true-in-L1', 'true-in-l-z',
etc., and each such predicate requires its own definition. Quine is perfectly
aware of this limitation and mentions it explicitly. 14
So how does Quine's second demonstration show that a Tarskian truth
predicate can serve as an adequate explication of the general notion of truth for
variable languages? It does not. It does not even really attempt to do so. It
merely attempts to show that a Tarskian truth predicate can serve as an
explication of what Quine calls "true-in-L ~ And we know from above that by
now Quine understands his term 'true-in-L' in the sense clarified by paradigm
(1), which-contrary to first appearances-does not really clarify 'true inL'
with variable 'L', instead it clarifies the indexed predicate 'true-in-English' .
The demonstration depends on the fact that Quine has reinterpreted the
explicandum. 'True-in-L', as clarified by (1), is 'true-in-English' not 'true in
L' with variable 'L'. No reason has been given for thinking that one of the
indexed predicates definable by Tarski' s methods should count as an adequate
explication of the general notion of truth.
It turns out, then, that both of Quine's demonstrations fail-at least by the
standards set in "Two Dogmas". The first demonstration fails to reveal the
peculiar clarity of the general notion of truth as an explicandum. The second
demonstration fails to reveal why Tarski's technically defined notions should
count as adequate explications for the general notion of truth. So far, truth
(together with the other notions of extensional semantics) still seems no better
off than analyticity. In other words, the more serious threat caused by the
generalization of the type of argument advanced in "Two Dogmas" is still
alive: the rigorous linguistic approach cannot solve the problem of explicatory
adequacy for any of the interesting semantic notions (semantic notions applied
to variable languages); it cannot make good on its promise to provide rigorous
technical definitions of the most basic philosophical concepts.
11
Quine's second demonstration brings to mind two questions that are relevant
to our topic. First, does his second demonstration at least succeed in showing
that an indexed notion of truth definable by Tarski' s methods can serve as an
adequate explication of truth-in-English? Second, could one devise an
alternative demonstration to show that an indexed notion of truth definable by
Tarski's methods can serve as an adequate explication of the general notion of
truth for variable languages? I think the answers to these two questions are Yes
and No respectively. Concerning the issue of explicatory adequacy, this means
that it is possible to show that truth-in-English is better off than analyticity-in-
English but not possible to show that the general notion of truth is better off
than the general notion of analyticity.
Quine's second demonstration, quoted in the previous section, is evidently
a somewhat simplified and importantly impoverished version of Tarski's
condition of adequacy for definitions of truth, Convention T. 15 Remember, for
214 MARIAN DAVID
his demonstration Quine has set up the proviso that the object-language, L, to
which an indexed truth predicate, '--x---', definable by Tarski's methods will
be restricted is to be contained in the metalanguage, L " in which the definition
is given; the metalanguage is assumed to be English. This proviso allows him
to circumnavigate any mention of the notion of translation which was present
in Tarski's original adequacy condition. At the same time, the proviso has the
effect that Quine's condition is, at best, relevant to truth-in-English. Always
assuming the metalanguage to be English, one could formulate Quine's
condition of explicatory adequacy in the following way:
(I) A restricted truth predicate '-~-' definable by Tarski's methods counts as an

adequate explicans of 'true-in-English' just in case its definition implies all instances of
'-x- iffp' that result whenever a name of a sentence belonging to some fragment of
English is put for' x' and that same sentence is put for' p' .
We know that Tarski-style truth definitions cannot do more than define

indexed predicates whose indices restrict them to formalizable fragments of
natural languages (or to artificially constructed formal languages which may
count as limiting cases of the former). Moreover, to avoid the paradox of the
liar, these formalizable fragments (or formal languages) must be essentially
weaker in certain important respects than the metalanguage in which the
indexed truth predicates are defined. Let 'El" 'E 2 " etc. stand for such
weakened, formalizable fragments of English. Now (1) simply amounts to the
proposal to regard the indexed predicates 'true-in-El ', 'true-in-Ez', etc. as
adequate explications of 'true-in-English', provided they are defined by
Tarskian methods. What is there to be said for this proposal? It turns out that
Quine has more to offer in response to this question than the mere fact that the
indexed predicates are indeed restricted to fragments of English. However,
what he has to offer requires some reinterpretation in the light of what was
argued above:
In Tarski's technical constructions, moreover, we have an explicit general routine for

defming truth-in-Lfor individual languages L [read: indexed truth predicates restricted to
individual fragments of English] which conform to a certain standard pattern and are well
specified in point of vocabulary. We have indeed no similar single defmition of 'true-in-L'
for variable 'L' [read: 'true-in-English']; but what we do have suffices to endow 'true-in-L'
evenfor variable 'L' [read: 'true-in-English'] with a high enough degree of intelligibility so
that we are not likely to be averse to using the idiom. 16
Even though each of the indexed predicates 'true-in-E1 ', 'true-in-~', etc.
requires its particular Tarski-style definition, each such definition proceeds
according to what can with some justification be called a "general routine".

The crucial part of this routine is the construction of the base clauses from
which the various indexed truth predicates are defined recursively. Strictly
speaking, the base clauses will differ for different indexed predicates. The base
clauses for 'true-in-El' will have the form
' _ ' is satisfied-in-Ecby _ ,

' _ ' refers-in-Ecto - ,
for the predicates and singular terms of El respectively. The base clauses for
~ will differ accordingly. Nevertheless, in the case at hand, i.e., in the case
in which all the different indices refer to different fragments of the same
metalanguage (English), the construction of the base clauses proceeds
relatively mechanically according to a routine that works just as well across
fragments as it does within each fragment: "Always substitute the same
expression (predicate, singular term) on both sides". Even someone who is
unfamiliar with the expressions constituting the fragments could follow this
routine as long as the person knows to which grammatical category each
expression belongs. There is, then, some reason for saying that 'true-in-El"
'true-in-~' , etc. have a "principle of unification" in the systematic routine
through which they are defined. Since they are, moreover, restricted to
fragments of English, this may be taken as a reason for saying that they can
serve as adequate explications of truth-in-English. If these admittedly
somewhat sketchy considerations are accepted, one can concede to Quine that
truth-in-English is in the clear with regards to the issue of explicatory
adequacy.
12
We have just seen that Quine's second demonstration can be taken to show that
an indexed predicate restricted to a fragment of English and definable by
Tarski's methods can be taken to serve as an adequate explication of truth-in-
English. What about the general, relational notion of truth? Is there an
alternative demonstration to show that a restricted, indexed notion of truth
definable by Tarski' s methods can serve as an adequate explication of the
general notion of truth for variable languages?
I have presented Quine's demonstration as following along the lines of the
Quinean adequacy condition (I). An attempt to get at the general notion of
truth for variable languages would require an alternative condition, one that
216 MARIAN DAVID
conforms a bit more to the spirit of Tarski' s Convention T-at least in the
sense that it does not avoid the notion of translation. Again I assume that the
metalanguage is English:
(IT) A restricted truth predicate' -x-' definable by Tarski's methods counts as an

adequate explicans of' true in L' with variable' L' just in case its definition implies
all instances of ' - d - iff p' that result whenever the name of a sentence belong-
ing to (some fragment of) the language that' -x-' is restricted to is put for 'x'
and a translation of that sentence into English is put for 'p' .
Notice that this alternative condition, containing the notion of translation,

is geared towards paradigm (2) much like the Quinean condition (1) was geared
towards paradigm (1). Let 'Ll" '~', etc. stand for fragments of arbitrary
languages-the fragments must be formalizable and they must be weak enough
to avoid the liar paradox. Condition (II) amounts to the proposal to regard the
indexed predicates' true-in-L l ', 'true-in-Lz', etc. as adequate explications of
'true inL' for variable 'L', provided they are defined by Tarskian methods.
Is this an acceptable proposal?
The proposal must be problematic to Quine simply because it contains the
notion of translation and is geared towards paradigm (2) which attempts to
install 'true inL' with variable 'L' as a reasonable explicandum via the notion
of translation. But even if Quinean worries about translation are set aside, (II)
is unacceptable. For, in the case at hand, the indices of the different restricted
predicates defined by Tarskian methods do not restrict them to fragments of
the metalanguage (English). Instead, they refer to fragments of arbitrary
languages. And this means that the Tarskian definitions of ' true-in-Ll ', 'true-
in-Lz', etc. will not proceed according to a general routine in the sense
sketched above because the base clauses for the different definitions (Le., the
reference and satisfaction clauses for Lh Lz, etc.) will not exhibit a pattern that
can be completed mechanically in any acceptable sense of this term. E.g, the
base clauses for' true-in-Ll ' will have the form
' - ' is satisfied-in-Lcby _ .

' - ' refers-in-Lcto - .
for the predicates and singular terms of Ll respectively. Completion of these

patterns requires knowledge of the translations of the expressions of Ll into
English. Moreover, the ability to construct the base clauses for Ll is not
projectable: knowing how to construct the base clauses for Ll does not in
general help construct the base clauses for other languages. So for each of Lb
Lz, etc., constructing their base clauses will be "a project unto itself' to borrow
a phrase from Quine. There is, then, no good reason for saying that 'true-in-
Ll" 'true-in-Lz', etc. share a "principle of unification", hence no good reason
for saying that they will serve as adequate explications of the general notion
of truth.
13
I have argued that Quine failed in his attempt to show that 'analytic in L' , with
variable 'L' is worse off than 'true in L' with variable 'L' . He failed, because
he did not find a way to protect 'true in L' against the type of argument he
himself advanced in "Two Dogmas" against 'analytic in L'. What are we to
make of this?
Maybe we can understand Quine's position along the following lines. Quine
has indeed given in to his own argument and has drawn the consequences. He
has given up on 'true in L' and on all other general, relational semantic
notions for variable languages (intensional and extensional ones): all general
semantic notions have to go. In view of later remarks by Quine concerning our
practice of "acquiescing in the mother tongue,,17, this interpretation does not
seem farfetched at all.
On this picture of Quine's position, the original issue concerning the general
notion of analyticity for variable languages will simply drop out (for better or
for worse) along with the general notion of truth for variable languages. All
that remains to inquire about is analyticity-in-English. Is it any worse off than
truth-in-English? More specifically: Is analyticity-in-English a less reasonable
explicandum than truth-in-English? and Is there a reason for thinking that the
restricted notions defined by Carnap are not adequate as explications of
analyticity-in-English while the restricted notions defined by Tarski are
adequate as explications of truth-in-English?
It appears that, once the discussion is allowed to shift in this manner from
general semantic notions for variable languages to semantic notions restricted
to English, Quine gets the upper hand. One should admit that paradigm
(I)-understood as clarifying the explicandum 'true-in-English'-is more
successful than paradigm (3)-understood as clarifying the explicandum
'analytic-in-English'. After all, paradigm (1) does not require the difficult
notion of translation. Moreover, with regards to the issue of explicatory
adequacy, truth-in-English also appears to be better off than analyticity-in-
English. We have seen above that there is some ground for thinking that truth
predicates restricted to fragments of English and definable by Tarski's methods
serve as adequate explications of truth-in-English. The ground was found in the
relatively general routine through which the definitions of such predicates can
218 MARIAN DAVID
be constructed. There is no such routine when it comes to analyticity

predicates restricted to fragments of English and defined by Carnap's methods.
In this regard, Carnap's definitions of analyticity for individual fragments of
English are much more like Tarski' s definitions of truth for individual alien
languages than Tarski's definitions of truth for individual fragments of English.
The base clauses of Carnap's definitions of analyticity for fragments of
English, his meaning postulates, fail to exhibit a discernible pattern that could
be filled in mechanically; they lack this "principle of unification". 18
NOTES
1. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" ,p. 33.

