G.R. No.

L-26182 May 31, 1971

1. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS BAGASALA, JUANITO BAGASALA, ANICETO RONAN, SALVADOR RONAN and ANICETO REX,
defendants, JUANITO BAGASALA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Hector C. Fule for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose Agbulos for defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1961, While Macario Okngkit and his wife was asleep, they were awakened by the barking
of the dog. Macario went to the sala armed with pipe and a bolo. He saw 5 men entering his house and
in order to protect his house he takes his chances against these men, but he was overpowered. He was
struck in the head that causes him to lose his consciousness but unfortunately this incident led to his
wife’s death.

In the morning afte the incident Macario regained his consciousness and saw his son taking care of his
wound. He asked his son to report the incident to the police after he was brought to the hospital. As the
police arrived in the place, they saw the lifeless body of the wife of Macario. Then the police proceeded
to the hospital to get the testimony of Macario, there he told the police about the robbery incident and
he identify that one of those is Tomas Bagasala.

The two accused was brought to the hospital where Onkit positively identify them as the perpetrator.

On the other hand, the two contended an alibi and that their confession was obtained by means of
torture, and infliction of body injuries

The two were convicted and sentenced to pay the heirs and the value of palay.

They appeal on the case on the Court of Appeals but pending appeal, Tomas Bagasala escaped from
imprisonment hence his appeal was dismissed. Meanwhile Juanito’s Appeal was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the constitutional right of Juanito Bagasala was violated hence he is entitled to acquittal

RULING:

If the conviction of appellant were predicated solely on the confession, he would be entitled to acquittal,
his attack on its voluntary character having support in the evidence of record. There is, however,
sufficient basis for the finding of guilt as the testimonial evidence is sufficiently wieghty and the defense
of alibi utterly unconvincing

The Constitution in its Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." There is thus a safeguard against the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. It
does not bar, as Justice Tuason pointed out, the conviction of an accused "on a voluntary extrajudicial
statement ...." Certainly, however, where the confession is involuntary being due to maltreatment or
induced by fear or intimidation, there is a violation of this constitutional provision. Any form of coercion
whether physical, mental, or emotional thus stamps it with inadmissibility. What is essential for its
validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the person confessing

ETO YUNG PART NG TORTURE

He repeated that before signing the confession on June 13, 1961, he was likewise subjected to physical
maltreatment, having been boxed many times on the breast and stomach. 23 His testimony received
confirmation from a competent and neutral source, Dr. Pedro Villafuerte, the city health officer of Naga,
who examined appellant on June 27, 1961 in the provincial jail of Camarines Sur seventeen days after his
being apprehended and taken to the constabulary barracks. When asked what he found on the person
of appellant, this was his answer: "He has five lesions here. Tenderness of the stomach on the left;
elongated scar, lower third of the forearm; healing wound, circular shape on the elbow, left side;
sensation of deafness and easily nervous." When questioned as to what could have caused the
tenderness, he replied as follows: "That is trauma. The elongated scar on the lower third might have
been produced by a stick; the healing wound circular in form, he might have fallen on a hard object and
the sensation of deafness, if you try to hit the two ears with the palm, there is compression of the ear
drum, so that the hearing is interfered with. But this will be temporary in nature. Easily nervous,
because of fear. I examined him in jail.

ETO YUNG START NG DECISION

Nonetheless, a reversal is not called for. There is sufficient competent and credible evidence of record
pointing unerringly to the guilt of appellant.
 G.R. No. 97936 May 29, 1995
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL, accused-appellant.

