Biologically Inspired Smart Contract: A
Blockchain-Based DDoS Detection System
Xu Han, Rongbai Zhang, Xingzi Liu, Frank Jiang*
Center for Cyber Security Research and Innovation (CSRI)
Deakin University,Geelong, Australi
*Correspondence: Frank.Jiang@deakin.edu.au
Abstract—With the increase of Internet usage, the identifica-
tion and recovery from cyber-attacks become the major concerns
for cyber industries. Therefore, the harm caused by network
attacks has caused widespread concern. Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack is a very common destructive cyber attack.
This is a network attack that destroys the network and can cause
multiple computers to be attacked at the same time, failing to
perform services properly. Therefore, based on the understanding
of blockchain structure and DDoS characteristics, a blockchain-
based DDoS detection model framework is proposed to form
a blockchain-based collaborative detection system. We use the
blockchain consortium chain structure to treat all participants
as part of the private chain in the system. Each participating
organization has its own channel, and other organizations cannot
access its information, thus fully protecting the privacy of each
participant. Our experimental results show that smart contracts
can detect DDoS data and generate anomalous chains on each
node. The time required to generate an exception chain and
information sharing is very short, which indicates that the system
can protect the privacy of user data. While sharing data in time,
good results can be obtained as a collaborative detection system.
Index Terms—Blockchain, smart contract, collaborative detec-
tion system, DDoS attack, Fuzzy Neural Network
I. I NTRODUCTION
As the number of assets connected to the internet increases,
the impact of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
are increasing. As a highly destructive attack, the destruction
and degradation of its service quality are unpredictable [1].
The peak bandwidth of DDoS in 2013 has exceeded 300
Gbps [2]. DoS attacks are highly destructive, making services
reduced or even crashed [1]. As an easy-to-implement and
powerful technology for attacking Internet resources. Attacks
add DoS issues to many-to-one dimensions, thereby affecting
such issues. In the past, there have been some large-scale
attacks against well-known Internet sites [3]. Some defensive
measures have been proposed to deal with their attacks, but
the cost of defence is high [4,5], and in the past, DDoS
detection was mostly centralized single-point detection by
analyzing local traffic features [6] which caused the DDoS
attack could not be effectively defended. Defence measures
against DDoS should be widely deployed to achieve collab-
orative defence by organizing themselves into a collaborative
framework to enable collaboration between different defence
systems [7]. Compared with single-point defence systems
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[8], the advantages of distributed defence have been proven,
such as collaborative intrusion detection systems, which allow
information from various nodes of the intrusion detection
system to interact and collect information [9], but this also
directly led to the issue of trust between members. Denning
proposed the universal intrusion detection model [10] in 1987,
and the intrusion detection system (IDS) has been well applied.
