V.C. RANGADURAI VS. D.

GOPALAN
Author: Manisha Chakravarti, V Year of B.A.,LL.B(Hons.) From Jagran Lakecity
University, Bhopal.
ABSTRACT
This article mainly contain the case brief of the V.C. Rangadurai vs. D. Gopalan, which
primarily discusses the conduct of advocates. A lawyer has certain rights and duties
towards his clients, judges, opponents, the public, colleagues, and so on. This case is
about the misconduct of the lawyer toward his client. In the legal profession, it all comes
down to a person acting in an unbiased manner when making decisions or rulings. In
this case, the appellant (V. C. Rangadurai) was found guilty of gross professional
misconduct by the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council, Tamil Nadu and was
therefore barred from practicing as an advocate for a period of 6 years.
In an appeal, the Bar Council of India upheld the asset findings but reduced the period of
suspension to 1 year. The lawyer then filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. A client comes to
the advocate with a case of a promissory note with the values of 15000 rupees and 5000
rupees. The advocate said that he would handle the case. The first plaint was dismissed. The
second plaint was made but no case was filed. The advocate also gave wrong dates and
informed the court that he had gotten a decree for the case. The advocate's complaint also
featured several inaccuracies. The case brief contains the facts of the case, the judgement
given by the court, case analysis, ratio decidendi, and the end conclusion.

Petitioner: V. C. Rangadurai
Vs.
Respondent: D. Gopalan and Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/10/1978
BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A. SEN, A.P. (J)
CITATION: 1979 AIR 281 1979 SCR (1)1054 1979 SCC (1) 308
ACTS/RULES/ORDERS USED IN THE CASE
Section 30, Section 35, Section 35(3), Section 35(3)(c), Section 35(4), Section
36, Section 37, Section 37(2), Section 38 of Advocate Act, 1961 and Article
19, Article 38, Article 39A of Constitution of India.
FACT BRIEF
In this case, the parties involved were an advocate named V. C. Rangadurai,
a 70-year-old deaf man named Devasenapathy, and an elderly woman named
Smt. D. Kamalammal. They had provided Rangadurai with two promissory
notes and had also paid the advocate's expenses (the values of 15000 rupees
and 5000 rupees.). Nonetheless, the lawyer did not submit the lawsuit on
time. The restriction was lifted.
After spending a considerable amount of time strolling about the advocate's
office, the elderly man realized that the lawyer had dumped him by failing to
file the cases on time despite being paid. He filed a complaint with the
disciplinary committee of the Tamil Nadu State Bar Council, which penalised
the attorney by suspending him for six years following an investigation.
JUDGEMENT
In this case, V. C. Rangadurai (hereafter referred to as the Appellant) was
found guilty of professional misconduct but his ban from practice was reduced
from six years to one year. When a lawyer was entrusted with a brief to
handle, he was supposed to adhere to professional ethical standards to
safeguard the interests of his clients. However, the Appellant had entirely
violated the complainants' faith in him. However, to unlawfully withhold a
client's money from a lawyer was a breach of integrity and lack of probity, and
such serious professional misconduct required condign punishment. The
State Bar Council determined that the Appellant deserved to be disbarred and
suspended him from practice for six years, which was reduced to one year by
the Disciplinary Committee. As a result, no restrictions could be put on the
advocate's rights to appear before any court or body, as provided for in
Section 30 of the Act. As a result, the sentence imposed by the Disciplinary
Committee of the BCI did not require further intervention. The appeal was
therefore denied.
When an advocate is prohibited from practising under section 35(4) cl.(c) of
subsection (3), he is prohibited from doing so in any court or before any
authority or person in India for the duration of the prohibition. If the issuance of
such a direction implies the termination of the order of suspension upon the
fulfilment of the requirements set above, "I am of the considered opinion that
no restriction on the advocate's right to appear before any court or authority,
which he enjoys under Section 30 of the Act, may be imposed."
As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the disciplinary committee's decision to
suspend the advocate for six years.
ANALYSIS
What constitutes professional ethics are the obligations that the advocate
must uphold? A lawyer is considered to have violated professional ethical
standards if they fail to fulfill these obligations. These are the moral obligations
that all members of society, not only advocates but also those in other
professions, are required to uphold since ethics and morality are essential to
every member of society.
The appellant was forbidden from practising as an advocate for six years after being found guilty
of gross professional misconduct in this matter by the Disciplinary Committee II of the State Bar
Council of Tamil Nadu. In response to an appeal, the Bar Council of India affirmed the
aforementioned conclusions but shortened the suspension to one year. The court dismissed the
appeal, concluding that punishment serves two purposes: deterrence and correction. But when
looked at from a reformatory perspective, traditional punishments have their own limits and
shortcomings. If only courts were allowed to experiment in unconventional ways while still
adhering to the rules of the law, a therapeutic touch, a correctional twist, and a locus
poenitentiae may have had a rehabilitative effect.