FACTS.
 Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard
Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
 That on or about the 7th day of May, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines,
conspiring together, rob one DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID.
 Armed with handgun, blocked the way of Madrid who was on board a Mercedez
Benz cruising along Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, took, rob and carry away his
cash money and jewelries and shot LORENZO BERNALES, the driver of Madrid,
who died afterwards.
 Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended.
The others remained at large. Trial proceeded only as against the three.
 Pfc. Alberto Pursal from the CIS was assigned to conduct the investigation of
the suspects. He declared that even before the investigation started, Lucero
verbally admitted his participation in the crime and that he was the one who
shot Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid. He went thru the motions of
investigation and informed Lucero of his Constitutional rights. When Lucero
told him that he had no lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal Department
about Lucero's need for a lawyer and Atty. Diosdado Peralta was assigned to
him.
 Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero but left afterwards.The next morning,
Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The
extrajudicial statement of Lucero (Exhibit "C"), was presented to Atty.
Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero. In the presence of the two (2) CIS
agents, Atty. Peralta examined Exhibit "C" and explained to Lucero its Legal
implications. He asked Lucero whether he gave the statements voluntarily.
Lucero replied in the affirmative. Atty. Peralta then signed Exhibit "C".
 RTC: Acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence and Lucero was
found guilty.
 Hence this appeal by Lucero.
ISSUE. Whether the trial court erred in convicting him despite the violations of his
constitutional right.
RULING. YES.
The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his positive identification by the
complainant, and (b) his extra-judicial confession admitting his participation in the crime.
We find that the evidence proving these facts cannot stand scrutiny.
Firstly, the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness, Dr. Demetrio Madrid who
identified appellant, is seriously open to doubt. It stands unrebutted on the record
that appellant had to participate at the police line-up four (4) times before he was
finally identified by Dr. Madrid. There is no reason for the ambivalence. The robbery
took place in broad daylight and the three malefactors wore no mask. They drove
them around for three (3) hours. Considering these circumstances, there is no reason
for Dr. Madrid's failure to immediately identify appellant.
Secondly, appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extra-judicial confession.
The 1987 Constitution 18 requires that a person under investigation for the commission of
a crime should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel
because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them
inadmissible. 19 We take pride in constitutionalizing this right to counsel even while other
countries have desisted from elevating this right to a higher pedestal. We have sustained
the inviolability of this precious right with vigor and without any apology.
Atty. Peralta was not his chosen counsel, when he apprised Lucero of his rights, he
received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant
understood him. Worse, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS agents
when his real interrogation started. He said he had to attend the wake of a friend. His
attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role as counsel to a
person under custodial interrogation for the commission of a very serious offense. It
was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. They tried to
cure his uncounselled confession for the next day, appellant was brought by two (2)
CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence of these agents, Atty. Peralta
asked appellant if he understood the statements he gave and if he signed it
voluntarily. Appellant, of course, affirmed the voluntariness of the execution of the
confession. Atty. Peralta was satisfied and the trial court ruled that appellant's right
to counsel was not infringed. We disagree.
We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any
kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances in the case at
bench clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty.
Peralta. In People v. De Guzman, 21 we held that in custodial investigation, the right to
counsel attaches from the moment the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the
accused. In this case, at the crucial point when the interrogation was just starting, Atty.
Peralta left appellant to attend the wake of a friend . At that critical stage, appellant gave
his uncounselled extra-judicial a confession. Surely, such a confession where appellant
was unprotected from mischief cannot convict.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-88-201 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City , Branch CIII, convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y
Cortel of robbery with homicide is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLO COMPIL Y LITABAN

 G.R. No. 95028 | May 15, 1995

FACTS
 On October 23, 1987, MJ Furnitures, which was owned by the Spouses Manuel and Mary
Jay, was robbed and during its commission, Manuel succumbed to 13 stab wounds. This
was witnessed by one Jenelyn Valle. After being positively identified, Marlo Compil was
immediately frisked, placed under arrest, and subjected to interrogation. He was then
brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned. While on their
way to Manila, the arresting agents elicited incriminating information. In these instances,
he confessed, without the assistance of counsel, to the commission of the crime and
admitted his participation therein. The following day after conferring with CLAO Lawyer
Melencio Claroz, he executed a sworn statement admitting his participation.
 On November 12, 1987, an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against
Marlo before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49. During arraignment, he
entered a plea of “not guilty.” After the prosecution had rested, the accused filed a
demurrer to evidence which was denied. He was then found guilty of the crime charged.
 Aggrieved, Marlo filed an Appellant’s Brief, claiming that he was not apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel before the police
officers started interrogating him from the time of his arrest, then the Tayabas Police
Station, and while on their way to Manila. He also alleged that he was made to confess
and declare the statements that can be used against him in any proceeding and further
argued that the belated arrival of counsel from the CLAO prior to actual examination of
the written extrajudicial confession did not cure the constitutional infirmity since the
police investigators had already extracted incriminatory statements from him.

ISSUE: Whether Marlo Compil shall be acquitted based on the irregularities during his arrest
and interrogation.

HELD
 NO. While it may be true that the arrest, search and seizure were made without the
benefit of a warrant, Marlo Compil is now estopped from questioning this defect
after failing to move for the quashing of the information before the trial
court. Thus, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of “not
guilty” and by participating in the trial.
 The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused through the following
circumstances: First, accused Marlo Compil and Baltazar Mabini who are both from
Samar worked in MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were familiar with the floor
plan of the shop. Second, on the night of the incident, they were seen in front of MJ
Furnitures. Third, they were seen going to the rear of the furniture store. Fourth, robbers
forcibly entered MJ Furnitures through the back window on the second floor. Fifth, some
two (2) hours after the commission of the crime, at around two o'clock the following
morning, they were in a house in Bangkal, Makati, dividing between themselves and their
five (5) other companions the money and jewelry taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. Sixth,
they all failed to show up for work the following day. Seventh, accuses Compil turned
ashen, was trembling and speechless when apprehended in Tayabas, Quezon, for a crime
committed in Manila. Certainly these circumstances as gleaned from the factual findings
of the trial court form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Hence even disregarding
accused-appellant's oral and written confessions, still the prosecution was able to show
that he was a co-conspirator in the robbery with homicide.

