Human Relation Chapter 2

PRELIMINARY TITLE
CHAPTER 2: HUMAN RELATIONS
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 115

Super Summary: Gashem Shookat Baksh courted and proposed marriage to Marilou Gonzales. He forced
Marilou to live with him. Marilou became pregnant and was subjected to threats and maltreatment.
Gashem later on repudiated their marriage agreement saying he was already married. Marilou filed a
case against him seeking damages for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. The trial
court ruled in her favor, the CA affirmed the decision. Gashem filed a petition before the SC claiming
that Article 21 does not apply to the said case. The SC upheld the CA and trial court’s decision, it held
that Article 21 is applicable not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
Doctrine: Article 21: Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Facts:
Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan, courted and proposed marriage to Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22-year-
old, single Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community. Marilou accepted the marriage proposal.
Subsequently, Gashem forced her to live with him. Marilou, who was a virgin before she began living
with Gashem, became pregnant. She was later provided some medicine for abortion by Gashem.
Marilou was subjected to threats and maltreatment by Gashem, who later on repudiated their marriage
agreement, saying that he is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
Marilou sought damages against Gashem for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married.
The trial court ruled in her favor and awarded her moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
Gashem filed an instant petition before the Supreme Court alleging that Article 21 of the Civil Code does
not apply in this case.
Issue/s: WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines?
Ruling:
Article 21 was designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system
envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious
acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills
that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has
greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-American law on torts.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The SC held that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the
private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have
been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress
not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience
about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her
after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
Pantaleon v. American Express International, Inc., G.R. No. 174269, [May 8, 2009], 605 PHIL 631-645
Super Summary: Facts: Polo Pantaleon attempted to make a purchase of a diamond and pendant using
his American Express credit card during a European tour but faced delays in card approval. He canceled
the purchase and later discovered that the delay had caused him embarrassment. He demanded an
apology from American Express (AmEx) but was refused, leading to a damages lawsuit.
Issues:
1. Did AmEx breach its obligations to Pantaleon?
2. Is AmEx liable for damages in favor of Pantaleon?
Ruling:
1. Yes, AmEx breached its obligations. The delay in handling Pantaleon's purchase constituted culpable
delay in addressing customer requests, which was unreasonable.
2. Yes, AmEx is liable for damages. While the credit card relationship typically involves creditor-debtor
dynamics, AmEx should have acted promptly and communicated the delay. Pantaleon is entitled to
damages for the injuries caused by the delay.
The Court granted Pantaleon's petition, reversing the Court of Appeals' decision and holding AmEx liable
for damages.
Doctrine: ARTICLE 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage
Facts: - In 1991, Polo Pantaleon and family joined a Trafalgar Tours European tour.
- During a visit to Coster Diamond House in Amsterdam, Mrs. Pantaleon intended to buy a 2.5 karat
diamond and a pendant, worth $13,826.
- Payment was made using Pantaleon's American Express credit card.
- Sales clerk took card imprint and Pantaleon's signature.
- After 10 minutes, clerk said card wasn't approved; Pantaleon canceled the purchase due to tour
concerns.
- Store manager later said AmEx requested bank references.
- Approval process involved AmEx's Amsterdam and Manila offices; approved at 10:19 AM Amsterdam
time.
- Card was used without delay in the U.S. except for a $1,475 golf equipment purchase (canceled due to
30+ minute delay) and $87 children's shoes (approved after 20 minutes).
- Back in Manila, Pantaleon demanded an apology from AmEx via letter, which was refused.
- Pantaleon filed damages lawsuit in RTC, which ruled in his favor.
- Pantaleon sought increased damages in partial reconsideration, but RTC denied it.
- Court of Appeals reversed decision on appeal, stating AmEx didn't breach obligations.
- Pantaleon argues for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not AmEx had breached its obligations to Pantaleon.
2. Whether or not AmEx is liable for damages in favor of Pantaleon.
Ruling:
First issue: YES
Pantaleon correctly cites the three requisites for default under mora solvendi: the obligation is both
demandable and liquidated, the debtor's performance is delayed, and the creditor demands
performance. The trial court rightly found that AmEx's delay in addressing Pantaleon's Coster purchase
constituted culpable delay in meeting its obligation to promptly handle customer requests, regardless of
approval outcome. While there's no strict timeframe for credit card approvals, an hour seems clearly
unreasonable in this case. If AmEx had promptly approved or disapproved the purchase, this situation
wouldn't have arisen.
Second issue: YES
Generally, the relationship between a credit card provider and its holders entails the creditor-debtor
dynamic. The card company extends credit, and the cardholder repays. This contrasts the usual bank-
depositor relationship. Here, AmEx should have acted promptly, whether to approve or not, for
Pantaleon's purchase. Even if they didn't have enough information, they could have told Pantaleon
about the delay. Pantaleon's entitlement to damages isn't solely due to delay but due to delay-induced
injuries, invoking Article 1170 culpability and Article 2217's compensatory moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SETASIDE.
NOTE:
Mora solvendi deals with the debtor's delay in fulfilling their obligation. It refers to the concept of
default or delay in the performance of an obligation. It refers to the situation where a debtor fails to
fulfill their obligation within the agreed-upon timeframe or within a reasonable period, causing a breach
of contract. In this case, it relates to the delay on the part of the credit card company (AmEx) in
promptly addressing Pantaleon's purchase request.
Mora accipiendi involves the creditor's delay in accepting the debtor's performance.
Cebu Country Club, Inc. v. Elizagaque, G.R. No. 160273, [January 18, 2008], 566 PHIL 65-77
Super Summary: CCCI is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and non-stock private
membership club. Elizagaque, being the senior vp and operations manager, filed with CCCI an
application for proprietary membership, endorsed by 2 members of CCCI. Since it was required for a
member to have a proprietary share the price of which was P 5M, the president of CCCI offered
respondent a share of only P 3.5M. E however, purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for P 3M.
This application was deferred and was disapproved. Three letters for reconsideration were sent to the
BoD to no avail which prompted E to file with the RTC a complaint for damages. RTC ruled in favor of E
and was affirmed by the CA, hence this petition. (It should be mentioned that the By-Laws of the
Corporation provided that his eligibility as member required a unanimous vote from the Board of
Directors. This provision, however, was not included in the application form. It was further revealed that
among the members of the BoD, only one voted his disapproval of the application. This, however, was
not made known to E.)
Doctrine: When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy
for its violation.
Facts:
Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and non-
stock private membership club, in Cebu City. Petitioners herein are members of its Board of Directors.
Respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, San Miguel Corporation’s Senior Vice President and Operations
Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, was designated as a special non-proprietary member. The
designation was thereafter approved by the CCCI’s Board of Directors.
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership, which was endorsed by
CCCI’s two (2) proprietary members, Misa and Ludo.
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5M range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI,
offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however, purchased the share of a
certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary
Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent. During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30,
1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action on respondent’s application for proprietary membership was
deferred, and was subsequently denied. Elizagaque wrote letters of reconsideration in which CCCI did
not reply.
Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed RTC a complaint for damages against
petitioners. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s: WON the petitioners are liable for damages in their disapproval of the respondent’s application
for proprietary membership [YES]
Ruling:
The court ruled in the affirmative.
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the “black ball system” of
voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the
admission of an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as amended,
cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is required. When respondent’s application for
proprietary membership was voted upon during the Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box
contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his application was disapproved. Obviously, the
CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an
application for proprietary membership. But such a right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions, thus:
“Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become
