Mod2 Irse Study Pack Mod2 PJW 080326final

IRSE Examination Resource Pack 10/05/2016 Module 2
IRSE Examination - Module 2

“Signalling the Layout” Student Resource Study Pack
Index
1. Introduction to the Study Pack
• Aims of IRSE exam and Study Pack
• Recognising that Railway Signalling has Commonality yet also Diversity
• Suggested use
• Structure of Study Pack
• Reminders whilst Studying
• Summary: Feedback request and Acknowledgements / over to you
2. Module Scope and Content- (i.e. what elements of signal engineering does this module cover)
3. Exam Format- (i.e. brief overview of what confronts the candidate at the examination itself)
4. Exam Elements- (i.e. syllabus detail: how the Study Topics relate to the examination activities)
5. Overview of Preparation Activities Required
• Domain Knowledge, Basic Reading,
• Obtaining Help
• Detailed Study: Basic Concepts, Applying to specific situations
• Practicing for exam, Examination Technique
• Final exam Readiness
6.Selected Study Topics: Tables of references: Standard Topics, Special Topics
• Purpose of Signalling / Role of Signals / Train Separation
• Braking / Warning the driver / Aspect Sequence / Overbraking / Regular Spacing
• Plating signals and degraded mode,
• Capacity
• Protecting the Junctions / Standage / Parallelism,
• Provision of Overlap: role / length / locking / sharing / maximum distances
• Signals at stations and level crossings, Undesirable positions for signals,
• Non-running Lines: sidings, loops
• Train Detection Sections
• Points: numbering, lie, definition of Normal, multiple ends, split detection
• Single Lines, Bi-Directional / Reversible
• Review, Compare
7. Practical Approach to the Examination

• Introduction / Read the Question Paper / Read the Plan Notes / State Practice Adopted
• Determining Braking Distance and Headway
• Placing Signals on the Layout: Signal Spacing / Protecting Junctions
• where to start / optimising the layout / adding symbol detail
• Defining the Route Boxes
• Dividing layout into Train Detection Sections
• Identifying point ends and their lie
March 2008 edition 1

APPENDICES
PAST PAPER INFORMATION
Appendix A Question Papers- overview; typical, examiner feedback, answers: good and bad
Appendix B Past Layouts 1- Mainline: index, layout review, 2005 commentary
Appendix C Past Layouts 2- Metro: index
Appendix D Past Layouts 3 IRSE Module 3 layouts comparisons
intro, learning from, index
Appendix E Examination” key words”
Exam Misc. Interpreting the wording of the questions.
SUPPORTING BACK GROUND KNOWLEDGE (generally based on NR practice)
Appendix F Introduction to train braking
Appendix G Braking Curves and Tables, comparisons, Braking calculations, Effect of gradient,
Braking, Headway Constant Speed Headway. Non-stop Calculations. Equations (stop/distant, 3, 4).
and Capacity DGR methodology Capacity. Comparison 3 and 4 aspects; benefits.
Intermixing 3 and 4 aspects. Distance-time curves. Stopping headway.
Capacity equations. 1998 calculations
Appendix H not available in 2008 edition
Appendix J varieties, proving clearance, track joints, Flank Protection, Trapping
Pointwork
Appendix K head-on risk, establishing directional control, appropriate train detection,
Single Lines islands of signalling, direction control methods, MAS alternatives, points operation.
Appendix L non-running lines, stabling sidings, loops, main line interface with depots,
Yards and Depots signalling off running line, signalling of yards & depots
STEP-BY-STEP GUIDES
Appendix M Signalling the layout step by step: Metro
M1 London Underground
Appendix N Signalling the layout step by step: Mainline
N1 Network Rail practice N2 Terminal stations- specifics
Appendix P Signalling the layout step by step: Transmission Based
P1 ETCS Level 2 initial draft only in 2008 edition
INFORMATION RELATING TO SPECIFIC PRACTICE [NR]
Appendix S Aspect Sequence; 3, 4, transitions, BR charts, questions only partially complete
Appendix T Route Boxes, ID plates, Junction signals: MAR, MAY in 2008 edition
Appendix U Train Protection (TPWS etc) not available in 2008 edition
Appendix V ETCS not available in 2008 edition
REVISION INFORMATION
Appendix W Revision Activities including headway, layout, 1998 calcs, 2006 layout critique
Appendix X Sample extracts of actual Plans etc
REFERENCE INFORMATION
Appendix Y External Resources for further study
RG Standards UK Railway Group Standards
NR Standards NR Standards and Specifications
Books Publicly available books
IRSE Publications IRSE Technical Papers and Internal Publications
Weblinks Internet resources
Appendix Z Abbreviations with summary explanation: [A, E, I, O, U]

1 Introduction to this Study Pack

1.1 Aim of the Examination
The IRSE Examination has the twin aims of assessing all candidates’ breadth of understanding of
the range of railway signalling engineering and providing the means of identifying particularly
outstanding entrants to the profession.
The reason for requiring candidates to achieve a pass in four different modules is to ensure a
sufficient breadth of understanding of the whole profession, not just having detailed knowledge
within just a few areas in which they may have the majority of their experience. The Syllabus
defines the aim and content of Module 2 as:
The primary aim of the module is to ensure that the student can signal a layout for a variety
of different traffic patterns and equipment systems in a professional and cost effective
manner, taking into account the constraints of the layout and safety requirements.
The student also needs to demonstrate a professional understanding of the integration of the
equipment and sub-systems used to form the complete signalling system.
Students may choose between a main line plan or a rapid transit (metro) plan, to best suit
their knowledge and experience.
1.2 Aim of the Study Pack

The aim of this Student Resource Pack is to assist those studying for the examination, whether as
an individual studying alone or within a study group.
• Do not assume that it is a text book having all the content that might be needed to tackle the
examination.
• It does however attempt to explain content of the examination, provide guidance how to
prepare for it, to provoke thought and suggest the location of suitable source material for
additional study.
• Students should also expect to study the details of the technical and operational
documentation pertinent to their selected railway (be aware that even a single railway
administration may have a range of standards- see section 4).
• The main text in this Study Pack has been made as generic as possible, with specific
information relating to the UK Mainline included within various Appendices. The decision
to structure it in this manner reflects:
1. whilst most examination candidates are indeed from this background or at least have
some experience working for it, many are not,
2. inclusion of the detail of a specific railway’s solution actually enables candidates from
other backgrounds to judge the level of detail expected when acquiring the equivalent
information of other signalling practices,
3. certain engineers wishing to undertake the IRSE examination may not have much
knowledge of any particular railway’s application principles; their field of expertise may
be in equipment design / manufacture or managing maintenance activities for example.
Recognising that such students may experience difficulty in obtaining suitable
information but that it is not important which railway’s practices are adopted, the
relevant Appendices do provide a basis on which to answer which can also be
supplemented by information freely available on the internet (see Appendix Y),
4. the hope that in time other countries / railway administrations will also produce specific
Appendixes reflecting their application (both technical standards and operation practices
and procedures).
1.3 Recognising that Railway Signalling has Commonality but also Diversity
Students fresh from an educational background frequently expect there to be a “set textbook” on
which any examination is based. It must be remembered however that professional competence is
about more than studying a book for the purposes of passing an examination.
There certainly is no one “Railway Signalling text book”; it would be virtually impossible to write
such a document and would certainly be impossible to keep it updated. Different railways operate
in different environments: geographic, traffic demands and cultural so different practices can be
appropriate. A railway system has to work as an entity and is often large and with long lived
assets, thus whilst parts of it are changed, this generally has to be in a way that respects the
technical and human elements of the remainder. Hence evolution over history can also be an
important influence on why a railway operates as it does currently.
Historically standards generally evolved only slowly over decades and equipment was very long
lived. Currently the pace of technology change is such that new ways of achieving a high level
objective become possible much more rapidly, but also the lifetime over which equipment can be
economically supported is reducing. This means there are more generations of different
technological solutions which need to co-exist.
In addition the increasingly international competitive market has led to many railways needing to
adopt slightly different standards for various parts of their network, depending not only on the
level of traffic and general environment, but also the particular manufacturer of its equipment as
well as being dependent upon the vintage of installation.
• The London Underground for example consists of a substantial mileage of surface railway,
generally at the extremities of lines that are either just sub-surface or alternatively are deep
tube lines. It has examples of interlocking technology from mechanical, through electrical,
to various generations of software. The situation is made more complex because the current
major upgrade works are split between two very different suppliers. It is inevitable that no
one standard applies to the entire network, yet there does need to be a certain commonality
since, although the lines generally operate largely independently of each other, some inter-
working is needed and staff can transfer from one line to another.
• On the mainline whereas certain fleets of trains and drivers are often “captive” to a certain
quite restricted area or line, there are other trains and drivers which need to operate
extensively throughout the network. Consistency of presentation to the driver is therefore an
important consideration; however there are differences and it is essential that the driver is
made aware when such a change is particularly significant to how they drive their train. In
the UK the system of signalling may be one of many types (AB, ETB, NSTR, TCB for
example) and a different set of operating rules is needed for each scenario. Indeed one of the
primary aims of ERTMS is to harmonise operating rules as well as the technical train control
system across national borders
A wide experience is obviously important to being able to comprehend what are the common
threads and what is a specific application detail. It is appreciated that the newcomer to the
industry can find the various differences between systems and nomenclature apparently
inconsistent and confusing. It is generally best to concentrate initially on studying the detail of
one specific solution, but whilst doing so trying to see where this fits into the generic overall
picture. Individual railways obviously concentrate on publishing their specific and often
prescriptive standards; the main role of this IRSE Study Pack is to aid the inexperienced student in
obtaining a high-level overview in order to understand more deeply the more generic issues.
Always remember that, as in so much other engineering, there always needs to be compromises
between different considerations; signal engineering is often said to be “as much an art as a
science”- there is no one right answer, but plenty of wrong ones to avoid!

1.4 Use of this Study Pack

Firstly do not assume that mere reading this Study Pack will be sufficient by itself to obtain a
good mark in the examination; more detailed information and understanding is required. The aim
is to provide enough information to give the student a good basic overview and then encourage
wider reading to discover further information and even more importantly encourage actual
PRACTICE at performing the exam activities.
• It is intended that this Study Pack is read and used (at least initially) in section order; the
structure is explained in section 1.5.
• To aid the student, hyperlinks are included to the relevant Appendices from places in the
main text where such a diversion may be appropriate (needs Word 2003 or later).
• Similarly hyperlinked cross references to other sections of the pack are implemented.
• In particular where an abbreviation is used, clicking on it will jump to the relevant entry
within Appendix Z where a brief explanation is included for the benefit of those unfamiliar
with the term.
Hence there is a certain advantage in utilising the Study Pack on a computer rather than in paper
form, though it is appreciated that this medium also has much to commend it and thus it may be
the optimum to use both in combination. This has been assumed in the compilation of this Study
Pack; for example no index has been provided, given that electronic word searches are so easy for
the user to perform. Do note however that the tables in sections 6.4, 6.5 do act as a detailed
contents list for the technical material included within it.
Whereas wide reading is an important part of the preparation for the exam, the real essential is
actually to attempt to put that knowledge into practice. The past papers and other suggested
exercises are included with the strong recommendation that they are performed; you might think
that you understand something having read it, but the way to find out is actually to try it.
The amount of time needed to prepare for the examination very much depends upon the
individual- their initial level of training, experience, aptitude and the degree of support they can
obtain from others. Some candidates attempt to sit the IRSE examination within two years of
having entered the profession; this is certainly possible provided that this period has been filled
with a mixture of technical training courses and widespread, if limited, real experience. Others,
particularly those without the advantage of such a structured training scheme, decide to sit the
examinations after having been in the industry for 5 years or more with perhaps a lot of experience
in certain elements but very little exposure to other facets; clearly the studying required in each
case is very different. Since the content of a Module 2 exam is clearly defined it is one for which a
student can effectively prepare themselves with confidence; hence many find that it is a good one
with which to start, perhaps before the demands of a young family intervene.
In all cases however the commitment entailed should not be underestimated; it is certainly not
something to be tackled in 6 weeks prior to the examination. As an indication, many students find
that attempting two modules in any one year is a significant effort and requires a study of some 5 -
10 hours a week between January (when the review session of the previous year’s exam is held)
and the exam date (which is usually at the beginning of October).
In the UK there tend to be more distractions from studying during the summer months and
therefore it is a good plan to attempt to have initially covered the content by June. Performing a
form of mock exam (but perhaps with more generous time limits) at this date gives a view of how
much more there is to learn / how much quicker there is a need to be. Get it checked or at least use
the self-check tick sheet in Appendix W to see how you performed. If appropriate, a slight respite
from studying can then be taken and so the task can be approached again with fresh enthusiasm in
the final period approaching the examination. A mock exam paper under strict examination
conditions approximately one month before the real thing is strongly recommended.
1.5 Structure of this Study Pack

The table below gives an overview of the contents which have been included:
Section 2 first puts the task of Signalling The Layout into context within the railway signalling
profession and then explains the scope of the broad range of subjects that should be
studied for module 2.
Section 2.43 focuses upon explaining the format of the paper itself which will confront the candidate
at the examination in order to “set the scene” for the culmination of the studying process
Section 4 gives more detail of the examination syllabus, those elements that support the combined
activity of Signalling the Layout and thus suggests the particular topics with which a
student should ensure they are fully familiar. Regard this as the “big picture” that gives a
high-level description of the really important issues; it won’t help you immediately but it
will show where you are heading within your studying.
It is useful to return to this section at times within the learning process so that you can
assess your progress; it ought to make more sense later and should enable you to prioritise
if you are becoming overwhelmed in the detail and can’t tell what are the most important
issues.
Section 5 takes an overview of the whole studying process.
It gives examples of ways in which the student can address the important task of widening
their general railway knowledge to become sufficiently familiar with the railway
environment: factors relevant to other railway engineering disciplines, the planning of
train services, the resources and infrastructure they require and how the railway is
operated on a day-to-day basis. This includes extensive reading; Appendix Y considers
some publications and additional resources that are potentially available to assist.
It then recommends working through the study material included in section 6 to
understand the relevant technical considerations before progressing to section 7 which
considers the actual tasks to be undertaken when sitting the examination.
It concludes by giving some advice relating to final examination preparedness.
Section 6 is a miscellany of particular Study Topics to explain some of the relevant theory and
background for increasing domain knowledge particularly relevant to the tasks to be
undertaken for this module.
• For those subject areas where there is published literature covering the breadth
required and is sufficiently general and up to date, this source is simply referenced
from the relevant tables for the student to study separately.
• Where such a reference could not be readily identified, the aim has been to
produce a summary of the subject to be included directly within the section.
Although a useful coverage has been achieved in this manner, this section should not be
regarded as fully comprehensive; comparison with section 2 will reveal other topics
(particularly general railway domain knowledge) the student should be familiar
This section has been written as generically as possible so that it is not aligned to the
practices of any one railway which do differ one from one another. Indeed one of the
fascinations of railway signalling is that each site on one railway can be unique; whereas
the same underlying considerations are relevant, the various factors have different
importance depending on the context and thus the optimum solution will be different.
This is why it is important to comprehend the issues and how they interrelate; helping the
student to acquire this understanding is the prime purpose of this section of the Study
Pack. It has however not always been possible to illustrate the issue adequately without
the detail of a specific example; these generally follow UK mainline practice.
Particularly specific information has been confined to the Appendices so you may wish to
read the relevant one in conjunction with certain of the sub-sections contained here; for
example Appendix G (braking / headway) should probably be studied early on..
It is appreciated that some students want the simplicity of being presented with “one
solution” but that is to miss the whole point; however section 7 does go someway towards
clarifying examiner expectations that may prove helpful to give a baseline.
Section 7 gives a practical approach to tackling “Signalling the Layout” under exam conditions.
The technical tasks are described only at a summary level in order to keep this description as
brief as possible to give a good overview of the entire activity; it needs to be read after
familiarity has been gained with the topics of section 6.
To assist candidates understand what is required of them, this section also includes some
guidance to the examiners’ expectations. This is not intended to prescribe one particular
approach- indeed candidates are encouraged to design the layout according to the practices
with which they are familiar- but allows candidates to appreciate where their solution might
depart from the “norm” and thus where they ought to take extra effort to ensure that it is
correctly understood by the examiners.
This section is supported by various Appendixes which give various “step-by-step guides”
to “Signalling the Layout”; each is written from the perspective of a specific railway’s
solution. Obviously if there is one aligned to your railway’s practice it should be particularly
useful, but there is learning value in reading them all, whether there is particular one (or
none) that is immediately relevant.
Be warned that attempting the examination reliant only on learning by rote and a “painting
by numbers” method will not ensure success; the examiners’ task is to satisfy themselves that
you have a sufficiently wide domain knowledge to actually understand what you are doing
and this will not have been obtained by basing your exam preparation on these guides alone.
Some overall advice re how to tackle the task within examination conditions is given and this
is supported by Appendix E which gives some general information that relates to all IRSE
examinations.
References Some are included directly on this DVD as separate free-standing documents whilst many
to follow more are not included but guidance is given how they may be found / obtained within
up Appendix Y.
Examples In particular extracts of elements of design are included as illustrative examples in certain
to study Appendices. The purpose is not to give examples of everything, nor to suggest that the
design is the only way to achieve an end, nor even that it is particularly good; the purpose is
purely to show the kind of information which the student should be seeking out to study in
greater detail. These include the past Module 3 papers in Appendix D.
Past Above all it is ESSENTIAL actually to obtain significant practice in attempting to signal
Papers to various layouts; hence students are advised to use all the past paper layouts included within
perform the relevant Appendix (Appendix B / Appendix C).
Section 6 is long and detailed; it is certainly not recommended that you read it through all at once!
It is best on the first study to get an overview and perhaps concentrate on particular key topics
such as braking, headway and positioning signals at junctions. This should enable you to get onto
Section 7 without too much delay which should give you a better overview of what you should be
trying to do when “Signalling the Layout”. Whenever you don’t understand it, recognise that it is
assuming something that you don’t know, you can then go back and dip into section 6 as required.
Once you have got a few attempted layouts “under your belt”, you can then go back and work
through all of section 6 more methodically to ensure that you don’t miss anything, perhaps
interspersing this activity with several more layouts.
The Step-by-Step guides (e.g. Appendix N1) are intended to be utilised to provide a focus for
optimising exam performance once the actual process of Signalling the Layout is understood.
They may also be useful for those who have studied section 6 but who feel daunted by the expanse
of whiteness on the blank layout and are unclear where and how to start. However these guides
are not intended as a substitute for the remainder of the Study Pack but to complement it by
providing a summary related to the specific tasks.

1.6 A Summary Reminder of the “high-level”; remember throughout the studying!

Whilst studying the detail, do try to maintain a view of the “big picture” and why “Signalling the
Layout” is such an important activity (see section 4). The signal engineer’s role is to produce a
solution that permits traffic to be moved efficiently and safely; our immediate customer is the
railway Operations department and then the various Train Operating Companies (in sense of both
passenger TOC and freight FOC) and ultimately the public and the government.
The Signalling Plan is the “high-level” specification of how we are going to deliver a system that
meets the stated requirements:
• functional (the primary functions the system is to perform, i.e. authorisation of the required
train movements on the layout, the defined modes of operation and conditions for the
transition between them),
• non-functional (the constraints of the technology, the environment - railway specific but
also geographical and societal- in which the system is to work, and the stated or implicit
RAMS),
• interface (with people and practices, with existing equipment – not only signalling but
including traction systems, train systems etc, at boundaries of control areas etc.)
All the remaining stages of detailed signalling design depend upon the overall design of this Plan;
it can be considered to be high up on the left hand side of the “vee diagram” depicting the project
life-cycle (as described for example within ESM).
It is a key part of the system definition; the Plan specifies at a functional level (when used in
conjunction with a list of applicable standards) and is also complemented by the system
architecture which describes how all the component parts interrelate to form a unified whole from
a technical perspective. If the Plan is itself wrong, the resulting system might be designed and
constructed correctly and thus work satisfactorily within its own terms, but it would not satisfy the
customer as we would have built the wrong thing and it may even be totally useless.
GRIP1: Specification Remit Business FRACAS

Client Rem it Requirements Monitoring
Asset Condition Reports
GRIP2: Feasibility Operational

Scheme Sketches Operational
Initial Project Specification Requirements Proving
GRIP3: Optioneering System

Scope and
Draft Scheme Plan
Function Testing
Final Option Selection Report
GRIP4: Development Outline Sub system

Final Scheme Plan Design
Final Project Specification Testing
Detailed Component
Design Testing
Manufacture Factory Acceptance Testing
Installation

Activity:
Try to understand the role of the Signalling Plan within the life-cycle, and how it relates to
the concepts which are the subject of the IRSE’s Module 1 examination.
[Note that the “Signalling Plan” is the record of the signalling for the site;; the various
“Scheme Plans” referred to in the previous diagram are effectively “Signalling Plans in the
making” since they reflect the proposal for the future signalling and thus become the
Signalling Plan when that signalling is commissioned].
GK/GN0806 is a useful reference which relates the theory of ESM into a signalling design
context.
A further thing to keep reminding yourself whilst using this Study Pack is that every railway is
different. No document can reflect them all; if it attempted to do so it would be too confusing to
understand. Although it has been primarily written from a UK Mainline perspective, attempts
have been made to make this Study Pack as useful as possible to those from other contexts by
placing the particularly detailed content into the various Appendices.
It is important for the student to appreciate that the value from studying is to acquire a good
understanding of the broad general principles applicable to many variants of railway signalling
and applicable to many generations of technology.
• Understanding the reason “why” enables the professional engineer to make appropriate
decisions when confronted with the unfamiliar application or novel technology.
• If learning purely concentrates on acquiring detailed facts, the best which can be expected is
the formulaic application of these “rules”; this is only satisfactory whilst the situation to
which they are being applied matches that initially assumed.
Hence even if this detail is not rapidly forgotten, it can become valueless in a different situation
such as a different railway environment or a new technology. Conversely being aware of the
similarities and the differences between specific applications of the same broad general principles
deepens understanding. Therefore do not totally discount those parts of this Study Pack that do
not appear to relate to the immediate situation; to do so is to miss the point of the exercise.

1.7 Errors and Omissions

When reading anything the student should always recognise that the source material may contain
errors, may not cover the whole subject in which they are interested, may be out of date or has
some other inherent assumption which renders it at least partially inapplicable. Whereas an
experienced reader can easily take such issues in their stride, it is recognised that even a slight
discrepancy (which is in reality could be quite trivial) may assume greater apparent significance to
someone who is less established; it can be potentially misleading and thus severely discouraging to
those with less relevant knowledge and less confidence about what they think they know.
The contents of this Study Pack are no different; it has been produced as a spare time activity by a
very limited number of busy people who already devote rather more time to the exams than many
candidates seem to. All reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that it is up to date to 2008 and
to avoid significant errors, but the very real possibility of misleading typos or potential ambiguities
remain. In addition there are some sections that are less complete than originally hoped and there
certainly are some presentational inconsistencies, notably whether revision activities are included
within the main text or separated into Appendix W, which time has not permitted resolution. The
intention is to continue to refine this Study Pack during 2008 and thus any feedback from students
attempting to use it will be most valuable to inform this process.
If you think that you have found something needing correction or clarification, please bring it to
the author’s attention by contacting the Professional Development Manager at the IRSE (for
example via hq@irse.org) so that it can be improved for future years. In addition posting a
message on the applicable thread at www.irseexam.co.uk would be useful since it would enable
the issue to be brought more rapidly to the attention of other students and you may also obtain a
more rapid response to assist you in your study from others who use that site.

1.8 Contributors and “Over to You”

The following have contributed to this Study Pack, to various extents and in different ways as
indicated below:
• Alex Goei Beng Guan (review by current student / proof reading of very many versions)
• Bob Barnard (text incorporated within RGS and ERTMS sections)
• Les Brearley (review of intermediate draft from non UK perspective)
• Peter Clifford (Appendix M1)
• Phil Gobetz (review of intermediate draft from non UK perspective)
• Derek Hotchkiss (Mod 2 Examiner reviews at strategic times during production)
• Lynsey Hunter (review of early draft by a student who had avoided mod 2 within their exam
/ production of certain diagrams to support the text)
• Robert Lang (Appendix M1)
• Jim McGrory (production of a predecessor Study Pack used as basis for this one)
• Siripunt Sparks née Puntpraesert (former mod 2 student; advice from the viewpoint of a
fluent but non-native English speaker)
• Dominic Taylor (review of a late draft by recent Thorrowgood scholar)
• Mark Watson Walker (administrative final production)
• Christine White (administrative final production)
• Colin White (Mod 2 Examiner reviews at strategic times during production)
• Peter Woodbridge (the remainder).
Also mention should be made of the unwitting input from various recent students (in particular
Ibrahim Atta Apau, Jessica Bignell, Andy Chaplin, Rob Ireland, Nigel Handley, Kelly Rogerson,
Jo Sharpe, Damian Westerman and Doug Young) whilst they were studying for module 2 and / or
module 3. Knowledge of the difficulties they experienced, the misunderstandings which occurred
and the errors they committed whilst learning has provided valuable input data to a FRACAS.
Some of them may even recognise their handwriting in some of the examples. Note that these
defects were discovered through testing during the development phase in time for remedial
attention before being put to the real test; make sure that you seek attention if you find that you are
prone to the same weakness as they once exhibited and can’t rectify it by yourself.
Whereas the “immediate fix” was direct to the individual concerned, this Study Pack seeks to
provide the “long term solution” as an attempt to address the underlying problems identified. It is
therefore largely based upon the experience gained whilst assisting the above students during their
exam preparation; it has influenced the whole content but in particular the self-check tick sheet in
Appendix W (which started life as a way of recording who was susceptible to which errors and to
encourage improvement to save future embarrassment). Assuming that this sample was typical of
the student population as a whole this approach should ensure that future candidates are well
prepared for examination. The hope therefore is that:
• the next generation of students will take full advantage of what has been produced and will
no longer be unclear on what is required in the examination or where to find relevant
information (there is plenty included within the pack plus a host of external references),
• the examiners will see the benefit by being presented with exam answers which are free of
the defects identified!
• there will fewer re-work cycles and more “right first time”.

2 Module Scope and Content:

2.1 Module 2 Overall Scope and Context
Modules 2 and 3 of the IRSE Examination together cover the conceptual design of signalling
systems to meet the functional and performance needs of the system railway. The tasks of
positioning the signals on a track layout and providing the interlocking between those signals and
the points are obviously highly inter-related; clearly some comprehension of the latter task is a pre-
requisite for performing the first task in a sensible manner.
Hence students generally find it beneficial:
• to have studied for Module 3 “Signalling Principles” prior to tackling Module 2,
or alternatively,
• to study for both Modules simultaneously.
However Signalling Plans are the fundamental interface and specification document with the
railway operator; candidates whose familiarity with railways is stronger from an operational
perspective than knowledge of the detailed engineering implementation may find the opposite;
module 2 can be a useful precursor to module 3.
Operational Engineering
Railway Technicalities
Module 2 Module 3
Signalling The Layout Signalling Principles
Note that this Study Pack includes information relating to aspect sequence even though the
production of aspect sequence charts is currently part of the Module 3 examination. This results
from the demarcation at the time when the Module 3 Study Pack was produced and thus inclusion
here is necessary to ensure that the subject is not omitted. Correct understanding of aspect
sequence remains an important element of Module 2, since it is relevant when determining the
placement of signals and when producing the route boxes (these need to depict the associated route
indicators and approach release conditions when applicable).
Module 2 focuses on testing a candidate’s understanding of:
a) the relationship between signal positioning, train braking characteristics and gradient,
b) the relationship between signal positioning and the intensity of traffic which can be
handled (headway between two following trains at constant speed, headway between two
following trains braking to observe speed restrictions or stopping at stations and re-
accelerating afterwards, between a train that has so stopped at a station and a following
train passing through non-stop).
c) how to interpret Signalling Principles and Operational Rules in order to determine
a suitable signalling solution for a given track layout and thus allow for the
efficient operation of trains with the appropriate degree of safety and economy.
2.2 Production of a Signalling Plan

Module 2 is specifically concerned with the design aspects related to a given infrastructure
layout (i.e. physical features such as tunnels, viaducts, stations, depots and a pre-determined track
plan). The candidate is given such a track layout to transform (see section 2.4) into a Signalling
Plan; its role is to act as a high level specification of the signalling required to fulfil the operating
requirement and indicate how it would be implemented.
For a real project this would be one of the principal documents forming overall “Concept Design”
on which all the subsequent detailed design of signalling would be based. A Signalling Plan
therefore “bridges the gap” between the “Requirements Specification” and the “Signalling System
Design”. Hence it is relatively independent of technology, but knowledge of the inherent
limitations and behaviour of the equipment to be utilised are important since these impose
implementation constraints and thus influence the optimum design solution.
Specific
Project
Requirements
Desired Railway’s
Operational Signalling
Use of Layout Principles
Signalling
Plan
Signalling
Equipment
System
Constraints
Architecture
Technical
standards
The Signalling Plan is thus a synthesis of the customers’ requirements (in the case of the
examination these are represented by statements within the layout notes) and the system’s
technical requirements (which in the exam are effectively defined by the candidate declaring their
practices). The production of a real plan is very much an iterative procedure with initial “on
paper draft” options being assessed by a multitude of separate processes including: Timetable
Modelling, Overrun Risk Assessments, Signal Sighting Committee, Value Engineering etc. all of
which feed back their findings and make often contradictory suggestions of how the design could
be improved. It tends also to be very Inter-Disciplinary as the overall solution must also take into
P’Way, Structure, Drainage and Electrification constraints to name but a few and therefore it is
easy for the essence of the basic signalling concept design to become obscured by many other
issues.
2.3 Design Objectives: Design for Safety, Performance And Economy.

When performing the task of Signalling the Layout, the engineer must keep these different
considerations in mind; examples how each of these factors influences the design are listed below.
Safety considerations:
• Provision of a locked, proved wheel path for each train,
• Protection to authorised train movements from unauthorised moves elsewhere,
• Signals positioned to protect conflicts adequately,
• Junction layout design (avoidance of single-lead junctions, minimise conflict length,
converging sideswipe preferable to head-on collision) and signalling of the divergence,
• Minimise length of any “bang road” movements in the direction contrary to predominant
traffic flow,
• Braking distance warning for any signal at danger (aspect sequences and transitions),
• Consistency of signal spacing,
• Optimisation of signal sighting distances,
• Awareness of SPAD-traps (ideally avoid, otherwise mitigate),
• Awareness of environment at signal positions (ideally avoid, otherwise mitigate)
• Provision of train protection to provide back-up to pure reliance on the driver in to control
appropriately the speed of their train,
• Determination of suitable overlap length and direction to provide safest possible overrun.
Performance considerations:
• Maximum speed limits for all categories of train for plain line and junctions,
• Maximum line capacity by minimising headway time between trains,
• Suitable for maximum train lengths specified,
• Ability to perform the movements needed in order to operate the train service (permissive
movements to allow joining of trains, locomotive running around trains, shunting, propelling
movements, ECS movements to depot etc.)
• Promote efficiency in operational use, ease / simplicity of communication etc.,
• Maximum flexibility in use of layout (parallel moves, permissive moves
• Maximum resilience in event of failure:
- ability to limit effect by “work-around”),
- Provision of reversible signalling on double track lines,
- Minimise number failures by minimum equipment count.
Cost considerations:
• Only provide the functionality actually really needed,
• Minimise quantities of equipment utilised,
• Simplest layout to avoid interlocking complexity,
• Utilisation of standard solutions,
• Utilisation of appropriate technology to meet the operational and technical requirements.
Many of the these are mutually contradictory; signalling scheme design is fundamentally
a compromise between them. The skill is knowing which requirements are absolute,
which are desirable and which are “nice-to-haves” for a particular scenario.
• It is essential for SAFETY that there is adequate, but not excessive, braking.
• It is essential for PERFORMANCE that it is possible to operate the required timetabled
headways.
• It is important for ECONOMY that only provide the minimum signalling needed to satisfy
the above.
The Specification is therefore important to learn about the context of the design, for example:
• the line (permissible speed profile- linespeed, permanent speed restrictions, junction speeds,
gradient profile, positions of specific features such as stations, viaducts and tunnels),
• the train operators’ trains (may be a variety in use over the totality of the layout):
- their top speed,
- how rapidly they can brake (and possibly how fast they can accelerate).
• the train service to be operated along each of the segments of line:
- which trains are to operate which service,
- how long a train length is to be operated,
- at what speed (if less than that physically possible by the train / permissible on the
line) the service is to be timetabled,
- calling pattern at any intermediate station,
- the closest timetabled separation between successive trains of the same type and how
they intermix with other traffic.
For a particular line, there may be a mixture of train service patterns, for example:
• express service with regular, long trains at highest speed possible,
• commuter service (very frequent, short trains of moderate speed, perhaps often stopping)
• freight service with occasional very long, but quite slow trains.
The signalling must meet the needs of ALL services and the solution must be a compromise. It
must ensure that this compromise meets all the essential safety requirements of every sort of traffic
as these are “non-negotiable”; the result may be the imposition of maximum speed or headway
constraints in order that the safety constraints can be observed. In addition the designer must
ensure that it is not only the through services that are catered for, but that trains needing to go to /
from depots and sidings can actually do so. It is therefore essential to think through all the
signalled moves that would be needed, whether there is a need for running around, propelling etc.
Proper understanding of the operation of the railway is necessary in order to be able to do this.

2.4 Design Practicalities: Task required for “Signalling the Layout”

However this may seem rather abstract and therefore it to clarify the activity in the student’s mind,
the actual tasks which result from these high level objectives are summarised below.
The prime task when producing a Signalling Plan is to position signals of suitable type and in
suitable positions on this layout to provide the basis of an effective signalling scheme, sufficient
but not excessive for the intensity and type of traffic. In particular:
• the signal spacing must be able to provide adequate headway to permit the specified traffic
to be worked efficiently at the desired speed to the specified destinations. This solution must
take into account the various constraints arising from:
- the speed and gradient profile of the line,
- the acceleration and braking characteristics and speed limitations of each type of train
within the mix of traffic,
- considerations of relatively uniform spacing including degree of over-braking, and
- the other considerations listed below:
• signals must be provided at suitable positions to protect junctions and other hazards whilst
taking account of:
- the relevant safety considerations required as mitigation in the event of unauthorised
movements etc. (e.g. the minimum length of overlap suitable for the operational
environment including the form of train protection being utilised, special interlocking
controls applied to points and signals),
- the impact on the operability of the layout imposed by the locking of points in an
overlap beyond a signal at danger,
- the impact on operability due to insufficient standage to ensure that junctions in rear
are not blocked nor excessive signals held to danger unnecessarily by the rear of a long
train being held at the signal beyond the constraint,
- suitable placing of signals to give good sighting to minimise the risks associated with
them being missed, confused, misinterpreted or otherwise being misleading to drivers
(and various possible mitigations if such positions cannot be avoided),
- the manner in which the driver is informed of the need to negotiate a diverging route
at the junction at an appropriate speed given the speed profile of the line ahead and
the actual pointwork at the junction itself (this may be indication of route perhaps
including approach release / special sequence or alternatively by presenting the driver
with advance information of the relevant speed profile required),
• it must be possible to make all the movements on the layout required to operate the
specified traffic, including any necessary to facilitate the actual timetabled services (e.g.
empty stock to / from maintenance depot),
• suitable compromises are needed to balance all the above considerations (some are inviolate
but most are contributions to good practice and a slight reduction in apparent safety in one
respect may be tolerated to permit greater safety gains elsewhere or indeed layout flexibility
where this is an operational imperative).

Secondary tasks include the adding of sufficient detail in order to present a complete overview of
the signalling proposed and the means of operating it. Such features include:
• the definition of the signalled routes on the layout with details of route indications
(appropriate provision, suitable type and display), approach release or special controls,
• the numbering and definition of the normal lie of points, provision of trapping, specification
of any restoration alarms or auto-normalising controls,
• the division of the line into train detection sections and depicting extent of all overlaps
(where necessary distinguishing between: the infrastructure which is locked, the extent of the
area proved clear of trains, the extent of an overrun constrained by the train protection),
• the depiction and numbering of other miscellaneous trackside equipment etc.
These are the signalling issues which are the subject of the majority of this Study Pack; they are
elucidated further within section 4 before the detailed presentation within Section 7. However it is
important not to lose sight of the overall objectives; understanding how the detail fits into the
overall picture is important for examination success.
Similarly knowledge of what faces an examination candidate and how to prepare for the exam
itself are also important; section 3 gives an overview of the exam and section 7 some specific
practical advice regarding how to approach and what is expected.

2.5 Knowledge Requirements

It is should therefore be clear that it is necessary for the student to have acquired an adequate level
of underpinning knowledge relating to the following subject areas:
railway • types of traffic and how they are handled especially at stations, terminals, depots,
operations • the roles of people in the front-line: signaller, driver, guard, shunter, station
dispatch, train preparer, maintainer (track, traction supply, train, signalling),
• operating procedures in normal operation and in failure & emergency situations,
rolling stock • types of traction, passenger and freight vehicles,
characteristics • service and emergency braking, acceleration,
• coupling, multiple working systems etc.
calculations • Newton’s laws of motion,
• braking distances,
• time / distance and time / speed curves,
• stopping and non-stopping headway,
signalling • the interfaces to driver and to signaller,
principles • the meaning of main and subsidiary . shunt aspects, auxiliary indicators
aspect sequence and transitions, route indications, approach release etc,
identification plates, marker boards and other lineside signage
• rules of interlocking between controlled functions
(signal route and aspects, route and approach locking points, level crossings etc),
• rules for providing safe separation between trains,
• external interfaces (different forms of signalling, depots, other engineering
disciplines, mutual co-existence with railway neighbours, environment etc)
risk • signal sighting factors (many affect the likelihood of SPAD),
management • other Human Factor issues
(e.g. knowledge of other influences on likelihood of SPAD),
• layout risk considerations such as “collision time-window” of conflicting traffic,
particularly hazardous environments (consequence of SPAD),
• provision of mitigations such as overlaps, trapping and flank protection, overrun
detection and effectiveness of train protection (mitigation of SPAD),
lineside the role, principles of operation, appropriate deployment and technical limitations of:
equipment • fixed signage,
• signals,
• train detection,
• point operating equipment,
• warning / protection systems
• telephones, radios and other communication systems.

Hence preparation for the exam should include:

• concentrating on understanding the overall philosophy rather than excessive attention to the
specific details of a particular implementation;
• general understanding of the operational use of signalling systems, especially from the roles
of signaller and driver.
Be aware that signalling technology is only part of the whole picture; an appreciation of the
associated rules and procedures for running trains (under full signalling and in various
forms of degraded mode given various failures or other situations) is important for
understanding what level of signalling equipment provision is appropriate;
• becoming familiar with the concept design as applied to a variety of sites and understanding
how those specific solutions address the needs of both safety and economy pertinent in the
particular site circumstances.
Familiarity with technical instructions, standards etc. will stand you in good stead, but it is not the
totality of what is required; section 5 explains the importance of broadening your horizons and the
ways in which you can achieve this. If you don’t comprehend railway operations you will struggle
with this module so its worth being aware of the material (books, magazines, DVDs) produced for
the railway enthusiast market.
As a light-hearted illustration of why looking at things from a strict engineering viewpoint is
sometimes insufficient, consider the catch question that was traditionally asked of the youngster
whilst learning from their elders: When on the railway does a red light indicate “all clear”?
The answer of course is: when it is on the back of a train and the signaller therefore knows that the
complete train has left an Absolute Block section, but a engineer focused on their signalling
equipment wouldn’t have got the answer because they weren’t thinking wide enough- of the
railway as a system involving many separate disciplines and ultimately the signalling is only a tool
for the train operators to use to be able to perform their job better.

3 Exam Format
Candidates are presented with a choice of a “Mainline” or a “Metro” layout blank track plan (see
table below), examples of which are included in Appendix B & C respectively). The task is to
transform one of these into a Signalling Plan (see section 2.2) which delivers the requirements
specified within the layout notes and compliant with the principles and standards of a railway
which the candidate nominates. Such track layouts should be regarded as a “blank canvas” on
which a candidate can paint a picture of their choosing (within the given constraints) with the
objective of demonstrating their competence to the examiners; i.e. proving that they have the
necessary knowledge and understanding and in addition showing that they can actually apply it
adequately when under pressure.
Note that whilst this Study Pack has been written primarily from a UK Mainline perspective, this
should not be taken to suggest that there is any expectation that a candidate’s answer will be in this
form. Indeed attempts have been made to keep the main body of the document reasonably generic
and to identify the key differences between alternative signalling systems in order to widen all
students’ knowledge of the variety and commonality which exists.
The question paper itself for module 2 is unusual in that the same basic questions are generally
asked every year (some typical papers are included in Appendix A2 but note that 2007 was
somewhat differently presented than its predecessors); it is the layout upon which the same
fundamental tasks are to be performed which varies significantly. The “questions” are in reality a
summary of the various task elements (see section 4) which together comprise the production of a
Signalling Plan and in particular give an indication of the weighting of the marks available for
each task.
The relative importance between the various tasks do vary slightly from year to year but more
significantly between the two distinctly different railway environments as depicted in the table:
The Metro environment normally features: The Mainline environment normally features:
• uniform stock, • significant variety in terms of speeds,
lengths of traffic,
• onerous headway requirement, • need for economical provision which just
• stopping headway calculations dominate, satisfies the headway needed, particularly
(simpler non-stopping headway; more on lightly used single lines,
complex stopping headway calculations), • non-stop headway calculations often
separate acceleration, service brake and dominate (more complex non-stopping
emergency brake rates, headway, simpler stopping headway
calculations),
• standard interval service, • mixture of origins / destinations and
(headway expressed in trains / hour), calling patterns of train services
(headway expressed by minimum interval
between services at a specified speed),
• calculated length overlaps, • relatively standard overlaps,
• simple aspect sequence, • more complex aspect sequence
and junction signalling,
• signal placement largely dictated by • signal placement needs to balance
headway, junction and overlap braking, uniform spacing, headway,
constraints, junction, overlap and sighting
considerations,
• no level crossings • level crossings
Metros often feature a greater level of train protection than is usually the case for Mainline railways; this
reflects the different risks arising from intensity of service, passenger density, tunnel environment.

This is the rationale re the examination offering the choice between layouts; the allocation of
marks by the examiners for the various tasks reflect the differences between the environments and
therefore the candidate’s methodology should do also. It is acceptable for a candidate to offer a
“transmission based” rather than “lineside signalling” solution and in judging such papers the
examiners will adjust the marking scheme in a way which reflects the signalling methodology
adopted.
The candidate is expected to supplement their designed layout by relevant supporting
information; some of this may be by annotations on the layout diagram itself but some is likely to
be best presented on separate on A3 or A4 sheet answer pages. In general the information
expected would be headway and braking calculations, explanations relating the system of
signalling adopted and any transition arrangements at fringes and interfaces. The candidate is free
to perform the overall tasks (see section 4) in any order, though obviously certain tasks need to be
completed before others can be performed.
There are extremely stringent time constraints imposed for this exam paper. This is deliberate as
it provides a means of assessing by written examination the candidate’s familiarity with the
material. Completion of the layout in the time available demonstrates that a “gut-feel” of how to
signal a layout has been acquired and this is precisely what the examination is seeking to discover;
the inexperienced see it as an impossible task but the solution is simple- get plenty of practice and
gain the experience! In the 2007 examination, three candidates presented an effectively complete
plan and all were of high quality; those that took longer generally also gave a lower quality
product. Note the contrast with “real world” behaviour where the optimum layout is deliberated at
length by a team of specialists (including those for signal sighting, calculation layout risk,
operability of various timetables, permanent way and electrification constraints etc.). Hence whilst
real experience of scheme development within a signalling design environment is definitely
extremely useful preparation for the paper, do remember that targeted preparation for the different
circumstances of the examination is also necessary. Real world experience is not absolutely
essential; it has proved possible for candidates to obtain Distinctions having never actually been in
such an environment, but obtaining such an insight by means of participation in Study Groups etc.
The module therefore requires that the candidate has really understood the fundamental concepts,
can see how these relate to the specific layout with which they have been presented and actually
derive a solution. Simply having memorised many facts for regurgitation at the exam will not
enable the student to pass the paper; actual practice is essential.
Candidates must appreciate that:
• the role of this module is to enable them to demonstrate to the examiners that they truly
comprehend the fundamental requirements and can apply them effectively; for this the
time permitted is sufficient.
• the task is not actually to produce the complete optimum solution for a specific site which is
the aim within scheme plan development for a real railway project. Perfection would be
unachievable but a good first approximation should be achieved (something like the Pareto
Principle- “80% of the result for 20% of the effort” applies).
• the submitted work must cover the whole scope; this means that outline detail for the entire
layout area is required with at least part of this worked up to a high level of detail.
• the examiners are looking both for breadth and depth of understanding; as a candidate it is
your task to provide them with sufficient evidence of both within the allocated time to be a
suitable demonstration of your competence. In this regard it is particularly important to
avoid mistakes that suggest the opposite- “obvious howlers” can seriously detract from the
overall impression given. See #55/3 for a light-hearted commentary.

4 Examination Elements:
4.1 Activities within Module 2 Examination
The purpose of the examination is to ensure that a candidate is competent; therefore regard it as a
test that you can perform the various activities when under pressure and can demonstrate that you
have the necessary underpinning knowledge. It is worth reminding yourself of these other
elements of the examination whilst you are focussing upon the actual activities; as in any
examination think what lies underneath the question which is ostensibly being asked. Hence you
should attempt to demonstrate that you have taken relevant factors into consideration and explain
something of the rationale of your solution (so that the examiner obtains evidence that you know
WHY as well as WHAT), rather than just provide a signalled layout.
The various separate but related tasks which together comprise “Signalling the Layout”, are:
• Familiarisation with the track plan and geographical context of the given layout,
• Comprehending the operating requirements for that layout including traffic pattern by
reading and assimilating the meaning of the layout notes,
• Understanding how the design of signalling can contribute to the safe and efficient
operation of the railway under various circumstances (and when transitioning from one
such mode to another):
- normal timetable,
- abnormal situations (additional trains / special traffic patterns for specific occasions,
altered planned working due to an engineering possession or perturbed working
resulting from significant unplanned departure from timetable or failure elsewhere),
- degraded working (“getting around” failures, providing some form of “graceful
degradation”, fallback or at least supporting the human to some degree when needing
to undertake safety-critical tasks which the system normally would perform such as
manually securing the route and then verbally authorising a driver to pass a signal at
danger or resetting an axle counter section to show clear after it has become disturbed),
- emergency situation arising (aid rapid response- simple, quick and easy).
• Calculating the relevant braking distances, where applicable, both:
- those for service braking for a normal approach to a signal at danger or speed
restriction, and
- those relevant to emergency braking after intervention by a train protection system,
• Assessing the stop signal spacing that would deliver the required headway,
• Determining the appropriate signalling system to use for each portion of line:
- sufficient to handle the available traffic,
- adequately safe for the circumstances,
- whilst being economically justifiable,
• Determining the headway that the solution would deliver, where applicable, for:
- two non-stopping trains,
- two trains on the same stopping pattern,
- a non-stop train timetabled behind one that had stopped at an intermediate station,
Note that proper understanding of aspect sequence, junction signalling approach release
and special interlocking controls are all necessary in headway determination and thus are
inherently part of the examination.

• Placing signals to provide proper protection of junctions and other hazards.

This must consider many factors:
- signal spacing dictated by aspect sequence / braking constraints,
- signal spacing dictated by headway requirement,
- positioning to achieve necessary signal sighting,
- positioning sufficiently beyond junctions so that adequate standage is achieved,
- positioning to protect conflicts (junctions, opposing movements, level crossings),
- positioning to avoid placing in restricted locations if possible,
- consideration of the overlap required- length, applicable directions where options are
available in conjunction with the effectiveness of train protection provided,
- placed to contribute to efficient use of the layout (both to ensure all specified moves
can be made easily and the flexibility to permit the maximum simultaneous
movements),
- layout risk considerations in the event of a SPAD or significant overspeeding. This
should include consideration of the effectiveness of any train protection for entering
terminal platforms and other hazardous areas,
- operational constraints, including the consequences of the signalling arrangements in
circumstances when failures occur and there is a need to operate trains in degraded
mode conditions.
• Reviewing the positions selected to ensure that headway and braking constraints are still
satisfied after any juggling of signal positions performed above,
• Providing details of signals:
- possible aspects including that which is usually to be displayed,
- appropriate route indications and associated auxiliary indicators and signs,
- supported by route boxes adequately defining all the operational moves possible within
the signalled layout,
- information relating to replacement controls, approach release etc.
• Adding such additional general notes necessary to give additional information relevant to
the means by which the layout is intended to be operated, particularly relating to:
- boundaries of operational control at fringe areas,
- interface to depots etc.,
• Determining the arrangement of points to optimise the arrangement to provide safe and
economical junction interlocking:
- numbering / pairing,
- definition of normal lie,
- trap points,
- self restoration,
• Detailing the train detection arrangements that divide the layout into sufficient sections to
permit the required flexibility for operational use and adequate safety, whilst avoiding the
use of unnecessary divisions, including:
- proving clearance at convergences,
- prompt releasing of locking on points where this increases utilisation of the layout,
- separation of sections as necessary to permit parallel movements,
- observing maximum and minimum length constraints (resulting from rolling stock
characteristics as well as constraints applicable to whatever technical solution
implements train detection functionality).

Be aware that:
• the examiners are looking to satisfy themselves that candidates demonstrate a sufficient
understanding of the various activities.
• whereas the production of the plan itself is a large element, the manner in which the end
result is achieved is also important.
Therefore candidates should attempt to provide sufficient information that their reasoning can
be followed; salient notes on the layout and providing an adequate commentary when performing
calculations contribute to this.
Above all remember that it is an EXAMINATION PAPER rather than the production of a
Signalling Plan itself and thus your approach will need to be subtly different than if performing the
activity in your normal work environment.
4.2 Activities within Module 3 Examination

Producing aspect sequence charts was formerly included in Module 2, but currently resides
within the Module 3 examination. Consideration is included within this Study Pack for
completeness as it was not covered within the Module 3 Study Pack when that was written. It is
indeed also possible that future exam changes might revert to the original split between the
examination papers or no longer require the specific production of such charts in any module;
however the requirement to have this as underpinning knowledge will remain.

5 Overview of Study and other Preparation Activities Required:

5.1 Introduction
To succeed in this examination, candidates must demonstrate:
• familiarity with the standards and practices of their chosen railway (both signalling
technicalities and rules relating to operational utilisation),
• sound understanding of these basic facts,
• ability to apply them to a specific example layout,
• good examination technique, particularly time management.
Hence preparation for the examination should not be restricted only to learning facts relevant to
the various activities which together comprise layout design but also include a more general
education relating to the running of a railway.
Candidates sometimes feel that it is difficult for them to interpret examination questions correctly;
often this is due to the lack of “railway common sense”. This colloquial phrase is a bit of a
misleading one, it would be more accurate to refer to general knowledge of the railway domain.
This is built up over time as experience within the industry is gradually accumulated, but there are
steps which students should take to acquire a basic level of understanding more quickly; some
suggestions are explained later in section 5. A lot of the difficulty faced by candidates stems from
a fundamental lack of railway understanding and this does take an effort to acquire; this is not an
examination that one can expect to pass having just attended a specific training course and relying
upon a last minute swot of the notes from it.
Largely it is a question of attitude:
• if you feel that you are being pressured into doing the examination to satisfy your employer,
get promotion etc. you are therefore likely to regard it as an imposition. The examination
may then seem to be a barrier placed in your way and therefore you will resent studying for
it; as a result it will seem unfair that you need to study for something which you don’t
believe is your day job. Recognise that it is your decision whether or not to sit the
examination; you have to make that choice taking into account the advantages and
disadvantages that are likely to ensue. Either decide to knuckle down and put effort into it or
decide not to bother at all.
• If alternatively you recognise that you, as a relative newcomer to the industry, need to
establish and consolidate your position within it you’ll be naturally keen to “get yourself up-
to-speed” with the established concepts, terminology and technology. It should be obvious
that you’ll otherwise be unable to contribute to a full extent or be able to fulfil your
potential; the exercise of studying for the various modules of the IRSE exam then becomes a
mechanism to achieve that end. Passing the examination acts as an external recognition that
you have achieved that goal and that you have successfully acquired a basic but wide
ranging understanding of the industry in which you operate and can thus work in an effective
team with your peers. If you are enthusiastic about learning it is far easier and more
effective.
General advice re studying for the IRSE exam is contained in [#64/6] and on the IRSE website.
Many books are available but there is also useful advice available from a number of websites, of
which a selection are included in Appendix Y.
If it has been some time since you have studied for anything, or you have never found that you
perform at your best in exams and are apprehensive about needing to sit the IRSE Exam, you may
find it beneficial to obtain some more general guidance on how you should approach the studying
activity and ways of coping with the stress of the exam itself.
5.2 Overall Approach

The student is recommended to:
• increase domain knowledge by personal experience (section 5.4),
• increase domain knowledge by general basic reading (section 5.5),
• address separately each Study Topic pertinent to “Signalling the Layout” (section 5.6); the
details of these are included in 6 which then further references Appendices in this Study
Pack and also recommends external sources of information,
• undertake activities to reinforce learning and deepen understanding (Appendix W)
• review specific examples to understand how the concepts are applied in practice to
particular situations (section 5.8),
• study detailed information defining the standards for a particular railway of choice,
• attempt some sample past papers to get experience of actually implementing what has
been learnt. Initially this should be undertaken whilst using the support of study material,
taking notice of the specific available hints etc. (section 5.9, Appendix B2 / Appendix C2),
• seek feedback on efforts (if impracticable, try using the tick sheet in Appendix W yourself),
• further study and revision to refine understanding,
• practice further past papers “closed book”,
• further fine tuning work to hone skills and final preparation to optimise performance in
examination conditions (sections 5.10 & 5.11) and therefore “working against the clock”.
The following referenced sections explain this methodology in greater detail. There is no need to
follow it rigorously and in reality there will always be a degree of parallelism between the
activities rather than the purely sequential process stated; however students should find that it
provides a sound overall methodology to direct their study and revision.
It is important to plan your study programme; it should be obvious that the above represents the
work of many months not just a few weeks leading up to the examination.
5.3 Planning to Succeed

Studying and exam preparation should be treated like any other engineering project.
• Firstly you should be convinced of the need to undertake in order to satisfy high level
objectives, then establish the specific requirements.
• The feasibility should now be assessed and various possible options evaluated (e.g. how
much is the examination aligned to your “day job”- is it just a question of practicing
applying what you know in a different context, is a formal training course available, can you
attend a Study Group, do you find that you learn best from lectures or books are all questions
that you should consider).
• Having made an overall decision of the best mix, then you should develop a detailed plan
with milestone target dates and set about implementing that plan.
• Whilst the process is underway you should ensure that you review progress and be prepared
to re-plan in accordance with the changing situation as time passes.
In particular your planning should recognise that studying is a separate phase to exam preparation
and indeed each of these phases should be broken down into separate activities.
Recall the old adage: “Failure to plan is planning to fail” and
the 7Ps: “Proper Planning and Preparation Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance” .
5.4 Building General Domain Knowledge

New entrants to the industry, especially those who are restricted to an office environment,
frequently find it bewildering and hence the examination impossibly difficult; however those who
make the effort to broaden their exposure find that it is far easier to comprehend. Younger people
often have a greater interest in the future than the past; this is understandable but it is important to
realise that history is an essential ingredient in any culture; much has been learnt the hard way
over generations. Hence the past can be key to understanding the reason why certain practices
have evolved and it is only by comprehending the underlying rationale that one can determine
whether an historic practice is still actually appropriate to a current situation.
All engineers should always be questioning whether an existing practice should be perpetuated or
needs to evolve as changes in the railway and technological environment occur; but history
provides the “common sense” which informs that judgement. No one source will provide all this,
but [#22] is a good book with which to start.
Experience is almost the only commodity which cannot be bought, borrowed or learnt and it has to
be acquired gradually by “living through it”. Books and lectures can help provide the background
and assist you in making sense of what you know, however there is no substitute for experiencing
for REAL and actually DOING. In the context of the examination, that means PRACTICE.
Many of a railway’s operational principles remain unchanged whilst several generations of
technology evolve; remember that to complete certain journeys the same driver has to drive their
same train in accordance with signalling designed over a 100 year time period. Therefore do not
shun apparently historic information; much of it remains directly relevant and even where it does
not seem applicable to much of the current railway it is still useful at shedding light on how
railway signalling evolved and thus why it is now how it is. In some respects a modern CBI
(Computer Based Interlocking) working in conjunction with a RBC (Radio Block Centre) has
more in common with a mechanical lever frame then a RRI (Route Relay Interlocking).
The student should attempt to educate themselves as widely as possible in order to become fully
familiar with the railway environment and not just concentrate on the technology of a particular
system of railway signalling. Suggestions regarding how this might be achieved include reading,
visits and networking with those in different branches of the railway signalling profession and
indeed other engineers and railway operators:
• Certain material such as books and DVDs produced primarily for the railway enthusiast
market can be useful at improving “general knowledge”; some of those particularly related
to signalling are listed in Appendix Y.
• The quality model railway exhibitions often feature layouts where the signalling and
operations do truly represent the real thing; these provide a means of visualising more of the
system than is generally physically possible at “305mm to the foot” scale (= real life).
- Beware that there is a wide variety of specialist interests; some are more interested in
the detail accuracy of individual models of locomotives or the overall scenic effect
than representing railway operations; conversely some go to great lengths to display a
representative timetable rather than just running trains to keep the kids amused. A
good indication is whether the signals are worked (i.e. are operated for and replaced to
danger after every train); if so the scene depicted is likely to be properly representative
of operations of that locality and the time period within which the model is set.
- Generally the “exhibition season” is from September to April; a listing of such
exhibitions is available on the internet, see in Appendix Y. This also gives details of a
particularly fine permanent historical model in Oxfordshire.

• Visits to heritage railways can provide a useful learning experience, especially when there
are opportunities to get behind the scenes either as a visitor or a volunteer worker.
See Appendix Y for weblinks; there are often specific dates for special events.
• Similarly there are certain museums worth a visit. In the UK the National Railway Museum
in York has a worthwhile display, but the Railway Age Crewe has the advantage of having
some real signalboxes on the site; see Appendix Y.
• Avail yourself of the benefits of IRSE membership to attend events:
- The IRSE holds technical meetings once a month between October and April in
London; the papers to be presented are generally published about a week before in the
relevant edition of IRSE News, so even if you cannot attend the talk the material itself
is available to all. All members receive the Proceedings annually (nowadays as a
physical book or CD-ROM) where all these, and other information besides, is
included; see IRSE website for the purchase of past years’ Proceedings.
- There are normally a couple of one day seminars per year on particular topics which
are very reasonably priced compared to other training / CPD events; generally a CD-
ROM is published shortly afterwards which can be purchased by those who didn’t
attend.
- The various local sections also hold meetings which may be easier to attend and
because of the small size tend to be more welcoming to newcomers and often discuss
topics of more immediately direct / local interest than the London meetings, though
written papers are rarely available.
• The IRSE Younger Members section tends to arrange a full day session (held normally in
Birmingham in November); every effort is made to ensure the topics presented are
specifically targeted at those having only a few years in the industry and keeping the price as
low as possible, so anyone within reasonable travelling distance really should make the
effort to attend. Some of the papers are often available to download from the website for a
period after the event.
• The IRSE Exam Review is generally held in London during January and is often combined
with the YM’s Annual General Meeting and a mini-seminar comprising talks on various
topics. General feedback is given of the exam performance in each of the modules with the
issues which seemed to present particular difficulty identified. Sometimes particular
questions in certain modules are discussed in greater depth and it gives an opportunity for
students to ask specific questions to the exam committee, especially regarding what is
actually expected from candidates under examination conditions. Examiners are sometimes
willing to arrange to visit Study Groups to give more detailed assistance in how to set about
tackling a particular type of question; this has to be undertaken prior to work commencing
on setting the following year’s examination.
• Participation on IRSE visits also provides opportunities to visit control centres, signalboxes,
train depots etc. which would normally be inaccessible; despite the inevitable constraints
these can provide the student with a different perspective that can have a value out of
proportion to the time spent. Look out for fliers within IRSE News etc.
• In the UK, the Institution of Railway Operators is keen to welcome those new to the
industry and have an active lecture and visits programme which allows networking with
others from other related disciplines; see entry in Appendix Y.
• Intelligent observation from carriage window and station platform when travelling as a
passenger can also be useful, particularly when some particular problem exists and is being
overcome. Whilst this does illustrate the process in action, to comprehend it often does
require some initial understanding obtained by other means.

• Study of the appropriate operational procedures or “Rule Book” is invaluable; for NR

(Network Rail) a distance learning “Safe Working of Trains” correspondence course is
available both to NR and non NR staff.
• Certain jobs entail liaison with “Operations” through signalling scheme development,
possession planning, layout risk reviews etc. and these activities help raise awareness of the
wider railway and how signalling relates to it.
• A “Railway Experience” course is available at the RH&DR miniature railway in Kent as a
joint venture with Lloyds Register Rail. This enables some invaluable “hand-on” experience
interspersed with classroom sessions for a small group of trainees. It is held during various
weeks in the railway’s quiet season and thus from late October until Easter.
• Some employers offer formal training schemes where attachments with relevant
operational staff are included; although rare this is extremely valuable experience. In other
instances it may be possible to organise unofficial exchange visits between disciplines.
• Discussions at Study Groups allow the pooling of knowledge and different practices
(between types of railway, types of technology, evolution over time) can be compared and
contrasted. A list of Study Groups is included on the IRSE website and advice regarding
setting up your own is also available upon request. See Appendix Y.
• A new “IRSE Exam” website has recently been set up with various intended roles:
- to make the process of setting up a Study Group (or indeed just pairing up with another
person as a “study buddy”) easier by providing a mechanism for perspective students
to make contact with each other,
- to allow Study Groups to exchange information relating to potential speakers and post
any useful study material so that it achieves a wider distribution,
- to act as a virtual Study Group so that students working alone can pose questions to
obtain assistance in their private study or attempted answers to questions which can be
compared with those produced by others. See Appendix Y.
• Surf the Internet to build domain knowledge regarding both operational practices and the
technicalities of equipment. Appendix Y includes some suggestions where to start; there is a
lot of information available but it must be recognised that the material varies from the
extremely good to the misleading and a certain amount of caution is, as always, appropriate.
• In summary be continually on the lookout for such opportunities to expand your knowledge;
- do not expect your employer to arrange everything, nor confine your learning to the
09:00-17:00 of a standard working week.
- Get out and about as much as you can within work and outside of it as well!

5.5 Basic Reading

Before commencing detailed study directed to signalling the layout, the candidate is advised to
undertake some general technical reading. In many cases this will be a revision of what should
already be known, but all these sources are certain to extend any student’s knowledge.
Appendix Y contains the details of the books which are referenced below and describes which
sections of them are most directly applicable to Module 2. It is suggested that the first look at the
contents of each book should be a reasonably quick background read, primarily for the student to
identify and address any existing weakness in their general understanding. At this time however it
would be wise to assess which elements of each book would be found helpful to study in more
detail later in connection with their preparation specifically for Module 2.
Whilst most of these books are to a greater or lesser extent based on the assumption of UK
practice, for a high level review they are sufficiently general to assist any student of railway
signalling and in most cases are not actually the best source of specific information for any
particular railway. Their primary role is to allow the student to be confident of an outline
understanding before concentrating on the more detailed learning relating to the specific
railway’s application.
• An important basic resource for any module of the examination is the IRSE book
“Introduction to Railway Signalling” [#4]. As its title suggests this is outline will need to be
supplemented by additional information but it is an excellent place to start.
• The IRSE book “Railway Signalling” [#5] has for long been a reference work for those new
to the industry. Chapter 2 is particularly useful for study for Module 2, especially regarding
braking distance and headway but unfortunately in other respects the book is quite dated.
• However this is partially addressed by the opening chapter of its companion volume
“Railway Control Systems” [#6] whose main role was to extend its coverage into further
subject areas. Whilst worth a read for general education, from a narrow module 2
perspective the relevant information is probably better acquired from other sources.
• The IRSE text book “European Railway Signalling” [#7] contains a comparison of the
practices of many different railway administrations. Its role is one of broadening experience
by giving an appreciation of alternative practices rather than being directly useful for
Signalling the Layout.
• The fourth in the series of IRSE textbooks is “Metro Railway Signalling” [#8]. This takes a
“systems view” rather than dealing with great detail; certain sections are relevant to Module
2, indeed for Mainline as well as Metro.
• “Two Centuries of Railway Signalling” [#9] is a commercial publication mainly aimed at the
serious railway enthusiast and student of history but also very valuable for those in the UK
industry.
• Similarly books in Ian Allan’s “abc series” are relatively cheap and have plenty of diagrams
and pictures to help general understanding of the overall UK national railway environment;
these include-
- Railway Terminology [#11],
- Railway Operations [#12],
- Modern Signalling Handbook [#13].
Also check out what current information is available on the internet; Appendix Y contains some
starting places; there is a lot of information out there and the quality of most is surprisingly good.

5.6 Obtaining Help

Whereas much can be learnt from private study from books, sometimes there are things that are
unclear and you can’t ask any questions of books. Hence most students find it useful to have
someone to whom they can turn for support and guidance. Often this support is readily available
in the workplace, but it isn’t always so easy when working for an exam module which is not
related to your “day-job” especially if you do not know anyone engaged in that activity or who has
successfully passed that module.
Many employers appoint mentors to trainees or have active training programmes and thus provide
a route through which support can be obtained. In other cases the student will need to seek out a
source of help for themselves. Bear in mind the following:
• Students are generally more reluctant to ask for help than experienced engineers are to give
it when asked. Most will take the time to explain something to someone who is interested;
after all that is the way they learnt in the past. People who really know their stuff tend to be
willing to share; those with little knowledge sometimes guard it jealously. Be sensible in
choosing your time and manner of asking of course, but if you don’t ask then you won’t find
out. If you are a bit apprehensive about approaching someone, then a good way to start
might be simply to ask them whether they could advise you where you may be able to lay
your hands on a copy of one of the reference documents in Appendix Y. This involves them
in very little immediate effort yet signals your intention and may be a good way of “breaking
the ice” and you might well find that extra assistance is subsequently offered.
• Attendance at IRSE events and visits is a good way of meeting people perhaps in other
companies, from other places or engaged in a different job type within signal engineering
who may have access to sources of information or knowledge that would be useful to fill a
gap that presents a difficulty to you in your normal working environment.
• It is not the examiners’ job to get you through the examination, but they customarily do give
a summary of the previous year’s exam performance in January and may be contacted for a
short period afterwards to give guidance to Study Groups.
• IRSE Exam Study Groups are probably the best way to obtain regular help, from fellow
students, from people who have passed the exams recently or much longer ago. Check the
IRSE website for the groups that currently exist and if there is not one convenient for you
consider setting one up, for which advice is also available. One possible alternative is
www.irseexam.co.uk, a virtual Study Group for which distance is immaterial.
• Remember however that all Study Groups require participants to do just that- participate,
which means contribute to the common pool rather than just expecting to withdraw from it.
- You may feel when just starting that you are not able to do that, but in a diverse group
you will always have a better idea about something than someone else.
- Put some effort into researching a subject and offer your notes or a suggested answer
to the group to critique; it gives a basis for discussion and even if bits of it are wrong
then you’ll have gained from the initial work and had your understanding clarified
whilst other members of the group will learn some mistakes not to make.
- Whilst studying for a module, support the group studying for a module you have
already passed; indeed continue your involvement after having completed the exam as
a means of “paying back”. The IET’s motto is Disce, Doce; do you know what that
means?
• In recent years the advent of mobile phones, faxes and email have made obtaining that
support from a distance a practicable possibility; certainly not as convenient as face-to-face,
but definitely practicable where necessary, though probably more of a challenge for module
2 than the others which can be constrained largely to words and A4 sized paper.
5.7 Detailed Study: Learning the Basic Concepts

5.7.1 What
When the student is ready to embark on detailed study, then it is recommended that the various
elements of the exam (as listed in section 4) are initially treated as separate study topics. The
relevant part of 6 is intended to serve as an introduction to many of the Study Topics but the
student will need to:
• revisit the appropriate sections of the books referenced in section 5.4,
• study the other sources referenced within Appendix Y which include the RGS. Although
written purely for the UK, these are generally high level and other railways are often similar;
the commentary provided [#2] is intended primarily to assist students of other railways
determine those areas that are generally applicable and those which are primarily addressing
a UK issue,
• obtain and refer to more detailed material relevant to the specific railway. For UK
Mainline there are many NR company standards and specifications available to support the
RGS; other railways may have fewer (which can be an advantage to the student as the salient
ones may be easier to locate).
An example of study material is the range of IRSE Green Booklets which were written specifically
to assist students for the IRSE Examination. However some of these were written nearly 50 years
ago and have inevitably become rather dated in certain respects and cannot be relied upon to define
current practice of any particular railway. Despite this, there is still much within them which is
useful; the following are valuable sources of information regarding headway and braking
calculations, which is of course broadly applicable to all railways:
• Booklet 14: Multiple Aspect Signalling [#10/1],
• Booklet 27: Signalling the Layout, British Railways Practice [#10/2].
To assist the student, much of the material has been incorporated into Appendix G of this Study
Pack and has been updated to the present day situation where necessary.
The closest thing to a text book that exists for the IRSE Examination is “Railway Signalling” [#5];
it is a good base text but was itself published in 1980. Hence it needs to be supplemented by more
recent additional information such as the IRSE Technical Papers and articles in IRSE News. To
assist the student in selecting relevant material Appendix Y considers which of those published
since this book was written are relevant to module 2. There may be relevant information in older
sources, however it is felt that since the nominal life a signalling system is often regarded as
around 25-30 years (although in reality many railways have significant assets dating in excess of
40years old and signalling dating back over 100 years is not unknown) then this period does reflect
a “generation” and [#5] can be taken as incorporating the relevant wisdom relating to colour light
signalling at the time when it was published.
Section 6 recommends that the related subjects of headway and braking are probably the study
topics with which to commence detailed preparation for the examination. They form such a
fundamental part of the entire Concept Design of any signalling solution that it is therefore not
surprising that they form a significant part of the exam. Note that when sitting the examination
paper itself, this is not the recommended initial activity (section 6.6 suggests some small but very
important activities should be performed first). For the purposes of learning however, it is
suggested that the order of topics within section 6 is an appropriate overall guide.

5.7.2 How
Don’t just passively read these sources; actively study them in the way which bests suits you. Be
aware whether you are “left-brain” or “right brain” dominant; do you prefer a step-by-step
approach to learning or do you need to see the “big picture” first and then focus on particular areas
of interest more spontaneously?
Different individuals find that they absorb information better by different means; you should be
aware whether you have more of a visual, auditory or kinesthetic memory. Hence whereas all
techniques are useful for certain situations each person generally has a particular preference for
one set of techniques that they find the most effective. A selection of useful practices are given in
the table below; it is a question of discovering which generally works best in your particular case.
Visual • highlighting text as you read,
• making lists or drawing diagrams to summarise a section
• make use of colour coding, cartoon sketches, symbols etc.
Auditory • talk out loud as you read, then at end of the section verbally summarising the
information again,
• sing your summary list to a favourite tune, or in a foreign accent etc to make it
unusual and thus memorable.
Kinesthetic • writing on individual small “post-it notes” / index cards as you read, then
rearranging to sort the information at the end of the section,
• recite your summary list as you climb a staircase or pace up and down the
room,
• discussing the subject with a colleague or in a group,
• move an object around a diagram to act out a portion of text describing a
sequence or invent a role-play to bring a scenario to life.
Overall you should:

• know what you are trying to find out from them before you start; no doubt you will discover
other things, but that is a bonus- whilst reading you should have a conscious objective.
• ensure that you have identified the bits to which you may need to revisit later. This can be
by highlighting, adding post-it notes, creating an index etc.
• do something (visual, auditory and / or kinesthetic) at the time of reading. Don’t be
frightened of reading out loud; indeed this need only be a whisper since this is particularly
effective (people often whisper important and interesting information!).
• If you are finding that something is not useful to you at that time, try another source instead
and perhaps return to this one later; the task is not to have read everything but to have learnt
what you actually need to know.
• At the end of a session don’t just stop, but do something (visual, auditory and / or
kinesthetic) to reinforce what you have learnt and help consolidate it. The best thing for
many people is to write yourself a summary bullet point list of what you felt you learnt
from reading. Read it out loud then close your eyes and attempt to recreate the list in
your mind and speaking it out loud again. This gets more portions of your brain involved
and hence you therefore have a better chance of remembering it longer term.

5.8 Detailed Study: Applying to Specific Situations

Having acquired a basic technical competence with the “tools of the trade” the student should
then be in a position to undertake the real task: developing the Concept Design for the signalling
that is appropriate to the needs of the railway operator for a particular set of site circumstances.
To be able to do this, the examination candidate must be able to interpret the information
presented to them by notes on the plan and envisage how the specified train movements would
be made on the track layout depicted. Without adequate domain knowledge this is impossible;
reading relevant material (the table in 6.1 makes suggestions for certain subject areas) should help
by stimulating consideration of those features applicable to any particular railway. However it is
very hard to pick up the required knowledge purely by reading and it is in this context that the
effort expended in the other activities suggested in 5.4 will pay dividends.
This Study Pack has been written to imply that all the topics in section 6 should be fully studied
before any past paper layouts are attempted following the process in section 7. In actuality many
students will find that the theory will only really make sense when combined with some practical
experience. Hence a “skim read” to get the overview of the contents and find your way around
section 6 and then continuing on to read section 7 whilst attempting a past paper is a good
approach. You will find that you will then need to go back to study in detail particular parts of
section 6 as you progress through the layout, but you’ll find that you may get more out of the text
when looking through it to find the answer to a specific problem which faces you when doing the
layout, rather than just reading page after page- you’ll be likely to get bored and fail to assimilate
much.
It is also suggested that the student should:

d) perform the activities included in Appendix W and those included in boxed sections
within the main text,
e) study the examples of layout design extracts included in Appendix X,
f) obtain other examples of scheme designs for actual sites on their chosen railway- these
may be records of existing infrastructure or proposals for planned work.
The purpose is to study the above in detail to see how these solutions reflect the concepts of the
various Study Topics; the student should attempt to reverse engineer the requirements which were
embodied within the design. When doing this:
• be aware of the date when the design was produced and that the circumstances for which it
was designed may no longer be those that currently exist at the site,
• also recognise that there may have been design constraints (such as the need to interface with
/ incorporate some pre-existing design) which may not now be readily apparent but could
have led to a different solution being adopted than if it had been a “green field” site.

5.9 Practicing for the Exam

Practice is essential at each stage during studying; it reinforces what has been learnt from reading
and provides the student a means of judging whether they truly understand the subject. It can also
identify areas for further work prior to moving on to the next topic. Suggested activities for the
topics within sections 5.6 and 5.8 are included within Appendix W.
Once basic knowledge is secure, the student should progress to attempting past IRSE layouts:
• Initially this could be “open-book” and “take as long as it takes” in order to be able to
devote the care and attention necessary to obtain the most from this activity;
• Then as confidence increases the student should attempt to do as much as they can without
looking at any notes or other references, but when this point has been reached then look-up
whatever is required in order to complete the activity and then seek help (see section 5.6) if
still uncertain;
• In the final run-up to the exam, practice “against the clock” in “examination conditions” of
several previously unstudied layouts should be undertaken;
• If you find it difficult to be rigorous about this, then getting together with others to attempt a
mock exam may help; it doesn’t even matter if they are working for a different module as the
important thing is strict timing, no distractions, no cheating etc. However the best
arrangement is where all students within a Study Group have decided early on to reserve a
particular paper for use as a mock exam perhaps a month before the actual examination,
especially where results are compared afterwards and there can be discussions about
mistakes made- both technical and within the allocation of time to different facets.
5.10 Examination Technique

5.10.1 Focus on the Exam itself, not just the Layout
Do remember that your primary task is to do well in the exam; whereas producing a well signalled
layout is obviously important, in this context it is just a means to an end. Never forget that it is
your examination performance which is to be judged. Just like attending a physical interview,
think the thing through first and consider how to create a good impression as well as simply just
answering the questions asked.
Look at it as your opportunity to display your skills on the “blank canvas” of the given layout.
Remember that it is your job to convince the examiner that you are competent, i.e.:
• have sufficient domain general knowledge to be able to interpret requirements etc,
• have a basic understanding of the important elements contributing to signalling layout
design,
• can actually apply this knowledge to a novel given situation,
• are able to work under pressure in an effective manner.
It is the examiner’s job to ensure that papers are marked fairly and that standards are maintained.
They’d obviously prefer that candidates pass rather than fail (and indeed get better results than just
a mere pass) but they can only make a judgement on what is presented to them. Whereas an
interviewer can occasionally “draw something extra out” from a candidate, there is no option to
attempt this in a written examination; the whole onus is on the candidate to present themselves in
the most favourable light.

5.10.2 Think about the Examiner

5.10.2.1 Why?
Although it might seem odd to suggest that a candidate should spare a thought for the examiners
when sitting a paper, it is actually in the candidate’s best interest to do so. Just for a moment put
yourself in someone else’s shoes to look at the situation from another perspective; it can be quite
informative and you might realise something which may benefit you.
The reality is that the examiners are faced with a range of papers to mark; they do this every year
as a voluntary activity, additional to their paid day job. In order to attempt to get the results out by
Christmas means that they need to devote significant quantity of their spare time at what can be a
busy time of year. How do you think it makes them feel when a significant percentage of the
offerings are of a poor standard and some candidates do not appear to have made any significant
effort in preparing themselves for the exam?
Just look at the information from the exam review sessions in Appendix A; year after year the
examiners’ comments are very similar. It is only human to get a bit depressed by the succession of
papers of mediocre quality, especially when they include the same type of errors that have
occurred many times before. Then think what it is like to feel reinvigorated having picked up the
next paper which looks well presented and clearly reflects that an effort has been made to avoid
some of the common pitfalls. Everyone (including the examiners) knows that the exam is
relatively rushed and neatness is not the prime consideration, but practice does show through, as
does the lack of practice. Errors and omissions are inevitable and whilst you can easily afford to
lose a few marks here and there, losing lots of marks everywhere is fatal to chances of success.
There is always some subjectivity in marking the papers (afterall since there is no one right answer
to the layout design, the marking scheme cannot be defined to the nth degree, but it has to be a bit
generic rather than totally prescriptive). On an otherwise good paper a significant omission may
be put down to running out of time- the candidate has already convinced the examiner that they
fundamentally know what they are doing so it is unlikely they would have overlooked that item;
the same omission on a generally poor paper may well be viewed as yet further evidence that the
candidate really has not been able to demonstrate that they are competent. The relatively
“mechanicalistic” marking scheme is supplemented by an “overall impression” rating; this
provides a sense-check on the result and any significant discrepancy in the results of these two
methods is analysed. If you are borderline at any of the grade boundaries, then much may depend
on whether the overall impression given by your effort allows (consciously or unconsciously) the
examiner to give you the benefit of the doubt.
Therefore isn’t it worth your effort to do your utmost to ensure that your work gives a good
impression, so that they think:
“this candidate may not be brilliant, but they have clearly got some idea what they are
doing, seems to have practiced and have taken the trouble to ensure that they have avoided
most of the common howlers, even if they obviously have no idea how they should have
tackled whatever was the special feature in this year’s exam and so somewhat embarrassed
themselves”
rather than:
“here’s another one who obviously has not made much of an effort, it’s clear that they can’t
have practiced many previous papers if at all, they certainly haven’t taken the trouble to
take notice of the feedback from last year’s exam so it has lots of the usual faults as well as
some unique stupidities and as for that attempt for the special feature......I really don’t know
why we bother to spend out time looking at papers like this!

5.10.2.2 How
• Make it easy for the examiner, for example:
- candidate number and sequential number on each sheet of paper you want to be
considered,
- if you need to change something make sure it is obvious which bits are to be looked at
and in what order,
- follow the instructions given, for example keeping your answers within the marked
area on the answer sheets, dimension signals outside the scaled area,
- write as legibly as you can given the time constraints.
• Ensure the examiner can avoid the need to guess (and possibly guess wrongly to your
disadvantage):
- explain the practice you are adopting as your standard,
- where you think that this may vary from what is the examiner’s default expectation
(see section 7), make sure that attention is drawn to the issue. If you think there is a
chance your answer could be misinterpreted, take the responsibility yourself to avoid
that doubt. Ironically it isn’t likely to be the “very different” practices which pose
problems since these will be very evident and the examiner will realise that they need
to obtain appropriate advice when they are uncertain; it’s the “basically very similar
but with a few key significant differences” which could appear to be incorrect. If you
aren’t proactive in this regard, you are running the risk of losing marks; you can’t
reasonably expect the examiners to be psychic and thus it would be your own fault if
they mark inappropriately.
- if you get so far and then find that it has all gone horribly wrong because of a silly
error or you’ve suddenly realised an inconsistency you can’t resolve in the time left,
then say so and indicate what you would have done to rectify had you the chance,
- summarise in the last few minutes anything that you know is outstanding and you
haven’t time to do- at least the examiner will know that you know that it needed to be
done (see section 5.10.5).
- state your assumptions. If for example the paper calls for a 4 minute stopping
headway, can you tell from the context whether it means “between two trains on the
same stopping pattern” or “between a train which has stopped and the train which
doesn’t stop that is following it”?
o If you don’t think you have been given the information to be sure, then say so.
Then state what your assumption is and proceed accordingly. The fact that you
have recognised you are uncertain and yet have clarified to the examiner how
you have interpreted it is far more important than what you have assumed.
o Be aware that real projects often encounter specification difficulties where
something which one party believes is perfectly clear is potentially liable to
misinterpretation by another; signal engineers should always be on the lookout
for this sort of thing and the exam sometimes makes sure that you are!
Remember the vowels; think about:
Ambiguities, Errors, Inconsistencies and Omissions and the Undefined (the
thing that isn’t written can actually be more significant than what is recorded).
It is up to You to point them out!
- you may find that reading the musings over a typical candidate’s paper in Appendix W
will enable you to comprehend better the problem when things are unclear and how the
candidate’s work may be viewed in that context; it may both inspire you to ensure it
won’t be a problem with your paper and give you clues how to achieve this aim.

5.10.3 Approaching the task

Whereas the ability to recall a certain amount of detail is certainly valuable, the most important
thing to be able to demonstrate is that you actually understand the broad subject. Your layout is
partially marked on impression, and fundamentally you must convince the examiner that you know
what signalling to put where and have an understanding of why
• You are therefore better off in placing signals over the entire plan and then concentrating
most of your attention on providing the detail for a substantial portion of the plan, rather
than being intent on doing the entire plan at too fast a pace and thus riddled with glaring
errors. Indeed candidates often betray their fundamental lack of understanding by virtue of
the “howlers” they commit; focus particularly on eliminating these.
- This obviously requires such faults initially to be recognised, so do try to get some of
your work reviewed by others. This might be by a Study Group leader, a peer review
of other students or some work colleague that you ask specially to help you. Many
students seem reluctant to ask for help or even accept it when offered, but it is far
better to learn of any defects in sufficient time to be able to tackle them rather than
failing the examination paper and even then not knowing exactly why. The exam
review which is held most years in mid-January attempts to give a flavour of how the
previous October’s examination was tackled and some elements of certain questions
are discussed but it is not the forum for individual feedback or assistance on particular
issues.
• However the opposite extreme must also be avoided; do not concentrate on one particular
element or area of the plan to such an extent that you fail to demonstrate at least an overall
solution to the entire plan.
If you produce a plan on which the signalling is basically complete and reasonably sound then you
should pass quite easily. If you are hoping for a Distinction in the module, or the Thorrowgood
scholarship for the examination as a whole, then you do need to put much more effort into
demonstrating that you know the why as well as the what and how and hence rather more in the
way of explanatory notes will be expected. Obviously to be confident of at least passing then a
student ought to aim significantly higher than the bare minimum, so all candidates should expect
to include a basic level of supporting information- route boxes, the method of working, fringe
arrangements etc.
Just like other examinations, and indeed so much else in life, the secret is in the preparation.
There are no short-cuts. If you have not started your study sufficiently early, thought carefully
about the paper you are to sit and also practiced what you will need to do under examination
conditions, then you should not expect to succeed in the exam. You also need to ensure that you
are physically ready for the exam itself; see section 5.11.

5.10.4 Time Allocation

Time management is extremely important in the exam. Be aware of which parts of the paper are
rewarded with the most marks and plan in advance how you are going to divide your time between
the different tasks. You may need to make your final decision when you see the mark allocation in
the actual question paper and have an appreciation of the layout. Teach yourself the self-discipline
to ensure that you do not get distracted later when in the heat of the examination.
The marks usually allocated for numbering and indicating the lie of points, and marking on track
circuits are relatively generous, so do ensure that you allow enough time to obtain these easy
marks. There is an argument for starting the layout with the points and indeed putting in many of
the block joints in and around them; you get to know the layout and have the satisfaction of
knowing that you have got off to a good start before undertaking a very careful reading of the
notes and commencing the calculations.
Ensure you understand the allocation of the examination marks and be aware of a Key
Performance Indicator, your “marks per minute” quotient; initial planning is needed to ensure
suitable prioritisation and then continual self monitoring during the examination should be
undertaken.
Marks per Minute
Programme yourself to monitor your own performance and ensure you implement a supervisory
function capable of:
• recognising a problem if the “mpm” value drops (indicating excessive time consumption on
a particular activity), and then,
• intervening to implement an appropriate remedial action (see section 5.10.5).
The table below gives an approximate suggestion of a possible time allocation; it is important to
emphasise that certain candidates will be quicker on some activities than others, and also the
layout content does also have a significant impact so it is just indicative.
Element Time
Candidate No, extra sheets, general notes stating practices, assumptions, abbreviations 5
Point lie, identification numbering, add trap points and show block joints within S&C 5
Calculation of braking distance, signal spacings, headway, 15
including workings, assumptions and any special notes on working
Signal positioning (including any shunting signal, banner repeaters etc.) 15
Complete signal profiles (displayed main & subsidiary aspects, route & auxiliary indications,) 10
Number signals 5
Route boxes for all controlled signals 10
Complete limits of train detection, including overlap extents, identification 10
Addition of miscellaneous items such as speed boards, 5
Check work, add explanations, address omissions and correct deficiencies. 10
Total 90

5.10.5 When time starts disappearing during the exam

It is easy to get distracted in an examination, perhaps you just can’t get the calculations to work
out to a sensible answer or perhaps you might spend a long time vacillating over which way to
signal an area because there seem to be disadvantages with each of the options you have tried.
Perhaps you seemed to start well but later discover that you have made an error which has had a
major impact on your plan, or indeed did find a reasonable initial design for one area of the plan
but it has later had unfortunate implication at an adjacent junction and that in retrospect you wish
that you’d made a different initial decision. It is unlikely that you’ll have the time to re-work the
issue and all its impacts.
Obviously you need to try to avoid such issues from arising at all and one way of doing so is
definitely to have had much practice at a variety of past papers; however problems can arise even
for the most prepared candidate. Time constraints are deliberately challenging so recognise that
everyone will struggling to complete the paper within the exam time; everyone always wants more
time, what you need is to have made the best use of what you have available to do sufficiently
well, not to have achieved perfection.
The key issues are:
• make sure you recognise the situation early,
• don’t panic,
• limit the damage,
• recover from the situation as best you can,
• don’t worry and focus on continuing with the remainder of the paper.
If you find that you have made a serious error or indeed just wish in retrospect that you had done
things differently, there is no good hoping that the examiners won’t notice! Cut your losses,
declare the issue and its impact so that the examiner “knows that you know” and then keep going
to develop your solution despite of it- otherwise you’ll end up not presenting enough evidence for
you competence to be judged.
If you do run short of time write short notes of what you know is outstanding - you may get
some credit since it removes doubt from the examiners’ mind whether you overlooked something
or just took too long to be able to resolve it.

5.11 Examination Readiness

Don’t forget that being ready for the examination is not only about revising technical knowledge
and honing your exam technique, but also about being physically and physiologically ready.
Like any examination much depends on preparation so do a rehearsal (at least mentally if not
physically) step-by-step of what you are going to face in the final week culminating in the actual
examination. The table below has a list of things that should start you thinking:
Have you got organised for the day?
• lots of sharpened pencils (don’t want to waste time sharpening) and several pens (ensure not
prone to smudging),
• rubbers (take 2, might lose one),
• a rubbing shield (so only rub out the required area)- failing that a small as well as a large rubber,
• some “typex” white correction fluid / tape [NB see section 7.2],
• a long ruler (at least 500mm) and a set square; useful both for measuring on a plan, drawing
route boxes etc.
• a scale rule to speed up the process of measuring. It is a good idea to produce one on translucent
film so that it can be rolled up (old 35mm film canisters make a good container) and to make
sure that it is long enough to cover the longest distance you might need to measure-
say 1.6 – 2.0m
• BASIC ONLY (non-programmable) calculator (headway and braking calculations etc.)
• a watch that can be in your face when you are struggling to complete work against the deadline.
Are they all together just ready to take?
Do you know?
• Your candidate number,
• EXACTLY where and when you need to attend,
• any public transport times (check for engineering work!), car park locations etc
• what time you need to get up and leave for the examination
Will you be tired at the end of a hard week at work?

• Have you asked your employer to allow you some study revision time just prior to the exam?
• Have you reserved some annual holiday to give yourself some breathing space in that week?
• Have you thought how you will be spending the evening relaxing before the exam?
Have you thought through the exam itself?

• how will you spend your 10 minutes initial reading time looking at the paper?
• have you decided how to allocate your time during the exam to maximise your marks?
• how are you going to spend those valuable last minutes just prior to the end of the examination?
• do you have a mental check-list of those silly errors to which you are prone and the oversights
that you tend to make so that you can do a self-check for these and resolve them rather than let
the examiner discover?
Have you understood and practiced the actual mechanics of the answer papers?
• obviously you’d have practiced many layouts, but in the exam itself it is important to put your
candidate number upon it and cross reference how many additional answer sheets that you wish
considered (e.g. containing calculations, general notes / assumptions, route box information)
• on A4 size portrait ruled paper only write on the lines in the broad central column- the narrow
columns on each side are for the two examiners to record their marks, so leave these clear
• on A3 sized landscape blank write answer only within the bold box- not outside to the edges!
• A4 and A3 sheets should quote Module and “sheet x of y” as well as candidate number.

6 Selected Study Topics

6.1 Role of Section 6.
A brief reminder of the key learning objectives is applicable here; Module 2 is primarily about
understanding:
• the relationship between the spacing of signals and the intensity of traffic, braking
characteristics and gradient,
• how to interpret Signalling Principles and Operational Rules in order to determine a
suitable signalling, show on a given track layout the detail of the signalling required
(i.e. adequate yet not excessive) for the safe and efficient movement of trains.
This requires a wide ranging knowledge and therefore the student ought to study (as explained
within section 5.6) each of the individual topics listed in section 4 before actually attempting to
“Signal a Layout”.
The role of section 6 is to give the student some direction in this task, especially where it applies to
the more technical elements;
• sometimes this is purely by cross-referencing a source in the tables of sections 6.4 and 6.5,
• sometimes information is included here explicitly in the later subsections.
Section 6 is therefore the heart of the Study Pack but do recognise that it includes a study of the
relevant references, not just the information presented here directly. Similarly note that it does not
represent the totality of the study material recommended; refer also to Appendix Y. This includes
papers published in the Proceedings and articles in IRSE News. Note that the London papers tend
to be published first in IRSE News benefiting from being in colour with photographs, but the post
meeting discussion is also included in the Proceedings, so both references are given where
applicable. Finally remember that the reading is only a “stepping stone”; the actual task is to
attempt to put the knowledge into practice as is described in section 7.
6.2 Ordering and Use of Section 6.

It is hard to arrange the topics in an ideal order in which they can be studied, since in truth they
inter-relate quite significantly. It is often necessary to learn a bit about one subject before being
able to make sense of another, but the converse is often also true and hence the difficulty in
ordering. For similar reasons a certain amount of repetition of information between sections
occurs, so if the text seems similar just treat it as a bit of revision.
• The order of the items in the table in section 6.4 reflects a reasonable overall ordering, but
recognise that in reality there will be a need to jump to & fro a bit amongst related lines of
entry. Often there is a cross reference to a later section within section 6 and this is best used
as an introduction to the topic before exploring the other references given either in the initial
table or the subsequent text. Subjects on which there is significant useful detail but are a bit
of a diversion from the main process have been separated into several of the Appendices.
• The items in the table of section 6.5 are similar but are the “special cases” of particular
considerations that are necessary for the student to know but only after the more general
material is well understood.
Keep referring back to these initial tables whilst studying; whilst the subsequent parts of the
section are approximately in the same order, they do not cover the whole range of the subjects
which are part of Module 2- they have been written primarily where there is not already
sufficiently up to date material which could easily simply referenced.

6.3 Context
Section 6 has been written from a UK Mainline background but as generically as possible in order
that candidates from different countries are able to draw out the principles and determine how they
apply to their specific environment.
However without some particular specific information generic text can be too abstract to
comprehend and thus would not be useful to the student. Hence it is illustrated with examples,
many of which are from UK practice. Be aware that some considerations are regarded to be of far
less importance in different countries; conversely in other environments there can be other relevant
factors which may not have been included here.
Students should seek out more detailed information specific to a particular railway; for example
those interested in additional detail relating to the NR application are referred to Appendix N1 (for
the practice) and to the various other Appendices (for some of the theory). Students of other
railways should attempt to locate similarly detailed information, such as can be compiled from
appropriate company documents.
Note that advice relating to how a candidate should approach a particular issue in the examination
context is given in section 7; this however relies upon the correct understanding of the broad
theory in this section which should be studied first.
The following tables attempt to summarise where information may be found to support this study.
Note that most of the references do tend to reflect broadly UK style signalling since this happens
to be the assumption of much of the literature available in English. The IRSE would wish to
extend this table to include a greater variety of reference sources and would welcome suggestions
where such sources are publicly accessible.
Despite this, these references do not necessarily represent modern UK Mainline practice as they
can only reflect the situation as it was when they were written. Indeed remember that the
substantial majority of the signalling on the railway is always “out of date” with the current
standard; much still substantially reflects the practices of the time when it was installed- some the
1960s, much the 1970s & 1980s and some the 1990s. Therefore it may well be the case that the
2008 student actually is more familiar with the practices of such a time than the current day.
The RGS however do reflect (except in the rare case of a “national non-compliance pending
standards change”) the current standard, although there is an inevitable lag of several years before
any new signalling schemes reflect the changes introduced by these updated documents.
Appendix Y contains details of how these can be downloaded and also includes a commentary
summarising which elements within them are quite UK specific and which are more generic.
Many may therefore prove of some value to students of other railways; sometimes truly generic
information is too abstract and complex to be useful to the student and hence a real case is helpful
even if the situation is not precisely familiar.

To summarise, the UK Mainline standards are included here for the following reasons:
• the majority of candidates for this paper are either from the UK or have performed some work
for this environment,
• any reference to give detail on a subject is normally better than no reference at all and there is
recognition that some students might experience difficulty in accessing any railway’s standards,
• the “Railway Group Standards” are freely available anywhere in the world by anyone with
internet access to the RSSB website; it is not known if the same is true for any other railway.
Although certain elements are indeed UK specific, much of the “high level” content is actually
reasonably generic and some guidance relating to this is included in Appendix Y,
• this Study Pack has had to be written primarily from a UK viewpoint; if a student has difficulty
in understanding the context then these further references may assist understanding as they
include a glossary of terms, definitions etc.
Candidates from other countries / administrations are advised to determine the appropriate local
practice by referring to the railway’s operational procedures perhaps contained within a “Rule
Book” and any Signalling Principles published. The IRSE would be pleased to include additional
information within a later edition of this Study Pack should such material be made available
without copyright restrictions.
6.4 System-wide Topics

System-wide Topics
Study Topic References UK Mainline Specific RGS/ NR
Purpose & Philosophy of 6.6 and associated refs. RSPG Part 1, Part 2[a,c,d]
Signalling within the Railway #5 Chapter 1 (pages 1-3)
System #22 Intro to Signal Engineering
#57/2 [changing concepts, ETCS] Handbook
#60/1
#61/4 [IRSE Philosophy Review]
#64/1 [concepts]
#64/2 [railway control]
#64/3 [Principles and Practice]
#66/8 [comparison India and UK]
Role of Signals 6.7 RSPG Part 2 [d]
#13 Chapter 5
Maintaining Train Separation 6.8 and associated refs. RSPG Part 2 [d]
#4 Chapter 1
Train Braking 6.9 RSPG Part 2 [f]
Appendix E and associated refs.
#11 (pages 29 – 47)
#19 Chapter 8
Relating train braking to 6.10 and associated refs. GK/RT0034
signalling design, including Appendix S (for NR)
mixed traffic utilisation #10/1, #10/2
#29/1 [Train characteristics]
#37/2 [Signalling Principles]
#59/1 [China: Mainline & Metro]
Railway Operations Infrastructure Description = Sectional Appendix
Procedures Manual = Rule Book
Running schedule of train services = WTT [Working Time Table]

System-wide Topics
Study Topic References UK Mainline Specific RGS/ NR
Giving the driver enough 6.11 and associated refs. RSPG Part 2[d]
warning: 6.12 and associated refs
• speed signalling, #10/1, #10/2
• route signalling, #38/1 [International comparisons]
#41/1 [comparison speed / route]
#51/1 [SNCF]
#51/2 [Mass Transit]
#52/1 [ETCS]
#52/3 [Eurotunnel]
#54/2 [upgrading to MAS]
#58/3 [TBS]
Aspect sequence for plain line. 6.12 and associated refs GK/RT0032 /B8-10 and Appdx
Appendix S (for NR) GK/RT0060
#5 Chapter 2 (pages 44-9)
Standage section 6.17
Appendix L
Capacity of a railway 6.8, 6.13, 6.15 7.5 &
Appendix G.17 and associated refs
section 6.22 (loop headway)
#12 (pages 37-8)
#25 (chapters 9, 10, 12)
#48/1, #58/2 [maximising; KCRC]
#51/3 [capacity modelling]
#60/1 [understanding capacity]
#60/5 [ERTMS]
#60/6 [effect of ATP]
#63/2 [meaning of capacity]
#63/3 [types of headways]
#63/5 [maximising]
Braking & Headway #10/1 & #10/2 GK/RT0034 [braking tables/
calculations: #5 Chapter 2 (pages 5-27) curves, gradient adjustments]
• Non-stop Appendix G including example
• Stopping
Relating to layout constraints 6.19
6.21
6.27.
Varieties of Pointwork (S&C) Appendix J NR/PS/SIG/2001
#4 Chapter 4 GI/RT7006
#11 (pages 48-56)
#12 (page 26-31, 36-7)
photographs

System-wide Topics (continued)

Study Topic References UK Mainline Specific RGS
Positioning signals to protect 6.13 GK/RT0032 B6
Junctions and other hazards 6.16.3 RSPG
6.17
Flank and Trapping 6.16.2.2, GK/RT0064 [flank, and trapping]
6.23.2, RSPG
6.24,
7.10.2.
Appendix J
Overlap determination of 6.16.1, 6.16.2 GK/RT0064 [overlaps]
appropriate type and length 6.24.3 GI/RT7006 [assessment of risk]
#5 Chapter 2 (pages 30-35) RT/E/C/111600 F3.4
#5 Chapter 3 (54-55, 60-61) SSI-8003
#29/1 [overlaps]
#56/4 [overlaps]
#60/3 [overlaps]
Train Protection and K.1 [collision risk on single lines] GK/RT8035 [AWS]
Layout Risk considerations #4 Chapter 13 GE/RT8018 [Train stops]
#5 Chapter 10 (pages 300-1) GE/RT8030 [TPWS]
#6 Chapter 6 9 [ATP] GK/RT0064 [Overlaps/ trapping]
#15 [Junction Risk] GI/RT7006 [Overrun risk assess]
#46/1 [ATC in Switzerland] NR/GN/SIG/0028 [RTP]
#49/1 [ATC in Netherlands]
#52/4 [BR ATP Spec]
#55/1 [ATC on MTR]
#56/5 [track layout design]
#61/2 [TPWS]
#63/4 [LUL overlaps & TPWS]
#65/3 [RTP and junction sig.]
#66/7 [mitigation by TPWS]
Fouling and Clearance Points at Appendix J GK/RT0011 [Train detection]
junctions #5 Chapter 10 (pages 30-31, 35)
Signalling at Stations 6.19 GK/RT0032 B6
See also Permissive Passenger) #5 Chapter 2 pages 28-29


Compromises and optimising 7.6
placement of signals to satisfy section 6.17
braking, headway and #10/2
protection and other
requirements
Other constraints on signal 6.20 GE/RT0037
positions (tunnels, bridges, GK/RT0032 B6
viaducts)
Route Boxes and 7.7 GK/RT0060 [route classes]
Signal Profiles, Indicators #4 Chapter 5 RT/E/C/11600 Fig F5:11
Appendix T
Types of block working: #13 Chapters 3-5 [TCB] GK/RT0041 [TCB]
• “open”/ “closed”, #13 Chapters 11-17 [AB] GK/RT0042 [AB]
• “absolute” / #39/1 [American] GK/RT0054 [RETB]
“permissive”, #59/2 [moving block]
• “fixed” / “moving”. #64/4 [space intervals]
#64/5 [TVM430 speed codes]
Junction Signalling #5 Chapter 2 (pages 44-49) GK/RT0031
types, #6 Chapter 14 (pages 180-185) GK/RT0032 B10
approach release #13 Chapter 7 GK/RT0060
#51/4 and #57/5 [splitting distant] NR/L2/SIG/19609
#60/3 [compares route and speed]
#65/3 [MAR, MAY-FA, MAF etc]
Aspect Sequence #5 Chapter 2 (pages 44-9) GK/RT0032 B8-10 and Appdx

#48/2 GK/RT0060
Signal sighting: 6.19.1 [close up viewing] GE/RT0037

• sighting distances, section 6.22 GO/RT3252
• repeaters / banners, NR/SP/SIG/SIG/10157
• read through,
• read across.
Signal numbering section 7.8 GK/RT0032


Point numbering and lie section 6.23 GI/RT7004
section 6.23.2
section 6.24
section 7.10.3
#5 Chapter 3 (pages 52 & 65 - 66)
#36/1 [point numbering]
[split detection]
Ground Frames etc #4 Chapter 8 (page 107) GK/RT0051 (section 9)
Appendix L GK/RT0054 (section 9)
#13 Chapter 16 GK/RT0061
Train Detection requirements #4 Chapter 7 GK/RT0011
#5 Chapter 2 (pages 35-8) GK/RT0063 [A/L & TORR]
#5 Chapter 7 (pages 190-2) [TCI]` GK/RT0217 [axle counter]
#6 Chapter 6 NR/GN/SIG/111900
#56/3 [alternatives to track circuit] GK/RT0032 Appdx3
#64/4 [train detection] RT/E/C/11600 F3.3.1, 3.3.4
RT/E/S/11764 (TCI)
RT/E/S/11752 (train Detection)
Train Detection identification section 7.9.2 GK/RT0009 B8
Permissible speed and other GK/RT0007
lineside signage GK/RT0038
GI/RT7033
Operation in degraded mode: #13 Chapter 5 (page 20) GE/RT8071
• Passable / non passable #13 Chapters 9, 18 NR/L2/SIG/SIG/30009
plates, #48/1 [Hong Kong experience] GK/RT0032 B7
• Signal positioning, #53/1 [signaller’s perspective] GE/GN8571
• Point numbering, #55/1 [fault tolerance] [POSA and emergency releases]
• Degraded mode aspects #57/3 [emergency aspect]
#58/1 [Metro Operations]
#59/5 [Axle Counter fallback]
#59/6 [KCRC]
Train Operation and Rules #12 (partic. pages 5-8, 57-106) GE/RT8000 GO/RC3900
GO/RC3055 GO/RM3056
GO/RC3571 GO/RT3251
GO/RT3475 ATOC/GN07
Glossary of Terms Appendix Z [abbreviations] GK/GN0802
#13 Appendix
Symbols for Plans RT/E/C/11004

6.5 Special Topics
Special Topics
Permissive passenger #4 Chapter 5 (pages 42 - 3) GK/RT0044
working at terminal and #5 Chapter 2 (pages 42-4) GO/RT3475
through platforms GE/RT8060 [train dispatch equipt]
=”Huddersfield” RT/E/C/11600 F3.2.6 [Lime St]
Terminal stations- headway #36/1
and capacity issues Appendix N2
#36/1
Shunting movements, #5 Chapter 2 (pages 38-41, 71)
including running around,
propelling.
Positioning of GPLs and
LOS, requirement for pre-set
shunts
Local control of points- Appendix L GK/RT0061
handpoints and Ground
Frames etc.
Operation at freight Appendix L GK/RT0061
terminals, rolling-stock #5 Chapter 3 (page 61) GK/RT0044
depots #36/2 (colliery/ power station) GK/RT0064
#54/4 (bulk handling terminal)
Fringes- boundaries of Appendix L GK/RT0061

control areas, co-operation GK/RT0031
between signallers via slots,
releases, acceptances etc

Special Topics
Operation of Single Lines 6.27 GK/RT0051
and Reversible Signalling Appendix K GK/RT0054 [RETB]
#1 Chapters VII- X. RSPG
#4 Chapter 16
#6 Chapter 3
#9 Chapter 7
#13 Chapter 22
#14 Chapters VII - X
#16 All chapters of part 2.
#37/1 [Reversible signalling]
#37/3 [Switzerland]
#39/1 [American blocks, CTC]
#42/1 [RETB]
#47/3 [developing railways]
#56/1 [radio token]
#56/3 [France & Germany]
#57/1 [radio based signalling]
#57/3 [CTC in South Africa]
#57/4 [Radio Block in Sweden]
Level Crossings- appropriate #4 Chapter 12 GK/RT0029 [Barrow xings]
type and protection #6 Chapter 6 GI/RT7011
arrangements #12 (pages 111-112) GI/RT7012
#13 Chapters 23, 24, 25 SSI-8003
#17 RT/E/C/11600 Part X
RSPG Part 2[e]
Lockout systems incl PLOD GK/RT0030
Buffer stops section 6.17.2, GK/RT0031 B25
section 6.20,
section 6.26.5.3.
Transition between signalling GK/RT0036 [no lineside signals]
systems GK/RT0039 [semaphore]
RSPG

6.6 The Purpose of Signalling

It is worth remembering why (almost all) railways require signalling:
• many trains have to use the same infrastructure,
• drivers of trains cannot “steer around” other trains and obstructions,
• the braking distance of a train is greater than the distance that the driver can see.
Therefore the tasks which signalling performs are:

• to set up and lock a route for the passage of each train over the track it is to traverse,
• to authorise the driver to make the movement and ensure that there is clarity regarding the
circumstances (so that the driver knows what is implied by that authority and conversely
what additionally they need to check to be assured that the movement will be safe),
• to maintain the route for the train whilst it is making the movement but then permit its
release once it is no longer required so that the infrastructure is available for use by other
trains,
• to regulate the passage of trains and ensure that trains are kept a safe distance apart both
in junction areas and when following another train along a track.
The overall purpose of signalling is to facilitate the safe and efficient movement of trains on the
railway. Trains can be run without signals but at the risk of human error; it is the signalling that
allows this risk to be managed to very low levels. A balance has to be achieved between:
• enabling the maximum number of trains to be run as fast as possible on the minimum of
infrastructure utilising the minimum of signalling equipment (minimise the costs to provide
and maintain),
• spacing trains sufficiently apart from each other and control junctions in such a way as to
minimise risk and thus maximise safety.
Although it is sometimes the perception by others that signalling stops trains, the actual task of
signalling is to keep trains moving and maximise the track capacity. The concept of capacity is
therefore a most important topic; see section 6.15 and Appendix G.17.
It is the activity of “Signalling the Layout” that very largely defines what is regarded as the best
compromise for the given situation; it is at the heart of signal engineering and the reason why one
IRSE exam module is completely dedicated to this task.

Related Activities:
1. Read relevant sections of IRSE Signalling Philosophy Review: Mainline UK Railways
[#61/4] to obtain a broad overview.
Supplement this with other sources (e.g. #64/1, #64/3).

2. Make a selection from the various other references described in Appendix Y in order to
Investigate how the signalling provided varies:
a) on lines of different natures under the control of a single railway administration /
in the same country (e.g. #57/3, #61/1),
b) on lines of similar nature in different countries (e.g. #7),
c) between a Metro and a Mainline environment,
d) between speed and route signalling (e.g. #18, #38/1, #41/1, #54/2),
e) between lineside signalling and in-cab signalling / TBS.

These may not seem directly useful to the task of “Signalling the Layout” but will actually
give you a firm foundation from which to tackle that activity from a position of
understanding the key issues.

6.7 Understanding how the Role of Signals affects their Positioning

Precise meanings of the aspects displayed vary widely between railways but at the most simplistic
level there are two basic messages to convey to the driver:
1) “stop here when red light shows”
e.g. junction in use for another train, level crossing in use by road traffic,
swing bridge open, have caught up the train ahead,
and 2) “warning: slow down for forthcoming hazard”
e.g. soon to encounter signal at danger, speed restricted junction etc
There are some constraints which affect the positioning of any signal; primarily these are:
• achieving sufficient long range visibility,
• avoidance of confusion (proximity to other signals, avoidance of background clutter and extraneous
light sources, away from miscellaneous distractions),
• physical mounting considerations,
• technical operational constraints
There are certain constraints re positioning stop signals these relate to:
• the adequacy of protection of any immediate hazard,
• consideration of operation in a degraded mode,
• the division of the railway into blocks as a means of ensuring separation of following trains.
There are other constraints relating to the positioning of warning signals; these relate to:
• the manner in which the warning is given to the driver,
• the distance which a train needs in order to reduce speed sufficiently to be able to comply with
conditions ahead.
Hence when positioning a signal on a layout, the purpose of that particular signal should always be
borne in mind; is it purely a stop signal, is it purely a warning signal or does it perform both roles?
6.8 Maintaining the Safe Separation of Following Trains

Many single lines permit only one train to be on the portion of track between two passing places
at any one time and thus the means of enforcing train separation for following trains is the same as
that which prevents attempted use of the line in opposite directions simultaneously; see
descriptions in Appendix K2. However, in general, a stretch of track is required to be used by a
succession of trains and therefore there has to be a means of ensuring that they are always
separated by a safe distance. In the vast majority of cases, some form of “fixed block” system is
used; the railway is divided into sections physically defined on the track (track circuit IRJ, axle
counter Zp, transponder position or similar) and only one train is permitted in any section at any
one time.
The length of each block dictates the line capacity; indeed it is limited by the block section which
takes the longest time to traverse. Of course this may not be the physically longest; it very much
also depends on the actual speed of the trains using the stretch of line. This is obviously limited
both by the maximum permissible speed of the train itself and the particular portion of line but
may be less; trains may be timetabled to travel at a lower speed, they may always need to be
braking to comply with a forthcoming speed restriction further along the line or constrained by the
signalling system. See Appendix G.

However, in general, the higher the speed of the line the longer the braking distance. Since this
tends to increase proportionally to the square of the speed, so does the minimum signal separation
and thus the length of the block sections. The time to travel a certain distance only reduces
proportionally to the speed, so the capacity of a given line is reduced if it is signalled for a higher
maximum speed. Where that line is also shared by lower speed traffic, this equally suffers from
the greater signal spacing but cannot take advantage of the higher maximum speed; therefore the
capacity of the line for such traffic is reduced even more significantly. The need to obtain more
capacity in such situations and in particular enable a line to be shared more effectively by trains of
different characteristics is one of the reasons why greater complexity has evolved and for the
solutions adopted by different railways to have diverged. Appendix G considers the various forms
of MAS utilised on NR to suit different levels of traffic and linespeed; the selection is a matter of
minimising the cost of signalling provision whilst remaining both safe and able to deliver the
capacity required. For further discussion of capacity, see section 6.15 and #25..
TBS systems do not necessarily need to utilise a fixed block system; instead of the infrastructure
detecting the train, the train can gather information regarding its whereabouts and communicate
this to the control centre. From knowledge of its characteristics and its current speed, the safety
distance which the train would need to stop is also known and this can be used to permit the
minimum train separation to be reduced accordingly. This is the basis of the concept of “moving
block”; a safety envelope around each train. Some such systems have fixed safety parameters
such as Safety Distance whereas in other systems these can vary dynamically according to the
actual conditions at the time.
• Such systems are gradually coming into use on Metro lines; potentially they offer increased
capacity, but much of the benefit can be obtained from dividing the line into many short
sections of track, such that the units of quantisation for headway purposes is very much less
than the braking distances. A railway fitted with a basic train stop system cannot deliver
more than 28 tph, even when the lengths of the overlaps is shortened by virtue of enforcing a
slow speed approach (see PD). In contrast 33 tph is achievable where a control system based
on speed codes is in use and moving block can deliver 36 tph; the line capacity is largely
constrained by the effect of station dwell times and the necessary braking and acceleration
phases.
• On Mainline railways, such systems have not yet been introduced. ETCS level 3 enables the
elimination of lineside train detection and the specification includes the option for moving
block functionality but this has yet to be implemented, despite there being a reference
[#29/1] to the concept as long ago as 1938!

Note that there are three different generic implementation philosophies:

Type Movement Braking Comments
Authority calculation
A Lineside Lineside All the key intelligence of the system is centralised in some form
of central vehicle control computer. The vehicles fundamentally
implement the speed profile instructions received and keep the
central computer updated regarding their current speed and
location.
B Lineside On board Trains calculate for themselves the necessary braking curve in
response to the movement authority based on their position and
characteristics etc. The gradient and speed profile for the relevant
portion of railway is transmitted as part of the movement
authority from the central computer.
C On board On board The central computer broadcasts common information relating to
the area of railway to all trains which happen to be within it,
rather than addressing each train individually. Each train works
out for itself its movement authority and braking profile and hold
a “map” of the entire line giving speed and gradient profile etc.
Thales’ Seltrac is an example of type A, whereas Westinghouse’s Distance To Go radio is an

example of type C. These are best suited where the train fleet is effectively captive to a relatively
small area, as is the case in the Metro environment.
ETCS is an example of type B and is the most suitable where a vehicle needs to be able to roam
widely. The logistic implications of a type C system for this scenario doesn’t bear thinking about
(any track layout change on an interoperable line in Europe would need to be reflected in the on-
board memory of every interoperable vehicle wherever it happened to be in the continent, just in
case it might have occasion to travel in that area in future, and this update would have to be
ensured in a safety critical manner).
Related Activities:
1. Compare the characteristics of various block systems that are utilised in different
situations. Good places to start include #7, #64/4.
Compare the requirements of GK/RT 0041 and GK/RT 0042 within #2

2. Make a study of relevant sources to understand the concepts applicable to:
speed signalling, train protection, transmission based signalling.

Possible references include:
#8 , #51/2, #58/2 , #54/1, #54/3,
#63/1, #52/4, #46/1, #51/1, #64/5, #51/2, #52/3,


6.9 Braking
6.9.1 The significance of braking for railway operation
A feature of railways is the low friction between steel rails and steel wheels; this has its advantages
but means long distances to stop are required due to the severely limited adhesion. Trains can also
be extremely heavy and/ or travel at considerable speeds; a moving train therefore has significant
momentum and there is a lot of kinetic energy to convert to other forms of energy during the
process of stopping a train. Hence braking assumes a much bigger significance within the design
of a railway system than it is within the design of a road network for example.
6.9.2 Relevance to Signalling
The most fundamental role of a railway signalling system is to communicate to the driver
information needed for the train to be driven safely and efficiently. Since braking distances are
generally far greater than the distance over which direct observation is possible, the warning to
brake for an unseen hazard is the most important piece of information to transfer to the driver.
Railways are signalled on the worst case assumption that the train ahead could potentially stop
instantaneously (but see [#60/1] and [#60/4]); hence it is necessary always to maintain a minimum
separation between following trains that is equal to the distance required (plus of course a suitable
safety margin- see section 6.16.2) to brake from the current speed to a stand
The concept of braking distance (i.e. the distance required for a train to brake to a stand from its
highest permissible speed at that position) is an important consideration for almost all railways:
• At one extreme, a tramway type metro operating light trains with good brakes at slow speeds
could potentially give enough warning to a driver purely by ensuring good signal sighting,
thus allowing trains the required braking distance from sight of the red aspect.
• In practice however many heavy metros do actually provide repeater signals to give more
warning. These are generally not placed at braking distance but instead relatively close to
main signal, positioned purely to maximise their approach view. Such provision of a
separate signal permits the stop signal itself to be positioned precisely where it is needed
without the need to be too much concerned about its long distance sighting. Hence whereas
braking distance does not affect the inter signal spacing in this environment, it is relevant to
the placement of individual signals- it effectively dictates the minimum distance over which
they must be effective in all conditions of visibility.
• At the other extreme, mainlines tend to operate either fast trains or heavy freight trains or
both; braking distances tend to be high due to the speed or the low achievable braking rate
respectively. Even at moderate speeds, braking distances can exceed one mile (1600m).
This distance obviously far exceeds the distance at which a driver could see a signal reliably,
which is why the concept of providing a distant signal to warn a driver well beforehand is
fundamental to almost all railway signalling. Braking distances can be comparable with the
signal spacing needed for headway and thus a particular signal often has a dual role and a
MAS (Multiple Aspect Signalling) system results.
Metros generally require much higher capacity than mainline railways and thus need close signal
spacing, however because of moderate speeds and relatively high braking rates, the warning
distances still tend to be less than the signal spacing in the vast majority of circumstances.
Conversely the signal spacing for mainline railways is frequently dictated more by the need to
provide sufficiently early warning to stop elsewhere than by the need to protect specific local
infrastructure hazards or indeed considerations of capacity.

In this respect MAS is fundamentally different from semaphore signalling in which:

• a signal is almost always either a stop signal or warning signal,
• every stop signal tends to be positioned very near to the particular junction it protects, and
thus semaphore stop signals are normally concentrated in groups around a particular area
(generally a station or an isolated junction),
• there is usually a significant distance between the signals controlled by one such signal box
and those controlled by its neighbour, the line between the separate areas of signalling being
termed the “block section”,
• there is generally one warning signal on each approach to a signalbox area, this “distant”
signal being placed to give the necessary warning to stop at any of the group of signals to
which it relates.
Although not discussed further in this Study Pack, be aware that colour light signals are
occasionally used as almost direct replacements for semaphore signals on the main line; in these
circumstances they do not form part of an MAS system despite the signal having the form of a
multiple aspect colour light head. In some countries the colour light signal aspects are always
identical to those displayed by night by former semaphore signals; in the UK colour lights are only
utilised in this manner for a minority of situations, generally when controlled from a mechanical
lever frame that formerly operated an equivalent semaphore.
Metro lines however often feature Red/Green signals which are potentially quite closely spaced in
and around station areas in order to provide the necessary operating flexibility and to permit close
headway. Braking is significant for the placing of such signals, but the relevant factor is the
ability for emergency braking to contain any overrunning train within the safe overrun distance
beyond the signal, rather than the service braking from a warning signal on the approach to the
signal being considered. See Appendix M1.
Related Activities:
1. Compare the considerations relevant to different railways by reading some of the
papers summarised in Appendix Y. Some suggestions are:
#42/1, #51/1, #51/2, #54/3, #55/1, #56/1, #57/3, #61/1.


6.9.3 Factors affecting braking distance

Braking distance depends upon:
g) initial speed of the train,
h) nominal braking rate of train,
i) brake build-up delay, i.e. the time during which the brakes gradually become increasingly
effective after having been initiated by the driver (this depends on the design of the braking
system, the length of the train and is a particularly relevant factor for freight trains – see
Appendix F),
j) effect of a rising / falling gradient (which reduces / increases the effective braking rate),
k) sufficiently good rail adhesion conditions (not affected by weather, contamination),
l) train achieving specified performance (wear & tear, certain brakes potentially isolated).
Design can take into account factors a, b, c & d; factors e & f cannot be known since they are
variable by their very nature and therefore a suitable safety margin is built into the declared
nominal braking rate of the train. This caters for a certain degree of deterioration from ideal
performance due to gradual wear or brakes isolated on one vehicle of a train etc.
Signalling must take account of both the line’s geography and its utilisation by rolling stock; see
sections 6.9.4 and 6.9.5.
6.9.4 Characteristics of line geography

Consideration of this topic is essential for any signalling solution- every railway has physical
characteristics that can be expressed as a permissible speed profile and a gradient profile (i.e. a
“map” of how these parameters vary along the length of each path that can be taken whilst
travelling along a railway).
• Sometimes it can be quite simple; leaving London Paddington for example the station throat
is all 25mph running and then there is a stretch of a couple of miles at 40mph for the six
track bi-directional section (in both cases including all pointwork) before the mainline speed
becomes 125mph for many miles. The gradient profile is even simpler- to all intents and
purposes it is dead level for nearly 80 miles.
• Other railways are very different, with very frequent changes in gradients as they thread their
way through the terrain to overcome the various physical features - often there is a climb to a
summit perhaps close to a tunnel to pass through a range of hills before descending to the
next valley, or the need to engineer a railway to pass over a river but under an existing canal
within the same valley. Even in exceptionally flat countryside such as in The Netherlands
there can be a need for gradients down to tunnels to pass under waterways or towns or climb
to a flyover to cross over other tracks, and these can be quite steep. Similarly if the line is
curvaceous or there are engineering structures such as bridges there may need to be a large
number of localised speed restrictions compared with the nominal “linespeed” which is the
ruling maximum for the overall length of the line.

6.9.5 Characteristics of the rolling stock

Each variety of rolling stock using a particular line has its own characteristics which are relevant
to how the line is signalled. In particular every type has a defined maximum speed as well as
acceleration and braking profiles (i.e. curves that define its acceleration / braking performance
which can be visualised as a graph of speed against distance travelled).
See Appendix F for additional information relating to the diversity of braking systems employed
and their effects on elements of performance. In particular be aware that the phrase “emergency
braking” can have one of a range of meanings depending on the context and it is important to have
a clear understanding what is meant whenever it is used.
Related Activities:
1. Read some of the papers summarised in Appendix Y that relate to the use of the
same railway by trains of different characteristics. Some suggestions are:
#41/1, #52/3, #54/3.
6.9.6 Determining braking distance

Some major railways use empirical tables / graphs in order to determine braking distances. NR
has a range of different tables within GK/RT0034, the one to use being a consequence of the
decision whether the line is to be signalled for “All trains”, “Passenger Trains” or “Enhanced
braking (9%g) trains”. These tables are used to look up a stopping distance from a given initial
speed when travelling on a particular rising /level/falling average gradient. The same information
is presented in tabular form (easy look-up of a precise value) and in graphical form (allows an
element of interpolation between empirical data).
Other railways use a calculation method, and this is what is required within the IRSE
examination. It is a great simplification to be able to assume uniform acceleration and braking
(which is of course just negative acceleration) since this means that braking distance is directly
proportional to the square of the initial speed (see Appendix F). Although this should be utilised
for the IRSE examination, it should be explicitly recorded that this is only a first approximation
which would be too inaccurate for most real situations. Appendix F explains some of the factors
that actually need to taken into account in the real world.
The notes on the examination paper generally specify the braking and acceleration rates to use.
Normally the Mainline paper quotes 0.5 ms-2 for both acceleration and braking. The Metro paper
often uses 0.9 ms-2 for acceleration with a Service Brake of 0.9 ms-2 and an Emergency Brake of
1.1 ms-2; refer to Appendix F for a discussion of the distinction.
Given the simplifying assumption of uniform braking, the equation below shows the distance
taken for a train to stop is proportional to the square of its speed and is also obviously dependent
on the braking rate of the rolling stock:
BD = U2
2b
BD= Braking distance to rest from initial speed U where b is braking rate
Details of braking calculations and examples are included in Appendix G.

6.10 Relationship of Braking Distance to Signalling Design

6.10.1 Train borne Signalling
For certain TBS systems much of the signalling is “on-board” within the train, such as for the
European Train Control System. In ETCS levels 2 & 3, the MA is given via GSM-R radio
messages from the RBC. These contain the relevant extracts of the gradient profile and
permissible speed profile applicable to the path which has been allocated to that train- it therefore
combines:
• the static information relating to the line’s physical characteristics including the SSP,
• the dynamic information derived from the interlocking reflecting which path is to be taken
through junctions and the EoA at which the train should stop and also takes into account any
TSR that has been applied.
It is the responsibility of the train itself to interpret this information in the light of its knowledge
of its own length, braking profile etc. to calculate the speed at which it should be travelling at any
intermediate place during its journey. Hence instead of the braking distance being “built into” the
design of the trackside infrastructure it is “parameterised into” the EVC on board the train. Hence
the place at which the driver is given an indication to brake in order to stop their train at a specific
place does not have to be fixed; it can be different for different trains and indeed even for the same
train on different occasions (dependent on speed, known adhesion conditions, uncertainties in
odometry etc). In ETCS level 3 it would theoretically be possible to take advantage of this by
implementing “moving block” and thus when trains are moving at slower speed than usual on a
portion of line to allow them to be signalled closer apart than they would in normal circumstances.
Each train would have a safety envelope around it reflecting its current speed and thus the current
distance which it needs to stop.
6.10.2 Lineside Signalling

Conversely for the majority of current signalling systems, the line itself needs to be signalled in a
manner which takes into account the physical characteristics of the rolling stock that is to
utilise it. There needs to be a signal to give warning a sufficient distance prior to a stop signal so
that a driver can stop at it, except in the rare case (see [#52/2] re Manchester Metrolink for
example) where sighting distance is sufficient.
On most railways the policy is that there should be at least braking distance from the post of the
warning signal to the post of the stop signal but there are exceptions; sometimes the sighting
distance of the warning signal is also taken into account (e.g. [#56/1] re South African signalling).
Note that this does not necessarily give a direct constraint on the minimum spacing between
adjacent signals. However the simplest signalling system is undoubtedly one where the signal
spacing does simply depend upon the braking distance, each signal spaced to give sufficient
warning for a stop at the next one, such as in NR’s 3 aspect signalling system. However such
systems do limit capacity when braking distances are long, which is the reason why other more
complicated systems are often necessary.
• Some are arranged to give the warning several signal sections previous to the signal at
danger- it is the complete warning distance (spread over several block sections) that is
important to ensure that adequate warning is given. NR uses a 4 aspect signalling system
that gives a double yellow as a preliminary caution aspect to warn that the next signal is at
yellow and therefore that the following may be at red.

