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Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek tragedy

a
Svein Østerud
a
University of Oslo ,
Published online: 22 Jul 2008.

To cite this article: Svein Østerud (1976) Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek tragedy, Symbolae Osloenses: Norwegian Journal of
Greek and Latin Studies, 51:1, 65-80

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 Symbolae Osloenses Vol. LI, 65-80

HAMARTIA IN ARISTOTLE AND GREEK TRAGEDY

BY
SVEIN ØSTERUD
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University of Oslo

Few passages in Greek literature have been more painstakingly studied

and more assiduously commented upon than Aristotle's Poetics 1453a
7-22 - the passage in which the author elaborates the notion of
hamartia. If no consensus has been reached by the scholars about the
meaning of the Aristotelian hamartia, this is due not only to the con-
cise and elliptical nature of the text itself, but also to the fact that
hamartia, like every other technical term in the Poetics, reflects Aris-
totle's own conception of Greek tragedy. Since Aristotle in the Poetics
is a theoretician rather than an objective historian, we can hardly
form a correct conception of hamartia by studying the actual practice
of tragedy, but must strive to get a general idea of his theory of
tragedy.1 Accordingly, the object of this paper is a double one: to
discuss hamartia in the light of Aristotle's theory of tragedy, and to
discuss whether the Aristotelian notion of hamartia really is applicable
to tragedy.
In order to bring out the complexity of the research into this tangle
of problems we shall briefly mention some of the most important con-
tributions during the last hundred years. The numerous scholars who
have passed an opinion on hamartia may be divided into two schools
of interpretation: on the one hand, those who in some way or other
associate hamartia with 'moral fault' or 'flaw of character', and, on
the other, those who deny that hamartia can have any moral implica-
tions and insist that it means 'error of judgement'.2
A most influential representative of the moralistic school of inter-
pretation in the last century is P. Manns, who defines hamartia as
'eine Schwäche, eine moralische Achillesferse',3 from which results
the hamartema. Here the distinction between hamartia - the flaw of
character - and hamartema - the very act which involves the hero in
catastrophe - is exploited for the first time.
 66 SVEIN 0STERUD

Manns' interpretation of hamartia is adopted by S. H. Butcher,

who, however, offers a more balanced discussion of the problem.4
First he states that hamartia (317 f.) 'denotes an error due to in-
adequate knowledge of particular circumstances'. Then he defines
hamartia as (318 f.) 'a fault or error where the act is conscious and
intentional, but not deliberate', adding that 'such are acts committed
in anger or passion'. Lastly, Butcher asserts that (319) 'the word may
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denote a defect of character, distinct on the one hand from an isolated

error or fault, and, on the other, from the vice which has its seat in
a depraved will', and this appears to be the interpretation on which
he settles.5
Amongst the recent essays on hamartia few have been more in-
fluential than that of P. W. Harsh,6 which, on the basis of an ex-
amination of Greek tragedy and of Aristotle's text, concludes that
(58) 'the most effective tragic character is in some way culpable and
at least partially responsible for his downfall'.7 Outstanding critics of
Greek tragedy, like C. H. Whitman,8 G. M. Kirkwood,9 and H. D. F.
Kitto,10 subscribe to this interpretation by Harsh. Other modern crit-
ics who have studied the Poetics and found that Aristotle attributes
some degree of moral culpability to the tragic hero, are W. C. Greene,11
G. K. Gresseth,12 and R. Sauer.13
The school of interpretation which denies that hamartia can have
any moral implications is headed by J. Vahlen,14 who sees hamartia
as 'ein Vergehen, das den sittlichen Charakter des Menschen nicht
aufhebt und doch dem Ungemach eine Handhabe leiht'. According
to Vahlen the 'Vergehen' is normally caused by ignorance, and yet it
can be a wrong deed committed in anger, or an overflowing of a senti-
ment which in itself is right and just.
At the beginning of the 20th century a new consensus began to dis-
place the moralistic interpretation which had prevailed since the
Middle Ages, especially after the appearance of I. Bywater's sober
commentary.15 In asserting that hamartia in the Aristotelian sense of
the term is a 'mistake' or 'error of judgement', and not some 'moral
fault' or 'infirmity of character', Bywater quotes two passages from
the Nichomachean Ethics (1135b 12,1110b 31). However, it is doubtful
whether these passages provide any foundation for Bywater's asser-
tion, since culpable acts, too, are included under the term hamartia
or its cognates.16
 Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy 67

This line of interpretation was later taken by scholars like P. van

Braam, 1T O. Hey,18 H. Phillips,19 and M. Ostwald.20 Particularly in-
fluential was Hey's essay, in which the meaning of hamartia is deter-
mined by an analysis of the history of the word. This seems a highly
controversial method, however, and besides, Hey has to go out of his
way to explain away cases where the word is used to include unjust
acts in Aristotle. Nevertheless, Hey's conclusions were accepted by
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many scholars and are repeated in the recent commentaries of A.