the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy
for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
The petition is DENIED.
Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736, [June 26, 2013], 712 PHIL 337-354
Super Summary:
Doctrine:
Facts:
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaue City a Complaint[5] for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223
and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu; that
respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and
1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners; that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against
petitioners... for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case
No. MAN-5125; that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid
permit and that the said construction would destroy the... wall of its building, which is adjacent to
petitioners' property; that the court, in that case, denied Aldo's application for preliminary injunction for
failure to substantiate its allegations; that, in order to get evidence to... support the said case,
respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec
two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners' property; that respondents, through their employees
and without the consent... of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners' on-going construction; and
that the acts of respondents violate petitioners' right to privacy. Thus, petitioners prayed that
respondents be ordered to remove the video... surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting
illegal surveillance. In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they did not install the
video surveillance cameras, nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners'
construction. They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.
The RTC issued an Order granting the application for a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Respondents were ordered to remove the cameras, they moved for a reconsideration but the RTC
denied the same in its Order
On the other hand, the CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of
discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ:- Right
to privacy of residence under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject
of the controversy is not used as a residence.- respondents are not the owners of the building, they
could not have installed video surveillance cameras.- They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a
separate juridical personality.
Issue/s:
WON the privacy of the Sps Hing were violated.
WON the respondents are proper parties to the suit.
Ruling:
For the first and second issue, the court ruled in the affirmative. Firstly, the right to privacy is the right to
be let alone. The Bill of Rights guarantees the people's right to privacy and protects them against the
State's abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
houses.
No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent
procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes. An individual's right to privacy
under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend
to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. In ascertaining whether
there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This
test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation
has been violated.
Secondly, A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done
to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the
former."
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the
building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras. Such reasoning, however, is
erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in
order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case. During the hearing of
the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the
video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to care, and
thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against
respondents before the RTC. He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute
between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.
With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to be
impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records
show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of
the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The
counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her
questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras. And when
respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the
arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed
and transferred. Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to
merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the
corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we
find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution
dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Unicapital, Inc. v. Consing, Jr., G.R. Nos. 175277, 175285 & 192073, September 11, 2013], 717 PHIL
689-711
Super Summary:
Doctrine: When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.
Facts: This is a joint decision of the Supreme Court on the civil cases originally filed in Pasig RTC (GR Nos.
175277 & 175285) and Makati RTC (GR No. 192073. However, the issue of damages only revolves
around the former case.
Defendant Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz, obtained a loan from Unicapital
amounting to P18,000,000. The same was secured by Promissory Notes and a Real Estate Mortgage over
a land located at Imus, Cavite, registered in her name as per the TCT. Plus Builders, Inc.(PBI), a real
estate company, entered into a joint venture agreement with Unicapital through URI, its estate
development arm. After further negotiations, Dela Cruz decided to sell the property to PBI and
Unicapital and appointed Consing, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact.
Unicapital, through URI, purchased one-half of the subject property (P21,221,500) while PBI bought the
remaining half (P21,047,000). However, certain Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu informed Unicapital
that they are the lawful owners of the subject property and Dela Cruz’s title was a mere forgery. After
further investigation, it was later revealed that Dela Cruz’s title was actually forged (of dubious origin).
This prompted PBI and Unicapital to send separate demand letters to Dela Cruz and Consing, Jr. seeking
the return of the purchase price paid.
Consing, Jr. filed a complaint before the Pasig RTC against the Unicapital and PBI, averring that the
incessant demand efforts made upon him by Unicapital and PBI to return to them the purchase price
they had paid for the subject property constituted harassment and oppression which severely affected
his personal and professional life. Likewise, Unicapital and PBI’s representatives were deliberately
engaged in a fraudulent scheme to compromise Consing Jr.’s honor. On the other hand, the Unicapital
and PBI filed a Motion to Dismiss on Consing Jr.’s complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, considering that there was no document attached to which Consing Jr.’s rights were ascertained
and that the demands were well within their rights as unpaid creditors.
The Pasig RTC ruled in favor of Consing Jr., holding that the latter’s complaint sufficiently stated a cause
of action for tort and damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code. It further stated that where there
is abusive behavior, a complainant has the right to seek refuge from the courts. Unicapital and PBI
moved for reconsideration therefrom but was denied for lack of merit. They elevated the case before
the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. Only Unicapital sought reconsideration therefrom but
the same was denied.
On the other hand, Unicapital and PBI filed a complaint before the Makati RTC for sum of money for
damages against Consing, Jr. and dela Cruz. Consing, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss the civil action but was
denied by the RTC. He filed a Motion for Consolidation with his own complaint filed before the Pasig
RTC. However, his Motion was dismissed as the reliefs sought from Pasig RTC will not bar Unicapital
from pursuing money claims against him. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the lower
court.
Hence, the help of the Court is sought to issue a joint decision on the cases filed involving the same set
of parties and facts.
Issue/s: Whether or not Consing Jr.’s complaint properly states a cause of action which sufficiently bears
out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code.
Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The set of facts may result into the recovery of damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code which
states that:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because it is recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts
in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not
when he acts with negligence or abuse.
Likewise, Consing, Jr.’s complaint states a cause of action for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code
which provides that:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from hisfriends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.
As explained in the case of Manaloto vs. Veloso, the philosophy behind Article 26 underscores the
necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the
human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant
consideration of every plan If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated,
in short, if human personality is not exalted — then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this
article, the rights of persons areamply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.
Records reveal that Consing, Jr., in his complaint, alleged that Unicapital and PBI are speaking of him in a
manner that is inappropriate and libelous; that they have spread their virulent version of events in the
business and financial community such that he has suffered and continues to suffer injury upon his good
name and reputation which, after all, is the most sacred and valuable wealth he possesses — especially
considering that he is an investment banker.
In similar regard, the hypothetical admission of these allegations may result into the recovery of
damages pursuant to Article 26 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, all petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeal’s decision is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Uypitching v. Quiamco, 510 SCRA 172

