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51

Life cycle cost procurement of Swedish State


Railways’ high-speed train X2000
H Akselsson
Swedish State Railways, Mechanical Engineering Division, Stockholm, Sweden
B Burstrom, MSc
ABB Traction AB,Rolling Stock Division, Vasteris, Sweden

After thorough investigations Swedish State Railways ( S J ) in 1981 decided to start the process of acquiring a high-speed train. It was
also decided that the life cycle cost technique should be used. This paper gives a short introduction to the life cycle cost technique and
describes the acquisition of the high-speed train from prestudy, through request ,for proposals, contracting, design and &finally oper-
ational verification. Some experience obtained from the supplier’s design work and from SJ’s initial operation of the system is also
outlined, as well as the outcome of the verifkation. The project has been a success, and both parties-SJ as customer and ABB as
supplier- are convinced that the use of life cycle cost methodology has greatly contributed to this.

1 INTRODUCTION 2.1 Life cycle cost model


After some 15 years of technical and economic investi- A very simple example shows what the figures can look
gations, it was decided in 1981 to start the process of like when two technically equivalent systems are com-
acquiring the high-speed train X2000. It was also pared: system B costs 50 per cent more but has 25 per
decided that the life cycle cost (LCC) technique should cent lower maintenance and operating costs than
be used. In this technique all relevant cost elements are system A.
taken into account and used to calculate the techno-
economic lifespan of the vehicle system. This lifespan A B
was fixed at 20 years, which is considered to be the ‘best
period’ of the complete system. It is necessary to allow a Acquisition cost 100.000 150.000
further 4 years for implementation and a number of Yearly maintenance cost 20.000 15.000
years for refurbishing/scrapping the vehicles. Yearlv cost of ooeration 20.000 15.000
If the lifesoan of the svstem is 10 years:
2 THE LIFE CYCLE COST TECHNIQUE A B
As mentioned in the Introduction, LCC means that the
Acquisition cost 1OO.OOO 150.000
total cost for the lifespan of a system is taken into con-
Maintenance cost 2fw).OOO 150.006
sideration. If the acquisition cost is omitted, the concept 200.000 15O.OOO
Cost of operation
is life support cost (LSC). It has been found that the
costs of acquisition, maintenance and operation of a Life cycle cost 500.000 450.000
railway vehicle system are each usually approximately
one third of the total (Fig. 1). This shows that it is Which system is best obviously depends on system life,
important to pay considerable attention to reliability and in this case system B, with a higher acquisition cost,
and maintainability performance. shows a lower LCC over 10 years. System A would
have been preferable only if the life of the system was
less than 5 years.
Other conditions also influence the calculation, and
this leads to a discussion of the calculation model, the
LCC model. A simple LCC model may cover
(a) acquisition cost;
(b) maintenance cost;
(c) cost of operation;
(d) extra costs.
The acquisition cost includes, of course, all the tech-
nical system and the vehicles, but also investment in
necessary maintenance equipment, documentation,
Acquisition training and spare parts and, if applicable, other
Fig. 1 Typical distribution of the main life cycle cost ele- project-related costs. The travelling costs vary greatly
ments for a train depending on whether a domestic or a foreign supplier
The M S was received on 16 December 1993 and was accepted for publication on (for example, at the extreme, a Japanese supplier) is
20 M a y 1994. chosen.
F01793 0 IMechE 1994 Proc lnstn Mech Engrs Vol 208
52 H AKSELSSON AND B BURSTROM