• Many other railways use a form of speed signalling that define the permissible speed for
each block section, compliance with this meaning that there then is sufficient distance in
which to stop in response to the next aspect. Depending upon the particular system utilised,
the aspect information not only gives the “current ceiling speed” but also often includes the
“target speed” at which the following block section should be entered.
Hence whatever the particular railway’s solution, the placement of signals is very dependent upon
considerations of braking distance, even if it does not directly dictate their spacing.
Where there is a range of different sorts of traffic that must be accommodated the solution must
address them all; there is inevitably a need to compromise. This is an issue that tends to be more
prevalent for Mainline railways as many Metros do have uniform stock; however it does still arise
on certain lines and in particular can be a consideration when the rolling stock on a line is being
replaced with the new stock having different performance characteristics to the original vehicles
(see #54/3, #58/2).
• An absolute given is the need for there to be sufficient warning to the driver of any train
that there is enough distance available to be able to stop by a specific position.
• In order to achieve this there often has to be a differential speed restriction to limit the
speed of the traffic with inferior braking ability so that it is able to stop within the distance
determined by the braking ability of the other traffic. On NR the distinction is often one of
passenger versus freight, but can be between different categories of passenger trains
depending on the basis for which that line is signalled.
• The reverse applies when there is a desire to run different trains on a line that is already
signalled. When the HST (= High Speed Train) was introduced in the UK in the 1970s, part
of its specification had to be the ability to stop from its top speed of 125 mph within the
distance for which the lines had originally been signalled (on the assumption of traditional
trains operating at up to 100 mph); although the line speed increased, the existing stock
remained limited by its design and thus the poorer braking was not a problem. More
recently new trains have been introduced onto other lines and the concept of EPS introduced
which permits these train to travel at a higher speed than others on sections of the line
(generally this is due to the higher speed that tilting trains are permitted to travel around
curves).
• Similar considerations apply to those (simpler) forms of TBS which allocate speed codes to
a particular track section and therefore different trains need to interpret a certain code
differently; a good illustration of this is given in [#52/3] relating to the Channel Tunnel.
Note that for lineside signalling there is a signal at the entrance to each block section (as a
minimum; there may also be additional non-block signals either purely as warning signals to start
braking for a stop signal or protecting some intermediate hazard- such as pointwork, level crossing
or tunnel- within a longer block section). Since a block section is only permitted to contain one
train, the spacing of these block signals dictates the spacing of consecutive trains and thus the line
capacity.
For lineside signalling there is a signal at the entrance to each block section (as a minimum; note
that there may also be additional non-block signals either purely as warning signals to start braking
for a stop signal or protecting some intermediate hazard- such as pointwork, level crossing or
tunnel- within a longer block section). Some railways permit a following train to enter the section
as soon as the last vehicle of the train has passed beyond the signal at the entrance to the next
section; others believe that there “should always be a greater margin of safety than the thickness of
a signal post” and require that the first train has travelled a further distance and thus define an
“overlap” which needs to be clear before a following train can enter the section (see 6.16.2).
In summary it is important to realise that:

• considerations of braking distance impose constraints on lineside signal spacing, and that
• signal spacing itself limits the headway that can be achieved on the line (this can be different
depending which variety of signalling is in use, but there is always an interrelationship).
Hence the maximum braking distance of the traffic using the line is an important consideration;
the constraint is often due to the highest speed traffic but this does depend on the relative braking
rates (as described above). This has a direct impact on the best headway which can be achieved;
see Appendix G.
Additional study material:

Appendix F
Appendix G

6.11 Giving the Driver Enough Warning

On most forms of railway signalling, the information that there is a need to slow down or stop is
conveyed to the driver by fixed lineside signals. In some cases an in-cab display is provided either
in addition to (e.g. CAWS on some lines in Éire) or instead of (e.g. ETCS) lineside signals;
however these are currently exceptional, some further detail is included at the end of this section
and in Appendix V.
Where the warning is given by a lineside signal, there obviously needs to be a relationship between
the positioning of this signal and the braking distance to the hazard. On a particular line there may
not be just one “braking distance” and the signalling has to be designed to be the worst case value
for the type and speed of traffic utilising that line. It is not always the highest speed train which
needs the longest distance to be able to come to a stand, the poorly braked train running more
slowly may need the greater distance. This is one reason (the others are mainly associated with
vehicle dynamics and wear-and-tear on the track formation and structures) why differential speed
limits for traffic are sometimes imposed; the speed for the worse braked traffic being restricted so
that its braking distance is then comparable to that of the highest speed traffic. On NR such
differential speeds are calculated for each site and signed in a similar way to the highest
permissible speeds; formerly the Southern Region of BR worked with a “two-thirds rule” which
effectively was a blanket restriction on the speed of freight trains as compared to the speed
actually signed.
Knowledge of the speed profile of a line in the UK is regarded as part of a driver’s competency to
be able to drive their train over it; it forms part of the “route knowledge” which is trained,
experienced via video, simulation and for real and assessed. Drivers need to “sign for the route” at
intervals and undergo refresher training if their knowledge is not kept current by regularly driving
over it. This is an important difference with many other railways in the world and is part of the
different signalling philosophies:
• route signalling (tell the driver in which direction and how far they are authorised to
proceed, so that they can use their route knowledge to determine the appropriate speed
profile),
• speed signalling (tell the driver to regulate their speed to a certain value).
Whereas route signalling is very heavily predominant in the UK, almost all the Continental
railways use their own variety of speed signalling [#7]. Various combinations of steady or
flashing, yellow, green (and sometimes other) colour lights are effectively a code for the speed to
which the driver should be aiming to travel; certain systems instead give that information in a
more intuitive manner by displaying a numeric indicator effectively depicting the speed in kph.
In reality the distinction is perhaps not as marked as it appears:
• In the UK although junction signals are given route indicators, it is relatively rare to inform
the driver where they will be routed before the junction signal itself is visible. Where it is
important for a driver to have commenced reducing speed prior to this, then approach
release of the junction signal is imposed. This “artificially” holds the junction signal at a
restrictive aspect (usually red, but in some cases yellow) purely to ensure that the previous
signal will display a restrictive aspect so that the driver commences braking; route signalling
therefore imposes a form of speed control.
• Conversely under speed signalling a driver who knows the line can often infer where they
are routed by the speed information presented. Indeed some speed signalling systems
provide a certain amount of route information as well; not all routes are equally suitable for
all trains (some may be electrified whilst others are not, sometimes the structure gauge may
be different) and therefore the driver needs information to know where they are routed as
well as what at speed to travel.
In Belgium where there is much bi-directional signalling the aspects for the “contra-flow”
direction are differentiated from those for the normal direction by displaying flashing rather than
steady proceed aspects. “Chevron” indicators are used at those signals where a train is being
diverted onto the “wrong line” and again at the signal where “right line” running is to be resumed.
Hence whilst route indicator are not used at geographic diverging junctions, use in this scenario
assists the driver in identifying which of the next signals being displayed side by side is for their
train.
Sometimes the “speed codes” of the signal aspects (or indeed the “distance to go” of the route
signal aspects) are also passed directly to the train itself (by superimposing on the track circuit for
example) and thus can give an in-cab display and be used to create an effective train protection
system.
• Systems such as TVM430 used on the French LGV (= Ligne à Grande Vitesse i.e. high
speed) lines and also on their extension on the CTRL route to St. Pancras work in this
manner; this is a full TBS system without the need for lineside signals.
• Although the technology used is very different, in concept this is quite similar to the
Automatic Train Operation / Automatic Train Protection used on LUL’s Victoria Line since
it opened.
• The signal aspects within the “equi-block” signalling system (see #51/2) widely used on
Metros are in fact speed commands. These speeds are chosen (it should be obvious from
section 6.6 why the speeds allocated codes are basically in a square law series) such that the
braking distance between any adjacent pair of speeds is the same; this distance dictating the
length of the block utilised.
• The technology used for ETCS is again vastly different, but fundamentally achieves the
same as TVM430 however with one significant difference. It permits each train to make its
own braking decisions based on its own performance rather than having to embody the
performance of a particular type of train within the signalling of the line itself. In ETCS
level 2, the train receives a MA from the RBC which gives information of both the gradient
profile and the permitted speed profile of the section of line allocated to the train by the
interlocking. It is up to the train itself to calculate where it needs to start braking in order to
comply with all the speed restrictions and the extent of the MA which it has been given.
Additional study material:

#7: Chapter 1
#21:

6.12 Aspect Sequence

6.12.1 Giving early Warning
Where the warning is given by lineside signals, the message given to the driver at one signal must
depend upon that of the signal beyond it; this is what is meant by aspect sequence. It should be
obvious that the information has to be conveyed towards the train which needs to know it and thus
flows in the opposite direction to train travel.
• In route signalling the aspect displayed at a signal informs the driver how many of the
following signals are displaying a proceed aspect for their train and also gives routing
information at junction signals (and in some cases earlier on the approach). Reliance is
placed on the driver’s route knowledge to control the speed of their train suitably, although
speed signs are provided lineside to reinforce that knowledge.
• In speed signalling the aspect displayed at a signal generally informs the driver of the
maximum speed of their train at the following signal. On most railways such aspects reflect
any permanent maximum permissible speeds for the section of line but this is not always the
case and in these situations lineside speed signage is utilised, as per route signalling. Where
the required speed reduction is more than can be accomplished within the signal section
some form of preliminary warning is needed; in The Netherlands for example the numeric
display giving the target speed flashes to denote that the speed reduction must be
commenced but will not be achieved at normal braking rate from previous maximum speed
prior to the next signal; see Appendix X for an extract of a Dutch aspect sequence chart.
Reference [#46/1] explains that the Swiss felt the need to make the change to a similar
system due to complexity and restrictions imposed by their earlier system which used a
multiplicity of combinations of lights to convey speed information to the driver.
Depending upon the form of signalling system in use (see Appendix S for details of the varieties in
use on NR) the warning may be required:
m) only at the block section signals (continuous MAS),
n) only at the non-block signal in mid section (“stop and distant”),
o) at several different signals (continuous MAS where signal spacing less than braking
distance).
Which of these is adopted very much depends how the required braking distance compares to the
signal spacing which is needed for other reasons.
In case c, it is usual to consider the sequence which exists between each adjacent pair of signals;
however it should always be remembered that the fundamental role of aspect sequence is to convey
to the driver information that they need to regulate their speed appropriately to stop by the required
place.
• In the UK it is policy that there shall be sufficient distance “from post to post” and
calculation of the braking distance takes no account of the driver being aware of the situation
once they can see a particular signal at caution in the distance, nor the fact that in reality
knowledge of the need to comply with a forthcoming permanent speed restriction would
mean that they would actually be travelling slower than the defined nominal permissible
speed at the position of that signal.
Hence 3 aspect signals should be spaced at a minimum of braking distance- if they have to
be closer then a restrictive approach release arrangement is required.
Similarly 4 aspect signals must be spaced such that the minimum distance between alternate
signals is a minimum of braking distance.

• This contrasts with the situation in South Africa (see ref #56/1) where on the heavy freight
single lines the emphasis is to give the driver different warnings for
- needing to brake to a suitable speed to traverse a speed restricted turnout into a loop,
and
- needing to brake to stop at the protecting signal,
since it is most undesirable to cause the train to brake and then permit it to reaccelerate. In
this environment it is not regarded as an absolute requirement that signals are spaced at a
minimum of braking distance; whilst this is the ideal, the policy is that in cases of difficulty
the additional warning for the sighting distance on the approach to the signal may be taken
into consideration if necessary.
It is clearly essential to ensure that the warning of the hazard is always sufficient, but be aware that
in many situations excessive warning can also present a hazard; see section 6.12.3. On most
railways a caution signal is an instruction to start braking immediately and if signals are spaced too
widely (i.e. over-braked) drivers can become accustomed to finding that they have applied the
brakes too much too early. Since they are judged on their ability to run their trains to time, the
temptation in the future is to brake less severely initially. This can lead them into a trap when
encountering a signal section that is actually spaced at the minimum braking distance, since they
will be unable to stop their train by the required place unless they have been braking at the full rate
for the entire length of the section.
6.12.2 Aspect Sequence Charts

Note that production of an aspect sequence chart is currently part of the module 3 rather than
the module 2 paper; it is however included in this Study Pack since the topic was not included in
the module 3 Study Pack. Understanding of aspect sequence is however necessary for
Signalling the Layout, at least for the Mainline option.
One of the questions which a candidate may choose to answer for the module 3 paper is the
compilation of an aspect sequence chart for the signalling depicted on the “layout 3” plan. Read
the question carefully; usually an aspect sequence chart for only one direction is required and only
running signals are to be depicted. Candidates from a NR background may be used to showing
call-on and shunt routes from main signals; note that (unless explicitly stated in the question) these
are not required since they are not strictly relevant to aspect sequence.
The purpose of an aspect sequence chart is to present in a readily assimilated manner how the
aspects displayed on one signal is affected by the one being displayed by the signals which the
driver will next encounter. Styles of depiction vary but, in general concept, lines are drawn from
each signal back towards each signal that reads up to it and affected by it. Each of these lines
represents a separate “line circuit” where the signalling is implemented by relays in the vicinity of
each signal linked by trackside cabling. Each of the various possible aspects (including any
associated route indication) are separately depicted at each signal; the lines drawn:
• defining the aspect to be shown given certain aspect(s) being displayed at the next signal (i.e.
the signal may display the same aspect for one of several displayed at the signal ahead),
• defining the aspect to be shown at the signal on approach (note that for any given aspect on a
signal, the aspect to be displayed by a previous signal must be uniquely defined. Where
there are converging junctions and thus several signals read up to the given signal, the
aspects displayed at each of them may differ- this can be the case when the speed profile of
these different routes are dissimilar)

Where a signal is held at a restrictive aspect until a train approaches it, then the aspect sequence
chart needs to reflect this “approach release”; certain aspects of the signal in rear would therefore
never be displayed in such a scenario. Generally such a condition is specified within the relevant
route box on layout 3; candidates should follow what is depicted unless it contradicts their
railways practice, in which case this should be made clear to the examiner by a suitable note.
See Appendix S for more detail relevant to NR aspect sequence and aspect sequence charts.
6.12.3 Overbraking
The consideration of over-braking is one in which the attitudes of different railways vary and
illustrates why it is so important for candidates to declare their practices; the examiners can only
apply the appropriate standards against which to judge a candidate’s attempt if they know what
they are (and do not have to infer / guess).
• In Western Australia (which in general has fairly similar signalling principles to the UK)
there is no expectation that braking should commence at the caution signal itself and
therefore signal sighting may be considerably greater than braking distance; hence the
concept of over-braking does not apply.
• Conversely the situation in the UK has become more extreme over recent years with the
increased prominence given to “defensive driving” techniques following several accidents as
a result of SPADs.
- In the past it was considered perfectly acceptable for a driver of a train equipped with
better braking / running at lower speed than that for which the line was signalled to
judge their own braking; thus such trains could continue unaffected past the double
yellow, perhaps leaving their braking until encountering the single yellow.
- Nowadays Train Operating Companies require often require their drivers to make a
meaningful brake application on sight of any applicable caution aspect, whatever speed
they are actually travelling and even before passing such a signal. There is a diagram
of a “practical braking curve” on page 21 of ref [#5] which illustrates that braking is
not generally undertaken uniformly. It shows initial braking to get the train under
control, then less severe braking until the signal is approached and then final braking.
The concept has now changed slightly to be such that the initial braking is a full
application until the speed is very significantly reduced and the final braking judged so
that ideally it should be very slight, so that there is plenty left in reserve if found to be
needed on the final approach to the stopping position.
- GK/RT0034 specifies limits of overbraking that are considered acceptable with and
without specific risk assessment. In essence in most situations it strongly encourages a
limit of 133% braking; however experience has shown that this is frequently
unachievable without needing to compromise other, and arguably more important,
standards. This has now been recognised by the granting of a national non-compliance
which recognises that the former standard of 150% braking actually reflects a better
balance when all factors are taken into account.

Even when an acceptable percentage overbraking is specified this should not be regarded as a cast
iron absolute requirement, but more as a prompt to think especially carefully of the risks involved
should a proposed solution violate it. For example:
• there always will be overbraking when a fast line is joined by a slow line, or where there is a
mix of traffic types using a line,
• the actual percentage overbraking is not a relevant consideration on a slow speed line where
the distances entailed are not themselves great,
• positioning a signal to comply with the limit may result in it having to be placed where its
sighting is poor, whereas a slight flexing of the constraint could significantly improve,
• the high level requirement of conformity with drivers’ expectation may not be best achieved
by strict observance to a particular numerical limit; see section 6.13.
Although overbraking is an issue, it is generally of far less significance in the overall
spectrum of risk than some with incomplete understanding would have you believe.
Rules are for the observance by fools and the guidance of wise men.
i.e. you must know what the rules are, you should follow them wherever it is sensible to do so, but
you should also appreciate why each rule exists and therefore the consequence of bending or
breaking it. You might be able to argue that a generic rule is not actually applicable to a particular
situation at all, or that sufficient alternative mitigations exist to control adequately the small
residual risk of not being able to follow it (since this would entail greater overall risk by
compromising some other element of the design).
As a professional railway signalling engineer, you’ll find that you will often be working in the area
of “shades of grey” than being able to follow strict “black and white” rules; the examination is
partially designed to ensure that you can operate in such an environment and thus its emphasis on
ensuring that you have the underlying knowledge and experience to make such judgements.

6.13 Regularity of Signal Spacing

6.13.1 Managing Variation in Spacings
When driving a particular route, drivers become accustomed to the regular rhythm of passing
signals. Hence if they suddenly encounter a signal section significantly shorter than those that
have preceded it, then this can act as a trap for the driver and a SPAD may potentially result.
Therefore maintaining a consistency of spacing along a line is actually more important than the
actual theoretical amount of overbraking for any particular section; in particular abrupt differences
should be avoided.
However it is often necessary to close up signal spacing in certain areas in order to match
geographical constraints imposed by a succession of junctions, particularly in and around major
stations. For example there generally needs to be a platform starter and it is also beneficial for the
signal spacing either side of the station to be as low as braking considerations allow. The average
speed of any stopping train will be relatively low for the block sections during which it is
decelerating or accelerating and thus to minimise the headway bottleneck these sections must be
made relatively short. Indeed the permissible speed for non-stopping trains in such areas may be
deliberately constrained to be less than elsewhere on the line further away from the station in order
that the signal spacing can be reduced to the appropriate amount for headway considerations.
Since the headway on a line is limited by the worst section, it is therefore sensible to reflect the
speed profile in the designed signal spacing (all trains at high speed in the plain line sections far
from the station allow the headway constraint to be satisfied by wide spacing, yet tighter spacing is
needed where speeds are lower in the vicinity of the station); this obviously conflicts with the aim
for totally consistent signal spacing. Compromise is therefore necessary; it is good practice is to
attempt to position signals such that their spacing gradually decreases through a transition zone of
a few sections so that drivers become acclimatised and can rationalise the situation.
..
107 109
101 103 105
111
113
Maximum spacing Minimum spacing

dictated by headway dictated by braking
Transition zone within which gradual shortening of signal spacing
This is depicted in the diagram above; note that the spacing between signals 101 and 103 is
approximately double that which exists between signals 107 and 109 in order to emphasise the
transition visually. On homogeneous railway this would imply that the first section was
excessively overbraked, but don’t forget that there might be a permanent speed restriction through
the station area or there could be a significant falling gradient from 101 signal and such variations
do occur in reality. Even in the scenario of level gradient and constant permissible speed, the
driver of a non-stopping train is not mislead by the signal spacing changing from 133% SBD to
minimum SBD as it is not a sudden change in the middle of nowhere but a gradual acclimatisation
in a well identified geographical area. Hence whereas the term used is “regular spacing”, the issue
really is one of managing the variation which does inevitably occur.

6.13.2 Braking distance split over several signal sections

A particular consideration is when the warning to stop is spread over several multiple signal
sections, as for example within NR’s 4 aspect system. Although the Rule Book is careful to make
no presumption that the “inner caution” is placed midway between the “preliminary caution” and
the signal at red, it is obviously beneficial where this is arranged to be the case. There are a
number of reasons, including the optimum arrangement for delivering the best headway but also to
aid the driver by giving a point of reference during their deceleration.
151 153 155 157 159 161 163 165
161-165 = braking distance+margin

159-163 = braking distance+margin
157-161 = Minimum braking distance
2/3 1/3
1/2 1/2
The diagram above shows that whereas signals 159, 161, 163 and 165 are regularly spaced with
each signal midway between its neighbours,
• signal 157 is considerably closer to 159 than it is to 155. Indeed it divides this distance in
the ratio of 1/3 to 2/3 and is thus on the limit of what is considered acceptable; this offset
may for example be necessary in order to satisfy sighting considerations or provide standage
clear of a level crossing perhaps,
• note that the placement of signal 157 off-centre as shown also means that the warning
distance to 161 is reduced and this is another constraint which would need to be taken into
account in such an scenario and may indeed be the more onerous consideration,
• obviously the positioning of signal 157 also means that 159 does not fall exactly midway
between signals 157 and 161 but the degree of imbalance is less,
• conversely signal 155 is midway between signals 153 and 157 since the overall signal
spacing in this vicinity is greater,
• however signal 153 is closer to 155 than it is to 151; the overall signal spacing in this area is
becoming greater.
When it is desired to place signals in one area at a shorter signal spacing (perhaps reflecting a
lower speed limit) than in another area it is inevitable that every signal cannot be mid-way
between its neighbours. In this case the designer has taken the opportunity of the necessary
positioning of signal 159 also to make use of it to facilitate the transition in spacing that would
have to occur in that vicinity anyway.
The important thing to recognise is that once a signal is displaced from its “regular” position then
it has consequences both for the aspect sequence up to it at red and for the sequences within which
it itself displays a cautionary aspect. The “one-third / two-thirds” rule limits the degree of offset
from its central position; note that it relates to the actual signal spacing on either side of it, rather
than relating to the minimum braking distance (which is a common misunderstanding).

6.14 Plating of Signals

6.14.1 Identification
Signals are identified with a unique reference to enable someone trackside and the signaller at the
control centre to be sure that they have a common understanding of which particular signal is
which and can thus relate actual site geography with the representational layout depiction.
The primary occasions when this is important are:
when a train has been stopped at a signal and the signaller needs to establish that they are
talking to the correct driver when being given some information, or giving some warning or
instructions. In particular if there is a fault or some other reason for degraded mode working to be
introduced a driver may have to be authorised to pass one signal at danger and stop at another one,
when a signalling technician is attending a fault or needing to perform some testing and thus must
establish that the correct item of trackside equipment is operated from the correct interlocking
output,
where a member of staff needs to arrange some protection for some engineering work to ensure
site safety or in emergency to protect an incident.
Hence it is important for each signal to have a unique identity and to be certain with which control
centre it is associated.
6.14.2 Degraded Working

A further requirement often is to give additional information to the driver in circumstances when
their train is stopped at the signal at danger in order to instruct them what course of action to take.
The possibilities in such situations depend on the specific railway which define rules that best suit
their operation, the environment and the availability of communications; in general the options are:
• stop, then proceed cautiously as far as line is clear,
• stop, then proceed cautiously to a defined place and then take some further action,
• stop, contact signaller to receive instructions,
• stop and wait.
• These are not necessarily exclusive; there may be a hierarchy of actions to be taken
according to circumstances or elapsed time etc. The rules obviously need to define a safe
course of action, but also recognise that there is a need for traffic to continue in some limited
manner even in failure scenarios. Therefore they must recognise the different site situations:
- In principle at certain signals (primarily those signals on uni-directional running lines
which only protect a rear-end collision with a previous train) the risk of permitting a
driver to continue cautiously on their own authority is quite low. The traffic density on
metros tends to be very much higher than mainlines so the chances of a signal being
held to danger by an earlier train are higher; by the same token the hazard being
presented to a third train by holding the second train at a signal is also higher.
Visibility around curves through tunnel sections is extremely low, so further measures
are often taken to mitigate the risk, such as provision of “around the bend” non-
headway signals or vehicle speed governing having passed a red signal.
- Conversely where there is moveable infrastructure (such as points, swing or lifting
bridges, level crossing or flat intersection with another railway) there are a range of
risks which need to be managed and therefore proceeding cautiously is not a sufficient
control measure.

The signal plate is often used to inform the driver what particular sub-set of rules to apply at that
particular site.
For example on NR there are plates for the purposes given in the following table:
White Diamond Relieves driver of the requirement to physically walk to the relevant signalbox in
plate order to remind the signaller of the presence of their train, since a berth track
circuit is provided to serve that purpose. (Not applicable to MAS signal on TCB)
Diagonal Striped Denotes presence of SPT for driver to contact signaller if detained at signal.
Plate
Variants exist which incorporate a number that denotes how many minutes the
driver should wait before making an attempt to contact the signaller for information /
instructions. An earlier version of the Rule Book required the driver to contact the
signaller once detained at the signal for 3 minutes and “zero plates” were introduced
to modify that rule to require immediate contact when detained. The Rule Book now
requires this as the default, but longer times are specified in places, such as the final
approach to a busy terminal station where it can be expected that train come to a halt
for a short while; if SPT is the communication method, a driver needs to leave the cab
and it is often said that a signaller must have a “foot on the ballast detector” and
drivers find that signals often clear just before they pick up the phone- this obviously
causes more delay before the train can be on the move again.
“Auto” Plate Denotes the signal as “passable”.
Gives authority to a driver who has attempted but was unable to contact the signaller
to pass the signal at caution and proceed slowly, prepared to stop short of any
obstruction (most likely to be a stationary train).
Only applied to simple plain line signals on uni-directional lines (or intermediate
signals on a long reversible line on which a direction is established by the train being
routed on, and maintained until the entire line has been vacated and thus at that time
effectively uni-directional).
Such signage permits trains to “trickle through” a length of line that has been subject
to a major failure where all communication to the control centre has been lost.
Note that the nomenclature “Auto plate” is potentially confusing; historically such
plates were associated with Auto signals and thus the nomenclature made sense.
However this is no longer precisely true;
• there can be Controlled signals defined as “passable” and
• there can be Automatic signals defined as “non-passable”
• see Appendix T.
“Delta” Plate Denotes that the signal can never display a red aspect and therefore can always be
passed. Applied to “distant signals” (Y/G or Y/YY/G etc) and is required for
circumstances such as power failure when the signal is totally black. Relatively
recently introduced; previously this information was inferred by such signals being
given the same number as the signal they repeated but with the addition of an “R”
suffix. Now these signals are also given delta plates and they are even often applied
to semaphore distant signals where they are really superfluous.
No SPT is provided at such signals; no train should ever stop at them.

Other railways have different rules and therefore different plates are applicable. For example:
• on London Underground the “stop and proceed rule” applies to many signals; the driver does
not attempt to contact the signaller before continuing (unlike at a NR signal with an Auto
plate at which drivers should only pass on their own authority in the absence of working
communication with the signaller),
• in France SNCF signals are denoted as either “F” or “nF” depending upon whether the signal
is franchissable (i.e. can be passed after having stopped) or non- franchissable; these
supplement the displayed aspect (there is a distinction between the “twin red” carré arrêt
absolu and the “single red” sémaphore arrêt de block).
Students should investigate their own railway’s practices to learn how signals are plated and the
associated operational rules which are relevant.

6.15 Capacity of a Railway

There are many factors which inter-relate to determine the capacity of a railway, only some of
which are directly related to the signalling system. This is particularly true in a Metro
environment where passenger densities are very high; the speed at which passengers can exit the
platform can have a significant effect on the time taken for boarding and disembarking the train
and thus the platform dwell time for example.
Ref [#58/1] gives a good account of the diverse considerations which affect the capacity of a
railway and considers issues of:
• signalling,
• stations and dwell time,
• junction layouts,
• timetabling,
• regulation,
• effects of ATO and ATP,
• recovery from perturbations.
Ref [#25] is a narrative concerning a specific railway where the need to provide capacity
dominates; it considers elements such as the interior design of rolling stock and the means of
crowd control as well as those elements of particular concern to the signal engineer.
Students should attempt to understand in outline all the various facets of what is actually a very
complex problem and therefore some references are suggested in the table of section 6.4.
However from an examination perspective the most important elements are the headway
considerations (constant speed and also stopping) which are discussed primarily for a UK
Mainline context in Appendix G, and the positioning of signal in a junction area that is discussed
in sections 6.16, 6.16.3 and 6.19.
Note that whereas the concept of capacity is important to the railway as a system, it is only part of
what is immediately relevant to the customer. Some examples of why this is the case are given
below:
• Passengers generally want to get to their destination as fast as possible on a train which is
not too crowded; the total time of their journey includes waiting time and interchange time.
Hence a more frequent service of short trains can be advantageous compared to an infrequent
service of long trains, even if the latter solution delivers the same passenger carrying
capacity for less use of network resources.
• Mainline railways generally have a mix of relatively infrequent trains from a variety of
origins to a variety of destinations and, even when on the same route, with different calling
patterns. If a train is delayed it is likely to affect any passenger intending to travel on it for
any portion of its journey.
• Metros on the other hand tend to feature a much more frequent service of trains with much
less variability of destinations and relatively short runs. Passengers tend not to intend to
travel on any particular train but turn up almost randomly and expect only a short wait for an
appropriate train.
- When there is disruption on such a line, it is often practice temporarily to stop all trains
on the line (ahead as well as behind the disruption) in order that trains do not become
bunched up behind the one which has been delayed. Whereas all those using the
system at that time are inconvenienced, once the problem has been overcome and

trains start running again the system is effectively back to normal (except for each of
the trains being more crowded than would otherwise have been the case).
- All trains may have become nominally 10 minutes late and remain so thereafter, but to
a user waiting on a platform this is totally irrelevant if they experience only a normal
waiting period and then the train they catch runs at usual speed.
- Conversely if a gap is allowed to open up in front of the delayed train, it will become
extremely crowded once running resumes again. It is likely that the situation will then
become even worse since the dwell times at every station will be extended if both
trains and platforms are packed and this compounds both the train delay and level of
overcrowding experienced.
• Another relevant factor is whether there are other reasonable routes within the network from
origin to destination which are possible if there is any disruption on the primary route:
- Sometimes on a mainline network there are alternative lines for certain portions of
routes which may be used for diversions; these are relatively rare and their use depends
upon their capacity, compatibility of the rolling stock (weight, loading gauge, form of
traction) the driver’s route knowledge (where applicable) and the effect on passengers
for intermediate stations to be by-passed.
- In a metro network there can be a mesh of lines with multiple interchange options and
thus the situation can be managed by recommending that travellers seek an alternative
path through the network utilising those lines which are running normally.
- Hence depending on the scenario, the response to the occurrence of a failure can be
quite different. Sometimes it is best totally to suspend the service until such time as
the failure has been overcome, sometimes it is best to keep traffic moving by a form of
degraded mode operation whilst the fault is being rectified, sometimes it is best to have
a fall-back system that can be used for a significant duration until the next opportunity
to resolve the problem. Different railways adopt different solutions reflecting their
environment: ability to divert / suspend traffic, logistics re attendance of technicians /
additional operational staff, practicality for technicians to attend to the fault whilst
traffic is being operated by some other means etc. Such considerations can affect the
capacity designed into the signalling on any route intended to cope with abnormal and
/ or degraded conditions.
• If routes between A & B and between C & D both need to utilise the same stretch of railway
at place E, then the railway’s capacity at E can limit the capacity on each of the separate
passenger flows and is therefore important even if no passengers actually want to go to or
from E itself.
For the IRSE examination, the headway achieved by the signalling is the important factor, but be
aware in the wider context of operating a railway that it is only one of many related issues.
Related Activities:
1. Study references: #51/2, #51/3, #58/1, #60/1, #60/5, #63/2, #63/3, #64/1, #64/2, #65/2
2. Consider the ways in which the design of signalling can impact upon a railway’s
capacity and in particular how decisions made when designing the Signalling Plan can
affect it.
3. Review reference #5: pages 18-19 to appreciate the effect on line capacity when traffic
run at a speed less than that for which lineside signalling is designed. Use the methods
of Appendix G to calculate some values on the curves for yourself.
4. Review reference #5: pages 26-27 to appreciate the loss of line capacity when certain
slower speed traffic is run amongst faster traffic.

6.16 Positioning Signals to Protect Junctions

6.16.1 Signal Positioning at Junctions- balancing the various considerations
Stop signals fundamentally exist to protect junctions and other infrastructure hazards such as level
crossings. The minimum distance at which a signal can sensibly be positioned prior to a
convergence is that which permits another movement to be safely made whilst there is a train
standing at the signal at danger. This requires that the division of the train detection section “at”
(in reality this means “just beyond”) the signal is sufficiently far from the point-work to prove the
existence of an adequate passing clearance; see Appendix J.
However the protecting signal is normally best placed at a greater distance from the conflict and
when considering this it is important to recognise that there always has to be a compromise
between:
1. relying upon trains to stop at (or only just beyond) a signal at danger in order to maximise
layout flexibility (i.e. permit a move to be signalled up to the signal protecting the junction
whilst it is at danger, even though another movement may be taking place immediately
ahead of it), and
2. locking the infrastructure for a significant length beyond the signal in order to provide a
safe overrun distance (i.e. provide a mitigation against the safety risk resulting from a
SPAD at the signal), and
3. placing the signal close to the junction both to minimise delays in normal working
(i.e. reduce junction occupation time should a train need to be held at the signal or if the
signal is subject to approach release) and to minimise the safety risk and operational
inconvenience / delay when in degraded mode (e.g. when handsignalling is in force it is
obviously beneficial if the signal is reasonably close to the pointwork).
4. Items 1 & 2 lead to the concept of the overlap; see section 6.16.2.
Placement of signals at a junction is typical of the differences between different railways:

• partly because of tradition (often built up following the occurrence of particular accidents),
• partly because of different operational imperatives and / or safety expectations,
• partly because of the degree of reliance that can be placed upon any train protection which
is employed. One of the key considerations is the likely course of events following a SPAD
at the protecting signal- see the next section.
903
or 903
13 13
15
15
Hence whereas most of the factors are relevant to a certain extent in all circumstances, the relative
weightings can be significantly different and therefore the solution regarded as optimal may differ
between different railways. Hence it is important for the student to be aware of the circumstances
of their particular railway environment.

6.16.2 The Role of the Overlap

As a general rule, most railways provide some form of “overlap”, i.e. a length of railway put at the
disposal of a train approaching a place at which it should stop as a safety margin prior to the
hazard being protected. At one extreme this may be defined as a purely nominal fixed length
(generally where there is no protection system) or at the other a carefully calculated distance for
each site specific situation (generally reflects the length within which the train protection system
can be expected to stop the train).
Do not assume that even sophisticated train protection completely eliminates the need for the
concept of an overlap. Under ETCS for example, there is a distinction made between the End of
Movement Authority (EoA) to which a driver may proceed and the Supervised Location (SvL)
which is the position being protected. The precision to which a train can be certain of its position
is dependent on its odometry and the cumulative amount of any inaccuracies which could have
occurred since it last obtained an absolute fix on its position from having passed over a balise at a
defined datum. This can be different for any one train at the same site from day to day; rail
adhesion conditions can affect tachometers and weather conditions affect radar differently for
example. Since the train cannot know precisely where it is in relationship to the EoA, it has to be
allowed to continue cautiously even when it thinks that it may have passed it; it is imperative
however that it will be brought to a stand prior to the SvL; hence the need for a distinction
between these two where the stopping position is critical as at junctions. Except in certain limited
cases in which the RSp is set by the lineside sub-system, the train must calculate the “Release
Speed” which it adopts when in the vicinity of the EoA such that it can guarantee stopping by the
SvL. At critical sites additional positioning balises may be provided close to such places in an
attempt to ensure that trains know their location with greater precision. However ETCS is tolerant
to a train failing to read any balise and the system must remain safe when this occurs; the train has
to assume that its “safe front end” is the furthest forward that it could be given the degree of
confidence that it has in its odometry from its last known position confirmed by passing a specific
balise.
Many railways have less sophisticated train protection systems and may just “trip” a train as it
passes the relevant signal at danger. The distance taken to stop cannot be known exactly but a
worst case can be determined given assumptions regarding the maximum approach speed and the
emergency braking performance from the varieties of rolling stock using the line in the
environmental conditions that exist on site. If the “train stop” at the signal is the only place at
which intervention can occur the overrun distances can be extremely long if the approach speed is
high, hence additional train protection is often provided on the approach to a signal so that
intervention can be initiated early if it is judged that a SPAD is about to occur. This effectively
means that the MOD (= Maximum Overrun Distance) from the train stop at the signal need only
take into account the maximum speed of a train for which braking would not already have been
initiated.
Therefore it can be seen that the risks associated with a SPAD very much depend on what, if any,
train protection is provided. This is of course not the only factor; for example the NR environment
is such that avoidance of junction collisions, especially head-on collisions is of supreme
importance compared with rear-end collisions on plain-line railway; statistically these are of a
much lower risk (likelihood and probable severity both being reasonably low). On a tube railway
there is not the same distinction between relative risks. This is because any collision in a tunnel is
extremely serious (crushing effect, high passenger density, limited crash resistance of rolling
stock, difficulty of access for any rescue) and indeed there is a far denser service of following
trains so that holding one outside a station whilst the preceding one is in the platform is routine
operation in peak hours.

6.16.2.1 Signal Positioning- Overlap Lengths

Whilst practically all railways do feature some form of overlap even if that specific word is not
utilised, the rules which pertain and the length which is considered sufficient do vary considerably
because of the factors mentioned previously.
• Where there is a fully comprehensive continuous speed supervision, then there is only a
relatively short distance between the place to which a movement authority has been granted
and the “supervised location” which is protected. This results from the degree of uncertainty
in the train’s absolute position and the value of the RSp at which it is permitted to approach
the “end of movement authority”.
• Where a high integrity train but more basic protection system is in use, the length of the
overlap is similarly generally related to the distance within which any overrun is expected to
be contained in all reasonable circumstances.
One possible scenario when utilising train stops is to provide overlaps sufficiently long to contain
a train on which emergency braking is initiated upon passing the signal. On LUL for example
where mechanical train stops are employed this can result in overlap lengths comparable with the
signal spacing since a train might be travelling at a significant speed when intervention occurs
The original ATB protection system in The Netherlands ensures that a train does not exceed the
speed permitted by the speed code imposed upon the track circuit; in the absence of code a
maximum 40 kph is permitted. However a low speed SPAD is not prevented or detected and thus
there is no position by which there is reasonable certainty that all movements will have come to
rest; the assumption is that any SPAD which does occur would only be due to a minor braking
misjudgement and therefore a 50m allowance before any danger point (pointwork in running lines
away from stations, lifting/ swing bridges) suffices.
Where such a train protection system is not employed, the length chosen is more of a nominal
distance, being a reasonable compromise between adequate safety and what is operationally
acceptable. To illustrate the general situation a consideration of NR practice is informative:
• the “full overlap” has for many years been defined to be 180m, but in areas of lower
permissible speed “reduced overlaps” are permitted subject to risk assessment.
• now that the TPWS (=Train Protection & Warning System) exists (albeit certainly not a high
integrity protection system), such risk assessment does consider the likely outcome
following intervention. The effect of an overspeed loop on the approach to the signal at
limiting the maximum likely speed of intervention at the signal itself is also taken into
account.
Note that what is regarded as acceptable does change over time, due partly to the changing railway
environment affecting the risks and also the affects of accidents and incidents that may change the
perception of those risks and what is politically tolerable. Reference [#29/1] is a recommended
read in this context.
• For example various different values for overlap length were utilised historically (these
depended upon variations in gradient and differentiated between 3 and 4 aspect signalling);
however these factors are now no longer considered relevant since for example the unbraked
goods train is a thing of the past.
• Conversely the traditional 440 yards still applies where the caution aspect is given by a
semaphore distant rather than a colour-light due to the greater risk of it being missed in
conditions of bad visibility. The original reason for this value appears to have become lost
in the mists of time but is thought that it might have resulted from trials of typical trains of
the period braking from sight of the stop signal.
6.16.2.2 Signal Positioning- Overlap Locking

Metros, being particularly concerned with capacity, position signals at least as much for where
their calculated overlap falls within a layout as for considerations for the signal itself. Whilst the
extent of overlap is certainly a significant feature for positioning signals on Mainline railways,
other factors for choosing suitable signal positions tend to dominate in that environment.
Railways also differ in the locking imposed when pointwork falls within the length of an overlap:
• Generally points within the overlap are locked in the lie which ensures that conflicts are
locked out. This normally provides a secured “wheeled path” in the case of an overrun at the
protecting signal; however in situations in which these points provide trapping from vehicles
in sidings, maintaining this protection is actually more important than to lock the points in
the position that would be needed by the overrunning train - see diagram in section 6.24.3.
Once there is confidence that a train has safely come to a stand, overlap locking is released
to permit other movements to be made.
• In Germany, the position of facing points in the overlap are selectable at time of route setting
but are then subsequently locked; see #67/4.
• In The Netherlands there is no overlap as such, but points are avoided for a certain distance
beyond signals and swing / lifting bridges for a greater distance.
• NR is relatively unusual in that whereas trailing points are locked, facing points within an
overlap are not normally, provided that there is an acceptable overlap available over either of
the alternate lies; this is known as a “swinging overlap”.
In circumstances when an overrun could occur and result in a wrong direction move along a
running line or the entering of a hazardous area such as a siding or depot, there may only be an
overlap defined over one of the lies of the facing points. Depending on the situation, this locking
can be released by the signaller subsequently setting a relevant forward route from the signal
protecting the points. Where multiple overlaps are potentially possible, certain overlaps may be
temporarily unavailable due to other moves being made on the layout and in these circumstances
suitable locking is applied to prevent the selection of such overlaps.
Once a particular overlap has been established additional “counter conditional” locking has to be
applied to the facing points in order to avoid the possibility of aspect reversion should there be a
request to change the lie of those points when the alternative aspects conditions are not satisfied.
Usually having facing points closely beyond the protecting signal is avoided. Sometimes such
placement is unavoidable and some railways lock these in position in the same manner as trailing
points. Others allow them to continue to be free to move whilst a train is signalled up to the
protecting signal, but “time of operation locking” may be imposed to prevent the facing points
from being swung at times when a train is close to the signal but has not yet been timed to a stand
at it. Whilst the fundamental reasons for this principle are generic, details of the actual application
depend on the circumstances:
• the former Southern Region of BR imposed this locking for points with switch toes closer
than 20m to the IRJ of the track circuit within which situated- this suited that environment,
• nowadays however there is no fixed generic distance; each site is individually assessed and
the” time of operation distance” is generally significantly greater (typically 35m – 50m).
This is because of the delays inherent within processor based interlockings and the greater
variety of point mechanisms and train detection in use which all affect the speed of reaction
of the signalling system to a track becoming occupied.

Railways also differ in the extent to which point flank protection is provided, especially in
relation to overlaps; again a balance needs to be struck between the desire to achieve maximum
safety and the necessity of having the capacity to carry the traffic. Indeed it also has to be
recognised that ironically overall system safety can actually be reduced if additional controls and
locking is imposed; greater disruption will be created in the event of any failure and if this means a
greater amount of degraded mode working the risks introduced during such working may
outweigh those which the locking might prevent during normal working. This is particularly the
case when the signalling system itself does not provide facilities with some basic protection for
such degraded mode working and hand-signalling has to be undertaken; the most dangerous
equipment in a signalbox is said to be the set of flags and the telephone (because the human has to
cope with an unusual and stressful activity with very little in the way of support other than
procedures).
Railways deploy flank protection to different extents; such decisions depend upon their judgement
re the relative risks in their own specific situation (reliability experience, access for maintenance,
the level of traffic, the level of train protection, the fallback means of operating the railway in a
degraded mode of operation etc.) Similarly consideration must also be given to the implication of
the increased complexity throughout the design / check / test lifecycle; the extra and more complex
work can result in mistakes being made and an error not being detected. It is important to realise
that it can be as important to avoid “right side” failures as “wrong side” failures; if an aspect
reverts unnecessarily there may be a technical SPAD which itself causes disruption to the
operation of the railway and subsequently presents an associated risk.
The subjects of overlap and point numbering are closely related; also refer to the diagrams and
descriptions in section 6.24.3.
6.16.2.3 Deciding whether the Overlap should Include or Exclude the Junction
The basic choice for any layout is either
p) position the signal so that its overlap is just clear of the junction (which gives layout
flexibility and simplifies the interlocking), or
q) position the signal close to the junction (resulting in more complexity, less operational
flexibility but potentially safer as conflicting moves are locked out- however see below).
It is however simplistic to regard b) as necessarily the “safer option” since the loss of operational
flexibility inevitably means that there will be more occasions when trains are signalled up to
signals at red and thus a greater likelihood of a SPAD occurring.
One possibility which attempts to obtain the best of both options that is sometimes used by NR is
to position a signal such that its normal overlap locks a junction but additionally give it a ROL
which is shorter and thus prior to that junction (which therefore is not locked by it). Typically a
ROL is determined to be the greatest length beyond a signal which just permits a set of trailing
points to be utilised for another movement. Hence in normal circumstances junction conflicts are
locked out but the signaller is given the facility to signal up to the red aspect when appropriate to
do so despite the full overlap not being available. Selection of the ROL (and thus a “Warning”
class route at the signal in rear- see Appendix S, Appendix T1) prevents the previous signal
clearing until the approaching train is close to it; the argument is that, by ensuring the train is
approaching cautiously at the previous signal, the likelihood of a SPAD occurring at the signal
with a short overlap is reduced.

The example shows that trains may be signalled over 901 reverse (e.g. from 109) whilst a train is
permitted to approach 107 having been severely slowed by the delayed clearance of signal 105.
105A(M) Locks to full overlap

105A(W) Locks only to restricted overlap
105 107
901B
ROL
109
901A
6.16.2.4 Shared use of Overlaps

It could be argued that, since the likelihood of a train intruding into the overlap beyond the signal
to which it is authorised to proceed is small, the same overlap could simultaneously also be
allocated to a different train on the assumption that the chance of two simultaneous SPADs is
negligible.
On NR this is not permitted; if a track section is in use for an overlap for one signal it may not be
simultaneously utilised as an overlap for another, but this may not be the case for all railway
administrations. Indeed on NR’s lines inherited from BR Western Region there are no ROLs as
such but much the same functionality is achieved although there is no obviously defined overlap
clear of the conflicting movement at the junction. A delayed yellow aspect is displayed when the
trailing points beyond the junction protecting signal are being utilised in their other lie (i.e. the full
overlap is unavailable) yet no separate track circuit is used to actually prove that there is any safe
distance beyond the signal at red. Other historic sites permitted the shared use of overlaps for
opposing signals on certain low speed lines; some of the older literature reflects this standard but
be aware that this is no longer a current practice on NR.
Hence this is another area where the student will find that practices vary between railways and
indeed can evolve over time on any given railway; therefore it is important to be truly familiar
with the relevant standards for a specific railway.

6.16.3 Maximum distance between Junction and its protecting Signal

Another constraint is the maximum distance that a protecting signal may be from the item
(normally a junction conflict) which it protects.
• The primary reason for avoiding large distances is the impact when the railway needs to be
operated in degraded mode following a failure or disruption which forces trains to be held at
the protecting signal. Excessive distances create greater delays due to the time taken for
trains to clear the junction area. They also increase the risk of a driver who has travelled
slowly from the protecting signal forgetting the hazard prior to arriving at it.
• Similar considerations occur in normal working where there is a diverging junction. The
greater the distance between the signal and the junction the greater the risk that the driver
fails to correctly associate the speed / routing information with the junction and therefore
perhaps forget it whilst still travelling towards the junction. If the junction signal is held at
red by approach release, then this has the effect of slowing the train on the approach to the
signal; if the signal is far from the junction then this is unnecessarily restrictive since the
train is slowed too early and the technique is also less effective at addressing the risk which
it is supposed to be mitigating (i.e. excessive speed through the junction) as the train has
distance in which it can accelerate again. Clearly the effectiveness of a delayed clearance of
a junction signal 100m from the relevant pointwork is much greater than if were 600m on
the approach to the points.
Again the rules adopted by various railway administrations vary, but for instance NR aims to
arrange that the distance from a signal to the first set of points is generally no more than 400m
(although site circumstances may require distances up to 800m to be tolerated).
6.17 Standage
6.17.1 Signals beyond Junctions
6.17.1.1 Avoiding fouling the CP
When positioning a signal on a layout, it is important to consider the relevance of the signal
placement on the railway on its approach as well as the railway beyond it. Trains are frequently of
significant length and it is the position of the rear of the train which determines the release of
portions of the railway behind it and thus their availability for other train movements.
For example the diagram below depicts the closest position of signal 42 to the junction given that
the signalling is to accommodate 300m long trains; it shows signal 42 placed at least 360m beyond
the CP of the divergence in order to make some allowance both for defensive driving and a small
amount of roll-back (which are both discussed later within this section). If a train waiting at
signal 42 exceeded the length for which standage has been allowed, it would be impossible for
another train to be routed on the diverging route from signal 40.
FG
AD
40 CP 42
Train Loco
AA AB AC AE
900 300m 20m
15m
Roll back 25m
allowance Defensive
driving
allowance

• In the case of a geographical junction (i.e. to a line with a completely different destination),
this would cause a train on one line to delay unnecessarily a train destined for the other line.
• In the case of a loop (for example the diverging route from 40 could read into a platform
loop through which a passenger train could be routed to call at the station and overtake a
freight held on the through line) then this would “stitch the job” and make the intended
operation impossible; the passenger train would not be able to pass the freight. Hence it
would suffer considerable delay as it would then be constrained to follow it perhaps for a
considerable distance along the line until reaching a loop with adequate standage.
• Similarly if the purpose of the loop had been instead to detach the locomotive from one end
of the train and to re-attach to the other end prior to hauling in the opposite direction etc. (see
Appendix L), then too long a train for the loop would not be able to achieve the intended
operation.
6.17.1.2 Considerations: Defensive Driving

Remember that drivers are not normally expected to take their train precisely up to the signal:
• a SPAD of the slightest amount is regarded as extremely serious (and will be detected the
instant one wheel passes the train detection boundary a few metres beyond the signal),
• trains are heavy, rail conditions vary etc. and so stopping them precisely is not like driving a
car,
• if the driver stops their train just prior to the signal, they are unlikely to be able to see its
aspect well (if at all) since they are directly alongside (or in the case of a gantry mounted
signal, under) it.
In the UK, the expectation is that drivers will stop their trains in the range 20-25m on the approach
to it, except in some particular places where space is so limited that they are trained to approach
somewhat closer. A good clue of the site expectation is the position of the SPT; generally to
current standards these are positioned some 15m prior to the signal and are provided with a
driver’s walkway that extends some 10m further from the signal.
• The 25m is sacrosanct in the case of right-hand mounted signals; this is generally a distinctly
non-preferred positioning, but station platforms represent one of the situations in which their
use can sometimes be justified.
• The ideal 25m distance can be reduced in other situations where necessary and length is
limited; a 15m defensive driving allowance is regarded as the absolute minimum for signals
mounted above the track (on cantilever or gantry) and 10m the absolute minimum for the
case of the default left-hand mounted straight post signal (i.e. the centre of the red aspect
positioned 2.1m offset from the cess rail running edge, 3.3m above rail top).
• The primary reason for stopping back from the signal is to ensure that the signal remains in
full view rather than only in peripheral vision whilst the train is stationary (particularly
important at stations where drivers may be distracted by other activities or there may even be
a change of train crew); such a policy also emphasises the importance to the driver that no
part of their train passes beyond a signal at danger even by the slightest amount.

6.17.1.3 Considerations of Train length

For IRSE exam purposes the lengths of the various trains are generally stated as part of the Plan
Notes, but the candidate may need to decide whether to assume that these include any locomotives
and state reasonable general assumptions regarding defensive driving and roll-back allowances.
Most UK trains are nowadays MU stock and therefore do not require separate locomotives. The
vehicles are often referred to by the length of their body shell but do not fall into the trap of
thinking that two 5-car sets of 22m stock will be 220m long; if you think about it, it should be
obvious that the body shells must be held apart so that the train can flex as it travels the track and
weaves through pointwork (passengers are quite accustomed to walking through corridor
connections between vehicles). The “length over buffers” can be up to 0.5m longer, so a train can
easily be up to 3% longer than it may at first seem to be and this difference can be crucial in
“tight” situations.
For example a typical real Signalling Plan may state specific lengths such as:
• Virgin class 390: 8car = 193m, 9 car = 217m,10 car = 217m
• Central Trains 323 EMU: 2 car = 47m, 3 car = 71m.
Freight train lengths vary considerably, but the 300m depicted in the diagram would be regarded
as a reasonably long freight train in the UK for many routes, though others are designed to cope
with trains up to 775m; in other countries such a length might be regarded as trivial and that the
majority of the train had been left behind!
Locomotive characteristics vary greatly, but 20m is a reasonable estimate for the length of a single
locomotive; be aware however that double heading (or even more) can be a regular feature of
some railway’s operations- it depends on the power available from each locomotive compared
with the weight of the train, the gradients along the line and the acceleration required.
6.17.1.4 Considerations: Roll-back

The last dimension shown on the diagram is the roll-back allowance.
The determination of a suitable allowance is dependent on the particular circumstances, but two
factors are relevant:
• a train starting from a signal may start rolling back slightly when the brakes are released
before application of traction power causes forward motion. This obviously depends on
driver skill, the type of traction, the gradient at the site and the weight of the train,
• trains are formed of many separate vehicles coupled together and there is inevitably some
relative motion. In former days when many freight trains were “loose coupled”, there was a
very significant difference in length
- when the couplings were taut whilst the locomotive was hauling up a gradient, and
- when they were slack whilst the locomotive coasting down hill, with the rest of the
train pushing it and thus all the buffers between vehicles being compressed to some
extent.
When a train like this stops there is a noticeable shortening of the train as the vehicles crash
into each other, followed by a bounce back. This effect is less significant on trains with
more modern coupling systems and continuous brakes, but it is not entirely absent.

6.17.1.5 Placement of the Signal

It is obviously best to place signals such as 42 sufficiently far beyond a junction that there is a
negligible chance of any problems occurring when a train is attempting to start from them; clearly
this distance does depend on gradient and train characteristics, including how fast another brake
application can be made at a time immediately after the previous release of the brakes.
There are two considerations:
• The train might become foul of the junction when attempting to move forward:
- In an environment of steam engines and limited brakes this was a significant issue and
spring catch points were often provided. Nowadays in the UK such risks are low and
provision of some positive means (such as run back trap points) of preventing the train
unintentionally becoming foul of the junction is exceptional.
• The train might have stopped with its last axles only just off the track section over the points
and therefore the slightest backwards movement would cause that track section (AD in the
diagram) to drop again and thus result in the reversion of the aspect of signal 42.
- If the track joint were just beyond the CP, the train routed over the points in the other
lie would be immediately endangered by the roll-back becoming foul. Whilst aspect
reversion does mitigate the risk to a certain extent, a serious accident could still occur;
a far better arrangement would be to position the signal further from the junction so
that the train remains clear even for the greatest credible roll-back.
- In other situations there is little risk of the slight roll-back movement actually
becoming foul, but the dropping of the track section will still cause aspect reversion
which obviously can give undesirable consequences. Hence the train detection joint
should be placed a sufficient distance behind the expected rear of the train so that a
moderate amount of roll-back (e.g. the 15m allowance) does not reach it.
- Therefore, where possible to position signal 42 more than minimum standage from the
junction, it is generally sensible to arrange that the limit of section AD is similarly
extended. It should be placed so that it detects a roll-back of an extent deemed to be
excessive (i.e. greater than the allowance) whilst accommodating smaller amounts
without causing aspect reversion. There is the disadvantage that putting it significantly
further from the junction than the CP will give consequential delay for the release of
point locking during normal operation and the degree to which this is acceptable has to
be balanced against the more prompt aspect reversion that would result in the unlikely
event of a significant wrong direction movement or the additional costs of splitting the
train detection section.

6.17.1.6 Providing the best possible Standage

Standage is certainly one of the factors that should always be considered but bearing in mind that
the ideal cannot always be achieved; it is just of the many items to be taken into account when
determining the best overall solution.
• At one extreme if 42 were an auto signal 9with a low chance of being held to danger) and the
points behind the train only lead into a little used siding, whether standage behind signal 42
can be achieved is hardly an important factor.
• Conversely if 42 were a signal protecting a busy junction, or a plain line signal protecting a
station platform where trains often stop for an extended period, achieving adequate standage
might be a prime consideration particularly if the points in rear lead to a busy diverging
route. However if 300m long train were themselves rare, a lesser distance could be deemed
sufficient, since it would be enough to contain the length of train that comprises the majority
of the train service. This would be particularly relevant if a longer standage could only be
created by accepting other disadvantages (e.g. the need to compromise on the available
length of overlap etc.).
This is another example calling for judgement to achieve the correct balance; to exercise
appropriate judgement requires a sufficient understanding of the operation of the railway (i.e.
domain knowledge and correct interpretation of the plan requirements).
Note that there are also other reasons why a signal only just beyond diverging points should be
avoided; see 6.21.1.
Similarly platforms give rise to special standage considerations; see sections6.17.2 & 6.19.2.
6.17.2 Signals where Trains Reverse

Standage is also a significant issue where trains run into terminal platforms and need to change
direction for the return journey. A similar defensive allowance is applicable for the approach to
buffer stops (indeed on NR there is often a stopping marker painted on the platform edge surface
to aid the driver judge the distance). It is typically smaller (say 10-15m) than that allowed at
signals (particularly if available platform length is limited- it often is). This is acceptable because:
the buffer stop is directly in front of the driver, it doesn’t need to observed once the train is
stationary, it is a regular stopping position (of course!), there are plenty of visual clues to the driver
on the approach, all movements approach at slow speed and practically all trains are passenger
rolling stock. To current standards the bufferstop itself is not positioned at the true end of the line
but is designed to arrest safely a train which crashes into it at slow speed by being displaced from
its nominal position. Hence they are placed at least 10m from the end of the platform well,
depending on the likely speed and weight of the trains and whether the track actually continues
under the platform surface (itself designed to be displaced if a serious bufferstop collision ever
occurs).
In the majority of cases the trains will be MU stock and will thus be driven next from the opposite
end cab. The platform exit signal must be visible from that cab so ideally there should be some 15
- 25m between the signal and the driver’s position in order to ensure visibility (distance depends to
some extent whether the signal is mounted high on a gantry or lower on a straight post, also the
visibility from the corner of the cab window of the type of rolling stock(s) using the platform).

Multiple Unit
10m 15m
Sighting
. 15m allowance
Defensive
driving
allowance
Should the train service be operated by locomotive and carriages, the situation is similar except for
the fact that for its return journey a new locomotive must be provided to haul the coaches out of
the platform and the one trapped at the buffer stops initially remaining behind in the platform and
then signalled elsewhere. Hence the distance between the signal and the buffer stop needs to be
sufficient for the train of coaches, plus two locomotives as well as the defensive driving and
sighting allowances.
A similar issue occurs at through stations where the platforms are bi-directionally signalled and
where trains can reverse; in the NR context it must be expected that the driver will stop some 20-
25m short of the signal when running into the station and the back cab will need to be at least 15m
from the exit signal for the opposite direction.
Standage is also important for freight train operation in particular for run-round operations (see
section 6.23 and Appendix L). Note that this issue can also be relevant to passenger trains that are
formed by carriages hauled by a separate locomotive (this tends to be quite rare nowadays- most
passenger trains are either MU stock or locomotives remain semi-permanently coupled to their
carriages and can be operated by a driving cab at the far end of the train and thus working in
“push-pull” formation).
Note that the standage discussed in this section is close to being an absolute requirement rather
than something where the ideal may need to be compromised in certain situations. If a train that
has run into the platform cannot get adequately behind the opposite direction departure signal, the
railway is effectively inoperable. The only element of compromise that is available is the length of
the allowances; for example it may be that the type of stock utilised has good cab sight lines or
that special arrangements can be made (e.g. co-acting signals) to enable the driver to observe the
departing signal when very close to it; see section 6.17.1. Obviously if the rear of the train does
not even clear the train detection section prior to the platform track then the train will continue to
lock the directional route locking and any points within that section; this would prevent other
movements being made and also prevent the signalled departure of the train itself and thus would
be a complete operational nightmare. This is not to say that all platforms have to be suitable for all
trains for all purposes; for example a platform may need to be utilised as a through platform for
200m long trains but the operational requirement may be to reverse only 100m long formations
within it; this is a further reason for ensuring that you fully understand those notes on the end of
the layout when undertaking the examination.

6.18 Maximum distance between a Level Crossing and its Protecting Signal
Similar considerations to sections 6.17.1 and 6.17.2 apply to protection of a controlled level
crossing.
• If a barrier has to be operated locally, it is obviously convenient that a train stopped by the
protecting signal can be seen by the local operator and that hand-signals displayed by that
operator can be seen by the driver. This maximises both efficiency and safety.
• In the vast majority of circumstances in the UK, a level crossing is not seen as an obstruction
in the overlap, yet it is clearly a safety advantage for the protecting signal not to be
immediately upon the crossing. Hence where possible signals are placed so that they are just
overlap clear of crossings; in the event of a SPAD the crossing immediately displays
flashing road lights to warn the motorist as risk mitigation although the barriers remain
raised. However this distance cannot always be achieved, the most likely scenario being
when there is a station platform just prior to the level crossing (which is quite a common
arrangement for obvious reasons that stations are placed where there is road access to the
railway). In such cases it is occasionally necessary to accept an infringement of the normal
50m minimum between signal and crossing, subject to risk assessment and additional
controls which can include early initiation of the road lights if a SPAD is judged likely to
occur or the requirement that the crossing is closed prior to allowing a train to approach the
immediately protecting signal (effectively making a signal further away to protect that
crossing).
Where a level crossing is automatic and not directly protected by signals but there is a signal
within its “strike-in” similar considerations can apply. However in general AHBC are free-
standing and are not interlocked with the signalling; they are relied upon to close the road a
sufficient time prior to the arrival of the train. The only requirement is for there to be a signal that
can in emergency be used to stop trains from reaching the crossing; in the UK the requirement is
that such signals shall be provided within “10 minutes running time” of the crossing.
When considering the positioning of signals with respect to any level crossing, efforts should also
be made to ensure that there is no likelihood of a train held at a signal beyond a level crossing
tailing back so that it still blocks the crossing. Hence the maximum length of trains should be
taken into account to ensure that there is sufficient standage and also that there is a track section
joint immediately beyond the crossing so that the crossing can be reopened at the first opportunity.

6.19 Signalling in Vicinity of Station Platforms

6.19.1 Platform departure signals.
In the common situation where there is pointwork immediately beyond a station platform, then a
signal should be placed at the departure end of the platform. Take special note of any through
platform where trains may terminate and either return as passenger train in the opposite direction
or require to be shunted into a turnback siding or depot, since platform departure signals would be
required at both ends of the platform despite the line itself being apparently uni-directional.
If no signal is provided between platform and pointwork then be aware that the junction inevitably
has to be committed for a train signalled into the platform until it departs, no matter how long it
may wait in the platform; this is unlikely to be acceptable for railway operations.
The diagram below shows a MU train in a platform which is only just long enough for it to fit and
points which represent a potential conflict not far beyond.
• The platform starting signal in this case does need to be a little way beyond the platform so
that good signal sighting from the cab of the train stopped in the platform can be provided
(see section 6.17.1). The distance required depends on the positioning of the signal (e.g.
gantry mounted signals are high up and thus harder to see when close to) and the rolling
stock (more modern stock and particularly that designed for higher speeds tends deliberately
to restrict the driver’s view to the straight ahead and thus when close to signals they can
disappear from view), but 25m is a typical figure that should be provided wherever possible.
If the platform were longer than the length of the trains needing to be accommodated then
the signal could be placed on the platform and a “car-stop marker” provided at a suitable
position for a driver to stop their train. In fact several are often provided on platforms to
give the optimum (often for passenger convenience) stopping position for say 4, 8 and 12 car
trains.
• Ideally the signal is however placed a significant distance prior to the first conflict- in this
case the CP associated with 917A. Platform starters are notorious for suffering SASSPADs
as the completion of station duties can be an influence which can erroneously provoke a
driver to restart their train without observation of the relevant signal. The overlap beyond
that signal will have of course already timed out by the time a train restarts from the station.
A distance of around 50m is generally sufficient for a very slowly moving MU train starting
at the signal to be brought to a stand by train protection intervention once a SPAD has
occurred; therefore if a conflict free distance of this amount can be provided it is obviously
beneficial. A shorter train can however accelerate whilst approaching the signal and,
depending upon the form and extent of train protection, may not be stopped before the
conflict. To guard against such situations, it is now NR policy to provide additional TPWS
loops to attempt to intervene in such situations, especially when long terminal platforms are
used by short formation trains.

50m
49
917B
25m
917A
The diagram depicts an ideal arrangement but the length of the trains and the positions of
pointwork with respect to the platforms often means that it cannot be achieved in practice; it’s a
question of applying as much good practice as the site conditions allow.
Note that the normal NR definition of a platform starting signal is a signal that falls into at least
one to the following categories:
a) where any portion of the longest passenger or ECS train is still alongside the platform
when that train has come to a stand at the normal stopping position prior to the signal,
b) where the front cab has passed over the AWS position prior to coming to rest any of the
normal stopping positions (i.e. if differently defined for different length trains) within the
platform.
As written the first consideration primarily considers the risk of passengers de-training and
therefore is arguably not directly applicable now that all trains in general use have central door
locking. However it basically recognises the risk of SASSPAD- the so called “ding-ding and
away” when the driver fails to recheck the signal aspect having been prompted to leave the station.
The second consideration concerns the risk of SOYSPAD; the driver has effectively already
registered the aspect of the signal before coming to rest and thus reaccelerates from the station
having temporarily forgotten about it and thus SPADs the subsequent signal when it is
unexpectedly encountered at red.

6.19.2 Platform standage

It is important that the whole of a train is alongside the platform when stopped at a starting signal
(or rather a “defensive driving distance” prior to it). For trains without door locking there is a
significant risk that passengers in part of the train not alongside the platform would open the doors
failing to appreciate the situation and fall or even intentionally attempt to jump down onto the
ballast. This particular risk is avoided by the implementation of power doors / central door
locking but conversely the railway must ensure that doors remain locked to prevent such a
situation arising; in such situations any responsibility that the individual passenger had for
ensuring that it was safe to open the door has disappeared. Where trains need to call at platforms
which are too short to fully accommodate them, special measures are needed; these can range
from:
• special announcements by train crew combined with labelling on windows and special
trackside warning signs (applicable for a long distance train service that stops at a local
station en route, perhaps just a few times a day),
• SDO (=selective door opening) which enables certain doors of the train to remain locked
whilst the majority are released for passenger operation. Such selection can be a purely
manual operation by train crew but generally entails automation requiring the train to know
where it is and which doors are to be released at which station.
Standage considerations are particularly important at platforms where trains reverse; see section
6.17.2. For a scenario in which lack of platform standage could be a contributory factor to an
accident, see the scenario at the end of section 6.22.

6.19.3 Signals beyond stations

When train departs from a station there is obviously a need to accelerate even if the starting signal
only clears to a restrictive aspect. There is a risk that the driver may out of habit then continue to
accelerate having temporarily forgotten that there is a potential need to stop at the next signal.
Indeed this is a particular problem when the same occurs day after day but the driver gets used to
“always” finding that the subsequent signal is off by the time they can sight it. Such situations are
recognised as presenting particular risks and are referred to as SOYSPAD- the root cause being the
need to start the train on a yellow aspect but then subsequently forgetting its significance (whereas
in the normal scenario the observation of a restrictive aspect initiates deceleration rather than
acceleration).
326
330 328 326
Speed
Signal
sighting
distance
“normal” acceleration
from station, despite “emergency” deceleration
328 only displaying possible from attainable
yellow speed if driver sights red
aspect on 326
Distance
The diagram above depicts the scenario: the train having braked to a stand in the station, waited
for passengers and the clearance of signal 328 then accelerates in order to regain its normal
running speed, the driver then suddenly recognises signal 326 is displaying red and attempts to
stop. Obviously whether or not this is successful will be determined by the distance for which
signal 326 is readable compared with the speed attained from acceleration, which itself depends on
the distance from the station.
It is therefore important that the Signalling Plan design attempts to minimise the chance of a
SOYSPAD, primarily by playing particular attention to the sighting distance of this signal, or even
perhaps providing a banner repeater to act as a visual reminder of its presence and give a warning
that it has yet to clear (rather than the traditional use of a banner to advise a driver approaching a
signal cautiously on the assumption that it would be at danger that it had subsequently cleared and
thus act as a “hurry up” signal). It is also beneficial that signal 326 is reasonably close to the
station, thus limiting the amount of acceleration that could have occurred prior to it becoming
visible. A general rule of thumb is that the best braking rate of a train is twice as good as its
acceleration and thus a form of “one third-two thirds” rule applies (not to be confused with that
explained in section 6.13.2!); provided that the signal becomes readable for one third of the total
distance from the station then it ought to be possible for a driver to stop the train on sight of the
red prior to committing a SPAD and certainly prior to the end of the overlap. However not that in
the IRSE Exam Mainline layout, for simplicity the quoted acceleration and deceleration rates are
usually the same and hence in such a case a “one half” rule would need to be applied instead.

Statistically it is found on NR that SOYSPAD is far more prevalent on 3 aspect rather than 4
aspect railway; this may be due to drivers encountering a single yellow in the latter environment
more rarely and thus it is regarded as more definitely implying the need for gentle acceleration and
particular caution or it may just be that the average signal spacing is much less and thus there
normally happens to be good enough sighting from the attained speed that the driver can recover
from their error without the incident being reported and thus featuring in the statistics.
Overall it is certainly good practice for the first block section beyond a station to be kept as short
as other considerations allow, since in addition to decreasing the incidence of SOYSPAD, it also
helps to mitigate the effects of the station stop on headway; see section 6.19.4.
6.19.4 Stopping Headway Considerations.

Stations in plain line sections do not necessarily require signals close to them since a train waiting
at the station for any reason does not prevent other movements from being made.
However where achievement of stopping headway is a significant issue then the positioning of
signals both prior to and beyond the station is important.
• Placing a signal at the departing end of the platform ensures that the accelerating train has
the minimum distance to travel before its rear clears that signal’s overlap joint. This permits
the signal controlling admission to the station to clear as soon as possible after the previous
train has departed; see Appendix N2.
• It is also beneficial for good headway that the signal section which includes the station
platform is as short as possible given other relevant considerations, since the stopping train is
stationary for the station dwell time as well as moving slowly during deceleration and
acceleration phases either side of the stop.

6.19.5 Platform Admission Signals.

Even where not required by stopping headway considerations, it is often sensible to position the
admission signal for a major station as close as possible to it (given the position of any pointwork
and the need to provide suitable braking distance). This is because even non-stop trains are likely
to be moving more slowly in the area than elsewhere along the line; for example the speed over
pointwork in the station throat can often be severely limited or a speed limit for a through train
using a platform line may be imposed due to safety considerations (concerns regarding the effect
of wind turbulence and passengers standing close to the platform edge). Hence trains approaching
the station area would need to be braking to comply with such speed restrictions and therefore
would not be travelling at the theoretical ceiling speed for that portion of line. The important
factor for headway is the time each train takes to traverse a block section and to compensate for
the lower speed, the physical length of the section must be correspondingly shorter; otherwise that
section will be the one on the line which constrains its headway and being for ever a bottleneck.
• In route signalling a relatively slow speed diverging route from the protecting signal could
require restrictive approach release.
• In speed signalling the permissible speed shown would be that applicable to the minimum
speed of any point in the route.
Hence, whatever system of signalling is used, there is benefit in making the section to be traversed
at a slow speed as short as possible and thus for the protecting signal not to be unnecessarily far
beyond the commencement of the slow speed area. Bear in mind that the pointwork in a station
throat is itself a collection of junctions and the same considerations re the relative benefits of
positioning the associated signals either “tight to" or alternatively “overlap clear” of these
junctions also applies (as discussed in section 6.16.1).
A further reason for wishing to provide the admission signal quite close to the station area is the
possibility that certain moves may have to be made into potentially occupied sections. The risks
are reduced (and indeed less delay is created) if the length of such moves can be minimised.
• Some railways permit (under some circumstances) the movement of passenger trains into a
section of line which is not proved free of obstruction using some form of “low speed”
aspect. For example NR permits “permissive passenger” movements controlled by “call-
on” aspects to enable a second train to be signalled into a platform known to be occupied,
the driver proceeding “as far as the line is clear” and stopping a few metres short of the train
already there. To modern standards this is only generally permitted for the purposes of
joining separate trains together so that they then go forward as a single train, but at some
sites it is still used to facilitate platform sharing by separate passenger services. The risks
are reduced considerably if the driver of any second train signalled to enter the platform can
see the rear of the first train which is already there, ideally from the signal authorising the
call-on move but at least soon after having passed it. The extent of visibility is more
important than the absolute distance; visibility is likely to be achieved for a signal within
400m of the platform a distance more than 800m would be regarded as too far. Some of the
continental railways provide portable markers that are positioned by the platform staff to act
as a signal where an incoming movement is to stop- sometimes these are free-standing notice
boards, sometimes these are fixed receptacles into which flags can be inserted, sometimes
these are trolleys with internal rechargeable batteries and an LED display.
• Other railways sometimes provide a form of degraded mode aspect to facilitate movements
through a junction area in the event of a failure of train detection etc. preventing the use of
the normal signalling. It is clearly beneficial for the distance from the protecting signal to
the platform to be a short as the position of junctions and considerations of braking distance
allow; this will minimise the distance of any movements under the authority of this POSA
(which necessarily have to be performed at caution and extremely slow speed).
6.20 Terminal Stations

6.20.1 Introduction
“The thing to remember about termini”, as the ticket collector told the old lady, “is that everything
stops; otherwise there is one heck of a crash!”.
Some of the considerations in this section are actually not unique to termini; many apply to
terminal platforms at through stations whilst others could apply even more generally. However
they do tend to be most significant when considering terminal stations.
Some of the above issues are discussed in relationship to a particular past IRSE Exam Paper in
Appendix N2.
6.20.2 The Platforms

In order to avoid the last outcome, train protection is generally provided in order to prevent an
excessive speed movement up to the buffer stops. In the case of TPWS this means the provision
of permanently energised OSS generally some 55m from the buffers. Whatever form of train
protection is provided there is always a permitted minimum speed so a buffer stop collision is still
possible; therefore it is practice for energy absorbing buffer-stops to be provided. The most
common are “friction” buffer stops which can be forced to slide along the rail whilst decelerating
the train; to be fully effective they must be located correctly and therefore the signalling system
must detect that they have moved from that position. The normal way of achieving this is to
provide a TCI just beyond them so that it fractures if the buffer stop shifts at all after being hit;
historic practice was for this to cause the track section to drop but modern practice is to provide a
specific alarm; see section 6.26.5.3.
The buffer stops themselves are generally provided with a pair of red lamps which act as the limit
of movement authority but these are not electrically proved and are often associated with the
station’s domestic main power distribution rather than the signalling. At remote termini on lines
where all trains operating have good headlights, reflectorised targets on buffers are the alternative
generally used.
Standage is an important consideration for termini; see section 6.19.2.
6.20.3 Incoming Service

The signals reading into the terminal platforms obviously cannot show a full range of aspects; for
example in an NR 4 aspect signalling system the last signals will only have
2 aspect (Red /Yellow) heads, and the signals in rear will have a 4 aspect head with the position
for the Green blanked out. Where all platforms are of essentially similar length, no approach
release is required but if some are significantly shorter than others then approach release is
imposed for these.
A particular issue arises when it is permitted to signal a train into an already occupied platform.
• For a through platform, should a train be signalled into the platform which does not fit
within it, the situation is definitely inconvenient since it will probably tail back into the
station throat and delay other train movements. However, provided the train has power
operated (or at least centrally locked) doors, there is no risk of passengers attempting to
leave the train when not alongside the platform and the situation will eventually be resolved
once the front train moves away allowing the second to continue to the end of the platform.

• The same situation arising in a terminal platform is a significantly bigger problem; it cannot
be resolved without reversing the second train out from the platform into which it did not fit.
The train will not be within fixed signals so such a movement would need to be hand-
signalled; it may even require the passenger train to be propelled through the station throat
(if it is not a MU) in the wrong direction along a running line, and even this assumes that
following traffic has been stopped well back so that it is possible to do it. Whilst the
situation is being resolved the terminus is likely to be completely paralysed; it is probable
that train would be unable to leave and even if part of the layout remained available the
station would soon run out of trains because of the blockage on the incoming line.
Hence particular care is required to ensure that such a situation never arises. If all trains are of
standard length the train detection sections can be arranged to prove that a whole train would be
able to fit in the remaining platform length. The problem is harder where the trains are of variable
length; traditionally in the UK “Lime Street Controls” were provided (see #5 pages 42-44).
However various factors have conspired to make these less appropriate: increased use of MU
trains, greater variety of train types (and thus lengths), regulatory pressure to reduce the amount of
permissive working, encouragement of defensive driving giving less certainty how close to a
signal the front of a train will be stopped thus rendering the “measuring” ineffective. Hence
although the basic requirement still exists other means, external to the interlocking and as an
adjunct to the signalling, are provided to aid the signaller to prevent the situation from occurring.
The converse to that described above is also an important factor when designing a busy terminus.
Any delays that occur to trains departing the station very soon means that the station runs out of
platforms into which to route the incoming services and thus this can lead to a queue of trains
building up. Hence even in a commuting peak when the passenger flow is effectively dominated
by one direction of travel, it is important that trains can be rapidly dispatched in the opposite
direction or be routed to holding sidings etc. in order to ensure all the platform capacity can be
utilised. It is important to recognise how inter-linked the two opposite directions of traffic truly
are; see section 6.20.4
Since all trains must be always stop by the buffer stops, this means that their maximum safe speed
at any place on the final approach is defined, dependent upon their braking rate. It is therefore
inappropriate for the nominal speed of the line to remain high within this area; not only might it
require a higher maintenance regime than is actually needed in practice for its traffic utilisation,
but also the signalling would have to be designed for a theoretical speed that would never actually
be achieved. This would mean longer block sections than really needed; the speed of all trains
would be below this and thus line capacity needlessly lost. Therefore the specified speed of a line
generally has a series of step reductions as the terminus is approached in order that the theoretical
speed limit always permits the maximum that could realistically be obtained and therefore the line
to be signalled appropriately. Indeed in some cases the speed limit is even set to be lower; this can
increase capacity and permit routes through diverging points not to be approach released and
therefore is a good solution in situations in which maximising capacity is the prime objective
rather than minimising journey time for just a few trains.

6.20.4 Operation of Termini: Turning Services Around

6.20.4.1 General
Additional complications in the operation of termini can include:
• the train descriptions attached to particular vehicles needing to be changed once that train
service has terminated and the same rolling stock becoming a different train service
travelling in the opposite direction,
• it is often the case that the staff operating an incoming train to a major station do not stay
with the same vehicles; the “stock diagram”, the “driver’s working”, “guard’s / conductor’s /
ticket collector’s working” and indeed that of the buffet car staff can all be different and thus
each person might go their separate ways and next work different services to each other. It
all depends on the location of their base depot, shift start and end times, need for rest breaks
etc. Rolling stock is generally used more intensively and for a longer operating day; it may
be deliberately designed to return to a different depot from where it started in order to
accommodate its need for various periodic maintenance activities that may only be possible
at certain depots and thus all vehicles need to be put onto a rotating pattern rather than being
confined to shuttling up and down on a particular route,
• it is these factors which make for complication in the operation of such places when there is
some departure from timetable affecting incoming services or when a failure is discovered
when a driver attempts to open up the cab which had not recently been used. This can
require “set swaps”, or staff to be reallocated to different tasks yet the operational control
needs to ensure that as far as possible all staff and trains end up where they need to be by the
end of the relevant operational day as well as trying to offer as good a public service as can
be achieved in the circumstances.
Hence it is often appropriate to provide signalling which in the normal station operation would
never actually be needed but would be essential for helping resolve the situation when things go
awry. Although its use is known (and certainly hoped) to be rare, it is justified by the avoidance of
the consequences that would otherwise ensue in such circumstances.
6.20.4.2 Reversal of Trains

The driver of a MU train has to shut down one cab and make it secure and then walk the length of
the train and open up the opposite direction cab before the train is ready to undertake its return
journey. The more sophisticated the train, the more systems need to undertake a self-test routine
and therefore the opening up of a cab can take several minutes; hence the minimum turn around
time is dependent upon the type of stock and length of train. Often a longer scheduled lay-over is
timetabled, in order that some recovery time exists so that delays on the incoming journey do not
then impact on the outgoing service and thus be perpetuated throughout the operating day.
Sometimes at remote termini the lay-over time has to be long enough to accommodate the driver
taking a PNB (= Personal Needs Break); at busier stations then it is usual for a different driver to
take that particular train set for its return journey and the incoming driver themselves take a later
train. Hence platform capacity has to be provided to suit the methodology of train working.

For trains consisting of locomotive and coaches, the considerations are similar but more complex.
Unless the track layout is such that the locomotive can be released from its position at the
bufferstop in order to run around its train, some other means of achieving the objective has to be
arranged.
• At a remote terminus this may require the propelling of the coaches from which the
passengers have disembarked as ECS to some sidings etc where the run around can be
performed and then the stock then propelled back into the station with the locomotive at the
other end to be ready for departure.
• At more busy stations a pilot shunting locomotive can be signalled onto the coaches and then
haul them to sidings, thus enabling the train locomotive to be released (perhaps itself to go to
a maintenance depot or just wait in a siding). Later, once the pilot locomotive has hauled
the cleaned and re-stocked coaches back into a platform, the train locomotive is then
signalled onto its train to be coupled onto it ready for departure.
• Another option where no station pilot is provided is for the train locomotives to swap
between trains. When an incoming service terminates, the locomotive is uncoupled but the
whole train remains in the platform until another train locomotive is signalled onto the stock
ready to operate the return train service. As this departs, the former train locomotive is
permitted to follow it at a distance but wait at the platform exit signal. Once that signal has
been returned to danger and then re-cleared, that locomotive can then obey that signal; it will
then probably be shunted onto coaching stock in another platform that a different locomotive
had subsequently hauled into the station and the process repeats.
Metro railways operated by a frequent service of short trains have another solution which is often
adopted, especially for new build. The platform at which the public train service terminates is not
actually at the true end of the line but operationally is a through station. Once the passengers have
left, the train continues as ECS a short way until it enters and is completely contained within a
turnback siding or headshunt. The driver then changes to the other end cab and drives the train
back but it is routed into the platform for the other direction. Thus two uni-directional platforms
are provided and can be used intensively. On some metros where trains are operated on the public
railway by drivers, the turnback operation is completely automated.
This form of turnback arrangement is not unknown on mainline railway but it is rare; this is
probably partly due to historical legacy relating to where the station platforms were built.
However a similar arrangement is provided just beyond through stations which do not have
sufficient platforms to terminate a train service. Typically these stations consist of one through
platform for each direction on a busy route and thus a train terminating in a platform would totally
block the line for one direction for the duration of its lay-over. Hence a turnback siding is
provided where there is space beyond the station at which the advertised passenger service
terminates, in which a train can be held clear of the mainline until it is time for it to emerge and be
routed into the platform for the other direction. In general such turnbacks are provided in the
immediate vicinity of the station but this is not always possible.
Hence it is only by understanding the operation of the station that the correct provision of shunting
signals, and their positioning to allow the requisite standage, can be assessed.

6.20.5 Outgoing Service

The importance of being able to clear the platforms has already been stated in section 6.20.4.
Whereas the theoretical permissible speed in the direction leaving the terminus may be high, in
reality even the best trains accelerate only moderately and thus the attainable speed at any place on
the acceleration curve is actually much lower; it may be many miles before full speed is reached.
• It would be a nonsense to signal the railway for a higher speed than could actually be
achieved; the blocks would be long and the time taken to traverse them excessive. There is
therefore a case for a stepped speed increase as the distance from the terminus gradually
increases; if this is not specified then the signalling would be designed for “attainable speed”
rather than the theoretical permissible speed; the Signalling Plan would need to record the
appropriate assumptions fully, since if a better performing train were later introduced to
service then the signal spacing would become unsafe.
• If a driver is given a restrictive aspect on the terminus platform stating signal, they have to
drive their train cautiously. Obviously it is highly desirable that an unrestrictive aspect can
be displayed for a train to depart as short a time period as possible after the departure of the
previous train. Since all trains start from rest the length of the first block section does not
need to depend on braking distance at all; to get the best headway it ought to be a s short as
possible and the signal position would be primarily determined by the standage issue (no
value in signalling a train out of the platform unless that it then enables an incoming train to
be signalled into the platform thus vacated), but also consideration of other junctions in the
station throat.
• For the same reasons, on NR 4 aspect signalling the platform starter itself would only be a 3
aspect signal. Not only would the double yellow be unnecessary (from effectively zero
speed there is plenty of warning distance to stop within one signal section!) but the display
of the Green allows a driver to accelerate in confidence. Providing the first section is shorter
than the subsequent section, the train cannot have achieved such a speed by the first signal
that it could not stop by the second signal (even in the IRSE exam train braking is always as
good as its acceleration and in reality is often considerably better).
• The provision of such items as TRS, CD and RA controls and indications is particularly
important at busy terminal stations. Similarly where short trains use long platforms they will
invariably terminate at the buffer stops and thus may be a long way from the platform stating
signal; therefore repeat indicators and perhaps banner repeaters would be needed. OFF
indicators for use by the train dispatch staff would be required unless the banner provided for
the train driver could also serve the purpose.

6.21 Avoidance of Signals in certain Areas

6.21.1 Signals just beyond Junctions
The importance of providing standage beyond a junction has already been discussed in section
6.17.1; however in an area that has a succession of junctions and is utilised by long trains then it
cannot always be provided. Indeed on the approaches to major terminal stations speeds are low,
there is a need for high capacity and therefore the signal spacing can be comparable to the train
lengths; in such a environment making sure that a train does not tail back onto the overlap track of
the signal in rear has to be the prime consideration and it has to be accepted that movements
between parallel running lines may well not be able to be clear of the pointwork if held at a signal.
The positioning of a signal just beyond point work is however also particularly undesirable for
other reasons as well. Consider the following diagram (in which all the signals shown are
suspended from gantries and thus apply to trains travelling from the right to the left):
920B 922A
52 56
919B 921
50 920A 922B
54
48 919A
Points 920B and 921 are so close before the gantry for signals 48 - 50 that a driver routed for
example from signal 56 to signal 50 will appear to be approaching signal 52 at the time when that
signal comes fully into view and indeed within the MRD. The driver’s attention is now on that
signal and the aspect and any routing information given at the previous signal is liable to have
been forgotten. Therefore if signal 52 were displaying a proceed aspect but signal 50 were at
danger then there would be a risk of a SPAD occurring; the driver has little time / distance to react
once they find themselves diverted through 920 reverse. The situation is obviously even worse in
a complex layout where there is also a diverging route from signal 56 to signal 48 through 920 and
919 as a “ladder”; in order to determine which signals 48 - 52 to observe, the driver needs to
remember not only which position route indicator they observed but also which particular running
line they were running on at the time. Remembering PLJI position 1 is insufficient without
knowing whether it was displayed on 54 or 56 signal; clearly the more parallel lines there are the
worse this problem becomes.
The situation can be helped to some extent by:
• providing route indicators (e.g. SARI) that directly identify the line to which they read (i.e.
by displaying an abbreviation of its name / number) rather than by relative position (e.g.
PLJI) as in the example above. This can be further assisted by the incorporation of “line
identification plates” within the design of the signal gantries to confirm to the driver which
of the lines their train is travelling on at any time,
• providing “anti- through reading controls” to ensure that a signal on the 48 - 50 gantry can
only clear if a route has been set up to it as an exit or its berth track section is occupied (to
allow it to clear when a train has been hand-signalled up to it). [Such controls are a
development of the historic “Insell’s lock”: a signal is held at danger unless points on the
approach are set appropriately or there is a train on the berth track section. For example
signal 50 would be held at danger unless points 919 were normal since it could otherwise
only be misleading rather than useful; note such a control does not prove the actual position
of the points via detection since it is sufficient to utilise only the interlocking intention (i.e.
"set”) and avoids a detection failure affecting this signal as well as 54 / 56].
Even so, placing signals in such positions is still undesirable from a driver’s perspective and in
addition makes the signal engineer adopt a more complex solution than would otherwise be
required. As well as the interlocking logic discussed above, any train protection equipment (e.g.
AWS, TPWS, ATP) required on the approach to the signal is likely to fall within the area of S&C.
This makes it awkward to position, inconvenient for the track engineer and the multiple
approaches each need protection; thus extra equipment is needed together with more complex
interlocking to control the appropriate element at the correct time.
Even where there are no facing points, situations such as that depicted below should be avoided.
Although a train held at signal 159 does not prevent another train being brought up to either signal
157 on the mainline or 301 on the branch line, positioning 159 too close to 939 points is still
undesirable. Particularly for trains coming from the branch line, a driver is liable to encounter
signal 159 unexpectedly; inevitably the driver’s attention will be drawn to the converging junction
itself. In addition signal 159 would probably also have limited sighting when approached via
points 939 reverse, even if it were visible its beam would be optimised for the straight approach
and thus it would appear dimmer to a train from signal 301.
157 159
Main 939
301
Branch
There cannot be any hard and fast rules but wherever possible a signal should not be placed closer
than MRD to the junction. Note that, in general, placing a signal relatively close beyond a
junction would give the undesirable consequence that the signals prior to the junction would be an
undesirably long distance from it. Amongst other considerations, this gives poor headway. When
a train is held at signal 301 to give precedence to one from signal 157, the “junction re-occupation
time” (i.e. the time between the first train and the second train passing over points 939) is long; the
train starting from 301 will be moving slowly and has a significant distance to travel before it
reaches the points.

6.21.2 Signal Sighting

For developing a real Signalling Plan, ensuring good signal sighting is a very important
consideration. Generally the designer will use site photographs / cab video footage to perform an
initial check that potential signal positions “on paper” have a good chance of being acceptable in
practice. Site visits are then undertaken, culminating in a Signal Sighting Committee (including
representatives of drivers of various train categories, local operations representatives etc.) being
held formally to agree the position or propose an alternative position or risk mitigations.
This committee must consider the following main elements:
• Signal Detection: making sure that the signal itself “stands out” from any background
clutter so that a vigilant driver will actually realise that they are seeing it,
• Signal Recognition: making sure that the driver can readily associate the signal to the
particular track to which it applies and is presented with a signal for which they can readily
decipher what combination of lights etc. is being displayed. This includes considering:
- the problems of reading the wrong signal when on a curved approach,
- the problems of “reading-through” to the signal beyond,
- the problems of obscuration (a word which isn’t included in any English dictionary but
now in current use in the profession!) of aspect on the approach due to something (e.g.
vegetation or Overhead Line stanchions) interrupting the view,
• Signal Interpretation: making sure that the driver can readily associate the displayed aspect
with the action that they need to take; for example considering any risk of confusion between
the meaning of the particular route indicators utilised.
However signal sighting does not feature as a significant consideration within the IRSE Module 2
examination; it is an important subject and frequently features in questions within the exam
Modules 1, 3, 5 and 7. Hence although students should be aware of the issues, it is not a subject
for detailed consideration within this Study Pack.

6.21.3 Miscellaneous constraints

6.21.3.1 General considerations
For real schemes with lineside signals, placement must take into account all kinds of physical
constraints. It is hard to give a definitive list of unsuitable places since in reality there are no total
prohibitions; the risks entailed by any unfortunate site circumstances need to be balanced against
those which would instead result from placing the signal elsewhere.
For example a signal’s approach view may be considerably improved by relocating it by 400m;
but there may be consequences such as:
• lower degree of junction protection should a SPAD occur,
• inability for the signalling to deliver the requisite following headway,
• requiring more interlocking to be applied and thus losing the ability to utilise a junction for a
different train movement which may be operationally unacceptable,
• non-standard signal spacing that could itself give risk of driver confusion and have a
detrimental effect on headway. Indeed it may even result in insufficient braking which
would then need to be resolved by one means or another, each of which could have
undesirable results:
- one option might be to relocate an adjacent signal; this might worsen its sighting
considerably and this could actually be a higher risk signal,
- another option might be to make some modification to the aspect sequence; this would
add complexity and potentially confuse drivers. For example approach release can
create a SPAD trap as drivers become accustomed to a late signal clearance and
certainly results in loss of line capacity.
In certain circumstances therefore it might be best overall to accept that the physical position of a
particular signal is considerably sub-optimal and then attempt to mitigate the associated risks.
There are various techniques available to reduce the risk; if for example the signal’s sighting
distance is deficient then it may be possible to increase this by raising its height or in extreme case
(though this sometimes creates more problems than it solves) by locating on the opposite side of
the track to normal. Alternatively placing a banner repeating signal on the approach (or in rare
circumstances a co-acting signal at the same longitudinal position as the main signal) can help
increase the effective sighting distance. Where the problem is more of drivers judging stopping
position due to the gradient profile etc rather than lack of sighting distance per se, then a series of
count-down markers 100m, 200, and 300m on the approach may help. See “anti-SPAD Toolkit”
information available to download from http://www.opsweb.co.uk for example.
Most of the following issues are items which cannot be known when placing signals on a layout as
part of the IRSE exam and therefore of minor importance in that context, but they are highly
pertinent considerations in the real world. However some IRSE track plans do incorporate features
which suggest that placing signals at certain sites should be avoided if practicable. It is generally
the potential sighting difficulties (curves, over-bridges etc.) which may be inferred from the plan;
remember to draw attention to any such assumption that influences your layout choices.
In general therefore only a brief reference to the type of potential problems that exist is indicated
below; it is not intended to be a definitive list. It is included primarily for completeness to assist
the student gain a wider consideration of sighting issues rather than being directly relevant to the
activities required within Module 2. A good candidate can display their expertise by taking such
things into consideration and thus distinguish their paper from an ordinary one; however it will
count for nothing unless the basic design of the plan is itself sound.

6.21.3.2 Gradient profile

The gradient profile can be an important issue; signals on rising gradients are to be avoided where
possible as they require drivers to drive their trains under power whilst on the approach (particular
issue for heavy freight, partly due to less responsive brakes) and also the difficulty of re-starting
from a stop and the risk of rolling backwards. A particular risk for any train is a gradient profile
which suddenly changes significantly on the final approach to the signal as the retardation rate
therefore also significantly changes, making the train hard to handle; it is a particular problem for
drivers who on occasions drive trains of different lengths, since the percentage length of their train
on a particular part of the profile can result in very different response than their previous
experience would tend to imply.
6.21.3.3 Inside curves
Where the approach to a signal is via a left hand curve (assuming left hand direction of running on
multiple track lines), there can be parallax errors, which makes it difficult to determine which of
several signals applies to which of a series of parallel lines. The problem is particularly severe
where the signals are actually staggered longitudinally; this can result in the relative ordering from
left to right appearing to change whilst the driver is approaching them, so it is easy to read the
wrong signal and only discover the error too late.
In addition sight lines to such signals actually cut across the inside of the curve; this is OK if there
are no obstructions, but a cutting or buildings close to the track can totally prevent the view. More
insidious are the stanchions in the cess supporting overhead electrification; being quite narrow
these would initially seem to pose no real problem but they can align to give a virtually continuous
“wall”. Therefore these can severely restrict the visibility that would otherwise be possible;
signals can become repeatedly obscured for short periods which may result in them appearing to
flash when they are displaying a steady aspect or indeed vice versa. Where this is a problem it can
potentially be solved by cantilevering the OHL supports from stanchions only on the outside of the
curve but this can be very expensive to achieve (particularly if the electrification is already there
and needs to be changed to suit the signalling rather than being designed new).
Where a line in tunnel is also on a curve, signal visibility is extremely restricted. Whilst the ideal
situation is clearly not to place a signal in such a situation, underground railways often have to do
so. In such circumstances it is then a matter of mitigating the situation as much as possible by
providing sufficient repeater signals on the approach that there is adequate visibility. Operation in
degraded mode also needs to be considered; there is a risk that a driver having passed the previous
signal under the “stop and proceed” rule may travel insufficiently cautiously to stop short if
another train is held at the next signal- see section 6.14.2.

6.21.3.4 Tunnels and Viaducts

Similar sighting considerations can also be relevant on viaducts or within tunnels, but in addition
positioning signals in such places could also be undesirable for other reasons (possible passenger
disembarkation risk, if collision occurs with stationary train it would be at a high risk site, access
difficulty for driver to use SPT, build up of fumes from diesel traction stopped in a tunnel, lack of
accessibility to a train that has stopped, difficult from a constructability and maintainability
viewpoint).
• On railways that are completely or largely in tunnel, it is clearly unavoidable to have such
signal placements. However in such an environment, the administration would have taken
this into account when making a generic assessment of operational risks. This in turn would
influence the railway’s policy, practices and standards; it represents “the normal” and thus
isn’t “special”.
• Conversely on other railways where such features are unusual, the generic standards do not
assume such a situation and thus a need to place signals in such places is subject to special
consideration and additional risk mitigation measures. Be aware of such issues and, if it is
not possible to avoid such signal positioning, demonstrate that you appreciate the situation
and have attempted to mitigate the associated risks; this may be by the inclusion of suitable
notes associated with the route boxes relating to specific interlocking controls for example.
“Tunnel controls” are sometimes specified to prevent another train entering the tunnel if a
stop signal in the tunnel is at danger except when there is a reasonable expectation that the
first train will have cleared the tunnel prior to the second train arriving at that intermediate
signal. Hence whereas a train might have to be stopped in the tunnel, the controls have
ensured that this will be a rare event and thus the level of risk is reduced. The corresponding
dis-benefit is that a “double block section” has effectively been created in certain scenarios;
don’t forget that the delayed clearance must be taken into account for the headway
calculations if tunnel controls are necessary.
On lines where all passenger rolling stock has power operated or centrally locked doors,
tunnel controls are often omitted since the primary risk (of passengers mistakenly getting out
at night) has been avoided by other means. Note that this is another example of a reason
why an examination candidate should declare their assumptions.
Be aware that any signal positioned in a tunnel is likely to need to be ground mounted or wall
mounted and indeed of a smaller profile; it can be virtually impossible to position route indicators
in addition to the main head.
Even positioning signals within a short distance (say 50m) of a tunnel exit can render them very
hard to see; the brightness of the background seen from within the dark tunnel can completely
swamp the light from the signal.

6.21.3.5 Traction constraints

On electrified railways there is a need to ensure that conductor rail section gaps or OHL (=Over
Head Line) neutral sections do not occur in the vicinity of any stop signal; this could result in a
train coming to rest in an area in which no traction power is available. The prohibited area extends
much further beyond a signal than on its approach, since it is necessary that a train starting from
rest can have performed a significant amount of acceleration before the driver must shut off power
to coast through the traction gap.
There is also particular issue with the design of certain OHL booster transformers which can result
in them becoming seriously overloaded as heavy traction current is drawn within their immediate
vicinity and therefore signals should be positioned at least 100m from them. On dc electrified
railway the currents drawn are high due to the relatively low voltage which can be utilised and
therefore a low impedance traction return path is needed. Details of the traction design influences
the sites where power available to the train is reduced and therefore signals at which train may be
stopped are best avoided; it is not just the distance from the traction return sub-station but also the
location of track paralleling sites (at which the rails are commoned up to allow multiple return
paths) which affect the volt drop is the worst and thus the power most affected.
6.22 Parallelism of signals

If there is a signal applicable to one track but there is not another signal at the same longitudinal
position for an adjacent track signalled in the same direction of running, then there is a chance of
drivers being confused or misled. Hence whenever possible it is preferred to position signals
“parallel to” (i.e. in line with) each other; either as separate straight posts side by side or signal
heads mounted on the same cantilever structure or gantry.
There are circumstances when this cannot be achieved; the most likely to be encountered during
the IRSE exam is where there is a Goods Loop or double ended siding off a running line whose
length is not compatible with the signal spacing adopted for that portion of line.
• A signal is certainly needed at the exit of the loop (ideally of course it is best [#] if there can
be an overlap length beyond the signal that is still within the loop, however it can only be
achieved if this still leaves sufficient standage for whatever length trains are scheduled to be
overtaken whilst recessed in the loop).
• The loop admission signal shouldn’t be too far away from the loop entrance facing points
(there will almost certainly be a slow speed restriction into the loop and thus to clear the
mainline as promptly as possible it is best that the train is not slowed excessively too far
from the place to which the speed restriction actually applies).

The diagrams below show three possible options: 17
13 19
Braking distance
27
23 25 29
Braking distance
37
35 39
Braking distance
# Note on locking and headway: In each of the options shown, it is not possible to route a train
along the straight track whilst a previous movement is still proceeding into the loop, since the
points at the end of the loop are locked by the overlap. Hence in the scenario of a passenger
express train following a slower freight train that is to be overtaken, the headway implications
need to be considered carefully. In general the freight will have to be slowing whilst still on the
mainline for potentially three different reasons:
1 to be able to stop at the loop exit signal,
2 to traverse the loop entrance points at the permitted speed,
3 due to any approach release of the junction signal.
Which of these is the governing factor obviously depends on the site circumstances but in most
cases reason c is more restrictive than reason b, which is itself more restrictive than reason a. Note
that it is sometimes justifiable to invest in a higher running speed into such loops even though the
freight is about to stop, purely so that it can clear the mainline more quickly and avoid delaying
other services.
Then the train must be proved to have come to a complete stand within the loop before the locking
on the trailing points can be released. Only then can the route be set for the faster train along the
mainline. The points subsequently take a few seconds to achieve their detection and then the
junction signal clears and shortly after that the aspect sequence in rear will step up.
If the express passenger train is within the sighting distance of the outermost signal which changes
aspect at this time, its driver would have already been braking to a stop at the junction signal.
Hence the time between the freight passing this position and the express being able to pass this
position at its scheduled speed defines the headway that is achieved between the two trains; the
time values for the sequence of actions described above would therefore need to be calculated
when assessing the headway which could be achieved and then an appropriate contingency
allowance added to give the headway to be utilised for timetabling purposes.

Option 1 provides parallel signals 17 & 19 at the end of the loop (on the assumption that the loop
is only just long enough to hold the longest required train). The problem is that placing signal 13
at braking distance on the approach is liable to mean that it is an excessive distance from the
facing points. Therefore this form of solution would normally be undesirable but in specific
circumstances it could be a good option: for instance if the loops were 400m and the speed of the
line low the braking distance might only be some 800m and thus signal 13 only some 400m from
the facing points. This would be perfectly satisfactory, the solution is simple, straightforward and
cheap and thus the best in that scenario.
• A speed signalled railway would explicitly require a train signalled up to 17 to traverse the
whole section from 13 at the speed of the facing points which would probably be quite low.
• A route signalled railway does theoretically allow the driver to travel faster through the
section, utilising their route knowledge to regulate to the required speed by the time of
traversing the points; however this does depend on the aspect sequence by which the driver
is informed of the route to be taken. In the example given it is probable that restrictive
approach release of 13 would have been provided; this would force an approaching train to
have commenced braking on the assumption that it would be stopped at 13. In other
circumstances (e.g. a straight route beyond 17 to a parallel line) it is possible that the
approach release imposed at 13 would be less severe on the basis of the driver having been
given some routing information at a previous signal.
Whatever the system of signalling too great a distance between 13 and the facing points
causes unnecessary delay in normal working for trains entering the loop and is particularly
inconvenient when operating in degraded mode when a failure prevents 13 from being
cleared.
Option 2 places signal 25 closer to the points to overcome these issues; the problem now is that
there is not braking distance to signal 29. Braking distance from 25 to 27 is not normally a
consideration, given the likely speed of the points. Hence should 29 be at danger the driver must
somehow be informed of the need to brake whilst approaching signal 23.
• For a speed signalled railway, signal 23 must display the appropriate aspect to instruct the
driver to reduce speed to a value at signal 25 for which there is sufficient braking distance to
stop at 29.
• The objective is fundamentally the same for a route signalled line; a preliminary caution is
generally displayed at signal 23 thus informing the driver that they have two block sections
in which to stop. However this also means that it is necessary to have another signal
positioned suitably to give adequate warning of the need to stop at signal 25.
• An alternative is instead to position signal 23 such that it is indeed full braking distance from
signal 25; in this scenario signal 25 must initially be held to danger when there is a need to
stop the train at signal 29, only releasing it to show its true aspect once the approaching train
has passed 23 and therefore braking in expectation of stopping. See Appendix S.

Option 3 takes the opposite approach in solving the problem by prioritising the signalling of the
running line and accepting that parallelism of the signals is less important than other
considerations in the particular site circumstances.
• In this scenario placing signal 35 reasonably close to the facing points is still a priority, but
signal 39 is well beyond the loop.
- Indeed given that it cannot be parallel, then it is best for signal 39 to be a significant
distance from it- say at least far enough to be able to have standage for an entire train
on the mainline having left the loop. Otherwise it will be a trap for a driver of a train
accelerating out of the loop; physiologically they would not be expecting to stop at a
time when their train has only just restarted after a wait in the loop.
- If closer positioning cannot be avoided, then the risk of SPAD should be mitigated by
only permitting signal 37 to clear when signal 39 is off; this information should be
shown on signal 37’s route box.
• Obviously the distance between signals 35 and 37 is considerably less than that between 35
and 39 so would be underbraked and therefore the diverging route would need to be
approach released, regardless of turnout speed. In the vast majority of cases this would be
needed anyway due to the normal junction signalling considerations as the permissible speed
of such loops are generally much lower than the mainline.
• Consideration needs to be given to the fact that a driver on the mainline routed from signal
35 to 39 will see signal 37. In this particular layout the signal certainly must be at red at that
time and thus the scenario is one of a driver being alarmed as the red suddenly comes into
view without a corresponding proceed aspect applicable to their train. In the UK this is
regarded as generally acceptable and a matter of a driver’s route knowledge, but it does
depend on site circumstances; if the approach view is particularly misleading (e.g. if line
curvature etc. could make it appear that this signal was actually intended to apply to the
running line) then either this particular option must be discounted or significant efforts made
to mitigate the situation.
- Given that trains routed into such loops are almost invariably going to stop and wait to
be overtaken and the speed of the loop line is low, the approach view of signal 37
doesn’t need to be particularly great. Thus it can be directed so that its main beam is
significantly away from the mainline, or alternatively a “medium range” (equivalent to
the old “spread-light lens”) be provided instead of a “long range” so that the signal
looks noticeably dim at a distance.
- Certain railways might address this by deciding to make the loop signal “approach lit”
so that it would only show if a train were routed up to it or was standing at it. This is
not a current usual UK practice, but potentially could be an option in extreme
situations.
- Another option, which is particularly applicable if signal 39 is not particularly far
beyond the end of the loop, is to provide a banner repeater parallel to signal 37 (to act
more as a position reference when seeing that signal than to mitigate any poor sighting
of signal 39).
It is important therefore to appreciate that there is no one option that is always best; it is a matter
of compromise between different, and often conflicting, considerations. This indeed is the skill of
the layout designer; for any one particular case one of the options is likely to be clearly preferable,
another acceptable but sub-optimal and the remaining one distinctly unsuitable if not completely
unacceptable.

Parallelism of signals (for the same direction of running applicable to the various tracks) should
certainly be provided whenever practicable. In most situations other than the example given the
risks of confusion are far higher. Consider the situation where signal 37 could additionally read
forward onto a parallel line and thus be capable of showing an unrestricted aspect at the time when
a train is routed up to signal 39 at red. A driver misreading in this scenario could believe that they
could stop braking and reaccelerate - only then to encounter signal 39 and commit a SPAD;
therefore the importance of providing parallel signals in such a case is much greater and thus
option 3 would not be regarded as an acceptable solution.
Where signals are parallel then they should be kept exactly in line wherever practicable. NR
attempts to avoid significant (>20m) staggers since if they are separated by a greater longitudinal
difference there can be an optical illusion of the signals changing relative places as the train
approaches them. Like many other considerations each site must be considered on its merits; this
particular problem does not arise if the approach is dead straight or if the signals are widely
separated with other visual clues such as at stations when there is the width of a platform between
adjacent lines. However even here there can be sighting problems when combined with other non-
ideal factors as the diagram below illustrates:
142 Platform 2
141 140 139
144 Platform 3A Platform 3B
920

Description of a particular such incident:

Platform 2 not really long enough for train using it, incoming driver stops well short of the buffer
stops (which was not therefore the thing to do at this site, although otherwise good practice).
Trains are disrupted so nothing quite working exactly as per timetable, driver from another service
instructed to take this train for return trip for which it is already late.
Hence rushes into train to prepare for the journey. Front cab is so close to signal 142 that the
signal can barely be seen (being blocked from view by window frame); however signal 144 (which
is a “right-hand mounted signal for the adjacent platform 3) is in full view.
Signaller decides that train in platform 2 won’t be ready to leave yet and decides to prioritise the
running of the train from platform 3B that is scheduled to leave after it, in order to save that from
being delayed as well.
Hence the mid-platform signal 140 (which protects the scissors crossover) is cleared up to 144 and
then signal is 144 also cleared.
Train dispatch staff give the driver of the train at signal 140 the “right away” by operating a key
switch on the station platform which causes the “RA” indication at signals 140 and 144 to
illuminate. Driver at signal 140 starts to move train.
Driver of train in platform 2 sees the “RA” illuminate at signal 144 which he thinks is for him and
hence also starts to move their train. This is before the days of TPWS so he carries on in blissful
ignorance until finding that is trailing through points 920.
Driver of other train thankfully sees aspect of signal 144 revert (once the other train reached the
relevant CP) and then the train itself; able to use emergency brake to stop prior to the train from
the bay platform and so narrowly averted a collision.
Like the vast majority of railway accidents, it happened because of a number of causal factors
which all happened to conspire to create a dangerous situation; a medley of non-ideal
arrangements and minor errors. If any one of these had been different it would have prevented the
incident, but it is hard to say which one was the actual main cause. However the significant lack
of parallelism of 144 and 142 was a key factor, when combined with the lack of the ideal standage
and the non-preferred mounting on 144 to the right of the track. There was of course good
rationale for positioning 144 where it was; there was a need for standage prior to the scissors
crossover at the platform mid point- the station only has the one through platform and thus needs
to utilise it to the full extent. The skill of the signalling layout designer is to attempt to anticipate
the risks inherent in their design that may only come to the fore in such a combination of
circumstances.

6.23 Points Lie

6.23.1 Point Lie Descriptions
Historically points were operated directly by a signalman’s manual effort via a lever frame;
although some examples of this still exist, this is now reasonably rare and some form of power
working is usually provided. As well as saving manual effort and removing the distance constraint
between point end and the controlling signalbox, it also enables all the points required for a
particular route to be automatically controlled to the appropriate position when that route is set
(rather than having to be individually placed in the required position as a pre-requisite to selecting
the relevant signal). However, in the UK at least, the nomenclature of the possible point lies as
“Normal” and “Reverse” persists, even though this was primarily associated with operation of a
mechanical lever frame. When operating such a signalbox the signaller was generally expected to
return all levers to their Normal position whenever there was no requirement to have them reverse.
It is more common in Europe to refer to the positions of the points as “Left” or “Right” which
denotes the direction which a train would take when taking the points in a facing direction. It is
important to realise that this is actually the opposite nomenclature to that used on NR when
describing the site lie of the points; for example points are said to be LHSC when the left hand
switch rail is closed, the right hand switch open and thus the train take the right-hand path.
Depending on the particular track layout, the “Normal” lie of a set of points can be defined either
as LHSC or RHSC.
In most circumstances with power signalling, points are not returned Normal after each utilisation;
rather they stay in the position to which they were last operated until required in the opposite
position again. Hence in most cases the nomenclature Normal / Reverse has less significance than
in the mechanically operated context; however there is the expectation that traffic utilisation is
such that most points will more usually be in the Normal position than the Reverse position.
However in situations where a specific safety risk is identified special controls are often
implemented; see section 6.23.2 and 6.28.3.
6.23.2 The Safest Lie of Points

For certain points on the track layout, there is a particular reason for ensuring that they adopt a
certain position whenever possible since it gives some safety value:
• Perhaps the most obvious is that whereas the straight route through a set of points can be
safely traversed at a high speed, the diverging route inevitably consists of a quite sharp
radius curve (and in the case of a crossover immediately followed by a reverse radius curve)
and therefore the safe speed at which they can be traversed is significantly less.
• A second situation is where a point provides trapping protection, in order to protect the
running line from an unauthorised movement by a train or individual errant vehicles from a
siding or depot (see Appendix L); in such cases such points are either made to return to their
protective lie automatically or an alarm is sounded if they are not returned to that position
when no longer required for a train movement over them.
• A similar situation is where the points can provide flank protection within a more complex
junction layout and can thus deflect a SPAD movement away from a signalled move in the
vicinity. Generally such points are not automatically restored to this lie nor alarmed, but
they are set and locked by those routes to which they can provide protection.
• Another situation is where the points can provide the safest overrun path if in one of their
lies; this is particularly true for facing points within the overlap of a signal what can
constrain any SPAD occurring at that signal to the path on which it presents the least risk of
collision with other trains in the vicinity.
The safety benefit in each case is given by the interlocking arrangements which ensure that the
relevant point is designed to be placed (and, in general, locked) in the safest position. It is
conventional to define this safest position as the “Normal” lie, but it is important to realise that the
safety benefit does not automatically arise from the nomenclature alone; rather it indicates an
intention to impose the relevant locking.
6.23.3 Definition of Normal Lie

Hence the practice on NR is generally to define the normal position of points according to the
following “rules”:
Two point ends numbered always to operate together to form a crossover is defined to be Normal
in the position which gives parallel movements on the two lines independently. (This almost
always gives running through the “straight” path of the points and certainly eliminates conflicts
between trains on the separate lines).
Trap points designed to derail inappropriate movements are defined to be Normal when in the
position that will derail and arrest errant vehicles.
Elsewhere, where reasonably practicable, the position of points is defined so that the Normal lie:
• is arranged to reduce conflicts (for example give flank protection at double junctions),
• leads a movement onto a line used predominantly in the same direction as the movement, or
as a less desirable alternative, into a siding,
• otherwise is the straight or primary route through the points.
Note that whereas in most cases the above rules lead to a clear definition of which should be the
Normal lie, there are some circumstances where different considerations suggest opposite
definitions. Therefore a certain amount of judgement is required re the most appropriate definition
and hence the rules should be regarded as guidance. It is permitted to “break” any of the above
rules if the consequences have been subject to risk assessment; following any particular standard
that has grown up in an area for reasons of history is a valid consideration.
One of the times when the definition of a point end’s Normal lie is important is at times of
degraded working when it is necessary for points to be manually operated on site prior to being
secured in readiness for making a hand signalled movement over them. Although on NR each
point end should be identified with clear marking on site, mistakes can be made and thus there is
some value in making the Normal lie intuitively obvious to the person on site who may be working
under pressure and in poor lighting and weather conditions.

6.23.4 Specific Examples of Normal Lie

Probably the most controversy is stirred up by the definitions used at double junctions as depicted
in the following diagrams:
nch nch
Bra Bra
LH double junction (1) Up
h LH double junction (2) Up
ranc
nB
Dow
Up 23 Up Main 25
Up Up Main
Down 24 Down Main
Down 26
Arrangement (1) is the more usual around the UK generally but arrangement (2) was practice of
the former Southern Railway (and therefore still remains the current policy for installations in that
geographic area “south of the Thames”) and is also found elsewhere.
The argument for the former is particularly applicable when the main line is particularly dominant
(higher speed traffic and the majority of the traffic flow) - when mechanically operated it clearly
makes sense to leave 23 points where it is probable they will next be needed and also ensures that
should there be a high speed runaway it is kept on the straight track and thus less likely to derail.
Conversely where all traffic is relatively slow, derailment through taking the diverging route at
excess speed is much less of a risk. Similarly if a significant volume of traffic uses the branch
then points 25 will often need to be directed to the Up Branch (both for traffic travelling over them
and also to give flank protection to traffic travelling over 26 points from the Down Branch).
Hence in that environment there is sense in defining that position as their Normal lie which also
gives the advantage that if there is an unauthorised movement when no trains are currently
signalled then such a train is directed to the line of lesser importance via a conflict free path.
Another particular case worth considering is a clear example of where one of the lies is
considerably better in the case of overrun than the alternative; for a clear example of such a
scenario see section 6.28.3 but be aware that situations also exist in areas on concentrated S&C
such as at station throats, although these are not always as obvious.
6.24 Multiple Ends of Points

6.24.1 Operating Point Ends in Tandem
It is often practice to operate two, or occasionally more, point ends from one operating device
(traditionally a lever, in modern practice an IPS or the equivalent icon on a VDU screen) and thus
they share an interlocking identity. This is only possible in situations when the point ends are
always required to operate in tandem; the most common arrangement is to pair the two point ends
that together form a crossover between parallel lines. Not all railways adopt this policy, but there
are several benefits from so doing:
• the arrangement automatically provides flank protection,
• it simplifies interlocking arrangements,
• it is economical since although two point mechanisms are usually provided (for a short light
crossover the same motor can potentially drive the two ends connected via rodding in the
same manner as for mechanical lever operation but in most cases it is a better solution to
provide separate POE) they can utilise the same interlocking and much of the same drive
circuitry.

6.24.2 Nomenclature of Point Ends

In order to indicate the status of point ends operated in tandem, a specific nomenclature is used.
On NR, the point identity is given by a numeric reference but where there are multiple ends these
are identified by adding an alphabetical suffix; hence the IPS for a crossover may be numbered for
example 927 but the two separate point ends identified on the track layout diagram (and indeed at
the point ends themselves) as 927A and 927B respectively. In any particular locality there is an
established practice which of them should be called the A and which the B end, but there is
variation:
• for small signalbox areas the A end was traditionally the one closest to the signalbox,
• when a signalbox controlled a remote junction via a separate local interlocking then in some
places that was regarded as the site to which the A end or B end should be referenced, but in
other places it was the position of the actual signalbox that was used as the reference
location,
• nowadays since many Signalling Centres control very large areas and the direction / distance
to a specific set of points no longer has any relevance, it is therefore now generally the
practice to nominate the “London End” as the A end.
• Hence there is no absolute consistency; it is always important however to follow whatever
is the established practice in that particular area. On other railways other more different
methodologies are utilised; for example all numeric references featuring a decimal point and
a final number to denote the particular point ends is an alternative means of achieving a
unique reference for the particular end of points yet signifying the relationship with other
point ends with which they are associated.
6.24.3 When to / not to Operate Points in Tandem

6.24.3.1 Introduction
Although it does depend on the preferred practice of a particular railway, it is usually sensible for
point ends to share an interlocking identity except when to do so would bring disadvantages. It is
obviously not appropriate to pair points in such a manner that prevent a desired operational move.
Sometimes the layout is such that there is one point end which could potentially be paired with
either of two others; however all three point ends could not be operated together as it would
impose a constraint that would prohibit the setting of a particular route.
6.24.3.2 Flank
In such circumstances a decision has to be taken which pairing gives the best solution, or indeed
whether there is advantage in retaining all three as separate point identities. One of the
considerations is the automatic flank which is being provided by the “other end” when a move is
signalled over only one of the two ends that have been paired. In most cases this is beneficial, but
sometimes it can prevent the setting of a “parallel move” that would otherwise have been possible.
Careful consideration is needed in such instances as it is sometimes necessary to trade the
operational flexibility of the layout with the level of flank protection which can be provided. This
can be a difficult decision as it is not always clear which is the safer option; it may seem a safety
benefit always to provide the maximum flank protection but if the consequence of such a decision
is the need to hold more signals at red then other risks are being increased. As so often it is a
matter of attempting to balance various competing considerations and factors such as the level of
train protection or other SPAD mitigations can influence this decision.

37
911
910
42
912
40
In the diagram above:

• If all three point ends were given the same number, setting the diverging route from 37
would prevent the use of signal 40; clearly this is unacceptable.
• 911 and 912 could have been numbered as a crossover and made 912B and 912A. However
this would mean that if a SPAD at signal 42 failed to stop within the overlap then it could
potentially continue until head-on collision with a train approaching signal 37. Also it would
not be practicable to give flank protection for moves over 910 reverse.
• 911 and 910 could have been numbered as a crossover and made 910B and 910A. This
would mean that when signal 37 set for its diverging route an overrun beyond signal 42
would be directed towards 912 and flank protection is achieved, albeit at the sacrifice of
flank protection for moves over 912. However the potential consequences of the overrun are
lessened since although a trail-through of the points would occur the likely outcome is
equipment damage (derailment is a possibility depending on POE type) and a possible “side-
swipe” collision with a train from signal 40. There are no certainties in accident scenarios
but statistically the risks are significantly lower than a “head-on”- there is a smaller
“collision window” in which the incident could occur and less energy to dissipate within the
collision.
• Keeping all three point ends as individual identities does have the advantage that 911 can be
made to give flank protection for 912 except when a train is approaching 37. However the
cost is not only in the additional control equipment but also a considerable increase in
interlocking complexity (significant design and testing effort, hardware costs of interlocking
technology, potential unreliability etc.)
There is no one right answer- it depends upon such factors as the speed of trains, the frequency of
trains on the various routes, the effectiveness of train protection and the options available within
the interlocking technology.

6.24.3.3 Double Junction Numbering

A special case of flank occurs at a double junction. In some circumstances the operation of three
point ends in tandem can be a sensible option; the classic case is that of the left hand double
junction (assuming left hand running on double track uni-directional lines as is the norm in the
UK). Where such an arrangement is provided by two single leads and a fixed diamond, the two
point ends must have distinct identities so as to be able to route a train onto the down branch
simultaneously with one from the up mainline (see the diagrams in section 6.24.1).
However where the diamond is implemented as a switch diamond (see Appendix J) this can be
operated in tandem with the trailing point. The two adjacent ends which together constitute a
switch diamond should always be operated together but in anti-phase; this is almost always
achieved by separate POE; hence in this arrangement with the single end it would form a “triple
ender” as shown:
nch
LH double junction, Bra
Up
switch diamond
Up 27 28C Up Main
28B
Down 28A
There are some disadvantages with this approach in failure situations:

• authorising a train to pass at danger in degraded mode,
• for the technicians trying to identify which point end is failing to achieve the desired
detection (but this could also be achieved by operating in tandem but providing split-
detection; see section 6.24.4),
• Therefore it is sometimes regarded as preferable to pair the two ends of the switch diamond
but keep as a separate identity from the single end.
Hence whereas the diagram depicts the traditional approach and therefore would probably be what
the examiners are expecting, it is no longer for example current NR policy (see section 6.24.3.5).
See section 7.10.3 for examination advice.

6.24.3.4 Trapping
Another example is the case of points in the overlap of a signal where one position lies towards a
siding:
• In the first diagram 906A and 906B are paired and thus when a train is signalled up to 31
both 906 and 908 need to be called and locked normal to provide an overlap, although this
locking may be released (i.e. overridden) by the forward route setting of 31 into the siding.
- Note that the track joint adjacent to signal 34 marks the end of track circuiting but is
not depicted as an overlap. Whilst the position does represent the limit of train
detection included within the aspect of the signal in rear, it is not a valid overlap
position, except in the specific circumstance of “FRS” (=Forward Route Set). This
reflects that trapping from the siding is normally required but that it is permissible to
destroy it once it is known that the train approaching signal 31 does itself require to
enter the siding (i.e. there is an obvious necessity to dispense with the trapping and the
train involved is clearly a non-passenger given its destination).
- Alternatively some people do prefer to depict such a position as an overlap but qualify
it with a note of the circumstances in which it is applicable (e.g. w FRS only).
There is no real difference in meaning; it just depends on whether you look at the overlap
symbol as depicting the “limit of controls imposed at aspect level in the signal in rear” or
whether you regard it as the “extent of point and opposing locking”. In the vast majority of
signalling these two meanings are identical. However in just a few scenarios (of which this
is one) the slight nuance becomes significant and thus leads to a different representation.
906B
white
Siding
34
31
..
BC BD BF 908B BG
906A
33
908A

• In the second diagram, the trap points have been given an individual number; this allows
more layout flexibility (e.g. the use of signal 33 whilst a train is approaching signal 31) since
31 is permitted an overlap over 906 reverse whilst 907 are retained normal to provide
trapping. Note that 907 are included within the overlap and thus is set and locked in the
correct position where “correct” is interpreted as “the position which gives trapping” rather
than “the position that an overrunning train would require” since this is the more important
consideration in this particular case. Be aware that some prefer to show an overlap position
that excludes 907 (since there is no track circuit boundary between 906 and 907 then this
would need to be depicted as POL with an arrow to denote the position of the “phantom
overlap”); however this is purely presentational and the locking in each case would be the
same.
907
white
Siding
34
31
..
BC BD BF 908B BG
906
33
908A
6.24.3.5 Typical Policy

There are some point ends which should always be operated together since there is no reason why
separate operation would bring any benefits and indeed could lead to an incident arising due to
confusion and oversight.
NR’s rules require that the interlocking shall command:
• both ends of a switch diamond to operate together,
• a swing nose crossing to operate together with its associated switches.
They also permit other point ends to be operated together “where there is advantage in so doing”
and give the examples of “provision of inherent flank protection” and “for economy of control
equipment”. However they require a risk assessment to be undertaken whenever it is proposed to
operate unusual combinations of point ends together. For an example of a potentially
controversial case, section 6.28.3.
The rules also states that “usually no more than two point ends should be operated together”, thus
expressing a clear preference for moving away from the traditional means of controlling a double
junction (6.24.3.3) without prohibiting the perpetuation for new work.
6.24.3.6 Special Configurations

When confronted with a complex piece of pointwork (see section 6.24.5) always consider it just as
a mixture of simple single ends and simple crossovers which have just happened to be physically
overlaid on top of each other to save longitudinal space. Analyse the complexity and separate into
these separate functional elements (which could have been used to achieve the same range of
operational moves on the layout had there been the luxury of greater length of railway in which to
achieve the required traffic needs); then number the ends accordingly. Look at some typical
examples (for example Appendix D) with this thought in mind and it should soon become clear.

6.24.4 Note on Split Detection:

Traditionally where a crossover was controlled from a mechanical lever, it was the facing end
detected in the signals reading over it. When such points were motorised both ends needed to be
detected but these were summated in the same indication to confirm that all the trackside
infrastructure had achieved correspondence with the signaller’s intention. Hence “one control- one
indication” became established practice since it is simple and effective.
However there are disadvantages when failures occur. Whereas both ends of a crossover must be
detected for a signal to clear over it in the reverse lie, this is not necessarily the case in the normal
lie. In this case one of the ends is in “line of route” and obviously must be detected, but the other
is “flank” and, depending upon the railway’s signalling principles, need not necessarily be proved.
As so often it is a balance of risks;
• is it good enough to assume that the flank point end has moved sufficiently to be effective to
give flank protection, even if not proved sufficiently tightly closed and thus allow a signalled
move?, or
• is it preferable to “play safe” and maintain the signal at danger even if this then necessitates
a hand-signalled movement during which a mistake is possible and perhaps the overall risks
are higher, particularly when the wider effects of disrupting the smooth running of the
railway system are taken into account?
In the UK the view taken is that a main or shunt signal may not be permitted to clear, but a
degraded mode aspect (e.g. POSA) may be provided explicitly for this purpose. Even where these
are not provided some benefit is achieved by providing the signaller with separate indications of
the relevant point ends; if the end in line of route is showing detected then a hand signalled
movement may be made by using the point switch to lock the points in position, without needing
to arrange someone on site to inspect the lie and secure them with clip and padlock. Hence “split
detection” can save considerable delay; whereas traffic on one line must await attendance on site,
traffic on the other line can be kept moving albeit at low speed. Hence for new work, this facility
is often provided and attention is drawn to it by a relevant note added to the Signalling Plan.
For example instead of the arrangement depicted in Appendix J3, the point ends could have been
numbered 901A and 901B and hence be operated from one set of interlocking and having one IPS
yet the signaller would have separate indications for each end and therefore would get the
advantages of the separate numbers in failure scenarios.
NR rules state that;
• it is permissible for correspondence of individual point ends (or group of point ends) to be
indicated separately to the signaller in order to facilitate hand signalling of train movements
when there is a partial failure.
• correspondence shall not be separately indicated between:
- the point ends of a switch diamond,
- swing nose crossings and their associated switch rails,
- supplementary detectors and their associated primary drive.
Note that this does not preclude the inputs for these being available to the technician separately;
indeed it is now policy to provide separate detection relays locally for each individual function
even if these are summated on site before being used as an interlocking input (though where a CBI
is utilised then advantage can be gained from inputting separately, often at little cost). For RRI
signalling, the separate ends of a point number effectively have to be very close to each other; this
is not necessarily the case with a distributed CBI but there are good reasons from a human factors
viewpoint for perpetuating; see section 6.28.3.
6.24.5 Depiction of Points

GK/GN0525 parts E,F & G show Signalling Plan symbols (as well as the signaller’s panel or VDU
display) applicable to the various types of pointwork used by NR and probably generally
applicable to other railways as well:
• spring points,
• hand points,
• Ground Frame points,
• standard power points,
• standard trap points,
• wide-to-gauge trap points,
• single slips,
• double slips,
• swing-nose crossings,
• switch diamonds,
• scissors crossovers etc.
Make sure that you know which are which (see Appendix J) and how to number these
configurations appropriately (see diagram examples in this Study Pack but also consult examples
of real sites on your particular railway, for NR some are included as Appendix X).
6.25 Non –Running Lines: Depots, Yards, Sidings and Loops

It is important to realise that any one railway consists of portions on which trains start and end
their journeys, places where they may need to call-in en-route and other stretches where they
simply want to run continuously without interruption. Therefore it isn’t an entirely homogeneous
entity; the means of operation, and hence the signalling which is appropriate, should also vary as
well. The primary distinction is between “running lines” and “non-running lines”; the issues are
discussed in more detail in Appendix L. Students should be aware that the examiners regularly
comment that it is the interfaces to non-running lines which tend to be signalled especially poorly,
so study of this topic is particularly recommended.