2. This is evident from Martin's "On' Analytic'", from Carnap's recently published response
to Quine, "Quine on Analyticity", p. 430, and from Camap's reply to Quine's contribution
to the Schilpp volume, oW. V. Quine on Logical Truth", p. 918.
3. Cf. Carnap, "Quine on Analyticity", pp. 430f., oW. V. Quine on Logical Truth", pp.
918f., and "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages", pp. 234f.
4. In Creath, ed., Dear Camap, Dear Van, Quine to Camap, 1951-3-29.
5. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", p. 33f.
6. See Quine, "Camap and Logical Truth", p. 403; Camap, oW. V. Quine on Logical
Truth", p. 919; and Camap "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages". The idea to
approach the issue in operational terms was foreshadowed in "Two Dogmas" , p. 36, where
Quine makes a remark concerning the "behavioral factors" relevant to analyticity.
7. Cf. Creath, "Introduction", p. 4lf.
8. "Notes on the Theory of Reference", p. 138. Paradigm (1) is the one numbered (7) by
Quine; see p. 135 of his essay.
9. Whenever possible, I use distinguishing notations to avoid confusing the general notions
of analyticity and truth with their restricted counterparts. My official notations for the
general, relational notions are not hyphenated and come with an italicized 'L' to indicate a
genuine (objectual) variable that can be quantified into (objectually). My official notations
for the restricted, indexed notions are hyphenated and the 'L' is not italicized to indicate that
it is not a genuine (objectual) variable and cannot be quantified into (objectually).
Unfortunately, Quine's notations are not as uniform and sometimes even misleading, if not
confused. For the purposes of exposition, I am forced to adopt Quine's notations temporarily
at various points of my discussion, e.g, in the text to which this note belongs.
10. Strictly speaking, (1) comes out right provided L is restricted to my language as I
understand it, i.e., to my idiolect, L.m, as understood by me. So the notion clarified by (1)
is, at best, 'true-in-~D'. However, it will simplify matters if we pretend that English is my
idiolect.
11. "Notes on the Theory of Reference" , p. 138.
12. A further remade on notation. It might have been slightly more perspicuous to use' true-
in-Lsnglilit' and 'analytic-in-Lsnglilit' instead of 'true-in-English' and 'analytic-in-English' to
make entirely clear why I call these terms indexed as well as restricted. However, the
notations would have been rather cumbersome, and I am confident that my simpler notations
will not cause any confusions.
13. "Notes on the Theory of Reference", p. 137.
14. Cf. "Notes on the Theory Reference", p. 138.
15. Cf. Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Fonnalized Languages", pp. 187f.
16. "Notes on the Theory of Reference", p. 138; my italics.
17. ·Ontological Relativity", p. 49.
18. An early version of this paper was presented at the conference on Austrian philosophy
at the University of Arizona, November 1994. My thanks to Paddy Blanchette, Hannes
Brandl, Rudolf Haller, Keith Lehrer, Gerhard Schramm, Gerhard Schurz, Peter Simons,
Leopold Stubenberg, and Nicholas White for comments and criticism.
REFERENCES
Carnap, R., "Meaning Postulates" (1952), in Meaning and Necessity, 2nd ed., Chicago, The
University of Chicago Press 1956, pp. 222-229.
- "Quine on Analyticity" (1952), in R. Creath, ed., Dear Carnap, Dear Van, pp. 427-
432.
- oW. V. Quine on Logical Truth" (1954), in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of
RudoljCarnap, La Salle, 111., Open Court 1963, pp. 915-922.
-"Meaning and Synonymy in Nafural Languages" (1955), in Meaning and Necessity, 2nd
ed., Chicago, The University of Chicago Press 1956, pp. 233-247.
Creath, R., "Introduction", in R. Creath, ed., Dear Carnap, Dear Van, pp. 1-43.
-ed., Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work,
Berkeley and Los Angeles, The University of California Press 1990.
Martin, R. M., "On' Analytic'", Philosophical Studies 3 (1952), pp. 42-47.
Quine, W. V., "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951), in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd
ed., revised, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 1980, pp. 20-46.
-"Notes on the Theory of Reference" (1953), in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed.,
revised, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 1980, pp. 130-138.
- "Carnap and Logical Truth" (1954), in The Ways of Paradox, revised and enlarged
edition, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 1979, pp. 107-132.
- Word and Obje.ct, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press 1960.
- "Ontological Relativity", in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York,
Columbia University Press 1969.
Tarski, A., "The Concept of Truth in Fonnalized Languages" (1935), in Logic, Semantics,
Metamathematics, 2nd ed., translated J. H. Woodger, edited by I. Corcoran,
Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company 1983, pp. 152-278.
ALFRED SCHRAMM
INDUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE'"
l. INTRODUCTION
A plea for an inductivist theoty of knowledge is presumably not quite in tune

with the fashion of the day. Nevertheless, contraty to the currently prevailing
opinion that the case for induction is closed and beyond any hope, my claim is
that induction is the only hope left if we want to avoid skepticism.
l.1 The Humean Skeptic
The skeptic to whom I am referring here and who, incidentally, also historically
gave rise to the problem of induction is of the Humean kind. The Humean
skeptic is not a person who doubts what most people believe - she is not a
Cartesian turning skeptical because her dream of a fIrst philosophy cannot be
fulfilled. Indeed, she believes what most other people also believe. But her claim
is that we cannot gain knowledge, because we cannot gainjustijication for our
contingent beliefs - whichever they may be, true or false. Thus, it is not for a lack
of truth but for a lack ofjustijication, that we must remain in a state of blind
faith forever. (Faith, that is, 'animal belief' as Hume called it.) According to the
Humean skeptic, any contingent! belief is as good as any other, because it's all
merely faith and none of it can ever be justifIed.
The Humean skeptical argument looks logically impeccable. Presupposing the
Empiricist's Principle that any contingent belief must, at least somehow and in
the last resort, rest on experience for its justifIcation, it simply seems to follow
that we will never arrive at any justifIcations: from experiential premises alone,
no valid non-ampliative argument can lead to conclusions beyond direct
experience (whatever the latter should mean). And possible principles of
ampliative inference are themselves invariably in need of justifIcation, which is
the starting point for the famous infinite regress ofjustifIcations. The conclusion,
thus, is that man is not a rational animal (rational, that is, being in command of
at least a few justifIed contingent beliefs) but only a simple animal, believing
merely on faith and gaining these faith-beliefs from habit without any good
reasons.
What can we do about this devastating diagnosis?
221
222 ALFRED SCHRAMM
2. MARGINALIZING
One thing should be clear from the start: it is certainly not a good strategy to
simply ignore the skeptic, or to 'marginalize' her, as I like to put it. Crudely
stated, the marginalizing attitude consists in the following reaction:
'We know that we can gain knowledge. Therefore, the skeptic must be wrong anyway. So, let's
forget about her.'
1bis move has, in essence, already been used by Moore, but there are also more
modem versions of it. 2 It is barely worth calling it a strategy, as it consists of
nothing more than a dogmatic counter-claim. 3 And we are not better offwith it
than we are if we succumb to the skeptic right from the start, because in either
case any talk of rationality of belief, of reasonableness, of having good reasons,
or the like, degenerates into mere ideology: making dogmatic claims is
tantamount to confessing that there are no good arguments. But wasn't this the
skeptic's claim anyway?
3. NATURALIZING
Another class of contenders, presently very fashionable, are the various

naturalistic d~ctrines. With some of them I am really at a loss, especially with
those versions which pretend to include a theory of justification. I mean, if they
are meant to be empirical science, then they are not in the position to provide a
theory of justification but are in need of one.
By empirical means we may find out about what people believe and/or value,
as a matter offact. But if we want to judge whether that which they do and/or
do not believe (as we have found out) is rational then we must use a
classification which we could not possibly find out or establish by empirical
investigation. As the declared aim of naturalized epistemology is to reduce all
relevant investigations to logic and empirical science, it simply cuts itself off
from the very possibility of giving answers to this latter question. Sure, there are
other interesting problems regarding human cognition where the only relevant
method will be that of empirical science. But certainly, these are other problems
than that of the justification of belief.
So, with marginalizing eliminated as a serious option and naturalizing being
incapable of answering our skeptic (or perhaps revealed to be a version of
skepticism itself), I can see only two strategies, or, rather, classes of strategies,
INDUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE 223
left. One falls into the realm of practical, the other into that of theoretical
rationality. Let us deal with them in turn.
4. PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
The subject matter of practical rationality is at issue whenever we deal with the
rationality of actions or, more precisely, with the rationality of decisions for
actions. One famous attempt to deal with the skeptic in these terms was Hans
Reichenbach's Vindication ofInduction, as Herbert Feigl called it.
4.1 Vindication ofInduction
This line of reasoning is sometimes also referred to as the pragmatic defense of

induction. It suggests, as Reichenbach in effect did, that even ifwe cannot have
rational belief, it is still sufficient to have rational procedures for pursuing our
everyday and scientific affairs.
But one must be very careful to understand what it is that is being defended
here.
For one thing, the vindication argument has an identical structure to Pascal's
Wager, and therefore is open to the same objections as Pascal's Wager.
Furthermore, it is still an open, and possibly unsolvable, question which one
of the infinitely many asymptotic rules one ought to employ as a Rule of
Induction in Reichenbach's sense. 4
But most importantly, one must not forget that, in effect, the vindication
argument means plain defeat in the decisive respect: the net value of the whole
enterprise must always consist in admitting that our beliefs remain blind dogma,
though Reichenbach called them more gently 'posits'. Ifone doggedly hangs on
'positing' the respective latest result in terms of relative frequency, and if one is
lucky and has indeed - though unwittingly - hit on a convergent series of
experimental outcomes, then one will eventually (in the long run) come close
enough the true probability value (limiting frequency) for the respective
hypothesis. Of course, one can never make out, let alone decide, whether one has
indeed reached such a true value or whether one is in for another long run -
possibly a neither converging nor ever ending one. Thus, one must not be misled
here by the term 'rational' and believe that this has got anything to do with
rational belief In this respect, Reichenbach's approach remains thoroughly
Humean: We can never be justified to believe a hypothesis - it will always
remain a blind posit which is nothing better than a Humean animal belief. Thus,
all that's left is the rational decision for using the Principle of Induction without
224 ALFRED SCHRAMM
rational belie/in its truth or in the truth of an accordingly preferred empirical

hypothesis.
But even this modest claim for rational procedures cannot be established by
the vindication argument. Christian Piller has shown in [1987] that the partition
of possible world states, relevant for justifying the decision to use
Reichenbachian inductive procedures, can always be extended in such a way that
no dominance for using a certain Rule of Induction results. There was an attempt
by Gerhard Schurz [1988] to refute Piller's argument, but this attempt seems to
rest on some misunderstandings. One is that Schurz seems to intend a
vindicatoxy justification for believing our predictions. 5 But this seems to me out
of the question - It's even difficult to understand what this has got to do with
'pragmatic justification', as Schurz calls it. My guess is that this claim rests on
Schurz's mistaken opinion that 'inductive regularities', as he calls them, could
be ascertained from some finite number of trials and their results (predictions
and their successes). This, however, is both wrong and question-begging. It is
wrong because in a relative frequency theory of probability, as Schurz is
presupposing, any distribution of finitely many results of trials (successes or
failures of predictions) is compatible with any distribution in the continuation
of the series, indeed, even with there existing no regularity at alI. 6 And it begs
the question because ifit were possible to ascertain the existence of a regularity
(that is a limit) then there would be no need for vindication anyway because then
we would already have an inductive method for justifying our beliefs.
Thus, I take Piller's argument against vindication as decisive and fmal: Using
inductive procedures cannot be vindicated.
But there is also another, more indirect, approach which uses practical
reasoning for theoretical purposes. It is, very crudely put, the subjectivist
Bayesian approach.
4.2. Rational Beliefas Subjective, or Personal, or Epistemic Probabilities
It may come as a surprise that I subsume subjective probability under the

heading of practical rationality. My reasons for this are as follows.
Except for Dutch Book arguments I have not found any really promising lines
of reasoning for the opinion that beliefs ought to be probabilities, formally
speaking, in order to be rational. Indeed, the usual claims to this effect seem,
rather, to be a widely shared but unqualified dogma which the respective
proponents simply presuppose without investing too much effort into giving
more detailed justifications for this claim. Sure, there is the well developed and
powerful calculus of probability which comes in handy. And there are some
conceptual intuitions in favor of interpreting rational belief as according with
this calculus. Thus, we can find highly sophisticated probability considerations

being put forward in our field. However, as soon as the request for an explicit
argument arises for why on earth rational beliefs should be probabilities, not
much comes up except Dutch Books.
Now, this is perfectly all right for a good Bayesian. Dutch Books offer the
most natural line of argumentation and they are tightly interwoven with the
Bayesian theory of induction. Thus, I take it that the only well developed
position utilizing personal or subjective or epistemic probabilities (or whichever
name one cares to give them) is the one of a thorough Bayesian as best
exemplified in the works of Bruno de Finetti or Leonard J. Savage. 7
But again, one must not be mistaken about the nature of a Bayesian's
hypothesis assessment. All she can do, is keep her evaluations of hypotheses,
understood as/air betting quotients, coherent and conditionalize on the evidence
she may acquire. This procedure of practical rationality must not be seen as
telling us anything about the rmionality of the beliejS involved, that is, in respect
to theoretical rationality. This can easily be grasped if one remembers that on
Bayesian standards alone, one can never detect a difference between a rationally
acting madman, that is a person who keeps her unreasonable beliefs nicely
coherent, and another person with perfectly sound convictions who cares also to
keep her convictions coherent just in order to not become the sucker of some sly
bookie - metaphorically speaking - in case she wants to act on her beliefs. But
it is exactly this difference between the reasonably acting madman and the
reasonably acting sound person which is at issue when we talk about the
rationality of beliefs. The first person is lacking rational beliefs, the second has
them - what marks their difference? Some personalists sometimes add as an
aside that the prior probabilities, when employed for Bayesian procedures,
should be chosen reasonably. For instance, if some relative frequencies or other
empirical probabilities are known, then the values of the priors should accord
with such probabilities. But exactly this kind of reasonableness remains and
must remain unexplicated by any personalist account and, thus, remains just
another Humean habit, a blind faith.
Still, the Bayesian theory is too attractive to leave it at that. After all, if a
Dutch Book argument can be upheld, then there is a perfect line of justification
for a pragmatic theory of inductive procedures in spite of its failure to provide
a theory of rational belief I must dwell on this a bit because I feel myself also
strongly attracted by this theory and must, therefore, give more reasons why I
consider it, nevertheless, only second best.
226 ALFRED SCHRAMM
4.3. Rational Decisions, Dutch Books, and Reasonable Belief
A few years ago I proposed an explanation for certain so-called paradoxes in