However, with the growth of Internet attack technology, this
traditional single-point detection is easily bypassed by high
attacks [11], so it is especially important to improve the
adaptability of intrusion detection systems [12]. In order to
enhance the capabilities of intrusion detection systems, some
collaborative intrusion detection systems have been designed
to allow information exchange and mutual collection [9]
between IDS. Although IDS has existed and developed for
nearly 40 years, it has been facing the problem of data sharing
[13]. Because participants do not trust each other and involve
privacy issues, they are reluctant to share data, which leads to
collaboration. The detection system cannot collect information
in time, and the collaborative detection system also faces
internal data security problems caused by internal attacks
[11]. Once the center receives attacks or tampering, the entire
system will not be able to collect the correct information. In
recent years, the industry and academia pay more and more
attention to encrypted currency. The bitcoin, commonly known
as the first encrypted currency, the capital market reached 10
billion US dollars in 2016 [14]. The blockchain as the core
mechanism of Bitcoin shows good application prospects since
it first proposed in 2008 by Nakamoto and implemented in
2009 [15]. From the initial encrypted currency to the current
smart contract, blockchain has been applied in many fields
like economics, software engineering, medicine, Internet of
things and so on. It realizes p2p network transmission through
encryption technology and distributed message transmission
protocol, and ensures data security through the distributed
structure, and realizes data sharing while efficiently process-
ing data [16]. As a decentralized, traceable and untouchable
database, blockchains can work in a centralized environment
through integrated encryption hashing and digital signature
and other core technologies. Its good data sharing features
and data security protection provide a good infrastructure for
the idea of a collaborative defence system. Therefore, we
propose a DDoS detection system based on blockchain. We
use the hyperledger-fabric as an experimental platform. Using
the structure of the consortium chain in the blockchain, each
participant is placed in the private chain under their own
channels, and its data is not accessed or modified by the
outside channels. In the smart contract, we use the fuzzy neural
network to detect the algorithm and filter the experimental
results. Once the abnormal data is detected, the attack results
(score) will be uploaded to the public chain to generate an
abnormal chain, and everyone can use the public chain to
access and upload data. The contributions of this study are
summarized as follows: (1)A blockchain-based collaborative
detection DDoS system is proposed. This system can effec-
tively solve the problem of data sharing and privacy protection
faced by collaborative detection. Due to the semi-public nature
of the consortium, the privacy of the collaborative detection
participants can be well protected in their own channels, and
when the abnormal data is detected, only the abnormal values
are uploaded to the public chain. Therefore, the privacy of
each participant is still not stolen, and this data sharing is
very efficient. Since the data in the blockchain cannot be
tampered with, participants do not have to worry about data
security issues when uploading and accessing data. At the
same time, due to the traceability of the blockchain itself,
once the internal threat is discovered, the destroyer can be
effectively tracked. (2)Apply biologically inspired scheme to
smart contracts for data training. We use fuzzy neural networks
to detect the data. Due to the self-learning and self-adaptation
of the algorithm itself, the new contract forms a self-evolving
smart contract. After the programming is finished, we will
still send the smart contract to the blockchain network. After
the condition is triggered, the data upload function will be
automatically executed. The user will verify the execution of
the contract and update the database for recording. This paper
is organised as follows: Section II summarized the previous
work. Section III introduces the algorithm model- fuzzy neural
network used in this paper. Section III introduces the system
architecture and its working principle. Section IV summarizes
and analyze the model output and system output. Section V
summarizes this research value and contribution then possible
directions for future research are described.
II. R ELATED W ORK
A. Previous Work
1) Distributed detection of distributed denial of service:
Kumar et al [17] proposed a scheme of using DenS detection in
entropy in an Internet Service Provider (ISP) domain. Seeing
that the previous traffic monitoring and analysis for DDoS is
carried out by the attacker on a single link of the ISP, this not
only increases the memory and computing pressure but also
makes it vulnerable to attack itself, so the author proposed
A distributed method based on traffic distribution between
ISPs and POPs is detected. Chen et al. [18] proposed a new
distributed traffic flow detection method for detecting DDoS
flood attacks. They use the mutual cooperation between the
change aggregation tree domain servers in the ISP domain to
aggregate the flood reports of route reports. Oikonomou et al.
[7] proposed a collaborative detection model called DefCOM,
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in which nodes collaborate during the attack through com-
munication and collaboration functions to propagate alarms
and protect legitimate traffic while limiting attack speed.
Rashidi et al. [19] proposed a DDoS defence mechanism called
CoFence, which involved dynamic resource allocation devices
in the domain, allowing the network to help each other to
face DDoS attacks through resource sharing. The main idea
of collaborative detection for DDoS is information sharing
between system members and resource allocation assistance.
This is a good idea for the detection of distributed denial of
service.
Fig. 1. An example of the virtual network of collaborative network graph
[19].