4. PEOPLE v BUSCATO
FACTS:

-In 1973, Isidro (Boy) Buscato, Nestor Dalud, and Ricardo Romo were drinking “tuba” in
the residence of Dalud at Sultan Kudarat, Cotabato. Buscato and Dalud told Romo to
come back after the latter excused himself to go home and have his dinner. On Romo’s
way back to Buscato and Dalud, he saw Manuel Largo and invited him on the drinking
spree. They finally saw the group of Buscato, with Dalud, Jabib Tan and Rodolfo Lim.
Romo and Largo went to a store and the group of Buscato, Dalud, Tan, and Lim
decided to go towards the direction of Philippine Trade Center.

-The next morning, the dead body of Rodolfo Lim was found at the riverbank. According
to the autopsy, there was a stab wound in his lower abdomen. Thereafter, the Philippine
Constabulary investigated the persons who were reportedly with Lim the previous night
(Buscato, Dalud, and Tan).

-Tan and Dalud allegedly voluntarily confessed their participation in the slaying of Lim.
On the other hand, Tan allegedly confessed to S/Sgt. Vargas that he participated in the
planning of killing and robbing Lim. Dalud, admitted having struck the victim with a piece
of bamboo, while Buscato stabbed Lim with a Batangas knife and got the belongings of
Lim.

-The trial court, was persuaded that the extra-judicial confessions of Dalud and Tan
were voluntarily and freely given by them to the investigators. On appeal, the accused
contended that the extra-judicial confession obtained from them was through force,
violence, or intimidation.

ISSUE:

Whether the extra-judicial confession obtained from them was valid.

RULING:
The constitutional right of a person against self-incrimination precludes the use of
confessions obtained from him thru force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiate his free will.

The doctrine that one accused of crime cannot be compelled to testify against himself is
predicated upon principles of humanity and civil liberty. The maxim Nemo tenetur
seipsum accusare had its origin in the protests against the abuses and manifestly unjust
methods of interrogating accused persons in the inquisitorial Court of the Star Chamber.
It was erected as an additional barrier for the protection of the people against the
exercise of arbitrary power.
The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege against self-incrimination
"is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens. To maintain a 'fair state-individual balance', to require the government
'to shoulder the entire load, to respect the inviolability of the human personality,
our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking
to punish an individual procure the evidence against him by its own independent
labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own
mouth.”

This right against self-incrimination guaranteed in the fundamental charter cannot be

abridged. "If the government becomes a lawbreaker", once observed Justice Brandeis,
"it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means ... would bring terrible retribution."

There is no question that cruel or degrading treatment to secure confessions from one
suspected of a crime seriously violates his fundamental human rights, the protection of
which is basic in a regime of law and justice.

We thus conclude that without such extrajudicial confessions the evidence of the
prosecution has failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor
of the appellants.

(BUSCATO and DALUD, acquitted)

 5. JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC), petitioner,
vs.
RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.

FACTS:
Retired Justice J.B.L Reyes on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from
the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to
5:00 in the afternoon starting from the Luneta Park (a public park) to the gates of the
United States Embassy. Once there, a short program would be held consisting of the
delivery of speeches and the presentation of a petition pursuant to the resolution
adopted by the International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace and
the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila addressed to the United States
Ambassador. There was an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be
taken “to ensure a peaceful march and rally.”
Mayor Ramon Bagatsing denied the application to a peaceful march. The denial of the
permit was due to police intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive or criminal
elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of
people are expected to attend.
Justice Reyes was unaware of such denial as it was sent through an ordinary mail.
Despite the denial of the permit in reference to persistent intelligence reports affirming
the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent
Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of the police
authorities, that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal
Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves
and the general public may be ensured."
The petitioner filed a petition for injunction. The SC deliberated on the matter.

Issue: WON the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble were
violated?

Held:
Yes. The denial of permit violated the constitutional rights of freedom of speech
and to peaceably assemble of the petitioner
The Constitution states "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government
for redress of grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship
or punishment.
There shall be no prior restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability
unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has the
right to prevent. It means that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct,
injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided.
Here, there can be no legal objection on the choice of Luneta as the place where the
peace rally would start. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets
to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard.
The reliance on the ordinance prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery,
although valid, cannot be raised in lieu of the primacy accorded to the
constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly.
The general rule is that while a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to
hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be designated
by the licensing authority if it be shown that there is a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil if no such change were made.
In applying a permit to peaceably assemble, the following must be noted:
 The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.
 If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required.
 Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place.
 It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
 If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
 Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to
them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the
proper judicial authority.
Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are
highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed
that on the judiciary, — even more so than on the other departments — rests the grave
and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred
rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has
been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of
justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.

As to the primacy of Constitution over International Treaties: Although the

Philippines is a signatory to the Vienna Convention for the protection of the premises of
a diplomatic mission such as the US Embassy, the denial of the permit to rally is not
justified in the absence of a clear and present danger to life or property of the
embassy. The rights provided under the constitution prevails over the Vienna
Convention. Clear and present danger, not mere assertions, in order deny permit or in
designating another place for rally.