deeision theory. 8 My main point was that any Bayesian Decision (SEU) hinges,
in order to be rational, on a specific hypothesis to be presupposed by the
respective agent, namely a hypothesis about the distribution of types of decision
situations to be expected in the world in which the agent believes herself to live
in. Such a hypothesis is, of course, factual. Thus, the problem arises for the
Bayesian of how to justify belief in a hypothesis which she must presuppose
before she can judge her personal probabilities in respect to coherence (and,
thus, in respect to rationality).
So, it came to me as a happy surprise that only recently Christoph Waidacher,
a student of mine who didn't know of myoid argument, came up with a very
deep argument which, though starting from an entirely different problem
situation, converges nicely with my view of the matter. I can present
Waidacher's argument here only in outline, because it is presently being
prepared for publication.
4.3.1. Waidacher's Argument
The argument is to the effect that it depends on a factual hypothesis whether any
version of Dutch Book Argument [DBA] tells for keeping one's beliefs as
probabilities or as other fimctions which are not probabilities, formally speaking.
Belief of this factual hypothesis can therefore not itself be justified by the very
same subjectivistic means (a DBA) for which it serves as a presupposition. We
have, thus, the skeptical pattern which is so well known to us by now occur
again.
The central claim of a DBA is that a person can safeguard herself against
running into a system ofbets9 where she is bound to suffer a net loss come what
may (that is, a Dutch Book) if and only if she places her bets according to her
coherent beliefs - that is, the measure of her beliefs must accord with the
standard probability calculus. But this depends obviously on what constitutes a
bet or how a bet is defined.
Let bx(h/e) be a rational number representing the degree of a person Xs
belief in a proposition h conditional on e. Then we may define a
Standard Bet
(leaving aside further conditions) as a contract between X and some other person such that
Xwagers bxfhje).S onh, or {l-bxfhje)}.S on ~h;
(S = sum of stakes; Winner takes all; Bet is called off if ~e or S = 0 ).
For Standard Bets the following has been proved:
For any system ofStandard Bets,Xis safeguarded against DBs iffher beliefs are probabilities, that
is, for any hand e, bxfhje) = p(h/e).10
Waidacher has shown that Standard Bets are only a special case of a much wider
class of
General Bets
which are contracts with conditions as above, except that
Xwagers i{bxfhje)}.S on h, or d{bxfhje)].S on ~h;
with i increasing strictly monotonously and d decreasing strictly
monotonously with bxfhje).
For General Bets the following can be proved:
For any system of General Bets, there is a pair (i[bxfhje)}, d[bxfhje)J) such thatX is safeguarded
against DBs. However, depending on the respective choice of i and d, her beliefs must then be
functions other than probabilities. ll
Thus, the agent X must know what constitutes a bet in the world she lives in. If
she lives in a world where she may only run into systems of Standard Bets, then
she is safe with her beliefs being probabilities. But if it is a world of non-
standard bets, then, again with her beliefs being probabilities, she may run into
a DB any time. As there are possible worlds where bets are defined non-
standardly, X is in need of a justification for relying on her presupposition that
the actual world contains only Standard Bets and systems thereof. But such a
presupposition cannot be justified as reasonable or rational by referring to the
DBA. It remains an instance of blind faith, an animal belief.
Summing up this section (and slightly generalizing it), one may put it very
briefly in the following way:
228 ALFRED SCHRAMM
The fact that a person is willing (maybe, rationally willing) to act on a set of believed propositions
does not make belief in these propositions rational. That is, standards ofpractical rationality are,
by themselves, not sufficient to define (exclusively in their terms) appropriate standards of rational
belief: that is, standards of theoretical rationality. (In parentheses we may add here, that this is also
valid in the other direction, which, however, appears to be much more obvious anyway.)
This leaves us with the last option: it's good old-fashioned induction again. I
shall try to explain the strategic part of it and leave out the technicalities, as
before.
5. THEORETICAL RATIONALITY
For a start, I shall explain why I consider a certain colloquial way of putting the
dualism between 'Induction' and 'Deduction' as very misleading.
Max Black once characterized 'Induction' as something like any kind of
nondemonstrative argument ' ... in which the truth of the premises, while not
entailing the truth of the conclusion, purports to be a good reason for belief in
it. ,12
In some innocent sense, I am perfectly willing to go along such a definition.
However, we can easily detect that it consists of a peculiar mixture of logical,
semantical and epistemological elements, as soon as we try to coin an analogous
fonnulationfor 'deduction'. It would render deduction as something like '[Any
kind of demonstrative argument] ... in which the truth of the premises entails the
truth of the· conclusion, and, thus, is a good reason for belief in it' .
Quite obviously such a characterization of deduction would not pass
unchallenged by any present day conception of deduction. Nevertheless, we can
learn something from this, namely that induction is not a purely logical notion
and that we will have to split it up into a logical(-semantical) and an
epistemological component. How this division ought to be drawn we can learn
if we consider the deductive situation first.
So let us ask, what is the connection between deductive or logical validity
and the justification ofbeliefs? Both have got something to do with the notion
of truth, but each of them in its own particular manner.
A belief can be characterized as an attitude of a person to agree under
appropriate conditions that something is the case or that some meaningful
sentence or proposition is true. Thus, I take belieVing and agreeing to the truth
of some proposition, or better: being disposed to agree to the truth of some
proposition, to be identica1. 13 In case this is found objectionable, then it will at
least be found acceptable to put them into one category of propositional attitudes
INDUCTNE KNOWLEDGE 229
which we call epistemic attitudes. Epistemic attitudes involve persons who have
these attitudes, and propositions, which are the objects of such epistemic
attitudes of persons. My paradigmatic case of an epistemic attitude is belief. To
believe some proposition h means then to be disposed to agree (under
appropriate conditions) that h, or, that the proposition h is true. Now, where is
the connection to deductive validity?
Imagine some true proposition e and that some person X does indeed believe
e, and let some proposition h be a logical consequence of e, that is, e entails h.
Can we infer from this anything about any further beliefs ofX? Not at all. The
very nature of entailment is such that a proposition h may be entailed by e
whether or not X believes h and whether or not X notices or believes that e
entails h. Thus, the mere existence of the logical fact that there is a deductively
valid argument from e to h cannot already be the whole story of what' constitutes
a good deductive reason' for a belief (remember our test formulation of
'deduction' above), or, let us say from now on, deductively justify a belief. In
order that X's belief in h be justified, given, as above, that X believes e and e
entails h, X must also have knowledge that e entails h.I4 Such knowledge must
not be presupposed as a matter of course even though it would be knowledge of
purely logical or semantical facts which might arguably be expressed by analytic
propositions in some suitably constructed metalanguage. IS But not all logical or
analytic truths are obvious to us right away. Some of them must be found and
there will always be infmitely many which are never found out.
Let us therefore distinguish between the case where a person may be said to
be justified to believe a proposition h, from the case where a person does, in
addition to this, actually believe a proposition h with justification.
JDsjustified to believe a proposition h on the basis of her belief that e, ifX
knows e and there exists a deductively valid argument from e to h. And X
believes a proposition h with justification if she knows that she is justified to
believe h, that is, if X knows that there is a deductively valid argument from e
toh.
Without going into a further discussion of these notions, one can see by now
that already if we set valid deductive reasoning into the wider perspective of a
theory ofjustification of beliefs and knowledge, such problems occur which are
often thought to be specially tied only to induction. But then, what is it that
makes induction special if compared with deduction in this wider perspective?
I think that the decisive point can be shown on the basis of what has been said
so far.
230 ALFRED SCHRAMM
5.1. Deductively Justified Belief
Let us call the evidence Ex,T that set of propositions of which a person X has
direct knowledge at some time T. Which kinds of propositions can or cannot be
members of EXT need not distract us now, though this is also a question which
must be consid~ed carefully in a fuller account. 16 What we can do, however, is
subdivide the evidence Ex,T into a set Pr,c,T of those analytic propositions a of
whichXhas direct knowledge atT(call this the analytic eVidence), and a set SXT
of synthetic propositions s of which X has direct knowledge at T (call this the
synthetic eVidence).
The 'epistemic position of a Person X at time T' is determined by these
three sets17 :
E.l;T= (e: DK.l;rle)}
A.l;T= (a: DK.l;rla) /\ I_ _ h}

S.l;T = (s:
-
DK.l;rls) /\ I j - h)
Next, consider logical consequence or entailment as a functional dependency,

call this a deductive supportfimction Scb which assumes for any arguments e and
h exactly one of two values, say
sd(h/e) = 1 iff el h, otherwise sfole} = 0
Such a functional expression for given arguments is purely analytic or L -deter-

minate1S as Carnap would have said. This gives us the neded ingredients to
formulate the connection between deductive support and justification of belief:
(DJ)
(All at time T:) A person X is deductively justified to believe a contingent proposition h, iff h is
deductively supported by X's synthetic evidence:
jfi3.l;rlh)) - Sd(h/SX.') = 1
(DJ~
(All at time T:) A person X believes a contingent proposition h with deductive justification, iffX
directly knows that X is deductively justified to believe h, that is, iff X directly knows that h is
F
deductively supported YX's synthetif evidence SX.T, and X believes h:
JJ3x.rlhJ - s,lh/Sx.,) = 1 E AX.T /\Bx.rlhJ
This still raw model displays all the ingredients necessary for the deductive
justification of beliefs: If h is some contingent, not L-detemrinate proposition,
then the evidence ought to contain also some contingent, not L-detenninate
propositions which serve as a base for the justification. But except from this
base no further contingent propositions need to be known in order to reach
justification for the belief of h. All that is further needed is that the respective
person has also knowledge of some analytic propositions - especially of the
analytic, purely L -determinate proposition that h is a logical consequence of the
contingent propositions in the evidence, that is, that the propositions in the
synthetic evidence SXT deductively support h. .
In a way, all this is merely a restatement of a trivial empiricist principle,
namely, that we can have justification for our non-logical convictions only as far
as these convictions are supported by empirical evidence. What the empiricist
wants to avoid; is, taking refuge with synthetic apriori beliefs. And this is how
he plans to stand by his principle: Given some synthetic evidence, justification
of any further belief must be achievable by purely logical or analytic
considerations without any reference to further synthetic convictions, because
this would immediately start Hume's famous infinite regress.
And this procedure remains essentially the same if we now proceed to
induction, though, of course, some precautions must be taken.
5.2. Inductively Justified Belief
The first precaution is that the support function needed for induction - even if it
may include some highest value for strict entailment - must assign values to
support which falls short of strict entailment, that is some kind of 'weak
entailment'. For reasons to be discussed below, I shall not specify this further
but simply assume that we can measure weak entailment in a suitable way and
represent it by a general support jUnction which maps its propositional
arguments onto real values r E rO, 1]. The statement which expresses the
support-relation for certain arguments hand e, e.g. 's(h/e)=r', is then, again,
analytic or L-determinate.
The second precaution is that our empiricist principle only allows us to justifY
degrees of belief that accord with the degree of support for the respectively
believed propositions, given the evidence Sx,l' So letXs epistemic situation, that
. . .
is the sets Exn Axn Sxn be as before, and let' support' , or 'weak entailment' be
represented by afunctions(. /.): h,eEL -+ R, then we have as the general model
of inductive justification:
232 ALFRED SCHRAMM
(GJ)
(All at time T:) A person X isjustified to believe with degree r a contingent proposition h, iff his
supported by X's synthetic evidence with degree r:
j(Bx.,{h) = r) - s(h/Sx.~ = r
(GJ)
(All at time T:) A personX believes with degree r a contingent proposition h with justification, iff
X directly knows thatXisjustified to believe h with degree r, that is, iffX directly knows thath is
supported with degree r by X's synthetic evidence SX.T, and X believes with degree r the proposition
h:
This is what I call the model of Good Old-fashioned Induction. It had to be