Gudeman,21 A. Rostagni,22 and G. F. Else.23
Even if Else's discussion of hamartia is controversial, it must be
regarded as a highly original and important contribution. Else brings
out the correlation between hamartia and anagnorisis, seeing agnoia as
a kind of pivotal point, inasmuch as it gives rise to the one and is
dispelled by the other (383):
It follows that the tragic hamartia is an ignorance or mistake as to certain
details. It should be, further, a 'big' mistake (53al6), one pregnant with disaster
for the hero. Further still, the finest mistake for the purposes of tragedy, like
its correlate the finest recognition, will have to do with the identity of a 'dear'
person, that is, a blood relative, and will accordingly lead to or threaten to lead
to his being slain or wounded. As a component or cause of the complex plot,
such a hamartia is inherently fitted to arouse our pity - and our 'fear', that is,
our horror that a man should have killed or be about to kill a 'dear one'. The
discovery is then the counterpart and reverse of the mistake. Here the emotional
charge which is inherent in the mistake (not in the ignorance per se, but in the
horrible deed to which it stands in causal relation) finds its discharge. The
hamartia represents the reservoir of emotional potential, the recognition is the
lightning-flash through which it passes off.

The obvious objection to this interpretation of hamartia is that it, at

most, applies to a very limited number of tragedies. However, in view
of the evidence offered by Else (391 ff.), the observation of R. D.
24
Dawe that the number of tragedies to which Else's conception of
hamartia applies 'does not exceed one' seems unfair.
In an extremely thorough and learned study K. von Fritz2S has con-
vincingly demonstrated that hamartia has nothing to do with the im-
perfection of character of the tragic hero (the hero should not be
επιεικής, 1452b 34), which in Aristotle's view is essential if the play-
wright wants the audience to identify themselves with the tragic hero.
The best argument for van Fritz's theory is of course provided by
Aristotle himself in the following phrase (1453a 14), αλλά τουναντίον

5·
 68 SVEIN 0STERUD

εξ ευτυχίας εις δυστυχίαν μη δια μοχ9ηρίαν αλλά δι' αμαρτίαν μεγάλην

ή ΟΪΟΌ εϊρηται ή βελτίονος μάλλον ή χείρονος, which may be rendered:
'but the other way round, from good fortune to bad, and not caused
by villainy but by a big mistake, on the part of a man either of the
kind we have specified or tending to the better rather than the worse
side.'26 In other words, the greatest effect is achieved when the catas-
trophe is brought about by a big hamartia, and when it befalls a person
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who is like us or somewhat better. It seems to be implied that the

hamartia should be big, the imperfection of the hero, on the other
hand, small. There is in the Poetics hardly any authority for identify-
ing hamartia with imperfection or a flaw of character.
More recently Dawe and Bremer have endeavoured to bring the
hamartia concept into relationship with the force of ate.11 This seems
prima facie a vain attempt, as the word ate does not occur in the
Aristotelian discussion at all; according to Dawe it had by that time
acquired the old-fashioned remoteness of a Homeric gloss. And yet an
examination of the meaning of ate shows that the idea of a relation-
ship between hamartia and ate is not as far-fetched as one is at first
inclined to believe.
There has been great confusion concerning the meaning of ate; in
his article Dawe enumerates some of the most fanciful definitions : to
Greene ate is 'something Satanic, a very devil', Μ to Schadewaldt
'Prädisponiertheit für kommendes Unheil',29 to Cornford 'exuberant,
sanguine, triumphant, fed by alluring Hope, leaping to clasp hands
wjth unconquerable Desire',30 and Whitman speaks of the 'mercilessly
truthful concept of the goddess Ate, whom Professor Jaeger has de-
scribed as the "madness of doom"'.31
Ate has one meaning about which there seems to be no disagree-
ment, namely 'ruin, disaster, destruction'. But it has also a narrower,
more specialized sense which is more relevant here, namely 'mental
blindness' or 'infatuation' (in German 'Verblendung').32 If we accept
the theory that hamartia means 'error of judgement' or 'ignorance as
to certain details', there seems to be a strong case for drawing a com-
parison between the two concepts hamartia and ate. And yet the
problem posed by Dawe and Bremer appears somewhat artificial,
since on the one hand Homer, who more than anyone has left his
mark on the concept of ate, never uses the word hamartia?3 and on
the other Aristotle, who made of hamartia a technical term, never uses
 Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy 69

the word ate. It is only in tragedy that the two concepts exist side by
side.34 Dawe goes to the length of classifying both hamartia and ate
as types οΐβλάβη, but although his theory is borne out by a substantial
amount of evidence,35 his efforts, me iudice, reveal the enormous dis-
crepancy there is between hamartia and ate rather than their alleged
similarity.
To study passages in which both ate and hamartia occur offers little
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reward to the critic who sets out to determine the meaning of ate in
tragedy and the meaning of hamartia in the Poetics. In the same way
as ate derives its meaning from the whole conception of life which is
reflected in tragedy, hamartia must be understood in the context of
Aristotle's own thinking. We should bear in mind, when embarking
on such a comparative study, that all the tragedies we possess date
from the fifth century B. C , whereas Aristotle was writing in the second
half of the fourth century B.C. In the course of this interval of time
a radical change in values and ethical outlook took place. Accordingly,
I am inclined to endorse the conclusion drawn by A. W. H. Adkins
in his important article, 'Aristotle and the Best Kind of Tragedy'
(101):