RATIO DECIDENDI
According to Bar Council Rules, an advocate is prohibited from appearing,
acting, pleading, or practising before the court if any member of their family—
such as a parent, son, wife, etc.—is a court-related party. The main object is
to avoid personal bias between an advocate and the presiding officer related
to such an advocate. Due to natural love and affection, the judge may be
inclined toward the advocate, thus favouring the client of the advocate who is
related to him or her.
The ratio decidendi in this situation is that every criminal who defrauds his
regular customer ought to be viewed with disfavour since the nobility of the
legal profession only lasts as long as its members uphold their dedication to
serving society.
CONCLUSION
The main objective of legal ethics is to uphold the honour and dignity of the
legal profession. It also aims to maintain a cordial environment in the
courtroom devoid of prejudice and arguments between attorneys, which could
try to sour relations between the bar and bench and negatively affect the
administration of the justice system. Advocacy needs to cooperate and treat
one another fairly. This mindset aids an advocate in gaining more clients and
being more responsible to society because it is thought that they serve a
public service.
Every individual has a set of guidelines that they adhere to. An advocate has
obligations or a code of behaviour that he must uphold in relation to himself,
his clients, his adversaries, his colleagues, the court, and others. The
advocate must maintain court etiquette and show respect to both his
adversaries and his fellow attorneys. He must always act in the best interests
of his customers and must never take any action that might jeopardise their
confidence in him. All of these duties, morals, and obligations help a lawyer
develop in his or her job and become a successful attorney. The appeal was
therefore denied.

R D sexana Vs balram Prasad Sharma

The Background of the Case:

K.T. Thomas drafted and delivered this case. The verdict in this case was
handed out on August 22, 2000.

Facts of the case:

The appellant joined the Madhya Pradesh State Co-operative Bank Ltd. (here
after referred to as the ‘Bank’) as a legal advisor in 1990. He used to represent
the bank in court issues. Following that, on 17.7.1993, the bank terminated the
appellant’s retainers and requested that he return all the bank’s data. Instead
of returning the files, he informed the bank that he would do so only after
the bank’s dues of Rs. 97,100/- were paid.

As a result, on 3.2.1994 the Bank filed a complaint with the Madhya Pradesh
State Bar Council, in which the appellant claimed that he had a right of lien
on the papers, while the respondent claimed that the appellant had
committed professional misconduct by not releasing the data to his client.

The matter was then referred to the Bar Council of India’s disciplinary
committee, where the appellant was found guilty of professional misconduct
and fined Rs 1000/-, as well as being barred from practising for 18 months
and ordered to return all the client’s case bundles without delay.

Issues:
Is it possible for the advocate to have a lien on the litigation papers that his
clients have entrusted to him for pending fees?

Rule of Law:
The bailment is defined by Section 148 of the Contract Act, which states that
if goods are transferred from one person to another for a specific purpose,
and the goods must be returned to; or otherwise disposed of according to the
directions of the person who delivered them, then the transfer is a bailment.
However, the items were not bailed to the appellant/advocate in this case
because the products were not delivered, and the advocate owned paper on
his account. As a result, items covered by section 171 must be marketable, i.e.,
they must be saleable because the case files in this instance cannot be sold or
transformed into money, section 171 has no application.

In the case of P. Krishnamachariar Vs. The Official Assignee of Madras[1], a

divisional bench of the Madras High Court held that an advocate could not have
such a lien unless there was an express agreement to the contrary; and the Patna
High Court held the same view in the case of RD SAXENA Vs BALRAM PRASAD.

Application of the law:

As India has a large illiterate population, requiring them to have a lien on the
litigation files will result in their exploitation. A litigant has the right to
change his or her attorney, and this should be done when the files are
returned. According to Article 22(1) of the Indian Constitution, the criminal
accused has a fundamental right of choice, and in the case of State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Shobharam & Ors[i][2], the court stated that the choice thus
referred to is the choice to change the attorney representing him in the same
case. To obtain the file back, an advocate must return it to the client.
The refusal of an advocate to return the client’s file falls under the purview of
Section 35 of the Advocates Act, and thus constitutes professional misconduct. As a
result, he faces the same sentence. However, in this case, the appellant had a
reasonable assumption that he did have a lien, and this presumption is relevant to
limiting the severity of the appellant’s penalty.