formulated here in a vety general form, because in this form it displays most
clearly the overall strategy pursued by many empiricists. And my claim is that
it is basically sound, consistent, avoids both Hume's skeptical argument as well
as the need for synthetic apriori convictions, and, finally and above all, it has,
up to now, never been shown to be mistaken. I do not claim that any of the
attempts to work it out in more detail thus far have been successful. On the
contraty, all attempts to that end have turned out faulty in one way or the other.
But nobody ever could show that these failures were due to some basic mistake
in the model itself. On the contraty, the basic model as such is already highly
successful insofar as it reduces the force of Hume's thrust to one field of
questions: are there valid support functions and, if so, what are their properties?
And these are questions which can be dealt with by purely logical and semantical
investigations. There are no other open questions left regarding induction and/or
the problem of the justification of belief.
Keynes has already employed the model, proposing logical probabilities as
support functions. 19 However, even though the model itself allowed Keynes to
avoid synthetic a priori judgements, he re-introduced them in the form of his
'Principle of Limited Variety' because he couldn't solve a problem which has
haunted all theories of logical probability since the first one was proposed by
Bolzano in his 'Wissenschaftslehre': the problem is that there seems to exist no
sound procedure for distributing values for the prior probabilities exclusively on
purely logical grounds. Earlier probabilists of the so-called classical period like
Laplace had used for this purpose the so-called 'Principle of Insufficient
Reason', which was severely criticized by Keynes who had the name
'Indifference-principle' for it. But in the end, Keynes himself didn't come up
with any more logically determined way to determine values for the priors.
INDUCTNE KNOWLEDGE 233
And, of course, Carnap employed the very same model as background for his
great venture in inductive logic: 'Our conception of the nature of inductive
inference ... enables us to regard the inductive method as valid without
abandoning empiricism.... Any inductive statement (that is, not the hypothesis
involved, but the statement of the inductive relation between the hypothesis and
the evidence) is purely logical. Any statement of probability is ... , if true,
analytic. '20
Whatever else Carnap changed in later years, there was never any need to
change the basic model, as can be seen from a clear restatement of it, this time
in terms of Credence and Credibility functions (again probabilities), in his
posthumously published 'Inductive Logic and Rational Decisions' .21
There are various opinions why Carnap also failed to develop the model
adequately. Space allows me to mention only the one reason which I consider
most serious, namely, that probability functions, technically speaking, are
unsuitable to serve as support functions in the way the model requires.
Rephrasing this finding of Wesley Salmon, I would put this as follows: Logical
probabilities explicate the wrong intuition. Support functions should provide a
measure for weak entailment, but logical probability measures partial
entailment. Weak entailment ranges (or ought to range) from full entailment to
logical independence. But partial entailment, such as delivered by logical
probability, ranges from full entailment of one proposition to full entailment of
the negation of that proposition. Thus, given their role in the model and given
the pre-explicative intuitions of what one should expect from such a measure of
logical support, it happens that logical probabilities simply deliver the wrong
goods. .
In conclusion of this sketch, I think enough has been said to understand that
the Model of Good Old-fashioned Induction is still a reasonable option and how
it is to be developed from here: The probabilities must go and, in their place,
some non-extensive measure must be employed which gets the range from
logical dependence to logical independence right. And, of course, it is going to
be a semantical measure, which means, it is tied to the language on which it is
defined.
NOTES
• I want to honor Rudolf Haller with this report on an ongoing project which has been growing
over the years and which could not have been kept alive without the philosophical environment
created, and the interest, criticism, and enouragement provided by Rudolf
234 ALFRED SCHRAMM
It is really just a report - the whole enterprise could not possibly be dealt with in a short
presentation, as one can imagine from the title. Thus, I shall present a rough outline of it and
substantiate one or the other point.
Many thanks to Linda Radzik for grammatical and stylistic improvements of the original
vetsion.
1. The term 'contingent' is used here and in the following to mean 'factual, expressing some
matters of fact which obtain independently of respective epistemic attitudes ofjudging persons'.
2. Chisholm calls this view 'particularism'; a more recent example is Pollock [1986].
3. Pollock's inherently dogmatic position to the effect that the greater strength of our conviction
thatwe can gain knowledge provides for a refutation of the skeptic's premises which lead to her
conclusion (that we cannot gain knowledge) will not do the job either. High strengths of
convictions do not provide instances ofadequate justification for these convictions as can easily
observed with the sometimes peculiar ideas of strongly convinced hypochondriacs.
4. Assuming thatwe have observed a series of n events, m of which showed a certain property A.
Then we have the relative frequency It' = min ofA 's occuring in this series. The Reichenbachian
Rule ofInduction (the so-called Straight Rule) then says: "For any prolongation of the series to
s events (with s > n) the relanv, frequency will remain within a small interval around It', that is:
[hn - E} ~ H ~ [FI + E}." Now, Reichenbach himself already knew that the argument of
vindication is applicable not only for the Straight Rule but for an infinite class of analogous rules.
Such rules are easily produced by simply setting h· + c. ± e instead of h· ± e , with Cn as some
function of n or h· and with the condition limrF4 __ (c,) = o. As the value of c. converges towards
the limit 0 , any such rule must also converge towards the same limit as the Straight Rule itself
which is just the special case with c. = 0 out of this class of 'asymptotic rules'.
5. Cpo Schurz [1988], p. 320: ' ... daB unser Glauben iiber den Prognoseerfolg ein rational
gerechtfertigter sein soll, niimlich durch Wahrscheinlichkeitsilberlegungen gerechtfertigter.'
6. Thus, we can never ascertain the 'success of a predictive method' from the observation of our
successes. The respective rate of successes or failures may not be due to the predictive method we
have been using, indeed, it may even occur in spite of our having used a certain (unsuitable)
predictive method. Therefore, whatever the outcomes of our trials are, they allow no validation of
the method used.
7. More recent writers on the subject have added to the subject in detail but not in principle. But
it is the principal account which is of interest here.
8. Schramm [1986], pp. 284f.
9. We presuppose that psychological questions in respect to the actual willingness of a person to
bet or not to bet are beside the point here. What is at issue is the observation that the willingness
of a person to act in accordance with her beliefs can be represented as hypothetical bets or systems
of bets. Thus, the betting shop parlance used here is merely a practical device which could, in
principle, always be supplemented by talk about a person's willingness to invest personal
commodities (including labour, or whatever she values) in order to gain as much and/or lose as
little as possible.
10. This way of putting it can be somewhat misleading. Strictly speaking, the equality sign should
be read as an identity sign: The Personalist would say that if the person's beliefs are personal
probabilities, that is, obey the axioms of the probability calculus, she is safe from having a book
made against her.
11. Except, of course, for the special case of Standard Bets.
12. Cpo Max Black's entry 'Induction' in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
13. I shall not further discuss here this preference for a dispositional account of belief.
14. The kind of knowledge required here, of course, does not entail that the person need to
understand the technical notion of entailment or have any explicit knowledge oflogical theory.
Some intuitive (and truthful) intuition on X's side will do like 'h is bound to be true because of e'.
15. The notion of analyticity presupposed here is a further tenet which cannot be discussed in this
paper. Just as with the provision about logical knowledge (cp. footnote 14 above), we need not
presupposeX's understanding of the technical notion of analyticity but only her actual disposition
to recognize an analytic truth as something like 'bound to be true in any case'.
16. This fuller account is of the foundationalist variety; the evidence contains beliefs in such
propositions p such that ifP occurs to X then X' s belief ofp is self-justified. This is, roughly, what
is meant here by 'direct knowledge'.
17. Note thatX's epistemic position is constantly changing as X moves through T.
18. The language L is that of the respective person X. Thus, we presuppose with this no more
than that X understands her own language, which should not be objectionable.
19. 'In orderthatwe may have rational beliefinp ofa lower degree of probability than certainty,
it is necessary that we know a set of propositions h, and also know some secondary proposition q
asserting a probability-relation betweenp and h." Cpo Keynes [1921], p. 16.
20. Cpo Camap [1962], p. 181. This statement is already in the first edition, 1950.
21. in Camap/Jeffrey [1971], esp. p. 30.
REFERENCES
Black, Max, [?], Entry 'Induction' in: Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Camap, Rudolf [1962] Logical Foundations of Probability, 2nd ed. Chikago 1962
Camap,Rudolfand Jeffrey, Richard [1971] Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Berkeley
and Los Angeles 1971.
Keynes, John Maynard [1921] Treatise on Probability, first ed. 1921; quotes from edition
Cambridge 1973.
Piller, Christian [1987] Dos Vll'ldizierungsargument - seine Wichtigkeit, seine Wirksamkeit, seine
Widerlegung, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 29 [1987], pp. 35 - 58.
Pollock, John [1986] Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.
Reichenbach, Hans [1935] Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre, Leiden 1935.
Schramm, Alfred [1986] Induktive Erkenntnis, (Habilitationsschrift) Graz 1986
Schurz, Gerhard [1988] Kontext, Erfahrung, Induktion: Antworten der pragmatischen
Wissenschaftstheorie aufdrei Herausforderungen, in: Philosophia Naturalis 25 [1988], pp.
296 -336.
RUDOLF HALLER
AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL OUTLINE
The historical background of my schooldays was the last period of the Austrian
Nazi regime and those years when Austria no longer existed after it had become
part of the German Reich. I was sent to school in Graz after the war and took
my final exams in 1947/48 at a night school.
How I came to read Nietzsche, Holderlin and Vaihinger (!) at the age of
fourteen, I do not remember. But I remember well that, at the same time, I began
to develop a philosophical theory of the world, i.e., to shape up my unclear
thoughts imitating the style of Hyperion and Zarathustra. My idea of a world
was not at all original, i.e., the entire cosmos, which I viewed in the most perfect
infinite spherical form, consisting of material and immaterial parts, altogether
of a divine nature.
What induced me one night to destroy all my previous "works" (including
poems, letters I had received and a whole bundle of papers together with a
Leibniz-like monadology of my boyhood), can only be explained by referring to
my experience of a principal inner change. Following my inclinations to indulge
in religious feelings that had become more and more important for me, I thought
it necessary to destroy the past, i.e., my earlier literary products. Doubtless, I
decided not to give up philosophy, although I then did not know very well what
it was. As the Austrian grammar-school curriculum provides the subjects
psychology and philosophy in the final two courses, my intention to be true to
philosophy was first fostered by my philosophy teacher Maria van Briessen, and
later by the bookseller and publisher Filip Schmidt-Dengler, whom I first met in
his second-hand bookshop. His fmancial situation permitted him to establish a
small publishing house in the late thirties, last but not least, to offer to the
general readers works by Austrian disciples of the poet Stephan George, whom
he himselfwas under the pseudonym of Filip Rabus.
I started to study philosophy at the University of Graz in the winter term of
1947/48 where there were only about 3000 students. Many of them were much
older than the usual beginners, because they had served in the war or had been
prisoners of war. That fact made our student years much different from all
following ones. The students were working hard and seriously trying to do their
best to finish their studies within the shortest possible time, because many of
them had to study under difficult economic conditions or wanted to make up for
their wasted years in the war. As the Austrian university system is not structured
in classes, beginners were attending lectures together with students who were
already preparing their doctoral theses. As concerns the university degrees, there
237
238 RUDOLF HALLER
was another difference to the American system: At the Philosophical Faculty

there was no other degree than the Ph.D.. Only those students who had qualified
for being grammar-school teachers received the title of professor.
There were only two teachers at the Philosophical Seminar, as the Philosophy
Department was then called: Konstantin Radakovic and Amadeo Silva-Tarouca.
Konstantin Radakovic, a brother of the Vienna Circle member and lecturer of
mathematics Theodor Radakovic, was the only Faculty member who
spontaneously gave up his post after the invasion ofNazi troops into Austria in
1938. His special subjects were history of philosophy and philosophical
sociology. Each semester he gave courses on a certain topic of the history of
philosophy, ranging from the pre-Socratic period to the 19th century. He held an
empiricist point-of-view, actually a Humean one, combined with an
open-mindedness towards attitudes that differed from his own. Neither in his
lectures nor in his critique did he make the slightest effort to convert his students
or to convince them of his own ideas. His mild scepticism became apparent in
his seminar when he often left it to the students to choose a topic. The fact that
he was honoured by his students with a festschrift on the occasion of his 65th
birthday titled Philosophie der Toleranz (1960) resulted from his generous
attitude towards people who developed opposite theories and theses.
The second philosophical chair was held by Amadeo Silva-Tarouca. Whereas
Radakovic had published only less numerous and minor writings before he was
offered the chair but had been a university teacher for many years,
Silva-Tarouca, descending from a well-known aristocratic family, had published
quite a number of books on various topics of which I just mention
Weltgeschir;hte des Geistes (1939), Deutsche Kunst aus deutscher
Vergangenheit (1943), and Thomas heute (1947), the latter publication being
a kind of existentialist interpretation of Thomas Acquinas, indicating better than
the other titles the philosophical direction which later became manifest in
Philosophie der Polaritiit (1955). In the course of eight semesters
Silva-Tarouca developed his own system in philosophy, called
ontophenomenology, which should be able to unify antagonistic poles at a higher
level, like for instance "for me/without me", subjectivity/objectivity, "thinking
and wanting", in a polar-dialectic manner. As I had to do the work of
Silva-Tarouca' s scientific aid, much time was spent discussing his invention of
a system whose terminology was also strongly influenced by existentialism. At
that time, every doctoral student of the Philosophical Faculty was obliged to sit
for a one-hour oral exam after having submitted their doctoral theses, i.e., a half-
hour with Radakovic and Silva-Tarouca each. As there was no secretary yet at
the Philosophical Seminar, the scientific aid was a secretary, librarian and
personal assistant to the professor and a tutor at the same time.
AN AUTOBIOGRAPIllCAL OUTLINE 239
The two professors had one assistant of the name of Rudolf Freundlich and
a part-time scientific aid. The latter job was done first by Dr. Pfuill, later by
Georg Janoska, and from 1954 by myself. Freundlich, who had studied with
Moritz Schlick and Karl Biihler and whose dissertation had been supervised by
Robert Reininger, qualified as a university lecturer in 1948 and lectured on
present-day philosophy, logic and philosophical logic, in a series of lectures
covering:first the phenomenological school and German existential philosophy,
and in a second one logical empiricism and modem ontology. In a logic course
the students for the :first time got acquainted with the principles of mathematical
logic, which five of us had already been taught in an optional course by the
professor of mathematics Hermann Wendelin. May be at that time or earlier
Rudolf von Scheuer drew my attention to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, which I
eagerly made extracts from, because the dichotomy between saying and showing
as well as his silence proposition seemed to me particularly helpful in my
religious reflections of those ~ays.
In my fourth year as a student, it became necessary to choose a dissertation
topic. As my religious thoughts seemed to me most interesting, I chose an
interpretation of the religious existentialism of the Russian Jewish philosopher
Leo Shestov. He had been suggested to me by Filip Schmidt-Dengler, the
publisher of a German version of Shestov' s main work under the title of Athen
und Jerusalem. Versuch einer religiosen Philosophie (German trans!. Graz
1938). The radical antirationalist Shestov vehemently attacks the traditional
Greek-Latin image of God and the traditional justification of belief. He opposes
all rational explanations of the Bible text taking it literally and denying any
metaphoric or symbolic interpretation thereof. It was this uncompromising
radicalism in the spirit ofKierkegaard's Either-or attitude that attracted me to
a great extent. One of Shestov's later works, which also appeared in German
under the title Kierkegaard und die Existenzphilosophie, was dedicated to the
Danish philosopher. Comparing the radical criticism of all efforts to rationalize
religious and Christian belief, I much favoured Shestov's alternative in
particular: either the works of God are governed by the rules of logic and are not
contrary to reason, in which case many of them are false and unacceptable, or
God's almighty power as well as his works are not subject to or restricted by
logic rules or the laws of nature, and it remains true that to believe means to lose
one's brains to regain God instead-nowadays one would call this a
fundamentalist thesis. According to Shestov, the purpose of philosophy is not
mere reflexion, but struggling for the one thing that is necessary. One example
frequently used by Shestov to demonstrate and defend his conception of belief,
is Abraham who obeyed God's order to set out and did not know where to go.
It was the unquestioning belief that strongly attracted me and also brought about
a solution to the very subject of my dissertation, a solution that had actually been
240 RUDOLF HALLER
fOlmd by Kierkegaard After all, the completion of my dissertation put an end to