I f my interpretation is correct, Poetics 13 has really no relevance at all to later

tragedy, unless some society can be found which both produced tragedies and
had the same values as Aristotle. Nor has the chapter any relevance to extant
Greek tragedy. Aristotle's values are not completely different from those of
fifth-century Athens, but they are different in just those respects which most
effectively distort his interpretation. Aristotle is looking at fifth-century drama
through fourth-century spectacles. 3 '

Let us now study chapter 13 of the Poetics, the chapter in which

Aristotle introduces the conception of hamartia. It should be noticed
that one of the tasks Aristotle sets himself in this chapter is to find out
what are the conditions on which the tragic effect depends (πόθεν
ϊσται το της τραγφδίας έργον, 1452b 29-30). A careful examination of
the chapter brings out that it is devoted entirely to the question of
how the tragedian can best achieve the proper effect of tragedy. In a
previous chapter (chapter 6) Aristotle lays down the principle that
the tragic plot should be of such a kind that it arouses pity and fear
(έλεος και φόβος), and this principle is also invoked when he now
considers the possible combinations of character and plot.
 70 SVETN 0STERUD

No attempt can be made within the scope of this article to discuss

exhaustively the meaning of Aristotle's pity-and-fear doctrine. We
must be content to assume that pity and fear denote certain emotional
reactions on the part of the spectator, and try to infer from their con-
text what kind of reactions they are. In chapter 6 pity and fear are
brought into relation with κά9αρσις - another controversial term in
the Poetics. To judge from the sentence in which the term is intro-
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duced, δι' ελέοο και φόβου περαίνουσα την των τοιούτων παθημάτων
κάΒαρσιν (1449b 27-8), Aristotle seems to rule that tragedy should
aim at bringing about an emotional change, a change consisting in a
purification (or purgation) of these very emotions.37 Even without
committing oneself to any particular interpretation of the κά9αρσις
doctrine, one is entitled to assume that κά9αρσις as well as έλεος and
φόβος are aspects of the psychological standard by which Aristotle
assesses the tragic plot.
Chapter 13 may be said to supplement the brief definition of tragedy
given in chapter 6: the psychological standard, upon which Aristotle
bases his assessment of the tragic plot, is here more sharply outlined.
The desired pity-and-fear effect is contrasted first with μιαρόν, mean-
ing 'repulsive' or 'shocking', then with ατραγωδότατον - 'most un-
tragic' -, and finally with φιλάνΒρωπον - 'appealing to ordinary sym-
pathy' -, 3 8 all three denoting reactions which Aristotle takes as in-
dicative of the failure of the tragic plot. Before we set about examin-
ing the different types of plot sketched by Aristotle in this chapter,
we should bear in mind that the key words here are the psychological
ones, namely φοβερόν, ελεεινόν, μιαρόν, ατραγφδότατον, and φιλάν-
Qpamov. Surely the moral terms, which have been the focus-point of
interest amongst the critics, should be interpreted in the light of these.
It has been laid down in chapters 10 and 11 that the subject of a
tragic action is a change of fortune (in chapter 10 Aristotle speaks of
a μετάβασις, while in chapter 11 he uses both περιπέτεια and μεταβολή).
In the passage at issue here the possible combinations of character
and plot available to tragedy are put in terms of good and bad fortune.
The first possibility mentioned by Aristotle is to the effect that vir-
tuous men (επιεικείς άνδρας) shift from good fortune to bad. This is
a combination which would not arouse pity and fear in the spectator,
but rather outrage his moral sensibility. Μιαρόν - the reaction Aristotle
foresees in this case - denotes the moral shock or indignation we all
 Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy 71

feel at the sight of the downfall of a thoroughly good man. The effect
of such a combination of character and plot would clearly not meet
the Aristotelian'requirements: in the first place he seems to urge that
tragedy should release a very subtle aesthetic-psychological reaction
in the audience, rather than provoke a moral revolt; secondly he
imagines the tragic action as bringing about a purification or provid-
ing an outlet for the emotions of the spectators, rather than making
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their blood boil.

The second possibility which Aristotle takes up for discussion is
when wicked men (τους μοχθηρούς) progress to prosperity. This is the
most untragic structure of all (μτραγφδότατον); it has none of the
required characteristics, inasmuch as it neither arouses pity and fear
nor appeals to ordinary sympathy (<ριλάν9ρωπον). Here again it is the
moral sensibility or the sense of justice innate in all of us that will
be outraged. We may imagine that a play with such a structure will
provoke the audience into protesting against the injustice of the world
represented in the play. Instead of a relaxation of their emotional ten-
sions - granting this to be the import of κά9αρσις - the audience will
experience a gradual increase of these emotions.
At first sight it seems hard to draw a line of demarcation between
φιλάν9ρωπον and έλεεινόν, both of which denote some kind of pity
felt by the audience for the person who suffers. However, the third
type of plot construction mentioned by Aristotle provides a clue to
the understanding of these terms.39 We are told that in the case of the
fall of a thoroughly wicked man (τον σφόδρα πονηρόν) this arouses
neither pity (έλεείνο'ν) nor fear (φοβερόν) but sympathy (φιλάν9ρωπον).
Luckily Aristotle applies the term elsewhere in the Poetics, namely in
1456a 21, where he gives cases of what is τραγικόν and φιλάν9ρωπον:
the frustration of the clever villain and the defeat of a brave but evil
man.40 It is clear from these cases that φιλάνΘρωπον indicates the feel-
ing we get when we hear or observe something tragic happening to a
man who deserves it. However, that the feeling Aristotle alludes to
may also be directed towards a person who suffers misfortune un-
deservedly, is evident from his statement at 1453b 17, where he takes
up the question of what kind of situations gives rise to pity. There he
says : 'If an enemy injures an enemy, there is nothing pitiable (έλεεινόν)
in this, either in the doing or the intention, except in so far as concerns
the deed itself (κατ' αυτό τα πά9ος); so, too, if they have no relation
 72 SVEIN 0STERUD