Super Summary:
Doctrine:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his
right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a
right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.
Facts:
October 1981
A red Honda XL-100 motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Uypitching.
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued
the payments.
September 1982
Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments.
Respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to amicably settle
the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them.
They surrendered to him the same motorcycle earlier being paid in installments by Davalan and a
photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration
but the three accused never came to see him again.
Davalan then told the petitioner Atty Uypitching that the motorcycle had allegedly been taken by the
respondent Quiamco’s men.
January 26, 1991

Petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, took to recover the motorcycle. Petitioner Uypitching
paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
February 18, 1991

Petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law against Quiamco.
Respondent Quiamco moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as he had
neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint.
Respondent then filed an action for damages against petitioner in the RTC of Dumaguete City.
July 30, 1994

The RTC ruled that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he called
respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision
Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner abused his right of recovery as mortgagee(s)
Ruling:
Yes. The manner by which the motorcycle was taken by petitioner Atty Uypitching was not only
attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law.
The act of filing an unfounded complaint was not in accordance with the purpose for which the right to
prosecute a crime was established.
The totality of Atty. Uypitching’s actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and
publicly ridicule Quiamco. Petitioner acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of
respondent
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et.al. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
Super Summary: Respondent Roberto Reyes, an actor aka Amay Bisaya, alleged that he was invited by a
friend to a birthday party at Hotel Nikko. However, he was asked to leave by the hotel's secretary, Ruby
Lim, since he was not on the guest list. Reyes claimed he was humiliated as Lim did this loudly. Reyes
was escorted out by a policeman. Lim admitted asking Reyes to leave when she discovered he was there
uninvited and already at the buffet, but she did so discreetly. Reyes sought damages against Lim and
Hotel Nikko for the embarrassment he felt. Hotel Nikko and Lim contend that they are not liable for
damages following the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria. Can Hotel Nikko and Lim be liable for damages?
HELD: NO, they cannot be liable for damages. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria doesn't apply here
because Hotel Nikko and Lim had a duty to treat Reyes fairly under Articles 19 and 21, even if he
assumed the risk of being asked to leave. Article 19, which deals with the abuse of rights, requires acting
with justice, giving everyone their due, and observing honesty and good faith. When violated, damages
may be sought under Articles 20 or 21.
Finding Lim's testimony more credible, the SC found that Lim had the right to ask Reyes to leave and she
had no intent to humiliate Reyes. Thus, Lim and her employer, Hotel Nikko, cannot be held liable for
damages.
Doctrine: Volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) would not
apply due to obligations of fair treatment under Articles 19 and 21.
Article 19, which deals with the abuse of rights, requires acting with justice, giving everyone their due,
and observing honesty and good faith. When violated, damages may be sought under Articles 20 or 21.
Facts:
Respondent Roberto Reyes, an actor going by the screen name Amay Bisaya, was approached and
invited by his friend Dr Violeta Filart to the birthday party of the manager of Hotel Nikko. Bringing a
basket of fruits with him, Reyes and Dr Filart entered the party held at the hotel's penthouse.
When Reyes lined up at the buffet table, Hotel Nikko's executive secretary Ruby Lim told Reyes to leave
the party since he was uninvited by the celebrant. According to Reyes, Lim did this in a loud voice for
everyone in the party to hear, much to his shame.
When Reyes explained that he was invited by Filart, Filart completely ignored him. A policeman
subsequently came to escort Reyes out of the hotel. Reyes then claimed for P1M actual damages, P1M
moral and/or exemplary damages, and P200,000 attorney's fees due to the shame that he felt.
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Reyes to leave, but not under the shameful circumstances
that Reyes recounted. Lim organized the exclusive guest list of 60 people for the party, and when she
found out that Reyes, who was uninvited, was there, she asked other guests with whom Reyes
interacted to ask Reyes to leave (although she did not ask Filart to do so directly).
When Lim found out that Reyes was already helping himself to the food from the buffet, she then
approached and politely told him to finish his meal and leave the party. But according to Lim, it was
Reyes who started screaming and making a big scene.
Filart's version of the event stated that she never invited Reyes to the party, and that she thought Reyes,
with his basket of fruits, would not be reaching the penthouse with her. When she saw that Reyes was
making a scene, she decided to ignore him.
The RTC dismissed the complaint filed by Reyes against Hotel Nikko, Lim and Filart, giving credence to
Lim's testimony that she was discreet in asking Reyes to leave. Further, the RTC reasoned that Reyes
assumed the risk of being thrown out as he was uninvited.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC's ruling as it believed Reyes' testimony. The CA relied on Article 21
of the Civil Code, that Lim's act of shouting at Reyes to leave was contrary to morals and good customs,
and thus Hotel Nikko and Lim must compensate Reyes for the damages.
Hotel Nikko and Lim contend that they are not liable for damages following the doctrine of volenti non
fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury", aka self-inflicted injury/consent
to injury).
Issue/s: WON Hotel Nikko and Lim are liable for damages?
Ruling:
The SC ruled in the negative.
The doctrine of volenti non injuria does not apply in this case because even if Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave the party, Hotel Nikko and Lim still had the obligation to treat him fairly under
Articles 19 and 21.
However, the SC found Lim's testimony more credible as Reyes himself testified that when Lim asked
him to leave, she was standing very close to him (that would make it unnecessary for her to shout at the
exclusive and posh party).
Thus, the SC held that Lim cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19, 20, and 21.
Neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a
panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.
The SC in an earlier decision explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible." The object of this article is to set
certain standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights and in the performance of
one’s duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.
Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act showing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following:
(1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another.
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.
Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not apply herein as Ms. Lim
was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and
has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
For Articles 19 and 21, the act complained of must be intentional. In this case, Reyes has not shown that
Lim had the intent to humiliate him. The two did not even know each other personally.
Parenthetically, the polite and discreet manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise
acceptable and humane under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is granted. The decision of
the CA is reversed and set aside and the decision of the RTC is affirmed.
Pe v. Pe, 5 SCRA 200

Super Summary:
Doctrine:
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance, Lolita
was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and is the adopted son of a relative of
Lolita’s father. Defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family.
Defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray
the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other. They exchanged love notes with each other
the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they
had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents,
and since then defendant was forbidden from from further seeing Lolita. The affair between defendant
and Lolita continued nonetheless.
On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper
inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. It reads:
“Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date on
the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.”
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
“Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
Issue/s: WON the defendant is liable for damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code
Ruling:
Yes, the defendant is liable for damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code. The circumstances under which
the defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who,
thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with
him.
The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations
Globe Mackay Cable v. CA 176 SCRA 778

Super Summary:
Doctrine:
Facts: Private respondent Tobias was an employee of petitioner GLOBE MACKAY as its purchasing agent
and administrative assistant. Anomalies in the petitioner’s company were later allegedly discovered by
Tobias regarding fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions. Hendry, Executive Vice--
President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY, confronted Tobias stating the latter as the number
one suspect and ordered a one week forced leave.
When Tobias reported for work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry called him a “crook” and a
“swindler.” He was also asked to take a lie-detector test and the specimen of his handwriting, signature,
and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. The
police investigators, however, cleared private respondent from the said anomalies. Later, petitioners
filed criminal complaints for estafa which were all dismissed by the fiscal. Tobias was also terminated by
petitioners from his employment.
Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner
Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed
by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Eventually, private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for
damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.
Issue/s: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent under the Civil Code.
Ruling: YES. Petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
Art. 19 of the Civil Code commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice;; to give everyone his due;; and to observe
honesty and good faith. The Court said that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does
not provide a remedy for its violation. Thus, generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper
In the present case, petitioner Hendry showed belligerence and told private respondent that he was the
number one suspect and to take a 1 week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, and to
leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry). Moreover, the imputation of guilt without basis
and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Hence, petitioners were ordered to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages to private respondent.
University of the East v. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, February 7, 2000