6.26 Train Detection Sections

6.26.1 Introduction
The minimum number of track circuit joints should be provided, consistent with the requirement
to protect all movements adequately whilst providing the necessary flexibility in the use of the
layout by enabling the prompt release of points in the route for use by other train movements and
permitting parallel movements to be signalled. Many railways use sectional release of route
locking and individually release each route locking element behind the train as it clears the
associated track section; some railways regard the entire route as one entity and release it
simultaneously- this can utilise some positive detection of the front of the train as additional proof
of position to supplement the clearance of track sections which have been traversed.
The different practices adopted by various railways do lead to them having different requirements
for train detection boundaries, but a typical practice is described below.
6.26.2 Signal Replacement Joints

Joints should be placed generally adjacent to (or, depending on local practice, 5-20m beyond) any
signal capable of showing a stop aspect, including Ground Position Light signals provided for
shunting.
• In principle the joint should be close to the signal so that the interlocking recognises as soon
as possible that the signal has been passed, whether entering a set route or as a SPAD.
However sometimes some other device such as a treadle is utilised for this purpose.
• There can be a need for a minimum distance to address the issue of “self-reversion”; for
trains where the leading axle is ahead of the driver’s position they might otherwise see the
aspect replaced before passing it. Historically the need for this was common, but most
current rolling stock is now driven from the front cab and the driver’s position is generally
close to the first bogie even if the train has a protruding nose. However “self-reversion”
became an issue in the UK when TPWS was provided on existing rolling stock; on some
vehicles the aerial had to be mounted behind the leading bogie so although the driver does
not see the signal revert to danger special arrangements were needed so that the train
protection system didn’t detect a SPAD and thus intervene.
One obvious exception is that Automatic signals do not generally justify a track section division;
being purely headway signals there is far less need to detect immediately that a train has passed a
signal. Hence provision of separate sections is not justifiable economically and thus they are
normally given combined berth and overlap track circuits. Hence such signals become replaced
only when the front of the train has reached the overlap joint, typically some 180m beyond the
signal.
Signals which only act as distant signals similarly do not necessarily require such a track joint
close to them.
• Whenever there is a train within the block section, the previous signal is obviously held at
danger and therefore prompt replacement of the distant is not essential; in normal
circumstances no legitimate train could see it anyway. Despite this it is desirable to return
the distant to caution at the first convenient possibility; if there is a failure and for any reason
(legitimate or illegitimate) a second train enters the block section there are obvious risks of
displaying a green aspect to its driver who may then suddenly encounter the previous train.
Therefore it is practice to force the distant to be at caution whenever there is a train waiting
at the berth of the following stop signal, but to utilise the first convenient train detection
division beyond the distant signal to do this (rather than incur additional expense to put one
in any particular position).
• An additional consideration is where such a signal is in a position where it could be observed

by drivers on other lines (perhaps a wrong direction signal on one line of a double track
railway); reasonably prompt (i.e. within 180m) replacement is necessary to avoid unduly
concerning other drivers who would consider it as a signalling irregularity and thus be duty
bound to report it as a suspected wrong-side failure. This can also be a consideration for
other railway staff; however delayed replacement doesn’t tend to get reported by platform
staff, possibly since they work in one specific area and just get used to the normal operation
and many may be unaware of its significance.
Similar considerations apply to banner signals; the exact position of the replacement joint beyond
them is not critical but it is generally good practice to provide one quite close. The mere fact that
there is a banner suggests the sighting of the associated signal is poor (due to a cutting and sharp
curve / over-bridge for example). It is clearly undesirable for the banner to be showing Off
(correctly reflecting the signal) when there is a train between it and the signal.
• This may be acceptable in some circumstances (the banner provided to give additional
warning on approach to a signal to lessen the incidence of SPAD, but once the train is close
to the banner there is good visibility through to the associated signal) since the risk of
confusion is negligible.
• Conversely if the banner is for a platform starting signal whose sighting is poor and a
permissive move is provided to allow another train into an already occupied platform, the
risks are far greater:
- the banner can be observed by a driver of a normally signalled movement (not just a
rare occurrence in degraded mode operation),
- a high likelihood of there being an intermediate train waiting in the platform,
- poor sighting combined with other distractions for the driver within a station area,
and therefore the cost of an additional track section to ensure prompt replacement of the
banner is easily justifiable on safety grounds. However if the interlocking rules prevent the
second train being signalled into the platform unless the platform starter is held at danger,
then the principal risk would be mitigated and thus prompt banner replacement would be far
less critical.
This illustrates the sort of decision which is the essence of signal engineering; striking the best
balance between various risks and costs to suit the circumstances and thus why policies
adopted on different railways, and also between sites on any one railway, differ.

6.26.3 Other Functional Requirements for Track Section Boundaries

Train detection boundaries are also required:
• at the limit of the overlap; utilise the appropriate symbol to denote the significance. There
should not be slavish adherence to any default or standard overlap length but it is far more
important to consider the significance of the overlap and where it is appropriate to place the
joint.
Various considerations apply:
- are track circuit joints needed for other reasons?,
- can a slightly longer overlap be provided without serious effects on headway or layout
flexibility?
- is the permissible speed sufficiently low that a shorter (i.e. reduced) overlap could be
considered acceptable?
- does the position fall within pointwork or at another position which is foul of another
line and thus not a particularly sensible place to have a joint?
- is it sensible to provide also a Restricted Overlap (see Appendix S, Appendix T1) so
that points which would otherwise be locked can be free to be used by another route?
If so, the ROL should be placed so that as long an overlap as possible is given whilst
being just short enough to prove clearance at those points; don’t forget to add a
Warning class route to the route boxes of the signals which read up to the protecting
signal where the ROL is provided.
• for purposes of approach release of the signal. It is generally not good practice to utilise a
specific track joint directly to “trip” a signal, but it is better use a joint further away and then
perform such a “trip” after a specific time delay. This has the desirable effect that drivers
become less accustomed to the better (i.e. less restrictive) aspect always being displayed as
they pass a particular position but introduces more variability. However using too long a
track section and therefore needing a corresponding long timer setting means that it becomes
too unpredictable for varying circumstances of train approach speed. Therefore if an aspect
is only adequate for readability at 100m, the signal ought to have a berth track circuit no
more than say 200m and a relatively low time value can be used,
• to enable the timely release of A/L or operation of TORR. Track divisions positioned for
other purposes should normally be utilised but occasionally it is necessary to adjust their
positions and exceptionally provide extra joints just for these purposes
• to initiate the activation of a level crossing sequence for an automatic crossing, or turn on
the picture / commence auto-lowering of CCTV / MCB crossings,
• to hold a crossing closed / be part of the proof that it is safe to re-open a crossing after the
passage of a train,

• to enable the signaller to be given adequate information for operational purposes regarding
the whereabouts of trains, for example:
- where there is use of a platform by multiple trains for example the provision of
separate track indications can be helpful when operating the layout,
- where there is a station prior to a junction, regulation of that junction can be awkward
if the signaller cannot tell when a train which has stopped is on the move again- hence
even where there is no platform starting signal a track circuit division can be
beneficial,
- in a suitable position that the signaller controlling the neighbouring area can be given
timely advice of the approach of a train and also has visibility of the state of the
railway up to the extent of the overlap beyond the last signal which they control.
6.26.4 Technical Requirements for Division of Track Sections

There are also constraints upon the maximum and minimum lengths of any track section which
also need to be taken into account when determining joint positions.
• The maximum length is essentially determined by the actual technology but is influenced by
the environment;
- track circuits need to operate reliably and are sensitive to ballast resistance so the
maximum length is influenced by the type of track and sleeper insulations (e.g. is it
bullhead rail mounted directly on chairs on wooden sleepers, flat bottom rail clipped to
concrete sleepers by pandrol clips insulated by nylons and with rubber pads
underneath) and the expected environmental conditions (such as areas prone to
flooding, especially by salt water). The presence of electrification can reduce the
permissible length (immunity of dc track circuits to differential longitudinal volt drop
due to traction return, necessary provision of impedance bonds to give a traction return
path inevitably shunts some of the track circuit current),
- similarly there are technical constraints relating to axle counters, though these tend to
be the distance between the detection heads and the ACE rather than the actual
physical length of the section,
- where there is a technical constraint which is shorter than the division required for
operational purposes then it is the practice of many railways to provide a
“combination” or “multi-section” track section which indicates to the signaller as if it
were one, yet to the technician is actually composed of multiple sections. This gives
significant economy and before the days of regular use of axle counters as many as 15
sections could be combined into one, though at the disadvantage of locating the faulty
section when a failure occurs.
o The most economical solution is the “cascade” where the contacts of one track
relay are used to disconnect the track feed of the next section from the rails at
the other side of the IRJ.
o An alternative solution is the “cut-section” which uses a line circuit into which
the contacts of each track relay are placed in series; this tends to be better for
fault finding as each track circuit operates independently of its neighbours but
at additional cost and some risk that a section gets missed out, particularly
when alterations are made.

o In a CBI implementation with distributed I/O (Input / Output object controllers)

each section is input separately and summated in data; the technician can
however get full information about each cut section separately and thus there is
no disadvantage in these circumstances, but still gives the advantages of less
interlocking data, smaller number of indications on VDU or panel etc. and is
therefore used whenever suitable.
o Individual portions of such track circuits may be used for interlocking functions
(including approach release of signals, in a sequence for approach locking
release or strike-in of a level crossing) but obviously when the signaller has a
need to know then a unique track circuit identity is required on either side of
the joint.
o Another reason for a track split is when the functional track section spans
dissimilar infrastructure requiring a different technical solution. For example
on dc electrified railway a “single rail” track circuit is required over S&C but
must be strictly limited in length due to the volt drop of the return traction
current. Hence if the limits of a track section include a significant length of
plain line as well as the area of the pointwork, then a “double rail” track circuit
would be used for that additional portion. Note however that a track section
would never be composed partly of a track circuit and partly of an axle counter
because of the different treatment required under failure conditions and the
signaller would only see as one entity and could not therefore know which rules
are applicable.
• The minimum length is essentially determined by the rolling stock permitted to use the
line. It is undesirable to have any portion of a track section that is shorter than the maximum
distance between inner axles of a vehicle since the track could show clear when it has no
axles on it yet is being spanned by a vehicle. Interlocking controls to protect against this
situation are necessary when shorter track sections are unavoidable.
There can also be other restrictions that arise from considerations of the time for which the track
section is occupied- for certain traffic characteristics (i.e. maximum speed and minimum length)
these impose a minimum length. Typically these reasons stem from the interlocking’s need to see
the tracks operating in a particular sequence to be able to raise level crossing barriers or release
approach locking; the presence of a short track can defeat this if there is a relative delay between
the inputs for two adjacent track sections. Two events happening close in time can become
reversed when seen by a computer based interlocking which scans its inputs, the same effect can
occur if a short dc track circuit follows a TI21 track circuit (since the latter is designed to continue
to give an occupied output to the interlocking until it has detected the correct frequencies for a
continuous period of 2 seconds- this is part of what gives it sufficient immunity to traction
interference). This level of detailed consideration is not required for Signalling the Layout, but it
is a consideration for real work and worth being aware of the issue for sitting other IRSE
examination modules.
The length of spur sections for track circuits is not a primary consideration for Signalling Plan
design; the issue is addressed by the design of the bonding during detailed design. However it can
be a very significant consideration during the design of a scheme to utilise axle counters, since
separate axle counter sections may need to be provided for such portions, depending on the
methodology being used to reset-restore the section after a disturbance has caused it to show
occupied despite actually being clear of trains.

6.26.5 Track Circuit Interrupters

A TCI is required whenever it is necessary to be able to detect that a train has travelled beyond the
place where any train should ever go and that it might be jeopardising the safety of other train
movements; although nearly always associated with a track circuit this is not necessarily the case.
6.26.5.1 Derailment Detectors- own track section
The most usual use of a TCI is at a set of trap points (see section 6.24.3.4) that are provided to, in
extremis, derail an errant train so that it cannot continue its unauthorised movement and thus
collide with another train in an area where a greater accident might result.
• The problem is that this very action can result in the train “disappearing” from the track
circuit intended to detect its presence and thus a device is needed to ensure that once a train
has passed beyond the place at which derailment is imminent, then the track circuit will be
maintained continuously occupied even if there is subsequently a loss of train shunt when
there are no longer any axles across the rails forming that track circuit.
• The simplest and most commonly provided device is nothing more than a metal connection
which is designed to get fractured by the wheel flange passing a place where it should not.
- Originally this was utilised to connect the track feed to the rails and thus was
automatically connected “in series” so that once fractured the track relay was kept de-
energised permanently until the TCI replaced by the technician.
- Due to the risk of chance inadvertent contact between the fractured connection and the
rail, later designs use an insulated interrupter that is bolted to the one rail but wired in
series to the opposite rail; hence should there be chance contact post derailment the
track circuit is shorted out.
- The current standard is for the TCI to be totally insulated from the track circuit itself; a
simple electrical circuit is constructed taking a fused power supply through the TCI
direct to a relay. Contacts of this relay are then either put in series with the actual
track relay within the deed into the interlocking, or fed back separately so that the two
functions can be utilised in combination or separately as required by each of the
various interlocking functions; see 6.26.5.2.
• Other devices that are not destroyed by being hit by the train are possible alternatives; they
do however need to be associated with a memory element that requires site attendance by the
technician prior to being reset to normal operation.
• Where train detection is by axle counter, once a wheel has passed the Zp the section will
remain permanently occupied until either it has cleared the section (obviously not possible if
the train has taken the route over a set of trap points leading to derailment) or until the
section is reset/restored. Hence in many circumstance there is no need for a TCI since the
risk that would be mitigated in the case of track circuit train detection does not exist.
- However there does need to be specific interlocking logic that recognises that
occupation of the section at a time when the points are not detected in the position
required for there to be a wheeled path must mean that derailment is a distinct
possibility. Therefore any means of reset-restore that does not involve site attendance
by a competent person to establish what the situation actually is would be potentially
unsafe. Some form of site based reset is therefore necessary in such situations, but
other means of reset/restore remain appropriate to clear the section after disturbances
when the points were detected appropriately.

- Note that a TCI is normally required in association with axle counter train detection
where there is a risk that a derailed vehicle could become foul of another train
detection section; see 6.26.5.2. It would potentially be possible to implement the same
functionality in logic where there is sufficient ACE - interlocking communication, but
a separate TCI has the significant virtue of simplicity (not only regarding obtaining
safety approval but also when staff are trying to understand and resolve the situation
on site in the event of an incident occurring.
6.26.5.2 Derailment Detectors- other track sections potentially fouled

Depending upon the track layout, there is a risk that a derailed vehicle will become foul of another
track. Obviously this is to be avoided as far as possible when determining the necessity for and
the positioning of trap points but inevitably the decision often has to be taken on the basis of “the
least bad of all the evils”.
At a site where it is anticipated that a derailed train might foul an adjacent line on which there
could be a legitimately routed train, detection of the event (e.g. the destruction of the TCI) is
arranged not only to fail the track circuit within which it is situated but also any other track section
which is considered at risk. This ensures that the normal interlocking of the area is able to protect
the situation by locking points and replacing relevant signal aspects. Provision of the TCI as a
free-standing interlocking input obviously facilitates this functionality. A further advantage is that
it can be used to place the track section in an “undefined” rather than “occupied” state; the
signaller’s indication shows occupied, any interlocking function that requires the track section
clear is disabled, yet those functions (such as approach release or part of a track sequence to
release locking) are not enabled.
6.26.5.3 Sliding Buffer Stop displacement detection

A further use of a TCI is not actually associated with train detection per se and could even be used
on a line without train detection (e.g. un-track circuited siding, lines operated under AB or ETCS
level 3). At the end of a passenger running line, and occasionally at other sites, it is now policy to
provide a means of safely arresting the progress of a train which impacts upon the buffers. Even
with sophisticated train protection there is always a residual risk of collision, albeit there can be
high confidence that any such collision would be at no more than a certain low speed. Hence for
new works the buffers are designed to arrest a train safely following a collision at that speed.
Generally this is achieved by the buffers sliding against friction resistance and overcoming specific
obstructions at intervals on its path; hence it is important to detect if a collision has occurred and
thus the buffer left displaced and no longer able to achieve its design specification. Generally this
is achieved by placing a TCI such that it is sheared off once the bufferstop is hit sufficiently that it
moves, but other devices to register position could potentially be used. Traditionally the TCI has
been wired into the associated track circuit so that the situation is revealed by an apparent track
circuit failure once the train has departed; NR’s current practice is to provide a separate
monitoring circuit to produce a specific alarm at the signalling control centre in the event of an
incident.
There are still plenty of places on the network where the still line terminates at fixed buffers; it
seems to have become practice now to locate a TCI very close on the approach to them so that in
normal circumstances it is not possible for a train’s wheels to hit it. If however a significant
collision does occur the logic is that it will probably be broken as the train derails or destroys the
bufferstop.

6.27 Single Lines.

In most cases the presence of a significant length of single line suggests that the portion of railway
carries relatively little traffic; otherwise the money to have doubled the line is likely to have been
found in order to eliminate the bottleneck created by it. There are exceptions; it obviously depends
on the costs involved. For example:
• where the traffic is predominantly heavy freight, the most economical solution can be to
invest in maximising the length of each individual train which can be run, such as on the
railroads of North America;
• if exceptionally heavy engineering works would be needed (e.g. to bore a new tunnel or
construct a new viaduct) or if the adjacent land that would be required has been developed
and therefore not available for purchase at a affordable cost, particular routes may be best
implemented as single lines but with frequent passing loops so that each individual section is
short. Countries such as Switzerland therefore do have intensively used single track main
routes.
In the UK however it is generally more advantageous instead to provide a double track line but
relatively sparse pointwork and signalling where traffic levels are in excess of around two trains
per hour in each direction. Hence it is rare for a single line to justify intensive signalling; they are
either secondary mainlines (where speeds are reasonably high and even wide signal spacing can
easily deliver the required headway) or local lines through rural areas (probably limited to speeds
below 60mph, perhaps with a station every 5 – 10 miles and a train service possibly only two-
hourly or even less).
This is one reason why IRSE exam layouts regularly feature single lines; they make a contrast with
the rest of the layout and thus give the candidate a chance to demonstrate that they comprehend the
importance of the signalling being designed to be appropriate to its use. Therefore students should
regard this as an essential study topic for the examination; however since it might form a bit of
distraction from the main text the relevant material is included within Appendix K

6.28 Bi-directional and Reversible Lines

6.28.1 Introduction to Terminology
Variations on the use of terminology can make this a confusing subject for the newcomer; in some
environments there are definite nuances in particular meanings, yet there is no one universal use of
each term! A student ought to appreciate the situation in order to be able to interpret information
that they see presented and be aware of the potential for misunderstandings. It is best not to worry
unduly re the actual nomenclature but to recognise that the following generic situations do exist:
• There is only one railway track between two distinct places and only one train may use this
line at any one time (with the possible exception of a train being permitted to shunt a short
distance into the block section from the station at one end whilst a train is already in the
section travelling to the far end). This is what would without exception be considered a true
single line and has been discussed in section 6.27.
• The same situation as above but with the difference that there are intermediate signals to
allow a succession of trains to follow each other in the same direction. For many this would
equally be regarded as a single line, yet in the UK Mainline context at least it tends
(depending on the context) to be excluded from the definition since it tends to be “normal
signalling” rather than “special”,. If operated under TCB then it is more often regarded as a
bi-directionally signalled line by the signal engineer because of the technology utilised,
though a railway operator would generally still think of it as a single line because there is
only the one track for carrying the traffic in the two directions and it is relevant to the
continued operation of traffic in degraded mode following a failure preventing the normal
use of the signalling system.
• Where there are signalled running moves in the both directions along a line, then these are
bi-directional both from an operational and an engineering perspective. Such lines may
often be quite short, perhaps through a station platform and in the station throat area; these
however are obviously not single lines. Where it gets confusing is that if there is one track
forming a chord between two separate railway routes, it is almost certainly regarded as part
of the bi-directionally signalled area if associated with other such railway, yet possibly as a
single line if it is in isolation from anything else (especially if it is long).
• On double track railway, one line is invariably allocated for carrying the traffic in each
direction; the default situation is that signalling is only provided for that one direction on that
line, which certainly makes it uni-directional. There may be some shunting moves provided
in the opposite direction but this does not change its status as far as the railway operator is
concerned. However since opposing route locking generally has to be provided to ensure
safety, the signal engineer tends to regard it as bi-directional in such cases.
• Reversible signalling is the term used when a significant distance of a running line of a
double track (or more) railway has signalled running moves in each of the two directions.
- In most cases this will be “reduced capacity bi-di”: fewer block sections being
provided in the “contraflow” direction, often just the one block section for the entire
length. It is provided on certain double track routes particularly to allow engineering
possessions to be taken for greater time periods on one track whilst allowing a low
level of traffic to be operated on the remaining track (there tend to be just a few trains
prior to the end of a day’s service- it may permit engineering work to start for example
at 23:00 rather than 01:00 for instance without very much effect on traffic).

- In some cases this will be “full bi-di” and there will be equal signalling in the two
directions. This may be particularly appropriate where there is a “tidal flow” with a
line generally being used in opposite directions in the morning and evening peaks, or
on a far more spontaneous basis at any time (particularly when the junctions associated
with a station are spread out for a considerable distance on the approach instead of
being concentrated in a geographically compact “throat” area).
6.28.2 Signalling of Bi-Directional and Reversible Lines

All the normal considerations apply, but there are certain special considerations:
• the positioning of signals for each of the two directions isn’t entirely unrelated:
- they can block each other’s sighting,
- standage considerations can take on a special significance,
- significant economies can be made by placing at the same site (especially if need to be
positioned on gantries as the same expensive structure can be used with them mounted
back to back). Similarly this can reduce the quantity of interlocking and minimise the
number of track circuit divisions needed,
- directionality may be required for the train protection (e.g. in the UK AWS has to be
suppressed for the non-applicable direction),
• the importance of establishing a particular direction of use for the line and maintaining it as
long as it is required:
- can either be established by means of a direction switch or by the act of setting a route
into the section,
- where the entire length of the line is not under the control of a single signaller then
there has to be a co-operative initial way of determining the direction in which the line
is to be used.
o Where the signallers are at adjacent positions within the same signalbox this
could be purely procedural and verbal, so that there is intended to be discussion
between them but the technology is such that the first of them to set the route
“wins”.
o When different signalboxes are involved (and indeed even often within the
same signalbox) then a form of “acceptance” or “slotting” is required.
Sometimes one of the signallers is given the ability by default to signal onto the
line except when they give a form of “release” to the other; they are then
inhibited from doing so but their colleague is enabled to do so. In other
implementations the two signallers have a more equal control and each has to
give a release before the other is able to signal towards them; it very much
depends upon the overlap arrangement at the ends of the line and whether key
infrastructure on a signallers area would be locked up by the actions of the
person at the far end of the section. The need for two signallers to participate
like this in the setting of a single route is in some people’s view the distinction
between “reversible” signalling and the more usual “bi-directional” which from
the operator’s perspective is just normal route setting; beware that others who
differentiate between the terms can mean something entirely different!
- even if there are intermediate signals (controlled or auto) the directional locking must
be established for the entire length of the line (until the next place where trains in
opposite directions may pass each other),

- intermediate signals are generally kept at their most restrictive aspect until such
directionality is established,
- the signaller is often given an indication of direction of use, particularly for long
reversible sections (especially where one signaller controls the one end and a different
signaller the other end) and sometimes for station platforms in which trains have
stopped and it is important to have a visual reminder of which direction they arrived
from.
- it is often appropriate to insist on an enhanced locking before permitting the directional
locking to release and the line to become available for other direction use. This is
particularly relevant where there may be situations in which the train detection may
not be 100% trusted to detect all trains; the loss of train shunt for a split second could
otherwise be enough to lead to the loss of opposing locking. Hence such measures as
timing all track sections simultaneously clear for a time (often either 7.5 or 15
seconds) before allowing the direction established to be changed, or making sure that
rarely used crossovers have welded eucleptic strip on the rail head in order to
overcome the problem of rusty rails),
• there are implications for trackside staff safety:
- staff warning systems may be required,
- particularly for the long reversible sections where the signalling for one direction is
rarely used, the occasional use in the opposite direction clearly presents a risk of staff
being caught unawares. Particularly for work such a track inspection patrolling where
a solitary individual has to be on the track looking for defects they need to be able to
walk facing traffic secure in the knowledge that they cannot have a train descend upon
them from behind. In this situation a PLOD would be provided so that the patrolman
can obtain the signaller’s permission and then disable the reversible signalling which is
then not available to the signaller until the patrolman surrenders the lockout again.
Practices adopted by different railways vary due to history, technology, rules and environment; the
student should study examples of practice on their railway to determine the extent of the above and
where similar considerations are generally applied.

6.28.3 Discussion of a Typical Example

Consider the example of a reasonably short stretch of single line on what is otherwise a double
track route; this typically may be due to a tunnel that was only built for a single track and hadn’t
been worth the cost and disruption of enlarging, or perhaps a viaduct that was built for double
track but isn’t now sufficiently strong to support the weight of two trains simultaneously and the
one remaining track slewed to the centre of the formation.
standage 77
71
Up & Down Main
731 732A
Down Main Down Main
Up Main 732B Up Main
white
standage
70 76
Two things should be obvious:

• firstly the section of line will impose capacity constraints; no longer are the Up and Down
directions of traffic independent but they need to share the same portion of single line.
Timetabling of services must reflect this constraint, but the signalling also needs to make as
much as accommodation as is reasonable to lessen the impact of any late running which
results in a train in one direction having to be given precedence over one in the opposite
direction.
- This certainly means that it should be possible for a train to be brought up to a
protecting signal quite near to the commencement of the single line whilst it is
allocated to a train in the opposite direction. Hence signal 71 has been placed just
overlap clear of the CP for 731 points, whereas at the other end of the section
advantage has been taken of the stub of track beyond 732B points to position signal 76
just on the approach of the point tips.
- The level of constraint created by the single line portion depends upon the length of
time for which it is occupied; this is generally dictated by the length of the section and
the speed of train movements. In the scenario given, the line itself would probably be
high speed, but whether full use of this can be taken would depend upon the speed of
the turnout 731 and 732.
o Note that in the arrangement drawn, the Down Main passes through both points
in the straight position and thus would be unrestricted in speed.
o Conversely any Up train would first need to slow for 732 points (indeed
although there is in fact only one route from signal 76, it would be signalled as
if it were a diverging route to mitigate against the risk of a driver being
mislead by the seeming continuation of the Up Main). The train could only
accelerate once its rear had completely left the area of speed restriction. When
accelerating the driver would need to remain aware of the need to slow down to
the appropriate turnout speed prior to reaching 731 points and taking the
divergence. Therefore the average speed of the train in the Up direction might
be considerably less; indeed there is no value in the published speed limit being
higher than the best accelerating and decelerating rolling stock could
realistically achieve within the limited length of this portion of line even if the
same track could be used at higher speed in the Down direction.

- There really needs to be standage at the first signal beyond the resumption of double
track; otherwise a long train held here would still be preventing the train in the
opposite direction from using the section. This may need to be compromised for the
longest trains, but only if the chance of a train needing to be held at such signals
considered negligible; if long trains are infrequent and the signals plated passable but
needed to be there for headway for example, then it may be the “least bad” option but
this significance should be noted.
• secondly there is a very significant head-on collision risk in the event of a SPAD. Indeed
almost the only reason for a protecting signal being at red would be that either there is an
opposite direction train already on the section or one is imminently about to enter it.
Therefore should an unconstrained SPAD occur, a collision would be virtually inevitable;
the only potential mitigations would be if:
- automatic detection of the SPAD is provided or the signaller happens to observe in
time, AND
- there is an effective means of quickly communicating to the drivers of both trains
(“emergency stop” functionality via a radio with complete line coverage is the most
effective but may not be provided at the site / on board trains; an alternative that could
be useful in certain limited situations would be the provision of specific “SPAD
Indicators” lineside. Note that it is necessary to stop the train that has been validly
signalled as well as the overrunning train; hence train protection itself does not prevent
the dangerous situation unless it can contain the overrun prior to it reaching the
convergence prior to the single line section.
Hence this gives a very clear example of the relevance of the length of overlap compared to
the effectiveness of the train protection and emergency braking, see section 6.16.2. It is this
consideration that will largely dictate the position of signal 71.
In the opposite direction, note that there is no overlap shown beyond signal 76 except when
points 732 are normal into the stub; hence unless 76 route is set a train being brought up to
that signal has a “safe” overrun that cannot enter the single line section. It is obviously still
important to provide train protection as the stub will soon end in buffer stops; in the case of a
viaduct there would be a risk of it being thrown into the valley below; in the case of a tunnel
a train hitting the buffers would be liable to be thrown foul of the single line (as the cess side
is likely to be a cutting or retaining wall). For this reason (and also since there the rails
would be extremely rusty since there should never be any vehicles on the stub of track and
thus the track circuit be ineffective), a TCI would be positioned so that it would be fractured
as soon as the first wheel passed over 732B in the normal lie since no vehicle should ever get
there. This could be utilised to give the signaller an alarm and automatically revert signal 71
to danger to give the best chance of mitigating the incident, by narrowing down the “window
of opportunity” for a collision.
Note that certain railways implement enhanced route locking on such single lines because of
the high consequence potential of a momentary loss of effective train shunt on track circuited
railway; one brief instance of the train detection showing clear due to rusty or contaminated
rails could result in the permanent loss of route locking for the movement. One possible
mitigation is to maintain the last route locking element locked for an additional time period
after the normal route locking has released as extra mitigation against invalidly being able to
signal a train in the opposite direction and where this is implemented this is utilised to drive
the signaller’s directional arrow indications applicable to the single line section.

• It should also clear that the signalled arrangement depicted wouldn’t comply with the rule
relating to the distance between a signal and the first set of facing points. This is a case
when “the exception proves the rule”. Certainly consideration could be given to providing
intermediate signals on the single line section considerably closer to points 731 and 732A
and they definitely would have some advantages, not only for point protection but also for
headway, possibly helping to maintain a more even signal spacing etc.
However this would need to be offset against the fact that in the scenario given they may
well be very inaccessible (i.e. on viaduct or in tunnel):
- they would not be a good position to stop a train,
- they would not be easy to maintain and entail possibly excessive cost, disruption and
risk to staff safety to be able to do so,
- they could be disproportionally expensive to provide (requirement for physical
construction in connection with equipment accommodation difficulties etc.).
Don’t fall into the trap of deciding to place a passable signal in mid-section; to protect the
points it must be plated as non-passable. Similarly it would be distinctly undesirable in
isolated 3 aspect signalling to place a Yellow / Green distant signal on the approach to the
points; the points would be protected by the Red / Green signal in rear yet in the event of a
hand-signalled move being made through the section the distant’s most restrictive aspect is
Yellow which would be a misleading aspect to give a driver in a scenario in which the points
beyond are undetected.
• Another consideration is the control of points 731 and 732 at each end of the single line
section:
- as drawn the normal lie of 731 points is unusually defined for the diverging path; this
is because it is clearly far safer for any runaway to be diverted onto a uni-directional
line in that direction rather than for a head-on collision for a line signalled in the
opposite direction. Do remember though, that in MAS a normal lie definition is just
that- nomenclature. It only has safety benefit if the points are given auto-
normalisation facility (or at least an audible alarm if left reverse without a signalled
route over them) and this would need to be shown as a Signalling Plan note.
- an alternative would have been to have operated points 731 and 732 as ends of a single
point number (see section 6.24.3) and that would have meant that the normal lie of 731
would have been changed to be to the straight route (think about it!).
o Although appearing to be opposite, it actually addresses the same risk; if the
entire single line including the point ends were in the same functional track
section the arrangement basically guarantees that a train from the Up must
leave on the Up and a train from the Down must leave on the Down- effectively
it acts as one very long crossover.
o Such arrangements do exist but there are disadvantages, given how far the two
ends are away from each other; they are almost certainly completely out of
sight of each other and probably require different road access by the technician.
At a minimum, they would need split detection (see section 6.24.4) and such
pairing could also lead to problems during engineering work.
o It could (and does!) certainly work if the track layout at the right hand end was
a mirror image of 731, but as drawn the need to keep 732 reverse whilst a train
was on the single line would prevent another being brought up to signal 76
unless that signal’s route were itself overset and that second train committed to
the single line; this would not always be suitable and thus 732B would need to
be given a different number to the other point ends.

- For a real job the different possibilities would be evaluated and the Design Log record
the rationale for selecting the chosen option; in the IRSE exam an abbreviated form of
this is appropriate- a brief note to demonstrate to the examiner that you realise that
there is an issue and have plumped for a solution that in your view adequately
addresses the anticipated risk.
• Another relevant item on the sketch is the provision of a route indicator on signal 76 even
though this signal only has the one route. In the UK such indications are provided where the
driver may be mislead by the track layout and imperfect route knowledge into assuming that
there could be a “straight route” from that signal and thus fail to appreciate that they must
respect the speed restriction through 732 reverse. Such “Didcot routers” are provided in
similar situations where a multiple track section converges to double track or at the end of
reversible working at the signal where all trains must the regain the “right road”.
• Similarly a further feature which is shown though not particularly associated with single
lines is that the buffer stop light is white rather than red; this is practice where a facing
running move needs to be made on an adjacent running line and there is a risk at night in
particular that it could be mistaken for a hand danger signal exhibited from the cess (or
indeed that drivers become so accustomed to such lights that they fail to appreciate the
significance of such an emergency stop signal exhibited at other locations).
6.29 Review
The discussion in section 6.28.3 obviously spanned a range of topics in addition to that
immediately relating to a single line. It was a useful demonstration of the typically wide variety of
factors which all need to be taken into account even for what might initially seem to be a pretty
simple track layout.
• If you found that you readily understood the elements and why they were relevant (even if
you did not necessarily agree that you’d have come to the same solution), then you are
fundamentally ready to progress onto section 7 and then try signalling some layouts for
yourself. It is however worth doing some wider reading of references, particularly those that
relate to very different railway environments than the one with which you are most familiar
since to do so can be illuminating; see section 6.30.
• If however you were surprised by, or did not comprehend, the items discussed then more
work on section 6 is indicated first. There are limitations what can be conveyed by writing
alone so you are advised to seek more interactive help from an experienced person to assist
you in comprehending more fully. You ought at least by now have a clearer view of what
elements you do understand and which you need to work upon and thus be able to ask for
some specific targeted help having clearly made a significant effort for yourself; therefore it
would be most unusual if you found that the help requested was not freely forthcoming.

6.30 Compare and Contrast

Different railways’ implementations vary significantly; all have developed over time depending on
the combination of chance which comprises their history: their environment, traffic, technology,
culture, strong personalities and above all the accidents and incidents that happened to occur.
Therefore the student is advised to study the details pertinent to their particular application:
• This Study Pack includes certain detailed NR information, for example Appendix S, but
study should not be restricted to that included within it and its Appendices
• This edition of the Study Pack does not include detailed information for any other railway;
the student will need to find an appropriate source via their employer. Various references
within Appendix Y do give an overview, but is not at a sufficiently detailed level to assist
the candidate wishing to be their exam answer on these practices.
However students from all backgrounds are urged to discover a little about other railways in order
to widen their knowledge and experience in order to see the context of their own specialist
knowledge. A good place to start to acquire an overview is [#7] which gives a comprehensive
comparison of the signalling practices of many different European Mainline railways.
There are also many past IRSE papers available that give various insights into different railways
(most give a least a little information regarding the meaning of aspects displayed) and a selection
is summarised in the table below:
Australia #38/1, #61/1, #65/1, Docklands Light Railway #47/1, #67/1

#66/5, #67/6
China #59/1 Glasgow Underground #55/2, #65/7
CTRL #52/3 Hong Kong MTR #48/1, #55/1,
#66/3
Finland #56/2 Hong Kong KCRC #58/2, #59/6
#66/6
France #51/1, #56/3, #57/1, LUL Central Line #54/1
#64/5
Germany #56/3, #57/1, #67/4 LUL Jubilee #67/2
India #66/8 LUL Northern Line
Japan #66/4 Madrid #54/3
Netherlands #49/1 Manchester #52/2
New Zealand #18 Singapore NEL #66/6
North America #23, #39/1, #63/1,
#63/5
Portugal #60/2
South Africa #56/1, #57/3
Switzerland #37/3, #46/1
Thailand #54/2

This section has been written to give an overview of the process of Signalling the Layout
within the context of the IRSE examination. It is intended to be read after section 6 has
been studied, to show how the various elements should be brought together when sitting the
examination.
7 Practical Approach to the Examination Itself
Whereas the earlier section concentrated on the theory, this section attempts to explain what
the examination entails, give guidance on how the theoretical understanding can be
demonstrated by being put into practice and help the student to understand better the
examiners’ expectations of their answer.
• To some extent partial repetition of earlier material is inevitable but where this
occurs the description here have deliberately been kept relatively brief as a
summary reminder only.
• A few items (particularly items such as numbering policies rather than the more
significant issues of signalling principle) are introduced for the first time in this
section since they are purely ancillary details to the core understanding of signalling.
Note that cross-references to other sections of this Study Pack have deliberately NOT been
provided from here; you should not be reading this section before you are sufficiently
familiar with the underlying technical content- the clue is in the title of the section!
If you find that you do not understand what is meant or see the relevance of something in
this section, the likelihood is that you are attempting at the last minute just to do the
minimum possible preparation to get through the exam or you have failed to assimilate what
you need to know from your previous study of section 6. Either way you should work
through the appropriate material contained in (or referenced from) section 6 before
returning to this section; you may also want to seek help in comprehending what has been
written since it would appear that you have not fully understood it.
However it is appreciated that some students may want to get started on attempting a layout
in order to get an overview of the process before studying the detail. This section should
give sufficient guidance to enable an experienced signalling designer to appreciate what the
exam requires (as they ought already to have much of the underlying knowledge). It may
be that others of less experience would wish to get an initial feel for the process (or perhaps
are working in a Study Group with more experienced people and need to keep up with
them); if attempting a layout by working through this section expect to need to consult
section 6 regularly whilst doing so. The tables in sections 6.4 and 6.5 can be a useful index
and don’t forget that “text search” within the electronic version can be helpful to locate a
section that might help.
In an attempt to specify clearly to the candidate what the examiners expectation will be (in
the absence of information from the candidate that their chosen practice differs), shaded
sections have been included to give that guidance. Candidates are reminded also to refer to
examiners’ comments made at the various Exam Reviews (Appendix A).
For an examiner’s overview of a real exam paper, see B.3.
For a detailed critique of an attempt at the 2006 Mainline layout see Appendix W; however
this is best left as a revision exercise. However there is in the same Appendix a self-check
test sheet which you can use for yourself to get an impression whether you are likely to be
avoiding most of the more common “howlers”.

7.1 Introduction
Students will be presented with a choice of two blank layouts; one for the Mainline and one for the
Metro option; see Appendices A, B & C. The question paper asks for one of these outline track
layout to be developed into a signalling plan and specifies the important activities to be undertaken
and gives the breakdown of marks to be awarded for each activity. These are not necessarily
identical from year to year and between the options- in general headway and capacity issues
dominate on metros but the importance of aspect sequence and the mix of types of traffic are of
greater significance on mainlines which also feature more varieties of junction signalling.
The plans are only to scale longitudinally, using diagrammatic presentation vertically and for any
curve. It is left to the candidate for example to make reasonable assumptions regarding the track
spacing in order to deduce where CP (see Appendix J) would exist on the layout. This is an
element which many novices see as difficult; it is however part of demonstrating that “railway
common sense” which is developed from experience- you must be able to visualise the physical
reality which is implied by an abstract presentation., If you consider there is ambiguity you can
always state your assumptions.
• Each track is represented by a bold single line, with the location of points generally shown
significantly lighter so that the normal lie can be chosen and drawn in by the candidate.
• Positions of significant items of infrastructure such as station platforms, depots, tunnels
and viaducts are included.
• Railways are generally long and thin, so to make the plan manageable it is usually depicted
having the various length portions stacked vertically above each other- be careful to check
which portion abuts which other, especially when there are junctions involved.
• To make scaling easier there are usually scales and datum lines at the top and bottom
margins of the layout plan; just be careful to relate to the correct portion of railway when
there are several lines of way stacked vertically. In addition sometimes figures written
perpendicular to the tracks give the cumulative metreage from a datum defined at one end of
the plan.
The layouts are designed to have features which give the candidate the means of demonstrating
that they are able to apply general principles to a fresh situation. Normally they are inspired by
one or more particular UK locations, but it is emphasised that the candidate may signal them to
any railway’s practice, including TBS.
Where this section gives guidance to the examiners expectation, this has primarily been written
from a UK Mainline lineside signalling perspective since that is the reality of the papers submitted.
The examiners do adjust their detailed expectation when presented with a layout clearly
undertaken to different practices whilst still aiming to set a common standard for the different
environments. It is however the candidate’s responsibility to present their solution in a manner
that allows the examiners to do this. Inclusion of the default assumptions within this section is
intended to make it easier for candidates whose practices differ from those stated to be aware that
they should ensure that the examiners know; this avoids misunderstanding so that intentional
departure from these default assumptions is judged correctly rather than being seen as a mistake.
They are therefore not to be seen as prescriptive items that a candidate must follow, but as
guidance of what the examiners are likely to assume in the absence of sufficient information to the
contrary from the candidate.
For a more detailed Step-by-Step commentary of the detailed process of completing a layout to
NR Principles, see Appendix N1 (and also N2 for the particular circumstances of a terminus).

7.2 Read the Question Paper

The actual questions asked are generally very similar each year but this is no excuse for failing to
read the questions; you have ten minutes reading time so spend it profitably. Most will be best
spent familiarising yourself with the blank layout but it is wise to ensure that you aware of the
allocation of marks between the various questions (which can alter from year to year) in order
that you can choose how to divide your time appropriately (see section 5.10.4) and make any
choices that need to be made if there is any choice of questions.
Examiner Expectation 7.2:

Candidates must not touch a writing implement within the reading time, but should use that time
purely to read carefully and think about:
• the actual questions and mark allocation,
• the plan notes and plan itself- see 7.3.
Do read the actual questions asked and the instructions given; these may vary from year to year
and the examiners will obviously expect whatever they have explicitly specified.
In particular the standard instructions are to write in pen; many candidates use pencil and in many
ways this is understandable. Recognise however that to do so is running a risk; at least ensure that
you choose an appropriate hardness so that there is a bold line which photocopies well but does
not smudge easily.
In general when you need to change something:
• it is best not to rub out pencil or use “typex” on pen, since this will hide your thought
processes from the examiner which might actually get you credit.
• however where there is very little space (such as if you need to modify what was originally
drawn as an overlap symbol into a normal track joint, or if you find that you need to add a
route indicator on a signal profile just where you have already written a track identity) then it
is probably best to overwrite that small area so that it doesn’t become confused.
• You certainly do not want to be deleting significant areas- it will just waste you a lot of time
and you have none to spare. In particular if you think you have made a mistake in the
calculations do any crossing out in a way that the original can still be read since it will help
the examiner understand where you were going and where you made the error; indeed if it
turns out that it was right all along then easy to reinstate by writing “STET” (Latin= “let it
remain”).

7.3 Read the Plan Notes

7.3.1 Overall
Before starting to answer the paper, it is essential to read and comprehend the information
presented on the plan. It is important to assimilate this information and understand how it relates
to the track layout which is to be signalled. The examination is all about being able to interpret
the information and hence develop an appropriate signalling solution.
This needs to be a safe, efficient, economic and appropriate means of enabling the particular track
layout to be utilised by traffic of the density and service pattern and operated by trains of the
type and length which have been specified. Therefore the time taken familiarising oneself with
the “customer requirements” is time well spent, so despite the time pressures resist the temptation
to launch straight in- you may feel that you are making progress in depicting some signalling but it
is unlikely to be the right signalling if you are ignorant of the requirements.
7.3.2 Check out the Information Given

Generally the information on the plan consists of:
• information to characterise the rolling-stock utilised for certain services which typically
includes the acceleration and braking rates, maximum speed and any other relevant
information. Unless otherwise specified it is reasonable to assume that all passenger trains
will be operated by fixed formation MU stock with a driving cab at each end. Conversely
freight trains would consist of one or more locomotives coupled to the front of a variable
number of vehicles up to the specified maximum length. If your railway’s trains customarily
utilise assisting locomotives at the rear of such trains (or indeed a vehicle in which the train
guard rides) then you need to state this as an assumption so that the examiners can take this
into account when reviewing how you have signalled the layout,
• the relevant speeds and gradients on each portion of the layout in order to characterise the
infrastructure (be certain to note any distinction between the maximum permissible speed
and any lower timetabled speed to be used for headway),
• turnout speeds (applicable to the curved but not the straight route through the points in
either the facing or trailing direction)- usually there is a default value quoted but sometimes
there are exceptions specified either in the notes or adjacent to the points on the layout,
• a description of the pattern of train services for which the plan is to be developed.
- This may include the various contracted paths to be available to the train operators
between specified locations. This description usually references letters depicted at key
locations on the main plan but more conveniently are also shown on a representational
small schematic usually placed in spare space within the plan often towards the left
hand end to be more easily read in conjunction with the notes. Be careful to
distinguish between the frequencies which are quoted per hour and those quoted per
day.
- Usually a specific non-stop headway is specified; otherwise a reasonable one should be
stated as an assumption based on the information given regarding the frequency and
pattern of train services.
- Take an overview of the layout and decide what are the key factors that determine the
need for capacity to be provided; see section 7.5 for the things about which you should
be thinking in these valuable few minutes.

- If there are one or more stations at which trains stop, then consideration of stopping
headway will also be required and usually the notes will give a specific requirement
for the signalling to achieve. Generally this will relate to one stopping train following
another with the same calling pattern, but on certain layouts which feature a mix of
services the important time may be the minimum separation between a non-stop train
and one that has previously stopped and thus has been caught up whilst decelerating,
stationary and reaccelerating. Make sure you know which is required and calculate
accordingly; if you think the requirement as stated is ambiguous then say so and state
what you are assuming.
• There may be reference to specific operational moves such as the ability to join trains in a
platform or terminate a service in a through platform before returning to its origin using a
turn-back signal. Do not however assume this explicitly states every single individual
movement which needs to be signalled; it is part of the examination for the candidate to be
able to deduce the whole suite of detailed requirements that are a logical consequence from a
stated high level statement about the intended operational use of the layout.
- At the most basic level if a train needs to enter a siding then it should be obvious that it
will need to exit it again. Indeed wherever a siding is provided on the layout (even if
not explicitly mentioned in the notes) there should be a way of entering and exiting
from it; note in some circumstances this may not necessitate fixed signals if traffic is
likely to be such that handsignalling and local operation of points via a Ground Frame
is appropriate.
- Similarly if the notes relate to freight traffic emanating from a siding to go to some
destination, then it is reasonable to deduce that there must be a return working so that
empty vehicles can re-enter it ready for re-loading for a further trip. Consider carefully
which end of the train the hauling locomotive would need to be, visualise the train
subsequently entering the siding and how the locomotive (with or without its train)
would then leave. Unless some form of “drive-thru” or “merry-go-round loop” facility
is provided it is generally necessary for the locomotive to propel wagons into a siding
in order to avoid being trapped in behind them. Depending upon the direction from
which the train arrives, it may therefore be necessary for there to be a “run-round loop”
external to the depot in order to achieve this, but occasionally such a run-round might
be provided once inside the depot itself. Similar considerations would apply if
passenger trains are formed from locomotive hauled coaches.
- Without understanding the use of the various different portions of the infrastructure
depicted on the layout, the exam candidate is unlikely to be able to produce a
reasonable solution. The examiners regularly comment that it is the interfaces to non-
running lines which tend to be signalled especially poorly and therefore making the
effort to understand the issues is likely to pay dividends when it comes to gaining good
exam marks.

• Standage is also an important issue, so the significance of train length may not just be
restricted to use within the headway calculations.
- It may well govern where run-round moves can be achieved or even necessitate the
handling of long trains in two portions at the terminal.
- It can also determine the closest which signals should be placed beyond a junction to
avoid it continuing to be blocked by a long train detained at the next signal.
- A similar restriction also applies to signals beyond level crossings or else the road can
remain closed for an excessive period.
- In addition a consideration of train lengths compared to platform lengths can inform
where platform sharing may be required, in the absence of any other definitive
information on the plan notes.
In the IRSE exam it is always wise to indicate on your plan where you consider standage to
be a significant issue, especially to draw attention to places where you have decided that
standage for the longest train cannot be provided, this indicating that you are aware of the
issue and have needed to exercise such judgement.
• Sometimes the signalled bi-directional use of a significant length of running line is a stated
requirement but also note that there may need to be other short stretches of lines around
station and junction areas in order to be able to perform all the operational moves stated.
• If the plan incorporates some feature then usually some indication of its nature will be
given. A typical example is a level crossing in which case the road vehicle utilisation might
be given so that the traffic moment can be calculated; this permits the candidate to select the
most appropriate form of level crossing protection and ensure that the remainder of the
signalling depicted on the plan adequately reflects and correctly interfaces with the crossing.
• an instruction to state:
- the method of working of any single line, (this is an important subject often
overlooked by examination candidates who fail to comprehend special significance)
- the type of block working implemented on all portions on the layout and any transition
between them (similarly although only a brief note is required, its absence will convey
to the examiners a failure to comprehend the actual task being assessed),
- the fringe arrangements (with any adjacent signalbox area, freight facility, rolling
stock depot sidings etc.).
• Generally a small extract of the overall area is given on the plan; once permission has been
given to start writing the paper, it is a good idea to annotate this with the traffic flows and
specific requirements. This only takes seconds and can be a useful summary reminder of
your interpretation / deduction to which you can refer to later when placing signals. Where
standage is critical it is worth scaling off from the critical location to annotate on the main
plan the closest place at which it would be desirable to place a signal so that you can take
this into account later when attempting to place signals at a spacing determined by headway
and braking constraints.

Candidates to have familiarise themselves with (i.e. read, marked, learned and inwardly
understood) all the relevant information (service requirements and the characteristics of trains and
track geography etc) and actually taken them in consideration when developing their solution.

7.4 State Practice Adopted / Explain your Assumptions

Every candidate should make clear to the examiners, the signalling practice with which they are
familiar and to which their answers relate. A brief description is sufficient, such as “Paris Metro
Ligne E”, “LUL Jubilee Line”, “KCRC”, “Railcorp NSW Australia”, “NR circa 2000”, “CTRL”
etc. As an illustration of why this is so important, refer to section 6.12. In the 2007 exam a
specific box was added to the top of the plan itself as an additional prompt to candidates to give
the required information but even so there were failures to do so; DON’T FORGET!
This is also an appropriate time to state any assumptions / deductions to which you wish to draw
the examiners attention. There is not time for a detailed explanation; what is required is a bullet
point list of key features that you consider relevant and not otherwise immediately obvious.
Examples may be statements covering:
• how you have interpreted any stated requirement that you feel is ambiguous so that the
examiner can understand the basis on which you have worked. For example you may not be
clear from the description given
- whether a higher turnout speed is intended to apply to a particular set of points, or
- whether permissive working in a reversibly signalled through platform is required in
both or only one direction.
• where you think that you may have failed to realise the full significance of a stated
requirement and what assumptions you have made.
- In the 2006 paper a candidate admitted that they had no idea what standage to provide
for the light steam locomotive mentioned in the plan notes, but stated they had allowed
200m which they hoped would be enough. Actually 50m would have been perfectly
adequate for the locomotive even with its support coach, but since the examiners knew
the source of confusion the candidate was not penalised for working with their wrong
assumption, even though it caused them some little amusement at the time!
The mark of a competent person is to know the limits of their knowledge and to
know to ask the right question rather than actually know all the answers.
• the working arrangements of freight trains as discussed in section 7.3,
• the rationale for adopting a certain form of level crossing protection and any additional
assumptions that choice would depend upon; for example the safe operation of an AHBC
depends upon the road user being able to get clear of the railway which imposes
requirements relating to the road layout, road profile, absence of “blocking back” risk etc.
• the intended working arrangements for the running lines including specifically any single
line portion, the sidings and depots, the fringes to other forms of signalling or areas of local
control (be it level crossing gate box, shunter’s panel, freight loading / discharge facility,
traffic and emergency GF etc).
• the use of axle counters obviates the need for provision of TCIs at locations on the plan that
have been marked by a specific symbol ☼1,
• trap points have not been provided at certain sites identified by the specific symbol ☼2
despite it being appreciated that such provision is often expected. This is because it is not
the railways’ practice / the traffic description implies that they would be unwarranted.
• train protection has not been shown but the general assumption is that:
- AWS provided 180m on the approach to all running signals except when there is no
signalled move in rear and on bi-directional lines would be suppressed accordingly,
- TPWS sufficient to give a high confidence of stopping overrunning trains prior to
conflict provided wherever a signal protects a junction or opposing move.


Candidates should explain the context of their answer so that it can be marked appropriately.
An overall comment from the examiners is that:
“If you are looking for a Distinction then you do need to put sufficient notes on the layout to
explain the rationale for your decisions rather than just present the layout as a fait acompli”.
Examiners are perfectly prepared to find out the relevant information to allow them to do so for a
solution with which they are unfamiliar, but they need to be given enough information to know
that they need to do this and the basis of which railway’s standards (or sub-set of a particular
railway’s standards) should be the benchmark for the candidate’s answer.
7.5 Determining Braking Distance and Headway

The first task undertaken is normally the calculations to derive braking distances from the
relevant speeds for the various types of trains; generally there is a greater mix of traffic types in
the Mainline example than the Metro.
The headway requirement must then be assessed and cognisance taken of both the running
headway and the stopping headway where applicable. It therefore needs to be related to the layout
in order that attention is directed to the most significant portion which would tend to act as the
bottleneck limiting capacity on the line as a whole.
• An intermediate station on a high-speed line (where the signal spacing on the approach must
necessarily reflect a large braking distance but where trains are decelerating to perform a
station stop) is one obvious example.
• Care needs to be taken to assess where the constraint is the most onerous; it may not be the
station handling the largest number of trains since the availability of multiple platforms and
the platform dwell times are also significant factors to take into account.
• In particular termini need special consideration, especially if there are significant lay-over
times prior to the trains returning and access to the station may be a constraint.
In general consideration of headway is a more significant part of the Metro paper than the
Mainline paper. In the Metro context headway is often expressed in terms of train per hour which
is particularly appropriate for a succession of similar trains on a regular service pattern.
Conversely in the Mainline context headway is generally expressed as the minimum time interval
between two trains that would ever be required. See Appendix G
In either environment it is important that there is some contingency between what the signalling is
designed to deliver and that which should be utilised for planning purposes in the development of
a robust timetable. The amount of this contingency varies between administrations and the
specific situation; unless the paper stipulates a specific value the candidate needs to state what they
feel is an appropriate allowance to permit operational recovery and thus achieve timetable
resilience. For example this might be: “In order to provide a suitable level of contingency, the
headway figure used for signalling design is 20% more onerous than that determined as necessary
for the utilisation actually timetabled”. When expressing headway as a minimum time, a common
error is to increase the time; this of course would result in less capacity.

It is permissible to determine headway either by calculation or by the production of headway

graphs. Although it is the candidate’s choice, calculations are often the more appropriate solution
for the relatively simple situations encountered on the Mainline layout whereas graphs are usually
the method of choice within the context of the Metro layout. Whichever method is selected it is
essential that:
• all assumptions are stated,
• any symbols and abbreviations used are explained.
Even when calculations are used, a sketch is often useful as an introduction to the mathematics
and to define the terms used. Note that under examination pressure it is very easy to make
mistakes in calculations, so beware of missing out steps or skimping on explanation. If the
examiner is able to follow your reasoning, credit is given despite an incorrect answer resulting
from an error but where this is not obvious no marks can be awarded for the work.
Do remember that the purpose of performing headway calculations is to prove that the signalling
proposed is capable of delivering the specified headway, but since braking distance, aspect
sequence, junction protection and headway are all inter-related there is a certain amount of
iteration required.
• Therefore the initial task in a UK mainline context is to determine which form of signalling
is likely to be suitable and at what nominal spacing the signals could be positioned; then the
headway which would result can be determined and checked to be appropriate to the
specification.
- For this the candidate needs to understand how the twin factors of braking and
headway relate to the various forms of signalling and relevant aspect sequence; with
experience (i.e. practice of attempting past exam papers!) the student can develop an
intuitive “feel” for the likely solution.
- For a particular form of signalling the best headway is achieved with the signals
spaced at the minimum distance permitted by braking considerations; if this gives
shorter headways than is actually required then the signal spacing should be increased
so that a more economical solution which still achieves the headway requirement is
achieved. A check should however also be made that this does result in signals so
widely spaced that there is significant risk from overbraking.
- Should the headway resulting from placing signals at whatever maximum signal
spacing is considered acceptable (e.g. due to overbraking considerations) be better than
that headway actually required, there is a choice to make. One option is to adopt that
signal spacing and provide more capacity than strictly needed, the other to choose a
different form of signalling. This must be judged on a “cost versus benefit” approach;
a small amount of excess capacity is no bad thing and there may be reasons why
signals are needed at relatively short spacing to protect junctions adequately and are
thus fully justified even if not required for headway. Another reason for “over-
signalling” a short stretch of line might be to avoid the need to transition from one
form to another and possibly back again. However unless there is good reason then the
more economical form of signalling should be adopted; if you decide on balance that it
is better to go for the more expensive option then you must explain your rationale to
the examiners, just as in real life a designer would have to justify to the project
manager and thereafter the sponsors who are having to pay for it.
- Conversely if the calculations reveal that the specified headway cannot be achieved
even with the minimum permissible signal spacing, then clearly the initial choice was
inappropriate and the exercise needs to be repeated with a form of signalling which is
more suited for the layout.

• This initial view based purely on uniform plain-line headway and braking calculations may
need to be modified subsequently once signal placement on the actual layout begins. The
wise candidate keeps half an eye on the layout implications of the calculation results as they
emerge, rather than feel that the calculations are necessarily complete and can be forgotten
prior to progressing to the activity of drawing on the layout plan; such a “Jekyll and Hyde”
approach is all too frequently evident in candidates’ answers! The moral is “look before you
leap”; do remember that you are given the 10 minutes reading time explicitly for that reason
so if you fail to make sensible use of it then that is your fault. In particular the factors that
tend to alter the initial assumptions are:
- the need to satisfy the stopping headway as well as the non-stop headway. Again with
experience a student can quickly tell from the layout specification whether this is
likely to be more onerous than the non-stopping requirement. A very rough
conversion of a speed in miles per hour into metre per second is to halve it, and
normally the braking rate for the mainline layout is 0.5 ms-2. Hence deceleration of 1
ms-1 occurs in 2 seconds so the time taken in slowing down to a stand from 60mph
would be about 60 seconds compared to the 30 seconds that a non-stop train would
take to cover the distance. On the assumption that acceleration is similar, the
approximate additional time that the stopping train would take is therefore in this case
= [(2 x 30) + dwell time]. This methodology is certainly not good enough to prove
what stopping headway the signalling delivers, but is a “quick and dirty” method of
deciding whether it is actually likely to be the more onerous constraint; it can be done
in your head in the 10 minutes reading time,
- a section of line where the permissible speed is limited to that significantly below the
remainder of the line. This may be in the environs of a major station where all trains
need to slow down whether or not they are booked to call at the station, it may be a
converging or diverging junction with low turnout speed and may be exacerbated in
the latter case if there is a need to impose approach release upon the junction signal,
- a section of single track on what is otherwise a double track route; considerably more
contingency allowance may be required due to the interaction of the trains travelling in
opposite directions should their lack of perfect timekeeping lead to conflicts which the
timetable no doubt attempts to avoid. Such a section may not just be an obvious length
over a particular viaduct, but could be disguised as the need for trains accessing a
branch line to travel for a distance on a running line in the opposite direction to its
normal traffic flow,
- pointwork spaced more widely than could be sensibly signalled as one extended
junction area, yet not so far apart that separate signals protecting each area are
necessarily too close together for there to be braking distance between them. Even
without performing detailed braking calculations an examination candidate should be
able quickly to recognise that there may be an issue and thus immediately the
calculations have been made then make the appropriate decision.

- If for example the calculations suggest 3-aspect signalling is appropriate generically

but a pair of signals cannot be spaced at minimum braking distance then the choice is
one of:
o deciding to implement a short stretch of 4 aspect signalling for that area,
o imposing some approach release, providing that this doesn’t prevent the
required headway,
o contemplate propose a reduction in permissible speed, again only if this would
not severely impact the running of trains. This would not normally be
acceptable but it would be a sensible option if the layout featured an abrupt
change of speed say from 100mph to 25mph; an intermediate length with a
defined speed of 60mph (where no train could anyway exceed that limit whilst
still being able to comply with the forthcoming speed restriction) would
therefore not affect the running of real trains yet permit the lower figure to be
utilised when calculating train braking and thus the required signal spacing.
Many students find that they have difficulty knowing where to start when assessing the appropriate
form of signalling and, in an attempt to assist them, a “process driven short-cut” methodology has
arisen, commonly referred to as DGR as it considers the Distance from Green to Red. An
explanation of this is included in Appendix G.14 and an example in Appendix G.22 as it is a useful
exam technique that can save time and does give the “right answer”, at least for the initial working
assumption. Do not regard it however as an alternative to proper understanding; if you use it in
the exam then be sure to explain it within your answer rather than just quoting it. If you cannot
explain it then you should not be using it and that fact is likely to become evident to the examiners
who will not give you much credit for your efforts.
Juggling signal positions to comply with headway and braking as well as other site constraints is
very much the essence of signalling the layout; the calculations are part of this but only a means to
an end. The calculations are “schoolboy mathematics”; it is the interpretation of the results and
their implications which is what this exam is all about. Above all REMEMBER that you get as
many marks for DEMONSTRATING TO THE EXAMINER THAT YOU UNDERSTAND as
you do by getting the actual answer correct; present your answer paper accordingly.


Candidates should be especially careful to ensure that:
• all quantities are converted into compatible units (metric is strongly recommended) before
using within a formula,
• the formula quoted is dimensionally correct,
• there is clarity between:
- timetabled headway / design headway,
- maximum permissible speed / headway speed,
- headway between two non-stopping trains / between two similar stopping trains)/
between a stopping train and a fast train following it / terminal station headway
between a train arriving and leaving the same platform or any platform,
- “green” headway (2nd train doesn’t encounter restrictive aspects) and “yellow”
headway (when it can be argued that the restrictive aspects encountered by 2nd train do
not unduly influence how it is actually driven),
• answers are quoted to a suitable precision,
- If a braking distance is quoted to the nearest millimetre the candidate betrays the
thoughtless use of a calculator to number-crunch a formula rather than demonstrating a
true understanding.
- Conversely beware of throwing away digits too early in a calculation, especially if you
are going to ‘square’ the result
- Consider carefully which way to round values- it depends whether you are calculating
a minimum or a maximum.
• intermediate workings / diagrams are shown; this enables certain credit to be given even if
the answer produced is incorrect due to a conceptual or arithmetical error,
• diagrams are strongly recommended to demonstrate that the significance of the various
quantities is clearly understood,
• where “short-cut” methods such as calculating DGR are used, the candidate only does so
when appropriate and also shows that they understand the significance of the ratio that
determines what form of signalling is appropriate rather than quoting it “from thin air”.
Be warned that the examiners do wish to ensure that a candidate really fully understands the
subject and believe that this is not always the case when the DGR methodology is used. It is
therefore quite possible that future examination papers may vary the wording of this question
to ensure calculation from first principles.
• the necessary headways are calculated / obtained by graphical methods; i.e. numerate values
quoted for both non-stop and stopping headways.
• where the calculations produce one answer for a stretch of line but the candidate ends up
signalling their layout differently to that, then the rationale for this must be explained,
• different portions of the layout are treated separately where applicable; where for example
there is a branch with lower speed then the relevant braking distance is required but no
headway calculation is needed if it is evident that even minimum signalling easily achieves
the requirement.
• The examiners warn that long answers over many sheets rarely get good marks; if you know
what you are doing a comprehensive, well explained, answer can still be quite compact- it
does need planning and practice however.

7.6 Placing Signals on the Layout

7.6.1 Overall consideration
The overarching requirement is for the candidate to apply the established signalling principles (of
the administration with which they are familiar) to ensure:
• the safe movement of trains,
• the delivery of the specified requirements in terms of capacity, operational moves and any
other performance considerations,
• an economic solution sufficient but not excessive for the traffic requirements. Remember
the old adage that good signalling is economic signalling. This latter factor is particularly
important when considering features such as the appropriate method of operating single lines
and freight or depot facilities.
7.6.2 Braking and Headway

Having initially considered the specification parameters such as
• the traffic requirements (speed and headway),
• the characteristics of the rolling stock (maximum speed, acceleration and braking rates),
• the characteristics of the line itself (permissible speed profile, gradients etc.),
the candidate needs to determine the most appropriate form of signalling for each portion of the
layout. In the case of UK mainline signalling for example, this essentially means determining
whether the required headway can be delivered by 3 aspect signals spaced just over braking
distance apart, whether the headway requirement is less onerous in which case “stop and distant”
type signals may be appropriate, or more onerous in which case 4 aspect signalling would be
needed; see Appendix S.
If offering a route signalled railway, you should also indicate how you are assuming that a driver
will have the information to be able to regulate their speed appropriately to observe all the relevant
restrictions; specify the extent of route knowledge being assumed and the policy adopted regarding
any fixed speed signage. Showing continuous speed signage on the plan is quite time consuming
and the best approach may be to demonstrate a small example area and cover the remainder of the
plan by virtue of a note.

7.6.3 Signal Spacing

It is important to ensure that the Signalling Plan is drawn with a signal spacing which is
compatible with the results of the braking and headway consideration already obtained, or if the
candidate perceives that there are other considerations which warrant a departure from that figure
then these reasons are fully explained.
When deciding re the possible positioning of signals along a length of line:
• remember that the braking consideration represents an irreducible minimum spacing
whereas the headway consideration imposes a maximum signal spacing that would provide
the design headway. Ensure any rounding of measurements is done in the right direction.
Look at the various physical constraints on the layout to determine the most appropriate
signal spacing to adopt as a default. Generally it is good practice to attempt to keep the
signal spacing within MAS as regular as possible (see section 7.6.3), but don’t be too slavish
to the determined figure. Recognise that signalling the layout is essentially a compromise,
attempting to balance various considerations; this is one reason why there is variation
between the policies adopted by various railways. Therefore don’t be afraid of departing
from true regular spacing within tolerable amounts where there are corresponding benefits.
A headway signal falling part way along a platform is a plain nonsense!
• if the delivery of the specified headway at a through station depends upon one train being
able to arrive in one platform simultaneously with the departure of the earlier service from
the adjacent platform, the layout must not prevent this by virtue of the overlap for the one
conflicting with the route for the other!
• similarly if it has been previously demonstrated that the specified headway can be delivered
by a particular signalling solution, then the signalled layout should not depart from this
without good reason. However it may well be that there is a need to provide signals at
certain positions to protect junctions etc. and as consequence there could be more signals
than would be provided purely for headway reasons; this is perfectly valid but this rationale
does need to be explained.
Whereas the above considerations lead to constraints upon the maximum and minimum
spacing of signals, there are other factors to be considered when determining signal positioning.
It is fundamental to the concept of MAS that generally each signal position has to be chosen to
fulfil the requirements of the danger aspect as well as the requirements relevant to the proceed
aspects (braking / headway). Therefore the acceptable range of signal spacings is just one of the
factors that need to be taken into account; see section 7.6.6.

7.6.4 Signal Positioning at Junctions

The optimum position of a signal protecting a junction requires consideration of both the signal
itself and its associated overlap(s) with respect to the pointwork.
In general the choice for any one junction is between:
• placing the signal close to the points and thus including them within the overlap to lock out
the possibility of conflict (but at the dis-benefit of preventing other possible movements), or
• placing the signal “overlap clear” of the points. This has the advantage of permitting
greater use of the layout but does entail a safety risk should a SPAD occur which is not
contained prior to the conflict.
The issues are discussed in section 6.13 and the candidate’s knowledge of the specific railway’s
practice is important when determining the optimum placement of signals protecting junctions.
Recognise also that each junction often cannot be considered in isolation, particularly if they are
close to each other. The need to place successive signals in a way that satisfies braking and
headway requirements as well as standage so that the rear of a train clears a previous junction and
can fully enter a station platform (and in the real world also physical sighting considerations)
further complicates; the best option at one junction may preclude the best option at another.
7.6.5 Signal Positioning – where to Start Performing the Placement?

Since it may be impossible to signal each separate junction area in the individually optimum
manner (conformity to braking and headway constraints and a fixed position dictated by an
adjacent junction), a sub-optimum arrangement for one may have to be accepted. For that reason
it is best to start with the most constrained area on the plan and try to develop a reasonable
signalling solution working out from it.
Generally on IRSE layouts it is sensible to consider first the most important station depicted
upon the plan.
• If there is a station platform with pointwork relatively close to it, then it is almost always the
best option to position station starting signals at the departure end of the platforms; see
section 6.19.
• Stations in plain line sections do not necessarily require signals close to them but where
achievement of stopping headway is a significant issue then the positioning of signals both
prior to and beyond the station is important; see section 6.19.1
• It is generally sensible to position the signal on the approach to the station relatively close
to it, especially where any form of permissive or shunting moves are made; see section 6.19.
This however needs to be balanced against the arrangements that would be necessary if such
positioning results (as is quite likely) in inadequate braking distance to the platform starting
signal. This can raise issues similar to those discussed in section 6.22.

7.6.6 Signal Positioning – Optimising the Layout

Inevitably in order to balance all the various constraints there is a need for a certain amount of
iteration.
• Hence the candidate is recommended to lightly mark tentative signal positions initially by
arrows rather than taking the time to draw as signal structures. It is very useful to have a
scale rule at least one metre in length; this minimises the time taken to measure possible
positions for adjacent signals so that the various options can be rapidly assessed. It has been
found convenient for such a rule to be produced on translucent film, since it may be rolled
and transported easily.
• Having sketched the preferred positioning of signals as you might like them for the principal
areas of the plan, then determine whether it is possible to place intermediate signals in
such a way that meets both headway and braking constraints.
• Whilst doing this, do not just plonk signals on the layout mechanicalistically at whatever the
nominal spacing you have decreed appropriate; keep alert to the significance of these
tentative placements:
- look “in rear” to think about the standage issues for trains which might come to a
stand at such a signal,
- look “in advance” to think what is happening to the overlap position,
- review the plan to determine whether there are any hints that signal placement should
be avoided in certain areas; see section 6.20. Where such placement is inevitable,
ensure that your plan incorporates notes of any relevant precaution which should be
taken in the overall design of the signalling.
If everything is readily compatible then you are fortunate that you have achieved the outline of a
coherent solution. Some minor adjustment to the nominal signal spacing within the permitted
constraints may significantly improve the initial tentative positioning, or perhaps you might feel
able to justify a shorter overlap at a particular signal if that resolves an issue.
If things do not work out and are not so easily resolved then you will need to determine how you
can amend the plan to resolve the issue. Various options might be possible, such as an alternative
method of signalling the less important junction area or indeed providing a signal spacing
requiring a different form of signalling than your initial calculations suggested as the most obvious
option. Remember that it may be appropriate to use more than one type and transition between
them. Alternatively don’t forget that in an NR context it can be appropriate to introduce an
isolated 4 aspect sequence within 3 aspect signalling; if you do, make sure that the top yellow is
blanked out on the appropriate signal- it is a giveaway that you don’t properly understand if you
get this wrong! Always think of the situation when a particular signal displays red and work back
from it to ensure that the driver is given the initial warning a suitable distance on the approach to
permit the train to stop in time. Whatever you decide, it is important to determine a reasonable
course of action fairly quickly; there is not the time to evaluate many different options and
deliberate at length.
Make a decision, record the reasons why that approach was adopted and then implement; even if it
turns out not to be the best you’ll be able to demonstrate your skills whereas if you fail to complete
the layout sufficiently then you can’t expect to get good marks. If you find at a later stage during
the examination that the original choice made was not the best, then make a note so that the
examiners are aware that you appreciate the shortcomings of your original choice.

7.6.7 Signal Numbering

Every railway has its own numbering system; some have very many mutually contradictory
systems for a variety of historical reasons involving technology evolution, railway environment
and personal preferences.
There are very few absolutes other than a single control centre should have unique references for
all its signals; indeed there are unfortunate exceptions to even that rule! Even within NR there are
a vast number of different and conflicting standards currently in use at different locations
reflecting the history of the signalling introduction. To give some examples
• sometimes Up and Down signals are in the same sequence, sometimes different sequences,
• sometimes “wrong direction” signals are in a unique sequence but not always,
• occasionally auto signals have completely different means of identification (often based on
mileage along the track) from controlled signals,
• often shunt signals are in a unique sequence, but that is no longer policy.
For a real place on a particular railway it is important to fully understand and follow the particular
practice at the site so that any alterations can be made in a manner that is sympathetic to the
original design; this applies to many things but signal numbering is one. Staff working in an area
will have acquired an expectation and risks are introduced by doing anything at variance with it.
For IRSE exam purposes such considerations are not relevant. It is suggested that most candidates
would be best advised to follow whatever practice they are most familiar, whether or not this
happens to be in accordance with their railway’s latest policy statement to which they may never
have actually worked (as in general alterations and amendments need to be performed “in
sympathy” with the existing signalling in the particular area). Certainly do not worry for exam
purposes about what is the “right” answer to adopt; decide to do something which suits you, that
you can apply easily, practice that way and then stick to it!
7.7 Route Boxes for the signals with multiple routes

Signals should be provided with route boxes that depict the various routes from them.
Time constraints are such that the candidate is advised to prioritise the more complex route boxes.
Remember that you not only want to demonstrate to the examiner that you know how to produce a
route box, but also provide them with enough detail to adequately define the routes you intend to
be provided within your design. In the absence of route boxes it is unlikely to be clear thus forcing
them to guess, so use your time wisely; where there are parallel signals obviously sharing
destinations perhaps do a route box for only one of them in order to have time to provide route
boxes for other sections of the layout where they may add more value.
See Appendix N for an illustration of the information which would be expected to be provided for
a plan produced to NR standards.

7.8 Signal Symbols- Adding the Detail

Once the basic signal positions have been selected, then the signal symbols should be completed.
Unless the specific railway’s standards determine otherwise, signals should not just be denoted by
an arrow representing their position but the depiction should be a representation of the profile
which the driver encounters.
As an illustration of the appropriate level of detail, in the case of NR this requires:
• the various possible aspects that a signal may display to be drawn- the red, yellow, green
and top yellow as appropriate (and not forgetting to denote which may flash),
• a “double bar” should be used to denote which of these is the normally displayed aspect.
- for controlled signals this will always be the red aspect,
- for automatic signals on uni-directional railway it will be the least restrictive aspect
compatible with that displayed by the signal to which it reads,
- for automatic signals on a single or bi-directionally signalled line it will usually be
their most restrictive aspect (since they are generally controlled to that aspect until the
direction of traffic on the portion of line is established, either by means of a direction
switch or by the act of setting a route into that section),
• the type of identification plate should be shown
- a signal should be depicted with an “Auto plate” whenever it can be defined as
“passable” (i.e. when it is safe for a driver to pass it at red on their own authority in
the absence of communication with the signaller, there being no points or opposing
moves in the route up to the next signal),
- a signal should be depicted a “delta plate” if it has no red aspect (thus informing the
driver that it may always be passed at caution if the signal is completely
unilluminated),
• appropriate route indicators to be depicted, relevant to the destination to which the signal
reads. In general:
- PLJIs (=Position Light Junction Indicators) should normally be provided for main
aspect diverging routes, especially those at “geographic junctions”,
- SARIs (=Standard Alphanumeric Route Indicators) are applicable for those main
aspect diverging routes where permissible speeds are relatively low. Particularly
applicable where there are a multiplicity of similar speed routes especially reading into
terminal platforms or at places where all trains start from rest,
- MARIs (= Miniature Alphanumeric Route Indicators) are short range and applicable to
those moves where speeds are very low such as for shunting or permissive passenger
movements,
- Auxiliary indicators (such as RA / CD) may also need to be provided, particularly
associated with the dispatch of trains from platforms
• any special control functions should be shown:
- a circled “A” represents an Auto facility (sometimes known as AWF or “fleeting
button”) that should be provided for controlled signals where it is likely that a
succession of trains may require to follow each other on the same route and signaller
workload can be reduced (in particular these are provided where there is an obvious
dominant traffic flow), conversely (since could never have both!)
- a circled “R” represents the Replacement facility that is provided nowadays on all
automatic signals (thus enabling a guaranteed replacement of the signal so that it can
be used to protect staff working trackside or to protect an incident etc.)

Examiner Expectation 7.6, 7.7 & 7.8

When determining a suitable signal spacing that satisfies both the braking and headway
requirements, the candidate should demonstrate that they are aware of:
• the need to give adequate warning to stop or pass through a speed restricted junction (if
signals are spaced closer than appropriate braking then explain why the solution is safe),
• the risks of over-braking (for the situations in which it is a significant issue),
• the value of consistent signal spacing (and the degree to which it this may be sensibly flexed
in different scenarios),
• the potential effect of various other decisions (e.g. overlap positions, junction approach release
or other special delayed clearance controls etc.) on the headway that can be delivered by the
completed layout.
It is inevitable that many such issues only emerge after the initial calculations have been performed,
but when they do, check on their impact and make an appropriate statement. It may be that it is
discovered that something would prevent the desired headway from being achieved in certain
respects; if possible make the necessary amendments but even if the issue cannot be solved then
flagging it up as an “open point” will gain certain credit, particularly if an outline proposal for an
alternative option is made.
Examiners want to be able to see that there has been sufficient consideration of:
• the placement of signals on the layout to provide for the safe and efficient movement of trains,
whilst not being excessive for the traffic environment,
• protection of all hazards from all relevant directions,
• the likelihood and consequence severity of a SPAD in the assessment of layout risk. This
would manifest itself by the provision of suitable length and aligned overlaps, clarity
regarding which overlaps apply to which signals / routes, any special controls for relevant
points and signals, train protection abilities,
• which signals apply to which lines in which direction reading to which destinations and there
is appropriate use of aspects, route indicators, auxiliary indicators with relevant thought given
to junction signalling and aspect sequence requirements,
• constraints on signal placement (overlaps, standage, likely sighting constraints and other
SPAD causal factors etc.).
• Do not assume that Warning and Call-on routes are always required around stations; provide
only where there is an operational need. Conversely if there is a stated requirement which it is
not your railway’s policy to provide, then explain that this is the situation and give any
alternative approach which may fulfil a similar high level objective. You will not be penalised
provided you make the examiners aware, though of course if it saves you time the expectation
will be just that little bit more completeness elsewhere!
• Do not place LOS on a line in such positions that they need to be passed by signalled train
movements; they are to limit the extent of shunting movements made against the flow of
traffic. Do not plate a signal as “passable” if there is a need to protect opposing moves
(including to LOS).
• On the mainline layout there are few marks available for such ancillaries as SPT, AWS and
TPWS. If these are part of your railway’s signalling, do not ignore completely but constrain
to a brief general note rather than spend excessive time adding detail.

Any reasonable and consistently applied numbering policy for signals is acceptable; it is primarily
for the candidate to be able to reference signals to the route boxes which show the origin and
destination of the various routes and be able to quote particular signal positions in any explanatory
notes; details of any railway or location specific numbering system is a level of detail relevant to
that specific environment and not relevant at the conceptual level of the IRSE examination.
The calculation of the various inter-signal distances is relevant in order to demonstrate that the
candidate has considered how these relate to braking distance and headway requirements; there are
no marks for performing the arithmetical calculations per se.
Where train protection is primarily an “add-on” to a system of signalling, then the time spent in
depicting it is largely a waste of effort given that there will be few marks available for it.
Conversely where the system providing train protection is an inherent part of the signalling
system, as important if not more important than the signals themselves, then the details are critical
to the key considerations of braking and headway and thus much fuller information is necessary to
gain those relevant marks.
The message is: concentrate your limited time on those elements which are fundamental to the
high level understanding of the operability of your solution, cover by brief generic note those
items of less importance.

7.9 Provision of Train Detection Sections

7.9.1 Division into Track Sections
The track layout must be divided into separate train detection sections; the choice of these limits
significantly influences the working of the layout. Different railway administrations have their
own practices and these can be dependent upon the operational use of the layout as well as the
technology of implementation. The specific guidance provided is written for a typical NR
installation, but the majority should be appropriate to many circumstances and students of other
railways should consider where their rules are effectively the same and where they differ
considerably. It is informative to try to work out why this might be; it will generally be found that
the same basic factors are at play but because of the traffic or environment (including operating
rules) of that railway they have a different relevant weighting and this is then reflected in the stated
policies.
In the exam candidates should probably choose to show the divisions as simple track circuit
boundaries since these symbols are considerably faster to draw than axle counter heads and there is
less complexity regarding the need to have separate sections for spurs in connection with axle
counter restoration. Therefore these are generally assumed within this section but it is emphasised
that candidates should follow the practice with which they are familiar.
Where joints are provided that are known to be foul (except those safely contained between ends
of a crossover having the same point identity), or where joints are provided that are being assumed
to be clear but where this is not clearly evident, the candidate is advised to make this status clear to
the examiner. This may be by the depiction of the joint relevant to the CP (see Appendix J) or by
some note applied to the joint for example.
Make sure that you have subdivided the train detection on plain line sections where necessary to
have the resolution needed for your proposed signalling solution to work; for example:
• check there are joints in suitable places for initiating level crossings, approach release etc.
• check that every controlled signal section has enough sections for their sequential operation
of sections to permit approach locking release.
There are also constraints upon the maximum and minimum lengths of any track section which
also need to be taken into account when determining joint positions; some are applicable to the
variety of train detection or interlocking technology whilst others relate to the characteristics of
the rolling stock. Refer to section 6.26.
Do not get confused and show non-functional IRJs on the Signalling Plan. A Bonding Plan (i.e. a
presentation showing both running rails and all connections to them- track leads, jumpers,
structure bonding etc.) shows every IRJ that physically exists including those for transposition
joints etc; a Signalling Plan only shows the limits of each separate track section, not those
joints completely contained within one section.
Remember to define which track section boundaries define the extent of any overlap, or to mark
the theoretical position of that overlap if it is a “phantom”. Your initial assumptions should have
made it clear to the examiner what policy you intended to adopt for the provision of overlaps
beyond the signal limiting a shunt class movement; make sure that your marking of the track joints
is consistent with this.
If your solution requires the use of treadles, position detectors or overlay tracks etc. these must
also be shown appropriately.

7.9.2 Track Section Nomenclature

Train detection systems must be identified in an appropriate sequence in a manner appropriate
to the relevant railway; many different systems have been used at various places and times. Thus
the student should discover an appropriate practice and implement it, but do not worry unduly
about which of several policies to adopt; the examiners are just looking for a reasonable approach.
Generally relevant considerations are:
• ensuring that each has a unique identity, however where a section is split for technical
reasons but to the signaller it operates as a single entity then such grouping should be
apparent,
- for example if the signal spacing is 1600m yet the maximum length over which the
variety of track circuit can satisfactorily operate is 600m, the sections may be shown
on the plan as AA/1, AA/2, AA/3 in direction of nominal train running, whereas on the
signallers display system it would be shown as AA (a combined indication into which
all three actual sections are summated and referred to as a multi-sectioned track
circuit),
• generally the identities on any one running line are arranged in some logical sequence,
- a fresh sequence on each of the different running lines (sometimes the policy is to
name sequentially in the direction of normal or nominal running, sometimes always
from left to right on the plan)
- certain gaps should be left in any sequence to allow for the latter addition of a section
without resorting to wholesale name-changing; leaving a few such gaps is a useful
policy in the examination for similar reasons to minimise re-work!
• policies are often set to minimise any potential confusion between similarly named sections;
for example where alphabetical nomenclature is used:
- letters which could easily be confused with suffix numbers (such as I or O) are
generally banned,
- sometimes the policy is that other potential sources of written or verbal confusion are
best avoided (use of T as an initial letter, use of both of M/N, P/R, U/V etc.),
- similarly erroneous reversal of nomenclature is sometimes felt to be a problem and
thus for example AB could be confused with BA; to avoid this it is sometimes
specified that the 2nd identification letter should be no earlier in the alphabet than the
1st one in the combined name (but this restricts the number of possible combinations
quite severely and therefore often necessitates a three character identifier- in these
cases the initial letter often denotes a geographical area, the second a running line and
the last letter is used in sequence),
• where there is a mixture of train detection methods which has relevance to the signaller, the
nomenclature should make this clear. For example the use of an (X) suffix is used to denote
an axle counter section in an area where the predominant form of train detection is the track
circuit, since the signaller needs to be aware of the difference due to failure modes and
restoration to service afterwards,
• devices such as treadles used to back-up track circuit operation (such as for level crossing
strike-in) are generally named after the track which they operate; those used as independent
devices- even if only effective whilst the relevant track circuit is occupied- are generally
named completely separately (e.g. A, B, C, D for the treadles used to establish directionality
at an AHBC, ABCL or MSL crossing).
All these issues are important when performing a real job on a particular railway but the detail of
any one particular policy is immaterial for the purposes of the IRSE exam, although it is useful to
have a general understanding of the rationale behind the policies.
Examiner Expectation 7.9.

Unless a candidate specifies otherwise, train detection is assumed to be by some form of jointed
track circuit appropriate for the traction environment being assumed by the remainder of the
answer paper.
Any additional form of train detection, such as treadles, position detectors, overlays, treadles,
flange detectors etc. must be shown and identified appropriately.
Where there is particular significance of a position of a train detection element that is not readily
apparent (e.g. level crossing strike-in, limit of indications to adjacent signalbox) this should be
annotated. Track circuit joints should be beyond, not on the approach to, a signal.
The minimum number of track circuit joints should be provided, consistent with:
• the requirement to protect all movements adequately [♦1],
• sufficiently prompt replacement of signals to danger following the passage of a train,
• the definition of the extent of overlap [♦2] where necessary for locking or aspect purposes,
• providing the necessary flexibility in the use of the layout by enabling the prompt release of
a set of points in the route for use by another train movement,
• permitting parallel movements to be signalled on adjacent lines without mutual
interference,
• providing sufficient information to the interlocking to determine a train position
- to control initiation and subsequent raising of a level crossing,
- on the approach of a signal to implement approach release,
- beyond a signal to be able to release its approach locking,
• giving enough information to the signaller of trains within or approaching the control area
so that it can be operated efficiently.
• [♦1] In the absence of other information from the candidate, a joint closer to a convergence
at a crossover (between lines of minimum spacing) than the switch tongues on the parallel
track will be assumed to be intentionally foul, whereas any further away will be assumed to
be proving clearance, with similar dimensions applicable to single point ends. However
examiners do expect that wherever there is an element of doubt, the candidate will indicate
in some manner their understanding of the significance of that joint position. Joints that are
placed unnecessarily to be foul will be regarded as incorrectly positioned.
• [♦2] Candidates are expected to explain the rationale applied when determining the length of
overlaps and if applicable to various classes of routes. This may often be by declaring a
standard minimum length, e.g. 180m is provided except where otherwise specified. In this
case it is not necessary to give accurate dimensions for any overlap that happens to be
slightly in excess of this, but those overlaps limits that are deliberately shorter should be
identified and a brief justification given why the candidate considers it acceptable.
• TCIs are expected at each trap point where derailment could occur; if some other device
(including a normal axle counter head) is performing this role then the candidate must
indicate this on their plan. Also a means of detecting that an energy absorbing bufferstop is
no longer able to perform its intended function with full effectiveness should be provided.
There is no specific expectation relating to the manner in which track sections are identified; any
reasonable and consistently applied practice is acceptable. The exercise is more of one of
clarifying the separate sections that have been created by the positioning of track joints rather than
being able to follow any prescriptive numbering sequence.

7.10 Depiction of Points

7.10.1 Normal Lie
The points on the supplied exam layout are usually shown with thin lines depicting their
alternative lies; the candidate should thicken the line representing their chosen normal lie (in
recent years the base plan has only drawn in lightly, but the earlier papers were harder to amend
clearly and “typex” correction fluid is useful in such circumstances) and draw the other line
slightly displaced so that the open switch can be represented.
7.10.2 Trap Points

Trap points are not generally indicated on the supplied layout; it is the candidate’s responsibility
to assess where these are required and draw them in the appropriate place on what the plan depicts
as plain line railway. Remember that the normal lie is always to the trapping position, so it can be
useful to bring some “typex” to be able to paint over the relevant small portion of solid line on the
supplied plan in order to depict clearly. Remember to draw a track interrupter in the position
where it would be broken off by a train derailing if attempting to pass over the points when
normal.
Where a candidate recognises that trap points could be expected at a site yet considers that their
railway’s practice would not provide for the envisaged use of the layout, then the candidate is
recommended to draw attention to this fact by means of a note referenced from the appropriate
position(s) on the plan. This will remove any element of doubt that may exist in the examiner’s
mind and by this means the candidate ensures that they are aware that there has been a conscious
decision that they would be unwarranted.
Similarly if the railway’s policy is to provide derailers or some other means of preventing or
detecting an unauthorised movement, then this equipment should be shown at the relevant sites.
7.10.3 Point Nomenclature

Points should also be allocated numbers according to the relevant railway’s practice. The most
important considerations are:
• to identify separately every point end, including traps,
• to group point ends sensibly according to the railway’s practice (if applicable),
• to determine the level of provision of split-end detection,
• to allocate numbers in a logical sequence, generally with consecutive numbers at a
particular junction area but with strategic gaps before numbering points at an adjacent
junction area (to allow for future changes on a real railway, but also useful to limit re-work if
you change your mind re the grouping of points or the need for additional trap points during
the examination).
The most recent NR practice is to number points in ascending order when travelling in the Down
direction (and with the suffixes applicable to the various separate ends of the same number identity
also increasing alphabetically in the Down direction), those points worked from a Ground Frame
being in a separate sequence applicable to that control site. As explained within section 6 there are
a range of practices in use even with NR due to historical legacy; for IRSE exam purposes any
sensible practice is acceptable and thus the candidate should follow whatever variant is relevant to
the railway with which they are familiar. It is wise for the candidate to add a brief note of the
reasons for adopting their preferred numbering policy (relating to the operation of point ends in
tandem, provision of split detection etc.).

Examiner Expectation 7.10

Unless the candidate specifies otherwise, the examiners will expect:
• the special symbols for switch diamonds and swing-nose crossings will be used when
appropriate (see RT/E/C/11004 and Appendix J),
• that all points that can reasonably be operated together to be numbered so that they do so, in
order to give the most economic (at least in first cost, though arguably not whole-life cost)
solution, in particular:
- crossovers operated as a pair of point ends,
- double junctions with switch diamonds operated as a 3-ended set,
- fixed diamonds are not numbered,
- single slips and double slips with ends paired to operate in association with the point
end on an adjacent line with which they effectively form a crossover.
• the normal lie of points:
- for ends numbered as crossovers will be such as to allow parallel moves except where
there are overwhelming safety considerations that suggest the contrary,
- for single ends will be such as to lead to the safest lie where there is a significant
difference between the paths that would be taken by an unauthorised movement,
• trap points to be provided wherever Goods Lines or depots / sidings meet Passenger Lines so
that they derail a vehicle which would otherwise be making an unintended move onto that
Passenger Line. Unless you want to reveal your ignorance, do ensure that traps are
positioned correctly:
- facing to a vehicle incorrectly attempting to leave the siding,
- with the “throw off” to the left or right as determined by the lesser hazard that the
derailed vehicle would pose to the running line.
Every year traps are drawn wrongly or overlooked completely; ensure you are not one of
those who throw away such easy marks.
• TCIs to be provided at all such trap points so that it detects any vehicle that could be derailed
imminently or is otherwise likely to be lost to the train detection system. Every year
interrupters are placed in the running line; ensure you are not one of those to throw away
easy marks.
• Any reasonable and consistently applied numbering scheme for points is acceptable.

Appendices A, B, C: PAST PAPERS MODULE 2

The actual question papers for this examination are fundamentally standard; it is the layout
supplied which varies from year to year. This enables the candidate to know broadly what
activities they need to be able to perform in examination conditions and thus they should be able to
prepare well for them.
However the layouts do differ significantly and always include certain features designed to
challenge; this enables the more able candidates to distinguish themselves from those with a lower
level of experience and understanding. To be confident that a good attempt can be made at
whatever comes up, the candidate should ensure that they are widely read and have actually
undertaken the signalling of many past layouts; for this reason a selection are included in
Appendices B (Mainline) and C (Metro).
Each of these Appendices is subdivided as shown:
B1 Mainline past papers: Layout 1, B2 Commentary on the salient features of
1997 – 2007 the layouts in the above Mainline
papers
C1 Metro past papers Layout 2, C2 Commentary on the salient features of
1997 – 2007 the layouts in the above Metro papers
To obtain an overview of the layouts, the files in These Appendices give a certain amount of
Appendices B1 & C1 may be viewed on screen guidance and help relating to the various
or plotted out as whole diagrams and there are layouts.
also separate files to make it easier to print out For a student who is relatively unfamiliar
portions on A3 or A4 paper which can then be with the process of signalling the layout,
stuck together to reconstitute the entire plan for reading the relevant information before
those without access to a plotter.
attempting the first layout may be sensible
However to attempt a layout, a far larger print is to gain sufficient confidence to start.
required; a full scale reproduction is highly However as experience is gained, it is
recommended. For those students with access to recommended that the student attempts the
a suitable plotter the same file can be used to layout without looking at the relevant
produce this, but as an aid to those for which this commentary and only refers to it once they
is not a practicable option, the other files can be have decided upon their own solution.
utilised to print out the various portions on A3
paper which can then be joined together.
If the student is working as part of a Study Group, then it is suggested that members should agree
upon a particular layout in advance, attempt it individually and then each bring their respective
attempt to compare the different solutions.
Learning is achieved by assessing the similarities and differences; in some cases it will be obvious
that someone has made a mistake or overlooked some feature but sometimes there may be several
alternative solutions, each with their own merits. Comparison with the notes in the relevant
Appendix should assist in a group discussion of the layout.
Eventually the student should seek to complete fully their own attempt without assistance and
against the clock in order to simulate exam conditions.
Another use of Appendices B2 / C2 (in conjunction with small scale reproductions of the complete
diagrams included within Appendices B1 / C1) is in the final revision process prior to the
examination; this may reveal the areas which may require extra study or practice.

Appendix A- Past Question Papers
A.1 Introduction
Whilst the primary content of what was traditionally the “morning paper” of the IRSE examination
has remain unchanged for many years, there has been a gradual evolution; the most significant
change being the split into:
• “Signalling the Layout” Modules 2, and
• “Signalling Principles (Control Tables)” module 3
when the modular structure (rather than the “all or nothing” format) came into existence.
There have been changes in the exact split between the modules over a period of time; in particular
aspect sequence is currently considered part of the Module 3 syllabus whereas it was once part of
the Module 2 syllabus. Candidates are advised to check the IRSE website for the current syllabus
for each module as future changes are possible and this Study Pack may not reflect such alterations
but is correct for 2008.
Each particular question paper defines the allocation of marks that has been determined applicable
to that particular year’s paper (and in future this may differ between the Metro and Mainline
layouts); candidates should ensure that they establish this during the reading time at the
commencement of the actual examination rather than rely on their knowledge of the split relevant
to a previous year’s examination.
Because of the similarity between the actual question papers for each year, they have not all been
included within section A.2. The paper for 2007 is included since it is the latest and represented a
significant departure from earlier years (due to the split of the paper into sections applicable to the
Metro and Mainline environments) but prior to this the papers were extremely similar for many
years. Therefore only the papers for 1997 and 2006 have been included as samples, instead of
including every paper which would be needless repetition. For certain of the intervening years
additional questions were included and these particular questions have been separately identified
prior to the examiners feedback for that year in section A.3.
Such questions were introduced in an attempt to ensure that candidates really understood the
underlying process and were not just following a process to enable them to pass the examination.
• Once such questions became the norm they were themselves anticipated and hence ceased to
be effective in this regard. In recent years, the question paper has tended to concentrate
purely on the process of directly signalling the blank layout in order to permit candidates to
concentrate on this in the hope of obtaining a better standard.
• However students should recognise that such questions do remain within scope of the
examination and may be asked from time to time; the examiners are always attempting to
ensure that a proper understanding is achieved and therefore some element of novelty in any
year may be expected. Beware therefore of restricting your studies to the exact questions
which you expect to be asked based on the previous year’s paper; you could be caught out
unless you have the wider appreciation of the subject which is expected to be able to
demonstrate a professional approach to the central task. An engineer is required to think
for themselves, not just follow a laid down procedure.

A.2 Sample Past Examination Papers:
INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS

1997 EXAMINATION
Module 2 – Signalling the Layout
ALL FIVE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ATTEMPTED AND CARRY MARKS AS SHOWN
QUESTIONS 1, 2 3 AND 4 SHOULD BE ANSWERED FOR
EITHER Layout 1 (Main Line Practice)

OR Layout 2 (Rapid Transit Practice)
If answering on Layout 2, candidates should include a brief definition of the signalling arrangements and
associated systems used, including a form of train protection.
Question 1
Determine theoretically, either by calculation or graphically, appropriate signal spacings for the braking
characteristics and the intensity of traffic on offer. All calculations and graphs must be shown.
(25 marks)
Question 2
Signal the layout in accordance with the notes thereon, numbering the signals (or equivalent) and
defining all routes.
(30 marks)
Question 3
Number all power worked points, starting at 201, and indicate their ‘normal’ position.
Add any trap points necessary. Identify hand worked or ground operated points as such.
(10 marks)
Question 4
Mark the limits of all train detection equipment and identify each in sequence.
(15 marks)
Question 5 - SHOULD BE ANSWERED IN RELATION TO LAYOUT 3
Prepare an aspect sequence chart for all the running signals on layout 3.
(20 marks)

Note that the aspect sequence question originally (pre 2004) comprised 20% of the Module 2
marks but this has now been transferred to Module 3. Even as part of Module 2, it was performed
utilising the layout utilised for Module 3 (which is reproduced in Appendix D of this Study Pack).


2006 EXAMINATION
MODULE 2 – SIGNALLING THE LAYOUT
TIME ALLOWED 1 ½ HOURS
10 MINUTES WILL BE ALLOWED BEFORE THE START TO READ THE PAPER
THIS PAPER SHOULD BE TREATED ON THE BASIS OF THE POWER SIGNALLING IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRACTICE WITH WHICH YOU ARE MOST FAMILIAR
ALL FOUR QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ATTEMPTED AND CARRY MARKS AS SHOWN

ANSWER SHEETS WILL BE PHOTOCOPIED- PLEASE USE ONLY BLACK INK
ALL QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ANSWERED FOR

EITHER Layout 1 (Main Line Practice)
OR Layout 2 (Rapid Transit Practice)
If answering on Layout 2, candidates should include a brief definition of the signalling
arrangements and associated systems used, including a form of train protection.
Question 1
Determine theoretically, either by calculation or graphically, appropriate signal spacings for the
braking characteristics and the intensity of traffic on offer. All calculations and graphs must be
shown. [35 Marks]
Question 2
defining all routes. [45 Marks]
Question 3
Number all power worked points, and indicate their ‘normal’ position.
Add any trap points necessary. Identify hand worked or ground operated points as such.
[10 Marks]
Question 4
[10 Marks]
End of Paper

The most recent exam paper was presented slightly differently, split between Mainline and Metro,
with different mark allocation but little difference in the actual wording:

2007 EXAMINATION
MODULE 2 - SIGNALLING THE LAYOUT
TIME ALLOWED - 1 1/2 HOURS
10 MINUTES WILL BE ALLOWED BEFORE THE START TO READ THE PAPER
THIS PAPER SHOULD BE TREATED ON THE BASIS OF POWER SIGNALLING IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRACTICE WITH WHICH YOU ARE MOST FAMILIAR
ANSWER SHEETS WILL BE PHOTOCOPIED - PLEASE USE ONLY BLACK INK
CANDIDATES SHOULD ANSWER EITHER

PART A (Main Line Practice) OR PART B (Rapid Transit Practice)
PART A - TO BE ANSWERED USING LAYOUT 1 (Main Line Practice)

Question 1
braking characteristics and the intensity of traffic on offer. All calculations and graphs must
be shown. [20 Marks]
Question 2
defining all routes. [60 Marks]
Question 3
Number all power worked points and indicate their `normal' position. Add any trap points
necessary. Identify hand worked or ground operated points as such. [10 Marks]
Question 4
Mark the limits of all train detection equipment and identify each in sequence. [10 Marks]
END OF PART A

and this continued on the 2nd sheet of the paper:
PART B - TO BE ANSWERED USING LAYOUT 2 (Rapid Transit Practice)
Question 1
braking characteristics and the intensity of traffic on offer. All calculations and graphs must be
shown. Include a brief definition of the signalling arrangements and associated systems used, which
must include a form of train protection.
[35 Marks]
Question 2
defining all routes.
[45 Marks]
Question 3
Number all power worked points and indicate their `normal' position. Add any trap points
necessary. Identify hand worked or ground operated points as such.
[ 10 Marks]
Question 4
[10 Marks]
END OF PART B
End Of Paper

A.3 Summary of Past Examinations: Questions and Examiner Comments
The table below depicts the variation within Module 2 over the past 10 year period; in all cases the
first 4 questions have been effectively the same, although the “mark allocation per question” has
varied. The comments specifically related to Module 2 made by the examiners at the subsequent
exam review are also included here since they often relate to the slight changes that have been
made to the papers over the years or particular features of the layout.
If you have completed an attempt at a layout and are wishing to assess how you have done, as well
as reading the examiners comments here you may wish also to judge against:
• the specific layout description included in Appendix B.2,
• the generic Examiner Expectations in section 7, and
• the generic “issues log tick sheet” in Appendix W.
Examiners’ Comments in Review Meeting for 1997 Exam

Many UK candidates tend to assume that British Mainline practice is standard; this is not the case. The
examination questions are set to be equally applicable to all our members, including those working
overseas and working on Mass Transit Systems. The panel recommends that all candidates state the
principles and explain any convention that they are using at the beginning of the appropriate questions.
There is no one right way to answer this module. The examiners are looking for professionalism and if the
calculations indicate one way but logic shows a better way which is safe, then the candidate is expected to
use professional judgement and clearly explain in their answer the factors which they have taken into
consideration. Even if calculations are completely correct they will not by themselves gain maximum
marks; a few lines explaining the calculations will improve marks significantly.
1998 25 marks for Q1, 30 marks for Q2, 10 marks for Q3, 15 marks for Q4.
Question 5 Prepare an aspect sequence chart for all the running signals on layout 3
(20 marks)
• The layout set reflected the policy introduced a couple of years ago to make them easier but was
still considered to be sufficiently demanding upon the candidate. The exam committee was
generally pleased with the results of this paper.
• Trap points are often forgotten.
• Metric measurements are required.
• In this year’s examination a candidate could have passed the layout part of the module without
signalling the layout if full marks had been achieved for the calculations; this will not be
permitted in future years. Marks will be apportioned to ensure that a candidate must do
sufficiently well in both the calculations and placing of signals to achieve a pass.
Mainline:
This was based on that proposed for Nottingham Victoria and had the feature that platform 5 could not be
accessed from the Down Main. Although not operationally flexible, all platforms could in fact be
occupied simultaneously. Signalling the layout with 2 aspect signals was possible, but 3 aspects were
more appropriate. It was noted that every candidate failed to consider signalling for the freight service.
The Aspect Sequence was based on the Scarborough layout.

1999 55 marks for Q1 & Q2 combined, 15 marks for Q3, 10 marks for Q4.
Question 5 Prepare an aspect sequence chart for all the running signals on layout 3.
(20 marks)
The 1998 layout 1 had been possibly too difficult and the 1999 one was simpler. There is currently some
discussion regarding further simplification, but with an expectation of greater completeness (approaching
100%).
For both layouts 1 and 2, the headway calculations and signalling had a combined mark this year,
because it had previously been possible to pass without showing very much signalling on the layout. The
proportion of marks was varied for each layout as there were more headway calculations required for
layout 2, but more signalling involved in layout 1.
Layout 3, which was loosely based on Grosmont on the NYMR, was also simpler than recently, but
candidates were expected to do the aspect sequence charts for all signals, where there had previously
been a requirement normally only for one direction. The aspect sequence question is currently under
review, but any changes will only be made with at least 1 year's notice.
Question 5 Prepare an aspect sequence chart for all the running signals on layout 3
(20 Marks)
The aspect sequence chart question will be simplified for future years so that it requires candidates to
spend less time answering it. The number of marks allocated to the question will be reduced from the
current allocation of 20 marks.
Candidates will be required to attempt an additional question, which will require hazards associated with
the layout to be identified.
It is essential to read and understand the question; many candidates clearly did not read and understand
the requirements detailed on the layout. Note that marks cannot be given where the answer fails to
address the given question. In particular candidates should ensure that line speeds, speed restrictions,
service and emergency braking rates are not confused nor used inconsistently; marks are deducted for
such errors.
Many candidates did not complete the paper having apparently run out of time to do so; it is helpful to
have planned in advance and had practice actually working under exam conditions in order to be
confident of addressing all requirements within the permitted time.
Mainline:
Many candidate lost marks by failing to identify all the operating requirements, common ones being:
• facilities for freight run-round were not provided,
• failing to provide signals required for the bi-directional movements.
Metro: The headway calculations were to a variable standard:

• It is essential to recognise the pinch point which limits the headway; you need to understand the
service requirements to correctly identify this
• Some candidates did not recognise that the tightest headway requirement was station B as its
platforms have a high dwell time and 32 tph are needed; they therefore incorrectly performed
headway analysis based on 16 tph.
• Also signalling arrangements at terminal stations must be designed to minimise delays.

2001 60 marks for Q1 & 2 combined, 10 marks Q3, 10 marks Q4.

Question 5 Using your signalled layout and the operating conditions specified,
assess qualitatively the site-specific collision and derailment hazards in
two areas where your judgement indicates significant risk. Explain what
site-specific action could be taken to reduce the risk in these two areas
(10 Marks)
Question 6 Prepare an aspect sequence chart for the DOWN DIRECTION running
signals on layout 3. (10 Marks)
About half of those candidates who sat Module 2 did not answer question 5; this is a high proportion and
it is not known why this was the case. However the aspect sequence chart was answered better than
normally.
Mainline:
Many candidates failed to meet all the operational requirements specified; in particular the reversal of the
freight train. Some candidates over-signalled the branch line; remember that the candidates are expected
to meet both operational and safety requirements but with reasonable economy. Candidates who provide
too many signals not only give themselves more work and increase the chance of error but can also lose
marks for signalling inappropriately.
Question 5 In any signalled layout, risks remain to safe train operation. Using your
signalled layout and the operating conditions specified, assess
qualitatively the residual site-specific collision and derailment hazards in
two areas where your judgement indicates significant risk. Explain what
site-specific action could be taken to reduce the risk in these two areas
(10 Marks)
Question 6 Prepare an aspect sequence chart for the DOWN DIRECTION running
signals on layout 3. (10 Marks)
It is emphasised that the IRSE exam is a professional exam. Achieving the pass mark is not just a question
of knowing the right answer but of understanding the principles behind it. Understanding the right reason
but getting the wrong answer is better than giving the right answer without an explanation.
Mainline:
• Many candidates who answered question 5 omitted to give the reasons for specific hazards on the
layout; if you do not write anything down you will not get any marks.
• Candidates are reminded that they should be consistent how they use the layout data information
in headway calculations; in particular there seemed to be confusion when to use headway and line
speeds within the calculations; read the information provided carefully. About ¾ of papers
omitted the stopping headway calculation completely.
• The specific notes must be read carefully since these state requirements which form an important
part of the question; ignore them at your peril.
• It would seem that few knew how to deal with depots; Study Groups ought to provide more help
with this topic.

2002 continued
Metro:
The view sometimes expressed that this is the easier option fails to recognise that the headway
requirements are much more onerous and therefore proving that it can be achieved has to be far more
rigorous.
• the use of a graph is encouraged,
• candidates are encouraged to explain how they reached any decision, not merely present the
calculation,
• when considering the critical location for headway analysis, the combination of dwell time and
tph is important. Use of a graph to facilitate calculation is again encouraged.
2003 70 marks for Q1 & 2 combined, 10 marks Q3, 10 marks Q4.
Question 5 Using your signalled layout and the operating conditions specified,
assess qualitatively the site-specific collision and derailment hazards in
two areas where your judgement indicates significant risk.
Explain what site-specific action could be taken to reduce the risk in
these two areas (10 Marks)
There appear to be no formal records of the Review of the 2003 Exam.
However it seems likely that the comments for the Mainline Layout would have been similar to the usual
pleas to:
• read and understand the descriptive notes of the requirements and implement the layout
accordingly; the specific working arrangements for abnormal working both for special events and
when a line is under possession were key features of this plan,
• don’t ignore the stopping headway calculations; they are particularly critical for signalling this
layout,
• provide a suitably economic means of signalling the long freight only branch,
• where signals are needed to protect junctions which do not fit within the normal signal spacing
and aspect sequence, ensure that the plan notes the special controls which would be required.

2004 No question 5,
80 marks for Q1&2 combined, 10 marks for Q3, 10 marks for Q4.
This year the requirement to complete an aspect sequence chart had been removed from module 2 and
instead had been transferred to be one of the written questions in module 3. The improved performances
in module 2 may have been a result of more time being available to complete the signalled layout.
Mainline:
• It is very important to properly read the question and the information on the layout. Half of all
candidates failed to do this, so their answers did not meet all of the correct requirements. For
example, some candidates chose the wrong speed to calculate the headway. Operational
requirements were also missed, such as the requirement to reverse freight trains.
• The majority of candidates did however recognise that a stopping headway was asked for, and
calculated it.
Metro:
• Half of all candidates who attempted this question failed to identify correctly the station requiring
the most critical headway, and hence went on to analyse the wrong station.
• Frequently it was not appreciated that the long dwell time at the station with the 4-platform layout
was not such a critical factor in the station headway, since a following train could be routed into
an empty platform before the first train had cleared the station.
Aspect sequence errors included:
• The starter signals 109/121 involved a 3 to 4 aspect change. This was poorly done by most
candidates,
• The warning route on 111 was largely ignored,
• Lots of candidates thought that despite the fact 111 - 125/127 was approach released you could
get a YY / G aspect back in 107!
[NB In 2004 this was set as a Module 3 question]
2005 No question 5,
35 marks for Q1, 45 marks for Q2, 10 marks for Q3, 10 marks for Q4.
General:
• Be sure to satisfy the overall objectives. The solution must be:
a) safe, b) cater for the specified train movements, c) economical.
• Read the layout notes - they contain essential information on how to signal the layout.
• You are not required (unless specially asked) to show every SPT, AWS inductor, or TPWS loop- a
general note will suffice.
• A guide to the level of detail required can be found in previous years’ ‘layout 3’ diagrams.
Braking & Headway Calculations:

• Be careful to use the correct permissible speed for the line when calculating braking distances,
• The train speed to be used for calculating headways is always given in the layout notes and is
generally lower than the maximum permitted speed.
• The ‘following stopping’ headway computation was attempted by very few candidates.
• The conclusion should be what kind of aspect sequence and target signal positioning to use. If the
calculation indicates one solution (e.g. three aspect), but you decide to use a different on (e.g. four
aspect), then say why.

Signal Spacing:
• If your layout shows a shorter distance from the first caution to the red than the braking distance
calculated for the permitted speed(s), it fails to satisfy objective a above.
• If your signal spacing requires the provision of special controls (e.g. approach control) to avoid
underbraking, then you must annotate the layout accordingly
Signal Profiles:
• It is not sufficient to merely show a signal as post, or lollipop; to avoid losing marks, each signal
requires all aspects properly orientated, with normal aspect shown by a double line.
• Appropriate junction and/or route indicators must also be shown.
Warning and call-ons:

• Provide these where required to satisfy objective b above.
• However don’t provide if they are not required; remember objective c) above.
Shunt signals:
• To be able to undertake the required operational movements specified in the layout notes,
shunting signals are frequently required. Objective b) applies; ignore them at your peril!
• Such requirements may include: allowing for run-round or stabling facilities, or joining and
dividing trains.
• If trains have to stand, ensure that an adequate length of standage is available
Route Boxes:
• These need to be shown for all signals with more than one route.
Points:
• Switch diamonds have been poorly answered in the past. They are not to be confused with double
slips, nor treated as fixed diamonds.
• Normal lies and numbering should be such as to direct trains onto a line in the ‘right’ direction.
• TRAPPING VERY POOR! Many failed to recognise that UK requirements are that sidings and
goods lines require trapping against passenger lines
Track Circuits
• Ensure that the same track does not feature in parallel routes; provide joints within S&C where
required to permit parallel moves.
• Ensure that any other joints are at ‘clearance’.
• Too many track circuits offends objective c).
• Do provide track circuit interrupters where there are trap points,
BUT NOT IN THE RUNNING LINE!
Note that a candidate’s actual examination paper is included in Appendix A.4 together with a brief
commentary from the examiners. It is offered as a contrast to the majority of this Study Pack since
it does not depict British practice.

2006 No question 5,
35 marks for Q1, 45 marks for Q2, 10 marks for Q3, 10 marks for Q4.
A change in the marking criteria will be introduced for future exams to address the concern that in theory
a pass in the mainline part of the exam could be achieved without undertaking the primary role of
signalling a layout (i.e. just performing calculations, identifying points etc.). Whereas the types of exam
questions would not change, the weighting will in future place more emphasis on the layout design. The
length of time given to undertake the layout would not be extended for the time being.
In order to obtain a Distinction, candidates must do well in calculations and then be consistent in placing
signals appropriately for headway and braking. In addition the correct form of signals supported by route
boxes are essential for a candidate to be able to demonstrate that they have an understanding of relevant
signalling principles. The administration’s practices to which the candidate is working should be stated;
this ensures that marks are not lost- the examiners will familiarise themselves with the stated practices if
required.
It was also emphasised that was possible to do the Module 2 paper without using calculations; graphical
proof is equally acceptable.
See also section A.4 regarding an attempted answer to this paper.
SUMMARY
Students reading the examiners comments included in this section will realise that, whereas there are
certain specific issues on papers, many of the fundamental criticisms repeat from year to year. They can
be summarised by:
• prepare yourself for the examination by actually attempting layouts against the clock,
• ensure you state the railway’s practice being adopted,
• explain your calculations and assumptions,
• think carefully which is the key part of the layout for the headway,
• don’t forget the effects of station dwell time / areas of slow speed running,
• use the right speeds for headway and braking calculations,
• work in metric in consistent units to a suitable level of precision,
• don’t forget to signal for all the operational moves required by the notes on the plan,
• make sure you understand operation of freight, depots etc,
• do not provide excessive facilities / over-signal branch lines etc
• remember safety, operability and economy,
• ensure that you are familiar with aspect sequence transitions and can apply the right form of
approach release,
• explain any decision to provide more signals than needed for headway purposes or where it has
been necessary to place signals in non-ideal positions and specify any suitable mitigation which
your plan assumes,
• attempt to signal the whole area of the plan to at least an adequate level of completion,
• show signals with all the required detail and support by providing route boxes,
• ensure you don’t get confused between swing nose points, switch diamonds, fixed diamonds,
single and double slips,
• provide trapping where needed and position track circuit interrupters appropriately,
• think about the layout rather than placing overlaps just a fixed distance beyond a signal,
• consider carefully whether track circuit joints would be foul, but don’t shy away from having
such joints where they are operationally needed for parallel moves to be made.
A wise candidate learns to avoid these pitfalls and thus increase their chance of passing!

A.4 Examples: The Good and The “Not Yet Competent”

In an attempt to give candidates a good idea of what is expected, this section comprises several
examples to study; these are deliberately diverse and the student ought to find them all useful but
for different purposes. It is important to realise that there is no one right answer for any layout and
indeed the examples here may be inappropriate for your railway; what you should be doing is
understanding each on its own terms and judge it against how well it achieves the key element that
were summarised in Section 4. You will gain from doing this even if the designs are not readily
comparable to those attempts that you have made.
link Description Purpose

layout “Model Answer” It is included in order that students can see how all the separate
calcs 1998 layout considerations that are needed are brought together to give an
explanation A very detailed solution integrated solution. It is therefore an example of the “goal” to
with copious notes which an examination solution should aspire, but will inevitably
produced by the not be able to achieve.
examiners to UK It is however a very useful learning tool since it puts into
practices of the time. practice the integration of those elements that have been
It represents a discussed individually in theoretical terms within section 6 of
comprehensive solution to this Study Pack and gives a real example of working through the
the problem of signalling process of section 7.
that particular layout but The best usage is not to look at it prior to attempting the relevant
far exceeds what any layout, but then to compare your solution to it. Even if you are
candidate could be signalling the layout to the same practices, your solution will
expected to produce under differ. You may even disagree with certain elements of the
examination conditions. design; this is fine- there is no one right answer and no-one is
infallible. The important thing is to do the comparison and
analyse the significant differences.
• You are bound to find some mistakes and things which
you had completely failed to consider; learn from these.
• You may find some divergence of opinion; ask yourself
whether you can understand the alternative rationale,
even if you don’t agree with it.
layout “Candidate answer” This demonstrates a reasonable “real examination conditions”
calcs 2005 layout solution; there is nothing fake about this: “what you see is what
comments A copy of the actual plan the examiners got”.
submitted by a candidate It shows that the examiners are not expecting an incredibly neat,
undertaking the exam. completely comprehensive production but know what ought to
The practices adopted are be able to be produced in 90 minutes under examination
those of New South conditions. It also shows that a solution which departs from the
Wales, Australia. examiner’s default expectations listed in section 7 of the Study
Pack are perfectly acceptable in the right context. For example
the signal symbols do not have the level of detail that would be
expected in a UK context; since the candidate correctly followed
their own country’s practices in this regard no marks were lost.
In addition to the layout itself and the separate sheets of
calculations provided by the candidate, a specific examiner
commentary is also included. Do read this in conjunction with
studying these examples; it points to what was considered good
about the attempt and also where marks were lost.

layout “Not so Good” example, This example is an amalgamation the efforts of two students’
2006 layout. when attempting this paper as a mock exam; hence it is an
“artificial reconstruction” in order to try to demonstrate the
“Avoidance of common errors”. However it is very much based
on the type of errors which real people make when under exam
pressure.
It may seem to be riddled with errors; it is! However it is not a
ridiculously exaggerated cartoon featuring all conceivable
errors; it is in fact no worse than the majority of efforts which
get submitted.
The main reason for amalgamating two examples was that the
level of completion of each was actually quite low and it was
desired to present full coverage of the entire layout; it also
serves to protect the identity of perpetrators (= mock exam
candidates). For the record it should be stated that both
individuals ended up with Credits in the actual examination
which indicates that they must have learned from their mistakes
and illustrates the importance of eliminating “howlers”.
Therefore the best use of this example is to:
• attempt the layout yourself
• then study this offering and look for similarities and
differences. The more crucial errors are identified on
the diagram with references to text within Appendix W.
• see whether you managed to avoid the common pitfalls
firstly by anticipating what the comment has been made
relating to this example layout before actually looking it
up, and secondly scrutinising your own attempt again to
verify that it is free of the same or similar errors.
The plan is annotated in red with references to indicate the
thoughts that are likely to be going through the examiner’s mind
when looking at such at attempt and using it to judge your
competence:
• letters (applicable to the interpretation of the various
instructional Plan Notes),
• numbers (applicable to the specific potential errors on
the plan itself).
Not every instance of every fault is identified; it is best to read
the explanation item-by-item, in alpha-numeric order.
To get the maximum value from this exercise though,
• you should have already have completed the 2006
layout yourself, and
• have your attempt in front of you at the same time as
reading about the faults discussed.
People tend to take far more notice of something if it is
addressing their own mistakes rather than someone else’s; if you
discover that none of the criticisms apply to your work, perhaps
you can allow yourself the luxury of feeling smug, but do
remember that a blank layout although free from errors is never
going to rate a pass!

Appendix B: Mainline Past Papers

B.1 Summary of Mainline Past Papers:
Eleven mainline layouts are included within this study pack; click on the links to access.
• The main pdf file can be viewed on screen as a small overview or individual portions can be seen in
detail by use of the zoom facility. It can also be used to obtain a plot of the plan which the student
can use as exam practice.
• For those students without access to a plotter, the diagram has also been included as a group of
individual portions each of which can be printed on A3/A4 paper respectively. These can then be
joined together to provide a whole layout at full scale. These may also be useful files for Study
Group leaders wishing to use a PC projector to display part of a layout to a class of students.
Year Brief Description links to layout diagrams

long A3 A4
diagram pieces pieces
1997 Terminus with train servicing depot and sidings. link link link
examiner Long single track branch with passing loops
1998 Station contained between tunnels; carriage depot, link link link
examiner burrowing junction.
model
answer This layout has been used as an example for braking and
headway calculations.
1999 Junction station, Stone Terminal, link link link
examiner main line single over viaduct.
2000 Freight branch, minor mainline station, 15km single track link link link
examiner dead-end passenger branch.
2001 Major through station, short branch to terminus with link link link
examiner intermediate freight depot.
2002 Double track branch off very straightforward main line. link link link
examiner Branch features two simple stations, Goods loop, Works
arrival / departure, tamper siding, level crossing.
2003 Four stations, main line with a bi-directional line used link link link
examiner tidally, beginning of 15km freight branch
2004 Main line with long tunnel, branch with single line portion, link link link
examiner power station terminal
2005 Station where four track section becomes a double track and link link link
examiner much of the service terminates.
candidate
answer
2006 Modest station with stabling sidings separated from a link link link
examiner double junction by a tunnel. Single track chord completes a
student triangle of lines, used occasionally for turning steam
attempt locomotives. Also simple station with level crossing
between staggered platforms.
2007 Station situated immediately prior to double junction with link link link
switch diamonds, the Valley Branch having a single line
section over a viaduct.
Layout also features a single track dead end passenger
branch which passes over a level crossing.

B.2 Review of specific features of Mainline past papers

Most of the text is reasonably generic but it has been written from an NR perspective.
It is suggested that you should first attempt the layouts yourself, then read this commentary; it is
intended to point out features of which you should have become aware whilst performing the
exercise. The comments can perhaps be useful to start a debate within a Study Group when
various versions of the same layout by different students are being compared.
Mainline Layouts
Year Specific features
1997 One of the rare appearances of a terminus layout and also featuring a significant train servicing
depot and storage sidings.
There is no escaping the need to perform stopping headway calculations on such a layout; the
signals need to be placed with care. For trains leaving the station the position of the first signal
beyond the platform should be dictated more by the requirement to ensure the rear of a train
held at it will be clear from the station throat, rather than any concern over braking distance.
Similarly since the acceleration and braking rates of the stock are the same, it should be
obvious that the following section will be of sufficient length to give braking at the attainable
speed of trains provided that it is longer than the first section. Also do ensure that the signals
are spaced sufficiently that the rear of one train is clear of the overlap of the signal in rear or
else the layout will compound any delay which occurs. See Appendix N2
Another significant feature on this layout was the long single track branch, shown as far as the
first passing loop. Operation by Train Staff would be too inflexible for this line, so some form
of token system is probably the best option. Manning of signalboxes at each site would be
prohibitive in labour costs, but NSTR could be a suitable solution. RETB is another option;
like NSTR there is little trackside infrastructure and either of these options would require the
provision of points which can be trailed but still be sufficiently safe for low speed facing
movements.
In the non Network Rail context there are even more options for operating such a line without
signals: such as Train Warrant with a dispatcher specifying crossing orders etc. or a system
based on track transponders and a satellite GPS for trains to establish their position.
One could also envisage the line might be used as an early deployment for ETCS, but in this
case the candidate would need to clarify that this is only seen as a cost-effective option when
viewed on the basis of national migration rather than on an individual line basis.
1998 Major station inconveniently situated between tunnels which makes finding suitable signal
positions on the approaches quite difficult. This is particularly so since achieving the required
headway is a major consideration due to the low permissible speed even for trains not stopping
at the station. Where braking distances are short, the usual concern over the extent of excess
braking is far less relevant.
Note that headway / braking calculations for this layout are included in G.22
In addition there is a need to consider carefully how the contracted train service pattern can be
operated on a layout which is not as flexible as first appears; there is strictly limited platform
capacity for through trains and it can only just handle the service specified. The scissors
crossover requires mid-platform signals on that platform face; the candidate needs to consider
whether similar signals should be provided on the opposite platform face.
Empty stock working from the terminal platforms to carriage depot gives an additional
complication and also needs to be factored in when considering the headway required on this
critical section of line. Bi-directional signalling in this area could ease operation of the ECS
working but is not explicitly demanded by the specification; if provided the candidate should
justify its provision.
The entrance / exit of the depot is within the vee of the junction, trapping protection is required
and the appropriate signalling of this area together with any relevant notes re its operation are
needed.
1999 Through station adjacent to double junction with switch diamonds. This is probably quite a
good layout to start with since it is possible to get started reasonably easily; however to do the
layout well then it is important to realise that it is not as simple as may first appear.
The most significant complication on this layout is the operation of the freight to the stone
terminal whose run round loop is too short for long trains specified. Need to work out how the
Goods Loop and Up sidings can be utilised and then provide the signalling required to enable the
required movements to be undertaken.
There is also a short stretch of single line over a viaduct on what is otherwise a double-track
mainline; this needs to be signalled appropriately to enable advantage to be taken of the high
speed turnouts and to address the risk of a high speed head-on collision on this section in the
event of a SPAD.
2000 Small through station into which the branch line shuttle service operates into a bay platform.
This requires bi-directional working over a length of the Down Main and an appropriate way of
operating the significant length of dead-end branch in an economic manner. Since Track Circuit
Block requires a signal at the point of reversal this would be disproportionally expensive and
some form of One Train Working a better option; this could be with a staff or a form of token
system but more likely without one- either utilising a sequence of track & treadle operation as a
basic check that something had gone in and then come out, or implemented by a single-ended
axle counter section.
The loss of line capacity entailed by the “bang road” (i.e. in the direction against the
predominant traffic flow) working when travelling towards the station having left the branch
must be taken into account when considering the type and positioning of signals on the Down
Main.
There is also a double track freight branch; the signalling appropriate to this and the implication
of the slower freight trains running amongst the passenger service on the mainlines must also be
considered.
2001 This plan features the area where a four track section of line becomes a double line just beyond a
station having four through platforms and a bay. Each end of the station has a reasonably
complicated throat permitting several parallel moves and so the track circuit divisions must
allow for this.
A length of the two-track section needs to be bi-directionally signalled, and the placement of
signals protecting the associated crossovers is complicated by the presence of a viaduct in that
vicinity.
There is also a single-track branch line which is used by passenger trains to a simple dead-end
terminus during the day, but by night there is a requirement for freight to access an intermediate
depot. Determining a suitably economic way of operating the branch is also therefore a
significant part of this layout. Power signalling would be inappropriate on the grounds of cost
and a rather more basic means of operation is sensible here. A train staff that is used as the key
to physically unlock mechanical levers of GF and then be retained captive until the relevant
points have again been locked normal is about as cheap (and also reliable) as it is possible to get;
since there is no traffic need for a train to be shut-in at the depot whilst another is running on the
branch, greater complexity would not be justified.

2002 The main line is short and simple; it is the branch which provides the significant features on this
layout. There are two simple stations relatively close together, so achieving the headway for
stopping trains needs to be considered carefully. Look at the traffic flows; the form of signalling
required on different parts of the layout differs.
A suitable means of protecting the level crossing must be shown; this also adds another
constraint re the positioning of intermediate signals between the two stations; even if an AHBC
is used (no signal protection) remember to ensure that enough standage is provided so that the
road can be opened with the longest train stopped at the signal beyond.
Much of the complication however is the working of the freight; there is a Works Yard with
separate arrival and departure lines but the access is from the opposite direction from that which
the relevant traffic requires. Hence the trains have to travel beyond and then be run around in
the station in order to return to it; this itself needs to be considered with respect to the stopping
passenger service. This station is probably more key to the layout design that the mainline
junction and the standage needed for the freight train gives constraints on the positioning of
many signals.
There is a Goods Loop just prior to the branch junction; the optimum way of placing signals to
protect this junction given the need also to have appropriate signals for the entrance and exit of
the Goods Loop is another complication.
2003 The overview diagram looks very simple; this is deceptive. Remember the exam paper is
designed to challenge the candidates and provide the opportunity for them to demonstrate their
familiarity and experience, so if it looks simple then it probably isn’t and you are missing
something.
Unusually this plan has a significant length of triple track railway with the centre line being bi-
directional. This is primarily for tidal use; in the morning and evening peaks it is used in
opposite directions so that fast trains can be timetabled to overtake the stopping service.
However it is also used to operate a train service when the normal running lines are under
engineering possession.
There are stations at either end of this three track section and two simple stations within it. This
gives some significant difficulty in arranging suitable signal spacing along this length; there are
many constraints- the necessary stopping and non-stopping headway, the intermediate platforms
and the positions selected to protect the junctions at each end. Whereas platform starters are
certainly appropriate at stations B and E, this may not be the best option at the intermediate
stations C & D. Certainly don’t attempt to signal the two ends separately first and just expect it
all to work out nicely in the middle!
Note carefully that certain pointwork is for high speed and ensure that the junction signalling is
appropriate. Don’t fall into the trap of providing wide-to-gauge trap points for what is supposed
to be a high speed “Y” turnout with both stock rails curved.
Another complication is the requirement for a special operating mode to be possible in order to
cater for special events. This includes the need for all platforms at one station to be available to
terminate and then return trains from either of the approach directions; the implication is that
shunt routes should be provided to enable trains to be stabled in a siding and return into a station
platform when required later.
Whilst the service is predominantly passenger, don’t forget to provide for the occasional freight.
Firstly an appropriate method for the long single track freight branch must be shown and
incorporate the transition to the mainline signalling at station E, including provision of trap
points if appropriate. In addition the running of this train also provides some complication at
each end of the three track section. For example an Up signal is needed at the end of the Goods
Loop which is not consistent with the signal spacing needed for the Up Main; this results in a
short distance between it and the next signal so it is appropriate to specify a control to prevent it
from clearing unless the next signal is off.
This is certainly not the layout to do as your first practice; conversely if you can make a
reasonable attempt at this layout within the allotted time limit then you have little to fear from
the exam.