The costs of daily servicing and cleaning are normally 1. Principles of the LCC evaluation, for example the
regarded as costs of operation, as are the cost of energy fact that the evaluation is a combined technical and
consumed and the cost of driver and train crew. economic effort. Missing data or the failure of the
Maintenance costs are divided into preventive main- tenderer to guarantee properties of the product
tenance, from weekly inspections to major recondition- implied by the supplied data may be a reason for
ing after 10 or 12 years, and corrective maintenance rejection of the tender.
(repairs). Because failures may have widely different 2. Supplier responsibility for availability performance.
consequences for the operation, failures should be cate- An availability performance programme shall be
gorized, for example as follows: carried out, involving continuous analyses of alterna-
tive technical solutions during the engineering phase.
(a) failures causing a stop on the line; 3. Expected guarantees from the supplier should be
(b) failures causing an unplanned workshop visit; stated.
(c) other failures. 4. Operational profile of the vehicles.
Extra costs include standstill costs, arising when vehi- 5. The present maintenance organization should be
cles are not available for operating owing to main- described. If the tenderer identifies missing resources
tenance, or costs arising from traffic disturbances. or equipment, necessary for maintaining the offered
Sometimes passengers have to be transported by alter- vehicles, this should be stated in the tender.
native means, and sometimes they have to be financially 6. The LCC calculation model must be provided with
compensated for cancelled trains or delays. the request for proposals (RFP), giving all customer
parameters.
7. Computer software for the calculations should nor-
2.2 Acquisition process with the life cycle cost method mally be provided by the customer. It is a great
advantage if both parties use the same software.
The main steps in the acquisition process are as follows :
8. Data necessary for the evaluation, thus to be
establishment of the LCC model; included in a tender must of course be carefully
determination of the operational profile; specified.
request for proposals;
evaluation and amplification of the proposals;
negotiations with tenderers; 2.4 Life cycle cost data from supplier
contract with LCC guarantee; Many data are needed for the calculations:
modifications of the contract if necessary;
delivery ; (a) investment in vehicles, etc.;
verification. (b) material structure and spare parts list;
(c) preventive maintenance programme and workshop
When establishing the LCC model it is wise to carry resources needed;
out a prestudy on an existing system similar to the one (d) component maintenance and resources needed.
to be purchased. The reasons are usually:
For calculation of corrective maintenance the follow-
(a) validation of the model; ing data are needed:
(b) establishing a reference for reliability performance
requirements in the request for proposals, and also (a) failure rates;
for the reliability and LCC evaluation of tenders; (b) repair times;
(c) training of the LCC team. (c) classification of failures;
(d) workshop resources needed.
The operational profile must be clearly defined since
it forms an important basis for the system’s reliability
performance and need for maintenance. 2.5 Customer’s calculations
The first evaluation of a tender normally reveals some The customer, of course, performs calculations accord-
missing or incomprehensible data, so a clarification of ing to the LCC model and also uses previous experience
the proposal may be anticipated. with other vehicles to estimate corrective maintenance,
Negotiations should result in a contract including a preventive maintenance, component maintenance and
guaranteed LCC value and preferably also a guarantee workshop resources.
concerning reliability performance. Normally the tenderers are requested to give advice
Any modification of the contract has to be done as to a suitable supply of spare parts. Swedish State
according to an agreed change procedure. If such a pro- Railways has also been using different computer models
cedure is not followed, there is an obvious risk that the for optimization of spares.
responsibility of each party will deteriorate, and the
main benefit of this way of contracting may be lost.
Verification of guarantees completes the process, and 2.6 Contract
if successful it terminates the supplier’s commitment as Among other things, of course, the contract will contain
to availability performance and LCC. rules for project realization, for example the change pro-
cedure, and guarantees. However, a guarantee is not
2.3 Request for proposal worth much unless its fulfilment can and will be verified.
How this will be done should have been outlined
When LCC is applied in the acquisition, the following already in the request for proposals, and a procedure
factors must be considered. agreed on included in the contract.
Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit @ IMechE 1994
LIFE CYCLE COST PROCUREMENT OF SWEDISH STATE RAILWAYS' HIGH-SPEED TRAIN XZOOO 53