2) Distributed Detection System: Collaborative intrusion
detection can be used as one of the defences of DDoS. Meng
et al. [13] pointed out the problems of data sharing and
trust management and demonstrated the application scenarios
of smart contracts. Since the distributed denial of service
(DDoS) defence system itself is not immune to large-scale
attacks, Rodrigues, Bocek and Stiller [20] proposed BLOSS-
a way to simplify DDoS by deploying collaborative network
hardware The new system of attack signalling shows that the
blockchain system has the decentralization feature and the
support of smart contracts, and it is possible to cooperate to
defend against DDoS cooperative attacks by simplifying the
operability and interoperability between Autonomous Systems.
However, for such systems, security and system performance
are key issues to consider. Gu et al. [21] constructed an alliance
blockchain framework (Figure 2) for malware detection and
evidence extraction in mobile devices, shared by the detection
federation chain shared by test members and users. The public
chain is composed and successfully achieves higher precision.
3) Biologically inspired algorithm: Fuzzy neural network is
a combination of artificial neural network and fuzzy logic sys-
tem, which can be used for learning, association, recognition
and information processing. Fuzzy logic theory, as a mathe-
matical framework for capturing uncertainty associated with
human cognitive processes (such as thinking and reasoning),

Fig. 2. Consortium detection blockchain structure [21].
simulates the perceptual and linguistic attributes associated
with human cognition through a mathematical form, while
understanding some The neural network’s learning ability
and self-adaptive ability are very prominent in the inherent
neuronal mechanism of biological species [22]. Thus, a fuzzy
neural network model combining fuzzy logic theory and
computer neural network is proposed. Applied in different
fields. Zhang et al. [23] argue that malicious code detection is
considered a pattern recognition and can be solved by a neural
network that does not require a mathematical description of
how the output is functionally dependent on the input to
estimate the function. Fuzzy logic and neural networks are
complementary, so they propose a fuzzy neural network-based
malware detection algorithm and it is proved that this method
can effectively detect malicious binary code. Shalaginov and
Franke [24] proposed an optimal fuzzy patch configuration that
uses elliptical fuzzy patches to automatically extract parame-
ters of Mamdani type rules, based on a new method based on
data X2 testing to estimate rotatable Patch configuration and
Gaussian membership functions to improve the accuracy of
fuzzy neural network detection. The particle swarm algorithm
proposed by Kennedy is a crowd-based random algorithm that
can be used to optimize based on the principles of social
psychology. Particle swarms do not use selection compared
to evolutionary algorithms. In the particle swarm algorithm,
in general, all subjects are retained from the beginning to the
end of the experiment. The interaction between them leads
to iteratively improve the quality of problem solutions over
time [25]. The particle swarm optimization algorithm used
as Swarm intelligence (SI) is a random search algorithm
that simulates animal foraging behaviour and uses group
collaboration as a basic component. It can be counted as a
multi-agent optimization system. MAOS). Because the particle
swarm optimization algorithm has a relatively fast relative
convergence rate in the early stage, it is easy to miss the
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optimal solution in the fast search process and thus fall into
the local optimum, so Eberhart and Shi [26] will adjust the
inertia weight in the particle swarm optimization algorithm.
The performance of the compression factor is compared under
five benchmark functions, and the conclusion is that the
compression factor is the best result. At the same time, in each
dimension, the maximum speed Vmax is set to be limited to
the dynamic range of the variable Xmax. Shi and Eberhart [27]
proposed implementing a fuzzy system to dynamically adjust
the inertia weight of the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)
algorithm. In the experiments in this paper, the reference
functions of three asymmetric initial range settings are used
as tests, and then the fuzzy system is used to test the discount
function. The conclusion is that the fuzzy adaptive particle
swarm algorithm performs well. Especially when it comes to
optimization problems in a dynamic environment.