2004 At first sight this is a stretch of double track main line with just a modest station with a right-
hand double junction leading to a single track branch which eventually becomes a double track
line.
The complication is primarily the freight service, especially in designing the signalling around
the station / junction to give the required standage and to permit the necessary change of
direction. Also the running of trains on the single line portion of the branch must be considered
to establish what is needed to permit the freight to be run to the intermediate power station
amongst the specified passenger service. Separate Arrival and Departure lines are provided at
the power station and the interface arrangement at this infrastructure boundary must be depicted
with any relevant notes regarding the intended means of operation added.
Another issue is the tunnel which is comparable in length to braking distance; this seems to
suggest some signal positions but these aren’t readily compatible with certain possible solutions
for the station area. Candidates who are familiar with the various methods of transitioning
between 3 and 4 aspect signalling will be able to display their knowledge here.
Note that the numerical answers expected from the calculations and a commentary regarding the
interpreting these are included in Appendix W.
2005 Another layout with a very similar overview plan but actually very different, a double track main
line becomes a four track railway with Fast and Slow lines. Much of the train service starts /
terminates at the station where this occurs and hence setback moves are required from various
platforms and the turnback siding between the running lines does require trapping from both (so
a wide-to-gauge point is appropriate here!). To avoid potential misinterpretation by trains on the
Down Slow, the bufferstop light should be white rather than red in such a scenario.
There is a mix of pointwork including a slow speed scissors crossover and a high speed double
junction with switch diamonds, so think about the appropriate approach release when designing
the route boxes. Similarly determine what parallel moves need to be possible over the pointwork
near the platforms and when it is / is not important to release the points immediately after the
passage of a train before dividing this area into track sections.
Stopping headway needs to be considered especially as there are simple stations each side of the
main station. Given that there is little flexibility re placing signals close to the platform ends at
station C, the candidate must consider whether subsequent 3 aspect signals can be positioned to
achieve the headway needed, or whether some 4 aspect signals are required.
The candidate also needs to interpret what is required in order to operate the specified freight.
Although it clearly runs from the Down siding, its destination (and therefore where any run-
round operation is to be performed) is less obvious; a reasonable assumption should be stated
and the relevant signalling provided.
An Australian candidate’s answer is included link and the examiners’ specific comments are
included in the section B.3

There are no guidance notes here for these last two layouts in the pack..
This is deliberate so there are layouts for which the student
must work out everything for themselves without referring to hints and guidance!
Why not do one as an “open-book” preparation exercise and then
the other as an “against the clock” mock exam at the beginning of September?
2006 Although there is no info here, you may recall a reference to the 2006 layout in section 7.4.
Furthermore 2006 is the example used to illustrate the so good” attempt (described in section
A.4) and linked from it.
There are some very detailed comments on the shortcomings of that attempt given in Appendix
W; the reason for locating them there is to reinforce that reading them should be a revision
activity, after you have already committed pen to paper and have completed your offering- you
will not get the full value from them if you take a sneak view beforehand.
2007 There is no technical information anywhere in this Study Pack (except for the overall description
entry in section A.3) specifically for 2007 layout so it is not worth looking for it!
It is however worth looking at Appendix K for hints on a single line over a viaduct, but other
than that, you are totally on your own!
2008 Not yet available; you can be one of the very first to experience it. Enjoy!

B.3 Examiners’ Commentary on Candidate’s 2005 Layout

IRSE Exam 2005 Module 2 Typical Answer
This solution to the Module 2 main line layout (layout 1) gained high marks in the 2005
examination.
• The candidate stated on the plan that the solution adopted was in accordance with New
South Wales (Australia) practice and used the symbols in use by that administration. It
should be noted that colours of individual aspects and the ‘normal’ aspect of signals are
not required to be shown on NSW plans.
• The candidate successfully used the specified braking rates and headway requirements to
determine the braking distances, signal spacing and the fact that three aspect signalling
would suffice. These calculations used the NSW standard overlap for non-trainstop fitted
areas of 500m. The calculations were concise and accurate for the criteria given.
• The signalling scheme adopted by the candidate included signals spaced at less than the
required braking distance. This was recognised and four aspect signalling provided as
appropriate to ensure that satisfactory braking distances were maintained. Additionally, at
some locations the standard minimum overlap length was exceeded (giving full block
overlap), even where track circuit boundaries could have been adjusted to provide
overlaps closer to the 500m standard. However, the candidate did not offer evidence that
the longer overlaps still enabled the required headways to be achieved.
• The layout and traffic requirements did present some difficulties to this candidate, for
example, scissors crossovers and switch diamonds are not in use in NSW, whilst freight
trains are longer, braking rates lower and turnout speeds lower than those specified.
• The provision of a full running signal out of the Down Siding could be seen as an
extravagance, given the short distance to the platform – the green aspect may never be
used!
• All shunting movements have been correctly terminated by the use of Shunting Limit
boards in the wrong direction [except for 65(S)B and 67(S)B, which is considered to be an
oversight]. However, use of a shunting limit board on the Down Slow line facing to normal
direction of traffic is incorrect.
• The turnback siding does not have adequate trapping protection against the Up Slow line;;
either wide to gauge traps, separate trap points or a derailer should have been provided.
• The positioning of signals (62, 66 & 73) on the right hand side of the track was noted.
These are all associated with contraflow starting movements from station C. Since
detailed signal sighting considerations are outwith the scope of this module, no penalty
was incurred although a note of explanation would have been appropriate.
• The candidate showed a turnout repeater for one signal (84), and pulsating (flashing)
yellow Band of Light (BOL) indications for some (but not all) of the medium speed
junctions at station C.
• Route boxes for most of the signals with more than one route have been drawn, although
some contain errors. Note the dimensioning of signals outside the scale area of the plan,
as required by the layout notes.
In summary, the candidate showed a good appreciation of the operational requirements of the
layout (including the specified shunting moves) and the criteria for the positioning of signals, also
the signal indications that would be provided for the specified train movements.

Appendix C: Metro Past Papers

C.1 Summary of Metro Past Papers
Eleven Metro layouts are included within this study pack; click on the links to access.
• The main pdf file can be viewed on screen as a small overview or individual portions can be seen in
detail by use of the zoom facility. It can also be used to obtain a plot of the plan which the student
can use as exam practice.
• For those students without access to a plotter, the diagram has also been included as a group of
individual portions of which can be printed on A3/A4 paper respectively. These can then be joined
together to provide a whole layout at full scale. These files may also be useful for Study Group
leaders wishing to use a PC projector to display part of a layout to a class of students.

long A3 A4
1997 Double junction beyond a through station with three link link link
platform faces, which is also used as a terminus for a shuttle
service. Straight route leads to an island platform terminus
having stabling for one train on each line beyond it. The
major station has a turnback siding parallel to the double
track running line.
1998 Junction station with higher speed turnouts and a fixed link link link
diamond crossing leading to a station where trains terminate
and from which they return after a short layover. Beyond
this is a significant depot with fan of sidings and two
scissors crossovers.
1999 Three platform terminal station with scissors crossover and link link link
surface depot accessed from platforms. Four other stations,
one with a turnback loop with dedicated platform faces and
another with a double junction just beyond the platforms all
with different dwell times.
2000 Station having two outer platforms for through traffic and a link link link
pair of inner platforms as a terminus accessed via scissors
crossover. Two other simple stations, but one with stabling
sidings accessed via trailing crossover and headshunt.
2001 Triangle of lines with a station at each intersection; left and link link link
right hand double junctions and a grade separated junction
at the primary station which has separate platform faces for
the diverging routes. Additionally there is a pair of carriage
sidings and a trailing crossover to permit access to any of
the routes.
2002 Straight double track line, largest station has 3 platform link link link
faces (the middle used bi-directionally) and also a turnback
siding. Terminal station with scissors crossover and entry
to EMU depot beyond it.
2003 Terminal station with two reversal sidings beyond it, link link link
junction station within tunnel. Siding complex connects to
running line near first station in open section. Different
service and emergency brake rates in tunnel than in the
open.


long A3 A4
2004 Double junction at station which has one platform face for link link link
each track, facing and trailing crossovers and siding Branch
terminates at island platform accessed via scissors
crossovers, beyond which are two bi-directional lines to a
depot.
2005 Island platform station has facing crossover to a headshunt link link link
via which sidings are accessed. Succession of other
through stations including one with a loop line for reversal
and another with a central bay platform for terminating
trains.
2006 The unusual feature of 2006 was that the Metro layout link link link
shared much of the basic track plan as the Mainline layout.
However much is shown to be in tunnel and the train
service pattern very different.
2007 This layout consists of: two simple stations, a double link link link
junction and a four platform station at a further double
junction which leads to depot sidings.

C.2 Review of specific features of Metro Past Papers

Metro Layouts
Year Specific features
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Unfortunately it has not proved possible to complete this section

prior to the publication of the Study Pack for 2008.
If you know of a volunteer who would be prepared to complete
this section for 2009, please encourage them to get in touch with the IRSE
Similarly at least one worked example for a Metro layout is required;
it would be good to feature several different approaches,
as per the Mainline examples included.

Appendix D: Past “Layouts 3”

D.1. Introduction
Do remember that the IRSE examination module 3 layouts (which are used as the layout for the
production of Control Tables) can be a very useful source of information for module 2 students.
When studying for module 3, it is likely that students would be focussed on the production Control
Tables for a succession of specific routes / points and thus would not have taken the time to step
back and look at the various elements of the design of the layout. However when studying for
Module 2 the student can view these elements differently as part of the whole and instead use them
to understand the various components of a signalled layout.
Unlike Module 2 the plans are not to scale but do show very much the level of detail of the
signalling that is expected for a good module 2 answer based generally on Network Rail practice.
They will obviously be of less use for other railway administrations but will still give a useful
insight. Whilst there is no substitute for studying real Signalling Plans for the railway whose
practices you intend to follow, the module 3 layouts do have the advantage of:
a) clarity when trying to assimilate an overview rather than getting lost in the clutter of
irrelevant detail which can afflict the more recent real plans,
b) depicting the extent of salient detail which the examiners will be expecting. In particular
note that train protection is covered by a note rather than included in detail.
D.2. Use of the Module 3 Layouts

For aiding the study for module 2, you should look at the plans included within this Appendix and
ask yourself some questions about how the layout has been signalled and whether you’d have done
it like it has been depicted. Some typical questions that you should be asking are given at the end
of this section, but first a few initial words of caution are appropriate:
• Be aware that the majority of these layouts tend to show arrangements that were more
common 30 years ago than they are today. They are still relevant of course since there is
often a need to undertake alterations on such layouts, or indeed re-interlocking them
following problems with wire degradation. However module 2 layouts less often feature
such historic features, the logic being that major re-signalling schemes are frequently
associated with remodelling and so the track layout is also new. Nevertheless it is still worth
ensuring that you know how to number a single or double slip appropriately; you certainly
do not want to get these confused with a switch diamond or swing-nose crossing should they
come up in the Module 2 layout.
• Be aware also that the questions for Module 2 often explicitly ask for more information
regarding the methodology of operation and interfacing fringe areas than generally appear on
these Module 3 plans.
• Note that these layouts are partially designed to test candidates on aspect sequence; hence
some of the arrangements are somewhat improbable, although feasible. They often feature
several aspect sequence transitions in a small area which in reality would be avoided if at all
possible; thus they do not necessarily represent good signalling in this respect.

• It is also important to appreciate that nomenclature and practices do not necessarily accord
with modern practices of any particular railway. Historically there have been regional
variations and preferred practices, some of which feature in IRSE layouts. Also railway
signalling practice evolves over time; it is responsive to changing circumstances, changing
technology, altered perception of a risk following a particular accident or near-miss trends.
• Taking the 1997 layout as an example you may notice that various things are certainly not
depicted exactly in accordance with the most recent NR practice.
- For example the route indicator nomenclature differs, certain aspects are referred to a
“Sub” rather than “PL” and the overlap and “end of track circuiting” symbols are also
not to the current standard.
- Similarly it is most unlikely that a ROL over 303 points Normal would be provided
nowadays, and it is actually more likely that 301A would have been numbered 300
(thus permitting an overlap beyond 108 over 301 reverse) and instead prohibiting the
overlap which is shown over 301 normal.
- Also it would now be usual to show a filled in top yellow aspect on a signal like 107
where the aspect can never be displayed (but the form of the signal is retained as a four
aspect to avoid confusing drivers).
• Remember that the role of these layouts is more generic and such differences only emphasise
that the examiners are not looking for all candidates to signal the layout to one particular
laid-down standard; the choice of practice is for the candidate to declare. If you are fully
familiar with any particular implementation then you should not find such discrepancies
unduly confusing; if you do then perhaps you are not yet ready for the examination..........
The sort of questions which should be provoked by looking at the 1997 layout are:
- where have trap points been provided?
- what points have been numbered as a crossover or a triple ender?
- how has the normal lie of points been defined?
- where have track circuit joints been provided to permit parallel moves?
- under what circumstances have track joints not been provided at each extremity of a
point end?
- which of the track joints are actually drawn to be foul?
- how have the signals been positioned with respect to junctions?
- where have the overlaps been depicted, do they lock each other / other routes?
- why have ROLs been provided where they have been?
- could I have produced the route boxes merely by looking at the layout?
- would I have provided that route indication / that approach release?
- did I know about the need for that special control which has been noted?
- how does that transition between 3 and 4 aspects work out?
- why is that LOS provided there?
- what’s that symbol mean?
- do I understand the significance of “overlap prohibited” note?
- do I know the difference between Absolute Block and Tokenless Block, RETB ?

D.3. Past Examination Papers: Layout 3 (Module 3 and Aspect Sequence)

Year Description of design characteristics Links to plans
1997 Double track, bi-directional platform, left-hand double junction, bay link to diagrams
platform, branch operated by Tokenless Block, main line TCB fringe to
AB.
1998 Terminus, bi-directionally signalled approach, siding, Ground Frame link to diagrams
operated crossover, MAF divergence to branch operated under TCB
but sparsely signalled
1999 Station at terminus of a double track line but with connection to a link to diagram
single track line primarily utilising axle counter train detection.
Scissors crossover, double slip, various sidings, CCTV level crossing
2000 Major station with four through platforms and two dock lines with link to diagram
throats utilising single slips.
Carriage and loco sidings, single track branch.
2001 Double track separating at a double junction into Fast lines to through link to diagram
station leading to a single track line and Slow lines which terminate in
suburban station. Bay platform and carriage sidings.
2002 Triangle of lines formed by chords between left-hand and right-hand link to diagram
double junctions.
Flashing aspect sequence, transition to single track, overlap towards
sand drag, bay platform, freight sidings off run-round facility one end
of which operated by Ground Frame points.
2003 Major through station, single and double slips, carriage sidings and link to diagram
servicing shed, locomotive sidings and shed, freight branch operated
under One Train Working-No Staff.
Features loco changes for through freight, mid tunnel signals with
tunnel controls, self restored points to minimise layout risk.
2004 Station with four through platforms and a bay platform. link to diagram
Goods Yard, quarry and stone terminal.
2005 Double track, right-hand double junction onto branch via single slips, link to diagram
bay platform, freight siding, Goods Loop between running lines with
wide-to-gauge traps, phantom overlaps.
2006 Double track line, platform loop lines, ladder junction then continues as link to diagram
four track section, right-hand double junction leads to double track
branch, also a single track branch with One Train Working-No Staff.
Signals drawn as LED “searchlights”, GPL type LOS, overlaps beyond
shunt signals, flashing aspect sequence.
2007 Station at right-hand double junction with switch diamonds and slip link to diagram
connection to Bay Platform. Branch becomes single track whilst main
line has Goods Loops. Significant yard and sidings.

Appendix E: Examination “key words”
Many exam candidates seem to be unclear how to interpret the wording of certain exam questions in order
to determine what is required of their answer. In some cases this probably reflects a lack of sufficient
domain knowledge and indeed interpretation of the technical content of the written question does constitute
part of what is being assessed by the examiners. However there is also some uncertainty relating to the
level of detail / form of presentation expected in response to an instruction in the question; this Appendix
has been included to attempt to assist candidates in interpreting the “key word” verbs used.
The actual meaning depends to some extent on the context in which the word is used within the question,
but the table below aims to help the student realise in broad terms “what the examiner wants”.
Given that the Module 2 question paper is the most simply worded and similar from year to year, this is
obviously not the most logical Study Pack in which to include this material as an Appendix; nevertheless it
is considered best to include, even though it is actually likely to be more useful for the other modules.
EXAMINATION QUESTION WORDING (1 of 2)

Verb used Requirement Purpose of the task
List * Make a list of items but give no other detail Demonstrate that you know
State Express clearly but succinctly the facts relating to ...... individual facts
Define Give the precise meaning (good to use the formal
wording) but do not explain further.
Describe Communicate the key features (physical appearance, Demonstrate that you have
$ mechanical properties, electrical characteristics, deeper and broader
functionalities, procedures etc.) of ....... knowledge and can link
Distinguish # Highlight the differences between things together
Explain Give detail which demonstrates “how / why”
$
Identify Select the salient features / examples which
$ * demonstrate whatever has been asked
Illustrate Use an example to show how a general concept
% applies in a specific situation
Analyse Describe in detail the things that you can deduce from Demonstrate that you fully
the presented facts understand the general
Categorise Determine into which grouping of similar items each environment and can see
# * example is best placed where individual elements of
Compare and Describe and explain what is similar and what is information fit into the whole.
contrast # dissimilar between the relevant examples
Construct Make from a combination of smaller components /
earlier arguments
Discuss Give detail which explains the extent that something
# is true in a range of different circumstances
(configurations, environment)
Interpret Translate the concept into more basic language or
relate to a familiar situation
$ = diagram often useful,
% = ironically a diagram is probably not useful for this one,
# = tabular approach often useful,
* = bullet point list often useful

EXAMINATION QUESTION WORDING (2 of 2)

Verb used Requirement Purpose of the task
Apply Put a generic rule / process into practice for the Demonstrate that you can put
specific situation given theoretical knowledge into
Calculate Work out the answer mathematically giving outline practice in a particular
$ detail of the steps towards the solution scenario
Demonstrate Produce an argument / calculation to prove the truth of
the statement
Produce / Create from scratch / take what has been given as a
Prepare starting point and make ready for other use
Reconcile Give the evidence that explains away an apparent
discrepancy or give the argument which disproves one
of the items presented as true facts but which are
incompatible with each other
Solve Find an answer to the problem presented and explain
$ your working / thinking
Tabulate Give the answer in the form of a table, for example it
# could be allowing the advantages and disadvantages
of two possibilities to be easily compared
Advise Give counsel as to whether on balance a particular Demonstrate that you can use
# * course of action is appropriate or not, and what the your learning to make a
associated risks would be in either circumstance rational decision based on the
Evaluate Calculate (or if not a numerate question, use facts presented
# * engineering judgement to explain the relative weight
you’d assign to the various factors) in order to come
up with an answer
Recommend Consider the pros and cons of various options and
# * determine which is likely to be the optimum, given
stated reasonable assumptions regarding the
circumstances.
$ = diagram often useful,
% = ironically a diagram is probably not useful for this one,
# = tabular approach often useful,
* = bullet point list often useful

Appendix F: Introduction to Train Braking
F.1. Vacuum brakes and Air brakes

For a considerable number of years in the UK at least, the traditional freight train comprised of un-
braked vehicles was reliant on what little braking was available from the locomotive (limited by its
weight as a proportion of total train weight and the number of braked wheels) and when necessary
by the guard screwing down a mechanical brake for a specially weighted guard’s van positioned at
the rear of the train. Prior to particularly steep downhill gradients it was necessary for the train to
be stopped and the guard to “pin-down” individually applied mechanical brakes on a certain
percentage of vehicles distributed along the length of the train, in order to mitigate the risk of the
train running away out of control. Such operation is now a thing of the past, but necessarily
influenced the development of signalling, some vestiges of which still remain.
Passenger trains were generally fitted with “continuous brakes” much earlier in railway history
than freight trains; in the UK it was a legal requirement from 1889 following concern regarding
the number deaths occurring in railway accidents. Continuous brakes (which are an unspoken
assumption on the vast majority of the world’s railways today) allow the train driver a degree of
proportional control (rather than just fully applied / not applied) of brakes on every vehicle of the
train.
• Vacuum brakes were initially dominant; their principal advantage was that they were easy to
engineer to be “fail-safe” and therefore relatively cheap. Brakes were applied by gravity
unless a pipe running the length of the train was exhausted of air by an ejector, and on a
steam locomotive this required a device with no moving parts which was a decided
advantage. Loss of vacuum in the train pipe provided an automatic braking action on both
portions of a train should it become divided. It was also possible to give the train guard a
control valve that could be used to admit air and thus a way of applying the brakes if
necessary. Similarly a valve on each coach could be opened by use of the “emergency
communication chord” by a passenger and thus initiate emergency braking. Once the brakes
had been applied they could not be rapidly released as this required re-creation of a sufficient
vacuum. The maximum braking force was limited by the size of the cylinders which could
be accommodated and the difference between atmospheric pressure and the best vacuum
which could reasonably be produced along the length of the train.
• The straight air brake is not failsafe as it requires positive pressure to apply the brakes; it is
however used on locomotives with a dual-circuit feature for redundancy, not unlike
hydraulic brakes on a car. However it is not suitable for train brakes (as there would be a
loss of braking if a train separated).
• The Westinghouse air brake was engineered to overcome this but inevitably is more complex
and thus expensive. It features a reservoir on each coach and a “triple valve” (a later
development was the “distributor” to allow better control of braking) on each coach that
applies the brakes when there is a reduction of air pressure in the train pipe and both
exhausts the brake cylinder pressure and recharges the reservoir when the brakes are
subsequently released by increasing the pressure in the train pipe.

The principal advantages over vacuum brakes are:

- maximum brake pressure is not limited by atmospheric pressure,
- the application, and especially the release, of brakes is quicker.
- the system is designed to detect a sudden loss of pressure in the train pipe (driver
selecting emergency braking or the train becoming divided) which brings into use an
additional compartment of the reservoirs and thus gives a higher “emergency brake”
rate of deceleration.
Hence the brake is both more effective and more controllable. Distributors allow a
graduated release of brakes (not possible on earlier systems) but this is limited by the rate at
which air pressure can be restored in the train pipe; in a “single pipe” system this is a slow
process since the reservoirs on each vehicle on the train all need to be recharged.
A slight disadvantage of air brakes is that it is possible for brakes eventually to “leak off” as
a result of the loss of the stored air as the pressure gradually leaks away through
imperfections; the risk of this occurring is small and only becomes a real issue if vehicles are
stored out of use for an extended period. Operational procedures are necessary to secure
such vehicles by alternative means but it is also one reason why it is necessary for trap points
to be provided to protect running lines from sidings and depots.
Historically certain railways adopted one type of brake, certain railways another. Upon
nationalisation, British Railways unfortunately standardised on the vacuum brake whereas the
majority of other countries had by then standardised on air brakes; soon however the requirement
for higher train speeds and thus better braking necessitated a belated transition to air brakes.
Whilst some “dual fitted” coaches still exist, vacuum brakes in the UK are now only used within
the heritage railway sector; indeed relatively few steam locomotives have air braking equipment.
Late adoption of the air brake did have the advantage that the higher performance “two-pipe
system” was used- the reservoir pipe provides a constant source of compressed air down the length
of the train completely separate from the train pipe which controls the braking. Various
advantages ensue; the most significant for signalling is the reduced delay which occurs during the
release of the brakes.
F.2. Electro Pneumatic brakes

This is a variant of the air brake used on passenger MU trains. This is called an EP (= Electro-
Pneumatic) brake and in normal operation utilises electrical control rather than the air pipe to
control the brake application on each vehicle. The great advantage is that brakes are applied by
electrically operated valves and thus the response is immediate and simultaneous on all vehicles on
a train, rather than gradually from the front end as the loss of air pressure gradually percolates
along the train pipe. This makes the braking more responsive to the driver with brake build-up
independent of train length and also avoids the surging that otherwise can occur as the rear of the
train pushes against that portion of the train on which the brakes are already effective; thus the ride
is smoother and the train can be stopped in a shorter distance. These benefits are greatest for
commuter train operation with frequent short stops at intermediate stations and it was on dedicated
EMU stock where this type of brake was first introduced.

A typical system is Westcode which utilises 3 control wires arranged to give 7-step braking (i.e.
selection of one of seven degrees of brake application). The brake is “self-lapping”- the driver
having control over the braking force applied to the wheels rather than the rate of change of brake
force and having to move the brake controller to a neutral position to maintain any current brake
rate which is a further advantage for the controllability of braking.
One disadvantage is that the electrical system by itself could not be completely failsafe; hence the
traditional air brake pipe was retained and the loss of pressure provided a fall-back means of
activation of the same braking system on each vehicle, albeit slightly delayed compared to the EP
operation. The driver’s brake controller has an “emergency braking” position which rapidly vents
the air pressure rather than slowly lowering it when the various “service braking” notches are
used- see F.6.
Modern trains generally use an electronic variant of the EP brake but with a train wire all around
the train taking the role of the train air pipe to prove the train intact and provide an automatic brake
application if the circuit is broken. The brakes are also more sophisticated in that the braking force
on each vehicle is adjusted according to its loading as determined from measuring the weight on
the suspension.
Passenger emergency alarms nowadays are normally electrical circuits giving a specific alarm to
the driver rather than directly affecting the braking system.
F.3. Braking the wheel

The other element of the braking system which is of particular interest to the signal engineer is the
means by which the wheels are physically braked. Historically the brake blocks were applied to
the running surface of the wheels, nowadays disc brakes are used on the vertical rotating surface.
These are more effective but do not have the scraping and polishing action on the running surface
that was inherent in the action of the older design of brakes.
Absence of such brakes is one of the factors which contribute to the difficulty which is sometimes
experienced in obtaining a good train shunt on a track circuit in poor railhead conditions. These
can occur on little used (and thus rusty) track but primarily results from contaminants on the rail
surface. In the UK the main problem is “leaf-fall”, experienced from approximately mid-October
to mid-December- fallen leaves can be compressed into a mulch which is both non-conducting
(leading to loss of train shunt) and slippery (leading to loss of adhesion for acceleration and
braking). From a “signalling the layout” perspective such areas can influence the positioning of
signals and should be taken into account when determining the type of train detection to be
provided (some varieties of track circuits are more susceptible than others, axle counters do not
rely on a train shunt for their operation) and when considering whether special interlocking
controls (e.g. “leaf fall data” to guard against loss of train shunt) are necessary.

F.4. Dynamic Braking

However the wheels are physically braked, the kinetic energy of the train is converted into heat by
friction. Particularly at higher speeds this results in considerable wear and tear as well as
producing significant temperature rises. Hence other methods are generally used to perform the
majority of the braking from higher speeds. One alternative method that was trialed by the
Advanced Passenger Train was to design axles incorporating turbine blades into which water was
injected when braking was required. A somewhat similar method is used for braking most modern
DMUs; hydro-dynamic retarders produce braking from a turbine spinning in oil and the heat
created is dissipated from a radiator via the engine cooling system. Other methods of braking
which are sometimes used include eddy current brakes and magnetic brakes acting on the rails
themselves.
The more usual means of dynamic braking on locomotives and multiple unit stock with traction
motors for every axle (or at least many axles) is to use them as generators. The power produced is
either dissipated in banks of resistors (rheostatic braking) or, where the traction power distribution
system can accept it, returned to the source (regenerative braking). The braking action is
controlled by the driver in a similar way to the application of traction power using a controller with
a series of “notches”. In the UK, a three notch system for braking MU stock is typical.
Dynamic braking clearly has many advantages but is only effective at high and moderate speeds.
Hence they are used in conjunction with EP brakes but this is largely transparent to the driver. The
EP brakes are very slightly applied so that the brake blocks are in light contact with the wheels but
providing little braking effect until the effect of the dynamic brake fades as train speed falls.
If there is a problem with the dynamic braking the EP brakes cut in earlier and thus act as a back-
up; the driver can also bring them into effect at any time by selecting “emergency braking”.
Be aware that if such a brake application is made from very high speed on a train such as a
Eurostar then it is necessary for the brakes to be allowed to cool for a significant period to regain
some effectiveness before the train can be allowed to move again; indeed it is likely that a
significant percentage of the allowable wear will have been sustained. The train will need to be
examined and may need to be taken out of service at the first convenient opportunity. Signal
engineers should be aware of the consequences of what is regarded as a right-side failure (an
aspect being replaced due to an intermittent track circuit failure and thus the train protection
system intervening, loss of the GSM-R radio contact for longer than the defined critical time
which results in “tripping” a train operating under ETCS levels 2/3).

F.5. Significance of brake build-up and brake release delays

It can be seen that the design of the continuous braking system of a train does have implications
for signalling. Not only does the braking force affect the braking rate, but the means of application
and removal of the brake can significantly affect the responsiveness. It takes time for air pressure
changes to propagate along a pipe and therefore “brake build up” delays become increasingly
significant the longer the train; this results in the initial response to a brake application only by
those vehicles closest to the locomotive, the percentage of the train’s braking capability gradually
increases until all brakes on all vehicles are until fully effective. This is one reason why braking is
not uniform and averages at less than the theoretical maximum value; the effect of brake build up
is of course proportionally greater when the brake application is for a relatively short time.
Similarly to release (=take off) the brakes also takes significant time. Vacuum brakes were
particularly slow as air had to be exhausted from the entire train pipe. Air brakes utilise larger
pressure differences and can therefore be more quick acting, whilst electrical control is quicker
still. Note that the air reservoirs on each coach also need to be recharged after a brake application;
the means by which this is achieved also varies. A dual pipe air brake system has a separate pipe
for this purpose and thus the time required to release the brakes is significantly shorter than with a
single pipe system. Another advantage is that it doesn’t suffer from the problem which can affect
the single pipe system that the air reservoirs are depleted by one brake application and therefore
may not be fully recharged before another application is required shortly afterwards.
In general the details need not concern the signalling engineer, but it is worth being aware of the
constraints the braking system imposes on how a driver is able to handle a train. For example
consider a freight train braking in anticipation of the need to stop at a signal which is then cleared
at the last minute to permit the train to proceed one further signal section. The signal engineer
may consider that this has brought the train under control and lowered the risk of a SPAD at the
signal at which it must stop.
However the reality could be somewhat different; once the driver has made a heavy brake
application it is necessary to release the brakes and if the gradient is steep there may be significant
acceleration as a result. The driver then has an extremely difficult job judging the braking
necessary to stop at the following signal since it is almost impossible to know at any time what
percentage of the train still has its brakes applied and therefore how much time will be taken for
brake build up from a partially applied status.

F.6. Braking Rates

Many types of rolling-stock on NR have 3-step service braking nominally equivalent to 3%g
mean, 6%g mean, and 9%g mean, where g is the acceleration due to gravity of approximately 9.81
ms-2 (i.e. an increase of speed of 9.81 metres per second, every second). A driver braking for a
speed restriction would be expected to use the most severe braking (step 3 which equates to 0.88
ms-2) whereas defensive driving policy for approaching a signal at danger would utilise step 2
(equates to 0.58 ms-2) for the final part of the approach in order to have some braking in reserve.
If step 3 is used drivers are often required to inform the maintenance staff since it is possible that
its use has resulted in noticeably higher wear of brake components than would normally be
expected.
There is also an emergency brake which should be no less than step 3; it is often significantly
sharper and many trains achieve 12%g (1.17 ms-2). However one does need to be wary of the
interpretation of the term “emergency braking”; to the rolling stock engineer it can mean the
braking rate which is guaranteed under all conditions (and thus only “mechanical” braking with
the more sophisticated “regenerative braking” isolated) and hence this rate will lower than the
normal braking rate. The signal engineer often uses the term emergency braking to mean the best
possible braking rate for which considerations such as comfort are disregarded; historically this
was appropriate, but the situation is now different and this can lead to confusion.
Modern trains in particular have good acceleration rates when just starting to move but this
performance steadily falls away as they travel faster and generally the acceleration rate as they
approach top speed is quite low. Braking rates are more constant but do vary according to
circumstances. There are many reasons for this; various factors such as wind resistance, rolling
friction make a more significant contribution at higher speeds and in addition the actual means
which the train uses to brake may be different at different speeds. For example the use of physical
friction brakes is not appropriate at the highest speeds because of the physical wear, heat
dissipation and energy conservation issues and therefore regenerative braking is utilised whilst
friction brakes are needed at lower speeds and the train needs to manage the transition between the
two methods.
The limiting factor for the brake rate is often the available adhesion; there is a relatively small area
of contact between wheel and rail. In poor rail head conditions, the co-efficient of friction can be
less than 10% its normal value. In these circumstances it is likely that the wheel will slide along
the rail rather than continuing to rotate. This must be avoided as it both results in a loss of braking
and causes a “flat” on the wheel and if such a damaged wheel is allowed to continue in service it
results in a hammer blow on the track, itself causing rail damage and passenger discomfort.
Hence modern rolling stock features WSP (=Wheel Slip Protection) which briefly releases the
brakes on the axle so that it revolves again.
Today’s freight trains are very much heavier and travel at considerably higher speeds and therefore
must have far more effective brakes than the traditional railway freight discussed in F.1. For the
long freight trains typical of Australia, regenerative braking is used for a significant proportion of
braking and this is controlled in a similar way to tractive effort, typically there are eight “notches”.

The air brake is normally used at low speed, thus limiting the amount of wear and tear of
components and heat dissipation incurred. However the signal spacing is determined from “full
service braking” which means a full service application of the air brakes, since it is this braking
which is of the highest integrity. Hence in normal circumstances when regenerative braking is
available, a higher braking rate is achieved; thus drivers become accustomed to performing the
majority of the braking, then coasting at low speed for a significant distance before final air brake
application on approach to the desired stopping position. Therefore there is not the same concept
of “over-braking” as exists on the UK mainline (which is signalled almost exclusively for
passenger trains, most of which are comprised of fixed formation “Multiple Units” whose
performance effectively doesn’t change with train length).
Whereas the detail of the various braking systems is not relevant to the signal engineer, the
important things to appreciate are:
• an assumption of a constant brake rate is a gross simplification,
• whereas on a multiple unit the brake build up time is only of the order of a second and can
therefore generally be ignored, this is not true for a long freight train with conventional air
brakes. Brake build-up can be of the order of 10 - 20 seconds; during this time the braking
rate averages around half of what it is nominally and this has a dramatic effect on braking
distances. See Appendix V for an illustration of the effect of this when considering the
implementation of ETCS.
• in the context of a particular design of conventional air brake, “emergency braking” does
imply the best possible braking of which the train is capable, but in other contexts it instead
means a guaranteed means of braking the train which may not achieve the braking rate
achieved in normal use. The ERTMS emergency brake may be the same as the Driver's
emergency brake, or be a lower application brake, to allow for adhesion limitations and
reduce the risk of wheel slide,
• there is not (despite significant advances in braking over railway history) the fine and
virtually instant control of braking that there is when driving a car. To get an idea of how a
main line train brakes, one day when driving on a clear straight road at 60mph and it is safe
to do so, try taking your foot from the accelerator and observe the car’s deceleration; it is
likely to be comparable with a train when brakes are applied. Then think how difficult it
would have been to have decided when to have started this deceleration if it was essential
that you stopped by a particular place on the road ahead. The environments are different; the
train driver wouldn’t be needing to look in the rear view mirror as you would be whilst doing
this!

Appendix G: Braking and Capacity / Headway

Comprehending the Relationships between them
G.1 Introduction
Various sections in this Appendix are largely based upon extracts from:
• IRSE green booklet 14 “Multiple Aspect Signalling” by Armand Cardani,
• IRSE green booklet 27 “Signalling the Layout, BR Practice” by Roger Pope.
These portions however have been substantially updated to reflect the changes which have
occurred during the time (50 years!) which has passed since being originally written. Some of the
text has been included virtually verbatim but other portions have been re-written so extensively
that even the original authors wouldn’t recognise. The diagrams, figure numbers and equation
references etc. have been retained from the original texts. It is judged that this is the most
appropriate way of ensuring that this key document remains useful to a new generation of signal
engineers whilst still acknowledging its origins.
This appendix assumes UK mainline practice although the overall concepts are much more
generally applicable. There is inevitably some slight degree of duplication from text in the main
body of the document which introduced the concepts more generically and attempted to avoid
specifics as much as possible; this has been done to make the Appendix readable in isolation-
regard it as useful revision.
The purpose of any signalling system is to pass information to the driver; most of this is required
for safety and therefore mandatory, but certain advisory information is also communicated.
Signals are used to control the movements of trains and the signalling must be designed to:
• maintain a safe distance between two trains running in the same direction,
• afford protection to trains at converging junctions and where there are conflicting
movements,
• give directional indications at diverging junctions to allow a driver to regulate the train
speed appropriately.
Colour light signals are arranged so that trains can be run sufficiently close together to satisfy the
operational need (minimum timetabled interval between consecutive trains) whilst satisfying the
above safety requirements.
Historically the first signals were purely stop / go signals used to divide the line into sections. The
absolute block principle was soon established and a train was then only allowed to enter a block
section when it was known to be free of trains; this was achieved by telegraph communication
between the two extremities of the section.
As train speeds increased, it was found that a train could not see a stop signal sufficiently far away
to be able to stop at it from full speed. Thus it was necessary to provide warning signals on the
approach to the stop signals. These became called distant signals and were placed at a minimum of
“braking distance” from the first stop signal, thus ensuring that application of the brakes when
passing the distant would enable the train to be brought to a halt prior to the stop signal. Since
then, signalling systems have always needed to communicate to the driver information relating to
the status of the line ahead sufficiently early to enable them to be able to drive with safety and
confidence to exploit the maximum permissible speed of the line.

G.2 Braking Distance Curves

The purpose of any warning signal is to give adequate warning for a train to stop at a stop signal.
Hence it has to be placed far back to enable any train travelling at its maximum allowable speed to
be able to stop at that stop signal with the use of a normal braking application. This distance is
referred to as the Service Braking Distance (SBD) and needs to be calculated for the specific site
circumstances; it depends upon factors such as initial speed, the gradient, and the braking
characteristics of the type of train (e.g. vacuum brake, air brake, partially braked trains).
Note that a full emergency brake application is normally capable of bringing a train to a stand in a
much shorter distance, but such a brake application is not desirable in normal service conditions
and indeed relies upon good rail adhesion which may not be achieved in all circumstances.
In order to slow a train to a stand, its kinetic energy must be dissipated, usually in the form of heat
via brake blocks but sometimes converted into electrical energy and then heat (rheostatic) or
returned into the traction system (regenerative). The kinetic energy of an object is proportional to
the square of its speed and thus the required braking distance also approximates to this
relationship.
There are two possible ways in which the braking distance of any train could be determined:
• theoretical assessment of the braking rate which can be achieved by the trains' design and
use of Newton’s Laws of motion to determine the distance travelled during braking from any
given initial speed and adjusted accordingly for the effects of gradient (method favoured by
the LUL and by many continental administrations),
• a series of physical trials with differing loads, speeds and gradients in order to give a
practical set of braking distances (method favoured historically by BR and the origin of the
braking tables and curves).
It is obviously important that there is a high degree of certainty that braking can be achieved
within the specified distance under any reasonably foreseeable circumstances. Hence allowances
are made for such factors as:
a) Poor weather conditions.
b) Driver's reaction times to a warning.
c) Driver's slight misjudgement of brake application.
d) System reaction time to a brake application (i.e. how long it takes for the brakes to come
on fully after a brake application initiated = brake build up).
e) Variations in a standard braking system from train to train, (e.g. as a result of normal wear
in the equipment, brakes having needed to be isolated on a vehicle of the train)
Hence the published information resulting from either the theoretical or the empirical method
incorporates a safety margin to reflect such factors.

The diagram gives historic

information for the braking of
locomotive hauled vacuum braked
trains, but in principle is applicable
to all train braking and has the
advantage of being simple and thus
more readily comprehensible.
Each line on the graph is a braking
curve which shows how the braking
distance for any particular speed
depends upon the gradient of the
line.
The different lines are the braking
curves for different speeds; compare
the stopping distances on level track
for a train running at 50mph and one
running at 100mph. To a first
approximation the distance required
to stop is proportional to the square
of the speed.
Another way to look at this is that
the braking distance from 70mph is
about half that from 100mph; this
fact also holds true on motorways
but some motorists don’t drive
accordingly!
Figure 1 Braking curves, vacuum braked stock
The same information can also be For example, gradient SBD yards
presented in tabular form (as at 80 mph
1 in 100 rising 1100
discussed in more detail within the
next section): level 1300
1 in 100 falling 1600
For example, Initial speed mph SBD yards

at level gradient 40 300
60 700
80 1300

The braking performance of different

types of trains varies greatly, there
being particularly marked
differences between passenger
coaches and freight vehicles which,
being significantly heavier, have
more kinetic energy at any given
speed and generally fewer axles on
which braking can be applied for a
given weight. Hence the need for
“composite curves” as shown here
where the higher speed curves are
the same as before (the freight does
not run at those speeds) but the
freight curves are applicable at the
slower speeds as their braking
distances are greater.
Historically passenger trains were
vacuum braked and freight trains
were often worked as “partially
fitted” rather than “fully fitted”
which further limited the braking
available; however their maximum
speed was defined such that they
could stop within the distance of a
fully fitted train from its higher
speed. Special consideration was
needed where there were permanent
speed restrictions of the same order
Figure 2 Composite braking curves as the speed of the partially fitted
trains.
Under BR there was a gradual transition to air braked trains which required shorter braking
distances (there is more braking force available and because less time is taken before the braking
becomes effective). Freight trains are also now fully fitted air braked, but the differential braking
performance remains.
The design of the HST (introduced in the mid 1970s) necessitated further improvements in braking
so that the trains could operate at 125mph on lines signalled for conventional trains operating at
100mph. All modern passenger trains now feature such “enhanced braking” of 9%g, where g
denotes the acceleration due to gravity of 9.81 m/s/s, i.e. 0.09 x 9.81 = 0.88 m/s/s.

G.3 Braking Tables

Another way of presenting the same braking distance information is in a braking table, such as
that shown below. Although less easy to visualise than a braking chart, it can be read
consistently, avoiding the need for interpolation. Sometimes such tables do not have entries as
close as in multiples of 5mph; if actual initial speed not included in the presentation then
necessary always choose the next higher speed that is shown in the table.
GRADIENT
Rising Falling INITIAL
1 in 50 1 in 67 1 in 100 1 in 200 Level 1 in 200 1 in 100 1 in 67 1 in 50
SPEED
(Mph)
2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0%
165 165 180 200 220 255 295 365 480 20
220 235 260 290 325 375 445 575 770 25
295 315 350 390 445 530 645 820 1305 30
375 405 445 505 585 715 925 1265 2046 35
455 505 570 660 795 990 1300 1740 2046 40
580 650 740 855 1035 1315 1520 1740 2046 45
629 704 747 855 1035 1315 1520 1740 2046 50
704 760 824 899 1035 1315 1520 1740 2046 55
776 833 896 970 1070 1315 1520 1740 2046 60
810 870 938 1019 1116 1315 1520 1740 2046 65
897 961 1033 1117 1218 1353 1520 1740 2046 70
953 1015 1084 1164 1258 1382 1534 1740 2046 75
953 1015 1084 1164 1258 1382 1534 1740 2046 80
1047 1110 1180 1261 1354 1471 1614 1788 2046 85
1181 1254 1334 1428 1537 1674 1842 2049 2330 90
1333 1418 1511 1621 1750 1913 2113 2366 2713 95
1528 1630 1745 1880 2041 2245 2503 2835 3312 100
1528 1630 1745 1880 2041 2245 2503 2835 3312 105
1528 1630 1745 1880 2041 2245 2503 2835 3312 110
1528 1630 1745 1880 2041 2245 2503 2835 3312 115
1585 1655 1745 1880 2041 2245 2503 2835 3312 120
1714 1789 1869 1957 2054 2245 2503 2835 3312 125
DISTANCE (METRES)
Figure 3 Signal Spacing chart for “All Trains” from GK/RT0034
• The distance given in the table above is an absolute minimum for signalling design. It does
however already include sufficient contingency to cover eventualities such as adverse
weather conditions, permitted degradation of a train’s braking ability. It is the interface
specification between rolling-stock engineering and signal engineering.
• There are risks associated with excess over-braking. It is generally considered permissible to
exceed this minimum distance by up to 33% without special consideration; additional risk
assessment is needed for greater excess and amounts over 50% should be avoided wherever
possible.

G.4 Selection Of Applicable Braking Curves

Whenever use is made of braking tables or braking curves it is important to ensure that the
information relates to the correct variety of train being considered. On a mixed traffic railway it
is important that the braking distances provided are adequate for all types of trains that are
permitted on the line so that they can brake to a stand from their authorised speed within the
available.
• Historically this would have been a question of using the “All Trains” curves rather than the
“Passenger Only” curves.
• Nowadays passenger traffic generally dominates; the relatively small amount of remaining
freight which has also changed significantly in nature. Hence the signalling is generally
optimised for passenger traffic of the fastest trains using the line and in order that traffic with
less effective braking can still use the line safely, it is necessary to impose differential speed
limits. It is important to realise that this does often result in these other train operating at
slower speeds than would otherwise be the case and this in turn affects headway and leads to
a loss of line capacity that can itself have detrimental effects on the faster traffic.
• However the more modern rolling-stock has improved braking and therefore various
varieties of passenger train braking curves are utilised.
Disregarding the electrified Southern Region commuter railway which had its own specific EMU
rolling-stock with its own particular characteristic, NR lines are currently signalled to one of three
sets of braking curves:
ALL Composite braking curves Applicable to:

TRAINS GK/RT0034 Appendix A • Freight only, or
• mixed traffic (Freight / Passenger).
(but not SR Passenger Lines!)
PASSENGER Passenger only braking curves Applicable to:
GK/RT0034 Appendix B • Passenger only (traditional)
(but not SR Passenger Lines!).
ENHANCED 9%g braking curves Applicable to:
GK/RT0034 Appendix C • “Modern” EMUs, DMUs
• HSTs, Mk3 & Mk4 coaching stock
Figure 4 GK/RT0034 Appendices
However on some lines certain rolling-stock is permitted to run at EPS, a higher speed than that
which used to be regarded as “linespeed” justified by virtue of their characteristics (including
weight, riding characteristics, tilting performance, braking etc).

braking distance, level gradient
Speed Appdx A Appdx B Appdx C
(mph) Resource
IRSE Examination m Pack m m10/05/2016 Module 2
40 795 258 246
A comparison between
60 the braking distances
1070 632 of the514
various categories for a selection of speeds is
shown below: 80 1258 1190 879
100 2041 2041 1341
125 2054 2054 2054
Figure 5 Comparative braking distances

Remember that the purpose of a warning signal is to give adequate warning for a train to stop at a
stop signal. The fundamental rule is that any train must always be able to brake to a stand after
passing the first cautionary aspect prior to encountering a signal at red. Therefore the “first
caution” has to be placed at a sufficient distance to enable any train travelling at its maximum
permissible speed to come to a stand on the approach to the red signal.
Pictorially the options for NR signalling are:
Isolated 3-aspect: Y R
large distance between each of the pairs of signals Braking distance
3-aspect: G Y R
all signals nominally equal spacing Braking distance
4-aspect: G YY Y R
all signals nominally equal spacing Braking distance
Note change scale for 4 aspects compared to the previous examples
Figure 6 Braking Distance in 3 and 4 aspect signalling
Braking distance depends on speed (approximately proportional to speed2 ) and thus there is a
relationship between:
a) the permissible speed of a train at the place where it first passes a signal at caution,
b) its braking ability,
c) the distance to the red signal.
Where there is a mix of traffic on any line, obviously item c) is the same for all types of train but
a) and b) may be different. The disadvantage of signalling a line for mixed usage is that the signal
spacing cannot be made ideal for all the different types of traffic. Signal spacing has to be:
• optimised for one particular type of traffic (usually the most dominant on that line), but
• sufficient that every type of traffic has the braking distance that it requires.

Nowadays passenger traffic generally dominates the relatively small amount of remaining freight,
which has also changed significantly in nature. Hence usual practice is:
• arrange the signalling to be correctly braked for the fastest passenger traffic using the line,
• impose differential speed limits if required for traffic with less effective braking so that it
can still use the line safely,
• aim to ensure that all headway requirements can be met (the priority and indeed often the
most onerous headway requirement may be for the medium speed trains, especially if they
form a stopping passenger commuter service).
It is important to realise that this does often result in certain traffic operating at slower speeds than
would otherwise be the case. This however in turn affects headway and leads to a loss of line
capacity; that in turn can itself have detrimental effects on the faster traffic which was the
determining factor of the signal spacing in the first place. It is an iterative problem of
compromising on performance aspirations where necessary, but always ensuring the safety
requirements are fulfilled.
One of the benefits of ETCS should bring is the ability for each train only to brake as it actually
requires in order to be able to stop from the speed at which it is actually travelling before the place
to which it has movement authority.

G.5 Activity to demonstrate comprehension of previous sections

Use figure 1 to determine:
1 • the braking distance (yds) on level track from 40mph
• the braking distance (yds) from 90mph on a I in 100 rising gradient
• the braking distance (yds) from 90mph on a I in 130 rising gradient
• the maximum speed (mph) for which 1500 yards on level track is
sufficient braking distance
2 • the braking distance (m) on level track from 40mph
• the braking distance (m) from 90mph on a I in 100 rising gradient
• the maximum speed for which 1500 yards on level track is sufficient
braking distance
• the maximum speed for which 1500 yards on a falling 1:200 gradient is
3 • the braking distance (m) on level track from 40mph
• the maximum speed (mph) for which 1500 yards on level track is
• the maximum speed (mph) for which 1500 yards on a falling 1:200
gradient is sufficient braking distance
Explain why the values for the lower speed entries in figure 5 are so different for the different
4 Appendices, yet at 100mph are identical for A & B and at 125 mph are identical for A,B & C.

Using Newton’s equations of motion Speed Braking rate

5 • v = u + at, 2
2 40mph ms-
• s = ut + 0.5 a t ,
2 = 2
• v u + 2 as 80mph
2
ms-
and the Appendix C data in figure 5, calculate the average braking
2
rate applicable to braking to a stand from each of the given speeds 125mph ms-
Explain the reason for the different values obtained.


2a *2
s = ½ u.t
s = ½ u (u/a) Equation #2
2
s = u

G.6 Braking Distance Calculations
The starting place for any calculation is Newton’s equations of motion.
By definition acceleration is where:
the rate of change of velocity. a = (v - u) a = acceleration (ms-2) Equation *1
t v = final velocity (ms-1)
u = initial velocity (ms-1)
s = distance (m)
Since we are concerned with the distance travelled by a train along a railway track, we do not need
to consider velocity as a vector quantity and therefore the more colloquial word speed will be
utilised in the text below.
Braking Distances on the level

In order to calculate the distance travelled whilst braking to a stand, the initial speed of the train
must obviously be known. This is often given on the exam paper expressed in mph and so the first
task must to be to convert into metres per second (ms-1) in order to have consistent units in any
equation.
Remember: Hence to convert from mph to ms-1 multiply by: 1609 / 3600
• 3600 seconds in an hour NB Remember that a rough approximation is to half the mph speed
and then deduct 10%; for some purposes this is good enough and it
• 1609 metres in a mile is certainly worth performing a “sense check” on your calculated
result.
Using equation*1, to decelerate to a stand (i.e. v = 0) from initial speed u takes time
a = (v - u)

t
Since uniform deceleration is being assumed, the average speed of the train over this distance is
easy to calculate since:
average speed = 0.5u
Hence the distance travelled is:
and therefore:

a = 6%g = 0.06 x 9.81 = 0.58 ms-2
-1
u = 80 x 1609 = 35.8 ms
3600
Example Question:
2Calculate the braking2distance of a train braking at 6%g on level from 80mph.
B = u B = (35.8) = 1105m
Answer:
2a (2 x 0.58)
Assuming that brake build up time is negligible and therefore that braking rate is a
constant 6%g throughout,
Note because this is a braking distance we want to make sure that we err on the side of
caution. Therefore we ensure that we round up (especially for the speed since it gets
squared). To quote any braking distance to more precision than 5m implies far more
accuracy than could be justified.

Activity
Obtain some braking tables / graphs from a real railway, such as from GK/RT 0034 of
which there are extracts in Appendix G3
For level gradient, look up the braking distances from various speeds;; for each of these
speeds calculate the average braking rate to a stand from that speed.
• Compare the different values obtained from each of your calculations.
Satisfy yourself that you can explain the results:
why do the calculated rates differ?
• How much contingency do you think has been built-in to the published tables?
Explain why this contingency might be needed?


1
-2 -2
x 9.81 ms = 0.0049 ms
G.7 Effects 200
of Gradient on Braking
The IRSE examination layouts generally assume level gradients, but very few railways are actually
completely level. Understanding how the effects of gravity affect the braking distance of a train is
an essential part of a student’s knowledge and thus well within the potential scope of the
examination.
It is probably easiest to consider a stationary train left with no brakes applied whilst standing on a
line of constant gradient. Gravity exerts a downwards force proportional to the mass of the train,
the vast majority of which is perpendicular to the rails. However there is a small component of
that force which is parallel to the rails since the line at this place is not exactly level. Hence this
force acts to accelerate the train along the line in the downhill direction; this produces an
acceleration.
In the UK gradients are usually expressed in terms of a ratio “1 in x” where x is the horizontal
distance travelled for one unit change in vertical height. As gradients are never uniform between
signals, there may be a need to calculate an average gradient using the following formula:
G
D = d1 + d2 + d3

G g1 g2 g3 1 in g1 1 in g2 1 in g3
d1 d2 d3
D
Where: Notes:
• G is the average gradient • For gradient 1 in 200, g = 200
• D is the total distance • Falling gradients taken as negative
• g are the individual gradients • Rising gradients taken as positive
• d are the individual distances
On the continent it is more usual to express the vertical change as a percentage of the distance
travelled. This system considers the vertical component and hypotenuse whereas the UK
considers the vertical component and horizontal component; however for the range of gradients
generally encountered on railways this distinction is insignificant. Thus it is easy to convert a
gradient of 1:200 into a 0.5% gradient, 1: 100 into a 1% gradient etc. indeed since railway
gradients are so low the usual measure is actually “per mil”: 5 and 10 respectively.
Expressing as a percentage makes the calculation of the component of the force of gravity acting
to accelerate the train down hill easy; for example on a gradient of 1:200 the calculation is

For a moving train gradient has exactly the same effect, so:
• for a train travelling uphill then its effective retardation rate will be the sum of its inherent
braking and that due to gravity thus reducing its stopping distance, whereas
• for a train travelling downhill then its effective retardation rate is lessened due to the effects
of gravity and the stopping distance extended.
If the inherent train braking rate is itself expressed as a “%g” then the effect of gradient can
simply be added in for a rising gradient or subtracted for a falling gradient at this stage, prior
to converting to units of ms-2.
Note that this is actually an over-simplification since a significant part of the train’s weight are the
wheels and axles and these rotating masses have inertia. Thus a moving train has some energy
stored in this form which the calculation above does not take into account since it only considers
the kinetic energy associated with the forwards motion; however for exam purposes it is sufficient
to follow the approach above but to state that the effect of rotating masses is being ignored.
G.8 Constant Speed Headway

Headway is the closest spacing between two following trains such that the second train can safely
run at its normal speed independent of the first. This usually means that the second train is
sufficiently far behind the first that the driver does not see a restrictive signal aspect (obviously
sight of a restrictive aspect may not itself delay the second train if the speed profile of the line
means that it would be braking anyway- where the line speed isn’t constant the considerations of
“stopping headway” apply).
“Non-stopping” headway calculations therefore consider the situation for two following
trains in which the second train arrives at the sighting point of a signal just as it displays an
unrestricted signal aspect as a result of the first train clearing a section in advance.
Headway is generally expressed as a time between following trains which can be converted to a
line capacity expressed in units of trains/hour, tph, although this is only really a relevant term
where there is a regular service of identical trains evenly spread over the duration considered
(hence tends to be more relevant for Metros than Mainline railways). Actual line capacity
achieved is dependent on many factors including the mix of train types, stopping patterns, station
dwell times etc. However for trains running at constant speed, the headway can also be expressed
as the constant distance between the two trains and this is the methodology for relating the signal
spacing to the resultant headway.
To calculate the headway achieved requires an understanding of aspect sequence. This section has
therefore been written for aspect sequences as used on UK mainline railway; these are explained in
more detail in Appendix S. Similar considerations apply to other forms of signalling, but the
details differ.

mph x 1609 = ms-1
G.9 Calculating Non-stop Headway
3600
It is certain that a means of demonstrating (via calculations or graphically) will be required within
the examination and hence students ought to be fully prepared so that this task can be performed
quickly. It is a straightforward process provided that you:
• quote the right formulae (ensure dimensionally correct!),
• convert all quantities into a consistent system of units,
• use the correct values (be particularly careful re using the appropriate speed),
• give sufficient explanation, ideally supported by diagrams, of your methodology,
• perform the calculations with appropriate accuracy,
• give your answers to sensible precision and quoting relevant units.
The following sections discuss the headway which is achieved by the various forms of signalling
where all trains are moving at a uniform constant speed. Obviously this is a theoretical abstraction
and in practice there are range of different trains with distinctly different characteristics and the
permissible speed of the line also varies along its length. Trains start from their origins at rest and
often stop at intermediate places en route before reaching their final terminus; therefore non-stop
headway, although important for many real situations, is only part of the picture; see section G.18
for discussion of stopping headway.
Be aware that the examination does not usually ask the candidate to derive the headway for a
particular form of signalling of given signal spacing; instead it effectively asks the question the
other way around by specifying the headway which is to be achieved by the candidate’s solution.
This effectively requires an informed choice of which form of signalling to adopt, followed by
calculations to derive a signal spacing which simultaneously satisfies both braking and headway
constraints. Many students find this difficult as they have not achieved an intuitive feel for the
subject; the later sections of this Appendix attempt to address this deficiency, but for specific
examination advice see section 7.5.
When undertaking the IRSE examination calculations, remember:
• the braking rate to use is usually stated in the notes section of the blank layout and for
mainline is generally 0.5ms-2 (for Metros usually separate rates are given for service and for
emergency braking) but could perhaps be expressed as %g or other units. Do check what
value is specified and convert into “metres per second per second” if given in other units; if a
rate is not given at all then the candidate should state a reasonable assumption.
• use the appropriate speed- for braking calculations this is generally the permissible speed of
the line unless the rolling stock itself is constrained to a lower maximum speed. However
the headway calculations must use the speed at which the train is scheduled to run; this may
often not be the same speed as used for the braking calculations. Again make sure of the
units; you may need to convert from mph; utilise:
• the signal spacing on a length of line must accommodate all traffic that needs to use it and
therefore several calculations may be necessary. If all trains have the same braking rate only
the highest speed service need be considered, but otherwise the distances required by trains
having a lower braking rate must be separately calculated from their top speed.
• often an IRSE exam mainline layout has a branch line portion which has a different speed
limit and therefore separate calculations are needed for this..

Worked Example to determine suitable signalling to meet non-stop headway requirement

Find the appropriate signal spacing range for the following:
• Max Permissible Speed of the line: 100mph
• Gradients: Level
• Train Length: 160m
• Required Headway (Timetabled): 120s
• Sighting: 300m
• Overlap: 180m
• Braking Rate: 0.489ms-2
Designing for a technical headway of 90 seconds (to allow plenty of contingency for recovery of
service perturbations).
Convert Line Speed into ms-1: 100 x (1609/3600) = 44.69ms-1
Find Braking Distance using the following formula BD = u2/2b, where b is the deceleration rate
(usually given in the notes, assume 0.5ms-2 if not stated), and u is the train speed. = 2043m
Check the best headway possible using 3 aspects:
Hd3 = (2B + S + O + L)
= (4086 + 300 + 180 + 160)
= 4726m, say 4730m is the minimum separation of following trains.
Ht3 = Hd3/V = 106s is the time interval when running at the maximum speed. This gives to great a
headway to meet the requirements, so we now need to resort to using 4-aspect signalling.
Check the best headway possible using 4 aspects:
Hd4 = (1.5B + S + O + L)
= (3064.5 + 300 + 180 + 160)
= say 3705m
Ht4 = Hd4/V = 83s . This does meet the requirements, so 4 aspect signals will be used.
Now, to achieve the most economical solution, we need to calculate the maximum possible 4
aspect signal spacing which still achieves the required headway.
V x Ht4 = 3d + S + O + L where Ht4 = 90s
3d = (V x Ht4) – (S + O + L)
3d = (44.69 x 90) – (300 + 180 + 160)
Giving d = 1127m, say 1125m
However we need to check that this does not result in a signal spacing which gives excessive
overbraking (i.e. restricted to a maximum of 33%) which is (SBD + 33%)/2 = 1355m.
Hence in this case the headway requirement is more onerous so the overbraking consideration is
not the limiting factor to dictate the maximum spacing.
The minimum spacing is constrained by the need to be braking distance between alternate signals;
i.e. SBD/2 = 1020.5m
Hence, to meet the stated requirements, 4 aspect signals are needed. They may be positioned
between 1025m and 1125m apart. Note that in reality this would give rather limited flexibility in
positioning; it would be hard to cope with other constraints (such as junction protection, signal
sighting and physical issues)

Ht2 = (B + X + S + O + L)
Equation #3
Vh
G.10 Headway: Isolated 3 aspect signalling (2 aspect signals)

The simplest situation is when each stop signal has its own warning signal; braking considerations
are almost completely decoupled from headway considerations. The diagram depicts train 1 just
clearing the overlap beyond one stop signal as train 2 reaches the sighting point of the distant for
the previous and thus at the minimum headway distance (denoted by “H”).
2 1
S B X O L
H
D2
The headway achieved depends on the following factors:
S : Sighting Distance (generally taken as 10s running at headway speed),
O : Overlap Length (generally 180m is assumed),
L : Train Length (maximum length of the traffic for which the headway is specified. In the
absence of other information, assume that a mainline passenger coach may be 23m long, so a short
multiple unit may be up to 100m but a long train may be in the range 200-250m. For IRSE exam
calculations the various train length are usually specified however.)
B : The distance between a stop signal and its distant (which is itself constrained to be a
minimum of braking distance,
X : The distance between consecutive stop signals,
Vh : The headway speed of the train (i.e. the constant speed at which the required headway was
specified and the train service timetabled to run; this may be less than the maximum speed of
which the rolling stock is capable and / or less than the maximum permissible speed along that
portion of line). Note this carefully; this is something many candidates get wrong.
It can easily be seen from the preceding diagram that the headway distance H is given by:
H = (B + X + S + O + L)
Therefore the headway time Ht2 at speed Vh is given by:

X = (Vh . H t2) – (B + S + O + L)
This equation is useful to determine what headway is achieved given a certain signal spacing; for
lines on which isolated 3 aspect signalling [whereas each of the signals is 2 aspect, the sequence
uses Red, Yellow and Green and is thus 3 aspect] is applicable:
• the position of the stop signals tend to be determined by physical features such as pointwork
and level crossings.
• the position of the distant signals is almost solely dictated by considerations of braking and
signal sighting.
The capacity of a whole line is limited by the section having the greatest headway time.
If a line has many sections giving a good headway, they do not compensate for one section
with poor headway that will always be the “bottleneck” for the whole route; it is ridiculous
to refer to “average headway”, it is a meaningless concept and reveals a total lack of
comprehension).
The limiting section is often not the physically longest; the speed profile through the section
is obviously also a very relevant factor.
The capacity requirement is usually stated as a maximum headway time and this imposes a
constraint on the distance X. It is important to appreciate the distinction between “timetable”
headway and “technical headway”; in order to be able to provide a robust timetable it is
important that there is some built in contingency allowance between what is needed for train
running and that which the signalling can provide. Otherwise if any one train runs late then that
lateness is imparted to the next train and all such delays accumulate until there is a gap in the
service. Hence signalling design should build in a contingency allowance to act as a buffer; slight
delays therefore no longer impact the following train and even if there is a major delay then it can
gradually be recovered.
Signalling should therefore be designed to give slightly greater capacity than is theoretically
needed for a theoretical train service running perfectly to time; the level of this contingency
is a matter of judgement for the circumstances, but something like 20 % is typical.
In order to determine the maximum signal spacing that can deliver a specified timetabled headway,
equation *3 becomes:
but note that Ht2 is the technical headway and this must be smaller than the timetabled headway
that was specified by the appropriate percentage.

The resulting value of X then gives the greatest distance between successive STOP signals which
allows the headway time to be achieved. If X turns out to be less than three times B, this is
indicative that isolated three aspect signalling (sometimes called stop and distant as each signal is
itself just a 2 aspect despite being within a 3 aspect sequence) is probably not the best solution.
The following diagrams demonstrate this by comparing two situations. It can be seen that when
distance X is three times the Braking Distance, headways can be greatly reduced by adding one
single asset (shown in RED bold) and altering the signals from 2-aspect to 3-aspect heads.
S B X = 3B O L
S B B O L
Hence relatively little extra expenditure results in a signalling system with nearly twice the
capacity and, even more importantly, allowing trains to be brought much closer to the previous
one if there is a failure which results in a backlog of trains.
Isolated 3 aspect signalling is:

• reasonably economical,
• applicable to lines with a low service,
• but can be an operating inconvenience when the train service is disrupted for any reason.
This is particularly the case for lines of sparse service but quite high speed; it can take a
very long time for a train to travel through a block section under caution or for some
other reason moving much slower than the speed at which the required headway would
be achieved.
Therefore in some circumstances there can be rationale in providing full 3 aspect
signalling even if the required headway does not strictly require it.
In the extreme, the best headway that can be achieved with “stop and distant” type signalling is
with the stop signals spaced at X=2B and thus the stop signal itself at braking distance from the
following signal’s distant. It should be obvious that full 3 aspect signalling must be a far better
solution for this headway requirement. A better headway can be achieved by giving each signal 3
aspects and increasing the signal spacing (so that fewer signals are required along the line); better
headway for less cost, therefore definitely the better solution.
When determining whether to select 3 aspect signalling continuous MAS or isolated 3 aspect
signalling via 2 aspect signals, one of the considerations is the extent of overbraking considered
tolerable. On the assumption of 133% braking as the upper limit, then the isolated 3 aspect
solution would be the cheaper option when:
spacing to deliver headway requirement = B +1.33B + 1.33B = 3.66
braking distance B
This is of course only one of several considerations, but it does act as a guide to when providing
3 aspect MAS at maximum spacing may be an inappropriate option economically.
Hd = (H t3 x Vh) – (S + O + L)
t3 = (2d + S + O + L)
Equation
Equation#4
#5
Resource
IRSE Examination Pack 2 h
V 10/05/2016 Module 2
G.11 Headway: continuous 3 aspect signalling
2 1
S d > B d > B O L
HD3
The headway time for signals spaced at d is given by:
The best headway is achieved when the signals are as close as possible; since 3 aspect signals must
be separated by at least braking distance this imposes the absolute best limit on the headway.
Equation *4 can be used to determine this value by making d equal to B.
In practice site constraints will worsen the theoretical best (since if a signal cannot be placed
exactly at braking distance then it must be positioned at some greater distance which will
necessarily worsen the headway). For this reason unless there is at least 10% margin between the
spacing dictated and braking and that required to meet the headway, then it is usually too tight to
be achievable and 4 aspect signalling would be provided instead.
Conversely it is more usual to need to determine what is the greatest signal spacing that is able to
achieve a specified headway, since this gives the most economical solution that just meets the
requirement.
By transposing equation *4, the maximum signal spacing d that achieves technical headway time
Ht3 at speed Vh is given by:
However if this gives a signal spacing that is very significantly more than braking distance then
there are risks associated with overbraking (see section 6.12.3); hence in some situations the upper
limit on signal spacing may be constrained by factors other than headway considerations. It is
then a question of deciding between:
• “overprovision” of 3 aspect MAS (in order to limit the degree of overbraking to that
considered acceptable but keeping the advantages of continuous 3 aspect signalling,
• providing 2 aspect signals to decouple the braking considerations (placement of the Yellow /
Greens) from the headway considerations (placement of the Red / Greens).
• As in all things it is a matter of degree; see previous page for guidance.
d = (H
H t4 . Vh) – (S + O + L)
t4 = (3d + S + O + L) Equation#6
Equation #7
Resource Pack 3 h
V
IRSE Examination 10/05/2016 Module 2
G.12 Headway: continuous 4 aspect signalling
2 1
S d d d O L
HD4
NB: 2d > B
Where the headway requires the signals to be closer together than braking distance, a preliminary
caution (double yellow) is needed to give train sufficient warning to stop at the signal at red. This
double yellow must not be less than braking distance from the forthcoming red aspect to which it
refers.
For signals uniformly spaced at distance d, the headway is given by
The best headway time which can be achieved with 4 aspect signalling is where the spacing of the
signals d = 0.5B.
To obtain the greatest signal spacing to achieve technical headway Ht4, we transpose equation *6
to give:
In practice, 4 aspect signals do not have to be exactly evenly spaced, as long as the distance from
every double yellow to the relevant red is not less than braking distance. Remember however that
the headway of a route is limited by the poorest headway section (extends over three signal
sections) and therefore significant departures from uniform spacing will have a detrimental effect
on headway as well as contributing other risks. Therefore “as even a spacing as possible” is
certainly an important consideration; only depart from it for good reason.

G.13 Headway Comparison between 3 and 4 aspect Signalling

3-Aspect Signalling
Since there can only be one train per section between consecutive signals, the best headway is
achieved when these are positioned as close together as possible. In 3-aspect signalling this is
limited by the requirement to have at least Service Braking Distance between every signal and the
next one ahead. This in turn depends upon:
• the braking ability of the trains to be operated, and
• the maximum speed at which they run
and so an alternative signalling solution is required if the aspirations for headway and maximum
speed cannot both be achieved simultaneously
4-Aspect Signalling
The introduction of a fourth aspect allows the signals to be placed closer together than SBD and
thus the headway to be improved. It is of course still necessary to give drivers the same amount of
warning of a red aspect, but now the first caution (the YY in the 4-aspect scenario) is displayed not
one, but two, signal sections in rear
In the diagram below:

• the black arrows represent braking distance(marked “B”),
• the green arrows the resultant minimum non-stopping headway,
for 3 aspect and 4 aspect signalling respectively. The various lengths of overlap [O], train length
[L] and sighting allowance [S] are the same in both examples and in most cases make a relatively
small contribution (typically 600 - 800m in total) to the overall headway length. Signal spacing
tends to be the dominant factor and it can readily be seen that:
• H3 is related to two signal spacings each of which must be a minimum of braking distance,
• H4 is related to three signal sections, each adjacent pair combined being a minimum of
braking distance.
3-aspect B
signalling
Minimum Headway H3 = L + O + S + 2 B
B
4-aspect
signalling
Minimum Headway H4 = L + O + S + 1.5 B
Hence one way of looking at the decision whether to provide 3 or 4 aspect signalling is to:
• calculate the separation between the Green and the Red signal which just satisfies the
headway consideration (and thus gives a maximum spacing constraint),
• work out whether this separation is at least equal to the length of two SBDs. This defines the
minimum spacing constraint for 3 aspect signalling; if they won’t fit into the headway
distance then 3 aspect signalling cannot provide the required headway and thus is not the
solution. Note how in the 4 aspect case how much closer the Green is to the Red.
G.14 Choice of Signalling System; Exam Calculations

From the previous sections it can be seen that the choice of signalling system is made by:
• determining the maximum signal separation that would give the headway required,
• comparing this to the braking distance needed.
The calculation is quite easy BUT MAKE SURE THAT YOU ALWAYS USE METRES AND
SECONDS. It’s easy in the stress of the exam to use the figures as given but ensure no miles, km,
mph or kph are used without conversion.
Newton’s equations: v = u + at; v2 = u2 + 2 as; s = ut + 0.5 at2 between them will always solve
the problem, whatever the question set. Just remember whenever dealing with braking that the
value for “a” will be negative as it is a deceleration.
Headway The question will either give the minimum time between trains (probably in minutes) or
Distance the number of trains to be run at equal spacings within an hour; convert appropriately. Use
the required headway in calculations, but at the end remember that signalled headway
needs to achieve, with some contingency remaining. Convert the time into a distance by
using the correct speed for the headway being calculated.
The common factor between the 3-aspect and 4-aspect case is that for minimum headway
the 2nd train is just arriving at closest Green as the 1st train clears the overlap so only one
signal at Red. Hence the concept of DGR, the distance between Green and Red, is useful as
in both cases: DGR = HD - L – O - S.
The question will probably give a value for the train length (use the appropriate one for the
headway being calculated!) but leave you to declare your assumptions for O and S. Do the
numbers and now know what the maximum DGR can be; park that for now.
Braking s = v2 - u2 = - u2 = B (since v = 0 as braking to a stand). As expected B is –ve.
Distance 2a 2a
[Just need to be careful that we find the highest braking distance. Calculate using the
highest speed, but if there is another variety of train with a lower braking rate then also
calculate the distance required for that one from the speed at which it is permitted to run.
Note that the speed used for the headway calculation could be different.]
Braking rates will probably be quoted in ms-2 (i.e. metres per second per second) but might
be expressed as %g in which case need to remember that g, the acceleration due to gravity
is 9.81 ms-2. Be highly suspicious if the braking rate is not in the range 0.5 - 1 ms-2;
broadly equivalent to taking foot off accelerator in a car travelling at 60mph!
Compare DGR = N If N between 1.5 and 2; choose 4-aspects spaced at 0.33 DGR
B If N between 2 and 2.66; choose 3-aspects spaced at 0.50 DGR
If N between 2.66 and 3.66; choose 3-aspects spaced at 1.33 DGR
If N over 3.66; choose isolated 3-aspects

Rationale Where do the magic ratio numbers come from?

• Green to Red takes 3 sections of 4 aspect signalling, so it needs to be 50% greater
than the braking distance which takes 2 sections.
• Green to Red takes 2 sections of 3 aspect signalling, so it needs to be double the
braking distance which takes 1 section. Wouldn’t provide 4 aspect signalling if 3-
aspects could provide the required headway (not on headway grounds at least-
there may be other reasons, see section G.15 Error! Reference source not
found.).
• The cheapest solution would be to space signals as widely as can just deliver
required headway, BUT excess (>133%) braking should be avoided. Thus this
becomes the spacing constraint when the headway requirement is undemanding.
• If the headway is even less onerous it eventually becomes cheaper to make each of
the signals a 2-aspect and have “stop & distant” signalling instead.
Example:
Q: 75mph trains, 150m long with 9%g braking, level. Line capacity to be 10 trains per hour.
Answer.
1. Convert the units. 75 x 1609 / 3600 = 33.5 ms-1 [Rule of thumb approx. is divide by two]
-2
0.09 x 9.81 = 0.88 ms braking rate
3600 / 10 = 360s headway time requirement between consecutive trains, but better
allow some contingency so can recover from late running; hence design for 300s.
2. Calculate Braking Distance = 33.5 x 33.5 / 2 x 0.88 = 637 m [Feels about right]
This determines the MINIMUM needed for SAFETY.
3. Calculate Headway Distance

i.e. the MAXIMUM needed to provide required CAPACITY.
For the 2nd train not to be affected by presence of 1st, its driver must receive Green by the time
they reach signal’s sighting point. At that time the first train must have cleared the overlap of
the relevant signal ahead and thus its driver must be a train length beyond that place.
Hence to determine the signal spacing that can deliver the required headway, the distance
between the Red aspect protecting the 1st train and the Green visible to the 2nd train is required:
Distance from Green to Red = (300 x 33.5) – 150 – 335 – 180 = 9385 m
(assuming 180m overlap and 10s sighting time allowance)
4. Compare these two distances

to determine appropriate signalling system to use
Ratio 9385 / 637 = 14.7 i.e. braking distance is very much less than headway distance.
Clearly isolated 3-aspect signalling is indicated from the numbers, but do need to think as well.
• Since headway requirement is only for a stop signal approximately every 9km yet the
braking distance is only some 650m, the most cost effective signalling would be stop &
individual distant. However because of the excessive delays that would be caused to a high
speed train service when a TSR had to be imposed, even only a section 7km long (25%
contingency signalled headway v timetabled headway) might be a problem. In reality may
be best to make the sections some 4.5km long and provide double the headway requested
since there is obviously significant important traffic using the line. This would mean three
intermediate signals to be installed for this length of line.
• Conversely if it had been decided instead to place 3-aspect signals throughout at their
maximum preferred spacing of 850m, there would be 11 sections and thus 10 intermediate
signals; the advantage of this solution is much more resilience in case of delays. Given the
shortness of the braking distance (because of the 9%g braking) it might be reasonable to
propose 3-aspects with a signal spacing of 1000m; although this is more than 50%
overbraked, it is comparable with signal spacings that a driver would experience when
driving the 9%g braked train on a line signalled for Appendix B trains so may well be
tolerable. If this were permitted by risk assessment, 8 intermediate signals would be needed
and this might be the better, more future proof, solution if it could be justified on financial
grounds.

G.15 Other benefits and costs of 4 aspect Signalling

Although the normal reason for justifying the provision of 4 aspect signalling is that there is a need
for better headway than could be delivered by 3 aspect signalling, there are other benefits of 4
aspect signalling which are sometimes a reason for provision.
However it is a significantly more expensive solution and therefore the additional cost does need
to be justified. Note that it is not actually the cost of the signal itself; given the costs of the
structure and the planning and possessions to place it trackside the marginal cost of the larger
signal head itself is almost insignificant. The reason why 4 aspect signalling is much more
expensive is due to the fact that there can be nearly twice as many signals along a given length of
line. It is not just the cost of the signals themselves but there also needs to be more track circuit
divisions, more cabling, more remote control bits, more relays, more data and a larger panel etc;
the benefits of 4 aspects does not come cheap. Therefore 4-aspect signalling should normally
only be provided when the headway requirement justifies it or there is some other specific
quantifiable reason. In the context of the IRSE exam remember that if you utilise it you should
give the justification so that it does not appear to be lavish overprovision.
The other benefits of providing 4-aspect signalling include:
• The driver receives a second warning of a red aspect. Whilst failure to react correctly to the
double yellow almost certainly will result in a SPAD at the red, action upon sighting the
single yellow would at least mean that a significant speed reduction would occur. This would
give some mitigation reducing the likelihood and severity of a collision, especially if the
driver realised the significance and used emergency braking and weather conditions were
good. [This was the justification used for the historic practice of providing shorter overlaps
for 4-aspect signals than were provided for 3-aspects.]
• A driver who has correctly initiated a brake application to stop at the red signal can be given
an update of information that the signal concerned has subsequently cleared and therefore
can avoid needless slowing down. This saves running time for that train, limits the knock on
effect for following trains thus making the headway more resilient as well as saving brake
wear and energy costs.
• On a mixed traffic line where certain trains travel very significantly slower than the speed
for which the line has been signalled, 3-aspect signalling can result in poor headway for the
slow trains because of the time taken to pass through each section. Hence one slow train can
consume many train paths; 4-aspect signalling helps significantly as the quantisation is
smaller. If a fast train does catch up a slower train, the driver generally realises this and 4-
aspect signalling enables that train to be closer thus saving time when the one in front
eventually takes a diverging route. In addition the more frequent and informative
information available allows the driver to some extent to regulate their speed appropriately,
thus avoiding the constant “stop - start”.
Therefore 4-aspect signalling is usually provided where the linespeed is 100mph or more
even when 3-aspect signalling would theoretically satisfy the headway requirement.
Justification then relies upon the safety benefit and the reduction in delays that can result
from perturbations from the timetable and as a result of dissimilar traffic.

• It can be impossible to position 3-aspect signals in a way which respects the necessary signal
spacing for braking whilst complying with other constraints and still protecting junctions
adequately. The option of providing approach release may impose unacceptable headway
constraints and therefore 4 aspects would be the only credible option. Such considerations
include:
- the need to provide optimum protection for junctions or placement at the ends of
platforms to minimise the loss of headway resulting from stopping trains (reasons for
positively wanting signals in particular places),
- the risks entailed by placing signals in such undesirable locations as on viaducts,
within or just after tunnels or in the midst of pointwork (reasons for avoiding placing
signals at such sites).
Since there is an absolute minimum spacing between consecutive signals imposed by
braking considerations and a desirable maximum imposed both by the headway requirement
and the strong desire to keep signal spacing reasonably consistent along a section of line
(certainly avoiding more than 50% excess braking but also avoiding wildly fluctuating
spacings within any given area), satisfying all the constraints simultaneously can be difficult
if not impossible.
The extra flexibility provided by 4-aspect signalling in such situations is occasionally the
reason why it is adopted when it would not otherwise be justified; generally the positions of
junctions, stations and tunnels are for all practical purposes fixed. Thus if their separation is
incompatible with 3-aspect signalling, the 4-aspect solution is indeed the appropriate one.
Hence there is sometimes a good argument to provide 4 aspect signalling on at least a portion of
the layout even if the headway requirements do not themselves necessitate. Occasionally one of
the factors above may be so extreme as to virtually force its selection; more normally it is a
combination of various factors that together constitute a compelling case. In many other situations
3 aspect signalling is perfectly adequate and thus should be provided; occasionally there may be
just one or two signal sections that need some careful thought and may justify a short isolated 4
aspect sequence in what is otherwise a 3 aspect signalling solution. Boundaries between different
forms of signalling present a challenge and an element of compromise and thus they should not be
intermixed indiscriminately; see section G.16.
Also remember that satisfying headway requirements for non-stopping trains is not necessarily
enough; the stopping headway requirement may actually be more onerous and may necessitate the
provision of 4 aspect signalling where 3 aspects would have been adequate for non-stop trains; see
section G.18.

G.16 Intermixing / Transitions between 3 and 4 aspect Signalling

A further consideration that might justify the provision of 4 aspect signalling along a stretch of line
which wouldn’t normally warrant it, is abutting an area in which 4 aspect signalling is necessary.
There are various risks associated with intermixing sections of 3-aspect and 4-aspect signalling
along a route and therefore minimising transitions between them and arranging them to occur at
suitable positions is a valid consideration.
The primary issues are:
• Drivers become accustomed to the signal spacing and this should be kept as regular as
possible so incorporation of a few 4-aspect signals in what would otherwise be a 3-aspect
sequence is not good practice.
• Drivers become accustomed to receiving two warnings before the red whilst running on 4-
aspect signalling. Suddenly sighting a yellow as a first caution can cause undue alarm and
might lead to overreaction. Conversely if a driver believes they are running on 4-aspect
signalling but is actually within a 3-aspect sequence, observation of a signal at single yellow
may incorrectly be interpreted as meaning that there is still full braking distance to the red
rather than prompting the emergency action that would actually be appropriate in these
circumstances.
Hence the aim when designing the signalling should be:

• to avoid any short lengths of one form of signalling within a stretch of the other.
- Note that a 3-aspect signal authorising a train to start from a terminal platform or loop
onto a 4-aspect signalled line is not normally a problem since all trains start from rest
at it. However calculations do need to confirm that a train with good acceleration
starting from that position could not attain a speed too great to be able to stop should
the next signal be displaying yellow up to the following one at red- in practice this is
rarely a problem. Indeed there is advantage in a terminal platform starting signal being
3-aspect since it will display an unrestricted aspect sooner and thus optimise the
headway between departing trains,
• provide a few extra “unnecessary” 4-aspect signals rather than change to 3-aspects and then
back again (perhaps because of a stretch of line subject to a lower permissible speed than
that of the line as a whole),
• make transitions at logical places, especially in the vicinity of junctions:
- Obviously headway requirements will be different on the different lengths of line
which meet at the junction since a certain proportion of traffic diverges from (or
converges with) the main line.
- Similarly the permissible speed of the diverging route in general will differ (so there
are good reasons why such a change may be needed) as well as enabling drivers to
associate the change with an identifiable place; 3-aspect signalled branches joining 4-
aspect mainlines are typical.
- At a diverging junction, the junction signal often displays a 4-aspect sequence for the
mainline but a 3-aspect sequence for the divergence.
- At a converging junction, the transition from 3 to 4-aspect sequence is generally best
achieved on the branch just prior to the junction itself.

- Another scenario where transition between sequences may be required is at a through

station which is the terminating place of a significant element of the train service
(headway requirements are probably significantly different each side of the station due
to different levels of traffic, risks are reduced because it is an identifiable place and
since most trains not terminating at the station will probably stop in a through
platform).
Note that there is a need to understand the aspect sequence which should be displayed in an area of
transition and in particular to select the most appropriate of the three possible options when
transitioning from 3 aspect signalling onto 4 aspect signalling, viz:
1 Approach Release of the first 4-aspect,
2 Second 4-aspect having no Red aspect,
3 First 4-aspect positioned at braking distance from the second.
For details see GK/RT0032 and Appendix S.

G.17 Non uniform speed: Distance / Time Curves

When considering non-stop headway, earlier sections have assumed that trains will always be
travelling at a single uniform speed and thus if its journey were plotted as a graph of distance
travelled against time the “curve” would be a diagonal line of constant slope representing the
speed. Calculations to convert a time into a distance are equally straightforward in such a case.
However in reality although there can be long stretches of constant uniform speed running,
different sections of line have different permissible speeds and trains also have scheduled stops.
Hence the more general case must consider trains undertaking their journey with accelerating and
braking interspersed with lengths of constant speed running at various different speeds. The
extreme case is “stopping headway” where trains need to start braking to stop at a station, then
remain stationary whilst passengers enter and leave before accelerating again. To optimise the
signalling, the signalling engineer must work out the speed profile of a train on such a journey; just
like the driver has to know where to start braking to stop at the station, the signal engineer needs to
work back from the known stopping position to discover the place at which braking must
commence from whatever is the running speed of the train.
This problem can be solved either graphically or by calculation, but in either case some
understanding of the speed profile of the train is advantageous; the graphical method relies on this
being produced perfectly to scale, the calculation method only requires an approximate sketch as a
visual aid for calculating the right values of the correct quantities.
It is very important to understand the difference between the two forms of graphical depiction that
are commonly used (since confusion between them invariably leads to meaningless results and
demonstrates that you really do not understand what you are doing):
• speed / time curve
(constant speed represented by a horizontal line, with uniform acceleration / braking by a
straight diagonal line with slope representing the rate of change),
• distance / time curve
(constant speed represented by a straight diagonal line, with uniform acceleration / braking
by a curve obeying a “square law”).
In this context it is the latter which is the more useful; also be aware that sometimes they follow
the general convention of graphs with time depicted horizontally on the x axis but more often they
are instead drawn with distance horizontally and thus time increasing vertically up the page. This
is frequently the “railway presentation”; think of a very long roll of paper which gradually comes
off a plotter as time passes- the current situation is represented by the paper under the plot head, all
the history is accumulating on the floor whilst future time is still on the roll yet to pass under the
print head. This is obviously a useful form of presentation for representing the positions of train in
an environment when information is required in “real-time”; however since it differs from many
student’s previous experience of maths and science it can initially cause confusion.

Graphical Plotting of Signals: Distance / Time Curves

Graphical methods to determine the required spacing of signals to provide a certain capacity can
be useful where trains do not travel at a uniform or constant speed throughout the line. The curves
applicable to a succession of trains travelling over the line in an identical fashion are merely
displaced in time from each other and therefore it is easiest to consider capacity in terms of
headway time between them.
In the real situation the information required to plot the curve for a typical train may be derived
from known data of point to point timings combined with the speeds attained at various places or
from the known accelerating / decelerating characteristics of the rolling stock. The duration of
station stops, the maximum attainable speeds and any permanent speed restrictions must also be
taken into account to produce a curve which corresponds as realistically as possible to the manner
in which the service is to be operated and with the assumption that the signalling does not impose
any additional constraints.
Assuming the braking and accelerating characteristics of the stock are known (and working on the
assumption that these are the rates which are actually utilised in traffic), the distance / time curves
may be plotted directly from the simple equation of motion s = 0.5 at2 for a train initially at rest.
• If performing the task as a physical drawing, a template can then be constructed in card or
drawn onto tracing paper utilising the same scale; this is then used to draw the appropriate
curves representing the acceleration or deceleration.
• Similarly if using a computer drawing package on screen, then curves of the correct profile
can be constructed as elements that are later used to produce the complete speed profile of
the train.
The braking curves are placed on the diagram working backwards from the known stopping
position and times or the place at which a specific constant speeds (s = vt; v = u + at) commences.
The various curves and straight line portions must of course all join smoothly at constant slope; the
speed of a train does not change very abruptly!

Fig. 7 shows how a time / distance curve may be constructed in this manner to represent a situation
in which the point to point timing T between two successive stopping points is known. The
acceleration and braking curves are placed at each end and then the constant speed line which joins
them together is interpolated between the two known end points; this may be as high as the
maximum permitted speed but more usually is a steeper slope which implies that the advertised
timetable has some contingency within it, as trains can keep to time by running at slightly less than
the maximum permitted speed and can therefore catch-up if they were running late.
In the absence of known point-point timings however then the assumption has to be made that the
service will be operated between the places in the shortest possible time, consistent with the
attainable acceleration and braking and the permitted maximum speed. This has also been shown
in fig. 7; the maximum speed is assumed as 45 m.p.h. and the time Tz has been determined by
moving the template curve representing the deceleration curve until it is found where the 45 m.p.h.
point on the curve intercepts the 45 m.p.h. straight diagonal line.
When constructing a distance / time curve in this manner, care must be taken in piecing the curves
together to avoid any errors becoming cumulative; any known point to point timings that are
known should be used as a cross-check and to recalibrate as necessary. If headway predictions are
critical, an accurate survey of the line is necessary: the location of platforms, points, speed
restrictions etc. are all needed. Since the same diagram will be utilised to determine the best
placement of signals to achieve optimum headway, it is necessary to have details of any
positioning constraints (any stretches where it may be undesirable or difficult to site signals, e.g.
sharp curves, steep up-gradients, tunnels, viaducts, etc) and such features should be plotted parallel
to n the Distance base line of the graph for cross-reference.
Particular attention should be given to the areas where rapid changes of gradient occur on the
curve representing the train’s journey, since the effect on signal spacing will be most pronounced
at these places; for example, through stations at which the service stops. The station dwell time is
a very important factor and a suitable value used which ensures that station duties can be
adequately performed even at peak congestion periods.
It is usual for time / distance curves to be plotted for both the front and the rear of the train, as both
are relevant to the positioning of signals and the resultant headway. One of the curves may of
course be readily derived from the other as both curves are identical, being merely displaced from
one another by a distance equal to the length of the train.
Whilst such curves are useful at placing signals to optimise headway which can be a very
important consideration, it is only one of many (which are covered in other sections of this Study
Pack). Indeed signalling is only one of many disciplines which together constitute a railway
system; rolling-stock characteristics, traction supply, driver training, platform dispatch
arrangements, timetable resilience, energy efficiency are just some of the other factors that can
have a major influence on the headway which can be delivered.

G.18 Stopping Headway.

A railway’s capacity is however rarely constrained by the capacity in the plain line sections where
trains run at their steady maximum speed; it is constrained by the routing at junctions and where
trains need to slow down and then stop at stations. Providing adequate headway for a stopping
service through a station is often a limiting or critical factor in devising a signalling system.
In general this is a complex issue:
• many factors combine to determine the capacity of a railway. the student is recommended to
read the IRSE papers cross referenced from the table in 6.4,
• generally it entails building a computer simulation model of the proposed railway and trying
out whether the layout of signalling can deliver the required timetable. The limiting effect of
ATP, particularly if of an intermittent nature, can be a very significant factor to take into
account.
However in simple cases, such as where all trains on a route have the same stopping pattern,
meaningful results can be obtained merely by utilising Newton’s laws of motion to consider how
soon a second train can be run behind the first train without being affected by restrictive aspect
sequence. The effect of the various factors contributing to the headway can be seen by referring to
the following diagram reproduced below (denoted fig. 5 in Cardani’s book). Note however that
this example does not show evenly spaced 4 aspect signals, but instead signal 2 has been
positioned so that:
• its overlap is just clear of a train waiting in the platform (in order that the following train can
be brought as close as possible to the stationary train so the platform reoccupation time is
minimised),
• it is at full braking distance from signal 1.
Such an arrangement of positioning a signal close to the running on end of a platform is an
effective way of improving stopping headways on a commuter railway. However where such a
signal is provided nowadays it is practice to provide it as a “closing up signal” (i.e. a signal
which is additional to the normal evenly spaced 4-aspect signals, with special approach release
conditions imposed as it has been injected into the normal sequence) rather than the distortion
of the spacing of signals shown in the diagram. Note that whereas one signal section is at least
braking distance (and thus overbraked, given that the train is within 4-aspect signalling and
hence will already have received a Double Yellow at the signal in rear that is not shown on the
diagram), the next is potentially very short, being the sum of overlap length and train length
(perhaps only 400m)
However the diagram does serve to illustrate the principles behind the determination of
stopping headways. Study it, read the text below then attempt the activities. This is an
effective method to determine whether you have actually understood the issues or are merely
following enough to plug numbers into formulae without really understanding the significance
of what you are doing.
It is important that students fully understand the train curve shown on this diagram and the various
times depicted on the vertical lines; it is the key to determining stopping headways, whether this
is actually achieved completely by graphical methods (in which case the diagram must obviously
be produced carefully to scale) or via calculations related to such a diagram purely as a sketch that
denotes the various values being separately calculated and then summated together.
The uneven signal spacing around the station would not be current practice; see later text.

The diagram assumes that deceleration having passed signal 1 commences at the place where
the driver knows that there is just braking distance “b” from their initial speed “v” (which may
perhaps be less than the maximum permissible speed “V” that determines the signal spacing on
the line) to stop at the platform signal.
[Note that this is not compatible with defensive driving as it implies that the driver has not only
passed the Double Yellow but also the Single Yellow without braking and is reliant upon their
route knowledge to leave the braking until the very last moment that should be adequate to stop
their train prior to the Red. This shows how times change and assumptions that once seemed
entirely reasonable now seem outrageous. However this is only a matter of the detailed
answer; it remains a useful example to show the methodology.]
It also depicts the train continuing to accelerate away from its station stop as it clears the
overlap ahead of signal 3; this will almost certainly always be the case and it may indeed be
several signal sections before the normal running speed is attained after the stop.
The right-hand of the pair of curves represents the front of the train, the left-hand curve the
back of the train; for obvious reasons the horizontal separation remains a constant. It is clearest
to see this for the parallel vertical lines in the centre of the diagram where the train is
stationary- as time passes imagine the paper scrolling downwards underneath two pens on a
plotter that are remaining stationary. Then when the train accelerates, these pens move to the
right representing the train’s change of longitudinal position and thus the acceleration curves
are the result since time continues to pass.
Note that the depiction is a shorthand (compare with the diagram at the end of this section); the
pair of curves represent the first (right-hand) train, from the time in the past (at the bottom of
the diagram) to the current time (at the top). The second (left-hand) train would of course have
a similar pair of curves identical to those of the first train but displaced vertically by their
headway separation. However since this is the unknown value that needs to be determined, it is
better to use the fact that there is a regular pattern of identical trains and consider the passage of
a single train between the time when it was “the train arriving” and the time when it now is
“the train leaving” the station.
Some students get confused by the lines representing the two ends of the train apparently
seeming to get closer together (i.e. when measured at right angles to the curves- but think: what
physical value is this actually representing?), but this is not true; put a ruler on the page
horizontally (which represents an instant in time) and you will see that the separation is indeed
a constant.
The pair of curves are needed for considering the headway:
• The front of the train is relevant because that is the location of the driver. However since a
driver needs time to locate and interpret a signal there is a need to consider the sighting time
that is needed for that task to be performed.
- On NR any new or altered signal must have a Sighting Form Pack which includes such
things as an Obscuration Diagram and an assessment of the MRT.
- This sighting allowance depends on various factors such as the complexity of the
signal (e.g. number of route indications, unusual presentation etc.) but is usually
around 10 seconds.
- The time is represented by the vertical line at the edge of the hatched area at the left of
the diagram and, since the train is travelling at constant speed at this location (i.e. the
curve is actually a straight diagonal line), it can easily be converted into a sighting
distance. This gives the place where the front of a train that is running at the minimum
headway must be at the time when signal 1 has just changed to a good-enough aspect
that the driver of the train does not feel the need to brake purely because of that
signal’s display.
• The rear of the train is relevant because it is only when the whole train has passed clear of a
track section that the signals in rear can change to give less restrictive aspects.
- In the diagram above, the rear of the first train has been drawn just beyond the overlap
joint beyond signal 3.
- It is at this time (and therefore on the diagram at the same horizontal level) that signal
2 can first clear to Yellow and therefore signal 1 can improve aspect to Double
Yellow. Whereas this is certainly still a restrictive aspect, it is telling the driver that
they must brake in order to stop at signal 3; however if the train is due to stop at the
station then it would be intending to stop at that position anyway. The only issue,
particularly now that the importance of defensive driving is emphasised, is that the
driver is likely to brake as soon as they sight the cautionary aspect, rather than leave
their braking later.
- Where the signal is positioned close to minimum braking distance, the difference in
time is relatively small; however where the driver knows that the signal spacing is
significantly more than the distance required to stop the train, then a Double Yellow at
signal 1 would have a negative effect on platform reoccupation time which would need
to be taken into account when calculating the stopping headway.
- The assumption within the calculation below however is that if signal 1 displays a
Double Yellow by the time that the second train reaches its sighting point, then that
aspect would not be limiting the speed of that train which is scheduled to stop at the
station; this will occur once the rear of the first train has cleared the overlap beyond
signal 3. Recognise that the assumption is more applicable to the 1960s rather than the
2000s, but that it does simplify the calculations slightly and although it will give an
optimistic headway result, it is not too bad an approximation.

Note how the diagram has a vertical line drawn downwards from the position of the front of the
first train on the horizontal axis until it intersects the curve representing the front of the train on the
distance / time curve. This defines the time at which the rear of that train clears the overlap joint
beyond signal 3; it is the uppermost dashed line on the vertical scale.
On the assumption that the interlocking responds instantly- an assumption far more nearly true
when implemented by RRI rather than CBI which can easily be two seconds longer such is the
effect of modern technology!) the first time when signal 2 can step up to Yellow and then the
remainder of the aspect sequence follows suit.
A further assumption inherent in the diagram is that if signal 1 can show Double Yellow before the
next train reaches its sighting point, then its driver will not drive their train in any different manner
than if a Green had been received; the train is due to stop at the station on the approach to signal 3
anyway.
• This assumption is most nearly true when the approaching train is travelling at the maximum
speed for which the signalling is designed and where signal 1 has been located at the
minimum SBD from signal 3; it is evident that brakes need to be applied when passing
signal 1.
• If however the signal is placed at a considerably greater distance from the station than the
particular train actually needs to stop, then the display of Double Yellow would cause the
driver to brake earlier than they otherwise would and thus the headway calculation should be
modified such that it uses the first time when that signal would display Green.

As drawn in the diagram however, the headway is depicted as 1 HYY; i.e. the time it takes for
signal 1 to display Double Yellow again (in sufficient time to be applicable to the second train)
after the time when the fist train was in that same position. This is the minimum headway and is
comprised of the following elements:
t5 the time prior to passing signal 1 in which the A default assumption of 10 seconds is
driver is likely to react its aspect (i.e. the MRT), reasonable.
t4 the time taken to travel distance x t4 is simply calculated as = x/v but of course the
(i.e. the distance which the train can travel distance x does need to be determined first!
having passed the signal before needing to x is the difference between:
apply the brakes, but see note #) at constant - the signal spacing from Double Yellow
speed v.
to Red, and
- the braking distance actually required
(which is calculated in conjunction
with t3 in the next step).
t3 the time taken to decelerate at constant braking This can be calculated from v=u+at where u=0
rate a2 from speed v to a stand. (stationary train) and hence t3 = v / a2.
The distance covered in this time is given by the
average speed for that duration,
i.e. (v / 2).(v / a2) = v2 / 2 a2- this is the distance
needed to calculate x needed above.
t2 the dwell time when the train is waiting in the This time is rarely less than 30 seconds, often up
station (which includes the time for the doors to to 60 seconds and when an express stops at a
be opened, passenger duties to be completed, major station could be 120 seconds particularly if
doors to be closed, brakes released and traction the doors are not power operated.
power reapplied).
t1 the time taken for the rear of the train to travel This can be calculated from s=ut +0.5at2
to the end of the overlap, (i.e. the train to travels where u=0 and s= [train length, L + overlap
its own length plus the length of the overlap) length, O].
whilst accelerating at rate a1. t1 = 2 (L + O) / a2
Note For defensive driving it would be more realistic to assume:
# • that braking commences no later than passing the first signal displaying a restrictive aspect,
• until a relatively slow speed (say 30mph),
• then running at that slow speed before the final brake application to a stand.
The brake curve is therefore different but the calculations are similar except that the “constant
speed” portion t4 is at the “cautious approach to signal” speed rather than the timetabled running
speed.
In the example depicted, the headway obtainable could be improved by:

• Improving the accelerating and braking characteristics of the rolling stock operating the
service and so reducing periods t1 and t3
• Reducing the station stop period t2.
• Reducing period t4 by the closer spacing of the signals. There is no need for signal 1 to be at
full braking distance from signal 2; the signal displaying the Double Yellow when signal 2 is
at Red must however be at a minimum of full braking distance.

Note that if signal 2 were moved closer towards the station it would be counter-
productive; its overlap would then be occupied whilst there was a train in the platform
and thus signal 1 held to danger making the headway situation worse.
If other constraints allowed signal 1 to be positioned at the minimum value of “d” (i.e. at
“b”, the braking distance from running speed “v”) from signal 2, then t4 would be at its
minimum value of (L + O) / v.
However it must not be forgotten that the primary constraint is the requirement to have full
braking distance at maximum permissible speed “B” between signals 1 and 3.
An additional constraint to modern standards is the evenness in spacing of the 4-aspect
signals is also an important consideration, so signal 2 would often need to be positioned
further from signal 3 than the distance “O+L”, in order to make it more comparable with
“d”. This would result in poorer headway; as in so much else , a suitable balance between
the differing considerations is necessary.
The diagram below depicts such regularly spaced signals and the durations for which each
of them displays restrictive aspects are drawn vertically. The headway is the closest
position at which the curve representing the front of the second train can be placed to that of
the first, whilst still ensuring that Green (Double Yellow in the case of those on immediate
approach to the station) aspects are achieved for the second train when at sighting distance
prior to the relevant signal.
Section G.21 discusses in more detail the implications of using of 4 aspect signals to give
enhanced flexibility for improving capacity around stations. This should be studied to enhance
understanding once the basic concepts of this section have been assimilated.

You really do need to make the effort to understand stopping headways; it is a key
element within the development of a Signalling Plan. Whereas it is possible to obtain
sufficient marks to pass the exam without performing stopping headway evaluation, the
examiners generally take a very dim view of candidates who omit and therefore are likely
to be that little less charitable when other facets of the attempt fall short of expectation-
afterall a better standard can be expected due to the time thus saved.
Sometimes a terminal station is a feature of the layout; in such a case there is no escaping
stopping headway calculations; see Appendix N2.
Similarly if there is a layout in which there is a stretch or low permissible speed, all trains will
require to brake and then reaccelerate; therefore constant speed headway calculations are
inadequate and the concepts used in stopping headway calculations must be employed.
Appendix G.22 contains a worked example for such a layout.
Activities:
Draw for yourself a diagram which is based on that which has just been discussed but
modified to show regularly spaced 4-aspect signals, each positioned at 60% braking
distance and the assumption of defensive driving as described. Work out the
equations for each of the time periods that together comprise the stopping headway
between two consecutive stopping trains based on your diagram.
Similarly draw another diagram for a line with 3 aspect signals regularly spaced at
130% braking distance, for the situation where the first train stops in the station but is
followed by one that runs through at its constant maximum speed. Work out the
equations that give the minimum time separation between the two trains prior to the
station if the second train is to follow the first one at minimum non-stop headway after
the station.
Get some graph paper, plot the signal positions on the distance scale and make
yourself a template with a curve cut to represent braking and acceleration at your
chosen scale. Use it to determine the same results graphically;; even if you decide to
use pure calculations in the examination, you’ll gain a better understanding by having
tried the “hands-on” approach.
If you can perform these tasks then it is evident that you do understand
stopping headway;; if not then you have more work to do.
Try re-reading the section again whilst performing the activities above and if
you are still experiencing difficulty then you may need to seek assistance.

G.19 Mixture of train services
The diagram above depicts the Up line between Leamington Spa and Banbury. The lines represent
the journeys of two different train types (both drawn as if departing Leamington at the same time)
and clearly shows the additional journey time by the Chiltern Trains class 165 Turbo compared
with the Virgin Trains class 220 Voyager which can operate at a higher maximum speed. The
signal positions upon departure from Leamington and those on the approach to Banbury are
marked and the graphical presentation has been utilised to determine the headway achieved for
these key sections (expressed in minutes) between two following trains of the same type. Note
that the values in the two cases are different; see Appendix G20 regarding the determination of the
speed at which maximum headway is achieved.
• Obviously if a class 165 follows a class 220, it is only the headway achieved for the first few
signal sections which is important to avoid delay to the class 165 since the class 220 is soon
well ahead of it.
• Conversely if a class 220 is to follow a class 165, then the timetable needs to ensure that the
class 165 has almost reached Banbury by the time the class 220 has caught it up to the extent
that it is only just achieving clear signals. Hence its departure from Leamington will be
significantly after that of the class 165.
Therefore the concept of headway between trains of different speeds cannot exist; headway must
be related to a particular type of train service. However where there is a stopping train followed
by a non-stopping train of same running speed, then a headway can be defined and is interpreted as
the separation after the earlier train has made its last station stop and regained full headway speed.

Conversely where a line accommodates traffic of a variety of speeds, the length of the line
between places where overtaking occurs is critical when assessing the effect on capacity.
The diagram shows one train running at
60 mile/h between other traffic running at
80 mile/h on a line 60 miles long.
The slower train takes 15 minutes
longer than the faster trains and thus the
second train arrives at its destination
18 minutes later than the first, assuming
that the signalling permitted its departure
3 minutes after the first.
Similarly for the third train to be the
minimum 3 minutes behind the second at
its destination, then it would leave its
origin 18 minutes after the second and
thus 21 minutes after the first.
This utilises all the train capacity;
compare with the situation of all traffic at
80 mph in which there could have been
departures every 3 minutes- i.e. there
could have been six intermediate trains.
Another way of expressing this is that the
single 60 mph train has utilised six train
paths.
Obviously the longer the length of line between places where trains can pass, the greater the
number of train paths that are wasted. It is important to appreciate that a mixture of speeds of
traffic creates a serious loss of capacity. On intensively used lines it is beneficial to set a
single permissible speed for all traffic and for this to be selected (relatively low, see Appendix
G20) to be optimal to deliver maximum capacity; this in turn requires all rolling stock to have
similar braking characteristics.
One way in which this loss of capacity can be minimised is by "flighting". This means that
the timetable is arranged such that there is a succession of trains of one characteristic
followed by a succession of trains with another. Capacity is still lost when the initial train
of one type follows one of a different type, but the situation is improved compared with
running the different types of train alternately.
Another option is to provide more places for the faster trains to overtake slow trains.
This can sometimes be arranged to take place whilst the slower trains are stopped at an
intermediate station at which the faster trains do not call. However to achieve this
operation reliably without unduly extending the schedule of the slower trains is virtually
impossible if the loop is only the length of the platform; it does become more achievable
however if there is a far longer length of loop during which the overtaking can occur.
Sometimes it is possible to provide a “dynamic loop” in the vicinity of a station (often
where in the past there has been a Goods Line or sidings which has been recovered but
the land has escaped being sold off). A converse situation occurs in circumstances in
which there is a constraint (such as a viaduct or tunnel) that has meant that a four-track
mainline has to revert to being a pure double track for a certain length and therefore
traffic from two running lines must be interspersed through the restricted section.

G.20 4 aspects: Capacity

Having now considered both non-stop and stopping headway, the following sections re-visit the
question of selecting 3 or 4 aspect signalling and also consider the potential advantages of 4
aspects in certain situations.
The capacity of a 4-aspect signalling system can be expressed in the form of simple equations:
Headway H4 =
L + O + S + 3D4
D4 D4 D4
O L
4-aspect S
signalling
Minimum Headway Distance, in metres

(vii) H4= L+O+S+3B/2 (achieved where the signals are all spaced at
the minimum of half braking distance, B)
Headway Time, in seconds
(viii) T4= L+O+S+3B/2 (where Vh is the speed of the trains for which
Vh headway is to be calculated; i.e. timetabled
speed)
Maximum Capacity, in trains per hour:
(ix) C4= 3600 Vh
L+O+S+3B/2
Capacity, in trains per hour:
(x) C’4= 3600 Vh (where signals are more widely spaced at D4
L+O+S+3D4 because maximum capacity is not needed)
C’3= 3600 Vh The equivalent expression for 3-aspect

signalling.
L+O+S+2D3
If the required capacity can be achieved with
D3 > B, then 3-aspects would suffice.

Optimising Capacity.
Braking distance is approximately proportional to speed, and signals obviously have to be spaced
to be suitable for the maximum speed, Vm. It is clearly non-optimal to have signals more widely
spaced than the speed at which it is desired to minimise the headway; hence in these circumstances
where the headway requirement is critical it can be appropriate to:
a) dictate a lower permissible speed for the section of line than might otherwise have been
determined, and
b) then fix the signal spacing appropriately.
In these circumstances Vh = Vm and equation (ix) can be written as:
(xii) C4= 3600 Vh = K1 Vh with K1, K2 and K3 all being
constants.
[L+O+S]+ k Vh2 K2 + K3 Vh 2
This form of equation gives a maximum

value of C for Vh2 = K2 / K3. Hence for
any particular combination of overlap
length, sighting allowance, train length
and braking rate there is a speed at which
the headway is at a minimum. The
diagram shows typical headway curves
separately for:
A) 3-aspect, and
B) 4-aspect signalling.
There is a loss of capacity for trains

travelling slower than the speed for
which the line has been signalled.
This is because their separation (when
running unchecked) is still fixed by the
same signal spacing, yet it takes longer to
travel that distance because of their lower
speed.
The capacity loss is simply proportional
to speed of the traffic compared with the
signalled speed (on assumption that other
factors such as S and L are the same).
Conversely if it were decided to signal the line for a higher speed, the signal spacing has to be
increased to provide enough braking distance. The trains for which we are considering the
headway now need to travel that greater distance but will still travel at their original speed and so
will obviously take longer.
For 3-aspect signalling the capacity loss is in the ratio: [L+O+S]+2Bt
[L+O+S]+2Bs
where Bt is the braking distance at the speed of the traffic and Bs the speed for which the line has
been signalled.

In the case of 4-aspect signalling, the situation is more complicated because of the “running on the
double yellow” scenario illustrated by curve C in the diagram. The argument (which as explained
earlier does not sit comfortably with 21st century ideas re “defensive driving”) was that:
• drivers of slower trains could treat the double yellow aspect as if it were an unrestrictive
aspect; they would then rely upon being able to stop at the red from the warning at the single
yellow on the basis that they were travelling at a speed for which the signal spacing was
actually braking distance.
• On the other hand, drivers of trains travelling at higher speeds or with less good braking
would act on sighting a double yellow aspect as usual.
There is of course, no difference in the meaning of the double yellow aspect to the driver of the
various trains, but the expectation was that drivers could take advantage of their knowledge of the
brake power of their train compared with their speed to maintain a steady speed until sighting a
single yellow aspect. The driver however could never rely on the perfect uniformity of signal
spacing and so would not actually drive to the limit, but 4-aspect signalling was regarded as being
able to offer a certain headway to lower speed traffic as well as a headway at the speed for which
the signal spacing had been determined. This is shown by the figures in brackets on curve C; the
horizontal scale gives the maximum speed at which the medium speed train can be permitted to
run to ensure that it has service braking distance between the signal at Single Yellow and that at
Red. Although the railway was operated for many years safely and efficiently using such a
methodology, it did rely on good knowledge by drivers built up from years of familiarity with the
route; to some extent 4 aspect signalling had some elements in common with speed signalling.
[The environment has now changed with drivers not having the same route knowledge as
previously (partially reflecting the more rapid progression to driving without decades of prior
experience as a fireman on a steam locomotive, partially because of a more uniform bland railway
without so many distinctive features etc.) and the current railway culture being far more risk
adverse.]
Suppose a stretch of line over which trains may travel at 80 m.p.h. is to be re-signalled.
Comparison of curves A and B show, with the theoretical assumption of evenly spaced signals, the
difference in headway obtainable between 3- and 4-aspect signalling according to the maximum
speed of the line.
From these we can see that trains could run safely at 80 m.p.h. on a headway of 112 seconds under
3-aspect signalling, or with a headway of 82 seconds under 4-aspect signalling. In other words at
this speed theoretically just over 30 trains per hour can be passed with a 3-aspects but 45 per hour
(half as many again) with a 4-aspect system. Moreover, with the latter, curve C shows that a
service running on double yellow could also be run on an 82 second headway at a maximum
permissible speed of 56 mph; indeed it is this service which is more likely to have the headway
requirement than the traffic at the highest speed. This analysis is based upon the assumption that
both the medium and high speed trains have the same braking deceleration characteristics so that
the service braking distance required is a function of speed only. In addition it has been assumed
that the signal spacing is determined by the service braking distance of the higher speed train, but
it would be the longest braking distance of any of the various types of trains that travel over the
line which determines the spacing; in many cases this could be a lower speed traffic with much
poorer braking characteristics, such as an unbraked freight train [not a 21st century feature but in
essence the logic is still applicable].
Do not forget that using a line for a mixture of traffic running at different speeds inevitably leads
to loss of capacity; see previous section G.19.

G.21 4 Aspects: Flexibility.

Another reason why 4-aspect signalling is sometimes provided is the ability to deal with a medium
speed service utilising a line signalled for a higher speed. It is well illustrated by the problem of
obtaining a given headway through a station which is served by a stopping suburban service. In
such a case it may become necessary to space signals at closer intervals on the approach to stations
in order to have block sections of shorter length to compensate for the longer time taken by such
trains during their braking to a stand, the station stop delay itself and accelerating away again
afterwards. The diagram below shows a time-distance curve for the stopping train and how the
signals have to be spaced to maintain a given headway based upon running on double yellow.
Note how dashed vertical lines have been drawn from the positions of the overlap beyond each
signal; the intersection of these lines with the curve on the graph gives the time at which the rear of
the earlier train has passed the relevant joint. This is (disregarding interlocking delays) the first
time when the signal in rear can step up to yellow and the remainder of the aspect sequence steps
up to reflect the better conditions. Hence the most right-hand vertical drawn on the diagram
denotes the double yellow headway applicable to signal 4; i.e. it represents the time after the
passage of the first train before signal 4 displays YY again.
For a stopping train service, it is clearly in the vicinity of the station that needs special
consideration; the further from the station the more nearly the stopping service will be running at
the speed that it would have done without the need to call at the platform. Generally it is the block
section within which the station is contained that which is the most critical; for the whole station
dwell time that section is occupied without the train making forward progress and thus capacity is
being eroded. However there is also a need to consider the section beyond the station since it is
important that a train when ready to leave the station has received a good enough aspect for the
driver to accelerate with confidence. Note from inspection of this particular diagram that 2HYY is
the longest line but 4HYY is very similar even though the signalling has been arranged to locate
signal 5 particularly close to the station; despite this section having been made short, the speed of
the trains departing the station is low and thus it is still occupied for a relatively long time.

a) Signal 4 is a platform starter and the signalling must be designed such that it can clear to
Double Yellow before the train is due to leave; in reality this is as good as a Green for a
train starting from rest. The driver knows that there are two block sections clear and is thus
able to accelerate with confidence until they can observe the next signal; hence the way in
which the 2nd train is driven is not being affected by the presence of the earlier train just
beyond signal 6 and this represents the best possible headway in that scenario. Having
received a Double Yellow at signal 4, the most restrictive aspect that could legitimately be
encountered at signal 5 would be Yellow. Provided that the signals are relatively evenly
spaced (which is not something on which drivers ought to place reliance, but the signal
engineer needs to consider particularly carefully when designing signalling in this context)
there should be a similar distance within which to stop as had just been used for
acceleration. Actually in reality there is quite a comfort margin since train braking tends to
be significantly better than acceleration and also the aspect of the intermediate signal
becomes obvious to a driver well prior to actually passing it so should it still be at yellow
the acceleration can cease and the braking commence as soon as it is sighted.
The same argument could NOT be made for a 3-aspect signalling solution; if a driver saw
the platform starter clear to Yellow then they must remain mindful that the very next signal
could be at Red when it is encountered. Thus, to be safe, drivers must proceed cautiously
so that they would be able to stop their train within the available sighting distance; failure
to do this is indeed the root cause of many SPADs; see section 6.19.3 regarding the
positioning of the first signal and for a discussion on SOYSPAD. From a headway
perspective, it should be obvious that signal clearance to Yellow is insufficient to maintain
normal speed and thus headway calculations must be based on the platform starter clearing
to Green. This would require the length of two block sections (both at least minimum
braking distance for non-stop running) to be free of trains, compared with the two block
sections (which together need to comprise that same length) in the case of 4-aspect
signalling. The benefit of 4-aspect signalling is thus demonstrated, though it must be borne
in mind that the length closest to the station is by far the most significance in terms of time,
since it is in this area where the average speed of trains is lowest and that there are the
fixed factors (train length, overlap, sighting distance) which also contribute and thus the
benefit is not the halving factor that it might initially appear to be.
Note that from a headway perspective there can be benefit in requiring all trains to pass
through the station slowly, even if they are not to stop. In this scenario the signalling
design can be freed of the constraint to have signals spaced widely for the through running.
- This is a methodology often adopted by Metros, where for example stations are not
open to the public on Sundays; trains still slow down to a crawl through the platform
so that they comply with the design parameters of the signalling.
o This is particularly necessary because short overlaps are provided beyond
platform starting signals in order to obtain the best headway; thus stringent
limits on the approach speed have to be imposed so that the train protection
afforded by the train stop is able to contain any overrun within the available
length. Where more sophisticated train protection is provided, it is possible for
the signalling to be configured to allow higher speed through running when the
station is closed.
o Remember that metros tend to use 2 aspect signals with separate repeaters
positioned for visibility rather than to denote braking distance and therefore the
stopping headway calculations differ from that illustrated. The important factor
in this environment is for the platform starter to have cleared in time for the
doors to be closed before the train can start accelerating so that the last vehicle
of the train clears the overlap joint as soon as possible; only then can the signal
protecting the platform clear to allow another train to be admitted- see section
b) below. Note that stations can be so close together that the platform starting
signal at one station is in fact the signal controlling admission to the block
section containing the next station.
- Whilst severe speed restrictions through platform can be appropriate for such Metros,
this policy is not applicable to Mainlines (trains travel faster, journey time is generally
more important than capacity and dictated more by high average speed than minimum
station dwell and interchange times); however to a lesser extent similar considerations
do apply. At major through stations where the majority of trains stop, a significant
reduction of permissible speed on the approaches to the station is sometimes imposed
in order that signal spacing can be reduced to be more suitable for optimising headway
for the stopping trains; the sacrifice in speed for the few through trains is worth the
benefit of increasing station capacity. Note that the inter-relationship arises due to the
MAS signal positions being both for headway and for braking reasons; one of the
benefits of adopting ETCS is that every train detection section can potentially be made
a block section and this is unrelated to the need to consider braking (which a function
of the EVC on board each specific train).
b) The clearance of signal 3 controlling admission reading into the platform can be the
bottleneck which limits the line capacity by having a long headway time. It is obviously
held to danger all the time the train is actually stopped in the station but in addition the
slow speed of the train when decelerating into the station and when accelerating again
after it also make significant contributions to this time.
Remember that a line’s capacity is maximised when a 2nd train is following the 1st train as
closely as it can without being constrained by its presence. In this regard it is only
generally considered necessary for signal 3 to be showing Yellow when the 2nd train
reaches its sighting point. This is because the train will be requiring to stop in the station
and thus on the approach to signal 4 regardless of its aspect; therefore a Yellow would not
cause the train to brake any earlier than it otherwise would. This is possibly a reasonable
assumption given the first caution signal (signal 2 in the diagram) is at minimum braking
distance, but it is less true if the signals are spaced at say 120% braking which is perhaps
more typical. In addition the adoption of defensive driving standards generally require a
driver to make a significant brake application upon first sighting a cautionary aspect; this
could mean that braking might commence a further 400m earlier when a cautionary aspect
is displayed compared to what would actually be needed to stop the train in the platform.
Add to this the consequences (disruption to services, inquiry, damage to the driver’s career)
of a SPAD of a few metres compared to a similar length overrun of an intended stopping
position at a platform and it ought to be evident that a Double Yellow at signal 2 would
affect how the 2nd train was driven.
It would be more realistic to perform the calculations based on braking from the sighting
point of signal 2 until the train speed has been reduced to a low value such as 25mph and
then continue at that speed until another application of brakes would bring the train to a
halt some 25m on the approach to signal 4. However this takes a bit more calculation and
thus in the IRSE examination when time is precious it is probably best to calculate on the
basis of signal 3 at Yellow being good enough for minimum headway and add a short note
so that this is in fact an over-simplification. For real work nowadays most railways use
computer based dynamic timetable simulators of much greater sophistication for accuracy,
so there is a rationale for the pen and paper method just to be a crude but rapid
approximation.

A common mistake by students is to forget train length when determining the time taken for
a train at the platform starter to become clear of the overlap; remember that it is the front of
the train which is initially waiting at the signal but it is the back of the train passing the
overlap joint which permits the signal in rear to clear. Look again at the diagram; note that
there are two related curves which denote the two ends of the train- it is important if solving
the problem graphically that the correct curve is utilised depending on the context. These are
always separated by the same horizontal distance during the deceleration, acceleration and
constant speed phases as they are during the station stop phase since the train does not
change length appreciably.
Applicability to the present day

Be aware that the signalling solution in the diagram depicts an arrangement which has been much
used in the past to optimise headway, but in the current climate has fallen out of favour because of
the irregularity of signal spacing. It is an example of signal engineers needing to balance the
definite performance benefits of such a solution against the perceived safety risks that it entails.
There used to be a strong argument that colour light signals were such an advance from
mechanical signals (visibility particularly at night and in fog, simpler to interpret etc) and because
of the then relatively recent fitment of AWS (to alert the driver and apply brakes unless positively
cancelled on passing a restrictive aspect) that the risks associated with SPADs were almost
negligible. A succession of incidents and eventually some catastrophic accidents in the 1990s
finally made the assumption that trains would stop at red signals untenable, and arguably this is a
result of a very significant reduction in drivers’ route knowledge (partly less years of experience
on the driven route, partially increasing homogeneousness of the railway, partly other
responsibilities now included in their work). Hence the industry is now much more sensitive to
SPAD causal factors and such an arrangement of signals would now be regarded as a SPAD-trap.
The argument used to be however:
• the distance between alternate signals (i.e. the YY to the R albeit with unevenly spaced Y)
was maintained at adequate braking distance for the high speed non-stopping train,
• the spacing between successive signals was maintained at adequate braking distance for the
stopping train,
• adverse effect on the headway avoided since signal 3 could be passed at single yellow
without having any impact on the speed of the stopping train.
It is unlikely, even with TPWS, that such an arrangement would now be proposed on conventional
signalling. However it is just the sort of advantage that could be regained following the
introduction of transmission based signalling with a full train protection system, even if not
implementing complete moving block.
Similarly another option to improve headway would be to split the braking not just over two block
sections as in the case of 4 aspects but over three or four. The logical implication is that a five or
six aspect signalling system would need to be provided. This gives all sorts of complications and
costs for a lineside signalling system but, although discussed, such a solution was never adopted.
However theoretically the logic of doing this is sound and it is in essence how speed codes are
implemented; see for example #58/2 which explains how capacity is increased by the cab
signalling using such a methodology (compared with the lineside signals retained as a fall-back
means of operation).

One option that has been adopted on particular lines with capacity constraints is the Consecutive
Double Yellow. The signal two in rear of the Red displays Double Yellow as usual, but if that
signal is insufficiently far away to be at braking distance, then the signal behind it must also
simultaneously show Double Yellow rather than Green. Indeed there have been cases where up to
three successive double yellow indications are exhibited before the signal at single yellow is
reached and was legitimised by the Rule Book description of the meaning of the Double Yellow
being: " Prepare to pass next signal at restricted speed and to find it showing one yellow light, or
two yellow lights in certain exceptional cases in closely signalled areas." This can be regarded as
being a clever solution in that many of the advantages of a five or six aspect system are obtained
without the majority of the costs.
• However it does have complexity (and read into this: the potential for getting confused and
designing it wrongly) for the signal engineer; there has to be a distinction between a signal
showing Double Yellow when it is at full braking (signal in rear can show Green) and the
same signal showing Double Yellow when it is not at full braking (signal in rear showing
Green would be a wrong-side failure).
• The solution also gives a trap for drivers; on commuter railway drivers can become
accustomed to “driving on the Double Yellows” as they attempt to regulate their speed to
keep as close as possible behind the previous train in an attempt to run to time as well as
safely.
- Certainly it is efficient operation if a driver can time their arrival at a signal so that it
shows Green just as they arrive at it, but if a particular signal remains at Double
Yellow the driver must brake in anticipation of a Single Yellow. If the next one is
encountered at Double Yellow, the driver may feel that they are now running “hard on
the heels” of an earlier train at much the same speed as it. This assumption would be a
reasonable one in areas in which standard 4 aspect sequence exists but where there are
consecutive Double Yellows the 2nd train may in fact have now caught up by an entire
signal section and now be running on Double Yellows that are significantly short of
braking distance to the Red. The speed would have been reduced enough for the driver
to be confident of stopping should they encounter a Yellow, however this would have
been based on the assumption that the remaining signal section would be
approximately half braking distance; in reality it could be a nominal third (and the
normal variation in signal spacing could mean that it is significantly less) and thus a
SPAD may result..
- In the past, great reliance was placed on drivers thorough route knowledge and
confidence in their train’s braking; this is something which is now considered less
acceptable. One issue is that service braking rates are higher than previously and
therefore any slight loss of adhesion is more significant; this is compounded by the
other effects of the move from tread brakes to disc brakes- there is more likelihood of
contaminant such as oil and in particular leaf mulch building up on the surface which
should be in metal-metal contact with the rail. Even with WSP (=Wheel Slip
Protection) severe loss of adhesion can occur and obviously the greater the braking
rate the more likely this is to occur and the more significant the consequence of some
loss of adhesion and thus braking effect.
- The GE Resignalling of the lines into London Liverpool Street was implemented on
IECC and SSI in the mid 1990s and significant numbers of such sequences (as indeed
had previously been incorporated within the previous signalling) exist. Although
fulfilling a need and still in use, it is unlikely that such a solution would find favour
today and at least would be subject to risk assessment and additional mitigations such
as additional provision of TPWS.

G.22 Example of Headway Calculations: 1998 Examination.