to each other.' In effect, κατ' αυτά το πάθος is equivalent to φιλάν-

9ρωπον, inasmuch as they define the same psychological reaction.41 Both
here and in chapter 13 Aristotle appears to have in mind the general
feeling of sympathy we have for any person who suffers what he calls
a πάθος.42
The criterion upon which Aristotle eliminates the above-mentioned
combinations of character and plot is that they do not give rise to
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pity and fear. Allowing for the individual dispositions of the spectators,
it seems impossible to base a definition of the pity-and-fear doctrine
upon an examination of their reactions. The only way in which we
can get a notion of what Aristotle is driving at here is by trying to
identify the common feature which separates the eliminated plots from
the ideal plot.
What Aristotle evidently wants to avoid is a tragic plot which ad-
mits of an interpretation in terms of well-defined moral categories:
reward for the good and punishment for the wicked (the so-called
poetical justice), the perishing of the good and the prosperity of the
wicked. Thus plots that immediately engage our moral sensibility, giv-
ing us the feeling either that 'justice is done' or that 'there is no justice
in the world', are rejected. For the spectator to take a moral stand,
as both these cases would imply, is to look at the plot from outside;
the spectator would not be in a position to see that the events which
unfold on the stage have a bearing upon him and his life. It is a com-
mon experience that when we pass a moral judgement upon a fellow
man, regardless of whether it is in his favour or disfavour, we are at
the same time establishing a distance between him and us. We are in
fact stamping him as either better or worse than ourselves.
Aristotle would appear to advocate a tragic plot which, rather than
creating a distance between the audience and the hero, incites them
to identify themselves with him. "Ελεος and φόβος may be regarded
as the main components of the Aristotelian aesthetic theory, which is
that the tragic plot should be one that allows the audience to identify
themselves with the hero.43 In the sentence which precedes the hamartia
passage Aristotle works the terms έλεος and φόβος into the theory of
identification, δ μεν γαρ περί τον άνάξιόν έστιν δοστοχοΰντα, δ δε περί
τον δμοιον, Ελεος μεν περί τον ανάξιον, φόβος δε περί τον δμοιον (1453a
4-6). Needless to say, ανάξιος does not imply that the hero is 'guilt-
less' or 'without responsibility for' his misery; it should rather be
 Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy 73

understood to mean that he does not deserve his misery. This state-
ment should be seen in relation to the next one, namely that the hero
must be όμοιος, if the tragedy is to give rise to fear. I f the hero had
deserved his fate, we should be incapable of identifying ourselves with
him: we should look on him as a stranger. And i f he were not like us,
we should not feel that what happens to him might just as well happen
to ourselves.44
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Aristotle touches upon the pity-and-fear doctrine also in chapter 9,

where he relates it to the notions παρά την δόξαν and το Θαυμαστόν,
Here he states (1452a 1-6) : htel δε ob μόνον τελείας εστί πράξεαχ; ή
μίμησις αλλά και φοβερών και Ελεεινών, ταΰτα δε γίνεται και μάλιστα
[και μάλλον] δταν γένηται παρά την δόξαν δι' άλληλα· το γαρ 9ανμασταν
οΰτοος εξει μάλλον ή ει από τοΰ αντομάτοο και της τύχης. Once more
the discussion of the tragic structure starts out with psychological con-
siderations: the events are most replete with pity and fear when they
happen contrary to our expectation (παρά την δόξαν), and are causally
related. It is only an amplification of this phrase when he states that
they will possess the quality of surprise (το 9αυμαστόν) if they happen
that way instead of happening by themselves, i.e. by chance. 45
Why do the events arouse more pity and fear when they happen
contrary to our expectation and when they stand in causal relation
to one another? In the first place, if there were no rationality or logic
in the sequence of events we should hardly conceive of the tragic ac-
tion as universal, or as something which can happen to all o f us. What
happens by chance will not be experienced by the audience as an ex-
ample of the general condition of man, and the pity and fear will fail
to materialize. In. the second place, i f the sequence o f events were so
transparent that the audience could foresee the catastrophe, it would
hardly arouse pity and fear: when the catastrophe does not take the
audience by surprise, they will be more inclined to think o f how it
could have been avoided than to fear that a similar catastrophe will
strike them.
We may conclude that in order to arouse pity and fear the structure
of the tragedy must be characterized by rationality or causality (in
chapter 9 Aristotle speaks o f το εικός and το άναγκαΐον), and yet the
evolution of the events must be unpredictable. Since this seems to be
where the discussion ofhamartia ought to start, we shall now examine
the text in which Aristotle introduces this controversial concept:
 74 SVHN 0STERUD