Guarantees should cover an LCC value that must not are rather expensive to perform, but the customer
be exceeded. Reliability and maintainability per- should at least reserve the right to demand verification
formance guarantees are also desirable, for example of any data provided by the supplier.
maximum number of stopping failures and unplanned Energy consumption ought to be verified, either theo-
workshop visits and average or maximum repair time. retically or in practice, or both, because of its great
Besides these guarantees there is of course a tradi- importance for the life cycle cost.
tional technical guarantee, which is not at all affected by
the other guarantees.
2.9 Benefits and possibilities of the life cycle cost method
2.7 Design The benefits for the customer are obvious. A much
better defined product is achieved already at the time of
When the contract is signed, the design of the vehicles contract signing, and the supplier is committed to do a
changes from the art of conceptual design, adopted good job with emphasis on availability performance. All
during the proposal phase, into a thorough and detailed relevant costs of different technical alternatives are cal-
design. In this phase, about 80 per cent of the main- culated, enabling the most favourable solution regard-
tenance costs are incurred, thus sufficient effort should ing LCC to be chosen. If a low LCC is predicted and
be expended on designing good maintainability to subsequently verified. the customer will benefit from low
achieve a low LCC for the vehicles. support costs for the entire life of the system.
Systematic reliability work presupposes that the
However, the method also has advantages for the
design work is executed under conditions of collective supplier. An insight into the customer's intended use of
responsibility. If the trains/systems are to perform at the product and the value placed on different costs is
optimal reliability, the complete chain of subsystems,
obtained. The supplier also gets a tool for evaluation of
including the maintenance system, must be integrated
different technical solutions since availability per-
and internally balanced so that a product of consistent formance can be valued in economic terms. Finally, if
strength is obtained. This implies that parameters that
evidence of a thoroughly evaluated product can be
have a strong influence on reliability performance are obtained, this can be used in marketing.
subject to an eMicient control.
During its development, the train goes through a
number of stages or phases, from the conceptual to the 3 ACQUISITION OF THE HIGH-SPEED TRAIN
commercially operational. During each stage reliability x2000
and maintainability should be taken into consideration.
Much of the reliability work and associated activities 3.1 Life cycle cost prestudy performed by Swedish State
are repeated in the different design phases. The degree Railways
of detail and the level of ambition of this work is depen- Swedish State Railways had no previous experience of
dent on the phase and when the work is performed. LCC modelling of railway rolling stock systems, so a
Examples of reliability activities which are important prestudy on an existing system similar to the high-speed
in the design work include : train was definitely necessary.
(a) specification of design preconditions together with A dummy train was composed of data from electric
preconditions for operation and maintenance; locomotives and coaches to include approximately the
(b) specification of requirements and preconditions for right amount of traction equipment and interior fittings,
reliability performance; similar to the intended composition of the X2000.
(c) development of technical system solutions and esti- In this way SJ first established a material structure
mation of the impact of system faults on the service- for this dummy train, and then relevant data at com-
ability of the trains; ponent level were retrieved. The most important data
(d) analyses of reliability and maintainability per- were failure rates, repair times, prices and information
formance. on preventive maintenance. These were collected from
computer-stored data and interviews with workshop
staff.
2.8 Verification An enormous number of work orders from work-
Verification is a wide concept, covering not only what is shops had to be reviewed to obtain the repair statistics.
related to LCC. The traditional predelivery verification Finally, the preventive maintenance schedules for the
is of course still there, with scrutiny of drawings and vehicles were identified and edited in the LCC input
specifications, type testing of new components, inspec- data file together with other typical SJ data, such as
tions during the production phase, etc. labour rates at workshops, costs of transportation of
LCC verification implies that the vehicles are very material, etc.
carefully followed up during a reasonable period of Several different calculations were performed:
normal operation. For the purpose of reliability per-
formance verification, all events are carefully reported (a) availability performance;
and logged, and customer and supplier together decide (b) optimization of spares;
whether or not any event is a relevant irregularity. The (c) availability performance simulation;
supplier is of course responsible only for failures (d) LCC calculation.
resulting from the vehicle itself. Maintainability per- The availability performance analysis first of all produc-
formance (that is repair times) may be verified through ed input to the LCC calculation, such as failure rates
test repairs of a number of randomly chosen failure and repair times, but also made it possible to identify
modes. Verification of preventive maintenance actions the components most likely to fail or taking most time
Q lMechE 1994 Proc lnstn Mech Engrs Vol 208
54 H AKSELSSON AND B BURSTROM