To signal the 1998 layout effectively requires a careful consideration of the stopping and non-
stopping headway and thus forms a suitable example for this Study Pack.
For ease of reference a sketch of the salient headway details for the layout and the associated
notes are reproduced in the table below; however to fully comprehend the description it is
necessary to look at the layout itself (link in Appendix B).
G
KEY: Trains at each site per hour per day
3
5
D E F
A 4 12 6 3 H
6 1
B 4
C 4
Train Lengths Main Line passenger 200m

Branch Line passenger 100m Normal; 200m Maximum
Freight 400m
Acceleration Rate All trains 0.5ms-2
Braking Rate All trains 0.5ms-2
Permitted Speed Passenger (Main & Branch lines) # 100km/h
Freight (Main & Branch lines) # 100km/h
Main line turnouts at Junction D and F 80km/h
All other running line turnouts 40km/h
# Except between tunnel mouths at E 40km/h
Required Headway Main lines: following stopping at 80km/h 3 min
Contracted Paths
Express Passenger Through Main Lines (A to H) 1 per hour each way
Terminating from South Lines (E to G) 4 per day each way
Semi Fast Passenger Through North to South Lines (C to G) 1 per hour each way
Local Passenger Terminating from Main Lines (A to E) 2 per hour each way
Terminating from North Lines (C to E) 2 per hour each way
Freight All Lines Maximum 1 per hour each way
Reversing at E (G to H) 1 per day each way
Working All Passenger Trains stop at Station E.
Semi fast cross at E & connect with southbound express A to H
Local passenger trains are stabled and services at the Carriage Depot.
Gradients Level except in fly-under which is average level.

speed
Succinct answer 1998 layout calculations

a b cConvert dto SI units (x e1000/3600). f v2 = u2 –g 2 a s. h
Braking
100 kmh-1 = 27.78ms-1 Braking distance = (27.78)2/ 2 x 0.5 = 775m
80 kmh-1 = 22.22ms-1 time (22.22)2/ 2 x 0.5 = 495m
40 kmh-1 = 11.11ms-1 (11.11)2/ 2 x 0.5 = 125m
The simplification of constant brake rate and negligible brake build-up time is assumed.
Headway Contracted to provide 180sec, therefore design to achieve 145sec (provide 25% contingency).
At 80 kmh-1, this equates to a maximum train separation of 145 x 22.22 = 3220m.
Deducting 400m maximum train length, 225m O/L length and 267m sighting allowance
(equates to 12 sec), DGR = 3220 - 400 - 225 – 267 = 2325m where DGR is distance from the Red
signal protecting the 1st train to the Green signal permitting 2nd to continue at full speed.
Requirement- Since two signal sections (even at 150% braking) fit comfortably into the headway distance, the
away from headway requirement at 80 kmh-1 is easily met by 3 aspect signalling.
stn Signals would be best spaced at nominal 1.33 x 775 = 1030m to limit the amount of excess
braking to that considered tolerable. For a line where there are only 4 contracted paths per
hour, isolated 3 aspects with several km between stop signals would generally be perfectly
sufficient unless the timetable required some trains to run in rapid succession.
Requirement- The headway requirement at 40 kmh-1 similarly constrains the maximum spacing:
near stn DGR = 1610 - 400 - 225 – 135 = 850m. Hence 3 aspects are suitable, spaced between 125 and
(non-stop) 425m. Given the close spacing, percentage excess braking is not a significant consideration.
Requirement- The key area for line capacity is D-E since:
stopping • trains are decelerating to comply with 40 kmh-1 limit, yet signals positioned on line
where permissible speed is 100 kmh-1 must reflect 775m braking distance,
• ECS moves to depot makes this the most intensely used section,
• stopping trains decelerate to a stand and then remain stationary for a station dwell time.
Hence the headway effect of this speed profile must be considered:
To accelerate / decelerate between 40 kmh-1 and 80 kmh-1 is assumed to occur at a constant

0.5 ms-2 so therefore takes just over 22 seconds.
Distance travelled is represented by the “area under the graph” and thus during these periods is
the average speed multiplied by time. Assuming a 30sec station dwell time (generally for a
major station such as E this is inadequate but see later).
section a b c d e f g h
time TBD 22s 45s 22s 30s 22s TBD 22s
distance TBD 367m 500m 125m 0m 125m TBD 125m

Note how the acceleration & braking periods are calculated first; hence the distance (and therefore the time) of
the constant speed portions can then be calculated as these obviously form the remainder. The TBD (=To Be
Determined) entries in the previous tables can then be calculated to achieve the final required result.
The 40 kmh-1 limit extends some 650m on the approach to the platform stopping position; thus section c is 625-
125= 500m long which is traversed at constant 11.11 ms-1 taking 45seconds.
A train leaving the platform needs to travel sufficiently to clear the platform starter’s overlap before another
train can reutilise that platform. The longest stopping train is 200m and, assuming 225m overlap (we could
potentially choose to reduce this length given the low permissible speed), it would need to travel 450m
(assuming 25m stopping position prior to signal). The train will initially accelerate as per section f, and then
continue at constant 11.11 ms-1 for the remaining 325m (as may not accelerate until the rear of the train has left
the speed restriction). Therefore it will take a total of 22+30= 52 seconds.
Ignoring the need for a mid-platform signal to protect the scissors crossover on platform 4/5 and considering
platform 1, the signal protecting the platform needs to be placed a minimum 775m in rear. Hence 150m of the
distance travelled from this signal will be in section b of the speed profile.
From v2 = u2 + 2 as, train speed on passing signal is √[(11.11)2 + 150] = 16.5 ms-1
Hence time taken to travel the 150m is (2 x 150) / ((16.5 +11.11) = 11 seconds.
The time from passing signal to coming to stand in station is 11 + 45 + 22 = 78 seconds.
Adding together the arrival and departure timings gives 130 seconds, and thus only 15 seconds is available at
the station in order to comply with the required 145s design headway. This is insufficient for a train dwell time
and is also insufficient to allow for the route setting / aspect clearance necessary if two platforms are to be used
alternately.
• It is possible to reduce the time needed for departure by providing a shorter overlap length. Given the
low speed it could be reduced to 80m and thus the departure time would be reduced to 22 + (180 /
11.11) = 38 seconds.
• However the dominant factor is the time needed for arrival and to reduce this requires the signal spacing
to be closed up. This necessitates several 4 aspect signals for the stretch of line where the permissible
speed is 80kph but trains will be braking for the forthcoming 40kph limit. It is undesirable to provide
an isolated 4 aspect signal within a 3 aspect sequence; a minimum group of three are usually provided.
Given the constraints relating to the tunnels and junction D, this seems a reasonable solution in this
case. [A similar treatment of the Down line between junction F and station E also seems appropriate.]
Positioning a signal between the North and Middle tunnels would reduce the section to around 600m
and thus reduces the arrival time to about 67 seconds.
Hence these changes would permit a station dwell time of 40 seconds and still allow the headway to be
achieved. Although this is a short time for a major station (and wouldn’t allow the interconnection needed), the
required headway could be achieved by the timetabled utilisation of two platforms alternately; this would permit
much longer dwell times that would in reality be needed at such a station.
NB With defensive driving, braking would probably actually start at the sighting point of the first caution- YY in
the case of 4 aspects. This would have the effect of extending arrival timings and I suspect in reality would
NOT be possible to achieve the headway requirement!

Discussion of station dwell time

1
2
Train 1 is in platform 1 whilst train 2 arrives in platform 2 (commences dwell time).
Once overlap releases the trailing points [15s], train 1 routed out of platform 1 [10s].
Signal clears [5s] and after short delay [10s] train 1 departs.
Train 3 routed into platform 1, junction signal clears once train 1 clears overlap [38s].
Train 1 runs into station [67s], the overlap is released once timed to stand [15s] and train 2 is then routed out of
platform 2 [10s].
Signal clears [5s] (end of dwell time) and after short delay [10s] train 2 departs.
Hence whereas only 15+10+5+10 = 40 sec of no train movement at each transition (and thus the headway
requirement is achieved), each individual train is actually at the platform for 175 seconds (effectively one “train
path”).
The station featured on the layout is different in detail but the same principle applies, with trains being able to
wait in the bay platform until there is a path to enable them to reach the depot.
Note that a more full explanatory approach to the same layout calculations in given in
Appendix W.

1.5km
1.0 km
A
G.23 Activity:
B Layout Calculations D
Now do the calculations for this one by yourself

C E
2004 Layout Info for Headway Calcs
Passenger Freight
Train lengths 200 m 400 m
Acceleration rate 0.5 m/s/s 0.5 m/s/s
Braking rate 0.5 m/s/s 0.5 m/s/s
Permitted Speed 120 km/h 90 km/h
Traffic C-E 2 / hr stopping -
2 / hr NON stopping -
A-E 2 / day stopping -
C-B via D - 6 / day

Line Speeds Main and Branch 120 km/h
Branch single – double connections 75 km/h
Other and other turnouts 40 km/h
Headway requirements Following fast at 100 km/h 2.5 mins
Following stopping 4 mins
Station dwell time 30 sec
Results of Calculations
Speed converts Braking Train Green to Red N (ratio of
to Distances separation for for headway DGR to SBD)
NON-STOP
(min) headway (max) (max)

120 km/h

100 km/h
90 km/h
75 km/h
40 km/h
Time taken for accelerating train to clear overlap =
STOPPING
Time taken to decelerate to a stop =

Having calculated the numbers, then decide what this is implying about the appropriate
form of signalling to provide on the various portions of the layout. See whether you get
the answers to work out approximately the same as given in Appendix W.
Appendix H:
This Appendix has yet to be written

Appendix J: Pointwork- Foul, Flank and Trapping

J.1. Pointwork
Although not strictly necessary for module 2 (being more relevant to module 3 or 5) an outline
description of some of the track elements of pointwork is included in this section; it is clear that
those who have never played with model railways generally have very little understanding of
pointwork. In particular it is very common for students to be confused between the different forms
of pointwork when attempting to signal the layout so this section is included to attempt to explain
them. Some railways may not employ all these categories of pointwork or may utilise different
nomenclature from that which is used in the UK Mainline environment. It is worth making sure
that you know the difference between a switch diamond, a swing nose crossing and a double slip!
Points, or turnouts as track engineers refer to them (they would say that the “point” itself is the
tapered rail forming part of the “vee” of the crossing), are used where different tracks join; they
permit a train to be routed either on one line or another. In essence all pointwork consists of a
combination of Switches (the moveable lengths of rail where the wheel flanges first start to
transfer to the other alignment) and Crossings (where the wheel flanges need to pass through the
alignment of the other running rail) and hence the other term: S&C. It includes fixed crossings
where one track needs to cross another, but there is no choice of routes for trains on either track.
The simplest and most common arrangement is the plain lead which consists of one pair of switch
rails and one acute crossing.
Signal engineers inevitably concentrate their attention on the switches since these need to be
driven, locked in position and proved to be so via the detection; however it is important to
remember that the crossings also form an important component. In every piece of pointwork there
is a need for the flange of the wheel running on one rail to cross through the path of at least one
other rail; this obviously requires there to be a short gap but to ensure smooth and safe passage
additional components to guide the wheel set adequately are also necessary and these together
comprise the crossing For high speed turnouts the angle of divergence needs to be shallow and the
consequence is that the length of the gaps in the intersecting rails would be excessively long. In
these cases the crossing itself is designed to have a moving portion of rail- a swing nose crossing;
the signal engineer must now become involved since this then needs to be treated as a separate
point end with its own special POE to drive, lock and detect it.
Similar considerations apply for diamond crossings where two tracks cross without joining;
traditionally there are no moving parts. Therefore the signal engineer only needs to be concerned
about:
• their implications for train detection: ensuring a train has moved sufficiently far from the
divergence that it is no longer foul and, in the case of track circuiting, that IRJ are installed
in suitable positions to enable suitable track circuiting arrangements to be designed.
• the need to provide interlocking to prevent collision at the intersection of the two tracks in
order to ensure that only one path through the crossing is in use at any one time.
However the more acute (i.e. the more nearly “parallel” rather than “perpendicular”) the angle
between the tracks, the greater the length of unsupported wheel through the crossing. This tends to
be necessary in connection with higher speed track layouts and at higher speeds smooth running is
even more important; therefore fixed diamond crossings are inappropriate and switch diamonds
need to be provided instead. Instead of obtuse crossings, two pairs of switch rails are provided
“toe-to-toe” and hence the signal engineer is again involved since these comprise two point ends to
be driven, locked and detected. It is occasionally necessary for the acute crossings also to be
achieved by a swing-nose arrangement; this is very unusual (but does feature in an IRSE exam
Module 3 track layout included in Appendix D).
Plain Lead
The simplest and most common arrangement is the “plain lead” consisting of:
• a pair of switches (otherwise known as tongues or blades), and
• one acute (sometimes called “common”) crossing which is either fabricated from separate wing
and splice rails or is one complete cast crossing.
The switches (sometimes called tongues or blades) have a long length of planing so that the running
surface of the closed switch very gradually becomes further from the stock rail as the distance from the tip
increases and it becomes fatter; for sharp radius turnouts this may just be around 2m, but for high speed
divergences could be close to 20m). Once full width has been achieved there is a distinct but shallow
angle between the switch and its associated stock rail and so the separate routes diverge. This
arrangement first transfers the wheel at the closed switch to run on the switch rail and then very slowly
deflects the wheelset from its former course; the wheel at the open switch remains on the stock rail and the
wheel flange must pass through the gap (“flangeway” giving adequate “free wheel clearance) between the
stock rail and the open switch.
The switches are supported in slide chairs, the extent of sideways movement is greatest at the toe end and
gradually reduces until the heel of the switch which is firmly fixed; the switch rails do however need to
be held firmly in place during the passage of a train (how this is achieved depends on the POE but in the
UK the stretcher bars are an essential component in this regard).
Although the two tracks are by now at a distinct angle to each other they are not yet separate; the wheel
which is running on the closed switch has still to pass through the line of a rail of the other track. The
wing rail guides this wheel into the necessary gap prior to the splice rail, whilst the guard rail ensures that
the other wheel cannot drop off its stock rail by acting on the back surface of the wheel flange if
necessary.
The diagram in the right above show the essence of the arrangement, albeit for a sharp set of
hand points such as might be found in a yard. It depicts what is known as a fabricated crossing,
with all the separate components being individual pieces of rail that have been planed, bent and
bolted together to form the whole assembly. Generally these are instead manufactured as
manganese castings as one complete unit; for a time large castings were used but these proved
problematic and the current practice is to use semi-castings where the crossing itself is a casting
but it does not include the long legs at each corner- instead it is welded to the separate rails.
The left hand diagram gives a better view of the part of the point of greatest interest to signal
engineers as it depicts the planed section of the switches, the stretcher bars maintaining the
correct separation of the switch rails and the soleplate on the wooden sleeper / concrete bearer for
the similar purpose of maintaining the gauge of the stock rails adjacent to the switch tips.

Note that many continental railways refer to the lie of points as being Left or Right rather than Normal or
Reverse utilised in the UK. Certainly the UK nomenclature has its origins in mechanical signalling and is
far more appropriate in the environment when points are returned to their normal lie whenever they are
not specifically required in the other position; under MAS points are almost always left in their last
position until required in the other.
One problem that the UK would have in
adopting the continental nomenclature is the
inter-mixing of standards.
It is unfortunate that R is the initial letter of
both Right and Reverse and thus a dangerous
confusion could occur. Similarly right could
be misinterpreted as meaning “correct”.
Furthermore, when a set of points is being
“corresponded” by one person trackside to a
person at the control centre to establish a
common understanding of the point lie, the
nomenclature “Left Hand Switch Closed” /
“Right Hand Switch Closed” is defined to be
used. Obviously this definition of left / right This point position is described as Left Hand Switch
is completely opposite to the continental Closed (as seen from the track looking at the switch tips
definition of left /right as the latter is based as if to traverse the points in the facing direction).
upon the destination of the train and thus is This lie would divert a train to the Right.
the same as the open switch; the potential for The continental definition would therefore be that the
a catastrophic misunderstanding should be points are set Right.
apparent!
The number on the sleeper identifies that these points are
Therefore the historic nomenclature for Normal when the right hand switch is closed; i.e. as
describing the interlocking’s definition of depicted therefore they are lying Reverse.
point lie persists; it’s too hard to change!

Fixed Diamond
Another simple arrangement is the fixed diamond crossing used where the alignment of two separate tracks
need to intersect but not join; the most common application is in conjunction with two plain leads to form a
“double junction”- the divergence of a double track branch from a double track mainline.
It consists of:
• two acute crossings (at the outer ends),
• two obtuse crossings (opposite each other at the centre),
• no moving parts,
and thus the significance from the signal engineer’s viewpoint is only the impact on the design of the train
detection system and interlocking arrangements. From a track engineer’s viewpoint however the item
needs careful design and maintenance to ensure safe passage of trains. In the diagram below the rails on
which no wheels run but are provided to ensure that the wheel is restrained so that it cannot leave the rail
are shown in dull red (representing the rust rather than the shine on their top surface); note that they are
provided wherever the other wheel on the same axle is having to pass over a gap in its rail. In the very
centre of the crossing however note that there has to be a length where no effective guidance can be given
to a wheel and thus reliance has to be placed upon it continuing to travel in the same direction. It is this
factor which limits the shallowness of the angle at which the two tracks may intersect; it depends on various
considerations including whether some stagger between the obtuse crossings can be introduced but the limit
is around “1 in 8” angle.
Very occasionally there is a need for two completely unrelated tracks to cross on the level via a fixed
crossing, for example there is a right angle crossing at Newark where a secondary route crosses the
mainline on the same level. The gauges of the two tracks can even be different, such as where the narrow
gauge steam railway is to cross the NR Cambrian route in north Wales.
Fixed Diamond Crossing

Note that the two tracks intersect but trains cannot be diverted from one to the other.
Trains can travel from:
• A to D, D to A.
• B to C, C to B.
Obviously interlocking is required to ensure that only one train attempts to pass through the area at any one
time, so although there are no moving parts this does not mean that the signal engineer should take no
interest in the arrangement!
Also consider the difficulty of placing IRJs in such arrangements; whilst every effort is made to avoid the
area in which there are check rails, if one is needed than one has to be provided in the check rail as well.

Switch diamond (sometimes called moveable angles)

If the angle between the two intersecting tracks is more shallow (in order to allow higher diverging speeds
through a double junction for example) the obtuse crossings become too long for the wheels to pass
smoothly through. Instead movable switch rails are provided so that one or other is in contact with one
fixed stock rail whilst there is a flangeway clearance at the other side, just as at a normal point end.
Note that the functionality of a switch diamond is the same as for a fixed diamond crossing; it allows the
intersection of train paths but not the transfer of a train from one line to another. The stock rails and switch
rails are essentially all straight and there is only a very short sharply tapered end rather than the much
longer planed section of switch rails on normal turnouts. There is therefore an unbroken path for one or
other wheel of an axle throughout its journey through the pointwork.
A 901B
B C
901A D
Switch Diamond Crossing

Separate point operating devices for the two ends are provided and these are always operated as a pair, so
that the rails are either placed as depicted in the diagram for the diagonal track or in the opposite position
for the horizontal track. When viewed as above the ends seem to operate in anti-phase- as 901A is moving
up then 901B is moving down and the track is either set for the “horizontal” or the “diagonal” path.
• A to D, D to A with the rails in one position
• B to C, C to B with the rails in the other position.
This diagram depicts such an arrangement (except that it was then referred to as “moveable elbows”) as
operated from a lever in a mechanical signalbox; it should be clear from the crank on the elbow timber how
the one operating rod was used to drive the switch rails in opposite directions.
Note that the length of taper planing on the

switches is very much shorter than for a normal
switch. The angle is arranged to match that
between the abutting stock rails so that the planed
edge of the switch fits up snugly to one stock yet
its running surface is parallel to the opposite stock
rail. The planing is thus over the extent of around
one sleeper bay rather than very many metres.

As far as possible, modern P’Way layouts are designed to utilise a small range of standard components and
consist of a succession of independent plain leads. Crossings are provided as required, these are generally
now switch diamonds except in low speed areas. However this can mean that junction layouts are very
long and the consequence is that sometimes the required operational moves cannot be provided utilising
this approach within the space available. Hence other more complicated S&C arrangements are provided
where necessary, generally in confined areas on the approaches to stations which are slow speed. This is an
example of the type of compromise between conflicting requirements that is often experienced within
railway engineering and there has to be an appropriate balance struck for the individual site circumstances
between:
• higher speed S&C utilising standard components. This gives RAMS and cost advantages for the
track engineer and the passenger gains from the speed and comfort achievable; however there may
be associated disadvantages:
- lack of flexibility in the track layout (can’t get from anywhere to anywhere) as well as
- negative effects on junction layout risk (because of the increased geographical extent of the
conflict between movements and the increased bi-directional use of tracks),
• bespoke S&C made specifically for the site to “squeeze a quart into a pint pot”. Custom design and
the use of non standard components are clearly major disadvantages, there are often much more
severely restricted speeds and less smooth passage through the pointwork as a consequence of
trying to achieve functionality despite the site constraints. However if it is essential to get the
maximum functionality (both in terms of the maximum possible routing opportunities within a
limited length of junction and to enable more “parallel moves” to be made simultaneously- benefits
of increased capacity and lower junction risk) then such an approach may be the only tenable one.
This is one facet of the multi-functional IDC Reviews which are necessary when developing a Signalling
Plan for a real re-signalling scheme. Accepting as an absolutely fixed “given” track layout designed by the
P’Way engineers is not regarded as acceptable nowadays by NR. Perhaps this situation may change again
when ETCS with its high level of train protection becomes standard; even so a track layout will need to be
assessed by its ability to deliver the required train service by operational modelling and thus be judged by
considering the “time dimension” rather than just the “2 dimensional, static” ability to route a single train
from one place to another that is the primary consideration of the track design engineer.

Single Slip
A single slip can be thought of a fixed diamond crossing which also incorporates two point ends that allow
a train to pass from one line to the other through a connecting chord. It would be possible to operate these
two point ends simultaneously, but this is not the usual arrangement; it is far more usual to pair one of them
with a point end on an adjacent line so as to form a crossover with it. See diagram in L.7 for example.
In the diagram below the rails which guide the inner faces of the wheel flanges are drawn in red
(representing the rust which accumulates on their top surface which is not used) and the switch rails (which
effectively are the difference between a fixed diamond and a Single slip) are shown in blue so that they are
more obvious in the diagram. In the lie drawn, the train would be routed via the slip connection from B-D;
in the opposite position the train will take the appropriate diagonal path and in this case the open switch
acts to some extent as a check rail for the obtuse crossing.
Single Slip
Single slips are only suitable for slow speed traffic and are utilised when it is essential to provide a layout
that enables all the necessary movements within a restricted length.
Note that whereas trains on two of the approaches can be directed to either of the lines beyond the fitting,
trains on the other two approaches can only cross the other track.
• A to D, D to A ] with points set in one lie
• B to C, C to B ]
• B to D, D to B with points set in the other lie.

Double Slip
As its name implies, the double slip has two chord connections so that it is possible for a train on any
approach to be directed to either of the lines beyond the fitting. It has the same functionality as two single
leads connected toe to toe, but these are effectively overlaid upon each other and thus occupy less overall
length.
Double Slip
Four pairs of switches need to be operated, one pair for each approach direction: A/B/C/D.
• Where point machines are utilised, one machine drives the four switch rails associated with
the A&B approaches and another the four switch rails for the C&D approaches; these
machines can only detect one pair of switch rails and therefore separate detectors are
provided for the other pair of rails being driven.
• Where clamplocks are utilised, each is a completely separate point end.
• However they are operated, the two ends on the same side of the double slips are always
paired together; the inner switch rails need to move simultaneously to avoid trying to occupy
the same physical space.
Trains can travel from
• A to C, C to A
• A to D, D to A
• B to C, C to B
• B to D, D to B
A double slip can be considered as being functionally equivalent to two single leads arranged “toe to toe”,
but with the two separate ends arranged to overlap each other to lessen the overall length of the formation.
The corresponding cost is increased complexity (number of switches and crossings) and lower permissible
speed; this is illustrated diagrammatically (the rails don’t actually do quite this!) below:
Note how the switch tongues of the “brown” and the “blue” now overlap each other and therefore the
relative positions of the point machines have changed over; also that what was one set of switches for each
has now become two sets which are always operated together (but are detected separately to ensure all have
moved appropriately).

Swing Nose Crossing

At the other extreme where long switches with shallow angles of divergence are required (almost always
associated with high speeds but potentially required by purely geographical issues), the “gap” at the acute
crossing would be excessively long. In order to prevent what would be too wide a length on unsupported
wheel, the nose of the crossing is made as a single blade switch rail which is either against one side or the
other in order to present a continuous rail surface. This means that it needs to be operated in unison with
the other switch rails and thus constitutes a separate end that must be set, locked and detected by the
signalling system.
Swing Nose Crossing
PHOTOGRAPHS
Photographs of many items of track-work as well as depictions given to the signaller are included in a
separate document contained on this CD. This has some extended captions to draw the student’s attention
to salient features and provide some background information to complement the detail included in this
Appendix.

J.2. Track Joints associated with Pointwork: FP and CP

A Signalling Plan represents a track by a single line and thus students with inadequate domain
knowledge tend to get confused by this convention. Whereas it is the switch tips which are of
primary interest to the signal engineer, do not forget that what is drawn on the signalling plan is
just an abstract representation of the reality.
Similarly the diagram below shows an overall general arrangement drawing of a typical trackside
installation at the toe end of the points; compare to the plan symbol adjacent.

Do not forget that:

• rail tracks are not single dimensional lines- they have a significant width and indeed the
trains which run on them are somewhat wider than the track gauge and thus significantly
overhang the line of rails,
• a long vehicle negotiating a curve adopts a position as a tangent to that curve. This increases
the overhang both between the bogie pivots (overhangs to the inside of the curve) and
beyond the bogie pivots (overhangs to the outside of the curve) and thus results in a wider
“swept path” due to the “centre throw” and “end throw”,
• trains extend longitudinally beyond their end axle,
centre
throw
end throw
end throw
• the practical realities of positioning axle counter heads or track circuit IRJs (particularly in
and around pointwork) also means that the train detection cannot necessarily guarantee to
detect an axle at all positions; for example if a pair of IRJs are not precisely opposite each
other then it is inevitable that an axle will get lost in the stagger if it stops in the critical area.
Hence it is important always to visualise the real site situation when considering how far beyond a
divergence a train needs to be before it is safe to move the facing points to their other lie and
signal another train on that other route. It is very common for exam candidates to demonstrate a
fundamental lack of such understanding in this regard, both when determining the train detection
arrangements in the Module 2 examination and when producing Control Tables for the Module 3
examination.
The important thing to appreciate is that the train detection boundary needs to be placed
sufficiently far from the divergence that there can be certainty that any train on one line is known
to be adequately clear of the junction before the points are used in their other lie. A position on a
“single line” representation schematic diagram that looks to be beyond the divergence is in reality
insufficient to prove that the two trains on separate tracks will not collide. Train detection needs to
ensure that it is safe to move the points and utilise them in their opposite position, not just that the
immediate area of the point itself is free of trains.
The details obviously depend upon the type of vehicles authorised to use the particular
infrastructure and thus the definitions used by different railways do vary; this section assumes
general NR infrastructure. Even within this there are variations; for example because of the
extended nose on trains such as Eurostar that run in certain restricted areas there has to be a
different definition. Despite Éire using rolling stock built to UK loading gauge, their track gauge
is slightly wider and thus the sideways overhang of the stock compared with the running rail is
less; conversely most continental railways use the same track gauge as the UK yet tend to have
wider and longer rolling stock since the lines were engineered to a more generous loading gauge.

The diagram below depicts two vehicles standing close to the convergence of the two separate
tracks and are as close to it as they can be without physically hitting; this is the Fouling Point [FP].
Fouling Clearance
Point Point
4.8m
1.88m
For a railway to operate safely there is obviously a need for a minimum passing clearance between
vehicles, allowance made for the dynamic effects of vehicle movement, tolerances etc. In addition
it must be remembered that train detection (whether axle counters or track circuits) does not detect
the ends of vehicles but the position of the wheelsets and these can be significantly set back from
the extreme ends of the vehicles themselves. Hence each railway has to define a Clearance Point
that takes these factors into account.
The equivalent representation on a Signalling Plan is depicted at the same longitudinal scale in the
diagram below; note that the Clearance Point [CP] is very significantly beyond the apparent
separation of the two tracks as shown using a single line depiction of the track. The CP is the
minimum distance which the train detection section must extend beyond the divergence in order to
ensure sufficient clearance between two trains on the separate lines; hence unless there is good
reason to do so track section divisions should not be placed between it and the switch tips
Clearance
Point
Any train detection joint closer to the convergence than the Clear Joint
Clearance Point is a FOUL Joint
CP

Note that it is often necessary to have a track joint closer to the divergence than this; they are
provided to divide the area into two separate track sections in order to permit simultaneous
movements to be made on two parallel tracks. The joint between the ends of a crossover between
two parallel tracks at the conventional 6 foot spacing is one obvious example; similarly where
there is a double junction there is the need for such joints in the immediate proximity to the
diamond crossing / switch diamond (see diagrams in section J3 ).
Where such joints need to be provided but cannot be at the necessary clearance, the joint is known
as a “foul joint” and must not used to prove that a train has passed clear of the pointwork. Hence
the adjacent track circuit must also be incorporated into the locking of points and / or the aspect
control of signals and is referred to as a ‘foul track’ in this context.
• Candidates for the Module 3 examination are generally expected to recognise which joints
are certain to be foul; do not rely on this being explicitly shown on the diagram and state a
reasonable assumption if it is felt there is insufficient information to be able to decide.
• Conversely candidates for the Module 2 paper are well advised to annotate any joint
positions which are deliberately placed in positions that are known to be foul or which are
intended to be “just clear” but could be misinterpreted. This is probably best achieved by
depicting the relevant CP on the diagram to show which side of it a joint is intended where it
is “tight”.
FP Fouling Point (NR)

is determined by finding the place where the diverging rails first become 1.97m apart (measured at
right angles to the track concerned, running edge to running edge). At some sites where tracks are
particularly closely spaced because of tight clearances, then it is the place at which the tracks first
run parallel.
CP Clearance Point (NR)
is determined by measuring along the rails away from the convergence a distance of 4.88m from
the FP. Note that there are some specific sites where it is defined to be closer (due to the lack of
space and therefore consequential restrictions are placed on the varieties of rolling stock authorised
to use the line) and conversely where it has to be defined to be further (for example where
Eurostars with their extended nose beyond the leading axle need to operate).
.

J.3. Positioning Track Joints near Pointwork

Referring to the previous diagrams it should be clear that a set of points must be locked for the
passage of a train from the time when the route is initially set until such time as the entire train has
passed sufficiently beyond the area that it is safe for them to be moved to their other lie.
Many railways therefore employ sectional release of route locking in order to make maximal use
of the layout so that the locking on points can be released as soon as they are no longer required
for a particular movement. Hence the positioning of the limits of any train detection section which
includes points is critical and must be selected so that it:
a) provides the earliest possible release, yet on the other hand
b) maintains the locking for as long as is needed for safety. If the joint is positioned too
close to the divergence and the points are then moved to their other lie, a second train
routed over them could hit the one that has only just passed over the points in their former
lie.
The diagram below depicts a trailing crossover between a double track line, with the separate point
ends denoted as 901 and 902.
901 Track Circuit A #3 Track Circuit B

#2 #1
Track Circuit D Track Circuit C #2
902
#3
• Joint #1 allows simultaneous moves over points 901 & 902 in their normal lie. Without it
track circuits A and C would operate as one and thus a train on one line would revert the
aspect for the one on the other. Note that for lines spaced at approximately six feet, this joint
is foul. Generally point ends 901 and 902 would in fact be operated together as a crossover
(say 901A and 901B) and thus achieve flank protection automatically; provided the
interlocking controls for signals reading over 901N also detect 902N this avoids the need to
prove track circuit C in those aspects (and thus it does not actually get regarded as a foul
track).
• Joints #2 & #3 should be positioned close to the points to enable them to become unlocked
as soon as possible after having been traversed by a train; however they need to be
sufficiently far away to be able to prove clearance.
- For lines spaced nominally at six foot, joints #3 should therefore be placed
approximately in line with the switch tongue of the points on the adjacent track.
- Joints #2 occasionally have to be placed very close to the switch tongues but a distance
of at least 5m should be provided wherever possible (due to mechanical considerations
of track engineering). Indeed to allow the use of standard P’Way components at as
many sites as possible, the preference is to position the IBJ at least 10m from the tip of
the switches (20m in the case of FBV = Flat Bottom Vertical fittings since a transition
rail to the normal inclined rail used for plain line is also required); however these
dimensions are not always compatible with an operable track layout from a signalling
perspective and so cannot be provided, though they should be respected when
practicable to do so.

• Note however that joints #2 and #3 are only required to be close to the points when the
layout is such that the release of their locking actually permits another route to be set; if no
advantage can be obtained then the requirement to be economical dominates and the next
available joint can often be utilised instead thus saving a track section.
• Conversely where there is an area of concentrated point work, then a joint may have to be
provided that is closer to the points than #3; these are necessitated by the requirement to
permit parallel moves and would be too close to prove clearance and thus the interlocking
must treat them as foul.
Therefore, in summary, the Signalling Plan design should:

a) aim that joint positions are placed beyond the clearance point wherever possible,
b) identify as such any foul joints which need to be provided (except those which are
safely contained between two points of the same number as discussed above) to permit
parallel movements; see section 7.9.1.
The diagram below depicts a typical double junction arrangement consisting of a facing single lead
(101 points), a trailing single lead (201 points) and a fixed diamond crossing which permits trains
on the Up Branch to cross the Down Main in order to join with the Up Main.
21
h
anc
Br
n
ow ch
D an
p Br
U
Y
Z
11 13
#
# 32
Z X Y
Down Main 101 #

Up Main X Z
Y 201 #
22 20
It is important for the student to understand the significance of the various track joints in the above
diagram:
• Joints X allow parallel moves, and MUST be provided within the S&C. These are foul
joints (remember that tracks are typically spaced at 6ft intervals and in these circumstances it
should be obvious that there is no possibility of the separation being sufficient to prove
clearance).
• Joints Y allow the points to be freed as soon as the junction has been cleared- obviously
these must be beyond the relevant CP to be able to be used for that purpose, but as close as
this permits in order to be able to achieve prompt release.
• Joints Z will be dependent on factors other than the requirements for the operation of the
junction, e.g. the position of the protecting signal. There is no particular need to have these
close to the junction since the lines are uni-directional and these positions are only used by
trains arriving at, not leaving, the junction. If bi-directional working were provided then
there may be a need to position them close- it depends on whether any additional expense is
justified by the operational benefit.
• To emphasise which of these joints are utilised to prove clearance those which must be
positioned at least as far as the relevant CP are additionally annotated #.
J.4. Flank Point Protection

Where there are multiple sets of points in a junction area, it is often possible to provide protection
to a valid route against the risk of collision by a train on a conflicting route that has failed to stop
at its protecting signal. Setting and locking points which are not directly required for the line of
route is called Flank Point Protection and is an interlocking control needing to be shown on
Control Tables (as in the IRSE Module 3 examination). However the design of the track layout
itself, and the way in which the points are numbered as pairs, very much determines the level of
flank protection which can be provided for a layout and is therefore a Signalling the Layout
consideration relevant to Module 2.
It is also important to comprehend how the issues of foul tracks and flank protection are related:
• A signal’s aspect should always prove that any track section foul of the route is clear (this
even includes shunt routes which do not necessarily prove all track circuits in the route itself
to be clear).
• Tracks beyond a protecting signal but are not so close to the set route as to be foul are known
as flank tracks. Whether or not a signal’s aspect should also prove these sections clear varies
between signalling installations- essentially it is a balance of risk:
- is it better to ensure prompt replacement of a valid aspect to act as mitigation against a
SPAD at a protecting signal?, or
- is it better to omit this proving and achieve a layout where the effect of a particular
train detection failure is minimised?
Remember that placing all signals to red is not necessarily the safest option if it then requires
the railway’s operators to fall back on purely manual and procedural methods of signalling;
without the support of an interlocking humans operating the railway in a degraded mode in a
stressful situation are inevitably error prone despite their best efforts, procedures, training
etc. Hence whereas some sites include flank track proving, some omit entirely but the
current practice is to provide Overrun Track Protection by attempting to detect a SPAD by a
sequence of track operations in order to minimise the RAMS impact of proving the track
sections directly.
• The better form of flank protection is Flank Point Protection, whereby a SPAD movement is
positively diverted from the set route. This is achieved automatically when two ends of
points are numbered as a pair such as a crossover. It can be achieved by interlocking with
separately numbered points; indeed on certain layouts the numbering of points as single ends
can increase the options available to provide Flank Point Protection rather than forcing two
point ends always to operate simultaneously. When flank points are in the adjacent line they
are generally within a track circuit which is foul of the route; if the route sets, locks and
detects the foul points then the foul track circuit does not have to be proved by the signal’s
aspect.

This is best understood by considering the following example. 21
ch
B ran
wn h
Do anc
WX p Br
U
XZ
11 13
32
AA AB AC AD
Down Main 101
Up Main CT CS CR CQ
201
22 20
• When the route 32A(M) is set, there may seem to be no requirement for points 101 to be in
any particular position. However Flank Point Protection would certainly call these points
Reverse so any overrunning trains from Signal 11 would not give a head on collision with
correctly routed train; at worst there would be a significantly less risky rear end collision
with a train at signal 21.
• Note that the joint between CS and AB has been provided to provide parallel moves on the
Main lines but that a train on CS moving over 201 Reverse would still be foul of the Down
Main. The aspect of signal 11B(M) would need to prove: (CS or 201N). Arguably there is
no need for 11B(M) to set, lock & detect 201N as there is no signalled move for which those
points would be providing flank protection; however it is probably best to at least set & lock
201N as there is no disadvantage by doing so. If it is decided also to detect 201N in the
aspect of 11B(M) then CS need no longer be considered as a conditionally foul track circuit
for that route.
• Track AC is foul of moves from Signal 32, the joint having been provided for other
purposes. Hence a train on route 11B(M) must continue to prevent the setting of 32A(M)
whilst AC is occupied. This is a good reason for making 11B(M) at least set & lock 201N
and then maintain this locking by route locking as far as AC; the availability of 201 points to
go Reverse is now sufficient to inhibit the setting of 32A(M).
• Note that the joint between AA and AB has been provided to provide parallel moves on the
Up and Down Branch but that a train on AB which has come from signal 11 would still be
foul of the route onto the Down Branch and thus points 101 need to continue to be locked
Normal. Hence the Normal to Reverse locking of points 101 must include track AB and also
the route locking as far as AB after route 11B(M); locking of the points thus will prevent the
setting of 11A(M). The aspect of 11A(M) should prove the conditionally foul track by
including: (AB or 201R); it is obviously important that the aspect is not replaced when a
train from the branch is traversing the diamond crossing as a parallel move.
• Similarly the aspect of 20A(M) needs to prove: (AB or 101N) since the CS/AB joint is foul
yet the aspect must not be reverted by a parallel movement along the Down Main. Track XZ
is sufficiently far away as not to be foul, but it is flank. A train that has failed to stop at 32
could eventually converge with the valid route but there are no points on the layout that can
be called to provide flank protection. The best mitigation that can be provided therefore is
the prompt reversion of 20’s aspect should there be a SPAD at 32; this could be the simple
inclusion of XZ as a flank track or by the provision of a more sophisticated means of SPAD
detection that gives availability benefits.

J.5. Trapping Protection

Trapping Protection is essentially similar to Flank Protection but whereas flank is provided to
minimise the risk of a signalled train overrunning its signal, trapping is primarily to avoid the risk
of endangering running lines from unattended vehicles moving from where they have been stabled,
perhaps due to brakes having been improperly applied.
Often the layout includes points which can be utilised to provide trapping protection (i.e. where
the siding / Goods Line continues beyond its junction with the running line, perhaps as a short
dead-end spur or a longer headshunt (sometimes called a “neck”) suitable for containing a long
train- see the diagram in Appendix L.7 for example). If such a point end on the parallel line is
numbered as crossover with the end in the running line, trapping protection is achieved
automatically.
However trap points (whose purpose is to derail and thus stop any inappropriate movement from
being able to stray onto the running line) need to be provided when there are no other connections
which can contain the vehicles within the siding / yard area. Candidates for the Module 2
examination must be certain to identify the places where these are required; be alert wherever there
is a convergence between two lines via a single connection (rather than via a facing and a trailing
end of points) and consider whether there is then a need to insert trap points and associated TCI.
The situations where it is necessary for there to be trapping include:
• sidings joining passenger lines,
• Goods Loops (both ends!) joining passenger lines,
• lines used exclusively for freight traffic joining passenger lines,
• possibly at entrance to bay platforms at stations (historically vehicles such as parcels vans
were regularly left for loading / unloading for extended periods at such sites but this is not a
feature of modern NR operations and therefore they would not be provided for new schemes
but continue to exist in many such areas) where there is a falling gradient steeper than 1 in
500.
FREIGHT LINE OR

SIDING
PASSENGER LINE
Where trap points occur in track circuited lines (see section 6.26.5), a track circuit interrupter must
be provided, as shown in the diagram above. Its purpose is to detect the fact that a trapping
incident has occurred and that there may now be a vehicle which has become foul of one or more
of the running lines. Since the vehicle may no longer have its wheels on the track there would
otherwise be a risk that the track circuit could show clear; the destruction of the interrupter forces
at least one track section to show occupied to the signaller. A common error is for candidates to
omit the interrupter entirely or to depict one in an incorrect position; remember that the symbol
represents the device which is physically broken by a wheel flange as it traverses a length of rail
along which there should never be any traffic.
In exceptional cases only, trapping is provided on the passenger railway where there are particular
risks, such as a swing / moveable bridges; the logic is that although a derailment is highly
undesirable it is actually preferable to the entire train plunging into a river.

The diagram below shows a spur beyond the placer where the Down Loop converges with track
for the other direction to create the single line section towards the next crossing loop. This spur
has been provided so that there is a valid overlap (the signal is insufficiently far from the loop end
for its overlap to be contained within it unlike the case for the Up Loop) which is needed to permit
a train to be brought into the Down Loop at the same time as one is in running into the Up Loop.
Note that the points leading to the sanddrag are actually full points (i.e. two switch rails and
crossing) rather than trap points (generally these have two switches but the rails stop prior to the
place where the crossing would otherwise be situated); however a TCI is provided. There is no
immediate derailment risk but there would be the risk of loss of train shunt (by virtue of the wheels
being lifted partially from the rails and becoming insulated as the train enters the sanddrag) and the
residual chance of the train hitting the end buffers and then potentially being deflected sideways
onto the adjacent line.
Down
Up
Obviously a TCI should only be provided where there cannot be a legitimate move made over it.
In the similar track layout shown below, the spur is used as a headshunt or shunting neck (in order
to be able to draw a train forward so that its rear then clears the points giving access to the
sidings); a TCI would be inappropriate and indeed specific trap points are not needed since
trapping is provided by point 937A. However a trap point complete with TCI would need to be
added at the other end of the loop (at the position of the arrow) so that the running line is protected
from any happenings within the Goods Yard.
HP
trap points required .

937A
Goods Loop
Single
937B

Appendix K: Single Lines

K.1. Head-on Collision Risk
Despite having relatively low traffic levels, single lines represent a significant collision risk and
therefore demand special consideration. A railway’s timetable is generally designed to avoid
conflicts at junctions in order to provide efficient operation and robust timekeeping; a side benefit
of this is that when trains are running to time the signalling system is not “stressed”; the trains
would not be at the same place at the same time even in the absence of interlocking. However the
situation is very different on a single line; to avoid long waiting times for trains at intermediate
places on the journey, the timetable will generally arrange approximately simultaneous arrivals
from opposite directions at an intermediate passing loop. Thus the location may only feature very
few trains a day, but those which are provided tend to be scheduled to arrive in pairs from opposite
directions within a few minutes of each other.
Further, should a train invalidly leave such a passing location and enter a single line section, there
is then a very high collision risk; once past the protecting signal there is a long “collision time
window” (see #15) and there is unlikely to be any other signal at which the train can be stopped as
a mitigation. The 1994 Cowden accident (see Appendix Y_Internet) was a fairly recent incident
where the signaller realised a collision was inevitable well before it happened but was powerless to
prevent the subsequent head-on crash. In addition the collision consequences are generally severe
since the closing speed of the trains is high, even on moderate speed lines.
In contrast on double track uni-directional lines the majority of collision risk is concentrated at
junctions; most of the length of railway is plain line which is reasonably low risk. On a mainline,
in general there is a low chance that a train will stop (except in a suburban environment where
station stops are a very significant issue), thus presenting an obstruction with which a following
train could collide. Even if the first train does stop, there is a chance that emergency braking may
be able to avert a collision, or at least reduce the consequences of collision by reduction of impact
speed and therefore energy. The closing speed of the trains is the difference between the speeds of
the two trains involved, rather than the sum of the speeds in the case of a head-on collision.
Obviously strenuous efforts are still required to minimise collision risk on such sections of line
(indeed high consequence accidents do occur, generally as a result of a train on the other track
running into the wreckage of what had been a relatively minor accident- for example at Clapham
Junction in 1988 see Appendix Y_Internet); it is just that additional precautions may be necessary
in the case of single lines in order to reduce risks to be ALARP since the potential risk is higher.

K.2. Establishing Directional Control

K2.1 Requirement for establishing a direction of use
Some form of directional control has been needed on single lines from the very earliest days of
railways.
• On double track lines, each track was uni directional and thus there could be a procession
of trains and the only requirement was the need for one driver to stop their train before
running into the back of a stationary one. Whilst services were sparse and speeds remained
low, operation by proceeding on sight was an initially acceptable means of working for the
safety standards of that time; when conditions changed and the accident rate became
intolerable, block working was introduced in order to enforce a space interval between
trains.
• Conversely on single track lines, it was appreciated that there did need to be some essence
of control; if two trains travelling in opposite direction met in mid-section (even in the
unlikely event of an accident being avoided) there would be an impasse requiring one of
them to reverse to the previous passing loop. This could be a considerable distance away and
this movement had to be undertaken very slowly. There was no guarantee that the loop
would actually be empty to allow the trains to pass; indeed further trains could also have
followed and they themselves would need to reverse. Such an event therefore had a great
impact on line capacity and smooth operation as well as safety.
K2.2 Different Methods of Directional Control

K2.2.1 Timetable
The first and primary means for avoiding such contentions for use of the line is the timetable;
however trains can become delayed for a variety of reasons, some passenger trains used to run to
connect with boats and thus times deliberately varied according to the state of the tide, freight
movements may well not be timetabled precisely, sometimes a train had to be run in two portions
due to heavy loading, other special extra trains were often run or others were cancelled either due
to failure or there being no traffic for conveyance etc.
K2.2.2 Train Order
Where no means of instant long distance communication was available, there was little option but
to adhere strictly to the planned train order of where such crossings were to take place. This
obviously led to unnecessary delays if a train in one direction was very late and there was also the
need for a means to recover the situation when a train didn’t run at all (e.g. perhaps wait for this
message to be communicated by a man on horseback, or just allow the train in the opposite
direction to proceed cautiously into the section anyway and hope that if the missing train was
really coming it was travelling slow enough to stop). This methodology soon proved
unsatisfactory and early railways generally adopted the telegraph to allow the flexibility to make
“real-time” modifications to the plan of where trains were to cross each other’s paths. To
appreciate the reason for the variety of methods of signalling of single lines that have been adopted
requires an understanding of the communications technology available at the specific location and
time in history.

K2.2.3 Telephone Block / Control Dispatcher Instructions

The ability for rapid telegraph messages to be transmitted between sites enabled the sharing of
information re how trains were running and allowed decisions to be taken whether an alteration
was needed to be made to the nominal passing arrangements. A centralised “Control” taking an
overview of the operation of an entire line became possible; its strategic view could be
disseminated for implementation at the distributed signalboxes, yard areas, train crew depots etc.
Whilst useful for any railway network, its role is particularly important in the context of single line
operation.
• For a railway which has local signalboxes for the operation of signals and points,
“Control’s” role is generally to coordinate the actions of the local staff so as to improve the
efficiency of traffic flowing on the network and thus primarily exert a supervisory
responsibility. The local staff remained responsible for the safe movement of trains on the
relevant section of line under their control and between the “islands of signalling”. This
could include negotiating with their immediate neighbours to make local decisions on where
trains should cross in the event of late running within the context of pre-defined rules. As
technology moved on, phones and radio links were utilised to replace the telegraph and such
systems of working fall into the general category of “telephone block”. A series of serious
accidents in the 1870s meant that this form of operation was deemed unsatisfactory in the
UK (see later in this section); elsewhere it survived in its basic form long enough for gradual
safety improvements to be incorporated. It can be appropriate to the operation of the single
lines on the periphery of a more intense railway network and is employed on rural lines in
countries such as France and The Netherlands for example- see [#7 section 6.4.2]. Current
implementations are generally supported by computer but no interlocking of the block status
and the signals (even if signals exist) on the lines is generally provided.
• For a railway without such developed local infrastructure and based on the assumption of not
having responsible station staff located at each remote site, “Control’s” role tended to
incorporate also the safety responsibility and directly authorise each individual traffic
movement. The sections of single line between passing places and yards on a trunk route
were traditionally operated on train priority, primarily based per timetable but modified as
required by dispatchers making “crossing orders” (i.e. making the movement authority given
to the train conditional upon it waiting at a particular passing loop until the arrival of a
specified train from the opposite direction). Such instructions were given to the driver at the
commencement of their journey but could be updated whilst the train was en-route by means
of instruction passed via telegraph. For example, consider the diagram on the following
page. If the eastbound train had been due to pass the westbound at loop C but was now
running late, a better crossing place would be at B to avoid unnecessarily delaying the
westbound train. It would therefore be necessary to get the information to the driver of that
train when at A and receive acknowledgement that this new instruction had been understood,
before it would be safe to give permission for the train at C to proceed as far as B (to make
the crossing there instead). In the language of the 21st century to describe this 19th century
method of operation, a co-operative shortening of MA for the eastbound train is a pre-
requisite to extending the MA for the westbound train.

A delayed westbound if B C D

held at C to await late
Time running eastbound train
Timetabled late running

westbound eastbound
possible path if

westbound crosses
eastbound at B
Timetabled
eastbound
late running
eastbound
eastbound driver
accepts instruction instruction given to
to pass train at B westbound driver to
Timetabled
rather than at C continue to B to pass
westbound
train there instead
Timetabled
eastbound Distance
In much of the world such methods proved satisfactory where traffic demands were light; thus they
have been retained in basic concept whilst being gradually improved up to the present day.
Fundamentally all such systems rely for their integrity on strict compliance with the rules and
effective safety critical communication. As experience grew and technology advanced they have
evolved over time in various manners on the different railways with the aim of improving safety
and efficiency without being too bureaucratic; these refinements generally formalise the
communication itself, ensure adequate recording and implement some form of appropriate
reminder system.

K2.2.4 Radio Dispatch

The introduction of train radio has meant that a centralised line controller can be in direct
communication with the drivers of several trains, either with coverage restricted to strategic places
along the line or benefiting from continuous coverage which can mean that such systems are more
flexible and efficient. Modern communications and distributed information systems have blurred
the distinction between what used to be regarded as a “Control” and what as a “signalbox”; often
where lines are modernised one former signalbox is retained to act as a Control for the line of
route and performs both functions. Modernisation of rural lines in parts of Europe has often
adopted radio dispatching; see references: #57/1, #57/4 for example.
In contrast where economies have been made in the operation of rural lines in the UK the basic
concept of the token has been retained; NSTR or RETB systems (see later) have been
implemented. The similarity is that in normal operation the operator to some extent does act more
as a line controller than a traditional signaller but the difference is that train dispatching does not
rely only on verbal commands. However the miniature gauge R&ER tourist railway in Cumbria
does utilise verbal radio messages direct to the drivers as their only authority to enter a single line
section (see #9/2, pages 119- 123).
Related Activities:
1. Discover more about the means by which operations on a single line can be directed
remotely and based primarily on verbal instructions. For example:
• An overview of the situation in the US is given in #39/1
• New Zealand’s “Train Warrant Control” is described in detail in #18 and #65/1
• Various enhancements (DTC/TMACS) of the basic Train Order Working used in
different parts of Australia are described in #61/1. In particular the additional
safeguard that can be provided by the use of spreadsheet held on a computer and
GPS on the trains is described in #66/5.

K2.2.5 Line Block

Where traffic was heavier, many European railways later introduced Siemens and Halske line-
block interlocking equipment. These instruments provided within the signalboxes at each end of
the section are electrically linked to coordinate the actions of the two signallers and interlock with
their signals. At its simplest, the proof that a section has become clear is the operation of a treadle
combined with the signaller observing the arriving train’s tail lamp but operation can be enhanced
either by continuous track circuiting or axle counter, depending upon the density of traffic and the
standards of the particular railway company. Fundamentally similar equipment is provided on
single lines as for block working on double track railway but with the additional functionality of
the direction of traffic at any instant being defined by the cooperative actions of people at either
end of the section; this tradition may partially explain why reversible signalling on double track
lines is more widespread in Europe than in the UK. See [#7 section 6.4.3] and #37/1, #67/4.
Sykes “Lock and Block” was the closest equivalent in the UK, but this was regarded as an
additional safety measure rather than the means of obviating the need for a token on a single line.

K2.2.5 Staffs, Tablets and Tokens

In the UK however the course of history was affected by a spate of serious single line collisions in
the 1870s which all stemmed from confusion regarding which train had been given the authority to
enter the relevant single line section (see #22). It was judged that giving the driver of each train
some physical evidence of their authority to enter the single line was the safest system of
working; block working was regarded as insufficient and this regulatory attitude persisted in the
UK for nearly 100 years.
• Some very minor isolated lines were only authorised to operate one locomotive at any one
time; this was termed OES (= One Engine in Steam). No signalling other than the locking
of facing points was required; having only one vehicle capable of independent movement
was regarded as an adequate control measure for mitigating the risk of collisions. The fact
that it takes many hours for a steam locomotive to become operable after its fire is first lit
was an effective mitigation against any well intentioned but rash decision to organise a
replacement locomotive if the first was assumed to have failed.
• Otherwise the simplest method is to define a person acting as “pilotman” who must
accompany all train movements through the section; this is still used as a degraded mode of
single line operation when the normal method of operation has failed, or where there is a
need to institute SLW on a uni-directionally signalled line when the other line is closed to
traffic due to incident or planned engineering work.
• The same security is given by the provision of one train-staff for each section; the drawback
is this is inflexible as the section has to be used alternately in each direction. However for a
dead-end line (or last portion of a line beyond the final passing loop) this is not a problem
and thus the method remains in use on a significant number of branch lines in the UK.
• A variant which overcame the inflexibility to some extent (given adequate pre-planning) was
the divisible train staff and this developed into “staff and ticket” working. It is barely used
nowadays; it needs people at the passing loops, it is susceptible to human error and can’t
cope with late changes to the plan of train movements. Where pilotman working has to be
introduced as a temporary measure for degraded mode working (and especially during
SLW), a succession of trains can be run in the same direction by the pilotman issuing tickets
to each train and then travelling on the last in that direction.
• The most common traditional method of working a single line is ETB; with this there are
interconnected instruments at either end of the section (and potentially also at other places).
These are arranged so that a token can be removed from any of them, but once one has been
removed from one, no more can be withdrawn from any until it has been returned to one of
the instruments. Hence possession of the token gives a train the unique right to be on the
single line but there are no restrictions (given an adequate number of spare tokens distributed
appropriately) on the sequence of train movements that can be made. Signals controlling the
entrance to the single line are also provided (which cannot be cleared until the withdrawal of
a token is proved to have occurred) but the driver must also possess the token before being
permitted to enter the defined single line section.

The first apparatus to be introduced was “Tyer’s Tablet” and there were in fact many
varieties of electric train staff, key token etc. (see #14); although the engineering details of
each system varied, at a functional level they were all very similar. The associated
disadvantages of:
a) requiring all trains to effectively stop to exchange tokens, and
b) needing to have a signaller at each passing loop, and
c) the single line section only being a single block section,
were generally tolerable in the UK context where in Victorian times,
- stations were relatively closely spaced,
- the passing loops almost all at stations (i.e. not every station having a passing loop but
extremely few places where a passing loop was required without a station, and these
were generally at junctions where the branch left another line and thus needed a
signalbox and slow running over pointwork),
- where most trains would be stopping anyway (normally the signaller leaves the
signalbox to hand the token to the driver whilst waiting in a platform but in some
circumstances the train is authorised to proceed up to the signalbox for the token to be
handed across), and
- labour was readily available and cheap.
• Special apparatus was developed for train and trackside to allow token exchange at speed;
however it is likely that Safety Case approval would prove difficult to achieve if this were
proposed today as a method of working! Only certain specific secondary mainlines at the
periphery of the network which had an occasional long distance express train warranted such
an operation; an extended station stop on most single lines was needed anyway for loading
and unloading miscellaneous light goods and mail from the guards van and for the crew to
oil around and perhaps replenish the steam locomotive’s water tanks etc. Hence ETB
dominated in the UK until manning levels of rural lines became a significant issue in the
1960s; some sections still remain unaltered but much has now evolved into NSTR or been
replaced by RETB or, where traffic justifies it, TCB. Relatively few NR lines still feature
physical token exchange between driver and signaller, but this method of operation is the
predominant one on the various heritage railways in the UK.
Much of the complexity associated with token systems arises from various attempts to minimise
their inherent disadvantages:
• Where trains cross, at least one of the trains has to remain stationary for a long time since the
token has to be collected from the second train when it arrives, be placed in the token
instrument and then a new token extracted and given to the driver; if the trains are long the
amount of walking can take a significant time. To save delay, auxiliary instruments were
sometimes provided closer to the front of the train so that the driver could insert / remove
tokens remote from the signalbox; see #16.
• With a basic token system each potential passing place has to be manned continuously whilst
the line is open, even at times of light traffic. To enable staff savings, it is necessary to have
a means by which the signalbox can “switch out”; this necessitates different operational
modes: “short section” when it is open and “long section” when it is closed. In general this
is achieved by having separate token systems for each of the modes, but these obviously
need to be interlocked against each other.

The issue is a very real one for the UK’s tourist railways which have highly seasonable
traffic; although volunteers are cheap they are not plentiful and thus when only one train is
operating the minimum staffing level is required. Conversely on gala days they operate as
intensive a service as it is possible to achieve and thus need the signalling that allows them
to maximise the use of their infrastructure- the single line sections are rarely unoccupied for
more than a few minutes between train movements and the lines can be far busier than they
ever were in their heyday.
A further complication is that most have grown gradually from one end over the years and
thus have historical legacies of their own former operational needs as well as being limited
by what redundant equipment which they can acquire; hence there is a great variety of
individual solutions. Reference #67/5 includes a description of the K&ESR’s novel
approach to the problem showing that even in 21st century token systems continue to evolve
to meet the operational need.
ETB became widespread in many countries following the British signalling tradition but was not
suitable everywhere:
• Unlike in the UK (where stations to serve a community were usually more closely spaced
than the need for passing loops on the line for traffic purposes), on long trunk routes through
undeveloped territory the reverse was true. Indeed some places where a passing facility was
needed operationally were not only truly remote but also effectively uninhabitable; therefore
any system requiring people to be based at such places was just not suitable.
• The capacity of a long single line section is severely limited if one train has to clear it before
a next can enter; capacity is much improved if there can be a flight of multiple trains
following each other in one direction followed by a change of directionality and then a
similar flight of trains in the opposite direction. This can be achieved with intermediate
block sections on a single line (as per a double track line) but is incompatible with the token
system and therefore some other means of establishing directional locking is required.
However in the UK it remained in use in use in significant quantities until the 1970s when
declining traffic and increased wage costs meant that there was a need for economy. One of the
problems was however that such lines where it was used didn’t warrant significant investment; see
section K.5 for information relating to the “variations upon a theme” that have since been
introduced. Although it has declined substantially, traditional token working is still utilised on NR
more widely than might be imagined and alterations / additions to existing systems have been
made in the 21st century, so do not regard it as “pure history” prematurely. In particular it ,or one
of the variants, is often a suitable means of operating the long single line that often features in
IRSE exam papers.

K2.2.7 Centralised Traffic Control and TCB

Therefore whilst historically many types of single line working grew up over the years around the
world they fell into two basic categories:
• those based on instructions given to the driver at the commencement of their journey
informing them at which loops they must wait until a specific train has arrived from the
opposite direction. Such working is generally relevant to very long trunk lines through
remote, and usually undeveloped, territory and therefore found in such places as Africa,
America, and Australia.
• those where there are areas of full signalling at each of the intermediate passing loops and
where the admission to the relatively short single line section between them is authorised by
signal (often supplemented by the handover of a physical token to the driver). Typically
such lines are cross-country interconnecting secondary lines or single ended branches off a
more intensively signalled railway network.
Since the latter proved a highly safe manner of operating the relevant secondary lines, there was no
significant development for nearly 100 years until it was no longer appropriate for the prevailing
circumstances. Conversely there was great motivation for improving the operation of lines which
were vital to a region’s economy but had little signalling infrastructure, being reliant largely on the
train crew following verbal instructions from a distant Control office as they passed through
sections of remote territory. It was on such lines that remote control first came into use; CTC was
developed to enable the operation of the points at the various wayside stations and provide
associated signals that could be directly controlled from the Control.
Once both ends of a section of single line are under the control of a single person who has some
visibility of the positions of trains on the route, many (but not all) of the special features of such
lines disappear and therefore their signalling can be much the same as for other portions of railway
line, be it at stations or on double track portions. However consideration must also be given to the
continued working of traffic in degraded mode in the event of failure of the signalling equipment.

K.3. Train Detection for Single Lines.

Assuming that an economical approach is required for the signalling of a particular single line, the
provision of full track circuiting for the entire length (of what is often a very significant length of
railway) is much too costly to be justifiable. The sparse traffic means that the block sections can
be long; track circuiting is expensive because:
• there is a need for much equipment (for most varieties of track circuits the maximum length
over which they can be made to operate safely and reliably is less than 1km, depending upon
environment) for which there is a capital cost, design, installation and commissioning cost
but above all an ongoing maintenance cost and reliability implications,
• there is also need for power supply and distribution, equipment locations, and
interconnecting cabling and thus some form of cable route along the entire line.
This cost of TCB is therefore disproportional to the traffic income and hence a cheaper form of
signalling is needed. Axle counter rather than track circuit train detection certainly offers some
advantages on such lines since only the number of sections actually required for operational
purposes are provided (subject to any technical limit of the distance of the Zp from the ACE for
the form of the technology, but on the latest systems this can effectively be unlimited). In addition
significant economy can be obtained since continuous power distribution and cable route along the
line can be avoided; each Zp requires:
• a power supply supported by a UPS but the source of power can be non-guaranteed and
derived from a power company locally, and
• a communications channel back to the ACE but this can be “local copper” (a Telecomms
paired cable) to a node on a digital transmission network such as FTN.
“Islands of signalling” can thus be provided where required without the need for infrastructure
throughout the length of the line. Whilst this gives significant economies and therefore may be
suitable for a certain level of traffic (especially useful if the line forms part of a useful through
route and thus is occasionally used by diverted trains as an alternative to a mainline closed for
engineering work etc.), on certain lines the traffic is too low even to justify this lower cost
particularly if communication facilities do not exist. Modern technology now allows the requisite
level of security for vital functions to be provided by secure coding thus permitting use of the
Telecomms “communications cloud” which can include radio transmission, a fibre optic network
and even satellite links. This allows controls and indications to be arranged even for the most
remote places and could potentially revolutionise the control of such railways; however it has yet
to become significant in practice. As ever the economics of the situation needs to be carefully
considered and the provision of the requisite power supply can also be an issue although improved
battery technology and use of locally generated power (solar, wind) also means that many things
are now possible that were previously impracticable.

K.4. Single Lines: Islands of Signalling.

Whereas such a methodology can be appropriate for certain lines, there is still the need to provide
some limited signalling and this generally requires both power and vital control circuits.
Traditionally this has meant lineside multicores but other technologies are now becoming available
with secure transmission over a network or radio link now becoming a practicable and cost
effective solution for the control of remote signals isolated from the remainder of the signalling
infrastructure.
Indeed radio transmission direct to the train itself is often a favoured option, thus eliminating the
need for the provision and maintenance of lineside signalling at the site; the reciprocal is that
suitable train borne equipment is needed and this has tended to restrict this option to lines utilised
only by a limited number of vehicles that can be suitably equipped.
In the traditional context however, the solution has tended to be the concept of “islands” of limited
local signalling at each passing loop separated by relatively long sections. Historically a signalbox
was provided at each site working local signals and points mechanically, and utilising a form of
block working to its neighbours in each direction. In contrast to double track lines where block
working is provided to provide a safe separation between following trains in the same direction, on
single lines the block working is also used to define the direction of use of the single line at any
particular time. Such a means of working can be safe and effective and was appropriate when
labour was cheap and technology limited; in the current environment it is generally hopelessly
uneconomic but remains in use primarily where the capital cost to re-signal in another manner
cannot be justified. This is largely dependent upon local factors which determine how many
signaller jobs can be saved, for example the presence of level crossings, depots etc. can be a major
influence.
Remote control of such islands of signalling from one particular control centre whilst retaining
long block sections between them has generally not been a UK practice; in essence either the line
was busy enough to justify inclusion within an MAS scheme (probably with isolated 3 aspect
signalling), or the traffic low enough that a more basic (see section K.5) solution to be appropriate,
or indeed the line still retains what is effectively 19th century signalling. In countries which have
very long remote single lines carrying trunk traffic, such as in parts of the USA, Africa and
Australia (see #18, #57/3, #61/1) for example, the situation was different and these have often
deployed a form of CTC.
K.5. Single Line Portions: Forms of Directional Control

Hence in the UK other methods of working evolved:
• on lines where all the trains need to perform a station stop at the place where tokens are
exchanged, little additional time is needed to perform the activity. Therefore the token
system itself is retained but drivers themselves obtain the required token from an instrument
housed within a hut on the platform and the system of working is called NSTR. Significant
cost savings and associated flexibility result from the closure of the signalboxes at the
intermediate passing loops.
• on secondary mainlines where non-stop running is important, tokenless block was
introduced (often at the time when a former double track line was “singled” to save P’Way
maintenance costs).
Uncompleted section: for additional information see for example reference #16.

K.6. More Economical Alternatives to MAS Colour Light Signalling.

It is important to recognise that even a dead-end single line requires at least one signal at the far
end of the line if the line is operated under TCB; this is needed to authorise the return journey by a
train changing direction at the terminal platform / freight depot. Whereas the other signalling can
be passive (i.e. a red light / reflectorised stop board at the end of the line and a reflectorised distant
board braking distance prior to it), such a signal must be active and is thus disproportionally
expensive to provide. Therefore it is advantageous for the line to be worked under some other
system of working; in the UK these tend to be variants of One Train Working either implemented
by means of a staff or token (carried by the driver as the prime authority to be on the line) or by
other means OTW-NS. Generally this has been implemented by creating a relay memory that
something has entered the line and resetting the line status to clear when a sequence of track circuit
and treadle operation proves that something has returned to the MAS portion with continuous track
circuiting. However this system cannot prove that the section is indeed vacant; this responsibility
is allocated to the driver who should not exit the line unless they can be sure that their train is
complete. It is a particularly appropriate method for signalling the final section of single line to a
passenger terminus operated by a MU train service. Nowadays a better solution for this situation
would be provision of an axle counter with a single Zp; this would provide a greater degree of
integrity and less complexity. However the line would still need to be operated under OTW-NS
rules in order to avoid the need to provide a signal at the point of reversal.
OTW-NS can be utilised for a line which ends at a significant siding complex, as for example at
docks or colliery. In this case the limits of the running line and the depot must be clearly
delineated by signage and a means of communication must be provided to the signaller from the
far end in order that there can be verbal authorisation to enter the single line portion. It is possible
however for vehicles to be left within the complex and indeed for there to be shunting locomotive
on that site; this area would be controlled locally (see Appendix L) but the single line portion
would continue to be regarded as occupied until the train engine had returned, albeit possibly with
a different train of vehicles. This means of operation is quite restricted and is only satisfactory
where the level of traffic is suitably low, perhaps a couple of trains a day. If an axle counter were
provided in such a scenario then it is clear that a Zp would be required at the nominated end of the
single line, just prior to the transition into the yard.

K.7. Point Operation

Where there is a need for points on the running line itself, a means of ensuring that these are
correctly locked in the correct position for the movement to be made over them is required. Hand
operated points are therefore not appropriate although one option is the provision of a Ground
Frame. This enables the guard of the train to throw the points manually, but only after the Ground
Frame has been released directly or indirectly from the responsible signalbox. Generally the
Ground Frame is provided in close proximity to the points, but occasionally it may be a former
signalbox that has been retained as a Ground Frame; in either case it is essential that the operator
has a clear view of the relevant area of track. Such an arrangement is adequate for occasional
traffic into a freight siding at an intermediate place on a lightly used (not necessarily single track)
route or at a terminal station where there may be a need to perform some shunting or a locomotive
to be run around its train for the return journey. However it is not in general suitable for an
intermediate passing loop; the process is too time consuming and the fact that two trains are
involved adds to the risks.
Advantage can be taken of the fact that a train arriving at a passing loop is always to be routed into
the same loop (in the UK almost invariably the left of the pair). In principle, spring points can be
used to direct trains taking them in the facing direction appropriately yet permit a train to trail
through them from the direction in which they are not set with the spring returning them to their
normal lie once it has passed. This arrangement can certainly be used for the “arrival” and
“departure” roads within depots, however for most railways it is not adequate for the running line;
the points need to be locked securely in position and the driver given a means of ensuring that they
are correctly closed when being traversed in the facing direction.
British Rail developed a Hydro-Pneumatic system, based on the clamp lock, for applications on
lightly used lines operated under RETB or NSTR signalling. This functions effectively as a spring
point but power is used to drive the switch rails which are held securely in position by hydraulic
pressure until this is released once a train commences to trail the points; the points re-motor to
their normal lie after a time period has elapsed. A point indicator is used to give authority to a
driver to pass over them in the facing direction; this proves detection and the hydraulic pressure
providing the effective Facing Point Lock. However this equipment is now reaching the end of its
supportable life and a means of replacing the points with a standard POE is currently being
developed; operation will be partially automatic but with the provision for driver override plungers
and entails additional control equipment. A point detection indicator for the trailing direction will
also be required and is likely to be incorporated with the TPWS indication on the STOP board.

Appendix L: Depots, Yards, Sidings and Loops
L.1. Non-running Lines

Almost all railways recognise the distinction between:
• “running line” on which a succession of trains operate from one place to another in a
continuous flow,
- They may need to stop en-route to pick up passengers at a station, be held temporarily
at a junction where other trains have been given priority or wait for a period at the
commencement of a single line portion until it becomes available (which can be
regarded as a special case of a junction conflict).
- The primary objective though is to run the system as a conveyor belt which different
services share to travel significant distances; many specific services may start at an
intermediate station and/or terminate at one whilst some could be run from one end of
the line to the other. On most railways the majority of these movements are planned to
be run to a specific timetable and thus extremely similar from day to day, on others the
actual timing and detailed arrangements are only worked out just before the movement
is made- these generally are those on which the majority of the traffic is slightly
unpredictable freight. In such cases there is almost always an overall pattern from a
high level perspective, even if the precise details on the traffic on any one day can be
significantly different from another.
- Where there is a mixture of traffic there can also be a need for loop lines off the
running line proper to allow one train to overtake another. Generally freight traffic is
operated at lower speeds than passenger and therefore to allow both forms of traffic to
share utilisation of the line, lay-by Goods Loops have to be provided at suitable
intervals so that the freight can be held whilst the passenger train that had been
catching it up is permitted to run through and as soon as it has passed the freight can
follow it. Another example is different passenger services, express and local that may
be operated by very different train types. Similarly on a commuter line that only
utilises one type of rolling stock some trains may be “all station stoppers” whereas the
“outer suburbans” may run non-stop through most stations but only stop at the more
important ones along the route to provide a “semi-fast” service. Generally the loops
which are utilised for this purpose are platform loops so that the waiting can be
performed at stations; if an island platform is used at a station where the semi-fast
service calls it makes a good passenger interchange as the schedule can be that the
slow train comes in, waits whilst the semi-fast stops briefly in the adjacent platform,
remains waiting a little time longer and then departs to follow it.
• “non-running line” which are those portions of railway that lie off the through route but
connect to it. These are known generically as sidings (although this term tends specifically
to relate to several tracks approximately parallel to the running line on which trains are
stabled). Private sidings are those facilities that are owned by a person or organisation that
does not own, control or maintain the running line to which it gives access; these are
generally specialised freight loading / unloading depots. There are several categories of non-
running line(any one railway is only likely to have a sub-set of these):
- origin of freight traffic (e.g. a quarry, mine, container port / transhipment facility,
factory complex).
- destination of freight traffic (e.g. landfill site, power station, container port /
transhipment facility, factory complex, aggregate distribution depot),
- freight yard (where trains from various origins call in to exchange vehicles. The
incoming vehicles are divided up and then re-sorted to form trains that then leave to
their various destinations; it is like a mail sorting office). Generally these are
characterised by many parallel lines of sidings that act as a temporary holding areas to
enabling the sorting to take place. The exchange of vehicles may be performed by the
train locomotives themselves but often this is performed by dedicated shunting
locomotives that remain constantly at the site. The busiest facilities are generally built
as hump yards where a train of uncoupled vehicles is slowly pushed up a gradient and
as each rake of vehicles passes over the summit these run by themselves downhill
towards a fan of sidings. The points are switched in the time between each separate
group of vehicles so that they are directed into the appropriate siding according to their
destination. The control of such areas is a specialised subject; whereas there are few
signals there generally needs to be a means of weighing, counting and measuring the
speed of vehicles on the move as well as retarding vehicles that are running too fast
and giving a fresh impetus of vehicles that would otherwise come to a halt before
reaching their intended stopping position;
- stabling sidings for storage of vehicles that are not currently needed in traffic; some
may be reasonably long term if traffic has seasonal fluctuations, there is excess stock
due to a decline in traffic, there is a need to store new vehicles before they can be used
in service for some reason. More often it is very temporary; a commuter railway
generally only utilises all its rolling stock for a few hours in the morning and evening
peak and thus much of the remaining 24 hours is spent in stabling sidings;
- running depot to perform those activities needed to keep the vehicles in traffic. For a
passenger railway much of this is operational maintenance such as cleaning the
vehicles internally and externally, refilling supplies such as water and perhaps bottled
gas, emptying the toilet retention tanks, refuelling the train in the case diesel traction
etc. Various technical maintenance activities are also required; regular safety checks
are needed, there may be a need to change brake blocks, recharge batteries and
download an on-board data recorder as scheduled activities as well as respond to any
items noted in any defect report book etc. Sometimes all these tasks can be performed
at one integrated depot site (this is generally what is provided when a new railway is
being built- see refs #55/2, #66/5 for example) but may actually be spread over a
several different facilities each connected to the running line where a railway has
evolved over generations especially where space and finance for rationalisation is not
available. Hence there may be separate fueling sidings, washing plants, flush aprons,
maintenance sheds etc;
- maintenance workshops for undertaking the more significant maintenance and repair
functions that require a vehicle to be out of service for longer than the few hours of
scheduled attention for which the stock is scheduled not to be needed; in the case of
commuter railway this is generally in the off-peak period during the day or during the
overnight closure). Sometimes such attention is “diagrammed”; i.e. it is scheduled that
a particular train will be undergoing planned maintenance attention on a particular day.
Sometimes it will be in response to some problem identified during a routine
inspection at a running depot or some failure which has occurred in traffic, perhaps
some damage sustained in a collision etc. Depending on the railway there can be
various grades of such workshops depending on their capability to perform increasing
size and complexity of repair, which can effectively be a complete rebuild taking many
months;

- cripple sidings for the temporary storage of an individual vehicle or whole train which
has urgently to be removed from traffic owing to a major failure or serious safety
defect. In order to clear the line to enable the resumption of other services as soon as
possible, many busy railways find that they need a “bolt hole” in which to stable a
defective train out of the way at key locations on the network. This means that the
problem can be temporarily “lost” and things return to normal until there is a better
opportunity to resolve it. It gives a chance to arrange for specialist staff to travel to
site to administer some “first aid” remedial attention and / or a rescue locomotive to
haul the failure back to a depot. In other cases the defective vehicle may be able to be
driven by itself but only at a severely reduced speed or in a degraded mode without the
protection afforded by the normal safety systems; waiting for an off-peak period means
that the movement can be made with the minimum of safety risk and delay to other
trains on the network. Sometimes a siding is specifically provided for the purpose and
may be named as such; an example is the short spur siding that is often provided at a
heavy freight facility so just one or two vehicles can be shunted out from their position
in the train and left behind should for example the hopper doors not be able to closed
properly after discharging. On other railways it may be that there is a stabling siding
or even running loop primarily provided for another purpose but that has been
identified to have the temporary storage of cripples identified as a secondary role and
may have influenced exactly where on the network the facility has been provided.
Related Activities
• Look through the various past layouts included in Appendix D and try to identify
the features described above;; no layout will have them all but every layout will
have some. Then review the signalling that has been provided and consider how it
facilitates the operations in areas such as depots, yards, sidings and loops and
consider on what assumptions it has been based.
• Obtain some drawings for the railway on which you work and perform the same
tasks. Some examples are included in Appendix X.
• If possible contact someone from a different environment and arrange to swap
drawings with them so that you both get exposure to a wider range of situations.


L.2. Signalling of Stabling sidings

When designing the signalling for a siding on a plan for the NR environment (but others are often
similar), bear in mind the following:
• Stabling sidings are primarily for the temporary storage of vehicles; hence they need to be
trapped to protect the running line just in case the brakes leak off (see Appendix F) and the
act of wind or gradient causes them to move. Where access to the siding area is not via a
crossover which automatically provides that trapping, a specific trap point purely to derail
errant vehicles is required (see Appendix J and K)
• A move into the siding in a facing direction would generally be signalled by a PL aspect
associated with a main running signal. If however the siding is a significant distance from
such as signal, then an independent GPL would be expected close to the points as well as a
PL aspect from the signal in rear up to the GPL which would need to be operated as a pre-set
shunt for the route along the running line. This is to limit the extent of the movement the
driver has to make on the authority of the one PL aspect. However “running moves” into a
significant destination are often beneficial; see section L.5.
• The signal reading out of the siding would generally be a main aspect, perhaps with an
additional PL if reads into a permissive platform etc. Should however the siding be
positioned such that its exit were close to the next signal beyond, then a GPL (or elevated
independent PL signal) might be provided instead; it is however undesirable for a driver to
have to run a significant distance on the running line only under the authority of a PL signal.
• It is clearly very little value in signalling a train out of the siding only to stop it; indeed it can
be a SPAD-trap as the driver will not be expecting to stop so soon. This is particularly
relevant for freight trains; generally unless there is at least enough distance for a whole train
to clear the siding exit points if held at the next signal then it is better for the train not to
have started. Should the signal spacing fall awkwardly with the siding position, then a
special control would normally be applied to the exit signal such that it would be held to
danger unless the forward signal is off.
• Train detection may possibly be provided for such sidings used to store MU stock,
particularly if it is used for relatively short periods by a succession of trains.
- For example a “turnback” siding is sometimes provided just beyond a station where
trains terminate in order for the train to be held clear of the running line so that it is not
blocked until it is time for the train to form a return working.
- Other sidings could even have several track sections so that the signaller would know
if there was sufficient space for another train; this would be especially important
when it could be used by a variety of train types. In general however train detection
would not be provided once the trap points had been traversed.
- Sufficient train detection is certainly required in order to lock any power worked
points.

L.3. Signalling of Loops

When signalling the layout featuring a loop, consider the utilisation of that loop.
• It may just be required for straight forward running movements, perhaps to allow one train to
overtake another and may therefore be signalled as the running line.
- It is good to have a signal on the running line opposite the loop exit signal, but this
may not always be possible; see 6.22.
- If it is a freight loop and it is long compared to the likely train length, it may be
required to use the line permissively so that more than one train can be accommodated;
check the Plan Notes / state an assumption. The 2006 Mainline Layout featured a
chord line (which joins two different routes) at a junction which is similar to a loop; it
was left to the student to determine its utilisation. Since it was of sufficient length that
standage of two freight trains could be provided, the provision of a shunt route (having
PL aspect) in addition to the main aspect “running move” in each direction does seem
a sensible choice, although it was not explicitly stated as a requirement. However it
does not seem likely that the line would be used for stabling unattended vehicles and
therefore trap points would not be necessary; however this would need to be stated as
an assumption to explain their deliberate omission.
- A passenger loop may similarly require permissive working to be provided in order to
permit platform sharing by separate trains or where two trains from different origins
are timetabled to join together and continue forward as one combined service. The
former use is nowadays avoided wherever practicable in the UK, but it is still a feature
of operations at many places, particularly in bay platforms and at terminal stations.
Mid-platform signals are the preferred option where lack of platform capacity results
in platform sharing by different services. Useful references are GK/RT0044 (re
platform sharing) and GK/RT0031 (re aspect sequence implications of a mid-platform
signal); these include information which the candidate should include within the route
boxes associated with the relevant signals. Do not forget also that there may be an
intention to terminate trains in the loop before the stock is used to operate a return
service or perhaps be shunted as ECS to sidings; the appropriate turnback signal would
therefore be required even if the line were otherwise purely for uni-directional running.
The Plan Notes should be consulted to discover the operating intention in these
regards; there may be an explicit requirement stated or the description of the train
service may imply a particular use. Otherwise the candidate should state a reasonable
assumption, based upon the practices of the railway with which they are familiar.
• A loop may also be utilised to stable vehicles; in this case it is effectively a double ended
siding and therefore requires trapping protection at both ends if a running line could
otherwise be endangered. Consider whether this is a likely operational requirement; for
example if the length of an incoming freight train exceeds that which can be shunted into
any one siding of a freight terminal. Also consider whether there is a need for a locomotive
to “run around” its train- detach from one end and re-attach onto the other end. This is
necessary for example when the track layout is such that a train arrives at a site from one
branch at a trailing junction and needs to continue its through journey by reversing and
taking the other direction at that junction.

If in the diagram below the train at B has come from D and needs to run to C, the locomotive
shown at its initial position shown in black has to be transferred to its new position shown in
white.
902B
A 901A 903
C
Freight Depot
901B 902A
B
D
Therefore there will need to be a signal (perhaps just a PL) for the locomotive to regain the
running line having left its train in the loop, then another to authorise it to run along the running
line so that it can clear 902B. There needs to be a limiting signal for that movement; if a line is
otherwise only signalled in the opposite direction this would be a LOS; do not however provide a
LOS in situations where there is a need for a running move to pass it in the facing direction- it can
either be a main signal if appropriate, otherwise a PL which would then need to be pre-set by any
running route which reads over it. If the loop entrance signal is close to 902B then the locomotive
can just “get behind it” in order to be signalled back into the loop; remember to provide a shunt
route for it to be able to do so since the loop will of course be occupied. If the loop entrance signal
is further away (perhaps the same signals protect 903 at the trailing junction and also 902) then an
additional PL would be needed at 902B. This of course would need to be preset for the routes
reading over 902, both into the loop and also those that continue along the running line so this is
something else that would need to be added to the relevant route boxes. Once back onto its train
the locomotive then needs to be able to be signalled back towards C and thus a main running
signal would be needed for this move. Finally do not forget the old maxim of “what goes up must
come down” and recognise that (unless the plan notes give a reason to assume the contrary) there
is bound to be a return working from C which will similarly need to reverse at B to continue its run
to D; consider whether the signalling already provided is sufficient or whether any extra facilities
are needed. You need to “play trains” in your mind to anticipate everything that will be required
to operate the railway.
If however the train from D is to be unloaded at the freight depot at B, there is still a need to
transfer the locomotive from the left-hand end to the right-hand end of its train so that it can push
it back into the siding without getting trapped in. Hence similar signalling is needed but also a
route from the signal at 901B which authorises the movement into a depot; remember that the
locomotive would be propelling a long train and think about the visibility of that signal; it would
certainly need to be elevated and may require repeaters such as banners that the driver could more
easily see when at a significant distance and the signal should not be replaced to danger whilst the
move is underway. Therefore the need to think about the utilisation once more and ensure your
Signalling Plan reflects the relevant signalling and there are relevant notes in the route boxes and
elsewhere. For example how would the signaller know that the freight depot is ready to accept the
train and that it was safe to authorise the movement to commence? See also sections L.5L.4 - L.6.

L.4. Interface with Depots, Goods Yards and Sidings

The boundary between the running line and a non-running line requires special consideration in
the development of a signalling scheme. In this document the term Yard is used to mean any form
of rolling stock depot, stabling siding or freight terminal or other such facility connected to the
main railway. Historically the interface would generally have been at a signal box which gave the
signallers a clear view of what was happening in the Yard so that they could determine if it was
safe to operate the entry points and clear the (shunt) signal to allow the entry movement. Similarly
Yard exit movements would be visible to the signaller when they arrived at the yard exit signal.
Many signalling installations dating from the 1960s and 1970s made use of the existing
signalboxes to become Ground Frames to control movements within Yards and working in
conjunction with (i.e. needing to be interlocked with) the main signalling centre for those routes
into and out of the Yard. Such GF vary in size from a single lever through to very large frames of
over 100 levers; in each case the signaller at the main panel (remote from the site) gives a release
that permits local staff to operate certain points, and (if provided) signals, generally based on
visual observation of local movements. Currently there is an aspiration to operate Yards with less
people and permit more efficient operations and therefore the circumstances of each site need to be
considered; in some greater amounts of signalling and automation are appropriate, in others the
emphasis must be on low cost operation.
At all sites it remains a priority to ensure that safety of operations is not compromised, not least to
manage the duty of care towards railway and other staff involved in operation of trains and Yards.
However another important consideration is that rail vehicles might become damaged even in very
low speed collisions and modern stock has great monetary value and very high utilisation;
operators cannot afford to have them out of use whilst repairs are made. It is thus necessary to
achieve a balance between cost of signalling facilities, the cost of staffing and local operational
requirements for each installation. The operator of the facility therefore needs a Safety
management regime which controls the relevant risks; interfaces to the running line are one
relevant consideration. However adoption of the practices of the adjacent railway is not mandated
and may well not be appropriate due to the difference in the respective environments.

L.5. Signalling off the Running Line

Where a train leaves a running line on which a driver can expect the track ahead to be clear, and is
then signalled into an area in which this cannot be taken for granted it is essential that there is no
possible confusion as to the change in environment.
Indeed in many such areas, each set of points may be operated by a hand point lever immediately
adjacent to them perhaps by a shunter or the guard of the train itself and train movements within
such an environment may be controlled by hand-signal and / or radios. Do not confuse such hand
points with the manual operation of points connected by rodding to a lever at a Ground Frame at
which there is usually an element of interlocking, even if there are no associated signals.
On NR the train entering such an area always does so with a PL aspect which means “proceed only
as far as the line is clear, no faster that 15mph”; other railways have generally similar
arrangements although different means of conveying this message to the driver.
However it is often important that a train can enter such a Yard at a reasonable speed in order to be
able to clear the running line as quickly as possible and thus minimise the delay to other traffic.
Where this is required a main aspect (albeit the junction is almost always signalled as MAR) must
be provided and this requires:
• all points to be locked and detected (but this may be via the locking of the Ground Frame
release which allows the local operator at the yard to control those points);
• an end of movement authority (this could be a retro-reflective STOP noticeboard with
additional wording such as “obtain instructions from shunter” or perhaps a fixed red aspect
with an associated PL operated by the local operator to authorise a shunting movement
beyond it into the Yard proper);
• train detection to prove the line clear to (and beyond if an overlap is considered essential)
this end of movement authority within the Yard;
• suitable means of providing protection against movements being made in the opposite
direction, normally by some means of “slotting arrangement”. This is often arranged such
that the signaller cannot set a route into the Yard without having obtained a “shunter’s
acceptance” for that particular movement. This effectively ensures that there is a clear
understanding that a move is to be signalled in and constitutes a promise that a hand
signalled movement will not be authorised in the opposite direction to infringe the area
reserved for the incoming train.
Where this solution is adopted, the area of TCB signalling extends into the facility and gives the
twin benefits of increasing both the speed and the certainty that the train will get clear of the
running line and lowering the risk of incident which may impact (safety / delays) on the operating
railway. However it is at the cost of increased equipment to design, install and maintain which can
be a particular issue where the facility is a private siding in an industrial complex and there are
specific site hazards for which the railway personnel need training etc. and where the costs are
directly borne by the operator of the Yard.
Similar considerations apply to operation under ETCS. However in this case a shunt route may be
set into the Yard from the protecting node but the MA given to the train can have two portions.
The train can remain in FS supervised to a suitable target speed by the LoA and then transition to
OS or SH as appropriate at the place where the Yard is entered. This gives a very clear
demarcation to the driver where the circumstances change and allows the first portion of the route
for which train detection and point detection are proved to be made at a higher speed, yet the train
be brought to the slow speed necessary for the last portion of the movement made in the Yard
environment.

L.6. Signalling of Yards and Depots

Initial necessary considerations are:
• the position of the boundary between the railway operator and the private siding operator;
• the position of the boundary between full signalling and whatever signalling is provided
within the Yard which may / may not be co-terminus with the above or indeed even the same
in the two directions. Note that there may also be separate legal ownership, railway
operational and equipment maintenance boundaries; for example signalling equipment
directly connected to a NR installation will usually be maintained by NR signalling
maintenance personnel regardless of whoever owns the land on which it is situated;
• the organisation responsible for internal operations in the Yard must be defined (this may not
necessarily be the Yard owner if not a Railway Safety case holder); it could be a train
operating company contracted to the yard owner.
The operational methodology also needs to be determined between the various parties, this
requires consideration of:
• the number and frequency of train movements into and out of the Yard
(this affects the level of signalling provision justified to clear the running line promptly for
example);
• the normal timing of these movements (since a simplification of interface may be possible if
the Yard operations only take place when other services on the line to which the Yard is
connected are not operating);
• the number and frequency of train movements within the Yard
(this determines:
- whether it is appropriate for the guard of the train to operate hand points as required,
- whether there needs to be a resident shunter,
- whether control of points should be centralised, and if so
- whether train positions can all be seen or any form of train detection is required,
- whether authority to move should be given by hand-signal, radio or fixed signalling,
- the level of interlocking that is appropriate within the Yard itself etc.);
• whether these movements are totally internal to the Yard or whether they conflict with the
incoming / outgoing traffic;
The objective is that the interface arrangements provide robust protection between the defined
Yard area and the main running railway. In most cases this requires:
• the provision of trapping protection to divert any errant internal movements in the Yard
away from the operational running lines. In certain instances this may be omitted where the
running line is itself a defined goods line and trapping is provided further away at the later
convergence with passenger running lines;
• no non-interlocked points or other functions (such as gates across the line) shall be located
within the limits of signalling controlled from the main signal box; such items may be
proved locally and incorporated within the “shunters acceptance” control or alternatively
these may be locked in their safe state until the main signaller gives a release for them to be
operated locally and the granting of this release then prevents the routes which read across
the affected item;
• A clear demarcation should exist at the Yard boundary; in some cases this is denoted by the
need for a driver to change radio channels so that they now come under the auspices of the
depot control rather than the signaller for the running line.

Another objective is to provide a suitable level of signalling within the Yard for its own internal
operations. The broad options are:
fully signalled railway operated Shunting signals generally appropriate, but possibly main running
from the main control centre signals to exit towards running line.
May need to be “slots” and “lockouts” so that provides a safe
environment for staff working in the area (maintenance on vehicles,
loading / unloading operations, need to interlock with other processes
on the site, ensure depot doors are open, traction isolated before the
move can be signalled into maintenance shed etc).
Full train detection or some other means for the remote operator to
have a clear picture of the situation on site.
May be considerable operator workload for facilitating movements in
the depot; whereas a straight in, straight out requirement may be
acceptable for a signaller with other responsibilities, more complicated
requirements may be incompatible with other workload
fully signalled railway operated Similar considerations but this methodology is advantageous for busy
from a signaller at a local control depots involving much internal shunting.
centre with some form of slotting
A dedicated operator that can directly observe much activity within the
/ acceptance facility between
depot can give much more efficient control and require less technology
them
as direct visual and audio communication can take place. Particularly
where trains are being made up into different formations far more
information is available via direct observation than can be provided by
significant quantities of train detection; there are also human benefits
of co-locating the different staff involved in a depot’s operation.
partially signalled railway The operator is intimately involved in all Yard operations and uses the
operated from a local control control centre to save walking to certain remote points yet operates
centre used by a shunter as part of others by hand levers.
other duties. Some form of
Interlocking may be restricted to dead track locking of motor operated
slotting / acceptance facility to
points; there may be no signals provided.
remote signalling centre
effectively un-signalled within All operations under the control of a local operator. Generally there
Yard would be an acceptance arrangement that permitted the remote
signaller to signal in to a Reception siding / Arrival road and thereafter
all movements controlled by the person on site.
Yard is permitted to authorise movements up to the Yard exit signal
except having given an acceptance for an incoming train.
Where there are separate Arrival and Departure lines which are each
uni-directional, there may not be a need for any interlocking with the
remote signalling at all, but telephone communication would still be
provided.
completely un-signalled All operations under the control of the guard of an incoming train.
Remote signaller can signal into the Yard at any time

L.7. Interface with Yards with Internal Signalling

The nature and control facilities provided for internal operations of the Yard will have a major
impact on the nature of the interface between the Yard and the running line. Many busy facilities
where internal movements are fairly continuous for much of the day, such as major rolling stock
depots and some freight terminals, are provided with an internal signalling installation covering all
or part of the site. As a general principle some internal signalling should be provided at places
where more than one possibly conflicting movement is expected to take place simultaneously on a
regular basis, but possibly only limited to the areas of the conflicting movements.
Where such locally operated internal signalling is provided:
• routes into and out of the yard shall be interlocked with the running line signals at the
interface. This will normally take the form of slots at least in one direction across the
interface;
• if the connection between the Yard and running line is through a crossover where the Yard
control point and the running line signal box can set routes independently when it is the
normal position, then an additional release for those points would be needed. Generally such
points would be “owned” by the main signalbox but the Yard control point would need to
give a release (either specifically for the points or via a slot for the associated route) before
the main signaller could move the points reverse. Alternatively the Yard could be given the
primary control of the points and require a release from the main signaller to be able to
reverse them;
• the main signaller needs to have some means of knowing when there is a train ready to
depart; this may be by one or more of the following: phone or radio communication with the
Yard shunter or train driver, use of a TD fringe unit, occupation of a berth track at an exit
signal, operation of a TRS plunger by shunter or driver.

Ground Frame released by

signalbox release 989.
Controls functions denoted x
1
Release lever proves Loading / unloading
35 route to yard requires 2 to 6 are normal,
levers
7
lever reverse 4
. HP
GF release 989 normal.
Main aspect requires Y Z
clear, Phone to signalbox provided 3 ..
5
PL aspect requires YZ occ
at time of clearance. 942B YY 7 ... YZ
Run-round
.. 2 6
... Noticeboard: HP
35 941B 36
PP .. 942A PQ PR
STOP Obtain Instructions
ST SS
941A
The diagram above depicts access to / egress from a typical yard via a single slip; the Ground
Frame is assumed to be a former manned signalbox that has been demoted in status given a
decline in traffic and the need for economy of staff.
• The main signalbox may signal into the yard provided that the Yard GF has not been
released, thus ensuring a locked wheel path to the STOP board which is the limit of
authority. Given the nature of the traffic and the site, provision of an overlap beyond this
board is not considered necessary.
• Provided the reception line is empty, signal 35 shows a Yellow and PLJI so that incoming
trains may enter the yard with confidence at the maximum speed which the pointwork
permits. Alternatively, should track section YZ already be occupied by a train when there is
another stood at signal 35 to enter the yard, then only a PL is displayed; the incoming train
therefore enters cautiously since the driver knows they are only authorised to proceed as far
as the line is clear- since the only route is onto the Reception line the drive knows which
way to look when running in off the main line.
• Once a train has arrived in the yard and is stood on the loop waiting at the STOP board, the
guard uncouples locomotive from train and authorises the driver to proceed into the head-
shunt and stands clear of the track whilst it passes. Once it has passed cleared the
handpoints, the guard now operates these so that they are set for the run-round loop and can
then authorise the driver to drive the locomotive up to signal 6.
• The guard may walk to, or perhaps travel with the driver before alighting at, the Ground
Frame to open it up. Once there, they would contact the signaller to obtain the required
electrical release to enable lever 1 to be restored normal and thus the other levers of the GF
to be operated. The signaller could also be requested to set the route from signal 36 into the
headshunt and thus the PL aspect would clear, thus permitting shunting moves to be made
into the spur and inherently locking 942 points Normal.
• The locomotive would then be signalled by the guard operating the Ground Frame and
visually observing the movement take place. GF signals 5 and 7 would be used and then the
locomotive would be re-attached to what used to be the rear of its train.
• GF signal 6 would now cleared to allow train to be hauled up to signal 36 and then into the
spur, in order that the new rear of the train is brought behind signal 7. (Since the points are
manually operated by the guard using the GF immediately adjacent to them, there is no need
for electrical locking and therefore no track circuit joint is needed at points 2).

• Signal 7 would then used to authorise the train to be propelled back into the unloading
facility; no route indicator is considered necessary given the familiarity of the train crew of
the manner of working at the site. However there would probably be a need for the guard to
be in continuous mobile radio contact with the driver to ensure that the movement is
performed safely and can stopped in the correct place; if the locomotive attempted to push
the wagons back into the buffer stop there is a high likelihood of derailment, especially if the
siding isn’t straight or part of the train is negotiating pointwork.
• When loading operations are finished, signal 4 would be cleared so that the train can proceed
up to signal 32 and thence into the spur again. The guard would then normalise the points,
and clear signal 7 thus permitting the train to set back sufficiently to be able to stand
completely behind signal 36 awaiting departure.
• The guard would then advise the signaller by phone that shunting into the spur is no longer
required and that signal 36 may be replaced; its locking would then commence to time off.
The GF release lever would then pulled, thus locking all its other levers and the signaller
advised that the release could be withdrawn. The signaller would therefore know all the
signalling functions controlled from the Ground Frame to be in their proper state and would
remain so. Thus it would be possible to signal in or out of the depot until the next time the
Ground Frame is released.
• Finally the guard can then rejoin their train and await the clearance of signal 36 for the return
journey of the train. When appropriate the signaller will set the route for the departing train
(over single slips 942 Reverse and 941 Reverse) in the normal manner. Since 942 points
form the trapping protection from the sidings, these would be given an normalisation alarm
once the train had departed to encourage the signaller to restore them Normal.
It is important to realise that the Reception line is in this scenario part of the infrastructure for
which the main signaller is responsible. However by granting a release, they give it away for
local operations. This prevents the signaller from attempting to use it until the person on site
gas given it back to them again by surrendering the release. This ensures that there is no
possible misunderstanding between the two parties and indeed where there is signalling on site
(as in the above example) is interlocked with it.

L.8. Interface with Yards without Internal Signalling

Where no internal signalling in the Yard is provided, local operations procedures need to be
defined and agreed between the railway and the Yard owners and operators. These are based on
stated parameters such as details of the traffic envisaged (type, level and scheduling) and the
details of operation (the number of movements handled by the yard at any one time, the level of
provision of shunters etc) and a review triggered if this is later subject to a significant change.
Similarly the operation of a rolling stock depot could change significantly due to some internal
change of facilities or the rolling stock stabled within, the routing used to /from the depot due to a
timetable pattern change etc.
Examples
Two examples of the possible signalling arrangements for a typical facility are shown below. Note
that elements of the one could have been used with the other, but the primary difference between
them is that the first permits a running move into the yard whereas the second only permits a
shunting movement.
HP Loading / unloading
HP
Departure
HP
YY S HP
..
Departure YD1
32 TRS Run-round
940B YZ 33
S HP HP
31 ED Arrival
MN 939B MP MQ
940A
NX NW
939A
• Main aspect move into yard Arrival Line up to fixed red at signal 33 which has PL
controlled by shunters switch YD1 (no interlocking).
Track circuits proved clear up to signal itself- no overlap provided.
Electrical detection (ED) provided on spring point for incoming movement which can only
enter using Arrival line..
• All movements within yard itself controlled by shunter using handsignals to the driver;
shunter operates all handpoints.
Having passed beyond signal 33, locomotive detaches from train then runs around it and
reattaches. Pulls train towards signal 32 then sets back to leave wagons for unloading.
[Obviously the distance over which such propelling moves are made should be kept to a
minimum, but must often be of just more than a train length- especially in freight yards.
Where passenger trains with driving cabs at each end or involved any reversal should be by
the driver changing ends and using the far end cab.] Loco detaches from original wagons
and then couples to others on adjacent line to form its outgoing train. Hauls these to yard
exit signal 32 (the same signal applies to both Departure Lines) to await being signalled for
return journey on mainline.
• Signaller communicates to shunter via mobile phone / radio to advise of train running on
approach but is able to signal into Arrival Line at any time. Driver or shunter operates
“Train Ready to Start” plunger adjacent to signal 32 when there is a train ready to leave the
depot to make the signaller aware; driver then awaits clearance of the signal.
• Departing train trails through spring points as necessary.
• Trapping protection against the running line provided by 940B; TCI operation forces track
MP to show occupied in the event of an unauthorised movement.
Noticeboards:
STOP
Obtain Instructions
HP Loading / unloading
Clearance HP
Shunter’s Acceptance switch
HP marker
HP HP
Clearance
Run-round
940B marker
PL slotted by
Yard Acceptance HP HP HP
.. 31 32
MN 939B MP MQ
940A
NX NW
939A
• PL aspect move into yard; route cannot be set by signaller until depot manager has turned
switch to “Accept”; subsequent change to this switch gives the shunter an emergency
replacement control over the aspect.
• Destination of incoming train determined by lie of handpoints; there is no point or train
detection included within controls of PL aspect within the yard area. Noticeboards provided
to ensure that driver contacts yard manager before entering loading / unloading area.
• All movements within yard itself authorised by yard depot manager utilising radio; train
guard operates all handpoints and communicates also by radio.
• Fringe train describer provided to prompt depot manager to give acceptance for an incoming
train and to inform signaller that a train at signal 32 is ready to depart. Telephone
communication also provided.
• Trapping protection against running line provided by 940B. TCI operation generates
signaller alarm and also automatically reverts relevant aspects.
Principles
Where only a single train is normally working within a yard at one time the interface between the
main line and yard signalling can be fairly basic, and the provision on NR generally follows the
following rules:
• the running line connection(s) must incorporate trapping protection and include provision
to restore the trapping protection as soon as practicable when an inward or outward
movement has been completed; this could be a normalisation alarm to the signaller;
• where the Yard has hand-points that are traversed by inward trains prior to coming to a
stop, detection of such points should be considered (so that derailment risk from incorrectly
operated points is minimised). One significant factor for the railway is whether a derailment
at such points could foul movements on an adjacent running line in which case some
mitigation is needed; the private siding operator would also need to assess the risks within
the context of how they operate the entire site;
• where Yard lines converge with a route taken by inwards movements, the relevant clearance
points should be indicated on site (perhaps by a white painted concrete block set in the
ground within the convergence of the two tracks) so that it is obvious if vehicles are stood on
an adjacent line foul of another movement;
• the signal(s) provided to control inward movements has to be shunt class and display a PL
aspect. The controls for these routes generally prove the line clear at least as far as the limit
of signal box control (but may exclude any train detection sections provided within the Yard
limits purely to indicate that there is a train waiting at the yard exit signal).
• at least one signal is required to control movements leaving the Yard; where there are
several sidings which converge via hand-points this signal is best situated beyond such
convergence. Where this is not possible either multiple signals are required one from each
siding, or a single signal applicable to all lines provided prior to the convergence; generally
this latter option is non-preferred because of the risk of confusion, but it is more economical
and at a low usage site the risks can be mitigated by providing a separate noticeboard for
each of the tracks to which the signal applies.
• the exit signal is normally a main aspect although specific local circumstances may mean
that a shunt signal is acceptable (indeed it may be preferable to provide such a signal if there
is a main running signal on the main line immediately after the siding connection). The exit
signal is normally located on approach to the points which form the trapping protection at
the yard exit. Train detection commences immediately past this signal but a berth track
section may also be provided when operationally expedient.
• Shunting movements within the yard may require to traverse points which are under the
control of the main signaller since they provide the trapping protection when in their normal
lie (e.g. like 942B points in the diagram of the previous section, but not points 940B in the
diagram in this section). In this case a shunt route must be provided from the exit signal into
the headshunt / spur to authorise that move.
- If the resulting headshunt is a relatively short spur to accommodate part of a train’s
length when shunting, the same train detection section may continue to the end of the
line. The PL in such circumstances authorises the move to enter the spur and return
from it; no additional signal is required as authorisation to return. However the
entrance signal should be non-disengaging and the route into the headshunt must not
normalise unless this train detection section is clear.
- Alternatively when there may be a need for a train to remain on the headshunt clear of
the entrance points whilst another movement is being made. In this case a further
shunt signal must be provided beyond the clearance point of the trap points; this
provides a limit of movement authority at which to hold a train when the exit points
are to be moved reverse. In such cases the signal route to the headshunt would
normally disengage but the interlocking arrangements with the signal at the exit of the
headshunt would be specified as “opposing locking omitted”; this permits continual
shunting within the confines of the yard to occur without the involvement of the
signaller for every separate movement.
See Barnwood layout within Appendix X for an example of each.

Where it is anticipated that more than one train will be operating within a yard facility at the same
time, an enhanced level of signalling may be needed. Suitable provision to ensure that movements
within the yard cannot come into conflict with those entering from the main line under signal
authority is necessary:
• This may take the form of a section of line under the control of the signaller which allows a
train to enter the yard and stand clear of the main line.
• The yard end of this line should be marked by a STOP board (or a fixed red main aspect
qualified with a relevant notice board or PL aspect when it is important that the running line
is cleared as quickly as possible) beyond which movement is under control of the Person in
Charge of the yard.
• To control opposite direction movement, a signal should be provided back-to-back with the
STOP board to control exit to this arrival/departure road. This line requires train detection
which will normally be included in the controls of the signal reading into the yard.
• If the layout permits, it is beneficial to provide separate unidirectional arrival and departure;
the arrangements are similar to the above except the opposing route exit signal is not
required and the situation generally simplified.
• Where no is space available for a dedicated arrival/departure road, the arrangements should
be similar to those for a single train operation but with the provision of an Acceptance
Switch.
- This enables the person in charge to accept each inward movement separately; by so
doing they are confirming that the portion of the route internal to the yard is correctly
set and also no conflicting movements are currently taking place or will be authorised.
- The acceptance control are proved within the signal controls authorising access to the
yard and effective for one train only. The control is continuously proved in the aspect
and thus it can also act as emergency replacement facility if the yard needs urgently to
stop that movement being made because of some unforeseen incident.
- In exceptional cases where no such Acceptance Switch is provided, the
communications between the signaller and the “Person in charge of Yard” may have to
be solely be by telephone or radio; in this situation all conversations taking place
would be recorded
• Signals should be provided in positions that would stop all movements in the vicinity of the
yard entrance in order that any interconnecting crossover to the running line can be operated
safely.
• Signals should not be placed in positions where internal movements would need to pass
them (or indeed just appear to pass them) when those signals are at danger. Yellow PLs
were historically provided (could be passed when indicating on for moves contained within
the yard over the points normal, but not when the points were reverse i.e. set for admission
to the running line); these are no longer permitted for new work and existing ones are
gradually being replaced by one of the approved arrangements (described above) as and
when works affecting these signals takes place.
• The working instructions for the yard should include procedures so that the signaller is
informed when the yard is under shunter control and when no staff are present.
• Note that for those sites which can be un-staffed, if points are electrically detected the
signals which read over them must also be electrically operated (rather than mechanically
operated) so that loss of detection would result in aspect reversion. However the
combination of mechanically operated points and mechanically detected wire worked
semaphores is satisfactory (because of the nature of the detector).

• In yards with signals operated by a Ground Frame but where no train detection is provided,
consideration is needed re how the operator can tell (during all conditions of traffic and
ambient lighting) that a movement has indeed passed clear of points. This has become a
particular issue when ground disc signals or a traditional GPL with a backlight are to be
replaced by an LED GPL; in hours of darkness in many yards reliance has been placed on
seeing the backlight to know that the locomotive was standing behind the signal, but this
visual clue is removed by the change to a modern form of signal.
• On non-passenger lines only, local hand operated points may be used. As a general rule
hand points should be detected in signals reading over them in a facing direction if they fall
within a distance of 100m beyond the limit of train detection. Trailable points on non-
passenger lines only are permitted and do not need either to be set or locked for trailing
moves over them.
Activity
Study the plans in #42/1, #55/2, #66/6, the extracts included in Appendix X and others of
the railway with which you are familiar.
Read the articles on a range of different facilities and types of railway operation:
#36/2, #47/1, #54/1, #54/4, #52/2,


Appendix M1
Signalling the Metro Layout: Step by step LUL Practice
The description below is based on London Underground practice but is written reasonably
generically; different lines have different physical, technical and operational imperatives and there
is now increasing diversity in the technical implementations being utilised.
Intro This step by step guide focuses on signalling the layout. It assumes the candidate has already
calculated the headway and has determined suitable overlap lengths and signal spacing.
[When producing the headway curve the candidate must identify the station with the most
demanding headway, whilst considering the station dwell, speed restrictions, reversing
locations, and trains per hour. Once the key station has been chosen, then a headway curve (or
a tabular presentation) to demonstrate how the required headway has been achieved must be
produced.]
Ensure you use the time allocated in the exam to read the question paper. Use some of this
time to review the layout and consider any notes the examiner has added on the layout.
Of course ensure you have added your candidate number to the layout and any supporting
sheets used to show calculations, assumptions or notes.
Step 1 Before commencing to signal the layout you should already have decided what signalling
system you intend to apply. You should therefore make statements to convey to the examiner
what system you are configuring. You should consider clarifying the following:
• State if you are signalling to specific principles e.g. LU principles.
• State what type of automatic train protection system you intend to apply; e.g.
trainstop, fixed block coded track circuit, moving block etc.
• State the train detection method; e.g. track circuit (e.g. capacitor fed AC) or Jointless
Track Circuits (JTCs) etc.
• State control system arrangements, e.g. a local interlocking is provided which is linked
to a remote SCC (Service Control Centre).
• State all controlled signals will be provided with SPTs.
• State that call-on signals are not provided.
Clarify if there are specific features of the equipment that you intend to use which lead to
design considerations e.g. mechanical interlocking controlling air-driven points result in a
track locking distance of 20m.
State assumptions; e.g. level gradient. Make sure that any of your assumptions do not
contradict the features described in the question. For example some candidates may choose to
assume all of the layout is in tunnel, therefore negating the need for fog repeater signals,
however some previous question papers have defined open and tunnel sections and these must
be respected.
Step 2 Mark on the point ends. The more heavily used route is Normal.
Add trap points at siding and depot exits to protect the passenger railway from un-authorised
train movements.
• On many Metro railways space is limited by the topographical layout of the railway,
therefore you may have to consider wide-to-gauge points for trap points.
• Other features to protect the passenger railway from trains in sidings and depots
should also be considered; e.g. TCIs at the exit of the sidings to alarm for an
overrunning train.

Step 3 If the layout contains a depot, then careful consideration must be given to authorising train
movements across this boundary.
• Not only will trap points be required (as described above), but also signals to authorise
moves from the passenger railway, along with signals or signs to terminate these
moves will be needed.
• Additionally, signals must be provided for moves from the depot reception roads to
the passenger railway. Other features that should also be considered are TRTS
plungers for train drivers to indicate the train is ready to leave the depot. Shunter
acceptance plungers should also be added which are used by the shunter to indicate to
the SCC that they are able to accept a train into the depot.
• If you decide (or the question paper states) that the depot is not to be signalled or train
detection is not to be provided within the depot, then the boundary of the area of track
circuit provision should be indicated.
Step 4 Decide on “wrong road moves” to support the traffic movements required in the plan notes.
Provide signals for these wrong road moves including signals that terminate the move, along
with any train protection equipment to prevent a train proceeding too far.
Step 5 Mark on the starter signals.
• These should be shown on the inside of the platform end, to avoid the need for
platform repeaters. This also allows for maintenance without staff having to go onto
the track.
• Remember to consider the requirements of any associated equipment, e.g. trainstops,
or appropriate transponder positioning to support accurate train stopping. Train stops
go on the right!
Step 6 Add train detection requirements, e.g. draw replacing block joints within 5m of a controlled
signal or 15m of an auto signal.
Consider the features of your system that require equipment to be positioned in specific
locations; e.g. for bi-directional working put a trainstop at the block joint to simplify wrong
road trainstop release.
Step 7 Mark on starter signal overlaps.
Don’t put overlaps on signals which can’t be approached at speed, such as terminal platforms
or wrong road starters with no preceding wrong road move.
Add a note that “overlap calculations using o = v2/2a is a simplification (ignoring gradient,
wheel slip etc.)”
Step 8 Draw block joints at end of overlaps.
(N.B. In practice track circuits can be longer than the overlaps defined).
Step 9 Mark fouling points.
Add a note ‘Fouling points to be confirmed on site’; consider using speed control if shorter
overlaps are required to protect a fouling point.
Step 10 Draw block joints around pointwork to facilitate continuous train detection and appropriate
track-locking as a train traverses P&C.
Block joints should be separated from the fouling point by at least the distance between the
last axle and the end of the train to account for the overhang.

Step 11 With Metro railways the nature of the service means that reversal of direction is a major
element of the operation; consideration should be given to providing protection to a train when
approaching terminal platforms (TETS protection). The level of protection required will
depend on different features, such as the overlap available and the form of ATP being applied.
• The candidate should consider what protection may be required (e.g. speed control on
the home signal plus two blind trainstops in the platform) and add a note ‘Speed
control to be used; trainstop position to be confirmed by calculation’. It maybe
quicker in the exam to draw this equipment explicitly on the plan for only one
terminal platform and then add a note: ‘Similar equipment to be provided at other
terminal platforms’.
• A fixed trainstop should be provided at the final stopping point.
• Also two FRLs should be positioned just beyond the normal stopping point (typically
3m), these should be protected with a TCI to identify a train that has overrun and
struck the FRLs, so that a subsequent move cannot be made into the platform without
the FRLs being in place. Arrestors or sand-drags should be added.
• A third FRL should be placed at all buffer stops.
Step 12 As noted in the previous step, the requirements of Metro railways include frequent reversing
moves, some of which will be via sidings.
• To mitigate the possibility of Train Operators becoming disorientated and driving as if
they are on the main line when in fact they are entering a siding, (particularly likely in
a tunnel environment), consideration should be given to providing TES protection
(e.g. a blind trainstop part way into the siding).
• Two FRLs should be placed beyond the normal stopping point, these should be
protected by a TCI to identify a train that has overrun and struck the FRLs, so that a
subsequent move cannot be made into the siding without the FRLs being in place. In
practice, this TCI would also provide alarms at the SCC to indicate a train has overrun
in a siding, since there is the potential for such an event to go unnoticed until the train
is required to exit the siding that might be significantly later.
• A fixed trainstop should be provided at the final stopping point.
• Other features should also be considered depending on the system employed. For
example, in the case of manually driven trains, count-down markers and fixed yellow
signals could also be applied, especially in areas where there is an overlap that is
inadequate to accommodate a train that overruns the final stopping point, having
successfully operated the blind trainstop speed control.
• Arrestors or sand-drags should be added.
• A third FRL should be placed at all buffer stops.
Step 13 Mark on station block joints 15m back from position of the rear of a berthed train.
On bi-directional roads, use the same block joint as the station block joint and wrong road
starter replacing block joint.
Step 14 Add home signals one overlap back from the station block joints.
(These could be BMBs on some ATP systems).
Step 15 Add junction protecting signals in rear of the track-locking block joint adjacent to point tips.
Remember to include the junction indicator if your system requires one!
Step 16 Add an additional controlled signal (junction home signal, these could be BMBs on some
ATP systems) one full speed overlap before the junction; use the starter from the previous
station if it is conveniently positioned.

Step 17 At locations where signals are required for reversing moves, consideration should be given to
providing features to mitigate a Train Operator becoming confused and attempting to reverse
the train at the wrong location.
• At reversing locations, for example, a FRL and associated trainstop should be
provided at the end of each berth from which there is no signalled move.
• In addition a FRL should be provided at the adjacent station in rear of the reversing
location.
• In tunnel environments ‘STOP’ boards are to be provided at all tunnel platforms
headwalls where there are no signalled moves.
Step 18 Mark facing point locks and ground locks on facing points
Step 19 Add shunt signals.
Remember that all colour light moves must be terminated by another colour light. Therefore it
may be necessary to provide a FRL adjacent to a shunt signal.
Step 20 Add any other block joints necessary to split long tracks, dependent upon technology
employed. For example, the maximum length of an AC track circuit is 600m and the layout
must respect that technical constraint.
Step 21 Add additional section signals/marker boards to provide the desired headway.
• Care should be taken when positioning signals to provide enough standage so that a
train stopped at the signal would not be foul of points.
• If the layout contains lines with parallel train running i.e. fast and local lines, then the
signals on both lines should be aligned (i.e. positioned “parallel” at the same
longitudinal position) to mitigate the risk of a signal for one road being incorrectly
read by the driver of a train on the adjacent road, especially due to parallax errors
when there is a curved approach.
Step 22 Mark signals as being auto or controlled.
• Consider making platform starters within an auto section to be controlled signals in
order to have the facility to regulate the service.
• Remember that autos which are speed controlled or approach cleared should be shown
as normally displaying red.
Step 23 Mark in a Signal Cabin or Signalling Equipment Room (SER) and label in accordance with
your design rules (such as a 2 letter code).
Step 24 Consider the requirement for diversity to permit locking release.
Unlike the Mainline environment in the UK, LU require diversity to prove that a train has
cleared the route and other Metros may have similar requirements.
This is normally achieved by
a) proof of track circuits clear, plus
b) operation of a device to confirm the front of the train has reached a place such that the rear
of the train would be clear of the last set of point tips.
In modern systems employed on LU this is through the application of PD. You will need to
demonstrate you have considered this requirement by either showing a PD positioned to be a
train’s length beyond the last set of point tips in all relevant routes or add a generic note
relating to such provision, perhaps with one illustrative example.
For an historic installation add note: “PDs not required for diverse train detection; manually
operated site”
Step 25 Add any other equipment upon which your system relies, as appropriate for the given layout.
For example:
• repeater signals on bends where the signal is not visible from the calculated sighting
point,
• fog repeater signal 180m back from its signal (remember to add a replacing block
joint).

Step 26 Allocate numbers to the controlled signals in accordance with your design rules (e.g. from
top left of signalman’s diagram so that signal numbers are passed in sequential order).
Step 27 Allocate letter/number reference s to track circuits in a controlled area in accordance with
your design rules
e.g. first letter denotes the road (increasing from top of diagram) and second giving the track
circuit a unique identity arranged in sequence.
Step 28 Allocate numbers to points as specified on the exam paper in accordance with your design
rules
e.g. Label ‘A’ and ‘B’ ends, depicting the ‘A’ end closest to the SER.
Step 29 Allocate numbers to auto signals in accordance with the design rules
e.g. odd numbered signals are on one road, even numbered signals on the other road and leave
gaps in the numbering for future modifications. Include an X for a signal leading into the
controlled area
Step 30 Allocate numbers to all track circuits outside of controlled area in accordance with design
rules.
e.g. tracks take the number of the signal furthest in rear that they control, and are then
uniquely identified by letters ascending in the direction of travel.
Step 31 Add PDs in platforms for early back lock release of controlled signals (these prove a train is
stationary within the platform for 15 seconds before allowing the train’s route to be
normalised.)
Step 32 Proof of Headway
Once complete you should select the section of track with the heaviest traffic flow and draw a
headway curve for it in order to prove that the service requirements have been met. If they
have not, make the necessary corrections or at least add a statement of how you’d do it (e.g.
move signals or add additional home signals.)

Appendix N1
Signalling the Mainline Layout – Network Rail Practice: Step by step

This Appendix attempts to guide the prospective candidate by providing a methodology suitable to
apply under examination conditions. It should also prove useful for someone of less experience
who is unclear where to start when confronted by a blank layout. It is not a substitute for the
detailed study of the different topics but does act as a summary reminder of the essential elements.
Step 0 It should go without saying, but do remember to put your candidate number on the plan
itself and any other sheets of answer paper which you wish to be taken into
Administration consideration, such as those having braking and headway calculations (steps 3-11).
You may decide that it is best also to put the general notes (steps 1 & 2) and perhaps
even the route boxes (step 16) onto separate pieces of paper to avoid writing something
on what may initially seem to be a blank piece of the plan that you might later wish to
depict something relating to that section of the track layout.
It is wise to add a note on the plan itself adjacent to your candidate number how many
extra sheets relate to the plan to form your complete answer.
Step 1 State the practices to which you are signalling the layout: i.e. current Railway Group
and NR Company Standards.
Initial Of course if you are actually more familiar with say former British Rail Western
Statements Region practice of the 1970s because these are the installations on which you regularly
work, do not be afraid of declaring this and signalling the layout accordingly. Be
aware though that because of the differences certain details within the text below will
not be relevant to your practice, but because of the degree of similarity much should
still be useful.
If you propose to use a variant of the UK Mainline practise which the examiner may
view as unusual (see section 7) be particularly careful to declare these as otherwise
your answer may be judged against inappropriate criteria.
Add any relevant notes which generally apply to your plan, such as:
• distances / dimensions all metric,
• overlaps 180m unless otherwise stated,
• TPWS is not shown but would be provided for all junction protecting and
other high risk signals, sufficient to stop a running SPAD within the SOD prior
to first conflict,
• AWS is not shown but would be provided for all main running signals except
where there is no signalled running move up to them,
• SPTs not shown but would provided for all main signals capable of displaying
red, PZTs at each group of points,
• continuous seed signage (i.e. a lineside sign marking the commencement of
every change of speed preceded by an advanced warning sign positioned at
braking distance to the restriction and separate signs with arrows for diverging
speeds over pointwork) is not shown but would be provided
• specifying the type of point operating mechanisms, train detection, signals etc.

Step 2 Make sure you carefully read and understand all the plan notes.
Read the notes For items NOT stated on the Plan or question paper you should state the assumptions
State you are making, such as:
assumptions • level gradient,
• the type of train detection envisaged,
• the method of working etc.
In a NR context, Track Circuit Block is almost certainly the most appropriate means of
signalling the main portion of the layout, but there may well be better means of
operating areas of lower traffic density more economically. In particular TCB on long
single lines should be implemented by axle counter, but consider also solutions such as
NSTR, OTW-NS etc. to avoid the need for a signal at the point of reversal.
Step 3 Do braking distance calculations for using BD = u2/2b (but add a note that this is a
Braking simplification assuming level gradient, ignoring adhesion etc.).
Ensure that the maximum BD is calculated taking into account the speed / braking rate
of the whole mix of traffic; round up the result to the next 5m. This dictates the
minimum safe spacing between the stop signal and the first caution warning of it.
Step 4 Do non-stop headway calculations to express the required technical headway in terms
Non-stop of Headway Distance and derive the maximum signal spacing to give the required
Headway capacity, round down the result to 5m.
Remember to utilise the timetabled train speed and to state all abbreviations and
assumptions.
Step 5 Consider any stopping headway requirement specified. In some papers it is obvious
Stopping that this is far les onerous than the non-stop headway requirement in which case a brief
Headway explanation of the basis of this decision is sufficient. Generally however there is a
need to perform stopping calculations (note that demonstrating headway using a graph
is equally acceptable but may be slightly more time consuming) to demonstrate that the
headway requirement is needed.
It may be best to perform a rapid approximation initially to determine whether it is
more onerous than the non-stop requirement; if so bear this in mind so that you can in
later steps optimise the signalling for the station stops taking into account other
positioning constraints. Once that is done, then evaluate the signalling that you have
designed and prove that the stopping headway requirement is actually met by your
design.
Step 6 Consider the most appropriate form of signalling and the signal spacing which satisfies
Choose generic both the braking and headway requirements, without being excessive. Signal for just
form above minimal requirements (no gold plating or future proofing).
Step 7 Review the layout and possible signal positions in order to select the best choice of
Overview signalling for each portion (see step 11) of the layout;
review of layout Where this consideration suggests a different solution should be adopted than your
calculations previously indicated then this should be explained.
For example in a NR scenario, provision of 4 aspects:
• is favoured in areas of high linespeed so that slower traffic does not take too
long to clear each block section,
• are useful where signals protecting junctions need to be spaced more closely
than braking distance.

Step 8 Decide what constraints there are on the layout in order to determine a good place to
Positioning start when placing signals:
constraints • if there is a terminal station, then a signal at the departure end of the platform
is almost obligatory,
• if there is a station with pointwork beyond the platform end, then a signal in
the vicinity is also almost a certainty. If there is an option to position such a
signal so that its overlap (even if only a reduced or restricted overlap) can be
clear of the points then this is a good strategy, provided that this does not
impact upon the required standage on its approach. Even a short distance
between the signal and the first fouling point is useful; SASSPADs are
disproportionally likely at platform starters yet a slowly moving train can be
brought to rest within 40m by the action of TPWS,
• do not feel however that it is always necessary to place a signal at the exit of
every station platform. If a minor station is situated on plain line there may be
no signals in the vicinity at all; when such signals exist it can be advantageous
to place them some distance (say 200m) beyond the station; this means the
AWS would be encountered after the station stop and the risk associated with
both SASSPAD and SOYSPAD should be reduced. Beware however what
effect such a positioning might have upon stopping headway; if achieving the
specification for this is a problem, consider positioning the signal controlling
admission to the platform such that it is just overlap clear of a train which is
stationary in the platform,
• consider also those areas where you wouldn’t want to place a signal if it can be
avoided- such sites might be partly along a platform (except if it is needed as
an additional mid-platform signal to allow two short trains to share the same
long platform), in tunnel or immediately after its exit, on a viaduct, in the
midst of an S&C layout. Sometimes such placement is unavoidable and in
these cases some special interlocking controls may be applicable to mitigate
the associated risk, but where practicable it is best to avoid the situation
altogether.

Step 9 Pencil in possible positions of signals in accordance with the considerations of steps 7 -
Tentative 10 and the calculations of steps 3 - 5 (minimum spacing dictated by braking distance,
positioning maximum spacing dictated by permitted degree of over-braking or headway
requirement – including stopping headway- as applicable).
Remember that consistency of signal spacing along a line is also important:
• excess braking of 33% is considered generally acceptable, and up to 50% may
be tolerable where there are other benefits from adopting such a positioning,
• however where speeds are particularly low over-braking is much less
significant and do not be over-concerned with overbraking in that situation, nor
where there is a converging junction and trains joining the mainline pass
through a speed-restricted turnout,
• there is also a “one-third / two third rule” re the positioning of the signal
displaying single yellow within each 4 aspect sequence to a red aspect.
• In order that the variation between sections is minimised, it is generally
sensible to start with a nominal spacing approximately mid-way between the
upper and lower constraints.
• Do be aware of all the constraints within step 8 (and indeed those of step 10);
you have to make a start somewhere but don’t regard it either as an absolute
certainty nor the spacing as inviolate; it is a question of trying to juggle all the
variables within acceptable limits to achieve a reasonable solution. There may
well be a need for a certain amount of iteration, so initially just mark possible
positions for the signal posts and only add the aspects once happy with the
positioning of every signal. However do not waste too much time doing this; it
is an exam and you are against time so settle for the reasonable rather than
trying to obtain the ultimate best solution. If you end up settling for something
about which you are not totally happy, a brief note will indicate to the
examiner that you are aware of the situation but needed to make progress on
other exam elements.