δ μεταξύ äpa τούτων λοιπός, εστί δε τοιούτος ó μήτε άρετϋ διαφέρων

και δικαιοσύνη μήτε δια καχίαν και μοχαηρίαν μεταβάλλων εις την
δοστοχίαν αλλά δι' άμαρτίαν τινά, τών εν μεγάλη δόξη δντων και ευτυχίφ,
οίον Οιδίπους και Θυέστης και οι εκ των τοιούτων γενών επιφανείς
άνδρες, ανάγκη άρα τον καλώς έχοντα μυ9ον απλούν είναι μάλλον ή
διπλούν, ώσπερ τινές φασι, και μεταβάλλειν ουκ εις ευτυχίαν εκ δυστυχίας
άλλα τουναντίον έξ ευτυχίας είς δυστυχίαν μη δια μοχΒηρίαν αλλά δι'
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άμαρτίαν μεγάλην ή οίου εϊρηται ή βελτίονος μάλλον ή χείρονος.

By way of introduction Aristotle makes it plain that neither should

the tragic hero be a paragon of virtue and justice nor should his mis-
fortune be brought about by a wicked disposition in him. What
Aristotle prefers is obviously a type of hero who is halfway between
good and bad, a man who, as far as morality is concerned, is average
or like us. This is confirmed by τον δμοιον (1453a 5), which has been
discussed above. One reservation should be made, however: when
Aristotle develops his theory of imitation in chapter 2, he distinguishes
between tragedy and comedy in the following way (1448a 17-18): ή
μεν [comedy] γαρ χείρους ή δε [tragedy] βελτίους μιμεϊσ9αι βούλεται
τών νυν. It is important that we do not wrench βελτίους out of its con-
text when we try to determine its meaning. The point Aristotle is mak-
ing is that tragic characters and comic characters belong to different
moral categories. Accordingly, I do not see any contradiction between
βελτίους here and τον δμοιον in chapter 13. 46
It will be recalled that the Nichomachean Ethics has a threefold clas-
sification of human moral types. Here the ακρατής occupies a mean
position morally between the εγκρατής - the good man - and the
άδικος or κακός - the bad man. In view of the fact that εγκρατής means
the 'self-controlled' man, one might expect ακρατής to mean the 'un-
self-controlled' man. However, it seems to be the άδικος or κακός who
is without self-control; ακρατής, then, must mean the 'half-self-con-
trolled' man.47 Another thing which speaks in favour of identifying
the ideal tragic hero with the ακρατής of the Nichomachean Ethics,
is the fact that the fault committed by the ακρατής or the man of
average moral state is called αμάρτημα. The fault of the deliberately
bad man, the άδικος is an αδίκημα, whereas the fault of the good man,
the εγκρατής - in so far as he can commit a fault - is called an
ατύχημα. The fundamental difference between the ακρατής and the
 Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy 75

κακός οτ άδικος is that the wrongdoings committed by the former are

committed in specific circumstances and to a certain extent against his
general moral intentions, while the latter commits wrongdoings de-
liberately or κατά προαίρεσιν.** This does not mean that the άκρατης
is not morally accountable for his acts: also in his case the action is
a result of προαίρεσις or resolution. We should rather conclude that
the question of moral responsibility is more complex when the fault
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is committed by an άκρατης, with the result that it is more -difficult

to pass a moral judgement on the person who commits the fault.49
Let us see whether this classification can be turned to account when
we now return to hamartia in chapter 13 of the Poetics. Evidently
hamartia is a characteristic of an act rather than of a person. It has
already been said about the person that he should be neither good
nor bad, but halfway between these (ό μεταξύ τούτων). If it is permis-
sible to use the teims of the Nichomachean Ethics, we would call him
an ακρατής. The act, however, just like the αμάρτημα of an ακρατής,
is committed in special circumstances; it is a fault or mistake which
qualifies the hero neither for acquittal nor for condemnation. Thus the
hamartia lends to the action a kind of moral twilight, preventing the
audience from deeming the hero guilty or innocent. Our self-identifica-
tion with the hero, as we have seen, is dependent upon his appearing
neither as a villain nor as a saint, but as morally equal to us.
There can be no doubt that Else touches on an essential aspect of
hamartia when he links it with its converse, αναγνώρισις or 'recogni-
tion'. It is true that the fatal act, the hamartia, is meant by Aristotle
to be attended by mental blindness or lack of insight; it is in fact be-
cause the act is committed in some kind of ignorance - this is how I
interpret Aristotle - that the audience will be inclined to suspend their
moral judgement. However, when Else gives hamartia the highly spe-
cialized sense of 'mistake or error or ignorance as to the identity' of
a blood relative, he restricts the realm of validity of the term unduly.
The attempt made by Dawe and Biemer to elucidate hamartia by
comparing it to the Homeric ate may be seen as an extension of Else's
theory. Here again it is the mental blindness or infatuation which is
focalized, the major difference being that whereas Else stresses the
technical aspect of hamartia; Dawe and Bremer make concessions to
the moral aspect of it by associating it with ate (ate has of course
moral connotations both in Homer and in tragedy). It is not incon-
 76 SVHN 0STERUD

ceivable that Aristotle may have had ate in mind when he developed
the concept of hamartia, and it seems beyond doubt that he has tried
to embody in hamartia the feeling of moral ambiguity with which the
tragic action must have left the audience. But the ambiguity of Greek
tragedy is of such a nature that it does not admit of being described
in Aristotelian terms. Needless to say, Aristotle works out his con-
cepts, hamartia included, under strict observance of the principle of
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contradiction. The'refore it is misleading to identify the Aristotelian

hamartia with the extremely complex concept of ate. In fact, ate epit-
omizes the famous double motivation in Homer which Dawe charac-
terizes as follows (100):

