HumanDignityTragic Choices 2015

Human Dignity and Tragic Choices
Author(s): Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

Source: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association ,
NOVEMBER 2015, Vol. 89 (NOVEMBER 2015), pp. 74-97
Published by: American Philosophical Association
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Human Dignity and
Tragic Choices
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL
Presidential address delivered at the one hundred eleventh Eastern Di

of the American Philosophical Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvani
29, 2014.
PREVIEW
My talk today, like most of my professional life, is about issues at th

intersection of ethical theory and practice.1 I have been teaching ethi
now for more than fifty years, so I welcome this opportunity to expre
my thoughts about the aspirations and limits of normative ethical
theory, some merits of a broadly Kantian version, and the common
complaint that Kantian ethics refuses to admit exceptions to familiar
moral principles. To preview, (1) I will begin with examples and general
comments on the challenges that they pose for ethical theorists. (2)
Then I will explain briefly how I understand the aspirations and limits
of normative ethical theory and some reasons why I chose to work so
long within a broadly Kantian tradition. (3) Next I will review some main
features of the Kantian perspective as I have tried to reconstruct it. This
reconstruction extends and (to some extent) modifies what Kant himself
wrote, but I believe that it still preserves the spirit, if not always the letter,
of his moral philosophy. What is more important for present purposes,
the reconstructed Kantian perspective represents a distinctive kind of
normative ethical theory that has appealing features that become lost in
the persistent disputes about Kant's moral rigorism. (4) As I shall explain,
the theory offers a way to justify some exceptions to normally binding
moral principles, but exceptions are severely limited by the core Kantian
values associated with human dignity. (5) The idea of human dignity
has been increasingly invoked in debates about moral issues, especially
since the end of the Second World War. Critics often dismiss the idea
as ambiguous, empty, derived from an obscure metaphysics, or an
unrealizable Utopian standard, but I argue that Kantian theory provides
an interpretation of human dignity that addresses these objections.
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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS - EASTERN DIVISION
(6) I return briefly to two classic examples, not so much to resol

hard cases, but to say what we can learn from them and why th
not give us reason to abandon the idea of inviolable human dignit
the broadly Kantian moral perspective in which it figures centra
conclude with a brief comment on the value of details and simpli
ethics.
This is a very large agenda, of course, and here I will be painting with
a broad brush, and mostly leaving aside specific details and contrasts
with other ethical theories.
EXAMPLES AND THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES

FOR PHILOSOPHERS
Philosophers love to debate about tragic cases in which appar

available option is morally repugnant, the outcomes are deplorable,
ordinary moral thinking doesn't help, and even the best ethical theories
either have no convincing solution or are too easily satisfied with answers
that fail to recognize the moral complexity of tragic situations. Focus on
these special tragic cases enlivens our ethics classes, but it can also
leave our students with an exaggerated feeling that no deeply contested
moral issue can be resolved. To make matters worse, our ethical theories
are often presented so over-simply and applied so superficially that
students are ready to join the professional anti-theorists in dismissing
the aspirations of normative theory. Then, too often, the true believers in
traditional theories just dig in their heels and deny both the objections
to their theories and the inherent limits to the project of theorizing about
ethics.
Many of the tragic cases that prompt debate and despair stem from the
inspiring idea that human dignity is a universal norm that we must never
violate. Unfortunately, it seems that at times, due to the cruelty or neglect
of others, what we must do to respect the dignity of one person would
violate the dignity of others. Cases in the literature abound. Antigone
will disrespect either her uncle the King or the memory of her brother.2
Sophie must pick which one of her two children to save or allow both
to be killed.3 Jim can prevent a tribal chief from killing twenty innocent
Indians but only by killing one himself.4 Interrogators think that they can
prevent the bombing of a city but only by torturing a terrorist.5 These are
notoriously hard cases that excite our students, provoke controversy,
and challenge any ethical theory.
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PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
Not just in fiction, but in real life, people face tragic choices in which
all available options are repugnant to any decent person. For example,
politicians, judges, and corporate executives in corrupt institutions are
often forced to choose to stay within the system in order to reduce
its harmful effects or to resign in order to affirm their integrity and
the dignity of those abused by the system.6 Oppressed women and
minorities have to submit to degrading treatment or else endanger
themselves or their families. In war (some say) a leader's only options
have been to allow a brutal aggressive enemy to go unchecked or to use
targeted bombing that inevitably also kills non-combatants, including
young children, as so-called "collateral damage."7 These choices are
tragic but not necessarily irresolvable moral dilemmas, for it may be that
in some cases there is only one right thing to do despite the fact that
doing it is morally repugnant.
Such cases pose both theoretical and practical problems for philosophers.
The theoretical challenge is to understand the moral demands that pull
us so strongly in different ways, whether or not in the end the morally
best option can be recognized.8 Understanding the moral values that
conflict in dramatic tragic cases, however, cannot be achieved by
focusing initially and primarily on these special hard cases, particularly
when the cases are imaginary ones for which all the facts have been
stipulated as given and known. Normative ethical theory, as I see it,
should first aim to make sense of our confident and widely shared moral
judgments and only then, with due humility, try to address the hardest
cases of moral conflict.
Thepracf/ca/c/ia//engeforphilosophersisnotprimarilytofinddeterminate
moral solutions to the apparent dilemmas that the extraordinary "hard
cases" pose in fiction or in real life. The primary practical tasks, instead,
are to confront seriously the complexities in hard cases and to clarify
and highlight what we can and must do in real cases where the moral
choice is clear. Here, too, humility about the practical value of moral
theories is needed. Theories can and should influence practice, but
even our best moral theories may provide no immediate practical help
or consolation when real life presents horrible tragic choices. I cannot
forget, for example, the awful feeling of helplessness expressed in a
letter from my good friend shortly before his death in Vietnam in 1965.
A West Point graduate and a "Congratulatory First" in P.P.E. at Oxford, he
was sent to Vietnam as one of the earliest "advisors." He was the only U.S.
officer in a small village when he was forced to observe while a villager,
who was suspected of being a spy and murdering the police chief, was
interrogated under torture. Shaken by the conflict between his desire
to intervene and the constraints of his position, my friend wrote, "I tried
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to think of the Categorical Imperative and of the Greatest Hap

of the Greatest Number, but nothing helped." Theoretical thin
useless and inappropriate at that moment even if theoretical debates
about torture can be helpful when we have the security and leisure to
reflect on them.
Clearly, then, theories have their limits, but normative ethical theory ,
modestly conceived, remains an unfinished philosophical project that
can help us to make sense of our offen confused and conflicting moral
judgments, that may help us to address some hard perplexing cases,
and that should inspire us to act more vigorously and effectively to
respect human dignity in the very real tragic cases where it is clear that
we can.
BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: CON SEQU ENTI ALI STS,