Step 10 In practice this step needs to be performed in parallel with step 9 and is mainly
Consider responsible for the need for various iterations. There is a need to ensure that signals
junctions are positioned sensibly in relation to the junctions and other hazards which they
protect. Consider:
• distance from signal to conflict (ideally should be > 50m both to avoid the
need for time of operation locking to be imposed on facing points, and to
contain a SASSPAD by the action of TPWS),
• for maximum layout flexibility then signals protecting junctions should
generally be “overlap clear” of points where this would require locking them /
preventing other operational moves. Typically this means a standard overlap
length of 180m but on higher speed lines this may be extended to 225m in
order to give the distance for a reasonable number of TPWS loops to be able to
contain any overrun. Conversely where speeds are low then a reduced overlap
may be justified. Where sufficient distance cannot be provided but significant
restrictions on the operation would result, consider providing an additional
restricted overlap (at least 45m), but in this case do not forget to include the
associated Warning routes for the signals which read up to the signal with the
ROL when compiling the route boxes in step 16.
• distance from signal to facing points (should be <800m and preferably less to
reduce the risk of a driver forgetting that they are routed over a slower speed
route)
• the standage you need at a signal. This is particularly important where there is
a requirement for a locomotive to run around its train or to allow two different
trains to pass at a passing loop on a single line (including the common
arrangement of a double junction from a main line to a short length of double
track prior to a branch becoming a single track line. However also be aware of
the problem of a train held at a signal being so long that it still locks the
junction or level crossing behind it. Another related issue occurs where the
signal spacing is low; if a train at one signal tails back onto the overlap track
circuit of the signal in rear then your layout will not be able to deliver the
headway that you’d otherwise expect.
Step 11 Within any given layout, there is likely to be portions with rather different traffic
Different demands from other portions; be aware of this and ensure that you treat each
treatment of appropriately, rather than enforce a “one size fits all” policy.
particular • For example a substantial percentage of the traffic may terminate at a major
sections station and thus it might be sensible to make a transition to a different form of
signalling once beyond it. When considering a transition from 4 to 3 aspect
signalling in such a situation, it is probably best made a few signal sections
beyond the station- this allows closer signal spacing which is useful for
positioning the platform admission signal closer to the station than it would
otherwise be situated and provides headway benefit in an area in which many
trains will be running slowly.
• Similarly the permissible speed of traffic on a branch line might be limited and
thus the braking distance lower than on other lines; alternatively there may be
freight traffic with a poor braking rate operating only on parts of the layout.
Therefore where necessary repeat the calculations and select the relevant form
of signalling separately for each area.
• A particular example is the control of a single line; generally the reason why a
single line is provided is that traffic density does not justify a double track. Be
aware however that there are occasionally geographical constraints which
dictate that it is not reasonably practicable to provide a double track line; in
such cases the length of any single track section is obviously kept deliberately
short and the signalling optimised to lessen the effect of the bottleneck.

Step 12 Show the distance to next signal ahead, giving signal numbers where there is a junction
Record signal and the distances for the various routes are significantly different. This helps identify
spacings uneven spacing and also helps you think appropriately when determining how to
achieve any aspect sequence transition necessary. It may be worth noting any sections
which are deliberately tight on any of the constraints so that the examiner knows that
you have made a conscious decision that it represents the best option rather than
wonder if you were aware of the situation.
For current NR plans every dimension would be required (to every signal in rear and to
every in advance); this adds a lot of meaningless clutter and wastes time which you
cannot afford during the examination, so restrict yourself to showing information
which adds value rather than between every signal in a line of regularly spaced of
automatic signals.
Step 13 Having settled on signal positions, add the detail required:
Add profile • select those which should be treated as “passable” and add the “auto plate”
detail symbol (this consideration should solely reflect the intended operation in
degraded mode and is nowadays completely independent of whether the signal
is treated as “controlled” or “automatic” within the interlocking and the
signaller’s means of control),
• consider which of the “non-passable” signals should be given an “Auto
button”,
• draw the main aspects to denote which aspects can be displayed and depict the
normally displayed aspect by a double bar; all controlled signals normally
display red, auto signals display their least restrictive aspect given the aspect
sequence up to the next controlled signal facilities,
• add the appropriate number and type of route indicators. Generally PLJIs are
provided for diverging routes at geographical junctions whereas SARIs are
used normally in relatively slow speed layouts where there are multiple
divergences such as in major station areas and for the exit signals from sidings
or terminal platforms.
• add PL signals as required for call-on or shunt routes from main signals in
order to be able to provide the required operational moves within the layout.
Associated MARIs should generally be provided where there are multiple
routes and there is a need to distinguish between them. There is however no
need to provide MARIs for shunt routes where all are similar, but if one is
judged to be different (e.g. a wrong direction (contra-flow) route to a LOS or
limiting GPL) then a route indication should be provided for each but those
routes to similar destinations should share a common indication rather than
provide a distinct one for each route.
• some signals, notably those at major stations, may require various auxiliary
indicators mainly associated with train dispatch: OFF, CD/RAs. The latter
would be provided on the signal structure and potentially also as repeat
indicators further down a long platform. OFF indicators are needed when the
guard (train manager) or platform staff could not see the signal from their
position on the platform- perhaps the platform is curved or it is a right hand
platform whereas the signal is left-hand mounted and the train itself might
block the view.

Step 14 There is some sense in putting in some of the train detection divisions when completing
Signal related each signal though others prefer to do all the division into sections together as a
train detection separately activity. Candidates are recommended to draw as track circuit boundaries
rather than as axle counters primarily because it is far quicker and time is at a premium
during the examination; however if there are some long [#] sections where axle
counters are the only sensible form of train detection then they should be shown as
such.
• Every controlled signal should be given a track joint some 5m (main aspects,
for GPLs although this is ideal it may need to be less since they often have to
be positioned virtually on the switch tips in order to create the required length
of standage) beyond the post; note that this representation is symbolic in the
case of gantries having signals mounted back-to-back; auto signals and non-red
signals generally do not have track joints close to them.
• Overlap joints should also be shown (afterall their positioning should have
been one of the factors considered in step 10. Remember to define overlaps for
each of the various lies of facing points, unless you are deliberately stating that
certain do not represent a valid overlap. Where overlap lengths do not match
(within suitable tolerance!) that stated in the general notes which you stated in
step 1, then mark the relevant overlap length. Only provide a ROL when there
is an operational need.
# Note: Axle counters are becoming the UK standard means of train detection for
major New Works schemes, although they are not without their disadvantages.
What is proposed here is to base the layout on track circuits (which still substantially
predominate nationally) but resort to axle counter sections where the length would
otherwise need to comprise many track circuits due to the technical constraint over
their length. Severn Tunnel has utilised axle counters for very many years- it is so wet
that each section could be less than a couple of hundred yards long, due to low ballast
resistance. More typically the maximum length of track circuits can be 650m – 1000m
depending on type and environment and thus axle counters become particularly
beneficial when the track section is at least 3 or 4 miles long; i.e. if the Branch only has
moderate traffic. Given that modern ACE cover many sections, once one has been
justified it is sensible to make use of it to provide the train detection for that whole line
of railway, the very short sections over points and at passing loops as well as the long
stretches in-between.
Step 15 Consider if any bi-directional signalling is required either along a length of running
Consider bi-di line or within a small area of a station throat (perhaps to enable trains to start and
requirements terminate in specific platforms). Check the stated operational requirements and also
think through the actual movements needed to be able to deliver the service
specification. Do not provide more than is actually needed (in the exam it adds work
and complexity, in real life it adds costs and safety risk).

Step 16 This is probably a good time to produce the route boxes which define the routes which
Route boxes can be utilised within the layout, the aspects displayed and any approach release
conditions. In practice this can be performed very much in parallel to the previous
step.
Indeed, try to use the production of route boxes to check your own work so far; keep an
eye out for inconsistencies between similar route boxes, a mismatch of route indicators,
a missing end of movement authority on a particular route etc.
Completion of route boxes does require the consideration of the junction signalling
arrangements and do not forget to revisit the signal profiles as necessary; for example
you would need to depict flashing aspects on the signal in rear if the junction signal is
to be signalled as MAY-FA.
To complete the route boxes obviously requires the allocation of numbers to the
signals. Obviously until you are certain that you have placed every running signal that
is necessary on the layout, allocating numbers at this time brings with it the risk of
rework and confusion if changes subsequently occur. Therefore some prefer to leave
the route boxes to later on, but this also has disadvantages since it separates the
recording from the thinking process. One option is to partially complete the route
boxes but leave allocation of numbers to later; another is allocate some numbers at this
time leaving some strategic spares within the sequence to accommodate afterthoughts.
Each candidate needs to discover what works best for them and gain practice.
It’s also a matter of personal preference whether you provide the route boxes on the
layout itself, or on separate pieces of paper:
• Putting adjacent to the relevant signal means that you are less likely to miss out
and avoids the examiner getting frustrated by having to search through a
separate list to try to find out whether or not you compiled a route box for a
specific signal.
• Conversely it is probably quicker to complete separate lines of entry in one big
table than draw lots of separate route boxes. It also avoids the risk of drawing
something in a space on the plan that you later discover that you wished you
had not / starting a route box but then find there is not enough room for all the
routes you need. However this method is less suited to partial completion prior
to the allocation of signal numbers.
• Try both methods during your various practice layouts and decide which works
best for you. Production of route boxes is certainly one element of the
examination where practice pays dividends in terms of the time saved.

Step 17 Now that all the main signals are in place, add the various shunting aspects that are
Consider required on them and then any additional free-standing shunting signals necessary to
shunting ensure that all the operational requirements can be met. Things to consider:
requirements • is there a need for a locomotive to run around its train?
• will the freight be propelled into the siding to avoid trapping the locomotive
inside?
• how long are the trains- have I provided enough standage?
• is there a signal limiting the extent of the valid movement along a line not
signalled in that direction?- A LOS should normally be provided in that
circumstance.
• is it reasonable that a movement into a depot be made utilising a shunt aspect?
If it is important that there is certainty that the whole length of the train can
clear the running line, then consider providing a running move instead (that
will require train detection to at least the limit of authority, be it signal or
noticeboard. Such an arrangement is also useful to get the train clear of the
running line promptly which reduces the headway impact of the move.
• is the shunting move into a facility within which other moves are made without
the authority / knowledge of the main signaller? There may need to be some
form of “Shunter’s Acceptance” facility, or a slot arrangement with a depot
signalbox, Ground Frame or Control Tower (which perhaps authorises other
movements by radio). Is any special authority needed to enter a piece of plant
such as a carriage washer, or a repair shed in which staff may be working and
require warning (to avoid the risk of movement accidents / electrical accidents
caused by train bridging over an isolation etc.)
• how far is the driver of the train being expected to move under authority of the
shunting move- is it reasonable both in terms of the time that it will take and
the need to give driver some reassurance?
• when the requirement is for a train to shunt behind a signal, reverse at it and
return on an adjacent line, has a signal been provided at the first place where
the reversal could logically occur? If not, how excessive a length of movement
is involved; has an appropriate balance been struck between provision of
superfluous signals and excessive length of movements?
Step 18 When you think you have achieved, mentally use the signal that you have provided to
Cross check satisfy yourself that it is possible to achieve the moves specified and implied within the
operational Plan Notes. It is clear that this is often an area of weakness in exam attempts, so the
moves time taken to eliminate such oversights is time well spent.
Check that the relevant entries have been made on the route boxes, including:
• any requirement for one shunting signal to prove another off before it can
clear,
• any requirement for a Main, Warning or Call-on route of a main running
signal to pre-set an independent GPL which lies within its route,
• last wheel replacement where a propelling move is anticipated,
• slots / acceptances / releases which are required prior to the signaller being
able to set the route.

Step 19 Similarly take a step back and look at particular stations on the layout. Have you
Review provided the signalling needed to match the specification? Ask yourself:
stations • should turnback signals be provided in particular through platforms in order to
terminate a train and for it then to return whence it came?
• is there a need for mid-platform signals to permit platform sharing?
• is there a need to provide Call-on moves so that trains can be joined? If so is the
admission signal sufficiently close to the platform (say 400m) that the “point of
visibility” is on its approach? Further has a note been added to the route tables
relating to the need to prevent trains being signalled out of the platform whilst a
second train is routed or running into it?
• for terminal platforms have buffer stops been added, along with a note regarding
the need for an over-speed TPWS installation? To modern standards a suitable
retardation device such as sliding buffer-stops is required; a TCI should be
provided to detect displacement following collision. Where in a platform well,
this TCI is sometimes arranged to prevent a proceed aspect being displayed into
either of the platforms; however most recent practice is to provide a specific
alarm to the signaller.
• have all facilities needed for train dispatch been provided- including the platform
plungers for TRTS, CD and RA if applicable?
Step 20 In many exam layouts there is a branch line which is a distinctly different environment to
Consider the main line whose requirements need therefore to be considered separately.
differences • If the service is light then isolated 3 aspect (stop and distants) may be
appropriate, but if it is very sparse then TCB may well not be an economic
solution, even if implemented using axle counters.
• Solutions such as One Train Working with Staff or One Train Working without
Staff may be appropriate; otherwise No Signaller Token Remote or even RETB
might be considered. Although such solutions use few if any signals, this does
not mean that there is no signalling; remember to provide any noticeboards and
other lineside infrastructure etc. that are applicable to the chosen method of
working. A brief note explaining why this method is suitable, specifying its
extent and how the interface to TCB is achieved should be added.
• If there is a double junction leading on to a single track branch make sure that
your signalling permits maximum use of the available track layout so that a train
destined for the branch to be held clear of the mainline whilst the train on the
branch can approach and join the mainline.
• Where there is a transition between 3 aspect and 4 aspect signalling, think
carefully and position the correct form of signals accordingly. Ensure that the
aspect sequences will be safe, logical and consistent to the driver. If the
transition from 3 aspect to 4 aspect occurs at a trailing junction, the attainable
speed through that junction may mean that the single yellow of the first 4 aspect
signal encountered may give adequate braking distance. However where the
transition is to occur on plain line, ensure that the transition is made
appropriately; if the arrangement requires special controls to be applied, then
ensure that these are added to the relevant route boxes.

Step 21 • Where there are freight lines, sidings or depots consider whether any train
Freight lines detection is needed. This should be considered along with the means of
and depots operating points; power worked points require train detection to be provided but
not necessarily as many separate sections as would be provided on running lines.
• In some depots the provision of a Ground Frame may be appropriate, but often
hand points with their individual local levers will suffice. Do remember that the
connection to the running line needs to be operated by properly interlocked
points (either controlled directly from the main signalbox or from a Ground
Frame released electrically by it or by virtue of the train staff or token carried by
the driver).
• Similarly there must be trapping protection to prevent any unauthorised
movements occurring from the facility and endangering the running line. This
can be provided by a normal set of points leading to a shunting neck / head-shunt
or perhaps even a sand-drag; alternatively if there is no such connection to use
provide a set of trap points (whose purpose is to derail and deflect from the
running line). Generally these will be powered and operated as a 2nd end of the
connection in the running line, but in some circumstances a single ender is
appropriate. Conversely where separate Arrival and Departure lines to a facility
are provided then trap points could be required in both lines, but the set only
used in the trailing direction could be spring points but should be provided with
electrical detection so that they are known to be in the trap position.
• When drawing trap points, remember to include a TCI which should be named
after the track circuit within which it is incorporated- the interrupter should be
drawn so that it would be knocked off by a train passing through the normal lie
of the points and thus about to be derailed. If the layout is such that it is
considered that there is a risk of a derailed vehicle becoming foul of another line,
then a relevant note re forced occupation of a further track circuit should be
added. If the train detection in the area is by axle counter then a physical TCI
may not be needed and the same functionality achieved by data; a note to this
effect is required.
• Consider whether the departure signal(s) of any depot or siding should be
provided as GPL, an elevated PL or a main aspect. In general a main running
signal should be provided unless the depot emerges onto the running line on the
immediate approach to such a signal. Where such a signal is so close that it is
less than a full train length clear of the connection, then a special control
preventing the clearance of the previous signal when the next is at danger should
be imposed. It is poor signalling for a driver leaving a depot to have to proceed
cautiously for any significant distance; similarly it is equally unacceptable for a
train to be stopped almost the moment it has started since the driver will not be
expecting this.
• At any such facility, think about what associated signals are needed on the
running line. There will certainly need to be a signalled route into it (as per step
17 consider whether this would be a Main or Shunt movement) which may
requires some form of release or slot. There may also need to be a need for
additional GPLs and LOS that allow any associated run-round or propelling
moves to be made.

Step 22 Level crossings also require special consideration; you need to decide the appropriate type
Level of level crossing and how it interfaces with the rest of the signalling. It is wise to write a
crossings brief note relating to the factors which influenced your choice of crossing protection.
• On a mainline the choice for a vehicular crossing is likely to between a CCTV /
MCB and an AHBC; the former is always possible whereas an AHBC is permitted
only in certain circumstances but does significantly reduce the road closure time
for the road user.
• On a line of low line speed other possibilities also exist, an ABCL usually being
the preferred option provided that the crossing speed is not unacceptably low for
the train service. These are not suitable everywhere and other forms of crossing
such as TMOB are sometimes provided.
The details of the crossing itself should be shown: road stop lines, road lights, barriers,
floodlight, CCTV cameras, phones, DCI etc. depending upon crossing type.
Where the crossing is controlled by, or at least indicated at, a signalbox then the interface
to the signaller should be defined. For example a CCTV crossing could potentially be
provided with “Auto Lower”, would probably have “Auto Raise” (though use of shunt
routes over the crossing would need to inhibit this) and would certainly require a “Crossing
Clear” function. The number of barriers and whether they are interlocked with the
signalling should be stated.
Whilst a CCTV/ MCB must be closed to the road user before a proceed aspect can be
displayed by a rail signal, AHBC, ABCL and AOCL are largely freestanding; however
where signals are provided for other reasons within their strike-ins then special controls
may be needed. Remember to note any special controls within the relevant route boxes.
Level crossings also influence the train detection arrangements, so it is wise to show any
necessary divisions at this time.
• These must be arranged to permit the crossing to be opened at the first opportunity
after the passage of a train as well as the initial activation of the crossing.
• Positioning the strike-ins for automatic level crossings is particularly critical and
joints will probably need to be provided specifically for this purpose, but turning
on the picture at a CCTV generally can utilise the nearest joint to the theoretical
position.
• Remember that automatic crossings to current standards should be provided with
strike-ins from both directions on each running line (to cater for engineering work
and SLW), even if the line itself is signalled uni-directionally. Treadles are often
used to reinforce track circuit strike-in and they also play a part in setting the
directionality as a train passes over the crossing and in reopening it subsequently.
Step 23 By this time you should be confident that all necessary signals have been provided and thus
Signal the numbering exercise can be undertaken. The current NR standard is to:
numbering • number all running signals in the same sequence (except that the “wrong road”
signals on unequally signalled bi-directional lines are sometimes in a separate
sequence),
• use Odd numbers for the Down direction of travel increasing in the direction of
travel,
• use Even numbers used for the Up direction of travel descending in direction of
travel,
• sequence kept “in step”; this means that gaps are left in one sequence in places
where there are more signals for the opposite direction,
• generally however few gaps are left but beyond junctions a separate batch of
numbers is utilised for the different lines of route,
• remember to check the question paper in case any requirements relating to the
numbering has been specified.

Step 24 NB: Some find that this is actually a good activity to perform very early in the exercise.
Points It is free-standing, allows some easy marks to be obtained early on and can help familiarise
with the layout. Alternatively it can be left until the majority of the hard work has been
done as is suggested here. Candidates should experiment during practice and then decide
which suits them best.
• Mark the normal lie of points by making bold one of the two possibilities which are
generally drawn quite thin and light. Railways differ but follow the convention to
which you are used- whether it be the most heavily used route, the lie which permits
parallel movements or the safest lie in that it diverts any SPAD along the lowest
conflict route.
• Cross check to ensure that any required trap points and their associated TCIs have
been added (see step 21) it is essential to protect the running line from places where
individual vehicles or complete trains may have been left unattended for a
significant period.
• Determine which point ends should be operated simultaneously and thus share an
interlocking identity. The two halves of a switch-diamond should always be
operated together and thus share a single number with A and B suffixes. Similarly
the two single leads forming a crossover are generally also best operated as a pair;
however be aware that in certain layouts it is beneficial to retain these as two
independent point ends since that can permit the provision of flank protection (that
otherwise could not be provided without unreasonably restricting other
simultaneous movements on the layout). Historically three or even four points were
operated as a group (in particular a double junction is often numbered such that the
switch-diamond is grouped with the single lead in the other track to form a three-
ended set) but this is no longer current practice. The rule is group point ends in
pairs as much as possible for maximum economy but ensure you do not combine
ends that restrict the usability of the layout or worsen the layout protection that
could otherwise be provided by flank point calling. For complicated pointwork
such as single slips, double slips and scissors, always consider the functionality
which is provided (i.e. envisage what arrangements of simple crossovers would
enable the same operational movements (albeit a succession of such crossovers
would require a longer length of railway than the more complicated arrangements in
which they are effectively overlaid on each other); the appropriate numbering of the
individual ends should now become obvious. See diagram in L.7.
• The point ends (including worked traps but excluding handpoints) should be
numbered in a sequence; it is usual practice for the numbers to increase in the
Down direction. The current standard also is that the suffixes also increment in the
same manner; be aware however that a previous convention was to number the
nearest end to the signalbox (and thus later, interlocking) as the “A” end. Check the
question paper which often specifies the first number in the sequence to be used.
Normally a junction area would be allocated consecutive numbers, but a small gap
in the numbering system is left before the next junction area in order to leave some
spare in case future changes are undertaken; it is not a bad idea to do this in the
exam as if you have second thoughts re the pairing of point ends then there is less
re-work to do.
• If there are any points operated from a different signalbox or a Ground Frame then
a separate sequence should be utilised and often those numbers are placed within a
circle or triangle to differentiate them from those operated by the main control
centre. Do not forget that the Ground Frame itself requires a release; unless this is
by possession of staff / token (for RETB the issue of an electronic “shunt token”
allows a key within the onboard unit to be removed which is then used to unlock a
cupboard adjacent to the GF in which the key which physically unlocks the GF
lever is attached by means of a chain), then the number of the electrical release
from the main signalbox must also be shown.

Step 25 If you have time remaining then enhance your work by such things as:
Ancillary • re-checking your work for silly mistakes and omissions
details • giving more explanations relating to your layout decisions (why you decided to
make a transition to 4-aspect signalling where you did, why you decided to provide
that particular route but not that facility, add more detail re how the depot or fringe
is to be operated),
• comment on risk of SPADs at various signals to display your knowledge of signal
sighting, causal factors and the consequence by a qualitative assessment of junction
layout risk,
• go back to your headway calculations and evaluate the headway that your signalling
would actually achieve in what you judge to be the most critical area,
• add refinements such as showing an example of speed signage, train protection etc.
in a limited area
Conversely it is more likely that you’d have needed to rush to save time to get through the
work in the time.
However do reserve at least the last five minutes for reviewing your work for obvious
errors and omissions and also identifying those areas of known incompleteness to the
examiner.
In particular check that you have declared the practices adopted and stated your
assumptions.
Also check that every piece of paper that you wish considered has your candidate
number on it and is numbered sequentially (don’t forget to hand in all your workings
for the calculated braking and headway).
DO ALL THIS EVEN IF YOU ARE NOWHERE NEAR FINISHING THE PLAN.
Refer to the next Appendix for specific information to signalling of terminal stations.

Appendix N2
Signalling the Mainline Layout – Network Rail Practice:
Specific information relevant to Signalling a Terminus

Although the signalling of significant terminal stations is a regular feature of the Metro
paper, it does not often arise within the Mainline paper; there has not been a recent
example but perhaps that increase the odds on it being a feature of next year’s
examination.
The following notes were written reasonably generically but for students who had
attempted the 1997 layout and required some additional assistance and guidance and
therefore based upon those considerations pertinent to that example.
Note that an explanation of the relevant exam calculations is included: link
1 Speed restriction in station throat to be equal to the speed over the points reverse. Start at (or
>200m on the approach to) the platform admission signal.
2 Platform admission signal will be a Red / Yellow.
• Give it a SARI to all the main class route destinations. All will be MAF unless there is one
to a shorter platform which should be MAR.
• Position it as reasonably close to the station throat as possible (try to get at least 50m away
from first facing points and provide it a swinging overlap; in some cases an overlap length
(could easily be reduced to 180m or even less given the line speed) clear of points.
Certainly don’t want it any further away.
3 If there is any reference to platform sharing, need also to provide a PL to give a Call-on into the
platforms.
• Give this a MARI- separate indication for all platforms.
• If there is also a need for shunt routes into sidings then uses the same PL and MARI.
Attempt to use the one MARI indication for a multiplicity of sidings; may need to split if
any of the shunt destinations is “significantly different”- e.g. carriage washer, maintenance
shed, freight terminal rather than sidings for spare passenger rolling-stock.
4 Even if requirement for call-ons is not explicitly stated, you might decide to provide them if the
platform is at least twice the length of the shortest passenger trains which are run, especially if
there is a lot of train service for the number of platforms provided. However you should justify
your decision rather than simply provide without explanation.
If providing them do write a suitable note such as: “Permissive moves into platforms need to be
justified by operational need and safety risk assessment”.
5 If providing call-ons, make sure that the platform TCs are split into 2 (or more).
The section closest to the buffers should be just over the length of one train (so remaining TC is
clear when 1st train in there).
6 Don’t’ forget the bufferstop lights (red). Provide a TC interrupter just beyond the buffers (if train
hits buffers it will dislodge the sliding bufferstop which is used as a last ditch attempt to slow the
train and we need to know that it has been moved)
7 Note that TPWS OSS is provided on approach to buffers (approx 50m prior, set speed 12mph)

8 If have a PL on platform admission signal for call-on moves give it a very short berth TC (50m)
and then put another TC joint in rear of the signal which is just over the length of the “inner”
platform TC. These are for “Lime St control” which attempts to stop a signaller trying to signal
into a terminal platform a train longer than that which would fit.
This control was primarily of use when trains were formed by loco and variable number of
coaches.
9 Consider putting an intermediate speed restriction on the line on the approach to the station such
that it reflects the braking that a train would need to be doing anyway. Hence no headway impact
but can then use in order to legitimise shorter braking distance and indeed reduced overlap lengths.
These can significantly help headway as the trains all bunch up as their speed is reducing coming
towards the terminus.
10 If you are closing up signal spacing, don’t fall into the trap of putting so close that a train waiting at
one signal will have the rear vehicle still on the track circuit of the overlap of the one behind, or
even locking up a set of points.
In the other direction ….

11 Platform starting signals should be R/Y/G even if you are immediately going to have 4 aspects
beyond this. Note that they won’t have AWS or overlaps. Terminal platform starting signals
needing route indicators should have SARI.
12 Headway is not so much about dwell time but about getting trains to leave the station on a Green
aspect so they follow the line speed profile rather saunter out. Hence always good to get the 1st
signal out as close as you can- braking is not a worry. Place it so the rear of the train held at it is
clear of all pointwork in the station throat. Given the relatively low speed don’t need a 225m
overlap here and helps headway to keep it shorter- just remember to put a dimension on it as a
reduced overlap- perhaps 100m.
13 Put the 2nd signal out of the station also pretty close. Given that the braking rate and acceleration
rate are equal (check!) then effectively can be at very much the same spacing- just beware the train
starting at the buffers and therefore passing the platform starter at a significant speed so perhaps
best to add the platform length to the signal spacing then you know is OK.
14 Using Newton’s laws of motion you can then work out what the attainable speed actually is at this
signal position.
• It might have reached the maximum permissible speed by this position in which case the
normal headway / braking considerations apply.
• Otherwise work out the braking from whatever is the attainable speed in order to determine
the minimum signal spacing to the 3rd signal. Obviously if the speed is lower than the
headway speed, it is necessary to keep the signals fairly closely spaced in order not to have
a headway bottleneck. Obviously you should find that the signal spacing gradually
increases as the distance from the station increases.
15 Definitely should have TRTS on the platforms to give indication to signaller that the train really
has a train crew on board and is likely to go if the route is set.
Also CD/RA plungers and indications on signal (and perhaps also extra ones positioned mid
platform if the trains are significantly shorter and could be starting from bufferstop end). If the
signal is not on the platform side of the train then provide an OFF indicator half way down the
platform so that train dispatch staff can tell the signal has been cleared.

Appendix P1
Signalling the Mainline Layout – ETCS Level 2: Step by step
Students are advised that the level of development and completion of this
Appendix is rather less than the remainder of the Study Pack.
However the IRSE considers that it is worth including even in its current state
in recognition of the direction in which the industry is moving and to emphasise
that such a solution would be acceptable within the Module 2 Examination. At
the current time, it is believed that anyone contemplating undertaking the
examination to these standards is likely to be truly familiar with them and thus
any inaccuracy within this Appendix is unlikely to deter. Indeed it will only be
by the actual attempt to signal typical past papers that an understanding will
be gained of the examination activities to be performed and for this guide to be
completed. It is suggested that it may also have some use to guide a student
considering offering a different form of transmission based signalling, perhaps
in a Metro environment.

This step-by-step guide focuses on signalling the layout with ETCS Level 2 with cab signalling without
any Level 1 fallback.
As a reminder, this solution implies:
• Lines are only accessible to ETCS level 2(+) fitted trains
• No lineside signals (except at entry / exit transitions)
• Frequently updated (say 5 – 10 sec) movement authorities (MAs) provide in-cab display
• Movement authorities can potentially be issued to the end of any train detection section
• SvL broadly equivalent to the end of overlap in lineside signalling
• Continuous speed supervision, including braking curve supervision according to the defined
performance of each type of train
• Degraded modes will require EoA block marker boards (FBM) , which are placed rather like
signals protecting junctions
• Supervision of trains is defined by the contents of each MA sent to the EVC by the RBC. This
includes the appropriate ETCS Mode (FS, OS, SH, SR, etc.) for each portion of the authority
and the appropriate speed and gradient information.
• Generic principles for the application of these modes in different operational scenarios are pre-
defined and must be applied to each section of line equipped with ETCS to ensure consistency
for drivers; however precise details of some elements of system operation do depend upon how
ETCS is configured to suit a particular railway administration’s infrastructure.
Step 1 It should go without saying, but do remember to put your candidate number on the plan
itself and any other sheets of answer paper which you wish to be taken into
consideration, such as those containing any calculations, stated assumptions or general
Administration application notes (steps 2, 3, 4 ) etc.
You may decide that it is best also to put the detail of any explanatory notes (steps 2-4)
and perhaps the route boxes (step 17) onto separate pieces of paper to avoid writing
something on what may initially seem to be a blank piece of the plan that you might later
wish to depict something relating to that section of the track layout.
It is wise to add a note on the plan itself adjacent to your candidate number how many
extra sheets relate to the plan to form your complete answer.

Step 2 State the practices to which you are signalling the layout: e.g. current Railway Group
Practices and NR Company Standards, SBB standards, Infrabel standards, etc
Remember that “ETCS Level 2” is primarily a specification of the “air gap” between the
train and infrastructure. Whilst there has to be consistency of generic application
principles to ensure interoperability, the precise functionality is significantly affected by
the values assigned to certain key parameters chosen by the infrastructure design.
Similarly the information passed between the interlocking and RBC (and indeed whether
a bi-directional link is implemented) does depend on the actual systems utilised
(manufacturer and version). For the examiners to have a clear understanding of the basis
on which your solution is based, your answer should include sufficient information
relating to the default and national values of the principal parameters.
For example you should discuss your reasons for specifying:
• the MA update time,
• the circumstances in which an EVC can request a new MA,
• implementation of TAF,
• the value of M_NVContact, T_NVContact,
• any infrastructure defined Release Speed,
• whether train position reports are utilised for purposes of TISP.
Step 3 Make sure you carefully read and understand all the plan notes.
For items NOT STATED on the Plan or question paper you should state the assumptions
Read the notes you are making, such as:
State • level gradient,
assumptions • the type of train detection envisaged (if for example axle counters are to be
utilised explain briefly whether the ACEs are to be centralised or distributed)
• the type of POE envisaged,
• the ETCS fitment status of the train fleets,
• the level of GSM-R coverage both for voice and data,
• the train positioning accuracy following passage over balise groups both initially
on start of mission and subsequently whilst running,
• the factors entailed in calculating acceleration and braking distances of each type
of train, including representative traction and brake delays, warning times,
margins, etc. Provided the figures used are roughly typical, this demonstrates to
the examiner that you understand the factors involved.
Step 4 Add any relevant notes which generally apply to your plan, such as:
• distances / dimensions all metric,
Explanatory • define method of working of all train services described in the Plan Notes; any
Notes occasional or engineering trains may need to be hauled by a ETCS fitted pilot
locomotive; if so then facilities would be needed to attach / detach / possible run
round etc,
• the minimum distance between track section boundaries and balise groups,
• explain what communication method would be used in degraded mode by a
driver to obtain authority to pass a block marker, or used by staff needing to
locally operate the points,
• detail any expected “radio holes” and how such areas would be treated,
• describe how the distance being allowed between the EoA and the SvL is
calculated and how it relates to the preferred RSp for the different train types.

Step 5 Based on the above, decide on the most appropriate signalling solution for each section
of the layout, taking into account operational and cost considerations:
Select ETCS • ETCS wherever appropriate,
area • Conventional signalling on sections needing access by non-fitted trains
(including a transition to/from ETCS demonstrates understanding of issues
involved),
• Minimal signalling on branches (e.g. if one train working is more appropriate).
Define the area for which GSM-R data coverage is required.
NB: There is no need to assess at this stage the capability of ETCS Level 2 to meet the
service requirements – it can be assumed that it is possible to better the capacity
achievable with conventional lineside signalling. The application details can be
determined later to achieve the required capacity most cost-effectively.
The examiners recognise that whereas braking and headway are key factors for a
lineside signalling solution, this is not the case for an ETCS signalling solution. Hence
the marks allocated for such calculations are not applicable to a candidate signalling
the layout exclusively with ETCS; instead the examiners will expect the candidate to
demonstrate an equivalent detailed understanding of the key factors for an ETCS
signalled layout. Therefore to obtain the appropriate marks, it is suggested that the
candidate should put equivalent effort into determining what separation of the EoA and
SvL would give an appropriate RSp and ensure that trains of any type would be able to
reach the FBM in an operationally appropriate manner.
If ETCS level 2 is utilised on only part of the layout and there is a transition to some
other form of signalling for the remainder, then the candidate should draw attention to
the reasons for that choice and the key factors affecting the selection of transition
locations from both technical and operational perspectives. Indeed a candidate is
probably wise to choose to demonstrate a transitional area in order to display their ability
in this regard.
Notes should also be made about any resultant limitations that the proposed solution
would impose on the operation of the railway system.
Step 6 Treat any conventionally signalled sections of the line as described in the appropriate
Conventional step-by-step guide.
area This appendix concentrates on the ETCS sections, and transitions to and from ETCS.
Step 7 Determine whether there is any requirement for:
Signs and • some lineside signage,(for example to ensure level crossing safety in degraded
signals mode), or
• some conventional signal (for example, to control shunting movements within a
train depot etc) or indeed lights at buffer stops,
• any signal / route set indicator to authorise movement from a train’s starting
position until it passes a FBM.
[Note: It is not possible for a train to start a mission in FS mode as the RBC
cannot determine whether track occupancy in the current section is solely due to
that train or if there could be another train within the section. In certain
implementations it is necessary for a train to enter a route for which the RBC is
not receiving assurance from the interlocking that the route is “proved” – i.e. the
equivalent of “aspect off” comprising all points set and detected, all relevant
track sections clear etc. Hence a train would need to start in SR and
subsequently make transitions to OS and thence to FS].

Step 8 State what extent of bi-directional operation is being provided, and why.
Determine Determine whether full bi-directional capability is possible with the track layout given
bi-directional for the ETCS sections of the line. In reality the marginal costs are such that this would
provision normally be exploited; however in the exam it is probably better not to try to provide full
bi-directional operation. You are working against time and others signalling with
conventional signals will probably not do so except where there is a specific requirement
given in the question.
Step 9 Assess the adequacy of the standing room for the defined length of trains, in all loops,
Standage platforms, sidings, etc., and between junctions. Add notes to the plan to define where
EoA crucial standing room is provided.
Propose locations for FBM to define the start of movements from these locations where
trains stand.
Step 10 Determine the type of level crossing installation needed in each instance on the layout
Level Crossing and propose the relevant signalling protection. A Protection Node would generally be
EoA provided analogous to a protecting signal in lineside signalling; for those types of
crossing not conventionally protected by signals, provision of an Emergency Stopping
Point or the facility to be able to impose an Emergency TSR of 0kph over the road width
is considered sufficient.
Draw the salient features of each crossing (barriers, road lights, signs, rail driver’s
indications, etc.).
Indicate the means by which the crossing is controlled and / or automatically initiated.
Where this would entail the specific provision of a train detection section, treadle or
similar trackside infrastructure make sure this is positioned appropriately with a brief
note of the significance of its positioning.
Step 11 Where appropriate, add FBM at Protection Nodes (these are used to protect crossings or
Exceptional other sites which are deemed to warrant specific protection but are not significant for
Stopping headway purposes).
Points, Determine if there are any other sites (consider the potential limits of an engineering
Protection possession whilst other portions of the layout are in operational use) where there may be
nodes and a requirement for a FBM.
non block Determine if there are other places (such as the entrances to significant tunnels) that
FBM warrant the definition of an Exceptional Stopping Point.
Differentiate between those FBM which can be designated “passable” in degraded mode
without communication with the signaller and those which must always be respected
without a movement authority (verbal in the case of degraded mode).

Step 12 For each FBM, work out the corresponding DP on the track layout and determine the
Protecting the SvL.
conflict The aim is to achieve a reasonable distance between the FBM and the SvL to minimise
the intrusiveness of supervision which should normally accord with the initial
assumption stated. Denote any sub-standard length which would therefore be likely to
have an adverse effect on the speed at which an approach to the FBM could be made.
Where the distance between FBM and SvL is short, take into consideration the train type
with the worst braking performance and the practicality of a driver being able to control
the train within the RSp which would be calculated on board. It may be necessary to
provide a facility within the interlocking to lock an extended overlap for such a
movement so that the SvL can be positioned further away thus resulting in an acceptable
RSp.
Conversely where the distance between FBM and SvL is particularly long, this might
result in certain trains calculating an unreasonably high RSp. Although this would be
safe, such a display may be disturbing to a driver and apparently contradict the need to
stop at the FBM at the EoA. In these situations it could be desirable for an infrastructure
dictated RSp to be imposed; however the corollary of this is that it must be set at such a
value that any possible train would be able to respect the SvL from that speed.
Step 13 Add further FBM, where you assess that, in occasional degraded operation, it might be
Protection desirable to be able to instruct a driver to stop a train driven on-sight (e.g. before tunnels,
node viaducts, level crossings).
Define any Protection Nodes that are required (relevant to “Emergency Stop” demands
but not a node to which an EoA is issued- for example for level crossing protection in an
emergency scenario).
Step 14 Note that although the RBC maintains train separation for following trains, there is a
Headway need for additional FBM to divide a long section for operation in degraded mode. These
node may not necessarily be route setting nodes (but any which are provided would coincide
with a location to which an MA would normally be issued).
Note that a FBM would not be provided at every possible end of MA; if required to stop
at them the driver relies solely on the indication on their DMI. To some extent a “virtual
FBM” can be thought of as the equivalent of a passable lineside signal.

Step 15 When you think you have achieved a basic signalled layout, mentally use the nodes that
Consider you have provided to satisfy yourself that it is possible to achieve the moves specified
operational and implied within the Plan. Assess whether any additional nodes are required to permit
moves, all the required operational moves on the layout and add any additional ones which are
especially needed.
shunting Consider also:
• how any propelling moves are to be undertaken,
• the area within which any shunting movement needs to be contained,
• whether there is sufficient standage for a run round movement to be undertaken,
• whether there is a need to undertake a movement on to a portion of line that
either may be, or certainly would be, occupied. Provide any additional routes
that would be need to be differentiated within the interlocking and thus give rise
to an MA containing a different supervision mode,
• whether the signalling allow movements to be undertaken without undue
intervention from the train protection,
• whether there a need to transition to / from some other form of signalling in
depot or siding,
• how the shunting movement is controlled (another control point, radio,
handsignals etc) and the means by which the driver is made aware of the
boundary and detail any slot / release arrangement needed,
Note that it is a general principle that ETCS should always provide the highest level of
supervision and protection which is practicable in the circumstances; thus do not confuse
the fact that an interlocking’s route may be of shunt class with the mode in which ETCS
will be operating- there is a distinction between “Shunt route” and SH mode.
Where areas of true shunting take place however SH is used and since this is a relatively
low level of supervision, the train needs to be contained within the allowable area.
Hence the design of the infrastructure must ensure that “Stop in SH balises” are
positioned appropriately.
Step 16 Number all FBM in a consistent logical sequence.
Number the On NR this utilises a system based upon the kilometric distance and the ELR.
FBM
Step 17 Route boxes are required to define:
Route Boxes • the physical routes which can be utilised within the layout,
• the class of route within the interlocking, and
• the relevant ETCS mode(s).
Note that ETCS should utilise FS whenever possible in order to obtain the maximum
degree of protection. Thus a call-on route into an occupied platform uses FS (constrained
by a low ceiling speed) for the majority of the length of the movement and there is a
transition to OS just for the section of line on which permissive movements are
authorised.
To complete the route boxes obviously requires the allocation of numbers to the FBM so
this activity is therefore best left until the layout is complete in this respect.
It’s a matter of personal preference whether you provide the route boxes on the layout
itself, or on separate pieces of paper. There is a definitive advantage from saving the
ruling of individual lines for route boxes but conversely there is a higher risk of
overlooking a node if separating the boxes from the plan.

Step 18 Add train detection section boundaries adjacent to FBM locations check re protection
Train nodes etc.
detection Add train detection section boundaries in areas, to permit parallel movements.
boundaries Define which of these boundaries is to be treated as defining the end of an O/L by the
interlocking system. Where it is necessary also to define extended overlaps for certain
traffic these should also be depicted and the principle of operation by the signaller
explained.
Axle counters are likely to be the preferred means of train detection for a new ETCS
scheme, in order to maximise the advantage of avoiding the need for lineside cable
routes and power supply. The design should:
• consider the allocation of ACE to the track sections so as to limit the disrupted
area should a failure occur; this will generally result in a “per running line” split.
Twin Zp (one for each ACE) will therefore be required in the turnout leg of
crossovers in order that the lines can be independent of each other; it is
obviously important that there is some small overlap rather than a gap between
the sections.
• recognise any constraints of the distance from the Zp to the ACE, especially if
these are assumed to be power fed along transmission cabling,
• aim to minimise any spurs of track sections in order to streamline the process of
resuming normal working following any failure or disturbance of the axle
counter system.
Step 19 Define those portions of the layout on which train awakening is required.
Awakening This should be determined from considering the situations in which a train may need to
tracks perform a “cold start” and thus would otherwise be constrained to start in SR mode and
transition to OS mode once it had read a balise.
A train can only perform a “warm start” if it establishes communication with the RBC
which can establish a valid and unambiguous position for that train. Generally this
requires that knowledge of the distance from the LRBG is sufficient to uniquely identify
a position (i.e. no facing points having passed the balise).
Step 20 Add the balise groups necessary for:
• maintaining odometry sufficiently accurate (localisation balises or OCB),
Balise • taking special consideration approaching those areas which warrant greater
positioning accuracy to ensure that the on-board calculated RSp can be sufficiently high to
allow approach to the FBM,
• to limit areas where moves in SH mode are planned to be made (Danger for
Shunting balises),
• “Stop if in SR”
• to allow the EVC and RBC to establish an unambiguous position for the train in
any “train awakening area”,
• to give any specific warning required for approach to level crossings etc (George
balises),
• to initiate a level transition (e.g. Network Registration, Radio Connection,
Transition Annunciation, Transition Border for entry to ETCS level 2 from
ETCS level 0),
• etc
Ensure that the intended role of each balise group is explained to the examiner so that
your solution can be understood.

Step 22 Once all the balise are placed, list all the balise and tabulate the relevant details:
Balise Table • Unique Identity
• Orientation
• Track Section
• N_PIG
• their functions in the Up and Down direction of travel.
These functions explain the reason(s) for provision of the balise at that location and
reflects the data programmed into them for transmission to the train. A brief explanation
of the significance of each functionality should be given (i.e. its purpose within the
operation of the system). Such functions may include:
• network registration, packet #45
• RBC connection, packet #42,
• level transition annunciation / annunciation boundary, packet #41
• exit transition, packet #41,
• Stop if SR
• Stop if SH
• Awakening- location reference for initial OS MA
• TAF- location reference to transition to FS mode
• Odometry (1000m) to reset confidence interval on approach to FBM
• Odometry-RSP- to reset confidence interval to give RSp near FBM
• Odometry- SSP - to reset confidence interval to give nearing speed change
• Odometry (4000m)- to reset confidence interval periodically in plain line section
Step 23 Mark the normal lie of points on the plan and number point ends. This task is essentially
the same as for lineside signalling, although the implementation of full train protection
Point lie could be argued to reduce the necessity for provision of flank protection.
Step 24
Transitions Not yet written
and Fringes
Step 25
Inter- Not yet written
operability
declaration
At present there is very little body of expertise built up in applying

ERTMS to a layout to be signalled. The above represents an attempt to
record the process in a manner analogous to the other step-by-step
guides. If you think you can offer a better guide, then please do so!
All contributions gratefully received.

Appendix S: Network Rail Aspect Sequence

S.1. 3 aspect sequence
The diagram below depicts standard aspect sequence for 3 aspect signalling. It is suitable where
the signal spacing dictated by braking considerations provides suitable headway. Note that there
must always be braking distance to the Red aspect from the Yellow displayed at the previous
signal, but on the other hand the signal spacing should not be so much greater that drivers get into
the habit of not commencing braking at the cautionary aspect.
103 105 107 109
103
R 105
Y R 107
G Y R 109
G Y R
G Y
G
If in a 3 aspect sequence a signal has to be positioned less than braking distance from the next
signal, a modified aspect sequence is used. The diagram below shows that signal 105 is approach
released when 107 is at red; this ensures that the driver starts braking due to the yellow displayed
on 103. Although the driver will then encounter 105 at yellow, the speed of the train will already
have been reduced so that there will now be braking to the red at 107. Approach release of the
yellow aspect is depicted by the vertical dashed line and a note added to explain when the
transition occurs- generally the first convenient opportunity after the train has passed the signal in
rear.
103 105 107 109
Underbraked section
103
R 105
Y R 107
G Y R 109
G Y R
G Y
G
This however is definitely a non-preferred solution and other options such as amending the
position of signal 109 to suit the unalterable position of signal 107, reducing the permissible speed
for the section of line enabling closer signal spacing, or the use of an isolated 4 aspect signal (see
later) should also be considered. In general therefore students should attempt to avoid utilising
such signal positioning within module 2; if it does seem the best solution then a note explaining
the situation should be added to the plan. Candidates producing aspect sequence charts for a given
layout (as per a module 3 question) are warned to be alert for situations in which such a sequence
may be required however.

S.2. Isolated 3 aspect sequence (2 aspect signals)

The diagram below depicts how a 3 aspect sequence is achieved where the headway requirement is
not onerous. Each signal can only display two of the three possible aspects: either Red/Green
(stop signal provided for reasons of headway or to protect a particular hazard) or Yellow /Green
(distant signal giving warning of the next stop signal).
103 105 107 109
103 105
Y R 107 109
G G Y R
G G
• Since the positioning of the distant signals (e.g. 103 and 107 in diagram above) is only
constrained by sighting considerations, it is never appropriate for them to be placed at less
than braking from their respective stop signals; generally they should be placed close to that
minimum distance but at a fringe with a series of 3 aspect signals consistency with that
spacing is also a consideration
• Generally the distance between a stop signal and the distant signal for the following one (e.g.
105 to 107 in above diagram) will be at least three times braking distance (otherwise it
would be a cheaper to have provided a sequence of 3 aspect signals at maximum spacing that
would also have given considerably better headway). See Appendix G.
• Positioning of the stop signals (e.g. 105 and 109 in diagram above) is often actually dictated
by the need for signals to protect hazards such as point work or level crossings rather than by
headway considerations. However where such signals do not provide sections of suitable
lengths (i.e. which can both deliver the required headway and not lead to excessively long
sections to manage in the event of failure or perturbed working) additional stop signals are
needed; distances of several miles are common but distances in excess of ten miles are rare.

S.3. 4 aspect sequence

The diagram below depicts standard aspect sequence for 4 aspect signalling.
It is suitable where signals need to be closer spaced (to provide the required headway) than
consideration of braking distance permits. There must always be braking distance to the Red
aspect from the Double Yellow displayed at the second signal to the rear (e.g. between 103 and
107, between 105 and 109 etc. in the diagram).
• It is not necessary for there to be half braking distance between adjacent signals, but it is
good practice to arrange the signals to be as evenly spaced as possible, whilst taking all the
other considerations for signal placement into account.
• The acceptable limit is generally regarded as a “one third-two thirds rule”; e.g. the distance
between 103 and 105 should not be less than 1/3 nor greater than 2/3 of the distance between
103 and 107 and so forth for every “inner caution” between the double yellow and its red.
Note that this is a percentage of the actual signal spacing, NOT a percentage of the minimum
braking distance.
103 105 107 109
103
R 105
Y R 107
YY Y R 109
G YY Y R
G YY Y
G YY
G

S.4. Aspect sequence transitions

Special consideration is necessary when there needs to be a transition from 3 aspect to 4 aspect or
vice versa. The easier transition is when the train is leaving a 4 aspect area and entering a 3 aspect
area.
4-Aspect to 3-Aspect
103 105 107 109
103
R 105
Y R 107
YY Y R 109
G YY Y R
G G Y
G
Signal 107 is a 4-Aspect Head
but it CANNOT show Top Yellow.
It MUST NOT look like a 3-Aspect Head
From a driver’s perspective they as there is NOT full braking between 107 and 109
have been used in the 4-aspect area to passing signals at a
nominal half SBD and getting first an outer caution and then an inner caution signal. When
running into the 3-aspect area they can encounter the first signal (109 in this case) an Yellow as
their first and only caution; this may surprise them if not fully familiar with the route but it is safe
as there is full braking distance and the driver would be reassured of this fact as the profile is that
of a 3-aspect.
Signal 107 can never display Double Yellow since the signal that it would refer to is “missing”
(see diagram below); effectively the 3-aspect signals only fall into the positions of where each
alternate 4-aspect would have been placed had the transition not been made. However it must be
given a 4-aspect head so that a driver seeing a Yellow at that position will associate it with a 4-
aspect sequence (should have been expecting as would have already received a Double Yellow,
but perhaps if had been following closely an earlier train may have passed more than one signal
whilst it was displaying Single Yellow). If 107 had been provided as a 3-aspect head, there would
be a risk that the driver may believe that they were already within the 3-aspect sequence and thus
there was still a significant distance to the Red and therefore travel inappropriately fast.
braking braking braking braking braking
braking
G
No G Y
YY G Y R
G Y R
G G Y R
G YY Y R
G YY Y R
YY Y R
Y R
R `

3-Aspect to 4-Aspect
For this transition, there are several options which are depicted below. Which one of these is
appropriate does depend on the site; in particular the relative spacing of the signals in the vicinity
of the transition and also the headway requirement. They all involve an element of compromise
and none are without there disadvantages or risks, but they are given here in the order that
generally is regarded as the most preferable.
The basic problem is that from the driver’s perspective they have been encountering signals at a
nominal spacing of SBD yet at the transition to 4-aspects there is a discontinuity.
Either there has to be:
• full SBD between the last 3-aspect and the first 4-aspect in order that there is enough braking
distance for a train to stop at it if displaying Red (in which case there is then a problem of
how to warn the driver of the need to stop at the second of the 4-aspects because the place
where the Double Yellow should be displayed has no signal to be able to do so), or
• nominally half SBD between the last 3-aspect and the first 4-aspect (this conversely is fine
for the forthcoming 4-aspect sequence but there is no way to warn the driver of this first 4-
aspect signal being at Red because there is no signal in the suitable position).
Hence there is always a problem at one signal or the other which needs to be overcome in the most
expedient manner without being a significant safety risk.
Approach Release
This option involves the FIRST 4-aspect signal being held to danger whilst the SECOND 4-Aspect
head is at Red, until the train has approached it.
103 105 107 109
for t sec
TC occ
103
R 105
Y R 107
Y R 109
G YY Y R
G YY Y
G YY
G
In this scenario there is SBD between 103 and 105 so that the normal 3-aspect sequence applies.
The problem of the “missing signal” to give warning of 107 at Red is overcome because the driver
has initially been braking on the assumption that they would need to stop at 105. However this is
Approach Released once the driver nears it and by this time the speed of the train will be slow
enough that the distance to 107 is perfectly adequate (indeed the train has actually had to brake
rather earlier than strictly necessary). Note the difference to MAR; it is ONLY the Yellow which
is affected since if there is no need to stop at 107 the normal 4-aspect sequence can be displayed.
The route box for 105 would need a note “Approach Released when 107 ON”.
Obviously there is a headway impact; until the overlap beyond 107 becomes clear, 103 will be
displaying Yellow (and it is approximately 1.5 x SBD in rear); be careful this does not occur at a
critical section!

4-Aspect Delta Plate

This option involves installing a 4-aspect repeater head (i.e. Yellow/Green/Yellow) with no Red
aspect (and thus identified by a “delta plate”) for the SECOND 4-aspect head.
Signal 105
cannot show
SINGLE YELLOW
101 103 105 107 109 111
Signal 107 does not

101 have a RED Aspect
R 103
Y R 105 107
G Y R no R 109
G YY Y R 111
G YY Y R
G YY Y
G YY
G
This method gets rid of the problem of how to warn of the Red on the second 4-aspect head by the
simple expedient of not providing it a Red.
In many ways this is the neatest arrangement, but:
• there is all the cost of a signal which makes no contribution to headway; indeed the headway
benefits of the 4-aspect signalling really occur once beyond109 signal so the extent of 4-
aspect signalling has to be greater than that which first seems obvious,
• it can be inconvenient to have a non-Red signal in certain locations. There certainly should
not be any points or controlled level crossings between 107 and 109; this is because 105
would have to be the protecting signal yet a driver may be authorised past it in failure
conditions. They would then encounter 107 showing a proceed aspect which could convey
quite the wrong message relating to the infrastructure that they had not yet reached.

Overbraking Provided
The last option takes the opposite approach, in that the first 4-aspect signal is positioned
effectively as if it were a 3-aspect (i.e. the signals in each direction are SBD from it).
Full Braking Distance

from 105 to 107
103 105 107 109 111
105 is the FIRST

warning for TPWS must be
BOTH 107 (Y) provided for 107
due to SPAD trap
and 109 (YY)
103
R 105
Y R 107
G Y R 109
YY Y R 111
G YY Y R
G YY Y
G YY
G
By providing the full required braking distance between the first and second 4-aspect heads, no
specific aspect transitions are required. At one time this was the favoured arrangement, but the
objection is that the same signal is a warning for 2 separate signals.
Although the aspects displayed are different, they both require the driver to commence braking at
the same place and hence it can be confusing;
• on one occasion they may find that the section is significantly overbraked as they are to stop
at 109 having received a Double Yellow at 105,
• on another occasion (having learnt from the first) they brake less hard and then find that the
are about to pass 107 displaying Red as they had only received a Single Yellow at 105.
Hence there is an increased SPAD risk at 107 and therefore the second 4-aspect head must be
provided with TPWS due to this potential driver confusion.
Since the distance between the first and second 4-aspects has in this scenario to be full SBD, then
the distance to the following signal (i.e. from 107 to 109 in this example) should be made as short
as practicable in order to limit the excess overbraking.
[Note that the caption to figure A1.1 in GK/RT0032 issue 2 is erroneous and can therefore be
confusing if this standard is consulted.]

S.5. Warning Class routes

The diagram below depicts a Warning aspect sequence for 4 aspect signalling. The restricted
overlap beyond signal 109 permits the points within the full overlap to be utilised by another train.
In order to mitigate the risk of this short overlap, the approaching train is brought under control at
signal 107; this only clears when the train has occupied its berth track for long enough that the
train must be moving slowly.
Note that the aspect sequence chart depicts:
• the “Red with a ROL”, separately to
• the “Red with a full overlap”.
This is because it is different as far as the clearance of the signal in rear is concerned.
The associated approach release is shown by the vertical step which denotes signal 107 changing
from Red to Yellow; the associated note explains when this transition occurs.
103 105 107 109
ROL
103
R 105
Y R 107
YY Y R 109
G YY Y R
G YY Y
G YY
G
Y R+ROL
tc occ
for t sec

S.6. Junction signalling: Necessity of Approach Release

If the speed over a diverging route is noticeably less than that over the main route, then the
junction signal must be approach released. This ensures that a restrictive aspect is given at the
previous signal, so that the train will be slowing down before sighting the junction signal;
otherwise the train could encounter the junction too fast (since the driver would only learn that it
was the diverging route which had been set too late to be able to take the junction at a safe speed).
Where the difference is actually small (∆v less than or equal to 10mph,) no approach release is
necessary; the train should be able to make a slight speed reduction between sighting the junction
signal and passing over the junction and indeed there is little risk from only a marginal overspeed.
Effectively the route signalling system is being used to impose a crude form of speed control
where it is otherwise not possible to convey to the driver the information relating to their
destination at an early enough time for them to brake accordingly. An alternative is to provide
items such as Splitting Distants (and to some extent PRI = Preliminary Route Indicators) to give
the required routing information further back from the junction. However these are very rare and
can effectively be ignored for the purposes of module 2 and 3 though it is worth being vaguely
aware (see #51/4, #57/5) of them. Normally we tell the driver a “white lie”, erring onthe side of
caution.
S.7. Junction signalling: Approach Release from Red

Refer to GK/RT0032 Appdx 3
The most restrictive form is MAR; this means that the junction signal is initially held at Red. It is
permitted to clear at the first opportunity it is safe for it to do so:
• the train has passed the signal in rear, and
• when both the signal and the junction indicator are readable by the driver.
The diagram below illustrates this, the vertical line depicting the aspect being held to Red until the
approach release condition is satisfied. Note that it is the route indicator which proves all the
aspect level controls (the approach release condition, tracks clear, points detected, signal ahead
etc.) and once this is proved alight, the main aspect then steps up to display its true aspect ( i.e.
changes from red to yellow or possibly then double yellow, green etc.).
Note that the main aspect is qualified by the route indication i.e. when the signal displays Yellow
with the PLJI position 1 it is a more restrictive aspect (because of the lower permissible speed)
than an unqualified Yellow. 201
103 105 107 109
107 201
Y + POS 1 R
YY + POS 1 Y
103 G + POS 1 YY
R 105 G
Y R 107
YY Y R 109
G YY Y R
G YY Y
G YY
March 2008 edition G 341
S.8. Junction signalling: Approach Release from Yellow (Flashing Aspects).

Since MAR initially gives the driver the impression that they are to stop at the junction signal, it
means that the train speed is often reduced by an unnecessary amount and that full opportunity of
the speed of the junction cannot be taken. It also has the disadvantage that drivers can become
conditioned to expecting that the junction signal will have cleared by the time that they arrive at it.
Inevitably there will be the rare occasion when the train is to be held at the junction signal and in
these circumstances there can be a risk of SPAD due to the driver’s expectation of clearance.
Hence where the diverging speed is a significant percentage of the straight route speed a less
restrictive form of approach release is utilised in which the junction signal is initially allowed to
clear but only to yellow. It is later allowed to step up to show its true aspect, once the approach
release conditions are satisfied (as per MAR).
LMH: Diagrams required for both MAY-YY and MAY-FA in 4 aspect
The example above shows the two signals on the approach to the Junction Signal have flashing
aspects. This gives the driver prior warning to expect to take the diverging route. The Junction
Signal is still held at Yellow until the approach release conditions are met. If a flashing sequence
is not established early enough that the driver is presented with an adequate view of signal 105 at
Flashing Single Yellow (this may because of a failure, but could just be that the signaller set the
route late or indeed the train was running too close behind an earlier train for the junction signal to
clear in time), then the sequence is inhibited and it defaults to MAR
T
his Appendix of the Study Pack is not totally complete for the 2008 edition, but has been included
since the portion which has been written should be sufficient for the majority of the situations
encountered when Signalling the Layout.
It is possible that an updated version will be made available during the course of the year at
www.irseexam.co.uk
The student is advised to consult NR/L2/SIG/19609 and ref #65/3

S.9. Banners.
If a signal has to be positioned where the MRT cannot be achieved (generally 8 seconds of
sighting time), a banner repeater is provided effectively to extend that time. The traditional banner
(whether in electromechanical of fibre optic form) only gives two indications: horizontal bar when
its associated signal is at Red and a diagonal bar whenever the signal is showing any proceed
aspect. The diagram below shows a typical scenario where one might be provided- an over-bridge
obstruction the sighting but they are equally used on curves. If at all possible they should be
placed such that the driver can see the signal itself as soon as they lose sight of the banner repeater.
The original purpose of the banner was as a “hurry up” signal; without it a driver who had seen
105 at Single Yellow would need to be approaching 107 very cautiously, given that it would only
come into sight when the train had nearly reached it. If the signal had since cleared this creates
unnecessary delay, but sight of 107BR off would give the driver confidence to approach it less
cautiously. Banners have also been used as a “be careful” reminder approaching those signal that
have history of SPADs or are thought to have factors that make them at risk.
Note that in a 4-aspect sequence as depicted below, the banner OFF indication must be depicted
twice; this is because although the banner does not change aspect as 107 changes from Yellow to
Double Yellow, signal 105 does upgrade its aspect. In a RRI implementation, each of the
horizontal lines of an aspect sequence diagram effectively represents a line circuit starting at the
signal in advance that eventually picks a relay at the position of the rear signal.
105 107BR 107 109
Over Bridge
105
R 107BR 107
Y ON R 109
YY OFF Y R
G OFF YY Y
G YY
If banner fails to clear G
when signal 107 is
off, 105 held to Yellow
Currently a new LED form of banner is being introduced on selected locations on NR. This is
capable of showing the black horizontal bar against a green background when the associated signal
is at Green (rather than against the usual white which is retained for the signal at Yellow or Double
Yellow). The rationale is that on high speed railway it is the sighting of the unrestrictive aspect
which is important to give the driver confidence to maintain full permissible speed when there is
only going to be a brief viewing of the signal which could be displaying Double Yellow and
therefore braking would be required. A problem when introducing them is that drivers will then
associate the usual OFF indication of a banner to be denoting a restrictive aspect (whether or not
that is true for the particular site); hence a particular route of railway will probably require a
“campaign change” to convert many in a reasonably short timescale.

S.10. Aspect Sequence Charts.

Production of Aspect Sequence Charts: A Summary
1 Aspect Sequence Chart should match the orientation of the Signalling Plan; a signal in the top left
should be on the sequence chart in the top left.
2 Only include main running signals and banners; not independent shunt signals but do include buffer
stops at end of platforms etc. Unless question says otherwise, for the IRSE exam you can safely ignore all
PLs, including those associated with Main signals as (C) or (S).
If you do show, depict as “R+PL+MARI “x” (where “x” is the route indication- if any- displayed and then
a dead-end; don’t show (C) as reading up to the next signal at R as it only creates confusion and is not
SEQUENCE.
3 Could be worth initially roughing out a very quick sketch just showing signals and link by single lines
between them, to show the “network” of what reads to what. Write a “3” or “4” adjacent to each line as a
shorthand re the aspect sequence to be provided. Helps plan the layout and ensure you don’t miss a route
to another running signal or indeed completely overlook a signal- a surprisingly common fault!
4 This should help you as a quick preliminary stage in drafting the real chart. Suggest you start at the
extreme top corner where signal “most in advance” is positioned (top left for signals reading from right
to left; top right for signals reading left to right).
Start with the Red with full O/L and then work back to the signals in rear, and then worry about the other
possible proceed aspects.
Check whether there is a ROL as well at this signal and depict this under the normal Red so that you don’t
forget; come back to this in step 7.
For a junction signal DO depict its proceed aspects for each route separately if they differ in terms of the
route indication displayed-“a yellow with a pos 1” is not the same aspect to the driver as a “straight
yellow”; DON’T depict the red more than once (except due to ROL) as a “red is a red”.
5 Don’t worry excessively re fitting on sheet- leave yourself enough space and if you need to continue to the
side and /or vertically, just use more sheets and “balloons” where a line leaves a sheet to reappear on
another and ensure that the same cross reference is added to both ends.
6 Put Y at the signal in rear (for the straight route if there are several) and ask yourself:
is this at braking distance?
if yes it is safe for signal in rear of it to show G, otherwise the driver needs earlier warning (normally by
YY but may need to A/R previous signal if that R is displayed ahead). Don’t forget that BD at full
linespeed isn’t the relevant factor if we know driver must have traversed pointwork at a lower speed en
route.
given that it is safe to show G, would this actually be confusing for a driver?
Relevant to aspect sequence transitions at junction areas & consistency to same /similar destinations from
parallel signals.
Having made this decision depict the rest of the sequence back to the Green, not forgetting to show the
sequence of G up to G.
If a plain-line transition occurs with a train leaving 3 aspect to run on 4 aspects, need to decide which of
the possible options is appropriate for the plan given:
• a non-R signal;
• A/R 1st 4 aspect if 2nd at R;
• 1st 4 aspect at full braking from 2nd
(giving the 1st warning for 2nd at R via Y and 3rd at R via overbraked YY).
7 Return to R+ROL
Check the route boxes of the signals in rear to establish if they have a (W) route (some entrances may not),
Show the signal in rear (i.e. the one with the (W) route) as having an Approach Released Y.
[A former standard depicted this as R/Y to make it more obvious that it was a “delayed yellow”; you
might care to follow this if you think it clearer]. Check route box for guidance on A/R track and time, if
not prescribed need to choose a likely value given berth TC length and ROL length (normally in range 15-
30 sec).

8 Consider if there are any other routes reading up to same signal and treat these similarly.
• Be particularly careful when there is a transition (e.g. 3 to 4 or 4 to 3) from one signal in rear
but not the other one. Clearest in this case if the aspect sequence lines only join up actually at the
forward signal.
9 Do a cross check for every possible signal in rear that each and every aspect of the signal in advance is:
• USED ONCE (otherwise signal in rear would go back to Red when it shouldn’t),
• AND ONLY ONCE (otherwise signal in rear would display mutually contradictory aspects).
Remember on Control Tables you are happy writing; “G reads up to YY or G” and make sure that all
“splits” in an aspect sequence line are diverging in direction of train movement (= converging in the sense
of aspect sequence information flow from the signal in advance).
Don’t forget the FY and perhaps FYY if there is a MAY-FA.
A signal doesn’t necessarily use all its possible aspects for all of its routes, but for every aspect it can
display then ALL signals in rear must be told what to display when it does (would be Y for any A/R
aspect).
10 If you have a junction signal which is MAF (or MAY-YY) (i.e. diverging route similar speed to the
“straight”) there will be a divergence of aspect sequence prior to the junction signal since we show
“Y+pos 1” as a separate aspect to “Y+pos 4” (yet the actual junction lies beyond that signal) but signal in
rear is to show YY for either.
11 A junction signal which is MAR is at red until after the signal in rear has been passed at Y. Hence show
a step-up (depending on track layout may need to depict down on the diagram) from the aspect sequence
line going back from that signal’s R. Again check route boxes for A/R condition (depends on route
indicator sighting but usually release goes back over several TCs, the outer one possibly timed).
12 Check for any MAY-FA: the step-up is from the “Y+PLJI”. Don’t forget to show the MAR as well !
13 When you think you have finished, check again to ensure that you have not committed any of the
following errors (which are all too frequent):
a) Missing a signal from the plan or ignoring it in a relevant sequence.
b) Drawing the sequence chart the wrong way around; the sequence is to go TOWARDS the train.
c) A signal shown to display simultaneously two contradictory aspects to the same signal in advance.
d) A signal reverting to RED when the forward signal steps up to GREEN.
e) The signal in rear of a RED being shown as anything less restrictive then YELLOW.
f) A signal at yellow being the FIRST warning of a red where there is insufficient braking to stop at
it.
g) Failure to apply APPROACH RELEASE when necessary to give sufficient warning of a
JUNCTION.
h) Failure to comply with information given in relevant route box on the plan (approach release
condition, signal requiring another off, provision of a Warning route etc.
i) Getting confused when there is a junction between lines having 3 aspect and 4 aspect signalling,
or where there is a transition between the different forms of signalling on plain line.
[Actually this is just a special case of c – h]
j) A signal at red with a ROL being regarded as the same aspect as a signal at red with a FULL O/L.
k) Putting the delayed yellow on the signal having the ROL rather than the ones that read up to it.
l) Connecting two separate aspect sequence lines together in a way that “shorts” between them- be
especially careful where a three aspect sequence and a four aspect sequence from different routes
apply up to a particular signal.
If you manage to avoid the 12 issues above, then you should do well in the aspect sequence question,
even if you don’t get everything entirely right. Aspect sequence is a chance to earn some easy marks; just
need to learn to do it quickly!

S.11. Aspect Sequence Charts: Examples.

Presentations vary significantly; in this example the railway line itself is depicted in the centre of the
diagram with the aspect sequence (for the Down direction) generally depicted above it, except for those
signals situated on the Up side of the layout. This style of presentation is best suited to relatively simple
railway, but does make it particularly useful for assessing headway because of the juxtaposition of the
layout and the sequence information.
The layout depicted is Fenchurch Street, a small yet busy London terminus, where it is important that trains
can leave promptly so that a platform is vacated on time for an incoming service to reoccupy it; any delay
here impacts on the railway as a whole and in that regard it is quite akin to a Metro operation. The presence
of the first station relatively close to the terminus compounds the problem and hence the design of the
signalling has to be primarily focussed in meeting the headway requirement.
Below is an example of the sort of diagram that a candidate for the Module 3 examination (it is an extract
from 2004 paper) would produce; it may have benefited from a little more thought before committing pen
to paper in order to aid clarity of presentation, but it does shows the essential elements.

Hence when performing the Module 3 exam it is worth looking at the layout as a whole and just visualising
the overall presentation that you intend to produce before getting stuck-in to the detail. For example for this
layout:
just think initially about the paths which trains would take over the layout depicting them with arrows and
against each whether the driver would have received a 3-aspect sequence or 4-aspect sequence to that
destination; this is represented by the numbers against the arrows below.
Note that the number does not necessarily define the number of possible aspects (e.g. from 122 to the buffer
stop there is obviously only a Yellow possible) but it does clearly show whether an outer caution is
necessary.
It can be worth the few moments it takes to sketch out roughly as below, before starting on the real answer
as it helps you:
• to plan how to allocate the available space,
• decide where it would be possible to combine similar sequences into a more compact presentation
(consider the previous example where a student had failed to do this)
• conversely to prevent an incorrect commoning up which can occur all to easily where dissimilar
sequences converge (signal 104 in the diagram).
122
3
3
108 3 124
126
3 3
3
3 3 112 114
106
104
4 4 4 4
This Study Pack contains some model answers from 1998 link
Module 3 past papers:
1999 link
and also a couple that are not so good (and are not immediately 1997 link
obviously from the same layout!) included so that you can learn from link
typical students’ mistakes identified on them.
and finally some unadulterated students’ efforts that you can compare 2000 link
with those that you have produced; judge for yourself who made the 2003 link
better attempt.

However for Module 2 purposes it is rather more important to have an overview of aspect
sequence and how it relates to the layout than to be able to draw aspect sequence charts.
Consider the diagram below and then see whether you can answer the following questions;; if you
are uncertain then you have some more studying to do!
Visibility of junction indicator, 25 27

“J” Down Branch
Visibility of main aspect,
“M”
Up Branch
24 28
Length of berth TC,
1 3 5 “T” 7 9 11 13
Down Down
AH ROL 901
Up
Up
4 6 8 10 12
1 Signal 7 is at Red. What is the least restrictive aspect that can be displayed by signal 5 if it is
a) a 4 aspect signal
b) a 3 aspect signal
c) a 2 aspect signal
2 Signal 7 is at Red. What is the least restrictive aspect that can be displayed by signal 3 if the
line is equipped with:
a) 4 aspect signalling
b) 3 aspect signalling
c) Isolated 3 aspect signalling
3 Signal 7 is at Red. At which signal is the driver first given warning to brake if the line is
equipped with:
4 The Red lamp in Signal 7 completely fails, so the signal is black. What aspect is displayed by
signal 3 if the line is equipped with:
5 There is a ROL defined beyond signal 7. Which signal is given a Warning class route if the
line is equipped with:

6 Which of the following statements are true relating to the approach release associated with a
Warning class route?
a) The signal must be held to danger until a train has TRUE / FALSE
been timed to a stand and then the yellow for the
warning class route can be displayed
b) The signal must be held to danger until it becomes TRUE / FALSE
visible to the driver of a train approaching it, but then
it can be cleared to show yellow.
c) The signal must be held to danger until the speed of TRUE / FALSE
an approaching train must have been reduced to a low
value at which time the signal is cleared to yellow.
d) The signal need only be held to red until the TRUE / FALSE
approaching train has passed the signal in rear whilst
it was displaying yellow.
7 The route from signal 7 is set to the branch. What form of approach release is applicable in
the following situations:
Approach speed Straight speed Diverge speed Type of A/R ?
a) 100mph 100 mph 30 mph
b) 50 mph 100 mph 50 mph
c) 100 mph 80 mph 75 mph
d) 100 mph 100 mph 75 mph
e) 50 mph 50 mph 40 mph
8 Assuming that the route from signal 7 to the branch is subject to Approach Release from Red,
what condition should be specified for that release to occur in the following situations:
Main aspect PLJI Berth TC A/R condition ?
visible (M) visible (J) length (T)
a) 600m 600m 600m
b) 400m 400m 600m
c) 600m 250m 500m
d) 600m 250m 800m
e) 900m 900m 900m
9 Assuming the main line is signalled with 4 aspects and the branch with 3 aspects, if 27 is at
Red with points 901 reverse, what is the least restrictive aspect which may be displayed by
signal 7 when the distance between signals 25 and 27 is:
a) at least braking distance at the maximum permissible
branch line speed
b) less than braking distance at the maximum
permissible branch line speed, but sufficient for
braking given the attainable speed is limited by a low
permissible speed over 901 Reverse
c) insufficient for braking at the permissible speed over
901 Reverse.
10 Assuming the main line is signalled with 4 aspects and the branch generally with 3 aspects,
what determines whether signal 24 ought to be a 3 or a 4 aspect signal?

Appendix T1:
Production of Route Boxes for Network Rail Practice
In the NR context, the information provided within route boxes should be:
• the destinations (lines and exit signals) to which they read,
• the “class” (Main, Warning, Call-on, Shunt, POSA),
• any route indication displayed (type and the displayed indication),
• the applicable form of approach release used for any junction signalling
(MAR, MAY-FA, MAY-YY, MAF-SD, MAF)
• special controls (such as requiring next signal off, presetting of a GPL, “last wheel
replacement”, requiring slot or shunter’s acceptance).
21
19 Down Branch
2
23
AB Down Main
LOS
Up Main
Sidings
Shunter’s
Acceptance
A typical route box for NR might be completed as follows:

Route identity Aspect Route Destination Exit Comments / Special controls
(including type indication line signal
class)
19A(M) M PLJI pos 1 Down Branch 21 MAR: AB occ for 20 sec
19B(M) M - Down Main 23 Auto facility
19C(S) PL MARI:“X” Up Main LOS
19D(S) PL MARI: “S” Siding - Reqs. shunter’s acceptance
In summary:
• the various routes from a signal are given a letter reference, with A being the route to the
most left-hand destination and then numbered in a clockwise direction B,C,D etc,
• the class is included in brackets (M=Main, W=Warning, C=Call-on, S=Shunt) and
potentially there could be routes of several classes sharing a route letter,
• the aspect type is either M for Main (for a Main or Warning class route) or PL for Position
Light (for a Call-on or Shunt),
• the exit signal is the signal which is the limit of movement authority for the movement and
the destination line name is that of the track at that exit signal,
• where a Main or Warning class route is approach released, the type of that release and the
track circuit control which implements it is shown in the comments column.

Activity
Chose one of the layouts in Appendix D. Without looking at it carefully, select a set of points in
the heart of the layout and avert your eyes from the route boxes.
Produce your own route box entries (see steps listed below) for each route which is needed to
lock the points before comparing your answers to the route boxes included on the diagram.
1 Imagine standing at the signal and look for all the possible destinations (need to find a “limit of
movement authority” as an exit of the route- this is normally another signal, but could be a “limit of
shunt”, “stop board” or “bufferstop”; mustn’t just go off into the wide blue yonder ……
2 Routes count from the left as viewed from the signal- hence for signals reading to the right on the
plan the A route is the one to the top whereas for signals reading to the left then the A route is
towards the bottom of the plan.
3 Be aware that there may (but only where there is an operational need) be different classes of route to
the same destination- these share the same letter but are distinguished by an additional letter which
is generally placed in brackets at the end of the route name:
from to
(M) = Main Main signal Main signal or The default route applicable to
Passenger bufferstop or passenger trains.
Stop board on freight Gives a M aspect (Y/YY/G) which is
line qualified with some form of route
indication as required.
(W) = Warning Main signal Main signal with a ROL Almost always additional to a (M) route
to same exit.
Gives a M aspect (Y) which is qualified
with some form of route indication as
required.
(C) = Call-on Main signal Permissive passenger Always additional to a (M) route to the
platform when occupied same exit.
by another train Gives a PL aspect with (almost always)
a route indication.
(S) = Shunt Main signal GPL, LOS, bufferstop, For non-passenger moves only.
with PL into sidings / depot etc. Gives a PL aspect.
GPL Main signal, GPL, LOS, Only has a route indication if the PL
bufferstop, into sidings / aspect leads to routes which have
depot etc. significantly different destinations.
4 Complete route box information re:
• the type of aspect displayed (M / PL)
• the type of route indicator (PLJI/ SARI/ MARI) and what is actually displayed: [e.g. PLJI
pos 2, SARI “D” etc]
• exit signal / other limit of movement
• destination line name
• remarks (such as occupancy of track in permissive platform)
5 Get a feel for the layout- look for the defined position of the overlap beyond each signal to ensure
you know which overlap symbol belongs to which signal. Remember that:
• the symbol is like a closed bracket “]” where the horizontal lines are pointing back to the
signal(s) to which it applies.
• a signal may have more than one (beyond facing points, or a ROL as well as a normal one)
• one symbol may apply to more than one signal (either in the same direction after a
convergence or a collocation of the extent of overlap from the left and an overlap from the
right)

Automatic & Controlled signals; Passable & Non-Passable

An Automatic signal is one that is (in normal operation) purely controlled by the passage of
trains. It acts as a block signal purely to maintain separation between following trains and hence
when its section is clear displays an aspect which is only limited by that of the signal beyond it.
• Historically the signaller generally had no control or indication of such signals; they worked
totally automatically without their knowledge. In order to be able to have a certain control
of a length of auto-signalling to cater for emergencies, selected signals were given
“Emergency Replacement facility”.
• Nowadays however it is policy that all such signals should have an individual “Replacement
facility” which is indicated to the signaller that it has been effective and thus is
“guaranteed”.
• An Automatic signal is generally plated as “passable”; however there are some such signals
where it would not be appropriate for the driver to pass on their own authority even though
there is no signalling hazard. For example the signal may be protecting an electrification
neutral section and a train proceeding could “bridge the gap” and energise a section which
had been isolated for staff safety etc; hence although such a signal operates technically as an
Auto signal, it is not given an “Auto plate” “so that a driver may only pass it on the
signaller’s authority. To clarify the situation the Signalling Plan is annotated with a note:
“Auto signal plated as Controlled”.
A Controlled signal protects pointwork or some other particular hazard and therefore is usually
maintained at red; it is cleared by the signaller setting the desired route when required. Generally
such a signal is “stick replaced” after the passage of a train; having been replaced to red by track
occupancy it then remains at red even after all the section is again clear. Its route remains set
(unless TORR is implemented) and hence the associated locking is still present but its aspect does
not reclear and the signal is said to be disengaged.
• Where a succession of trains may need to take the same route, the signaller’s workload is
unnecessarily high. Hence an Auto Working Facility is provided for selected routes; this
overrides the signal disengagement and TORR that would otherwise occur and thus, until
that facility is cancelled, the signal works effectively as if it was an Automatic signal for that
selected route.
• A Controlled signal in general protects some junction, opposing move or some other
signalling hazard and thus these cannot be plated as passable. There are however some
signals which are implemented as controlled signals for certain technical reasons or historic
legacy and which are suitable to be designated “passable” and thus are given an Auto plate.
To avoid confusion the Signalling Plan is additionally annotated with a note: “Controlled
signal plated as Auto”.

A
R
A
The, somewhat confusing, situation can be summarised as in the table below:
Controlled Automatic Signal

Passable
if route justifies Every signal
“Controlled signal plated as Auto”

Non-Passable
if route justifies Every signal
“Auto signal plated as Controlled”

The Auto plates are shown on the symbol of the signal post and the text in the same vicinity.
The “circled A” denoting the AWF for Controlled signals is drawn adjacent to the signal symbol
on the plan and is repeated in the route box entry for the relevant route or routes to which it
applies.
The “circled R” denoting the Replacement facility for Auto signals is drawn adjacent to the signal
symbol; it could however be omitted and covered by a general note now that it is a standard
applied to all such signals.

Appendix W, Revision Activities and Examples
Activity 1A: Headway and Braking Calculation Exercises

As a revision exercise work through the following questions to check that you can still perform the
necessary calculations easily and also that you realise the significance of what you are calculating.
These question “ring the changes” around the way in which the questions are asked to ensure that
you have enough understanding of the subject to be able to cope for whatever comes up in the
examination. Later exercises are more aligned to the usual exam question and give you a chance
to focus upon optimising your technique and presentation skills for ensuring good exam
performance.
Remember to state any assumptions you are making where the required information has
not been given to you
1 Permissible speed 80 mph
Braking rate on level averages at 0.72 m/s2
Gradient level
Train Length 100 m
Sighting allowance time 12 s
Headway time for 3 aspects at ?
maximum permitted spacing?
Braking rate on level averages at 4% g
Gradient level
Train Length 375 m
Sighting Allowance distance 250 m
Headway time for 3 aspects as ?
closely spaced as possible?
Headway time for 4 aspects as ?
closely spaced as possible?
Braking rate on level averages at 4.5% g
Train Length 250 m
Timetabled headway time 150 s
required
What form of signalling ?
What signal spacing is suitable ?


Braking rate on level averages at 1.5mph/s
Gradient level
Train Length 220 yds
Timetabled headway time 2 mins
required
What form of signalling is ?
suitable
Braking rate on level averages at 0.76 ms-2
Gradient level
Train Length 200 m
Timetabled headway time 120 s
required
suitable
Think about your answer again!
Is the result of the number
crunching really sensible?
If not, why not?
You are an engineer not a
programmable calculator!
Braking rate on level averages 0.50 m/s2
at
Gradient level
Train Length 150 m
If overlaps were made 225m ?
rather than 180m long, what
difference would be made to the
achieved 3 aspect headway at
60mph
For trains at 25mph on this line, ?
what is the headway if:
a) 180m overlaps
b) 225m overlaps


Braking rate on level averages 0.50 m/s2
at
Constant gradient 1 in 150
falling
Train length 200 m

Train weight 600
tonnes
What is the braking distance ?
from 90 mph
8 Permissible speed of line 100 mph
Gradient level
Passenger Maximum speed 100 mph
train (day)
Braking rate on 0.50 m/s2
level averages at
Length 100 m
Timetabled 120 s
headway
requirement at
80mph
Freight Maximum speed 60 mph
train
(night) Braking rate on 0.25 m/s2
level averages at
Length 400 m
Timetabled 180 s
headway
requirement at
60mph
suitable
9 A 75mph line is signalled with 3 aspect signals regularly spaced at nominal 1200m. One of these is
positioned as a starting signal at the end of a 250m long platform at an intermediate station on the
line.
• What headway is achieved for following through trains of 200m at 75mph?
• What headway is achieved for following stopping trains of 100m with a top speed of 50
mph?
• If 4 aspect signals spaced at 600m had been provided instead, what would then be the
headway for the through trains?
• Similarly what would then be the headway for the stopping trains ?

1.5km
1.0 km
A IRSE Examination Resource Pack 10/05/2016 Module 2

D
Activity 1B: Headway and Braking Calculations (2004)
B
C This is certainly an activity to practice, practice and practice to ensure that

E you can work out
accurately without wasting time. Don’t just work out the numbers but also plan and practice how
you will present your answer to the examiners because that is just as important. It needs to be both
Accurate, Brief and Clear; you need to find a style that suits you, but one example is given in
Appendix G14 (simple non-stopping example), .
Appendix G22 (succinct non-stopping and stopping calculations for 1998).
To support these worked examples the exercise below gives the bare essentials of the 2004
examination paper for you to perform the calculations and check that you arrive at sensible
answers. Be aware that the numbers may well not come out exactly; you may be making different
assumptions re contingency, overlap lengths etc. but indicative figures are given on the following
page with some of the intermediate steps; note that in the examination you should be providing
more information to the examiner than this and you should be practicing your presentation for this
now as part of this exercise- you can compare with various other worked examples in this Study
Pack and against the information given in section 7.5.
2004 Layout Info for Headway Calcs
Passenger Freight
Train lengths 200 m 400 m
Acceleration rate 0.5 m/s/s 0.5 m/s/s
Braking rate 0.5 m/s/s 0.5 m/s/s
Permitted Speed 120 km/h 90 km/h
Traffic C-E 2 / hr stopping -
2 / hr NON stopping -
A-E 2 / day stopping -
C-B via D - 6 / day
Line Speeds Main and Branch 120 km/h

Branch single – double connections 75 km/h
Other and other turnouts 40 km/h
Headway requirements Following fast at 100 km/h 2.5 mins
Following stopping 4 mins
Station dwell time 30 sec

Results of Calculations
Speed converts to Braking Train separation Green to Red for N (ratio of
Distances for 120 sec 120 sec headway DGR to SBD)
(min) headway (max) (max)
NON-STOP
120 km/h 33.33 m/s 1115 m 4000 m 3175 m 2.86

100 km/h 27.80 m/s 775 m 3330 m 2575 m 3.34
90 km/h 25.00 m/s 625 m 3000 m 2075 m 3.32
75 km/h 20.80 m/s 435 m 2500 m 1625 m 3.74
40 km/h 11.11 m/s 125m 1330 m 575 m 4.66
Time taken for 200m train to clear 225m overlap (accelerating from rest 25m prior to signal)
STOPPING
= 43 seconds
Time taken to decelerate to a stop from 120 km/h at 0.5 m/s/s = 67 seconds
Time taken to uniformly decelerate to a stop over a distance of 1115m from initial speed of 100
km/h = 80 seconds
The non-stop calculations certainly do not suggest an onerous headway requirement. At the
100km/h it is clear that the train separation at headway speed is significantly over three times the
minimum braking distance; i.e. it could be met by 3-aspect signalling even at a spacing of 150%
SBD, which is probably a greater degree of excess braking than would be regarded as acceptable;
hence the choice is to provide better headway than really needed by placing 3-aspect signals at the
maximum tolerable excess braking or potentially save some money and opt for isolated 3-aspect
signalling with separate “stop” and “distant” signals. Would now to look at the layout to
determine where stop signals would be needed to protect particular junctions etc and then decide
which option to adopt, or even a bit of “mix and match”; sometimes the signalling required to
signal a layout effectively may result in more signals than headway calculations initially suggest
would be needed.
However the effect of stopping trains also needs to be considered. As a first approximation a
stopping train would take an additional 40 seconds to decelerate, 30 seconds to dwell and 30
SUMMARY
seconds to accelerate again compared to a non-stop train (assuming signals spaced at minimum
SBD for the maximum permissible speed). If the signals were more widely spaced then the effect
of defensive driving would be more pronounced and thus perhaps nearly 60 seconds might be lost
during the deceleration. It is therefore clear that it is the stopping headway which is the more
onerous to achieve (stated as 4 minutes rather that 2.5mins but as above the stop will be imposing
more than 1.5 minutes of relative delay). Hence the thing to do is to start placing 3-aspect signals
at what seem like suitable places around the station and check that the stopping headway
requirement can be met, then intend to widen the spacing / adopt isolated 3-aspect signalling when
further away from that area and all trains at their timetabled speed.
The key thing about achieving headway on the branch is to work out how that single line section
(between station at D and that junction for B) is to be utilised; how the freights can be slotted
between the timetabled passenger movements. Use the elements of time to accelerate / brake and
the distance covered during that time (as utilised within stopping headway calculations) to work
out the time for which each service needs routes set on that single line section; refer back to
Appendix K.2.
State your assumptions for the examiner to understand your methodology and workings
DON’T FORGET
The numbers are a “means to an end”, not the “be all and end all”.
The examiners do not want you just to prove to them that you can do “school boy mathematics”
(as they’d like to assume you can, even if some evidence is to the contrary!);
they are interested in whether you can use numbers to inform engineering judgement in the
context of “Signalling the Layout”

Activity 1C: Example of Headway Consideration (1998).

To signal the 1998 layout effectively requires a careful consideration of the stopping and non-
stopping headway and thus forms a suitable example for this Study Pack.
The description below is clearly more detailed than could be produced in the exam, but aims to
explain the relevant factors to the student; a briefer presentation more aligned to what the
examiners would expect is given in G.22. Don’t just read, WORK IT THROUGH YOURSELF
To fully comprehend the student will need to access the detailed description of the layout itself
(link in Appendix B) but a summary of the most essential information is given in the table below.
Note that the description describes positions on the layout by referring to the measurements from
the layout datum shown [thus] in the text.
Detailed Answer 1998 Headway Calculations
1. Units Conversion
100kph = 100 ×(1000 / 3600) = 27.8ms-1; 80kph = 22.2ms-1; 40kph = 11.1ms-1
60kph = 16.7ms-1 (the average speed for the period when braking from 80kph to 40kph)
2. Braking Distance
Since the passenger and freight trains operate at the same speeds, and have the same braking rate, the
following calculations apply to either:
From Newton’s equations of motion, the braking distance from speed u to speed v, is given by Db = v2 –
u2 / 2a, where a in this case is the braking rate (assuming level gradient). Hence:
Db (100 → 0kph) = -(27.82) / 2(-0.5) = 773m Db (80 → 40kph) = (11.12 – 22.22) / 2(-0.5) = 370m
Db (80 → 0kph) = -(22.22) / 2(-0.5) = 494m Db (40 → 0kph) = -(11.12) / 2(-0.5) = 123m
3. Signalling for Main Lines
Stopping Headway (Up Main)
To provide a timetabled stopping headway of 180s (3 min) at 80km/h, it is assumed that the signalling will
be designed to achieve 150s to provide suitable contingency (20%) to allow recovery following disruption
to the train service.
It is assumed that the following stopping headway primarily applies to passenger trains, since this is the
predominant traffic and freight trains will use the Goods Loop. For this reason, a train length of 200m is
assumed.
Assuming the platform stop signal is positioned at [2200m], the time taken for the 1st train to accelerate
and clear the overlap can be calculated as follows:
Train accelerates up to 40kph in 123m, taking 123 / (11.1 / 2) = 22s.
Train continues at 40kph, until rear of train is within the tunnel, i.e. for 2380 – 2200 + 200 = 380m, at
which point the train will have cleared the overlap. The time taken at this speed to clear the overlap (i.e.
cover a distance of 225 + 200 – 123 = 302m) = 302 / 11.1 = 27s.
Therefore the time to clear the overlap = 22 + 27 = 49s.
Assuming a platform dwell time of 30s (pessimistic since other platforms are available), and a sighting time
of 12s, this leaves 150 – 12 – 30 – 49 = 59s for the train to travel from the first cautionary aspect to the
platform stop signal. At 40kph, only 650m would be covered in this time. Therefore it is clear that a mid-
platform signal is required to achieve the necessary headway and avoid positioning a signal in the point
work on the approach to Station E. It is proposed this signal is positioned at [1900m] with a 100m overlap
(this reduced overlap would have to be justified by risk assessment on the ground that the speed is very
low). To achieve the stopping headway, this signal would also have to be the first cautionary aspect, and
hence 3 aspect signalling is appropriate (at least in the station area).

With the cautionary aspect at [1900m], the time taken for the train to stop is calculated as follows:
• Train decelerates from 40kph in 123m, taking 22s.
• Prior to deceleration, train travels at 40kph, for 2200 – 1900 – 123 = 177m, taking 16s.
• Therefore the time to travel from the first cautionary aspect to a stand = 22 + 16 = 48s
Overall, the stopping headway time is: sighting time + stopping time + dwell time + time to clear the
overlap = 12 + 48 + 30 +49 = 139s, which is well within the requirement.
Similar signal spacing will be applied on the Down Main to ensure that the requirement is met in both
running directions.
Non-Stopping Headway
The non-stopping headway either side of the station stop will also have to meet the 150s requirement.
100kph Line
• In the 100kph areas (operating at 80kph), following trains must be able to run unimpeded by the
signalling at a maximum separation of: 150 × 22.2 = 3333m.
• Subtracting the freight train length (since freight operates on these lines), L (=400m), the overlap
length, O (=225m) and a sighting allowance, S (=267m, being the distance covered in 12s), gives a
maximum distance between the Green and Red signals, DGR of:
• DGR = 3333 – 400 – 225 – 267 = 2441m.
The above results show that in respect of the non-stopping headway, 3 aspect signalling is suitable for the
100kph areas on the main lines, since two sections of minimum braking distance (773m) easily fit within
the maximum Red-Green separation distance. Therefore the positioning is largely dictated by the braking
requirement as follows: signals must be spaced at a minimum of 773m, with a maximum of 1031m
(133%) desirable but a maximum of 1160m (150%) tolerable.
Approach to Platform 5 (Up Main)
The approach to the mid-platform signal has a mixture of line speeds. Subtracting from the minimum
headway the sighting time (12s) and time to clear the 100m overlap by a 200m train at 40kph (27s), gives
an allowance of 111s for the time between Green and Red signals (two signal sections) of 111s.
The time taken to traverse the 40kph section (1900 – 1510 = 390m) is 35s, and the time taken to reduce
speed from 80kph to 40kph (370m) is 370 / 16.7 = 22s. From the 111s allowance, this leaves 54 seconds
at a constant speed of 80kph in the 100kph section (i.e. signals must be within 1200m to satisfy headway
constraint. This is in excess of the maximum suitable signal spacing determined by braking considerations
(see previous section) in the 100kph area. Therefore, a decision has been made to position a signal
between the North and Middle Tunnels, with a further signal approximately 1km in rear to ensure sections
are not excessively overbraked in the 100kph areas.
Similar signal spacing will be applied on the station approach from the Down Main.
Departure from Platform 5 (Up Main)

Subtracting from the minimum headway the sighting time (12s) and time to clear a full 225m overlap by a
400m train at 80kph (28s), gives an allowance of 110s.
The time taken to accelerate up 40kph over 123m is 22s, the time taken to clear the 40kph section (2380 –
2200 – 123 + 400 = 457m) is 457 / 11.1 = 41s, and the time taken to accelerate from 40kph to 80kph
(370m) is 22s. This leaves an allowance of 25s at a constant speed of 80kph in the 100kph section (555m)
before which the second signal must be encountered. This equates to 2200 + 123 + 457 + 555 = 3335m.
It is therefore proposed that the intermediate signal be positioned just beyond the tunnel mouth at 2800m
(with an associated banner signal in the tunnel to achieve the necessary sighting). This only leaves 535m
braking to the signal at 3335m. However, at this point, freight trains will still be travelling at 40kph
(123m braking), and passenger trains will have only been accelerating for 200m, giving a speed at the
tunnel exit (from v2=u2+2as) of 18ms-1 (65kph), which equates to 323m braking.
Similar calculations will be applied to departure from the station on the Down Main.

4. Signalling for Branch Lines

Examination of the contracted paths for the North and South lines suggest that traffic in the order of 4 trains
per hour needs to be catered for. Allowing a 25% contingency, it is appropriate to signal for a 12 minute
headway.
Therefore, assuming operation at 80kph, following trains must be able to run unimpeded by the signalling
at a maximum separation of: 12 × 60 × 22.2 = 16km.
Subtracting the freight train length (since freight operates on these lines), L (=400m), the overlap length, O
(=225m) and a sighting allowance, S (=267m, being the distance covered in 12s), gives a maximum
distance between the Green and Red signals of:
DGR = 16,000 – 400 – 225 – 267 = 15km.
The above results show that “stop and distant” signalling is more than adequate on the branch lines.
Activity 2: Headway and Layout Consideration

Now you should try doing the same sort of exercise completely by yourself.
• This is not taken from an exam past paper but is based on a mock exam undertaken by some
lucky past students. It is a bit different from the usual, but is designed to make you think
about the layout and its usage which is definitely a weakness that affects many students.
• It is therefore a bit more complex than what will probably face you in the exam; however it
is good to know that if you can cope with this then the exam should not be too daunting.
Don’t forget that examinations do put you under pressure and that therefore it is good to
have a margin between what you can cope with in a relatively relaxed environment
compared with the level of performance that needs to be delivered when under more
pressure. This is much the same as performing tests on equipment under particularly harsh
conditions before regarding it as satisfactory to operate for real in normal conditions.
This activity is designed to give the student practice at assimilating the information given in the
exam on the blank layout and especially in interpreting the notes to gain an overall understanding
of the use of the layout. This is essential for being able to decide on what to base the headway
calculations, as well as determining the factors influencing the working of the layout.
In this example understanding the crossing moves which are to be made on the ladder junctions
and the method of working of the freight traffic as well as determining a suitable manner in which
to operate , the branch and its level crossing are the important factors which influence design of
the signalling.
When performing the braking and headway calculations, take care to use the appropriate speeds
in each case. When you have made your attempt, why not share it with others on
www.irseexam.co.uk ?

Headway Calculations and Layout Operation Considerations

Perform the headway and braking calculations for the layout below, taking regard of the information relating
to both the lines and the traffic using them
E
Oil Terminal
Down
Main Main Up
A B D Down F
Relief Relief Up
C Goods Loop
Branch (8 miles)
G
Level crossing H
500 vehicles per hour
Line Main Relief Branch
Max. Permissible 175kph 120kph 100kph for multiple unit
speed Loco hauled excursion
traffic limited to 80kph
Headway 180sec at 175 kph 180 sec See other notes
non-stopping stopping from 120kph
Traffic Max Acceleration Braking rate Length Utilisation

speed rate
Express 175kph 0.5 ms-2 0.88 ms-2 200m 4 per hour on Main A-F
1 per hour crosses at B
from Main to Relief and
vice versa
Local 140kph 0.5 ms-2 0.5 ms-2 varies 8 per hour on Relief A-F
between of which 4 are stopping
100m and and 4 are non-stopping
300m
Freight 80kph 0.5 ms-2 0.5 ms-2 up to 300m 4 a day Relief A-F
1 a day Relief from F, via
C to E and return
Branch same rolling stock as local passenger 100m Varies- see below
passenger During the middle of the day, an hourly shuttle service C-H stopping at intermediate stations.
In the am peak, run Relief fromF to H stopping only at G, back via C then Main to H
In the pm peak, run on Main from A to H stopping only at G, back via C then Relief to F
Excursion 120kph 0.25 ms-2 0.25 ms-2 200m Rare- see below
During “Regatta week” only, special excursion traffic travels on the Relief line from A, and then runs non-
stop from C to H. It returns later on the Relief line to A, supplementary to the normal hourly shuttle service.
Two trains carrying passengers in the morning, return ECS to stable at A, which then return ECS in the
evening to form the return working back to A.
See separate file

Activity 3: Route Boxes

Ensure that you can remember the column headings for the style of route boxes which you intend
to utilise and can quickly produce the blanks.
Practise producing route boxes;; there is a layout on the next page for you to consider. Another
possibility is to utilise the layouts designed for Module 3 and attempt to reproduce the route boxes
(without cheating_ and later compare to those that are shown. Note any errors / oversights you
are making as well as the time taken. Attempt further layouts with the intention of gradually
increasing your performance.
Activity 4: Aspect Sequence

For NR revise the related topics of:
Junction Signalling / Approach Release
Aspect Sequence / Transitions (GK/RT0032)
Check whether you really understand by attempting the question paper at the end of Appendix S
and then attempting to draw the aspect sequence chart for the layout on the next page;; there’s a
student’s attempt as a separate file on the DVD.
You may wish to continue practising by utilising the layouts for Module 3 and there are two model
answers referenced from Appendix S. Whilst aspect sequence charts themselves form a
question in the Module 3 exam, familiarity with the concepts (if not the presentation) is just as
important for Module 2.
Activity 5: Layout Risk Assessment

Study the Standards relevant to your railway
Be aware that layout risk assessments come in different types and have different names (e.g.
qualitative, quantitative) and have attracted different titles (Structured Expert Judgement, Overrun
Risk Assessment Model etc.)
Look at the various past papers and consider how you could demonstrate your familiarity with the
relevant considerations when performing the “Signalling the Layout” exercise.
You may care to start by assessing the layout on the following page.

58 A
25
2
A
1 Siding
39A 40
1
18 19 29
Down 14 37 Main Through 27 41
35B
39B
March 2008 edition

ROL 56 38A Main Down
Chicester 28 Up
ROL
38B
2
33 35A
1
Up
16 2 55 57
31 53
21 A A
IRSE Examination Resource Pack
Havantish
20
Permissive Passenger working:

wn d Platform 1 used for joining separate trains,
Do fiel
rs Platforms 1 & 2 used for dividing trains to form
te
Pe 22 separate services
Up
10/05/2016
3
1. Identify any signals which could be plated as “passable”:
2. For all other signals, produce route boxes defining:
• the destination to which each reads,
• the class of the route,
• the type of aspect given and details of any route indicator (type and displayed indication)
• additional comments relating to operational use such as Auto working, Pre-set shunts,
Module 2
Preferred/ Non-Preferred routes, Approach Release arrangements etc.
364
Activity 6: Station & Depot Working

Study the design of various different siding and depot facilities on the railway with which you
are familiar. In the absence of available information, look at the various layouts produced for
Module 3 and study these instead.
Consider the various categories of movements (into, completely within, out from the facility)
and try to understand which movements require the authority of the main signalbox, which are
made totally under the control of a local operator, which need an element of co-operation
between the two, how much responsibility is devolved onto the train driver, guard, site shunter,
local control room operator, local vehicle maintenance staff etc
Ask yourself questions such as:
• what are the operational needs of a facility for passenger rolling stock - is it just storage
space for spare carriages or are operational tasks (such as refuelling, interior / exterior
cleaning or emptying chemical retention tanks) or engineering maintenance tasks (such as
inspection, renewing brake blocks etc) undertaken? What are the arrangements made for
staff safety for these activities?
• what are the operational needs of a freight facility- does a train get loaded / unloaded
when slowly on the move through a hopper, does loading / unloading occur when the train
is stationary, does the train need to be sub-divided and shunted;; does the train enter the
facility in a facing direction from the running line or does it set back into it via a trailing
connection;; does the hauling locomotive need to have run-around its train prior to entering
the facility, does it run-around within the facility or is there a complete loop or chord
permitting the train to run in one direction throughout;; is there anywhere to stable a
defective vehicle within a cripple siding?
• is the facility completely within the control of a signalbox or is there an element of local
operation- if so does this take the form of manual or power assisted operation of each point
immediately adjacent to it or is there a separate local control point? In this case is this
control point subservient to the main signalbox (only having control when released from it)
or is it autonomous but with an interface which enforces a degree of cooperation between
the different control points when movements between their separate areas are to be made?
• how is movement authority conveyed to the driver- is it by fixed signals and /or
noticeboards, , verbal communication by telephone or radio, handsignals etc. or do they
undertake movements upon their own authority?
• what level of interlocking is there both within the facility itself and at its boundary with the
running line?
• is the facility operated by a different holder of a Railway Safety Case, is it a facility which
has a railway connection but which is also a hazardous industrial site, are there different
rules, procedures or instructions applicable within the facility than outside it (e.g. trains may
be moved within depots by staff not trained and / or medically fit to drive on the running line)
and how are the limits of the two environments made obvious?,
• where there is a boundary between control areas how does the driver know who is the
source of their instructions / information at any location?,
• what communication is there between different control sites- is it provided by radio or
telephone?, is it supported by any source of additional information such as train detection or
train describer?, is it enhanced by some form of slot / acceptance arrangement – if so is it
purely a visual reminder or does it actually interlock with the clearance of a signal or
movement of points?

• is it safe for the main signalbox just to send a train into the facility to wait at a signal or stop
board on a reception line at its entrance or is a permission (either purely verbal or
interlocked) required before this can be done, how does the main signaller know that there
is a train waiting to leave (verbal information, berth track circuit, TRS indication)?,
• is it important that a train entering the facility is able to clear the running line quickly and if
so how is it achieved, how does the main signalbox know that the train is completely inside
the facility and the running line available for use by another train?
• if there was some sort of incident within the facility which could endanger the running line,
how would this be communicated quickly?,
• how is the running line protected from an unauthorised movement from the facility, be it
vehicles moving having been left unattended and inadequately secured, points having been
incorrectly set or a verbal misunderstanding regarding the extent of movement authority?

Activity 7: Working of Single Lines

Ensure that you know about the various potential methods of operating a single line.
You need to consider if you know:
• which means of operation is applicable to what operational scenario. What are the
advantages and limitations of each
• the essential elements of the method of operation,
• how to depict on a Signalling Plan- what symbols need to be shown where?
• whether there is a need to add any associated comments in a signal’s route box and put
some other note on the plan
Activity 8: Study Real Plans

Spend time poring over plans featuring the railway whose practices you are to use in the
exam to become fully familiar with the style of presentation and also envisage how that
layout is used operationally.
A selection of plans applicable to NR are included in Appendix X

Activity 9: Mock Exam Layouts

The importance of practicing real IRSE layouts, some at least under mock examination conditions
cannot be overstressed. There are probably more in Appendix B and Appendix C than most
students will find time for, but you really should have attempted the majority.
There is no real substitute for having your work reviewed by an experienced person and /or
comparing various attempts at a Study Group. However the best that this Study Pack can offer is:
• Section 7 emphasises the approach to take to a generic exam paper and this is supported by
the “Examiners Expectations” for each of the separate activities to give you a clear steer on
what you should be attempting to present,
• Appendix M1 (Metro) and Appendices N1 (Mainline) give a step-by-step approach to
tackling a paper generically in more specific detail, based on UK practice. Appendix N2
considers terminal stations and is particularly based on the 1997 layout (the only recent
Mainline example)
• Appendix B reviews the main features of the Mainline layout for each year; for early
attempts you may need to look at this first but you should generally attempt the layout first
and read the comments afterwards,
• A.3 has the examiners comments at each of the Exam Reviews for both Mainline and Metro
papers. Although they are paper specific, there is a recurring theme, year after year and most
comments would be generically applicable,
• Appendix A.4 has some completed examples (various varieties / plans) against which to
judge your own work for some of the Mainline papers, but unfortunately not for the Metro
papers. This includes an Examiner Review / Critique of a specific candidate’s attempt at the
2005 Mainline paper as a good demonstration of what is actually achievable in examination
conditions.
These are of course all relatively high level albeit with the inclusion of a few specific detailed
comments and it is appreciated that students want much more comprehensive comments on their
work.
The following section attempts to do this for the attempt at the 2006 paper which is included
within Appendix A.4. It is of course long and will take quite a lot of effort to work through all the
issues; however it should be a good revision exercise from which you can learn from your
mistakes and also identify those topics that you may not have understood as well as you thought
that you had.

Critique of 2006 Attempted Layout
Refer to diagram to read the comments in this section,

HAVING ATTEMPTED THE LAYOUT YOURSELF.
The comments here are cross referenced to salient places on the diagram
• the letters refer to the Layout Notes and the candidate’s interpretation / fulfilment of them,
• the numbers refer to the plan itself and generally relate to errors / omissions but sometimes
just give some supportive information.
The review doesn’t claim to be completely comprehensive and it has not been performed by one of
the real examiners, but there should be plenty here to learn from and assess your work against to see
whether you’d have done better than this candidate.
A Candidate hasn’t stated practice or other assumptions.
The impression given is that it is supposed to be NR, but probably not the latest practice but the
candidate is more familiar with signalling introduced some 15-20 years ago.
No AWS or TPWS is shown on the plan which is OK, but if (as the examiner must presume in the
absence of guidance from the candidate) it forms a significant element of the solution then it should
at least be covered by an appropriate general note. Similarly provision of SPT, PZTs etc.
B It seems as if the candidate hasn’t bothered to read, or has completely failed to understand and
act upon the various notes on the plan- no provision for trains to join at station F by provision of
appropriate call-on routes into an occupied platform. Also although a route has been provided for a
train coming from H to enter the Down Main platform in the Up direction, there is no signal to act as
a limit of authority nor to signal the train back onto the Up Main.
There does seem to be some conflict between the various parts of the exam requirements. When
initially read, it appears that the intention is that at station F a train is constructed from two portions
(one from A and one from C) that then runs towards H and in the opposite direction a train from H is
split into two portions that then go their separate ways to A and C respectively. However this does
not seem compatible with the fact that there are no passenger train “paths” declared for the Branch
Line. The candidate is thus faced with a bit of a dilemma and must state an assumption that they are
going to use when designing their layout:
• declare that it is obvious that there would be equal passenger train paths on the branch line
since they must match those on the main given the method of joining / splitting described,
• declare that they regard the Branch as certainly being freight-only given the statement re
train running requirements makes no mention of a passenger service on that line. This is
probably not what the examiners intended when setting the paper, but provided a candidate
had explained their assumptions and reasons for taking this approach, it could not be
penalised. However since there is a clear requirement to attach and detach in station F, the
candidate would need to address this and give some credible scenario. In order to illustrate
what a candidate should do in this situation, the text in italics is offered as a suggestion.
“I cannot comprehend the operating requirement for the attaching / detaching of portions of
passenger trains from & to A, given that the train running requirements only include freight services
on the Branch. I am therefore assuming, although it is not explicitly stated, that the attaching and
detaching vehicles refers to an 8 car set arriving from C and then being separated into two 4 car sets
having stopped in the platform at F. The first of these would then be signalled towards H; thereafter
the remaining 4 cars would proceed as ECS into the stabling sidings beyond the platforms. In the
opposite direction, a train from H would be strengthened with additional vehicles from the sidings
prior to continuing to C. In this scenario, a permissive move would be needed into the station for a
cont train coming from H but not from C. The reference to portions from A is regarded as a mistake on
the question paper”.

B Obviously such an operation is best achieved in the Down Loop but the requirement could also be
cont read as this operation occurring in the Down Main reversible platform and in this case it must be
possible to get the ECS into some siding. Given that there needs to be a route from this platform
onto the Up Main anyway, then a possibility is a shunt signal positioned between the crossover and
the tunnel mouth which has a route into the Up siding; having provided such a signal it would seem
appropriate to provide routes also into the Down Loop (so that the ECS can get into the proper
stabling sidings) and also into the Down Main reversible (so that any train that has been held in the
Up siding can later be routed into that platform to be joined to the train from H on the return
journey).
The plan explicitly shows that the Down Loop is only signalled in that direction, yet the requirement
for attaching / detaching does suggest that these activities should be possible there and indeed the
track layout would make this sensible; the candidate may choose therefore to provide the signalling
to allow Up trains to use either of these platform faces but it would be wise to state the rationale for
so doing and recognise that these may be facilities that wouldn’t be justified economically.
For trains attaching in the Down Loop the signalling should allow for either the ECS to be in the
platform first awaiting the arrival of the passenger train from H, or for the ECS to be brought from
the siding to attach to the rear of the train which has already arrived. For trains attaching in the
Reversible platform, the ECS movement is more convoluted and therefore can be assumed to have
occurred prior to the trains arrival from H. One option is to provide the signalling to take the train
from the siding, reverse in the Loop, be routed to the Down Main and reverse again to get into the
reversible platform in the Up direction . Another, and possibly better, option is for the train to run
through the Loop in the Up direction and then perform one reversal before entering the reversible
platform in the Down direction; this has sub-options of the reversal occurring on the Down Main
(need LOS) or on the Up Main (less signalling, but the move does impact on the running lines for
each direction so less convenient operationally / capacity impact). Both of the second options only
entail the one reversal prior to arriving in the platform, but have the disadvantage of the reversal
happening in the tunnel (essential that the rolling stock allows driver to change ends by walking
through the unit rather than descending to ballast) and also taking place on what appears to be the
busier portion of the route. Note that an interpretation of the plan requirement is that detaching
always is to occur in the Down Loop and the corresponding attaching will always occur in the Down
Main reversible; indeed reading the notes and layout together this is perhaps the most reasonable
assumption to make; again if this is the judgement made then explain your reasoning since it could
be argued to be slightly non-compliant with the stated requirement.
It is more likely that the examiners envisaged the situation rather differently than that explained
above; i.e. the busiest section of the line being from H to station F with the trains then proceeding to
two different destinations A and C in much the way that the Cambrian service splits at Machynlleth
with one portion proceeding to Aberystwyth and the other portion along the coast to Pwllheli.
However this does seem odd given the definition of the Down direction and certainly the train
running requirements information seems misleading in this regard.
In reality conflicting and ambiguous requirements on projects are not uncommon; the exam is giving
you an opportunity to demonstrate how you would deal with such situations. Don’t worry too much
about which is the best possible option, but do display to the examiner as much as you can about
your thinking process behind any decision. Do state your assumptions clearly (may be worth
annotating the notes on the plan where the requirements are stated) as there can be a major impact; in
this case it does not only affect the signalling around station F but also the two possible
interpretations gives rise to a very different level of traffic on the Branch line and therefore affects
headway considerations.
Above all do not do what this candidate did which was to ignore the issues entirely!

C The requirement to provide standage on the Chord for freight trains is potentially ambiguous; it
could certainly be interpreted to mean for one train at any one time (but this doesn’t seem to be an
issue given its length and the length of trains). It is JUST possible to provide standage for two
maximum length trains and thus it seems that this is what is intended. Certainly the ability to hold
two trains clear of main routes could be useful, but the level of traffic does not seem to justify this;
there is only supposed to be four freights per day (and traffic cannot be held in the loop too long as it
is also needed to be used for the opposite direction).
Hence the candidate should either:
• decide to interpret as meaning only one 400m long train and could then take advantage of
the space by positioning the exit signals some 200m from the ends of the Chord thus gaining
a valuable in which to contain any overrun,
• decide to interpret as needing to maximise the standage in the Chord, think about the risks of
overrun at the signals at the exits and provide a PL aspect for a permissive move onto the
Chord from the signal giving admission to the line.
In either case the assumption concerning the meaning of the requirement should be stated.
This candidate has made no such statement and seems to have just provided signals at the very end
of the lines in order to maximise the standage, yet without any way to make use of the length of
unoccupied railway in rear of that train; hence the worst of all worlds.
D Similarly no shunt moves have been provided to provide the functionality requested to be able
to turn a steam locomotive on the triangle of lines created by the Chord.
To address the requirement the signalling should allow a locomotive which is on the Up Branch at
junction B to be routed onto the Chord. This would then allow it to be routed onto the Up Main at
junction D but there would also need to be a signal provided to cross it back so that it can be
signalled towards H via the Down Main.
An alternative methodology would have been to make provision for the triangle to have been used in
the opposite direction for turning purposes. In this case a signal to route onto the Chord from the Up
Main at junction D would have been needed as well as a LOS (on the Down Branch on the approach
to junction B) to which the locomotive could have been routed from the Chord in order to get behind
the signal which could route it back to H. This would have meant that signal 3 in this candidate’s
attempt would have been to have been made a controlled and non-passable signal rather than an auto.
The former option is simpler and therefore more economical than the second, but literal
interpretation of the requirement suggests the order H-E-D-B-E-H. There is no obvious reason why
this was the required order and in the real situation an engineer should clarify with the client if there
was some particular reason why this had been specified or whether the cheaper option would be just
as acceptable operationally. In the exam scenario it certainly wouldn’t be wrong to provide exactly
what was stated, but the candidate who pointed out that there was a potentially better option may get
even more credit (either provide the better option with the justification or the literal interpretation
with words describing the possible alternative or even both annotated option a and option b).
It probably doesn’t matter too much how your layout achieves the functionality, but the candidate
whose plan fails to achieve the operational need to change the orientation of the steam locomotive
can expect to lose marks heavily.
E The candidate has not stated the means of block working; presumably it is TCB but even the limits
of track circuiting into the sidings has not been clearly defined and there is no hint given how these
are to be operated. The sidings seem plenty long enough for three 4-car sets but in the presumed
absence of track circuiting (or even the one track circuit per line that might be intended) it is not
obvious how the signaller keeps track of what space is available in each.
There was actually little to do for this particular layout, but the candidate seemed to ignore
completely whereas a little thought and a few words would have got full marks for this.
The candidate has also failed to provide a significant number of route boxes, and those which exist
are not good or even complete, so the examiner is really struggling to understand how the candidate
envisaged the layout working. If it is not obvious and the candidate has not provided the necessary
information, the assumption has to be that it doesn’t work; this is a significant failing and will be
penalised in the marking.
F The candidate has identified that the level crossing is to be CCTV which is certainly a possible
choice. The station has platforms conveniently staggered and just beyond the crossing in each
direction and therefore signal positioning to protect the crossing may been that it is sub-optimal for
stopping headway considerations (the same block section would include a significant portion of the
slowest running whilst decelerating to stop and whilst accelerating afterwards as well as the dwell
time and thus a special check of compliance with the stopping headway requirement having placed
the relevant signals would definitely be needed.
If the assumption were made that road conditions were suitable (nature of usage, no significant risk
of blocking-back, away from road junctions, not in a busy high street with pedestrians more intent on
shopping than taking care of their personal safety) an AHBC may be suitable and would have the
advantage of less impact on the signalling.
From an initial look at the layout it is clear that platform starters would be needed at station F and
that in a 3 aspect signalling solution there would only be one intermediate signal. Thus until a CCTV
crossing had been closed and the signaller given “crossing clear”, then the platform starter could only
display yellow and any driver leaving on that aspect would have to do so cautiously. The initiation
of the level crossing sequence for Down direction trains would be operationally hard to judge, given
that station dwell at F (particularly with the splitting of trains which sometimes occurs there) would
be quite variable; this could result in the barriers being closed for an unnecessary long time should
the train at F not be ready to depart when anticipated. For an AHBC solution, the aspect sequence is
independent of the operation of the barriers; however given the difference in running time for a
through freight and a passenger train which is starting from F and needs also to stop at G then
consideration should be given to a “stopping / non-stopping” facility. The various timings would
need to be evaluated but it is possible that delayed clearance of the signal within the strike-in would
be needed and thus a similar issue as affected the CCTV solution may arise.
Whatever solution is adopted, the candidate is required to “show the arrangements necessary”;
writing CCTV does NOT address this.
• Certainly there should be a drawing of any road lights and barriers for the road user, plus a
note of the most relevant approach signage. Depiction of the CCTV mast and lighting
column is also sensible though possibly not essential.
• The railway arrangements also need to be clearly shown and annotated accordingly-
protecting signals, other indications to the rail driver, track circuit joints critical for crossing
operation (to close and to re-open) whether provided specifically only for the crossing or are
the most appropriate joint provided for other purposes at which to initiate the crossing
sequence (either directly or by turning on signaller’s picture etc.).
• A summary of the signaller’s most important controls: LOWER / STOP / RAISE /
CROSSING CLEAR and whether an Auto Raise and /or an Auto Lower facility is provided
(and the assumptions underlying such a decision).
G The headway requirement has not been stated separately for different portions of the whole layout,
but when read in conjunction with the traffic pattern it should be clear that the Branch is only utilised
by one freight an hour [however see also item B], with the occasional extra freight which traverses
the Chord and thus joins the Main line in the opposite direction via junction D rather than junction B.
The candidate has performed the headway calculations using the figures given but has then applied
the results uniformly over the whole layout. There could potentially be an argument for providing
continuous 3 aspect MAS signalling throughout, but the candidate has not made this and therefore
the uniform approach appears unthinking rather than reflecting a conscious decision to provide
suitable signalling to allow the line to be used as a diversionary route, or the cope better with a
particular freight traffic which has to be operated at much slower speeds than the majority of the
traffic for example.
Given the level of traffic in the specification, isolated 3 aspect signalling (stop and distant) would
otherwise be expected and the length of the block sections suggest that axle counter train detection
would have been more appropriate.

H The two pages of calculations for this layout are included as two separate files: link, link. Unlike the
layout itself which is a bit of an amalgam of two student’s efforts, this is exactly what one student
really produced for a mock examination (it is not a set-up for this Study Pack!)
An initial view is positive: it’s legible, the candidate has not written in the margins on either side
which are for examiners’ marking, they haven’t written on the back and they have annotated each
sheet with their candidate number, question number and sheet number. Further it is contained on two
pages with the diagram at the bottom of the first sheet suggesting that they are on with stopping
headway already (if calculations go on for several pages the chances are that the candidate isn’t
making a good job of it and is certainly taking time which they simply cannot afford).
Unfortunately when looking in more detail, the reasonable first impression evaporates. The
candidate barely explains the braking calculation, makes a silly recording error and also quotes the
distance to the centimetre. At least it is not to the millimetre, but there are so many variables in
braking that even the nearest metre would be wildly optimistic.
The figure of 1.33 is then plucked out of thin air and they declare the range of possible spacings for
3-aspects; they don’t say so but they are evidently considering the risk of overbraking but do not
consider at all any non-stop headway constraint that may exist.
Then they launch straight into considering stopping headway, yet for some reason believe this
applies to the freight trains which run straight through the station without stopping. The figure they
use is the one given for the timetable requirement; they have failed to add in any contingency for
perturbations within the designed headway.
Although the diagram drawn is on the right lines, there are various things wrong with or missing
from it. There is reference to DGR but without explanation;. this is the pet hate of one of the
examiners and it does not bode well. There is in fact nothing wrong with the methodology if used
correctly by someone who understands and explains it; however it applies to non-stop headway and
the candidate seems to be attempting to use it within their stopping headway calculation. It is not
hard to see why an examiner faced with several papers like this each year would develop a deep
aversion to the whole concept. A hammer is a perfectly good tool, but not in the hands of a buffoon
who uses it in lieu of a screwdriver.
Onto the second page and the good news is that they don’t seem to be using it; the bad news is that
although they have the basic idea, they are quoting some formulae incorrectly and also getting the
numbers wrong even when they have had more than one go at it.
Then at the end DGR pops up its ugly face again and after another couple of indications that they
don’t know what they are doing, two incorrect numbers are added together and apparently divided by
another and the answer (to what isn’t exactly clear) is stated to be 5.36.
The crowning glory is the assertion which follows; blandly stating the solution is therefore 2 aspect,
but why this should be the case was not made clear. Indeed to be technically correct, 2-aspect
signalling only has stop and proceed aspects which makes a nonsense of having calculated braking
distance in the first place.
Finally the real saving grace: the phrase “this does not seem correct, have gone for 3-aspects on the
plan”. The candidate may not be aware of quite the mess they have made but at least they have
shown that they recognise all is not well and have made a pragmatic decision and even better told the
examiner what they are doing.
They would certainly get some credit for this, also they did calculate the braking distance and ought
to be able to place their 3-aspects in a way compatible with the range of possible spacings.
Conversely they have literally no idea whether this would meet either the non-stopping or stopping
headway requirement. They obviously set about the stopping calculations fairly reasonably, OK they
made a few mistakes perhaps suffering exam nerves, but obviously can’t have practiced sufficiently.
Never seemed even to attempt non-stop headway; the suspicion is that they may not even realise the
distinction. They can never have had any concept of what DGR is all about contemplating using it as
they did. Nowhere was there much explanation of what they were doing, save for the less than
wonderful diagram.
If you were the examiner, what percentage of the available marks (35) would you allocate?
20%….25 % … 33%. Let’s be generous and say 30% x 35 = 10.5. That took the candidate over
30 minutes to achieve. 60 minutes left, score so far 10.5 out of 100. Needs 50. Not looking good!

These comments arise from a review of the layout produced by the candidate and are generally
ordered from the line from A to E, then the line from C to E before considering the central area
around station F and then the continuation via the station and level crossing at G.
However the whole concept of a layout design is that it inter-relates and thus it is not so easy to
compartmentalise everything, since many things inter-relate. Once an issue has been identified, not
all occurrences are mentioned.
You may find that this write-up refers to elements that have not been explicitly discussed in this
Study Pack. This is a minority of issues but reflects the fact that the Signalling Plan is effectively the
general arrangement diagram for a system comprising many sub-systems. In order to perform an
integrated design it is sometimes necessary to know particular technical details about certain specific
components and some of the relevant information more naturally falls within other spheres; i.e. it
may be regarded as “Module 1” or “Module 3” or “Module 5” or “Module 7” knowledge. In reality
it is not appropriate to compartmentalise knowledge in this way; all are facets of the same subject.
Within the strict time constraints of the examination you cannot be expected to analyse the layout in
a huge amount of detail; much needs to be performed on “gut instinct” and for this you need practice
and familiarity. It is hoped that this critique of the layout will be found useful on several levels:
• helping you avoid the real “stupids” that lose you marks,
• giving some tips for “quick wins” in gaining additional credit,
• getting an understanding of how the various elements of layout design interact,
• showing that a lot of consideration can lie behind what looks like a simple drawing,
• acting as a summary reminder of some of the things you have learnt,
• identifying those areas where more investigation and study is indicated.
1 Aspects not shown; presumably 3 aspect red/yellow/green. Possibly acceptable at fringe of scheme
if candidate really running out of time (depiction of normally displayed aspect clearly needs to be
added once signalling ahead determined) but unacceptable in main body of the plan.
2 IBJ provided at an auto signal- generally serves no useful purpose and thus may be regarded as
profligate provision.
3 No replacement facility depicted, despite other signals (e.g. signal 2) being so provided. This looks
like a small oversight / rush to get completed, but others are missing as well. If it is your railway’s
policy (as was the case “pre Clapham” on BR) only to select certain autos for provision, then this
should be stated.
4 Initially it appears that the plan has arranged the signal on one line to be 180m away from that on
the other, this would be good for economy of provision of locs. (equipment housings) as the overlap
for the one comes opposite the other signal. Whilst this should not be regarded as a major
consideration to dictate the design of signalling, it is worth taking into account so that economy is
achieved where it can be without sacrificing usability or safety.
However on closer inspection of the “Not to Scale” area it is clear that the signals are in fact
significantly staggered. The candidate has dimensioned the signals and drawn attention to the
boundary with the “to scale” area of the plan which is good; it would have been better however to
have placed items for the two lines in the correct order with respect to each other, even if that would
have meant showing the overlaps closer to their respective signals- afterall “not to scale” means just
that!

5 There are some track circuits depicted of more that 1km long. The candidate hasn’t stated their
practices (it appears to be NR) and hasn’t stated the nature of the train detection (but presumably
track circuits). Whereas there are some track circuits that can be used in some environments that
could operate safely and reliably over that length, in the absence of definite information from the
candidate, the suspicion must be that they haven’t thought about it. Whereas no specific marks
would be lost for this, examiners will use the “overall picture” presented by a candidate’s answer to
determine their competence and this factor would negatively influence this subjective evaluation.
Looks particularly odd not to split these long tracks into sub-sections (i.e. separate track circuits on
the ground but indicating to the signaller as one) given the unnecessary additional track circuits
provided for each auto signal’s overlap.
The fact that JL is a very long berth track for signal 5 which presumably would need to be approach
released for the route to the Down Chord (in the absence of a completed route box or even a note on
the plan, the examiner can only guess the candidate intended this) reinforces the view that the matter
has not been considered; its possible that 800m sighting of signal 5’s PLJI is being claimed and
thus the release could occur after a relatively short time, but it doesn’t seem at all likely so the
candidate isn’t going to be given the benefit of the doubt.
6 Signal 5 has been positioned overlap clear of the junction which is generally a reasonable thing to
do. However it might have been better to have positioned this signal closer to the junction:
• if a shunting move from the Chord to a LOS on the Down branch had been provided [see
item B] minimising the distance of this move would be of benefit on safety and capacity
grounds;
• if a permissive move onto the Chord- not actually stated as an explicit requirement but
suggested [see item D] - had been provided, then the severe approach release and thereafter
the slow speed of the permissive movement means that closer positioning to the junction
would have been advantageous.
In that case placing signal 5 reasonably close (say 50m to give some protection by TPWS of a
SASSPAD and also avoiding Time of Operation locking on the points) to points 104B and defining
two possible overlaps: the default one over 104B normal and one that is only applicable when a
forward route to the Chord is set over 104 and 103 both Reverse would be the better option.
7 Block joint looks foul when evidently meant to be proving clearance; where lines are at standard 6ft
interval then do not place IRJs closer into convergence than the switch tips of other point end of
crossover.
8 By failing to put an IRJ between 104A and 103B, it means that 104 will continue to be locked
reverse (and thus signal 5 displaying a red impacting upon the aspect sequence in rear) whilst the
long freight slowly passes over pointwork. The level of traffic on the branch is quite low (one per
hour on the Branch and only 4 per day around the Chord) so it is reasonable to save the cost;
however it would depend on the timetabling. Given that junction E is for 75kph running it would be
a pity to cause a through freight (which would have caught up the earlier one routed via the Chord
quite considerably) to brake unnecessarily due to encountering a restrictive aspect sequence. There
is no right or wrong answer in this particular case; in other instances it is more clear-cut.