The division of responsibility between men and gods has long been properly
understood to be an irresolvable problem in Homer: or to speak more real-
istically, it has long been understood that the Homeric poets did not recognise
any contradiction between assigning responsibility for a particular event to the
gods in one line and to men in the next.

On this point tragedy is more akin to Homer than to Aristotle. In

Greek tragedy there is a fundamental ambiguity as to the responsibil-
ity for the downfall of the hero. We can never tell whether the mental
blindness and the ensuing destruction of the hero is self-inflicted or
caused by the gods. 50 However, we surely approximate the truth if
we say that Greek tragedy maintains this contradiction and makes no
attempt to solve it.
Whereas tragedy conveys an ambiguous or contradictory view of
the world, Aristotle's conception o f action makes it impossible for him
to understand, let alone accept such a position. The double motiva-
tion o f the action which is manifest in Homer as well as in tragedy is
incompatible with Aristotelian logic. The Aristotelian concept of
causality may be complex, but it allows o f no contradiction and so
cannot apply to tragedy.51 Surely what Aristotle finds when studying
the tragic action is lack of clarity rather than ambiguity. His hamartia
is not, like ate, a metaphysical teim which epitomizes the double mo-
tivation of the tragic action, but rather a technical term, a designation
o f a particular arrangement o f the plot. We may conclude that Aris-
totle starts with a definition o f the audience's psychological response
to tragedy (έλεος, φόβος and κά&αρσις), and then proceeds to elucidate
the technical prerequisites (αμαρτία and αναγνώρισίς) o f this response.
 Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy 77

But the particular effect of tragedy can hardly be explained as a con-

sequence of these technical devices; rather, the psychological response
of the audience is called forth by the ambiguous picture of the world
and of human action that tragedy conveys. Thus tragedy has a meta-
physical dimension to which Aristotle's psychological and technical
study fails to do justice.
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NOTES
1
The premise of my argument is the very opposite of that of P. W. Harsh,
who says in his influential article "Αμαρτία Again', TAPhA 76 (1945) 47: Ά
thorough acquaintance with Greek tragedy is assumed by the author of the
Poetics. Any interpretation of a doubtful passage that contravenes the actual
practice of tragedy, therefore, is suspect. Although Aristotle may express dis-
tinct preferences, he does not primarily theorize how tragedy should be written
in a theoretical world.'
2
A more detailed survey of these scholars is to be found in S. M. Pitcher,
'Aristotle's Good and Just Heroes', PhQ 24 (1945) 1-11 and in J . M. Bremer,
Hamartia. Tragic Error in the Poetics of Aristotle and in Creek Tragedy (Amster-
dam 1969) 65-98.
3
P. Manns, Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der tragischen Katharsis und Hamar-
tia (Leipzig 1883) 72.
4
S. H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (Edinburgh 1897).
5
Butcher is careful enough to offer 'by some error or frailty' as translation
for δι' αμαοτίαν τινά (1453a 10), while W. H. Fyfe in Aristotle, The Poetics
(London 1932) does not scruple to render the phrase as 'through some flaw in
him'. See also Fyfe's note, p. 46.
6 Cf. supra, n. 1.
7
In his analysis of Euripides' Alcestis in A Handbook of Classical Drama
(Stanford University 1944) P. W. Harsh speaks about (168) 'the fatal weakness
necessary for the most effective tragic character'. This seems to have been the
normal interpretation amongst the more casual students of the Poetics. See, for
instance, Maxwell Anderson, The Essence of Tragedy (Washington 1939), who
writes (8 f.): 'The hero who is to make the central discovery in a play must
not be a perfect man. He must have some variation of what Aristotle called a
tragic fault . . . "
8
C. H. Whitman, Sophocles. A Study of Heroic Humanism (Cambridge,
Mass. 1951) 22-41.
9
G. M. Kirkwood, A Study of Sophoclean Drama (Ithaca, New York 1958).
10
H. D. F . Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama (London 1956) 233 and Greek
3
Tragedy (London 1961 ) 100.
11
W. C. Greene, 'The Greek Criticism of Poetry', Perspectives of Criticism,
Harvard Studies of Comparative Literature 20 (Cambridge, Mass. 1950) 19-53.
 78 SVBN 0STERUD