CONCLUSION
In this case, the court ruled that the Punishment will be altered to
reprimanding the appellant. However, if any person commits this type of
professional misconduct in the future; then Bar Council will determine
respective punishment; and the lesser punishment imposed in this case
should not be taken under the ambit of precedent.The Supreme Court’s
ruling is cautious in nature, and it overturns all relevant laws and precedents.
The client-counsel connection is built on trust, which implies a fiduciary
relationship; as a result, the relationship should be respected throughout its
duration. Ordinarily, a prior agreement between the council and the client is
assumed, in which it is specified that the client will pay a set amount as
legitimate fees, which will assist counsel in addressing future problems. An
example for the same can be that suppose a person is hospitalized; and the
same person has to be shifted to any other hospital due to lack of facility in
the former hospital.As a result, it would not be appropriate for the hospital
to place a lien on such medical report until the dues are paid; until then, the
later hospital should review the prior reports for future medicine; the same
process will apply to the attorney’s lien. One cannot manipulate the court
system by possessing such a lien. Considering the difficulties that attorneys
face in obtaining payment, the Advocates Act of 1961 establishes a right for
advocates to keep any property entrusted to them, as defined by Rules 28 and
29. The attorney’s rights were given teeth by this rule.

There is a requirement of possession for the start of a lien, which must occur in the
case of bailment. A transfer of goods is required for a bailment; however, a lien on
a case file is not considered a good because it lacks marketability in the legal sense.
For the sake of marketability, a person cannot sell a client’s case files to another
client. As a result, it will be seen as illegal in the eyes of the law, resulting in
professional misconduct.

New India insurance company Ltd vs A.K Sexana

JUDGMENT 2003 Supp(5) SCR 387 The following Order of the Court was delivered : Leave
granted.
This appeal is against a judgment of the High Court dated 3rd April, 2002. Briefly stated the
facts are that the respondent was an advocate on panel of the appellants. As such a number of
matters used to be assigned to him It appears that some dispute arose between the appellants and
the respondent as a result of which the respondent was asked to return all papers. The respondent
was willing to return the papers provided that all his fees were paid.
It appears that when appeal from Order No. 24 of 1999 was on the Board of the High Court, the
respondent moved an application before the High Court saying that he has been asked to return
the files and therefore he may be discharged on payment of his full fees. On such application, the
High Court relying on earlier judgments passed the following order:
"In view of the above decisions of this Court, the application of Sri A.K. Saxena is allowed and
he is granted leave for being discharged as counsel for the appellant. However, the appellant
New India Assurance Co. Ltd., shall pay his full fees. On payment of full fees, he will
immediately return the files as required by the appellant company in letter, Annexure
After this appeal was filed, by an order dated 9th October, 2003, this Court directed the
respondent to return all the files. We are informed that all the files have been returned. Learned
counsel for the respondent insists that full fees for all the matters must be paid to him.
Learned senior counsel for the appellants states that no fees is payable to the respondent. In our
view, it is not for this Court, as it was not for the High court, to adjudicate upon such a disputed
question of fact. The High Court should not have given the directions it did also because at the
time the High court passed the impugned order, a writ petition No. 27380 of 2001 was pending.
In this writ petition the respondent had claimed payment of his fees.
This case is fully covered by a decision of this Court in R.D. Saxena V. Balram Prasad Sharma reported in
[2000] 7 SCC 264 wherein this Court has held that advocates have no lien over the papers of their
clients. It is held that at the most the advocate may resort to Legal remedies for unpaid remuneration. It
has been held that the right of the litigant to have the files returned to him is a corresponding
counterpart of the professional duty of the advocate and that dispute regarding fees would be a lis to be
decided in an appropriate proceeding in Court.

We do not go into this question as to whether or not fees are payable to the respondent. It will be open
for the respondent to file appropriate proceedings for recovery of his fees. The fact that, because of the
impugned order, he has withdrawn his earlier writ petition would not preclude him from filing any other
appropriate proceeding. In view of the above, the impugned order is set aside. The appeal is allowed.
There will be no order as to costs.