WHEREFORE, the mandatory injunction prayed for is granted. No costs.

 6. G.R. No. L-21741 January 25, 1924
AURELIA CONDE, petitioner,
vs.
PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal of Tayabas, and
FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:

Facts:

Here a certain Aurelia Conde, a former midwife was charged with more than five information for various
crimes and misdemeanor. She, her counsel and witnesses appeared on several hearings only to see that
the caused was postponed. She was also required to come to the Supreme Court for protection but for
more than a year no resolution yet was obtained.

Issue:

Whether Aurelia Conde’s right to speedy disposition of her case was violated

Ruling:

We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in
this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom

The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts to
prosecute the accused pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set forth in previous
informations, and the charges now pending before the justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are
ordered dismissed, with cost against the respondent fiscal. We append to our order the observation
that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts of record, will take such
administrative action as to him seems proper to the end that incidents of this character may not recur.
So ordered.

ETO YUNG FACTS SA ORIGINAL CASE

On December 28, 1922, Aurelia Conde is charged in an information filed in the justice of the peace court
of Lucena, Tayabas, with the misdemeanor denominated lesiones leves. When the accused appears
before the justice of the peace of Lucena, accompanied by her lawyer on the day set for the trial, the
fiscal changes the information so as to charge the accused with the crime of attempted murder. The new
crime not being within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, the case is set for preliminary hearing.
But at the date named, the fiscal does not appear, ever, upon the recommendation of the fiscal, the
municipal council of Lucena, Tayabas, suspends the accused from her humble position. Two days after
the complaint has been dismissed, the fiscal again becomes active and charges the accused anew with
the crime of attempted murder. A new arrest, the filing of a new bond, and a preliminary hearing follow,
and the case is transmitted to the Court of First Instance, where the fiscal files an information for the
same crime, attempted murder. Six months later, or to be precise as to the date, on August 30, 1923,
the case is called for trial. the accused is present with her lawyer, and with her witnesses, some of
whom have come from the neighboring Province of Marinduque. But the fiscal claims that he is not yet
ready and obtains a postponement until the afternoon of the same day. The case is again called at the
time named, the defendant is again ready to proceed, but the fiscal again desires further postponement.
Three days later, on September 3, 1923, the accused once more appears with her attorney and
witnesses, only to be met with the renewed petition of the fiscal for a few minutes of postponement.
When the few minutes have grown into hours, he comes into court and informs the presiding judge that
he has no evidence to sustain the charge of attempted murder, and, therefore, under his power to
amend the information, charges the defendant with the new crimes of illegal detention and lesiones
graves.

When the revised charge is presented, the counsel for the accused asks for a preliminary investigation,
which is denied. Thereupon the accused is arraigned and ordered to plead to the information. But she
remains silent, and notwithstanding the directions of the trial judge, refuses either to plead guilty or not
guilty. The trial proceeds no further, because at this moment counsel gives notice of his desire to elevate
the proceedings to the Supreme Court.
 G.R. No. 95445 August 6, 1991

7. MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER MERLIN ANONUEVO,

MINDA GALANG and other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
THE HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 18, HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports and the HON. ERLINDA LOLARGA in her capacity as Manila
City Schools Superintendent, respondents-appellees.

G.R No. 95590 August 6, 1991

ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), ENRIQUE D. TORRES, RODRIGO G. NATIVIDAD,

FRANCISCO A. NERECINA, EVA V. FERIA, LUCIA R. CARRASCO, LEO R. RAMBOYONG,
ZENEIDA PEREZ, MARIA ACEJO AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
TOO NUMEROUS TO BE IMPLEADED, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

FACTS.

 The Teachers and Employees Consultative Council (TECC) and the Alliance of
Concerned Teachers, in accordance with their Constitution and By-Laws, resolved to
engage in mass concerted actions, after peaceful dialogues with the heads of the
Department of the Budget and Management, Senate and House of Representatives in
public hearings as well as after exhausting all administrative remedies, to press for,
among other things:

o the immediate payment of due chalk

o clothing allowances

o 3th month pay for 1989 arising from the implementation of the Salary
Standardization Law

o the recall of DECS Order 39 s. 1990 directing the oversizing of classes and
overloading of teachers pursuant to the cost-cutting measures of the
government

o the hiring of 47,000 new teachers to ease the overload of existing teachers
 o the return of the additional 1% real property taxes collected by local
government units to education purposes to be administered by the Local School
Boards, and

o Consequent recall of DBM Circulars Nos. 904 and 9011 and local budget circular
No. 47 consistent with RA 5447 and the new Constitution mandating that
education shall enjoy the highest budgetary priority in the national budget, and
other equally important demands

 The series of dialogues and conferences initiated by the petitioners and other teacher
organizations with various national agencies were unfruitful leaving them with no
other recourse but to take direct mass action.

 September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day. There is no
question that the some 800 teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct their
classes on that day; instead, they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio.

