Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Introduction
First of all, what is a hypothesis? You might remember writing a hypothesis in high school chemistry class or a
science fair, like ‘will chilling an onion before cutting it keep you from crying’? As defined by Google Dictionary
(Oxford Languages), a hypothesis is ‘a supposition or proposed explanation made on the basis of limited
evidence as a starting point for further investigation’. It should explain what you anticipate, be easily
understandable, and be testable.
So, what does a hypothesis have to do with our geotechnical and geological work? Well, quite a lot it turns
out. When undertaking a site investigation or geotechnical assessment, it is fundamental to have a hypothesis.
Otherwise, how do we know what we are, and are not, meant to be looking for. We are much more likely to
misinterpret the ground conditions if we don’t have a hypothesis. Misinterpretation of ground conditions is
our biggest risk and is the most common reason for liability claims made against geotechnical engineers (Lucia
et. al. 2017).
State of play
I have written this piece, because in my view most geotechnical projects are lacking a hypothesis and have
room for improvement in this space. I believe that often ground models (1) are not reviewed critically during
design. It is all too easy to focus on the geotechnical engineering facets of a design, this calculation or that,
when the ground model is clearly illustrated on cross sections and plans subdividing a block coloured
stratigraphy using discrete lines. It is also very difficult to see beyond a cross section, to understand the
potential for different ground conditions and incorporate that risk prudently into the design.
A robust hypothesis developed at the start of the project, to refine and challenge over the project lifecycle will
help form a better ground model and manage project risk. Note that a hypothesis can be similar or analogous
to a conceptual engineering geological model (Parry et. al. 2014).
Figure 1 depicts three trend lines for the development of site geological knowledge over the basic stages of a
project.
◼ The blue line I think shows the typical process in New Zealand. There is no hypothesis developed at project
commencement, limited desktop study and only a brief site walkover where little site observations are
recorded. The (observational) ground model developed for design therefore heavily relies on, and is
essentially fitted to suit the results of physical ground investigations, such as boreholes, Cone Penetration
Tests etc. This is a key pitfall, because somewhat blindly fitting the model to the investigation results might
not necessarily make geological sense. This could result in a ‘mechanical’ interpretation such as that shown
in Figure 2. These mechanical interpretations seem to be common across our profession, noting that
curved lines can be mechanical too, not just straight ones.
◼ The green line and to a slightly lesser extent the red line, has a hypothesis developed at the outset and a
rigorous desktop study has been completed. The hypothesis is challenged during the investigation process
and the physical investigation results are integrated with the hypothesis (conceptual model), to build the
observational model used for design. This is practically the reverse of the process followed by the blue line
and is significantly more robust i.e. ‘fitting’ the investigation results within the conceptual model
framework as opposed to fitting the model to the investigations.
(1) Or geological or engineering geological model depending on which terminology you prefer.
Figure 1: Development of site geological knowledge over the basic stages of a project. Reproduced from Fookes et. al.
(2015).
Figure 2: Example of a mechanical interpretation (upper section) by somewhat blindly fitting the cross section to the
investigation data, and a more realistic interpretation (lower section) by integrating the investigation data with geological
concepts. Reproduced from Baynes et. al. (2020).
Need more convincing?
i) An insurance company in the US undertook a study of liability claims against geotechnical engineers, over
the 25 year period from 1988 to 2013 (Lucia et. al. 2017). The main findings were:
− Out of 1500 total claims against engineering companies, 897 were for geotechnical engineering.
− The majority of claims against geotechnical engineers related to site investigation and inadequate site
characterisation, accounting for 56% of the total loss severity ($69.4M of the total $124.1M from the
897 claims). The study states that these claims originate primarily from ‘incorrect characterisation of
the subsurface stratigraphy (including missing a geologic feature), groundwater conditions, and the
associated engineering properties of each layer’.
− The critical recommendation made by the study to mitigate geotechnical risk and demonstrate that
‘standard of care’ is met, is to develop a hypothesis of the expected site conditions prior to physical site
investigations, based on desktop study information.
ii) Over 80% of 71 major tunnel failures worldwide which occurred between 1964 and 2015 were attributed
to unexpected geological or hydrogeological conditions (Hong Kong geotechnical engineering office 2015).
It was six men from Indostan The fourth reached out an eager hand,
To learning much inclined, And felt about the knee.
Who went to see the elephant “What most this wondrous beast is like
(Though all of them were blind), Is mighty plain”, quote he;
That each by observation “Tis clear enough the elephant
Might satisfy his mind. Is very like a tree!”
The first approached the elephant, The fifth who chanced to touch an ear,
And happening to fall Said “E’en the blinded man
Against his broad and sturdy side, Can tell what this resembles most;
At once began to bawl: Deny the fact who can
“God bless me! – but the elephant This marvel of an elephant
Is very like a wall!” Is very like a fan!”
The second, feeling of the tusk, The sixth no sooner had begun
Cried, “Ho, what have we here About the beast to grope,
So very round and smooth and sharp! Than, seizing on the swinging tail
To me ‘tis mighty clear That fell within his scope,
This wonder of an elephant “I see”, quote he, “the elephant
Is very like a spear!” Is very like a rope!”
Hong Kong geotechnical engineering office, 2015. Catalogue of notable tunnel failures. Case histories up to
April 2015. Mainland east division, Civil engineering and development department, Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
P.C. Lucia, L. Yabusaki, J.T. DeJong, D.L.J. Coduto. Claims against Geotechnical Engineers. Geostrata magazine
July/August 2017.
S. Parry, F.J. Baynes, M.G. Culshaw, M. Eggers, J.F. Keaton, K. Lentfer, J. Novotný & D. Paul Engineering
geological models: an introduction: IAEG Commission C25. Bulletin of Engineering Geology and the
Environment, February 2014.
J. Skipper, 2017. The 18th Glossop Medal lecture – Variability and ground hazards: how does the ground get to
be ‘unexpected’?