PLURALISTS, AND KANTIANS
Early twentieth-century Anglo-American ethical theory was largely

dominated by the so-called "ideal utilitarianism" of G. E. Moore.9 Moore
modified the utilitarian theories of Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick by
replacing pleasure and happiness with his idea of intrinsic value, which
he argued is a simple, indefinable, non-natural property known only by
intuition. According to Moore, our (objective) duty is to do whatever
would make the whole universe intrinsically best. The moral pluralist,
W. D. Ross, argued to the contrary that there are many basic principles
of prima facie duty that are independent and not subject to ranking.10
Each of these principles, Ross argued, can be overridden in particular
cases: for example, in some cases beneficence may trump truth-telling,
non-injury may override justice, self-improvement may outweigh
beneficence. In other cases, the opposite may be true, and we have
only our intuitive judgments unguided by theory to rely on.
Both approaches to normative ethics claimed a major advantage over

Kantian and natural law theories because they allowed that all the
familiar, common sense level moral principles, such as "Keep your
promises " and "Don't tell lies," can admit exceptions.11 Both theories
imply that even the prohibitions that seem most stringent can give
way to other considerations. For example, stealing ballots, torturing
prisoners, and terrorist bombings could in principle be justified if the
ultimate outcomes were better than had we refrained. Good-hearted
utilitarians and moral pluralists, of course, say that their theories rarely,
if ever, recommend resorting to these measures in actual cases, but as
moral theorists they are committed to keeping the possibility open.
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This was the scene when I first began studying ethics many years ago.
The debate has echoed over the years, but now the competing theories
are labeled "consequentialism" on the one side and "intuitionism,"
''pluralism/ and ''particularism" on the other. Although modified in many
sophisticated ways, these theories tend to be united in their opposition
to those who insist that commonsense moral principles, such as the
prohibitions of lying and torture, hold without exception.12 Immanuel
Kant is still taken to be the prime example of a famous philosopher who
insisted on "absolutely" inflexible moral principles.
We need to ask, then, to what extent can those inspired by Kant's

affirmations of human dignity admit reasonable exceptions to common
moral principles without losing what is distinctive and appealing about
his ethics? More specifically, can a broadly Kantian normative ethics help
us to frame reasonable deliberations about the limits of widely accepted
moral principles? The practical question is when to stand firm and when
to bend , when to hold and when to fold. Standing on unreasonably
rigid principles can be foolish and dangerous to oneself and others,
but bending with the wind and compromising with evil can be worse.
Similar theoretical and practical questions can be raised about the limits
of our positive obligations. For example, when and to what extent are we
morally required to work, and even to sacrifice, for the good of others?
Here the usual complaint is not that the Kantian duty to give aid is too
rigid but rather that it is too indeterminate, in effect, allowing too many
exceptions to what should be a more demanding principle.13 We cannot
expect moral theory to provide easy answers about where to draw the
line. My question is whether a deliberative moral framework respectful
of Kanťs main insights can help us to think reasonably about the issues.
COMMENTS ON TERMINOLOGY
A few words about my terminology may help to avoid misunderst

First, when I speak of tragic situations and choices, I am not spe
exclusively of cases that literary critics would classify as trag
philosophers would call "moral dilemmas." What I call tragic choi
not necessarily involve a heroic figure who is brought down by a f
or a case where someone has absolutely no morally justifiable course
of action. A choice is tragic in my sense if one has no choice, morally
speaking, but to do something that, either because of its consequences
or the kind of act it is, any good person would find repugnant and deeply
regrettable, even if it is the morally right thing to do.
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In addition, although I often speak of making an exception to

principle, this can be misleading. What is at issue, more gener
the limits of moral principles. Principles can be limited in diffe
For example, some principles, if fully expressed, would contain
within them that specify a range of cases to which they do no
for example, one ought to do what one promised, at least provided
the promisee has not released one from the promise. Other principles
can be expressed in a way that shows their limited scope up front,
for example, parents ought to ensure that their children are cared for.
Some principles specify moral obligations that apply only to a limited
jurisdiction, for example, citizens should respect the just laws of their
state. Systems of principles often include priority rules, for example,
certain negative duties take precedence over positive ones. Obviously,
all these principles can be re-expressed with universal quantifiers
and the qualifications "built in," but normally the scope and limits of
principles are understood implicitly, if not precisely, by those that live
by them.
The special phrase making an exception , however, sometimes refers

not to the use of built-in, scope, and jurisdictional limits but to the
practice of taking extraordinary, unanticipated circumstances to warrant
deviation from an accepted rule or principle. For example, in ordering
the atomic bombs to be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Harry
Truman made an exception (not for the first time) to the still widely held,
though often violated, principle that in war one should not intentionally
kill non-combatants for the purpose of intimidating the enemy.
A similar point applies as well in more mundane cases. When derivative

moral rules are quite specific, as, for example, in professional codes,
the rules may allow officials the prerogative to "make an exception"
when they recognize good reasons to deviate from standard practice in
circumstances that were not anticipated in the codes.
However, when Kant and others insist that certain mid-level principles
are binding universally and without qualification, they tend to think
of "making an exception" to principles as an illegitimate practice. The
exception-making that Kant primarily addressed was the hypocritical
practice of not applying to oneself principles that one takes to be
binding on everyone else.
For present purposes, I don't assume that making exceptions to moral

principles is always either an illegitimate practice or a benign one,
because that is just what is at issue.
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ASPIRATIONS AND LIMITS OF NORMATIVE MORAL THEORY
Faced with problems such as these, as philosophers we naturally

to moral theory. But what are the aims and limits of such philo
investigations? Here I am concerned with what has come to be called
"normative ethical theory" as distinguished from "metaethics." In brief,
while metaethics focuses on questions about the language of morals
and the metaphysical status of moral properties, normative ethical
theory aims to explain how we can understand our particular moral
judgments together, consistently, and appropriately revised under
critical reflection.14 Normative theorists, such as consequentialist,
contractualists, and Kantians, aspire to find or construct a unified and
systematic way to understand and critically revise our considered
moral judgments. For this purpose, focusing initially on "hard cases'7
is unpromising. Examination of the less controversial cases, though
not as exciting in the classroom, enables us to identify and articulate
our most fundamental moral standards and values. Why are murder,
rape, and racial oppression wrong? Why are lying, manipulation, and
coercion normally wrong, and when and why, if ever, are exceptions
justified? The normative theorists' hope is that understanding better
the basis for our judgments in standard cases will clarify our thinking
about the harder, more controversial cases. The project is not to find
a metaphysical foundation for morality or to explain "the sources of
normativity" but to understand the structure of our normative judgments
and the connections among them, and to revise them on due reflection.
Whether or not our best normative theory rests on a constructive or
realist metaethical "foundation" is a question that is postponed, not
dismissed. The project may fail, as anti-theorists and many virtue
ethicists believe, but the still aspiring normative theorist can reasonably
respond that we need to wait and see. As John Rawls often reminded
us, no current theory is perfect and even the best will no doubt leave
many questions unanswered. Consequentialists, contractualists, and
Kantians need to develop and refine their work so that at some point we
are in a better position to assess how well each satisfies our aspirations
as normative theorists.
Also, we must respect and learn from our history in moral philosophy.
As Rawls said, in an early (and rare) book review, "The fault with the
misinformed attitude toward traditional moral philosophy displayed in
this book is that it may cause us to forget what older moralists have
had to say. Why is this undesirable? Mainly because morals is not like
physics: it is not a matter of ingenious discovery but of noticing lots of
obvious things and keeping them all in reasonable balance at the same
time. It is just as disastrous for one age to cut itself off from the moral
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experience of past ages as it is for one man to cut himself off

moral experience of his fellows."15
We must remember, too, that moral questions arise at differen