my religious excursions leading me towards conceptual and aesthetic questions.
In fact I did not deliver my first lecture on Shestov, but on Nietzsche and Sartre,
a topic which reflects again how widespread existentialism was in the fifties and
how long it took to free myself from it.
I have always been interested in aesthetics and the philosophy of art and have
noticed very soon that dealing with those topics belongs to the most difficult
things in phIlosophy. Except in my first two semesters as a university teacher
and a seminar on Nelson Goodman's Languages ofArt I did not use topics in
aesthetics for my lectures again. My interest in this difficult specialty has still
remained, even though I have published very little on it. The natural cause for my
theoretical interest in aesthetics must have been the power of the arts, or better,
the works of art that attracted me strongly. As far as I remember, that has always
been the case and includes nearly all kinds of poetry and music, painting,
pictorial art and architecture. It is not at all surprising that many of my friends
have been writers, artists, architects as well as philosophers and scientists. Since
my early student days among my friends have been the architect and critic
Rudolf von Scheuer, the poets Heimrad Backer, Rudolf Stibil and Alfred
Kolleritsch, the painters Mario Decleva and Hannes Schwarz, and the pianist
Alfred Brendel, who at that time also painted and wrote poems.
One of my most interesting fellow students was Georg J anoska, who wrote
his dissertation on Ding an sich und wissenschaftliche Philosophie and had
completed his studies two years before myself. Thus, for a few years the
confrontation between Kant's theory of belief and Shestov's conceptions
remained one of the subjects of our conversations. At that period I learned a lot
from my friend Junoesque because we shared several philosophical ideas and,
additionally, the topics he was mainly dealing with, like Kant, Hegel, Marx and
Freud, had not been familiar to me before. Janoska favoured Franz Kroner's
so-called "systematological" point-of-view, a kind of metaphilosophy of
philosophical systems, which, without any individual point-of-view should lead
to a systematic judgment of an "anarchy of philosophical systems". Kroner, who
later sympathized with the Nazis, published a book in 1929 under the same title
trying to prove the idea of a necessary pluralism of philosophical ideas, which
should derive from the very nature of system or theory building itself. However,
the semi-sceptic position of an anarchy of philosophical systems-as it had
earlier been called by Dilthey, who vehemently opposed this thesis-was not to
be taken as relativism. As little as a pluralism of different geometries implies
relativism, as little can alternatives or antitheses, inherent to any theory or
system, back up a hypothetical universal relativism of philosophical theories.
Thus, the theorem about the parallels in the Euclidian geometry holds
AN AUTOBIOGRAPlllCAL OUTLINE 241
unrestrictedly true, regardless of the fact that there are contradictory theorems
in other geometries l .
Of course we raised the question of a theory pluralism too early, especially
as concerns philosophy, maybe because we had no finn standpoint then and no
analytic comprehension of the nature of theories and their changes. Besides, this
later became a much preferred subject of my lectures and seminars after my
return to Graz from Hannover. In the following years Junoesque's manifold
interests more and more led him to the history of philosophy ranging from Kant
to Hegel and Marx; at last he concentrated on something that he called
"nominalist dialectics", a topic I could not and would not make my own.
When reading philosophical literature available in the mid fifties I came to the
conclusion that for continuing my own work I should have to know more about
analytic philosophy. By the aid of my friend Helmut Sihler, the later general
manager of the Henkel company in Germany, I applied for a post-doc
scholarship to as many as 42 American philosophy departments. However, there
were no offers, except from the universities of Chicago and Yale, but only with
restricted financial conditions. I was fortunate enough to be offered an Austrian
scholarship in Oxford, where in 1958/59 I received my "philosophical baptism".
I studied under Gilbert Ryle and shared his opinion about the importance of
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. I found myself in the Eldorado of
philosophy, which Oxford then undoubtedly was. J. Austin had just returned
from his successful stay in the United States and in 1959 for the last time
lectured on "Sense and Sensiblia", and the previous term, or the following one,
on "Words and Things". I participated in David Pears' and McGuinness'
"Introduction to ·the Tractatus", had good conversations with A. Quinton,
listened to Peter Strawson's lectures and to Isaiah Berlin's inaugural lecture, got
acquainted with Friedrich Waismann, who, though being frequently ill, had still
remained interested in what was going on. I enjoyed taking part in evening
lectures and discussions of various societies, like for instance the
Undergraduate's Jowett Society, the Socratic Club, the Philosophical Society,
which were as enthusiasticly attended by professors and lecturers as by visitors.
I still have a vivid memory of the whole philosophical furioso, and of course of
Gilbert Ryle, who patiently listened to my stammering English and tried to
justify his philosophizing against the background of his early studies of
Meinong, HusserI and Heidegger. His first-rate seminar on "Late Plato and early
Aristotle", with participants like Elizabeth Anscombe, Richard Walzer, G. E. I.
Owen, John Ackrill, Brian McGuinness and others, was highly impressive. Ryle
was marvelous in expounding the reason why a problem stated by Plato was a
real problem or not, and surely he returned to Plato's Parmenides again and
again as well as to Aristotle's Categories, topics which Ryle had tackled already
in the late thirties. His "informal instructions" held weekly as open discussions
242 RUDOLF HALLER
were an excellent example of his way of taking up philosophical problems. The

audience liked this way of doing philosophy, "linguistic philosophy", and so did
1. But it was nothing else than discussing philosophical problems in a serious
manner, taking seriously what had been said by anyone in class and analyzing
it with words we then were able to use.
Returning from Oxford I started to write my habilitation thesis under the title
of Untersuchungen zum Bedeutungsproblem in der antiken und
mittelalterlichen Philosophie2 that should give me the right to lecture at the
university. During my habilitation colloquium in the academic year of 1960/61,
attended by all professors of the whole faculty, which then included humanities
and natural sciences departments, everybody was entitled to ask me any
questions from their specific perspectives. To give an example, the professor of
Classics and Byzanthine Studies Endre von Ivanka examined me on Scotus
Eriugena's conception of universals, on Descartes, Goethe and at last Sartre, the
latter being not at all difficult for me.
The history of concepts and ideas is quite fascinating like any investigation
of historical changes. But without a philosophical point-of-view it does not
contribute to any systematic construction. However, it can be helpful in viewing
philosophical problems in a new perspective. I had got an idea of what meanings
really were and thus was able to grasp what others proposed as their theories of
meaning and reference. Very often we discover that our philosophical ancestors
found solutions which are valuable and useful even today. This holds true for
myself when in later years I spent a lot of time excavating the forgotten history
of Austrian philosophy. To understand what kind of question can be asked is an
important ~tep in our philosophical practice. But I did not fmd out all that by
myself. Ryle was one of those who taught me most, and another one was
Roderick M. Chisholm.
After Oxford philosophy had been revealed to me, I returned to Graz, where
I was asked by Hofrat Kindinger whether we could host .the Chisholm family in
the academic year of 1959/60. They lived in our house, although there was not
enough room for visitors at that time but only six rooms without central heating.
So Roderick Chisholm worked hard to heat three rooms and the kitchen. But as
he remarked in his "Self-Profile", it "meant the beginning of a lasting friendship
and a series of mutual projects pertaining to philosophy in Austria 3." In 1972
Chisholm was awarded an honorary degree by our University, and from 1974
until 1991 he regularly gave so-called "Blockseminare" in Graz four or five
weeks after the end of his term at Brown. He has been honorary professor at our
Department for seventeen years, and his impact on myself, the assistants and the
students has been remarkable and lasting.
But now I should continue sketching my own career: After having qualified
as a university lecturer in 1961, nearly everything I was working on was
AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL OUTLINE 243
determined by analytic literature and I obtained a new perspective that induced

me to see traditional philosophy in a new light and to follow the tradition of
Austrian philosophy based on the view of Russell and G. E. Moore and their
successors. There was a general feeling as if the spirit of the world had moved
from the old continent to Great Britain and over to the new continent, the United
States, because it rather seemed as if after the heyday of Oxford philosophy the
new analytic ideas came mainly from the United States.
I started lecturing in the winter term of 1961/62 on "Descartes and modem
subjectivism", gave a proseminar course on "Kant's critique of the aesthetic
judgment", and continued with lectures on Leibniz. In 1962 I gave my first
seminar on "Wittgenstein and Ryle". Other topics I was concerned with were
"theory of meaning", "analyticity", "perceiving and knowing", "the concept of
a person". In aesthetics, where I had contributed a paper on "the present
situation of aesthetics" at the XII International Congress of Philosophy in Venice
in 1959, I insisted in taking into account two pillars: the work of art as object
and aesthetic experience. Therefore, the analysis of the aesthetic object has to
comprise both sides. As the methods of analysis I proposed psychological,
phenomenological and semiotic ones.
In 1962 I delivered a lecture on the problem of meaning at the German
Congress of Philosophy in MUnster, which provoked a lively discussion with P.
Lorenzen, G. Patzig, H. A. Schmidt etc., and in 1963 I was invited by Hans
Wagner to the University of Bonn, where I spoke about "The linguistic method
in philosophy" and received a rewarding response. H. Wagner, E. Rothacker, G.
Martin, G. Hasenjager, Baron and Derbolav among others were taking part in the
discussion Especially Hans Wagner, who was very open-minded to the analytic
movement and with whom I had a good contact, supported me a great deal for
sometime.
From 1963-65 I also contributed to Paul Weingartner's
"Forschungsgesprache" in Salzburg with papers on description theory, the
controversy on the analytic-synthetic dichotomy and on metaphysics and
language. Especially the second one of those symposia was of lasting influence
on myself There I met Herbert Feigl, Paul Feyerabend, Jaakko Hintikka, Bela
von Juhos and Harald Delius. Hintikka delivered a few lectures on analyticity,
and we had very good and profound discussions. At that period I learned to
admire Quine's analysis and followed Putnam's advice, "Ignore the
analytic-synthetic distinction, and you will not be wrong in connection with any
philosophical issues not having to do specifically with this distinction."
In 1964 I received the title of associate professor, which did not mean very
much. In 1965 I was invited for the first time as a visiting professor to Munich
to stand in for Professor Stegmuller during his sabbatical. The audience there
was well prepared to hear my stories about Oxford philosophy. One of my
244 RUDOLF HALLER
students was Eike von Savigny, who a few years later published an account of
the "philosophy of normal language", which to a certain extent continued to
expound the ideas of ordinary language philosophy, a topic I had dealt with in
my seminar. In the winter term I proposed to lecture on "Perceiving and
Knowing". Starting from the difference between sensing and perceiving, I
discussed some of the proposals of Austin, Ayer, Chisholm, Malcolm, Ryle and
Wittgenstein, trying to find my own line. Particularly interesting seemed to me
the significance of our memory in all our language use and in our mental habits.
The problem of the adequate analysis of remembering sounds, tunes, colours etc.
can best be solved by referring to existing objects. Soon after the term in
Munich, during a further term in Oxford on the basis of a grant from the British
Council, I was offered a chair in Hannover to succeed Gustav Heckmann, a
devoted student of Leonard Nelson. A few weeks after I had begun to teach in
Hannover, the capital of Lower Saxony, I rather surprisingly received a call to
Innsbruck. As soon as. that had become known in Graz, I was suggested for a
chair there. Thus within a few months I was offered three chairs, but
unhesitatingly decided to accept the Graz offer because the conditions, for
instance the size of the department, its library and my private circumstances,
seemed to me most convenient. So the "lifetime professor" of Hannover
remained in Hannover only one year, where I much enjoyed teaching because the
students were not so shy as in Austria and were keen on discussing everything
that had been said and also answered eagerly when asked at examinations. My
time in Hannover was the only one in my life when I happened to get in contact
with a group of young actors and stage directors whom I spent a lot of time with.
After hav4ig accepted the chair in Graz I continued teaching in Hannover one
semester. Even today I still remember with pleasure the marvelous period in
Hannover.
To teach in Graz meant to start from the very beginning. There were two
other chairs here, the one held by Rudolf Freundlich, and the other one by
Amadeo Silva-Tarouca, who was about to retire and was followed by Ernst
Topitsch, who, like myself, had taught in Germany for a while before receiving
a chair in his home country. While Freundlich mainly taught on logic and
language theory, Topitsch was responsible for the history of philosophy and
periodically offered classes thereon.
I set to structure a cycle of lectures for a period of four semesters exclusively
dealing with philosophy of science, a discipline I had gone further into six years
before. What was closer at hand than to continue the Austrian tradition of the
philosophy of science, i.e., the Vienna Circle philosophy, and particularly
Stegmuller's elaborate presentation of Probleme und Resultate der
Wissenschaftstheorie, published no sooner than two years after I had
commenced teaching in Austria again. At that period of time philosophy of
science had reached a climax, and it was important and interesting to elaborate
the Camap-Quine-Putnamline. As useful forme was Mario Bunge's publication
Scientific Research (1967), but even more appealing I found-apart from
Quine's writings-were the publications by Carl G. Hempel ranging from
Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science to Aspects of
Scientific Explanation and Philosophy of Natural Sciences. I was much
inclined not to disregard the historical origin of phenomena. Feyerabend's and
Kuhn's publications, also available in German of late, presented a new
interpretation forming a theoretical background for Ernst Mach's conviction that
history has made everything and history can change everything. By reading
Neurath, which certainly had also done Kuhn and Feyerabend, I knew what role
the scientific community was able to play.
In general I can say about that time of a new start, it was my main concern to
bring information and cooperation to the same level as quickly as possible,
which had not been the case between Austria and the leading countries in
analytic philosophy. The first steps should be to freshen up the stuffy, provincial
atmosphere, and to immediately recommend the more gifted students to go
abroad for one or two semesters, for instance, to one of the well-reputed German
universities like Gottingen, where Patzig, Scheibe and Wieland were teaching.
In addition to that I also planned symposia and discussions in order to exchange
ideas and opinions and to point out the relation between different points of view.
Philosophers were invited from Scandinavia, Germany, the Netherlands, England
and the USA, and it was most delightful to see that all members of the
department and students were cooperating enthusiastically. Many of them
followed my advice to go to Gottingen or England for a while. There was a
highly spirited atmosphere then, which I cannot any more imagine in the present
days.
The next subject I started to work on was the theory of knowledge, and I
translated Chisholm's Theory ofKnowledge into German. I agreed with him in
various points but found the method of doubting should be given more attention,
and justifying knowledge could most adequately be carried out by acting on the
analogy to performative speech acts. It was the analysis ofWittgenstein's later
writings which led me to the thesis of praxeological foundationalism in the
theory of knowledge. How much lowe Wittgenstein, whom I regard as the most
outstanding philosopher of this century, cannot be put into words. When working
on him I have always found new questions, and there has not been any other
philosopher whom I have been dealing with more intensely.
My most important duty as a university teacher has been to provide a
profound education and training for my students that should keep up with
international standards, a goal that can be reached for instance by inviting
well-reputed foreign philosophers who directly demonstrate students how to
246 RUDOLF HALLER
make good philosophy. So I regularly invited Roderick Chisholm (Brown