Super Summary:
Doctrine:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Facts: Romeo Jader was a law student at the University of the East from 1984 to 1988. In his first
semester of his fourth year, he failed to take the regular examination in Practice Court I for which he
was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester and on February 1, 1988, he filed
an examination for the removal of his incomplete grade, which was approved by the dean. He took the
examination but was given a grade of 5 (failing).
The dean and the faculty members of the university deliberated as to who among their graduating
students would be allowed to graduate. Jader’s name was in the tentative list of candidates for
graduation. The invitation for the commencement exercises also included his name, but at the foot of
the list, the following was written:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete
requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports.
During the ceremony, Jader’s name was called, and he received a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical
of the law diploma. After graduation, he took a leave of absence without pay from his job to prepare for
the bar examination and enrolled in a pre-bar review class. When he learned the deficiency in his
requirements for graduation, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar exam.
Jader filed a case in the trial court, and the latter granted him the amount of Php35,470 as well as
Php5,000 for attorney’s fees. At the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was upheld, but the
CA added the award for moral damages amounting to Php50,000.
Issue/s:
1. Can the University of the East be held liable for actual damages?
2. Is the university liable to pay Jader moral damages?
Ruling:
1.Yes. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not
wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or
welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for
damages. The university could not just give the grades at any time because law students have a deadline
to meet in the submission of requirements for taking the bar. It was guilty of negligence and for violating
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, which provide
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
2. No. The Supreme Court did not agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that Jader suffered
shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate. It was his duty to verify for
himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. If
respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not
verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before preparing himself
for the bar examination.
The Court affirmed the CA’s decision with modification. It granted Jader the actual damages of
Php35,470 with legal interest of 6 percent per annum computed from the date of the complaint until
fully paid, as well as Php5,000 for attorney’s fees. The award for moral damages, however, was deleted.
Carpio v. Valmonte, G.R. No. 151866 September 09, 2004

Super Summary:
Doctrine:
Facts:
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle de Rosario and Jon Sierra hired
Valmonte for their church wedding. Valmonte went to Manila hotel where she was greeted by the bride
and the family. Among those present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride preparing to
dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went to the restaurant where the reception will be held to pay
suppliers and other preparations for the wedding. Upon returning back to the suite room, everyone
suspiciously stared at her and uttered obnoxious words. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched and
interrogated by police officers. Even Valmonte’s car was searched.
Few days after the incident, Valmonte sent a letter to Carpio demanding an apology to redeem her
smeared reputation, but Carpio did not respond. To which Valmonte filed a suit for damages against
petitioner Carpio.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, and ruled that when the petitioner sought investigation for the
loss of her jewelry, Carpio was merely exercising her right, and if damage results from a person
exercising her legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. The CA ruled differently and opined that
Valmonte was singled out by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. However, the
court finds no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual damages. Hence this petition.
Issue/s: WON respondent Valmonte is entitled to the award of actual and moral damages
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the respondent is entitled to moral damages but not to actual damages.
One of the fundamental precepts is the principle known as “abuse of rights”under Art 19 of CC. To find
existence of an abuse of right, the ff elements must be present:
There is legal right or duty
Which is exercised in bad faith
For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he
acts with prudence and good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
The Court said that the verbal approach of Carpio against respondent Valmonte was uncalled for,
considering by her own account that nobody knew she brought such jewelry in her paper bag. Carpio
had no right to attack Valmonte with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly
accusatory. Petitioner had willfully cause injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals
and good customs.
BDO v. Gomez, G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015