As teachers, parents, friends, and citizens we face particular moral
questions. For example: Is it fair for us to exempt that student from
the usual course requirement? Is it wrong to lie to my friend about
her deceased husband's infidelities? Should I support the least bad
candidate even though her campaign deliberately misrepresents
her opponents' position? We might call this the street level of moral
thinking. We move to more general levels of reflection when we focus
on our policies, principles, and reasons for our particular judgments. For
example: Why should we accept and enforce our department rules, and
what, if anything, can justify exceptions? Why, and within what limits,
must we fight fair in politics against opponents who are fighting dirty? In
raising such questions of policy and principle we are thinking at the more
general level of practical ethics. Here we work from values, principles,
and rules that we accept provisionally in order to address the issues
at hand. While philosophers can help to clarify the arguments at this
practical level, the issues are, quite rightly, taken up by thinking people
of all kinds in sermons, editorials, blogs, and debates in boardrooms,
bars, and coffee shops. The task of normative ethical theory, as I see
it, is to press the vxwhy?" questions still further, beyond what is needed
(and would be tolerated) by moralists and decision-makers faced
with immediate practical problems. We see that our familiar moral
assumptions are often in tension with each other, and we try to find
ways to understand, reconcile, reform, and unify these assumptions, to
the extent possible, in critical reflection.16 This is the more abstract level
of philosophical investigation of normative ethical theory. Anyone can
take up philosophy, of course, but no one should expect easy or simple
answers to immediate practical problems.
WHY TURN TO KANTIAN NORMATIVE THEORY?
There are probably many explanations why interest in Kantian ethics

increased and persisted in recent times, despite some apparently
problems and a constant stream of objections. Kant's strong affirma
of human dignity and its promise as an alternative to consequentiali
have inspired many readers, including myself. In particular, Kan
ethics offers a way of thinking about practical questions witho
presuming that we can assess the intrinsic value of possible worlds a
determine what we ought to do accordingly. Kantian ethics is inclusi
and demanding but leaves ample room for the pursuit of perso
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projects. It focuses on our attitudes and reasons for choosing one way
or another, not merely the facts apart from the agent's ability to know
and respond to them. It gives a central place to self-respect and respect
for others, and it encourages human solidarity and hope for the future
of humanity despite the horrors of current wars and revolutions. Kantian
theory includes derivative principles of punishment, but it is not so
much about accountability to others as about the attitudes and choices
needed to be worthy of self-esteem. Many of the familiar objections to
Kanťs theory turn out on examination to be misguided, and others, I
think, can be accommodated by modifications that remain true to what
is most important and distinctive in Kant's normative ethical theory. For
example, Kanťs extreme and sometimes deplorable views about lying,
sex, punishment, and animals arguably do not strictly follow from his
basic principles. And, despite Kanťs too-ready acceptance of cultural
prejudices of his time, his basic principles in fact strongly oppose racist
and sexist attitudes. These at least are some of the reasons that, despite
the many problems that remain, I have continued to work in the broadly
Kantian workshop.
KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM IN NORMATIVE ETHICS
In normative ethics, once again, the question is not whether Kantian

moral realists, anti-realists, or constructivists as a matter of metap
Rather, we draw from Kanťs complex attempts to articulate the ess
features of the moral point of view that are inherent in common
thinking.17 One, but not the only, purpose in this ambitious proje
to try to describe procedures of deliberation that can appropr
guide our attempts to assess critically the substantive principle
shape our judgments in daily life. Kanťs well-known formulati
the Categorical Imperative express different aspects of one concep
of such a fundamental deliberative point of view. A formulation t
combines ideas from the others is that we should always conform
laws of a possible kingdom of ends.18 This ideal moral commonwea
defined as a union of rational and autonomous persons under comm
moral laws of which they are both authors and subjects ,19 In legisl
the members respect each other as "ends in themselves/7 Hum
in each person has dignity, an unconditional and incomparable w
They have "autonomy of the will" and so they "abstract from pers
differences" and legislate only laws that all can endorse. The m
fundamental moral requirement is to conform to the more specifi
mid-level) principles that would be accepted by all the members of
ideal moral union. More generally, the idea is that we should view
principles as authoritative insofar as they would be endorsed b
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for all rational moral agents who, while setting aside their ind
differences, aim to find principles that respect the dignity of
person. From these abstract ideas, I have argued, we can develo
Kant ian deliberative framework beyond Kanťs texts, as a persp
for assessing specific moral principles, trying to reconcile pot
conflicts, and deliberating about possible exceptions.20
The idea of moral legislation here has some apparent advantages

over common interpretations of Kanťs universal law and humanity
formulations when these are taken by themselves. For example, it
encourages systematic thinking about how our moral norms work
together. Without conflating law and ethics, we can see by analogy that
we need to evaluate sets of rules and principles together. What might
make sense as a "'universal law" in the context of certain laws might be
unacceptable in the context of other laws. Thinking systematically also
exposes potential conflicts and invites wide-ranging critical reflection on
how they should be managed. The analogy with law also suggests that
legislators can continue to affirm the fundamental moral point of view
as their constitution, as it were, while allowing reasonable limits and
exceptions to specific rules. Also, in light of the problems generated by
attempts to test maxims by the formula of universal law, the legislative
perspective is promising, too, because its application does not require us
to pick out one most salient description of a person's acts and intentions
to determine what is permissible.21 If, under any true description, the
agent's intentional acts and policies are incompatible with the system of
"legislated" moral principles, they would be forbidden, otherwise not.
TWO OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES: NON-CONFORMITY AND