University), Stephan Komer (Bristol University), who both were awarded
honorary degrees by our University. A few years later we had two other visiting
professors: Keith Lehrer (University of Arizona, Tucson) and Brian McGuinness
(Oxford, Siena), who both have been appointed as honorary-professors at our
faculty, and every year I have tried to stimulate the interest of visiting professors
from several countries, and especially from the USA, to teach in Graz for some
time, either in the frame of exchange programs or of other projects. Among the
visitors have been Mike Harnish (Tucson), George Kerner (Michigan),
Christoph Nyiri (Budapest), Barry Smith (Sheffield), Risto Hilpinen (Turku),
Gershon Weiler, Zvie Bar-On, and Joseph Agassi from Israel. Our Department's
teaching staff is to a great extent recruited from its own students. In Austria, as
in Germany, one can qualify as a university lecturer by the recommendation of
a habilitation supervisor, I have rather often been approached by several
candidates. Thus, in .the course of 25 years ten former students of mine
(including Christiane Weinberger, Heiner Rutte, Werner Sauer and Wolfgang
Gombocz) obtained the right to lecture here.
I have always been interested to materialize ideas in the shape of institutional
organizations, such as societies, symposia, congresses, editions that I have been
able to establish in the course of the years, an effort that has taken up much of
my time, sometimes too much. Even to those institutions that had come into
being without my initiative, I devoted more energy than was good for me and my
family.
As mentioned before, I founded the Shestov Society together with
Schmidt-Dengler, an assistants association, the "Vereinigung fUr
wissenschaftliche Grundlagenforschung" in 1964, which, within the fIrst twenty
years of its existence, organized nearly a hundred lectures mainly delivered by
foreign philosophers and philosophers of science. It was not until 1975 that the
idea of a project of an international journal of analytic philosophy had
successfully been carried out thanks to the Dutch publisher Schipers and later to
his son Fred van der Zee, a journal I quite deliberately called Grazer
Philosophische Studien, a series now holding a special position in the history
of philosophy. It is presently producing its 50th volume containing all
contributions to the Meinong symposium of 1995. In 1979 I started a further
series with Rodopi named after my book Studien zur Osterreichischen
Philosophie to materialize another idea of mine which was of great importance
to me. Up to now more than 25 volumes have been published.
I should like to mention two further large-scale projects: one on "Science and
Ethics" initiated by Ivan Supek, now President of the Croatian Academy of
Sciences, on the occasion of my participation in an inter-university program in
Dubrovnik in the early sixties, sponsored by the German Volkswagen
Foundation. There was an impressive list of outstanding participants from

Finland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, France, Great Britain, Poland, Yugoslavia
and the USA. Although we discussed more about science than about ethics,
there had been made a start anyway. In the course of nearly ten years the
contributions to that project resulted in three volumes edited by Risto Hilpinen,
Keith Lehrer and myself. Finally I should also mention my cooperation with the
Austrian Wittgenstein Society that started in 1976 to organize a series of
symposia in Kirchberg with the help of the vet A. Hubner, his wife Lore,
Elisabeth and Werner Leinfellner and Paul Weingartner, which has become a
centre of lively Wittgenstein discussions.
Perhaps it is also important to mention that, after having accepted the call to
the University of Graz, I organized exchange programs with several American
philosophy departments which enabled lecturers from Boulder, Minneapolis and
Tucson to teach in Graz and vice verse. I will now put a stop to the list of my
activities referring only to those I do not regret, but on the contrary, have always
felt necessary to take part in, according to my conviction to do what had to be
done.
With a symposium on Alexius Meinong in 1970 I started a series of
international congresses opening Graz to the philosophical world because,
bordering on the Balkan states, it had been isolated for a long time. The list of
participants included Findlay, Chisholm, Hintikka, Lambert, Marc-Wogan,
KOng, and Poser; altogether there were philosophers involved from six countries,
Ryle delivering the opening speech. However, one of my main concerns was the
edition of Meino~g' s works, which I later carried out together with Kindinger
and Chisholm. In the first ten years of my Graz period I organized four more
symposia, one can almost say five if one adds a symposium in Gottingen,
Germany, in 1977 dedicated to Leonard NelsonS, with a vel)' large number of
participants from Graz, like for instance Chisholm, Haller, Komer, Lehrer,
Sauer, Weinberger, and Weinke.
Especially worth mentioning is the Schlick-Neurath symposium in Vienna in
1982 at the Wittgenstein house, an event that gave rise to the re-evaluation of
Neurath's philosophy. We were proud of having there C. Hempel and Tscha
Hung as two foreign members of the Vienna Circle, and a younger generation of
philosophers with F. Barone, F. M. Black, R Chisholm, R Hilpinen, H.
Lauener, and K. Lehrer, who introduced a new analytic spirit into the
interpretation of the Vienna Circle philosophy. I will not make a long list of all
my philosophical undertakings, but only mention the last one in a series of
symposia, namely the Meinong Conference of 1995. Its contributions are
contained in volume 50 of Grazer Philosophische Studien, the most
comprehensive one of all GPS volumes.
248 RUDOLF HALLER
There only remains to refer to one topic which most of my historical research
work has been dedicated to: the rediscovery of Austrian philosophy, whose
existence had frequently been concealed or denied. As little as everything written
in: Gennan can be regarded as German literature, as little can one conclude that
philosophizing in: the same language means to belong to the same movement.
Austrian philosophy developed during the Austrian empire about a hundred
years ago, its main subjects bein:g of a strictly scientific and anti-Kantian nature
and focussing on the critique of language. It only gradually excluded itself from
the traditional philosophy of other German speaking countries.
In 1982 I established the Austrian Philosophy Documentation Centre where
its researchers collect and compile the literary legacy of several Austrian
philosophers, for instance Brentano' s private library and several personal
documents as well as materials concerning the Vienna Circle and its previous
history. The research work done by the members of the Documentation Centre
resulted for instance in: R Fabian's edition of Christian von Ehrenfels' works
and the projected edition of the correspondence Moritz Schlick and the works of
Oskar Kraus and Adolf Hofler.
What I think important in: philosophy is not to disregard ways or forms of life
we are rooted in, in: order to know when our justificational attempts need to be
stopped. Mutual understanding is a basis for dissent as well as for agreement.
It may be found in our common sense as well as in our common way of acting.
Without such a basis, or at least the hope for reaching it, we cannot rely on the
assumption that what we say, like what we do without saying, will be really
understood (and accepted) by others.
If I were forced to summarize my work in: philosophy I would stress two lines:
in philosophy proper I tried to find an appropriate answer to the questions of the
kinds and rationality of scientific progress, continuing some of the neglected
Neurathian lines of thinking. It seemed to me that theories have more in common
with fictional objects than people normally think. Also in aesthetics I found the
question of novelty versus originality an interesting one, especially With regard
to new kinds of what we call art.
In epistemology a reconstruction of the common sense experience seemed to
be fruitful also for an explanation of the objects of scientific theories. For some
time I have been working on a much larger systematic project with the
key-notions "language - mind - world". If I shall ever finish it, remains an open
question.
The other line of my work was studies in the history of philosophy and
interpretations of other philosophers' works. Here most significant for me was
firstly, the rediscovery of Austrian philosophy and all my work concerned with
it, secondly, the studies on the philosophy of the Vienna Circle and the proposal
AN AUTOBIOGRAPIDCAL OUTLINE 249
of a completely new way to see and to evaluate it, especially the work of
Neurath, and thirdly, my studies on the philosophy ofWittgenstein.
Karl-Franzens-Universitat, Graz*
NOTES
1. F. Kroner, Die Anarchie der philosophischen Systeme (1929). Geleitwort zur Neuausgabe
Ferdinand Gonseth. Nachwort: G. Junoesque. Graz: Akademische Druck- und
Verlagsgesellschaft 1970, p. 327.
2. pub!, in: Archiv/uer Begriff.sgeschichte 7 (1962).
3. R. M. Chisholm, op. cit. p. II.
4. R. Hilpinen (ed.),Rationality in Science. Studies in the Foundation o/Science and Ethics.
Dordrecht-Boston 1980; R. Haller (ed.), Science and Ethics. Amsterdam 1981; K. Lehrer (ed.),
Science and Ethics. Amsterdam 1987.
5. P. Schroeder (ed.), VemunJt, Erkenntnis Sittlichkeit. Intern. Philos. Symposium Gottingen,
27. - 29. Okt. 1977, ausAnlass des 50. Todestages von Leonard Nelson. Hamburg 1979
• For translating parts of my text I thank Mrs. Evelin Maierhuber.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RUDOLF HALLERI
BOOKS
1. Leo Schestow. Eine 11I01IOgraphische und soziologische Betrachtung (doctoral thesis

/ typescript), University of Graz 1952, pp. 123.
2. Studien zur Osterreichischen Philosophie. Variationen fiber em Thema. [Studien zur
Osterreichischen Philosophie 1] Amsterdam, Rodopi 1979, pp. 194.
3. Grenzen der Sprache - Grenzen der Welt: Wittgenstein, der Wiener Kreis und die
Folgen. Franz Kreuzer im Gespriich mit RudolfHaller. Wien, Deuticke 1982, pp. 123.
4. Urteile und Ereignisse. Studien zur philosophischen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie.
Freiburg, Alber 1982, pp. 213.
5. Facta undFicta. Studien zu iisthetischen Gmndlagenfragen. Stuttgart, Reclam 1986, pp.
152.
6. Fragen zu Wittgenstein und Aujsiitze zur Osterreichischen Philosophie. [Studien zur
Osterreichischen Phi/osophie 10] Amsterdam, Rodopi 1986, pp. 254.
7. Questionson Wittgenstem.London,RoutlegeILincoln, Univ. ofNebraska Press 1988, pp.
149.
8. Wittgensein e la Filosofia austriaca: Questoes (transl. by N. Abreu e Silva Neto). Sao
Paulo, Editora da Universidade de Sao Paulo 1990, pp. 152.
9. Neopositivismus. Eine historische Einfohrung in die Philosophie des Wiener Kreises.
Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1993, pp. VIII+304.
10. Japanese Translation of Questions on Wittgenstein, transl. by Y. Hayashi, Tokyo 1995.
EDITIONS
1. Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Beitriige zur MeillOng-Forschung. Graz,

Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972, pp. 314.
2. Roderick M. Chishohn: Erkenntnistheorie. Ed. and transl. by R. Haller. Miinchen,
Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag 1979, pp. 200.
3. Science and Ethics. [Grazer Philosophische Studien 12/13] Amsterdam, Rodopi
1981, pp. 298.
4. Sprache und Erkenntnis als soziale Tatsache. Beitriige des Wlltgenstein-Symposiums,
Rom 1979. Wien, HOider-Pichler-Tempsky 1981, pp. 147.
5. Schlick und Neurath - Em Symposion. Beitriige zum lntemationalen philosophischen
Symposion aus Anlaft der 100. Wiederkehr des Geburtstages von Moritz. Schlick
(14.4.1882 - 22.6.1936) und Otto Neurath (10.12.1882 - 22.12.1945), Wien, 16.-
20.6.1982. [Grazer Philosophische Sludien 16117] Amsterdam, Rodopi 1982, pp.
Xxm+489.
6. Kasimir Twardowski: Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine
psychologische Untersuchung. Miinchen, Phil,osophia 1982, pp. XXI + 120.
7. Beitriige zur Philosophie von Stephan Komer. [Grazer Philosophische Studien 20]
Amsterdam, Rodopi 1983, pp. 305.
8. Asthetik. Akten des 8. Internationalen Wlltgenstein Symposiums (reill), 15.-21.
August 1983, KirchberglWechsel. Wien, Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 1984, pp. 262.
9. Non-Existence and Predication. [Grazer Philosophische Studien 25/26] Amsterdam,
RodopiI986,pp.602.
251
252
10. Investigating Hintikka. [Graz~r Philosophische Studien 49] Amsterdam/Atlanta,