III. B LOCKCHAIN - BASED D ETECTION BY B IOLOGICAL
I NSPECT S CHEME IN S MART C ONTRAC
A. System Introduction
Because DDoS itself has distributed features, single-point
or isolated defence systems are easily bypassed, so distributed
collaborative detection is more suitable for its defence. Be-
cause the blockchain itself has distributed characteristics and
the ability to share data and decentralize, it solves the problem
of sharing private information and requiring trusted third
parties to perform collaborative detection. It not only shares
information but also shares information rights. All participants
can participate in block access and add information, and all
members are contributing to the system. Our system structure
is shown in Figure 3. All members are in their own private
chain. Each chain structure forms a private chain with partic-
ipants. Each participant works under his own channel without
worrying that his organization’s data is accessed or modified
by outsiders. The rest of the organization cannot access or
modify the information without going through its word order.
The public chain structure in the middle is to change the
location of data storage. Once malicious data is detected, it
will be uploaded and recorded on the public chain to form an
abnormal chain. All members of the organization can access
and upload it. Data, so each participant does not have to worry
about their privacy issues, and because of the irreversible
and traceable nature of the blockchain, there is no need to
worry about data being tampered with. Single-point attacks
do not affect the whole and can be quickly traced back to
Internal attackers. Its decentralized structure also poses a major
obstacle to the attacker’s target selection. As a collaborative
detection system alliance chain, it can protect privacy while
sharing data, and this data sharing is very efficient. All
members will get warnings and take corresponding measures
when an attack occurs.
B. System Architecture
Figure 4(taking the private chain and the central public
chain as an example) shows the architecture of our blockchain-
based DDoS detection system, which is basically divided

Fig. 3. The structure in our blockchain-based DDoS detection system.
Fig. 4. The architecture of our blockchain-based DDoS detection system.
into four layers. The application layer contains the relevant
interfaces in which the application and the user interact with
the application, and this layer does not involve the underly-
ing blockchain technical issues. The contract layer contains
algorithmic mechanisms, script code, and smart contracts. In
this layer, we add fuzzy neural network algorithms to the
smart contract to calculate the DDoS data set. In the network
layer, the private chain adopts a blockchain structure, and
each node can communicate through a p2p network, which
also includes a propagation mechanism and an authentication
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mechanism. The public chain stores the detected outliers and
their corresponding related information (such as ID) in the
exception chain. In the private chain, each participant has
its own channel, they manage their own data through the
peer-to-peer network structure, others can’t operate, and the
detection of smart contracts is performed on each node. When
malicious data is detected, the smart contract uploads the data
to the public chain, the user will verify the execution of the
program code, then update the database to record the execution
of the contract, and monitor the contract terms to check for
compliance. All the test results will be displayed on the own
chain by the test results of the smart contracts in the member
private chain, which can be stored in the private storage block,
and the detected abnormal results will be stored in the public
chain. All members can access it. Since each member of
the system has its own private chain, there is no interaction
between members, and there is no need to consider privacy
leaks and trust issues. Abnormal results on the public chain
are shared, which causes all participants to detect the attack
and understand the attacker’s information in a timely manner
and respond in a timely manner.
C. Data Processing
The data set we used is from the CICDDoS2019
data set shared by the Canadian Cyber Security In-
stitute (https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ddos-2019.html) [28].
We used the DDoS DNS, it includes benign and DDoS DNS
attacks, similar to real data (PCAP), which uses tagged traffic
based on timestamps, source and destination IPs, source and
destination ports, protocols, and attacks. By calculating the
weights, we retain four features (Flow Duration, Flow IAT
Std, Packet Length Std, and Average Packet Size) as input
data.
D. Smart Contracts
In the smart contract, we introduced a fuzzy neural network
model to calculate the data. After many experiments, we
set the learning rate of the model to 0.35 (at this time, the
loss divergence is acceptable, the training progress speed is
normal), input the four-dimensional data for training, and
output the one-dimensional data as the result. For the abnormal
score, we set the model training result to 3.24-3.26. For benign
data, set the model training result as others. After the test
is completed, the smart contract uploads the test results to
all devices, the user will verify the execution of the program
code, then update the database common chain to record the
execution of the contract, and monitor the contract terms to
check for compliance.