9 As per item 7, the IRJ close to 103B seems foul. It is also not obvious why the ROL has been
provided. Signal 6 could have been positioned further from this junction whilst still having
sufficient standage to permit the freight to be clear of the main line to avoid delaying operation of
the other train services. Given the level of traffic on the Chord it does not seem likely that a train
would often need to be brought up to signal 6 at danger so provision of a warning route at the signal
in rear seems unnecessary. As drawn there is no position defined for a full overlap beyond signal 6
(would fall conveniently at the IRJ placed opposite104B); it seems that the candidate may be
confused between a reduced and a restricted overlap. Of course it could be a simple omission; if
only the candidate had provided route boxes then this would have been made clear to the examiner,
but in their absence the presumption must be against the candidate.
The suspicion is that the candidate has felt the need to position signal 6 to be opposite to signal 68.
Whereas this is a laudable aim in general, it is not a particularly valid consideration here. In reality
the Chord will not be aligned as depicted diagrammatically on the plan but is likely to be a uniform
radius sharp curve for almost its entire length; hence the actual alignment of the signals will be such
that there is little chance of misreading anyway.
Signal 6 would be better positioned (subject to other constraints such as braking) overlap clear of
junction B; if it did need to be positioned where it is shown, then only a full overlap position should
be provided.
The positioning of signal 22 also exhibits similarities but with even less apparent rationale for
placing extremely tight to the junction, with a short ROL and even that position looking as if it is
foul. At least in this case a full overlap has been provided, so perhaps the other instance was a
slight oversight afterall.
10 TCI has been placed on the line over which trains are routed rather than the derailment leg of the
trap points; it is surprising how many candidates do this- it happens every year!
11 It seems hard to believe that the candidate is correctly following their preferred numbering standard
for points (whatever that may be) rather than just numbering by starting at the left hand end of the
diagram:
• points on the Branch are in the same sequence as those on the Main
• generally the A end seems to be the one first encountered in the Down direction, yet the
Branch beyond the Chord Line has the opposite convention.
It is unlikely that the candidate would lose marks directly for this given that there is no defined
practice it is hard to consider it “wrong”; however it does form part of the picture that the examiner
is constructing of the candidate and the manner in which the task is tackled.
12 It is not clear to what feature this note is intended to apply; presumably the ROL for signal 6 [item
9] but is written quite a way apart. Perhaps it is intended to be a justification for providing a short
overlap but fails to reflect that as long an overlap as practicable should be provided (the relaxation
to reduce only being utilised when operationally necessary and justified by risk assessment).
13 Signal 7 has been placed overlap clear of the junction and this looks to be an appropriate place for
it. However it is unclear whether this is supposed to be the signal protecting station F or not. There
certainly is no other signal provided, but this one is a long way out from the platform and suspicions
are raised:
• is the position suitable for stopping headway (or even through headway)?
• why are there no route indicators for reading into the relevant platforms?
• it is a long way from points 108, 110 etc; how could this railway be operated in degraded
mode (presumably handsignalling, but is it practicable and safe given the distance and the
intervening tunnel)?
• why are there no PL aspects provided in order that trains from A and C can be joined up in
the platforms at station F?
• even if such signals were provided, how could they possibly be legitimate when placed that
far from the occupied line / needing to pass at caution through a long section most of which
is in tunnel?

14 Signals 68 and 70 have been placed very tight to the end of the Chord and have been given no
overlap but just trap points. This is (or at least was) legitimate for freight only lines and thus could
be acceptable, but it would seem practicable to have placed the signals further back. Indeed even if
there is no booked freight, signalling the Chord to passenger standards could be sensible as it would
allow the use of the line as a diversionary route when engineering works etc.
The Chord certainly appears to be a running line rather than a site where a locomotive would be
detached from its train and there is a possibility of unattended vehicles. In such circumstances the
trap points could have been omitted as being unnecessary, although the candidate would need to
ensure that the examiner was aware of the conscious decision rather than view the omission of trap
points as a mistake.
To current NR standards, overlaps would be provided even on goods only lines and even before that
standards change, lines such as this Chord are likely to have been signalled to passenger standards.
If maximal standage were an issue (not in this case unless it is intended to accommodate two trains
[see item C]) then an overlap which locked the Main line points Reverse until the train had safely
stopped would have been necessary. In the case of signal 70, such an overlap would have locked
both 102 and 101 Reverse in order to prevent a run away “bang-road”; thus if the length had been
such that only one of the signals could have had an overlap totally contained with the Chord then
the preference would be for it to have been signal 70.
15 The candidate has clearly read the requirement for the to be 400m standage, but it appears that they
are confused. It seems to have been interpreted as needing a 400m berth track circuit and indeed
this seems to have resulted in the totally unnecessary LM track circuit just to fill in the length
between the berth TCs for the two signals at opposite ends of the Chord.
16 The TCI has been placed correctly, yet the Normal lie of the trap points is incorrect; this is another
frequent error that recurs year after year, probably as it seems wrong to “break” a line that has
already been drawn on the base plan. Another perpetual howler is to provide traps only at the exit
(rather than at both ends) of a Goods Loop be it bi-directional or uni-directionally signalled.
There may actually be no need to provide traps on this Chord Line at all; [see item 14].
17 This IRJ gives no value and both it and track LP are superfluous.
Although it is at clearance from 102A, points 102B still need to be retained locked until a train
entering the Chord has got behind signal 70.
18 Conversely there should be a IRJ reasonably shortly after a train has cleared 102A in their Normal
lie, so that the points can be moved to permit a train to be routed onto (or more likely, from) the
Chord Line.
19 Signal 70 has been shown as a two aspect Red / Yellow and this is obviously intentional since there
is a note “no green- slow speed”. The candidate therefore appears confused; the UK is a route
signalled railway and the signalling system does NOT indicate the speed at which a driver may
proceed but informs them of the destination to which authorised to proceed. The permissible speed
of the movement is determined by the driver’s route knowledge and their training in professional
driving techniques and familiarity with the traction (i.e. the type of rolling stock / train
characteristics) which they are driving. Hence a Green aspect is appropriate, regardless of the speed
over the points, provided that the next signal is displaying at least a yellow in 3 aspect MAS.
A PLJI has also been shown even though there is only one route from the signal. In circumstances
in which a driver might be misled into believing that there were a straight route (the classic case
would be at the end of a reversibly signalled section of line at which all trains need to take a facing
crossover to get back on the “right road” despite the track obviously continuing straight ahead) such
a route indicator would be appropriate. The colloquial name is a “Didcot router” after the accident
at Foxhall Junction in 1967. However this is not an appropriate usage given the low speed of the
chord (not actually stated but it is clear that radius is quite tight and thus 40 kph a reasonable
assumption which matches the turnout speed at each end) and the obvious convergence at the
junction without any destination which could be mistaken as being a straight route.

20 No overlap has been shown beyond signal 68 and almost certainly no overlap beyond signal 70 (the
overlap symbol on the Up Main has not been annotated with being applicable only to signal 22 or
annotated as being applicable to both signal 22 and signal 70).
As mentioned in item 14, traditionally overlaps have not been provided on Goods only lines, but the
current NR standard is to provide. Note that the plan instructional notes do not even specify that the
Chord is non-passenger and it can certainly make sense to signal it to passenger standards so that it
can be used for special excursion trains or as a diversionary route when engineering work is taking
place.
One possible solution would have been to nominate the KP/KN joint as the overlap beyond both
signals 6 & 68 and the BC/BB joint as the overlap beyond both signals 22 & 70; however it would
probably be better for this latter joint to be only for signal 22 and relocate signal 70 further back
from the end of the Chord so that an overlap can be provided clear of the Main line.
21 There is an error on the base plan which depicts the cut line X-X at datum position 1600 whereas
from scaling it is really at 1700m; it would be easy for the candidate to be misled by 100m if using
subtraction between datum measurements to determine separation. Choose yourself whether you
believe it was an unconscious error made by the examiner who drew the layout (and no doubt
needed to modify it to colleagues’ comments at short notice) or whether you believe it was
deliberately introduced to see how well each candidate would cope with such a discrepancy.
Remember such errors in base documentation are not unknown in the real world!
Just be thankful that in the IRSE exam the initial operating specification remains constant
throughout the activity and there is no sudden need to de-scope the work to save costs because the
finances have run out.
22 Since an NTS area has been shown on the plan it is probably wise to make use of it by showing the
next signals on each line. It would help to clarify the intention re spacing as no dimensions have
been placed at signal 19.
By scaling, the distance from signal 19 to signal 21 is some 1290m which at nearly 140%
overbraked is greater than would normally be considered reasonable; this excess spacing is
exacerbated since the following section to signal 23 is very nearly at minimum spacing. It would
have been better practice to have arranged for the distance 19-21 to have been say 120% SBD and
thus act as a transition between a regular spacing of 133% SBD and the section which is necessarily
at 101% SBD.
23 The normally displayed aspect at signal 19 has been shown to be Green; this is incorrect since the
signal beyond is a controlled signal whose normal aspect is Red and thus the auto would normally
be displaying Yellow.
Similarly in situations in which an auto signal has special controls applied (e.g. aspect sequence
transition), these must also be taken into account when determining which is its normal aspect.
24 Presumably this signal was intended to have been plated as passable and to be an automatic signal
since it is shown with normal aspect Green and a combined berth and overlap track circuit and this
would have been an appropriate choice. The candidate is likely to be given the benefit of the doubt
and the error be put down to working under stress in an examination if a one-off since it probably
represents a late change of mind not fully implemented; however if such errors were frequent then it
is more likely to be viewed as a trend of carelessness and inconsistency.
25 Again there are no dimensions on this signal and the reasons for positioning as it has been are
unclear. Given the wide spacing of signals on the Down Main at this location, the minimum
spacing from signal 24 is rather a surprise as there seems no need for it and without a following
signal for comparison the examiner is left wondering.
One rational explanation may be that the candidate placed this signal before deciding to place signal
24 very close to points 105A; perhaps an original intention had been to place it within the tunnel
further away. Realistically there isn’t the time in the examination to give the examiner a detailed
account of your thought processes, but it is worth noting down any significant change of intention
that hasn’t been fully implemented. Indeed consider crossing out or rubbing out lightly so that
previous workings can still be seen (rather than complete obliteration via typex) is recommended as
the examiner may be able to deduce what has happened; if they understand then it is likely to be to
your advantage when marks are allocated.

26 No track names have been allocated on this section of line; this looks like a pure oversight / lack of
time to complete. If time is short then it is certainly a reasonable area not to complete as enough
will have been done to show competence in this element in more complicated areas; however a
further look at the plan whilst undertaking this activity may well have enabled the candidate to have
picked up their own mistake regarding signal 20 for example.
It was a bit of a mistake to start at AA and BB from the position of the cut-line Y-Y; it suggests that
the candidate hasn’t really appreciated how the various bits of the plan fit together but just started in
the bottom left corner of the sheet of paper.
27 Signal 21 has been positioned overlap clear of the junction and has been given a PLJI for the route
to the Chord, both of which are appropriate. It also fits nicely with the position of signal 23 which
is some 950m (just over SBD) beyond it, but it would have been good for the candidate to have
indicated this distance explicitly in order to demonstrate that they had actually considered rather
than just placing the signals to protect their respective junctions.
It can be time consuming to mark all the inter-signal distances, but the candidate should at least
mark up the key ones and this is essential in the area of the plan which is NTS. This has been done
for signals 1 and 3, but it would have been worth noting that the 1245m represents the maximum
degree of overbraking considered tolerable. It can also help the examiner understand the
candidate’s intention when there is a discrepancy (see item 21)
28 As per item D, a PL could have been provided at signal 21 for a permissive move onto the Chord. If
the line were used by passenger trains the Sectional Appendix would define it as PF (i.e. permissive
only for freight) rather than PP (permissive passenger, as utilised where necessary to enable two
trains to enter a platform); both the signaller and the driver would know that the PL would not be a
valid aspect for a passenger train at this signal. Indeed it is usual for permissive passenger moves to
be associated with a MARI and for other moves not to be, but this isn’t a 100% distinction. If a PL
were provided then a suitably short track section (say under 200m) would be needed so that
approach release could be timed from its occupation.
29 The rational for the positioning of IRJs AC/AD and BE/BF is not clear. As per item 18, the one on
the Down Main would be better located much closer to 102A points; indeed a 400m train held at
signal 23 would be continuing to lock 102 Reverse. Although there are no scheduled trains of this
length on the section of line from D to E, such a train is not inconceivable and where more
flexibility can be given at no cost then it should be provided. Given that BE and BF together are
only 720m there may not be a need to split these at all, providing that the form of train detection
utilised can work over this length (the candidate has not specified but has provided far longer track
sections on the layout).
30 Signal 23 has been positioned so that its overlap is just clear of the double junction. Since the plan
is to scale only longitudinally and is effectively NTS in the vertical dimension, it isn’t always very
obvious where the CPs are. It is reasonable to judge the “6ft” width by comparison with the spacing
for parallel lines, but where positioning a joint “tight”, the candidate should depict on the plan so
that the examiner can be certain whether the IRJ is intended to be clear.
The candidate should also recognise that such a signal is one where the risk of a SPAD are
particularly serious. The approach speed is quite high, the driver will probably not be expecting to
stop at the junction, may be mentally preparing for the darkness of the tunnel and whatever activity
is to be undertaken at the station (e.g. split of train) and the signal may not be able to be ideally
sighted because of the positioning constraints imposed by the proximity of junctions D and E and
the need for braking distance between the relevant signals. Thus the likelihood of SPAD is higher
than average and the consequences are also high given that a head-on type collision at the switch
diamonds with a 75kph train is possible and there is no point flank protection that can be given.
The candidate who lets the examiner know that they have recognised the situation and add notes
that:
• there is a need to ensure that there is a long MRD or provide a banner repeater on the
approach (to mitigate likelihood), and
• an enhanced level of TPWS provision to have confidence that any overrun would be
contained within the length of the available SOD (to mitigate consequences),
could expect to receive additional credit.

31 The IRJ between KS/AF is positioned to allow the earliest possible release of locking on the
junction and would be a sensible position for a joint in the absence of the need for an overlap joint
slightly further away. As drawn though it serves little purpose and results in a superfluous track
circuit of some 70m; if it were eliminated the additional delay in releasing points 105 for a train at
maximum permissible speed would be only 4 seconds (and even for a train pulling away having
been held at signal 24 would probably be under 10 seconds). Given the utilisation of the lines
involved the small time saving is unlikely to justify its provision; the examiner is left with the
impression that a clearance joint has been positioned due to one activity and the overlap by another
without the candidate taking a moment to look at the overview and think. In such situations if you
feel that provision is warranted for some particular reason then you should note that rationale; even
if the examiner does not agree, at least they will comprehend your thinking. Actually in this case
there is a reason why the few seconds might count (see item 37) but given the general level of this
candidate’s attempt the examiner is justified in believing that the candidate would not be
considering the operation of the layout to this degree of detail.
32 No IRJs shown within the S&C. Failure to provide these for track circuited (or indeed axle-
counted) railway will result in a train on one running line occupying the same track section which
extends over the parallel line of railway; an MAS signal reading over that section would
automatically be replaced to danger. Thus omission of such joints is a serious error; for some
reason whereas candidates rarely miss a joint within a crossover between two horizontal running
lines, joints such as these within more complicated S&C are often overlooked. Indeed it is usually
the joint required in the line which happens to be drawn horizontally that forms the bridge between
two running lines depicted diagonally on the diagram which gets missed out.
33 Depicting the curved lie of 107 points as Normal is rather unusual and there does not appear to be a
good reason for it. It is true that (depending upon how you interpret the plan informative notes- see
item B) there is a slightly higher level of traffic from the Branch than the Main, but this is not so
dominant as to justify the reversal of the usual convention; neither are there any facing moves to
points 107. The definition though is not actually wrong, even though the examiner may be left
wondering whether the candidate is confused with a convention often applied for the facing point at
a left-hand double junction.
34 The candidate has drawn the switch diamonds as if they were double slips and has also numbered
them in this manner as if 105A/B could be used as a crossover between the Up and Down Main and
the Up Branch could be joined from a wrong direction move along the Down Main.
A switch diamond only allows moves either straight or diagonally; the two ends must be numbered
as a pair (optionally with the facing points to form a three ended set). Note the symbol represents
the straight stub-ends of the switches as opposed to the curved switch of a usual turnout and the
parallelogram “diamond” symbols.
Also for some unknown reason 105A/B has been numbered in the opposite order as appears to be
the convention generally followed by the candidate.

35 Signal 24 has been shown as having a SARI rather than a PLJI which is more usually provided for a
geographical junction. However this may well have been done intentionally (as it is possible that
the sighting might be improved from within the tunnel); the candidate would have been well advised
to have explained their thinking if this were the reason.
However the symbol shows two route indications presumably for the Main and the Branch, but of
course in the absence of a route box the examiner has to guess the intentions. There should only be
an indication given for the diverging route with an unqualified aspect for the primary route from the
signal except where this cannot be unambiguously defined. In this case the route over 105 normal is
clearly the straight route given the continuity of the line name, the representation on the diagram
and the fact that it is of the higher speed all leading to the same conclusion. Indeed whereas the
250m maximum readability of the SARI is adequate for an approached released route of moderate
speed, it would only give a bare 8 seconds at the highest speed for the straight route.
Note that provision of a SARI as the route indicator for the divergence forces signal 24 to be made
MAR and this in turn means that trains will not be able to take advantage of the 75kph speed of
junction E (since until approach release occurs the driver must be braking in the expectation to
stopping prior to signal 24); this is a waste of the P’Way provided and a non-conformance with the
operating specification that has been given. If the candidate feels that such an arrangement is an
unavoidable consequence of the site, then they must make this clear. The need to ensure safety does
on occasion mean that desirable facilities cannot be provided, but where this occurs there is need for
identifying and explaining the issue to the client.
Alternatively, to be able to provide signalling that can permit trains to pass over 105 Reverse at the
maximum permitted speed requires the junction to be signalled as MAY-FA. This in turn requires
signal 24 to be provided with a PLJI and the signal in rear to exhibit flashing yellow (which needs to
be depicted with the flashing symbol around its yellow aspect on its profile). This actually helps if
the visibility of the PLJI is not as good as the main aspect; whereas MAR of signal 24 would need
to be delayed until the indicator did become readable which would mean that it imposes severe
restrictions, in normal circumstance the driver will have been pre-warned by the flashing sequence
and although the signal 24’s final release to Green will have to be very last minute, the train will
still be able to take the junction at the full permitted speed.
Signal 24 has been positioned much closer than would normally be felt appropriate to points 105A,
but the position of the tunnel and junction justify in this particular case. Overlap positions have
been correctly depicted on the two relevant lines. Time of Operation locking would be necessary on
the facing points to prevent their swinging if a train were on the berth track circuit of signal 24 until
it had been timed to a stand; it may be that the candidate has deliberately positioned the signal IRJ at
least 20m from the switch tips in order to avoid the need for such locking (this distance was an old
standard reflecting fast POE and fast interlockings but current practice requires site specific
assessment of the speed response of the technology utilised and generally results in a significantly
greater distance being required). Had the candidate explained the rationale it is possible that they
may have been given some credit, but as presented the examiner has no means of knowing.

36 The candidate has chosen to depict axle counters through the tunnel; this may be a sensible option
but it has not been explained. Although the tunnel is only about 500m and a track circuit solution
could still avoid placing equipment in the tunnel, it is certainly possible that the tunnel is very wet
and there could be difficulty in getting a single section working reliably over that length in poor
ballast conditions.
At the left-hand end of the tunnel, no IRJ has been shown to limit the extent of AF or BG;
presumably this is an oversight and they are supposed to terminate effectively at the tunnel mouth.
It is not clear why the joints have been positioned here:
• BH would be about 100m track circuit which might have been useful for approach releasing
a PL (but signal 24 hasn’t got one!) and could be used in connection with any Time of
Operation locking imposed on points 105 but has no clear rationale for existence
• the joint on the Down Main would be better placed just beyond points 107 switch tips to
allow prompter release of the junction (in the absence of any specific benefit of extending
the unnamed track circuit- see item 32- up to the tunnel mouth).
It is certainly good practice that where there is a significant length tunnel that it is given a specific
train detection section (useful at limiting disruption in a failure scenario due to the different risk
profiles re railway in the open and in a tunnel), but this should not be taken to ridiculous extents by
regarding there to be a need for a joint exactly at the tunnel mouth.
The situation is further confused by their being an overlap joint depicted in the tunnel:
• firstly it is not necessary (see item 37),
• secondly it is unclear how the candidate expected it to work as it seems to be placed within
the axle counter section. (The examiner may think: s it indeed supposed to be the limit of
BH?- but even this makes no sense since it would be the clearance of the section on the
approach rather than the occupancy of the section beyond it that would be significant. This
would be a sensible length for a berth track to initiate approach release for signal 24, but it
doesn’t seem likely that this was what was intended- if only the candidate had provided a
route box perhaps this would have been clarified).
This all leaves the examiner not able to rationalise the situation and thus the candidate would lose
marks.
At the right-hand end of the tunnel the limits of the track circuiting have been depicted, but on the
wrong side of the axle counter heads; the axle must be counted into the section prior to moving from
the track circuited area / must be in a position to shunt the track circuit before being counted out of
the axle counter section.
37 The depiction of this signal is most curious and the obscure note “for headway and signal spacing”
doesn’t help much.
Signals in tunnels should be avoided when possible; they often need to be of special small profile
and mounting arrangements (often ground mounted with “upside down” aspects”), present access
difficulties for maintenance and are operationally inconvenient. If a driver is stopped at a red signal
it can be difficult for them to judge precise position in the darkness to stop at it accurately. This is
particularly important as they may need to contact the signaller via SPT and descending from the
cab and walking through the tunnel has personal safety risks, yet positioning a phone so that it can
be used through an open cab window requires very precise stopping and presupposes an opening
window that is not always provided on modern rolling stock. If a train does not have power
operated doors / central door locking then there is a risk of passengers inappropriately attempting to
leave the train, believing themselves to be in a station. If the train is diesel (or steam) hauled there
can be a build up of fumes making breathing difficult.
The candidate does seem to recognise some of this by showing a signal without a Red aspect; this is
clearly intentional since they have also shown a “delta plate” and no track section division at the
signal. It has been identified as 26R whereas the signal in advance is signal 24; the candidate
appears to have muddled up two possible naming conventions (giving such a “distant” a unique
identity or giving it the identity of the signal it repeats but with an R suffix. Adding to the mystery
is that signal in rear is denoted 26 and thus the repeater is actually beyond the signal which it is
cont allegedly repeating; just seems a complete mess.

37 Despite this the signal has been given an overlap (as if it had a Red aspect) so the assumption must
cont be that either there has been a change of mind or the candidate really does not know what they are
doing.
The note does not help; there could possibly be an argument for providing a non-block signal in a
tunnel to maintain a regular signal spacing, but from a headway viewpoint it gives no advantage as
the block section extends from the stop signal prior to it until the stop signal beyond it. Whilst such
a signal can be of some use within a 4 aspect sequence, it serves no purpose at all within a 3 aspect
sequence as here.
The examiner has by now reached the conclusion that the candidate must have seen some example
of something similar in a different context and has attempted to apply what they can remember
without ever having understood its purpose. The signal drawn is only about 370m on the approach
to signal 24 which is considerably less that braking distance; perhaps this is why the candidate has
drawn a Yellow / Green /Yellow head for a signal that could never be required to show Double
Yellow as they realise that there is not full braking distance. However the signals in rear are a
similar distance away but are only 3 aspect heads; the examiner is left wondering whether the
candidate expected them to be showing Yellow (in which case what is 26R for?) or Green (in which
case 26R is underbraked) when signal 24 at Red.
Perhaps there would be value in positioning a banner repeater in the tunnel if signal sighting of
signal 24 were inadequate, but in this situation it would need to be a splitting banner as it relates to a
junction signal; unless the tunnel were quite exceptionally large it would however be impossible to
accommodate.
No doubt the candidate thought provision of this signal was a clever thing to do, but the examiner
has tried and failed to make any sense of it and thus it will have detracted from the perception of the
candidate’s competence. However see item 69.
One option may have been to have used that signal position for a miniature wall-mounted or a
ground mounted 4-aspect signal with a Red aspect but with the 2nd Yellow aspect blanked.
• This would provide good headway (see items 39/40) and was probably what the candidate
intended but with the various disadvantages of positioning a stop signal in the tunnel which
presumably they were hoping that their solution avoided.
• However it would also be necessary to ensure that the driver was given sufficient warning
of a Red at signal 24; see items 43-47.
• Provision of the signal as a miniature LED “searchlight” would largely address the
maintenance issue.
• Consideration should be given to providing “tunnel control” on the signals in rear; this
would prevent the aspects on signals 26/48/50 from clearing whilst there is a train in the
tunnel unless signal 24 was displaying a proceed aspect. Although this does not prevent a
train encountering the intermediate signal at danger, it does make it much less likely and
holds the train outside the tunnel unless there is the expectation of a clear run. Headway is
affected by implementation of tunnel control, but in this case the important issue is how
soon the second portion of the train can be routed to follow the first into the tunnel; once the
portion to C has cleared track circuit KS, then the straight route can be set for the portion to
A to receive a clear aspect sequence. A Double Yellow is perfectly adequate for a train
starting from rest, particularly given the speed restriction over points 108 Reverse for those
from the Down side of the layout; if the junction can be set in time for the tunnel signal to
show Green by the time the train enters the tunnel, then no delay will be incurred by the
second portion.
• Given that MAY-FA should have been provided for signal 24 (see item 35), this
intermediate signal should be depicted as capable of displaying Flashing Single Yellow
when the junction signal is off for the Branch.
cont

37 Another possibility to consider is positioning such a signal outside the tunnel:

cont • it would be very much on the limit of the 1/3: 2/3 rule but given that this would be an
isolated 4-aspect stretch of signalling for a clearly identifiable stretch of railway rather than
a large irregularity within otherwise uniform 4-aspect MAS, this would probably be
acceptable.
• It would still mean a track section joint within the tunnel but if this were an axle counter
head this is no great problem. Even if track circuits were used, it could be configured as
two feed ends thus minimising the equipment inside the tunnel and the need to access it.
• However it is not a good position for a signal, firstly because it is immediately beyond
trailing points which the train has just used to cross from a parallel track and such signals do
have a relatively high occurrence of SPAD (this particular circumstance is not too bad given
that there are no signals on parallel lines and the sighting of the signal against the backdrop
of the tunnel may be good), secondly as if a train is detained at it then it will still be
blocking the Down line (and still be in sight of passengers who may just have missed it!).
38 There needs to be a PL signal here; how else does a train enter the Up siding. Even though there is
no timetabled move described, the fact that the siding is provided on the layout should be enough of
an indication that it does required to be signalled. Potentially the signal could have been located at
109 points but positioning here allows it to be accessed by a train that has come from the Down side
of the layout, and the points are so close that provision of a PL at both would be excessive.
It would seem appropriate to provide routes to at least the Down Loop and the Up Siding and
probably to the Down Main as well. A wrong direction move on the Up Main has not been called
for in the specification and since this would require a LOS to be provided to limit the extent of the
move and would add a additional complication to the interlocking it would be viewed as excessive
to provide.
Obviously there is a need for an IRJ at this position, but this would be achieved by moving the
BJX)/BK joint further from the tunnel.
39 As per item 13, points 108 & 109 are a long way from their protecting signal on the Down line.
Signal positioning is not simple; it is not good to place a signal (at which it is quite likely that a train
will be held) within a tunnel. There are various reasons (as explained in item 37), but sometimes it
is the “best of the evils”.
However it is obvious that the signals 25 & 39 positioned by the candidate at the exit of the Down
island platform need to be positioned where they are and that if an intermediate signal were
provided between junction E and station F it could not be fitted into the 3 aspect sequence. One
option might be to move signals 7 & 23 further away, but that can rapidly be discarded when the
effect of doing this is assessed. Hence it would seem to be a choice between providing a modified 3
aspect sequence or making a transition to a 4 aspect sequence for a short stretch of the Down line.
cont

39 Consideration of the line beyond the station towards station G and its level crossing may influence
cont this choice:
• it may be that it would be good to have some short sections in this area as well (need to
consider what is required to meet the stopping headway requirement and also the
positioning of the signal to protect the level crossing (if CCTV rather than AHBC); see item
F. If so, then a succession of 4-aspects with a spacing of around 700m with a transition
back to 3-aspect signalling beyond station G may well be sensible; it potentially solves
other problems and gives a reasonable length of 4-aspects in a stretch rather than as a one-
off that can confuse drivers. One benefit certainly would be that a train can depart from
station F with a Double Yellow aspect with the level crossing still open to road traffic and
the driver would accelerate with confidence, rather than needing to be very cautious if only
getting a Yellow on a 3-aspect signal. If a 4-aspect solution were adopted then thought
would be needed regarding where and how to make the transition to it from the 3-aspects on
its approach.
• if however the signalling otherwise worked out nicely with continued 3-aspects, the best
solution might be just to introduce an “extra signal” within the signalling depicted by the
candidate. The new signal would be placed opposite 108A just outside the tunnel and
obviously less than braking distance to the next signals and thus it would need a note:
“special control: approach release unless signal 39 off”. For the (A) route to signal 25, it
would need to be approach released (MAR) anyway due to the 40kph limit over points 110
(and indeed at that speed braking is only 125m). For the (B) route, it would not clear until
the approaching train were in the tunnel; by the time the driver could observe it the speed of
the train would have been reduced below that which adequate braking to signal 39 at Red
did exist (75kph, 435m). If however signal 39 was displaying Yellow or Green it would
also display Green. Obviously this does extend the headway distance (for non-stopping
headway by approximately 500m) and thus the proposed solution in this area assessed for
compliance with the specified headway requirements to determine whether this is a suitable
option.

40 In either case (item 39), the signal located just outside the tunnel exit is inevitably a bit of a SPAD
risk since its sighting may be poor from within the tunnel, particularly if the background is bright.
The signal is quite likely to be at danger, but the compensation is that drivers will come to expect
that and will drive accordingly so that the chance of a SPAD occurring may well be tolerably low;
the most likely scenario being the false expectation of approach release.
If the signal is at danger though, it is quite likely to be because there is an Up direction train leaving
from one of the Down platforms and thus a head-on potential (albeit the departing train being slow
speed) exists. If the signal is positioned where shown however, such conflicts are locked out whilst
the extra signal is being approached, since its overlap would be locking points 108 Normal. This is
potentially operationally restrictive as an Up train would have to be held at signal 7/23 whilst a train
was departing, or alternatively initially brought through the tunnel and then wait whilst the overlap
timed out and then the opposing train departs.
Positioning the extra signal further from the station (inside the tunnel, with overlap clear of 108
points) would give additional layout flexibility but greater layout risk in the event of SPAD; a lot
depends on the confidence that can be placed on the train protection. In this case, it seems
appropriate to implement the safer option, especially as the remainder of the layout and information
about train running suggests that the timetable should generally mean that the apparent loss of
flexibility should not be an issue in practice. In the 3-aspect case there may be a higher chance of a
driver anticipating approach release than for 4-aspects; however the same position of a signal is
appropriate and does comply with the 1/3: 2/3 rule.
Positioning a signal as shown does minimise the length of the permissive passenger movements into
occupied platforms and the rear of the existing train is very likely to be visible from the signal itself.
It also permits quick platform reoccupation times to deliver good headway; it must be remembered
that the timetable is almost certain to arrange for the portions of the trains from A and from C to
arrive at junction E almost simultaneously, so that there is minimum delay to the passengers when
the trains join up in section F. Hence far better headway is needed in the section E-F than a pure
consideration of the number of trains per hour would suggest; when there is a passenger train then it
is actually two which ideally require to run very closely together. this would be another factor
tipping the decision to provide 4-aspect signalling for this part of the corridor.
41 At first sight, as the layout is currently drawn, the joint between AH/AI seems unnecessary; points
108B and 110 may as well be in the same track section. There is no advantage releasing points
108B quickly after a train has passed over them from the Down Main leaving the tunnel; until that
train has also unlocked points 110 then no other signalled route can be set anyway. Similarly in the
opposite direction, there is no value in releasing 110 promptly as a train routed from signal 48 into
the tunnel will still be locking points 108 Reverse and there is no other reason for wishing to get
points 110 Normal.
There is a hint that the division may have been a bit of an after thought. Generally letters such as O
and I are not used in track identities to save confusion with other letters and numbers 0,1; the
candidate indeed has been following this policy (and also avoiding using letters which could be
accidentally reversed- i.e. in the sequence of track circuits with an initial letter K then the first used
is KK) yet here has used I, so perhaps it is a late addition into the sequence (it is always sensible to
leave the occasional identity spar so that if you need to add one then the re-work is limited).
Actually there would be reason for this to be a joint position if the candidate had actually provided
all the other signalling required by the operational notes- see items 38 and B for example. A
shunting move from the Up Main into the Down Loop would then exist so there would be a reason
for releasing 108 immediately AH became clear despite the train running slowly on AI track; even
so the delay caused would be quite small and unless this were a regular manoeuvre (not explicitly
stated as a requirement so therefore unlikely) the tracks could still be one rather than two.
A joint certainly should have been provided immediately beyond the CP for 110 points (or perhaps
further away if it could be sensibly combined with a joint required for the missing signal (see item
44); otherwise they remain locked all the time a train is in the Down Main platform rendering the
Down Loop useless for the duration; this is obviously a serious error.

42 100m overlaps have been shown beyond signals 48 and 26, but with no other explanation.
Although the joints look well into the convergence at the points, these would be clear given that the
spacing between the lines is quite significantly more than typical 6ft spacing (as they are on
opposite sides of island platforms). The diagram does depict this greater spacing but not
proportionately and the candidate would be well advised to add the assumed CP (as in item 30).
The candidate has been utilising 180m overlaps elsewhere (and quoted the figure in the headway
calculations) but has not explained the rationale for the shorter overlaps here:
• The one beyond signal 48 is certainly reasonable for a Reduced Overlap, given that the
attainable speed through the loop is largely constrained by the 40kph turnouts at each end;
indeed this would probably be the quoted speed in the Sectional Appendix.
• The one beyond signal 26 is however too short for the permissible speed. Given that there
is also a further overlap symbol depicted (see item 46) a distance of 180m beyond the
signal, then presumably the closer overlap is intended to be a Restricted Overlap and thus
should have been annotated as ROL. Positioning such an overlap here (as opposed to those
used at junctions B and D) is sensible; signal 26 cannot reasonably be positioned anywhere
else and the ability to bring a train into the platform under caution whilst another train is
using points 108 Reverse is beneficial (although arguably not warranted for the traffic
pattern described which suggests that all scheduled Up Passenger trains use the Down
Platforms in order to split, though the reason for this is unclear and could be challenged by
the candidate as being unnecessary when that operation could be performed in the Up
platform, thus avoiding conflicts. However that requirement could perhaps have been
imposed by the TOC (Train Operating Company) as it could be more economic for them
only to man the one island platform with shunting and train dispatch staff). For another
possible reason see item 45.
43 It is not entirely clear whether the exam paper expected the Down Loop to be signalled bi-
directionally (see item B) but the arrow on the plan suggests that there should be no running moves
in the Up direction. However even for this interpretation, provision of signal 48 to allow a running
move of ECS from the stabling sidings (or a passenger train that has terminated and then reversed
direction in the platform) does seem sensible; however the candidate should probably have made a
note that it may not strictly be required by the specification but may wish to be considered as an
option. However the candidate would definitely need to justify fully the apparent decision to signal
the Down Loop fully bi-directionally rather than the Down Main which was an explicit requirement.
On the assumption of no intermediate signal being provided in the tunnel, signal 48 is correctly
depicted as a 3-aspect signal even though it is just 900m to signal 24, since the attainable speed is
low (see item 42). The PLJI is debatable but certainly more justified than that for signal 70 (item
19) and particularly given a signalled move up to it from the Up Main.
If a 4-aspect signal (see item 37) were provided within the tunnel, a 4-aspect head would (probably)
need to be provided at signal 48 so that the correct aspect sequence could be given up to signal 24 at
Red. However with the 4-aspect signal positioned outside the tunnel, signal 48 would be a 3-aspect.
It’s a question of attainable speed:
• with the intermediate signal close to the speed-restricted points it is obvious that there
would be adequate braking distance from it to signal 24 at Red and thus the signal 48 at the
end of the platform can display Green. See also item 45.
• with the intermediate signal further from the station it is possible that the train speed could
be such that this would not be true and therefore the earlier warning by signal 48 displaying
Double Yellow would be necessary. See also item 45.
The reason why the candidate has chosen to depict signal 48 in the generally distinctly non-
preferred position on the right of the line has not been made clear. There can be reasons for doing
this but they don’t seem appropriate here. Given the splitting of the trains which may occur in this
platform, the available length is at a premium and such positioning is liable to make viewing from a
left-hand driving position within the cab more difficult when the cab is close to the signal. In
addition the train itself would hide the signal from the platform staff who need to be able to observe
it before giving the right away to the driver; OFF indicators would be necessary and have not been
provided.

44 No signal has been provided for the Down main (Reversible); this seems a complete unintentional
omission given the profile and route box provided for signal 2. Provision of a signal as per signal
48 (see item 43) would be appropriate; the “Didcot router” would certainly be required on this
signal and therefore provision of one similarly for signal 48 would then be essential for consistency.
45 There is not sufficient braking distance between signal 26 and signal 24; had the candidate actually
dimensioned the inter-signal distances then the deficit of some 35m would have been more readily
apparent and they may have avoided the “trap” inherent in the design of the exam plan.
Fortunately the platform is just long enough for standage for a 184m train with the signal positioned
on the platform to provide the required SBD. However the preferred “defensive driving allowance”
for the train stopping position prior to the signal is not available and this may well be the reason
why train splitting does not occur in this platform (when the two portions of the train separate it is
inevitable that the front portion moves towards the signal leaving a gap of a few metres from the
rear portion) and this could result in signal 26 becoming very difficult to see from the front cab.
Note that this does result in the signals at the end of the platform not being precisely parallel; this is
acceptable given the presence of the platforms which clearly associate each signal with the relevant
line. The problem with signals on different lines being staggered with respect to each other is
primarily one of “parallax” when there is a curved approach and the signals apparently changing
relative position as the train approaches and thus confusing the driver which one is relevant to their
train.
In the situation (see item 37) of an intermediate 4-aspect signal in, or on the approach to, the tunnel
then signal 26 must be given a 4-aspect head. Unlike from signal 48 (see item 43), the attainable
speed is the full permissible speed of the line (since there are no speed restricted points) and thus
provision of full braking distance to signal 24 at Red is essential and therefore this would display
Double Yellow. It would also need to display flashing Double Yellow as advance warning of the
high speed divergence when signal 24 is cleared for the Branch (if it was decided not to provide an
intermediate signal then signal 24 would be retained as a 3-aspect signal and display Flashing
Yellow for the divergence). Assuming however an intermediate signal (4-aspect profile) at the
tunnel mouth, this would display Single Flashing Yellow to warn of the forthcoming divergence and
signal 48 would at that time display Green (as befits the correct 3-aspect sequence.
46 The overlap position beyond signal 26 is in a silly place as it is certainly foul of points 108 Reverse.
It is pretty obviously just placed here since the candidate has measured 180m beyond the relevant
signal and has drawn it in without thinking further. In such situations decide whether:
• the signal can be moved back,
• the operational impact of locking the points is acceptable (if so provide a longer than
standard overlap so that it extends over the points and is placed just beyond switch tips
where a joint is useful for releasing the locking on those points)
• a shorter overlap could be justified (risk assess safety).
In this case the situation is resolved by moving signal 26 which is placed incorrectly anyway; see
item 45.
A similar situation occurs with the overlap position drawn foul of points 113 Reverse. This has been
annotated to show that it is applicable to both signals 25 and 39 which is good and also
demonstrates that there is no overlap beyond signal 25 into the sidings. It perhaps could have been
argued that a Reduced overlap beyond 25 would be justified by defining the Down Loop
permissible speed to be appropriately low; in practice there would be no value in setting it higher
than 40kph. However the overlap beyond signal 39 should have been placed beyond the CP
opposite 113B and annotated with its actual length, some 200m.

47 Signal 52 has been provided as a Red./ Green signal with a PL. The main aspect head must include
a Yellow aspect since it reads to signal 24 which could potentially be at Red.
The PL seems to have been provided in the mistaken belief that there is a need to perform a shunt
movement into an occupied section, possibly associated with item 48.
Sometimes GPLs (or elevated individual PLs) are provided for exit signals from rarely used sidings,
but the disadvantage is the length of the movement which has to be run cautiously at slow speed.
Such a solution would be appropriate here in the scenario in which a signal were provided at the
tunnel mouth (see item 37); the signal would be clearly visible before the train leaving the siding
clears the speed restriction over the points.
In other circumstances however, it is modern practice to provide a full running signal- in this case 3-
aspect.
48 No trap points have been provided to protect the running line from vehicles left in the siding; this is
a serious error which will be penalised.
49 A LOS has been provided which is facing to the normal direction of traffic; this is another all too
frequent error. To give some credit to the candidate, perhaps they were realising that they ought to
provide a means of getting a train from the Up Siding to the Down Sidings and believed that they
needed something to stop the driver proceeding into the tunnel rather than reversing (at the GPL
which has not been provided at points 108A!). However nothing is needed; the driver is expected to
know the move they are to make and if there is a misunderstanding then it is an operational
inconvenience rather than a safety issue.
The role of a LOS is to limit the extent of a shunting movement when made in the OPPOSITE
direction to that in which a line is signalled. Remember that it has two red lights and may not be
passed. Hence it is inappropriate in the position shown and this would be regarded as a significant
error.
50 A station such as this probably ought to have TRTS plungers and possibly RA/CD key switches and
associated auxiliary indications on the relevant signals. This is not a key element and so don’t
waste much time on it, but a general note might win you a little extra credit if your basic layout
design is sound. Items like this though are the “icing on the cake” and if you haven’t got the
fundamentals right they won’t help you scrape a pass but they may contribute to tipping the balance
when close to the higher grade boundaries.
51 Consideration should have been given to the buffer stop, the colour of the light, whether sliding
buffer stops are needed, a TCI to detect that it had been displaced (or a fixed bufferstop approached
too closely).
If the siding was intended to be track-circuited then a IRJ and symbol denoting the limit of track
circuiting would be needed just prior to the buffers.
52 No end of track circuiting demarcation has been shown; it is not clear how far train detection is
intended to continue into the siding. Track names have not been provided but signal 52 does appear
to have separate berth and overlap sections. Probably it was intended to show a boundary just
beyond signal 52 but potentially it should have been shown just prior to the buffers if a track
circuited siding were considered justified.
53 For some reason the candidate has suddenly started putting IRJs just prior to rather than just beyond
the associated signal in this area of the plan. This is another common error, though usually it is
consistently wrong rather than as her an odd slip. Obviously there is a chance that the driver would
observe “self-reversion” as the first wheels of their train causes the aspect to be replaced before the
train passes beyond the signal itself. In this case the examiner may be charitable and judge that the
fault resulted from a decision to move the signals slightly beyond the platform but without
remembering to move the IRJs similarly; if it had been consistently wrong then the fault would
probably be assigned to ignorance and thus more heavily penalised.

54 Signal 25 has one main route (strangely the candidate has not followed their usual practice here in
providing a PLJI as this is actually the example where a straight on route may seem to exist- to set
against this the approach speed is low and it may be very obviously entering sidings so it certainly is
not essential).
An Auto button (AWF) has been shown; certainly possible but strange that it has been given to this
signal when signal 39 and particularly signal 26 would have been far more likely candidates;
perhaps it was added when preparing the route box- see item 68.
The PL has been shown as if it had three lamps and thus an ON aspect; this is assumed to be a
minor slip under exam conditions. Presumably the two indications given by the MARI are for the
two sidings, but since these seem identical and the movement would be proceeding as far as the line
is clear, these are superfluous. Another common error which is not featured here is to show in the
route indicator the display that is given to the driver for the route; this should actually be shown in a
column in the route box (see item 68) with the indicator depicted (as has been done in this case) the
number of separate indications which are capable of being displayed from that unit.
55 Whereas trapping protection has been provided from Stabling Siding No2 by drawing in trap points
112B, this has not provided trapping protection from Stabling Siding No1. Another set of traps
could have been positioned on that siding at the same longitudinal position as 112B but would need
to be given a unique number (it couldn’t have been 112C- think about it!).
A better solution would have been to have not provided either of these traps, but instead to have
provided one set of traps in the common line, effectively opposite 111B with the throw-off into the
cess if anything was inadvertently attempting to leave the sidings.
[Note that some candidate misunderstand so badly that they actually position trap points to derail
trains entering sidings or choose to derail the vehicles on least safe side of the track; don’t be one of
them.]
56 It seems as if the candidate has become distracted and overlooked putting track joints within the
S&C at the right-hand end of the station; there are missing IRJs for parallel moves and one between
111B and 113A would be useful to allow use of the Up Main for a through train as son as the move
crossing to the Down platform (which will be moving rather slowly) has cleared 113A.
57 The candidate has sensibly chosen GPLs as the exit signals for the sidings, which is an appropriate
choice given the short distance into the platform and the fact that it would be required to make that
movement both when the platform was empty and when it was already occupied by a train.
However the have been placed a long way back from the siding entrance and this means that each
can only hold an 8 car set, whereas had they been placed at the end of the siding then a further 4 car
could have been accommodated. Railway operators would generally expect to be able to use all of
their infrastructure unless there were an overriding safety reason why this was not possible. In this
case it seems a totally unnecessary loss of stabling capacity.
These signals have been numbered in a unique sequence; it does however seem odd that that they
have been given consecutive numbers where the policy for main signals generally reflects the NR
approach of odd numbers ascending whilst travelling along the Down line and even numbers
descending whilst travelling on the Up line. In fact it is evident from the numbering of the main
signals that the candidate initially considered the through moves at the station (curiously along the
down Loop rather than the Main) and only went back to the other signals later and had not left
spares in their numbering sequence; signal 48 is more understandable as a late addition than signal
39).

58 Owing to the incomplete nature of the train detection in the area (item 56) it is hard to be certain
what the candidate intended regarding the provision of train detection up to and within the sidings.
The symbols here are presumed to indicate that the sidings themselves are not track circuited but the
rest of the layout is.
However these symbols are not a common standard and have not been defined; they certainly look
as if they mean that the sidings do have track circuits but the area beyond signals 1001/1002 does
not. If this was intended then the limits of the track circuiting should have been shown also at the
other end of the sidings, just prior to the buffer stops and indeed there would also need to be limits
to the track circuiting from the direction of the station.
• Since points 112A/B are motor worked, they do need to be included within track-circuited
railway and therefore if this had been the candidate’s intention then it would have been
wrong.
• However it would have been possible to have terminated the track circuiting from the
running line so that it just incorporated the set of trap points mentioned in item 55 and
placed one GPL at the siding exit. Points 112A could then have been made handpoints
instead which would give some economy, but would require the train crew (or site staff) to
set them for the appropriate siding and this could cause operational delay. When leaving
the sidings to proceed up to the exit GPL these points could just be trailed by the train and
they would adopt their new position, but there would then be the issue of how the signaller
would know that this move was taking place in order to avoid a head-on scenario with a
train being routed into the facility. “STOP and telephone signaller” boards just prior to the
CP between the two sidings could have been provided and at certain yards with a multitude
of sidings would have been an appropriate option. However in this particular case which
seems to feature regular movements into a small number of sidings, the candidate has
selected an appropriate means of operation.
Working on the assumption therefore that the candidate used an inappropriate symbol, the design
seems reasonable except for the fact that a train that is still on the approach of either of the GPLs
could actually drop the track circuit and therefore lock points 112 because the IRJ has been
positioned on the wrong side of the signals. It’s fair to conclude that, whatever the intention, the
candidate is confused / has been careless and therefore will loose some marks.
59 Unlike item 51, buffer stops lights have been shown. They probably shouldn’t have been shown as
red lights given that if the siding is vacant then they would be visible straight ahead for a train
entering the Down Loop and indeed will be in the left-hand cess for trains passing on the Down
Main beyond the station. Practices vary and in reality it depends how close to the running line they
are situated (just because the plan shows the sidings parallel and close, this is not necessarily a true
representation), but it would probably have been wise in this case to have defined white lights by
annotating the disc symbol with a “w” and adding an explanatory note.
A candidate would not lose marks by depicting as they have, but by demonstrating domain
knowledge by such slight touches, a candidate does tend to increase the confidence of the examiner
in their competence. Thus they are more likely to be given the benefit of the doubt when some
other factor is being assessed and the examiner cannot be totally sure from the written evidence; an
informed deduction has to be made and the candidate’s “track record” for such items may colour
that judgement.

60 Nothing has been written to demonstrate that the candidate has thought about the operation of the
sidings (although as discussed in item 58, they have come up with a reasonable option in principle,
if flawed in detail).
There certainly isn’t any Shunters Acceptance control which slots signal 25, so presumably there are
no resident staff and the signaller just routes a train into the sidings.
• This is reasonable but would be reliant on the signaller maintaining a record of how many
vehicles(they obviously operate as 4-car units but often in pairs) are stabled in each. For
two sidings this is not too much difficulty, provided of course that the signaller can find out
which trains are formed of 4 and which of 8 cars. This may be done via a computer
information system at the time the trains enter, or indeed by talking to the driver. Of course
the candidate could have chosen to depict the signalbox in the vicinity of 25 signal and then
visual observation from the window would then be an option.
• It also implies that there is no activity performed in the sidings that relies upon the non-
movement of trains to be adequately safe. From the description of “stabling sidings” it is
reasonable to suppose that there is no technical engineering work undertaken, but a driver
may need to inspect their train externally whilst preparing it for duty or indeed some
external cleaning may take place. The separation of the two sidings may be sufficiently
great that there is plenty of clearance, but even so a slight “buffering up” of one train onto
another end-on can be highly dangerous to someone working on the stabled vehicle. The
candidate would have been well advised to have stated their assumptions.
Certainly there needs to be some means of a driver who has completed their train preparation in the
sidings to communicate this to the signaller. The candidate may be assuming that the GPLs have
phones, that there is an in-cab radio but has not stated this; neither have they provided a plunger for
the driver to operate, nor is it evident that the signaller would hear the train’s whistle or horn- all of
which methods are appropriate in some situations.
The lesson here is that an essay is not required but a few bullet point notes or the relevant symbols
on the plan would demonstrate to the examiner that you have envisaged a method of working that
could be appropriate for the defined circumstances. Few bother, so even a few words would ensure
that your plan would be distinctly better than the rest.

61 Signal 2 has been placed as close to the station as 3-aspect braking distance allows; indeed the
necessary correction to the position of signal 24 (item 37) means that this signal must also be moved
slightly further away. It is unfortunately quite a long way out, being some 500m to the first set of
points and 700m to the beginning of the platform. This is illustrative of the compromises that do
need to be made and the position is acceptable if not ideal for the main aspect moves.
It is however unacceptable (to modern standards) in relation to the length of the permissive
movement into an occupied platform; the move will take a long time, the driver may forget the
significance of the PL aspect that they have been given. It is perhaps possible that a train already in
the Down Reversible platform would be visible, but one in the Down Loop is virtually certain to be
invisible. The candidate is evidently anticipating that there is a need for such permissive moves;
however although there is some ambiguity (see item B) it is actually likely that these were not
intended and therefore this signal position would be satisfactory.
If the permissive moves were required, the options would be:
• determine whether the site circumstances (geography, utilisation of the layout) are such that
the signal position as planned is acceptable for both safety and operability,
• opt for additional (see item 37) 4-aspect signalling on the approach to the station, thus
allowing a signal to be positioned just overlap clear of points 113B (or indeed even closer to
the station with these points within its overlap),
• consider whether a reduction in permissible speed of the line in the area would be
operationally acceptable. Given that there is a non-stop passenger service from H to A then
it is unlikely that this would be acceptable in this case; it would certainly be easier to
negotiate this if the express services were operated by the same Train Operating Company
as wanted the permissive moves than if they were rival operators! However in other
circumstances this may be a tenable option; for example if the only through service had
been the freight which needed to diverge at 75kph through the junction at E, then de-rating
the line’s permissible speed for a couple of km on the approach would not incur a huge time
penalty to those trains but would enable the signal spacing to be reduced significantly and
thus helped with the positioning of signal 2. Such an option is not to be adopted lightly;
however in the real world occasionally a speed reduction for a stretch of line can be the best
solution. Within the examination context it would not normally be appropriate. However
sometimes there is a significant step-change of speed (e.g. to a slow speed area through the
station) and by defining an area on the approach at an intermediate speed limit, the signal
spacing can be reduced yet no loss of journey time is incurred; trains would be needing to
brake to respect the forthcoming speed restriction and thus would not actually be taking
advantage of the nominal permissible speed of the line at that position. In such
circumstances it is entirely reasonable that the published speed (which determined the SBD
calculated) more closely matched that at which the trains would really need to be travelling.
Signal 2 is one of the few that has been given a route box; it is not however accurate nor complete
and is of only limited help in determining the candidate’s intentions- see item 68.

62 Given that signal 2 has been given a PL which needs to be approach released when there is a train
nearly at a stand at the signal, there is no train detection section with which this could reasonably be
achieved.
Track circuit BR is over a kilometre long which (even if it operates technically) is far too long for a
timed occupation to give a meaningful indication of the train position; even worse the section
includes station G and thus a stopping train would have been “timed nearly to a stand at signal 2”
when in reality it is just accelerating away from the previous station!
A small oversight perhaps, but the examiners are not going to be too impressed, are they?
Disregarding the PL, there is still a requirement for MAR. Assuming good approach view of the
signal, the maximum range of a PLJI is 800m and thus the release could occur upon leaving station
G (see item 63). If, as is often the case, the PLJI is not visible with the main aspect then the release
would need to be delayed; depending on the valid release position this could probably be achieved
by timing from that same joint but it might be necessary to relocate it closer or indeed provide a
separate cut-section track that is used separately for technical functions but indicates as the same
track circuit to the signaller. Conversely if the whole signal comes into view together at a distance
less than the range of the PLJI, then the MAR can occur anytime after the approaching train has
passed the signal in rear and nothing special needs to be provided.
63 As per item 62 this track circuit needs to be split somewhere along its length and this location is as
good as any, particularly if a Down Line signal is to be provided in this vicinity (see item 39).
Indeed it would be good to make this a separately indicated track to the signaller, as it gives
knowledge that the train is on the move again after the station stop (which can be of variable
duration); this enables sensible regulation of station F given that the stopping passenger services
need to cross over onto the Down side of the layout.
One problem of the layout is the necessary placement of signal 30 on the approach to the CCTV
level crossing is that there is risk that a driver starting away from the platform will not be able to see
a signal for a significant distance:
• Firstly there is a risk that they will forget that they entered the station on a Yellow aspect
(almost certain, given that the booked working for the stopping trains is to cross to the
Down platforms at station F and these route(s) at signal 2 are MAR because of the turnout
speeds. If the sighting of signal 2 is reasonable (>400m) then the speed that the accelerating
train would have obtained is sufficiently low that it would have the braking distance to be
able to stop at it having seen it. Otherwise there could be a significant chance of a SPAD
occurring at it. There is good mitigation in that the signal is a long way from the first
conflict so its SOD is considerably longer than its overlap.
• Secondly a driver being aware of this SOYSPAD potential is liable to accelerate only
moderately and run at slow speed until the junction signal becomes visible and thus journey
time is extended and capacity lost. This may be a particular issue given that the timetable
may well arrange that an express train is imminent as it is designed to pass through the
station on the Up line whilst the slightly earlier stopping train is in the Down platform.
Had a 4-aspect solution been adopted regarding signal 2 (item61) then a further 4 -aspect signal a
few hundred metres beyond the station platform would avoid these problems. It is good to be at
least train’s length beyond the platform (SASSPAD risk) and there is the need to ensure that there is
standage for a freight clear of the crossing. If this were provided other track circuits would be
needed; the IRJ mentioned in item 63 would not be required (but may be useful to retain to give an
indication to the signaller for regulation) as the those associated with this additional signal would
have to be used for the MAR. Perhaps the best option would be to provide a Yellow/Green/Yellow
head here as it could form part of the 3-aspect to 4-aspect transition that will be required (see item
67)
Otherwise in a 3-aspect solution the only option is provision of a banner; since signal 2 is a junction
signal then this would in fact be a splitting banner. It would probably be provided in much the same
place (i.e. some 400m on the approach to signal 2) so that there would be time for the signaller to
observe the train leaving the station, set the route and the signal 2 to clear prior to the driver passing
the banner. Cognisance would however need to be taken of the sighting distance of signal 2 as
ideally the driver should have virtually continuous sighting of the signal / banner combination.

64 Many of the general comments relating to the level crossing are contained in item F.
IRJ should have been provided just beyond the roadway on both running lines to enable the barriers
to be raised immediately the crossing track circuit is cleared by the train. This has not been
achieved by the candidate; potentially this could be seen as a trivial oversight or alternatively as a
significant error. If you think of all those unhappy motorists waiting impatiently at the crossing all
the time for which a train which had already passed clear of the road itself was waiting in the
station, you can be sure how they would regard it and the examiner is likely to take the same view
and more marks will be lost.
65 Signal 27 is not satisfactory for the protection of the CCTV level crossing; it has incorrectly been
plated with an auto plate to denote that it is passable. It is also some 700m from the crossing which
may just about be acceptable but is really far from good, particularly when the crossing has to be
operated in local control. If a train needs to run cautiously from the protecting signal as far as the
crossing, with this positioning it could take well over a minute.
As per item 39, 4-aspect signalling along this stretch could position a signal approximately opposite
the commencement of the Up platform and thus just over overlap clear of the crossing which is a far
better solution. This signal probably (see item 66) ought to be the last of the string of 4-aspect
signals (therefore it would not actually be capable of displaying Double Yellow despite having that
profile- the top aspect would be blanked) and positioned rather closer to signal 29 than the one to its
rear.
Signal 29 has to be at least (see item 66) SBD prior to the next signal (since it is a 3-aspect
sequence) and the relocated signal 27 would display Green when 29 is at Yellow. Making this
section short (but still well within the 1/3: 2/3 rule) minimises this block which contains the station
and therefore is a constraint on line capacity. By chance (well probably not by chance- see item 67)
this scenario places the signal in an ideal place (just overlap clear) to protect the level crossing.
Therefore this solution is a win-win.
66 Positioning of signal 29 is also poor with respect to the crossing. A freight train held at it would be
trailing back across the road because there is inadequate standage; more unhappy road users. Since
the signal is an auto and it is assumed to be a long plain line section beyond H, there is perhaps little
likelihood of a Red here and thus it may be tolerable. However if the freight is following a
passenger that has previously stopped at station G then it is possible that it has yet to clear the
section, and indeed there could be a regular succession of stations on this line. At very least the
candidate should have recognised the situation and drawn attention to it, stating their assumptions re
what is reasonable in the circumstances.
Given the argument in item 39 for 4-aspect signalling, then that scenario would give a much
preferable result, as a signal could be placed some 200m beyond the platform but as the first of the
3-aspects following the transition. Moving away from the platform also gives the benefits of
reduced SASSPAD risk for the stopping passenger trains and sufficient standage for the freight.
The next signal (which the candidate has failed to draw -if the examiner has given it to you, then use
it- see item 22!) ought to be placed at minimum braking distance beyond signal 29. This keeps the
block section in which the train is accelerating from station G as short as possible. It is worth
considering extending the 4-aspect stretch one further section and making signal 29 rather than 27
the last. A train departing from a platform following another on close headway benefits from a
more informative cautionary aspect- for leaving a station a Double Yellow is almost as good as a
Green yet a Yellow on a 3-aspect means a very cautious departure. However in this case the
headway requirement wouldn’t seem to warrant it and to be of any use would need in fact two more
4-aspect signals since the last of them cannot show Double Yellow and a Yellow on a 4-aspect is
worse than from a 3-aspect; providing these signals would certainly be an extravagance.

67 Signal 30 however is sensibly positioned to protect the crossing. It has been given an AWF
(otherwise called Auto button) which is sensible given that it is a controlled signal with only one
route; however this rather pre-supposes that the crossing has been given Auto Raise (which operates
even though routes are still set over the crossing) since a pre-requisite for Manual Raise is the
cancellation of the routes so there would be very little benefit of the facility in that scenario.
Given the suggestion (item 61) that 4-aspect signalling should have been provided in the vicinity of
the station, there is a need to provide the appropriate transition from the 3-aspect signalling used on
the remainder of the line. Hence in that scenario,
• signal 30 would be provided with a 4-aspect head yet it would never show Single Yellow
(and therefore an appropriate note would be needed against the profile)
• the extra signal located beyond station G would not have a Red aspect and therefore would
not contribute to headway. Its role is therefore partly as an element within the necessary
aspect sequence transition, but with the benefit of providing a signal for a driver leaving
station G and combating the related SPAD risk. It falls into place so neatly that the
suspicion is that it is not chance but instead deliberately engineered by the person setting the
exam paper; it thus gives you a feeling that you have “cracked it” and must have got a good
solution- the signal engineers equivalent of solving a crossword puzzle. The fact that it has
come right on both the Up and Down Main really cannot be a pure coincidence. This is not
to say that there is only one possible signalling solution; the layout could have been
signalled using any technology or standards; what it does imply that it was designed as “an
interesting layout complete with signalling” and then presented to the candidate as a blank
layout. If you share the same background as the original designer, you are likely to come
up with a similar solution and it is this “reverse engineering” process that has become
apparent.

68 Few route boxes have been provided and those that have been drawn would get the candidate very
little credit. There are two reasons for a candidate to supply; first it allows them to demonstrate that
they have the knowledge to produce them accurately and secondly to complete the picture that
explains how their signalling solution is intended to operate- a key part of the interface specification
with the railway Operations Department (the people who have to decide how to timetable the
railway, familiarise the drivers and signallers, assess the method of station working- which train
service will use which platform etc- and also how they would keep trains moving in failure
conditions).
This candidate has failed on both scores; there are not enough of them, the ones that exist are
incomplete and have errors (based of course still on the assumption that they are supposed to be
following NR practice).
• The candidate seems to have an identification scheme all of their own, first numbering all
the Main aspect routes from the top of the layout and then all the PL moves and not actually
including a column to specify the class of each route (Main/ Warning/Call-on/Shunt). Had
they done this they may have realised that they had provided what is presumably a ROL
beyond signal 26 (see item 42) and could then have marked it up accordingly and included
the appropriate Warning route up to 26 from signal 2 in the route box.
• They have only written in the destination line name when it is actually written in the precise
area of the plan; the examiner must assume that there are intended to be routes of M and C
class into all three of the through platforms (but note there was certainly no suggestion form
the plan informational notes that any permissive move was wanted into the Up Main
platform).
• In addition the candidate has denoted the first divergence to the left of straight as if PLJI
position 1 (whereas it should be 4) and the second position 2 (whereas it should be 5).
• The only designation for the MARI (and the route box doesn’t even specify the size of the
indicator but it has to be inferred from the profile diagram) is “DL”. Although two letters
can be used these are non-preferred and in this case “L” would have been better, leaving
“D” for the Down Main Reversible platform; alternatively the candidate could have chosen
to number the platform 1-3 (from the Down to the Up) and thus could then have used:”1”
and “2” (this of course assuming that there was a justification for the Up direction move
into the Down Loop which was somewhat ambiguously specified- see item B). An
argument against this could be the designation of the route indicators from signal 25 into
the sidings and therefore it might be an idea to have avoided this same designation at the
Down signal (which the candidate has failed to provide!) granting admission to these same
platforms.
• There is no column explaining the approach release for either the Main or the Call-on
moves; had the candidate completed this they may have discovered their own oversight
relating to the berth track length (see item 62 etc).
The candidate did do a little better for signal 24’s route box, possibly because there was less to get
wrong. They persisted in the odd route identification, again failed to realise that there should have
been Warner routes to match their ROL (or perhaps may have reconsidered and decided that this
provision was excessive and revised their plan accordingly). The route indicator specification is
better but because the approach release column was not included they didn’t realise that their
solution would prevent Branch trains passing over the junction at the appropriate speed and that a
PLJI should have been provided instead (see item 35). There is no explanation why a route
indicator was provided for the obviously straight route.
The best route box is that for signal 25 possibly because being a Down signal the route designations
from A-C used correspond with normal NR practice. There is an extra column squeezed in that is
presumably the aspect class (though it would be good to have defined headings and abbreviations
used against one of the route boxes so the examiner can be sure). The route indicators are sensible
and it even seems that the candidate is specifying in the last column that the shunts are designated as
last wheel replaced (but would you really want to propel into un-track circuited stabling sidings?)
and the main route has been given a facility to work Auto (see item 54)

69 The alert reader will have realised that when reviewing this plan, the 3-aspect signalling at the left
hand end initially seemed suitable but as the area around the station was considered it became clear
that 4-aspects were appropriate here. The comments for the right hand end of the layout have
discussed how a transition to the 3-aspect signalling for the plain line would occur; however we
have not gone back to re-evaluate where and how such a transition should be engineered on the
other side of the station.
This is left as an exercise for the student, but the signalling to the left of the tunnel at E “feels”
inherently right and thus those signals probably ought to stay where they are. It may be time to
revise aspect sequence transitions, but two hints:
• there is only one way to leave a 4-aspect sequence and run onto 3-aspects; it results in an
unused top yellow on the last of the 4-aspect heads; there seems a very obvious contender
for this. Indeed this again gives the candidate a good feeling that they are very much
thinking like the person who set the paper; that worry about placing a signal at the very
limit of the 1/3: 2/3 rule suddenly evaporates- we must be drawing towards the end: there
really is a light at the end of the tunnel,
• there are three possible ways of transitioning from 3-aspect signalling onto 4-aspects, none
are ideal everywhere but each has its application but some are more generally preferred to
others. The basic issue is how to give appropriate warning for the “extra” signal when
leaving an area of signals spaced at nominal SBD entering an area where they are spaced at
nominal half of SBD. Seeing it is an exam and the examiners are wanting you to display
knowledge, perhaps it might be that one of the other means of transition may be the answer
here. Look back at items 39 & 40 where the discussion of 3-aspect or 4-aspect issue first
appeared, then consider the possible transitional arrangements and see if you spot the
similarity and something else slots neatly into place.
Now look again at that odd signal 26R in the tunnel. Perhaps the candidate wasn’t so far adrift after
all and were toying with performing a transition but got confused about precisely what they were
doing where. Had they provided a more accurate note as to its intended purpose (as well as having
the time to amend other signalling in the area to give credence), then they may have received a some
credit for what they were attempting to do, rather than leaving the examiner with the impression that
they hadn’t a clue about what they were doing!
As well as attempting to point out specific candidate’s errors, the above description attempts to lead the
student through the thinking process which surround the design of optimum signalling for a particular
layout. It has deliberately been written contemporaneously with the thinking as the layout was gradually
analysed in a broad sweep from left to right. Where there is a reference to a higher numbered item from a
particular part of the text, this generally relates to something which was not originally apparent when
considering that part of the layout (as no cognisance had yet been taken of the things yet to be encountered
to the right). In this way it is hoped to illustrate the iterative nature of the activity and the need to initially
keep some options open before deciding to select one to implement and then undertake a consistency check
of other earlier decisions.
Obviously it is a good idea to make as good a guess initially as possible in order to minimise re-work. So
the best approach is normally to familiarise yourself with the traffic pattern and requirements and then start
from what you think will be the most difficult area; generally this is the principal station in the middle of
the plan.
• Certainly platform staring signals are bound to be needed at station F so they could be shown
initially with certainty but don’t do too much without looking broader for neighbouring constraints.
• On this plan the level crossing and the need for freight train standage immediately give an area
where signals are best avoided; conversely the need to protect a controlled level crossing suggests
some desirable positions.
• The tunnel is obviously a nuisance and faces the candidate with the question: signal just prior /
signal just after/ signal within- which is it to be?
• The immediate proximity of junction E also influences that decision on both the Up and the Down
The above is precisely the sort of consideration which you could and should have been doing in that
valuable reading time (10 minutes) at the commencement of the examination.
Plan to use that time well; look before you leap. Know the essence of the layout before doing the calcs.

Having worked through all of the above you should be in a much better position to have formed a
view of what the examiner would be thinking if they had been presented with your offering. Do not
be depressed though if the list of deficiencies would have been long; remember that the pass mark is
only 50% so you can fall a long way short of perfection and still achieve a pass. However it may help
put the situation into perspective for a student who failed the exam last year but couldn’t understand
why, because they had thought their attempt had been reasonable.
If some of the more esoteric stuff passed you by, don’t worry excessively. The important thing is to
ensure that you learn what you can from the exercise and especially focus upon eliminating those
“give-aways” that you really don’t understand the basic essentials because it is those things that
determine Pass / Fail.
Ask yourself:
• did I get all the trap points correctly?
• did I always allocate point numbers correctly or can certain routes not be set at all?
• are the signals allocated to be passable / non-passable correctly and shown displaying their relevant
aspects?
• have I included enough route boxes in order to uniquely define my intentions so that the examiner
can assess my solution without always having to guess what I might have meant?
• did I ever fail to put an IRJ at a controlled signal and was it always on the correct side of it?
• did I put in all the IRJs needed for parallel moves in pointwork and ensure that the points could be
released as promptly as required after being traversed yet made sure that any joints that had to be
placed foul were clearly marked as such?
• is there always a signal defining the end of movement authority and is there always a correct aspect
sequence (including any route indications) up to it so that the driver isn’t taken by surprise?
• did my design address the interlocking requirements of the level crossing?
• had I thought enough about the train services that were running on the layout and how this should
influence the signalling of the station?
• is it actually possible for all the defined and implied operational moves to be made?
• did I record enough of my basic assumptions and in particular specify my intentions about the
manner in which trains were to enter and leave the stabling sidings?
• have I related the layout back to the headway and braking calculations to ensure they are
compatible or at least explained why they may differ?
If the answer to the at least most of the above is YES (and you completed at least a substantial
proportion of the layout in the allotted time), then it is probable that you would have passed.
Almost every fault depicted on the layout was perpetrated by one of two students attempting this
layout as a mock exam, with just a splattering of other common faults inserted.
The good news is that both of those students obtained a Credit in the exam about one month after
attempting the mock, so even if you now know that your attempt was not as good as it should have
been, there is still hope if you concentrate in learning from your more basic mistakes.

Activity 10: Self-check “Tick Sheet for Past Papers

For other layouts which you have attempted and which there is no blow-by-blow critique, you
may find that attempting to mark your own work by completion of this tick sheet is useful. It
cannot be used as a numerate score sheet but if you record how you think you did:
+ + for really happy, + for content,
0 for OK,
- for rather weak, - - for completely missed / right mess)
it will give you an “at a glance” impression of how you actually did and identify your weak areas.
Of course you will then need to take a view of the contribution of that element to the overall
marking before being sure where to concentrate your efforts;; for that a reconsideration of
section 4 should enable you to separate the “wheat from the chaff” to focus on the essentials.
GENERAL
G1 General Notes
§ Current Signalling Principles and Standards applicable to Network Rail,
§ AWS provided 180m on approach of all main signals,
§ TSS provided at all signals protecting conflicts on passenger lines, with OSS
provided as necessary to contain overrun within the SOD,
§ OSS provided on approach to passenger line buffer stops,
§ SPTs provided at all main stop signals,
§ Default Standards Overlaps of 225m
§ Signal Sighting Allowance of 12sec at headway speed,
Headway calcs do not assume extreme defensive driving.
G2 DO read the information re the required moves, both what is actually stated and what is
inferred. What goes UP must come DOWN and vice versa; if trains are to start from
platform or siding they must be able to have got there in the first place. Always think
which end of the train a locomotive would be at any time (if not multiple unit rolling-
stock).
G3 DO explain your rationale if providing a route, closer headway or other facilities over and
above the stated requirements.
G4 Having done the headway calculations, do briefly relate to the actual layout of the
question rather than doing in splendid isolation. Don’t necessarily assume that either 3 or 4
aspects will be appropriate for the entire layout.
In particular ensure that your layout does actually implement what the calcs indicated, or
explain why:
§ providing different form of signalling to that initially stated,
§ how any underbraked sections are made safe.
Be careful that you don’t confuse yourself between the various figures for your stated
nominal, the maximum to achieve the headway, the minimum to have braking and the
maximum tolerable degree of overbraking.
G5 DO recognise that speed signage can help you think through layout. Having provided a
speed board through pointwork, remember to provide a speed board for such trains to be
advised the speed for the line just joined. Should differential speed signage be needed, the
upper figure is for the lower speed.
G6 DO ensure that there is sufficient standage; it is not just the need to get a train length in-
between signals but to ensure that the rear of a stationary train has passed clear of any track
circuit locking points that might be needed to permit another movement, and also (if at all
possible) to clear the overlap of the signal in rear.

SIGNALS
S1 DO number as hard work to refer to otherwise. Current standard is to number all main
signals in same sequence (auto and controlled) from the low odd numbers at the beginning
of the Down Line [London termini generally have signals 1,3,5, 7 etc on platform ends].
Where multiple lines, parallel signals normally given sequential odd numbers. The Up
Line signals use the even numbers which fit “in and between” the numbers used for the
Down signals in the similar area.
S2 DO draw the right symbols:
§ GPLs have reds horizontally, whites at 45 degrees (up top left)
§ PLs on main signals are furthest away from driver and only have the two whites
(up top left)
PLJIs are above the top aspect- draw a little stalk if need positions 2 /5 or especially 3 / 6.
S3 DO provide the correct type of route indicator on main signals:
§ Generally go for PLJI, except as below:
§ Provide SARI if all routes from a signal (including straight) are 40mph or less- in
which case provide indication for the straight route,
§ Provide SARI when route into terminal platform,
§ Provide SARI for a signal which is not approached by a signalled move (from
terminal or set-back platform, out of sidings etc.),
§ Provide SARI if need > 3 PLJI positions on one side of the straight (if fast
divergences then provide the one PLJI to indicate overall divergence and provide
an additional SARI to qualify it for each of the diverging routes)
§ Provide SARI if likely to be sighting difficulties (tunnels, footbridges) or “nasty”
routes that diverge from a line only to re-cross it again via a fixed diamond.
Mixing on a signal is generally not a good idea but not totally prohibited. Different forms
of indicator on parallel signals is quite acceptable.
Never use MARI with main aspect
S4 DO provide the correct type of route indicator on PL signals:
§ Provide MARI if more than one PL route from a signal,
§ Provide MARI if move reads to a LOS or GPL acting as one,
§ Provide one common indication in the MARI for routes which are essentially
similar (e.g. a group of sidings of the same length),
§ Provide MARI with a PL used as a Call-on if the associated main aspect has a
route indication.
Never use other forms of route indicator with PL aspect.
S5 Do provide the correct form of Approach Release for junction signalling:
§ MAF if within 10mph of straight route speed,
§ MAY-FA if divergence is a) 40mph or more from a high speed (>75mph) line or
b) 25mph or more from medium speed (>35mph)line
§ MAR otherwise.
[Remember PLJIs are readable for maximum of 800m, SARI for maximum of 250m so
these are the max limits at which a junction signal can be released.]
S6 DO provide Approach Release for:
§ PLs associated with main signals (typically 100m berth TC occupied),
§ Warning routes (typically 250m berth TC occupied for time),
§ Deficient braking between two signals within 3 aspect signalling,
The 1st of the 4 aspects following a transition from 3 aspect signalling (if using the
preferred methodology for transition).

S7 DON’T provide a signalled route without an appropriate limit of movement authority to

which it reads.
For a main (Y/YY/G) aspect:
§ almost always another main aspect,
§ in the case of a terminal platform it is the bufferstop light,
§ for moves into sidings / yards (i.e. non-passenger) it may be to a reflectorised Stop
Board.
For a shunt PL aspect:
§ on a running line it is generally a main aspect,
§ may be another PL (generally on a running line we’d want the forward signal
OFF),
§ a LOS for limiting a “bang-road” move,
could be into sidings, but we’d still have a bufferstop or noticeboard to which it would
read.
S8 DO remember the lights on buffer stops; red unless that would cause confusion to drivers
apparently approaching them, in which case white should be used instead.
S9 DON’T place a LOS that is “facing” to traffic; they are to limit movement in the direction
contrary to traffic.
S10 DON’T place a signal having a red aspect without having a signal that can warn the
driver at braking distance from it, except:
§ where the signal cannot be approached by a signalled move (i.e. OK from a
siding, a set-back move from a platform etc.)
where the aspect sequence is arranged to check the train initially at the signal in rear (e.g.
MAR route at a junction or a non-junction signal approached released whilst the signal to
which there is inadequate braking is at danger). In this case need to explain by note in
route box.
S11 DO place signals (and dimension them) in the Not To Scale areas on the edge of the plans-
unless you are clearly in a boring sequence of signals so that it would add nothing.
S12 AVOID if you can (but do recognise that they are sometimes needed and appropriate):
§ signals placed on the right-hand side of the line as seen by the driver (long
sections of simple bi-di signalling on two track railway can be an exception),
§ signals on parallel running lines for the same direction placed staggered wrt each
other or missing entirely (at passing loops and station platforms can be
exceptions),
§ long (>400m) movements on PL moves especially bang road or as a permissive
call-on into an occupied platform,
§ a signal with facing points in overlap closer than 35m,
§ a signal placed closer than 50m to nearest conflict,
§ a signal placed more than 400m from the closest point or level crossing it protects
(may have to accept 600m but extremely reluctant to be 800m)
§ a signal on a viaduct, in a tunnel or just outside a tunnel (good to have 12sec
sighting time!),
§ a signal just after trailing points (good to have a train length)

S13 DO think about what aspects any signal may be required to show:
§ a fixed R is perfectly sensible (but may also have an associated PL),
§ a R/Y is only likely to be correct for the signal authorising entry at a terminus
station,
§ in isolated 3 aspect signalling, the signals alternate between R/G (section signals
dictating headway) and Y/G in rear of these (to provide the braking requirement),
§ if you are introducing an extra signal within 3 aspect signalling there is the
choice between making it additional to the normal aspect sequence (i.e. when it is
at red making the signal in rear approach released) or providing a small run of 4
aspects. Consider where the driver gets warned for each of the signals at R (best
way to transition from 3 aspects in this case is generally a Y/YY/G signal).
§ in 4 aspect signalling a signal from where all trains start from rest should
generally be a 3 aspect. Need to check that there would be braking at the
attainable speed at the single yellow- so make the 1st section shorter than the 2nd
(assuming equal braking / acceleration). Similar also applies to speed restrictions
through pointwork etc.; better to provide a 3 aspect provided that there would be
braking for that train at the following signal
if you are providing a junction with MAY-FA, do make sure that you showed the signal in
rear flashes yellow and in 4 aspect sequence the one next in rear flashes double yellow.
S14 DO think stations and possibility of needing some or all of:
§ TRTS, RA/ CD plungers on platforms,
§ RA/ CD indicators on signals,
§ OFF indicators on platforms.
S15 DON’T plate a signal as an Auto if:
§ it has points in its overlap, or
§ it is to have a Warning route (!),
there are any opposing moves into its overlap (unless it is a mid-section signal within a
long length of reversible).
S16 DO remember that an Auto signal:
§ will have its normal aspect dictated from the one ahead (i.e. except in unusual
circumstances won’t be R, could well be G but may be Y or YY),
§ should be given an R facility,
has a combined berth and overlap track.
S17 DO remember that a Controlled signal:
§ will always have its normal aspect as R
§ may be candidate for an A facility. [Especially if there it has only one route but
this signal is the predominant traffic flow at the converging junction, or there are
multiple routes but one has clearly the dominant traffic flow at a diverging
junction]. Consider carefully before giving conflicting signals each an A button!
Has separate berth and overlap tracks.
S18 DO remember that a non-red signal:
§ will have its normal aspect dictated from the one ahead,
§ needs a Delta plate,
probably wouldn’t have a track joint at it or have an overlap, but ought to have one
somewhere beyond it as soon as practicable.

S19 DON’T blindly shove overlaps in at 225m or 180m; think about the locking;
§ DON’T provide for a signal which cannot be approached by a signalled move,
§ DON’T select a foul joint,
§ DO consider to which line a SPAD train will be directed,
§ DO consider what other moves are prevented (you may wish to do so for safety or
not to do so for operational flexibility)
DON’T be afraid to shorten O/L where speeds relatively low (180m is comfortable at
55mph, 100m at 40mph).
S20 ONLY provide ROL where clearly advantageous for layout flexibility whilst having
tolerable safety risk. Generally they’d be a set of trailing points in the O/L which is
deliberately excluded from the ROL over which another move (or overlap) is to be routed.
DO make sure that you depict the Warning route for the signal which reads up to the
signal ahead of which is the ROL.
TRACKS
T1 DO provide track joints at every controlled signal including GPLs.
Actually best to do this when drawing the signals so you don’t forget.
T2 DON’T have any track circuit that can be occupied by separate trains taking “parallel
routes” through a layout.
T3 DON’T just have the track circuits “petering out”. Show the end of TC symbol at any
extremity into sidings or depot
T4 DO put an IBJ immediately after having passed over a set of points in the facing direction
unless there is no advantage of being able to release the locking on the points (i.e. unless
the rest of the layout is such that no other move could possibly be waiting to be able to set
T5 DON’T position a track joint as foul unless it is needed to permit parallel movements and
there is nowhere else to put it. DON’T use such a position as an overlap joint; select one
that is clear (justify a short overlap or make the overlap longer if not excessively
restrictive).
T6 DO make sure that there is a track circuit provided over every power worked point.
T7 DO ensure track circuits of sensible lengths:
§ <50m- are you sure you really need it separate?
> 650m- will it work functionally? Depends on type- can be over 1000m- but would
normally expect a track circuit between adjacent 3 aspect signals to be 2 sections, best
place the joint opposite signal in other direction for e.g. even if off centre.
T8 DON’T waste too much effort worrying about the numbering. Suggest use 2 letter codes
with each line using its own initial letter then increasing in direction of train running on
that line. Start the lines at AA, BB, CC etc to avoid dyslexic confusion. Don’t use letters
I, O and generally a good idea to avoid using both of M/N and U/V but no great
consistency in what is done in reality! Always a good idea to leave a few unused letters in
a sequence anyway, in case need to add a track section.
T9 DON’T give each section of a track circuit a full separate identity if the signaller does not
need to be shown which is occupied; use AA/1, AA/2, AA/3 for sections of track circuit
which need to be split because they are long rather than because the joint is significant in
an operational context. [Subsections can be used for initiating level crossings, release of
approach locking etc.; separately indicated sections are needed either side of a controlled
signal, to implement route locking over points etc.]

POINTS
P1 DON’T forget to add the symbol for switch diamonds.
Both ends at the diamonds must be numbered as a pair; the associated single lead at a
double junction is best numbered separately.
P2 DON’T confuse above with a single or double slip.
§ For a solitary single slip, the two ends of the “chord” may be numbered as a pair.
However it is generally best to pair one end of the slip with the associated turnout
on the adjacent line with which it forms a crossover; this is especially the case if
there is a succession of single slips that can be thought of as an overlapping series
of crossovers.
For a double slip, the two ends adjacent to each other are numbered as a pair (all 4 rails
actually normally driven from the same machine) and the two ends at the other ends of the
two “chords” are numbered as a separate pair.
P3 DO make it clear how all “other” points are worked and distinguish between:
§ handpoints,
§ trailable / spring / hydro-pneumatic points,
§ Ground Frame operated points.
Consider and depict any detection arrangements needed.
P4 DON’T forget to provide trap points from sidings, freight depots and probably also Goods
Loops and even bay platforms if vehicles could be left stabled; if in doubt- provide.
DON’T forget the interrupter.
However always be on the lookout for points that already exist on the layout which can
provide trapping by being numbered as a pair. If there are full rails with a signalled move,
obviously DON’T provide interrupter.
There may be times (uni-directional railway) when you can use spring or hydro-pneumatic
points (indeed not only for traps).
Wide-to-gauge points can be of a type where one machine drives blades in anti-phase, or
where each switch is driven separately from its own machine; think which you need!
P5 DO a cross-check and look back from any point to find the signal on each approach that
protects it. If the line is unidirectional away from the point it’s fine, but otherwise there
must be one (but sidings and loops in particular can easily be forgotten).

Appendix X: Extracts
The student is encouraged to look at a variety of different Signalling Plans for different types of site on
their railway.
This Appendix contains some from certain places on NR of different vintages and feature various regional
practices, so expect a variety of depictions and styles of diagrams. These are all small extracts of larger
plans and the reproduction is not wonderful but they do give a flavour of the area depicted; some of the
more important things to look for on each are listed below.
In some diagrams a signal is highlit in yellow; there is no significance (except that it has been subject to a
SPAD which is why the diagrams used were acquired initially; note that GPLs and noticeboards also
feature!)
layout001 West Coast Route Modernisation Alteration Plan link
Shows red (for new work) and green (for recovery) presentation of changes to
be made including EPS speed signage and moving TASS balises (for tilt
authorisation) and TPWS . Also includes an aspect sequence extract for the
CDR “double Reds” control. Not very typical perhaps, but more mundane is
the Goods Loop with its traps and TCIs.
layout002 Mountsorel Aggregate Sidings link
Shows Reception Line from main line with train detection up to the end of
movement authority limited by a STOP noticeboard (highlit yellow).
Beyond this, and on other lines there is no train detection and just handpoints
between the various sidings etc. Note how a train in the Reception Line
needs to Gods Loop draw forward and then set back through the loading shed
and the places where run-round is possible. A cripple siding is provided for
any vehicle that has to be removed from the train due to a defect.
Note that moves over motor points are protected by GPLs and track circuits
at least over the points themselves for dead-locking.
layout003 Woking Station link
Layout includes trap points and TCI at end of Bay platform, suppressed
AWS, ROL and POL etc. Note end of track circuiting symbol beyond STOP
board protecting sidings.
Plan shows datums and inter-signal distances, the need to place signal
symbols away from the layout in complex areas, route boxes, three letter
track IDs etc.
layout004 Neilston link
Shows Red /Yellow signal reading into terminal station and isolated 3 aspect
signalling; also Ground Frame protected by semi-automatic signals.
Diagram includes TPWS fitment table.
layout005 Ely link
Shows AHBC with depiction of barriers road lights treadles and rail signage;
also the strike-in arrangements and special signal controls.
layout 006 West Ealing link
Layout shows SN215 with flashing double aspect and SN6152 LOS, signals
fitted with ATP (beacons, infill beacons and in-fill loops shown).
Note power worked points at entrance to loops but handpoints from engineers
sidings and works all of which have GPLs authorising movements up to the
main exit signal SN216 beyond which there are trap points with TCI.
Also on the branch there is AOCL with signage and strike-in arrangements
specified .

layout007 Streatham link

3-aspect signalling on branch, 4-aspect signalling on mainline, banners.
Many auto signal only some of which have emergency replacement facility.
Limits of signalbox areas. Datum positions all referenced to the signalbox /
relay room.
DF is two section track circuit. CCTV level crossing.
layout008 Doncaster link
Gantry suspended signals, some with PLJI; datums given in km.
Yard repays study: Shunters cabin some colour light signals and power points
(for entrance / exit) but main fan of sidings operated by handpoints and
protected by noticeboards.
layout009 Edinburgh link
Entrance and exit lines to locomotive depot, featuring AWS test magnets to
check the trains leaving the depot and the chargeman’s slots on signals
EH915 and the relevant routes from EH527 that need to be given before the
signaller can route a train into the depot. Also note the description regarding
the utilisation of the layout.
Diagram also shows a POL which denotes that point 185B is included but
188A is excluded from an overlap (for train routed up to EH525 / 517 / 527)
which proves track 544T.
layout010 Leamington Spa link
Platforms feature TRS plunger, RA and OFF indicators.
The final portion of the Up Bay which is little utilised and hence gets rusty
approaching the buffer-stops features eucleptic strip welded on to the rail
surface to ensure reliable train shunt.
Note this is actually a Location Area Plan so shows what equipments is fed
from what apparatus case and denotes the feed and relay ends of the track
circuits etc.
layout 011 Reading West Main Junction link
Layout depicts a variety of pointwork:
• scissors crossover (762 / 767),
• pair of fixed diamonds (between 750A and 750B),
• switch diamond (755B/C) associated with a single end 755A,
• three crossovers but numbered as single ends to maximise flank
opportunities (752 / 754 / 751 / 756 / 757),
• trap point (744B).
It also shows speed signage
layout 012 Reading West and access to Upper Triangle Depot link
Layout shows mixture of LED and conventional signals, the shunting signals
outside the DMU depot (note how any train on the Up Westbury line to enter
the depot at the west end must be signalled via 552, 535 and 537 signal since
points 735B only give access when routed via points 734 and not 733).
Layout also shows a note explaining the reduced overlap beyond DW37
signal, the limits of track circuit indications to adjacent Signalling Centres,
TPWS etc.
Some features are not to current standards (e.g. 541 signal as the main exit of
the depot would nowadays be provided as a main signal, 379 signal utilises
both position 2 and 5 PLJI which being opposite each other is a non-preferred
configuration although possibly unavoidable given the number of routes from
that signal

layout 013 Maynooth link

To ring the changes, a NTS scheme sketch for replacing semaphore signalling
with colour lights. If you think the shunt signals for example are a little
unusual, you are right; Eire is slightly different from the UK.
layout 014 Paddington link
Something else unusual- a small extract showing the gantry for the signals
controlling admission to London Paddington, when “fibre optic searchlights”
replaced the traditional signals.
layout 015 Barnwood link
Shows the interface of two freight facilities operated by local Ground Frames
on the approach to a converging junction. Note that one has a GPL (432)
within the shunting spur at which a train can be held clear of the entrance
whereas the other has only s short spur- see Appendix L description.
layout 015 Double Gloucester link
Shows a double junction with switch diamonds. Note positions of IRJs, the
signal profiles showing a variety of route indicators, the slot symbols for the
GPLs reading into yards to the extreme left of extract etc.
Dutch Signalling Plan link

A view of something slightly different; look for the similarities with the UK
an d the differences!
Dutch Aspect Sequence link
This is of course for a speed signalled railway. Note that the various different
sequence are presented as specific styles of dotted / dashed lines; the “aspect
sequence” on this sort of railway is of course aligned to the speed code
superimposed on the track circuits for the train protection system.
It is therefore relatively understandable, particularly when you know that R =
Red, GL=Yellow, GR= Green and FL written after a colour designates
flashing. The numbers reflect the display on a form of indicator rather like a
SARI which give the target speed in multiples of 10kph. Where the signal
spacing is such that there would be inadequate braking distance to comply
with that target speed before reaching the next signal, then an earlier warning
is needed. This is given by providing the previous signal with a speed
indicator which flashes as a preliminary warning of the forthcoming speed.

Appendix Y: Additional Resources

Introduction:
The student is encouraged not only to take full advantage of any training activities organised by
their employer but also take responsibility themselves for furthering their Continuing Personal
Development. Where possible this should include:
• attendance at technical talks and seminars arranged by the IRSE (or other bodies such as the
IET or RAE),
• participation in a Study Group with other students,
• in particular undertaking appropriate technical visits which offer the opportunity to see
something that would not otherwise be possible,
It is recognised that the extent to which this is possible will vary greatly, dependent upon the
student’s location and nature of their job, the level of support / flexibility available from their
employer and their financial and domestic circumstances.
Whereas such occasions generally represent the best way of learning, any such opportunity has to
be grasped as it becomes available and hence will inevitably be random rather than to a planned
programme. To complement such first hand experiences, the student should always be seeking out
written material from which they can learn in a more structured manner.
The role of this Appendix is to act as a pointer to some of the above, in order to give guidance to
the student who does not know where to start looking.
• It is obviously best to seek advice from someone in your workplace as they should be able to
make specific suggestions; they would know what sources were available locally, which are
pertinent to the environment in which you work and would be appropriate to your existing
knowledge and experience.
• Generic advice included here obviously cannot do this, but it is hoped that this Appendix, by
identifying likely sources and giving some information about them, will help the student
determine for themselves what they should seek to study.
Possible sources include items under the following categories:

5. published books (both general and specialised),
6. IRSE technical papers (as delivered at London meetings and certain others),
7. other IRSE publications (e.g. CD-ROMs of seminar technical papers etc.)
8. articles in “IRSE News”,
9. commercial magazines such as “Modern Railways”,
10. training course notes,
11. company standards and instructions,
12. signalling project documentation,
13. signalling records,
14. the internet.

Note however that this Appendix primarily considers items 1-4 in the above list; these tend both to
be the most generic and the most available. Conversely it is important to emphasise that, since the
candidate may elect to signal the layout in accordance with any railway’s practices, the documents
which record or demonstrate these need to be a prime source of learning material.
Generally candidates will find that they can access the relevant standards from their employer,
whether this is the railway concerned or a contractor performing work for that railway;
The documentation for a current or completed scheme will often serve as a worked example which
may be easier to comprehend than the railway’s functional specification or prescriptive standards
themselves;
There may well be other general or project specific documents at your workplace which may prove
invaluable;
This Appendix does make reference to the primary standards relevant for Signalling the Layout for
the UK mainline railway. These are divided between:
• the highest level principles, applicable to alterations performed under ROGS, are specified
within “Railway Safety Principles and Guidance” [#1],
• RGS which are more detailed standards defining interfaces (such as between track and train)
applicable to NR’s infrastructure are published by the RSSB [#2],
• NR’s own Company Standards [#3] are generally more prescriptively written- these
themselves are currently being reorganised into a series of levels.
Candidates from NR should therefore find these references are particularly helpful, but they may
also be useful to candidates from other backgrounds. Certain of the RGS are reasonably generic
and even where they are prescriptive or purely relate to a specific UK issue which renders them
inappropriate elsewhere, they should still serve to illustrate the level of document that the student
should seek to obtain and then study. Further it is recognised that some students may be from a
branch of signal engineering such as equipment development without ready access to any
particular railway’s application standards and therefore may find it easiest to adopt the practices of
NR for the purposes of the examination.
When studying, it is important to concentrate on obtaining a good overview and really

understand how everything interrelates, rather than concentrating on memorising masses of detail
which is actually not so significant as the overall picture. Gaining a good overall familiarity with
the relevant Rule Book and the key Signalling Principles is essential; remembering lots of numbers
to quote is not.

Resources: General
The remainder of this section considers the more general sources of information that may also
prove useful. The usefulness of each source to each student obviously depends upon which
railway’s practices they intend to adopt and their level of existing knowledge. There is some
degree of overlap between the various sources but each of those listed has some unique content
that would be directly or indirectly useful to an exam candidate. It is not suggested that students
need read the whole of every reference; the descriptions given are intended to assist an individual
decide whether they are likely to find any particular source useful to them in their circumstances.
It is hard otherwise to prioritise the reading list since there is such a wide range of experience and
background amongst those attempting the exam; a book that contains absolutely essential
information for one student may be far too basic and contain nothing new for someone with more
relevant experience.
However the sources have been marked with a “star rating” to give some indication of the order in
which an average candidate (UK based with around 4 years of railway experience) might find it
helpful to consider. The judgement has partly been made on the basis of “value obtained for the
cost of study”; this evaluation has been based primarily on the study time (of selected sections
where applicable) but also taking into account to a lesser extent the purchase price / expected
difficulty in obtaining the source.
rating description
*** Essential foundation information.
If not already familiar, these sources should be read at an early stage
within the studying, preferably before commencing the study of sections 6
and 7 of this Study Pack.
Assuming a study period from January to September, then these sources
should be read in the first couple of months.
** Core recommended reading for basic knowledge /understanding.
Probably best read in conjunction with studying 6 and 7 and as reference
when working through past papers.
Aim to read these in the period up to June.
* Reading for the enhanced knowledge /understanding necessary to perform
well in the examination. In general this material assumes a high level of
general understanding and therefore it is most appropriate to read once the
basics are secure. They should serve to consolidate what is learnt and
allow the student to relate the various elements together, as well as
“putting some icing on the cake”.
Make this your reading during July and August; most can be printed on
only a few sheets of paper so ideal to take with you on your holidays to
read when at the airport etc.

UK RAILWAY STANDARDS
The documents listed in this section all apply to UK Mainline Rail but candidates from other
backgrounds may also find these useful. The NR internal company standards are internal
documents and therefore cannot be included in this Study Pack for copyright reasons; they are
however made available by NR by those companies working on their infrastructure so many
students may be able to obtain them via their employer. The documents listed in #1 and #2 are
however freely available for download by anyone with internet access; the relevant links are
included below.
Candidates intending to Signal the Layout to the practices of any other railway are recommended to
obtain the equivalent information which applies to that environment.
#1 “Railway Safety Principles and Guidance”; part D

http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/rspg-2d-signlng.pdf. **
Contains high level requirements many of which can be traced back to the 1889 Regulation of
Railways Act or even before. Although technically “guidance”, for all normal situations these have
the status of quasi law and in the UK one would need to be very certain of one’s ground to do
anything which conflicted with them.
A large percentage would also hold true for any railway; however there are differences in the level
of safety regarded as appropriate and also the means of ensuring that safety (taking the railway
system as a whole) which can lead to individual differences of significance:
• For example the UK has always held a particular view relating to point stretcher bars and
the undesirability of trailable points in the running line that is not shared everywhere.
• Similarly the UK has historically always considered it important to inform the driver clearly
of the set route and then depend upon their route knowledge to control the train to best effect; in
other cultures it is felt more important to be prescriptive of the speed of the train.

#2 UK Railway Group Standards as a Study Resource

Background
With the privatisation of British Rail in 1995, a means had to be found for former BR standards that
henceforth would apply to more than one party in the fragmented railway, to be maintained and
promulgated. After some evolution, the result is the catalogue of RGS published on behalf of the
industry by the cross-industry RSSB. The set of standards includes the UK main line railway Rule
Book, as well as technical standards and guidance notes on various disciplines, including CCS.
Train operators and infrastructure managers generally undertake to make adherence to these
standards mandatory, as part of their Safety Cases to operate the railway.
For those studying for the IRSE Exam, whether in the UK or overseas, the set of RGS can form a
useful learning resource, especially as they are freely available to download via the internet from the
RSSB website www.rssb.co.uk . This section of the Module 2 Exam Resource Pack attempts to
provide some guidance to the use of RGS in this way.
General Guidance
Students must keep in mind at all times that these standards describe the situation on the UK
mainline railway; some significant differences in philosophy and practice will inevitably exist for
other railway authorities. In fact, it may be an instructive exercise to compare the RGS with
equivalent standards on other railways, as this can aid understanding of the issues involved.
The scope of the RGS is intentionally limited, to minimise the constraints imposed on individual
railway organisations. They are intended to define the responsibilities of train operators and
infrastructure owners for safe interworking. This means that, in the case of a procedural
requirement (e.g. fault reporting), the detailed process is not defined, but only the top-level
requirements (i.e. the “what”, not the “how”). Similarly, the requirements are technology-
independent (although alternative rules may be provided for different technologies, such as rules
applying to train detection with track circuits or axle counters). In the case of a technical interface
between trains and track, however, fully prescriptive (and therefore more detailed) requirements are
provided or referenced.
As an example, the Rule Book provides the formal definition of the meaning of each signal aspect
to drivers. To support this definition, the RGS prescriptively define and quantify various design and
functional requirements, including:
• The rules for the positioning, spacing and sighting of signals
• The requirements to be implemented by the interlocking before clearing a signal, in terms
of route locking, detection of points, etc.
• The permitted signal aspects, and aspect sequences
• The minimum braking requirements for trains, to ensure stopping within signal sections.
Similarly track-to-train communication systems, whether for Train Protection or Voice
Communication, are generally prescriptively defined.
The structure and wording of RGS do vary slightly, according to their age (e.g. in older standards,
the “Railtrack” rather than Network Rail was specified as the infrastructure). However Section A
defines the formal responsibilities of each party in the UK railway industry for compliance with the
standard whilst Section B (and sometimes a Section C) contain the meat of the technical
requirements, supplemented by more detailed Appendices as appropriate. Each standard cross-
references others, and using these can be a useful way of navigating around the documents.
The on-line Catalogue entry for each RGS also identifies any non-compliances that have been
granted against it, including those agreed “applications for standards change” which will be
incorporated in the next up issue. These can be helpful (although mainly to NR students) to indicate
where compliance is sometimes difficult and show what arguments may be appropriate to relax
standards in particular instances. Understanding such real world problems can help a candidate’s in
the Module 2 exam, to have the confidence to propose a reasonable solution when they come across a
seemingly intractable problem when signalling the given layout.

Railway Group Standards www.rgsonline.co.uk

The following table gives some guidance on the content and likely usefulness to students of the
RGS referenced elsewhere in this resource pack.
The commentaries given below may help to guide students towards the most relevant sections and
to understand where requirements are UK-specific.
GK/RT0007 Alterations to Permissible Speeds
Not relevant to module 2 study
GK/RT 0009 Identification of Signalling and Related Equipment
UK-specific, but quite high-level, defining the principles rather than details of
numbering and identification of equipment.
The principles are generally applicable to the numbering of signalling
equipment forming part of the task of signalling the layout.
GK/RT 0011 Train Detection
Useful general principles concerning fouling points, clearance points, and the
application of train detection systems to determine safely that track sections are
free of trains.
GK/RT 0025 Signalling Control Centres
GK/GN0525
Useful overview but not strictly relevant to module 2 study, however the
Appendices of the Guidance Note have tables that relate the symbols shown on
the Signalling Plan to the symbols used at a mechanical signalbox, panel or
signaller’s VDU together with a short note of the terminology and occasionally
a remark re its application.
Obviously the information is NR specific and is not directly related to the task
of signalling the layout; however students of all backgrounds would probably
find that an overview of the extensive document would repay study by
increasing their comprehension.
GK/RT 0027 Resetting and Restoration to Service of Signalling Systems
A brief standard worth reading to give an overview; although written for NR
environment many of the underlying issues are the same. It is particularly
important to understand the distinction between resetting and restoration when
relating to axle counters, which is further detailed in GK/RC0527; any
signalling plan using this technology should provide sufficient notes so that the
examiner can tell the candidate is aware of the issue.
GK/RT 0029 Train Activated Warning Systems
This standard is relevant to Signalling the Layout yet in an IRSE exam context,
it is of less importance. Note that Appendix A relating to barrow crossings has
since been superseded by GI/RT7012.
GK/RT 0030 Signalling Lockout Systems for the Protection of Personnel On or Near
the Line
Similarly lockouts are unlikely to feature strongly within the IRSE exam and
thus although this standard is relevant, it would not be a priority for detailed
study but some general awareness is advisable. Note also that NR’s current
policy no longer follows the non-mandatory Appendix A & B in detail.

These following pair of standards define the technical requirements that underlie the explanations of the
meaning of signals and indicators given in the Rule Book.
The detail is UK-specific, but the types of information defined for signals are generally applicable, and
gaining a clear understanding of these will benefit all candidates.
GK/RT 0031 Lineside Signals and Indicators
This contains prescriptive requirements intended to ensure the uniform appearance
of signal indications to drivers, and also to define performance standards to ensure
adequate readability of signals and indicators.
GK/RT 0032 Provision of Lineside Signals
This contains the technical rules for positioning signals on the layout, and the
permissible aspect sequences that can be displayed. The contents of this standard
are crucial for UK main line candidates for Module 2. Other candidates can benefit
from understanding what has to be defined, and why, but should also refer to the
equivalent local standards for detailed information.
• Section B5 contains rules for positioning stop signals.
• Section B6 contains constraints that may prevent signals being located in
certain places on the railway.
• Sections B8 and B9 define permissible aspect sequences.
• Sections B10 and B11 extend the definitions to cover junctions and bi-
directionally signalled lines.
• Section B12 defines requirements for signal identification and numbering.
NB It is recommended that NR/L2/SIG/19609 is also consulted since current
practice re junction signalling does differ in a few significant details from that
recorded in the most recent published version of GK/RT0032.
former 0033 See GI/RT7033

GK/RT 0034 Lineside Signal Spacing

Section B5 references other RGS covering the definition of minimum braking
performance for trains. Students may find it helpful to try to understand how these
rolling stock standards relate to the braking distances used in GK/RT0034.
Section B6 makes clear that minimum signal spacing on NR is determined by
means of predefined empirical curves, given in the Appendices. There are different
sets of curves for different categories of rolling stock, each set gives the minimum
signal spacing at different gradients and different maximum speeds. Where several
categories of rolling stock use a route, signal spacing must be adequate for all types
of train. In some instances, this leads to the need for differential speed limits, to
restrict the speed of trains with less good braking.
NB The IRSE Exam requires that students understand how such braking curves are
derived, by calculating braking distance from first principles. Students should try
doing such calculations, and observe how the results differ from those given in the
Appendices to GK/RT0034 and attempt to explain the differences.
Section B7 defines other design constraints on signal spacing intended to provide
drivers with regular updates of movement authority, by maintaining reasonable
limits on the spacing of signals in multi-aspect territory. This is not possible in all
cases; for example there can be considerable distances between block signals where
headway requirements are not onerous so separate distant signals are used to warn
drivers of their approach to the end of the block section. Similarly stations where
the signalling permits fast through running inevitably means that the stopping trains
will have considerable over-braking, due to their lower speed compared to the fast
trains for which the signal spacing must be arranged. The number of derogations
that exist against GK/RT0034 indicate the difficulty of achieving perfection in this
respect.
Much of the detail within this standard purely applies to NR; however at a higher
level all railways face similar issues.
GK/RT 0036 Transition between Lineside Signalling and Other Systems of Train Control
It is unlikely that a candidate’s layout would feature such a transition and thus most
students could decided not to study this standard with fair confidence. Be aware
though that it does not just apply to the transition to ERTMS but also to RETB, and
in addition to other infrastructure managers such as LUL whether or not the
transition is to “in-cab” signalling or to another administration’s lineside signalling.
GE/RT 0037 Signal Positioning and Visibility
GE/GN 8537 This covers the requirements for positioning of signals, and the requirements to
ensure readability of signals by drivers (minimum reading times, uninterrupted
view, etc.). It also includes procedural requirements for the carrying out of formal
signal sighting work, and for the involvement of different parties in that task.
The issues that affect signal visibility are quite generic, although the procedural
aspects are more UK-mainline specific.
GK/RT 0038 Signing of Permissible Speeds and Speed Restrictions
The details of this subject are NR-specific, although the underlying considerations
may have more general applicability

GK/RT 0039 Semaphore and Mechanical Signalling

Although not core to module 2, some understanding of the fundamental
differences between such signalling and colour light MAS is important and
would be useful within the exam if there were a need to interface between them.
Students from non NR backgrounds should similarly be aware of the equivalent
in their environment.
GK/RT 0041 Track Circuit Block
GK/RT0041 describes the equipment requirements and operational principles of
the most common form of operation for UK railway lines. It supplements
requirements given in GK/RT0060 Interlocking Principles, for lines where TCB
is used.
Most of the underlying principles are quite generic, and could be found on any
railways overseas. The detail of equipment provision (Signal Post Telephones,
etc.) may be more specific to the UK application.
GK/RT 0042 Absolute Block
GK/RT0042 describes the equipment requirements and operational principles of
Absolute Block signalling, which is still widely used on many lines with a
succession of mechanical signal boxes linked by block bells and block
instruments, and where continuous train detection is not provided. Safety is
ensured by a combination of the functionality of the equipment provided at each
signal box, the block instrument controls between signal boxes, and strict
operational procedures for signallers. Similar systems may be encountered
outside the UK, but the detailed requirements are probably quite UK-specific.
Similar comments as for GK/RT 0039 and indeed these two standards often
apply together; however do not make the mistake that the terms are
interchangeable- some absolute block utilises colour light signals for example!
GK/RT 0044 Controls for Signalling a Train onto an Occupied Line
The details of GK/RT 0044 are NR specific and indeed are generally only
actually fully implemented in recent signalling schemes; the restrictions imposed
upon permissive passenger working at stations in particular have been
significantly tightened up in recent years following pressure from the regulatory
safety authority. The NR candidate is however strongly advised to familiarise
themselves with this standard since many of its requirements due directly impact
on the task of Signalling the Layout.
SSP50 Remote Control Standby arrangements
The last remaining BR Standard Signalling Principle which has yet to become
renumbered, probably because in today’s environment full duplicate remote
controls are provided rather than a restricted facility “override” arrangement that
was appropriate when electronics was rare and very expensive.

GK/RT 0051 Single Line Control

NR specific standard to define the signalling requirements for the control of
traffic on single and equivalent bi-directional lines but explicitly excluding the
detail for TCB and RETB which have other standards dedicated to them.
It includes a useful tabulation of the key features of each possible system:
TCB, Interlocked AB, Tokenless Block, RETB, NST, NST(R), ETS, OTW-NS.
The standard includes definition of relevant terms and gives more details
concerning the principles of operation and application detail (but not the
technical implementation) of the various methods. It continues by considering
the implications for permissive and shunt working, switching out of intermediate
signalboxes and the operation of mid-section Ground Frames and level
crossings.
GK/RT 0054 Radio Electronic Token Block
GK/RT0054 describes the equipment requirements and operational procedures
for RETB, which is a radio-based form of signalling used on several rural lines
in the UK. As the RGS is quite old, it does not give all the prescriptive technical
details for the track-train interface, but these are referenced in a separate
specification (BR1654). Similarly it does not reflect the later implementation of
TPWS on such lines.
This standard is UK-specific
GK/RT 0060 Interlocking Principles
GK/RT0060 defines the top-level functional requirements of interlockings,
excluding some peripheral functionality concerned with particular types of train
detection (Track Circuit or Axle Counter), particular methods of train working
(TCB or AB), etc.
As such the requirements stated are intended to achieve functions that are quite
generic and thus broadly applicable to all railways (e.g. point-to-point locking,
route locking, signal controls, etc.). However, experience shows that there is
more than one way to achieve the functionality within an interlocking,
particularly when conceptual objects such as routes, sub-routes and overlaps are
concerned; the “UK requirements” describe just one of these. Indeed in recent
times difficulties have been experienced when attempting to implement this
functionality in various forms of electronic interlockings and therefore some
sites actually implement the high level requirements slightly differently.
This standard is highly applicable for Module 3 Control Tables but much less so
for Module 2; however some understanding is useful as understanding the
interlocking that will be applied to the layout informs various decisions such as
the pairing of point ends, placing of track section boundaries etc.
GK/RT 0061 Shunter’s Releases, Ground Frame, Switch Panels and Gate Boxes
Certainly worth reading for background knowledge, but gives little information
directly relating to the task of signalling the layout for NR.
Other railways use a variety of methods for controlling such points; students
from other backgrounds should be familiar with those used on their railway.
GK/RT 0063 Approach Locking and TORR
Similar comments apply as for GK/RT0060.
The generic principles would be applicable to any railway but the detail included
is specific to NR.

GK/RT 0064 Provision of Overlaps, Flank Protection and Trapping

Understanding the content of this standard is important for the task of signalling
the layout to NR standards.
The generic principles would be applicable to any railway but the detail included
is specific to NR and thus candidates from other environments should study their
railway’s policy and standards.
GK/RT 0091 Driver’s Reminder Appliance
This relates to an element of the most basic “in-cab” signalling; hence not
applicable to the module 2 student.

GE/RT8071 Control Facilities for use during Lineside Signalling Failures

GE/GN8571
Guidance on Control Facilities for use during Lineside Signalling Failures
Part 3 discusses the “secondary hazards” that can result from what initially
appears to be a safe failure. It introduces the POSA and explains how it relates
to degraded mode facilities in France and Germany. Part 4 gives detail of the
form of the displayed aspect, the interlocking controls appropriate etc.
Parts 5 & 6 give details of the emergency route release and emergency point
release facilities with additional information given in the relevant Appendices.
GK/RT 0217 Technical Requirements for Axle Counters
GE/RT 8217 Introduction and Use of Axle Counters- Managing the Risk
These documents provide information relevant to a form of train detection
which has become increasingly significant on NR in recent years. Older
documents tend therefore to assume the utilisation of track circuits and thus the
information contained here serves to complete the picture. Note that various
means of reset/restore following failure are utilised; this partially depends on a
specific railway’s environment and risk profile and can also change over time
as experience grows and technology evolves.
GK/GN 0801 Using RGS to Support Signal Engineering Safety Cases.
Guidance on Using RGS to Support Signal Engineering Safety Cases.
The role of this document is to assist a project to demonstrate safety by
identification of hazards and ensuring that appropriate mitigations are in place.
For the student Appendix A1 is the most useful part as it acts as an index to
RGS that contain mitigations which address various hazards.
GK/GN 0802 Glossary of Signalling Terms
A handy reference to the precise meaning of many of the “jargon” words
encountered; whilst some are certainly specific to UK Mainline, many are used
in a wider context. Note that most RGS define a few additional specific terms
so this not a complete listing but it is reasonably comprehensive.
GI/RT 7004 Requirements for the Design, Operation and Maintenance of Points
This standard is primarily concerned with the trackside and thus mainly
relevant to module 5 but some of the requirements are relevant to Signalling
the Layout and thus also to modules 2 & 3.
GI/RT 7006 Prevention and Mitigation of Overruns- Risk Assessment
GI/GN7606
Guidance Note: Prevention and Mitigation of Overruns- Risk Assessment
The RGS describes a complex UK-specific process for assessing the risk
associated with a particular track layout. However the majority of the factors
considered in the assessment are generic and thus applicable to any railway;
the specific requirements for mitigation methods are UK-specific. The issue is
of particular significance where the signalling does not incorporates a high
standard of train protection.
Pertinent study for all to gain an understanding of layout risk and how the risk
resulting from a SPAD can be reduced by junction design and the placing of
signals etc.

GI/RT 7011 Provision, Risk Assessment and Review of Level Crossings

GI/GN 7611
Guidance on Provision, Risk Assessment and Review of Level Crossings
GI/RT 7012 Requirements for Level Crossings
GN/GN/7612 Miscellaneous Guidance on Level Crossings
Details are specific to NR environment but the overall approach would have
parallels on other railways where level crossing risk is a significant
consideration.
GI/RT7033 Lineside Operational Safety Signs
This standard contains details of the various current lineside signs used on the
NR network with their meanings. Coloured diagrams with dimensions are
included. See also Appendix Y (Internet)
Although not all are directly relevant to depiction Signalling Plans, the
majority are; a student of UK Mainline ought to be familiar with all the signs
shown. Students from other railways should consider each sign to determine
whether it has a direct equivalent or is not required in their environment for
some reason; they should also consider the signs utilised on their railways for
which there does not seem to be an equivalent here.
GE/RT 8012 Controlling the Speed of Tilting Trains Through Curves
GE/RT 8019 Tilting Trains: Controlling Tilt Systems to Maintain Clearances
Although a consideration on a small proportion of NR Signalling Plans and
implemented via balise, this is of minority interest and unlikely to be relevant
to the module 2 examination.
GE/RT 8021 Facilities for Emergency Voice Communications with Control Rooms
GE/RT 8048 Positioning and Labelling of Lineside Telephones
The production of a Signalling Plan should include consideration of degraded
modes of railway operation and communications can form a significant part, so
whereas the details may not be relevant study of these documents should
ensure that the issue is not forgotten.
GE/RT 8026 Safety Requirements for Cab Signalling Systems
GE/GN 8526 Guidance on Safety Requirements for Cab Signalling Systems
Considers safety requirements, modes of operation, authorisation and
protection of train movements, control of overrun and excessive speed, various
interfaces including the DMI and system management. Applicable to ERTMS
but also other forms of cab-signalling

These following three standards define the characteristics of various forms of train protection
used on lines in the UK. They take the form of requirements specifications, defining the
interface requirements of the track and train subsystems. The sections of particular relevance for
the module 2 examination have been identified below.
All these requirements are UK-specific (although the same technologies may have been applied
overseas, e.g. in Australia). Although the examination does not call for detailed design of train
protection, general notes relating to the level of provision is certainly required. An
understanding of these standards is therefore required by candidates signalling the layout for an
environment where such technology is utilised.
GE/RT 8018 Mechanical Train-stop Systems
There are few NR lines where such train-stops are utilised; whilst students
ought to have an appreciation of what trainstops are, detailed knowledge of
how to apply them is not be essential for most candidates.
GE/RT 8030 Requirements for TPWS
Section C2.1 defines where TPWS should be provided, and Section C3 defines
the requirements of the track subsystem for different track configurations.
GK/RT 8035 AWS
Sections B6, B7 and B8 define where AWS track equipment should be
provided, what configuration of equipment must be provided, and how it must
be controlled in order to provide the information the train driver expects
according to the Rule Book.

GE/RT 8000 Rule Book

The Rule Book consists of various Modules issued to staff according to their
responsibilities; generally it is those sections that apply to signallers and
drivers which are most relevant to students studying for IRSE Module 2
examination.
It is important to understand that the provision and layout of signals and
lineside signs is the interface to the train drivers. In order to drive a train
safely and to the scheduled timetable, they need to interpret the signalling in
accordance with the Rule Book’s formal generic definitions and of the correct
course of action to take in particular circumstances. In the UK, at least the
generic rules are supplemented by the Sectional Appendix relevant to the
particular line; this give the particular signalling arrangements on the route
(speeds, types of signalling, particular hazards, etc.).
The most relevant Modules (each of which contain several subsections that
need to be separately downloaded) are:
• Module S: Signals (meaning, observation etc)
• Module TW: Train Working (preparation and movement etc)
• Module SS: Station Working and Shunting
• Module SP: Permissible Speeds and Speed Restrictions
• Module TS: Track Signalling (incl. AB and TCB Regulations)
The detail in these sections is of course UK-specific, although every railway
will have something equivalent. Students from non NR environments should
seek the equivalent information pertinent to their railways, but may still find at
a high level that the information here is of some use at understanding how
signalling technology needs to relate to the operational use made of it. In
addition study of the similarities and differences can be revealing.
Other sections of the Rule Book may also be of more general background
interest, to improve understanding of how the railway actually works – what
sort of things must be defined to drivers and signallers, what do all staff rely on
from the signalling system, and what sorts of tasks depend on staff following
rules and procedures. At this level, the UK Rule Book is a guide to all
students, from the UK or overseas.
GO/RC3055 Train Working
Although high level, this gives some insight to the roles of operational staff,
primarily by specifying the competencies required to perform various
activities. Details of the boundaries between specific roles do vary between
railways, but much would be common.
GO/RC3571 Driver Only Operation of Passenger Trains
This, and other standards cross referenced from it, consider the requirements
for this mode of operation to be adopted. Some of these impact upon
signalling design, provision of train radio etc. and thus reading will improve a
students understanding of a railway as a system.
GO/RT3475 Operational Requirements for the Dispatching of Trains from Platforms
GO/GN3575 Guidance Note: Dispatching Trains from Platforms
GE/RT8060 Technical Requirements for the Dispatching of Trains from Platforms
Defines what constitutes a platform starting signal and describes the different
responsibilities for the various possible methodologies adopted at places
around the network. The technical requirements consider many facets, of
which signalling is a relatively minor part.
Certainly valuable information as it relates to the technical facilities that are
required to support each method of operation at significant stations.

GO/RC3900 Recommendations for Safe Freight Train Operation

This, and other standards cross referenced from it, consider the whole process,
most of which is not directly related to signalling. However it is useful domain
knowledge and can certainly help the student comprehend some of the
considerations which influence the design of terminal arrangements etc.
GO/RM3053 Working manual for Rail Staff: Handling and Carriage of Dangerous
suite Goods
A skim read recommended; far more detail than needed but does cast useful
light on the wider management of risk within the railway and contains a useful
glossary.
GO/RM3056 Working Manual: Freight Train Operations
Similarly contains more general details re freight operations- the sections re the
classification of trains, marshalling and composition and treatment of defective
vehicles all impact to some degree on the signalling that needs to be provided,
so a general knowledge helps the student understand the context.
GO/RT 3251 Train Driving
Primarily concerned with the standards applicable to competence management:
the selection, training, monitoring of drivers and therefore of less direct
relevance to Module 2 study than its title may suggest.
GO/RT 3252 Signals Passed At Danger
Standard considers the risk of SPADs and the requirements for investigation
after one has occurred. Much of the document are the forms to be completed
immediately an incident has occurred and are of limited interest to the module
2 student, but Appendix 7 is one page that it is well worth reading as many of
the error categories can be directly influenced by the manner in which the
Signalling the Layout has been performed.
ATOC/GNO7 Defensive Driving Techniques
Available from a different page on RSSB website, this gives guidance to Train
Operating Companies re the contents of defensive driving policy statements.
As such it gives useful insight of how drivers are expected to react upon
sighting a cautionary aspect etc.
Note there are many more RGS worth consulting for specific information, for example:
• GK/RT0217;
• GM/RT2401 - 4;
• GK/GN 0806,
• GE/RT 8071,
• GE/RT 8034

#3 Network Rail Company Standards

available to NR staff and to their contractors via a restricted website and in paper form.
There are many standards and only the most relevant for Module 2 are listed below:
NR/GN/SIG/0028 General Guidelines on Train Protection and the Provision of
Signalling.
This specifies the requirements of RTP.
NR/L2/SIG/30009 Signalling Principles and Application Handbook.
This has recently been published and as yet contains little content but it is
anticipated that information will gradually be transferred here so that it
will eventually constitute a compendium of “how to do signalling”.
NR/L2/SIG/19609 Requirements for Colour light Junction Signalling
NR recently published standard on Junction Signalling which differs from
the RGS (especially GK/RT0032) and previous practice in some respects,
particularly which form of route indication to use and the selection of the
form of approach release in various scenarios. Where applicable this
Study Pack accords with this document but almost all other sources of
information that the student may find pre-date it.
RT/E/S/10097 Interlocking Rules Requirements- User Case Descriptions
Gives a Requirements Specification for NR Interlocking giving
traceability, generally from RGS and the functionality is illustrated by
many sequence of diagrams. It was however produced for a particular
application that was never implemented and is therefore slightly
idiosyncratic; it hasn’t been updated to recent changes but overall it is
however generally sound.
The majority would be more useful to the module 3 rather than the module
2 student, but can be a useful reference on some of the topics discussed.
NR/PS/SIG/2001 Requirements for Power Point Operating Equipment
This document primarily specifies the functional, environmental, interface
and RAMS requirements for POE and thus concentrates on the trackside.
From a module 2 perspective it is primarily of value for its definitions and
descriptions.
NR/L2/SIG/11704 Signalling Requirements for the Application Design & Management of
Points
This document (which replaces GI/RT7004) gives some initial definitions,
then:
• defines the identification of points,
• defines the Normal lie,
• states the requirements for worked points, train operated points,
criteria for unworked points,
• scopes the necessity for FPL provision, detection settings and free
wheel clearance
• lays down provision of facilities for the manual operation of
power worked points
• demands the detection of uncommissioned points laid into the
running line during enabling works or retained post
commissioning pending full recovery.

NR/GN/SIG/11900 Application Manual for Axle Counters

NR/GN/SIG/11901 Design Requirements for Axle Counters
These documents together give information regarding axle counter train
detection to supplement the information relating to track circuits generally
assumed in other documents.
NR/SP/SIG/10157 Signal Sighting
Specifies the implementation of the considerations within GE/RT 0037.
From a module 2 perspective, the important content relates to the
positioning of signals.
link The Purpose of Signalling, Functionality & Systems
Although it is not (yet) a formal NR standard, this is an introductory
section originally intended for a proposed Signal Engineering Handbook.
It is contained separately on the Study DVD and gives an overview with a
historical perspective of the NR signalling tradition. It is worth
remembering that the author, Charles Weightman, is an examiner for
Module 3 and generally designs the base plan for Module 2.

RT/E/C/11600 Signalling and Operational Telecommunications Design:

Technical Guidance
A very large book of much useful stuff, although it can be difficult to find
what you are looking for. Of particular use to the module 2 student are:
• clearance point / fouling point,
• track circuit constraints,
• trap points,
• information on interlocking controls and approach release times,
• level crossings.
You’ll learn a lot just by starting from the beginning and reading the bits
which catch your eye, but be prepared to devote significant time to the
activity.
Section 3 in Appendix F is overall probably the most valuable but even
that portion isn’t particularly short and is concentrated with material.
RT/E/C/11004 Symbols for Plans and Sketches Used in Signalling Applications
link The symbols in Appendix A (A1-A7) are those which the examiners
would generally expect for a layout signalled to NR Principles; they aren’t
actually the very most recent (e.g. LED signals) but still represent a good
set to use. Don’t worry; there are far more here than you are likely to use!
Appendices B and C are symbols for other forms of plans; it is however
worth being aware that certain symbols seen on old Signalling Plan may
now be obsolete but are recorded in Appendix D.
SSI 8003 -xxx SSI Data Preparation Handbook.
This series of instructions can be quite useful more generally as the
various sections often contain an introductory text description of the
principles to be implemented. Some of these are useful for understanding
required for signalling the layout in an NR context and thus there are
sections of the documents which are useful for the module 2 student. The
documents covering the most appropriate subject areas are:
61 TISP and TORR
62 Automatic and distant signals
63 Route class selection and overlap releasing
64 Ground Frames and Shunters’ Releases
65 Swinging Overlaps
66 Restoration of Points,
67 Searchlight Signals and Banner Repeater Signals
68 Preset Shunts
69 Junction Signalling (not to latest standard!)
74 Lockout Devices
75 Track Circuit Interrupters and Wide-to-Gauge Traps
76 AWS and SPAD Indicators
77 Bi-directional Signalling with Auto Signals
80 One Train Working without Staff
81 TPWS
82 Sequential Proving of Track Circuits
83 Permissive Controls
100 et seq. Level Crossings

PUBLISHED BOOKS
These are all books that have been published and were generally available through normal book
suppliers but may not all currently be in print. However even in these cases it is often possible to
obtain a copy to borrow from contacts within the industry or may be purchased from specialist
dealers specialising in out of print books (for example try http://www.nigelbirdbooks.co.uk or even
websites such as Ebay).
Certain reference libraries may also have copies which can be consulted, for example:
• NRM York (no prior arrangement necessarily needed),
• British Library
(need to register for a reader pass – see http://www.bluk/services/reading/reading.html),
• the student may have access to other facilities via university, The IET etc.
Several of these books are published by the IRSE and obtainable directly which is likely to be
quicker than ordering via a retailer; see ordering details in next section.
#4 “Introduction to Railway Signalling”

ISBN 0-7136-2067-6 available from the IRSE ***
This 1999 publication provides a general grounding over a range of subject areas, and thus a
good starting place prior to serious study for the specific examination module. Be aware that it is
written very much focussing on UK Mainline practice; however it should still useful for
candidates from many backgrounds.
Indeed this book is probably the most useful of the IRSE text books for the exam student, partly
because it is one of the more modern and partly because it does keep to a high level description
rather than introduce a significant quantity of detail relevant to one specific technical solution.
Hence UK Mainline candidates in particular are advised to ensure that they are reasonably
familiar with the whole of this book and pay special attention to particular chapters of specific
relevance to Module 2. These are:
• Chapter 4 (Points)- especially pages 29-34,
• Chapter 5 (Lineside Signals),
• Chapter 12 (Level Crossings),
• Chapter 16 (Single Line Control).

#5 “Railway Signalling”
ISBN 0-7136- 2724-7, available from the IRSE **
This 1980 book edited by O.S. Nock has long been a reference work for those new to the
industry and generally goes into significant detail for specific parts of certain specific subjects.
Much of this detail is irrelevant for Module 2, but chapter 2 is highly relevant since it considers:
how to determine the appropriate form of MAS for specific situations, both for mainline and for
metros. This includes
• the calculation of braking distance and how it affects the constant speed headway which
can be achieved under 2, 3 and 4 aspect systems,
• the effect of trains stopping at an intermediate station. It illustrates how graphical
methods can be used to determine how soon a second train can follow the first without
its speed being affected by a restrictive aspect sequence.
• the importance of considering the positioning of signals with respect to the junctions
they protect. In particular the significance of including points within the overlaps is
explained.
• the subject of trapping and what can be achieved automatically by the numbering of
point ends. The characteristics of double running junctions and ladder junctions are
compared.
• the division of the layout into track sections; the relevant principles are stated and
examples of applying these to various layouts are given.
• the provision of subsidiary signals both to permit permissive movements into passenger
platforms and for undertaking shunting activities. The importance of ensuring that there
is sufficient standage within the layout and the options available where this is a
constraint is also included.
• the special considerations which apply at terminal stations. In particular the importance
of placing signals to optimise headway, train standage and the protection of junctions on
the approach to the station is stressed, speed limits being imposed as necessary to permit
the required signal spacing. The special controls to measure the length of an incoming
train to ensure that it would fit into an already partially occupied platform are also
explained.
• junction signalling and aspect sequence charts. There is a discussion of the requirement
for approach release and the role of flashing aspects.
It should be noted that this chapter has been written primarily from the viewpoint of British
mainline signalling practice of the late 1970s. The fundamental principles are generally
applicable to many signalling systems but even within the context of NR signalling, certain of
the specific information is now outdated.