Rodopi 1994/95, pp. 220.
11. Meinong und die Gegenstandstheorie. [Grazer Philosophische Studien 50]
Amsterdam/Atlanta, Rodopi 1995, pp. V +620.
12. (with 1. Gotschl) Philosophie und Physik. Braunschweig, Vieweg 1975, pp. 138.
13. (with K. Freisitzer) Prob1eme des Erkenntnisfortschrilts in den WlSsenschaften.
Wien, Verb and der wiss. Gesellschaften Osterreichs 1977, pp. 340.
14. (with R. M. Chisholm) Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Beitriige zur Brentano-
Konferenz, Graz 4.-8. September 1977. [Grazer Philosophische Studien 5]
Amsterdam, Rodopi 1978, pp. X+266.
15. (with W. Grassl) Sprache, Logik und Philosophie. Akten des 4. Internationalen
Wittgenstein Symposiums, 28. August - 2. September 1979, Kirchberg/Wechsel.
Wien, Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 1980, pp. 617.
16. (with R. M. Chisholm) The Descriptive Psychology of the Brentano School. Topoi
6, No.1 (1987), 1-64.
17. (with F. Stadler) Ernst Mach - Werk und Wirkung. Wien, Holder-Pichler-Tempsky
1988, pp. 540.
18. (with B. McGuinn~s) Wittgenstein in Focus - 1m Brennpunkt: Wlttgenstein. [Grazer
Philosophische Studien 33/34] Amsterdam/Atlanta, Rodopi 1989, pp. 435.
19. (with 1. Brandl) Wittgenstein - Eine Neubewertung. Wittgenstein - Towards a Re-
Evaluation. Akten des 14. Internationalen Wlttgenstein Symposiums in Kirchberg.
Feierdes 100. Geburtstages. 13.-20. August 1989. Wien, Holder-Pichler-Tempsky
1990: Part I pp. 336, Part II pp. 313, Part ill pp. 347.
20. (with P. Kruntorad and W. Hocbkeppel) Jour fixe der Vernunft. Der Wiener Kreis
und seine Folgen. Wien, Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 1991, pp. 294.
21. (with F. Stadler) Wien - Berlin - Prag: Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen
Philosophie. [VerOffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis, Bd.2] Wien, Holder-
Pichler-Tempsky 1993, pp. 710.
22. A1exius Meinong Gesamtausgabe (together with R. Kindinger and R. M. Chisholm),
7 vals. and 1 suppl.vol. Graz, Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt 1968-1978.
Vol. I: Abhandlungen zur Psychologie, 1969. Compiled by R. Kindinger and R.
Haller, pp. XII+643; vol. II: Abhandlungen zur Erkenntnistheorie und
Gegenstandstheorie, 1971. Compiled by R. Haller, pp. XI+559; vol. ill:
Abhandlungen zur Werttheorie, 1968. Compiled by R. Kindinger, pp. XIV +765;
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NOTES
1. Compiled by Reinhard Fabian and Evelin Maierhuber.

INDEX
Abraham, 239 Bergson, Henri-Louis, 1

Ackerman, Robert, 43 Berkeley, George, 42
Ackrill, John, 241 Berlin, Isaiah, 241·
aesthetics, 21-28, 240 Bernard, Claude, 49
aetiological myths, In Binder, Thomas, 69
African philosophy, 147, 148 Black, F.M., 247
Agassi, Joseph, 246 Black, Max, 228, 234, 235
Alder, Friedrich, 5 Blackburn, Simon, 145
analytic-in-English, 210, 211 Blackmore, John, 103, 104, 122
analytic philosophy, 5, 11, 12, 16,241 Boehme, L.J., 11
analyticity, 203-129 Boltzmann, Ludwig, 2, 5, 6, 7, 103, 105-
Andemon,John, 158, 159, 161, 164, 165 109
Anscombe, G.E.M., 78, 82-84,241 Bolzano, Bernard, 2, 3, 8, 10, 11, 13,43,
anti-clericalism, 4 83,164,206,232
Apel, K.-O., 15 Borst, C.V., 145
Aquinas, Thomas, 238 Brendel, Alfred, 240
Aristotle, 12,60,62,109,241 Brentano, Franz, ix-xii, 1,3,4,6,8-11,
Armstrong, D.M., 126, 135, 138-142, 18,50,55-69,105,154,159,164,
145 165,248
art, 21-28 Bridgman, P.W., 50
Aspekt,22, 102, 103 Brink, David, 201
atomism, 104, 106, 107, 115 Brown, Robert, 159, 164, 165
attitudes, 179, 182, 185, 186; (self- BUhler, Karl, 17,239
directed) 179, 185, 186 Bunge, Mario, 245
Augustine, 118 Burnyeat, Myles, 146
Austin, J.L., 241, 244
Australian philosophy, 125-146 Camus, Albert, 46
Austrian philosophy, ix-xiii, 125-146, Camap, Rudolf, xi, 6, 15, 17,45,47, 50,
147-163 51,154,203-219,230,233,235,245
Avenarius, Richard, 49 Cartwright, Nancy, 99
Ayer,A.J.,4, 18,41, 155,244 Cassam, Quassim, 186
Cassirer, Ernst, 1
Backer, Heirnrad, 240 Castafieda,H.-N., 76,82,84,179-181,
Bacon, Francis, 14, 18 186
Baker, Gordon, 42 Cat, J., 98
Balazs, Bela, 26 Catholicisms, 4,5,8,9, 11, 12, 16
Bar-On, Zvie, 246 Cavell, Stanley, 31, 41, 42
Barone, F., 247 Chalmers, David, 146
Bauer, Otto, 5 characterization problem, 148, 154-157
Baumgartner, Wilhelm, 69 Chisholm, Roderick, xii, 69, 73, 74, 76,
Bayesianism, 225, 226 77,82-84,145,146,179,181,182,
belief, 179-186; (ascription of) 179, 181- 234,242,244-247,249
184; (content and quality of) 177, cogito, 71, 12, 77, 78,80,82
181,185; (de re) 181, 182; (de se) colonization, 153, 161, 162
181,182; (self-directed) 181, 182, color incompatibility, 108, 114
185 commentary, 13, 15
Bergmann, Gustav, xii competitive advantage, 161
269
270 INDEX
Comte, August, 49, 55,60 Evans, Gareth, 179, 186

concep~,55,61,62,66,69 existentialism, 238-240
continental philosophy, 1,2,11,15 explication, 212-215
conventionalism, xi, 88,89,91,97 extensional semantics, 209, 211, 213, 217
Creath,EUchard, 209, 218, 219
culture, 147, 148, 151-153, 158-163 Fabian, R., 248
Feigl, Herbert, 45, 126-135, 143-146,
Dahms, H.-J., 18,45 223,243
Davidson, Donald, 127 Feyerabend, Paul, 2, 48, 126, 144, 146,
de Finetti, Bruno, 225 243,245
dere,76 Fichte, Johann, 10, 12,30,41
de se, 71, 72, 76, 77, 81 film, 22, 24-26
Decleva, Mario, 240 Findlay, J., 247
decon~ction, 168-174 first person, 71-84,177,178,181-183,
deduction, 228-231 186
Delius, Harald, 243 first person pronoun, 71-84,181,182,
demolition of metaphysics, 167, 174 184,187
demonstrative, 74-76 Fleck, Ludwik, 2
denote/express, 184, 185 Fodor, Jerry, 134, 146
Derrida, Jacques, 1, 13, 15-18, 162, 167, Frank, Philipp, xi, 17, 18, 88, 90, 98-100
169,170,172,175 Frege, Gottlob, 10, 11,30,38,41, SO,
Descartes, Rene, 77, 78,87,97,185,242, 109,112,169,180,181,186
243 Freud, Sigmund, 8, 240
Devitt, Michael, 144, 146 Freundlich, Rudolf, 239, 244
durerance, 173, 175
Dilthey, W., 240 Garver, Newton, 42
Drury, M.D'C., 42 Gentzen, Gerhard, 11
Duhem,Pierre, 17, 18,87-101 George, Stephan, 237
Duhem (Quine) Thesis, 87-98 German classicism, 23-25, 27
Dummett, Michael, 186 Gt'rman idealism, 8, 13,29,31
Dupuy, J.P., 174, 175 Gelman philosophy as a whole, 10-12
Durkheim, Emile, 93 Gilli,~s, Donald, 98, 100
Dutch Books, 224-228 Gilson, Etienne, 1
Dvorak, Johann, 3, 17, 18 Girard,R., 172, 175, 176
given, the, 102,.103, 110-119
Eagleton, T., 15 Goddard,Leonard, 159, 165
economics,4,6-8,15 Gombocz, Wolfgang, 69, 246
ego, 71, 78 Godel, Kurt, 6, 17
Ehrenfels, Christian von, 6, 248 Goethe, J.w., 10, 11, 12,23,25,240
Einstein,A1bert,6,7, 17, 104 Gomperz, Heinrich, xi, 8,45,46
eliminative materialism, 126 Good,David, 17, 18
empiricism, x-xiii, 6-8,11-13,55-68,221, Goodman, Nelson, 240
232 Grassl, W., 164, 165
end of philosophy, 167, 174 Griffin,N.,174-176
Engel, Morris, 42 Guttenplan, Samuel, 146
Engel, Pascal, 18
Engels, Friedrich, 13,46 Habermas, Jiirgen, 11, 15
epistemology, naturalistic, 222 Hacker, P.M.S., 31, 41, 42
essence, 115, 116 haecceity, 73, 74
Euclidean geometry, 240 hagiography, 11, 13, 18
INDEX 271
~,F.Wns,vu,4,17,88 illusion, 140-142

Haller, Rudolf, ix-xiii, 1,2,8-11, 13, 14, inconsistenttotaIities, 170, 172-175
16,17,20-24,26,27,29-34,40-42, indetenninacy of translation, 209, 211
45-48,51,53-56,59-69,71,72,74- indexical, 72, 74
77,79,81-84,87,88,98-100,109, indicating/saying, 184, 185
122,155-157,163-165,186,247, individuation, 57-69
249 induction, 221-233
Halperin, David, 18, 19 inexpressibility, 173, 175
Hansel, Ludwig, 41 Ingarden, Roman, 1,46
Harnish, R.M., 246 intensional semantics, 209, 211, 217
Hartmann, Nicolai, 1 intentionality, 71, 72, 76, 77,181,182
Hasenjllger, G., 243 internationalism, 158, 160,164
Hayek. Friedrich, 4, 7, 17 Irigaray,Luce,I,15
Heckmann, Gustav, 244 "if', 77,78,81-83
Hegel, GW.F., ix, 11, 12,30,41,60,
104,170,173,240,241 Jacquette, Dale, 42, 43
Heidegger, Martin, ix, 1, 11-13, 15,21, James, William, 145
22,46,51,167,168,174 Janik. Allan, 42
Helmholtz, Hennann, 17 Janoska, Georg, 239-241
Hempel, Carl, 245, 247 Jeflrey,Richard,235
Herder, J.G., 10, 13,24,25,27,28 John PaullI, 53
Hering, E., 104 Johnston, Mark. 202
Hertz, G., 107-109 Johnston, WIlliam, 29, 41
Hiebert.Erwin, 107, 122 Juhos, Bela, v, 243
Higgins,K., 152, 164, 166
Hilbert. David, 11, 176 Kamenka, E., 158, 159, 165
Hill, Christopher, 145, 146 Kant, ix, 8,10-12,29-43,98,113,169,
Hilpinen, Risto, 246, 247,249 201,240,241,243
Hintikka,Jaako,102, 103, 114, 118, 120- Kantianism, 29-43, 156, 190-201,248
122,243,247 Katz, Jerrold, 83, 84
Hintikka, Merrill, 102, 122 Kaufmann, Felix, 5, 164
history, 45-52 Kerner, Gt~rge, 246
Hofler, Adolf, 6, 248 Keynes, John Maynard, 232, 235
Homer, 24, 25 Kierkegaard, Seren, 239, 240
Honderich, Ted, 146 Kindinger, Hofrat, 242, 24 7
HUbner, A., 247 K1opstock. F.G., 25
HUbner, Lore, 247 knowledge, inductive, 221-233
Hume, David, 30, 33, 39, 42, 49, 177, Kolakowski, Leszek. 49-54
178,189,201,224,231,232 Kolleritsch, Alfred, 240
Humeanism, 189-201,221,225 Korner, Stephan, 246, 247
Hung, Tscha, 247 Kotarbinski, Tadeusz, 49
Husserl,Edmund, 1,6,9-11, 17, 19,46, Kraft, Viktor, X, 5, 45
50,101-122,154,164,174,175,241 Kraus, Oskar, 248
Hyperion, 237 Kraut, Richard, 201
Kripke, Saul, 33, 42, 128, 129, 146
"r', 71-84,175 Kroner, Franz, 240, 249
ideal language, 118 Kuhn, Thomas, 87, 245
idealism, 142-146 KUnne,Wolfgang,186
identity, contingent. 128, 129 Kurz, Heinrich, 28
identity theory, 125-145
272 INDEX
Lacan,Jacques,16 morality, 189-191