12 G. Κ. Gresseth, 'The System of Aristotle's Poetics, TAPhA 89 (1958)

312-35.
13
R. Sauer, 'Charakter und tragische Schuld', Arch. Gesch. Philosophie 46
(1964) 17-59.
14
J . Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristoteles' Poetik (Berlin 1874).
15
I. Bywater, Aristotle: On the Art of Poetry (Oxford 1909).
16
For a criticism of Bywater's interpretation of the Nichomachean Ethics
1135b 12 and 1110b 31, see Harsh 56, n. 30.
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17
P. van Braam, 'Aristotle's use of hamartia', CQ 6 (1912) 266-73.
18
O. Hey, "Αμαρτία', Philologus 83 (1928) 1-18, 137-64.
19
H. Phillips, De Vocis AMARTIA Vi et Usu apud Scriptores Graecos
usque ad Annum CCC ante Christum Natum (unpublished dissertation, Har-
vard University 1933).
20
M . Ostwald, 'Aristotle on hamartia and Sophocles OT', Festschrift Kapp
(Hamburg 1958) 93-118.
21
A . Gudeman, Aristoteles, ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ (Berlin and Leipzig 1934).
22
A . Rostagni, L a Poética di Aristotele (Torino 1928).
23
G . F . Else, Aristotle's Poetics, the Argument (Cambridge, Mass. 1957).
24
R . D . Dawe, 'Some Reflections on Ate and Hamartia', HSCPh 72 (1968)
89-123.
25
K . von Fritz, 'Tragische Schuld und poetische Gerechtigkeit in der griechi-
schen Tragödie', Antike und moderne Tragödie (Berlin 1962) 1 ff.
26
This is Else's translation.
27
In his book Ate, Beitrag zur Frage des Selbst- und Weltverstandnisses des
frühgriechischen Menschen (Göttingen dissertation 1950) J . Stallmach has car-
ried out a careful investigation o f the meaning o f ate.
28
W . C. Greene, HSPh (1935) 24.
29
W . Schadewaldt, W S (1955) 12, η . 2 1 .
30
F . M . Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus (London 1907) 182 f.
31
C. H. Whitman, Sophocles (Cambridge, Mass. 1951) 38.
32
F o r the meaning of ate, see Lexicon des frühgriechischen Epos.
33
Dawe (101) suggests that it may be for metrical reasons that the noun
hamartia does not occur in Homer. I find this argument rather shaky.
34
Dawe (102 f.) examines the passages in poetry where ate and hamartia
are linked, such as Archilochus fr. 73, Pindar Pyth. 2 . 25 ff., Soph. Ant. 1259-60,
and Apollonios Rhodios 4 . 412. Thereupon he quotes passages in ancient criti-
cism where ate and hamartia appear to be equated: the scholia B T on Il. 2. 1ll
άτη ή εκούσιος αμαρτία, in the Lexici Segueriani Σοναγωγή λέξεων χρησίμων
explains the word άτάσ9αλα by άδικα, αμαρτωλά whereas ατάσ&αλος in Apoll.
Lex. 4 6 . 24 is explained by αμαρτωλός, παρά τήν άτην; in Apoll. Lex. 2 . 9
άάσατο is equated with ήγνοήσεν, ήμαρτεν, and αναμάρτητος is o f course the an-
cient gloss on άάατος.
35
First he mentions passages in poetry and ancient criticism which establish
a correspondence between "Ατη and Βλάβη, then he proceeds to passages which
establish a correspondence between 'Αμαρτία and Βλάβη. There is no need to
 Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy 79

repeat these lists, but one particular passage deserves to be mentioned: the
Eth. Nie. 1135b where Aristotle classes ατόχημα. αμάρτημα, and αδίκημα as
types o f βλάβη. This will b e returned t o below.
36
A . W . H. Adkins, 'Aristotle and the Best Kind o f Tragedy', CQ 16 (1966)
78-103. Whitman is not far from Adkins' position ( 3 5 ) : 'Fifth-century tragedy
was in itself morally sufficient for its time. I t had its own scheme. Aristotle's
attempt t o understand that scheme was based on the philosopher's ethical re-
quirements more than on the values o f the older poets.'
37
F o r a survey o f the voluminous literature on the catharsis question, see
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Else 225, n. 14. Else himself regards the sentence in which catharsis occurs as
spurious.
38
I adopt Else's translation o f φιλάν9ρωπον in order t o avoid 'pitiable' which
may put one in mind o f ίλεεινόν.
39
There is a variety o f opinions on the meaning o f φιλάνΒρωπον: Butcher
( 3 0 3 ) : 'sense o f justice', Rostagni ( X L ) : 'giustizia', Gudeman (239) and Bywater
(214) define it as 'human sympathy', Else (370) speaks o f a 'fellow-feeling for
humanity'.
40
Else (369, n. 14) leaves this occurrence o f φιλάνΒρωπον out o f account, be-
ing convinced that the remark is spurious.
41
Thus Gresseth 322 f.
42
I n 1452b 11 Aristotle defines πάίος as ' a n act which is destructive t o life
or painful, such as killings, paroxysms o f pain, woundings, and all that kind
o f thing in the visible realm'.
43
That fear and pity have to do with the self-identification o f the judge with
the judged is apparent from chapters 5 and 8 in the Rhetoric 2, where Aristotle
treats respectively fear and pity. I n chapter 5 he states, ώστε δεϊ τοιοότονζ
παρασκευάζειν, όταν j βέλτιον το φοβεΐσ&αι αυτούς, όχι τοιούτο! είσιν οίοι παθείν
και γαρ άλλοι μείζσος ίπαΒον και τους τοιούτους δεικνύναι πάσχοντας ή
πεπον9ότας, και υπό τοιούτων όφ' ών οόκ φόντο, καΐ ταύτα κα'ι τότε δτε ούκ
φόντο. (1383a 8-12) I n chapter 8 he states, και τοοζ δμοίοος έλεοΰσιν κατά
ήλικίαν, κατά ή$η, κατά εζεις, κατά αξιώματα, κατά γένη· έν πασι γαρ τούτοις
μάλλον φαίνεται καΐ αύτφ αν ύπάρξαν όλως γάο και ένταΰ9α δεϊ λαβείν άτι, όσα
Ιφ' αοτών φοβούνται, ταΰτα έπ' άλλων γιγνόμενα έλεοΰσιν. (1386a 2 5 - 9 )
44
I partly agree with Else when he concludes his pity-and-fear discussion as
follows (371): ' T h e tragic pity and fear, then, are not mere indiscriminate feel-
ing, like the φιλάνδρωπον. On the other hand they are n o t mere judgments,
for judgment per se connotes psychic distance between the judge and the judged,
whereas in this case the two emotions depend basically o n the φιλάνθρωπο ν,
which mean self-identification o f the judge with the judged.' I t seems t o me that
Else does n o t discriminate clearly between φιλάνΒρωπον o n the one hand and
έλεος and φόβος on the other. T h e point is surely that φιλάν9ρωπον denotes a
sympathetic feeling, but this is a feeling which should not b e confused with the
self-identification o f the spectator with the tragic hero. Only when certain require-
ments are satisfied will the spectator b e able t o identify himself with the hero.
45
In Phys. 2 . 5 spontaneity (τό αυτόματον) is distinguished from chance (ή
 80 SVHN 0STERUD