DISAGREEMENT
If stated in this bare and unqualified way, the Kantian ideal is s

several obvious objections. Here are two. First, not everyone will
follow the ideal principles that would be justifiable to all in an ideal
kingdom of ends. Ideal rules for perfect rule-followers may be foolish
and dangerous when used to guide us in our world of imperfect rule-
followers. The problem is akin to the concern that Rawls's principles,
which are designed for a "well-ordered" society, are unfit for societies
marked by deep conflicts.22 If the members of the kingdom of ends are
conceived as always conscientiously following the laws that they make,
then their laws may not be applicable to us.
In response, I interpret the model as a deliberative perspective for

trying to identify the moral laws that ideal legislators would adopt for
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a real world of non-ideal moral agents. In other words, we are to ask

what, in our best possible deliberations, we would endorse as principles
for ourselves and others who live under all sorts of imperfect human
conditions. The principles must apply to human beings as we are,
which is often ignorant, foolish, biased, weak, and corrupt; but to be
morally authoritative the law-making must be appropriately informed,
wise, unbiased, consistent, and well-motivated. And so, while it may be
inspiring and helpful to think first of the ideal world where everyone is
perfectly virtuous, the aim is to articulate principles that are appropriate
for us now and in any reasonably foreseeable future. Trying to imagine
what Rawls called ''realistic utopias" - far better social worlds that
are at least possible for imperfect human beings - can be valuable in
suggesting feasible reforms to work towards and hope for, but (as Rawls
knew) it is foolish to think that we should simply act as if we live in such
a world now.23
A second objection is that, in our imperfect and diverse world, even

conscientious people disagree. An ideal model can be regarded as
Utopian if it turns out to have few or no implications for how we should
act, and one might suspect that this is true of the Kantian legislative
model because even in their best deliberations people often disagree.
If the theory says that the correct or fully justified moral principles are
whatever all ideal moral deliberators would adopt, then we cannot know
what such principles are unless we can know that ideal deliberators
would come to agreement on them.24
The objection raises a serious concern but does not undermine the
Kantian theory as I understand it. A major aim of this theory, in fact, is
to provide a reasonable framework within which we can deliberate and
debate about specific moral issues on which there are diverse opinions.
Even at our best we are not ideal moral deliberators, and so we must
acknowledge that there can be reasonable disagreements among
ourselves on some issues. But the Kantian deliberative perspective
can still serve as a guide and constraint for conscientious decision-
making. Complete convergence of judgment among ideal deliberators,
then, might serve as a criterion of truth or the fullest justification for
moral principles, rather than as a necessary condition for our treating
principles as valid for action-guiding purposes. This does not ignore the
opinions of others, but on the contrary puts pressure on us to challenge
our initial judgments by consulting with them - otherwise our judgments
are unlikely to be conscientious.
Any theory that appeals to an ideal hypothetical agreement among

ideal deliberators must explain the values or kinds of reasons that are
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supposed to move the deliberators to endorse one principle rat

another. In his theory of justice, for example, Rawls stipulated
members of the original position were motivated by a rational i
securing for themselves what he called the primary goods and
moral powers.25 The primary motivation of the ideal deliberat
Kantian model, by contrast, is respect for the dignity of human
person. So I turn now to the idea of human dignity, which pla
role in the Kantian perspective and in current moral debates.
HUMAN DIGNITY: A KANTIAN INTERPRETATION
In law ; theology and common discourse - as well as in philosophy -

arguments increasingly appeal to the idea of human dignity as a
fundamental inviolable standard. The United Nations Charter and the
constitutions of Germany and several other countries treat human dig
as an inviolable constraint, and their judges struggle to determine w
laws they must strike down as unconstitutional violations of dignity
The United Nations Charter affirms human dignity as the basis for
reaching human rights, and textbooks in ethics routinely condemn
racism, sexism, pornography, and torture in the name of human dignity.27
On some issues, such as assisted suicide, both sides appeal to dignity
as supporting their position.28
Many writers, however, have found the idea of human dignity problematic.
Historians call attention to the relatively recent emergence of the
modern idea of human dignity and the diversity of ways that it has been
interpreted. Some complain that the idea of dignity is too indeterminate ,
too Usquishy," to serve the weighty roles that theorists and common
culture have placed upon it. Critics dismiss the idea of human dignity
because (they say) it is derived from obscure metaphysics.29 To assert
inviolable human dignity, it seems, also entails inflexible principles, that
are suitable only for a utopia and either impossible to satisfy or utterly
untenable for conditions where superstition, self-deception, and malice
set the agenda. The constantly repeated example is Kanťs contention
that one never has a right to tell a lie, not even to save a friend from
murder.30
Turning, then, more specifically to the Kantian account of human

dignity, in the Groundwork dignity is characterized as an xvinner worth,"
an ''unconditional and incomparable worth," that is vxexalted above all
price" and xxadmits no equivalent."31 Dignity is contrasted with price,
which is a comparative value dependent on what is useful and pleasing
to us. Kant first attributes dignity to xva rational being who obeys no law
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other than one which he himself also enacts" and then (by implication)
he attributes dignity to members of the kingdom of ends and (explicitly)
to * morality and humanity so far as it is capable of morality."32 The
basis of dignity, Kant says, is autonomy, which is not freedom to do as
you please but entails commitment to living by norms that everyone
can accept. Contrasting relative and conditional ends with ''objective
ends," Kant argues that persons exist as objective ends, or "ends in
themselves," with an ''absolute value."33
In the Kantian view, as I understand it, "values" amount to complex

rational prescriptions.34 The fundamental values or presumptive norms
associated with dignity most obviously include negative prohibitions
on killing, incapacitating, degrading, and disrespecting persons. But,
as Kant says, treating humanity as an end in itself is more than just not
treating persons as mere means , which is a requirement that we could
satisfy by being indifferent to them.35 If the idea of humanity is to have
its full effect, Kant says, we must also strive to promote the happiness
of others, that is, to share resources and take opportunities, within other
moral constraints, to promote the aims and projects that others freely
set for themselves.36
Hard questions arise about the scope of dignity, but in Kant's view and
mine every person has this unconditional and incomparable worth.37
Animals lack this special status, but (despite what Kant at times suggests)
this does not imply that they are only instrumentally valuable. For cases
where public opinion and psychiatry dismiss an adult human being
as without conscience and devoid of even the capacity to be moral,
we have historical and practical reasons to resist such classifications
because they have so often been used as excuses for mistreatment.
The Kantian position, as I understand it, is that the worst evil-doers
have human dignity despite their atrocious acts, for this basic dignity
is a moral status that is not earned and cannot be forfeited.38 Under
just laws, legal rights can be forfeited by criminal acts, but all criminals
retain their fundamental status as human persons. Their freedom can
be justly restricted, but degrading treatments and utterly contemptuous
dismissal, however tempting, cannot be justified.
Human dignity, in this view, is an inviolable and incommensurable

value, but its inherent presumptions have limits. What I call inherent
presumptions are the evident and widely acknowledged implications
of affirming human dignity. They specify how we would always act in
a more ideal world, but in our messy and often cruel world we must
acknowledge their limits. They are not merely prima facie or pro tanto
requirements but a set of norms that we should always strive to fulfill
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as best we can even if, regrettably, in some circumstances it may be

impossible to fulfill all of them to the extent that we should wish.39
Arguably, among the highest priority values from the Kantian point of
view are those commonly associated with human dignity: to be treated
and to treat other persons in accord with just laws, with basic respect as
persons, and with due concern to preserve their capacity and resources
to live as a rational autonomous persons. 40 In the extended Kantian view
these principles, together with the general requirement to act only in
ways that can be justified to others, are constitutive of dignity.
RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS: AMBIGUITY, INDETERMINACY,