Lakatos,Lrrue,52,54 Moore, G.E., 222, 243
Laplace, Pierre-Simon, 232 Mulligan, Kevin, 17, 19
Lauener, H., 247 Munitz, Milton, 146
Lee, Desmond, 114, 117, 122 Musil, Robert, 14
Lehrer, Keith, 246, 247
Leibniz, G.W., 8, 30, 128, 138,237,243 Naess, Arne, 155
Leinfellner, Elisabeth, 247 Nagel, Thomas, 191-201
Leinfellner, Werner, 247 national philosophy, 9, 12-14
Lenin, Vladimir, 46 nativism, 55-64,67-69
Lessing, G.E., 10,23 Natorp, Paul, 30, 41
Lewis, David, 76,145,146,179,181, natural sciences, 55, 60
182,186 Neider, Heinrich, 2, 17
liberalism, 3-8, 17 Nelson, Leonard, 244, 247
Lichtenberg,G.C.,42, 71, 72, 77-79 neo-Kantianism,2943
linguistic philosophy, 32, 35, 36, 3840 Neurath, Otto, xi, xii, 1-19,46,47,87-
linguistic turn, 206 101,245,247-249
Locke, John, 69 Neurath Principle, 87-98
Lockwood, Michael, 145, 146 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 9, 82, 84,237,240
logic, 6-9,11-13,15,17 nominalism, 177, 181, 183-185,241
logic of the supplement, 170-173 noumena-phenomena, 35, 36, 38, 39,41
Lorenzen, P., 243 Nyiri, J.C., 5, 19, 164, 165,246
Lukitcs, Georg, 26, 46
objects, incomplete, 21, 24
Mach, Ernst, X, xi, 2, 5, 7,8,10,14,17, ontophenomenology,238
49,71,72,77,82,84,88-90,94-96, oratio obliqua, 180
99,100,103-110,122,245 origin of entities, 167, 170, 171, 174
Malcolm, Norman, 43, 138, 141, 145, Owen, G.E.I., 241
244
Martin, G., 243 paraconsistent logic, 168, 175
Martin, R.M., 219 paradoxical items, 168-174
Marx, Karl, 13,46,240,241 Pasc:a1's Wager, 223
Marxism, Austro-, 5,6, 8, 13, 17 Passrnore, J., 159, 164-166
Masaryk, Thomas, 2,15 Patzig, G., 243, 245
Mauthner, F., 33,41 Pears, David, 241
Maxwell, Grover, 145 perception, 55-69
McGinn, Colin, 42 Perry, John, 181,186,187
McGuiness, Brian, 241, 246 perspective, 81, 82
meaning postulates, 203-205, 217 phenomenal green, 57-58, 63
Meinong, Alexius, ix-xii, 6, 9, 10,21,24, phenomenalism, 6,103,104,106,109,
154,241,246,247 110,119
Menger, Carl, 7 phenomenology, 101-122,239
Menger, Karl, 2, 5, 7,17,19,45 philosophy of science, 4
Messori, Vittorio, 53 physicalism, xi, 6, 7,12,125-145
metaphilosophy,240 physics, 5, 7,17,104,106-108
Mill, J.S., 8,49,62 Piller, Christian, 224, 235
Minkowski, H., 143 Place, U.T., 126, 135, 137-140, 145, 146
Mises, Ludwig von, 4, 45 Planck, Max, 104
monadology,237 Plato, 8, 10, 62,241
Monk, Ray, 41 pluralism, 147, 149, 153
INDEX 273
pluralism of theories, 240, 241 Rothacker, E., 243

Poincare, J.H., xi, 1, 17,88,90,91 Routiey,R., 165, 166
Polanyi, Michael, 2 Russell, Bertrand, 30, 37,38,41,43,74,
polar-dialectic,238 75,78,79,83,84,103,106,107,109,
politics, 1-18 110,112,119,121,122,145,155,
Pollock, John, 234, 235 161,176,243
Popper, Karl, xi, 2, 4,17,47,48,52,154, Rutte, Heiner, X, 2, 16, 17, 19,45,75,83,
155 84,246
positivism, xi, 3,5,8-10, 17,45-54,239 Ryle, Gilbert, 15,21,22,241-244
Potrc,Matjaz,69
praxeological foundationalism, xiii, 245 Salmon, Wesley, 233
praxeological foundations oflanguage, 32, Sartre, Jean-Paul, 46, 240, 242
40 Sauer, Werner, x, 246, 247
Priest, G., 175, 176 Savage, Leonard J., 225
probability, 224, 225, 232, 233 Scheibe, K., 245
property attribution, 74-77, 81-82 Scheler, Max, 46
prudence, 191-201 Schelling, F.W.J., 30, 41, 60
psychological phenomena, 56, 59, 61, 62 Schiller, 10, 12
Puhl, Klaus, 83, 84 Schlick, Moritz, xi, 2-6, 9, 10, 15, 17,45,
Puntel,L.B., 17, 19 47,109,113,130,143,146,164,239,
Putnam, Hilary, 243, 245 247,248
Schmidt, HA., 243
qualia,126-145 Schmidt-Dengler, Filip, 237, 239, 246
quasi-indicator, 180 scholasticism, 8, 9
Quine, W.V.O., 87, 88, 98,100,121, Schopenhauer, Arthur, 9, 22, 30, 35, 41-
183,186,187,203-219,243,245 43
Quinton, A., 241 Schramm, Alfred, 234, 235
Schroeder, P., 249
Rabus, Filip, 237 Schulemann, GUnther, 52, 54
Radakovic, Konstantiq, 238 Schurz, G-erhard, 224, 234, 235
Radakovic, Theodor,238 Schwarz, Hannes, 240
Rammstedt, 0., 99 science, 1-7" 11-13, 17, 18
Ramsey, Frank, 176 scientific philosophy, X, 45-54,147,150-
rationality, practical, 189-201,223-228 152,164
rationality, theoretical, 223, 225, 228-233 Scotus Eriugena, 242
reference, 71-82 Searle, John, 125, 126, 145
regional philosophy, 9,15,18,147-163 secondary qualities, 139-142
relativism, 240 self, 71, 77, 78,177,178,184,186
Reichenbach, Hans, 50, 155,223,224, self-knowledge, 177, 181
234,235 self-predication, 183, 184
Reinach, A., 1 self-referential paradoxes, 169, 170, 172,
Reininger, Robert, 239 173
reism,62 self-refutation, 167, 173
Rickert, H., 12 sensation, 56-69
Robinson, Howard, 146 sentience, 127, 135,137,138,142,143
Romanticism, 3, 25-27 Sheffer stroke, 109
Rorty, Richard, 126, 144, 146 She~ov,Leo,239,240,244
Rose, Margaret, 159, 164, 165 Shoemake~Sydney,83,84
Rosenberg, Gregg, 145, 146 signs, artificial and natural, 91-93
Rossi-Landi, F., 165 Sihler, Helmut, 241
274 INDEX
Silesius, Angelus, 175 unity of science, 89-93

Silva-Tarouca, Amadeo, 238, 244 University ofGraz, 237
Simmel, G., 92, 93, 98-100 utilitarianism, 7
Smart, J.J.C., 126, l35, l37-140, 145,
146 Vaillinger, Hans, 237
Smith, Barry, v, 17, 19,20, 150, 163-166, van Briessen, Maria, 237
246 van der Zee, Fred, 246
socialism, 2-5, 8, 9,17 van Frassen, Bas, 175, 176
sociology, 88,92,93 Varela,F.J.,174-176
Solomon, Robert., 152, 164, 166 Vienna Circle, vi-vii, 2-9, 11, 15, 18,206,
Sommer,~ed,101,105,122 244
space,57~,67~9 von Ivanka, Endre, 242
Spann, Othmar,4 von Mises, Ludwig, 4, 45
Spencer, Herbert, 48, 62 von Savigny, Eike, 244
Spengler, 0., 87 von Sheuer, Rudolf, 239, 240
Spiegelberg, Herbert, 101, 106, 121, 122 von Wright,G.H.,41,42, 101
Spinoza, Baruch, 10,22 Vuillemin, J., 98,101
Sprigge, T.L.S., 145, 146
Srzednicki, J., 165, 166 Wagner, H., 243
Stadler, Friedrich, 3, 9,17,20,45 Waidacher, Christoph, 226, 227
StegmUUer, Wolfgang, 2, 11, 17,244 Waismann,Friedrich, xi, 5,113,114,
Stibil, Rudolf, 240 122,241
Strawson, P., 174, 176,241 Walzer, Richard, 241
Stumpf, Karl, 6 Wartofsky, Marx, 17, 20
style/substance, 149 Webe~~,92,93
substance, 71,81-83 Weiler, Gershon, 246
Supek, Ivan, 246 Weinberger, Christiane, 246, 247
Sylvan, Richard, 20, 163, 165, 166, 174- Weingartner, Paul, 243, 247
176 Weininger, Otto, 10
Wendelin, Hermann, 239
Tarski, A., 205, 209-219 Whitehead, Alfred North, 109, 164, 166
tautology, 109, 113-115 Winch, P.G., 27
thinking, 177, 185 Windelband, Wilhelm, 30, 41
"tlus", 74, 75, 77,79,82 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, ix-xi, 2,5,6,9,17,
Toeplitz, Jerzy,28 21-7,29-43,45,46,49,50,52,71,72,
T6nnies,Ferdinand, 88, 92, 93, 95-101 74-77,79-81,83,85,101-122,154,
Topitsch, Ernst, 244 155,164,165,167-169,173-175,178,
transcendental reasoning, 31, 38, 39, 41 186,239,241,244,245,247,249
translation, 209-218 Wood, D., 165, 166
true-in-English, 210-215, 217 women's philosophy, 3,15
truth, 2, 3, 13, 15, 16, 18,209-218 world philosophy, 150, 153, 158, 165
Tulving, Endel, 121 Wundt, Wilhelm, 89
Twardowski, Kazimierz, 6
Zarathustra, 237
Uebel, Thomas, 17,45,98,99,101
underdetermination of theory, 91-94

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AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY PAST AND PRESENT

BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHll.,OSOPHY OF SCIENCE

ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University

Editorial Advisory Board

THOMAS F. GLICK, Boston University

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KEITH LEHRER AND JOHANN CHRISTIAN MAREK /

BARRY SMITH / The Neurath-Haller Thesis: Austria and the Rise of

J. C. NYlRI / Haller on Wittgenstein on Art 21

DALE JACQUETTE / Haller on Wittgenstein and Kant 29

JAN WOLENSKI / Haller on Wiener Kreis 45

MA TJAZ POTRC / Haller and Brentano' s Empiricism 55

JOHANN CHRISTIAN MAREK / Haller on the First Person 71

THOMAS E. UEBEL / From the Duhem Thesis to the

JAAKKO HlNTIKKA / The Idea of Phenomenology in Wittgenstein

LEOPOLD STUBENBERG / Austria vs. Australia: Two Versions

RICHARD SYLVAN / Issues is Regional Philosophy:

RICHARD SYLVAN / Metaphysics: De-stroyed or

JOHANNES L. BRANDL / Thinking and Talking About Oneself 177

CHRISTIAN PILLER / Humeanism and Prudence 189

MARIAN DAVID / Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth 203

ALFRED SCHRAMM / Inductive Knowledge 221

RUDOLF HALLER / An Autobiographical Outline 237

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RUDOLF HALLER 251

This book is about Austrian philosophy leading up to the philosophy of

Research Institute and Documentation Center for Austrian Philosophy founded

Meinong. In this way, he makes an important contribution to an understanding

establish what he calls praxeological foundationalism. The epistemological

University ofArizona & Karl-Franzens-UniversiUit, Graz

THE NEURATH-HALLER THESIS:

1. 'THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY'

It will be useful to begin by considering that peculiar creature of the North-

Here, however, it is the fate of philosophy in Austria which is our primary

Or, as Thomas Masaryk expressed it in the words he chose in 1918 as the

looked at everything-ideas as well as facts-ilirough an often distorting lens of socialist

3. TRUTH VS. AGITATION

There is indeed a subtle tension by which the practice of scientific

A similar thesis is defended by Ayer, who encountered the Vienna Circle on

And as Dvorak formulates the matter, citing Neurath:

4. THE LATE FLOWERING OF LffiERALISM

How, then, are we to ~plain the dominance of an analytic, scientific

5. THE NEURATH THESIS

Even when all of this is granted, however, it would still be insufficient to

More importantly, however, an individual, even an individual of

As a Catholic priest Brentano had an understanding for scholasticism; he started directly

Brentano, too, was marked by the Austrian liberalism of the nineteenth

6. THE NEURATH-HALLER THESIS

Brentano was not only sympathetic to the idea of a rigorously scientific

7. PROBLEMS WITH THE NEURATH-HALLER THESIS

Haller's own formulation of what I have called the Neurath-Haller thesis

The thesis, however superficially convincing, is not without its problems.

8. LANGUAGE AND STYLE

The attitude I have in mind, a still widespread attitude of dismissal at the

as Hegel, Heidegger, or Habermas, associated with Germany proper. 18 Most

9. THE SICK MAN OF EUROPE

Perhaps, then, we should reformulate our initial question as to why

Hence, Neurath claims (somewhat over-optimistically), the 'revolt against the

associated with the need for commentaries. They grow up further in a

10. THE LAW OF CONSERVATION OF SPREAD

In analogy with the physicist's law of conservation of matter (and with

be taken seriously in the fields of economics or political theory, then it will