 The Secretary of Education warned them that they would lose their jobs for going on
illegal and unauthorized mass leave. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass
actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed.

 The Secretary of Education had filed motu proprio administrative complaints against
the teachers who had taken part in the mass actions and defied the return-to-work
order.

 The petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila a petition10 for prohibition, declaratory
relief and preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain the implementation of the
return-to-work order and the suspension or dismissal of any teacher pursuant thereto
and to declare said order null and void to wit the said Court rendered judgment
declaring the assailed return-to-work order valid and binding, and dismissing the
petition for lack of merit.

 Review of said judgment is sought but were denied as well as their MR.

ISSUE. Whether the right to due process of the petitioners were violated. Not determined as
the case is not ripe for adjudication.

RULING:

As to the contention that it was a “mass action” and not a strike – It was the later based on
the facts alleged in their submitted pleadings.

As to the right of the petitioner to strike and peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. – NOT violated. Reiterated the doctrine that everyone
can enforce such right save for those employed in the public sectors who are enjoined from
striking which is what happened in this case, therefore, the whole process is unlawful.
DUE PROCESS: The issue is not ripe for adjudication by this Court in the exercise of its
review jurisdiction; and this, for the obvious reason that it is one of fact.

The striking teachers who did not heed the return-to-work order were
administratively charged and preventively suspended for ninety days for grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, insubordination, refusal to perform official duty,
absence without leave beginning September 17, 1990 and other violations of Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations. All of striking teachers were served with the
suspension orders and the change sheets notifying them of the charges and giving
them five (5) days from receipt of the charge sheets within which to file their
respective answers. A committee was formed to investigate the issue and to provide
for the basis and evidence of the charges filed against the striking teachers as well as
the corresponding penalty thereto. While some teachers filed their answers and
participated in the investigation, some refused and even teared the notices sent to
them. Nevertheless, the investigation proceeded, and a decision was promulgated by
the Committee which was approved by the Secretary of Education. The notices
thereof served personally and/or via mail to the striking teachers.

This copious citation is made, not to suggest that the Court finds what is stated therein to be
true and the contrary averments of the petitions to be false, but precisely to stress that the
facts upon which the question of alleged denial of due process would turn are still in issue,
actively controverted, hence not yet established.

It is not for the Court, which is not a trier of facts, as the petitioners who would now
withdraw correctly put it, to make the crucial determination of what in truth transpired
concerning the disputed incidents.

This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court, especially
when numerous parties desparately situated as far as the facts are concerned gather
under the umbrella of a common plea, and generalization of what should be alleged with
particularity becomes unavoidable. The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the
administrative proceedings but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their
rights therein, see those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal
to the Civil Service Commission; or if, pending said proceedings, immediate recourse to
judicial authority was believed necessary because the respondent Secretary or those
acting under him or on his instructions were acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, to apply, not directly to the Supreme Court, but to the
Regional Trial Court, where there would be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts
warranting corrective relief.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION. WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED, without prejudice to any
appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service
Commission on the matters complained of. The motions to withdraw, supra, are merely
NOTED, this disposition rendering any express ruling thereon unnecessary. No pronouncement
as to costs.
 8. GERRY TOYOTO, EDDIE GONZALES, DOMINADOR GABIANA AND REY
CINCO v. HON. FIDEL RAMOS, CAPTAIN ALVAREZ AND CAPTAIN BALLEN
G.R. No. L-6920 | October 15, 1985

FACTS
 On October 23, 1983, Gerry Toyoto, Eddie Gonzales, and Dominador Gabiana, who
belong to the “Urban Poor,” conducted a march, demonstration, and rally along Northbay
Blvd. in Navotas, Metro Manila. Subsequently, they were arrested as they were accused
of violating PD No. 1835 (Codifying the Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and
Increasing the Penalties for Membership in Subversive Organizations [January 16,
1981]). During their arraignment, they pleaded not guilty.
 Since the prosecution was able to present only 1 witness despite repeated postponements,
the accused moved for the dismissal of the case. Said motion was granted. However,
when the petition for habeas corpus was filed, the Respondents had not released and
refused to release them on the ground that a Preventive Detention Action has been issued
against them. 3 days later, they Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the Petitioners had been temporarily released and their case had, therefore, become
moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether the case of the petitioners shall be considered moot and academic.

HELD
 NO. The petitioners would have their case considered moot and academic only if their
release would be permanent. The release of the petitioners being merely “temporary,” it
follows that they can be re-arrested at any time despite their acquittal by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The Court held that such a reservation is repugnant to the
government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a person
 is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same
offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration.

9. PEOPLE v CUIZON

FACTS:

-Antolin Cuizon was charged for violation of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.

-As per the facts given by the Prosecution, in 1992, the NBI gathered an information
regarding the drug-related activities of Antolin and his wife, Susan. A surveillance was
then conducted upon them. It came to the knowledge of the NBI that the couple would
arrive at NAIA, the group was then dispersed. They saw that Cuizon handed four bags
to Pua and Lee and left the scene.