Daroga Singh & Ors vs B.K. Pandey on 13 April, 2004

Showing the contexts in which contempt of case appears in the document and does not
say "where the act alleged to constitute such contempt is an offence."
On an examination of the decisions of several High Courts in India it was laid down that the
High Court had the right to protect subordinate courts against contempt but subject to this
restriction, that cases of contempt which have already been provided for in the Indian Penal
Code should not be taken cognizance of by the High Court. This, it was stated, was the principle
underlying section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. This Court then observed that it
was not necessary to determine exhaustively what were the cases of contempt which had been
already provided for in the Indian Penal Code; it was pointed out, however, that some light was
thrown on the matter by the provision of section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which
empowers any civil, criminal or revenue court to punish summarily a person who is found guilty
of committing any offence under sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal
Code in the view or presence of the court. The later decision of Brahma Prakash Sharma ([1953]
S.C.R. 1169) explained the true object of contempt proceedings.
Section 14 provides for the procedure where contempts is committed in the face of the Supreme
Court or a High Court. Section 15 is very material for our purpose. It provides in regard to
cognizance of "criminal contempt" in cases other than those falling under Section 14. The
material portion of Section 15 reads thus :
15. (1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in Section 14, the
Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by -
section in a negative form. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding in agreement with the
High Court, that sub-section (2) of Section 15, properly construed, does not restrict the power of
the High Court to take cognizance of and punish contempt of a subordinate court, on its own
motion."
[Emphasis supplied] We respectfully agree with the view taken in this judgment and hold that
the High Court could initiate proceedings on its own motion under the Contempt of Courts
Act against the appellants. On the facts of this case apart from the report sent by the 5th
Additional District & Sessions Judge of the incident, Young Lawyers Association had also filed
a writ petition. The Presidents of the three Bar Associations and the Advocate General were
present and heard before initiating the proceedings for the criminal contempt. It has been noted
by the High Court that "all the three Presidents of the High Court Associations and the Advocate
General arrived at the conclusion that a prima facie case of criminal contempt was made out
against the contemners". This shows that the Advocate General of the State was also of the
opinion that prima facie a case for initiation of proceedings for criminal contempt was made out
and he was a consenting party to the initiation of the proceedings.
proceedings.
The contempt proceedings have to be decided in a summary manner. The Judge has to remain in
full control of the hearing of the case and immediate action is required to be taken to make it
effective and deterrent. Immediate steps are required to be taken to restore order as early and
quickly as possible. Dragging the proceedings unnecessarily would impede the speed and
efficiency with which justice has to be administered. This Court while considering all these
aspects held in In re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (the alleged contemner), 1995 (2) SCC 584, that the
criminal contempt no doubt amounts to an offence but it is an offence sui generis and hence for
such offence, the procedure adopted both under the common law and the statute law in the
country has always been summary. It was observed that the need was for taking speedy action
and to put the Judge in full control of the hearing.
It was emphasised that immediate steps were required to be taken to restore order in the court
proceedings as quickly as possible. To quote from the above-referred to case "However, the fact that
the process is summary does not mean that the procedural requirement, viz., that an opportunity of
meeting the charge, is denied to the contemner. The degree of precision with which the charge may be
stated depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific allegations is made clear or
otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate the
charge in a specific allegation. The consensus of opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike is that
despite the objection that the Judge deals with the contempt himself and the contemner has little
opportunity to defend himself, there is a residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to punish on the
spot but it is the only realistic way of dealing with certain offenders. This procedure does not offend
against the principle of natural justice, viz., nemo judex in sua causa since the prosecution is not aimed
at protecting the Judge personally but protecting the administration of justice. The threat of immediate
punishment is the most effective deterrent against misconduct. The Judge has to remain in full control
of the hearing of the case and he must be able to take steps to restore order as early and quickly as
possible. The time factor is crucial. Dragging out the contempt proceedings means a lengthy
interruption to the main proceedings which paralyses the court for a time and indirectly impedes the
speed and efficiency with which justice is administered. Instant justice can never be completely
satisfactory yet it does provide the simplest, most effective and least unsatisfactory method of dealing
with disruptive conduct in court. So long as the contemner's interests are adequately safeguarded by
giving him an opportunity of being heard in his defence, even summary procedure in
the case of contempt in the face of the court is commended and not faulted."