METAPHYSICS, AND UTOPIANISM
Arguably, this Kantian interpretation of human dignity has the resources

to address the familiar objections noted earlier.41
(1) Consider, first, the worry that "dignity" is ambiguous. That is, it is said
that sometimes "dignity" refers to an elevated status, as in "the dignity of
a duke" or "the dignity of a judge," but at other times dignity is equated
with being worthy of respect more generally, and at times it refers to
a self-control, confidence, a "dignified" way of presenting oneself to
others. Kantian theory incorporates all of these, explaining how they
are related. Dignity is interpreted as a moral status, which is attributed
equallytoall human beings. It is defined bythe general principle that one
must strive to make one's attitudes and acts consistent with principles
justifiable to all in light of the basic human values described earlier.
These principles include requirements to respect oneself and others,
and to cultivate the self-control, confidence, and "dignified" demeanor,
not of an aristocrat or office-holder, but of a human being worthy to be
an equal member of an all-inclusive moral community.
(2) Is the Kantian conception of human dignity too vague and squishy?
The Kantian conception (as I reconstruct it) provides some substance to
an otherwise indeterminate idea that plays a vital role in contemporary
moral debates. There are competing interpretations, but the term
"dignity" is similar to "liberty," "equality," and other passion-arousing
terms in that it requires an interpretation to give it content.42 The content,
however, must not be so specific and parochial that, by fixing the
answers to all controversial moral questions in advance, it undermines
its primary function of specifying the basic values and procedures that
set the terms of reasonable moral debate.
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(3) The complaint that the Kantian idea of human dignity is based on
metaphysical obscurities is common, but it is not appropriately directed
at the Kantian normative ethics that I have sketched here. It is also not a
fair representation of Kant's own arguments. The methods of normative
ethics aim to give the best unifying account of our firmest and most
stable moral convictions insofar as these survive critical reflection. The
methods do not draw their conclusions from metaphysics but rather
from critical assessment of these convictions. Kanťs own arguments
in the first two sections of the Groundwork start from several general
propositions that he claims to find in common moral thought, and he
argues by what he calls an ''analytical method" that these presuppose
the moral principles expressed in formulations of the Categorical
Imperative; it is these moral principles that affirm the dignity of humanity
as a normative, not metaphysical, claim. His practical use of his most
troublesome metaphysical ideas are part of his (perhaps failed) effort
to reconcile common moral thought with his own strong conclusions
in the Critique of Pure Reason about natural causation and the limits of
empirical knowledge. His claims about noumenal freedom, God, and
immortality were not the premises from which he derived his moral
principles but rather the extreme conclusions that he thought necessary
to address the worry that all moral thought, indeed all active thinking, is
incompatible with modern science.
(4) Finally, is this Kantian conception of human dignity Utopian? That is,
are we unconditionally required to act by the impossibly high standards
fit only for a more perfect world? If the dignity of each and every person
must always be respected, then isn't it always wrong to commit or
even tolerate acts that kill, degrade, or diminish the capacities or life-
prospects of any human being? If so, our messy real world inevitably
places us in genuine moral dilemmas because respecting the dignity of
some would violate the dignity of others. Some philosophers apparently
accept this, concluding that often we cannot avoid doing something
wrong no matter what we do, and then we are justified simply to act
pragmatically. I find this a strange and even incoherent position. We
cannot be (all things considered) justified in doing what is (all things
considered) really wrong to do. This is because to do wrong is to do
something that is unjustifiable when there is an available alternative
that is justifiable. Instead of accepting genuine moral dilemmas, we
can and should say that sometimes, with deep regret, we are morally
justified, even required, to do something that would be always wrong
in a more perfect world and is normally and almost always wrong in our
imperfect world.43 This, in any case, fits with my conception of human
dignity as a guiding ideal and constraint that we can and must always
respect, even when the presumptive values inherent in it cannot all be
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fully satisfied. Unfortunately, in some unavoidable tragic circum

deceiving, killing, and expressions of disrespect may be justified,
required, by the broadly Kantian deliberative perspective, but if s
are not violations of dignity but rather our best way of respecti
human dignity of each and every person. We may hope (with Kan
the forces of nature, if not our good intentions, will gradually ma
world come closer and closer to the ideal, but it would be wrong and
foolish to use this idealistic hope as an excuse for not making the hard
choices and doing the hard work that realistic moral goals require.44
Dignity is never to be sacrificed for things of merely conditional and

commensurable value, but both good common sense and moral theory
acknowledge that some of the presumptions inherent in the concept
of human dignity generally take priority over others if all cannot be
fully satisfied. Destroying or degrading human lives is no doubt almost
always worse than merely neglecting to advance someone's happiness,
but (despite what Kant himself suggests) I doubt that very precise
ranking principles can be given at this abstract level. Judgment is
required, as in any theory, but judgment that is constrained and guided
by fundamental moral values. The special role of the ideal of human
dignity, in my view, is to represent some of the essential aspects of
a moral point of view relevant for reflecting about systems of moral
principles and their limits. Although to deliberate and debate at this
abstract level is a philosophical task, not a task of ordinary life, history
shows, I think, that arguments and conclusions at this level can make
a difference in the world. And to dismiss such theoretical thinking as
worthless can also have practical effects, leaving moral decisions to be
governed by unreflective '"intuitions" that, even if generally reliable, are
too often uninformed, biased, fragmented, and dangerous.
PERSISTENT EXAMPLES: ARE LIES AND TORTURE ALWAYS

WRONG?
Now I want to say a few words on two cases that have dominated
discussions about making exceptions: (a) telling a lie to save a friend
from a murderer and (b) torturing a suspected terrorist to get information
to stop a bombing.
In the first case, I think, most of us would agree that telling a lie is
justified, and what is troublesome (at least to those sympathetic to
Kant's philosophy) is that Kant himself said that telling the lie would
be wrong!45 In sum, my response is this. A reasonable core of Kant's
ethics can be separated from his own extreme personal opinions about
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particular cases. And this reasonable core, as I call it, does not condemn
lying to the murderer. Why? For one thing, lying to someone to deflect
him from a murderous project is hardly a violation of his human dignity.
Given the stipulated facts of the case, he is asking for cooperation in
committing one of the most heinous crimes, contrary to just laws, and
depriving an innocent person of a life, one of the most important dignity-
based values. The murderer gives us no opportunity to engage with
him straightforwardly and non-coercively without thereby aiding him in
a vicious personal project with no claim to be justified from a moral
perspective that respects the dignity of all. The limits to the dignity-
based presumptive rule against telling lies that this case highlights
are not arbitrary concessions to consequentialist thinking but rather
limits that are justified by the same principle and values that normally
demand truth-telling. To lay out the full argument would take more time
and patience, and there are gray areas in which reasonable mutually
respecting people may disagree about the limits or exceptions to the
requirement to be truthful. But I would argue that the classic "murderer
at the door" case is on one clear side of the fog.
The case of torture in interrogation is different. The case is troublesome