to repair and components most likely to cause vehicle Stockholm-Gothenburg and Stockholm-Malmo lines
unavailability. were performed. The timetable included about 3000
The purpose of optimization of spares was of course single tours a year, corresponding to a little more than
to identify how much money had to be invested in 15 million train-kilometres. This was expected to be
spares in order to maintain an acceptable availability of carried out with 36 trains plus three spare trains. The
the vehicles. availability performance simulation showed, however,
The availability performance simulation was carried that as many as 12 spare trains might be needed, and
out using an extensive computer program, developed that would of course be unacceptable. This led to many
primarily for the X2000 project. The program, called questions and discussions. Could the time for exchange
SIDRIX, takes into account, among other things : of a faulty coach be decreased? Would it be possible to
do more repairs at service platforms nearby the stations
(a) the trains’ timetable;
instead of taking the train to a workshop? Eventually,
(b) availability performance characteristics of the vehi-
the requirement for spare trains was reduced, and the
cles;
(c) workshop resources, such as working hours and dif- results of the different evaluations showed that an
ferent track facilities; acceptable solution could be within reach.
(d) number of spare vehicles;
(e) acceptable number of cancelled trains/week;
(f) time for exchange of a faulty coach or power car. 3.5 Contract
All these calculations increased the knowledge of the The formal negotiations started in November 1985.
behaviour of such a train system, and led to some Finally, after many time-consuming negotiations, a con-
adjustments of the LCC model. SJ also decided not to tract was signed on 29 August 1986. Delivery was to
specify reliability requirements in the RFP, but to raise encompass 20 trainsets, spare vehicles corresponding to
the question in negotiations with the suppliers after the two reduced trainsets, maintenance equipment, docu-
tenders had been evaluated. mentation and spare parts.
The contract included guarantees concerning both
reliability performance and LCC :
3.2 Invitation for tenders and first evaluation
1. The number of stopping failures should not exceed
The invitation for tenders was sent out in July 1982, 12 per million kilometres, the definition of this being
and tenders were received in February the following a stop on the line for more than 15 mins without
year. None of the tenders fulfilled the requirements, possible restart. (Contractual status had indicated
either technically or with regard to acceptance of guar- about 11 stopping failures per million kilometres.)
antee commitments concerning availability performance 2. The number of faults causing an unplanned work-
and LCC. Thus all tenders had to be rejected, and a shop visit directly after arrival at the end station
modified invitation for tenders had to be prepared. New should not exceed 750. (Contractual status had indi-
tenders were received in December, and a second evalu- cated about 450.)
ation started. 3. The LCC value as calculated according to the agreed
LCC model should not be exceeded by more than 10
3.3 Second evaluation of tenders per cent.
The second time around several tenders were much Guarantees are not worth much, unless a procedure for
better regarding availability performance and main- verification of their fulfilment is agreed upon. Thus the
tenance. However, guarantees seemed to be hard to contract stated that the contractor had an undertaking
obtain since tenderers preferred to characterize their to conduct verification of reliability, maintainability and
data as ‘estimated’ or ‘calculated’. This ‘uncertainty’ LCC.
from tenderers meant that some sensitivity analyses had The contract also included a contractor commitment
to be carried out, evaluating what the impact would be to carry out an availability performance programme
if the tenderer had, for example, underestimated all (APP). This means that during the engineering phase
failure rates and preventive maintenance by a certain continuous analyses concerning reliability performance
percentage. and maintainability performance should be carried out,
and their impact on LCC assessed.
The APP also included a maintenance analysis to be
3.4 Further invitation for tenders and evaluation carried out in six steps, gradually refined concurrently
The findings of the second tender evaluation and a com- with approval of the vehicle design. The maintenance
mercial study led to some changes in the train outline. analysis should cover :
The concept finally included one power car, four inter-
(a) necessary maintenance equipment;
mediate cars and one driving trailer. A further invita-
(b) necessary manpower;
tion for tenders was sent out in April 1985, with replies
(c) necessary standstill time for actions;
received 1 month later.
(d) consumption of spares;
With only one driving unit it was necessary to intro-
(e) necessary documentation ;
duce asynchronous motors if desired travelling times
(f) necessary training.
were still to be achieved. The asynchronous motor is
more powerful than traditional motors of the same size. One outcome of the maintenance analysis was the
The whole battery of calculations was repeated. At balance between preventive and corrective maintenance.
this stage calculations of a system designed for the The proportions of the predicted necessary labour
Part F : Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit @ lMechE 1994
LIFE CYCLE COST PROCUREMENT OF SWEDISH STATE RAILWAYS’ HIGH-SPEED TRAIN X2OoO 55