Lalit Mohan Das vs Advocate-General, Orissa on 29 November, 1956

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 15/23,1955 of the Orissa High
Court, in Civil Reference No, 4 of 1954, N. C. Chatterji, D. -N. Mukherjee and R. Patinaik, for
the appellant.
Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 1. 1956. November 29. The Judgment of
the Court was delivered by S.K. DAS J.-The appellant is Shri Lalit Mohan Das, a pleader of
about 25 years' standing. who ordinarily practiced in the Courts at Anandapur in the district of
Mayur bhanj in Orissa. The Munsif of Anandapur, one Shri L. B. N. S. Deo' drew up a
proceeding under ss. 13 and 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, against the pleader for
grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty and submitted a report to the
High Court through the District Judge of Mayurbhanj on December 12, 1953. The District Judge
forwarded the report,
accompanied by his opinion, to the High Court of Orissa on March 9, 1954. The recommendation of the
Munsif was that the pleader should be suspended from practice for one year. The reference was heard
by the High Court of Orissa' and by its order dated March 15, 1955, the High Court came to the
conclusion that the pleader was guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspended him from
practice for a period of five years with. effect from March 15,1955, Shri Lalit Mohan Das then obtained
special leave from this Court to appeal against the judgment and order of the Orissa High Court dated
March 15 /23, 1955. He also filed a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has not pressed the petition under Art. 32 and nothing more need be said about it. We
proceed now to deal with the appeal which has been brought to this Court on special leave.

In the result, the petition, under Art. 32 is dismissed and the appeal is,also dismissed subject to
the reduction of the period of suspension as indicated above. In the circumstances of this case,
there will be, no 'order for costs.
Appeal dismissed

Harish Uppal V. Union Of India

The petitioner, in the present case, was an ex-army officer.

In 1972, the petitioner was posted in Bangladesh, where some accusation which was related to
embezzlement was put on him and he was brought to the military court in India.

Charges against him were outlined and he was court-martialed from his post and titles
alongside imprisonment for 2 years.

He filed a pre-affirmation application in a civil Court to audit the matter and he got a reply from
the court after an extensive stretch of 11 years when the limitation period of the survey has been
expired.
It was subsequently discovered that documents along with the application got misplaced
during a vicious strike by advocates.

A special petition was filed by the petitioner to announce strikes by advocates illicit.

ISSUES The issue analyzed by the court - Whether lawyers have a right to strike?

IMPORTANT PROVISIONS The Constitution of India: 1. Article 226:

Powers given to the court to issue writs. 2. Article 145:

defines the rules of court. The Advocates Act: 1. Section 7: Functions of the Bar Council of India.

Section 34: Powers given to the High Court to make rules.

4. Section 38: Appeal to the Supreme Court.

ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT The Petitioner presented that strike as a method for collective
bargaining was perceived only in industrial disputes and lawyers who were officials of the Court
could not utilize strikes as a way to extort the Courts or the clients.

They further contended that the call for strike by lawyers was in actuality a call to break the
agreements which lawyers have with their clients. Then again, the legal fraternity presented that
lawyers retained the right to strike in uncommon cases to get their interests imparted in the
case of improper treatment being given to them

The Supreme Court stated that lawyers reserve no right to go on strike or give a call for the
boycott of court, not even on a symbolic strike.

The protest, if any is required, must be made by giving press explanations, TV interviews
completing of the Court premises standards and additionally notices, wearing dark or white or
any shading arm groups, tranquil dissent walks outside and away from Court premises, going on
dharnas or relay facts and so on.

The Court on acknowledging the fact that even those lawyers willing to go to the Court couldn't
go to inferable from the strike or the boycott asked the lawyers to intensely decline to submit to
any call for strike or boycott court.
The Court also stated that no lawyer might be visited with any adverse consequence by the
Association or the Council and no threat or coercion of any nature including that of expulsion
are often held call at an occasion of his refusal to attend to the strike or boycott.
 The Court also saw that an Advocate is an official of the Court and appreciates uncommon
status in the public arena. They have commitments and obligations to guarantee smooth
working of the Court and they additionally owe an obligation to their customer.

Strikes are meddled with the organization of equity, disturb Court procedures, and put the
interest of their customers at risk. Thus the Court has imposed a ban on strikes by lawyers.

CONCLUSION The Supreme Court of India concluded that the strike by an advocate is
considered unlawful and illicit. A strike might be allowed in the most extraordinary of the
uncommon situations where respectability, regard, and working of the courts are at the stake. A
silent disappointment can be showed or a meeting to the press and media can be given, till the
time it does not affect the working of the courts.

SUMMARY: It was held that lawyers reserve no right to strike or give a call for boycott, not even
on a symbolic strike. They can protest, if required, must be only by giving press articulations, TV
interviews, completing of Court premises standards and additionally notices, wearing black or
white or any shading armbands, peaceful protest outside and away from Court premises, going
on dharnas and so forth.