Super Summary:
Doctrine: Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the"abuse of right principle."
Facts: Josephine Gomez was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a certain Colin R.
Harrington opened Savings Account with said branch in January 1985.The following day, Harrington
presented two (2) genuine bank drafts issued by the Bank of New Zealand. The first draft was in the sum
of US$724.57 payable to "C.R.Harrington,"while the second draft was in the sum of US$2,004.76 payable
to "ServantsC/C.R. Harrington.Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate
supervisor, whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to
the savings account of Harrington. When her supervisor answered in the affirmative, Josephine received
the deposit slip.
On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington withdrew the sums of
P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made the
withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington P50,600.00 representing the
amounts of the bank drafts in his name.The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why
no disciplinary action should be taken against her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits.
Josephine reasoned that being a new teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various aspects of the
job. She further alleged that she had asked the approval of her immediate supervisor prior to receiving
the deposits.
The PCIB deducted the amount of P-423.38 from Josephine's salary. Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask
why the deduction was made.After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another
memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and liable for performing acts in violation of
established operating procedures. The memorandum required Josephine to pay the amount of P-
50,600.00 through deductions in her salary,allowance, bonuses, and profit sharing until the amount is
fully paid.Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings that she was grossly negligent and
liable to pay the amount of P50,600.00.
During trial, the RTC found that the PCIB did not even respond to this letter. PCIB, however, alleged that
it had replied to Josephine's letter, and explained that she was afforded due process and the deductions
were merely a withholding pending the investigation.
On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction
before the RTC of Makati City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by gradually deducting
from her salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Josephine and ordered the PCIB to pay her actual damages
The RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the salary and allowance of Josephine as
having been rendered in bad faith and contrary to morals, good custom, and public policy.The CA
affirmed the RTC decision.
PCIB went to the Supreme Court contending that the CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions were in
total and wanton disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily
imputed bad faith on how it had treated Josephine
Issue/s: Whether or not Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code were violated.
Ruling: No
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the"abuse of right principle."
The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code.
Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code
and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of
negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly and illegally. In this case, the PCIB made deductions
on Josephine's salary even if the investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a
memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank
erroneously paid to Harrington's impostor.When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the
finding of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions
on Josephine's salary, allowances, and bonuses.WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED
Coca-Cola v. Spouses Bernardo, G.R. No. 190667, November 07, 2016
Super Summary:
Doctrine:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the
use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method
shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
Facts:
This case is a Petition for Review filed by Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines Inc.
Sps. Bernardo were distributors of Coca-Cola products in their business “Jolly Beverage Enterprises”
from 1987-1999. Both parties agreed that the petitioner will extend cash assistance and trade discount
incentives to the respondent while the latter will: (1) sell the petitioner’s product exclusively, (2) meet
the sales quota of 7,000 cases/month, and (3) assist the petitioner in its marketing efforts. Prior to the
expiration of their contract, Coca-cola required Sps. Bernardo a list of their customers as the former
would formulate a policy defining the territorial dealership in Quezon city, and for the renewal of their
contract to which Sps. Bernardo complied, however such contract was not renewed.
It was later found out that:
the petitioner started to reach out to those who were on the list;
that the respondents’ delivery trucks were being trailed by the petitioner’s agents that as soon as the
trucks left, the latter would approach the customers;
The petitioner employed a different pricing scheme, that the price given to the distributors are higher
than what is given to supermarkets;
Petitioners also also enticed direct buyers and sari-sari store owners in the area with its "Coke Alok"
promo, in which it gave away one free bottle for every case purchased; and
further engaged a store adjacent to respondents' warehouse to sell the former's products at a
substantially lower price.
Sps. Bernardo filed a Complaint for damages alleging the acts of petitioner constituted dishonesty, bad
faith, gross negligence, fraud and unfair competition in commercial enterprise. The petitioners denied
the allegations stating that it had obtained the list through surveys, and promotional activities were only
implemented after the expiration of their contract. The RTC held the petitioner liable for damages for
abuse of rights in violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 and for unfair competition in Art. 28. Hence, this
petition.
Issue/s: WON the petitioner violated Articles 19, 20, 21, and 28 of the Civil code (YES)
Ruling:
This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what the appellant did in order to take over the market:
directly sell its products to or deal them off to competing stores at a price substantially lower than those
imposed on its wholesalers.
It must be emphasized that the petitioner is not only a beverage giant, but also the manufacturer of the
products; hence, it sets the price. In addition, it took advantage of the information provided by
respondents to facilitate its takeover of the latter's usual business area.
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party
who suffers damage whenever another person commits an act in violation of some legal provision; or an
act which, though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain
rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved. Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed
business methods resulting in unfair competition also gives a right of action to the injured party.
Villalva v. RCBC Savings Bank, G.R. No. 165661, August 28, 2006
Super Summary: Spouses Villalva bought a car from Toyota — they issued checks as payment