-Some of the members of the group were instructed to follow the vehicle of Pua and
Lee. Arriving at the Manila Peninsula Hotel, the NBI team coordinated with the security
team of the hotel for the arrest of Pua and Lee. Thereafter, when Pua and Lee went to
their room, the NBI team went inside and search their bags, as they were given
permission by the two (written permission). When the NBI found an alleged shabu, they
immediately apprehended the two and were brought to the house of Cuizon. In the
house of Cuizon, they also found suspected shabu. Thus, they brought Cuizon and his
wife to the NBI Headquarters.

-On the other hand, the defense’s version was: Paul Lee was accompanied to check in
at the Manila Peninsula Hotel. Pua was engaged by Lee to act as the latter’s interpreter
(because he does not know how to speak English and the local language). That, they
have allowed the NBI team to enter the room when the latter has introduced
themselves.

ISSUES:

Whether the warrantless search subsequent to his warrantless arrest is valid.

RULING:

NO.

Well entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be
made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority.

("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose,
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.")

On the occasion of any of the aforementioned instances of legitimate arrest without

warrant, the person arrested may be subjected to a search of his body and of his
personal effects or belongings, "for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense," likewise without need of a search warrant.

However, where a person is searched without a warrant, and under circumstances other
than those justifying a warrantless arrest, as discussed above, upon a mere suspicion
that he has embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of discovering if
indeed a crime has been committed by him, then the search made of such person as
well as his arrest are deemed illegal. Consequently, any evidence which may have been
obtained during such search, even if tending to confirm or actually confirming such initial
suspicion, is absolutely inadmissible for any purpose and in any proceeding, the same
being "the fruit of the poisonous tree." Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law
requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may
likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken,
then an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search
and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.

CUIZON, acquitted (constitutional grounds).

10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
NENITA QUIZON y KATIPUNAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts:

On August 25, 1983 at about 7:30 o’clock in the evening, Lt. Alfredo Lazarte, Officer-in-Charge
of the Auxiliary Services Bureau, Special Anti-Narcotics Group of the Western Police District,
received information that a certain woman and her cohorts were selling marijuana in Almario St.,
Tondo, Manila. Thereafter Lt. Lazarta dispatched a team of policemen to entrap a certain Melda,
the woman allegedly engaged in the sale of marijuana.

They proceeded to the appellant’s house. The informant told the appellant they wanted to buy
marijuana. Appellant brought out 15 sticks of marijuana which she gave to Gesolfon, a police
offcier. Gesolfon handed money to her after receiving the fifteen (15) sticks of marijuana. At this
point, Patrolwoman Mendez gave a signal to their companions outside the house. The latter
responded by moving into the house of the appellant. Then, they arrested her.

They brought her to the police precinct. The appellant was brought to a room by Mendez who
stripped off appellant’s pants and searched her body for marijuana. Mendez found nothing from
her. Barely one (1) hour thereafter, the appellant was forced to execute a statement before
Mendez admitting the charge against her. The policemen did this by shouting at her and
threatening her that she will rot in jail if she does not give her statement. The policemen did not
allow her to read the statement, but instead forced her to sign it without knowing its content. She
was afraid and nervous during that time.
The appellant Nenita Quizon was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to
Section 21, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The appellant was
convicted primarily on the basis of her alleged extra-judicial confessions.

Appellant interposed an appeal to the SC.

Issue: WON the lower court erred when it admitted in evidence the alleged extrajudicial
confessions of the accused.

Ruling:
YES. The SC opined that the appellant was not informed of his right to have a counsel neither
she was informed that she could ask the State to provide her with one.

The appellant’s extra-judicial confession executed on the night of her arrest (Exhibits ‘E’ and ‘E-
1’ is prefaced as follows:

‘TANONG:
Nais mo bang magbigay ng kusang loob na salaysay at sagutin ng buong katotohanan lahat ng
itatanong namin sa iyo na hindi ka namin tinatakot, sinasaktan, o pinangakuan ng anumang
pabuya at dapat mong malaman ang lahat ay sasabihin mo dito ay maaring gamitin laban o
pabor sa iyo at kanino mang tao sa alin mang hukuman sa ating bayan at dapat mo ring
malaman na sa pagsisiyasat na ito karapatan mong magkaroon ng manananggol at ang
karapatan mo sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ay maaari kang huwag sumagot sa itatanong namin sa
iyo kung gusto mo.

‘SAGOT: Opo.

‘TANONG:
Samakatuwid, magbigay ka nang malayang salaysay kahit na wala kang manananggol?

‘SAGOT: Opo.

‘(SGD) NENITA K. QUIZON’

The foregoing indubitably shows that while the appellant was informed of her right to remain
silent and to hire a lawyer to assist her, she was not, however, informed that if she could not
secure a lawyer, the State will provide her with one, to assist her in the custodial investigation.