to most of us, I expect, because we see two important moral principles
apparently in conflict. On the one hand, though our primary responsibility
is to make sure that we ourselves do not wrongfully assault, murder,
coerce, cheat, and debase other people, we have some responsibility
to try (by moral means) to prevent others from committing harmful and
immoral acts. So we have a reason to try to prevent terrorist suspects
from carrying out their bombing piot. On the other hand, interrogation
by torture deliberately inflicts intense pain and humiliation on a captive
who may be conscientious or even innocent, to break his will and turn
him against himself in an attempt to extract information that he may not
have.46 We use the tortured captive as a means to get information but in
so doing, it seems, we assault his dignity as a human being. So we also
have strong reason to avoid the use of torture. How would reasonable
Kantian moral legislators think about the conflict here? All too quickly,
I would say that a review of the history of the use and abuse of torture
would give them reason to condemn torture in the strongest terms
and for all reasonably foreseeable circumstances.47 Making exception
for some extraordinary case would not be inconceivable , but in the real
world the problem is not what is suggested by most fanciful stories about
the "ticking bomb." A major difference between these fictional stories
and real life is that it is usually stipulated in the stories that we know
that in fact the torture is absolutely necessary and will be completely
successful in preventing a bombing. In the real world we do not have
such knowledge, and moral principles are made for fallible people
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who must act on estimates and guesses. Importantly, to be eff

the relevant principles must be publicly promulgated, learned, and
enforced. From the perspective of Kantian legislators, introducing an
exception to the prohibition of torture, I think, would be hard to justify.
Would they, as legislators committed to the dignity of humanity in each
person, adopt the universal but qualified principle, "Don't interrogate
with torture unless you think your using torture will prevent others from
causing serious harm to innocent people"? The dangers of an exception
like this should be evident, especially given that there is much data
now to confirm what professional interrogators have often said, namely,
torture is not the most effective way to get information from captives.48
The main Kantian reasons against the practice of torture, of course,
stem from the horrible and degrading way it treats a human being - the
empirical evidence regarding its ineffectiveness only helps to set aside
facile attempts to justify exceptions. Anyway, this (too briefly) is the way
I would try to respond to the problems, but I should emphasize that my
reasonable core of Kantian ethics acknowledges that reasonable people
can disagree about how fundamental principles should be applied to
hard cases.
The extreme ticking bomb torture case, with all its stipulated conditio
may be one about which reasonable people may disagree and my broad
understanding of human dignity may provide no definitive answer. B
to emphasize what I said earlier, the primary practical challenges for
philosophers posed by tragic cases of moral conflict is to clarify and
highlight what can and must be done in the many real cases where,
despite the conflict, the right thing to do is relatively clear. Most
importantly and clearly we must respond to violations of human dignity
in our world where, for example, it is estimated that one woman in five
will be raped in her lifetime; two million people (mostly women and
children) annually are trafficked into prostitution, forced labor, and
servitude; and, in the United States, African-Americans are incarcerated
at six times the rate of whites.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL

VALUE OF SIMPLICITY
I conclude with a comment on the value of detail and of simpl

ethics. Normative ethics must steer between the two rocks of useless
complexity and misleading simplicity. But nevertheless in both
theorizing and judging particular cases, details can matter. This is the
wisdom expressed in two of my favorite quips: In Oscar Wilde's The
Importance of Being Earnest , Jack reveals his naivety in a hilariously
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complex situation, saying "That, my dear Algy, is the whole truth pure
and simple!" Algernon responds wisely, *The truth is rarely pure and
never simple. Modern life would be very tedious if it were either, and
modern literature a complete impossibility!"49 Similarly, at the end of a
very complex theoretical study, J. L. Austin warns us: "Life and truth and
things do tend to be complicated. You have heard it said, I expect, that
over-simplification is the occupational disease of philosophers. And in
one way one might agree with that. But for the sneaking suspicion that
it's their occupation."50
But tempering Austin's warning, Aristotle reminds us that an "account

will be adequate if its clarity is in line with the subject-matter, because
the same degree of precision is not to be sought in all discussions."51
In other words, ethics is not rocket science. Certainly, no simple theory
can do justice to the complexity of real moral issues, but there are
legitimate uses of simplicity in both theory and practice. Words like
freedom , equality , and human dignity have come to serve as banners
under which good people have worked, fought, and sacrificed, even
though we do not yet (and may never) have any exact, settled, and
common understanding of these terms. Kantian theory offers a partly
substantive interpretation of human dignity, but there are others, and
for practical purposes some indeterminacy is not a bad thing. Kantian
theory, I think, offers an interpretation simple enough to allow diversity
of opinion among those of us who march under the same banner, but
determinate enough to point us in the right direction.
NOTES
1. I am grateful to the members of the American Philosophical Association f

giving me the opportunity to express my thoughts in this forum. Over the yea
I have learned from the writings of many others. I appreciate the inspiration
and challenges that they have provided, and I regret that I cannot cite the
all individually here. Philosophy at its best is a cooperative enterprise, and m
life and work have been enriched by many thoughtful colleagues, friends, a
students. Working with graduate students, especially, has been a highligh
of my life. I want especially to thank Susan Wolf for her well-focused doub
Bernard Boxili for years of friendly challenges, and Adam Cureton for ongoin
philosophical companionship and valuable help with this and other philosophica
projects. Robin Hill is my constant support, wonderfully patient with my work, a
always helping me to see the good life beyond philosophy. My debt to Robin
really beyond words, but I should perhaps take the occasion to express publical
my very belated thanks and apology for not citing her in my often reprinted essa
on preserving natural environments. The ideas for this developed as we dro
across the country in an old VW Rabbit thirty-four years ago, camping in stat
parks along the way, and she not only listened encouragingly but tolerated m
typing the paper to meet a deadline the day after our wedding! Alas, I thank
many others but not her!
2. Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus and Antigone, in The Three Theban Plays , tra
Robert Fagle, Penguin Classics (New York: Random House, 1984).
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3. William Styron, Sophie's Choice (New York: Random House, 1979).
4. Bernard Williams (with J. J. C. Smart), Utilitarianism: For and Against

University Press, 1973), 98-99.
5. See, for example, David Luban, ''Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works. Paper 148, 2005,
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/148; Henry Shue, "Torture in
Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb/' Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law 37 (2005): 231-39; and Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism
Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2002); Fritz Allhoff, Terrorism , Ticking Time-Bombs , and
Torture: A Philosophical Analysis (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago
Press, 2012).
6. See, for example, Williams's example of George who thinks about working for the
chemical weapons factory. Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism , 97-98.
7. See Thomas Nagel, "War and Massacre/7 Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 2
(1972): 123-44.
8. For two (among many) discussions of such conflicts see Bernard Williams,
''Conflicts of Values,77 in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers , 7 973-1980 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 71-82; and Thomas E. Hill, "Moral Dilemmas,
Gaps, and Residues,77 in Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 362-402.
9. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903) and

Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912).
10. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon, 1930), ch. 2, 16-64.
11. To illustrate with a time-worn example, suppose that you have promised to meet
someone for lunch at a certain time but on the way you are the only one to
find a severely injured accident victim who needs to be taken at once to the
hospital. Both G. E. Moore's utilitarianism and W. D. Ross's pluralism can support
the common sense judgment that it is right to break such a minor promise in
order to save someone's life.
12. Some philosophers, however, including the patron saints of contemporary

virtue ethics, Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot, continued to hold that
certain kinds of acts are always wrong, no matter what the consequences and
no matter what other considerations might favor making an exception. G. E. M.
Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 1-19;
Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect,"
Oxford Review 5 (1967): 5-15; G. E. M. Anscombe, "Mr. Truman's Degree," The
Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Ethics, Religion, and Politics
(3; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 62-71.
13. Kant presents the duty of beneficence (practical love of others) as an impeďect
duty and a wide ethical duty of virtue. Everyone is strictly required to make it a
maxim to promote the happiness of others (adopting this as an end). This does
not specify exactly when, how, and to what extent one must act to promote others'
ends, and it remains controversial how much "playroom" this leaves for "free
choice." Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 153 [6:390]. See also 198-205
[6: 448-61 and (as background) 145-72 [6: 379-413]. Bracketed numbers referto
volume and pages in the standard Prussian Academy edition of Kanťs works.
14. My understanding of the aims of normative ethical theory is similar to (and was
influenced by) the views expressed by John Rawls in his early lectures and
essays. See, for example, "An Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics," "Two
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Concepts of Rules/' and ^Justice as Fairness" in John Rawls, Collected Papers ,

ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
15. Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 579-80. The book that Rawls was reviewing was
Stephen Toulmin's An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1950). Thanks to Adam Cureton for this reference
and others.
16. This is essentially the method that Rawls described as seeking (wide) reflective
equilibrium. See, for example, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1999), 18-19, 42-45, 507-508.
17. Kanťs theory and arguments are developed in several important works. In
Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy , trans, and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge
University Press, 1996), these are Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
(1785), 37-108, Critique of Practical Reason (1788), 133-271, On the Common
Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, ; But It Is of No Use in Practice (1793), II,
275-90, and The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), 353-603.
18. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, co-edited by Thomas E. Hill, Jr. and
Arnulf Zweig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 233-40 [4: 433-40]. Over
the years I have proposed and developed a reconstruction of Kanťs ''kingdom
of ends" as an apparent improvement on the formula of universal law and the
humanity formula, as well as a promising idea for normative moral theory. I
discuss the merits, applications, and limits of this idea, which to some extent
modify and extend Kanťs explicit views, in several works: Dignity and Practical
Reason in Kanťs Moral Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), chs. 2 and
11; Respect, Pluralism, and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000), chs.
2 and 8; Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), ch. 3; and Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 2.
19. The exception is the "head" ( Oberhaupt ) of the kingdom of ends who an author
of the laws but is not subject to them. This is a reference to God or a "holy
will" that is perfectly rational and lacks human needs and imperfections. The
head necessarily legislates and conforms to rational laws, apparently the same
basic laws and laws for human beings that would be legislated by other rational
autonomous members, but the head, lacking human imperfections, is not said to
be subject to, bound by, or under obligation to the laws.
20. Thomas E., Hill, Jr., Dignity and Practical Reason in Kanťs Moral Theory (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1992), chs. 2, 3, 4, 10, and 11; Respect, Pluralism, and
Justice: Kantian Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chs. 2-5;
Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), chs. 3, 8-11, and 13.
21. Kant, Groundwork, 221-25 [4: 420-24].
22. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Rev. edn.; Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1999), especially sections 25, 39, 55-59; John Rawls,
Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
23. This response may seem to "compromise" and "water down" our moral principles
in order to accommodate our failings in a way that Kant would resist, but arguably
the response fits with Kanťs understanding of morality. Moral imperatives and
obligation only apply to finite persons who have "imperfect wills," subject to the
limitations and vulnerabilities of human sensibility. Pure practical reason in each
person is supposed to be "legislating" for us, but what it legislates is a system
of principles (a "metaphysics of morals") appropriate for human capacities
and limitations. Kant himself may have had an over-confident faith in human
capacities, but those who make exception to the appropriate principles in order
to make excuses for their avoidable failings are illegitimately compromising the
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principles. In theory the Kantian principles are meant to be reasonably

for human conditions that can vary widely in their particular kinds and
imperfection.
24. I assume, of course, that the adoption and agreement here is under specified
conditions, for example, for Rawls the conditions defining the original position
and for Kant the conditions for legislating in the kingdom of ends.
25. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 79-81; 1 23-4; 380-81. Rawls, Political Liberalism , 1 74-90.
26. See Christopher M. McCrudden, ed., Understanding Human Dignity (The British
Academy, 2013), 359-402.
27. Mark Timmons, Disputed Moral Issues: A Reader , third ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2014).
28. Patrick Lee, "Personhood, Dignity, Suicide, and Euthanasia/7 The National Catholic
Bioethics Quarterly 1, no. 3 (2001): 329-43; Thomas E. Hill, "Self-Regarding
Suicide: A Modified Kantian View/' in Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 85-103.
29. See, for example, Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Charles R. Beitz, "Human Dignity in the
Theory of Human Rights: Nothing but a Phrase?/' Philosophy and Public Affairs
41, no. 3 (2013): 259-90.
30. Immanuel Kant, "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy/' Practical
Philosophy , ed. Mary J. Gregor and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 605-15 [8: 425-30].
31. Kant, Groundwork , 235-36 [4: 234-36].
32. Ibid., 235 [4: 434-35].
33. Ibid., 228-30 [4: 427-29]. There are many competing interpretations of these
(and related) passages, which are relevant especially to the relation among
Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative, but putting that aside, here
I focus on a conception of human dignity that is central to my broadly Kantian
perspective for assessing moral principles and their limits. See, for example,
"Treating Criminals as Ends in Themselves," in The Annual Review of Law and
Ethics, Band 11 (2003): 17-36. Reprinted in Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian
Aspirations, 296-3 1 9.
34. The word "dignity," as I use it, stands for a cluster of principles that are (normatively)
fundamental. Most generally and abstractly, no human being should ever be
treated in ways that violate norms and priorities that would be accepted by any
ideally rational and autonomous person, but the inherent presumptions or values
expressed these norms cannot all be absolutely binding because in tragic cases
they cannot all be fully realized. Then judgment is required in applying these
"grounds of duty." Judgment, however, is not totally unconstrained or left merely
with Ross's list of unstructured first order prima facie duties.
35. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 157 [6: 395].
36. Kant, Groundwork, 231 [4: 431] and The Metaphysics of Mora Is, 198-204 [6: 448-
56].
37. Here I leave aside the controversies about when a fetus becomes a human
being and when it becomes a person. For example, Mary Anne Warren, "On
the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion," The Monist 57 (1973); Judith Jarv
Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971); a
Don Marquis, "Why Abortion Is Immoral," Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989). Ka
focused primarily on morality among persons who are human beings at lea
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capable of having moral obligations, but recent debates emphasize that at best
human capacities develop gradually over time from the barest potentiality to
latent capacity to full moral agency. Kant studied and lectured on the empirical
conditions for developing the moral capacities of children, but he did not, as far
as I know, address questions about moral capacity and standing from conception
to birth. Immanuel Kant and Robert B. Louden, "Lectures on Pedagogy/ in
Anthropology, History, and Education, eds. I. Kant, G. Zöller, and R. B. Louden,
486-527 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
38. This controversial idea is a main theme of my Tanner Lectures. See Grethe B.
Peterson, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, xviii (Salt Lake City: University
of Utah Press, 1997), 1-76, reprinted in Respect, Pluralism, and Justice, 59-118.
39. When I say "as best we can" and "to the extent that we would wish," I do not
mean that what is morally required is to be determined by maximizing a some
scalar value or simply by weighing commensurable pros and cons. Kantians must
try to judge what is required in a more complex principled way, though (in my
view) they need not suppose that there will always be a determinate answer
(such as "wrong/ "duty," or "indifferent").
40. These values correspond roughly to principles in The Metaphysics of Morals. A