installment, they secured a chattel mortgage in favor of Toyota and both (promissory notes and chattel
mortgage) were assigned to RCBC. Under the mortgage, they are to insure the car. In 1997, they failed
to deliver a copy of the insurance policy to RCBC (but they complied prior to this). Because of this, RCBC
had the car insured and the bank paid the premium, but that was cancelled since the spouses did have
the insurance policy already, they just failed to deliver a copy to RCBC. RCBC demands payment from the
spouses and claims they were unjustly enriched on account of the payment it made to the insurance
company. The Court ruled that they were not unjustly enriched, they were already paying the insurance
and were never in default of their payment. RCBC did not have to pay for the insurance premium since
they were not in default anyway.
Doctrine: Unjust Enrichment – Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so
long as it is appreciable in money—it may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other
indispensable reductions in the patrimony of a person, as well as the prevention of a loss or injury.
Facts: Petitioner spouses Villalva issued 48 checks (P547,392.00) to cover installment payments due on
promissory notes secured by a Chattel Mortgage executed in favor of Toyota for the purchase of a
Toyota Corolla. Under the Chattel Mortgage, Spouses Villalva were to insure the vehicle against loss or
damage by accident, theft and fire, and endorse and deliver the policies to the mortgagor. The
promissory notes and chattel mortgage were assigned to respondent RCBC.
The spouses were able to comply with the mortgage requirement on insurance until 1996. In 1997, they
failed to deliver a copy of the insurance policy to RCBC. As a consequence, RCBC had the mortgaged
vehicle insured and paid P14,523.00 insurance premium, which was later cancelled due to the insurance
policy obtained by the spouses. RCBC was then reimbursed with P10,939.86 by the insurance company.
In 1999, RCBC sent a letter of demand to the spouses amounting to P12,361.02 allegedly for unpaid
obligations on the mortgage and demanded that the spouses surrender the vehicle. The spouses ignored
the demand letter on the ground that they have fully paid their obligations. The remaining amount was
due to the insurance obtained by RCBC.
RCBC filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Replevin. The MTC and RTC ruled in favor of the
spouses, however the CA reversed the decision and ordered the petitioners to pay the difference
between the premium paid by RCBC against what they were able to reimburse from the insurance
company. The MR was dismissed by the CA, hence the petition for review.
Issue/s: WON Spouses Villalva were unjustly enriched when RCBC obtained insurance coverage for the
mortgaged vehicle under Art. 22 of the NCC. –NO (there is no unjust enrichment)
Ruling: The key issue is whether petitioners failed to comply with their obligation to insure the subject
vehicle under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The Supreme Court held that petitioners did not default in
the performance of their obligation. Meaning that the condition sine qua non for RCBC to exercise its
right to pay the insurance premium over the car has not been established.
As a rule, demand is required before a party may be considered in default. Demand by a creditor is not
necessary in order that delay may exist: (1) when the obligation or the law expressly so declares; (2)
when from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the
time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the
establishment of the contract; or (3) when demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered
it beyond his power to perform. None of the exceptions are present in this case
RCBC further contends that its payment of the insurance premiums on behalf of the spouses unjustly
enriched the latter. Respondent RCBC adverts to the provisions on quasi-contractual obligations in the
Civil Code.
RCBC’s payment of the insurance premiums on behalf of Spouses Villalva did not unjustly enrich the
latter. Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable
in money. It may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable reductions in the
patrimony of a person. It may also include the prevention of a loss or injury.
In this case, Spouses Villalva were not enriched when RCBC obtained insurance coverage for the
mortgaged Toyota Corolla as the spouses had already obtained the required insurance coverage for it.
Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013
Super Summary:
Doctrine:
Facts:
James Walter Capili, the petitioner, faced a bigamy charge due to his prior legal marriage to Karla Y.
Medina-Capili and without his marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled. He contracted a
second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo before the RTC of Pasig.
The Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-
Capili; that in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the
charge of bigamy; and the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage
serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case. It was granted.
The RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage
contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning. Thus, the
petitioner filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private
respondent had already been declared void by the RTC. It was granted but was reversed in Court of
Appeals upon proper appeal
Issue/s:
WON the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of
the criminal case for bigamy.
Ruling:
NO. The subsequent judicial declaration that the petitioner's second marriage was bigamous in nature
does not preclude the prosecution of the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
This principle aligns with the precedent set in the case of Jarillo v. People, where the court affirmed the
conviction for bigamy. The court's rationale is that bigamy is committed at the moment a person enters
into a subsequent marriage without the previous one having been legally declared null and void.
The outcome of the civil case seeking the annulment of the petitioner's marriage to the private
complainant does not affect the determination of the petitioner's guilt or innocence in the criminal
bigamy case. The key factor for a bigamy charge to stand is the existence of a valid first marriage at the
time of contracting the second marriage. According to the law, a marriage, even if it may ultimately be
deemed void or voidable, is considered valid until a competent court declares it otherwise through a
judicial proceeding.
It's crucial to emphasize that individuals cannot unilaterally decide the nullity of their marriage; this
determination must be made by the appropriate legal authorities. Only when a court officially declares
the marriage as void can it be legally considered as such. Therefore, anyone who enters into a second
marriage before such a declaration assumes the risk of facing prosecution for bigamy.
In this specific case, even if the petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was
void from the beginning, both the first and second marriages were in existence before the annulment of
the first marriage. Consequently, it is evident that the crime of bigamy was committed by the petitioner
when he contracted the second marriage with the private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the petitioner's second marriage does not prevent the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
Pimentel v. People, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010