IV. O UTCOME E VALUATION
A DNS attack is an attack that an attacker uses an open
DNS resolver to flood a target server and network with a
large amount of traffic. It essentially takes all possible steps
to make the DNS system unable to serve normal users. The
most common DNS-based DDoS attack is that an attacker
uses multiple downtimes to send a large number of requests
to the target DNS server so that the target DNS server cannot
perform normal parsing and response to the request. We
randomly selected 500 data in the DDoS DNS dataset from
the CICDDoS2019 dataset for training. The output is shown in
Figure 6, the average running time of our model to train 500
data is 876.2162783ms, and the best performance accuracy is
0.898. For evaluation purposes, the measurement is defined as:
1) If a malicious procedure is considered as malicious after
the test, the result is called TP-True Positive;
2) If a malicious procedure is considered a benign program
after testing, the result is called FN-False Negative;
3) If a benign procedure is considered a benign program
after testing, the result is called TN-True Negative;
4) If a benign procedure is considered a malicious program
after testing, the result is called FP-False Positive.
The precision measurement could be calculated as follows:
|T P |
precision =
|T P | + |F P |
The recall (R) measurement could be calculated as follows:
|T P |
R=
|T P | + |F N |
The accuracy (ACC) measurement could be calculated as
follows:
|T P | + |T N |
ACC = (3)
|P | + |N |
TP TN FP FN Precision Recall Accuracy
DATA 359 90 0 51 1 0.8756 0.898
TABLE I
O UTPUT EVALUATION .
It can be seen from Table 1 that the DDoS DNS data
detection performed by the fuzzy neural network in the smart
contract has an accuracy rate of 1, a recall rate of 0.8756 and
an accuracy of 0.898, which proves that the algorithm can
exert a good detection effect in the smart contract.
Fig. 5. The output of the FNN model.
Since the efficiency of the neural network depends on the
training data [26], for the inaccuracy of anomaly detection re-
sults (Figure 7), the learning rate and input data characteristics
are the main factors to be considered.
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Fig. 6. TThe FNN output results show in blockchain.
Fig. 7. Generate the abnormal chain.
Figure 6 shows all output data trained by fuzzy neural
network in blockchain system, all results are shown, and
Figure 7 shows the generation of the abnormal chain with the
abnormal score so that every participates in their own channel
(1) could access and upload the abnormal score without leaking
their privacy. The time it takes for our system to store 410
pieces of information is 677.8348ms, and the average time
required for each piece is 1.6533ms. The expected system is
(2) implemented, and the data storage time is acceptable.
V. C ONCLUSION
As a highly secure, traceable, non-tamperable, decentral-
ized distributed ledger, blockchain technology is designed
to increase the complexity of evolving universal traffic for
complex, secure, sustainable and efficient services [13]. Since
DDoS attacks bypass a single or isolated detection system
and consider the distributed nature of DDoS, it is easy to
attack the entire system, so a collaborative detection scheme is
considered here. For collaborative detection, there is usually a
data-sharing problem. Mutual distrust between members leads
to the inability to share data in a timely manner. Based on the
blockchain, we propose a collaborative DDoS detection system
based on the idea of consortium chain. Each member is used
in its own private chain. The information between members
is not shared, and the privacy problem is fully protected. The
abnormal data is stored in the public chain. All members can
access and add data to it, which allows an organization to keep
an eye on the attacker’s information. It is worth mentioning
that the blockchain’s powerful encryption technology ensures
data security in the blockchain and avoids tampering. This
causes the abnormal information in the public chain to not be
tampered with, so members can receive accurate information
without searching a trustable third party.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The work has been supported by the Cyber Security Re-
search Centre Limited whose activities are partially funded
by the Australian Government’s Cooperative Research Centres
Programme.
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