starting point in the Doctrine of Virtue (Part II) is the respect for one's own humanity
implies that one has "duties to oneself," which Kant says are the foundation
for all other duties. We must reciprocate and be willing to respect these same
values in others under moral principles that all can accept. Arguments for these
basic Kantian values or presumptions, I think, must depend on a substantive
conception of what human beings most deeply and pervasively value insofar as
they are rational and autonomous. Kanťs teleological conception of what it is to
be a rational agent apparently included valuing one's continued agency and its
capacity to function well, but arguably more specific concerns about human life,
health, mental powers, self-respect, and mutually respectful relations are not
simply derivative from the idea of a purely rational agent but depend also on
general facts about human psychology and the circumstances of human life.
41. My brief responses to objections in the next three sub-sections, (1) to (3), are
more fully expressed in "In Defense of Human Dignity: Comments on Kant and
Rosen," in Understanding Human Dignity, ed. Christopher M. McCrudden (The
British Academy, 2013), 313-25.
42. John Rawls interprets treating persons as ends in themselves as "treating them
in accordance with the principles to which they would consent in an original
position of equality" as explained and developed, for example, by his own theory
of justice. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 156-57. The point is we should not
suppose that we can intuit or briefly define what it means to treat persons as
ends in themselves, but rather we should see such general normative concepts
as getting their meaning by from their role in a well-developed theory that
incorporates many normative concepts and arguments. Similar remarks, I think,
should apply to "liberty," "equality," and "dignity."
43. I defend this idea with respect to Kantian ethics in "Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and
Residues," Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, ed. H. E. Mason (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), reprinted in Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Human Welfare and Moral
Worth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 362-402.
44. This is a common theme in Kanťs essays on history. See Kant, Zöller, and Louden,
Anthropology, History, and Education.
45. Kant, "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy," 605-1 5 [8: 425-30]. In this
context Kant is concerned with whether such a lie is compatible principles of
right (justice, law), but he leaves little room to doubt that he thought that telling
the lie would be also morally wrong (contrary to ethical principles of virtue).
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46. See David Sussman, "'What's Wrong with Torture?/' Philosophy and Publi
33, no. 1 (2005): 1-33.
47. Regarding the history, see, for example, Edward Peters, Torture (Phi
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
48. Mark A. Costanzo and Ellen Gerrity, "The Effects and Effectiveness of Using
Torture as an Interrogation Device: Using Research to Inform the Policy Debate,"
Social Issues and Policy Review 3, no. 1 (2009): 179-210; Intelligence Science
Board, ''Educing Information: Interrogation Science and Art" (Washington, DC:
National Defense Intelligence College, 2006).
49. Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), 258.
50. J. L. Austin, "Performative Utterances/7 Philosophical Papers , eds. J. O. Urmson

and G. J. Warnock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 239.
51. Aristotle and Roger Crisp, Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge Texts in the History
of Philosophy; Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4
(1094b).
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HumanDignityTragic Choices 2015

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Human Dignity and Tragic Choices

Author(s): Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/43661503

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Presidential address delivered at the one hundred eleventh Eastern Di

My talk today, like most of my professional life, is about issues at th

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(6) I return briefly to two classic examples, not so much to resol

EXAMPLES AND THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES

Philosophers love to debate about tragic cases in which appar

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to think of the Categorical Imperative and of the Greatest Hap

BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: CON SEQU ENTI ALI STS,

Early twentieth-century Anglo-American ethical theory was largely

Both approaches to normative ethics claimed a major advantage over

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We need to ask, then, to what extent can those inspired by Kant's

A few words about my terminology may help to avoid misunderst

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In addition, although I often speak of making an exception to

The special phrase making an exception , however, sometimes refers

A similar point applies as well in more mundane cases. When derivative

For present purposes, I don't assume that making exceptions to moral

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ASPIRATIONS AND LIMITS OF NORMATIVE MORAL THEORY

Faced with problems such as these, as philosophers we naturally

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experience of past ages as it is for one man to cut himself off

We must remember, too, that moral questions arise at differen

WHY TURN TO KANTIAN NORMATIVE THEORY?

There are probably many explanations why interest in Kantian ethics

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KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM IN NORMATIVE ETHICS

In normative ethics, once again, the question is not whether Kantian

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The idea of moral legislation here has some apparent advantages

TWO OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES: NON-CONFORMITY AND

If stated in this bare and unqualified way, the Kantian ideal is s

In response, I interpret the model as a deliberative perspective for

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a real world of non-ideal moral agents. In other words, we are to ask

A second objection is that, in our imperfect and diverse world, even

Any theory that appeals to an ideal hypothetical agreement among

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supposed to move the deliberators to endorse one principle rat

HUMAN DIGNITY: A KANTIAN INTERPRETATION

In law ; theology and common discourse - as well as in philosophy -

Turning, then, more specifically to the Kantian account of human

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In the Kantian view, as I understand it, "values" amount to complex

Human dignity, in this view, is an inviolable and incommensurable

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as best we can even if, regrettably, in some circumstances it may be

RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS: AMBIGUITY, INDETERMINACY,

Arguably, this Kantian interpretation of human dignity has the resources

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fully satisfied. Unfortunately, in some unavoidable tragic circum

Dignity is never to be sacrificed for things of merely conditional and

PERSISTENT EXAMPLES: ARE LIES AND TORTURE ALWAYS

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The case of torture in interrogation is different. The case is troublesome

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