Super Summary:
Doctrine:
Facts: On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC of Antipolo City for the pre-
trial and trial of Civil Case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case
would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled
that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the
commission of the crime of parricide. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of
marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent
would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.
Issue/s: WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case of
frustrated parricide. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal
case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent. Thus, the petition was denied.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Doctrine: There was no mention of Civil code provision in the case. This will fall under Article 36 -
Prejudicial questions.
Facts: Tenebro married Ancajas (complainant) on April 10, 1990. A year after their marriage, Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he was previously married to a certain Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Invoking
this previous marriage, Tenebro left Ancajas stating that he wanted to cohabit with Villareyes.
Subsequently, on January 25,1993, Tenebro again contracted another marriage with Villegas. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she then filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against Tenebro.
During trial, Tenebro admitted having married to Villareyes. However, he denied that he and Villareyes
were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place. He alleged that he
signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with
his work as a seaman. The trial court found him guilty of bigamy.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. In his petition for review to the SC, Tenebro presents
a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2)
argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. Hence, petitioner argues
that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.
Issue/s: Whether or not Tenebro may still be convicted for the crime of bigamy despite the subsequent
judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
Ruling:
Yes, Tenebro may still be convicted of Bigamy. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere
act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED in
toto.
Te v. CA, 346 SCRA 327