The omission is a fatal defect rendering the extra-judicial confession inadmissible in evidence as
ruled by this Honorable Tribunal in People v. Pascual

Even the subsequent extra-judicial statement executed by the appellant does not unequivocally
show a clear and intelligent waiver by the appellant of her constitutional right to counsel, thus:
 Tanong: Ngayon, nauunawaan mo ang iyong mga karapatan, gusto mo bang magbigay ng isang
malaya at kusang loob na salaysay at sagutin ng pawang katotohanan lamang ang lahat ng
aking mga itatanong sa iyo?

Sagot: Opo, magbigay ako ng salaysay.

Tanong: Gusto mo bang kumuha ng isang abogadong makakatulong sa iyo?

Sagot: Huwag na ho, alam ko naman ang isasagot ko.’

As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the appellant was simply asked whether she wanted the
services of a lawyer. However she was not told that if she could not afford to hire one, the State
would provide her one to assist her in the investigation.

Considering, therefore, the circumstances under which the appellant’s subsequent extra-judicial
confession was executed, it stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is a thing that never
existed

Moreover, the ruling in People v. Galit (135 SCRA 465, 472), to the effect that the right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel, clearly applies to the case at bar.

SC also states that there are several material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police
officers raising serious doubts as to the truth of the supposed entrapment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby REVERSED, and
another one entered ACQUITTING the herein appellant of the charge against her.
 11. G.R. No. L-51858 January 31, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO CABRERA and LORETO SIPE, accused. RICARDO CABRERA, accused whose death sentence is under
review.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Facts:

September 16 of 1962 a dance party was held somewhere in South Cotabato when the incident
happened. An unidentified man approached the patrolmen reporting that somebody is chasing him.
Patrolmen saw Sipe with his paltik, fire a warning shot and ordered Sipe to drop his gun. However, Sipe
did not heed to the command of the patrolmen and fire to the Victim. The victim returned fire and when
about reload his shot gun he was stabbed by another person which is allegedly to be Ricardo Cabrera
and subsequently died. The next morning, the chief of police arrested Ricardo Cabrera and obtained
from him was a sworn statement confessing to the stabbing of the victim.

During the trial, however, Ricardo Cabrera repudiated his statement and alleged that those statements
were obtained by force and because of the maltreatment of which he was subjected. The accused also
posited his own alibi. But the trial court convicted him with capital punishment.

Hence this automatic review of the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the constitutional right of the accused against torture force threat intimidation was violate
hence he is entitled to an acquittal.
Ruling:

The Chief of Police and the Municipal Judge, each in his turn, testified that APPELLANT was in good physical
shape when the latter gave his statements before them. However, their testimonies cannot prevail over the
physical evidence as shown by the medical findings. During the trial, APPELLANT also exhibited to the Trial
Court the scars from the injuries that he had received.

APPELLANT's confessions having been extracted by force and violence, they stand discredited in the eyes of
the law and cannot be the basis for sustaining a judgment of conviction. Such a verdict would now rest largely
on Patrolman Poral's Identification of APPELLANT, which, however, we do not find as indubitable. Said police
officer maintained that he witnessed the stabbing of the VICTIM by APPELLANT.

.It was only on October 16, 1972, at the preliminary investigation before the Fiscal, or one month after the
crime had been committed that he gave his version of the incident.

Furthermore, one Benjamin Maca, who had also attended the dance that evening and who was apparently
also in the scene of the crime, graphically described how the VICTIM was attacked. He testified that when the
VICTIM was firing his gun at accused Loreto SIPE, Andresito Sipe approached from behind, went under the
VICTIM's right arm and stabbed him as a result of which the latter went limp. He was certain that it was
9

Andresito Sipe and not APPELLANT who had stabbed the VICTIM, but explained that since they both had the
same height and build, Patrolman Poral must have mistaken one for the other, since the latter was not
personally acquainted with APPELLANT.

G.R. No. L-59318 May 16, 1983

12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS.

 At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of May 3. 1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and
P/Sgt. A. Linga were on routine patrol along Taft Avenue, they had seen and observed
one MALCON OLEVERE y NAPA, acting suspiciously near the corner of Estrada Street.
The police officers, after Identifying themselves, stopped and frisked the suspect and
found in his possession dried marijuana leaves. The police officers thereafter placed
Malcon Olevere under arrest. Upon investigation, suspect Olevere declared that he
bought the recovered marijuana leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, alias
"Balanchoy".
 The following day, May 4, 1981, at about 12:00 o'clock noon, a police team with
suspect Malcon Olevere y Napa proceeded to the residence of appellant Rogelio Ramos
y Gaerlan in 2366 Singalong, Malate, Manila and arrested him. The police operatives
immediately brought appellant to the Drugs Enforcement Section Western Police
Department Headquarters for investigation.
 During the custodial investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn
statement implicating the accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the
marijuana leaves. 4 The accused, after having been duly apprised of his constitutional
rights, verbally admitted before Lt. E. Mediavillo and Sgt. A. Linga the commission of
 the offense charged. He likewise admitted that he sold to Malcon Olevere the
marijuana leaves for P10.00.
 RTC: found Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Hence this automatic review.