requirements are 78 per cent for preventive maintenance failure localization and exchange of equipment,
and 22 per cent for corrective maintenance. etc.) is cheap and efficient, especially if considered
early. Among other things, this has led to exten-
sive use of modularization, resulting in short
4 DESIGN PERFORMED BY ABB TRACTION train outage times.
(d) Find the cost drivers! The design was continually
In view of the strict reliability and LCC requirements
evaluated in order to kccp track of cost drivers,
stated in the contract, a prerequisite for a successful
that is components with high failure rate and/or
project result was an integration of LCC and reliability
maintenance volume.
considerations into the train design process.
It was soon found that this was most efficiently done The chairs are a good example of how this procedure
by ensuring a high degree of participation from the worked to pin-point problem areas. In preliminary
system designers. Thus, the LCC work was led by a analyses, the chair design considered was found to have
small group of experienced reliability engineers with an expected failure rate much in excess of the expected
overall responsibility for the elTort. However, a large (that is of the system reliability goal). A design change
portion of the system-specific reliability work was done was initiated, resulting in a considerable reduction.
by the system designers as part of their normal duties. The LCC work within the design phase required con-
This had the advantage of making the overall effort siderable resources, both from the reliability group and
manageable while at the same time the technical com- from the system designers. However, since much of the
petence of the designers was efficiently used. When work invested will be reusable within future projects,
systems or equipment were designed and/or produced this must be considered a worthwhile investment.
by subsuppliers, a similar approach was chosen, that is
the analysis requirements were transferred to the sub-
supplier as part of the purchasing specification. 4.1 Theoretical design verification
Obviously, this decentralized analysis approach led to To verify theoretically during the design phase that the
a number of additional tasks for the reliability group, design would meet the reliability demands, an LCC
for example: computer model of the train was continually updated as
the design proceeded, resulting in several interim
1. Education: The effort started with the education of
reports, showing the ‘current LCC status’ (see Fig. 2).
all key system designers, in order to make them
aware of the design implications of the requirements For each piece of equipment in the model about 10 dif-
posed in the contract, and to give them the necessary ferent parameters important to the LCC were included.
basic training in reliability techniques. The predicted LCC values were compared with those
2. Coordination: The efforts of the various designers stated in the contract, calculated from a contractual
and subsuppliers had to be coordinated with respect
to working methods, scope and results.
3. Response: In order to keep system designers and Contractual status
subsuppliers motivated, quick response to the input
supplied was important.
4. Reliability subgoals : All contracted guarantees were
given on the train level. However, in order to ensure +
efficient design management, system subgoals were _ _
defined and applied in all system evaluations. In this Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 18
\ 86-08-29 92-01-20 1
manner, it was possible both to spot problems and to
direct corrective action.
5. Design management: In most cases, the designers
were not supposed to make any formal reliability
analyses by themselves. Instead, a set of rules of
Current status Final status \ ,

thumb were developed, that is general rules to be


considered and applied in detailed system design.
The rules of thumb were formulated early in the
project, and played an important role in design man-
agement, for example. vwwon 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4
86-08 29
(a) Use of redundancies. Redundancies were eco-
nomically motivated only in a few specific cases.
Mostly, cost reduction as a result of improved
reliability could not compensate for the radically
increased volume of corrective and preventive
maintenance. Verified failure rate
(b) Design complexity. In this case, the rule was Prrdicted failure rate
simply ‘Keep it simple !’, meaning that extrava-
Verified MTTR
gance should be avoided because of high costs,
Predicted MTTR
for example of spares, maintenance equipment, Final slalub Vcr1fied status
failure localization, component exchange. 92 07 20
(c) Maintainability. Improved maintainability (that Fig. 2 Overview of the LCC work from contract to finished
is good access to equipment, short times for verification
Q IMechE 1994 Proc Instn Mech Engrs Vol 208
56 H AKSELSSON AND B BURSTROM