#6 “Railway Control Systems”

ISBN 0-7126-3420-0, available from the IRSE **
This 1991 book edited by Maurice Leach has an opening chapter designed to update #5 to the
standards effectively applicable at the time of privatisation of British Rail. However its primary
purpose was to extend its coverage into further subject areas and from the perspective of a module
2 student the more useful sections are:
• Chapter 3: Single Line Signalling. Much of the detailed information here is of greater
relevance to other modules of the exam, but the initial summary explanation of the various
methods is very pertinent; single line branches are a regular feature of the exam papers.
• Chapter 6: Level Crossings again includes detailed circuits and their descriptions but it is
the general descriptions which are relevant to module 2.
• Chapter 10: Automatic Train Protection may also be useful, especially for its discussion
on the reduction of line capacity which can result from the use of an intermittent system,
and how the use of in-fill can reduce this effect.
#7 “European Railway Signalling” 1995
ISBN 0-7136-4167-3, available from the IRSE *
This IRSE text book contains a comparison of the practices of many different railway
administrations. Chapter 1: Railway Signalling Principles is the most relevant for module 2. In
particular:
• the various meanings of signal aspects is discussed with particular emphasis on the
various approaches of signalling junctions,
• comparison is made between speed and route signalling,
• the extent and the role of a signal’s overlap (both in the situations of having and not
having a full train protection system) is also covered.
The overview given does serve as an excellent general introduction to lineside railway signalling
and is certainly therefore relevant to the module 2 subject area. Since however its intended role is
to compare and contrast the various approaches adopted by different railways, it is best read by
someone already quite familiar with one particular example as otherwise the pure diversity could
be quite confusing.
By necessity the information about any one railway isn’t in sufficient detail by itself to provide the
relevant base knowledge for attempting the module 2 examination (since this is exclusively
focussed on discovering whether a candidate can apply one chosen set of principles to a particular
layout satisfactorily). This resource certainly does have value to the UK student attempting
Module 1 or the Module 3 written questions since it gives an appreciation of alternative practices
which can deepen understanding of a familiar situation by providing a contrast to it; however
considerably more detailed information would be needed to be able to prepare for Module 2
intending to signal the layout in accordance with the practices of one of these European railways.

#8 “Metro Railway Signalling”

ISBN 0-902390-14-7, available from the IRSE **
This is the fourth of the IRSE text books and it considers the role signalling and control systems
play within the operation of a rapid transit railway. Its overall approach is to view a Metro as a
complete system and thus it adopts a far wider definition of signalling than its predecessors. It
has less of the specific technical detail and therefore certain sections are almost as relevant to a
student studying Mainline railways as Metros.
• Headway and capacity issues are well covered and in particular Annex A has a clear
explanation of the distinction between Speed/ Distance and Time / Distance charts.
• The book also contains more up to date information than elsewhere regarding train
protection, including a short section on ERTMS.
#9 “Two Centuries of Railway Signalling” Geoffrey Kitchenside & Alan Williams
ISBN 0-86093-541-8 **
Much of the book is the history as implied by its title, there are also sections which are good
sources of up to date contents, especially:
• the particularly useful chapter on Single Lines (this gives good descriptions, diagrams
and photographs of the many past and present means of controlling such lines),
• the description of flashing aspects for junction signalling,
• the speed curves used for the TVM in the Channel Tunnel,
• the Appendix defining terms used within Signalling Terminology. `
This is a much expanded and slightly updated version of the earlier book
“British Railway Signalling” [4th edition: ISBN 0 7110 0898 1] which is obtainable cheaply
and being compact can be convenient when reading whilst travelling etc.
#10 Reference deleted- transferred to next section.
#11 abc: Railway Terminology

ISBN 0-7110-2266-6 **
This is far more than a list of definitions; it gives brief descriptions of various generic forms of
traction and rolling stock which includes information on traction control, bogies and suspension,
braking systems, electrification catenary systems permanent way as well as various signalling
elements including level crossings and single lines.
On the one hand there is probably little information which appears directly relevant to signalling
the layout; on the other hand there is a concise text supported by diagrams and pictures giving a
wealth of information the railway environment. How can one expect to understand how
signalling relates to the rest of the railway system without being familiar with this range of
subject at this outline level?

#12 abc: Railway Operations

ISBN 0-7110-2689-0 ***
A surprising amount of information is packed into this slim volume. Very little may seem
immediately applicable to the task of “Signalling the Layout”, yet the following chapters in
particular provide much of the background needed to being able to understand the context of the
task:
• Chapter 2: Principles of Operation
• Chapter 3: Track and Signalling
• Chapter 5: Passenger Train Operation
• Chapter 6: Freight Train Operation
• Chapter 7: Service Provision and Operational Planning
• Chapter 8: Executing the Operational Plan
#13 abc: BR Signalling Handbook abc: Modern Signalling Handbook
ISBN 0-7110-2052-3 ISBN 0-7110-2471-5 ***
Essentially these are two editions of the same book, published in 1992 and 1996 respectively.
The latter edition includes some extra material on Engineering Operations on the Line and
Channel Tunnel Signalling and is amended to certain Rule Book changes.
Either gives a good overview of signalling from the perspective of the railway operator; thus
focusing on what it does and why it needs to do so in relationship to the operational rules, rather
than becoming involved in the technicalities of the details of exactly how it works. Therefore it is
aligned to the type of understanding required for Module 2.
Being a small book it is necessarily brief but has a good range of pictures and diagrams. There is
a slight historical bias, but both editions do very much represent the current NR scene with the
exception of TPWS and the advent of the Robust Train Protection philosophy pertinent to layout
risk.
The sections on Single Lines and Level Crossings in particular express very succinctly the
essential elements of these subjects.
#14 Power Railway Signalling
Part 1A, Signalling Instruments: ISBN 1-899890-11-4, *
Part 1B, Automatic Signalling: ISBN 1 899890-07-6
Part 2, Power Frames and Power Resignallings: ISBN 1 899890-00-9
This is a reprint from a work first published in 1908 so therefore it has hardly surprising that the
world has moved on in one hundred years. Note in particular that “power” meant pneumatic or
electrical operation, but not colour light signalling.
Hence there is little of the content directly relevant to the Module 2, but do remember that there
are places where the equipment described is still in use. In particular an economic method of
operating a single line when an area is re-signalled can be to retain and interface to the existing
arrangements. Therefore the last few chapters of Part 1A might be a useful read to understand the
principles rather than worry about the details. It is also interesting to read the discussion in
Chapter XI in part 1B regarding the provision of automatic signals and especially their usual
aspect and what, if any, overlap should be provided.

#15 Dr. Murphy: Risk Assessment of Railway Junction Layouts

ISBN 0-9526234-0-4 **
Another book which may initially not seem immediately relevant to the exercise of “signalling the
layout”. However again it offers the opportunity for the student to understand the context of the
task which they are to perform:
• It considers the “time window” during which a SPAD could occur and endanger a
legitimate movement and sheds light upon the value of providing flank protection
• It compares and contrasts the relative safety performance of certain designs of track
layout including single lead junctions.
• It also looks at the contribution that timetabling can play in reducing risk by minimising
conflicts.
• There is a section that evaluates certain past collisions such as Bellgrove, Colwich,
Newton, Purley, Reading and Tretten; arguably there is more to be learnt from reading
this than the accident reports themselves.
#16 NRM History and Development of Railway Signalling in the British Isles
Volume 2, David Stirling: Telegraph / Absolute Block / Single Lines
ISBN 1-872826-13-X *
Part 2 of this volume is probably the definitive work on single line control (albeit with an
understandable emphasis on history) but this is probably a book to borrow rather than to buy.
It considers:
• the main systems of operating single lines,
• working by block without tokens,
• the Train Staff system,
• ETB, Electric Token Block,
• Electric Token Systems- Ancillary,
• Tokenless Block systems,
• RETB, Radio Electronic Token Block,
• Operating Rules and Practices
• Comparison of British and Foreign Practice
#17 Signalling Principles and Guidance Part 2E
ISBN 07-176095-29 but available as free download from the ORR website ***
http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/rspg-2e-levxngs.pdf
This is probably the most useful single source for Level Crossings, especially for Modules 2 & 3
where high level principles rather than implementation detail is required. Whilst many of the
legal requirements are not relevant for module 2, it includes diagrams of each crossing’s
appearance to the road user which are invaluable. It also helps understanding which form of
level crossing is applicable in a particular site circumstance. It is certainly recommended over
IRSE Booklet 25 which unfortunately is too out of date to be useful.

#18 R. Heine: Semaphore to CTC

ISBN 1-872826-13-X *
This book is a survey of signalling and train working in New Zealand 1863 -1993. Only the
second half of the book relates to “power signalling” and most of the content of course doesn’t
directly address the issue of “signalling the layout”. However the book does provide a significant
contrast to many of the other sources which tend to reflect UK mainline practice, signalling
practice in New Zealand seemingly being more directly derived from the USA.
Chapter 11 considers the speed signalling / route signalling argument and Chapter 13 gives details
of the Centralised Traffic Control system, which could be a suitable system for a long single line
with regular passing loops which sometimes does feature in the exam. For the majority of
students however the value of the book is the light it sheds on a signalling system which has some
elements in common, but many differences from, that in the UK.
#19 British Rail Handbook
ISBN 0-7110-1027-7 *
Compact book reflecting the UK mainline environment of the early 1980s and hence things have
changed since. However much of the current railway dates from this period and therefore most is
still relevant. There are chapters on Permanent Way, Diesel Traction, Electric Traction, Air
Brake, Passenger and Freight Rolling Stock, “125mph and above” as well as Signalling. A book
useful for imparting general railway knowledge which is certainly useful for understanding the
context of the task but nothing in here is directly helpful for Signalling the Layout.
#20 Engineering Safety Management
ISBN 978 0 9551435 2 6 (Issue 4) *
downloadable free from: http://www.yellowbook-rail.org.uk
This provides guidance on how to prepare an Engineering Safety Case.
Study of the “Yellow Book” is essential for modules 1 & 7 but not so for module2; the actual task
of Signalling Plan design can be performed without knowledge of it. However ESM considers
safety engineering through the life-cycle and the wise module 2 student ensures that they are
broadly familiar with its concepts; this enables the task to be seen within its relevant context and
comprehend how decisions taken at the concept design stage can influence the safety and
operability of the installation throughout its life.
#21 John Francis: An Entry in the Train Register
ISBN 978 0 9514636 1 1 ***
There are many books containing signalman’s reminiscences; these can be useful for obtaining a
better view of the operation of the railway but inevitably tend to be the railway in earlier times.
Do not discount them purely because of this; much remains valid and even those practices that
have largely or completely passed into history have still played their part in arriving at the railway
of today.
This particular book is unique in that the author has not only been (and still is in the heritage
sector) a signalman but also is a past-president of the IRSE; how could we recommend any other
book in the category?

#22 Tom Rolt: Red For Danger

ISBN 0-7509-2047-5 ***
This is a definitely good book. However it does not clearly relate to the task of
“Signalling the Layout” and it is now a long time ago when it was first written (1955);
hence there seems no logical reason for inclusion of the reading list. And yet ........
One of the prime difficulties that candidates for IRSE examinations (especially module 2)
have is that they don’t understand the railway. Despite being a story of death and
destruction this book is a pleasurable read; it narrates the events which lead up to
significant railway accidents in the UK up to the early 1970s. It is true that the railway as
described has almost completely passed into history, but human error has remained
remarkably constant. It is a distillation of well over a hundred years of lessons learnt the
hard way, presented as a story book for light reading; it is thus an excellent way of
“getting up to speed”. Newcomers to the industry often complain that what others call
“railway common sense” is in fact very difficult for them to acquire; this book is a good
way to start. It is also one of those books that you gain more from every time you re-
read; there are many other books covering more recent railway accidents but none that
match this classic which explains much of signalling evolution.
#23 Brian Solomon: Railroad Signalling
ISNN: 0-7603-1360-1 *
As might be guessed from the title, this is a book concentrating on North America..
Primarily an illustrated history it compares the primitive nature of signalling at the end of
the 19th century compared with that in the UK, but then how it rapidly developed with
pioneering colour light signalling and CTC whilst that in Britain changed less rapidly.
The topics covered include: telegraphs, manual block and automatic block, semaphore
and colour light speed signalling (searchlight and colour-position-light), mechanical,
electro-mechanical, electro-pneumatic, relay and electronic interlockings, signal
positioning, radio dispatching, Train Warrant Control, in-cab signalling, grade crossings.
Therefore a broad spectrum of information relevant to a different form of railway than is
familiar to most; obviously there is no great detail on any one subject but this makes it a
good general read to raise general awareness.

#24 IEE International Conference: Developments in Mass Transit Systems

M. Lockyear: Application of a Transmission Based Moving Block *
Automatic Train Control System on Docklands Railway
Paper describes the project to develop and commission the SELTRAC ATC system on
the DLR. The system uses centralised control and continuous transmission through
which speed and stopping point information is transmitted to the trains and obtains
position reports from the trains. The various factors that contribute to positional
uncertainty are discussed.
M. Kuwabara: Integrated Traffic Control and ATP System for the *
Waterfront Line, Tokyo
Paper describes the ATO control equipment on the wayside and in the cab for a rubber
tyre rapid transit system which operates completely automatically once trains are ready to
exit from the stabling depot.
M. Miyachi: The New ATC System using Digital Transmission for Super *
High Speed Operation on the Shinkansen Lines
The ATP system using continuous digital transmission through the rails which can cope
effectively with a mixture of trains with different braking performances is described. It is
compared with the original system where the block lengths have to be set to cope with the
worst performing trains and thus cause trains with superior characteristics to slow down
sooner than necessary.
C. Harai & N. Tomii: *
A Train Traffic Control Simulation with Passengers’ Flowing Model
A paper which considers the impact that train regulation and passenger control can have
on a metro railway’s congestion and energy efficiency. It is not directly associated with
the signalling of the layout but complementary and therefore helps to set the context of
the task being undertaken.
D Gill: The Impact of Moving Block on Heavy Metros *
Explains the philosophy of moving block and implementation with reaction envelope of
the ATO and the safety envelope of the high integrity ATP. The effect on line capacity,
mixed traffic operation, journey times, optimisation of coasting control, recovery from
operational disturbances, effects on peak power supply loading etc. are discussed.
#25 Managing Railway Operations and Maintenance: Best Practices from KCRC
ISBN 9 780952 999720 *
This University of Birmingham publication by various authors provides detailed
descriptions of railway best practice as developed by KCRC to meet the extreme demands
placed on the railways in Hong Kong, focussing on the reliable provision of high
capacity. The chapters of particular interest for the module 2 student are:
• 9: Timetabling an Intense Mixed Traffic Service
• 10. Managing a Heavy Capacity Light Rail System
• 12. From 4 aspect signalling to Automatic Train Operation
• 13. Communication Based Signalling
Many of the remaining sections of the book would be useful material for other IRSE
exam papers, especially modules 1 and 7.
IRSE TECHNICAL PAPERS etc

These specialist publications are primarily for the railway signalling community and therefore not generally
available in the public domain. They fall into several categories:
• small “green booklets” produced by the IRSE to assist those studying for the examination in the
1960s and 1970s; these have since been reprinted but not updated.
• technical papers published in the Annual Proceedings (primarily but not exclusively delivered at
the monthly London meetings)
• technical papers delivered at the Aspect Conferences (generally held every 4 years) or other
special subject Seminars, or in conjunction with Annual Convention or other visit.
The technical papers selected as relevant are listed below in approximate chronological order from 1977
(older information is regarded as of little current relevance or by default included within [#5].)
In some cases, generally the more recent documents, physical copies are available to be purchased from the
IRSE. The vast majority of the other documents are similarly obtainable in electronic format; for example a
DVD of the IRSE Proceedings 1913 – 2001 has been produced from scanned original documents. More
recent Proceedings were made available in electronic format on first publication.
It is anticipated that a DVD of the past issues of IRSE News will similarly be available shortly.
Order form available at http://www.irse.org/PublicationGoods.html
# 10 “British Railway Signalling Practice – Multiple Aspect Signalling”
available from the IRSE
This is a combined reprint of 4 of the IRSE Green booklets: 14, 15, 16 & 27; the first and last are
useful for Module 2 and are considered separately below.
# 10/1 Booklet 14: Multiple Aspect Signalling
some originals exist in personal libraries etc. **
Is now included in the modern reprint #10.
This includes the following portions relevant to Module 2:
Sections 2 d) and 2 h) give a good understanding of how line capacity is affected by the speed of
the line and derives expressions for capacity and headway.
Section 2 e) considers the significance of the overlap, both the determination of its length and its
effect on capacity; however the usual NR overlap is now 180m (and indeed since the introduction
of TPWS now generally aims to be sufficient to contain an overrunning train) rather than the ¼
mile discussed in the text.
Section 2 f) may at first similarly seem very dated as it discusses the effect of GW ATC; however
the very same issue affects modern train protection systems which are intermittent rather than
continuous in nature.
Section 3 c) (i) is useful for explaining the graphical method of determining stopping headway
utilising time-distance curves. However be aware that uniformity of signal spacing is nowadays in
the UK regarded as more important than this text implies. Also with drivers now being trained to
drive defensively, braking can be expected on sight of a double yellow and therefore it would be
too optimistic to achieve the headway stated. Similarly the use of consecutive double yellows
(discussed in section (ii)) has associated risks and is rarely adopted on NR today).
Section 3 d) continues the consideration of how to improve headway when a station stop is
involved.
Section 4 explains further the graphical placement of signals using time / distance curves shown
for section 3; the same caveats apply. Nevertheless it serves a useful purpose provided attention is
paid to the general approach, rather than the details of certain specific pieces of information.
Hence very well worth reading and taking the effort to understand; the maths and physics remain
unchanged but be aware that a combination of accidents and human factors studies has resulted in
a change in driving styles and expectations regarding driver performance. Therefore the perceived
wisdom of what constitutes good / acceptable / unacceptable signalling practices have changed
since this book was written.

# 10/2 Booklet 27: Signalling the Layout, British Railways Practice

some originals exist in personal libraries etc. **
Is now included in the modern reprint #7.
This booklet is significantly more modern and reflects practice broadly as implemented on the
last of the significant size RRI resignallings. Of particular relevance to module 2 are:
Section 1.3 explains the factors affecting braking distance and how it is determined,
Section 1.4 first introduces the various signalling systems in use in the UK and then route
indicators, subsidiary and shunting signals.
Chapter 2 firstly considers system capacity and headway, first introducing the various factors
and then performing sample calculations for non-stop headway. It emphasises the headway
achieved on a line is a function of the train speed and shows the effect upon line capacity of a
slower train within traffic of the speed for which the line was signalled. Note that the overlap
lengths and variation with gradient contained within the text is no longer the practice.
Chapter 2 continues with a graphical presentation of the factors that affect headway, notably
station stops at through stations, arrival and departure from terminal platforms as well as the
effect of speed restrictions on plain line and through junctions. It concludes by discussing the
effect of gradients, both rising and falling. This is an extremely useful source of information and
has wider application than mainline UK, although some interpretation is necessary given a
different signalling system.
Chapter 3 considers the signalling of converging and diverging junctions. The detail of the
approach release arrangements is now dated, so the student is advised to seek current
information. Similarly the advice given re positioning overlaps in relation to junctions also does
not reflect all current considerations. In addition certain of the nomenclature used within the text
is not to modern standards and the display of a green aspect into a terminal platform is now
certainly not permitted, but despite these caveats, the chapter is still worth a read. In particular
• section 3.13 explains what would nowadays be known as a “Warning” class route
associated with a “restricted overlap” beyond the next signal; note that the term “reduced
overlap” has changed its meaning since this paper was written!
• section 3.15.1 explains the use of permissive passenger (nowadays referred to as “call-
on” rather than “draw-ahead”) movements and introduces the basic “Lime Street control”,
• section 3.15.2 contrasts this with the shunt route which is also given by what is now
known as a PL aspect. When signalling the entrance to a Goods Loop or depot on the IRSE
layout, candidates should demonstrate that they understand when it is sensible to provide a main
aspect (as in section 3.11) and when a PL as per this section,
• section 3.15.3 depicts how to apply GPLs to a layout to permit the various shunting
moves needed. Many candidates have difficulty in envisaging what is required and this section
should help. In particular note that a Limit of Shunt is NOT provided on a line signalled in a
direction that would require a train to pass it in the facing direction!
• section 3.16 gives a clear list of those conditions when trapping is necessary- a feature
that candidates often overlook when signalling an IRSE layout,
• section 3.17 gives several layouts depicting where track circuit joints should be placed
for a simple divergence, a double geographical junction, a crossover between lines and a double
running junction as well as at trap points from an un track circuited line.

# 10/2
contd. Chapter 4 considers the capacity of a single line between intermediate passing loops or as an
isolated section within double track railway. This treatment assumes the use of MAS which is
often the preferred solution when capacity is crucial and this feature does sometimes appear
within an IRSE exam layout. However often the single lines depicted are lightly used; this
chapter includes no information regarding the various possible operating methodologies and
hence the student must consult other reference material.
Chapter 5 is a brief overview of the manner in which a Signalling Scheme Plan needs to
integrate all design elements into a cohesive whole. In particular it emphasises the need to
consider the headway achieved throughout the line so that the capacity provided on one section
is not wasted due to capacity constraints elsewhere, such as a station where trains stop.
Although there is little specific information to learn, the exam candidate would be well advised
to heed its message!

TECHNICAL PAPERS
#29/1 A. Woodbridge: Some Notes on the Acceleration, Speed, Retardation of Trains **
and their Relation to Signalling
05/10/38 (IRSE Proceedings 1938-9)
This reference is included despite its age, more for historic interest than current applicability. It
is very pertinent for seeing how thinking on the key issues of headway, braking and overlaps
have developed from the early days of MAS when diesel and electric traction on the mainline
was in its infancy. It is clear how much progress has been made on the effectiveness of train
braking since that time, but whereas it is true that the average speed of trains has increased
considerably, top speed has not.
The most surprising revelation is the need to dispense with lineside signals and provide some
form of cab signalling combined with ATP was foreseen and the possibility of migrating to a
moving block was also contemplated. Much has changed in the last 50+ years, but in this
particular respect the situation in the UK hasn’t actually changed a lot yet although things seem
about to change significantly.
#31/1 H. Hadaway: London Transport Methods for **
Control and Locking of Junctions
08/03/61 (IRSE Proceedings 1960-61) link
Despite being rather old, this is still useful since it presents clearly (using layout extract
diagrams in juxtaposition with simple circuits and well supported by text description) a step-by-
step to the essential features. It thus makes clear how the layout design interacts with the
technology to form the signalling appropriate to the railway’s needs; hence whilst a very specific
solution is discussed it is worthwhile outline reading for all.
#36/1 Roy Bell: London Bridge Re-Signalling **
The part of this paper most relevant to module 2 discusses the various means used to maximise
the capacity of the layout:
• Delayed Clearance (=Warning routes in today’s parlance),
• Approach Control (=Approach Release in today’s parlance) ,
• Closing Up signals (i.e. just overlap clear of train waiting in platform),
• Platform Clearing signals (i.e. just over a train length beyond exit of terminal platform),
• Automatic Working Facilities,
• Alternative Routes,
• Reversible Lines
• Point end numbering,
• TORR
Therefore the relevant parts of this paper repay study by many, not just those wishing to
understand the signalling of a busy commuter London terminus station.
#36/2 W. Stephenson & G Rowe: *
Control of Coal from Colliery to Power Station
This paper records a joint meeting with Association of Mining Engineers and thus some of the
content refers to the various transport operations “below ground” as well as the railway loading /
unloading operations which occur at surface level. It describes a railway very different from
many students’ experience and therefore may be helpful to those having difficulty in
understanding operations off a railway’s main running line.

#37/1 Victor Openshaw: Reversible Signalling between Didcot and Bristol **

(04/01/78 IRSE Proceedings 1977-8)
Describes the first application of long length reversible signalling on a UK Mainline which
remains in use effectively unchanged up to the current date although not conforming completely
to current standards. As well as diagrams of the layout of signals and circuits the paper discusses
the operational issues including the ability for a patrolman to securely inhibit the facility as well
as the problems of installation and testing. Given that such signalling is sometimes required in
the module 2 examination, it is well worth reading this paper as it gives an overview at an
appropriate level.
#37/2 G. Bentall: Signalling Principles **
(08/02/78 IRSE Proceedings 1977-8)
Discusses signal spacing, the signalling of a principal through station on a high speed route,
flank protection, reversible working, emergency crossovers, ground frames and the signalling of
single lines which are all subjects very pertinent to module 2. The paper is well illustrated with
diagrams and was obviously intended to provoke debate by taking a slightly controversial view.
#37/3 R. Fairbrother: Single Line Control in Switzerland *
(IRSE Proceedings 1977-8)
Brief resume of paper included within the Student & Graduate section outlines the interlocking
block and its application in conjunction with full track circuiting for busy lines but with axle
counters for branch lines and without much train detection for older installations on lightly used
lines.
#38/1 J Fews: International Signalling Projects *
This review of a variety of railways around the world contains consideration (and aspect
sequence charts) of speed and route signalling aspects, including hybrid systems. It also shows
the deceleration curve resulting from the action of the ATC. Railways discussed include those in
Australia, Iran, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Liberia
#39/1 John Govey: American Signalling *
Thorrowgood Scholarship Paper Jan 1980 (IRSE Proceedings 1979-80)
A paper that raises awareness of a wide range of topics that all have some relevance for module
2 but are not immediately relevant to the actual task of Signalling the Layout:
Review of the various form of block signalling utilised on American Railroads in conjunction
with timetables / dispatchers setting superior rights to various train movements.
Also discusses Centralised Traffic Control which places the management of an entire section of
line under one dispatcher in a control centre.
Various forms of highway / grade crossings are described briefly including predictors.
The operations on several rapid transit systems are also described.
#41/1 Bob Wyatt: Speed and Route Signalling *
A comprehensive comparison between the different philosophies and including a comparison of
the headway possible and aspect sequence diagrams. A paper well worth reading in its entirety;
although very pertinent to module 2 it is however unlikely to be directly useful for the
examination task of Signalling the Layout.

#42/1 T. Matthews, J. Cooper & B. Chambers: *

Tyne and Wear Metro Train Control and Supervision
Description of a line signalled broadly in accordance with UK Mainline practice but with
significant differences to suit the particular conditions which are explained. The special
conditions that pertain to the portion of the route also used by freight trains are also noted. The
paper includes an extract of the Signalling Plan which is indicative of the level of detail
appropriate to the IRSE examination; hence the beginning of the paper is recommended reading
for students of a variety of backgrounds.
#42/1 M. Birkin: Low Cost Signalling by Radio *
Description of RETB which was an early application of SSI. The paper contains information
which is also relevant to other low cost signalling of lightly used lines.
It is worth being aware that although the basic system is still in use, the point detection is now
proved electrically and is displayed to drivers who traverse the points in a facing direction by a
yellow “point indicator” light and TPWS at the loop exits has been provided via
“eavesdropping” on the token issue by radio.
#46/1 Oscar Stalder: New Systems for Signalling and ATC in Switzerland *
Describes the system of speed signalling that had evolved over time and the consequential
complications which had arisen; this resulted in the need for drivers of a nominally speed
signalled railway to have a certain amount of route knowledge in order to interpret the signal
aspects correctly.
The paper then describes the new system being introduced in which the speed is displayed by a
number qualifying the proceed aspect (either because of the infrastructure speeds or due to
braking considerations) rather than a complicated combination of coloured lights.
Note that additional information is contained within the paper:
Lucerne Station; The New Centre by Willi Kaeslin delivered at May 91 Convention
included in IRSE Proceedings 1991 - 92
There is also a section on train protection which includes a diagram showing how the
surveillance curve and emergency braking curves relate to the signal position and its overlap.
#47/1 Keith Ware & Rodney Wyles: *
Signalling & Control Systems for the Docklands Dock Railway
Describes the original system installed to operate the DLR when its use was predicted to be
rather less than it currently has turned out to be. It was designed as a fixed block system
utilising track circuits with ATO and ATP and the trains being operated totally automatically,
there being a conductor on board that could drive in a degraded mode in failure scenarios. The
depot signalling is also explained. Although this system has now been superseded (see #67/1)
there is still value in reading this paper and indeed comparing and contrasting with the system
which now operates the railway.
#47/2 Chris Thompson: Performing for the business *
Much of this paper is concerned with data capture and performance monitoring, manning levels,
training etc but it is the “case study: Investment in Good Performance” that is most pertinent to
module 2 study.

#47/3 D Angill: *
Low Cost Signalling for Developing Railways- what are the options?
Divides lines into categories: light / moderate / heavy use.
Discusses various radio based methods of train dispatching, including RETB but also Radio
Tokenless Block as used in Nigeria.
On the Mainline layout there is often a portion of branch line, sometimes extensive but with low
utilisation on which such methods may be appropriate but with which many students are
unfamiliar, so this is useful study material as it includes layout sketches as well as a description
of the technology.
#48/1 P. Gaffney & F. Harris: *
Mass Transit Railway- the Hong Kong Experience
Describes the changes made to the original signalling in response to increased traffic, to improve
reliability and reduce maintenance costs. As well as a change from RRI to SSI, this entailed a
change to jointless track circuits with separate cable loops for the ATP signals. There are
drawings of the track circuit configuration and brake assurance profile.
The scissors crossovers outside the terminal stations are then discussed, with the reasons from
changing them from two interlocked crossovers to four separate single ends discussed. The
interim solution of split-end detection is also mentioned.
Provision of axle counters as an overlay to track circuits (so that the railway could continue to be
operated normally in the event of the failure of one of the forms of train detection) is described.
The range of suitable ATO speed profiles for running between stations is then examined and the
judgement needed when matching the available speed codes to the assessed safe track speed
described. Train regulation is also an important issue for the railway and improved ATO
functionality to address this is mentioned
Therefore this is an interesting paper that highlights elements of the design which were found
from 10 years operational experience to be worth improving; many of the issues are most
appropriate to Metros but some are equally applicable to Mainline railways.
#48/2 Tony Howker: Have we forgotten the driver?
IRSE Paper 15/11/1988 (IRSE Proceedings 1988-9) **
Considers signalling from the driver’s perspective. Discusses issues such as:
• the less dependence that should be placed on route knowledge given loss of lineside
clues re positioning and fewer years of driving experience,
• potential confusion due to the various uses of the caution aspect-
- is it for junction signalling?,
- due to a restricted overlap?,
- is a particular signal a repeater for one signal or a distant for several?,
• potential misinterpretation of flashing aspect sequences,
• PL aspect- various different usages, possible deficiencies,
• SPADs resulting from anticipation of a junction signal’s approach release,
• modern layouts often limiting the extent of the flank protection which can be provided-
single lead versus double lead junctions,
• provision of overlaps,
• provision of train protection including comparison of various forms of continuous and
intermittent ATP.
• It is suggested that this paper is read in conjunction with its sequel [#66/1].

#49/1 P. Middelraad:
The NS Approach to the Development of a Second Generation ATC System
IRSE Paper 09/01/1989 (IRSE Proceedings 1989-90) **
Paper describes the process by which ATP was being introduced in The Netherlands and nearing
completion.
It followed a serious accident resulting from a SPAD; when the colour light signalling had been
installed it had been felt that the overlaps and flank protection of the previous semaphores were
unnecessary and were eliminated to give greater capacity.
The first generation system used coded track circuits for cab display and speed supervision
system but did not prevent slow speed SPADs; this and various other limitations of the system
and the reasons for wishing to upgrade are explained.
To support the paper there are included diagrams which specify the signal aspects of the NS
speed signalling system and related aspect sequence diagrams.
The paper then discusses the decisions relating to the form of the replacement system, including
consideration of intermittent versus continuous systems and the migration path from the existing
system. In particular it envisaged the two systems co-existing on a stretch of lines with the new
system being initially additional to and then gradually taking over from the original; the hard
compromise during the interim period between maximising capacity or maximising safety is
mentioned.
There is also a discussion of the problems caused by trains running early as well as running late
and how a method of control which could lead to better speed regulation would have advantages.
In particular the manner in which the activation of level crossings could safely be delayed for
situations in which trains are approaching at less than the speed for which the traditional strike-in
was designed is also discussed; this is a very significant issue as there are a lot of level crossings
in The Netherlands!
It is also clear that, with ETCS at that time being on the distant horizon, the Dutch were
particularly keen to reach agreement on the track-train interface so that they could develop a
solution that would be reasonably future-proof.
Hence this paper is a particularly recommended read due to the range of issues discussed; it is
particularly interesting from a UK Mainline perspective since the railway is in some ways very
similar yet in some ways quite different from NR.
#51/1 J Guilloux: Speed Control System on the SNCF *
(Aspect Conference 1991)
Paper traces the gradual development of increasingly sophisticated speed control systems on the
various French high speed lines, initially giving protection in conjunction with lineside
signalling and then an integral part of in-cab signalling. Graphs illustrate the stepped control of
TVM300 and also the stepless monitoring curve of later systems. Hence relevant reading for
TBS and includes some consideration of braking / headway issues but not directly useful for the
module 2 examination paper.

#51/2 D Gill: Computer Based Design and Analysis of Signalling Systems for **
Mass Transit Railways
Contains useful information regarding the equi-block system which has nominally equal length
track sections which are coded, at any one time, with two speed codes: one giving the maximum
speed within the block, the other the target speed at which a braking train should enter the next
block. It also discusses the performance of the signalling system when there is disturbance to the
timetable and contrasts the situations:
• when the transmission to train only occurs at discrete locations,
• when it is continuous but only periodically updated,
• when full moving block is implemented.
This paper therefore is particularly relevant to those using TBS to signal Metro layouts but also
useful for others, particularly to understand the importance of considering recovery from
perturbed running and not just the steady state when designing signalling.
#51/3 T. Taskin & C. Goodman: *
Modelling of Signalling in an Object Orientated Simulation Model
Paper concerns the computer simulation of a railway’s operation and includes diagrams of the
braking and stopping sequence for trains under continuous and under step speed supervision as
well as train conflicts in a junction area.
#51/4 Colin Bray: Return of the Splitter *
IRSE News Issue 23, Nov 1991, page 5
Details of the colour light splitting distant approaching Airport Junction including track plan and
aspect sequence. See also #57/5.
IRSE News Issue 26, Sept 1992 has information relating to an historic installation at Miles
Platting for comparison.
#52/1 J M Thomas & W J Coenrad: European Train Control System *

Paper principally concerns the origins of ETCS and concerns itself with the specifications of the
Euro-balise, the Euro-Radio and the Euro-Cab.
As such it gives a good introduction to this important subject but is not directly applicable to the
module 2 examination.
#52/2 A P Mills & D J Peach: Signalling Manchester Metrolink **
This paper discusses the various modes of operation on the segregated sections (fully signalled
and drive on site) and the street running sections.
• The fully signalled section is generally 2 aspect but with the provision of distant signals
(which sometimes need to be approach lit) where the sighting of a red aspect is
insufficient for a LRV (= Light Rail Vehicle) to be brought to a stop at it.
• The street section entails use of a Vehicle Recognition System which is used to select
routing and demand the appropriate phase from the road traffic lights to give the LRV
priority.
Thus this paper gives information relating to a rather different form of railway than most
students have experienced.

#52/3 J-P Moreau, G Pascault, M Pousse & S Sanner: **

Channel Tunnel Signalling
A series of detailed papers giving details on a railway with very specific operations.
Chapter 1 contains much information about the speed curves and the cab indications and shows
how these differ for different train types utilising the line. It also shows the curves displayed for
manual driving, the control curve and the intervention curve and how they relate to the stopping
place which is to be respected and the buffer section beyond it.
There is also a diagram of the transition arrangement to UK lineside signalling.
The other chapters are less directly useful for the module 2 examination.
#52/4 D Holgate & R Walters: BR Automatic Train Protection Specification **
Useful discussion of such concepts as release speed, the distinction between service and
emergency braking performance, full and partial supervision. Hence good material for
strengthening underpinning knowledge, but not directly useful for the task of signalling the
layout.
#53/1 John Francis: From the Signalbox Window **
One of the few papers written from the viewpoint of a user of the signalling system; it is full of
examples of what our customer sees as good and bad practice, many of which relate to the design
of the Signalling Plan.
The paper is best read once the student has some experience of signalling the layout and wishes
to improve their solution to avoid certain pitfalls. The quotations from various sections from the
Signallers Instructions / Rule Book should also help the student obtain a broader understanding
of the context in which the signalling is used. It also demonstrates the reliance that is placed
upon the signaller in the event of failure and argues that the signal engineer needs to do more to
assist the signaller in such situations.
#54/1 Tony Humphrey, Chris Brown, John Crisp & Karl Dodsworth: *
Central Line Re-Signalling
The most relevant section in this paper is that on the inter-running of old and new trains.
Within this portion there are some details of the concepts of Target Speed and Maximum Safe
Speed and they are related to service and emergency braking; hence there is a certain amount of
information here relevant to ATO and ATP.
#54/2 Trevor Perry: *
Centralising Control of the Central Line of the State Railway of Thailand
This explains the upgrading to an MAS 3 aspect system based loosely on UK practice, from the
former signalling arrangement- colour lights operating as replacement for the original
mechanical signals.
It gives some useful information about the trackside, in particular the operation of the level
crossings; worth a read from a UK viewpoint to see what is the same and what is different.

#54/3 Ernesto Capillas: The Madrid Metro **

This paper includes diagrams showing the sequence of speed codes superimposed on the track
circuits to provide the ATP function required. It compares the lines with older rolling stock and
lower capacity demand where a 3 code system is sufficient and those which justify a 6 code
system, which enables closer headways and the implementation of ATO. It also shows how the
length of the track circuits needs to be related to braking distance.
Hence for those students from a metro background these sections of the paper are highly relevant
study material; for others it is of less relevance but still worthy of inclusion to gain a broader
understanding.
#54/4 D. Knight: Bristol Bulk Handing Terminal *
IRSE News Issue 32, Feb 1994, pages 4-5
Details of the new freight loading facility for trainload coal, diagrams and photographs of the
track arrangement and overall description of operation.
#55/1 Lai Yin Lam: *
An Overview of the MTR New Automatic Train Control System
Explains the TBS system based on the “distance-to-go” principle and considers the transmission
of information to the train by radio, the intermittent return channel information via inductive
loops in stations and the beacons used to determine the position of the train. There is also
description of various fault tolerant features of the design, in particular related to a train
detection failure.
Hence this is good material to help in understanding the issues related to TBS in general.
#55/2 Stephen Clark & J Sneider: **
Glasgow Underground- Resignalling for the next century
Aspect Conference 1995
Whilst there is little in the written paper itself particularly relevant to module 2, it does feature as
an attachment a Signalling Plan for the entire system. The railway itself is unique and therefore
unlikely to be a model for any candidate, but nevertheless it repays study. Part of the value is the
relative simplicity yet completeness (includes stabling facilities, workshops etc) of the railway
and generally at a level of detail which would be appropriate for the IRSE examination.
Whereas the “circle” is straightforward, the student should consider how the signalling of the
depot addresses all the operational moves which would be required.
#55/3 How to Pass the IRSE Exam *
(IRSE Proceedings 1995-6 and 1996-7)
A bit of a joke layout featuring many “howlers” (to UK eyes) was published in IRSE News (and
reproduced in the proceedings) as a form of competition. The following year’s Proceedings
named some of the most severe errors.
#56/1 A W Fiddes: Experiences with the Radio Train Token *
This paper primarily considers the safety assurance associated with the system which at that time
was being introduced in South Africa; it does also serve to illustrate a possible low cost method
of working a single line which is of more relevance to this IRSE module.
On the heavy freight single lines the emphasis is to give the driver pre-warning of the speed
restricted turnout into a loop distinct from the need to stop at the protecting signal. However
whereas signals are spaced at braking distance wherever possible, this is not regarded as an
absolute requirement- the sighting distance can be taken into consideration as well.

#56/2 Lassi Matikainen & Harri Alanko: *

Signalling & Telecommunication on the Railways of Finland.
The paper concentrates on explaining the upgrade of the signalling: control by CBI and
provision of ATP but also includes a tabulation of the aspects of the Finnish speed signalling
system.
#56/3 Tony Kornas: *
Recent Developments to Signalling on French and German Railways
This paper concentrates on relatively low cost methods of operating single lines, generally
utilising axle counters. Most of the information relates to the hardware utilised rather than its
application and therefore may not seem directly useful for the module 2 examination, yet there is
value in reading of different solutions to common problems- for example the driver aiming a
laser gun at a target to initialise a level crossing sequence.
#56/4 Mike Page: On Board Train Detection- an alternative to Track Circuits *
IRSE News Issue 43, July1996, pages 6-7
Discusses the pro/cons of the train detecting its position on the line rather than the lineside
infrastructure detecting the train. Starts at the fundamental problems that any signalling system
has to solve and looks to the future railway with cab signalling and ATP.
#56/5 Stan Hall: *
Have Overlaps Had their day?
IRSE News Issue 44, Sept 1996, page 3
Discussion of the role of the overlap in mechanical and colour light signalling and comparison
with European railways.
#56/6 M. Stevens: Great Eastern Scheme Reaches Stratford *
IRSE News Issue 45, Nov 1996, pages 6-7
Article includes “before” and “after” diagrams of the track layout at the station. It depicts
typical simplification of the track plan that characterises remodelling works; increased speeds
can be achieved with less infrastructure but with increased use of bi-directional signalling that
has “layout risk” implications.
#57/1 Christoph Klose: Radio Based Signalling for Secondary Lines *
Paper describes a system being developed to put the signalling on board the train and eliminate
signal and train detection. Although some information is particular to the manufacture’s
proposed system, much applies to TBS more generally. Whilst it is unlikely that the content will
be directly useful for the module 2 examination, it is suggested that all students should seek to
have some awareness of signalling the layout without signals and this paper is a useful overview.
#57/2 Tony Howker: Interoperability *
The last section of this paper raises various issues (such as: what is meant by “route”?, do we
need an “overlap”?) which will arise with the introduction of ERTMS, in particular ETCS level
3.

#57/3 Graham Paverd: *

Railway Signalling & Telecommunication Systems in South Africa.
The paper explains the signalling system used on each of the four categories of lines which are
interesting to compare with each other and to contrast with the UK’s 3 aspect signalling system,
in particular for the signalling arrangements on the approach to a speed restricted turnout into a
running loop.
Another comparison is the description of the “emergency aspect” for use when there is failure of
the train detection; the POSA has yet to be adopted in the UK, with the special exception of the
CTRL.
There is also a description of CTC and good detail is given on the ATR (= Automatic Train
Routing) system and also some description of the hump yards for marshalling freight.
It is therefore a useful paper to read in order to broaden knowledge of railways in general and
how their signalling needs to support their operation.
#57/4 L. Orve: Radio Block in Sweden *
IRSE News Issue 47, Mar1997, pages 6-8
System implemented with marker boards and balises trackside and a RBC communicating via
radio to the train to give a low cost means of operating the line and the protection of ATP. A
fore-runner of ETCS level 3.
#57/5 Ian Harman: Interesting Signal at Hayes and Harlington *
IRSE News Issue 53, Mar1998, page 11
Following on from #51/4, this article has photographs of the splitting distant and the PRI =
Preliminary Route Indicator used to signal this high speed divergence.
#58/1 Colin White & David Millard: Metro Signalling and Operations **
This paper concentrates on how to deliver a high capacity system reliably and therefore is highly
appropriate to module 2 studies and has sufficient pertinent detail to be useful for the
examination itself. Although written from a Metro perspective, much applies to other railways
although perhaps to a lesser degree.
The paper:
• introduces a systems approach to capacity and then considers the headway components:
the signalling, the platform dwell and the recovery margin,
• then gives examples and considers the effect of ATO and ATP,
• discusses the role that graceful degradation can play in limiting the effects of any failure,
• explains how service regulation can influence journey time and capacity,
• gives details on the components of station dwell time,
• illustrates with statistics from particular examples.
It is therefore recommended reading whilst studying the details of headway calculations for all
module 2 students.

#58/2 Terence Law, John Benson, & Vincent Passau: *

Improving Capacity- the KCRC Solution
The signalling basis of the ATP project is explained: blocks used for lineside signalling by non-
equipped trains are sub-divided into blocks used for cab signalling in order to achieve greater
capacity.
There are clear diagrams which depict the ATP speed profile in situations where there is, and
also when there is not, an overlap available; in concept these are very similar to many such
systems.
It is therefore a good source of general introduction regarding cab signalling at a suitable level of
detail for the student to grasp the essentials without getting lost in the complexity.
Hence even students of railways where cab signalling has yet to make an impact should read this
paper in order to gain a general awareness of many of the issues.
#58/3 F De Vilder: Implications of Applying Transmission Based Signalling *
The most relevant parts of this paper for a study for module 2 are the sections on:
• Dual Signalled areas
• Transition from conventional signalling to TBS
• Application to rural lines
#58/4 Luigi Berlincioni: Radio System Requirements- EIRENE FRS *
25/11/98 (UIC Paris Conference: Signalling and Communications for the 21st Century)
Paper explains the functionalities required from an Interoperable radio system to support ETCS.
Although this may not seem appropriate to Signalling the Layout, an understanding of the part
played by the radio system is key to understanding certain differences between what is required
for a conventional lineside signalling solution and one implemented with ETCS and therefore
examination candidates adopting this as their practice would be wise to be familiar with the
subject and this paper is at an appropriate level for that purpose.
#59/1 Jialun Ji, Baohua Mao, Tin-kin Ho & Zhenzhou Yuan: *
Signalling Systems on China’s Railways
This paper explains various signalling features of both mainline and metro lines in China that
relate to braking and headway and highlights the differences from the UK practice.
It includes diagrams and some calculations to provide a useful comparison and this should prove
useful to the student seeking a more complete understanding
#59/2 Paul Booth: *
Development of an ERTMS Moving Block Interlocking for CML
Compares a simple layout with fixed block lineside signalling and the same layout within a
moving block environment. Describes how MAs cannot overlap even if the locked paths for
different trains do so
It will probably be many years before a moving block methodology will be appropriate for
Signalling the Mainline Layout but the paper does serve as an introduction to the subject.
#59/3 David Crabtree: Chiltern Capacity Works *
IRSE News Issue 58, Jan 1999, pages 1& 8-9
Comparison of the diagrams of the “before” and “after” signalling when the line was re-doubled
north of Princes Risborough.

#59/4 Nick Terry: United Team achieve New Year Goal in Manchester *
IRSE News Issue 59, March 1999, page 8
Diagrams showing amendments to signalling to increase station flexibility etc; shows the
introduction of mid-platform signals and the changes made to accommodate the revised track
layout.
One of these signals featured as Interesting Signal 81 in IRSE News Issue 114, May 2006, page
6
#59/5 Peter Day: Novel Override Solution for Penzance *
IRSE News Issue 60, May 1999, pages 1& 8-9
Interesting from two perspectives:
• the use of an axle counter to give a form of degraded working when salt spray from the
sea causes the track circuits to fail
• the diagram of colour light signalling (albeit controlled from a mechanical lever frame)
of a provincial mainline terminus.
#59/6 John Benson: Change of Aspect for KCR *
IRSE News Issue 61, July 1999, pages 1& 8-11
Explanation of the blue aspect and the extinguishing of the normal aspects for a healthy ATP
fitted train on the KCRC East Line. Diagrams showing how the lineside signalling and cab
signalling blocks co-exist and the relevant aspect sequence.
Most intriguing to British eyes is how this unique railway’s signalling principles are still based
on 1970s UK practice and have been implemented with SSI.
See also #25.
#60/1 David McKeown: Developing the Philosophy of Signalling *
A deliberately challenging paper questioning what we do and why.
One of the major themes is highly relevant to module 2: Understanding Capacity.
Full of ideas worth reading, but not useful for sitting the exam itself.
#60/2 Victor Soares Lopes: Portuguese Signalling *
Within a wider paper, there is some limited information relating to the types and meaning of
Portuguese signals and practices.
#60/3 Stan Hall: British Junction Signalling- Time for a Change? **
23/01/01 (Future Trends in Signalling and Train Control Conference)
Paper expands on IRSE News article of November 2000 and traces the changes made to the
principles for approach release over several decades, partly in an attempt to signal higher speed
divergences, partly in response to accidents. It continues by comparing with the speed signalling
used in The Netherlands and argues that it may be the time to adopt similar practices and argues
for in-cab signalling.
This is therefore a good source for getting a perspective on junction signalling and helps to
understand the issues, particularly from the driver’s viewpoint. It should therefore help when
learning the details of a particular railway’s practices but does not itself directly aid the student
in the task of signalling the layout.

#60/4 Dirk Brauer: Train operation using relative Braking Distance **

23/01/01 (Future Trends in Signalling and Train Control Conference)
Theoretical paper showing the capacity advantage that would be obtained if train separation
could be reduced to be more similar to the way that cars are driven- the “safe distance” between
two trains being derived from a difference of their braking distances plus a comfort margin
rather than insisting that the second train must always be able to stop prior to the current position
of the first train.
This proposal goes somewhat further than a train calculating its current braking distance and
implementation of moving block that has been achieved in a few real applications. Therefore
although of interest by highlighting various capacity constraints, it is highly unlikely that an
exam candidate would wish to adopt these proposals.
#60/5 J Corrie & D Billin: Some Economic Aspects of ERTMS *
17/11/00 (ERTMS & Its Application Conference, London)
Discusses:
• track capacity in relationship to the formula for lineside signalling,
• relationship headway and speed for lineside signalling and moving block,
• more efficient train regulation,
• reliability and fall-back options,
• changes to interlocking principles (e.g. overlaps, overrun protection and flank)
#60/6 Helmut Uebel: *
Mainline ATP / ATC Intermittent and Continuous Systems
April 2000: IEE 8th Residential Course, Railway Signalling and Control Systems
Discusses operating principles and technical solutions for a wide range of systems. Gives details
of the various levels and modes of operation and the increasing functionality from a protection
system for safety into a control system to maximise line performance and illustrates the effect on
headway both in blocks and in stations.
#61/4 IRSE Signalling Philosophy Review: Mainline UK Railways *
April 2001
This was written in the aftermath of the Southall and Ladbroke Grove accidents to give the
IRSE’s view of the then current situation. Since it was written to inform non-signalling
specialists, the main document is useful material for giving a good explanation of the key issues
to those having limited experience.
Supporting document within the same publication are:
Report by Working Group 1 (Signalling Principles); sections 3-6 in particular also assist in
deepening that understanding. Appendix C (Requirements for Signalling Systems) and Appendix
D (Comments on current Assumptions underlying Signalling Principles) also add to this.
Report by Working Group 2 (Human Factors)- less applicable to the module 2 student than
others. It does however emphasise importance of the rhythm of consistent signal spacing,
avoidance of over and under braking etc.
Report by the International Technical Committee comparing UK practices with various other
countries. The various Appendices giving an overview of each of these make for interesting
comparisons.
Therefore this document is a recommended read (at least selectively) for students from any
background; it won’t give very much information on the WHAT, but it does help with the many
hints as to WHY.

#61/1 Peter Symons: Australasian Signalling **

Paper outlines the variety of signalling and safe-working systems in use on the continent.
Certain are discussed in greater detail; for example there is an explanation of the aspects utilised
on:
• TransPerth (3 aspect route signalling),
• TransAdelaide (3 aspect route/ speed signalling),
• Victorian (4 aspect speed signalling),
• New South Wales (4 aspect route signalling),
• Queensland (4 aspect route signalling),
• New Zealand (speed signalling),
• Train Order Working / Direct Traffic Control (low density lines, dark territory).
• To the UK reader some things seem very familiar, some very different.
#61/2 David Fenner: Train Protection and Warning System *
IRSE News Issue 72, May 2001, pages 1& 4-5
Description of TPWS and the rationale behind its introduction.
Details are given of its application, with diagrams showing the protection afforded by the basic
system and when an additional OSS is provided. See also #63/4
#63/1 Bill Scheerer: Communication Based Train Control *
Introduction to the concept of Incremental Train Control System as a transmission based overlay
signalling system to allow higher speeds by provision of train protection. Also a discussion of
differential GPS in order to determine the location of a train with sufficient certainty. Provides a
useful insight and interesting contrast to ETCS but not directly useful for module 2 examination.
#63/2 Andrew Love: Capacity- The Big Issue **
This paper discusses the meaning of “capacity” and contrasts rapid transit and mainline practice.
It considers many factors which affect it (such as the provision of ATO and countdown clocks
on platforms) other than just pure signalling design. It also identifies two types of “margin”
which give robustness to the timetable but at the expense of capacity.
Hence study is highly pertinent to module 2 in order to give the necessary understanding of one
of the most important subject areas; however the nature of the exam structure is such that direct
questions on the topic are more likely within the module 3 examination.
#63/3 Daniel Woodland: The Capacity of Railways and their Control Systems **
A complementary paper [to #63/2] which analyses the theoretical achievable headway as a
function of permissible speed for different forms of signalling systems and contrasts this for
“following train headways” and “point headways”. It discusses the recovery margins that need
to be included in order to translate this to an “operational headway” and the use of the concept of
“train paths”. Understanding such issues is a very important part of designing a signalling plan
but the later sections of the paper are less directly useful to the examination candidate.
#63/4 Mark O’Neill: Adapting TPWS for speeds over 100mph *
IRSE News Issue 82, Jan 2003, pages 1& 4-5
Continues from 61/2. Describes the LUL philosophy re provision of overlaps and describes how
it can be adapted for the mainline with the provision of TPWS. Diagrams show how CDR on the
outer junction protecting signal ensures that a train approaching too fast will suffer intervention
at its OSS and thus be stopped before the conflict. Includes aspect sequence diagrams showing
the delayed release of the outer signal.

#63/5 R. Troup: The Secaucus Transfer Story *

IRSE News Issue 83, Mar 2003, pages 1& 4-7
The means by which 30 tph was achieved in New Jersey is described; this paper explains the
headway considerations, the optimal speed, the existing cab signal speed codes and those
proposed
#64/1 John Corrie: I Bear a Far Shining Sign *
Presidential Address 23/04/04 (IRSE Proceedings 2004-5)
Amongst many subjects discussed, those particularly relevant for this Study Pack are:
• Railway braking,
• Moving Block and headway,
• Reversionary interlocking,
• Dependence on track circuits,
• Regulating at junctions and stations,
• Requirements of a railway’s Rules & Regulations,
• Centralisation of interlockings / Stop & Proceed rules
#64/2 Daniel Woodland: Railway Control Philosophy *
Also IRSE News Issue 97, Sept 2004 pages 4-11 and
IRSE News Issue 98, Oct 2004 pages 4-11
Discusses the Railway Control System at a high level and demonstrates that Train Control
encompasses more than just pure signalling, including:
• Train Operation including manual driving, ATO and ATP,
• Train Regulation, traffic monitoring and ARS,
thus giving the context within which the signalling design fits.
The paper then becomes even more relevant to module 2 as it discusses:

• Adhesion and braking,
• Speed, Separation and Capacity for an “n” aspect signalling system
• Fixed versus moving block
#64/3 Francis How: Railway Signalling Philosophy, Principles and Practice *
Also IRSE News Issue 99, Nov 2004, pages 4-13.
A wide-ranging paper which goes beyond module 2 considerations but three sections do have
direct relevance:
• Key considerations in the application of ETCS level 2 to the Cambrian line,
• Tabulation of Degraded Mode Functionality
• Fundamental Requirements for Operations and Signalling
#64/4 John Francis: Block Working, Route Holding and Train Detection *
Also IRSE News Issue 100, Dec 2004 /Jan 2005, pages 29 - 39
More of the content is directly applicable to module 3 than module 2, but of course there is a
strong link between them and design of a layout should take into account how it will be
interlocked and operated. The most directly useful contents are:
• Brief consideration of the variety of “space interval” systems,
• The issue of Movement Authorities within TBS.

#64/5 Christian Sevestre & Michel Laurin; *

The Evolution of Signalling on the High-Speed Lines in France
Also IRSE News Issue 102, March 2005, pages 4 - 9, and
IRSE News Issue 103, April 2005, pages 4 – 12.
Contains details of the technical solutions applicable to the various HSL; these are very different
types of railway to those featuring in the module 2 layouts. Hence at one level the information is
not relevant to the exam; on the other hand the same issues of braking and headway apply and
the explanation of the blocks and the TVM430 speed codes is very clear and is a good
introduction to those unfamiliar with TBS. The remainder of the paper is interesting in other
respects but not module 2 relevant.
#64/6 Colin White: The IRSE Examination and Furthering your Career **
IRSE News Issue 93, April 2004, pages 23
General advice for students and examination candidates, written by a Module 2 examiner.
#65/1 Warwick Allison: 150 Years of New South Wales Signalling *
IRSE Paper, Sydney Convention March 2005 (IRSE Proceedings 2005-6)
Amongst the historical survey, there is discussion very pertinent to module 2:
• Speed / Route Signalling,
• Overlaps and Train Protection,
• Single Line operation- tokens, train orders, track warrant, GPS,
• The future: Target Speed
#65/2 Helmut Uebel: Capacity of Railway Lines and Stations **
(IRSE Proceedings 2005-6 Page 142 et seq.)
Also IRSE News Issue 104, May 2005, pages 11 -- 17
Paper takes a global view and even includes some consideration of road traffic. It includes:
• Absolute and relative braking distance,
• Calculation of Train Headway,
• Comparison of the results of various system configurations,
• Graphs of line and station capacity etc
#65/3 Graeme Christmas & Lynsey Thomson: **
Junction Signalling and Robust Train Protection
IRSE YM Conference: Making Headway 16/06/2005 link
• Evolving Signalling Principles are discussed:
• Considers the philosophy of Junction Signalling, the hazards and their mitigations
• Describes the various forms of Approach Release
• Speculates regarding the future approach to be taken for junction signalling
(the Preliminary Route Indicators are just coming into use but the Dynamic Speed
Boards may never do so)
• Introduces the various elements of RTP: Additional TPWS, CDR, Flank Protection and
pseudo point-to-point locking, Overun Detection.
• Discusses what has since become known as CTP to reduce and mitigate SPADs, and the
calculation of the possible overrun after intervention compares with the available SOD
This paper is supported by a Powerpoint presentation animated sequence of slides to illustrate
the description- run using f5.
This paper helps understand NR/L2/SIG/19609 and NR/GN/SIG/0028 which are applicable to
NR and strongly influence the manner in which a layout should be signalled.

#65/6 Ken Burrage: History of the IRSE Examination **

IRSE News Issue 100, Dec 2004 / Jan 2005, pages 47-8
Review of the development of the exam since 1946.
Spare a thought for candidates of former years who had no choice but to sit the entire
examination in one day and if they failed just a portion then had to re-sit the entire examination
the next year! It was all or nothing.
#65/7 Ed Gerrard and Les Lyman: *
SPT Glasgow Subway ATO, Obsolescent Analogue to Revamped Digital
IRSE News Issue 105, June 2005, pages 4 - 8
Paper describes the ATO functionality: speed regulation, stopping in stations, rollback
protection, slip/slide detection and correction.
#66/1 Tony Howker: Have we forgotten the driver?- The Sequel
IRSE Paper 11/10/2006 (IRSE Proceedings 2006-7) *
Also IRSE News Issue 118, Oct 2006, pages 2 - 9
Review of the changes in the industry since his previous paper [#48/2] including:
• the increase in the quantity of standards,
• the number of Rule Book reissues,
• proliferation in signage and the number of differential speed restrictions,
• the sprouting of many banner repeaters,
• the increased use of axle counters,
• provision of TPWS, risk assessment of layouts, development of the principles of
“Robust Train Protection” as a response to a succession of accidents resulting from
SPADs,
• change to GPLs that display two red lights for ON aspect.
Although this pair of papers do not consist of information directly useful for “Signalling the
Layout”, they are useful at putting the issues into perspective. They should assist the student in
understanding some of the thinking behind the practices and raising awareness that whilst the
fundamental principles remain constant, things do change over time; hence it is rare for any
sizeable railway network to be completely homogeneous.
#66/2 David Gill: **
Distance To Go ATC for Mass Transit Railways
(Aspect 2006 Conference)
Paper includes text and diagrams which:
• Compare speed coded fixed block with fixed block DTG and moving block,
• Show how the ATO target speed and control curve relate to the ATP MA and
intervention envelope as one train approaches a platform which another is just leaving
• Indicate recovery from service perturbations
#66/3 Kam Yuen Leung: Fully Automatic Operation of MTR Hong Kong *
Paper gives details of the developments which have led to the adoption of automatic turn round
at terminal stations, automatic door opening and closing.
Shows how train separation achieved by “virtual fixed block” where the ATO is designed to
bring the train to rest leaving a buffer section of one block within which in extremis the ATP can
bring the train to rest.

#66/4 Tokuro Igarashi: *

Train Control Systems for high speed / high density lines in Japan
Paper describes conventional multi-stepped train speed control system and then describes the
new system where the braking is calculated on board the train from its database and gives
smooth braking; this gives a more comfortable ride and reduces time loss. Demonstrates the
headway improvement achieved.
An interesting comparison with ETCS and other TBS systems.
#66/5 Bill Pallazi: *
TMACS Train Order Working (with the benefit of hindsight)
A longstanding method of operating a long single line railway where the optimum train passes
arrangements at intermediate loops to keep traffic flowing effectively has been updated for the
21st century. This paper demonstrates that:
• dictated Train Orders can be “interlocked” by computer spreadsheet to give a form of
safe working,
• GPS can continually monitor the position of the relevant trains to give an independent
check that they are operating within their authority,
• a graph depicting both the authorised and actual train movements can be given in real-
time on a computer display.
Paper also gives details of the advantages stemming from the system and the lessons learnt from
its implementation many of which would be applicable to other projects.
The contrast between this paper and others at the same conference demonstrates the variety of
the world’s railways and that different forms of signalling are applicable to each; any student for
the IRSE examination should be aware of the diversity and that each has its place- remember that
when Signalling the Layout in module 2 since “one size does not fit all”.
#66/6 Didier Dupre, Mark Appleyard and Long Tan: *
Singapore North East Line Metro- the return of experience
Summary of the lessons learnt from implementing a fully automatic heavy metro system. The
section on managing the performance is of particular relevance to the study of module 2, since it
addresses such issues as: how to dimension the system, the response time for train insertion /
removal from service, availability, the time taken to recover from failure.
A description of the moving block system, and the fall-back of lineside train detection is
included
It also has a diagram depicting the track and signalling arrangements in the depot, with various
stabling tracks, routine maintenance areas, washing plant, workshops and test track area. This is
an element of railway operation unfamiliar to many students and thus worth of study as much is
similar even for very different railways.
#66/7 Henry Cheung: *
Hong Kong KCRC West Rail- the first year
The paper concentrates particularly on the reliability growth achieved and demonstrates that it is
often the most simple things which contribute to unreliability and that attention to detail counts.
From a module 2 perspective it is the system architecture which is the more important, but only
scant detail is given on this element of what is otherwise an excellent exposition.

#66/8 Peter Woodbridge: TPWS- the Why, What and Wherefore *

(21/11/06 YM Conference Making best use of the Past, Looking to the Future) link
After a brief historical survey of nearly 100 years of train protection in the UK including the
pilot ATP projects which never became the subject of widespread implementation, this paper
concentrates on the retrofit implementation of TPWS. This needed to be performed rapidly
following a series of railway accidents as a result of SPAD, the intention being to address the
majority of the risk from junction collisions as soon as possible; speed of introduction being
more important than complete effectiveness as a stop-gap measure prior to ETCS.
The operation of the system and how it can applied as part of RTP to give greater protection than
in the retrofit scenario is explained and the scene is set for the deployment of ETCS.
Much of this paper is more applicable to module 1 (as it considers the various risks on the
railway to attempt to put the risk from SPADs in context), but from a module 2 perspective it is
useful by illustrating how the implementation of TPWS has lead to the significance of the
overlap changing and the new approach to signalling junctions.
#66/8 M. Dwivedi: *
Comparison of the Evolution of Signalling British & Indian Railways
IRSE News Issue 119, Nov 2006, pages 12 - 18
A very pertinent article for Module 2 students.
This discusses the similarities and differences of practices regarding:
• Multiple Aspect Signalling and its meaning to the driver,
• Braking Distances,
• Flank Protection / Isolation,
• Overlaps,
• Yard (layout) Design,
• The meaning of the Aspects,
• Use of 4 Aspect in 3 Aspect Signalling,
• Aspect Sequence for Movement over Crossover,
• Yard Signalling & Block Signalling,
• Locking of Siding / Isolation Points,
• Overrun Protection.
#67/1 Ralph Harding: The Docklands Light Railway- Coming of Age *
Also IRSE News Issue 121, Feb 2007, pages 9 – 16.
Amongst other information there is some explanation of the manner in which the interlocking
communicates with the Vehicle On Board Computer via an inductive loop in the track and
achieves ATO and ATP functionality for moving block.
An interesting comparison with #47/1
#67/2 Andrew Dalgleish: Migrating Towards a TBTC System on the Jubilee *
(20/02/07, Making Headway on the Underground Conference)
Obviously much of the paper deals with the problems of migration within a challenging
timescale and other constraints, but from a module 2 viewpoint it is the description of the Seltrac
S40 CA system application which is of principal interest. Three modes of operation: Automatic,
Protected Manual and Restricted Manual are explained and there is a diagram depicting how
vehicle position information is determined and transmitted to the Vehicle Control Centre.

#67/3 Mark O’Neill: Signalling at the St Pancras CTRL Terminal *

IRSE News Issue120, Dec 2006 / Jan 2007, pages 4 - 11
Article includes a diagram of the layout and associated signalling from the platforms to the
interface with TVM430 TBS at the entrance to the tunnel to Stratford. Explains the
dependability approach, Engineering Zone Protection, Manual Operation of points Device etc.
#67/4 Joern Pachl: German Block and Interlocking Principles *
IRSE News Issue120, Dec 2006 / Jan 2007, pages 19 - 22
Part 3 of the article is the most relevant for module 2 students. In particular there is:
• an explanation of the role of the overlap, its length depending on that role and the speed
of trains approaching the signal and the associated controls,
• discussion of the German peculiarity of overlapping overlap,
• details of the provision of selectable, but not swinging, overlaps
• flank protection / protective points/ derailers.
#67/5 Ian Allison: Report on Heritage Railways Seminar *
IRSE News Issue121, Feb 2007, page 22s-28
.Details given of both level crossing protection and single line working methods on some of the
UK’s tourist railways.
#67/6 John Francis: Interesting Signals No 94, Queensland Repeaters *
IRSE News Issue127, Sept 2007, page 21
Article explains some differences between Queensland Rail’s and NR’s signalling systems,
including the very different use of the flashing yellow.
#67/7 Les Braithwaite: *
Signalling System for the new Eurostar Engineering Centre, Temple Mills.
IRSE News Issue129, Nov 2007, pages 2-5
A good description of a fully signalled depot (some of the signals have 13 route indications
associated with them). Includes discussion of:
• a Depot Protection System and its associated derailers,
• staff warning light system,
• need for test facilities for rolling stock leaving the depot,
• use of “parallax markers” to enable drivers to stop in correct position within shed.

ENTHUSIAST VIDEOs / DVDs

The railway enthusiast market means that a wide range of items are available commercially, but it is
understandable that the emphasis is on locomotives and scenic journeys rather than the subjects of
particular use for student of railway signalling. However some can be of potential use in building up
railway domain knowledge, though the emphasis is more on historic practices (some of which still survive
but are not generally representative of modern day operations).
The list below contains those productions with an emphasis on signalling. None of them is directly useful
for any particular IRSE exam module but they would all contribute a thread in building up that tapestry
which is that elusive item: railway domain knowledge. Unfortunately there is a dearth of such sources
depicting more current railway operations; however some particular product promotion / safety training
production do exist which the student may be able to acquire. Similarly a few of the more recent re-
signalling schemes feature on short promotional films made by the signalling supplier, but none is so
informative or publicly accessible to those listed below.
Signals and Points BCL Video

Signal Engineer: The classic British Transport Film of the 1960s which shows a very different world than
currently exists; the young lads featured are now into their retirement years. Despite this many of the
fundamentals remain unchanged and thus it is valuable to understand where the profession has come from
and did an excellent job at giving an overview of signal engineering to encourage a new generation to make
it their career. It concludes at a major commissioning weekend at Barking which has since been resignalled
again some years ago.
Points and Aspects: The story of resignalling a portion of the West Coast Mainline in the mid 1970s; gives
a good overview of what was entailed in a large RRI scheme that is still in use.
Signalling and Stations
A rather odd miscellany of separate items, travelling around the UK taking a look at station architecture and
signalling infrastructure in equal measure. It compares and contrasts the signalling for London Waterloo
with RETB in Scotland and a mechanical signalbox utilising token working in the West of England.
One Day in Severn Video 125
A working day filmed during the early 1990s inside the UK’s largest surviving mechanical signalbox.
Terminus www.ddhe.co.uk
Terminus: 1961 film captures the essence of a major London terminus.
London – Brighton in Four Minutes: cab video with a difference!
First of the Thirteen: Record of the 1970s modernisation scheme showing the transition of semaphore
signalling to colour lights, stagework alterations to track layouts and consolidation into a single control
centre
Mental Block Virgin Trains training video
Reconstruction of what can go wrong when temporary block working is in operation following an extensive
signalling failure. Useful for understanding the operation from signaller, handsignaller and driver
perspectives.

INTERNET
By its very nature this is always evolving and contains a range of information of various degrees of
credibility and accuracy; caution is always required when obtaining information from a website of unknown
origin. Inclusion in the list below cannot be taken as IRSE’s endorsement, but the information relating to
signalling which is available on the internet is in general of sufficiently good quality for it to be useful and
therefore investigation of what is available is a worthwhile activity.
The list below suggests some links which are likely to be useful and lead to additional resources.
PROFESSIONAL ORGANISATIONS
http://www.irse.org
The IRSE’s website. Useful for News, details of forthcoming Events and Visits, Younger Members and
Local Sections information.
• Don’t overlook the IRSE exam information (filed not particularly obviously under Careers) which
includes:
• general Guidance re examination,
• Syllabus (updated for 2008 examination),
• listing of Study Groups,
• Reading List (per module),
• Application Form
http://www.railwayoperators.org http://www.iroyoungprofessionals.org.uk
The website of the Institution of Railway Operators, including their list of talks and visits.
Also their Younger Members section.
GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS
http://www.era.europa.eu/pulbic/core/interoperability/pages/CRTSI/aspx
The European Railway Agency’s website includes this page from which the ERTMS Mandatory
Specifications can be downloaded for free. These include (amongst many others):
UIC ETCS FRS ERTMS / ETCS Functional Requirements Specification
UNISIG-SUBSET-023 Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
UNISIG-SUBSET-023 System Requirement Specification
UNISIG-SUBSET-036 FFFIS for Eurobalise
UNISIG-SUBSET-040 Dimensioning and Engineering Rules
UNISIG-SUBSET-054 Assignment of Values to ETCS Variables
These collectively provide a good source of reference for site application of ETCS and thus would be
essential study for a student intending to provide such a signalling solution in the examination. These are
fundamentally equipment specifications and not an Application Guide, yet do explain the functionality and
the constraints which need to be observed.
http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk
The website of the UK Governments’ Office of Rail Regulation. Many useful downloads are available
including:
• A Guide to ROGS
• Safe Movement of Trains (intended to be used as the basis for developing operational rules and
standards)
• Rail Safety Statistics

MISCELLANEOUS TECHNICAL REFERENCE

http://www.devilsguide.com
Claims to be “everything you ever wanted to know about running a modern railway but were afraid to ask”.
All kinds of technical information relevant to the rail industry, including glossary etc
http://www.railway-technical.com/index.shtml
A similar site that has plenty of signalling content including links to many more, plenty of information re
train braking, UK railway lexicon and conversion from the US terminology etc.
http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/
Tremendous resource for UK Railways including (but certainly not limited to) practically any accident
report from 1830 until nearly the present day which can be downloaded for free
http://www.raib.gov.uk
The site has the most recently published UK accident investigation information and other such reports.
http://www.rssb.co.uk
The web site of the UK Rail Safety & Standards Board from which can be obtained downloads of RGS as
well as data on safety performance and risk including the national monthly summary SPAD report.
http://www.railsigns.co.uk
The title almost says it all: “Rail Signs and Symbols of Great Britain” but it means Mainline.
Signs marked to denote whether current, obsolescent but examples still exist, or purely of historical interest.
They all have some explanatory text concerning their use and some also have photographs.
Complements GI/RT7033 and GK/RT0031
http://www.opsweb.co.uk
The former SPADWEB site is now renamed to reflect that it now addresses all forms of Operational risk on
the UK rail network, having originally been set up to tackle the issue of SPADs following the accidents at
Southall and Ladbroke Grove in particular.
Unfortunately whereas the former website had a significant amount of readily accessible information and
only certain of the material was restricted to those with a login and password, the site now requires a log in
to gain access at all. It is not clear how easy it will be for students to obtain access, but it does constitute a
valuable resource with lots of information available for download, such as:
• reports containing statistics on SPAD and TPWS interventions,
• Professional Driving Guides and other briefing material for drivers,
• videos on SPADs, communications etc
• Route Learning Maps (i.e. lots of signalling plans as seen by the driver) etc.
• signal sighting information.
http://www.signalbox.org
The website of a former NR signalman which concentrates on mechanical signalling but not exclusively- it
has an excellent article on RETB for example. It also has sections comparing the practice overseas with
that in the UK. The whole site is of particularly high quality and worthy of a thorough exploration.
It also has a comprehensive range of links to other sites (relating to signalling past and present in many
countries of the world) available having “pulled the distant” on the lever frame.
http://www.davros.org/rail/signalling
A website of an “interested amateur” but who seems to be well informed and able to present in a clear
manner. Articles on both UK Mainline and London Underground signalling.
http://www.du.edu/~jcalvert/railway/railhom.htm
US site re the history of railways and their signalling with a range of links to signalling in various European
countries as well as America`

http://www.irseexam.co.uk
A new website aiming to be a forum for those studying for any IRSE examination.
It is intended to be a means by which students can make contact with each other to:
• set up a physical Study Group meeting, or
• operate as a virtual Study Group (exchange information to which they have access, seek advice on a
particular problem, compare solutions etc.)
It will only be what people make it and will rely on contributions as well as potentially offering a useful
resource on which to draw. When registering, don’t forget to include some biographical details about
yourself so that everyone knows for which modules you are studying / or have already passed and in what
locality your are based; you can hardly expect anyone else will know to contact you without such
information!
http://www.imperialcollegehealthcentre.co.uk/exam.htm
http://www.childline.org.uk/examstress.asp
http://www.brookes.ac.uk/student/services/health/exam.html
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/councelling/leaflets/exam-stresstest.pdf
http://www.supportline.org.uk/problems/examstress.php
Just a small selection of websites that contain advice re how to approach examinations and preparing for
them. These are all aimed at specific audiences and thus it must be accepted that some of the advice is not
relevant to studying for the IRSE Exam, but the vast majority of it is generally applicable. Similarly every
individual is different and what suits one may not suit another, but everyone is likely to find at least
something of use to them.
http://www.testcafe.com/lbrb
http://www.mathpower.com/brain.htm
http://www.pages.towson.edu/mcmahon/generic/brain_dominance.swf
http;///www.bfc.postitscience.com/
Just a few of the sites that teach you something about your own brain, explore the different kind of
memories and offer suggestions regarding what methods of learning might suit you best.

HERITAGE AND MODEL RAILWAYS

http://www.ukhrail.uel.ac.uk/ http://www.heritagerailways.com
UK Heritage Railways website showing the location of and giving links to heritage railways and railway
museums within the UK.
A few advertise public opening of some of their signalboxes on particular “gala” days; these have in the
past included Gloucestershire & Warwickshire, Great Central, Severn Valley, Llangollen all of which have
several fine mechanical signalbox installations. In practice it is often possible to arrange to visit at other
railways, particularly if you make contact in advance.
However almost all heritage lines are single tracks with passing loops and only a few such railways have
significant quantities of colour light signalling (and that rarely controlled from a panel). The Great
Cockrow miniature railway has the signalling most relevant to module 2, is certainly by far the busiest and
the most comprehensively provisioned, having benefited from the assistance of many eminent signal
engineers over the years; see IRSE News issue 72, May 2001 pages 7-9.
Site also features links to many foreign related sites, not just the heritage sector.
http://www.nrm.org.uk
The National Railway Museum York has a reasonable display of signalling equipment and indeed has a
significant quantity in store. However it is mostly not particularly useful for module 2 study; there is
though a live view of the VDU for the York area so it is possible to watch ARS / signaller’s actions in real
time and also observe the real trains passing as a consequence.
It also has a reference library “The Search Engine” which is likely to contain a copy of any of the published
books listed at the beginning of this Appendix as well as much other archive material.
http://www.therailwayage.co.uk
This museum at Crewe is otherwise depressingly run down, but the signalling content is good and well
presented; plan your visit on a day when both the large mechanical signalbox from Exeter West and the
miniature lever frame / electrical interlocking of Crewe North Junction are both being demonstrated and
you can have a tour of the significant relay room.
http://www.ukmodelshops/other/events.php
A listing, generally with links, to the model railway exhibitions and related events planned in the UK over
the next rolling year.
The most prestigious in the calendar are typically: Warley, Birmingham (early December); Brighton
Modelworld (February); SECC Glasgow (February); Alexandra Palace; London (March), York (Easter),
Bristol (May).
One of the best layouts currently on the exhibition circuit from a signalling perspective is “Horton”- depicts
modern railway, colour light signalling controlled from VDU with computer interlocking:
http://www.bwwmrc.co.uk/layouts/horton/control.shtml
http://www.pendonmuseum.com/index.jsp
Small Oxfordshire permanent museum of highly detailed model landscapes, representing both the local area
and also Dartmoor in 1930s. Both incorporate an accurate railway, the latter being explained whilst
demonstrated. Obviously representative of the past rather than the current scene but can still give an insight
into operations.
SIMULATORS
http://www.simsig.co.uk http://www.pcrail.co.uk
Signalling simulators for various UK places available for download, modelled closely on real VDU systems
and surprisingly accurate. Others represent mechanical signal boxes and some simulations based on other
countries are available.
Recommended for those inexperienced in signalling from a signaller’s perspective; learn through play!

Appendix Z: Abbreviations
The abbreviations given in this Appendix are those used in this
resource pack and generally reflect NR usage.
Comments are intended to give a summary explanation rather than a formal definition.
Students should obtain copies of abbreviations for their railway organisation
and compare them to those below identify similarities and differences.
Initials Meaning Comments

A/L Approach Locking The means by which the locking associated with a signalled
route is maintained even after the signal has been returned to
danger. This is necessary because there are legitimate reasons
why a signaller may choose to replace a signal that has shown
a proceed aspect, yet a driver may not be able to respond to the
change.
Locking is therefore necessary if there is a possibility that a
driver has been misled (by seeing either that signal is off or
would have inferred it by seeing another signal whose aspect
has changed in response) and may be unable to stop their train
in the distance available prior to the signal recently replaced to
red.
The locking is held until either the train has been proved to
have entered the route (hence unnecessary as situation
thereafter protected by the route locking) or such a time has
elapsed that it can be assumed to have managed to stop;
comprehensive approach locking is sometimes provided and
enables instant release if it can be ensured that no driver was
within the relevant approach area to have known that the signal
had been off.
AB Absolute Block A system of controlling traffic on a double track railway
without full train detection by division into sections between
signalboxes, only one train being permitted into a section at a
time. Signallers communicate by bell code and block
instruments, the signaller in the forward box giving a “Line
Clear” so that a train can be permitted to approach from the
previous signalbox. The block is placed to Train on Line once
the train has entered the section and is maintained in that state
until it has been observed, complete with tail lamp, to have left
the section.
ABCL Automatic Barrier An AOCL but with the addition of half barriers so that to the
Crossing, Locally motorist it is essentially indistinguishable from an AHBC.
monitored

AHBC Automatic Half Barrier Crossing protected by lights and nearside half barriers blocking
Crossing the entrance to, but not the exit from, the crossing. Suitable for
rail speeds of up to 100 mph, operated automatically by
approaching trains to give motorists a minimum of 27 seconds
warning. Not suitable for sites where there are more than two
tracks or where shunting movements take place. Not suitable
unless road conditions are such that there is a negligible risk of
motorist being unable to clear the crossing in time.
No interlocking with signals, except where a signal falls within
the strike-in area and inhibits crossing operation but then as a
consequence requires “delayed clearance” controls to give
crossing time to operate. Extremely high integrity operation is
essential- crossing incorporates “self-proving” features and
correct operation is monitored by supervising signalbox.
ACE Axle Counter Evaluator The central part of an axle counter system which maintains the
current record of the number of axles within a section of line
defined at each extremity by heads mounted on the rails at the
Zps. These communicate with the ACE the number and
direction of each axle passing them. Modern ACEs are
microprocessor based multi-section evaluators and provides the
functionality for a number of sections (normally adjacent ones
on same running line).
ALARP As Low As Reasonably In the UK. it is necessary to be able to demonstrate that the
Practicable risks associated with a solution have been considered and
appropriate measures put in place to eliminate any risks
assessed as intolerable and efforts made to reduce any residual
risks where the cost of doing so is not grossly disproportional
to the safety benefit gained. When this has been achieved the
risk is regarded as ALARP; this recognises that there is a finite
amount of money which can be spent on increasing safety and
better returns on that investment are likely to be achieved if
spent on tackling other safety concerns.
AOCL Automatic Open Crossing, Crossing protected by lights but no barriers, operated by the
Locally monitored approach of a train. Lineside signs require rail driver to slow
to “crossing speed” calculated to ensure that it can brake to a
stop prior to reaching the crossing if it is not safe to traverse.
A DCI shows that motorists are being given adequate warning
but the train driver must also ensure the crossing is clear. Only
in exceptional cases is there any interlocking with signalling.
AOCLs are no longer provided new and the existing sites are
gradually being converted to ABCL (prioritised by risk).
ARS Automatic Route Setting A facility to reduce signallers’ workload by setting routes
according to the timetabled schedule of train movements,
modified by an analysis of junction conflicts where trains are
not running strictly to timetable.
ATO Automatic Train Operation ATO provides operation of trains to a timetable within limits of
safety. It is not used on the UK mainline network but
increasingly used on metro systems; ATO performs many of
the functions of the driver. It is rare for a train to be
completely unmanned; sometimes a driver performs certain
functions (e.g. operating the doors at stations), sometimes there
is a train captain with other duties but can drive the train
manually in certain circumstances if required.

ATP Automatic Train Protection ATP provides for safe control of train speed and separation and
ATB thus protects against derailment and collision.
A system to monitor the speed of a train and to intervene
should the defined safe speed be exceeded. It can be one
functionality of a system (such as within ETCS) or can be a
separate standalone system of which there are some in the UK
but limited in extent.
Other countries have more extensive systems of which ATB in
The Netherlands is a typical example; however these are
generally incompatible with each other and is one of the main
arguments for European railways all migrating to ETCS.
AWF Auto Working Facility A means by which a signaller can allow a controlled signal to
re-clear after the passage of each train without having to set the
route again; otherwise sometimes referred to as a “fleeting
button”.
AWS Automatic Warning System NR system to confirm to the driver that they are approaching
an unrestrictive aspect or alternatively to give warning of
restrictive aspect and apply the brakes if warning is not
acknowledged. See GK/RT8035
BMB Block Marker Board LU term for a lineside marker to denote limits of authority
when transmission based signalling is used, similar to FBM.
BR British Rail The former nationalised mainline railway industry in the UK;
most of the infrastructure is that which is now managed by NR
whereas the operation of train services are now the
responsibility of different companies.
CAWS Continuous Automatic Iarnród Éireann system to provide in cab display and warning
Warning System system using data transmitted from coded track circuits
CCTV Closed Circuit Television Essentially a MCB but with the signaller remote from the
(controlled level crossing) crossing and observing the crossing indirectly via CCTV in
order to give “crossing clear”
CBI Computer Based Any interlocking system whose functionality is defined by data
Interlocking rather than wiring- however some usage excludes first
generation systems such as SSI.
CD/RA Close Doors/Right Away Auxiliary indicators for signal used for train dispatch on NR
CDR Conditional Double Red Where the TPWS fitment of a junction protection signal is
(generally because of high approach speed) unable to contain
an overrun within the overlap which can be committed beyond
that signal, additional protection is necessary. The signal on
the approach to the junction signal is therefore fitted with
TPWS and the aspect sequence is arranged that this signal is
initially held at red. A train approaching too fast to be able to
stop at it would be tripped by its OSS; however once the
approaching train has passed beyond the OSS the outer signal
can be approach released. The maximum speed of a train for
which the inner signal’s TPWS fitment must be effective has
therefore been reduced and thus the MOD brought within the
available overlap.
This methodology results in there being two reds protecting
certain junctions on lines where the speed is high, the release
of the outer one being conditional upon the train having passed
the OSS.

CP Clearance Point The minimum distance from points and crossings at which
track circuit boundaries must be positioned if intended to prove
a vehicle on one track is clear of a movement on the other.
See Appendix J
CSR Cab Secure Radio An in-cab radio system which allows secure communication
between signaller and driver, now being superseded by GSM-R
CTC Centralised Traffic Control A form of working a long single line with passing loops from
one central control location, generally deployed by various
former British colonies. See refs #18, #57/3
CTP Comprehensive TPWS Fitment of TPWS intended to bring any train to a stand within
Provision the length of the locked overlap; generally this requires more
and differently placed OSS loops than were provided for the
initial retrofit programme.
CTRL Channel Tunnel Rail Link The high speed line to London St Pancras International from
the Channel Tunnel; the signalling on this line is effectively
that of the French High Speed Lines, see #13, #52/3,
DCI Driver’s Crossing Indicator Associated with AOCL or ABCL, this displays a flashing
white light to show the train driver that the road lights are
showing correctly; it emits brief red flashes at other times.
DMI Driver Machine Interface Refers, especially in ERTMS, to the means by which
information is displayed to the driver and the means by which
the driver controls the train. Hence the principal components
are usually a display screen, traction / brake controllers, the
radio system and a host of miscellaneous other functions.
DMU Diesel Multiple Unit See MU; transmission from diesel engine may be mechanical,
electric or hydraulic.
DOO Driver Only Operation The operation of a train without a guard, the driver undertaking
all primary safety responsibilities. Introduced primarily on
commuter trains, where various pre-requisites are met; these
include trains with power operated doors and the route having
full CSR operation coverage which itself requires radio
coverage and a computer based TD.
DP Danger Point ETCS term: The location beyond the EoA at with the front on
an unauthorised train movement could first come into conflict
with a legitimately positioned train (i.e. the commencement of
the “area of conflict”)
DY Delayed Yellow The delayed clearance of a signal when routed to a main signal
where only a restricted overlap is available.
EB Emergency Brake LUL context: the brake used to bring the train to a stand as
quickly as possible following intervention of the train
protection system
ETCS (and generally but not always within NR) context:
The guaranteed brake used by either the driver or the on board
system to stop the train in emergency or when other brake
systems has failed. It will not necessarily stop the train more
quickly than the service brake. See Appendix F.
ECS Empty Coaching Stock A movement of passenger rolling stock which is not an
advertised train for the carriage of passengers; can include
short trips to / from sidings or depots and longer distance
journeys getting into position for a commuter trip at the
beginning of the day or the equivalent return working after the
last train at night.

EIRENE European Integrated The Functional and System Requirements for an Interoperable
Railway Enhanced Network radio system as part of ERTMS, substantially based upon GSM
but with various adaptations for railway application.
EoA End of Authority The place to which ETCS issues an MA and the target speed is
zero, broadly equivalent to the position of the exit signal at red
in lineside signalling. [Note a LoA is the place to which a train
is permitted to proceed with target speed >0].
ELR Engineer’s Line Reference The ELR convention has been used for many years on the UK
mainline network to give a nomenclature for each separate
stretch of railway line. At a junction between railway routes
the ELR for the principal line is generally continuous but there
is a different ELR for the diverging formation, whether or not
the mile posts reset to zero or continue counting from the same
datum as for the main route. Hence whereas some ELRs
continue for hundreds of miles, some may be short chord
connections between intersecting or crossing lines of route and
may therefore be only a few hundred yards in length. Where,
for historic reasons, the datum of the mileage changes the ELR
also changes; the combination of a longitudinal mileage and an
ELR should uniquely identify a particular location.
EMU Electric Multiple Unit See MU; traction current may be supplied by overhead line or
additional rail(s).
EOL Extended Overlap This term means something slightly different for lineside
signalling and ETCS implementations.
Lineside: In order to reduce junction risk it is sometimes
necessary to set and lock points for an extended distance
beyond a protecting signal so that the basic train protection
provided by TPWS can be effective from a high approach
speed. However the risks associated with a rear end collision
are less and it would be excessive to treat this position as the
extent of train detection (delayed clearance of signal in rear
would have impact for headway). In these circumstances two
separate positions are defined, the EOL being the extent of
locking and a shorter “aspect overlap” denoting the extent of
train detection; see RTP. Sometimes associated with “blind
locking” and “locking beyond the overlap”.
ETCS: An additional overlap provided in order to provide a
sufficient length beyond the EoA to enable specific trains
(generally freight) to allow a reasonable RSp so that the FBM
can be closely approached.
EP Electro Pneumatic Function operated by air pressure that is controlled via
electrically operated valves; can apply to trackside
infrastructure such as points and train stops or to train braking
systems for example. Electro pneumatic equipment can also be
found in Interlocking Machine Rooms (IMR) e.g. remotely
controlled mechanical interlocking machines.
EPS Enhanced Permissible The speed which applies to tilting trains over the normally
Speed permissible speed of a portion of line due to the higher levels
of cant deficiency at which they can operate. A speed
supervision and control system is necessary- see GE/RT8012.

ERA European Rail Agency Set up by the European Union to create a safe, modern and
integrated rail network by setting standards both for safety and
for interoperability and promoting increased use of the rail
network.
It acts as the system authority for ERTMS and the relevant
specifications can be down loaded from its website.
ESM Engineering Safety Perhaps better known as “The Yellow Book”, this interprets
Management standards such as EN50126, EN50128 EN50129 and contains
guidance for identifying and addressing system failures and
associated hazards.
ERTMS European Rail Traffic A system for managing rail traffic enabling it to operate on
Management System compatible signalling systems across European borders.
ETB Electric Token Block Signalling system for a single line in which possession of a
token is the prime authority to enter the section. There are
multiple tokens held in various token instruments only one of
which can be released at any one time.
See Appendix K
ETCS European Train Control In cab signalling system incorporating full train protection to
System which the railways of Europe are gradually migrating to
achieve increased safety and interoperability. Key component
of ERTMS.
Functionality defined by various documents that may be freely
downloaded from the ERA.
ETS Electric Train Staff A term which nowadays generally refers to any system of
electrically connected instruments (staff, tablet or token) from
which a maximum of one physical item can be removed at any
one time; this item confers the right for a train to occupy a
section of single line.
EVC European Vital Computer Central component of the on-board subsystem of ETCS which
is connected to the GSM-R antenna, the odometry and the
BTM (=Balise Transmission Module) which obtains
information from track mounted balises.
FBM Fixed Block Marker Specifically an ETCS marker board whose main purpose is to
act as the designation of the place at which a driver should stop
when in degraded mode. They are placed in the physical
vicinity of an EoA where such a site protects a junction or
some other hazard.
Note that the presentation now features a yellow arrow
pointing towards the applicable track on a blue background
rather than the yellow triangle symbol that is still depicted in
GK/RT0033; this is an international change following the need
to utilise different markers than utilised for the French TVM
system on a dual fitted high speed line.
FIS [Form, (Fit)] and Function It is important that there is an interface specification to define
FFIS Interface Specification the manner in which it interfaces at any boundary. Similarly
FFFIS within a system, there need to be specifications which define
the interactions between the different sub-systems within it.
The degree to which it is appropriate to define an interface
does depend upon its nature; a functional specification only
defines what it should do whereas a FFFIS should ensure that
one item made to that specification is completely
interchangeable with another made to the same specification.

FP Fouling Points The position on a converging, diverging or crossing line

beyond which any vehicle would infringe the required passing
clearance for a vehicle on the other line.
See Appendix J
FRACAS Fault Recording And A means of “learning from experience” during the
Corrective Action System development or operation of a system.
Any failure to meet its specification is logged and then
investigated to determine the fault(s) which gave rise to it. An
assessment of the underlying root cause is then undertaken
with the intention of eliminating it, or if this is not practicable,
to provide some mitigation to protect against it or reduce its
impact appropriately. The intention is to reduce the likelihood
of repeated failures (in the same or a similar system) by
reducing the chance of the fault occurring and /or increasing
system resilience when such faults do occur.
FRL Fixed Red Light LUL term . Most through platforms are only signalled in one
direction of running; however a FRL is often provided in the
position of a platform starter for the opposite direction. They
are needed to limit the extent of any move signalled into that
platform as a terminus (depending on the track layout a move
from a siding or via a crossover from the other running line)
but are sometimes provided when no such move is possible. In
this instance their role is to guard against the risk of a
motorman (driver) getting into the wrong cab when first
joining the train and then attempting to drive their train in the
wrong direction along the line.
LUL also require all colour light moves to be terminated by a
colour light. Therefore FRL are often provided along side
shunt signals where the move up to the shunt signal has been
authorised by a colour light signal.
NR utilise “fixed reds” (possibly qualified with a PL aspect if

there is a shunt route beyond) to limit the extent of a running
move in similar circumstances but do not use the abbreviation;
such cases are treated as full signals, albeit only having one
possible aspect. Signals are not provided to guard against a
stationary train starting to move off in a direction for which the
line is not signalled.
FS Full Supervision ETCS mode of operation when the on-board system has all the
train and track data available that is required for complete
supervision of train movements against a dynamic speed
profile. It is not selected by the driver but is entered
automatically when all the necessary conditions are fulfilled.
FTN Fixed Telecomms Network The project to provide communication nodes distributed at
strategic places along almost all NR’s railway lines. The
system is primarily based on fibre optic transmission and is
constructed to be fully diverse, with the relevant ends of the
lines being interconnected by means of dedicated
communication paths provided by a public network operator.
Its primary role is to provide the communication needed to
support GSM-R and thus eventually ERTMS but it is also
intended to provide for all other railway communication.
FY Flashing Yellow NR aspect giving advance warning of divergence at next signal
(provided only for relatively high speed divergences)

FYY Flashing Double Yellow NR aspect giving initial advance warning of divergence at next
signal (provided only for relatively high speed divergences)
G Green Aspect Unrestrictive aspect in route signalling; in speed signalling its
meaning depends on the other aspects simultaneously
displayed.
g Acceleration due to gravity,
approximately 9.8 metres per second per second
GF Ground Frame A local facility for operating points (and associated signals, if
any) which needs to be released from the signalbox before it
can be utilised. Generally a GF is mechanical lever frame but
may be a switch panel. The GF can be released directly
electrically, indirectly via an Annett’s key (itself electrically
released) or via the possession of the relevant single line token
or staff by the driver of the train.
The release cannot be normalised until all functions controlled
by the GF have themselves been normalised; conflicting
functions of the main signalbox are locked until the GF has
been proved normalised.
See Appendix L
GPL Ground Position Light NR shunting signal, ground mounted. To current standards
displays two horizontal red lights when on (=stop) and twin
white lights at 45 degrees when off (= proceed prepared to stop
short of any obstruction, maximum speed of 15mph).
GPS Global Positioning System System for determining co-ordinates by measuring small time
differences in signals from satellites in earth orbit, colloquially
known as Sat-Nav.
GSM-R Global System for Mobile A railway-enhanced-functionality version of GSM (digital
Communications- Railway cellular radio network) developed according to the EIRENE
specific. using a frequency band dedicated to railway use.
HD Headway Distance The closest distance between two trains running at the same
defined constant speed where the aspects of the 2nd are not
affected by the presence of the 1st.
HT Headway Time The minimum time between two trains such that the running of
the 2nd train is not influenced by the presence of the 1st. It is
only meaningful for two trains which perform identically and
have the same stopping pattern. As the trains accelerate /
decelerate / stop during their journey, the distance between
them constantly varies but the time between them remains
constant
IDC Inter Disciplinary Check A review of a concept design undertaken by specialists from
many different technical and non-technical disciplines so that it
can be agreed before being used as a basis to develop detailed
designs. A Signalling Plan is an example where there are
many interfaces to consider and thus a review would involve
track engineers, structures engineers, electrification engineers,
signallers, drivers, timetable planners, human factors experts,
architects etc according to context.
IM Infrastructure Manager Duty holder for the Operation, Maintenance and Renewal of
railway infrastructure.

IPS Individual Point Switch A 3-position switch provided so that points are able to be
operated individually (to provide protection, for degraded
mode operation during handsignalling, or for testing purposes)
as well as when forming part of a route. The switches are
usually left in the centre position which enables their position
to be selected automatically for the routes being set on the
layout but the position of the points can be forced to a certain
lie by placing the switch either Normal or Reverse as
appropriate. Routes that require the points in the opposite
position are then prevented from setting.
IRJ Insulated Rail Joint A means of mechanically joining two lengths of rail
IBJ Insulated Block Joint mechanically whilst providing electrical insulation between
them so that it can form the limit of a track circuit section.
Sometimes called track joint.
JRI Junction Route Indicator Term used by several railways for an indicator broadly similar
to NR PLJI but with less individual lights.
kph Kilometres per Hour Metric measurement of speed used in the majority of the
world. In the UK few railways are signed in kph, but used
technically for ease of calculation.
Note the alternative abbreviation kmh is sometimes used
instead.
LED Light Emitting Diode LEDs are used in modern colour light signals in lieu of
incandescent lamps and coloured filters.
LHSC Left Hand Switch Closed A description of the lie of a set of points when looking at the
toes (switch tips) from the viewpoint of a train about to
traverse them in the facing direction. LHSC is such that the
wheel on the left hand running rail will be deflected onto the
switch rail and thus the train take the route through the points
which is towards the right; it thus gives parallel running for a
trailing crossover between running lines on which trains run on
the left hand of a pair of tracks.
LoA Limit of Authority See EoA; it is similar but slightly different!
LOS Limit of Shunt The fixed extent of movement authority for a shunting
movement being undertaken in the opposite direction to the
running movements for which that line is signalled. On NR
historically it could be a illuminated sign, but to current
standards is the horizontal display of twin red lights usually at
ground level (GPL without an off aspect)
LRBG Last Relevant Balise Group The last valid, linked and correctly read balise used by a train
as a trackside reference from which to determine its current
location. A balise group marked as unlinked can never be used
as LRBG since its position may itself be unknown to the RBC.
LUL London Underground The former infrastructure manager of London’s tube and sub
(Limited) surface line metro network, now part of “Transport for
London” which is a local government body responsible for
managing transport services across London and setting
strategic development
LX Level Crossing Intersection of railway with public or private road or footpath.
Grade Crossing Many minor crossings may be without active protection, but
higher risk crossings are generally protected by lights and
possibly supplemented with full or partial barriers.

MA Movement Authority The ETCS equivalent of a proceed aspect as given by a lineside

signal. It is given to the EVC by the RBC and contains such
information as the ETCS mode, the speed profile and the
gradient profile of the route to be taken up to the EoA.
MAF Main Aspect Free Form of NR junction signalling where the diverging route
speed is sufficiently similar to the straight route that no
approach release is required The rare MAF-SD (Splitting
Distant) is used when there is a speed differential but the driver
is given full information regarding the junction signal’s aspect
by the display of “splitting distant” at the preceding signal.
MAR Main Aspect approach The most common form of NR junction signalling in which
released from Red driver initially believes will be stopped at the junction signal.
This signal is then permitted to step-up to its true aspect when
the approaching train has passed the signal in rear and it is
ensured that there is no risk of the driver seeing the main
aspect without being able to read the route indicator which
qualifies it.
Movement Authority In ETCS the message given by a train in certain circumstances
Request (such as at SoM) in order to obtain an MA from the RBC.
MARI Miniature Alphanumeric A short range route indicator for use with PL aspects to display
MI Route Indicator one or more characters to inform the driver the route which is
set. Uses quartz halogen lamp and fibre optic technology or
LED technology.
These effectively superseded the old stencil indicators (which
literally were a cut out stencil illuminated by a lamp behind)
that were abbreviated “ST”; some people still refer to the
modern equivalent by that name.
MAS Multiple Aspect Signalling Signalling where both the stop and the warning indications are
given by the colour of the displayed light(s) and the aspect
displayed by one signal is dependent upon the one ahead,
rather than colour light replacements of semaphore signals.
Generally associated with TCB and route setting panels or
VDU equivalent.
MAY-YY Main Aspect approach Form of NR junction signalling which is less restrictive than
MAY- FA released from Yellow with MAR.
Double Yellow in rear MAY-YY was previously called “free Yellow” and in this
scenario the driver initially believes they will be passing the
junction signal showing Single Yellow. It is only used within
4 aspect signalling and the driver receives initial warning to
brake via the usual Double Yellow sequence (apparently due to
the signal beyond the junction being at Red). However this is
actually misleading; the junction signal is actually being held
at Yellow for the diverging route until the approaching train
has passed the signal in rear and the driver is able to read the
route indicator.
It is only a suitable method of signalling where it can be
ensured that the resulting speed reduction is sufficient for all
trains to be able to pass over the junction at a safe speed once
the driver learns the true situation (by being able to read the
route indicator at the junction signal). It requires site specific
calculation relating to the position and speed of the divergence
with respect to braking curves of all rolling-stock and is a non-
preferred option, although useful in some limited
circumstances.

Main Aspect approach Form of NR junction signalling which is less restrictive than
released from Yellow with MAR.
Flashing Aspect in rear MAY-FA provided where diverging route speed is a significant
percentage of that for the straight route; the driver receives a
“flashing aspect” sequence on approach to the junction.
The driver therefore initially believes will be passing the
junction signal showing Single Yellow with a PLJI and is
warned of this by being told of the forthcoming divergence by
passing a signal displaying Flashing Single Yellow (in 4 aspect
signalling this is normally itself preceded by a signal
displaying Flashing Double Yellow). The junction signal is
then permitted to step-up to its true aspect when the
approaching train has passed the signal in rear and it is ensured
that there is no risk of the driver seeing the main aspect without
being able to read the route indicator which qualifies it.
MCB Manned Controlled Barriers Level crossing protected by lights and full barriers which
completely close the railway against the road and controlled
from a signalbox who can directly observe the crossing
through the window. Signals reading over the crossing can
only show a proceed aspect after the signaller has confirmed
that the crossing is clear of obstructions after the barriers have
been proved down. Generally the signaller lowers and raises
the crossing by the operation of buttons but, dependent upon
site circumstances, Auto Raise is often provided and Auto
Lower may also be provided.
A CCTV crossing is essentially similar but the signaller is
remote and views the crossing via a VDU.
MOD Maximum Overrun The furthest extent which a train would be expected to travel
Distance beyond the signal at danger before coming to rest following
intervention of TPWS either by the TSS at the signal itself or
an OSS on its approach.
mph Miles per Hour UK measurement of speed.
A mile is approximately 1608m. An hour is 3600s.
MRSP Most Restrictive Speed The speed which a train must not exceed at any particular place
Profile on its route; it reflects the lowest value of all the constraints-
the line profile, any temporary speed restrictions, the train
characteristics.
MRT Minimum Reading Time The assessment of the time required for a driver approaching a
[MRD] [Minimum Reading particular signal to:
Distance] • detect the presence,
• determine whether it is applicable to their train,
• observe the whole signal being displayed,
• interpret the information presented to determine any
action which is required in response.
This assessment is made by the signal sighting committee
when determining whether the proposed placement of a
lineside signal or sign is acceptable. It is used to calculate the
Minimum Reading Distance (based on maximum permissible
speed) for the signal.

MSL Miniature Stop Lights Red / Green lights provided at certain minor level crossings
MWL Miniature Warning Lights where the combination of the speed of trains / site visibility
means that the user would otherwise be unable to use the
crossing safely. Not used at a public road, but may be at a
private user crossing or at footpaths / bridleways especially if
usage is high or there are other specific risk factors. The
normally displayed green light is extinguished and the
associated red is lit automatically by the approach of a train.
MU Multiple Unit Several vehicles semi-permanently coupled together as a “set”
DMU Diesel Multiple Unit or “unit” which can either be a complete self-contained train
EMU Electric Multiple Unit having a driving cab at each end, or coupled to similar unit(s)
to create a longer train with all the traction and braking
controlled from the leading cab.
N_PIG Number- Position In Group ETCS packet which is transmitted by each individual balise to
identify its relative position (1-8) within a balise group;
numbers increase when balise group read in the nominal
direction (general the Up direction of the line).
NNTR Notified National Technical A standard notified to the European Commission by the
Rule national body (the DfT = Department of Transport in the case
of the UK) to address an “open point” within the TSI
NR Network Rail The railway infrastructure manager of mainline railway within
the UK.
NSTR No Signaller Token Remote A method of operating single lines with passing loops where
all trains stop;, at each site train staff are authorised verbally to
operate traditional key token instruments themselves by a
signaller supervising the line remotely.
NTS Not To Scale Abbreviation generally written on plans where the majority is
to a quoted scale but where certain sections are not to that scale
but purely representative of relative positioning.
O/L Overlap The safety distance beyond a signal as a mitigation against
SPAD. Conflicting use of this length of railway is prevented
generally by the locking of points. Normally train detection is
proved clear in the controls of routes reading up to the signal,
as a mitigation against rear-end collision as well as junction
risk.
OCB Odometry Correction Balise A balise provided solely to provide the on-board ETCS system
with a new reference point for distance measurement.
OS On Sight ETCS mode of operation which allows restricted movement (to
a defined maximum speed and distance) in situations where
track occupancy is not known by the system. The driver is
responsible for checking the track occupancy when moving the
train.
OSS Over Speed Sensor TPWS loops separated by a distance that defines the set speed;
if the onboard detects the 2nd frequency within a critical time
period of the first, then the speed-trap operates and the train is
braked to a stand.

OTW-NS One Train Working: No A means of operating a dead-end single line section. Instead of
Staff a train staff to be carried by each train as authorisation,
admission is controlled only by a colour light signal. The
length of the line does not have train detection but an
indication of the occupancy status is given by the use of a
sequence of track circuit / treadle operation to prove
“something on” / “something off”. However the responsibility
for ensuring that each train exiting the branch is indeed intact
is that of its driver. Majority of applications are for the last leg
of a passenger only branch to a single terminal platform,
although there can be a depot or sidings beyond the end of the
defined single line section.
P&C Points and Crossing LUL term meaning effectively the same as S&C.
PD Position Detector LUL term for a means of positively determining the presence
of a vehicle. These are usually used to detect the front of the
train, a train length beyond a critical site in order to be able to
give added assurance that the train really has cleared the
section and that a track “bob” (i.e. a brief invalid clearance due
to momentary loss of train shunt as might occur on a stretch of
rusty rails) has not occurred.
These are used as an alternative to the delta tracks which
operate at high frequency and pick up when there is an axle
shorting the rails in close proximity, being overlaid over and
operating independently from the normal track circuits.
Another use is to measure the speed of a train between two
positions, thus allowing the interlocking to be relaxed due to
the confidence that the train is following a normal braking
curve; for example trainstops in platforms can be arranged to
allow a slow moving train to pass yet trip one approaching the
signal at danger too quickly, thus permitting a shorter overlap
to be provided at the site.
PL / PLS Position Light aspect / NR aspect associated with a main running signal for use either
Position Light Shunt to authorise shunting movements (similar to a GPL) or in some
limited situations allow “permissive passenger” movements to
be made into occupied platforms. Displays two diagonal white
lights for off but is extinguished otherwise (since associated
with a main red aspect).
PLJI Position Light Junction Route indicator representing divergence from straight route by
Indicator angled white lights (on NR, a minimum of 3 of the 5 lights
must be proved illuminated to be regarded as a valid
indication).
Colloquially known as “feathers” (or north of the border:
“horns”)
PLOD Patrolman’s Lock Out A means by which a track patrolman can disable any “wrong-
Device direction” signalled movements on a defined section of line.
This protection allows the track to be inspected whilst walking
facing on coming traffic without the risk of a train utilising the
railway in the opposite direction
POE Point Operating Equipment The track mounted equipment that provides the actuation,
locking and detection over the length of the moving rails of a
set of points. In the case of a traditional point machine it
therefore includes items such as the mounting, the rods, the
back drive and supplementary detectors as well as the actual
machine itself.

POL Phantom Overlap The limit of overlap locking where the track section extends
PROL Phantom Restricted Overlap further; hence at a theoretical position rather than being
coincident with a physical track section joint. These are used
where an overlap length falls just short of a set of points which
are therefore not detected in the overlap but the track circuit
over them is included since part of it falls within the calculated
position.
POSA Proceed On Sight Aspect A proposed degraded mode aspect which has yet actually to be
commissioned on NR. The intention is that it would prove that
points in the wheeled path from the entrance to the exit signal
(but not flank, nor overlap) are set, locked and detected but not
train detection. It would be used to authorise a driver to pass a
signal at danger and proceed at caution as a quicker and safer
alternative to receiving such authority by verbal
communication with the signaller. Fundamentally it proves
“route secure” and thus allows the driver to proceed for as far
as the line is clear,
POV Point of Visibility The position from which the driver of a train which is
undertaking a permissive movement into an already occupied
platform has a clear view of the first train which is continuous
until the place where the second train is to be brought to a
stand. The POV shall be determined for each position at which
the nearest part of the first train could stand in normal working.
PZT Point Zone Telephone A telephone provided in the vicinity of each junction area so
that there is one in reasonable proximity of any set of points.
Primary use is when points have to be hand-wound locally in
failure conditions or when technicians are working on the
points. Usually dedicated phones to “concentrator” but can be
normal dial phones on the railway’s general telephone
network.
R Red aspect Stop aspect in route signalling; however in speed signalling it
may have other meanings in conjunction with other aspects
displayed.
RAMS Reliability, Availability, RAMS, in combination, is a measure of a system’s
Maintainability, Safety dependability- the reliance that can be placed upon its ability of
to perform its intended functions adequately.
For signalling systems Safety (the avoidance of death, injury or
poor health to people and avoidance of damage to property and
environment) is clearly important. However “right-side”
failures do not only cause delay but the need to operate trains
under some form of degraded mode is subject to human error
and therefore also contributes to risk. Hence Availability (the
percentage of the time when the system is able to operate
properly) is also important; this itself depends upon how likely
the system is to fail (measured by Reliability) and how much
time it takes to repair after a failure or needs to be taken out of
service to receive other maintenance attention (measured by
Maintainability).
Note that if the system is fault tolerant, a failure of a
component may not cause an operational failure of the system
as a whole, so it is important to distinguish between logistic
reliability (requiring maintenance attention) and operational
reliability (loss of function for the operator).

RBC Radio Block Centre A key component of the “lineside” subsystem of ETCS. This
computer performs the communications with the EVC on
board trains, giving them the appropriate MA to maintain the
appropriate train separation. It obtains information from the
interlocking (which performs the route reservation, locking and
proving). Where there is a bi-directional link, train position
information can be given to the interlocking to be used for
route release purposes etc.
RETB Radio Electronic Token A signalling system used primarily on single lines with low
Block traffic density. An electronic token is issued from the
controlling signalbox (via SSI and dedicated radio) to the train
and is displayed to the driver as their authority top proceed
between the named places. This requires radio coverage at all
passing loops / other TEP (Token Exchange Points) and all
trains to be fitted with receiving equipment (transportable unit
available for those not permanently fitted).
Hydro-pneumatic points are provided at the passing loops
which are set to the left for facing movements and for which
the train can trail through when leaving a loop. Minimum
signalling is provided: primarily Stop board with TPWS at the
loop exits and point indicators which assure the driver that the
points are held securely in position for passage at slow speed in
the facing direction.
RGS Railway Group Standards A suite of documents under the management of RSSB
pertinent to UK mainline rail. These are generally high level
standards which are focussed on control of risk at the interfaces
between different companies. The most relevant ones to IRSE
Module 2 are the “Rule Book” and the successors of the
documents formerly known as “Signalling Principles”; see #2
RHSC Right Hand Switch Closed A description of the lie of a set of points when looking at the
toes (switch tips) from the viewpoint of a train about to
traverse them in the facing direction. RHSC is such that the
wheel on the right hand running rail will be deflected onto the
switch rail and thus the train take the route through the points
which is towards the left; it thus gives parallel running for a
facing crossover between running lines.
ROL Restricted Overlap On NR an additional short (generally 0-100m) overlap which is
justified by ensuring that the signal is only approached
cautiously, due to the delayed clearance of the signal reading
up to it (associated with Warning class route).
NB some older texts refer to the term “reduced overlap” in this
context; reduced overlap nowadays means an overlap less than
180m but whose reduced length is justified by the low
permissible speed of approach and therefore associated with a
main route and normal aspect sequence.
ROGS Railway and Other Guided The legislative Regulations applicable to railways in the UK.
Transport Systems 2006 They put into practice the 2004 European Railway Safety
Directive and replaced the existing legislation:
• The Railways and Other Transport Systems (Approval
of Works, Plant and Equipment) Regulations 1994
• The Railways Safety Critical Work Regulations 1994
• The Railways Safety Case Regulations 2000

RSp Release Speed A speed calculated to ensure that the train can approach the end
of its MA in a safe manner (i.e. with the guarantee that it
would be able to stop prior to the SvL)
RSSB Rail Safety and Standards Body to lead and facilitate the industry’s work to achieve
Board continuous improvement in the Health & Safety of UK
railways. One of prime responsibilities is to manage the RGS.
RRI Route Relay Interlocking Any interlocking based on the use of relays and hard wired
electrical circuits to control colour light signalling. There are
many different variants, but the primary distinction is that
between:
a) free wired- each relay is a separate component with
bespoke wiring designed for the individual site circumstances
for the functionality required
b) geographical- factory built standard “sets” incorporate
standard functionality in a generic manner for a signal, point,
track circuit etc. These are then used as “building blocks” that
are connected together by cabling in a manner that represents
the physical track layout, and are customised to implement
whichever of their in built functionalities are actually needed
RTP Robust Train Protection A policy adopted by NR to improve safety in the event of a
SPAD. It consists of several elements:
• a level of TPWS provision (CTP) above that which
was retrofitted to the existing signalling following the
Ladbroke Grove and Southall accidents,
• calculated overlap lengths based on the above
(including a distinction where necessary between the
proof in aspect for following trains and an EOL
locking a greater length of railway to lock-out junction
collisions)
• greater consideration of the safest possible overrun
path beyond a signal,
• a combination of “soft calling” and more auto
restoration of points which could provide flank and
trapping protection,
• overrun protection to revert valid aspects in the event
of a SPAD at a signal which should be protecting the
conflict.
RU Railway Undertaking The holder of a Safety Certificate for the provision of rail
transport services for goods and / or passengers with the
requirement that the undertaking must ensure traction.
In the UK these are generally known as:
TOCs ( = Passenger Train Operating Company) and
FOCs (=Freight Operating Company)
S&C Switch and Crossing Pointwork at junctions between tracks or intersections of
tracks, as opposed to “plain line”.

SARI Standard Alphanumeric A medium range route indicator for use with main aspects to
SI Route Indicator display one or more characters to inform the driver the route
which is set. Uses quartz halogen lamp and fibre optic
technology or LED technology.
These superseded a former indicator (which had much poorer
approach visibility) which were formally designated MLRI
(Multi Lamp Route Indicators) but were almost always referred
to as “Theatres” and indeed the abbreviation “TH” was an
official designation on route boxes etc. Some old drawings
still use the former nomenclature and some people use term for
the larger fibre optic indicators but they are really significantly
different both in technology and usage.
SASSPAD Start at Signal SPAD See SPAD
SBD Service Braking Distance The distance within which train can be brought to rest from
relevant speed when a full service (i.e. usual, such that
passengers do not experience discomfort or alarm) brake
application is made; if un-stated braking from the greatest
permissible speed of the train is assumed.
SCAT Speed Control After LUL term for the onboard functionality which constrains the
Tripping train to travel at a low maximum speed for a defined time
period after there has been an intervention; this lowers the risk
of an incident when it is necessary for a train to pass a signal at
danger.
Such functionality is not part of NR’s TPWS but is being
considered as one possible option to address the problem of
“reset and continue” after an intervention.
SLW Single Line Working A form of degraded mode working in which traffic is passed
on one of a pair of uni-directionally signalled tracks to bypass
an obstruction or bypass engineering work on the other. This
is achieved by the appointment of a pilotman used as a human
temporary train staff.
On NR this term is not used for the normal working traffic on a
single line with passing loops, but other railways may differ in
this respect.
SH SHunting mode ETCS mode of operation when shunting movements are to be
performed; supervision is to a given ceiling speed and within a
set geographical area. The driver can select SH when the train
is at a standstill or can be ordered by the trackside.
SOD Safe Overrun Distance The distance beyond a signal at danger for which an
overrunning train will remain free of any possibility of junction
conflict. When TPWS was retrofitted to NR, it had to be
accepted that it could not always be effective for all trains.
The SOD was the site measured distance from the signal to the
possible conflict and in general was longer than the proved
overlap.
SoM Start of Mission ETCS status as the EVC leaves the SB (=Standby) state
(during which the brakes are fully applied) to transition into
any mode in which the train can be moved, usually upon
receipt of a MA but possibly by the driver accepting
responsibility to do so in SR.

SPAD Signal Passed At Danger running SPAD- train fails to stop at a red signal
SASSPAD- train starts from rest against a red signal
SOYSPAD- train SPADs having inappropriately continued to
accelerate after having correctly restarted (significance of
yellow forgotten), generally after a station stop.
SP Sighting Point The furthest from a signal at which a driver can reliably read
the aspect and associated route indication of a signal. When
considering the proposed positioning a lineside signal or sign,
the sighting committee compare this to the MRD to determine
whether such placement is acceptable.
SPT Signal Post Telephone A dedicated telephone provided at each main running signal
which connects to a “concentrator” so that the signaller knows
the origin of the call. Primary use is communicating safety
critical message to the driver to pass the signal at danger when
there is a failure or abnormal working.
SR Staff Responsible ETCS mode of operation which allows a driver to move a train
on their own authority within an ETCS equipped area;
supervision is to a given ceiling speed and within a set
geographical area. It is used when the system does not have
full information concerning the route (e.g. after awakening or
after a loss of radio contact).
SSI Solid State Interlocking An early CBI, in use in the UK for over 20 years. It is a
distributed system with TFMs (=Trackside Functional Module)
for signals and points in location cases connected via
duplicated data links to the central interlocking.
SSP Static Speed Profile The map of the route in terms of the speed limit at any position
along it; this reflects the maximum line speed qualified by any
speed restrictions relating to curves, pointwork, tunnels and
bridges etc.
NB historically SSP = This nomenclature has almost fallen into disuse now that the
Standard Signalling UK Signalling Principles are published as RGS by RSSB but
Principles may well be encountered in older references.
SvL Supervised Location ETCS term for the place by which it can be guaranteed the
train will be stopped due to train protection; it is distinct from,
but broadly similar to, the concept of overlap used by the
interlocking. The SvL can be co-located with the EoA or
beyond it, “at the end of the overlap” but it always relates to it.
It must always be prior to the DP and if beyond the EoA as a
train approaches it is often time limited (i.e. analogous to an
overlap “timing out”)
Formal definition of SvL is that it is defined on board as:
• the end of the overlap assigned (if any, and prior to
timeout)
• else the DP (if any),
• else the EoA.
TAF Track Ahead Free An ETCS term for the functionality by which the driver
confirms that there is no other vehicle between the front of
their train and the nominal start of the MA to enable a train to
start its journey with a higher level of supervision than would
otherwise have been possible. In some circumstances the TAF
can be automated.

TBS Transmission Based A generic term which relates to any form of signalling in
Signalling which the driver is given an “in-cab” display rather than
lineside signals to observe. The manner in which the relevant
data is transmitted to the train is generally via the track circuit,
via inductive loops or via radio. Similarly the content of the
data and the use of it on board the train also varies between
systems. TBS generally incorporates train protection; indeed
historically systems have tended to evolve from those
originally provided purely for that purpose. ETCS is just one
modern example of TBS.
TCB Track Circuit Block A method of operating trains where train separation is ensured
by provision of train detection throughout (continuous track
circuits or axle counter) dividing the railway into sections. A
signal controls admission to each section and may only show a
proceed aspect whilst there is no train between that signal and
the extent of the overlap beyond the exit signal of that section,
(except in the special cases of permissive or shunt working).
Therefore there is no requirement to ensure that trains leaving
the section are complete.
Signal replacement is generally automatic; where it is not
prompt, automatic and guaranteed then the replacement must
be proved in the controls of the signal in rear.
TCB may be used on any line (uni-directional or bi-directional)
where the type of vehicle and the level of traffic are adequate
to operate reliably the train detection system employed. A
signal is required at any place at which a train is permitted to
reverse its direction of travel in order to authorise the
movement. Once a train has stopped in a permissive platform,
it has no authority to restart towards the exit signal unless that
signal is itself cleared.
TCI Track Circuit Interrupter A physical device that detects that a train has passed through
trap points and may therefore be derailed and thus may fail to
continue to occupy the track circuit and may indeed become
foul of other lines. See section 6.26.5.
TD Train Describer Equipment which associates a character code that (at least on
any signalbox at any time) uniquely defines a specific train
with the train detection. Thus a TD is stepped from signal
berth to signal berth as the train operates train detection so that
a signaller always knows which train is approaching any
signal. TDs are also transmitted automatically from one
signalbox to another.
TES Train Entering Sidings LUL term for the special train protection required for a train
approaching buffer stops in a siding; similar to TETS. See
Appendix M1

TETS Train Entering Terminal LUL term for the special train protection required. It is
Station generally implemented by the use of “blind trainstops” (i.e.
trainstops not associated with a physical signal) which are
designed to lower and thus allow the passage of a train but only
if it is proved that it is running at a suitable speed. It is normal
for the station home signal to incorporate speed control in
order to prove that a train is being driven at an appropriate
speed.
NR utilise TPWS overspeed loops to act as a speed-trap to
intervene unless a train approaching passenger buffer-stops is
running at less than 11mph; this is a less sophisticated way of
addressing a similar risk and is referred to as “bufferstop OSS”
See Appendix M1
TI21 Traction Immune track A “jointless” track circuit using the rail impedance and tuned
circuit zones to permits separation into separate track circuits without
the use of IRJs
TISP Train In Section Proving A SSI term for the sequence of track section occupancy which
proves that a train has passed beyond a signal and thus the A/L
can be released.
ToOL / Time of Operation Locking Locking imposed on facing points lying just beyond (typically
T of Op 35m) protecting signal
TORR Train Operated Route The automatic cancellation of a route after the passage of a
Release train
TPWS Train Protection and A system that provides protection which mitigates the effects
Warning System of a SPAD. A TSS at the signal is energised whenever the
signal is at danger and causes a brake intervention. In general
there are additional OSS loops on the approach to a signal
which similarly intervenes if a train passes them at greater than
their “set speed” whilst the associated signal is at danger.
tph Trains per hour Measure of headway applicable to a regular interval service;
i.e. generally identical trains with the same calling pattern
along a stretch of route where the time between trains is
timetabled to be constant. [Indeed if a train becomes delayed,
trains in front are sometimes deliberately held in order that
once the service can resume the trains are suitably spread out
rather than being bunched together.]
It tends therefore to be used primarily for Metros; on Mainlines
there is overall a less frequent service of dissimilar trains and
the more relevant figure is the closest time spacing at which
any two train can be run, rather than the number that can pass
through within a period of one hour.
TRTS Train Ready to Start A means by which platform dispatch staff can advise the
TRS signaller that platform duties are complete / the train is staffed
ready for departure and it is appropriate to commit the route to
the train. Also occasionally used at freight facilities / rolling
stock depots or stabling sidings, similarly to indicate that there
is a train ready for departure. Where ARS is provided this is
often configured to be a necessary condition before a route is
set.

TSI Technical Standard for The TSIs specify how the “Essential Requirements” for a
Interoperability particular sub-system are defined, assessed and implemented as
a means of achieving the goal of a harmonised European
railway system. They are mandated by law in all European
Union member states and take precedence over any other
standard for railways falling within scope of the
Interoperability Directives.
The most relevant TSI for the signal engineer is:
CCS: Command-Control & Signalling
TSS Train Stop System The pair of adjacent loops which form the “trainstop”
functionality of TPWS; when energised loops are detected the
train brakes are fully applied.
TSR Temporary Speed A speed restriction on a length of railway imposed for a short
Restriction period for a specific reason such as to protect deteriorated
infrastructure, in connection with engineering work etc.
UPS Uninterruptible Power A device which maintains a constant electrical supply of
Supply appropriate voltage and frequency despite the failure of the
incoming supply. To provide a “no break” supply these are
normally on-line with an invertor taking power from storage
batteries which are normally kept charged by the utility supply
VDU Visual Display Unit Generally taken to imply the whole of a signaller’s control and
indication system for interfacing with the interlocking(s)
controlling a section of railway where utilising computer
technology driving screens, rather than the human interface
being a physical panel or lever frame.
Y Single Yellow aspect NR caution aspect. In 3-aspect signalling it is the only caution
aspect, in 4-aspect signalling it is the inner caution aspect.
YY Double Yellow aspect NR preliminary caution aspect (used in 4 aspect signalling)
Zp Detection Point From the German “Zählpunkt”, the part of the axle counter
equipment that determines the number and direction of wheels
passing at an extremity. It consists of two pairs of
transmitters/receivers which are mounted on the rails, together
with the interface electronics (in what is colloquially known as
the yellow mushroom” which interface to the ACE.
=========================== T H E E N D ==============================

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IRSE Examination Resource Pack 10/05/2016 Module 2

IRSE Examination - Module 2

7. Practical Approach to the Examination

March 2008 edition 1

March 2008 edition 2

1 Introduction to this Study Pack

1.2 Aim of the Study Pack

March 2008 edition 4

1.4 Use of this Study Pack

1.5 Structure of this Study Pack

March 2008 edition 7

1.6 A Summary Reminder of the “high-level”; remember throughout the studying!

GRIP1: Specification Remit Business FRACAS

GRIP2: Feasibility Operational

GRIP3: Optioneering System

GRIP4: Development Outline Sub system

Manufacture Factory Acceptance Testing

March 2008 edition 8

March 2008 edition 9

1.7 Errors and Omissions

March 2008 edition 10

1.8 Contributors and “Over to You”

March 2008 edition 11

2 Module Scope and Content:

2.2 Production of a Signalling Plan

2.3 Design Objectives: Design for Safety, Performance And Economy.

March 2008 edition 15

2.4 Design Practicalities: Task required for “Signalling the Layout”

March 2008 edition 16

March 2008 edition 17

2.5 Knowledge Requirements

March 2008 edition 18

Hence preparation for the exam should include:

March 2008 edition 19

March 2008 edition 20

March 2008 edition 21

March 2008 edition 22

• Placing signals to provide proper protection of junctions and other hazards.

March 2008 edition 23

4.2 Activities within Module 3 Examination

March 2008 edition 24

5 Overview of Study and other Preparation Activities Required:

5.2 Overall Approach

5.3 Planning to Succeed

5.4 Building General Domain Knowledge

March 2008 edition 27

March 2008 edition 28

• Study of the appropriate operational procedures or “Rule Book” is invaluable; for NR

March 2008 edition 29

5.5 Basic Reading

March 2008 edition 30

5.6 Obtaining Help

5.7 Detailed Study: Learning the Basic Concepts

March 2008 edition 32

Overall you should:

March 2008 edition 33

5.8 Detailed Study: Applying to Specific Situations

It is also suggested that the student should:

March 2008 edition 34

5.9 Practicing for the Exam

5.10 Examination Technique

March 2008 edition 35

5.10.2 Think about the Examiner