τύχη). See W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (Oxford 1936) 354 f. However, the
two concepts often overlap, as in our passage and in E.N. 1112a 31.
46 Else finds it necessary to try to reconcile these terms (377): 'We know from
chapter 2 that the tragic hero should be βελτίων ή κα&' ήμας. But if he is too dis-
tinctly so and then falls into misfortune (which is required to arouse either pity
or fear), the result is 'revolting'. On the other hand, if he were merely δμοιοζ
('average') his fate would not be significant one way or the other. Hence the
hero must fall somewhere within the range, not between good and bad, but
between good and average: high enough to awaken our pity but not so perfect
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as to arouse indignation at his misfortune, near enough to us to elicit our fellow-

feeling but not so near as to forfeit all stature and importance.'
47
F o r the main characteristics of these three types, see the Nicomachean
Ethics, book VII, especially 1146b 22, 1147a 14 ft"., 1148b 2, 1150a 19 ff., 1150b
29-36, 1152a 4.
48
See Eth. Nic. 1151a 6.
49 This parallel between the portrayal of the tragic hero in the Poetics and
the portrayal of the άχοατής in the Nicomachean Ethics was adduced by Gres-
seth, p. 324 with n. 20, who gave a precise description of the three definable
types in Aristotle's thought (325, n. 2 3 ) : '1) the man who knows what is right
to do and does it, 2) the man who knows what is right to do and does not do
it, and 3) the man who does not know what is right to do and does not do it.'
The second type (the ακρατής) must according to Gresseth be regarded as
Aristotle's answer to the Platonic aporia how a person can know what he
should do and yet not do it (cf. 1145b 2 2 ff. and 1147a 32 ff.).'
50
This has also been recognized by Dawe, who states ( 9 4 ) : 'It is apparent
to any student of Greek tragedy that the difficulty in understanding the issues
involved is not that the poets fail to express themselves on the subject, but that
they express themselves in contradictory ways, ascribing the downfall of a hero
to fate, or to the malevolence of a particular deity, or to the ill will of some
other human agent, or simply to the hero himself, either for some defect in his
attitude or to some wrong decision he has taken.'
51 The same position is taken by J.-P. Vernant, who, in his and P. Vidal-
Naquet's book, Mythe et tragédie en Grèce ancienne (Paris 1972), expounds the
relationship betwee 5th-oentury tragedy and 4th-century philosophy. Vernant
argues that tragedy is (21, n. 1) "contraire à la vérité philosophique... E t peut-
être aussi à cette logique philosophique qui admet que de deux propositions
contradictoires, si l'une est vraie, l'autre doit nécessairement être fausse. L'hom-
me tragique apparaît de ce point de vue solidaire d'une autre logique qui n'é-
tablit pas une coupure aussi tranchée entre le vrai et lefaux:logique de rhéteurs,
logique sophistique qui, à l'époque même où s'épanouit la tragédie, fait encore
une place à l'ambiguïté, puisqu' elle ne cherche pas, sur les questions qu'elle
examine, à démontrer l'absolue validité d'une thèse, mais à construire des dissol
lôgoi, des discours doubles qui, dans leur opposition, se combattent sans se
détruire, chacune des deux argumentations ennemies pouvant, au gré du sophiste
et par la. puissance de son verbe, l'emporter sur l'autre à son tour."