(somewhat simplified) model of the train. As changes to not be verified at the end of these 6 months, the verifica-
the contract were agreed upon, that is changes affecting tion period was to be postponed for 2 months at a time
the LCC, the contractual model was also revised, until the guaranteed reliability was obtained.
issuing a new ‘contractual status’ for comparison. The In the worst case, if guaranteed reliability could not
contract demanded that the LCC value of the ‘final be achieved even after several modifications and dis-
status’, should not exceed the LCC value calculated placements of the verification period, a financial penalty
from the contractual status at the same moment. This in form of compensation would be imposed.
demand was met. Verification of repair times was carried out simulta-
neously with the reliability verification, enabling a cal-
5 EXPERIENCE FROM OPERATION AND culation of verified LCC at the end of that period.
MAINTENANCE
Commercial operation was started in September 1990 5.1.1 Reliability performance ver8cation
between Stockholm and Gothenburg with only one
trainset delivered, 5 months before delivery of trainset A special form was established for reporting all events
no. 2. In spite of the lack of spare trains, only one can- that occurred during the verification period. Both train
celled train was registered, and that was caused at the crew and workshop personnel were instructed to report
depot by an incorrect positioning of an emergency as soon as anything exceptional was observed, or any
brake handle. repair was carried w t .
In October 1993, 17 trainsets had been delivered (plus When the agreed mitiirnum verification period hid
two spare units of each power car, driving trailer, buffet come to an end. two points were clear: the veh1c:le.i h,i
and intermediate car), operating on six routes with a travelled enough kilometres to ell -Ire cvnfidxc- 11 the
weekly number of turn and return journeys as follows : statistics and a preliminary eva!untior; indicaied that
the outcome of the verification was likely to be suc-
(Uppsala-) Stockholm-Gothenburg 43 cessful. Thus the report;rrg could be stopped, and when
Stockholm-Skovde 34 all necessary informatLn had been collected rhe evalu-
Stockholm-Linhoping (-Nassjo) 22 ation was finalized. The results worc 9s follows:
Stockholm-Borlange-Falun 17
Stockholm-Jonkoping 6
(a) 1.7 stopping failures per million kilometres;
Stockholm-Karlstad 6 (b) 100 unplanned workshop visits per million kilo-
metres.
5.1 Contractual verification
The contractual verification includes verification of reli- 5.1.2 Maintainability performance veriJication
ability performance guarantees, as well as verification of Fifty randomly chosen failures were test repaired and
a guaranteed LCC value. Since failure rates and repair the repair times registered. Twenty-five failures were
times greatly influence the overall cost, both these chosen from the reports of real failures that had
parameters were to be verified, although they were not occurred, and the remaining 25 from the equipment
individually guaranteed, only their overall impact (see stated in the final status database. A mean time to
Fig. 3). repair (MTTR) was calculated from the predicted repair
The reliability performance verification was carried times for these test objects and compared with the
out at the start of operation of the system. It was to MTTR calculated from verified repair times. The quo-
start at delivery of trainset no. 3, and nominally con- tient between verified and predicted value should form a
tinue for 6 months. If the guaranteed reliability could correction factor for all repair times in the database,

Verification of reliability parameters

Stopping failures General relevant

Verification of maintainability

Correction factor Verified LCC

Fig. 3 Overview of the performance of the verificatioon. Bold ovals indicate


guaranteed values.
Par1 F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit @ IMechE 1994
LIFE CYCLE COST PROCUREMENT OF SWEDISH STATE RAILWAYS HIGH-SPEED TRAIN X2000 57

as experienced during the reliability performance verifi-


cation and the verified mean time to repair.
The total failure rate turned out to be about the same
as the predicted value, while MTTR was 55 per cent of
predicted value. With these verified figures replacing the
--+---t--.
..........
predicted ones in the LCC model, a verified LCC value
was calculated, and shown to be 94 per cent of con-
tracted level and 85 per cent of guaranteed level (Fig. 5).