ISSUE. Whether the accused right to due process and meet the witness face to face was
violated.

RULING. YES.

The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written sworn affidavit of Malcon
Olevere. It can be gleaned from the records that Malcon Olevere executed the written
sworn statement declaring that appellant Ramos sold to him the marijuana leaves for
P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because Malcon Olevere was not
produced in court for cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex-parte is often
incomplete and inaccurate. Such kind of evidence is considered hearsay. The
constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face in order not to deprive persons of
their lives and properties without due process of law is well-protected in our
jurisprudence. Thus, in People vs. Toledo, 16 We elucidated:

Testimony in open court in actual trial cannot be equated with any out-of-
court declaration, even when the witness has in fact been confronted already
by the defendant. The direct relevance of the trial to the ultimate judgment
as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not present in any other
proceeding and is thus a factor that can influence materially the conduct and
demeanor of the witness as well as the respective efforts of the counsels of
the parties.

For the court to admit the sworn statement of Malcon Olevere without giving the adverse
party the right to cross-examine him would easily facilitate the fabrication of evidence and
the perpetration of fraud. The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based, not only on the
lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on
the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself
but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements which may
either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.

The oral testimonies given by the witnesses for the prosecution prove nothing material and
culpable against the accused. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General not anyone of
the three witnesses presented testified on the basis of their personal knowledge that the
appellant sold the marijuana leaves to Malcon Olevere. Under Rule 130, Sec. 30 of the
Revised Rules of Court, "a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception. ...

The lower court in convicting appellant of the crime charged, Partly relief on the verbal
admission made by appellant himself before Lt. Mediavillo and Sgt. Linga during the custodial
investigation. Although the records prove that the appellant has been duly apprised of his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, We are not fully convinced that this appraisal
was sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood and accepted by the appellant. This
is fatal to the admissibility of appellant's verbal admission.
In the case at bar, appellant has only finished Grade VI, 22 which means that he is not
adequately educated to understand fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel. As mandated, it is not enough that the police investigator
merely informs him of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking
his statements down, the interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these
rights to him. The records do not reveal that these requirements have been fully
complied with, nor was there any showing that appellant has been represented by counsel
during custodial investigation. In consonance with Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which
states that "any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence," We hold that the verbal admissions of appellant during custodial investigation
may not be taken in evidence against him.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila is REVERSED, and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged in the information. No costs.

13. EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

G.R. No. 95770 | March 1, 1993
AMOLO v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and SANGUTAN
G.R. No. 95887 | March 1, 1993

FACTS
 Students who were Jehovah’s Witnesses were expelled from the Daanbantayan National
High School, Agujo Elementary School, Calape Barangay National High School,
Pinamungajan Provincial High School, Tabuelan Central School, Canasojan Elementary
School, Liboron Elementary School, Tagaytay Primary School, San Juan Primary School
and Northern Central Elementary School of San Fernando, Cebu, upon the order of then
Acting Division Superintendent Marcelo Bacalso, for following their religious belief
which is allegedly against the Flag Salute Law.
 On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed special civil actions for
Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition, alleging that the public respondents acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering he
expulsion without notice and hearing, in violation of their right to due process, their right
to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship. On
his comment, the Solicitor General contended that flag salute is devoid of any religious
significance and the religious practices of Jehovah’s Witnesses produce rebellious and
anti-social school children and disloyal and mutant Filipino citizens.

ISSUE: Whether the expulsion of the students who were Jehovah’s Witnesses is violative of
their constitutional rights.
HELD

 YES. The Court was not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from
saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this
religious group which admittedly comprises a “small portion of the school population”
will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation “untaught and
uninculcated” in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country
and admiration for national heroes.” After all, what the petitioners seek only is
exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they
may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and
learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training
for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human
rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and
spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Forcing
a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a
ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of
country or respect for dully constituted authorities. Moreover, the expulsion of
members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will
violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free
education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all. A similar exemption
may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag
ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however “bizarre” those beliefs may
seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
 14. MARCOS v MANGLAPUS

FACTS:

-Former President Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency through a non-
violent people power revolution and fled to Hawaii. When he signified that he wanted to
return to the Philippines, former President Corazon Aquino stood firmly with the decision
that he cannot make a return as during that time, the government stability is still under
threat and the economy is just beginning to rise.

-Further, the Marcoses contended that under the Bill of Rights provisions, the President
is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within
the limits prescribed by law”. Nor according to the petitioners may the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

-Thus, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the
respondents (Manglapus) to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to
bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban of Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines has
international precedents?
RULING:

NO. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it
is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of
the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]

However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against
being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).]

On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any
country, including his own."

[Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect
national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of
which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).]

It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to

one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the
right to travel.