Super Summary:
Private respondent filed with the RTC a criminal case of bigamy against petitioner and an administrative
case filed with the PRC Board for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license, while petitioner filed a
civil case for annulment of marriage with private respondent.
Petitioner filed with the PRC Board a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the
pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for
bigamy, which the board denied.
Petitioner now raises the issue with the court claiming to suspend the other legal proceedings in view of
the pendency of the civil case on the ground of a prejudicial question.
Doctrine:
Pendency of a civil case for annulment of marriage does not give rise to a prejudicial question which
warrants the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy if at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
Article 40 of the Family Code states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked
for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus,
under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Facts:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites. They did not live
together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private
respondent gave birth to a girl, petitioner stopped visiting her.
Less than two years after, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner
contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime after, when she learned
about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to
private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent
concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
Private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case
against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground
that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite
their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private
respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of
falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single.
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative
case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings
therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent
and criminal case for bigamy in the RTC of Quezon City.
When the Board denied the said motion, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for
certiorari
The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of petitioner’s motion and find that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings
in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no
prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the
other action involved is a civil case.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the
same was denied.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition.
Issue/s:
WON the legal [criminal and administrative] proceedings should be suspended in view of the pendency
of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Ruling:
No.
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would
necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to
private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could
continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him
from criminal liability, is untenable.
The ruling in People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The
prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of
petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is
void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage
to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime,
their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative
proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a
civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is
administrative and the other is civil.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Mercado v. Tan, 337 SCRA 122
Super Summary:
Doctrine:
Facts:
Vincent G. Mercado, while still being married to Thelma Oliva, contracted another marriage with Ma.
Consuelo Tan.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the
City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before
this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s
Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-
Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Despite this, the Trial Court charged Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting at
the time he had contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court. The petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and assailed the decision of the CA. Under Article 40 of the
Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment
declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second
marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what
constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent
marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage before contracting the second marriage.
Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004
Super Summary:
Doctrine:
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a
period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In
1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the
Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was
granted by the court.
Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio then filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
He was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. Morigo pleaded
not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio.
Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
Issue/s: WON the marriage of Lucio Morigo with Lucia Barrete was not valid in order for him to be
exculpated from his bigamy case.
Ruling: The marriage with Lucia Barrete was not valid. Article 6 of the New Civil Code provides that:
“No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the
contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. x x x
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia
by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the
two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the
Family Code.
As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, “This simply means that there was
no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage.
In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first
marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the
eyes of the law, never married.”
Pahang v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil, G.R. No. 148595 July 12, 2004
Super Summary: Petitioners Sps Pahang obtained a loan with respondent Metrobank and was secured
by a real estate mortgage on a parcel od land. Petitioners failed to pay their obligation resulting in
foreclosure of the property mortgaged. Metrobank was the highest bidder and after 1 year of expiration
of period to redeem, registered the land in its name and filed a writ of possession. Petitioners, on the
other hand, filed an injunctive relief and an alternative relief to redeem the property after
determination of exact obligations. The RTC granted the writ of possession so the petitioners alleged
that it committed grave abuse of discretion by not acknowledging the existence of prejudicial question
in both cases filed by the parties. The SC ruled that there is no prejudicial question.
Doctrine: A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
Facts: In 1996, the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term loan of
P1,500,000.00 from the respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (MBTC) payable on December
27, 1996. The loan was covered by Non-Negotiable Promissory Note and was, likewise, secured by a real
estate mortgage on a parcel of land covered by a TCT. As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the
respondent foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially. As a consequence, the mortgaged
property was sold at public auction on January 8, 1998 to the respondent bank as the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale was executed by the Sheriff in favor of the respondent on January 14, 1998 and was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City on January 27, 1998.
On December, 1998, respondent wrote the petitioners that the one-year redemption period would
expire on January 27, 1999. Instead of redeeming the property, the petitioners filed, on January 19,
1999, a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale against the respondent bank and the Sheriff.
Petitioners prayed for injunctive relief, likewise the alternative reliefs to declare the foreclosure on the
subject property as null and void, and to allow the plaintiffs to pay the same; as alternative prayer, to
allow the plaintiffs to redeem the subject real property based on the amount determined and
established as true and exact obligation of plaintiffs to defendant bank.
After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the respondent consolidated its ownership over
the foreclosed property was issued a TCT by the Register of Deeds in its name for the auctioned
property. On July 23, 1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Possession before the RTC of
Mandaue City .
Petitioners, citing the ruling of this Court in Belisario v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, opposed the
petition on the ground that the core issue in their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 constituted a
prejudicial question, which warranted a suspension of the proceedings before the court. They averred
that the filing of their complaint within the period to redeem the foreclosed property was equivalent to
an offer to redeem the same, and had the effect of preserving such right since they prayed for the
redemption of the same in their alternative remedy..
Issue/s: Whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of
extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial question to the petition of the respondent bank for the issuance of a
writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3.
Ruling: NO. There is no prejudicia question in this case.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into
play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action
and the respondent’s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3 is but an incident
in the land registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the
two actions.
The focal issue in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent bank and the sale of their property at
public auction are null and void, whereas, the issue in LRC Case No. 3 was whether the respondent bank
was entitled to the possession of the property after the statutory period for redemption had lapsed and
title was issued.

Human Relation Chapter 2

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PRELIMINARY TITLE

CHAPTER 2: HUMAN RELATIONS

Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 115

The petition is DENIED.

Uypitching v. Quiamco, 510 SCRA 172

January 26, 1991

February 18, 1991

July 30, 1994

Pe v. Pe, 5 SCRA 200

Globe Mackay Cable v. CA 176 SCRA 778

University of the East v. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, February 7, 2000

Carpio v. Valmonte, G.R. No. 151866 September 09, 2004

BDO v. Gomez, G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015

Pimentel v. People, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Te v. CA, 346 SCRA 327

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

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