5.2 Additional results from operation and verification


0 I
All event reports were continuously reviewed by both
0 10 20 30 40 50
Number of tests carried out
parties’ verification leaders, and classified as ‘relevant’
or ‘not relevant’. An event was regarded as irrelevant if
Fig. 4 Correction factor for MTTR as the number of tests the system was used beyond specification, incorrectly
carried out increased handled, or if the failure was a secondary failure or con-
cerned equipment not within delivery.
thus establishing a verified MTTR value. The routine regarding event reports was prepared in
plenty of time for being introduced on the very first
50
trainset taken into operation in September 1990. This
1 (Quant x failure rate x MTTR,,,) meant that development of the failure rate could uni-
E< = n5=t formly be studied from the beginning. The curve in Fig.
(Quant x failure rate x MTTR,,,) 6 shows what could be identified as the beginning of a
n= 1 bathtub curve, but the downward trend is not caused
merely by burning in. Instead it is the result of several
improvements that have successively been introduced.
Result A chart of failure rates (Fig. 7), predicted and verified,
The correction factor was calculated to be 0.55, that is of different subsystems shows that exterior equipment,
catering, water, bogies and brakes performed somewhat
the verified repair times were only 55 per cent of the
worse than expected, while interiors, doors, the tilting
predicted.
When the correction factor was calculated each day system, information system and air supply performed
better than expected.
as an accumulated value it could be seen that the value
The failure rate development was also followed up
stabilized when only half the tests had been carried out
(Fig. 4). This indicated a high level of confidence in the continuously for each subsystem so that any alarming
result. Any further test repairs would not have signifi- trend could immediately be identified.
cantly changed the correction factor.
5.3 Maintenance
5.1.3 Life cycle cost When commercial operation was started with only one
The requirement on the LCC value was that verified trainset it was obvious that traffic was very vulnerable
LCC should not exceed a limit defined as a 10 per cent to any disturbance. Moreover, it was realized that pre-
increase in contractual LCC. ventive maintenance had to be carried out at night. To
The verified parameters to be entered into the calcu- minimize this, the overhaul process was split up into
lation of a verified LCC value were the total failure rate small parts, each one short enough to be easily carried

0.25

Contractual LCC limit Predicted Verified


Fig. 5 Comparison between the contractual LCC value, the LCC limit, the
predicted value and the verified value
@ IMechE 1994 Proc Instn Mech Engrs Vol 208
58 H AKSELSSON AND B BURSTROM

Relevant events

Required level

_ _ _ _ _ - Predicted level

I Verification period

out within the normal service pauses of the vehicles. ability performance, maintenance and other critical
The system was called SPLIT. The prerequisites for properties. This proved to be an efficient method, since
such a system to work properly are a computer system all the agreed warranties concerning vehicle costs and
to keep a record of all different actions on a large availability performance were met.
number of vehicles and a well-defined responsibility for As to the verification, it is now proven that
the complete maintenance.
1. It is possible to achieve sufficient reporting.
2. Introducing improvements after delivery has in this
6 LESSONS LEARNED case proven to be time-consuming and expensive.
3. It is a lot of work, with more than 10000 event
Life cycle cost is a means of ensuring that the product reports to deal with.
delivered is custom designed, and not only with respect
to technical performance. Attention is drawn also to the Both SJ and the supplier ABB are convinced that every-
customer's requirements regarding total costs, avail- one has gained a lot from using the LCC method in the

Verified
0.8
O.:i
0 Predicted

r
O-*hIl
0.1
0

Fig. 7 Relative failure rates on system level, with the systems exceeding the
prediction furthest to the left
Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit 0 IMechE 1994
LIFE CYCLE COST PROCUREMENT OF SWEDISH STATE RAILWAYS' HIGH-SPEED TRAIN X2000 59

X2000 acquisition. By continuous and systematic ceedings of the annual symposium on Reiiabilit): and
maintainubility, Anaheim, 1994, pp. (66- 171 (Piscateway, New
analyses throughout the whole process, from contract to
Jersey, USA).
verification, the result is a very reliable train. There is Ericsson, G., Kjellsson, U. and Jonsson, M. Organizing for high avail-
no doubt that lower failure rates and shorter repair ability performance and low life cycle cost in the Swedish high
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Q IMechE 1994 Proc Instn Mech Engrs Vol208

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